Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"The high destiny of the individual is to serve rather than to rule."

– Albert Einstein

““That is a great mystery,” said Doctor Winter. “That is a mystery that has disturbed rulers all over the world—how the people know. It disturbs the invaders now, I am told, how news runs through censorships, how the truth of things fights free of control. It is a great mystery.””

– The Moon Is Down (Twentieth-century Classics) by John Steinbeck

“If you were to look up the word rhetoric in the dictionary, it would tell you more or less the following: Rhetoric is the art of using language to persuade or influence others. It would tell you, too, that the etymology of the word started in Greek and traveled through Latin to get to us. If you were to look up the word polemic, you would find, perhaps to your surprise, that its root is from the Greek word for war. A polemic, originally a theological term, is defined as language used to create controversy in contesting a thesis or point of view. Polemics is making war, or rather pursuing conflict, with words instead of literal, physical weapons. So rhetoric and polemic are closely related concepts, but they are not exactly the same.”

– Political Writing: A Guide to the Essentials by Adam Garfinkle

1. Talking Points: North Korea Part 3: Talking Points on Military Spending, Objectives of Nuclear Armament, Nuclear Negotiations, “Hostile Policy,” a Peace Treaty, and an End-of-War Declaration

2. N. Korea fires several cruise missiles from its east coast: JCS

3. Sullivan voices concerns over N. Korea's weapons tests, ties with Russia in talks with Wang: official

4. Kim Jong Un’s sister ‘not to be underestimated,’ author says

5. On the brink: Why inter-Korean relations have reached a new low

6. The end of North Korea

7. North Korea poised to take 'lethal military action' against Seoul within months

8. Escaping North Korea - An interview with the Director and Producer of a new Bafta-nominated film

9. Kim Jong-Un rips up plan to reunify Korea, raising fears of all-out war

10. Korea's status as China's import partner drops to 30-year low

11. Kim Jong Un’s rejection of Korean reunification opens perilous new era

12. China unlikely to play constructive role in resolving N. Korea's threats

13. There Is A Way Out Of The North Korean Nuclear Crisis – OpEd

1. Talking Points: North Korea Part 3: Talking Points on Military Spending, Objectives of Nuclear Armament, Nuclear Negotiations, “Hostile Policy,” a Peace Treaty, and an End-of-War Declaration

Note especially the discussion on the purpose o nuclear weapons.

Practitioner to Practitioner Series

https://apstrategy.org/2024/01/27/talking-points-north-korea-part-3/

Talking Points: North Korea

Part 3 Talking Points on Military Spending, Objectives of Nuclear Armament, Nuclear Negotiations, “Hostile Policy,” a Peace Treaty, and an End-of-War Declaration

January 28, 2024

Ambassador Thomas Schäfer

CAPS Advisory Board

DOWNLOAD THE ARTICLE

Editor’s Note:

The three-part “Talking Points: North Korea” series is the inaugural publication in the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy’s “Practitioner to Practitioner” series, which seeks to provide practical and actionable policy recommendations for practitioners from practitioners.

Talking Points: North Korea Series

by Ambassador Thomas Schäfer

Part 1:

Encouraging A Different Mindset In North Korea: Introduction And Recommended Talking Points On Agriculture, Food Security, Private Economic Activities, And The Enterprise Reform

Part 2:

Talking Points On Private Foreign Investment And Special Economic Zones

Part 3:

Talking Points On Military Spending, Objectives Of Nuclear Armament, Nuclear Negotiations, “Hostile Policy,” A Peace Treaty, And An End-Of-War Declaration

Talking Points on Military Spending

Military spending was extraordinarily high under Kim Jong Il, but has further increased since Kim Jong Un took office. In the (non-public) discussions before the Policy of Parallel Development was announced in 2013, it was argued that while substantial additional resources for the development of missiles would be needed in the short and medium term, the new policy would allow for long-term savings in conventional forces, since deterrence would then be guaranteed by nuclear weapons. Has this expectation materialized? Has the military’s share of the national product been cut back in recent years?

The People’s Army has been vaunted for its role in some traditionally civilian sectors like fishing or construction. Are there plans to reinforce again the civilian part in the North Korean economy to the detriment of the military’s role in “socialist construction”?Background:

In his first public speech in April 2012, Kim Jong Un promised that the population would never have to tighten its belt again. Only one year later, in March 2013, he reneged on that promise. The “Policy of Parallel Development,” also known in Korean as Byungjin, that is, the simultaneous development of nuclear weapons and the economy, was announced. The term “parallel development” seemed to imply a departure from Kim Jong Il’s Military-First Politics, although it indeed reinforced it. The new policy accelerated the build-up of a nuclear force and granted additional budget and income opportunities for the military, which had already been given preferential treatment under Kim Jong Il. In private conversations, this was occasionally admitted by North Korean officials. A senior official said that the Parallel Development Policy “puts nuclear armament at the center” and that “in second place,” it was “about economic development.” Another senior official said that the population “tightened its belt” because the Policy of Parallel Development meant “spending the bigger part of the gross domestic product on the military for many years.”

As even during Kim Jong Il’s time, there had been discussions about whether military spending did not impose excessive burdens on the national budget, the plan to adopt the Policy of Parallel Development became the subject of controversial debate in the leadership. Proponents justified it with long-term savings. The increasing role of the armed forces in economic sectors like construction or fishing was reinforced by the adoption of the new policy. The official news agency KCNA described the result in April 2016: “The Korean People’s Army has played a big role in creating people’s wealth, holding aloft the slogan ‘Let the People’s Army take charge of both national defense and socialist construction!’ … They are now playing a key role in all fields of building a thriving and highly civilized socialist nation.”

Talking Points on the Objectives of Nuclear Armament

Why does DPRK want nuclear weapons? It seems to be more than deterrence. Sometimes DPRK links nuclear weapons to the creation of “international justice.” And sometimes they are compared to a sword to liberate the Korean peninsula from the US. What is meant by this?

Background:

Nuclear weapons: Not just for deterrence

When asked by foreigners why North Korea needs nuclear weapons, North Korean officials usually mention only one point: deterrence. They say that the US would not have overthrown Saddam Hussein and Gaddafi if Iraq and Libya had possessed nuclear weapons, and want to make sure that something like that does not happen to North Korea. The argument seems plausible, but is only part of the truth.

Since the start of Kim Jong Un’s reign, the DPRK has placed nuclear weapons development in a new context. In 2014 e.g., the weapons were described not only as a “self-defensive deterrent” but also as a “precious sword of justice that should break the United States’ cursed nuclear stick and should establish a fair global order.” The US was warned that “the plan to eternally sit astride on the Korean Peninsula is an anachronistic daydream that hastens the United States’ disgrace and ruin. … The United States’ aggressive attempt to permanently occupy South Korea is a delusion that can never be realized forever and ever.” There were similar statements in the years that followed. The Foreign Ministry, for example, said in 2017 that the nuclear weapons would “contribute to regional peace and security and genuine international justice.” In his 2018 New Year’s speech, Kim Jong Un declared that the country would only use nuclear weapons if its “sovereignty or interests were violated.” However, it would “resolutely respond to acts of wrecking peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.”

Threats to use nuclear weapons for undefined “protection of interests” or to achieve an equally undefined “international justice” go beyond deterrence. What exactly Pyongyang has in mind, however, is not clear. It might mean arms proliferation or cyber attacks. Even more worrying is the link between nuclear weapons and the prospect of terminating the “American occupation of South Korea”: Pyongyang apparently believes that possessing nuclear weapons will help it in its endeavor to stop the deployment of US troops and to free South Korea from US influence. It has not been explicit, however, on how this should be done, that is, whether by force or through political pressure.

Political and military provocations have long been part of North Korea’s toolbox. Provocations are used to test the opponent’s reaction; they are meant to show fearlessness and convince North Korea’s enemies that it would strike back immediately in the event of an attack. For decades, Pyongyang has repeatedly staged incidents on the inter-Korean border while declaring that it would shoot back if the opposing side responded militarily. It is possible that some North Korean generals believe that Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons expand the scope for such provocations because they trust that their nuclear weapons will deter South Korea from responding vigorously.

Talking Points on the Nuclear Negotiations, “Hostile Policy,” a Peace Treaty, and an End-of-War Declaration

DPRK has repeatedly asked for a peace treaty or at least an end-of-war declaration. What would be the content of such documents?

Background:

Since Kim Jong Il`s death at the end of 2011, Pyongyang had been saying more often than before that progress on the question of denuclearization could only be made if the US abandoned its ”hostile policy” -without clearly explaining what was meant. When, in private talks, North Korean officials were repeatedly asked for a definition of the “end of hostile policy” slogan, they emphasized the end of maneuvers and the withdrawal of US troops from the Korean peninsula, whereas the lifting of sanctions was subordinate. When North Korea intensified calls for a peace treaty in 2014 and 2015 (without explaining in public what the peace treaty should include), the answers of representatives of various institutions were similar: the end of maneuvers and the withdrawal of U.S. troops and, sometimes, the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella were called indispensable elements of any peace treaty whereas sanctions relief was only mentioned incidentally. Inquiries about the content of an end-of-war declaration would probably result in similar answers.

The insistence on an end of the maneuvers and troop withdrawal has to do with the division of the country. Fearing the influx of destabilizing ideas and a German-style reunification “by absorption” (as Pyongyang calls it), South Korea is considered by the North Korean regime as an existential threat which it can only hope to somehow neutralize once the alliance between South Korea and the US has been weakened. Moreover, large parts of the current North Korean leadership view any cooperation with any foreign country (as all of them permit more personal freedom and are economically better off) as a latent threat to the stability of the regime. The overriding intention to push the US off the Korean peninsula, the scope of Pyongyang’s nuclear objectives, and the fear of “spiritual pollution” does not bode well for efforts to convince North Korea to change course. Past nuclear negotiations, e.g. the Six-Party-Talks, were essentially based on the international community’s hope that confidence-building measures, security guarantees, and the prospect of economic development, including the lifting of sanctions, would suffice for North Korea to renounce nuclear weapons. However, arms control agreements can at best contain, but not satisfy, Pyongyang’s offensive ambitions. The intention to oust US troops and destabilize South Korea, and the fear of foreign ideas, cannot be negotiated away. This requires a shift in opinion in Pyongyang.

H.E. Thomas Schäfer hails from Oldenburg, Germany and he is a member of the Board of Advisors to the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy. During his career in the German Foreign Office, he was posted several times to East Asia and is the former German Ambassador to North Korea (2007-2010 and 2013-2018), and Guatemala (2010-2013). He has PhD in German history from the University of Kiel in 1985. He is the author of the book, From Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un: How the Hardliners Prevailed: On the Political History of North Korea (2007-2020).

2. N. Korea fires several cruise missiles from its east coast: JCS

(2nd LD) N. Korea fires several cruise missiles from its east coast: JCS | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · January 28, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with ruling party condemnation in last 5 paras)

SEOUL, Jan. 28 (Yonhap) -- North Korea fired several cruise missiles from its east coast on Sunday, the South Korean military said, days after Pyongyang test-fired new strategic cruise missiles from the west coast.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said the North's launch took place around 8 a.m. in waters off Shinpo Port, but did not elaborate, citing an ongoing analysis.

"While strengthening our monitoring and vigilance, our military has been closely coordinating with the United States to monitor additional signs of North Korea's provocations," the JCS said in a text message sent to reporters.

It marks the North's second cruise missile launch this year after it test-fired strategic cruise missiles, named Pulhwasal-3-31, toward the Yellow Sea on Wednesday.

This photo, released by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on Jan. 25, 2024, shows the North's launch of a Pulhwasal-3-31, a new type of strategic cruise missile under development, the previous day. The North's Missile Administration conducted the first test-fire of the missile as part of "regular and obligatory" activities to develop powerful weapons systems, the KCNA said. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Experts said the Pulhwasal-3-31 appears to be a nuclear-capable cruise missile, considering that the number in its name is identical to that of the Hwasan-31, a tactical nuclear warhead that North Korea first unveiled in March 2023.

The North first test-fired the Hawsal-1 cruise missile in September 2021 and launched several Hwasal-1 and -2 cruise missiles presumed to be capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons last year.

Hwasal means an arrow in Korean, and Pulhwasal means a fire arrow. Cruise missiles fly low and maneuver, making them better at evading missile defenses.

The launch of a cruise missile is not a direct violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions banning the North's use of ballistic missile technology. But it could pose a serious threat to South Korea's security as nuclear warheads can be mounted on such missiles.

North Korea has dialed up tensions on the Korean Peninsula with weapons tests and harsh rhetoric in an election year for South Korea and the United States.

North launched a solid-fuel hypersonic missile into the East Sea on Jan. 14 in its first missile firing this year.

Pyongyang also claimed it had tested an underwater nuclear attack drone in protest of the latest joint military drills among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan earlier this month.

The ruling People Power Party (PPP) "strongly" condemned Sunday's missile launches as aimed at escalating tensions in the run-up to the upcoming parliamentary elections in April.

"As the April general elections approach, the frequency and type of North Korea's provocations are getting shorter and more varied," Jung Kwang-jae, a PPP spokesman, said in a release.

North Korea has a track record of staging provocations ahead of South Korean elections.

In the months before South Korea's parliamentary elections in April 2016, North Korea carried out a series of provocations, including its fourth nuclear test in January and the launch of a long-range missile in February.

In 2020, North Korea fired short-range ballistic missiles on four occasions in March alone, just weeks before South Koreans went to the polls to elect lawmakers in April.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · January 28, 2024

3. Sullivan voices concerns over N. Korea's weapons tests, ties with Russia in talks with Wang: official

I wonder what was said behind closed that is not reported. I bet to China our "concerns" are interpreted as our weakness. We should remember that our public comments are speaking to the Chinese leadership as well as the American people. Chinese comments are speaking to the US leadership as well as the American people. No one is really speaking to the Chinese people.

Sullivan voices concerns over N. Korea's weapons tests, ties with Russia in talks with Wang: official | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 28, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Jan. 27 (Yonhap) -- U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan raised concerns with China over North Korea's recent weapons tests and growing ties with Russia during his talks with China's top diplomat, Wang Yi, in Bangkok this week, a senior U.S. official said Saturday.

During their talks on Friday and Saturday (local time), Sullivan and Wang discussed a wide range of bilateral, regional and global issues, including those concerning North Korea, Russia's war in Ukraine, the Middle East, the South China Sea and Myanmar, the official said in a telephonic briefing.

"I know we are deeply concerned about the recent testing of weapons. We are deeply concerned about the growing relationship between Russia and the DPRK and what that might mean for (North Korean leader) Mr. Kim's intentions," the official said, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"We raised those concerns directly with Chinese given their influence on Pyongyang and we hope these discussions will continue further between our two envoys," the official added.

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula have risen due to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's pugnacious rhetoric against South Korea and his regime's weapons performance tests this month, including that of a solid-fuel intermediate-range ballistic missile tipped with a hypersonic warhead and of an underwater nuclear weapons system.

This photo, released by AFP, shows U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan (L) and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. (Yonhap)

The official took note of Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong's visit to Pyongyang this week. The North's state media reported that Sun met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui in a sign of the North's efforts to maintain close ties with Beijing amid its deepening cooperation with Moscow.

"I think the Chinese just sent their vice foreign minister to Pyongyang," the official said. "So our next step would be a call between our envoy and the vice foreign minister upon his return."

The official also expressed hope that China would utilize its influence over the North to help address the North Korean nuclear quandary.

"Certainly, Beijing certainly maintains influence as well. And I think our expectation would be that they use that to bring us back to the path of denuclearization," the official said.

In a readout, the White House said that Sullivan and Wang held "candid, substantive and constructive" discussions on North Korea and other regional and global issues, which included the Taiwan issue.

"They discussed cross-Strait issues, and Mr. Sullivan underscored the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait," it read.

"The two sides committed to maintain this strategic channel of communication and to pursue additional high-level diplomacy and consultations in key areas between the United States and the People's Republic of China, including through a call between President Biden and President Xi," it added.

The bilateral talks came as Washington has been striving to maintain its strategic competition with Beijing "responsibly" to "de-risk" the bilateral relationship rather than decoupling it.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 28, 2024

4. Kim Jong Un’s sister ‘not to be underestimated,’ author says

When Professor Lee talks, I listen. Again, I cannot recommend his book strongly enough.

Kim Jong Un’s sister ‘not to be underestimated,’ author says

The world will soon be seeing a lot more of Kim Yo Jong, according to a new book about her.

By Alex Willemyns for RFA

2024.01.28

Washington

rfa.org

North Korea’s next global “charm offensive” will be led by leader Kim Jong Un’s younger sister, Kim Yo Jong, who is the strategic mastermind in Pyongyang and could eventually succeed her brother in power.

At least that’s according to Sung-Yoon Lee, a North Korea expert and fellow at the Wilson Center who late last year released a 304-page biography about the woman he calls “the brains” behind the despotic rule of her brother, a man he says is more interested in basketball.

“She is really the mastermind of this family campaign to expand their influence over South Korea and beyond,” Lee said at a book-signing event hosted by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea at DACOR Bacon House in Washington, D.C., on Thursday morning.

Lee told the gathering that his book, titled “The Sister: North Korea's Kim Yo Jong, the Most Dangerous Woman in the World,” was years in the making, with his interest piqued by her attendance at her father’s funeral in 2011, when the world knew little about her or her brother.

Even though in Korea, the “proper way to express your sorrow is to really overdo it, to exaggerate and wail away almost deliriously,” Lee said, noting there was an added incentive to do so in the North, Kim Yo Jong “showed genuine, profound sadness” but otherwise felt no need to go further, even when the cameras were trained on her face.

Sung-Yoon Lee, left, speaks alongside Committee for Human Rights in North Korea Executive Director Greg Scarlatoiu at an event at DACOR Bacon House in Washington, D.C., on Jan. 25, 2024. (Alex Willemyns/RFA)

In the years that followed, he said, her always perfectly upright posture, “Mona Lisa smile” and “imperious” demeanor when appearing in public made him more curious about her role leading the hermit kingdom.

“Unfortunately, I see in her eyes a sparkle – intelligence,” he said. “I saw that in Kim Jong Il, too, and in Kim Il Sung, the state founder. They were intelligent; they were not crazy, in the conventional sense.”

“I don't see that sparkle in Kim Jong Un,” he added.

Winter Olympics

The wider world first got to know Kim Yo Jong, believed to be 37 years old, at the February 2018 Winter Olympics in the South Korean city of PyeongChang, which took place in the lead-up to then-U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un’s first meeting in June 2018.

With South and North Korea fielding a united team, Kim Yo Jong was invited to the south to represent Pyongyang in meetings with then-South Korean President Moon Jae-In and to attend the games.

After arriving at Incheon airport “not showing any bit of excitement or happiness that she was there … [almost] as if she had walked into her own living room,” she later attended the games’ opening ceremony, where she was seated directly behind Moon and U.S. Vice President Mike Pence, who famously chose to “ignore” her presence behind him.

“Throughout the evening, from certain camera angles, it seemed she was lording it over Mike Pence, seated right behind,” Lee said, adding that the visual was sought by North Korea for propaganda reasons.

“Later, I learned that this was not an accident,” he said. “Kim Yo Jong had insisted that she be seated behind them – above President Moon and Vice President Pence – or else ‘We go back home.’”

“So accommodations were made,” he explained.

The Sister: North Korea's Kim Yo Jong, the Most Dangerous Woman in the World by Sung-Yoon Lee is about Kim Jong Un’s increasingly powerful sister, tapped to be his successor to lead North Korea. (Courtesy of PublicAffairs)

The next day, Kim Yo Jong visited Moon at his offices in Seoul and for a short while became “a star” on the world stage, with many seemingly enchanted by the sudden emergence of a female North Korean leader.

More importantly, after months of escalating provocations between her brother and Trump, her message of peace and reconciliation seemed to resonate as more sincere than if it had come from Kim Jong Un.

‘Don’t trust her’

Lee says that is a mistake he hopes to shatter with his biography, arguing Kim Yo Jong will be wheeled out as the friendly face of the North’s global outreach when it once again tries to appear open to compromise. He called for the world not to be fooled.

“She is the No. 2 official in arguably the world's most tyrannical regime,” he added. “What she says, no matter how sweet it may sound, must be questioned and cannot be accepted at face value.”

A switch back to diplomatic niceties after the ongoing round of provocations is as predictable as the plot to Rambo 4, Lee said, noting that “[Rambo] First Blood was a good movie, but by the time you’ve seen Rambo 4, you have a pretty good idea how the movie ends.”

As the true director of North Korea’s propaganda department since 2012, he said, Kim Yo Jong was a skilled political operator, and would be even more at ease on the world stage her second time around.

Kim Yo Jong, right, shakes hands with South Korea's director of the National Security Office, Chung Eui-yong, June 12, 2019 as she delivers a condolence message in Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) from her brother to the family of former South Korean first lady Lee He-ho, who passed away. (Korean Central News Agency/AFP)

“People will want to believe in her message, and perhaps even share in the credit that she seeks peace and denuclearization,” Lee said. “Don't trust her. Don't believe everything she says. Don't patronize her.”

“She's not to be underestimated,” he said.

Eventually, Kim Yo Jong may position herself to take over the reins from her brother, even if the current leader’s daughter, Kim Ju Ae, born in 2013, has been slated as the heir apparent in Pyongyang.

“When [Ju Ae] is in her mid-20s, and comes to view her auntie as expendable, cumbersome or even expendable, who knows what will happen?” Lee said. “Who knows who will strike first?”

He cast his mind back to the 2013 state execution of Jang Song Thaek, Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong’s uncle, who was accused of trying to seize power following the 2011 death of his brother, Kim Il Jong.

“She will remember that,” he said.

Edited by Malcolm Foster.

rfa.org

5. On the brink: Why inter-Korean relations have reached a new low

Again, I do not think the Kim family redeem ever had a goal of peaceful unification. Nor do I think it has given up its major strategic aim of unification of the Korean peninsula under the domination of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. That said because of the regime's political warfare strategy we are likely to see it someday again talk about peaceful unification but that will only be to undermine the ROK as part of its subversion line of effort. Ironically returning to a public policy of peaceful unification will somehow be viewed as a step toward reconciliation and even a "concessions" from the north as it will appear to be reducing tensions by doing so. We must never be duped by the regime's political warfare strategy. All strategy is based on deception (or so Sun Tzu told us).

On the brink: Why inter-Korean relations have reached a new low | Brookings

The Brookings Institution · by Andrew Yeo

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Several troubling events have transpired on the Korean Peninsula in recent weeks, reflecting a breakdown in inter-Korean relations and raising the specter of conflict.

Inter-Korean relations had already been spiraling downward since 2020 when North Korea blew up a joint liaison office with South Korea at the Kaesong Industrial Complex. However, actions taken by North Korea over the past few months, including a military satellite launch, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test, artillery fire along the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the testing of another underwater nuclear drone, and the disavowal of reunification with South Korea, point to more provocations in 2024, especially as South Korea and the United States prepare for elections. Seoul and Washington must respond to escalated threats but do so without triggering yet another crisis on the heels of the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and in Gaza-Israel.

Ending reunification as a stated goal

Perhaps the most significant but least understood action in recent weeks is North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s decision to end his country’s long-stated goal of reunification with South Korea. In a speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly on January 15, Kim called for constitutional revisions to refer to South Korea as the “principal enemy.” North Korea would no longer treat the South as a “partner of reconciliation and reunification.” The comments echoed remarks Kim made at an end-of-year speech to party officials in which he blamed South Korea’s collusion with foreign forces and its hostile position toward Pyongyang as reasons for giving up on reunification.

Since the division of the Korean Peninsula, inter-Korean relations have been mostly hostile. The two Koreas periodically pursued cooperation to promote reconciliation and reunification (albeit on each Korea’s own terms), and did so as recently as 2018-19. However, Kim’s reversal means that the regime will treat South Korea as its “number one hostile country.”

The regime has already begun scrubbing all references to “peaceful reunification” and “great national unity” from North Korean media, monuments, and other public outlets. Beyond the symbolism, Kim’s attempt to dismantle the unification narrative promulgated by his father and grandfather allows him to redefine South Korea as a “foreign” state. Such steps help further legitimize a future attack against South Korea.

Increased military tension

Although the number of North Korean ballistic missile tests in 2023 did not exceed the record-breaking number the country conducted in 2022, Pyongyang still tested five ICBMs along with dozens of other short- and intermediate-range missiles. The regime’s advances in space and cyber capabilities and deepening ties with Moscow have also worried South Korean leaders. After two earlier failed attempts in 2023, North Korea successfully launched a military reconnaissance satellite into orbit on November 21, with likely assistance from Russia, according to South Korean intelligence.

North Korea’s actions led Seoul to partially suspend the 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) with Pyongyang. The CMA emerged during an era of high-level inter-Korean engagement to reduce military tensions near the border by restricting surveillance, military movement, and live-fire exercises along the North-South border. Although North Korea allegedly breached the CMA in over 3,000 incidents in five years, Pyongyang also declared its abandonment of the CMA and threatened to “deploy more powerful armed forces and new-type military hardware.”

Then on January 5, North Korea fired hundreds of artillery shells from its western coast toward the Northern Limit Line (NLL) — the de facto maritime boundary between the two Koreas. South Korean civilians on nearby islands sought shelter, evoking memories of North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 which killed two South Korean soldiers. The South Korean military responded by firing over 400 rounds of artillery just south of the NLL.

The leaders of the two Koreas have since been engaged in a war of words and tit-for-tat actions. Touring a munitions factory on January 10, Kim stated that North Korea would not hesitate to “thoroughly annihilate” the South if provoked. Meanwhile, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol vowed to punish North Korea “multiple times over” should it attack South Korea.

Spillover effects

Escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula are not isolated to inter-Korean relations. Over the past year, the United States, South Korea, and Japan have boosted trilateral cooperation in response to North Korean missile, nuclear, and cyber threats. Meanwhile, North Korea has supplied Russia with short-range ballistic missiles in return for economic, scientific, humanitarian, and military assistance from Russia. Increased rail and ship movements across the Russia-North Korea border have raised suspicion of an uptick in arms transfers from Pyongyang to Moscow.

White House officials have described the level of Russia-North Korea military cooperation as “unprecedented” and warned it could “drastically” change the nature of the threat in the region. Underscoring these relations, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui visited Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin in Moscow last week, setting up Putin’s likely visit to North Korea in the near future.

The possibility of a growing North Korea-Russia-China axis only emboldens Kim and bolsters North Korea’s geostrategic position. Meanwhile, some South Koreans worry that strengthened U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation may result in a spiraling arms race in Northeast Asia. Last week, the United States, Japan, and South Korea conducted their largest trilateral naval drill to date in the Yellow Sea, but it did little to prevent North Korea from making further provocations. Responding to what the regime called “hostile military maneuvers of the navies of the U.S. and its allies,” North Korea asserted that it had tested an underwater nuclear-capable drone.

Implications for 2024

Three factors may explain North Korea’s shift on inter-Korean relations and increased aggression in the first weeks of 2024:

Kim believes reunification is now futile with the Yoon government moving in lockstep with the United States and adopting a harder line towards North Korea. Whereas Kim was able to use inter-Korean engagement with the previous Moon Jae-in government to reach out to Washington, the North Korean leader now seeks to marginalize Seoul. Yoon’s appointment of more hawkish leaders at the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Unification in the second half of 2023 may also have been interpreted by Kim as a threat to the regime. For instance, Minister of Unification Kim Yung Ho’s staunch support for North Korean human rights and statements about regime change prior to his appointment may have angered Kim Jong Un, further prompting the North Korean leader to see the two Koreas as incompatible.
Strengthened U.S.-South Korea relations and the direction of U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation have pushed North Korea to increase its own capabilities and reorient its diplomacy to prioritize relations with Russia and China. North Korea appears more, not less, confident than a year ago, despite serious economic problems.
Kim may be seeking to influence election outcomes in South Korea and the United States in April and November, respectively. By spotlighting the Yoon and Biden governments’ inability to rein in North Korea’s nuclear threat, Kim may be hoping to boost support for parties and candidates seen as more favorable to the regime’s long-term goals. South Korean progressives generally seek reconciliation and engagement with North Korea in contrast to the conservative parties’ more hardline positions. Regarding U.S. elections, Kim would prefer a candidate more willing to accept North Korean nuclear weapons. Based on sources from a recent Politico report, former President Donald Trump could fit this bill. Kim would also welcome the potential disruption of U.S. alliances under a Trump presidency, including a weakened U.S.-South Korea alliance.

A more belligerent North Korea will take up additional bandwidth in Washington and Seoul in an important election year for both countries. Both sides will need to continue coordinating their policies to reduce misperceptions and avoid misjudging North Korean intentions. Although the United States remains preoccupied with conflict in the Middle East and Ukraine, it will need to continue strengthening defense and deterrence measures with South Korea and Japan and possibly lean on China to prevent North Korea from upsetting a fragile peace in Northeast Asia.

Authors

Andrew Yeo Senior Fellow SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies @AndrewIYeo

The end of North Korea

Newsweek · by Ellie Cook · January 27, 2024

"It is a fait accompli that a war can break out at any time on the Korean peninsula," was the message from North Korea's supreme leader, Kim Jong Un, as the world rang in the new year.

The comments set the tone for the North Korea of 2024. The secretive nation is more belligerent, provocative and focused on its military than ever before. It has stepped closer to Russia, with a post-Covid clampdown reining in any half measures of change that were floated in the early years of Kim's rule.

But as the global order reshuffles, and power tips in new ways, attention is once again turning to the "Hermit Kingdom" and whether it can survive the decades to come.

It is not clear what a collapse of North Korea would look like. It could be reunification with its southern neighbor, which it has now declared its "principal enemy," or it could be the tearing down of the Kim family regime and the grip it has maintained on 26 million people.

Experts broadly agree there are a handful of events that could trigger the collapse of the pariah state. The unexpected or untimely death of Kim Jong Un could spiral, or a popular uprising may gain momentum if backed by the country's security institutions. There may be a coup in the upper echelons of power, or North Korea could find itself at war.

All scenarios are possible, and Kim is aware of it, said Scott Snyder, senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Yet a deep scepticism accompanies these analyses. There is no real confidence in the impending end of the closed-off regime, headed by three generations of the Kim family and sustained by Beijing and Moscow, in the near future.

"North Korea has tended to be a lot more durable than it looks from the outside," Snyder told Newsweek.

A graphic of North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un. "It is a fait accompli that a war can break out at any time on the Korean peninsula," was the message from North Korea's supreme leader... A graphic of North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un. "It is a fait accompli that a war can break out at any time on the Korean peninsula," was the message from North Korea's supreme leader in the new year. Getty Images

It is perhaps "more likely than other governments, but still very unlikely given its total control over the state, its isolated nature, its support from China and Russia, and its nuclear weapons," added Frank Aum, senior expert on Northeast Asia at the U.S. Institute of Peace and a former Defense Department adviser on North and South Korea.

So what could spell the end for North Korea?

Scenario 1: Death of Kim Jong Un

The demise of Kim, currently believed to be 40, would be a point of vulnerability for North Korea. He is thought to have been plagued by health problems, although this is all speculation—anything from gout, diabetes and Covid bouts have been floated, fuelled by periods of absence from state media and dramatic weight fluctuations.

Decades younger than world leaders like Russian President Vladimir Putin or U.S. President Joe Biden, the impact of Kim's future death is all about timing. And at this time, there is no fixed successor in place to stave off the uncertainty the sudden, unforeseen demise of the current leader would bring.

"Certainly, it would be a new, critical juncture for the country," said Andrew Yeo, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution's Center for East Asia Policy Studies and a professor at the Washington, D.C.-based Catholic University of America. At this point, "maybe North Korea can follow a different trajectory," he told Newsweek.

North Korea has an established family dynasty, showing it can hand off power to the next generation with few hitches. "The hereditary system is strong in North Korea," Michael Lee, a director at South Korean satellite analysis firm SI Analytics, told Newsweek.

But Pyongyang "operates as a patrilineal family dynasty and there is no ready male heir apparent," Aum said.

Some have tipped the supreme leader's younger sister, the U.S.-condemning Kim Yo Jong, for the role. Often dubbed the de-facto second in command, she has assumed a more visible position in the public spotlight in recent years.

She "is a part of the Kim family line and experienced in governmental and foreign affairs, but it's unclear whether she could overcome the strong male dominance in the North Korean system," argued Aum.

South Korea's spy agency has also suggested Kim Jong Un's young daughter, Kim Ju-ae, is being prepared for the position. "At present, she appears to be the most likely successor," Seoul's National Intelligence Service said earlier this year. "But we are keeping our eyes open for all possibilities because Kim Jong Un is still young, has no major health problems, and there are many variables."

Kim is believed to have three children, yet only Kim Ju-ae—aged somewhere between 10 and 12—is the only child in the public eye. Experts suggest that both Kim Ju-ae and Kim Yo Jong would both carry on the regime with little deviation, but the timing of a new leader remains a big unknown.

Kim Yo Jong, sister of North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un, at Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum in Hanoi, March 2, 2019. Some have tipped the supreme leader's younger sister as the next leader of the... Kim Yo Jong, sister of North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un, at Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum in Hanoi, March 2, 2019. Some have tipped the supreme leader's younger sister as the next leader of the secretive country. JORGE SILVA/AFP via Getty Images

"The bottom line is that the timing of his death may not be as important since Kim Yo Jong is ready to lead today, but rather whether a woman could ever lead the heavily male-dominated government," Aum suggested.

Scenario 2: Interior threats

Any hopes of North Korea being brought down by internal, public dissent are remote. Yeo is the most optimistic; South Korean efforts to prop up human rights, support defectors and spread information among its northern neighbor's citizens could go some way to turn North Koreans' minds away from the propaganda of the regime.

But with the state apparatus, "even if there is discontent among the North Korean population, they're not going to be able to resist," Yeo said. It is "highly unlikely" North Korean citizens could organize in this way, added Aum.

The totalitarian system drowns the possibility of any significant rebellion, and experts say North Korea has been remarkably effective in fighting technological developments with the potential to threaten the Kim regime. It has battled back against the rise of the internet and information leaking through its borders, combating the threat in a "cat and mouse fashion," Snyder said.

"The only form of internal threat that poses a direct concern for the North Korean elite is a palace coup scenario," Snyder added. "It's going to be a threat that's a lot closer to Kim himself than anything that goes on in the streets."

Some form military coup "is possible, but would require an anomalous situation," said Aum.

Kim has shown himself to be aware of, and prepared to act against, any hint of movement against him. More than a decade ago, he executed his uncle—former senior official Jang Song-thaek—who was the "closest we've seen to a direct threat" to the regime's stability, Snyder said.

Kim's uncle was denigrated in state media as "worse than a dog," and a "traitor for all ages." Jang's death "does give a picture of the resilience and the extraordinary control that the central leadership is able to assert even at the elite level," Snyder argued.

This is, arguably, Kim's biggest menace. "At the end of the day, I still think it's fundamentally just the internal dynamics that make or break North Korea," Yeo said.

Scenario 3: The Free Markets

Threats from within the country's borders could become all the more real if Kim opted to attempt a China-style approach to the North Korean economy, embracing the markets and relinquishing the iron grip on the centralized economy.

There are serious risks of "pursuing Chinese-style reform for stability and perpetuation of the Kim family regime," Snyder said, even though North Korea has been haunted by a moribund economy and famine with its own power to sow dissent. China's economic path, forged by Deng Xiaoping after the death of Chairman Mao, opened China up to investment and laid the foundations for Beijing's current status as the world's second-largest economy.

But should Pyongyang attempt to emulate this, there are big risks for the Kim regime. North Korea would likely have to court foreign investment, which would entail "some sort of reforms to guarantee that the foreign investors would make a return," rather than the state pocketing the profits, Yeo said. There would be more exchanges with the outside world, and exposure to non-state-controlled information. It could also undermine one of Pyongyang's ideological bedrocks of self-sufficiency.

There are scant indicators the supreme leader is willing to try this risky approach. Much like his father, Kim Jong Un has showed indications of tiptoeing towards limited reforms, before yanking back.

Executed uncle Jang had a wealth of business connections in China, which sat uncomfortably with Kim, Yeo argued. These connections, and the money that came with them, "could begin challenging the regime because they could provide things for the people that the state clearly cannot," Yeo said.

In the years since the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, Kim has doubled down on recentralizing the economy and reconsolidating his power, rather than flirt with a new economic model, analysts say.

"I was much more optimistic maybe seven or eight years ago about the economic reforms and change through the markets," Yeo said. "But just seeing the way Kim Jong Un has been heightening laws about outside information about South Korean cultural content and then reasserting control authority over the economy, I've become more sceptical about that path, at least for the time being."

Scenario 4: War

"Kim Jong Un has made a strategic decision to go to war," researchers writing for U.S. website 38 North, dedicated to analysing the Korean peninsula, wrote earlier this month. A bold statement from well-established voices—and one that not all experts agree with.

It's not hard to see the argument. North Korea is one of the world's most militarized nations, and its military numerically dwarfs its southern neighbor. Pyongyang has said it is now on a war footing, upping its defense production and forging ahead with ballistic missile tests that are deeply alarming to South Korea, Japan and the U.S. On Thursday, it said it had test-fired a new type of strategic cruise missile, although state media insisted it had "nothing to do with the regional situation."

How North and South Korean militaries compare

Figures released by data gathering and visualization company Statista show that North Korean military spending may have reached one-third of the country's GDP in 2022, a marked increase from previous years, when North Korea dedicated just under one-quarter of its GDP to the military.

Pyongyang also tore up an agreement with Seoul that tried to hamper rising border tensions after North Korea launched what is believed to be its first successful satellite. It fired artillery shells close to South Korean islands at the start of the year, and invested in delivery systems for its cache of weapons. This all came in the context of Pyongyang declaring it had abandoned unification goals, and ripped down a monument to that verify objective.

Analysts say North Korea has also tipped resources into cultivating its cyber capabilities alongside its conventional military power, making Pyongyang a more dangerous and threatening presence in the region.

When tensions are high, there's more of a possibility for a provocation, escalation, and therefore change, Yeo said.

Korean People's Army (KPA) soldiers watch a military parade marking the 105th anniversary of the birth of late North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung, in Pyongyang on April 15, 2017. North Korea is one of the... Korean People's Army (KPA) soldiers watch a military parade marking the 105th anniversary of the birth of late North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung, in Pyongyang on April 15, 2017. North Korea is one of the world's most militiarized nations, and its military numerically dwarfs its southern neighbor. Ed Jones/AFP via Getty Images

But speech, not action, prevails. North Korea's military, for all its volume, lacks the breadth of training experience South Korea has gained through military exercises with the likes of the U.S., Yeo said. Less than two weeks ago, the U.S. finished joint drills with South Korea and Japan, a reiteration of Washington's commitment to supporting Seoul. South Korea has also paved its way to becoming a major defense exporter, and upped its military spending.

"A general war could kill a lot of people in the South, but it would be the end of Kim Jong Un and his regime," Peter Ward, a senior researcher at Seoul's Kookmin University told the BBC earlier this week.

For this reason, experts are confident Pyongyang will pull back. "North Korea will not attack South Korea," Lee said. "It will just continue the threat and will be mostly rhetoric."

Lurking over this are nuclear weapons. Kim is betting that Pyongyang's nuclear capability will stave off regime transition, Snyder said. "What we see is a desire by Kim Jong Un to use the nuclear weapons capability as a source of perpetuation of his regime."

Pyongyang is maintaining its nuclear arsenal at the forefront of South Korea's, and the U.S.'s, minds, carrying out a test of an "underwater nuclear weapons system" supposedly capable of unleashing a nuclear tsunami on North Korea's adversaries. In September, North Korea said it had debuted its first "tactical nuclear attack submarine," able to carry and launch nuclear weapons. There is some doubt among Western analysts about the submarine's true capabilities, but North Korea has also launched a spy satellite, and committed to putting several more into orbit this year.

The power is in the existence of North Korea's nuclear weapons, not their use. "If North Korea attempts to use nuclear weapons against us, we will retaliate overwhelmingly by utilizing the dramatically strengthened extended deterrence of the ROK [South Korea] -U.S. alliance and the three-axis system, and the Kim Jong Un regime will face its end," Seoul's defense ministry said at the end of last year.

Beholden to allies

North Korea is ultimately dependent on its major allies for its survival. Russian and Chinese backing is what allows North Korea to "survive and muddle through," said Yeo. "It cannot feed its own people or meet other basic economic goals—such as infrastructure-building—without external support," wrote Robert Kelly, professor of international relations at South Korea's Pusan National University.

But Pyongyang is not the same ally to Beijing as it is to Moscow. The Ukraine war changed the terrain, pushing Russia away from the rest of the world and becoming a "big win" for North Korea, Snyder said.

It forced Moscow to join the sanctioned space in which North Korea had long languished alone, making Pyongyang "valuable to Russia, and has really provided life to that relationship," Snyder added. "That's probably the biggest game changer within the last six months or so, the North Korea-Russia relationship," Yeo commented.

Kim now feels like he has a "real ally" for the first time in his life, said Simon Smith, former British ambassador to Ukraine who also served as London's link to Kyiv. "This enables him to widen his options in terms of action he can take to sustain his regime's grip" on the country, including upping the bellicose posturing against Western countries, he told Newsweek.

The war in Ukraine also pulled North Korea out of a total dependence on China, a reliance that had long sat uneasily with Pyongyang. "They're in a much stronger position at this point," Snyder said.

However, unexpected changes in China would still have unintended and damaging consequences on North Korea—a real point of vulnerability for Pyongyang, Snyder said. Despite this, though, analysts agree that China and Russia would work to keep North Korea propped up if needed.

If, for whatever reason, China and Russia turned on North Korea, Pyongyang would be staring down the barrel of the end of its existence as it knows it. Should Beijing and Moscow decide to turn away from Pyongyang, "that would lead to implosion," Yeo said.

The future "renegade state"

North Korea has, in many ways, defied the odds, and is likely to continue doing so. In a decade or so's time, it will probably be militarily stronger, Yeo said, but it will still be poor, "renegade state."

There is also the hope among many analysts that North Korea could open up in a way that appeases both the U.S. and its allies, as well as Russia and China. Washington would back economic reform in North Korea, but it would demand Pyongyang surrendering its nuclear weapons, Aum said.

"China and Russia would also be concerned about potential instability and collapse, like when Kim Jong Il died in 2011, and support economic reform as long as North Korea remained an ally and partner that was favorable to the current Chinese and Russian governments," he suggested.

The world is shifting, and so are perceptions. It's unclear how kind the future will be to North Korea, but many Western countries are going to quickly move on from seeing Pyongyang as a limited threat to one to a dangerous part of a bigger problem, Smith warned.

Uncommon Knowledge

Newsweek is committed to challenging conventional wisdom and finding connections in the search for common ground.

Newsweek · by Ellie Cook · January 27, 2024

7. North Korea poised to take 'lethal military action' against Seoul within months

I am sure this is what Kim wants us to believe. He is saying my political warfare strategy is working - I can undermine the ROK and the US alliance.

And he wants us to fear war not only for external political purposes, he wants us to talk about war so the Propaganda and Agitation department can spin our comments for domestic propaganda to demonstrate the external threat to justify the sacrifice and suffering of the Korean people in the north.

North Korea poised to take 'lethal military action' against Seoul within months

Kim Jong-un's stance towards his neighbours has grown more hostile in recent weeks, with experts warning open war may be on the table.

By AURORA BOSOTTI

08:41, Sat, Jan 27, 2024 | UPDATED: 08:41, Sat, Jan 27, 2024

Express · by Aurora Bosotti · January 27, 2024

Kim Jong-un has been laying the groundwork for a clash, experts have suggested. (Image: GETTY)

North Korea is considering taking "lethal military action" against South Korea as tensions between the two neighbours continue to rocket, according to a recent report.

Pyongyang's tones have become more aggressive, with Kim Jong-un pursuing a new strategy to strengthen his military and resuming missile tests.

The North Korean leader also appeared to be laying the groundwork for a potential clash with his speeches – resuming a bitter tone to condemn Seoul's alliance with the United States.

Relations between the two nations collapsed during the pandemic, which also isolated the rogue nation further and left Kim grappling with considerable poverty issues.

He recently described efforts to reconcile with Seoul as a mistake, doubling down with his assessment by tearing down the 100-foot Arch of Reunification.

Pyongyang has renewed testing missiles, fuelling fears of an attack in South Korea and Japan. (Image: GETTY)

The arch was commissioned by Kim's father, Kim Jong-il, in 2001 to symbolise hope for a potential reunification of the peninsula in the future.

According to The New York Times, US officials believe that an all-out war would threaten the North Korean leader's position but they noted smaller military strikes could be on the table, something the paper described as "lethal military action".

The anonymous officials told the paper that Washington DC is not expecting the fragile peace in the peninsula to break but they are taking Kim's hostility seriously.

Their assessment came days after a report by 38 North researchers claimed that Pyongyang "made a strategic decision to go to war."

They argued the Korean Peninsula is now facing its most dangerous moment since the Korean War.

North Korea says it tested new solid-fuel long-range missile

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Express · by Aurora Bosotti · January 27, 2024

8. Escaping North Korea - An interview with the Director and Producer of a new Bafta-nominated film

Thank you to Sir Lawrence Freedman for an excellent interview and an excellent and important documentary. I have sent some very negative reviews of the documentary in the past free days from people who are passionately pro-north Korea and anti-America.

Note also the two comments following the interview.

Escaping North Korea

An interview with the Director and Producer of a new Bafta-nominated film

https://samf.substack.com/p/escaping-north-korea?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=631422&post_id=141074524&utm

LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

JAN 28, 2024

∙ PAID

Beyond Utopia is a thrilling and moving documentary that follows the stories of people trying to escape from North Korea, with some graphic footage of the conditions they are fleeing. I was privileged to have an opportunity to interview Madeleine Gavin, who directed and edited the film, and one of the producers, Sue Mi Terry. Madeleine is an Emmy-nominated filmmaker who has edited many award-winning documentaries and received the 2024 Dupont-Columbia Journalist Award for excellence in journalism. Sue served in several government posts as an analyst of North Korea and East Asia, and is now Director of the Asia Program and the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy.

The movie features Pastor Seungeun Kim, a key figure in the Underground Railroad for defectors from the North, and two attempted defections. In the first, Soyeon Lee, who escaped herself years earlier, tries to get her son out, without success. In the second, the five members of the Roh family have reached China and the film follows them in their dangerous journey through Vietnam and Laos before they reach Thailand and safety.

Beyond Utopia will be shown on BBC Four on Tuesday 30th January at 10pm. You can find a link to the trailer here.

Lawrence Freedman

Thank you very much for joining me. I wanted to start by asking about your choice of stories. You could have started, as I believe was the original intention, with the story of Hyeonseo Lee [who defected 20 years ago as described in her book Girl With Seven Names]. She was a high-profile defector, who gives Ted talks and so on. You could have just made it about Pastor Kim. In the end you chose two extraordinary and very different stories, one with the sad ending, one with a happy ending. But a happy one could have gone wrong. So I am wondering, in the course of making this did your view of the narrative arc change?

Madeleine Gavin

You're right, it did start out around Hyeonseo Lee, and from the beginning I knew that what I definitely wouldn't want to do is some kind of recreation of her defecting 20 years previously. I wanted to try and document something present tense and experiential, because we don't hear from the people of North Korea. There was such a gaping hole in terms of hearing those voices. And then I found this hidden camera footage which showed their lives inside North Korea.

But yes, initially there was a whole different potential arc to this film which started with me shooting with Hyeonseo. In that version of the film, the present tense story would have been more of a psychological thriller taking place in South Korea about what it's like to be the most high-profile defector in the world at the time, someone who had been targeted by the regime. Extremely successful, as you say, Ted talks and her memoir, and yet one of the most traumatized people I've known. Traumatized by what she went through in the fleeing of her country more than 20 years ago and the brutal cut-off from family in the process.

While I was shooting with Hyeonseo, I met Pastor Kim, and after many months getting to know each other, he and I decided to work together and to attempt to follow the next two escapes who contacted him. Those escapes were Soyeon and the Roh family, and those are the only escapes that we followed. And you’re right, either of those escapes could have gone differently. Additionally, because of the vast amount of story we had in the end, there was quite a process involved in finding the film you are seeing now. In order to use more of Hyeonseo’s story, at one point we thought about this as a series, and we thought about it as a two-part feature. Ultimately, we decided to focus largely on the two attempted escapes and to allow Hyeonseo to be the voice of memories of North Korea.

Sue Mi Terry

There was a high level of risk right from the start because, as you said, we had no idea how things were going to play out. We did not know one story was going to be happy and one was going to be a sad ending. The Roh family could have been captured at any point, be sent back and then there's no film or one that comes to an end very quickly. But I do think that’s what makes the film unique. I myself had participated as a pundit in other programmes talking about defectors and North Korea, but it’s a different experiencing seeing this play out.

Madeleine

Another risk that was unprecedented in my work as a filmmaker, was that we knew that no matter what happened with these stories, we could not ask for, or even accept, consent from the Roh family until the end, if at all. We knew that the only possible way to make a film like this was to risk being told at the end that our subjects didn't want to participate. Before any consent was given, they had to be allowed to get to a place where they could actually evaluate what a documentary is, what their role would be, and whether they wanted to be a part of this. So we had to go in knowing that we may not be able to use anything we were documenting. And likewise, with Soyeon. I was shooting with Soyeon up until the very last minute before we locked the picture because we were trying to get accurate information out of North Korea and that is a time-consuming, difficult process. Because of this, we made sure Soyeon knew that, up until the end, depending on what we found out, she could choose not to participate. And so, up until just before picture lock, I was actually editing two versions of the film: one version with Soyeon and one version without her in case she decided she didn't want to participate. So, there were a lot of variables involved in so many aspects of this film.

Lawrence

You were getting to know them during the course of their escape. So you were developing a personal relationship with them, which turned out very clearly in this movie.

Madeleine

Very much so. Most people who meet defectors meet them after they've been through some degree of assimilation and have gotten to a safe country - South Korea or United States or wherever it may be. And so there is this reminiscing in most interviews with North Korean defectors. But we were meeting the Roh family just days after they had fled North Korea, getting to know each other, witnessing the unravelling of all of our mutual mythologies. The process and the mystique around the Roh family meeting Americans and South Koreans for the first time, and likewise us meeting North Koreans so soon after leaving their country, ultimately ended up making us extremely close.

Lawrence

For many people one of the most fascinating parts of the film will be with Grandma Roh, in many ways the star of the show. Coming out of North Korea completely believing in the Dear Leader Kim. And then her gradual realisation that it's all quite different, starting with realising that the ‘American bastards’ as she's been taught to think of you aren't so bad after all. I don't think I've ever seen that before. This sort of transformation of a person at that age, as they see that for 80 years they've been taught nonsense.

Sue

That scene is, I think, one of the most revealing ones in the film even to me as someone who has been a North Korea watcher and scholar, for many, many decades. It was such an interesting moment because I spend a lot of time talking about how North Korea is the most heavily ideologically indoctrinated society in the world. But then you see that moment and you understand what this means for this Grandmother. You see her reaction when she gets to Vietnam and realises how prosperous it is. It's like she can't fathom that the Dear Leader could be at fault. So she says ‘this must be our fault, that our country is so poor, right?’

Madeleine

That is the unprecedented thing, capturing how Grandma feels initially and then tracking the evolution of that. It really was like the unpeeling of an onion. I mean Grandma believed in the Kim regime in her bones, in her blood, in her guts. This was her whole reality. And she was steadfast in that. But those beliefs were up against what she was experiencing in the present. Like Sue says, when she first saw the greenery and lushness of Vietnam and then began to get to know us. Watching her grapple with what she's known to be true versus what she was experiencing in the present, and which version to trust and how to trust. It’s one of my favourite parts of the film.

Sue

She was like, “oh, you seem so nice but are you going to kill us in the middle of the night” because she's been taught that we’re the most evil people on the planet.

Lawrence

It also puts the word “defection” in a slightly different context as well because when we think of defection we tend to think of it as being for ideological reasons. But she was escaping for family. The family were escaping because they were at risk, they knew that the regime had given up on them and if they didn't get out they'd have a terrible life in front of them.

Madeleine

Yes, the Roh family left because, as you said, their lives were at risk. They knew their lives were over if they stayed in North Korea. So they had no choice. Grandma actually wanted to stay behind, but she left as well because she knew that at her age she could not possibly survive in North Korea without her daughter. She would have had to bribe people weekly in order to survive and she had no means to do so. So yes, Grandma left because she also felt like she had no choice.

Sue

Yes, Grandma left very reluctantly, but the family's lives were at risk because of family members who had already defected to South Korea. The Kim regime treats disloyalty like a disease that needs to be quarantined. That's how important loyalty is. So already this family was marked and they couldn't have any kind of a life in North Korea. So in a way, it is still defection in the traditional sense because it might not be ideological, but they're still looking for freedom. They're still looking to have some sort of a life for themselves.

Lawrence

It does bring out the tension which you see in all totalitarian regimes: between the family as an institution and the state as the institution. This is why states want to break up families and disintegrate them. What your film shows is the strength of the family bonds. And that's true even in the sad case of Soyeon and all those very painful conversations she's having with the people who are speaking on behalf of her mother [who is still in North Korea]. And she's desperate to demonstrate her loyalty and that she's still a good daughter, despite the fact that she's defected. That was very painful to listen to.

Madeleine

Very painful and it's really interesting what you're saying because in North Korea, you're right, the regime actually is above the family. In North Korea the word ‘love’ is not used amongst family members. You only really use it for the Dear Leader. You don't use it for your children. You don't use it for your husband or wife. And it is interesting how in the film the strength of the family does come out in both stories. The importance of family comes through. It speaks to a humanity that that has been denied by this totalitarian regime, by forcing loyalty first and foremost to the regime over your family. But in the end, you can't actually squash the love of family, which is amazing.

Sue

You know, one of the saddest things is that North Korean defectors have so much trauma, because even when they live okay lives in South Korea, they live with that guilt that either they had to leave their family members behind or they're the ones that made it and their family members are still in North Korea, and they will be questioned about it. This is one of the biggest traumas for the defectors.

Lawrence

Going back to the actual making of the of the movie. How did you get such extraordinary footage? It starts with this plea for help recorded on an iPhone. They were already in China at that point but then you're charting every inch of the way it seems.

Madeleine

We have to give so much credit to Pastor Kim. We could not have gotten any of this without him. Pastor Kim and I got to know each other over many months. And when we did come to really trust each other we realised that we were interested in making the same kind of movie. Which was as experiential as possible. Trying to put audiences in the shoes of North Koreans so that we can't turn away from these people who we've basically not acknowledged for more than 70 years.

The Roh family had fled over the river from North Korea, and then roamed around the Changbai mountains in China for five days. They happened upon a farmer who luckily for them was semi-sympathetic. A lot of people they could have met in the mountains of China would have immediately turned them into the police because they can make money off defectors. But luckily for the Roh family, this person did not do that. This farmer happened to know someone involved with the Underground Railroad and through a series of people, this video got to Pastor Kim. And that initial footage that you're talking about was shot by the farmer.

But in terms of your question about the footage, when the Roh family fled over the river they were obviously at risk. Our mandate from the start was not to add any additional risk to the risk they were already facing. So none of us went into China. We weren’t going to put the family at risk by doing that. And Pastor Kim can't go into China anymore because he's been known by the regime for 23 years and had been warned that he could be kidnapped into North Korea if he ever went back into China. So everything in China was shot by the Underground Railroad, and it was through Pastor Kim that we were able to arrange that. He really line- produced most of the China shoot and made all of that possible. We were then able to go to Southeast Asia with Pastor Kim.

Sue

It's really unusual to have a family of five defect like this. This is not a normal occurrence, and it's extra difficult and risky for a group like this to move. I mean from an 80-year-old grandmother to young daughters. Usually defection is solo.

Lawrence

Obviously not much could have been done if they'd been caught in China. Did you have contingency plans for Laos and Vietnam? Did you have plans for how to help them in those circumstances? Obviously you can't go into detail.

Madeleine

Yes, we can't go into details, but yes very much so. And again, we had Pastor Kim, and the Underground Railroad, and then a huge body of consultants in both the United States and in Asia who are involved in the Underground Railroad and other work like this. So yes, we definitely had a lot of different contingency plans.

Lawrence

One of the things viewers would like to know more about, but for understandable reasons can't, are the other people involved, the fixers along the Underground Railroad. And I suppose there's a question going back to the issue of trust as to their motivations. How transactional is it? What risks are they prepared to take? In the end we don't learn very much about them. Presumably that was deliberate.

Madeleine

So the Underground Railroad is really made-up of four groups. Brokers who do it only for money and really don't care about the people; brokers who have some sympathy but are also doing this to make a living; people who are really involved for the cause, who often have some sort of religious affiliation or missionary work affiliation; and then there's people who are helping for the cause but who don't have any religious affiliation. So there's all manner of groups involved in the Roh family's escape. There were more than 50 members of the Underground Railroad involved in that escape. With the brokers, we blurred their faces, we distorted their voices. At one point I did want to go more into exploring the world of brokers in the film, because it’s very interesting, but the film just couldn't contain it. But it is a fascinating world. It's like a whole other universe that we don't even know about but that has its own rules, its own logic.

Sue

Yes, no doubt there is a huge business component. There are people for who this is just business, and this is how they make money. And when some North Korean defectors arrive in South Korea oftentimes, they also owe money to brokers. So they go to Hanawon, which is a training facility for three months where you learn how to live in democracy, in a country like South Korea, they come back out and they start working and they get some stipends from the South Korean government. But it's really heartbreaking because then they have to send money back to the brokers so they're perpetually economically suffering because they owe money to the brokers.

Madeleine

And to be clear, that's not true in the stories we follow. Pastor Kim's church, which is funded on donations, decided to help these cases so it was a different situation for these people. But yes, for someone just coming over the river, let's say from North Korea, they often have no choice but to make a deal with a broker. “Oh, I'll pay you, whatever, $1000 someday.” Then when they get to South Korea, like Sue said, they're paying that debt off forever.

Lawrence

What about the brokers who are in North Korea and talking to Soyeon about her son. It was very hard for her, and us, to work out how credible they were?

Madeleine

One of the most difficult things is getting accurate information out of North Korea. It's complicated, and it's very time consuming. You have to pay for any information going in and out of North Korea. And often there's a broker on the Chinese side of the border and then a broker on the North Korean side. So you're generally paying both sides. But also you could pay someone and they could just tell you nonsense. They could tell you something that's not true at all.

So in Soyeon’s case - and this is why I was shooting with her up until the very end - we wanted to make sure what she was hearing was as accurate as possible, which meant going to different factions inside North Korea who don't know about each other, trying to get consistent information. Going through contacts from her old life inside North Korea to see if they validate the story. And there is another complicated process of how someone like Soyeon even gets money to a broker to begin with, because you can't send money into North Korea. You can't use a bank. So everything goes through China. It's very hard it, it's so complex.

Sue

With Soyeon there's a scene where she doubts what she’s hearing from a broker and she's like “I don't even know if this is trustworthy, but I have no choice”. That shows the desperation for any information. But brokers also have to work a very fine line because there is a network. So if your information is consistently incorrect or if you develop a reputation as somebody who's entirely untrustworthy, then that information will also spread around the defectors in South Korea. So if they want other clients, brokers also need not to be short-term minded.

Madeleine

That's also why Pastor Kim was so key. A lot of these brokers who might just turn someone in for money, they're going to be loyal to Pastor Kim because they want the continued work from him. So that's his security, his insurance.

Lawrence

The existence of these brokers and the fact that they do seem to have access, suggests somewhere in the higher reaches of North Korean society there are elements around that know the outside world is different, that their system isn't the whole world. Does that indicate there is more doubting and questioning within North Korea than anybody lets on?

Sue

The regime absolutely worries about its monopoly on information, that there are cracks in the security services - those controlling the population. They're deathly afraid of their people finding out more about the outside world and finding ways to get around their system. But they cannot completely control it. So while the regime remains the same, and it has the most totalitarian control over its population in the world right now, there are changes on the ground. Information is seeping into North Korea, even though the regime is cracking down on it. Because people can no longer count on the public distribution system or the regime for survival; there are private markets, black markets. People have found a way to survive. This is the thing that the regime, I think, is most concerned about. They keep talking about the United States and South Korea as the hostile forces to worry about, but the regime is really worried about the people.

Madeleine

In the 90s, during the famine, the Kim regime turned a blind eye to the black markets because millions more would have died if they hadn't allowed some kind of market economy. The reality is, everyone is scrambling to find a way to live so some security police take bribes; some are even brokers themselves. Some of them even shot some of the hidden camera footage from inside North Korea. Most of that is not upper- level people, but the stuff inside the prisons, et cetera, that is.

Sue

That's right. So even the mid-level people or those in the military or the security services can be bribed. There are defectors who just flat out bribe the border guards to get out of North Korea, or when they are caught watching a South Korean film which would mean they go to prison. This is a very concerning development for the regime.

Lawrence

Sue, you've been watching. North Korea for a good number of years. Do you detect a new fragility in the regime or? Are its days numbered? Or does it seem as embedded as ever?

Sue

I do think it is getting worse for the regime. How does this regime survive when it’s one of the poorest countries in the world, ranked 198^th in the global economy? It survives by having elite loyalty. As long as the elite support the regime, it continues to survive. But let's look at that. Elites were very loyal under Kim Il Sung. And they were a little less under Kim Jong Il. But under Kim Jong Un, there's tension between the elites and the regime. They used to have a complete blockade on information, but now more and more information is getting into North Korea that the regime cannot control. They also rely on security services’ fear tactics. But now we're seeing these people can be bribed. So from the regime's perspective, if you're looking at these various pillars of stability: elite loyalty; monopoly on information; the security apparatus – it’s not as solid as in the past.

This is why the regime is quite nervous and one of the things that Kim Jong Un is doing right now is he's really cracking down on people watching South Korean films and the border control because he's worried about that.

Madeleine

Information getting in and out is his biggest fear, and defectors also represent that because defectors are a way for information to get out and to come back. When a defector who has made it to safety contacts a family member inside North Korea through a broker and tell them about the outside world, there's this exchange.

Lawrence

There's a poignant moment right at the end where the pastor is having to explain to people that because of COVID and because of lockdown, it's almost impossible to move around China. Has that eased up since? Are defectors getting out again now?

Madeleine

Yes, while we were shooting, Pastor Kim was continuing to get phone calls from people desperate to get out. And he had to tell them it's impossible. The Underground Railroad was decimated. People who were doing it for the cause, and people who were doing it for money, all had to turn elsewhere to make a living. Recently, it has been slowly rebuilding. And Pastor Kim has been involved in a few defections and escapes in the last few months.

Sue

The cost has definitely gone way up. It’s tens of thousands of dollars. It used to be a $3000 to get one person out now it's $30,000 or $40,000, because the infrastructure was decimated. It is much more costly and more difficult right now.

Lawrence

How are the Roh family doing?

Madeleine

The family are doing great. They are the luckiest of the lucky. And the mother is actually training to be a social worker to help defectors with what Sue was talking about - struggling with disconnection from their family, guilt, depression, from being just brutally cut off in a way that doesn't exist with other countries. You can't even e-mail your family; you can't pick up a phone.

Soyeon was an activist before we met her. She was speaking out on violence against women in the military in North Korea because she had been in the military. She had experienced that violence. Pastor Kim and Soyeon have been traveling with us for most of the fall, and Soyeon has been reactivated as an activist. She is really involved with advocating for her son. But also for other families, because there are so many defectors who are going through or will go through a similar situation. So she's been protesting before the Chinese embassy. She's written letters to the Kim regime. She's been travelling with us in multiple countries. And she's really finding the hope of a connection to her son through her activism.

Sue

I got involved with this film because there's nothing like film as a medium in getting the story out. I've been watching North Korea for many, many decades. I've written opinion pieces, I’ve testified to Congress and so on. But it's nothing like these individual stories. As Madeleine always says “the more specific, the more universal”. So it's really gratifying to see that how people are reacting to this film.

And policymakers too. I just went to South Korea because the Foreign Minister was hosting a screening in front of their foreign ministry. The State Department just hosted a screening in Washington DC a few days ago. So what's next is I hope that more people watch this film and gain awareness.

Madeleine

The hope is that our film will lead to activism where we continue to put pressure on North Korea and, also China for its policy of forcibly repatriating North Koreans, knowing exactly what's going to happen to them. If China changed their policies, everything would change in North Korea. So China is absolutely key. I also feel like every time the words North Korea are mentioned, the people have to be mentioned. Every time. Because what we hear on the news is all about the missiles, Kim Jong Un as strongman, the parades. But if every single time we mention North Korea, we also talk about human rights and about the 26 million people inside that country, it's got to have an impact.

Lawrence

On that note, thank you so much for your time. It was absolutely fascinating. Congratulations again.

2 Comments

I remember Barack Obama talking about how he used to get criticised for spending a lot of time meeting with wounded veterans so that he could amongst other things better understand the personal impact that decisions like going to war have on people.

The critique, if I recall, was rooted in a belief that if you are the commander in chief responsible for making decisions to go to war you shouldn’t get too emotionally intwined with the human impact of those decisions.

I think stories like the ones outlined in this piece are vital for decision makers to know about. Not in a way that fuels some type of misguided liberal interventionism but in a way that hopefully leads to more sober minded nuanced policy.

Ebbe Munk

9 hrs ago

Grandma Roh believed in the Kim regime, it was her whole reality. She fled because she couldn't cope on her own in the country.

If for whatever reason North Korea falls apart, many people will leave for China and South Korea.

These people will have to accommodate to another reality just like Grandma Roh, but a lot of people at once. How will they react? Can China and South Korea cope? We can only guess.

I worked in Russia in the 1990s and felt first hand how the proud Russians experienced a violent disillusion. In North Korea, it will be on a far larger scale.

9. Kim Jong-Un rips up plan to reunify Korea, raising fears of all-out war

But do not be mistaken. He has not given up the strategic aim to dominate the Korean peninsula under his rule by the Guerilla Dynasty and Gulag State.

Kim Jong-Un rips up plan to reunify Korea, raising fears of all-out war

The Telegraph · by Nicola Smith,

North Korea leader’s warmongering tone shows no sign of abating after arch of reunification destroyed and missiles launched off east coast

Kim Jong-Un has started the year in a belligerent mood Credit: AP

For more than 20 years, the Arch of Reunification straddled the highway from Pyongyang to the heavily guarded border with South Korea as a symbol of hope that two countries ripped apart by war would one day be reunited.

But this week it lay crushed to dust, along with a goal that had spanned three generations of the Kim family dynasty to reconcile the North with the South of the Korean peninsula, under Pyongyang’s control.

New satellite images, analysed by NK News, showed the nine-storey monument – depicting two women in traditional dress reaching forward to jointly hold a globe with a map of a unified Korea – had been torn down days after Kim Jong-Un called it “an eyesore.”

Even before the arch’s destruction, the North Korean leader had had a belligerent start to the year. He publicly abandoned the unification aims of his forefathers, declaring the constitution be changed to designate South Korea the “principal enemy,” and to codify “completely occupying” it in the event of war.

The Arch of Reunification, seen in the background, has been destroyed after the North Korea leader called it an 'eyesore' Credit: Getty Images/Thomas Imo

More cruise missiles launched

Kim’s warmongering tone was accompanied by tests of a nuclear-capable ballistic missile and a suspected underwater nuclear weapons system. That followed revelations by US intelligence that Russia had fired North Korean-supplied ballistic missiles into Ukraine.

On Sunday, North Korea fired multiple cruise missiles off its east coast, its second such launch in less than a week.

Seasoned North Korea experts warn Kim is not just experiencing a fit of pique, but has signalled an unprecedented shift in ideology that could lead his nation down a dangerous path to accidental conflict.

Some even believe he has opted to deliberately start one.

“The situation on the Korean Peninsula is more dangerous than it has been at any time since early June 1950,” wrote Robert L Carlin, a former CIA analyst, and Siegfried S Hecker, a nuclear scientist who has frequently visited the North, on the respected 38 North website.

They referred to the timing of the start of the Korean War that devastated and split the Peninsula.

“We believe that, like his grandfather in 1950, Kim Jong-Un has made a strategic decision to go to war. We do not know when or how Kim plans to pull the trigger, but the danger is already far beyond the routine warnings in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo about Pyongyang’s ‘provocations’,” they said.

The situation is as dangerous as it has been since 1950, according to two experts on the Korean peninsula Credit: AP/Ahn Young-joon

‘This is not just rhetoric’

Most analysts disagree with their doomsday prediction, arguing that Kim would not risk the obliteration of his regime through all-out war. But many concede that in a world of rapidly changing battle lines and geopolitical alliances, his renewed threats are a cause for alarm.

Experts such as Chun In-bum, a retired general who once commanded South Korea’s special forces, believe Kim could engage in more limited military aggression now that he has taken the “significant” step to reject the historic common bond between North and South.

“This is not just rhetoric,” he said. “It is increasing tensions, and when you have people who are trigger happy, all tensed up, you are going to have a big problem.”

Kim had lost patience with South Korea and the United States, and while “he doesn’t have the capability to start a major war,” a possible flashpoint could be his claims around the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the disputed maritime boundary between North and South, said Gen Chun. “He has implied he is not going to respect that.”

Hopes for nuclear disarmament dashed

Leif-Eric Easley, a professor at Ewha University in Seoul, said Kim’s policy shift appeared to be an attempt to justify his expensive pursuit of nuclear missiles and failure to win sanctions relief, while aligning himself closer to Russia and China.

“North Korea is now exploiting ‘Cold War 2.0’ geopolitics to become more interdependent with, rather than dependent on, Russia and China. Through illicit trade in violation of UN sanctions, Pyongyang seeks to revitalise its economy and act as a more significant military power,” he said.

The bellicose moves have combined to dash hopes for reconciliation and nuclear disarmament, with Kim’s motivation likely to be blaming South Korea for his costly policies to maintain power, Prof Easley added.

“While the Kim regime may be playing to its domestic political audience, these moves risk unintended escalation and inadvertent conflict on the Korean Peninsula,” he said.

The Telegraph · by Nicola Smith,

10. Korea's status as China's import partner drops to 30-year low

Sunday

January 28, 2024

dictionary + A - A

Published: 28 Jan. 2024, 16:41

Korea's status as China's import partner drops to 30-year low

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-01-28/business/economy/Koreas-status-as-Chinas-import-partner-drops-to-30year-low/1968633?utm

Containers at Busan port for exports [YONHAP]

Korea's status as China's import partner dropped to its lowest level in 30 years as Beijing moved to indigenize the production of chips and electronics amid an economic downturn.

According to data from the Korea International Trade Association (KITA) on Sunday, Korea accounted for 6.3 percent of China's import market in 2023, a 1.1 percentage point drop from the previous year's 7.4 percent. This was the lowest level in 30 years since 1993 when the figure reached 5.2 percent.

Korea's rank also dropped to third place among China's import partners last year, after Taiwan and the United States. In 2022, Korea ranked second after Taiwan.

The shrinkage in trade value is partially attributed to the overall economic downturn in China.

According to the General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China, China's imports reached $2.5 trillion last year, a 5.5 percent drop from the previous year.

Korea has been dealt a bigger blow than other countries. China's imports from Korea plunged by 18.7 percent last year, while those of Taiwan or the United States dropped by 15.4 percent and 6.8 percent, respectively.

Lackluster demand last year in the IT segment, in which Korea excels, and China's continued efforts to achieve independence in chip and electronics manufacturing contributed to the drops, according to experts.

The statistics showed that the share of electronic integrated circuits among China's import items dropped to 13.7 percent by value in 2023 from 15.4 percent the previous year. The share has declined since 2020, when they accounted for 17.1 percent.

Korea's export of semiconductors to China nosedived by 30.6 percent in 2023 year-on-year to $36.1 billion.

"Korea used to export intermediary goods to China, and China made the end product with it, forming a tight collaboration relationship," Jo Sang-hyeon, head of the Institute for International Trade at KITA, told Yonhap.

"Since 2010, China's independence in manufacturing has increased, changing the dynamics of Korea-China's economic cooperation."

Experts say Korea must improve its competitiveness in items other than chips and electronics to regain its status in China's trade market as the country remains Korea's biggest trade partner — especially for exports.

"Although China is in an economic downturn, no country can replace China given that it logs 5 percent annual growth continuously," says Jung Man-ki, vice chairman of KITA.

"Korea should focus on raising its export competitiveness aside from sensitive areas affected by U.S.-China geopolitical issues."

BY JIN EUN-SOO [jin.eunsoo@joongang.co.kr]

11. Kim Jong Un’s rejection of Korean reunification opens perilous new era

Excerpt:

“He may not have decided what he is going to do, or when. But people are finally starting to realise that the North Koreans have not been seeking nuclear weapons all this time purely for defensive purposes.”

Kim Jong Un’s rejection of Korean reunification opens perilous new era

Financial Times · by Christian Davies · January 28, 2024

North Korea’s giant concrete “Arch of Reunification” depicted two women in traditional dress leaning towards each other to hold up an image of a united Korean peninsula.

But a week after North Korean leader Kim Jong Un described the 30m-tall monument as an “eyesore”, it was gone — a demolition that drove home his renunciation of his country’s long-standing commitment to eventual reunification with the South.

Kim’s dramatic policy shift this month has opened a dangerous new phase in the frozen conflict between the two Koreas, analysts say, with some even fearing that he is laying the ideological groundwork for a new war.

The break with a reunification policy that dated back to the division of the peninsula in the 1940s illustrates how Kim has been emboldened by the progress of his nuclear weapons programme, as well as his burgeoning defence co-operation with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

“The situation on the Korean peninsula is more dangerous than it has been at any time since early June 1950,” veteran US diplomat Robert Carlin and nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker wrote in a recent commentary for the Stimson Center think-tank in Washington.

“We believe that, like his grandfather in 1950, Kim Jong Un has made a strategic decision to go to war.”

For decades, Pyongyang has portrayed South Koreans as compatriots held hostage by a US-backed “puppet regime” in Seoul. The North’s sacred mission to liberate its fellow Koreans from the imperialist yolk offered its leaders legitimacy and its downtrodden subjects a sense of moral purpose.

But all that was swept away when Kim told North Korea’s rubber stamp parliament on January 16 that “the North-South relationship is no longer a relationship of kinship or homogeneity, but a relationship of two hostile countries, a complete relationship of two belligerents in the midst of war”.

The regime has moved swiftly to implement the new vision. Propaganda outlets directed at South Korean audiences, pro-unification organisations and state bodies for facilitating inter-Korean tourism have all been axed.

Go Myong-hyun, senior fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul, said Kim’s move was the result of disillusionment dating back to 2019, when talks collapsed with then-US president Donald Trump at their last summit in Hanoi.

“Kim hoped that a leftwing South Korean government could help convince Trump to accept the existence of North Korea’s nuclear programme in exchange for the normalisation of relations,” said Go. “But when the negotiations failed, he appears to have concluded that no South Korean government could ever be trusted.”

A North Korean missile test. Pyongyang has continued to make progress in its nuclear weapons programme © Jung Yeon-je/AFP/Getty Images

Rachel Minyoung Lee, a North Korea expert and fellow at the Stimson Center, said Kim was instituting a “fundamental shift in North Korea’s policy towards Seoul” after “laying the military and legal groundwork for the use of nuclear weapons against South Korea if and when needed”.

In 2021, Kim announced an acceleration of efforts to develop, test and deploy tactical nuclear weapons capable of striking South Korean targets. The following year, he revised the country’s nuclear law to allow for pre-emptive strikes in a wide range of scenarios.

Kim’s rejection of the possibility of unification through peaceful means was the logical next step, said Lee. “It is hard to justify the use of nuclear weapons against South Korea when the South remains part of the Korean nation.”

“That does not mean that Kim has taken a decision to go to war,” she added. “But his actions suggest he will be more inclined to take military action than he was in the past.”

The US in 2022 warned Pyongyang that “any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime”.

That threat was reiterated by South Korea’s defence minister Shin Won-sik on January 24. “North Korea has defined [South Korea] as its principal enemy,” he told fighter pilots, according to the state news agency.

“If the Kim Jong Un regime opts for the worst choice of waging war, you should be at the vanguard of removing the enemy’s leadership at the earliest possible time,” Shin said.

Some observers worry an escalating war of words, coupled with the collapse of military confidence-building measures last year, could soon spill over into armed clashes between the Koreas.

North Korea early this month fired more than 200 artillery shells near a maritime buffer zone between the Koreas, prompting South Korea to fire more than 400 shells during “corresponding” drills.

Seoul’s response was consistent with its doctrine of “punishment and retaliation” to North Korean “provocations”. Last month, Shin called on South Korean sailors to “mercilessly bury” their North Korean adversaries in the event of an attack.

“The South Korean government is goading Kim Jong Un to fight,” said Chun In-bum, a retired lieutenant general and former commander of the South Korean special forces. “But if you dare someone like Kim, then eventually he is going to accept.”

Recommended

The Big Read

Kim Jong Un’s comeback

Sydney Seiler, who served as the US national intelligence officer for North Korea in the Biden administration between 2020 and 2023, said that while the Korean peninsula was entering “rough waters”, the “fundamental nature of the conflict has not changed”.

“We have seen incidents as recently as 2010 and 2015 in which the North Korean armed forces killed South Korean sailors, marines, and civilians, but which still didn’t lead to war,” said Seiler. “The question is whether we now see concrete actions that take us in a dangerous new direction where de-escalation is more complicated.”

More concerning, he added, was the possibility North Korea would start to use the threat of its expanding nuclear arsenal to try to extract concessions or even an eventual capitulation from Seoul.

“As Kim’s military programme grows both qualitatively and quantitively, the more offensive or coercive options become available to him,” said Seiler, now a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

“He may not have decided what he is going to do, or when. But people are finally starting to realise that the North Koreans have not been seeking nuclear weapons all this time purely for defensive purposes.”

Financial Times · by Christian Davies · January 28, 2024

12. China unlikely to play constructive role in resolving N. Korea's threats

I concur with that assessment. China is unlikely to be helpful. But some will continue to argue China Is the key to "controlling" north Korea. I think it cannot exercise the control we think it can or want it to.

China unlikely to play constructive role in resolving N. Korea's threats

The Korea Times · by 2024-01-28 11:18 | North Korea · January 28, 2024

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong, left, meets North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui in Pyongyang, Friday, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency, Saturday. Yonhap

Sullivan, Wang discuss NK issue; Pyongyang, Beijing hold high-level diplomatic talks

By Lee Hyo-jin

China is either unwilling or unable to play a constructive role in addressing North Korea's nuclear threats despite repeated calls from the international community. This observation comes in the wake of the latest appeal made during a recent meeting between the top security official of the United States and China's top diplomat.

Beijing sees little reason to respond to Washington's request, especially considering the ongoing bilateral tensions surrounding the Taiwan issue, experts said. Moreover, it appears that China lacks practical measures to exert influence on North Korea.

U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Bangkok, Thailand, from Friday to Saturday. The two officials discussed a wide range of bilateral and global issues, including North Korea, the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East and the South China Sea.

"The two sides did discuss DPRK," a senior U.S. official said during a teleconference held after the meeting. DPRK stands for Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name.

"We are deeply concerned about the growing relationship between Russia and the DPRK and what that might mean for Mr. Kim’s (Kim Jong-un) intentions. We raised those concerns directly with China, given their influence on Pyongyang," the official said.

North Korea has escalated military provocations recently, with Russia as its main backer. This has prompted growing concerns within South Korea and the U.S., leading some American pundits to contemplate the possibility of another war breaking out on the Korean Peninsula.

N. Korea fires several cruise missiles from its east coast: JCS

But China, which maintains friendly ties with North Korea, has remained silent about Pyongyang's growing military threats.

"Sullivan's mention of North Korean issues to Wang shows that the Joe Biden administration needs China's help to prevent North Korea from crossing the red line, at least until the presidential election in November. But Beijing is unwilling to cooperate given the U.S.' unchanged stance regarding the Taiwan Strait, issue," said Lee Sang-man, a China expert at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University.

Following the meeting with Sullivan, China's top diplomat described Taiwan independence as "the biggest challenge" to Sino-U.S. ties and warned Washington not to interfere in issues concerning the island.

Chinese President Xi Jinping, left, shakes hands with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during a summit in Pyongyang, June 21, 2019, in this photo released by North Korean state media Korean Central News Agency. Yonhap

"Taiwan issues aside, there are few reasons for Beijing to discuss sensitive matters with Pyongyang, as doing so would potentially strain currently warm bilateral relations," Lee said.

The two neighbors have recently been engaging in high-level diplomatic talks, which some observers view as a build-up for Chinese President Xi Jinping's potential visit to Pyongyang, or the North Korean leader's trip to Beijing later this year, which marks the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

According to the North's state mouthpiece Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Saturday, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong visited Pyongyang and met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui the previous day.

Cho Han-bum, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, a think tank, analyzed that China does not possess practical measures to exert influence on North Korea.

"One might assume that China and North Korea's relations follow a superior-subordinate structure, with Pyongyang dependent on Beijing. However, that is not the case. North Korea positions itself as a independent nation in bilateral diplomatic talks," he said.

Cho also commented that Kim Jong-un, similar to his predecessors, does not heed advice from outsiders, be it from China or Russia, when making strategic decisions regarding nuclear arsenals.

"Although China is unhappy with the heightened security risks arising from North Korea's nuclear threats, it is reluctant to play an active role, as doing so may jeopardize relations with Pyongyang, one of Beijing's few remaining friends in the Asian region," the researcher explained, pointing out China's strained relations with other Asian nations such as the Philippines, India and Japan.

The Korea Times · by 2024-01-28 11:18 | North Korea · January 28, 2024

13. There Is A Way Out Of The North Korean Nuclear Crisis – OpEd

With all due respect to Mr. Powers and his decades of foreign policy experience, this smacks of appeasement to me. And appeasement never works.

Excerpt:

Then the US must agree to two things Pyongyang really wants: to open talks on a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War which terminated with only an armistice in 1953. Second, to limit American military exercises around the Korean peninsula.

We need no more bluster. The US needs to get on with searching for a peaceful solution. Being positive is not easy but in the end, after tortuous years of progress followed by retrenchment, it’s informed optimism that counts. Where there’s a will surely there’s a way. And now after many missteps we do know the way to go, if we want to. Unfortunately, to be realistic, it will not happen until the Republicans are in a minority in both the House and the Senate. Otherwise, they will sabotage any president-led agreement.

This excerpt also demonstrates a lack of understanding. The regime does not want a peace agreement unless it can be leveraged to support its political warfare strategy to dominate the peninsula. Second, it does not really want an end to US exercises. Yes it devotes a lot of criticism to them but that is for domestic propaganda purposes. Kim is more afraid of the Korean people inside north Korea than he is of the US military.

And unfroauntely Mr. Powers uses thie OpEd less for advocating solutions to the "Korea question," and more for expressing his partisan political agenda.

There Is A Way Out Of The North Korean Nuclear Crisis – OpEd

eurasiareview.com · January 26, 2024

By Jonathan Power

Last November the dangerous arms race between North Korea and South Korea in what is in effect a civil war was wound up a few more notches. South Korea said it was going to scrap a security pact made with North Korea in 2018. The pact halted all military exercises along their common border.

The South made this move in retaliation for the North’s decision to launch a military reconnaissance satellite, violating UN Security Council resolutions banning the use of ballistic missile technology. This month the war of words has escalated further. North Korea tore down an impressive monument symbolizing union with the South, according to reports on January 23.

Peacemaking initiatives have come and gone. Both the Biden Administration and its partner (erstwhile?) in this endeavour, the Chinese government, appear to be treading water.

When, soon after the election, President Barack Obama invited Donald Trump to the White House we didn’t learn much about their conversation. But we were briefed on one thing: Obama had told Trump that North Korea would be the most pressing and difficult issue on his agenda. It remains so. Trump arranged a festive meeting in Singapore with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un in 2018. It was showbiz and came to naught. President Joe Biden has not even attempted to get to grips with the issue.

The Americans have seemingly missed the boat. It’s as simple as that. What’s done is done. While Washington has dithered and dithered through five successive presidencies, missing opportunity after opportunity, North Korea has gone from zero nuclear weapons to an arsenal of at least 40 to 50. North Korea now has a few intercontinental ballistic missiles said to be capable of striking the US. Experts believe it has miniaturised a nuclear warhead that can be fitted into the cone of these rockets.

One thing is certain, albeit many Western politicians will dispute this: North Korea would never have become a nuclear-bomb-possessing nation if the US had honoured its early agreements.

The Clinton Administration negotiated what it called an “Agreed Framework”. The US started to build in the North nuclear light-water reactors that could only manufacture electricity. For a time, North Korea was the major receiver of American economic aid in Asia. Clinton sent his secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, to Pyongyang where she was received with honours. North Korea softened its attitude.

Just before he left office President Bill Clinton believed he was on the cusp of a deal. But then right at the end of his presidency Clinton got diverted by crucial Arab/Israeli negotiations that seemed like they would bring peace to Palestine. (In the event, needless to say, it did not happen.) At the same time Republicans in Congress never stopped drilling holes into what had been already agreed with North Korea. Promises made by the US government to the North Koreans were sabotaged and undermined by the Republicans.

Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, kicked Clinton’s good work aside

The stand-off between the US and North Korea is a precarious one. The American military knew that if the US fired its weapons North Korea would aim south its arsenal of conventionally armed rockets and destroy Seoul, only a couple of minutes of flying time away.

For its part, the North Korean military knows that a (thin) majority of American public opinion, according to polls, would back a large-scale retaliatory nuclear attack if the North Koreans launched towards the US even one rocket armed with a nuclear warhead.

Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, kicked Clinton’s good work aside, despite the views of his secretary of state and former military chief, Colin Powell and most of the academic political science and international relations community, who thought this was a worse mistake than going to war with Iraq. North Korea then decided, and only then, to complete its work on building a nuclear bomb.

We can’t wind the clock back to Clinton’s “Agreed Framework”, but we can create another- slowly. But first the North has to be “warmed up”- with some of the same techniques that in the end helped undermine the Soviet Union—cultural, educational and sporting exchanges—regular visits of US soccer, baseball teams and symphony orchestras, the New York City Ballet and Opera, Broadway musicals, pop musicians and building branch campuses of major US universities that teach, besides arts and sciences, human rights (which has been done by Western universities’ outreach programs in some Chinese universities).

Then the US must agree to two things Pyongyang really wants: to open talks on a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War which terminated with only an armistice in 1953. Second, to limit American military exercises around the Korean peninsula.

We need no more bluster. The US needs to get on with searching for a peaceful solution. Being positive is not easy but in the end, after tortuous years of progress followed by retrenchment, it’s informed optimism that counts. Where there’s a will surely there’s a way. And now after many missteps we do know the way to go, if we want to. Unfortunately, to be realistic, it will not happen until the Republicans are in a minority in both the House and the Senate. Otherwise, they will sabotage any president-led agreement.

*Jonathan Power has been an international foreign affairs columnist for over 40 years. For 17 years he was a columnist and commentator for the International Herald Tribune (now the New York Times). He has interviewed over 70 of the world’s most famous and influential presidents, prime ministers, and political and literary icons. Jonathan has also been a frequent guest columnist for the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times and the Washington Post. He has written eight books on foreign affairs and, in his early days as a journalist, made films for the BBC, one of which won the Silver Medal at the Venice Film Festival.

eurasiareview.com · January 26, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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