Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:


“Everything in life can be taken away from you and generally will be at some point. Your wealth vanishes, the latest gadgetry suddenly becomes passé, your allies desert you. But if your mind is armed with the art of war, there is no power that can take that away. In the middle of a crisis, your mind will find its way to the right solution. Having superior strategies at your fingertips will give your maneuvers irresistible force. As Sun-tzu says, “Being unconquerable lies with yourself.”
- Robert Greene, The 33 Strategies Of War

"One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil." 
- Friedrich Nietzsche

"The man who listens to Reason is lost: Reason enslaves all whose minds are not strong enough to master her."
- George Bernard Shaw, "Man and Superman’ (1903) ‘Maxims: Reason’




1. Biden says U.S. not discussing joint nuclear exercise with S. Korea

2. Yoon's office maintains S. Korea, U.S. in talks over joint nuclear operations

3. Moon says preceding gov't established anti-drone system

4. S. Korea OKs 5.52 bln won worth of private humanitarian aid to N.K. in 2022

5. Yoon, Biden get nuclear exercise signals tangled

6. Korea may disclose its forced labor solution this month

7. [Column] A Goldilocks strategy ( A critique of the ROK's INDOPACIFIC strategy)

8. Decoding Korea's Indo-Pacific Strategy

9. South Korea, U.S. in talks over U.S. nuclear planning, tabletop exercise

10. S. Korea, US allay jitters over possible rift in extended deterrence against NK

11. [ANALYSIS] Kim's missile inspection with daughter hints at possible succession plans

12. Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy broadens diplomatic, security, economic horizons

13. Dangerous escalation (north Korea)

14. Global rise of Korean soft power

15. Korean lunar orbiter sends photos of Earth, moon





1. Biden says U.S. not discussing joint nuclear exercise with S. Korea


Communications breakdown? Surely the ROK statements were coordinated. Where was the breakdown? Or was this at the presidential level in Seoul but only at the Pentagon level in Washington?


We need to get this sorted out ASP.

(LEAD) Biden says U.S. not discussing joint nuclear exercise with S. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이치동 · January 3, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with senior official's comments from 4th para)

WASHINGTON, Jan. 2 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Joe Biden said Monday his country has no ongoing discussions with South Korea on joint nuclear exercises against North Korea's threats.

He said, "No," responding to a reporter's question about whether the allies are in consultations over the issue, according to White House pool reports.

Speaking earlier at an interview with a South Korean newspaper in Seoul, President Yoon Suk Yeol said the two sides are in discussions on conducting joint drills using nuclear assets in a move to bolster "extended deterrence" by practicing its implementation. He added the U.S. is "quite positive" about it.

In response to the news reports of Biden's response, Yoon's office again said Seoul and Washington are talking about information sharing on the operation of the U.S. nuclear assets to counter the North's nuclear threats as well as relevant "joint planning" and ways for "joint action."

However, a senior Biden administration official reportedly said soon that the U.S. is "not planning joint nuclear exercises with South Korea," now that it is not a nuclear power.

The two sides are "looking at enhanced information sharing, expanded contingencies and an eventual tabletop exercise," as both are committed to joint efforts to deter North Korea, the official was quoted as saying by Reuters.

Since the launch of the conservative Yoon government in May last year, the allies have sought to beef up extended deterrence, which refers to Washington's commitment to the deployment of both nuclear and non-nuclear assets to defend Seoul.

The nuclear-armed North's Kim Jong-un regime has openly threatened a preemptive use of its tactical nuclear weapons against the South.



(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이치동 · January 3, 2023



2. Yoon's office maintains S. Korea, U.S. in talks over joint nuclear operations


It is not like we have not discussed these issues before. And if we are going to consider using nuclear weapons on the peninsula we need to conduct training exercises as ROK and US military forces will have to react to the fallout and contamination. There are myriad exercises and training scenarios that need to be conducted especially to prepare for after nuclear weapons are employed.


WBut we need to get this issue unscrewed quickly and out of the public spotlight as this issue will undermine the alliance, extended deterrence, confidence in the nuclear umbrella, and of course the Kim family regime will figure out a way to exploit this (and this friction gives Kim conficdence that the nuclear deterrent is at least ambiguous if not uncoordinated).


Yoon's office maintains S. Korea, U.S. in talks over joint nuclear operations | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · January 3, 2023

SEOUL, Jan. 3 (Yonhap) -- The office of President Yoon Suk Yeol said Tuesday that South Korea and the United States are in talks over sharing information and jointly implementing plans involving U.S. nuclear assets, after U.S. President Joe Biden denied the allies were discussing joint nuclear exercises.

Yoon said in a recent newspaper interview that the two sides were in talks over joint planning and exercises involving U.S. nuclear assets to counter North Korea's nuclear threats.

When asked by a reporter at the White House on Monday (local time) if such discussions were under way, Biden said, "No."

"When the Reuters reporter asked him point blank if joint nuclear exercises were being discussed, President Biden obviously had to say, 'No,'" senior presidential secretary for press affairs Kim Eun-hye said in a statement. "Joint nuclear exercise is a term used between nuclear powers.

"South Korea and the United States are in talks over information-sharing, joint planning and the joint implementation plans that follow, in relation to the operation of U.S. nuclear assets, to respond to North Korea's nuclear weapons," she said.


hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · January 3, 2023


3. Moon says preceding gov't established anti-drone system



​I am reminded of a fellow officer who I followed in a number of positions ​throughout my career. He would say after he left the position, "It was straight when I was there." He was saying such things with sarcasm. I have a feeling Moon is working on protecting his legacy.


Moon says preceding gov't established anti-drone system | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이민지 · January 3, 2023

SEOUL, Jan. 3 (Yonhap) -- Former President Moon Jae-in has said his administration established a system to counter North Korean drone infiltrations, according to officials of the main opposition Democratic Party.

Moon made the remarks when DP leaders visited his home in the southeastern city of Yangsan on Monday, apparently in response to criticism from President Yoon Suk Yeol that the North's recent drone infiltration revealed how Seoul's military readiness and exercises have been "greatly lacking" over the years.

"Former President Moon said the government had introduced radars and prepared substantially with regard to countering drones," a DP official who met Moon on Monday told Yonhap News Agency.

Another official quoted Moon as saying that the government had installed air defense radars to cope with North Korean drones and that the military had prepared against such attacks for 20 years and boasts substantial capacity.

DP Rep. Seo Young-kyo, who attended Monday's meeting, said in a KBS radio interview that Moon voiced concern over the security lapse and stressed the importance of "solid peace."

Former DP chief Lee Nak-yon, who served as prime minister during the Moon administration, meanwhile, took a swipe at the ruling party over what he called "reckless" remarks on North Korean issues.

"They speak too recklessly about war," Lee wrote on Facebook. "Security cannot be earned through big talk."


mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)


en.yna.co.kr · by 이민지 · January 3, 2023



4. S. Korea OKs 5.52 bln won worth of private humanitarian aid to N.K. in 2022


The ROK government does support civil society that is trying to make a difference in north Korea for the Korean people. Of course what we need to know is how much aid actually arrived at the point of need for the people who need it.


S. Korea OKs 5.52 bln won worth of private humanitarian aid to N.K. in 2022 | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · January 3, 2023

SEOUL, Jan. 3 (Yonhap) -- South Korea approved a total of 5.52 billion won (US$4.32 million) worth of private humanitarian aid deliveries to North Korea last year, the unification ministry said Tuesday.

The government gave the green light to 12 cases of humanitarian aid deliveries by civic groups to the North for the whole of 2022, including a shipment of goods worth 300 million won in December, according to the ministry.

Of the total, five cases were approved after the launch of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration in May last year.

"The government plans to continue to approve civic groups' bid to send humanitarian goods to North Korea this year after reviewing their applications," a ministry official told reporters on condition of anonymity.

The ministry has said it will seek to provide humanitarian aid to the North through nongovernment organizations regardless of political and military situations.


sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · January 3, 2023



5. Yoon, Biden get nuclear exercise signals tangled


We need to get this untangled. I look forward to the spokespeople at the White House and the Pentagon getting this straightened out today. The impact on the ROK public's confidence in extended deterrence (and more importantly Kim's view of extended deterrence) is at risk.


President Yoon's statement here is rather reasonable.


Excerpts:


Yoon told the newspaper that "although nuclear weapons belong to the United States," the two countries must "jointly share information, plan and train" and that Washington holds a "positive position" on that issue. 
 
He added that the "concept of a nuclear umbrella or extended deterrence in the past was to reassure that the United States is going to take care of everything regarding the Soviet Union and China and was before North Korea developed nuclear weapons." That may not be enough to reassure the South Korean public anymore, he said. 
 
But at the White House on Monday, after returning from Kentucky on Marine One, U.S. President Joe Biden was asked by a reporter if he was currently discussing "joint nuclear exercises" with South Korea.
 
Reuters reported that Biden replied "No." 
 
"President Biden obviously had to say, 'No,'" said Kim Eun-hye, senior presidential secretary for press affairs, in a statement Tuesday. "Joint nuclear exercise is a term only used between nuclear powers."
 
She added that the two countries are "discussing information sharing and joint planning, followed by joint execution, in relation to the operation of U.S. nuclear assets to respond to North Korea's nuclear weapons."


Tuesday

January 3, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

Yoon, Biden get nuclear exercise signals tangled

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/01/03/national/politics/Korea-joint-nuclear-exercise-Yoon-Suk-Yeol/20230103185006298.html


U.S. President Joe Biden speaks with reporters after stepping off Marine One on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington on Monday. [AP/YONHAP]

 

Seoul and Washington officials said they are not planning to hold "joint nuclear exercises" Tuesday, after contradictory remarks from the countries' leaders.

 

But they confirmed they are working on plans that will involve U.S. nuclear assets.

 

In a Chosun Ilbo interview Monday, President Yoon Suk Yeol said Seoul was in talks with Washington "to operate U.S. nuclear forces under the concept of joint planning and joint exercises to respond to North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles." 


  

Yoon told the newspaper that "although nuclear weapons belong to the United States," the two countries must "jointly share information, plan and train" and that Washington holds a "positive position" on that issue. 

 

He added that the "concept of a nuclear umbrella or extended deterrence in the past was to reassure that the United States is going to take care of everything regarding the Soviet Union and China and was before North Korea developed nuclear weapons." That may not be enough to reassure the South Korean public anymore, he said. 

 

But at the White House on Monday, after returning from Kentucky on Marine One, U.S. President Joe Biden was asked by a reporter if he was currently discussing "joint nuclear exercises" with South Korea.

 

Reuters reported that Biden replied "No." 

 

"President Biden obviously had to say, 'No,'" said Kim Eun-hye, senior presidential secretary for press affairs, in a statement Tuesday. "Joint nuclear exercise is a term only used between nuclear powers."

 

She added that the two countries are "discussing information sharing and joint planning, followed by joint execution, in relation to the operation of U.S. nuclear assets to respond to North Korea's nuclear weapons."

 

A White House National Security Council spokesperson said in a statement Tuesday that Seoul and Washington are "working together to strengthen extended deterrence, including eventually through table-top exercises that will explore our joint response to a range of scenarios, including nuclear use" by North Korea. 

 

In November, Seoul and Washington agreed to "information sharing and joint planning and execution" to deter and respond to Pyongyang's advancing nuclear and missile threats in a joint communiqué after the 54th Republic of Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting. 

 

At the time, the two countries' defense chiefs agreed to deploy U.S. strategic assets in a timely manner and enhance such measures and identify new steps to reinforce deterrence.

 

The two sides pledged to conduct table-top exercises (TTX) annually, which would include a North Korean nuclear use scenario. 

 

The TTX is a table-top exercise in which South Korean and U.S. government and military officials and experts discuss how to respond to North Korea's use of nuclear weapons and missiles. It could be considered the "joint planning" portion referred to by Yoon. 

 

In comparison, a joint nuclear exercise would involve drills in which Washington mobilizes its strategic bombers such as B-52Hs, which are capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and conduct training on nuclear attack procedures, as in the Steadfast Noon, an annual nuclear exercise held by NATO allies last October. 

 

South Korea, a non-nuclear state, would not be able to take part in such an exercise, as pointed out by officials from both countries.

 

A senior U.S. administration official told Reuters Monday that joint nuclear exercises would be "extremely difficult" because South Korea is not a nuclear power, but that the allies are looking at joint contingency planning and an eventual table-top exercise.

 

"This is going to be done through a variety of ways, including as President Yoon said, through enhanced information sharing, joint planning and expanding the range of contingencies that we plan for, as well as training, and with the idea eventually leading up to a table-top exercise," the official told Reuters.

 

After talks on the sidelines of Asean meetings in Cambodia in November, Yoon and Biden asked their teams to explore ways to address their increasing concerns North Korea's recent actions and statements, according to this official. 

 

While the timing of the planned tabletop exercises has not been finalized, they are expected to take place "in the not-too-distant future."  

 

The United States withdrew tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula in the early 1990s following a disarmament deal with the Soviet Union. 

 

As a presidential candidate in 2021, Yoon said he would ask the United States to either redeploy tactical nuclear weapons or ask for substantial nuclear sharing, and idea Washington has not been keen on. 

 

In an interview with CNN shortly after taking office in May, Yoon ruled out the possibility of redeploying tactical nuclear weapons but he told reporters in October that he is still looking at ways to strengthen U.S. extended deterrence.


President Yoon Suk Yeol speaks at the Blue House state guesthouse in central Seoul Monday. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]


BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]



6. Korea may disclose its forced labor solution this month


The question is whether this will help improve ROK-Japan relations.


Monday

January 2, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

Korea may disclose its forced labor solution this month

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/01/02/national/diplomacy/korea-japan-forced-labor/20230102194705274.html


Yang Geum-deok, a 94-year-old victim of Japanese forced labor, speaks with the press in Gwangju on Dec. 26 to protest one of Foreign Ministry's options to resolve the compensation dispute with Japan. [YONHAP]

Korea will hold a public hearing to propose options to compensate victims of Japanese forced labor, the Foreign Ministry announced Monday.

 

"The government has been gathering various opinions from all walks of life in Korea through discussions with victims and through public-private council meetings," the ministry said in a statement. "Soon, we will host a discussion forum of a wider scope."


 

The ministry statement came a day after news reports in Tokyo said Korea could propose a solution to the issue in January.  


 

“A likely solution would be for South Korea's Foundation for Victims of Forced Mobilization by Imperial Japan, which supports former forced laborers, to solicit donations from South Korean companies,” the Sankei Shimbun reported on Sunday. “It is expected that this proposal will be presented at a public hearing [in Korea].”

 

The report cited a visit by Seo Min-jung, director general for Asia and Pacific affairs of the Foreign Ministry, to Tokyo on Dec. 26 to meet with Japanese officials, adding that the Korean delegation had indicated to Japan that it intends to “announce a solution as early as January.”

 

The ministry on Monday did not comment on a specific deadline for a decision.

 

In an attempt to resolve the lengthy dispute with Tokyo on the issue of compensation for Korean forced laborers, many of whom are in their 90s, the ministry has been negotiating with both victims and Japan.

 

One of the options the ministry is considering is to have the Foundation for Victims of Forced Mobilization by Imperial Japan create a fund to take Korean corporate donations to compensate the victims. 

 

Forced labor victims have been against this proposal. 

 

“We are strongly against this idea, which is all about giving Japan and its companies an easy way out,” a civic group representing some victims said in a statement last week. 

 

Yang Geum-deok, a 94-year-old victim of Japanese forced labor, is a member of that group. Yang and four other victims sued Japanese companies in October 2012 for compensation. She is one of some 220,000 Koreans who were forced to work in Japan during the 1910-45 Japanese annexation of Korea, according to a fact-finding committee created by the Prime Minister’s Office.

 

A landmark ruling on the case came on Oct. 30, 2018, when the Korean Supreme Court ordered Nippon Steel and Sumitomo Metal, renamed Nippon Steel, to pay 100 million won ($78,590) each to Korean victims of Japanese forced labor. The Supreme Court made a similar ruling on Nov. 29, 2018 against Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.

 

Japan protested the decision, claiming that all compensation issues related to its colonial rule were resolved with a treaty with Korea in 1965. The deal saw Japan give Korea $300 million in economic aid and $500 million in loans. 

 

Korea’s top court acknowledged the illegality of Japan’s colonial rule and recognized that individuals' rights to compensation had not expired.

 

Both Nippon Steel and Mitsubishi refused to comply with the top court's decisions, and the victims filed another case requesting the liquidation of assets of two Japanese companies to compensate forced labor victims. 

 

The Supreme Court in Korea has yet to rule on the latest case.

 

The rift between the Foreign Ministry and the victims group started to become more prominent when the ministry in August 2022 submitted an argument to the court to take into account the diplomatic efforts the ministry was making to try to reach a solution with Japan when deciding on its ruling.

 

Several victims at the time expressed disappointment at the ministry’s action, describing feelings of betrayal.

 

The issue has put Korea-Japan relations in the deep freeze in recent years.

 

Following the Supreme Court ruling in 2018, Japan implemented export restrictions on three high-tech materials crucial for Korea’s semiconductor and display industries and removed Korea from its list of preferred trading partners.

 

Korea responded in August 2019 by threatening to pull out of a military intelligence-sharing pact with Japan, the General Security of Military Information Agreement. 


BY ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]


7. [Column] A Goldilocks strategy ( A critique of the ROK's INDOPACIFIC strategy)


Excerpts:


When we read between the lines of the strategy, the government included a warning to China. “Mutual respect” was listed as a core concept, showing Korea’s intention that it will not tolerate it if China does not follow laws and principles.


Henry Kissinger said the highest virtue of diplomacy was moderation and flexibility. He advised that insisting on an extreme or rigid foreign policy will prevent a country from dealing with a change in a situation. Who would not like fiery things? Even so, maintaining moderation to win practical gains and sometimes presenting a lukewarm strategy is true courage.



Tuesday

January 3, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

[Column] A Goldilocks strategy

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/01/03/opinion/columns/Yoon-Suk-Yeol-IndoPacific-strategy/20230103195436968.html


Nam Jeong-ho

The author is a columnist of the JoongAng Ilbo. 


Policies that try to stay in the middle are often unpopular. They satisfy neither the left nor the right. The Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s moderate “Indo-Pacific Strategy” was criticized by both conservatives and progressives. The issue was China. After the government announced the strategy on Dec. 28, a conservative commentator expressed anger. “Instead of declaring that China, which breaks international laws and regulations frequently, is a threat to Korea, the government called it a strategic partner,” he fumed. The United States used a different tone to approach China. In its Indo-Pacific Strategy Report last February, Washington criticized China by noting that its oppressions and aggressions are all over the world, the worst in the Indo-Pacific region in particular. Canada also criticized China explicitly.


In contrast, the liberals attacked the Yoon administration for joining the Indo-Pacific strategy targeting China. Moon Chung-in, the chairman of Sejong Institute, said, “Korea is not in position to treat China with hostility, since it is its largest trade partner.” Over the same strategy, conservatives are upset that the government failed to attack China properly, while the progressives complained that the government made China an enemy unnecessarily.



But the fact that the strategy was criticized by both sides shows the strategy was appropriate. I believe the government produced this balanced strategy by seriously considering its eventual goal and the cold reality. In fact, the Yoon administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy was a surprise. North Korea is about to conduct its seventh nuclear test at any time, while its drones are flying in South Korean air space. Due to the need for a strong Korea-U.S. alliance, I worried that the Yoon administration would side with the ally and announce a doctrine unilaterally criticizing China. Since Yoon’s foreign affairs and security aides were all pro-U.S. experts, I had serious concerns.


But the strategy released by the government was a surprise. Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy was focused on security issues, but Yoon’s highlighted the economic importance of the region from the beginning. Then, it introduced the concepts of freedom, peace and prosperity followed by the need for inclusiveness. Overall, it was evident that China was a factor seriously considered when creating the strategy.


I came to have a question. Given the importance the Yoon administration attaches to Korea-U.S. relations, how did it present such a lukewarm strategy? After some investigation, my question was answered. First, I realized that the first impression of the strategy — that it treated Korea-U.S. relations lightly — was a misunderstanding after reading an analysis of a U.S. expert. He paid attention to the title of the strategy, “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region.” He said the title speaks for the Yoon administration’s true intentions.


The Moon Jae-in administration was reluctant to join the Indo-Pacific strategy under the justification of strategic ambiguity. In contrast, the Yoon government announced a doctrine entitled “Indo-Pacific strategy.” That’s an enormous change. I was foolish to just look at a tree, instead of seeing the forest.


Sources said the government had serious considerations before releasing its Indo-Pacific strategy. After creating a draft, relevant ministries reviewed it and revised the draft over and over. Indo-Pacific strategies of the U.S., Japan, Canada and the EU were thoroughly reviewed in the process. Then, how come it did not condemn China, which still sanctions Korean companies for having allowed the deployment of the U.S. Thaad missile defense system in Korea?


First, the Yoon administration had no choice but to accept China’s importance in foreign relations, particularly in regards to North Korea issues.


Second, Korea-China economic relations were also an important factor. Before announcing the strategy, the government reviewed Korea and China’s mutual dependence on 200 major products. The administration concluded that Korean companies were too vulnerable to sever ties with China immediately. As a result, the government concluded that it will take time to reduce Korea’s reliance on China and diversify economic relations.


When we read between the lines of the strategy, the government included a warning to China. “Mutual respect” was listed as a core concept, showing Korea’s intention that it will not tolerate it if China does not follow laws and principles.


Henry Kissinger said the highest virtue of diplomacy was moderation and flexibility. He advised that insisting on an extreme or rigid foreign policy will prevent a country from dealing with a change in a situation. Who would not like fiery things? Even so, maintaining moderation to win practical gains and sometimes presenting a lukewarm strategy is true courage.


8. Decoding Korea's Indo-Pacific Strategy



Excerpts:


Seoul must also think deeply and meticulously. As a first step, it should take into consideration how the U.S.-China rivalry may unfold in different scenarios and deliberate on available policy options. It then must work with other like-minded countries to take steps to mitigate the risks of the rivalry spinning out of control. Seoul has legitimate grounds to pursue this avenue, as Korean history is a testament to the costs of failure.

Getting the Indo-Pacific strategy right will be a long and tough task for Seoul. But it must be done not only to reduce the mounting dangers in the region, but also to effectively manage the North Korean problem. The right strategy is a prerequisite to securing the lowest-common-denominator agreeable to the United States, China, and the two Koreas. Without the right Indo-Pacific strategy, a peaceful and nuclear-free peninsula would not be feasible. I count on the wisdom and commitment of the South Korean government to bring peace and prosperity to Korea, the Indo-Pacific and the world.

Decoding Korea's Indo-Pacific Strategy

The Korea Times · January 2, 2023

By Kim Won-soo


The phrase Indo-Pacific has become quite fashionable in international relations lately. It has replaced Asia-Pacific as the main term describing the evolving geopolitical dynamics across the region, which includes players from North America and Oceania.


Many factors are behind the emerging Indo-Pacific concept. A main factor is the rise of Asia, in particular China, in world politics. It also reflects the significance of the growing competition between the two camps, one led by the United States and the other by China. The U.S. side is primarily maritime-oriented, while the Chinese side is largely continental. This competition between maritime and land powers is an age-old story, strongly reminiscent of Cold War rivalries.


Both camps are trying hard to attract the countries that are on the fence. As a result, the fault line is being drawn across Southeast, Southwest and West Asia. So far, Indo-Pacific strategies have emerged largely among the countries within and close to the American camp. Certainly, China is watching this development closely and becoming increasingly wary that it might find itself completely encircled by U.S. allies and partners one day.


These Indo-Pacific strategies are far from monolithic. It means U.S. allies and partners have diverse interests that are not easy to reconcile and it will take time for them to build coherent, compatible strategies. For now, we see divergent positions on how much risk each country is willing to take in confronting China. If we are to rate major regional players on a scale of 1 (close to the United States) to 10 (close to China), we may place Japan (a U.S. ally with greater regional focus) and Australia (AUKUS) at 2, followed by Canada and New Zealand (Five Eyes) at 3, Korea (a U.S. ally with a greater focus on the Korean peninsula) at 4, India (Quad) at 5, and various ASEAN members somewhere between 5 and 9.


Last week South Korea announced its own Indo-Pacific strategy. It is a welcome first step toward clarifying South Korea's foreign policy principles for the region and beyond. The strategy is based on the statement given by the top leaders of South Korea, the United States and Japan following their trilateral summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia and Bali, Indonesia in November 2022. It reaffirms the joint commitment of the three countries to seek a free and open Indo-Pacific. It also elaborates on South Korea's aspirations to contribute to peace and prosperity on both regional and global levels as a rule-abiding middle power.


Noteworthy here is the nuanced reference to its relationship with China. The South Korean strategy barely mentions China, while emphasizing the principle of inclusiveness as well as the importance of the trilateral relationship between South Korea, Japan, and China in tackling regional and global challenges.


Inclusiveness is the watchword in various Indo-Pacific strategies announced individually or jointly by interested countries. It implicitly indicates who is more or less willing to confront and/or antagonize China. These differences are bound to come to the fore if U.S.-China relations continue to deteriorate for both, intended and unintended reasons. The higher the tension between them, the tougher each country's policy choice will become. South Korea will be one of the first to be exposed and forced to make the difficult decision.


Therefore, it is imperative that the South Korean government continue to refine its Indo-Pacific strategy. The recent announcement is the right step forward. But it should not be the end but the beginning of hard work that lies ahead. It will be a long way until partner countries in and outside the region produce compatible Indo-Pacific strategies. Various emerging initiatives such as the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the Chip 4 alliance need further refinement and alignment with other existing arrangements such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and ASEAN. Seoul should make every effort to be a part of all of these initiatives and actively participate in their norm-making processes. Maintaining an inclusive outlook will best serve Seoul's interests. Seoul must strive to remain open and inclusive toward all regional initiatives, even the ones proposed by the opposing camp.


Seoul must also think deeply and meticulously. As a first step, it should take into consideration how the U.S.-China rivalry may unfold in different scenarios and deliberate on available policy options. It then must work with other like-minded countries to take steps to mitigate the risks of the rivalry spinning out of control. Seoul has legitimate grounds to pursue this avenue, as Korean history is a testament to the costs of failure.


Getting the Indo-Pacific strategy right will be a long and tough task for Seoul. But it must be done not only to reduce the mounting dangers in the region, but also to effectively manage the North Korean problem. The right strategy is a prerequisite to securing the lowest-common-denominator agreeable to the United States, China, and the two Koreas. Without the right Indo-Pacific strategy, a peaceful and nuclear-free peninsula would not be feasible. I count on the wisdom and commitment of the South Korean government to bring peace and prosperity to Korea, the Indo-Pacific and the world.


Kim Won-soo (wsk4321@gmail.com) is the former under-secretary-general of the United Nations and high representative for disarmament. As a Korean diplomat, he served as secretary to the ROK president for foreign affairs as well as for international security. He is now the chair of the international advisory board of the Taejae Academy (Future Consensus Institute) and a chair professor at Kyung Hee University.



The Korea Times · January 2, 2023



9. South Korea, U.S. in talks over U.S. nuclear planning, tabletop exercise



I think we probably have a situation of semantics and translation issues. Good statement ehre from the US official. We will still need to hear from senior leaders to reinforce that there is no weakening of extended deterrence.


I would also recommend in addition to "nuclear planning tabletop exercises," that the alliance restart the long dormant political-military tabletop exercise "Pyeonghwa" (those who know, know) to look at other contingency issues such as internal instability and regime collapse.


Excerpts:


A senior U.S. administration official said both sides are looking at enhanced information sharing, joint contingency planning and an eventual tabletop exercise following a request from their presidents after a meeting in Cambodia in November to explore ways to address North Korea's threats.
But the official noted regular nuclear exercises would be "extremely difficult" because South Korea is not a nuclear power, echoing the comment from U.S. President Joe Biden that the allies were not discussing such activities.
"This is going to be done through a variety of ways, including as President Yoon said, through enhanced information sharing, joint planning and expanding the range of contingencies that we plan for, as well as training, and with the idea eventually leading up to a tabletop exercise," the official told Reuters.
The timing of the planned tabletop exercises has not been finalised, but they would take place "in the not-too-distant future" and cover scenarios including nuclear situations, the official said.



South Korea, U.S. in talks over U.S. nuclear planning, tabletop exercise

By Hyonhee ShinTrevor Hunnicutt and Soo-Hyang Choi

https://www.reuters.com/world/skorea-is-discussing-joint-planning-implementation-operations-using-us-nuclear-2023-01-03/


U.S. Air Force F-22 fighter jets take part in a joint drill with South Korea's Air Force at Kunsan air base, in Gunsan, South Korea, December 20, 2022. The Defence Ministry/Handout via REUTERS

SEOUL/WASHINGTON, Jan 3 (Reuters) - South Korea and the United States are discussing joint planning and implementation of U.S. nuclear operations to counter North Korea and hope to conduct a tabletop exercise soon, officials from both sides said on Tuesday.

The plan came amid South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol's push to strengthen American extended deterrence - the U.S. military capability, especially its nuclear forces, to deter attacks on its allies - since taking office in May, in the face of evolving North Korean threats.

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In a newspaper interview released on Monday, Yoon said the allies are discussing joint nuclear planning and exercises and that would help clear doubts about the extended deterrence, with its existing concept "falling short of convincing" South Koreans.

"In order to respond to the North Korean nuclear weapons, the two countries are discussing ways to share information on the operation of U.S.-owned nuclear assets, and joint planning and execution of them accordingly," Yoon's press secretary, Kim Eun-hye, said in a statement.

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A senior U.S. administration official said both sides are looking at enhanced information sharing, joint contingency planning and an eventual tabletop exercise following a request from their presidents after a meeting in Cambodia in November to explore ways to address North Korea's threats.

But the official noted regular nuclear exercises would be "extremely difficult" because South Korea is not a nuclear power, echoing the comment from U.S. President Joe Biden that the allies were not discussing such activities.

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"This is going to be done through a variety of ways, including as President Yoon said, through enhanced information sharing, joint planning and expanding the range of contingencies that we plan for, as well as training, and with the idea eventually leading up to a tabletop exercise," the official told Reuters.

The timing of the planned tabletop exercises has not been finalised, but they would take place "in the not-too-distant future" and cover scenarios including nuclear situations, the official said.

"The idea is to also try and make sure that we're able to fully think through the range of possibilities based on the DPRK capabilities which they've demonstrated, as well as their statements," the official added, using North Korea's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

A National Security Council spokesperson said in a statement that the United States is committed to providing extended deterrence, and that the allies are working on "an effective coordinated response to a range of scenarios, including nuclear use by North Korea."

When asked about the tabletop exercises, a spokesman for South Korea's defence ministry said talks were under way but declined to provide details.

The two countries have revived consultations on extended deterrence this year after a years-long hiatus amid North Korea's increasing nuclear and missile capability.

Pyongyang defined South Korea as "undoubted enemy" and vowed to beef up its nuclear arsenal this year, after firing a record number of missiles in 2022 and fuelling tension by sending drones into the South in December.

"The U.S. countermeasures have not kept up with the North's advancing nuclear programmes, and the extended deterrence strategy is almost no different from when their nuclear capability was insignificant and weaker," said Go Myong-hyun, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul.

But Kim Dong-yup, a professor at Kyungnam University, said the comment from Biden, who has sole authority to authorise the use of U.S. nuclear weapons, suggests an American reluctance to share nuclear operations, given their sensitivity and security concerns.

"Given growing voices for tactical nuclear weapons, Washington could try to give reassurances and send more nuclear assets when we want, but they're unlikely to fully materialise President Yoon's push for greater extended deterrence," Kim said.

Reporting by Soo-hyang Choi and Hyonhee Shin in Seoul and Trevor Hunnicutt in Washington; Additional reporting by Simon Lewis in Washington; Editing by Jacqueline Wong and Gerry Doyle



10. S. Korea, US allay jitters over possible rift in extended deterrence against NK


Excerpt:


In the Joint Communique, they "pledged to further strengthen the Alliance's capabilities, information sharing, and consultation process, as well as joint planning and execution," to deter and respond to the North's advancing nuclear and missile threats.

They also promised to "conduct the Deterrence Strategy Committee TTX annually, which is to include a DPRK nuclear use scenario" in response to recent changes in Pyongyang's nuclear strategy and capabilities." DPRK is the abbreviation of North Korea's official name.

Experts view the latest incident as a happening that stemmed from terminology, because what Yoon said was already agreed in the Security Consultative Meeting, and joint exercises, such as the TTX or Support of Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics (SNOWCAT), are already being discussed.

SNOWCAT is used to enable military assets from non-nuclear countries to support a nuclear strike mission without being formally a part of it.

"This should be seen as an episode, because the president may not be able to know all the details of certain issues," said Go Myong-hyun, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.

"Rather, this shows that the U.S. is sensitive about its nuclear strategy being interpreted as nuclear proliferation," Go said, adding that Washington is reluctant to use a NATO-style nuclear planning group in South Korea-U.S. efforts to deter North Korea's threats, even though it is similar to the concept of joint planning.


S. Korea, US allay jitters over possible rift in extended deterrence against NK

The Korea Times · January 3, 2023

President Joe Biden walks over to speak to reporters after stepping off Marine One on the South Lawn of the White House, Monday (local time). AP-​Yon​hap 


Misunderstanding triggers speculation about Biden's comments


By Nam Hyun-woo​    

Seoul and Washington tried to dispel what is seen as a rift between the two allies in their stances on extended deterrence to thwart North Korea's nuclear threats.

It all began with President Yoon Suk-yeol's remarks during an interview with the Chosun Ilbo daily published on Monday where he was quoted as saying, "South Korea and the U.S. are discussing information sharing, joint planning and joint execution plans regarding U.S. nuclear assets' operation, in order to counter North Korea's nuclear threats."

​ ​

After Yoon's interview was published, a White House correspondent asked U.S. President Joe Biden whether Washington is discussing "joint nuclear exercises" with South Korea. Biden said, "No," without elaborating.


The U.S. president's denial sparked speculation among South Korean media outlets that there might be discord between Seoul and Washington regarding their responses to North Korea's nuclear threat.


It turned out that the use of the term, "joint nuclear exercises," which was not what the South Korean president said, seems to have triggered the misunderstanding.


Senior Presidential Secretary for Public Relations Kim Eun-hye said, "As the reporter asks, 'are you discussing joint nuclear exercises,' without presenting related context, President Biden had no choice but to say 'No.'" Kim added, "The term 'joint nuclear exercises' is only possible between countries that possess nuclear weapons."


Her remarks indicated that South Korea has no nuclear bombs, so the term "joint nuclear exercises" cannot be applied to a country like the South, and thus the U.S. president's denial made sense.


"South Korea and the U.S. are discussing information sharing, joint planning and joint execution plans regarding the operation of U.S. nuclear assets, in order to counter North Korea's nuclear threats," Kim clarified in a statement released to the media.


In the Korean version of Kim's statement, she used a term which directly translates into "nuclear war exercise" to stress that the White House correspondent used the wrong terminology when asking Biden, which was different than the words Yoon used in the interview.


An official at the presidential office said the terms "joint planning" and "joint exercise" involving U.S. nuclear assets Yoon said in the interview differ from joint nuclear exercises.


Joint planning is more focused on enhancing information sharing and consultation in the planning stage of U.S. nuclear operations, and exercising the deployment of U.S. nuclear assets on the Korean Peninsula. The concept of joint nuclear exercises, on the other hand, is reserved for countries that possess nuclear weapons, thus Seoul, which has none, is not included.


The U.S. also offered a similar explanation.


Citing a senior U.S. administration official, Reuters reported that joint nuclear exercises with Seoul would be "extremely difficult" because South Korea is not a nuclear power, but that the allies are looking at enhanced information sharing, joint contingency planning and an eventual tabletop exercise (TTX).


A U.S. Air Force B-52 bomber flies over Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek in this Jan. 10, 2016 file photo. AP-Yonhap 


This is in line with an agreement following the 54th Security Consultative Meeting held between Seoul's Minister of National Defense Lee Jong-sup and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in November of last year.


In the Joint Communique, they "pledged to further strengthen the Alliance's capabilities, information sharing, and consultation process, as well as joint planning and execution," to deter and respond to the North's advancing nuclear and missile threats.


They also promised to "conduct the Deterrence Strategy Committee TTX annually, which is to include a DPRK nuclear use scenario" in response to recent changes in Pyongyang's nuclear strategy and capabilities." DPRK is the abbreviation of North Korea's official name.


Experts view the latest incident as a happening that stemmed from terminology, because what Yoon said was already agreed in the Security Consultative Meeting, and joint exercises, such as the TTX or Support of Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics (SNOWCAT), are already being discussed.


SNOWCAT is used to enable military assets from non-nuclear countries to support a nuclear strike mission without being formally a part of it.


"This should be seen as an episode, because the president may not be able to know all the details of certain issues," said Go Myong-hyun, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.


"Rather, this shows that the U.S. is sensitive about its nuclear strategy being interpreted as nuclear proliferation," Go said, adding that Washington is reluctant to use a NATO-style nuclear planning group in South Korea-U.S. efforts to deter North Korea's threats, even though it is similar to the concept of joint planning.

The Korea Times · January 3, 2023



11. [ANALYSIS] Kim's missile inspection with daughter hints at possible succession plans


I still think this speculation is very premature. But I wonder if Kim does these things just to drive a reaction from the ROK and the US.


[ANALYSIS] Kim's missile inspection with daughter hints at possible succession plans

The Korea Times · January 3, 2023

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and his daughter Ju-ae inspect a KN-23 factory at an unspecified location in North Korea, in this photo released on the first day of 2023. Yonhap


Women's roles are expected to expand in North Korean politics, expert says


By Jung Min-ho


Every move means something in politics. It is particularly so for Kim Jong-un, the supreme ruler of North Korea, where everything he does or says is carefully choreographed.


In the photos released on the first day of 2023, Kim can be seen inspecting the facilities for missiles believed to be capable of carrying nuclear warheads ― the Hwasong-12 and KN-23 ― while holding the hand of his daughter, Ju-ae.

This move leaves little doubt over who is next in the line, as the pictures symbolically show North Korea's future, according to Cheong Seong-chang, a senior analyst on North Korea at the think tank, the Sejong Institute.


That future is the one where the North will continue to develop nuclear weapons and, at some point, Ju-ae, who has previously been described as Kim's "most beloved" daughter, will receive the baton to carry on the mission, Cheong told The Korea Times Tuesday.


"The pictures can be interpreted as the public message that Kim Ju-ae is the heir apparent," he said. "At this stage, she is receiving training. Once officially appointed, she would rule the North with Kim and be given access to the nuclear button … Kim appears to have started to share information over the control of future strategic assets such as nuclear weapons and missiles."


Cheong said it is "no coincidence" that Kim toured the weapons factories with his daughter following his speech calling for an "exponential increase" in nuclear weapons against Seoul and Washington at a major party event for the review of 2022.


Intelligence reports show that Kim and Ri Sol-ju have three children, who were born in 2010, 2013 and 2017 respectively. The first one is believed to be a son, it is unknown if the third child is a boy or a girl.


However, not everyone shares his view that Ju-ae will eventually take over North Korea. Experts such as Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University, cast doubt on the scenario because Kim, 38, and Ju-ae, 9, are still young and the traditional ideas ― of seniority and the predominance of men ― are deeply embedded in its society. They say Kim took Ju-ae to the factories to convey the message that the weapons developed on his watch will keep the future generation safe and that Ju-ae just symbolizes that generation.


To understand who may become its next leader, Cheong said it is important to keep in mind that Kim was not the oldest ― not even the second oldest ― son of the late Kim Jong-il.


"I heard from Kim Jong-un's aunt, Ko Yong-suk, and her husband, Ri Gang, in March 2021 that Kim Jong-il had decided to appoint him as his successor on Jan. 8, 1992, his eighth birthday … His older brother, Kim Jong-chul, was excluded because he was too meek," Cheong said. "Kim Jong-un himself was not the eldest son, but he became the leader, so why would he have reason to adhere to such a rule?"

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un smiles as he poses with children representing the Korean Children's Union at an unspecified location in North Korea, in this photo released Monday. YonhapAccording to "White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2022," published last month by the Korea Institute for National Unification, a think tank, women in North Korea have increasingly played important roles over the past several years.


Ri Hye-jong, new head of the Party History InstituteThere are more female judges, military officers, high-level party officials and politicians, with some North Korean defectors saying that the regime is promoting the policy of hiring more women as senior officials recently.


On New Year's Day, the ruling party announced that Ri Hye-jong will head the Party History Institute, one of its key bodies. Under young leader Kim Yo-jong, the first vice director of its propaganda department, Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui and Hyon Song-wol, leader of both the Moranbong Band and the Samjiyon Orchestra, have been promoted and have played vital roles in North Korean politics.


"Unlike his father, Kim Jong-un, who spent his teenage years in Switzerland and does not have a strong belief in 'Namjonyeobi' (the notion that men should be preferred or respected over women in terms of status or rights)," Cheong said. "If Kim Ju-ae is to become the next leader, which seems very likely, I think we will see more women playing bigger roles in North Korean politics in the future."



The Korea Times · January 3, 2023




12. Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy broadens diplomatic, security, economic horizons


Excerpts:


The spirit of contributive diplomacy, an essential component of a global pivotal state, is not limited to ASEAN only but to all its development partners around the world. A whopping 18 percent increase in the official development assistance (ODA) budget for 2023 explains Korea's commitment. Such commitment should come with well-thought-out planning and empathizing ears for the taxpayers' money to be well spent.

However, a greater budget should not be equated with more projects. With a greater budget, more multi-year and scaled-up projects aiming at a more substantial level of outcomes should be produced. A contributive diplomacy should involve an overhaul of the existing planning, implementation and evaluation methodology and techniques of ODA projects. The Indo-Pacific region fits perfectly for this purpose, for out of Korea's 27 priority development cooperation partners, 13 are located in the region.

In short, how the commitments described in the nine core lines of effort are detailed and implemented in line with the vision and principles of cooperation of Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy will likely be the final verdict.

Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy broadens diplomatic, security, economic horizons

The Korea Times · January 3, 2023

By Song Kyung-jin


Korean diplomacy wrapped up 2022 with the announcement of its Indo-Pacific strategy just before the year-end, as promised. I welcome the government's effort and its comprehensive Indo-Pacific strategy. It is a strategy for a free, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region with three overt principles of cooperation ― inclusiveness, trust and reciprocity ― and with nine core lines of effort. Korea's Indo-Pacific reaches out even to the African Indian Ocean, Europe and Latin America, expanding its geographical boundaries further than other countries with their own Indo-Pacific strategies.


A free, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region is of particular significance for Korea's national interests, when the region accounts for 62 percent of the world's GDP and 46 percent of global trade and 78 percent and 67 percent of Korea's exports and imports. Hence, not just economic security but also maritime security is critically important for safeguarding and promoting Korea's national interests.

On top of that, it to me is a clear sign of confidence of Korea as a nation and an explicit statement of its intention to play a responsible role toward its aspirations of transforming into a global pivotal state. Despite being defined as a regional strategy, it indeed moves beyond that, given its much broader geographical scope. This breadth conveniently provides effective building blocks for Korea's aspiration to be a global pivotal state, meaning the success of the Indo-Pacific strategy will be a useful precursor for realizing Korea's global ambition.


It also signals the beginning of a departure from Korea's conventional diplomacy, narrowly focused on North Korea and the Korea-U.S. and a few more bilateral relations, to a comprehensive diplomatic strategy encompassing security, economic and technological cooperation with more diversified partners, with the conventional issues duly integrated. The Korea-U.S. alliance, the Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation and cooperation with the U.N. Security Council still remain critical to strengthening non-proliferation and counter-terrorism efforts across the region.


The strategy recognizes the emerging importance of technology in today's diplomacy by stating: "Technologies determine a nation's security and competitiveness for the future. Ultimately, they will be conducive to a free and prosperous region when used in the service of fostering cooperative international relations." Korea pledges throughout the text of its Indo-Pacific strategy to cooperate with partners with regards to critical and emerging technologies, where appropriate, not just bilaterally but also minilaterally and multilaterally such as the Quad and NATO.


In the face of declining multilateralism, issue-specific minilateralism may be a more useful option to go about to boost necessary cooperation among like-minded countries on certain specific issues. Minilateralism has its own advantage of agility, for instance, in that any partner interested in the issue or likely to benefit from such cooperation can easily make proposals and choose to join. Minilateral cooperation is relatively easy to dissolve when objectives and targets are achieved.

Per the principles of cooperation ― inclusiveness, trust and reciprocity ― minilateralism should not exclude any partner, insofar as it abides by mutual respect and reciprocity, guided by international norms and rules.

That said, the ever-changing geopolitical, geoeconomic and geo-technological circumstances will likely allow or compel Korea and other nations for that matter often to adjust and fine-tune their stance, as and when such circumstances arise. We must therefore be ready to respond to the changes accordingly instead of resisting them.


While respecting ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, the strategy elaborates Korea's intention to engage in more "contributive diplomacy" that is focused on more mutually beneficial and substantive cooperation by aligning ASEAN's needs with its strengths, with particular emphasis on digital, climate change, environment, energy transition and public health. In a rapidly urbanizing Indo-Pacific region, more people are moving to cities in need of affordable housing, sound physical and digital infrastructure and public health. Korea can offer knowledge and assistance in building smart cities, for example.


The spirit of contributive diplomacy, an essential component of a global pivotal state, is not limited to ASEAN only but to all its development partners around the world. A whopping 18 percent increase in the official development assistance (ODA) budget for 2023 explains Korea's commitment. Such commitment should come with well-thought-out planning and empathizing ears for the taxpayers' money to be well spent.


However, a greater budget should not be equated with more projects. With a greater budget, more multi-year and scaled-up projects aiming at a more substantial level of outcomes should be produced. A contributive diplomacy should involve an overhaul of the existing planning, implementation and evaluation methodology and techniques of ODA projects. The Indo-Pacific region fits perfectly for this purpose, for out of Korea's 27 priority development cooperation partners, 13 are located in the region.


In short, how the commitments described in the nine core lines of effort are detailed and implemented in line with the vision and principles of cooperation of Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy will likely be the final verdict.



Dr. Song Kyung-jin (kj_song@hotmail.com) led the Institute for Global Economics (IGE), based in Seoul and served as special adviser to the chairman of the Presidential Committee for the Seoul G20 Summit in the Office of the President. Now, she is executive director of the Innovative Economy Forum.



The Korea Times · January 3, 2023



13. Dangerous escalation (north Korea)


A free and unified Korea must be the objective for the ROK and and the US must support thROK in this pursuit.


Excerpts:


This is no time for Yoon to be mired in a tit-for-tat escalation of verbal exchanges, giving only excuses to his North Korean counterpart for further provocations. The only way the political novice can leave his legacy is to keep the two Koreas from getting further away from each other in this age of individual survival globally, leaving the era of globalization behind. The reunification of the Koreas may take a long time, but should remain intact as the final goal of all Koreans.

Koreans will get no international sympathy if they let this peninsula become a global battlefield for the second time in 70-odd years.


Dangerous escalation

The Korea Times · January 3, 2023

It's time to stop 'strong vs. strong' confrontation


South Koreans are known for being ― or appearing ― insensitive to the threat of war. People in other countries are often amazed that people here go about their business as usual despite bellicose rhetoric from North Korea.


It is not because Koreans are particularly fearless, but more that they cannot imagine the possibility of repeating the fratricidal catastrophe of 73 years ago.

Recently, they began to sense the possibility could be genuine, if in limited ways.

On the final day of 2022, North Korea's Kim Jong-un called for an "exponential increase" in nuclear weapons, calling South Korea an "undoubted enemy." Kim said the North's multiple rocket launcher (MRL) system has the entire South Korea in its range as a "key offensive weapon" of its military forces.


What could the young North Korean leader's wild vitriol imply? It might reflect Kim's confidence in what he propagandized as "paralleled progress" in nuclear and economic capabilities. Or, he might have just been encouraged by the new Cold War. Perhaps Pyongyang felt the existential threat from the solidifying trilateral alliance of Seoul, Washington and Tokyo. Or all of these.


The primary reason may be the "South's betrayal," as Kim sees it.


The center-of-left Moon Jae-in administration tried not to agitate the North. Still, the right-wing Yoon Suk-yeol government is more about an eye for an eye, moving closer to the U.S., North Korea's professed archenemy. Pyongyang had long said its atomic weapons were aimed at America, not South Korea. But direct nuclear threats against the South only reveal the North's pretense and desperation.

What's happening on the Korean Peninsula seems to confirm that the hardliners are right: North Korea aimed to be a nuclear power, and no amount of dialogue can prevent it. Yes, the conservatives are correct now, but they were wrong a few decades ago. Likewise, the progressives, who said the North's atomic weapons program was to defend itself from the only country to have used atomic bombs in warfare, were right before but wrong now. Time changes everything, and everything is relative, always moving.


At stake is what Seoul should do now.


Keeping peace by preventing war on this divided peninsula is "not an option but an obligation," as President Yoon says whenever he describes some crucial missions. This is the time to make possible, or at least more likely, what appears to be impossible. In this three-way game of pull and push, Seoul has always been the primary party that found a breather from a deadlock. The U.S., bent on keeping China in check, can hardly be more indifferent, shifting from strategic patience to "strategic neglect."


Yoon could learn from two of his conservative predecessors ― Park Chung-hee and Roh Tae-woo.


The two generals-turned-presidents surprised everyone by finding a breakthrough in the deadlocked inter-Korean relationship when everybody thought it impossible. In 1972, Park sent his spy chief to Pyongyang to secure the first inter-Korean agreement. Roh, a seemingly characterless leader, did more than any of his successors by conducting his "Nordpolitik" policy, normalizing ties with China and Russia and realizing the two Koreas' simultaneous admission to the United Nations.


What made these possible was that both ex-presidents were conservative leaders, free from criticism from South Koreans who were averse to communists. In contrast, three leftist leaders ― Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun and Moon ― were constantly put on hold by inter-Korean hawks from within and out.


This is no time for Yoon to be mired in a tit-for-tat escalation of verbal exchanges, giving only excuses to his North Korean counterpart for further provocations. The only way the political novice can leave his legacy is to keep the two Koreas from getting further away from each other in this age of individual survival globally, leaving the era of globalization behind. The reunification of the Koreas may take a long time, but should remain intact as the final goal of all Koreans.


Koreans will get no international sympathy if they let this peninsula become a global battlefield for the second time in 70-odd years.



The Korea Times · January 3, 2023


14. Global rise of Korean soft power




Global rise of Korean soft power

The Korea Times · January 3, 2023

'K' in K-content has become indicative of 'premium': culture experts


By Kwak Yeon-soo


There is no doubt that Korean cultural content has taken the world by storm.

Netflix's smash hit drama, "Squid Game," won major Emmys, including Lee Jung-jae's Outstanding Lead Actor award; director Park Chan-wook and actor Song Kang-ho brought home Cannes awards for films "Decision to Leave" and "Broker," respectively; a K-pop category has been newly added to the American Music Awards; and BTS member Jungkook participated in the official soundtrack of the FIFA World Cup in Qatar and performed at the opening ceremony of the global sporting event.


With the global reach of online platforms like Netflix and YouTube, Korean dramas, films and pop music continued their dominance in 2022, and are likely to maintain their popularity in the coming years.


According to data provided by the Korea Creative Content Agency, exports of "K-content," including Korean pop music, dramas, movies, entertainment TV shows and games, set a new record in 2021. They jumped 13.9 percent to $13.5 billion from the previous year. Korea ranked 12th in the world in terms of soft power in 2022, according to Brand Finance's Global Soft Power Index.


The origin of K-content's popularity dates back to roughly 20 years ago when "hallyu," or the Korean wave, gained traction in Asia following the popularity of drama series such as "A Wish Upon a Star" (1997) "Winter Sonata" (2002) and "Jewel in the Palace" (2003).


Content expert Noh Ga-young, who previously worked at entertainment giant CJ Entertainment, attributes the success of K-content to its universal appeal and nationalistic fervor.


"A majority of filmmakers and producers that are making waves right now were heavily influenced by Western films and TV series, so they follow the Hollywood formula but with a little bit of originality. That's why K-content holds universal appeal. Also, Korea is one of very few countries where local audiences support their homegrown films," she said.


"From the industry perspective, tech companies in Silicon Valley have helped K-content gain international traction. Unlike hallyu dramas that were exported to individual countries in the past, K-dramas are now available globally thanks to streaming services."


The year 2022 has seen some incredible K-dramas that stunned global audiences.

From the zombie horror series, "All of Us Are Dead," to the courtroom series, "Juvenile Justice," and "Extraordinary Attorney Woo," the themes and subjects have also become more diverse.


Noh, the co-writer of "2023 Content is Everything" (literal translation), noted that the meaning of "Made in Korea" has evolved from cost-effective to high quality.

"The 'K' in K-content has become an indication of a 'premium.' When we eat a delicious food, we wonder, 'Who made this?' The same applies for K-content. When the audience consumes enthralling K-content, they wonder who Koreans are. That is why American studios made big bets on 'Minari' and 'Pachinko,'" she said.


Co-writers of "2023 Content is Everything" (literal translation) Noh Ga-young, right, and Kim Bong-je pose before an interview with The Korea Times in Seoul, Dec. 16. Korea Times photo by Choi Won-suk


Kim Bong-je, the head of artist management at Why Not Media, said the creator economy has also contributed to the K-content boom.


"From game streamers to beauty influencers, digital creators also played a role in bringing K-content to the mainstream in the U.S. and other parts of the world. Thanks to them, words like 'chimaek' (chicken and beer) and 'mukbang' (binge-eating livestreaming show) were added to the Oxford English Dictionary. Of course, YouTube has enabled this trend," he said.


"Nowadays more and more people think TV is boring. Many star producers and TV production teams have shifted their playing field to YouTube, which doesn't have limits in terms of genres and longevity, and launched their own shows on the digital platform."


Kim, the co-writer of "2023 Content is Everything," predicted that the convergence trend (such as the convergence of drama and entertainment shows) and short-form content will become more popular in 2023.


"Short-form videos of scenes from popular TV dramas or films go viral on social media, which brings more interest among people," he said. "The majority of 2022's releases raised the bar high, so creators should diversify genres."


Noh stressed that local productions should seek ways to reduce their financial dependency on streaming giants and protect their intellectual property (IP) rights.


"I think the case of 'Extraordinary Attorney Woo' has taught content creators a lesson on the importance of securing the show's IP and getting the upper hand over streaming platforms. They should always keep in mind that without IP, a company has to depend on outsourced deals," she said.


Music critic Kim Young-dae argues that BTS members' solo careers have created a new paradigm in K-pop. Speaking at an end-of-the year seminar organized by Korean Foundation for International Cultural Exchange, he argued that the sum of each member's fans has stronger power than the fans of the group itself. Furthermore, he explained that "the fourth generation of girl groups" reshaped the K-pop universe in 2022.


To give an outlook on the K-pop industry for 2023, Kim said, "From a regional perspective, the Middle East and Africa ― formerly uncharted territory ― are turning into new realms for K-pop artists. A new territorialization of the fandom of K-pop is in progress."


The influence of K-content has spread just as quickly across highbrow culture like classical music and visual art.


Pianist Cho Seong-jin's 2015 victory at the Chopin competition resulted in an explosion of interest in classical music, particularly among younger musicians in Korea. In 2022, pianist Lim Yun-chan won the top prize at the Van Cliburn competition; pianist Lee Hyuk took first place at Long-Thibaud competition; cellist Choi Ha-young won the Queen Elisabeth competition; and violinist Yang In-mo took a trophy at the Sibelius competition.


Executive Director at Suum Project Lee Ji-yoon, left, and documentarian and music director for Belgium's RTBF public service broadcaster, Thierry Loreau / Courtesy of Suum Project, Thierry Loreau"K-pop, K-drama, K-movies paved the way for opening up Korea to the world. 


Korea now realizes that the country can also be proud of its classical musicians," said Thierry Loreau, a documentarian and music director for Belgium's RTBF public service broadcaster.


"In Europe, people always thought that the musicians from Asia had a wonderful technique but that they were not moving because they didn't understand this music. The situation completely changed. Now, the jurors in competitions and audiences everywhere in the world are amazed by these young Korean musicians, full of energy, freshness and sensitivity."


Korea's art market is expected to surpass 1 trillion won ($780,662) for the first time on the back of brisk sales by galleries and art fairs, according to the Korea Art Market 2022 report. Frieze, one of the top global art fairs alongside Art Basel and FIAC, was held in Seoul in 2022 for the first time. Globally established players like Perrotin, Lehmann Maupin and Gladstone opened new galleries in Korea.

Lee Ji-yoon, executive director at Suum Project, a contemporary arts curation office, said Korea's growing arts ecosystem ― renowned artists, dynamic galleries, museums and ambitious collectors ― have established the country as a major art destination.


"The Korean art market has become global at the expense of political turmoil in Hong Kong and lockdowns in Shanghai. Above all, the arts ecosystem is well-established in Seoul. Modern and contemporary Korean artists are recognized on the international stage. Leading galleries are investing a lot in Korea," she said.


According to her, Seoul's status as a fast-growing art market in Asia has been acknowledged by many gallery representatives and industry experts, due to its expanding cultural and economic network of collectors, artists and exhibitors.

"If Korean artists and galleries demonstrate their ability amid the growing influence of foreign galleries and international artists, Korea's art market will continue to prosper," she said.



The Korea Times · January 3, 2023



15. Korean lunar orbiter sends photos of Earth, moon


Kim Jong Un: go ahead and match these photos and capabilities. You can compete with South Korean advanced technology.




Korean lunar orbiter sends photos of Earth, moon

The Korea Times · January 3, 2023

This photo of Earth, provided by the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), was taken on Dec. 24, 2022, by a camera onboard the Korean lunar orbiter Danuri. Yonhap


Korea's unmanned space vehicle Danuri has sent videos of Earth and the moon after reaching the moon last month, the state space research center said Tuesday.

The orbiter performed three rounds of lunar orbit insertion (LOI) maneuvers from Dec. 17 to lower its speed and commit itself to the gravity of the moon before entering the selenocentric orbit on Dec. 27.


The first video was taken on Dec. 24 some 344 kilometers above the satellite of Earth, when Danuri was carrying out its second round of LOI, and the second footage was taken four days later while rotating the moon, according to the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI).


This photo of Earth, provided by the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), was taken on Dec. 28, 2022, by a camera onboard the Korean lunar orbiter Danuri. YonhapAfter traveling for 145 days from Earth, Danuri is now orbiting the moon at a speed of 1.62 kilometers per second in a regular two-hour cycle.


The lunar orbiter will transform its system to the main operation mode this month to carry out its mission on the moon.


The space vehicle will measure the terrain, magnetic strengths, gamma rays and other traits of the lunar surface using six onboard instruments during its yearlong mission starting in February. The orbiter will also identify potential landing sites for future lunar missions. (Yonhap)



The Korea Times · January 3, 2023















De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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