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Quotes of the Day:
"Man needs knowledge in order to survive, and only reason can achieve it; men who reject the responsibility of thought and reason, can exist only as parasites on the thinking of other people."
– Ayn Rand
"If we Americans are to survive it will have to be because we choose and defend and elect and defend to be first of all American; to present to the world one homogeneous and unbroken front, whether white Americans or black one or purple or blue or green...If we in America have reached that point in our desperate culture when we must murder children, no matter for reason or what color, we don't deserve to survive. and probably won't."
– William Faulkner
"The hardest part about gaining a new idea is sweeping out the false idea occupying that niche. As long as that niche is occupied , evidence and proof and logical demonstration get nowhere. But once that niche is emptied of the wrong idea that has been filling it – once you can honestly say, 'I don't know,' then it becomes possible to get at the truth."
– Robert A. Heinlein, The Cat Who Walks Through Walls
1. Korean Strategic Culture of the last Eight Korean Nation States: Comparing the Past to Today’s North and South Variants
2. Korean Peninsula Update, January 27, 2026
3. Exclusive | U.S. Warns Korea Against Targeting American Tech Firms Amid Trade Escalation
4. North Korea claims successful test of upgraded large-caliber rocket system
5. Kim Jong Un's inspections grow harsher ahead of party congress
6. Accelerated OPCON Transfer Must Avoid a Security Vacuum
7. US ouster of Maduro nightmare scenario for Kim Jong Un, says North Korean ex-diplomat
8. UNC says pending bills to ease DMZ access 'completely at odds' with armistice
9. Minister says probe into drone incursion focuses on acts by 'remnants' of Yoon gov't
10. S. Korea will explain efforts to pass special investment bill to U.S.: presidential aide
1. Korean Strategic Culture of the last Eight Korean Nation States: Comparing the Past to Today’s North and South Variants
Comment: This is original research and deep history from my good friend and mentor, Robert Collins.
All those who are concerned with solving the "Korea question" (the unnatural division of the peninsula per para 60 of the Armistice) should read this history.
Below the summary and Bob's bio is my introduction to his research history that explains why this is important for those pursuing a free and unified Korea.
Read the entire work at this link: https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/Original-Research/Korean-Strategic-Culture-of-the-last-Eight-Korean-Nation-States-Comparing-the-Past-to-Todays-North-and-South-Variants?full=1
Original Research
Korean Strategic Culture of the last Eight Korean Nation States: Comparing the Past to Today’s North and South Variants
Author: Robert M. Collins, HRNK
January 26, 2026
https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/Original-Research/Korean-Strategic-Culture-of-the-last-Eight-Korean-Nation-States-Comparing-the-Past-to-Todays-North-and-South-Variants
Executive Director’s Note: Robert Collins is a senior advisor for the Committee of Human Rights in North Korea. He has provided an important history of Korea that is relevant to all who pursue a free and unified Korea. The following is a short introduction to his work.
Summary:
Robert M. Collins argues that Korea’s strategic culture, shaped across eight historical Korean nation-states, shows enduring patterns driven by geography, recurring great-power pressure, internal volatility, and the quality of strategic intelligence. He emphasizes that the decisive variable is alliance management, since Korean states that aligned effectively with stronger partners and coordinated operations tended to survive and prosper, while those that balanced poorly or relied on culture over readiness suffered disaster. He traces distinct models across Koguryo, Paekche, Shilla, Palhae, Koryo, and Choson, then compares these legacies to today’s North and South Korean variants.
Author’s Bio:
Robert M. Collins completed 37 years of service as a soldier and U.S. Department of the Army civilian employee. He served 31 years in various assignments with the U.S. military in Korea, including several liaison positions with the Republic of Korea Armed Forces. Mr. Collins’ final assignment was as Chief of Strategy, ROK-US Combined Forces Command, serving the four-star American commander as a political analyst for planning on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian security issues. He received the Sam-il Medal (Republic of Korea Order of National Security Medal, Fourth Class) from President Lee Myung-bak and the U.S. Army Decoration for Exceptional Civilian Service by the Secretary of the Army. Mr. Collins earned a B.A. in Asian History from the University of Maryland in 1977, and an M.A. in International Politics, focusing on North Korean Politics, from Dankook University in 1988.
Mr. Collins is a Senior Advisor at HRNK, where he conducts interviews with North Korean escapees in South Korea to gather information on the North Korean population and the human rights situation in that country. He is the author of Marked For Life: Songbun, North Korea’s Social Classification System; Pyongyang Republic: North Korea’s Capital of Human Rights Denial; From Cradle to Grave: The Path of North Korean Innocents; Denied From the Start: Human Rights at the Local Level in North Korea; North Korea’s Organization and Guidance Department: The Control Tower of Human Rights Denial; South Africa’s Apartheid and North Korea’s Songbun: Parallels in Crimes Against Humanity; Propaganda and Agitation Department: Kim Jong-un Regime’s Sword of Indoctrination; and Slaves to the Bomb: The Role and Fate of North Korea’s Nuclear Scientists; all published by HRNK.
[ Read Full Original Research Work ]
An Introduction
Strategic Culture and the Korea Question
To plan for the unification of Korea one must first understand the long arc of Korean strategic culture. The division of the peninsula did not erase the strategic habits formed across two millennia. Those habits persist in doctrine, alliance choices, civil-military relations, national myths, and ideas about war and diplomacy. They shape how Seoul and Pyongyang think, how they threaten and reassure, and how they imagine order after the guns fall silent. To solve the “Korea question” identified in paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, the United States, South Korea, and their partners must reckon with this deeper history.
Korea’s geography exposed every Korean state to existential threats from larger neighbors. Geography forced Koreans to become masters of alliance management, intelligence, and strategic adaptation. Koguryo and Palhae built militarized continental states. Paekche linked security to maritime trade. Shilla unified the peninsula through a combined alliance and maneuver strategy. Koryo sought balance and diplomacy. Choson embraced isolation and cultural defense at great cost. The modern Korean states mirror these lineages. north Korea adopted the expansionist and coercive habits of the warrior states. South Korea inherited defensive Confucian pragmatism, maritime openness, and alliance-based security.
The Armistice suspended hostilities but not the contest over legitimacy. The “Korea question” endured because the peninsula remained trapped between competing strategic cultures, external power politics, and unfinished civil war. Modern diplomacy often focuses on nuclear weapons and crisis management. Yet weapons are only the surface. The strategic culture beneath them explains persistence, risk tolerance, bargaining style, and visions of unification. If unification is to be peaceful, durable, and legitimate, the planners must understand how earlier Korean states succeeded or failed when confronting rivals, managing alliances, or governing diverse populations.
History also reveals counterarguments. Some argue the modern peninsula is unique: industrial South, totalitarian North, nuclear shadow, China’s rise, America’s alliances, and Japan’s rearmament. Yet the pattern of great powers circling Korea is not new. The peninsula has repeatedly been the hinge of Northeast Asian strategy. Earlier Korean states endured similar pressures. The lessons are sobering. States that neglected alliances or early warning paid dearly. States that managed alliances wisely, as Shilla did with Tang, altered the strategic map. Others like Koryo tried to balance without commitment and suffered when continental powers shifted too fast. These lessons speak directly to contemporary choices regarding the U.S.–ROK alliance, Japan–Korea cooperation, and the role of China and Russia in any settlement.
The core question becomes sharper. If unification comes, what kind of Korean state will emerge? Expansionist or defensive? Maritime or continental? Alliance-based or isolationist? Centralized or pluralist? History does not dictate the answer. It offers a set of possibilities. Understanding those possibilities gives strategists the intellectual map needed to think beyond armistice management toward true settlement.
The paper’s purpose is therefore practical. Strategic culture is not antiquarian curiosity. It is a planning tool. To solve the Korea question one must understand how Koreans have solved and failed to solve similar problems before. Only then can Seoul, Washington, and their partners craft a unification strategy that is rooted in history yet oriented toward a future Korean state that is stable, legitimate, prosperous, and at peace with its neighbors.
One final question frames the work. If the Armistice asked how to create “a peaceful settlement of the “Korean question,” what strategic culture would such a settlement require, and which of the eight historical Korean states offers the best guide? The answer to that question matters now more than at any time since 1953.
For those who study Korea, make policy and “do strategy,” and those who especially focus on the pursuit of a free and unified Korea, I recommend studying this important work from Robert Collins.
David Maxwell
Executive Director, Korea Regional Review
2. Korean Peninsula Update, January 27, 2026
Comment: From AEI/ISW. Maps/graphics at the link.
Korean Peninsula Update, January 27, 2026
AEI · Dan Blumenthal
by Dan Blumenthal, Nicholas Carl, Alexis Turek, et al.
January 27, 2026
Article | Institute for the Study of War
Foreign and Defense Policy
https://www.aei.org/articles/korean-peninsula-update-january-27-2026/
Data Cutoff: January 26, 2026
The Korean Peninsula Update is a joint product of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). It supports the AEI–ISW Coalition Defense of Taiwan project’s broader mission to strengthen a de facto coalition to deter and contain China and North Korea in the Indo-Pacific. This update tracks and analyzes political, military, and security developments on the Korean Peninsula—centered on the North Korean threat and evolving dynamics on the peninsula, South Korean responses, and broader US strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
Toplines
Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) General Secretary Kim Jong Un publicly dismissed a senior economic official on January 20, possibly to limit the growing influence of a potential rival faction. Kim Jong Un told Cabinet Vice Premier Yang Seung Ho to resign due to incompetence while delivering a speech at the opening ceremony site of the Ryongsong Machine Complex.[1] Yang has served as the vice premier in the Cabinet since April 2020 and was a core technocrat under former Premier Kim Tok Hun, who served from August 2020 to December 2024. Yang and Kim Tok Hun started their career at the Taean Machine Industry Complex. Yang’s promotion followed Kim Tok Hun’s rise in ranks. The South Korean Ministry of Unification (MOU) reported that Kim Tok Hun has not appeared in public since December 2025, indicating possible demotion or removal.[2]
South Korean intelligence assessed that Yang and Kim Tok Hun are part of a faction led by WPK Politburo Standing Committee member Choe Ryong Hae.[3] They both rose within the party and state while Choe was the head of the WPK Organizational Department — the party’s key organ responsible for official appointments and removals — between 2017 and 2019.[4] The connection to Choe likely protected Yang and Kim Tok Hun for some time. Kim Jong Un criticized Kim Tok Hun over a failed project in August 2023 but did not dismiss him, reportedly due to support from then-Central Audit Commission Chairman Kim Jae Ryong, who is a member of Choe’s faction.[5] The regime demoted Kim Jae Ryong to commission vice chair in 2024, which may have removed this protection.[6] The regime removed at least two other Choe-associated officials in 2025, including former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Ri Pyong Chol and former Director of the Korea People’s Army Reconnaissance General Bureau and the United Front Department Kim Yong Chol.[7]
Kim may be purging officials due to the upcoming Party Congress, based on established precedent. North Korea replaced 66 percent of the ruling elites the 8th Party Congress in January 2021.[8] The Party Congress typically serves as a platform for announcing new economic policies. Kim may want a new Cabinet formation aligned with his post-COVID-19 pandemic priorities.
The removals specifically targeting Choe’s network could reflect Kim Jong Un’s efforts to manage the influence of competing factions in the WPK. Kim Jong Un has historically prevented any single faction from gaining a dominant position in the WPK.[9] The systematic weakening of Choe’s network suggests that Kim perceives Choe’s power as increasingly problematic. Kim may conduct additional purges ahead of the 9th Party Congress.
North Korean internal political instability has historically correlated with external provocations, as Kim seeks to consolidate domestic cohesion through nationalist rallying.[10] The absence of immediate military mobilization indicators suggests current internal tensions are manageable and unlikely to trigger near-term escalation.
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung appears to be prioritizing escalation management and diplomacy over denuclearization or unification efforts. Lee said on January 21 that North Korea is unlikely to abandon its nuclear program but maintained that complete denuclearization remains South Korea’s ideal outcome. Lee reiterated his three-stage denuclearization proposal that involves freezing nuclear material and weapons production, reducing nuclear capabilities, and ultimately achieving denuclearization. Lee’s focus on escalation management and diplomacy marks a departure from the previous Yoon Suk-yeol administration. Yoon viewed pre-emptive economic incentives for engagement without a denuclearization commitment as an acknowledgement of Pyongyang as a nuclear weapons state. North Korea rejected the Yoon administration’s proposals and instead codified a nuclear doctrine in September 2022 and declared South Korea an “enemy state” in its Constitution in January 2024. Lee separately said on January 21 that his administration would work toward peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula and “set aside” unification talks for now.
North Korea is unlikely to accept Lee’s calls for dialogue, even as South Korea deemphasizes its denuclearization goals. North Korea is not facing immediate food or aid shortages due to its trade with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, meaning that North Korea lacks an immediate incentive to engage in diplomacy. North Korean leaders appear increasingly confident given their growing diplomatic, military, and economic power, in fact, further reducing the incentive to grant concessions. South Korea’s challenges vis-a-vis North Korea are compounded by the fact that there appears to be little coordination with the United States on their North Korea policies.
Seoul may propose an inter-Korean economic cooperation effort to incentivize Pyongyang’s engagement and galvanize Washington and Beijing to facilitate a dialogue between Kim and Lee. South Korea’s MOU is already seeking to import North Korean food and approved a draft to allocate around 12 million US dollars (17.1 billion KRW) to various inter-Korean exchange projects.[11] North Korea, however, has recently intensified its anti-United States and anti-South Korea narratives to its domestic audience without signs of reversal in the near future.
The US 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) urged South Korea to take primary responsibility for defending itself without reaffirming US extended deterrence against North Korean nuclear threats. North Korea may view this as the United States retreating from extended deterrence commitments on the Korean Peninsula. The United States released the 2026 NDS on January 23, presenting the Department of Defense’s role in implementing the National Security Strategy (NSS).[12] The 2026 NDS marked a departure from longstanding US policy toward North Korea. The strategy did not mention achieving North Korean denuclearization or enforcing UN Security Council resolutions. The 2022 and 2017 NDS’s both committed to “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization.” The 2026 NDS did not include explicit extended deterrence guarantees either, such as previous language that North Korean nuclear use would “result in the end of that regime.”[13] The NDS shifted the primary responsibility of maintaining Korean peninsula stability to South Korea by stating that Seoul is capable of deterring North Korea with only “critical but limited support from US forces.”[14] North Korea may interpret the reduced US security guarantee as a vulnerability that it can exploit and test.
The NDS also removed language on enforcing UN sanctions and denuclearization, two long-standing US policies toward North Korea. North Korea annually earns over one to three billion US dollars through cyber theft, arms sales to Russia, and sanctions evasion.[15] These revenues are likely funding nuclear weapons development. Reduced sanctions enforcement will likely accelerate North Korea military expansion.
The Lee administration could respond to the new US strategy by calling for the acceleration of the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the US forces to South Korean forces.[16] Seoul increased defense spending by 7.5 percent to 44.8 billion US dollars in 2026 in order to strengthen its independent warfighting capabilities against North Korea.[17] US commitments to provide extended deterrence would remain essential even after the transfer of OPCON, however.[18] The NDS language on “updating US force posture” likely signals Washington’s desire for greater US Forces Korea (USFK) flexibility to deploy assets to higher-priority areas, particularly for potential cross-strait contingencies or Middle East crises. The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act legally prevents reducing USFK below 28,500 troops, however.[19]
Key Takeaways
-
North Korean purges: Kim Jong Un publicly dismissed a senior economic official, possibly to limit the influence of a potential rival faction. The removal may reflect Kim’s efforts to manage factional influence ahead of the next WPK Congress.
-
Inter-Korean relations: South Korean President Lee appears to be prioritizing escalation management and diplomacy over denuclearization or unification efforts vis-à-vis North Korea. Pyongyang remains unlikely to accept Lee’s calls for dialogue.
-
US regional policy: The US 2026 NDS urged South Korea to take primary responsibility for defending itself without reaffirming US extended deterrence against North Korean nuclear threats. Pyongyang may feel emboldened by the rhetorical change.
North Korean Domestic Politics
See toplines.
North Korean Military Developments
Nothing significant to report.
North Korean Foreign Relations
[The following text appeared in the China & Taiwan Update, January 23, 2026]
The PRC and North Korea have recovered their pre-pandemic level trade volume as of December.[20] The PRC General Administration of Customs reported that PRC-North Korean trade in December 2025 was the highest recorded since November 2017.[21] The two countries reported 310 million US dollars in trade for December, a 30-million-US-dollar increase from November. PRC-North Korea trade has experienced a steady upward trend since the COVID-19 pandemic.[22]
The PRC and North Korea will likely continue to expand their trade relationship in 2026. The PRC is constructing a new large-scale trade complex in Dandong, China, on the PRC-North Korea border.[23] An unnamed high-level official from Dandong revealed the city plans to complete the New Yalu River Bridge, which connects Dandong with Sinuiju, North Korea, in 2026.[24] North Korea is continuing to smuggle goods such as vehicles, grains, and oil through the PRC.[25] North Korea will likely seek to expand its trade relations with Russia as well, reflected by the ongoing construction of North Korea’s first road-bridge connecting it to Russia.[26]
North Korea’s trade cooperation with the PRC comes amid a possible downturn in PRC-North Korean political relations. WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un did not mention Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping’s name in his January 9 New Year’s Greetings, a significant omission and deviation from the norm. The omission of Xi’s name could indicate that Kim is currently prioritizing the relationship with Moscow over the relationship with Beijing. Russia currently fully acknowledges and supports the Kim Jong Un regime, while the PRC remains hesitant to broaden its engagement. Kim likely thus considers Russia a better partner. The omission of Xi’s name may also reflect Kim’s discontent with Beijing regarding its recent diplomatic engagement with Seoul. Xi Jinping met with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung on January 5 and agreed to enhance PRC-South Korean bilateral cooperation.
North Korean state media intensified its coverage of the Trump administration’s effort to acquire Greenland from Denmark in order to frame Washington as the primary driver of international instability and weakening alliance with the European nations. Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom on January 18 released a joint statement to protest the US proposal to acquire Greenland, stating that the US tariff “threats undermine transatlantic relations” and risk a “dangerous downward spiral.”[27] North Korean state media on January 21 and 22 reported that European countries could not stop the United States’ “brutal ambition for territorial seizure” based on “foreign media” assessment without specifying the source.[28] The state media added “foreign media predicted anti-US sentiment will intensify across Europe,” without clarifying which foreign media.[29] North Korea, in a separate report, cited a January 17 statement by Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem accusing the United States of “hegemonic and interventionist strategy” worldwide.[30]
North Korea uses the narrative of “US imperialism” to justify the development of its nuclear program as a response to “external threats.” North Korean media coverage of geopolitical incidents involving the United States and its democratic allies frequently portrays them as aggressive and villainous, likely to increase domestic support for the WPK and the Kim regime. North Korean rhetoric concerning US actions toward Greenland are reminiscent of its coverage on US operations in Venezuela, US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, and the South Korean drone incursion into Kaesong.
North Korean Influence Operations
Nothing significant to report.
Inter-Korean Relations
The Lee Jae Myung administration is considering a preemptive proposal to restore a no-fly zone near the military demarcation line (MDL) to North Korea. Restoring the no-fly would mark the first step toward reinstating the “9.19 Military Agreement.”[31] The 9.19 Military was an inter-Korean agreement enacted during the Moon Jae-in administration.[32] The 9.19 Military Agreement aimed to build trust between North and South Korea during the third inter-Korean summit in 2018.[33] The agreement included the removal of military facilities in demilitarized zones, the complete cessation of hostile acts by both states, and a no-fly zone.[34] The no-fly zone set by the agreement applied to all aircraft types within a 20-40 km range from the MDL, with drones specifically set at a 10–15km range.[35] Pyongyang unilaterally terminated the agreement in November 2023, and former South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol completely suspended it in June 2024.[36] An unnamed Lee administration official said on January 19 that the administration is still undecided on the method or timing of the proposal for North Korea yet.[37]
The Lee administration may seek to restore the no-fly zone due to recent cross-border drone incidents.[38] South Korean civilian drones trespassed into North Korean airspace more than twice in September 2025 and on January 4, prompting backlash from Pyongyang.[39] The Lee administration’s measure appears intended to manage further accidental incidents and avoid provoking North Korea further. Pyongyang may hold a positive stance on restoring the no-fly zone based on the 9.19 Military Agreement as a reciprocal measure yet will not accept Seoul’s proposal at the moment, given that Pyongyang has taken a firm stance on refusing engagement.
South Korean Domestic Politics
The South Korean MOU is encouraging relations-building and dialogue with North Korea. The MOU’s lack of coordination with the United States and other key actors could result in inconsistent and less effective policy. MOU Minister Chung Dong-young convened the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council on January 22 for the first time since 2022.[40] The MOU decided to provide approximately 11.8 million US dollars to support inter-Korean exchange projects.[41] Chung reiterated the Lee administration’s desire to resume exchanges with North Korea.[42] The MOU also announced a plan to transfer the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), a state-run research institute, to the MOU’s jurisdiction on January 14.[43] An unnamed MOU official stated that “the need for an organic linkage between policy and research” was a reason for the transfer.[44] The KINU is currently under the Prime Minister’s Office, though it conducts independent research without the administration’s direction.[45] The MOU withdrew the plan after receiving criticism that it was a unilateral legislative move lacking consultation with the institute or the Office for Government Policy Coordination.[46] Chung announced the administration’s intention to reopen the “Peace Trail” in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) as part of its “preemptive trust-building measures” on January 21.[47] The United Nations Command (UNC), responsible for the primary management of the DMZ, expressed its opposition to Chung’s plan for the Peace Trail on the following day.[48] The UNC’s opposition stems from security concerns regarding the reopening of three locations along the trail.[49]
The MOU and Minister Chung have been promoting trust-building policies since receiving Lee’s support during a dispute with the Foreign Ministry over North Korea policy jurisdiction in December 2025.[50] The MOU’s primary objective is to expand exchanges with North Korea. Chung has argued that the Lee administration should respond accordingly to North Korea’s claims on the drone incident to foster mutual trust.[51] Chung expressed the need for efforts to avoid similar incidents and prevent escalation on January 14. Chung appears likely to call for dialogue on responses to the drone incident, possibly including an official apology to North Korea.[52] Pyongyang’s continued refusal of dialogue with Seoul may reduce the efficacy of these policies, if implemented.
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s approval ratings are remaining steady, with slight improvement, according to some polling results. Lee’s foreign and economic policy appears to be contributing most to his favorable ratings. Gallup announced that Lee’s approval rating was at 61 percent in the fourth week of January, a three-percent increase from the previous week.[53] Twenty-seven percent of respondents who approved Lee evaluated his foreign policy to be most favorable, followed by the economy and public communication.[54] Lee’s visit to the PRC and Japan in early January appears to still reflect his ratings positively.[55] Realmeter reported that Lee’s approval rating remained at 53.1 percent, however, unchanged from the previous week.[56] Realmeter posited that Lee‘s economic achievements, such as the KOSPI (Korea Composite Stock Price Index) breaking records and surpassing the 5,000 mark for the first time, had a positive impact on his approval ratings.[57] Realmeter stated that controversies over the administration’s first nominee for the Minister of the Planning and Budget could have prevented Lee’s approval from increasing.[58]
Counter-North Korean Coalition Building Efforts
Nothing significant to report.
Endnotes:
[1] https://nk.news1 dot kr/news/articles/6044709
[2] https://www.news1 dot kr/nk/politics-diplomacy/6036467
[3] https://www.nars.go dot kr/report/view.do?cmsCode=CM0156&brdSeq=47200
[4] https://www.voakorea dot com/a/korea_korea-politics_issue-3/6029688.html#:~:text=%EC%9D%B4%EC%96%B4 %EC%A7%80%EB%82%9C%ED%95%B4 4%EC%9B%94 %EC%B5%9C%EB%A3%A1%ED%95%B4%EA%B0%80 %EC%B5%9C%EA%B3%A0%EC%9D%B8%EB%AF%BC%ED%9A%8C%EC%9D%98 %EC%83%81%EC%9E%84%EC%9C%84%EC%9B%90%EC%9E%A5%EC%9C%BC%EB%A1%9C %EC%9E%90%EB%A6%AC%EB%A5%BC,%EA%B4%80%EB%A0%A8%ED%95%B4 %EA%B9%80%EC%97%AC%EC%A0%95%EC%9D%B4 %EB%82%98%EC%9D%B4%EA%B0%80 %EB%A7%8E%EC%9D%80%EB%8D%B0%EB%8B%A4 %EC%A0%84%EB%AC%B8%EC%84%B1%EB%8F%84 %EB%96%A8%EC%96%B4%EC%A7%80%EB%8A%94 %EB%A6%AC%EB%A7%8C
[5] https://www.nars.go dot kr/report/view.do?cmsCode=CM0156&brdSeq=47200
[6] http://drm.nars.go dot kr:7003/sd/imageviewer?doc_id=1POJOvAIPjI&DocId=1POJOvAIPjI&documentId=&DOCUMENTID=&DOCUMENTID=&EdmUserId=datauser&ViewerYn=Y&type=S&fileName=KE5BUlMg7J6F67KV7KCV7LGFIDE2Ne2YuC0yMDI1MDQxMCnrtoHtlZwg7JeY66as7Yq4IOuCtCDqtozroKXqtazsobDsnZgg67OA7ZmU7JmAIOyLnOyCrOygkCDvvJog7LWc66Oh7ZW0IOu5hOqzteyLneyhsOyngeydmCDqs7Xsi53sobDsp4Eg7J6l7JWF7J2EIOykkeyLrOycvOuhnC5wZGY%3D
[7] https://www.news1 dot kr/nk/politics-diplomacy/6036467
[8] https://www.sejong dot org/web/boad/1/egoread.php?bd=1&itm=4&txt=%EB%B6%81%ED%95%9C&pg=3&seq=12564
[9] https://www.bbc dot com/news/world-asia-25359939
[10] https://asaninst dot org/bbs/board.php?bo_table=s1_2&wr_id=144
[11] https://www.newsis dot com/view/NISX20260122_0003486570
[12] https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF
[13] https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF
[14] https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF
[15] https://www.chainalysis dot com/blog/crypto-hacking-stolen-funds-2026/
[16] https://www.chosun dot com/international/us/2026/01/25/P5FQAI2JIBBY7NGC47QGZCHCTU/
[17] https://www.nknews dot org/?p=964765
[18] https://www.inss.re.kr/publication/bbs/rr_view.do?nttId=410261&bbsId=rr&page=1&searchCnd=0&searchWrd=
[19] https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/1071/text
[20] https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/north-korea-china-trade-surges-25-in-2025-to-nearly-reach-pre-pandemic-levels/
[21] https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/north-korea-china-trade-surges-25-in-2025-to-nearly-reach-pre-pandemic-levels/
[22] https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/north-korea-china-trade-surges-25-in-2025-to-nearly-reach-pre-pandemic-levels/
[23] https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/china-breaks-ground-on-new-cross-border-trade-park-on-north-koreas-doorstep/
[24] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20260122155300073?input=1195m
[25] https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/north-korea-china-trade-surges-25-in-2025-to-nearly-reach-pre-pandemic-levels/; https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/north-korea-invites-china-firms-to-spring-trade-fair-after-foreign-ban-last-year/
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-january-22-2026/; https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20251028083000009
[27] https://www.government dot se/statements/2026/01/statement-by-denmark-finland-france-germany-the-netherlands-norway-sweden-and-the-united-kingdom/
[28] http://www.rodong.rep dot kp/ko/index.php?MTJAMjAyNi0wMS0yMS0wMzVAMkAyQEAwQDIwQDBAMA
[29] http://www.rodong.rep dot kp/ko/index.php?MTJAMjAyNi0wMS0yMi0wNDJAMkAzQEAwQDMxQDBAMA==
[30] http://www.rodong.rep dot kp/ko/index.php?MTJAMjAyNi0wMS0yMS0wMzdAMkAyQEAwQDIyQDBAMA
[31] https://www.news1 dot kr/diplomacy/unikorea/6044074
[32] https://www.korea dot kr/special/policyCurationView.do?newsId=148865808
[33] https://www.korea dot kr/special/policyCurationView.do?newsId=148865808
[34] https://www.korea dot kr/special/policyCurationView.do?newsId=148865808
[35] https://www.korea dot kr/special/policyCurationView.do?newsId=148865808
[36] https://www.joongang.co dot kr/article/25254090; https://www.voakorea.com/a/7366972.html
[37] https://www.news1 dot kr/diplomacy/unikorea/6044074
[38] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20260122075100504
[39] https://www.bbc.com/korean/articles/c5yvp7dw4lwo
[40] https://www.newsis dot com/view/NISX20260122_0003486570
[41] https://www.segye dot com/newsView/20260122515660?OutUrl=naver
[42] https://www.segye dot com/newsView/20260122515660?OutUrl=naver
[43] https://www.donga dot com/news/Politics/article/all/20260119/133184715/2
[44] https://www.chosun dot com/politics/politics_general/2026/01/19/W4LKCKOIK5F45KMWHWLGN26FJA/
[45] https://www.chosun dot com/politics/politics_general/2026/01/19/W4LKCKOIK5F45KMWHWLGN26FJA/
[46] https://view.asiae dot co.kr/article/2026011916534801496
[47] https://m.yonhapnewstv.co dot kr/news/AKR20260122111701qEi
[48] https://www.news1 dot kr/nk/politics-diplomacy/6047454
[49] https://www.news1 dot kr/nk/politics-diplomacy/6047454
[50] https://www.chosun dot com/politics/politics_general/2025/12/20/NPMS2FLFQZGKVJVEM52XE342HA/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-december-23-2025/
[51] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20260115119800504?input=1195m
[52] https://www.joongang.co dot kr/article/25397525
[53] https://www.gallup.co dot kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1615
[54] https://www.gallup.co dot kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1615
[55] https://www.korea dot kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148957531; https://www.korea dot kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148958168
[56] http://www.realmeter dot
3. Exclusive | U.S. Warns Korea Against Targeting American Tech Firms Amid Trade Escalation
Summary:
The WSJ reports the U.S. warned South Korea against what Washington sees as discriminatory scrutiny of U.S. tech firms, with Coupang a focal point, and the message was delivered by Vice President JD Vance to Prime Minister Kim Min-seok. This landed as POTUS threatened to restore tariffs to 25% from 15% over delays in ratifying a trade package that included a non-discrimination pledge on digital policy.
Comment: Seoul believes its investigations are legitimate and Washington believes they are political. How do we reconcile this?
Exclusive | U.S. Warns Korea Against Targeting American Tech Firms Amid Trade Escalation
WSJ
JD Vance cautioned Prime Minister Kim Min-seok against pursuing penalties and regulations on U.S.-based firms like Coupang
By Gavin Bade
Follow and Amrith Ramkumar
Follow
Updated Jan. 27, 2026 6:53 pm ET
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/u-s-warns-korea-against-targeting-american-tech-firms-amid-trade-escalation-7a8a5a3a
Coupang does most of its business in South Korea. Seongjoon Cho/Bloomberg News
WASHINGTON—The Trump administration is warning South Korea not to target tech companies with discriminatory regulations and investigations, its latest effort to protect U.S. internet platforms as it threatens higher tariffs on the country.
Many recent discussions involve Coupang, a U.S.-based e-commerce company similar to Amazon that does nearly all its business in the East Asian nation and has powerful allies in the Trump administration and Congress, people familiar with the matter said. They have also covered platform and artificial-intelligence rules that are a concern for companies including Facebook owner Meta Platforms and Google.
Vice President JD Vance met with South Korean Prime Minister Kim Min-seok in Washington last week and warned him against penalizing U.S. tech firms including Coupang, the people said. The vice president’s office declined to comment.
The exchange happened just days before trade tensions between the two nations came to a head. President Trump Monday said on Truth Social that he would restore tariffs on South Korean cars, drugs and other products to 25% from 15% because the country’s legislature hasn’t approved the preliminary trade agreement between the two sides. That pact includes South Korea’s committing to invest $350 billion in the U.S., and a pledge to not discriminate against U.S. tech firms.
South Korean Prime Minister Kim Min-seok said his government isn’t discriminating against Coupang. Yonhap/EPA/Shutterstock
While Trump’s post focused on ratification of the trade deal, the threat comes amid growing displeasure among some administration officials about South Korea’s approach to a number of issues, including treatment of U.S. tech firms and actions against Christian churches in Korea, say people familiar with the administration’s thinking. A White House official, however, said ongoing tensions over tech and religious issues didn’t push Trump to issue his Monday tariff threat.
“While the president lowered tariffs on Korea, the Koreans have made no progress on fulfilling their end of the bargain,” said the official. “Other alleged issues in the U.S.-Korea relationship are not pertinent to the president’s decision here.”
Though Trump’s post implied that he would increase levies on South Korea immediately, the administration has so far taken no action to alter tariff rates, opening an opportunity for negotiations between the governments. The South Korean government diverted its trade minister, on a visit to Canada, to Washington, D.C., but the White House didn’t comment on the tariff threat or whether negotiations were possible.
Trump’s post comes after weeks of investigations from South Korean lawmakers and officials into Coupang that could result in regulations, fines and penalties over one of the country’s largest-ever data breaches and other complaints about its business practices and working conditions for its employees.
The probes have prompted the CEO of Coupang’s flagship Korean subsidiary to step down, and his interim successor—an American—to leave and then return to South Korea amid investigations by police and lawmakers. South Korean authorities have also raided Coupang’s offices there. The company is the second-biggest private employer in the country while branding itself as an American business.
Vance told Kim that the U.S. side wanted to see meaningful de-escalation in the South Korean government’s treatment of tech firms such as Coupang, the people familiar with the meeting said.
JD Vance warned against penalizing U.S. tech firms. Holden Smith/ZUMA Press
The South Korean embassy in Washington didn’t respond to requests for comment on the meeting, but Kim told South Korean media after his meeting that he told Vance his government isn’t discriminating against Coupang.
Disagreements over regulating U.S. tech firms have already thrown up complications to the U.S.-South Korea trade pact that the Trump administration and Kim’s government agreed to in October, lowering U.S. tariffs on most Korean goods from 25% to 15%. In December, the U.S. Trade Representative’s office canceled a planned meeting on the agreement with the Korean government in part because of concerns about Seoul’s digital regulations and actions against U.S. tech firms, the people said.
In recent weeks, South Korea lawmakers have proposed online platform fairness rules that would impose new regulations on tech companies, potentially reneging on a commitment that was part of the initial trade agreement that Trump put at risk with his Monday social-media post. Rules for companies developing artificial-intelligence models recently took effect in South Korea. Security hawks also fear such policies would benefit Chinese tech companies that are expanding in South Korea.
While Vance didn’t issue an explicit threat to Kim, the implication was that continued action against U.S. tech firms could mean more complications for the U.S.-South Korea trade deal, potentially leading to its unraveling and higher tariffs on South Korean goods, the people said.
It is the latest use of that tactic after the administration made tariff threats to target internet policies from Canada to the European Union last year.
“They feel they have leverage right now. They want to make sure they get these core issues addressed before they finalize a deal,” said Rob Atkinson, president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, an industry group that has been asking the administration to address digital trade issues challenging U.S. companies.
Coupang is the second-biggest private employer in South Korea. Anthony Wallace/AFP/Getty Images
When Kim visited Capitol Hill for lunch during his trip, lawmakers including Korean-Americans Dave Min (R., Calif.) and Young Kim (R., Calif.) asked whether Coupang was being treated differently than Korean companies, people familiar with the meeting said. The prime minister said it isn’t meant to be discriminatory, just as some said the U.S. immigration raid on a Hyundai Motors plant in Georgia last year shouldn’t be seen as singling out Hyundai, they said.
The warning from Vance highlights the identity crisis faced by Coupang, which was founded by a Harvard Business School dropout in 2010 and was based in Seoul at the time of its 2021 initial public offering. The company has since moved its headquarters to Seattle and rebranded as an American company, hiring Trump alums including former White House staff secretary Rob Porter as its chief global affairs officer.
Harold Rogers was named interim CEO of Coupang’s Korean business. Seongjoon Cho/Bloomberg News
But most of its revenue still comes from South Korea, where it has built a loyal customer base but alienated some local competitors who don’t think it is fair that Coupang claims to be an American company while being a dominant player in Korea.
Park Dae-jun, the former CEO of Coupang’s Korean business, stepped down in December following news of the data breach, which compromised the information of roughly 30 million people and prompted legislative hearings and investigations. Coupang named a new interim CEO of the business, Harold Rogers, but he left South Korea this month before a scheduled interview with police over charges of obstruction of official duties and obstruction of business under Korean law, according to South Korean news reports. Coupang declined to comment about his whereabouts, but a person familiar with his location said he has since returned to Seoul to continue working with Korean authorities.
Coupang shares are down about 30% since the data breach.
Write to Gavin Bade at gavin.bade@wsj.com and Amrith Ramkumar at amrith.ramkumar@wsj.com
Corrections & Amplifications
The CEO of Coupang’s Korean subsidiary stepped down following the data breach. An earlier version of this article incorrectly said it was the CEO of Coupang, the parent company. In addition, Harold Rogers was named interim CEO of the subsidiary. An earlier version of this article and a photo caption incorrectly said he was named interim CEO of Coupang. (Corrected on Jan. 27)
Copyright ©2026 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the January 28, 2026, print edition as 'South Korea Warned Over Tech'.
WSJ
4. North Korea claims successful test of upgraded large-caliber rocket system
Summary:
north Korea says Kim Jong Un oversaw a Jan. 27 test of an “upgraded” large caliber multiple rocket launcher, firing four rounds that reportedly struck a sea target about 358 km away. KCNA framed the event as a step toward more “effective” strategic deterrence, citing improved self guided flight, accuracy, and launcher mobility, and tied it to messaging ahead of the Workers’ Party congress expected soon. The signal is political as much as technical: capability claims, rehearsal, and agenda setting for the next cycle of coercion.
Comment: Kim says, "don't you forget about me" (from the NSS) but also let me prove my DPRK paragraph in the NDS.
World News Jan. 28, 2026 / 1:52 AM
North Korea claims successful test of upgraded large-caliber rocket system
By Thomas Maresca
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/28/Kim-Jong-Un-multiple-rocket-launcher-system-test-successful/8371769582020/
North Korea test-fired a large-caliber multiple-rocket launcher system on Jan. 27, state media reported Wednesday. Photo by KCNA/EPA
SEOUL, Jan. 28 (UPI) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversaw the test-firing of an upgraded large-caliber multiple rocket system, state-run media reported Wednesday.
Kim said the test held "great significance in improving the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent," according to the official Korean Central News Agency.
"We have achieved technical upgrading of this weapon system to employ its most powerful characteristics in the most appropriate and effective way, and thus made it possible to apply it in specific attacks," Kim said.
The North Korean leader cited improvements in the system's self-steered guided flight system, as well as the "intelligence and hitting accuracy of the rockets." He also claimed the mobility of a newly modernized launch vehicle was "perfect."
Related
The launch marked North Korea's second major weapons test of the year, following a Jan. 4 firing of what Pyongyang described as hypersonic weapons.
The test took place ahead of the Ninth Congress of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, expected to be convened by early next month. The gathering is seen as a forum for the leadership to review policy performance, announce a new five-year economic plan and signal potential shifts in military and foreign policy priorities.
Kim said the upcoming congress "will clarify the next-stage plans for further bolstering up the country's nuclear war deterrent," according to KCNA.
The KCNA report said four rockets were fired during the test on Tuesday, hitting a target in the sea some 223 miles away.
South Korea's military announced on the same day that it detected multiple short-range ballistic missiles launched from an area north of Pyongyang into the sea between Korea and Japan.
North Korea did not supply detailed specifications of the system, but it has tested a 600mm multiple rocket launcher on several occasions, most recently in May.
The United States and South Korea refer to the 600mm rocket system as the KN-25 and characterize it as a short-range ballistic missile. Pyongyang has claimed since October 2022 that the weapon can be fitted with a tactical nuclear warhead.
In late December, Kim visited a munitions factory and praised a new rocket launcher system that can "annihilate the enemy through sudden precise strike with high accuracy and devastating power" and can also be used as a "strategic attack means."
Analysts warn that North Korea's expanding long-range rocket artillery poses a growing conventional threat to South Korea, where much of the population and key military infrastructure lie within range of such systems.
5. Kim Jong Un's inspections grow harsher ahead of party congress
Summary:
Kim Jong Un is changing how he rules in public as the ninth Workers’ Party Congress nears. Analysts at KINU say his field inspections now look less like staged encouragement and more like judgment. At the Ryongsong Machinery Complex on Jan. 19, he dismissed Vice Premier Yang Seung-ho on the spot, blaming “irresponsible and incompetent” economic officials for losses and “man-made confusions.” The pattern fits earlier episodes, like the 2024 flood site meeting where officials were replaced and corruption cases labeled “extraordinary.” Seoul urges caution, noting Kim still wraps discipline in “people-first” language.
Comment: Rule by terror? Or trying to give the appearance of decisive leadership? And of course he casts blame but never truthfully accepts responsibility for all the failed policies of the Kim family regime. The policies are of course a failure for 7 decades from the perspective of the welfare of the people. But the policies and strategy have been successful for 7 decades because the Kim family regime continues to survive (by standing on and breaking the backs of 26 million Koreans in the north).
World News Jan. 27, 2026 / 10:43 PM / Updated Jan. 27, 2026 at 10:43 PM
Kim Jong Un's inspections grow harsher ahead of party congress
By Asia Today and translated by UPI
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/27/on-site-inspection-pattern-changed/8291769571303/
A photo released by the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) shows North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (C) inspecting the Ryongsong Machine Complex in Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province, North Korea, 19 January 2026 (issued 20 January 2026). During a speech at the site, the North Korean leader dismissed Vice Premier of the Cabinet Yang Sung Ho "on the spot," stating the project "encountered difficulties and incurred not a little amount of economic loss, experiencing unnecessary man-made confusions," according to KCNA. Photo by KCNA / EPA
Jan. 27 (Asia Today) -- As North Korea approaches its ninth Workers' Party Congress, analysts say leader Kim Jong Un has sharply altered his pattern of on-site inspections, shifting from symbolic encouragement to direct judgment and punishment.
According to a report released Monday by the Korea Institute for National Unification, Kim's recent field guidance has taken on a more punitive and interventionist character, with the leader openly reprimanding officials and ordering personnel actions on the spot.
The report cited Kim's appearance at a ceremony marking the first phase of modernization at the Ryongsong Machinery Complex in South Hamgyong Province on Jan. 19. During the event, Kim publicly dismissed Cabinet Vice Premier Yang Seung-ho, accusing "irresponsible and incompetent economic officials" of creating artificial confusion and economic losses. State-run Korean Central Television reported the dismissal the following day.
The institute's analysis said the move was unprecedented in scale and symbolism, suggesting growing pressure on the regime to deliver tangible economic results amid sanctions, resource shortages and domestic hardship.
Related
"Kim Jong Un harshly criticized a senior official and removed him immediately at a public event," the report said, calling it an extraordinary display of personal authority. "This suggests that the leadership's burden to produce outcomes has reached a critical point."
The report noted that similar actions have occurred in recent years. In 2024, Kim convened an emergency Politburo meeting at a flood recovery site, where he held officials responsible for disaster damage and replaced senior party and security officials in North Pyongan and Jagang provinces. In other cases, officials accused of corruption in Nampo and Jagang Province were designated as subjects of "extraordinary criminal cases," with reports of severe punishment.
The researcher argued that such actions reflect an erosion of formal party and state personnel procedures, replaced by direct intervention from the leader. The pattern contrasts with Kim's earlier emphasis on a people-friendly leadership style and points to a revival of coercive rule as systemic pressures mount.
The report described the trend as a more sophisticated "scapegoat mechanism" ahead of the party congress, expected as early as next month. It said stalled results from Kim's signature "20×10 local development policy" have increased the incentive to shift responsibility to mid- and high-level officials to deflect public dissatisfaction.
South Korea's Ministry of Unification, however, urged caution in interpreting the developments.
A ministry official told reporters that while the vice premier was dismissed during an on-site visit, Kim also emphasized "people-first ideology" and "love for the people" in his remarks. "It is too early to conclude that this represents a return to a reign of terror," the official said, adding that further observation is needed.
-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI
6. Accelerated OPCON Transfer Must Avoid a Security Vacuum
Summary:
Bridge Colby’s Seoul visit has reopened the OPCON debate, with his “model ally” remarks read as a nudge toward faster wartime operational control transfer under President Lee Jae-myung. Seoul argues OPCON is central to a Korean-led defense posture and wants a clearer roadmap. The current three-step certification could finish Full Operational Capability this year, with Full Mission Capability as early as 2027 exercises, enabling transfer well before 2030 if Washington provides bridging support. The warning is human and strategic: transition friction, higher costs, and deterrence ambiguity if South Korea commands conventionally while the United States retains nuclear authority against north Korea.
Comment: It is now the vacuum or gap/seam created by OPCON transition combined with CBLS "critical but limited support." The ROK/US Combined Forces Command's defense plans have to be drastically revised (written, approved, properly resourced, and rehearsed). During this period there could be a security vacuum unless the leadership says that all resources will continue to be provided until the new plan is developed and approved. Unfortunately US political leaders seem to want to shift to CBLS immediately if not sooner thus creating a security vacuum and an opportunity for Kim Jong Un to exploit. We could be heading for dangerous times because, with all due respect, the political leaders who are driving this lack the military expertise and experience to foresee these threats and challenges and only seek to implement their agenda driven strategies – and this is true in both Seoul and Washington.
World News Jan. 27, 2026 / 10:21 PM / Updated Jan. 27, 2026 at 10:21 PM
Accelerated OPCON Transfer Must Avoid a Security Vacuum
By Asia Today and translated by UPI
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/27/colby-wartime-operational-control-transfer/6311769569779/
A handout photo made available by the ROK Ministry of Defense shows South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back (L) shaking hands with Elbridge Colby, U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy, during their meeting at the defense ministry in Seoul, South Korea, 26 January 2026. Photo by ROK Ministry of Defense / EPA
Jan. 27 (Asia Today) -- Recent remarks by Elbridge Colby, U.S. deputy secretary of defense for policy, have reignited debate over the pace of South Korea's wartime operational control transfer.
Colby, currently visiting South Korea, said Monday that Seoul has the will to take a leading role in defending the Korean Peninsula by strengthening its own military capabilities, calling South Korea a "model ally." His comments are widely interpreted as signaling U.S. support for accelerating the transfer of wartime operational control, or OPCON, under the administration of President Lee Jae-myung.
Colby, regarded as a key security strategist for U.S. President Donald Trump and an architect of the administration's new National Defense Strategy, met separately with Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, Defense Minister Ahn Kyu-baek and National Security Office Director Wi Sung-lak to discuss alliance issues including OPCON transfer and South Korea's pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines.
Defense Minister Ahn told Colby that transferring OPCON is essential to establishing a Korean military-led defense posture and urged closer communication, including the development of a roadmap to accelerate the process.
Related
Under the current framework, OPCON transfer requires a three-stage verification process. The Security Consultative Meeting joint statement issued last November stated that the second phase - Full Operational Capability verification - would be completed this year. Some military officials believe that once this phase concludes, Seoul and Washington could immediately set a target year for transfer.
Speculation has grown that the final phase, Full Mission Capability verification, could take place as early as next year during combined ROK-U.S. exercises, potentially allowing OPCON transfer within two years if Washington agrees to provide supplemental capabilities during the transition. Such a timeline would move the transfer well ahead of the South Korean government's original 2030 target, depending on U.S. policy decisions.
The new U.S. National Defense Strategy makes clear that South Korea is expected to assume primary responsibility for deterring North Korea, while U.S. forces prioritize homeland defense and deterrence against China. Under this framework, OPCON transfer appears increasingly inevitable.
If Washington presses for an accelerated transfer, Seoul must seek meaningful concessions, including U.S. administration and congressional approval for the construction of nuclear-powered submarines. In addition, the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella could diminish after OPCON transfer, raising questions about long-term deterrence options.
Confusion may arise during the transition period, as South Korea would command the combined forces while the United States retains authority over nuclear decision-making. The risks are substantial, including higher defense spending and the possibility of a temporary security vacuum if deterrence against North Korea weakens.
For these reasons, the government must approach OPCON transfer with extreme caution and select its timing carefully to minimize strategic and economic risks.
-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI
7. US ouster of Maduro nightmare scenario for Kim Jong Un, says North Korean ex-diplomat
Summary:
Former north Korean diplomat Lee Il-kyu says the U.S. capture and ouster of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro is a nightmare for Kim Jong Un. It shows a decapitation operation can succeed, so Kim will likely harden personal security and contingency plans. Lee, who served in Cuba from 2019 to 2023 and defected in November 2023, describes a last minute airport struggle before South Korean diplomats secured his family’s protection. He urges Seoul to stop any repatriation of two north Korean POWs held by Ukraine, warning return would mean torture or death. He also notes South Korea’s institutions endured political turmoil today.
Perhaps. But have we lost the opportunity to exploit this from a cognitive warfare perspective because of our shift to CBLS (critical but limited support) for our ally, South Korea? Have we telegraphed that we are not going to provide the resources for such an operation? CBLS and the telegraphing of it is removing our strategic options and reducing our opportunities to create strategic dilemmas for our adversaries.
US ouster of Maduro nightmare scenario for Kim Jong Un, says North Korean ex-diplomat
straitstimes.com · January 28, 2026
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/us-ouster-of-maduro-nightmare-scenario-for-kim-n-korean-ex-diplomat
Seoul – The dramatic US operation that overthrew Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro earlier in January may have left North Korean leader Kim Jong Un feeling he was also vulnerable to “decapitation”, a former Pyongyang envoy to Havana told AFP.
In a wide-ranging interview, Mr Lee Il-kyu – who served as Pyongyang’s political counsellor in Cuba from 2019 until 2023 – said Washington’s lightning extraction in Caracas was a worst-case scenario for his former boss.
“Kim must have felt that a so-called ‘decapitation’ operation is actually possible,” said Mr Lee, who now works for a state-backed think-tank in Seoul.
North Korea’s leadership has long accused Washington of seeking to remove it from power and said its nuclear and missile programmes are needed as a deterrent against alleged regime change efforts by Washington.
But the former diplomat, who defected to the South in November 2023, told AFP that Maduro’s ouster will now spark panic among North Korea’s security-obsessed leadership.
Mr Kim will “overhaul the entire system regarding his security and countermeasures in case of an attack against him”, he said.
From his perch in Havana, a key backer of Mr Maduro’s socialist regime in Caracas, Mr Lee was charged with promoting the interests of the nuclear-armed state in Latin America.
He played a key role in high-profile negotiations, including securing the release of a North Korean vessel detained in Panama in 2013 – work for which he received a commendation from Mr Kim himself.
One of his last missions was an ultimately doomed effort to prevent Cuba from forging diplomatic ties with the North’s rival, Seoul.
But his deep frustration with the system led him to become one of the highest-level diplomats to defect in years.
“I was fed up,” he said.
Being denied opportunities after refusing to bribe a superior was the final straw, he told AFP.
Life-or-death struggle
He almost did not make it.
In a life-or-death moment for his family, he and his wife and daughter found themselves stuck at an airport in a Central American nation he asked AFP not to name.
Despite his stated intention to defect, officials at the airport insisted he needed to board a plane bound for Venezuela, which would almost certainly have sent him back to Cuba.
Cuban authorities would have been obliged to hand him over to North Korea – a death sentence.
“I physically struggled in desperation, trying to save my family. But it was not working,” he told AFP.
His plea was accepted at last when a South Korean diplomat showed up, telling officials that Mr Lee and his family were now under the protection of Seoul.
“At that moment, all the officials disappeared,” he said.
“Looking back, it was a moment that showed South Korea’s national strength.”
Mr Lee is now imploring South Korea to do the same for two North Korean prisoners of war captured by Ukraine – part of a cohort of thousands of troops sent by Pyongyang to assist Russia.
The two men recently wrote a letter expressing their desire to go to the South – a decision Mr Lee said would be perceived by Pyongyang as an “utter act of betrayal”.
It is not immediately clear why they have not been sent to South Korea, with Seoul saying it is in consultations with Kyiv over the fate of men it considers its citizens.
“Under no circumstances should they be sent back to the North,” Mr Lee said.
“If they were to be repatriated it would be better to be dead than alive. Living would become an ordeal in itself for them,” he said.
Seoul must take the lead in bringing them in, he said, an effort that also “requires the joint efforts of the international community and human rights groups”.
Dictatorship to democracy
Since settling in South Korea, 53-year-old Lee has become an outspoken commentator on his homeland, writing regular columns for the country’s largest newspaper.
He has published a memoir in Japanese titled The Kim Jong Un I Witnessed, with an English version in the pipeline.
His time in South Korea has coincided with some of the most tumultuous periods in the country’s politics in years, from President Yoon Suk Yeol’s stunning martial law declaration in late 2024 to his impeachment and subsequent removal from office.
South Koreans then elected as president the progressive Lee Jae Myung, who favours better relations with the North.
Former diplomat Lee said the recent turmoil helped deepen his appreciation of liberal democracy.
“South Korea went on without a president following the impeachment for months. Even without a president, the system worked very well,” he noted.
Such an outcome would be unthinkable in North Korea.
“The North has completely deified its leadership,” he said.
“It cannot give its people the notion that its so-called supreme leader could actually be brought down by the people’s will.” AFP
straitstimes.com · January 28, 2026
8. UNC says pending bills to ease DMZ access 'completely at odds' with armistice
Summary:
The United Nations Command is warning that South Korean bills to shift control of non-military access to the DMZ from the UNC commander to Seoul are incompatible with the Armistice framework. UNC officials argue the DMZ exists as a military-administered buffer, and that civil activity in the southern half still falls under the commander’s duty to prevent incidents that could unravel the armistice. The dispute is less about tourism and more about command authority, escalation control, and who bears legal responsibility when something goes wrong in the DMZ
Comment: Do we have a perfect storm brewing for the alliance as a result of myriad actions (political and economic), in both Seoul and Washington?
UNC says pending bills to ease DMZ access 'completely at odds' with armistice | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · January 28, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260128009700315?section=national/defense
By Lee Minji
SEOUL, Jan. 28 (Yonhap) -- The United Nations Command (UNC) on Wednesday voiced strong opposition against bills seeking to grant the South Korean government control of non-military access to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), saying they are "completely at odds" with the armistice agreement.
The remarks by UNC officials came as ruling party lawmakers have proposed bills aiming to give the government the authority to regulate non-military access to the DMZ, as part of efforts to promote the peaceful use of the military buffer zone separating the two Koreas.
The UNC has objected to the legislative move, urging the need to adhere to the armistice in administering the 250-kilometer-long, 4-km-wide area between the two Koreas, which remain technically at war as the 1950-53 Korean War ended with an armistice, not a peace treaty.
"From a technical reading of the armistice agreement and reading of the bills that are pending, they are completely at odds," an UNC official told reporters.
"The purpose of the DMZ is to provide a buffer zone that is governed or administered by the military commanders to ensure that nothing happens within that 4-km stretch that could cause an end to the armistice and a resumption of hostilities," the official said.
Against this backdrop, the official said despite the preamble of the armistice indicating terms are intended to be "purely military in character," civil administration also falls within the responsibilities of the UNC commander, who is tasked with ensuring that "everything that happens within the southern half of the DMZ is in compliance with the armistice."
This Jan. 11, 2026, file photo, taken from the border city of Paju, shows the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas. (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · January 28, 2026
9. Minister says probe into drone incursion focuses on acts by 'remnants' of Yoon gov't
Summary:
South Korea’s unification minister says interim findings in the probe of an alleged drone incursion into north Korea will be released soon. Minister Chung Dong-young told lawmakers the joint military police team is focusing on whether “remnants” of the former Yoon Suk Yeol government were involved. He linked this to the ongoing insurrection trial tied to Yoon’s martial law declaration last year. Investigators reportedly identified two men who built and flew drones toward north Korea and who had worked in the presidential office in 2022 on temporary contracts. The minister implied intent and urged accountability once the facts are confirmed.
Comment. It is fascinating to see how much political leadership depends on blaming the past administration. The public should not stand for this. And this does not happen just in Korea.
Minister says probe into drone incursion focuses on acts by 'remnants' of Yoon gov't | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · January 28, 2026
SEOUL, Jan. 28 (Yonhap) -- Interim results from an investigation into a drone infiltration alleged by North Korea will be released soon, the unification minister said Wednesday, suggesting the probe focuses on possible involvement by "remnants" of the former Yoon Suk Yeol government.
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young made the remarks at a parliamentary committee meeting as a joint military-police investigation is under way into the alleged drone infiltration into North Korea.
Earlier this month, the North's military protested that drones were sent from South Korea across the border into the country in September and on Jan. 4, prompting Seoul to launch an investigation, including into the possibility of civilian involvement.
"As far as I know, the investigation is zeroing in on (the possibility) that it was carried by remnants of the insurrection forces," Chung said, referring to the government of Yoon, who is standing trial on insurrection charges over his declaration of martial law last year.
The investigation team has recently found that two men who each manufactured and flew drones to North Korea worked at the presidential office under Yoon in 2022 on temporary contracts.
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young speaks to the parliamentary Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee on Jan. 28, 2026. (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · January 28, 2026
10. S. Korea will explain efforts to pass special investment bill to U.S.: presidential aide
Summary:
South Korea will reassure Washington that delays in passing a special investment bill do not signal backsliding on the bilateral trade deal. Presidential policy chief Kim Yong-beom said POTUS’s threat to raise tariffs on South Korean goods and vehicles from 15 percent to 25 percent appears driven by frustration with the National Assembly’s slower legislative timetable. The Democratic Party introduced the bill in November to support Seoul’s $350 billion investment pledge, but it remains stuck in committee. Seoul will intensify outreach to lawmakers, aim for passage as early as February, and use upcoming ministerial talks with U.S. Commerce and USTR to explain the process. In parallel, it may begin preliminary project reviews.
Comment: We really should have respect for all democratic processes.
S. Korea will explain efforts to pass special investment bill to U.S.: presidential aide | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · January 28, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260128010800315?section=national/politics
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Jan. 28 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will explain the National Assembly's efforts to pass a special investment bill tied to a bilateral trade deal with the United States in a bid to ease Washington's concerns over delays, a senior presidential aide said Wednesday.
Kim Yong-beom, the presidential chief of staff for policy, told reporters that U.S. President Donald Trump's announcement of plans to raise tariffs on South Korean goods and vehicles from 15 percent to 25 percent appears to be linked to the slower-than-expected legislative process.
"The U.S. complaint appears to stem entirely from the delayed legislation at the National Assembly," Kim said.
The ruling Democratic Party submitted the bill in November to support South Korea's US$350 billion investment pledge. It is currently pending at a parliamentary committee and must clear committee deliberations before being put to a plenary vote.
Kim said Washington appears dissatisfied with the review process, noting the government will step up communication with lawmakers to push for passage of the bill as early as possible, potentially in February.
"We will respond calmly by explaining in detail that both the government and the National Assembly are making efforts, while also seeking ways to resolve the issue," Kim said.
Kim stressed the importance of upcoming talks between Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan and U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, noting that Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo is also set to hold discussions with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer.
Even before the bill is passed, Kim said the government will consider conducting preliminary reviews of potential investment projects as part of preparations for full-scale implementation.
Kim Yong-beom, the presidential chief of staff for policy, speaks during a meeting on a military airport relocation in the southwestern city of Gwangju in this Dec. 17, 2025, file photo. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
ejkim@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · January 28, 2026
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
https://apstrategy.org/
Executive Director, Korea Regional Review
https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/
Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal
https://smallwarsjournal.com/
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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