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Quotes of the Day:
“Why look for conspiracy when stupidity can explain so much.”
- Johann Goethe
“Wisdom fears nothing, but still bows humbly to its own source, with its deeper understanding, loves all things, for it has seen the beauty, the tenderness, and the sweetness which underlie life's mystery.”
- Manly P. Hall
“However repugnant the idea is to liberal societies, the man who will willingly defend the free world in the fringe areas is not the responsible citizen-soldier. The man who will go where his colors go, without asking, who will fight a phantom foe in jungle and mountain range, without counting, and who will suffer and die in the midst of incredible hardship, without complaint, is still what he has always been, from Imperial Rome to sceptered Britain to democratic America. He is the stuff of which legions are made.
His pride is in his colors and his regiment, his training hard and thorough and coldly realistic, to fit him for what he must face, and his obedience to his orders. As a legionnaire, he held the gates of civilization for the classical world; as a blue-coated horseman, he swept the Indians from the Plains; he has been called United States Marine. He does the jobs—the utterly necessary jobs—no militia is willing to do. His task is moral or immoral according to the orders that send him forth.”
- T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (p. 658)
1. Avoiding a Long War in Ukraine: U.S. Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
2. New RAND Study Breaks From US Hawks, Warns Against "Protracted Conflict" In Ukraine
3. Is Anybody Telling The American People About The War?
4. Top Armed Services Democrat: US military readiness a ‘huge problem’
5. Is helping Ukraine reducing US preparedness, security?
6. Zelensky urges allies to send long-range missiles
7. 66,000 war crimes have been reported in Ukraine. It vows to prosecute them all.
8. Pentagon Distances Itself from Minihan Memo Suggesting Possible War with China in 2025
9. House Republican warns of pending conflict with China
10. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 29, 2023
11. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issues frightening warning: CCP has invaded ‘every major’ US university
12. A decade of quiet preparations helped Ukraine turn the tables on Russia's bigger, better-armed military, experts say
13. In first update in a decade, the Pentagon plans for AI’s increased role in warfare
14. Special Operations News Update - Jan 30, 2023 | SOF News
15. Does the West's decision to arm Ukraine with tanks bring it closer to war with Russia?
16. Telling the Truth About Possible War Over Taiwan
17. TikTok’s Chief to Testify Before Congress in March
18. Integrated Deterrence Requires a Unique Intelligence Mindset
19. Underfunding the US Army undermines deterrence in Taiwan
20. How two former Army Rangers built an engagement ring business
21. Former US Defense Secretary Robert Gates says Putin believes it's his 'destiny' to 'recreate the Russian Empire'
22. How to Get a Breakthrough in Ukraine
23. The Trust Gap: How to Fight Pandemics in a Divided Country
1. Avoiding a Long War in Ukraine: U.S. Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
Download the 32 page report at this link: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PEA2500/PEA2510-1/RAND_PEA2510-1.pdf
Conclusion
The debate in Washington and other Western capitals over the future of the Russia-Ukraine war privileges the issue of territorial control. Hawkish voices argue for using increased military assistance to facilitate the Ukrainian military’s reconquest of the entirety of the country’s territory.71 Their opponents urge the United States to adopt the pre-February 2022 line of control as the objective, citing the escalation risks of pushing further.72 Secretary of State Antony Blinken has stated that the goal of U.S. policy is to enable Ukraine “to take back territory that’s been seized from it since February 24.”73
Our analysis suggests that this debate is too narrowly focused on one dimension of the war’s trajectory. Territorial control, although immensely important to Ukraine, is not the most important dimension of the war’s future for the United States. We conclude that, in addition to averting possible escalation to a Russia-NATO war or Russian nuclear use, avoiding a long war is also a higher priority for the United States than facilitating significantly more Ukrainian territorial control. Furthermore, the U.S. ability to micromanage where the line is ultimately drawn is highly constrained since the U.S. military is not directly involved in the fighting. Enabling Ukraine’s territorial control is also far from the only instrument available to the United States to affect the trajectory of the war. We have highlighted several other tools—potentially more potent ones—that Washington can use to steer the war toward a trajectory that better promotes U.S. interests. Whereas the United States cannot determine the territorial outcome of the war directly, it will have direct control over these policies.
President Biden has said that this war will end at the negotiating table.74 But the administration has not yet made any moves to push the parties toward talks. Although it is far from certain that a change in U.S. policy can spark negotiations, adopting one or more of the policies described in this Perspective could make talks more likely. We identify reasons why Russia and Ukraine may have mutual optimism about war and pessimism about peace. The literature on war termination suggests that such perceptions can lead to protracted conflict. Therefore, we highlight four options the United States has for shifting these dynamics: clarifying its plans for future support to Ukraine, making commitments to Ukraine’s security, issuing assurances regarding the country’s neutrality, and setting conditions for sanctions relief for Russia.
A dramatic, overnight shift in U.S. policy is politically impossible—both domestically and with allies—and would be unwise in any case. But developing these instruments now and socializing them with Ukraine and with U.S. allies might help catalyze the eventual start of a process that could bring this war to a negotiated end in a time frame that would serve U.S. interests. The alternative is a long war that poses major challenges for the United States, Ukraine, and the rest of the world.
Avoiding a Long War in Ukraine
U.S. Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
by Samuel Charap, Miranda Priebe
rand.org · by Samuel Charap
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Avoiding a Long War
U.S. Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
by , Miranda Priebe
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Discussion of the Russia-Ukraine war in Washington is increasingly dominated by the question of how it might end. To inform this discussion, this Perspective identifies ways in which the war could evolve and how alternative trajectories would affect U.S. interests. The authors argue that, in addition to minimizing the risks of major escalation, U.S. interests would be best served by avoiding a protracted conflict. The costs and risks of a long war in Ukraine are significant and outweigh the possible benefits of such a trajectory for the United States. Although Washington cannot by itself determine the war's duration, it can take steps that make an eventual negotiated end to the conflict more likely. Drawing on the literature on war termination, the authors identify key impediments to Russia-Ukraine talks, such as mutual optimism about the future of the war and mutual pessimism about the implications of peace. The Perspective highlights four policy instruments the United States could use to mitigate these impediments: clarifying plans for future support to Ukraine, making commitments to Ukraine's security, issuing assurances regarding the country's neutrality, and setting conditions for sanctions relief for Russia.
rand.org · by Samuel Charap
2. New RAND Study Breaks From US Hawks, Warns Against "Protracted Conflict" In Ukraine
Excerpt:
...So even RAND is sane enough to see that the Western world is headed for disaster if it keeps up this jingoistic push to support Kiev at all costs and with no off-ramp.
* * *
Meanwhile, most top decision-makers and commanders are unlikely to heed the memo... Journalist(1:05 of the video):"We are ready to a direct confrontation with Russia?"
"We are" - Chair of the NATO Military Committee Rob Bauer pic.twitter.com/GbrzgYzMN4— AZ (@AZgeopolitics) January 28, 2023
New RAND Study Breaks From US Hawks, Warns Against "Protracted Conflict" In Ukraine | ZeroHedge
ZeroHedge
The famous Pentagon and US government-linked think tank RAND Corporation has finally attempted to inject some rare realism into the Washington establishment's thinking and planning regarding the Ukraine war. So far throughout eleven months of conflict which remains largely stalemated, though the last few days have seen Russian military momentum and advance grow in the Bakhmut offensive, US and NATO officials have unhesitatingly and enthusiastically cheered on every major escalation of the West's involvement.
But the new 32-page RAND document has sounded the alarm over the dangers of this approach, which is unusual given the think tank is notorious for being the hawkish academic arm of the military-industrial complex. This was especially the case in the Vietnam war era, when RAND became infamous for its fueling the policy behind various insurgency and counterinsurgency fiascos in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.
RAND now argues that in Ukraine "US interests would be best served by avoiding a protracted conflict," and that "costs and risks of a long war...outweigh the possible benefits."
US Marine Corps image: war gaming
The policy document lays out that allowing the conflict extend longer, which we should note the Biden administration has almost guaranteed with its decision this past week to supply advanced battle tanks, is itself a severe danger.
The abstract on the introductory page reads as follows:
The authors argue that, in addition to minimizing the risks of major escalation, U.S. interests would be best served by avoiding a protracted conflict. The costs and risks of a long war in Ukraine are significant and outweigh the possible benefits of such a trajectory for the United States. Although Washington cannot by itself determine the war's duration, it can take steps that make an eventual negotiated end to the conflict more likely.
Ultimately the study (pdf) explains why from a strategic point of view based on real US interests, there's little benefit for Washington in rolling back Russia's control of territory in east; however, there remains immense risk and high costs that would be attached to it.
The study additionally concludes of ongoing efforts to punish Russia economically and militarily that
"further incremental weakening [of Russia] is arguably no longer as significant a benefit for US interests." Alternately it warns that the impact on energy markets and food in the at-all-costs drive of "keeping the Ukrainian state economically solvent" may not be worth it, given these costs will only "multiply over time."
Similar to some recent media reports based on the reluctant acknowledgement of US officials, RAND also points out that continuing NATO military aid to Ukraine "could also become unsustainable after a certain period," given the likelihood that Russia may "reverse Ukrainian battlefield gains."
From the Rand Study: "Avoiding a Long War U.S. Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict"
Another crucial admission in the document is that the Ukraine war distracts and wastes precious defense resources away from another important theatre of operations: China and east Asia. It states:
Beyond the potential for Russian gains and the economic consequences for Ukraine, Europe, and the world, a long war would also have on sequences for U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. ability to focus on its other global priorities —particularly, competition with China— will remain constrained as long as the war is absorbing senior policymakers’ time and U.S. military resources.
And although Russia will be more dependent on China regardless of when the war ends, Washington does have a long-term interest in ensuring that Moscow does not become completely subordinated to Beijing. A longer war that increases Russia’s dependence could provide China advantages in its competition with the United States.
Thus open-ended and deepened Pentagon involvement in helping Ukraine to push back Russia ultimately benefits Beijing.
But at this point, the authors ask, what can be done? RAND recommends the following course to be put into action immediately:
A dramatic, overnight shift in U.S. policy is politically impossible—both domestically and with allies—and would be unwise in any case. But developing these instruments now and socializing them with Ukraine and with U.S. allies might help catalyze the eventual start of a process that could bring this war to a negotiated end in a time frame that would serve U.S. interests. The alternative is a long war that poses major challenges for the United States, Ukraine, and the rest of the world.
...So even RAND is sane enough to see that the Western world is headed for disaster if it keeps up this jingoistic push to support Kiev at all costs and with no off-ramp.
* * *
Meanwhile, most top decision-makers and commanders are unlikely to heed the memo...
Journalist(1:05 of the video):"We are ready to a direct confrontation with Russia?"
"We are" - Chair of the NATO Military Committee Rob Bauer pic.twitter.com/GbrzgYzMN4
— AZ (@AZgeopolitics) January 28, 2023
ZeroHedge
3. Is Anybody Telling The American People About The War?
Conclusion:
This whole Ukraine business has me obsessing over how the Iraq War was sold to the American people. Did anybody learn from that? The US was humiliated in both Iraq and Afghanistan, but did anybody in the US military establishment, or anywhere else, pay a price for their failure? Does anybody ever in America today? Actually, the better historical analogy for what we're doing in Ukraine is Vietnam, where the US incrementally raised its involvement, while the government misled the American people about what it was doing. Ukraine is Vietnam sped-up, but this time, with the risk of direct military conflict with a superpower, and of nuclear war.
I know, I'm rambling. It's just so damned depressing. Here in Europe, the only national leader begging the West to find some negotiated settlement before this thing spins out of control is Viktor Orban -- and he's demonized by the Great and the Good. It's madness. And look, none of this requires saying that Putin is good and that Russia's invasion is justified. He's not. It's not. But as bad as the war has been till now, it could easily get much, much worse. Again, I ask: is anybody telling this to the American people?
Is Anybody Telling The American People About The War? - The American Conservative
The American Conservative · by Rod Dreher · January 29, 2023
That image above is from this animated speculative account of how World War III could begin in Ukraine.
Take a look at this headline now leading CNN's website:
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The answer is, "Probably not, for now." Uh-huh. We'll see.
Meanwhile, did you see this news from eight days ago?:
The Pentagon will keep several thousand American troops in southeast Romania for at least nine more months, closer to the war in neighboring Ukraine than any other U.S. Army unit, officials said on Saturday.
Over the last year, the sprawling Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, just a seven-minute rocket flight across the Black Sea from where Russian forces have settled in Crimea, has become a training hub for NATO forces in southeast Europe. The forces would be a first line of defense should Russia invade further west.
There are around 4,000 U.S. soldiers with the 101st Airborne Division who have been stationed at the air base since last summer, including small groups of troops that frequently train right on Romania’s border with Ukraine. Before that, there was a smaller contingent from the 82nd Airborne that was sent as part of a quick-response force after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February.
The 101st Airborne Division troops will leave in the next two months, and officials said they would be replaced by a different brigade from the 101st Division, which is based at Fort Campbell, Ky.
A month ago, the Russian foreign minister said that the West "is at war" with Russia. That's how they see it. Last week, Hungarian PM Viktor Orban said this is a fact -- a fact he decries, because he has been pushing for a negotiated end to the hostilities before the fighting spreads out of control. His belief seems to be that the West is deluding itself about what it's doing, and marching the world towards catastrophe. He got in trouble with the Ukrainian government for telling visiting journalists and others that the Russians have wrecked Ukraine. Well:
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Ukraine might have 23mn residents left vs. prewar paper total of 43mn, $1 tr of damage on a $120 bn GDP, and a failing military position. The Ghost of Richelieu told me a year ago that Putin would erase Ukraine as a country. https://t.co/vhX7CSfX5p
— David P. Goldman (@davidpgoldman) January 24, 2023
Here's what the fictional Cardinal Richelieu told Spengler in his imagined conversation with the wily French strategist last summer:
The cardinal chortled. “Now, my naïve friend, Putin commands Chechen shock troops in Ukraine. Putin understands ‘the systematic exploitation of time as the deadliest of all weapons.’ Ukraine was hollow before the war began. It had one of the world’s lowest birth rates, and its birth rate will fall even farther. Twelve million Ukrainians, fully half the able-bodied population of working age, left before the war started. Another five million have fled. As Russian artillery pounds Ukraine’s cities, more will flee. How many will return? Large parts of Ukraine will fall into ruin. Centuries of Ruthenian resentment against Russian overlords encrusted over the centuries will be consumed in a few weeks of war, and in its place, there will be nothing but a dull sense of horror.”
As of last April -- nine months ago! -- 30 percent of Ukraine's infrastructure had been destroyed by the Russians, according to the Ukrainian government. More recently, the Kyiv government estimated that total destruction to Ukraine's economy by the war to be $700 billion. A Brookings report in December said:
Putin’s war has been calamitous for Ukraine. The precise number of military and civilians casualties is unknown but substantial. The Office of the U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights estimated that, as of the end of October, some 6,500 Ukrainian civilians had been killed and another 10,000 injured. Those numbers almost certainly understate the reality. U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley on November 10 put the number of civilian dead at 40,000 and indicated that some 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed or wounded (Milley gave a similar number for Russian casualties, a topic addressed later in this paper).
In addition, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees placed the number of Ukrainians who have sought refuge outside of Ukraine at more than 7.8 million as of November 8. As of mid-November, the Russian attacks had caused an estimated 6.5 million more to become internally displaced persons within Ukraine.
Besides the human losses, the war has caused immense material damage. Estimates of the costs of rebuilding Ukraine run from $349 billion to $750 billion, and those appraisals date back to the summer. Finding those funds will not be easy, particularly as the war has resulted in a significant contraction of the Ukrainian economy; the World Bank expects the country’s gross domestic product to shrink by 35% this year.
It is very difficult to imagine what "winning" would look like for either Russia or Ukraine in this situation. And the big Russian spring offensive is coming.
Note well this recent Foreign Affairs piece about the warnings the late US diplomat George Kennan, the great man of Russian affairs, gave over the decades to the US Government not to involve itself in conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Excerpt from the essay:
Since the Cold War, however, the United States’ military frontier has advanced much farther eastward. Regardless of how Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine ends, the United States has committed itself to sustaining a robust military presence on Russia’s doorstep. If alive today, Kennan would note the danger of cornering the Russians to the point where they might lash out. He would also gesture toward the United States’ multiple problems at home and wonder how this exposed presence in Eastern Europe accorded with the long-term foreign and domestic interests of the American people.
In the best possible pie-in-the-sky outcome for the US, the Russians would be pushed out of Ukraine. What then? Ukraine becomes not only a destroyed country that will have to be rebuilt by the West (read: mostly the American people), and will then have to become a permanent garrison state on the Russian border. We will never, ever have peace with Russia as long as we occupy Ukraine. Whatever else happens in the world, Russia will be our eternal enemy. This is in our interest how?
The thing I worry about most of all, though, is NATO being dragged into the war. I read the US print media online, but I don't see the electronic media. It is my strong impression that the American people are largely clueless about the maelstrom into which their leaders are taking them. They are clueless because our media have decided that there is one correct position on the war. In 2002, the year the United States prepared for war on Iraq, it was not easy to oppose the war, but there were plenty of antiwar voices to be heard, if not (alas) heeded. Today? Now that the liberal establishment (political and media) have found a war it can support, there doesn't seem to be much discussion or debate at all about the wisdom of our intervention. What are the American people going to say when they wake up one day and American soldiers have crossed the border into Ukraine and are fighting a shooting war with Russians? Have the American people forgotten that the Cold War might have ended, but both we and the Russians still have nuclear weapons?
Are the American people prepared for a nuclear exchange with Russia, for the sake of extending the American empire to Russia's borders? Is anyone even talking to them about that? Or is our media all "Putin is Hitler" and "peace negotiations are Munich"?
Look at this, from one of Europe's leading liberal intellectuals:
#Zelensky fights with our weapons and holds, against #Putin’s Russia, the border of Europe. Therefore, it’s not only that we help #Ukraine; it’s Ukraine that helps & protects us; Ukraine is already our #NATO ally & all we need is to see it formalized asap. https://t.co/YEeJXpMbv6
— Bernard-Henri Lévy (@BHL) January 28, 2023
Simple as that, ain't it? Bring Ukraine into NATO, just like George W. Bush said in 2008. Make an attack on Ukraine, which has been part of Greater Russia since forever, an attack on all of NATO. That won't be destabilizing at all, will it? /sarc
I saw that BHL tweet because Bill Kristol, one of the intellectual architects of the Iraq War, retweeted it. About the Iraq War: as US Senator, Joe Biden voted for it. Victoria Nuland spent the entire G.W. Bush administration in senior policy positions, defending the Iraq War. She was caught on a bugged phone call in Kiev in 2014 discussing US manipulation of the Color Revolution that ousted a pro-Russian elected president. Now she's Joe Biden's top diplomat in charge of the Ukraine portfolio. And hey, what about Libya? Barack Obama overthrew Muammar Qaddafi, and now Libya is a hellhole. Biden served as Obama's VP, of course, but says he argued strongly within the White House against the Libya attack. My overall point is that the same US elites who got us into the messes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya are now marching us into a war that would be incomparably more dangerous.
Do ordinary Americans know that this is what their elites are doing?
Did you know that our leadership class has been drawing Ukraine into NATO for years now? I did not, until I read Mearsheimer. In Vienna over the weekend, I met a Hungarian in a coffee shop. He hates Viktor Orban with the heat of a thousand suns, but he told me that Orban is right about the war. This was caused by the West, he said. Our behaving so recklessly with Ukraine over the years. Look:
There are many US State Department press releases announcing steps that Ukraine is taking to achieve “NATO interoperability.” Yet it is also claimed that NATO expansion couldn’t be a reason for the war because US took no steps to bring Ukraine into NATO.https://t.co/1LB3ckRiEy
— David Sacks (@DavidSacks) January 29, 2023
By now, Americans should be well aware that the government and the media -- including social media companies -- colluded by massage the Covid, and Covid vaccine, narrative. In Britain today, it was reported that the Army spied on Covid skeptics, including commentator Peter Hitchens:
Military operatives in the UK's 'information warfare' brigade were part of a sinister operation that targeted politicians and high-profile journalists who raised doubts about the official pandemic response.
They compiled dossiers on public figures such as ex-Minister David Davis, who questioned the modelling behind alarming death toll predictions, as well as journalists such as Peter Hitchens and Toby Young. Their dissenting views were then reported back to No 10.
Documents obtained by the civil liberties group Big Brother Watch, and shared exclusively with this newspaper, exposed the work of Government cells such as the Counter Disinformation Unit, based in the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, and the Rapid Response Unit in the Cabinet Office.
Do you remember how our American media refused to report on Ukraine-connected Hunter Biden's laptop, saying it was all Russian disinformation -- until long after it was no threat to Joe Biden's quest for the presidency? These are the same people massaging the war narrative to convince the American people that it's in their interest to risk nuclear war with Russia over a country many thousands of miles away from America, but right on Russia's border.
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This is all weighing on my mind this weekend because I'm deep into That Hideous Strength, the concluding volume of C.S. Lewis's Space Trilogy. It's a novel about a sinister cabal of scientists and government experts manipulating the media to convince the British public to let them do works of profound evil. Lewis published that novel in 1945, but it is eerily prescient about the way bureaucratic elites work, especially how they manipulate public opinion to convince people to support things they would never support if they understood what was really going on.
This whole Ukraine business has me obsessing over how the Iraq War was sold to the American people. Did anybody learn from that? The US was humiliated in both Iraq and Afghanistan, but did anybody in the US military establishment, or anywhere else, pay a price for their failure? Does anybody ever in America today? Actually, the better historical analogy for what we're doing in Ukraine is Vietnam, where the US incrementally raised its involvement, while the government misled the American people about what it was doing. Ukraine is Vietnam sped-up, but this time, with the risk of direct military conflict with a superpower, and of nuclear war.
I know, I'm rambling. It's just so damned depressing. Here in Europe, the only national leader begging the West to find some negotiated settlement before this thing spins out of control is Viktor Orban -- and he's demonized by the Great and the Good. It's madness. And look, none of this requires saying that Putin is good and that Russia's invasion is justified. He's not. It's not. But as bad as the war has been till now, it could easily get much, much worse. Again, I ask: is anybody telling this to the American people?
The American Conservative · by Rod Dreher · January 29, 2023
4. Top Armed Services Democrat: US military readiness a ‘huge problem’
Top Armed Services Democrat: US military readiness a ‘huge problem’
BY JULIA MUELLER - 01/29/23 4:07 PM ET
https://thehill.com/homenews/sunday-talk-shows/3835308-top-armed-services-democrat-us-military-readiness-a-huge-problem/
Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.), the top Democrat on the House Armed Services committee, said U.S. military readiness is a “huge problem” as global tensions heighten and the war in Ukraine rages on.
“This is a huge problem. And we don’t have the industrial base. And we don’t have the ability to ramp up that industrial base,” Smith told host Shannon Bream on “FOX News Sunday.”
Concern is growing among experts that U.S. support for Ukraine’s war against Russia could hinder U.S. military readiness should another conflict arise with China in the near future.
Smith warned that without a “demand signal,” manufacturers don’t want to make a “major investment” in increasing production, and American taxpayers “don’t want to spend a ton of money on weapons that we don’t need.”
But the Armed Services ranking member said he and committee chairman Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.) share the “huge priority” to up the country’s weapon production capacity as conflict simmers on the global stage.
“We need to increase that ability to surge when we need it, which means we desperately need to increase our manufacturing base for key weapons systems,” Smith said.
Russia’s war on Ukraine is nearing its one-year mark next month, and a U.S. general reportedly said Friday that the U.S. could be at war with China by 2025.
“Anything is possible. I’m really worried, though, when anyone starts talking about war with China being inevitable. And I want to be completely clear: it’s not only not inevitable, it is highly unlikely… I don’t think we should be out there telling the world that we’re going to war with China, most importantly because we’re not,” Smith said.
“War is not inevitable. That’s a very dangerous situation that we need to be prepared for, but I’m fully confident that we can avoid that conflict if we take the right approach.”
President Biden announced last week that the U.S. will join Germany and other Western nations in equipping Ukraine with battle tanks as it continues its counteroffensive against Russia, a move Moscow has painted as “direct involvement” in the war.
Smith underscored that the aid was not equivalent to engaging in the conflict.
“We are not going to have the U.S. or NATO get in direct conflict with Russia. And that is going to continue to be the case. We’re going to provide these tanks to Ukraine. Ukraine is going to operate them. We are not, repeat, not going to war with Russia,” Smith said.
5. Is helping Ukraine reducing US preparedness, security?
Is helping Ukraine reducing US preparedness, security?
BY ELLEN MITCHELL AND BRAD DRESS - 01/28/23 12:00 PM ET
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3832541-is-helping-ukraine-reducing-us-preparedness-security/
Questions are mounting as to how long the United States can continue to supply Ukraine from its own weapons stockpiles without hindering its own security.
With more than $27 billion in weapons committed to Kyiv since the start of Russia’s Feb. 24, 2022, attack on the country, Washington shows no sign of slowing down on shipping munitions and other lethal aid overseas.
But experts question what that might mean for U.S. military readiness should another conflict arise with China in the near future, with a U.S. defense industry that is far behind where it needs to be to account for a major war.
That concern is merited, according to a new report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which found that the U.S. defense-industrial base is ill-prepared for Washington to enter a fight with Beijing over Taiwan’s independence, in addition to aiding Kyiv.
Among the most alarming points in the report was the estimate that the U.S. military would run out of critical long-range, precision-guided munitions within a week should China start a fight in the Taiwan Strait.
The war in Ukraine has “exposed serious deficiencies in the U.S. defense industrial base,” according to Seth Jones, the report’s author.
“Given the lead time for industrial production, it would likely be too late for the defense industry to ramp up production if a war were to occur without major changes,” he said.
The estimate as to how long the U.S. can continue to pull from its own weapons stocks and how fast defense firms can refill them has been a topic of discussion since shortly after the war began.
Since nearly a year ago, Washington has pledged to send Ukraine everything from helmets to high-tech systems, including a Patriot air defense battery, Bradley fighting vehicles, various types of missiles and now M1 Abrams tanks. The military aid, along with that of other Western allies, has been credited with helping the Ukrainian troops beat back Russian forces in the largest land war in Europe since World War II.
But the war, which currently has no end in sight, has exposed weaknesses within the U.S. defense industry.
With the U.S. withdrawal of the Afghanistan War in August 2021, the nation found itself not directly involved in a conflict for the first time in 20 years. The end of that American chapter meant a drop in the U.S. of manufactured material needed to produce weapons and ammunition for a war.
Further hampering the weapons supply chain were production delays and worker shortages due to the COVID-19 pandemic, defense firms claimed.
What’s more, Jones said defense manufacturers have for decades been working under the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as other counterterrorism operations in the Middle East, which as the years went on became less demanding for major war-fighting weapons and ammunition.
The Pentagon, however, has remained steadfast in its insistence that there’s no cause for concern.
In May, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin asserted that the U.S. military would not go below its readiness requirements after being pressed by Senate lawmakers over how it would replenish munitions being sent overseas.
“It’s very critical to ensure that we maintain what we consider to be our minimum required stockage levels, and you can rest assured that I will not allow us to go below that in critical munitions,” Austin told Senate lawmakers at the time.
And just this week, Defense Department press secretary Big. Gen. Pat Ryder brushed off questions over the numbers of munitions being expended in Ukraine and what it means for U.S. stockpiles in the event of another conflict, telling reporters the U.S. military won’t “do anything that’s going to affect our readiness or our ability to meet our national security requirements.”
But the fears are not unwarranted.
In November, CNN reported that the Pentagon’s stockpiles of certain systems including 155mm artillery shells and some missiles were “dwindling.”
Mark Cancian, a senior adviser also with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, earlier this month also identified 155 mm artillery rounds as part of six categories of weapons and ammunition that won’t be restocked for at least three years, forecasting that some might not be rebuilt for up to 18 years.
Cancian, who pulled from Defense Department documents and sources for his report, said certain artillery shells could eventually run low enough to reach a crisis point for Ukraine.
“What will happen is that they will have to prioritize targets as the flow of ammunition slows,” he said of Ukrainian forces. “They can’t fire at everything, they’ll only fire at the highest priority.”
Pentagon Undersecretary for Policy Colin Kahl told reporters in November that “there’s no question” the constant flow of weapons to Ukraine has “put pressure” on U.S. stockpiles and the industrial base.
“We’re seeing the first example in many decades of a real high intensity conventional conflict and the strain that that produces on not just the countries involved but the defense industrial bases of those supporting, in this case supporting Ukraine,” Kahl said.
He insisted, however, that the U.S. military has not been put “in a dangerous position as it relates to another major contingency somewhere in the world” due to the constant flow of lethal aid given to Ukraine.
Still, the heads of several military services have recently acknowledged that they’re keeping a close eye on their own weapons stocks to ensure they have enough to keep up readiness should the U.S. be pulled into a conflict.
If “you draw that down too much, now the risk is on you,” Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger told reporters in December. “Your own readiness might suffer if you didn’t monitor it closely. So we have to do that and we have.”
And Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro earlier this month told reporters that if defense contractors can’t increase production in the next six to 12 months, Washington could find it “challenging” to help Ukraine and arm itself at the same time.
“With regards to deliveries of weapons systems for the fight in Ukraine … yeah, that’s always a concern for us,” Del Toro said, as reported by Defense One. “And we monitor that very, very closely. I wouldn’t say we’re quite there yet, but if the conflict does go on for another six months, for another year, it certainly continues to stress the supply chain in ways that are challenging.”
But there is a cause for optimism.
Jones said the Pentagon is aware of its industrial base issue and could address it by awarding multiyear contracts with defense manufacturers to produce munitions, something that has typically not been done in the past.
The Pentagon, meanwhile, revealed on Wednesday that it is set to place a number of large orders in the next two months to replenish the drained U.S. stockpiles.
“There are going to be several big awards coming in February and March that will just move us further down that path,” said Doug Bush, assistant Army secretary for acquisition, logistics, and technology.
Defense production companies also have publicly said they are working to increase production supply. Two of the largest defense manufacturers, Raytheon and Northrop Grumman, did not respond to a request for comment on this story.
Raytheon CEO Greg Hayes said during an investor call this month the company has the capacity to meet demand, but still needs more materials, according to the Wall Street Journal.
Lockheed Martin pointed The Hill toward a quarterly earnings call with CEO Jim Taiclet this week in which he noted several ways to increase production.
Taiclet said the Defense Department should fix multiyear contracts, ease the burden of auditing and regulation on smaller companies in particular, and bolster supply chains to ensure there are multiple sources of components.
“This issue of restocking raised an important industry issue that we’re going to try to work with government to solve,” he said in the call.
The Pentagon did not respond to a request for comment on this story.
6. Zelensky urges allies to send long-range missiles
Zelensky urges allies to send long-range missiles
BY STEPHEN NEUKAM - 01/29/23 9:04 AM ET
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3834986-zelensky-urges-allies-to-send-long-range-missiles/
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stressed that his country needs long-range missiles to help combat Russian missile attacks following a blast in the Donetsk region on Saturday that killed three people.
“It would have been possible to stop this Russian terror if we could provide the appropriate missile capabilities of our military,” Zelensky said in an address posted to the president’s website on Saturday.
“Ukraine needs long-range missiles — in particular, to remove this possibility of the occupiers to place their missile launchers somewhere far from the front line and destroy Ukrainian cities with them,” he added.
Russia has been able to attack regions in Ukraine that are far from the front lines, such as the Donetsk region, because of its long-range missile capability. As Zelensky pleads with foreign allies to provide more military aid, the U.S. has held back on providing such weaponry, worried that Kyiv would launch an aerial attack on Crimea, which Russia annexed from Ukraine in 2014. U.S. defense leaders believe militarily taking back Crimea is nearly impossible in the short term.
But that hasn’t stopped Zelensky from repeated requests for long-range support.
Rep. Victoria Spartz (R-Ind.), a Ukrainian native, has also pressured the Biden administration to provide long-range missiles to the country.
“The next six months will be critical to the brutal war in Ukraine and longer-range capabilities will be crucial for its success,” Spartz said in a statement Wednesday. “The Biden Administration needs to be proactive for a change and provide proper security assistance to the Ukrainian Army more timely to deter further Russian aggression.”
7. 66,000 war crimes have been reported in Ukraine. It vows to prosecute them all.
Excerpts:
But for a variety of legal reasons, including that neither Ukraine nor Russia ratified the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, the ICC can’t prosecute the crime of aggression. It also can’t prosecute heads of state such as Putin, or conduct trials in absentia of his top ministers.
For that reason, Ukraine is campaigning for the creation of a special tribunal, along the lines of the tribunals established to prosecute war crimes in Rwanda and what was previously Yugoslavia. Kostin said his office has gathered evidence on 627 suspects, including ministers, generals and the members of the Russian Duma, or parliament, who voted for the war who could be put on trial for the crime of aggression.
But a special tribunal would have to be endorsed either by the United Nations Security Council, where Russia has veto power, or by the United Nations General Assembly, where it is unclear whether Ukraine could achieve a majority of votes. Broad international support, including from non-Western countries that have been hesitant to condemn Russia’s invasion, would be essential for the tribunal to have the legitimacy required to lend weight to its proceedings, said the European diplomat.
The European Union is leaning toward supporting such a proposal, but the United States has not yet decided whether to back a tribunal, said Beth van Schaack, the U.S. ambassador at large for war crimes. The Biden administration is interested in potentially supporting a new Dutch proposal to create an office for an interim prosecutor to gather evidence on the commission of crimes of aggression for use at a future date.
Ukraine is open to all suggestions that will bring about the best chance of justice, said Bilousov. “There are as many opinions about how to go about this task as there are lawyers,” he said.
66,000 war crimes have been reported in Ukraine. It vows to prosecute them all.
The Washington Post · by Liz Sly · January 29, 2023
KYIV, Ukraine — The 25 Russians convicted so far of war crimes in Ukrainian courts include a soldier who forced two Ukrainians at gunpoint to hand over laptops and money, four who beat and tortured Ukrainian soldiers, and two who admitted shelling residential buildings in the first weeks of the war.
Over 66,000 additional alleged war crimes have been reported to Ukrainian authorities since the Russian invasion began in February, according to Ukraine’s Office of the Prosecutor General. The number is growing by hundreds every day as investigators fan out into areas retaken from the Russians and Ukrainians step up to lodge complaints, ranging from the theft of property to torture, murder, rape, the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia and the relentless missile strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure.
It’s a staggering number of cases, one that would overwhelm any judicial system anywhere, legal experts say. But Ukraine’s prosecutor general, Andriy Kostin, has vowed to investigate all of them and to bring to trial all those in which enough evidence can be gathered. President Volodymyr Zelensky has made justice for the victims of war crimes one of his conditions for eventual peace with Russia. The issue is as important for Ukraine as defeating the Russians militarily if Russia is to be deterred forever from attacking Ukraine, Kostin said.
“We have to win in both battles — in the fight for our territory and in the fight for justice,” he said in an interview.
The battle for justice could prove just as challenging as the fight for land.
The war in Ukraine offers an unparalleled opportunity to test the still-evolving international justice system that began to take shape after World War II. The United Nations has found clear evidence that “an array” of war crimes and other violations of human rights and international law have been committed, according to an initial report by the Independent International Commission of Enquiry on Ukraine set up under the auspices of the United Nations earlier this year.
Not only is there an overwhelming number of cases, but also abundant evidence, noted a European diplomat, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive issues. Technology has brought new means of documenting crimes, from the videos posted on social media by Russian and Ukrainian soldiers to satellite footage that reveals patterns of deliberate attacks on civilian targets.
The liberation of territory by Ukrainian troops has enabled investigators to obtain firsthand accounts and forensic evidence within days or weeks of the crimes being committed — rather than years, as has been the case with most previous attempts to put war criminals on trial. If Ukraine succeeds in retaking more territory, the number of cases could easily double, Ukrainian officials say.
There is extraordinary international interest in the effort to hold the perpetrators to account, surpassed only by the Nazi war crimes trials that followed World War II. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has deployed its biggest team yet to Ukraine. Human rights lawyers and advocacy groups have flooded into the country. The United Nations and European governments have opened investigations. The diplomat said he had counted at least 11 different investigations underway in Ukraine.
But there is a risk the entire effort will be weighed down by the sheer number of cases, the overlapping inquiries and the loopholes and contradictions of a still imperfect international judicial system, legal experts say. Whether there is a path to prosecuting the most senior figures who bear overall responsibility for the war, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, is increasingly in question, they say.
The Ukrainian authorities expect to try the overwhelming majority of the cases, Kostin said. International mechanisms have always been intended to complement and supplement national jurisdictions, stepping in where governments are unable or unwilling to carry out prosecutions of their own and bringing international accountability for the highest-level officials.
But for Ukraine to prosecute the 99 percent of cases that Kostin says he expects to take on is in itself a massive undertaking. Every day brings new reports of mass graves uncovered, torture chambers revealed and fresh missile strikes that kill civilians and destroy property. There are likely to be some duplications, but it’s still a huge number of cases, he said.
Take the example of just one mass grave discovered in the wake of the Russian retreat from the northeastern town of Izyum in September, said Wayne Jordash, a Ukraine-based human rights lawyer with Global Rights Compliance, one of the international organizations advising the Ukrainian government. To demonstrate that a war crime was committed will require detailed forensic examination of all the 400 bodies unearthed and the circumstances of their death, even before identifying the perpetrator, he said.
“You can never investigate every single one of these cases. Some have to be prioritized, some have to be deprioritized, when you have a situation of such mass criminality as you have here,” Jordash said.
His organization, and others helping the Ukrainian government, advocate grouping a number of crimes together into single cases. They might include, for example, the entirety of the killings committed in the vicinity of Bucha, outside Kyiv, where the forced Russian retreat in April drew attention to the scale of Russian atrocities taking place.
But Ukrainians insist it is important to hold to account every Russian soldier who transgressed the laws of war, no matter how small the crime or whether the perpetrators are in Ukrainian custody. “The victims want justice,” Kostin said.
Among the 86 indictments brought so far are one accusing a Russian soldier of stealing food and other possessions from a Ukrainian home and another against the wife of a Russian soldier for encouraging her husband to rape Ukrainian women, “on the basis of personal hostility to Ukrainian society and contempt for Ukrainian women,” according to records of the Office of the Prosecutor General.
There are also charges against a battalion commander who ordered subordinates to fire on fleeing civilians in Kharkiv, resulting in the death of at least one woman; two servicemen who raped a 16-year-old; and the Russian minister for transport, accused of preparing the war and the “illegal transportation of persons” across Ukraine’s state borders — the highest-level civilian to be indicted.
The minister and the vast majority of the 86 suspects indicted so far are to be tried in absentia, according to figures provided by the office of the prosecutor general. There are no reports so far of investigations into possible Ukrainian war crimes.
“We have to find a way to provide justice for all regardless of who they are, what social position they have and what level of crime they faced,” said Oleksandra Matviichuk, whose organization, Ukraine’s Center for Civil Liberties, was a joint winner of the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize for its work campaigning on behalf of war crimes victims.
There is, however, a risk of opening up what Matviichuk called “an accountability gap,” in which ordinary Russian soldiers are punished for acts committed in the pursuit of their orders to wage war while top leaders such as Putin continue to pursue the war with impunity. The 25 Russians convicted so far have been issued sentences ranging from 10 years to life imprisonment. According to figures provided by the Office of the Prosecutor General, only 18 of the 250 Russians for whom enough evidence has been gathered to lay charges are in Ukrainian custody, as prisoners of war.
Ukraine is meanwhile gathering evidence on high-level figures who could be indicted for committing violations of international law to pass on to international authorities, said Kostin. But Ukrainian law prohibits the admission of evidence that has not been gathered by Ukrainian investigators, rendering some of the international assistance that has poured into the country unhelpful, said Yuriy Bilousov, who heads the war crimes prosecution department of the prosecutor’s office.
Much of the evidence being gathered by foreign human rights organizations is being sent directly to the ICC, where it risks gathering dust, he said. The nongovernmental organizations “are helpful but they could be more helpful if they gave us the information,” he said. “The ICC wasn’t set up to prosecute every war crime. It would be more helpful if we could get the information immediately because we could try to find the Russian criminal.”
Left unaddressed by all the inquiries is the crime of aggression, of waging war at all against a sovereign country. This counts as “the mother of all war crimes,” said Kostin. “Without the invasion of Russian troops, the other war crimes wouldn’t have been committed.”
And it is the crime that would be easiest to prosecute, including at the highest levels of the Russian leadership, said Jordash. There is plenty of evidence, ranging from televised statements to the act of the invasion itself, that Putin and his ministers deliberately set about a war of aggression against Ukraine.
But for a variety of legal reasons, including that neither Ukraine nor Russia ratified the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, the ICC can’t prosecute the crime of aggression. It also can’t prosecute heads of state such as Putin, or conduct trials in absentia of his top ministers.
For that reason, Ukraine is campaigning for the creation of a special tribunal, along the lines of the tribunals established to prosecute war crimes in Rwanda and what was previously Yugoslavia. Kostin said his office has gathered evidence on 627 suspects, including ministers, generals and the members of the Russian Duma, or parliament, who voted for the war who could be put on trial for the crime of aggression.
But a special tribunal would have to be endorsed either by the United Nations Security Council, where Russia has veto power, or by the United Nations General Assembly, where it is unclear whether Ukraine could achieve a majority of votes. Broad international support, including from non-Western countries that have been hesitant to condemn Russia’s invasion, would be essential for the tribunal to have the legitimacy required to lend weight to its proceedings, said the European diplomat.
The European Union is leaning toward supporting such a proposal, but the United States has not yet decided whether to back a tribunal, said Beth van Schaack, the U.S. ambassador at large for war crimes. The Biden administration is interested in potentially supporting a new Dutch proposal to create an office for an interim prosecutor to gather evidence on the commission of crimes of aggression for use at a future date.
Ukraine is open to all suggestions that will bring about the best chance of justice, said Bilousov. “There are as many opinions about how to go about this task as there are lawyers,” he said.
Serhiy Morgunov contributed from Kyiv
The Washington Post · by Liz Sly · January 29, 2023
8. Pentagon Distances Itself from Minihan Memo Suggesting Possible War with China in 2025
General Minihan's memo is at the link: https://www.airandspaceforces.com/pentagon-distances-itself-minihan-memo-possible-war-china-2025/?utm
However, there are Congressional leaders who back up the General's comments.
Pentagon Distances Itself from Minihan Memo Suggesting Possible War with China in 2025 | Air & Space Forces Magazine
airandspaceforces.com · by Chris Gordon · January 29, 2023
Jan. 29, 2023 | By Chris Gordon
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Comments by Air Force Gen. Mike Minihan, the head of Air Mobility Command, about a potential war with China in the next few years have generated international headlines and led the Department of Defense to formally distance itself from the remarks.
Minihan, who is known for his energetic, passionate style, prepared a memo saying that Airmen under his command at AMC should prepare to be at war with China within two years.
“I hope I am wrong. My gut tells me we will fight in 2025.” Minihan wrote in the memo, which circulated on social media and was confirmed as authentic by Air & Space Forces Magazine.
“Xi secured his third term and set his war council in October 2022,” Minihan wrote. “Taiwan’s presidential elections are in 2024 and will offer Xi a reason. United States’ presidential elections are in 2024 and will offer Xi a distracted America. Xi’s team, reason, and opportunity are all aligned for 2025.”
The memo was dated Feb. 1 and intended for Minihan’s subordinates at AMC, but it attracted worldwide attention when it made the rounds on social media Jan. 27.
The Department of Defense has sought to make it clear that it does not agree with Minihan’s assessment.
“These comments are not representative of the department’s view on China,” a defense official said in comments emailed to Air & Space Forces Magazine on Jan. 28.
A statement from Pentagon press secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder reiterated the department’s formal policy on China.
“The National Defense Strategy makes clear that China is the pacing challenge for the Department of Defense and our focus remains on working alongside allies and partners to preserve a peaceful, free and open Indo-Pacific,” Ryder said.
The public disclosure of Minihan’s comments came just before Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin left for South Korea and the Philippines on Jan. 29, as the U.S. tries to warm its relations with nations in the Pacific in a bid to counter Chinese influence. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is due to visit China in early February in an effort to dampen growing tensions and maintain top-level communications with Beijing.
Department of Defense officials often walk a fine line when commenting on the threat posed by China, calling the country America’s ”pacing challenge” that requires the military to reorient itself toward the Pacific, while frequently saying they do not anticipate imminent conflict.
“We believe that [the Chinese] endeavor to establish a new normal, but whether or not that means that an invasion is imminent, I seriously doubt that,” Austin said Jan. 11.
But Minihan’s memo, which was intended to encourage his subordinates to be prepared for a potential contingency, was written in his usual colorful style, ordering Airmen with weapons qualification to brush up on their marksmanship sometime in February and “fire a clip into a 7-meter target with the full understanding that unrepentant lethality matters most.”
“Aim for the head,” Minihan added.
Minihan also made it clear he expects Airmen to follow through on his directions.
“You need to know I alone own the pen on these orders,” Minihan wrote in the memo. “My expectations are high, and these orders are not up for negotiation. Follow them.”
Despite the stir his comments have made, Minihan is not the first four-star uniformed officer to warn that a military confrontation with China could occur in the near future. Adm. Michael M. Gilday, the Chief of Naval Operations, said in October the U.S. should prepare to fight in 2022 or 2023.
“I can’t rule that out,” Gilday said. “I don’t mean at all to be alarmist by saying that, it’s just that we can’t wish that away.”
In 2021, Adm. Phil Davidson, then-head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), predicted China might take military action against Taiwan by 2027—a timeline that has been dubbed “the Davidson window.”
Minihan has top-level experience in the region. Before becoming the head of the Air Force’s transport and tanker arm, he served as the deputy INDOPACOM commander from 2019-2021.
And since taking command of AMC, Minihan has continued to stress the importance of competition with China. In a roundtable with reporters during AFA’s Air, Space, & Cyber Conference in September, he said his experience in the Indo-Pacific was the main reason he was selected for the job, and in his colorful “Mobility Manifesto” keynote, he stated that Mobility Guardian 23, AMC’s “crown jewel” exercise, will focus on the Pacific.
AMC has also pushed the envelope with record-setting refueling endurance missions and limited aircrew operations.
Minihan’s memo makes it clear he wants to keep pushing, instructing all AMC commanders to “report all 2022 accomplishments preparing for the China fight and forecast major efforts in 2023” by the end of February.
One particular line of effort he wants to pursue involves the KC-135 Stratotanker—the memo calls for KC-135 units to “coordinate to provide a conceptual means of air delivering 100 off-the-shelf size and type UAVs from a single aircraft” by March. It is unclear what the intended use of those drones would be.
Air
airandspaceforces.com · by Chris Gordon · January 29, 2023
9. House Republican warns of pending conflict with China
House Republican warns of pending conflict with China
The Washington Post · by Azi Paybarah · January 29, 2023
Days after a four-star general in the Air Force predicted the United States could be at war with China in two years, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee said Sunday he agreed with that assessment.
“I hope he’s wrong as well but I think he’s right though, unfortunately,” Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Tex.) said during an interview on “Fox News Sunday.”
On Friday, Gen. Michael A. Minihan sent a memo to officers he commands warning about a fight with China. “I hope I am wrong. My gut tells me we will fight in 2025,” he wrote in the memo, which was dated Feb. 1 but has already been distributed to his subordinates.
McCaul said Sunday that China is looking to take control of Taiwan, whose independence it does not recognize. First, China will try to influence the elections in Taiwan next year, McCaul said. If that influence effort fails, McCaul said, “they are going to look at a military invasion, in my judgment. And we have to be prepared for this.”
McCaul contended that Biden was projecting weakness and that “the odds are very high we can see a conflict with China and Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific.”
Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.), a member of the Armed Services Committee, disagreed with McCaul and the general, telling Fox News Sunday, “It’s not only not inevitable, it is highly unlikely.”
Smith did acknowledge, “We have a very dangerous situation in China,” and generals have to prepare for a wide range of possibilities. But, Smith warned against generals publicly talking up the possibility of a military conflict, and said, “I am fully confident that we can avoid that conflict if we take the right approach.”
The Washington Post · by Azi Paybarah · January 29, 2023
10. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 29, 2023
Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2023
Key inflections in ongoing military operations on January 29:
- Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensives in the vicinity of Kuzemivka (about 16km northwest of Svatove).[27]
- Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued to repel limited Russian counterattacks west and south of Kreminna.[28]
- Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced that Wagner forces seized Blahodatne (about 12km northeast of Bakhmut) on January 29.[29]
- Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks in the Bakhmut and Donetsk City-Avdiivka areas.[30]
- Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces repelled assaults near Pobieda (4km southeast of Donetsk City) and Vuhledar.[31] Russian sources claimed that fighting is ongoing to the west and east of Vuhledar.[32]
- Russian sources did not report on any Russian ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast for the third consecutive day on January 29.[33] Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike against a bridge in Svitlodolynske (20km northeast of Melitopol).[34]
- Russian forces continued to conduct routine fire against Kherson City and other settlements in the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[35] Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan reported that Russian forces used incendiary munitions to fire on Beryslav.[36]
- Russian authorities are continuing to set conditions for a second wave of mobilization. Head of the State Duma Committee on Defense Andrey Kartapolov stated on January 28 that the committee is reviewing over 20 laws regarding mobilization deferrals.[37]
- The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 29.[38]
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 29, 2023
understandingwar.org
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 29, 2023
Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard, Mason Clark, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros
January 29, 8:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, January 29. This report focuses on the impact of delays in sending high-end weapons systems to Ukraine on Ukraine’s ability to take advantage of windows of opportunity throughout this war.
Delays in the provision to Ukraine of Western long-range fires systems, advanced air defense systems, and tanks have limited Ukraine’s ability to take advantage of opportunities for larger counter-offensive operations presented by flaws and failures in Russian military operations. Western discussions of supposed “stalemate” conditions and the difficulty or impossibility of Ukraine regaining significant portions of the territory Russia seized in 2022 insufficiently account for how Western delays in providing necessary military equipment have exacerbated those problems. Slow authorization and arrival of aid have not been the only factors limiting Ukraine’s ability to launch continued large-scale counter-offensive operations. Factors endogenous to the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian political decision-making have also contributed to delaying counteroffensives. ISW is not prepared to assess that all Ukrainian military decisions have been optimal. (ISW does not, in fact, assess Ukrainian military decision-making in these updates at all. Yet, as historians, we have not observed flawless military decision-making in any war.) But Ukraine does not have a significant domestic military industry to turn to in the absence of Western support. Western hesitancy to supply weapons during wartime took insufficient account of the predictable requirement to shift Ukraine from Soviet to Western systems as soon as the West committed to helping Ukraine fight off Russia's 2022 invasion.
The military aid provided by the US-led Western coalition has been essential to Ukraine’s survival, and this report’s critiques illustrate the importance of that aid as well as its limitations. Western military advising before the February 24 invasion helped the Ukrainian military resist the initial Russian invasion. Western weapons systems such as the Javelin anti-tank missile helped Ukraine defeat that onslaught and throw the Russian drive on Kyiv back to its starting points. The provision of essential Soviet-era weapons systems and munitions by members of the Western coalition has kept the Ukrainian military operating throughout the war. The delivery of more advanced Western systems such as the US-produced 155mm artillery (in April) and then HIMARS (in June) facilitated the Ukrainian counter-offensives that liberated most of Kharkiv Oblast and then western Kherson Oblast.[1] The arrival of Western NASAMS air-defense systems in November helped blunt the Russian drone and missile campaign attacking Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.[2]
The war has unfolded so far in three major periods. The Russians had the initiative and were on the offensive from February 24 through July 3, 2022, whereupon their attacks culminated. The Ukrainians seized the initiative and began large-scale counteroffensives in August, continuing through the liberation of western Kherson Oblast on November 11. Ukraine has been unable to initiate a new major counter-offensive since then, allowing the conflict to settle into positional warfare and allowing the Russians the opportunity to regain the initiative if they choose and to raise the bar for future Ukrainian counteroffensives even if they do not. The pattern of delivery of Western aid has powerfully shaped the pattern of this conflict.
Western reluctance to begin supplying Ukraine with higher-end Western weapons systems, particularly tanks, long-range strike systems, and air-defense systems, has limited Ukraine’s ability to initiate and continue large-scale counter-offensive operations.
Sound counter-offensive campaign design calls for stopping the enemy’s offensive as rapidly as possible, initiating decisive counter-offensives rapidly after the enemy’s offensive culminates to take advantage of the enemy’s disorganization and unpreparedness for subsequent major operations, and then continuing counter-offensive operations with the briefest possible pauses between them to prevent the enemy from reconstituting its forces and possibly regaining the initiative.
Many factors contribute to the failure of most militaries to meet this ideal standard, and the Ukrainian military faced many internal challenges to do so. Weapons and supplies are always central to the planning and execution of sound campaigns, however. Ukraine had no meaningful defense industry going into the war and was therefore almost entirely reliant on its Western backers to provide the materiel it needed to stop the initial Russian offensive and then, even more so, to initiate and sustain counter-offensives. The patterns of Western aid thus heavily shaped Ukraine’s ability to develop and execute sound campaign plans.
The Russian invasion began on February 24, 2022. The only major phase of Russian offensive operations continued through the capture of Lysychansk on July 3.[3] Russian offensive operations then culminated, and Russia lost the initiative in July.
Indicators that the Russian offensives would culminate and that Western weapons would be needed at scale emerged clearly in late May and June. ISW observed on May 28 that “Ukraine may have a chance to launch significant counteroffensives with good prospects for success.”[4] The West had been sending Ukraine Soviet-era equipment and ammunition to resupply and replace Ukraine’s Soviet systems, but Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Vadym Skibitsky warned on June 10 that Ukrainian forces were running low on Soviet supplies.[5] Western officials began publicly warning that stocks of Soviet-era materiel were running low on June 24.[6] The United States authorized the delivery of 155mm howitzers on April 21, and those systems began arriving in Ukraine on April 29.[7]The United States authorized HIMARS in late May, which began arriving on June 23.[8] The Western coalition did not prepare to provide Ukraine with armored vehicles during this period.[9]
If the West’s aim had been to shorten the war by speeding Ukraine’s liberation of occupied territory, the assessment that stocks of Soviet-era weapons held by friendly states were running low should have triggered a fundamental change in the provision of Western aid starting in June 2022. The Western coalition has no capacity to produce Russian weapons or ammunition at scale, so the exhaustion of the Cold War holdovers of those systems clearly indicated that the West would have to shift Ukraine to full reliance on Western systems in order for Ukraine to have any military at all in the future, to say nothing of supporting Ukraine’s continued ability to fight a protracted war against Russia. The West should therefore have begun setting conditions to shift Ukraine onto the use of Western weapons platforms, including tanks, artillery, and aircraft, by early summer 2022 and in advance of the forecasted culmination of Russian offensive operations.
Ukraine used what systems the West made available to it to take advantage of the window of opportunity presented by the Russian culmination following the seizure of Lysychansk on July 3, 2022, to initiate counter-offensive operations. Ukrainian forces began using US-provided HIMARS systems to set conditions for counter-offensives in both Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts in July. Ukraine launched its first major counter-offensive, in Kharkiv Oblast, on September 6.[10] That counter-offensive was a stunning success, recouping over 12,000 square kilometers of territory in a six-day lightning advance that overran and destroyed some of the most elite mechanized units in the Russian military.[11]
The Ukrainians followed the Kharkiv counter-offensive with a counter-offensive in Kherson Oblast. They began setting conditions for operations in Kherson as early as July 23, escalating in September and October, and culminating in the Russian withdrawal from western Kherson Oblast on November 11, 2022.[12] That counter-offensive proceeded much more slowly and cautiously than the Kharkiv counteroffensive had, partly because the Ukrainians wanted to avoid fighting in (and thereby destroying) the city of Kherson, but largely because by that point they feared running out of counter-offensive capabilities. The West was still refusing to supply armored vehicles and was increasingly warning about Western shortages of supply even of the artillery systems and munitions it was providing.[13]
Had the West begun providing Ukraine the equipment it needed for sustained counter-offensive operations as the Russian offensives were culminating, it might have been possible for Ukraine to begin those counter-offensive operations earlier.[14] If the West had begun working to shift Ukraine fully to Western systems when the need to do so had become apparent in the summer of 2022, conditions could have been set to allow Ukraine to continue counter-offensive operations after Kherson and thereby deprive the Russians of the ability to reconstitute their forces and attempt to regain the initiative.
Western delays in providing Ukraine the materiel needed for counter-offensive operations have instead had a snowballing effect on Ukrainian abilities to conduct and sustain counter-offensives. Having failed to begin setting conditions to send Ukraine armored vehicles in May and June, when the need was becoming apparent, the West still did not prepare to do so when the Ukrainian counter-offensives began. The Ukrainians thus lacked any assurance that they would receive replacements for weapons systems lost or damaged in a new counter-offensive and therefore likely became more cautious in deciding to initiate and continue counter-offensives after liberating western Kherson Oblast.
Failure to commit to providing counter-offensive materiel at scale after the conclusion of the Kherson counter-offensive has contributed to delays in the initiation of any further counter-offensives. The effects of that failure and of the cautiousness it likely induced in Ukrainian leaders may help explain the fact that Ukrainian officials routinely indicated that they intended to continue counteroffensives in the winter of 2022 and 2023 while some Western officials said instead that they anticipated a lull in fighting during the winter and therefore did not see any urgency in providing additional materials.[15] Ukrainian forces, in any event, have not initiated a new large-scale counter-offensive following the Russian withdrawal from west bank Kherson Oblast in mid-November.[16]
The Russians have taken advantage of these delays and failures to benefit from the windows of vulnerability their own defeats and incompetence produced by mobilizing manpower and equipment and starting to rationalize their own forces. They renewed their offensive against Bakhmut in late July, although it picked up steam only when Wagner Forces began leaning into it (although without making significant territorial gains) in October-November.[17] The Bakhmut offensive coincided with the dramatic air campaign against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure that started on October 10 and made use of Russia’s remaining stocks of precision missiles as well as drones that Moscow procured from Iran.[18] Both the Bakhmut offensive and the missile-drone campaign put pressure on Ukraine that distracted from efforts to prepare for further counter-offensives—the Bakhmut offensive by drawing Ukrainian reinforcements to the defense of the city and the infrastructure attacks by diverting Ukrainian command attention from the battlefield. The muddy season in October and November also slowed operations but did not stop them.[19]
The initial deployments of mobilized Russian reservists were largely disastrous for Russia and did not pose a major obstacle to Ukraine’s continuation of counter-offensive operations.[20] As the months went on and stretched into 2023, however, the Russians redeployed conventional units, likely filled out with mobilized reservist replacements, to stiffen the sector of the front (Luhansk) toward which the next Ukrainian counter-offensive appeared to be headed and filled out those units with mobilized personnel in a more effective way.[21] Russian forces also spent considerable resources in the fall of 2022 establishing a long line of supporting field fortifications in Luhansk Oblast to defend against Ukrainian advances.[22] The mass mobilization of Russian convicts by the Wagner Group rapidly generated tens of thousands of “soldiers” who were used in human wave attacks that generated dreadful casualties on the Russian side but placed great pressure on Ukrainian defenders in November, December, and January.[23]
Ukraine’s inability to mount a subsequent counter-offensive in November following the Russian withdrawal from western Kherson Oblast gave Russia time and space to stabilize its lines and put pressure on Ukraine to which Kyiv had to respond.[24] Many factors no doubt contributed to Ukraine’s failure to continue counter-offensive operations after Kherson, but the West’s failure to provide the necessary materiel was certainly key. That failure thus allowed the Russians partially to regain the initiative in the war starting in November and to establish defensive positions posing a much greater challenge for the next counter-offensive than the Russians could have posed in November-December.[25]
The incorporation of Western weapons systems such as tanks and aircraft takes a long time. Many Ukrainian soldiers must be trained to use them. Logistics systems must be established to supply them. Spare parts must be assembled and depots equipped to repair them. The inevitable delay between the pledge to send such systems and the Ukrainians’ ability to use them means that Western leaders must commit them when the earliest indicators that they will be required appear, not when the situation becomes dire. Had Western leaders started setting conditions for Ukraine to use Western tanks in June 2022, when the first clear indicators appeared that Western tanks would be needed, Ukrainian forces would have been able to start using them in November or December.
The continual delays in providing Western materiel when it became apparent that it is or will soon be needed have thus contributed to the protraction of the conflict. They are not the only reason for that protraction, to be sure, but the West must recognize the contributions these delays have made to hindering Ukraine’s ability to liberate more of its territory faster.
Recent Western commitments to provide Ukraine with the tanks and armored vehicles it requires for further counter-offensive operations are important, but the delays in making those commitments may have cost Ukraine a window of opportunity for a counter-offensive this winter. Russian forces are likely preparing to launch an offensive of their own in Luhansk Oblast and are adding weight to their offensives around Bakhmut, as ISW has reported.[26]
Ukraine may still launch a long-planned counteroffensive this winter, which would somewhat mitigate the consequences of Western delays in providing necessary aid. The delay in launching that counter-offensive thus far, however, has allowed the Russians to set conditions to make it harder and more costly. The delay has also allowed Russia to set conditions for an offensive of its own, greatly complicating Ukrainian campaign design.
If Ukraine does not already have the materiel it needs to launch its counteroffensive, then it may have to wait many weeks for Western tanks to arrive in enough quantity to support renewed efforts. The delay will likely be lengthened by the weather. Both the Russians and the Ukrainians will have to account for the spring muddy season, most likely to occur in March and April, that will make high-speed mechanized counter-offensives difficult if not impossible. Ukraine may need to wait until late spring or early summer before renewing its large-scale efforts to liberate strategically vital terrain. Ongoing Russian offensives may well make more gains before then.
The West will need to avoid drawing the erroneous conclusion that future Ukrainian counter-offensives are impossible based on a timeline imposed by the West’s own delays in providing necessary material and meteorological conditions. Current and planned Russian offensives will very likely culminate without achieving operationally decisive gains and in ways that could very well create propitious conditions for Ukrainian counter-offensives, especially once Ukraine has ingested the incoming Western tanks. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine can liberate critical terrain with the current and promised levels of Western support and that it is a matter of vital national interest for the United States and its Western partners that Ukraine do so.
Key inflections in ongoing military operations on January 29:
- Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensives in the vicinity of Kuzemivka (about 16km northwest of Svatove).[27]
- Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued to repel limited Russian counterattacks west and south of Kreminna.[28]
- Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced that Wagner forces seized Blahodatne (about 12km northeast of Bakhmut) on January 29.[29]
- Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks in the Bakhmut and Donetsk City-Avdiivka areas.[30]
- Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces repelled assaults near Pobieda (4km southeast of Donetsk City) and Vuhledar.[31] Russian sources claimed that fighting is ongoing to the west and east of Vuhledar.[32]
- Russian sources did not report on any Russian ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast for the third consecutive day on January 29.[33] Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike against a bridge in Svitlodolynske (20km northeast of Melitopol).[34]
- Russian forces continued to conduct routine fire against Kherson City and other settlements in the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[35] Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan reported that Russian forces used incendiary munitions to fire on Beryslav.[36]
- Russian authorities are continuing to set conditions for a second wave of mobilization. Head of the State Duma Committee on Defense Andrey Kartapolov stated on January 28 that the committee is reviewing over 20 laws regarding mobilization deferrals.[37]
- The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 29.[38]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lAAmRSLIaVo&ab_channel=UkraineMediaCente... https://zn dot ua/ukr/UKRAINE/reznikov-rozpoviv-koli-prodovzhitsja-kontrnastup-sil-oboroni-.html; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/eng/news/2022/12/11/7380306/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lAAmRSLIaVo&ab_channel=UkraineMediaCente... https://zn dot ua/ukr/UKRAINE/reznikov-rozpoviv-koli-prodovzhitsja-kontrnastup-sil-oboroni-.html; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/eng/news/2022/12/11/7380306/; https://fakty.com dot ua/ua/ukraine/20221206-ukrayini-sogodni-ne-potribna-dodatkova-mobilizacziya-reznikov/; https://nv dot ua/ukr/ukraine/politics/ukrajina-otrimaye-zahidni-tanki-ta-boyovi-litaki-zayaviv-reznikov-novini-ukrajini-50288954.html; https://twitter.com/jseldin/status/1602372117290713089; https://thehill.com/policy/international/3761171-us-intelligence-chief-s...; https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/04/us-intel-chief-on-russia-using-up-ammuni...
[34] https://t.me/vrogov/7389; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/76714; https://tass dot ru/politika/16912247; https://ria dot ru/20230129/himars-1848232453.html; https://twitter.com/PStyle0ne1/status/1619744858016727040
understandingwar.org
11. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issues frightening warning: CCP has invaded ‘every major’ US university
Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issues frightening warning: CCP has invaded ‘every major’ US university
foxnews.com · by Fox News Staff | Fox News
Video
China will be ‘inside the gates’ if Biden continues to let them ‘walk on’ US economy: Pompeo
Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo discusses President Biden’s mishandling of classified documents and the ongoing threat that China poses to U.S. national security.
Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo joined "Sunday Morning Futures" to discuss China and the dynamic threat they pose to the U.S.'s vulnerable national security.
REP. MCCAUL ON AIR FORCE GENERAL’S PREDICTION OF 2025 WAR WITH CHINA: 'I HOPE HE’S WRONG … I THINK HE’S RIGHT'
MIKE POMPEO: If you're afraid to enforce the rules, if you continue to allow them to walk on the American economy, if you keep giving an inch in every space, they'll be inside the gates here in the United States. And frankly, that's what we face today. And for four years, during my time as CIA director or secretary of state, I never gave an inch.
Video
It's crazy, Maria. We've now had several senior leaders, certainly President Biden included, who had documents where they weren't supposed to be. Get them back. Get these documents where they're supposed to be, and then transparency matters. I heard Sen. Cruz say this, and we need to know what's in those documents, what the seriousness of them is, what potential breaches there are. And then finally, these senior leaders need to own this. We need to find out if the Chinese Communist Party actually may have had access at the University of Pennsylvania, where President Biden clearly had documents that would have been a pretty open space. And Maria, you and I have talked about this for years, the Chinese Communist Party's inside every major American university today with research dollars and with their students. They're at the University of Pennsylvania, too. And we now know that this Chinese money, these Chinese officials met classified documents in that space. They were in the same place. We need to know if there's any risk they might have gotten a hold of them.
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foxnews.com · by Fox News Staff | Fox News
12. A decade of quiet preparations helped Ukraine turn the tables on Russia's bigger, better-armed military, experts say
A decade of quiet preparations helped Ukraine turn the tables on Russia's bigger, better-armed military, experts say
Business Insider · by Constantine Atlamazoglou
Ukrainian troops carry rocket-propelled grenades and sniper rifles toward the city of Irpin in March 2022.
Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images
- Following Russia's 2014 attack, Ukraine's military set out to improve and modernize its forces.
- Kyiv's decisions during that period helped it hold off Moscow's assault in late February 2022.
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When Russia annexed Crimea and stoked a conflict in eastern Ukraine's Donbas region in 2014, Ukraine's military was in poor condition, with only 6,000 combat-ready troops out of a 140,000-strong force.
In the years that followed, Ukraine's military underwent a period of preparation that helped it blunt the full-scale invasion that Russia launched in February 2022.
According to a report by the Royal United Services Institute assessing the first five months of the war, decisions made by Kyiv during those years modernized its hardware and enabled its troops to hold off Russia's assault.
Artillery in recovery
Ukrainian troops fire a howitzer in the Zaporizhzhia Region in December 2022.
Dmytro Smoliyenko / Ukrinform/Future Publishing via Getty Images
Recognizing Russia's artillery capabilities, which caused roughly 90% of Ukraine's casualties between 2014 and 2022, Kyiv strengthened its own artillery force, which was systematically reduced prior to 2014.
Ukraine created new artillery units that doubled its total strength by February 2022 and gave it "the largest artillery force in Europe after Russia," according to the report.
Although Russian sabotage between 2014 and 2018 destroyed much of Ukraine's artillery ammunition, when the full-scale invasion started, Ukraine still had enough ammunition "for just over six weeks" of high-intensity fighting, the report says.
Ukraine also modernized its artillery force by introducing US-made radars, equipping artillery units with drones for reconnaissance and targeting, and introducing an intelligent mapping system that reduced artillery units' deployment time by 80%. Training for artillery troops was also intensified.
As a result, the report says, "the amount of time to destroy an unplanned target was reduced by two-thirds" and the time it took to open counter-battery fire shrunk by 90%.
Tanks and anti-tank capabilities
A tank turret is repaired at the Kyiv Panzer factory in August 2015.
NurPhoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images
Most of the 30 tank battalions — totaling about 900 tanks — that Ukraine had in 2022 were formed between 2014 and 2018, a period during which Ukraine added 500 tanks to its fleet.
However, Russia's tanks still outnumbered Ukraine's nearly four to one when the invasion started.
To compensate for that disadvantage, Ukraine's military adapted its tank doctrine and started using tanks for indirect fire, like artillery pieces, with high-explosive fragmentation rounds.
To do this, Ukrainian tankers use "special guidance devices" and other modern technology along with "automated transmission of information to other tanks," which made it possible to be highly accurate at ranges of up to 6 miles and reduced the timed to make corrections to fire coordinates down to a few seconds, according to the report.
A Ukrainian tank in the city of Slavyansk in July 2014.
GENYA SAVILOV/AFP via Getty Images
"This technique blurs the line between tanks and artillery" and "allows tanks to concentrate fire over a wide area while they can manoeuvre without the protection and screening needed by artillery pieces," the report says.
Many of the tanks that Ukraine fielded in the 2010s were older models that had been upgraded, as Kyiv lacked the funds for new tanks. At the beginning of the invasion, Russia's tanks were generally better, with higher-quality protection and sighting systems and ability to engage targets from longer range, though those advantages "were less relevant" at shorter range, the report says.
While experts have said that attention on anti-tank guided missiles tends to overstate their role in halting Russia's initial advance, Ukraine invested heavily in ATGMs after 2014, buying thousands of launchers and missiles and setting up the School of Anti-Tank Artillery to train troops on them.
While Western-made ATGMs were quickly delivered at the start of the war, maintenance issues and their limited numbers meant they weren't the "primary means" of wearing down Russian forces, the RUSI report says.
The battle of the skies
A Ukrainian MIG-29 fighter jet at the Vasilkov air base in November 2016.
Efrem Lukatsky/AP Photo
After 2014, Ukraine tried to modernize its air force, and when the invasion started, it had about 50 MiG-29s and 32 Su-27s, as well as a few Su-24s and Su-25s, but it was outmatched and outgunned by Russia's Aerospace Force in every respect, according to RUSI.
Therefore, Ukrainian planners focused on survivability by training units to disperse aircraft from main bases to secondary airfields. Crews were also trained to maintain and repair combat-damaged planes under conditions they would face in the field.
As Ukrainian pilots were well aware of their aircraft's limitations and of "the fearsome capabilities" of Russia's anti-aircraft weapons, "they trained extensively for low-level flight over Ukrainian territory and were highly familiar with the exploitation of terrain to evade radar detection," the RUSI report says.
A Russian Su-35 downed by Ukrainian forces in the Kharkiv region in April 2022.
Press service of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff/Handout via REUTERS
Ukraine also prioritized its air-defense capabilities. Its radio engineering troops, tasked with warning of an air attack, "reorganised after 2014 to ensure they could detect targets at 300-400 km, and direct fighters and anti-aircraft missile troops against them," the reports says. Those units also received better radars.
Thus, at the onset of the invasion, Ukraine had continuous radar coverage of its border with Russia and its own airspace, though its Black Sea coverage was "less extensive."
Russia's air force failed to account for those improvements, "leading to tactical errors in the employment of radio-electronic attack," RUSI says.
Additionally, Ukrainian air-defense missiles forced Russian pilots to fly low, where they could be targeted by Ukrainian troops with modernized shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, the report says.
Russian aircraft still have some technological advantages, but their operations are now mostly limited to airspace over Russian-controlled territory.
More and better-trained troops
Ukrainian troops outside the city of Debaltseve in the Donetsk region in December 2014.
SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images
Ukrainian troops deployed to the Donbas region had developed "an intimate understanding of the battlefield" over the years and were able to prepare for Russian escalation.
At the tactical level, Ukrainian troops were "confident" they would be better prepared and trained than their adversaries, according to the RUSI report, which added that Ukrainian troops who had observed Russia's treatment of Ukrainians in the occupied territory were "highly motivated" to prevent Moscow from taking more of it.
Yet, at the formation level, Ukrainian commanders were concerned about Russian artillery limiting their ability to maneuver and hitting their supply lines. This problem was exacerbated by a personnel shortage, which in turn meant Ukrainian forces were spread thin along the Donbas frontline.
Prior to 2022, Ukraine's military had struggled to retain troops, but high turnover during those years meant Ukraine had a large pool of civilians with military training. To capitalize on that, the country created the Territorial Defense Force.
Recruits receive first-aid training during an exercise with Ukraine's Territorial Defense Force in February 2022.
Dominika Zarzycka/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images
The TDF was established in January 2022 and didn't have time to receive heavy weapons and the necessary command-and-control mechanisms. While they were initially an "impediment in many cases," Ukrainian commanders have sorted out many of those issues, and the TDF's role has increased from "rear-area security to ground holding to contributing manoeuvre brigades to offensive operations," the report says.
Manpower problems and limited equipment at the beginning of the war meant Kyiv had to make difficult decisions about which troops to deploy where. "The critical question therefore was whether the professional body of [Ukraine's military] could hold for long enough for a wider mobilisation to bolster Ukraine's defences," the report adds.
Thanks to Ukraine's years of preparation, those troops did hold long enough.
When the advancing Russians met the Ukrainian defenders early on February 24, they had been surprised by what their commanders in Moscow had ordered them to do, while Ukrainian troops "had been psychologically and practically preparing for this fight for eight years," the report says. "The interaction between these variables would be decisive in determining the outcome of the first 72 hours of fighting."
Constantine Atlamazoglou works on transatlantic and European security. He holds a master's degree in security studies and European affairs from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. You can contact him on LinkedIn.
Business Insider · by Constantine Atlamazoglou
13. In first update in a decade, the Pentagon plans for AI’s increased role in warfare
Excerpt:
Although the framework wants to advance the study of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems, they must “be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”
Right now, artificial intelligence is still evolving, and the military is still developing ways to integrate it into units. That has ranged from tests to create robotic wingmen for Air Force pilots under the combat collaborative aircraft project to testing how troops can evade detection from computers.
This week, the Pentagon announced a $12 million partnership with Howard University to conduct research for the Air Force’s tactical autonomy program, which aims to develop systems which require minimal human engagement or oversight.
Right now the Pentagon is excited about autonomous systems, but it wants to avoid becoming Skynet, it seems.
In first update in a decade, the Pentagon plans for AI’s increased role in warfare
The Department of Defense sees a “dramatic, expanded vision” for automated weapons.
BY NICHOLAS SLAYTON | PUBLISHED JAN 29, 2023 12:19 PM
taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton · January 29, 2023
The Defense Department is aware of how quickly artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons are becoming a part of war. As a result, it’s updating its automated weapons directive for the first time in more than a decade in order to guide development of new systems..
The new framework is laid out in the updated directive, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems.” Effective as of Wednesday, Jan. 25, the framework has been revised for “the dramatic, expanded vision for the role of artificial intelligence in the future of the American military,” according to Michael Horowitz, the Pentagon’s Director of Emerging Capabilities Policy.
Horowitz told reporters on Wednesday that the new version has only “relatively minor clarifications and refinements” — namely creating clear oversight and advisory bodies to ensure ethical research and development — but a directive update was necessary due to the increased use of autonomous weapons systems in the U.S. military and other armed forces around the world.
And it is a significant update in that regard. The last time the Department of Defense put out a guidance on artificial intelligence was 2012. Since then, the field has significantly grown, with autonomous or semi-autonomous weapons systems becoming major elements in modern warfare. Drone systems have become essential parts of war, as the use of reconnaissance systems, amphibious attack drones and automated guns on technicals in the war in Ukraine have demonstrated. The U.S. military has also been looking into weapons capable of disabling enemy drone systems.
At the same time, the Pentagon’s own bureaucracy has evolved with new technologies; many of the offices that the department has stood up to address autonomy and AI in defense are newer than the 2012 guidelines, and the 2023 directive formally integrates them into policy. Those include the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office, which is tasked with coming up with requirements to implement the Pentagon’s AI Ethical Principles.
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The newly updated policy serves as a framework for how the military will study and develop AI systems going forward. No type of weapon is prohibited, Horowitz told Breaking Defense. Aside from updating responsibilities for development, the policy creates “guidelines designed to minimize the probability and consequences of failures in autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems that could lead to unintended engagements.”
The directive also establishes the Autonomous Weapon Systems Working Group which, run by Dr. Colin Kahl, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, which will serve as an advisor to Pentagon leadership regarding autonomous technologies. It’s to create “good governance,” Horowitz told Breaking Defense.
Although the framework wants to advance the study of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems, they must “be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”
Right now, artificial intelligence is still evolving, and the military is still developing ways to integrate it into units. That has ranged from tests to create robotic wingmen for Air Force pilots under the combat collaborative aircraft project to testing how troops can evade detection from computers.
This week, the Pentagon announced a $12 million partnership with Howard University to conduct research for the Air Force’s tactical autonomy program, which aims to develop systems which require minimal human engagement or oversight.
Right now the Pentagon is excited about autonomous systems, but it wants to avoid becoming Skynet, it seems.
The latest on Task & Purpose
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taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton · January 29, 2023
14. Special Operations News Update - Jan 30, 2023 | SOF News
Special Operations News Update - Jan 30, 2023 | SOF News
sof.news · by SOF News · January 30, 2023
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.
Photo / Image: A Green Beret diver prepares to dive into a frozen reservoir during ice driving training on Fort Carson, Colorado, February 18, 2021. The training is part of a wide range of training conducted by the Green Berets on Fort Carson to help maintain their proficiency in Arctic warfare. (U.S. Army photo by SSG Eliverto V Larios)
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SOF News
Jon Skinner – Honor Foundation. THF has a new Chairman of the Board of Directors beginning in 2023. The non-profit organization has developed and implemented a transition program for elite members of the Special Operations Forces enterprise – helping navigate the complex career transformation from military to civilian life. “The Honor Foundation Announces New Chairman of the Board of Directors”, PRWEB.com, January 24, 2023.
Death of a Ranger. The author of Back in the Fight and an Army Ranger with multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan has died. “RIP Joseph Kapacziewski: US soldier and ‘absolute legend’ dies age 40”, The Focus, January 23, 2023.
SOAA Annual Report. The Special Operations Association of America has published its 2022 Annual Report. January 2023, PDF, 10 pages.
https://soaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2022-Annual-Report.pdf
Big Dollars for Navy’s Elite. Fat paydays are heading the way of senior enlisted SEALs and special warfare boat operators to keep them in the service. E-7s or above with more than 20 years of active duty service will qualify for over $80,000. “Navy offering big bucks to retain senior enlisted special operators”, Navy Times, January 23, 2023.
‘MARSOC 3’ Trial. The defense team for the two Marine Raiders has raised questions on the cause of death of the retired Green Beret who died after an altercation with three MARSOC members in Iraq in 2019. “In homicide trial, Marine Raiders’ defense seeks other causes of death”, Marine Corps Times, January 26, 2023. Prosecutors say that the fight outside the bar is the cause of death. “Prosecution experts in ‘MARSOC 3’ trial say fistfight killed Army vet”, Marine Corps Times, January 28, 2023.
New Chairman of House Intel and SOF Committee. Representative Jack Bergman, a Republican from Michigan, will be leading the House Armed Services Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee in his role as chairman. He is a retired Marine Corps Lt. General and has served on the committee since 2019. The subcommittee has jurisdiction over DoD policy, programs, and accounts related to military intelligence, national intelligence, CWD, CP, CT, SOF, and other sensitive military operations.
Famous SEALs. This article profiles a few of the high-profile SEALs that have been in the media over the past few decades. The list includes Chris Kyle, Jesse Ventura, Richard Marcinko, William McRaven, Rudy Boesch, Marcus Luttrell, and others. “Famous Navy SEALs: Who Are They and Where Did They Serve?”, War History Online, January 26, 2023.
Obstacles to Women in SOF. According to this news report U.S. special operations forces still hasn’t overcome barriers that hinder women in elite units even though it has been years since the DoD has ordered complete gender integration. Some of the data and narrative from the article comes from a Government Accountability Officer report entitled Women in Special Operations (Dec, 2022, PDF, 169 pages). “Despite full integration order, women in special ops face many barriers”, The Washington Post, January 27, 2023. (subscription)
Ronald Shurer – MoH Recipient. A Green Beret medic showed immense valor and bravery during a raid in northeastern Afghanistan while deployed with SOTF-33. His actions that day earned him the Medal of Honor and the respect of his comrades. “Ronald J. Shurer: The US Army Medic Who Braved Enemy Fire to Resuce His Fellow Green Berets”, War History Online, January 29, 2023.
Little Known Patriot Passes Away. A retired Special Forces officer who went on to a career in the CIA has died at age 85. He was a decorated soldier who fought in wars but advised members of the government at the highest levels. He lived an amazing life defending the nation he loved. “American lost a little-known patriot named Bob Andrews”, Fox News, January 28, 2023.
EOD NCO Wins SOCOM Award. The senior enlisted leader for the EOD company that supports the 75th Ranger Regiment was recognized for his service and heroic actions in combat. He was awarded the U.S. Special Operatons Command Excalibur Award for NCO Leadership. “Explosive Ordnance Disposal first sergeant earns U.S. Special Operations Command award”, Army.mil, January 26, 2023.
Col. Taylor (USAF) Promoted. Air Force Col. Terence G. Taylor has been nominated for appointment to the grade of brigadier general. He is currently serving as the commander, 27th Special Operations Wing, Air Force Special Operations Command.
International SOF
Video – French Special Forces in Burkina. The African nation of Burkina Faso is asking France to pull out its ‘Sabre’ troops over the next month. “Burkina Faso confirms demand that French troops leave”, January 23, 2023, France 24.
China’s SOF. There are a number of special operations units in the Chinese armed forces. Read more in “Chinese Special Forces: Dragons of the East”, Grey Dynamics, January 29, 2023.
SOF History
MACV-SOG. On January 24, 1964, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group was established. It was a highly classified special operations unit that conducted reconnaissance missions, rescued downed pilots, and captured enemy soldiers. Most members of MACV-SOG came from U.S. Army Special Forces; however, some were from the Navy SEALs, Air Force, Marine Corps, and CIA as well.
Ranger Bat. The 1st Ranger Battalion, 75th Infantry was established on January 31, 1974. The battalion was to be an elite, light, and very proficient infantry unit.
Nick Rowe – SF Hero. Rowe was a Special Forces officer captured and imprisoned by the Viet Cong for five years. He managed to escape his guards and was recovered by a helicopter. He would later establish the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) course at Fort Bragg, NC. Unfortunately, while stationed in the Philippines he was assassinated by the Communist New Peoples Army in 1989. Read more in “Col. Nick Rowe: Long-Ago Conversations with a Special Forces Legend”, SOF Mag, December 2, 2022.
‘By, With, and Through’ – Campaign Against ISIS. Defeating ISIS in its strongholds in the Euphrates valley in Iraq required a broad global coalition to assist the Iraqi forces. The concept known as ‘by, with, and through’ was employed; providing Iraqi forces with ‘enablers’ and ‘accelerants’. But this also meant some U.S. forces were ‘on the ground’ very close to the front lines. “American Ground Force Contributions to the Campaign Against ISIS”, Modern War Institute at West Point, January 24, 2023.
OSS Women. About 35% of those serving in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II were women, and yet their stories have only begun to be told. “The Women of the OSS: On the Pioneering American Spies of WWII”, CrimeReads, April 9, 2021.
National Security
CT Opn in Somalia. The U.S. military conducted a successful counterterrorism operation in Somalia. A high-level member of the Islamic State was killed by U.S. special operations forces in the Cal Miskaad mountains in a remote part of northern Somalia on Wednesday night (Jan 25, 2023). Ten other terrorists were also killed in the operation. The principal target, Bilal al-Sudani, was an important financier for ISIS. “Somalia Welcomes Killing of IS Leader”, Voice of America, January 27, 2023. Read about how the SOF units rehearsed for the strike on the ISIS mountain cave complex. (Business Insider, Jan 27, 2023).
ISIS Members Captured. Over a week ago U.S. forces conducted a raid in Syria that captured two facilitators of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in a helicopter and ground assault raid. The event took place after three suicide drones struck a U.S. base in Syria just days prior to the raid. Last year the United States conducted 313 operations in Iraq and Syria with nearly 700 ISIS fighters killed and 374 detained. “US forces capture two ISIS members in Syria”, The Hill, January 23, 2023.
Drones in the Iranian Skies. Recent news reports indicate that bomb-carrying quadcopter drones have attacked at least one if not more military targets in Isfahan, Iran on Saturday, January 28, 2023. Some national security observers speculate that Israel or Iranian Kurds are behind the attacks. Apparently one of the targets was a munitions facility possibly tied to Iran’s missile program. The drones appeared to be commercially available mini-drones that operate from short ranges by remote control. “Iran says drone attack targets defense facility in Isfahan”, AP News, January 29, 2023.
Afghanistan
Afghan Commandos – Fighting in Ukraine . . . For Russia. A Green Beret comments on the unfortunate circumstances of America’s allies now forced to fight on Russia’s behalf in the Ukraine conflict. “The Afghans I Trained Are Fighting for Putin in Ukraine”, The New York Times, January 24, 2023.
Charges Dropped Against Afghan Commando. Abdul Wasi Safi was an Afghan soldier of the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC). His brother, now living in Texas, is a former interpreter for U.S. Special Forces in Afghanistan. After the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban, Abdul fled to Iran, got a humanitarian visa to Brazil, made the perilous journey through South and Central America, and crossed the U.S. border to join his brother in Texas. Unfortunately, he was arrested by the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and detained for months. He was threatened with deportation or a prison sentence. After months of publicity and a bipartisan congressional effort to request a pardon from the president, Abdul Wasi Safi could be set free. “Feds drop charges against Afghan soldier trying to claim asylum in Texas”, Texas Tribune, January 24, 2023.
1208 Foundation. An organization of current and retired Special Forces and EOD soldiers have joined together to help with the relocation and resettlement of Afghan members of the National Mine Reduction Group (NMRG). The 1208 Foundation is assisting these Afghan allies to safety and a new life free from the Taliban. The NMRG worked for and assisted U.S. Army Special Forces units in Afghanistan. “Green Berets lead the 1208 Foundation in its mission to save lives”, by Joel Searls, We Are the Mighty, January 27, 2023.
Afghan Report. Catch up on the news about Afghanistan, relocation efforts for at-risk Afghans, immigration, resettlement, Taliban, humanitarian crisis, and more. Afghan Report, Jan 17, 2023.
Upcoming Events
February 4, 2023. Birmingham, AL
20th SFG(A) Reunion / Dining Out
20th Special Forces Group (Airborne)
April 5-6, 2023. San Diego, California
Warrior West
ADS
May 8-11, 2023. Tampa, Florida
SOF Week
USSOCOM
June 21-22, 2023
Warrior East
ADS
Podcasts, Videos, and Movies
Podcast – The Many Faces of Al-Shabaab. Two guests on this podcast describe the complex security landscape of Somalia, analyze the methods the insurgent / terrorist organization uses to maintain its foothold in East Africa, and discuss the international and indigenous efforts to eradicate al-Shabaab. Mary Harper is the Africa editor of BBC World Service News and specializes on Somalia. Sam Wilkins is an Army Special Forces officer with deployments to Somalia and other conflict regions. Irregular Warfare Podcast, Modern War Institute at West Point, January 27, 2023, one hour.
https://mwi.usma.edu/the-many-faces-of-al-shabaab/
Podcast – Guerrilla Communications. A discussion about current topics to include the situation in Brazil, Ukraine, CCP’s infiltration of the Western Hemisphere, and a new book entitled The Guerrilla’s Guide to the Baofeng Radio. The Pinelander Podcast, January 20, 2023, one hour.
Podcast – The Theory and Practice of Resistance. Host John Amble speaks with Sandor Fabian, a former officer in the Hugarian military’s special operations forces, on the concept of resistance as an approach to national defense. Fabian argues that resistance is the most viable means of defense for small states – like the Baltic states facing aggression from Russia. Modern War Institute at West Point, January 25, 2023, one hour.
Podcasts
SOFCAST. United States Special Operations Command
https://linktr.ee/sofcast
The Pinelander. Blacksmith Publishing
https://www.thepinelander.com/
The Indigenous Approach. 1st Special Forces Command
https://open.spotify.com/show/3n3I7g9LSmd143GYCy7pPA
Irregular Warfare Podcast. Modern War Institute at West Point
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/irregular-warfare-podcast/id1514636385
sof.news · by SOF News · January 30, 2023
15. Does the West's decision to arm Ukraine with tanks bring it closer to war with Russia?
Does the West's decision to arm Ukraine with tanks bring it closer to war with Russia? | CNN
CNN · by Luke McGee · January 28, 2023
CNN —
The West’s decision to finally send tanks to Ukraine has caused some to ask the uncomfortable question: Does this mean that NATO is now in direct conflict with Russia?
This narrative, which is being pushed hard by the Kremlin, undoubtedly helps Russian President Vladimir Putin and his allies deflect from the fact that Russia launched an unprovoked attack on Ukraine and illegally occupied parts of a sovereign state.
It also, perhaps more conveniently for Putin, gives the NATO allies pause for thought when it comes to deciding exactly how much military assistance they should give Ukraine.
First things first: the consensus among experts is that no NATO member is anywhere near what could be considered to be being at war with Russia by any internationally accepted legal definition. Therefore, the idea that the alliance is at war with Russia is a non-starter.
“War would require strikes carried out by US or NATO forces, in uniform, attacking from NATO territory against Russian forces, Russian territory, or the Russian populace,” explains William Alberque, from the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Britain's armored vehicles prepare to move at the Tapa Military Camp in Estonia, on January 19, 2023.
Pavel Golovkin/AP
US-owned M1A2 Abrams tanks are seen in Grafenwoehr, Germany.
Daniel Karmann/picture alliance/Getty Images/FILE
“Any fighting by Ukraine – with any conventional weapons, against any Russian forces – is not US/NATO war on Ukraine, no matter how much Russia wants to claim it so,” he adds.
Alberque points to the United Nations Charter, which states that nothing “shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”
Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and has used its veto to block condemnation of its actions in Ukraine.
The Kremlin has certainly sought to exploit certain grey areas that are inherent in any modern warfare to incorrectly claim that NATO is the chief aggressor in the Ukraine conflict.
Those grey areas might include the use of Western intelligence to carry out attacks on Russian targets.
They could also include the US launching the war on terror and invoking NATO’s Article 5 after the 9/11 attacks, in which America was attacked by terrorists rather than a nation state.
Russia’s Security Council secretary, Nikolai Patrushev, has claimed that the West is trying to “destroy” Russia. Anatoly Antonov, Russia’s ambassador to the United States, has said that the US administration is pushing Ukraine to “carry out terrorist attacks in Russia.”
Of course, whatever slim merit there might be to these dubious claims, they pale in comparison to the documented brutality and illegal actions of Russian forces in Ukraine since Putin ordered the invasion.
But the fact that they exist and are being taken seriously by analysts and commentators outside of Russia, including in Washington DC, plays into the Kremlin’s hands in more ways than one.
John Herbst, former US ambassador to Ukraine and senior director of the Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council, explains that promoting the idea of this being a NATO-Russian war helps explain to Putin’s domestic audience why the invasion has not succeeded as quickly as Russia had hoped.
“Because the Russian military has been such a failure in Ukraine, it is helpful to explain this as a war with NATO rather than Ukraine. This also helps justify whatever steps Putin might take next, and Russia has been very keen to play up the idea that this might mean going nuclear,” Herbst told CNN.
Herbst believes that Russia’s information war on the West has been more successful than its military campaign, in the sense that it has caused credible and rational people in Washington, DC to self-deter from backing increased military support to Ukraine because they overstate the prospect of Putin using nuclear weapons, which would be disastrous for Russia too.
“I can’t tell you how many experts have said we really can’t provide Ukraine with certain weapons because Putin will go nuclear. What we’ve seen in the past six months is Russian think-tankers contacting their colleagues in the West to say that Putin could really do it. Sadly, Washington and Berlin, especially, allowed themselves at times to be deterred by this threat,” he says.
Two Leopard 2 A7V battle tanks are pictured prior to an event to mark the reception of the first units of the new tank on September 15, 2021 in Bad Frankenhausen, Germany.
Jens Schlueter/Getty Images
The reason long-term Putin-watchers think there is little threat of Russia escalating to the point of provoking NATO to respond with force is simply that Moscow knows it couldn’t survive the confrontation.
“One of the few objectives that the Russian and US leadership share at the moment is avoiding a direct conflict between the two powers,” says Malcolm Chalmers, deputy director general at the Royal United Services Institute think tank in London.
“Russia knows that a conventional confrontation with NATO would be over very quickly for them. However, there is some sense in ratcheting up the idea that it is willing to take that risk, if it means it can extract more concessions from the West,” he adds.
Multiple European officials and NATO sources agreed with the analysis that Putin going nuclear was unlikely, though the possibility had to be taken seriously and avoided. The question is, avoided at what cost?
Ukraine will very likely continue to ask for more weapons and greater support from its allies the longer the war drags on. Each time, every NATO member will have to weigh up whether or not it’s worth the risk, or if dragging its feet actually plays into the Kremlin’s hands.
Women stand next to damaged homes, as workers try to repair electricity cables following Russian missile attacks on January 26, 2023 in Hlevakha, outside Kyiv, Ukraine.
Roman Pilipey/Getty Images
Herbst believes that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has served as a sharp reminder of what dealing with an aggressive Kremlin is like and that Western officials had temporarily forgotten the tactics of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
“The soft-headedness of the West has happened because we’ve had peace between the great powers for the best part of 30 years,” he says. “We are currently in the process of discovering stuff that we knew in our bones at the height of the Cold War. And the only reason why we are seeing this now is because one of the great powers has decided it doesn’t like the world order that now exists.”
As the war progresses, the West and NATO are being forced to learn hard lessons in real time.
But each time Russia warns of escalation – either by itself or NATO – Western capitals must keep sight of the fact: Russia is the aggressor in this conflict and the West is nowhere near being at war with Russia.
And no matter what noises Kremlin officials make about the West trying to destroy Russia, only one sovereign state has invaded another sovereign state and illegally claimed parts of its territory by force.
CNN · by Luke McGee · January 28, 2023
16. Telling the Truth About Possible War Over Taiwan
Telling the Truth About Possible War Over Taiwan
Gen. Minihan shocks Washington by telling his troops to be ready to fight against China.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/telling-the-truth-about-war-over-taiwan-general-michael-minihan-troops-china-military-power-memo-leak-11675023652?mod=hp_opin_pos_4#cxrecs_s
By The Editorial BoardFollow
Jan. 29, 2023 6:22 pm ET
Honesty is not the default policy in Washington these days, so the political and media classes were jolted this weekend by the leak of a private warning by a U.S. general telling his troops to prepare for a possible war with China over Taiwan in two years. Imagine: A warrior telling his troops to be ready for war.
In an internal memo leaked to NBC News, Gen. Michael Minihan told his troops: “I hope I am wrong. My gut tells me we will fight in 2025.” The general runs the Air Mobility Command, the Air Force’s tank-refueling operation, and he says in his memo that he wants his force to be “ready to fight and win in the first island chain” off the eastern coast of continental Asia. He called for taking more calculated risks in training.
The general’s document won’t be remembered for subtlety. One of his suggestions is that airmen with weapons qualifications start doing target practice with “unrepentant lethality.” Another tells airmen to get their affairs in order. This candor seems to have alarmed higher-ups at the Pentagon, and NBC quoted an unidentified Defense official as saying the general’s “comments are not representative of the department’s view on China.”
But while Gen. Minihan’s words may be blunt, his concern is broadly shared, or ought to be. U.S. Navy Adm. Phil Davidson told Congress in 2021 that he worried China was “accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States,” and could strike Taiwan before 2027. Gen. Minihan came to his post after a tour as deputy of Indo-Pacific Command. He like many others suggested that 2025 may be a ripe moment for Chinese President Xi Jinping to move. Taiwan and the U.S. both have presidential elections in 2024 that China may see as moments of weakness.
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No less than Secretary of State Antony Blinken said last year that Beijing was “determined to pursue reunification” with Taiwan “on a much faster timeline” than it had previously contemplated. Are war-fighters supposed to ignore that message as they prepare for their risky missions?
Gen. Minihan is doing his troops a favor by speaking directly about a war they might have to fight. A recent war game conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies warned that, in a conflict over Taiwan, “the scale of casualties” would “stagger a U.S. military that has dominated battlefields for a generation.” Gen. Minihan’s boom operators are accustomed to working in skies the U.S. controls. Tankers would be essential in a fight for Taiwan given the vast distance over the Pacific—and would be vulnerable to heavy losses.
Former naval officer Seth Cropsey explained on these pages last week that America isn’t investing in the ships and weapons stockpiles that would be required to support a long war in the Western Pacific. Such yawning gaps in U.S. preparedness make a decision by Beijing to invade or blockade the democratic island more likely. Preventing a war for Taiwan requires showing Beijing that the U.S. has the means and the will to fight and repel an invasion.
Whatever his rhetorical flourishes, Gen. Minihan seems to understand this, and what Americans should really worry about is that some of his political and military superiors don’t.
WSJ Opinion: The Big Tanks Are Going to Ukraine
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Journal Editorial Report: Paul Gigot interviews General Jack Keane. Images: Zuma Press/Polish Defense Ministry via AP Composite: Mark Kelly
Appeared in the January 30, 2023, print edition as 'Telling the Truth About War Over Taiwan'.
17. TikTok’s Chief to Testify Before Congress in March
TikTok’s Chief to Testify Before Congress in March
Republicans are expected to use hearing to highlight security and privacy concerns over video app
https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktoks-chief-to-testify-before-congress-in-march-11675050606?mod=hp_lead_pos2
By John D. McKinnonFollow
Jan. 30, 2023 5:00 am ET
TikTok’s chief executive has agreed to appear before a congressional committee in March, as House Republican lawmakers step up scrutiny of the Chinese-owned video-sharing app.
Shou Zi Chew will appear before the House Energy and Commerce Committee on March 23, a committee spokesman said, in what would be the first appearance of a TikTok CEO before a congressional panel.
The Harvard-educated Mr. Chew, who once interned at Meta Platforms Inc.’s Facebook, agreed to testify voluntarily and will be the sole witness at the hearing, the spokesman said.
The hearing will give lawmakers—particularly Republicans who recently gained a slim majority in the House—an opportunity to explore a range of growing concerns over the app.
Those include alleged sharing of U.S. users’ data with China, as well as risks that the app could be used for propaganda or manipulation of U.S. users.
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“TikTok has knowingly allowed the ability for the Chinese Communist Party to access American user data,” Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R., Wash.), who chairs the committee, said in a written statement. “Americans deserve to know how these actions impact their privacy and data security, as well as what actions TikTok is taking to keep our kids safe from online and offline harms.”
Along with other Republican lawmakers, Mrs. Rodgers has demanded more information from TikTok on its impact on young people amid concerns about harmful content and potential sexual exploitation of minors on the platform. Mr. Chew has said recently that TikTok needs to invest more in protecting young people.
TikTok, owned by Beijing-based ByteDance Ltd., has said that it would never allow interference by the Chinese government. To address U.S. security concerns, the company says it has devised a $1.5 billion plan to ensure the website is independent, including creating a system for monitoring the secret algorithms that determine the content pushed to users.
The security measures have been the subject of negotiations with a U.S. national-security panel, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., for more than two years.
TikTok Offers More Transparency to Win Over U.S. Regulators
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TikTok Offers More Transparency to Win Over U.S. Regulators
Play video: TikTok Offers More Transparency to Win Over U.S. Regulators
TikTok is trying a new tactic in its efforts to reach a deal with U.S. regulators that would allow it to keep operating in the county: more transparency. But what exactly is the social-media platform willing to reveal and how much will it help address U.S. concerns about its Chinese ownership? WSJ social-media reporter Georgia Wells joins host Zoe Thomas to discuss.
The drawn-out talks have triggered criticism from congressional Republicans, who have accused the Biden administration of foot-dragging. They plan to use the Energy and Commerce hearing as well as other committees—including the newly created Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party—to focus on the need to resolve the TikTok issue.
TikTok has been seeking to allay concerns over its vast presence in the U.S., where it has more than 100 million users, and Mr. Chew will have a chance to address Americans directly on the issue at the hearing.
A Singaporean with experience in the Chinese and American cultures, he has been on something of a public-relations offensive in recent weeks. He paid a high-profile visit to European Commission officials this month to discuss TikTok’s plans to comply with broad new European Union rules.
That has paralleled the company’s stepped-up efforts to convince U.S. officials that any potential threats raised by TikTok can be addressed through the proposed security measures amid increasing calls for banning the app outright, as former President Donald Trump unsuccessfully sought to do.
Lawmakers such as Sen. Marco Rubio (R., Fla.) and Reps. Mike Gallagher (R., Wis.) and Raja Krishnamoorthi (D., Ill.), as well as Sen. Josh Hawley (R., Mo.), are among those who have introduced legislation to enact a nationwide ban on TikTok.
An issue that has arisen with potential bans is finding a way around what are known as the Berman amendments, which provide First Amendment-style protections for informational content from adversarial nations.
Write to John D. McKinnon at John.McKinnon@wsj.com
18. Integrated Deterrence Requires a Unique Intelligence Mindset
Excerpts:
Intelligence for deterrence relies on experience, as the best way to understand adversary considerations, including in response to deterrence measures. However, it mainly engages questions about future conduct of adversaries. It must imagine future and idiosyncratic events, assessing the implications of cost imposition or denial measures.
Sherman Kent has taught us to look at intelligence as an organization, a process, and a product (knowledge). While much attention has been given in recent years to intelligence process and organization, mainly in the context of integrating advanced technologies and exploitation of OSINT, the deterrence-aimed product has been overlooked.
Intelligence for deterrence, therefore, needs its own concept of operations and doctrine. A deterrence mindset in the IC requires dedicated theoretical and practical attention. Intelligence agencies are still required to provide early warning for conflicts, or to enable statecraft warfighting. However, the IC and decision-makers must adopt another mindset for intelligence, focused on integrated deterrence: preventive, enabling campaigning, integrated into strategy and operations, and foundationally competitive.
Integrated Deterrence Requires a Unique Intelligence Mindset
By Itai Shapira
January 30, 2023
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/01/30/integrated_deterrence_requires_a_unique_intelligence_mindset_878545.html?mc_cid=d27b7d7152
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is placing much emphasis on the concept of Integrated Deterrence, which should be executed through a ‘mindset of campaigning’ in the context of strategic competition. High-quality intelligence, enabling the understanding and leveraging of adversary perceptions, is a critical condition for creating such deterrence. The intelligence community (IC) should adopt a deterrence-focused mindset and create a dedicated concept of operations for intelligence enabling deterrence, on top of its traditional roles in early warning and enabling statecraft and warfighting.
The recent National Defense Strategy has described three types of deterrence, mainly in the context of strategic competition with China and Russia: by denial, by resilience, and by cost imposition. This resonates with traditional terminology of deterrence by denial and by punishment. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has also begun to implement another form of deterrence, aimed at Iran: by detection.
Integrated deterrence as described by the DoD also relies on partners and allies, beyond the U.S. system. Integrated deterrence towards Russia relies on European actions, integrated deterrence towards China relies on Japanese and South Korean actions, and deterrence towards Iran relies among other things on Israeli actions. While assessing these actors’ intentions and capabilities is not the exclusive role of intelligence agencies, assessment of partners’ and allies’ potential influence over adversary perceptions should be the responsibility of the IC.
Creating sustainable deterrence rests on understanding and shaping adversary perceptions, or in other words, on strategic intelligence. Additionally, cost imposition relies on accurate tactical intelligence, enabling offensive action, while denial and detection rely on accurate tactical intelligence, enabling defensive action. Intelligence for deterrence, therefore, is required on all levels of statecraft and warfighting.
Intelligence for deterrence is therefore action-inclined and prescriptive. It must participate in net-assessment discussions about ways to influence adversary perceptions. This mindset is relevant for all function of intelligence agencies: collection, analysis, covert operations, and interaction with decision-makers.
Intelligence for deterrence is more about mysteries than about secrets. Adversaries do not necessarily have a structured plan for their contingent considerations. Intelligence agencies cannot merely reveal secrets through covert collection and to enable support successful deterrence. The challenge for intelligence agencies is extremely complicated.
However, the ‘market’ for secrets is not necessarily declining, and intelligence analysis for detection must rely on collection of intimate and reliable information. To understand adversary perceptions, intelligence must gain access to the relevant decision-making circles. This relies on covert collection and relevant analysis.
To enable the shaping of adversary perceptions and thus enhance deterrence, deep knowledge of specific decision-makers’ mindset and considerations is required. This knowledge is dependent on covert collection, alongside open-source information (OSINT) and knowledge about adversary strategic and political cultures.
Additionally, if intelligence agencies wish to conduct effective information operations to enhance deterrence these should be targeted at relevant and specific audiences. This is the same, naturally, with covert operations aimed at remaining clandestine yet transferring a deterrent message to the adversary. Identifying such audiences cannot rely solely on open-source information.
Non-government intelligence agencies alone cannot support a deterrence-based strategy. True, these agencies have become professional in exploiting and analyzing OSINT, using advanced technologies and data science methods. However, for deterring adversaries, understanding the specific context in which decision-makers act is crucial. Intelligence for deterrence is not generic and cannot be a ‘stand-alone’ product. It is created in a specific and idiosyncratic context.
Deterring Russia from broadening the Ukraine war to NATO allies, for instance, requires specific intelligence, different from that required to deter Russia from expanding its public mentions of nuclear weapons, or to deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Non-governmental agencies can contribute to the creation of such intelligence, but only government intelligence agencies which engage in a constant and intimate dialogue with decision-makers can conduct a comprehensive and relevant intelligence process and produce a tailored product.
Intelligence for deterrence relies on experience, as the best way to understand adversary considerations, including in response to deterrence measures. However, it mainly engages questions about future conduct of adversaries. It must imagine future and idiosyncratic events, assessing the implications of cost imposition or denial measures.
Sherman Kent has taught us to look at intelligence as an organization, a process, and a product (knowledge). While much attention has been given in recent years to intelligence process and organization, mainly in the context of integrating advanced technologies and exploitation of OSINT, the deterrence-aimed product has been overlooked.
Intelligence for deterrence, therefore, needs its own concept of operations and doctrine. A deterrence mindset in the IC requires dedicated theoretical and practical attention. Intelligence agencies are still required to provide early warning for conflicts, or to enable statecraft warfighting. However, the IC and decision-makers must adopt another mindset for intelligence, focused on integrated deterrence: preventive, enabling campaigning, integrated into strategy and operations, and foundationally competitive.
Itai Shapira is a retired colonel from the Israeli Defense Intelligence (IDI). He is currently a PhD candidate at the University of Leicester, studying Israeli national intelligence culture. Itai has published academic and professional works about intelligence and strategy in Intelligence and National Security, Defense One, RealClear Defense, War on the Rocks, 19FortyFive, RUSI, and Small Wars Journal.
19. Underfunding the US Army undermines deterrence in Taiwan
Excerpts:
Under-resourcing Army capabilities for large-scale ground combat endangers US interests not only in a Taiwan conflict but also in the broader Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. With 28% of the military’s service department budget and less than 50% of the total force, the Army accounts for about two-thirds of global US Combatant Commander requirements. An inadequately resourced Army will also leave Americans less secure at home, as the Army has provided over 80% of the forces necessary to respond rapidly to recent domestic crises, whether administering COVID-19 vaccines to the American public or responding to natural disasters.
Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine demonstrates the devastating costs of conflict when democratic nations fail to deter invasion. The Army’s budget must receive the 3-5% real annual growth necessary to secure America’s national defense, matched by investments in the other services. The United States can still maintain the world’s most formidable military force, but the window to correct our course is rapidly shrinking. Congress’ duty to the American people is to fund an Army so strong that no adversary seeks to fight it and that can win if they try.
Underfunding the US Army undermines deterrence in Taiwan - Breaking Defense
Congress must stop shortchanging the Army budget, especially modernization, so it can play its proper role in the Indo-Pacific and worldwide, writes the former chief of US Army Pacific.
breakingdefense.com · by Robert Brown · January 27, 2023
Taiwanese Marines on exercises in 2013 (Photo by Ashley Pon/Getty Images)
Ukraine has riveted attention to ground combat in Europe — but what about a land war in Asia? In this op-ed, former USARPAC commander Gen. Bob Brown, now retired, argues that deterring or defeating a Chinese military landing on Taiwan requires the US Army to be as modernized as its air, naval, space and cyber counterparts.
For years, defense budgets have been influenced by questionable predictions that future warfare would occur primarily in the air, sea, and cyberspace, fought with electrons and missiles, while ground forces play a modest supporting role in long-range fires, force protection, and logistics. But Russia’s war in Ukraine is the latest evidence that these predictions have been wrong.
Gen. Robert Brown during his Army service
No single warfighting domain will dominate in future conflict – even in the watery vastness of the Indo-Pacific. As commander of US Army Pacific from 2016 to 2019, overseeing extensive experimentation and exercises for future Multi-Domain Operations, I saw firsthand that victory will mean converging the unique capabilities of each service to overmatch adversaries in ways that no service could achieve alone.
But inadequate Army funding and end strength are placing this necessary jointness at risk. Between FY2019 and FY2023, as a recent Association of the US Army study lays out, the Army has lost almost $40 billion in buying power through flat or declining budgets, while the other services have roughly broken even or experienced slight increases. What’s more, approximately 80 percent of the Army’s annual budget supports operations — often support operations that only the Army can provide the whole joint force, like logistics, communications, and medical support — leaving less money for modernization than the other services.
The Army has always been an essential member of the joint team in the Pacific, starting from the Philippine Insurrection in 1899. Since Dec. 7, 1941, there have been three major wars in the Pacific — World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Land warfare has been predominant in all three, and there is no reason to expect this to change.
Some suggest that air and naval forces dominate the Indo-Pacific, and that a war over Taiwan would be fought almost exclusively in these domains. But the rapid growth in China’s military capabilities allows the PLA to deny US air and naval forces from penetrating Chinese defenses if the Navy and Air Force are not supported by agile, survivable Army formations like the Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs). Prevailing in conflict with China requires the US military to present Beijing with multiple dilemmas across every warfighting domain.
Russia’s land war in Ukraine should force us to acknowledge the limitations of our ability to predict the future. Beijing’s political aims may require China to occupy Taiwan with its ground forces to establish permanent control – control that a naval blockade or missile barrage would not guarantee. Several wargames have shown that the United States faces severe obstacles in preventing a Chinese landing on Taiwan, not only military ones, but also legal and political barriers to approving attacks on a nuclear state before an invasion begins and without an existing Authorization for Use of Military Force. In addition to cross-domain capabilities like the MDTFs, the Army may be required to liberate conquered Taiwanese territory after a People’s Liberation Army landing. Underfunding Army modernization may leave the US joint force without the capabilities to do so.
Under-resourcing Army capabilities for large-scale ground combat endangers US interests not only in a Taiwan conflict but also in the broader Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. With 28% of the military’s service department budget and less than 50% of the total force, the Army accounts for about two-thirds of global US Combatant Commander requirements. An inadequately resourced Army will also leave Americans less secure at home, as the Army has provided over 80% of the forces necessary to respond rapidly to recent domestic crises, whether administering COVID-19 vaccines to the American public or responding to natural disasters.
Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine demonstrates the devastating costs of conflict when democratic nations fail to deter invasion. The Army’s budget must receive the 3-5% real annual growth necessary to secure America’s national defense, matched by investments in the other services. The United States can still maintain the world’s most formidable military force, but the window to correct our course is rapidly shrinking. Congress’ duty to the American people is to fund an Army so strong that no adversary seeks to fight it and that can win if they try.
Retired Gen. Bob Brown is the president and CEO of the Association of the US Army.
breakingdefense.com · by Robert Brown · January 27, 2023
20. How two former Army Rangers built an engagement ring business
Hooah. Rangers lead the way.
How two former Army Rangers built an engagement ring business
NPR · by Quil Lawrence · January 27, 2023
Wove is a design-your-own engagement ring company started by two former Army Rangers who got the idea while on combat deployment.
MARY LOUISE KELLY, HOST:
This next story has two former Army Ranger combat veterans, a detailed strategic plan and thousands of dollars' worth of diamonds. No, it is not a heist movie. It is the story of veterans turned entrepreneurs, as NPR's Quil Lawrence reports.
QUIL LAWRENCE, BYLINE: I'm walking through New York's Diamond District with two combat veterans who have started - what else? - an engagement ring company. Andrew Wolgemuth describes the scene here on Jewelers' Row.
ANDREW WOLGEMUTH: Yeah. So it's a very kind of dingy, dirty - it feels as if you're going into a pawnshop. It's certainly not consumer-facing whatsoever.
LAWRENCE: Before Wolgemuth became an Army Ranger, he worked in his family's jewelry shop. So he can say this.
WOLGEMUTH: And the jewelry industry, as a whole, already has this reputation of being kind of, you know, a little bit slimy.
LAWRENCE: That's because most people don't know much about what a good diamond looks like and what it should cost, says Wolgemuth. That was true of his business partner, Brian Elliott.
BRIAN ELLIOTT: I personally had a very bad engagement ring first attempt.
LAWRENCE: Elliott was living on Fort Benning in Columbus, Ga., and he planned to propose to his girlfriend, so he went to the nearest jewelry store.
ELLIOTT: I was in a mall off of Exit 8. And I'm in there. I'm talking to the guy. He's hard selling me, and I smell Auntie Anne's pretzels waft into my nose right as I'm about to spend $10,000 on this thing that I - it was probably worth, like, you know, a quarter of that. And I realized, like, wow, this is probably not the best spot to make this really lifelong purchase in this kind of halogen light mall in this crappy environment. And I just walked away at that point.
LAWRENCE: This is common enough to be a military cliche - the young soldier home from deployment and making really dumb purchases at the mall outside the base. Another cliche is what Andrew Wolgemuth was dealing with on deployment - soldiers who wanted to propose as they stepped off the plane home from Afghanistan.
WOLGEMUTH: A bunch of Rangers in my platoon, they were at that point in their life where they wanted to get engaged, but they want this idea of buying an engagement ring. They're fresh off a combat deployment, and all of the wives, girlfriends, family members are standing there with signs. And they get to walk out, drop to a knee and propose.
LAWRENCE: That perfect moment - except these soldiers had no way to get a decent engagement ring in Afghanistan, even by mail.
WOLGEMUTH: The odds are, you know, not in your favor that that package is going to show up.
LAWRENCE: But then word got around the Ranger regiment about Wolgemuth's family business.
WOLGEMUTH: The Lt. knows how to build engagement rings.
LAWRENCE: Lieutenant, or Lt., Wolgemuth started arranging video calls with jewelry-makers to design rings and then make very convincing duplicates with brass and glass to mail over. The real ring could be collected later. But the guys would have a ring as they got off the plane. And for a few of his fellow Rangers, it worked.
WOLGEMUTH: I mean, yeah, it was a once-in-a-lifetime proposal, off the plane. They got the moment, a beautiful moment, yeah.
LAWRENCE: Wolgemuth came home from Afghanistan and got out of the Army. He was living at home in Lancaster, Pa., but he had zero interest in the family jewelry business. He did a workshop for veterans who want to be entrepreneurs. And then he was listening to a podcast.
WOLGEMUTH: And so I was like - I had just listened to NPR, How I Built This, the - I know, right?
ELLIOTT: What a plug.
LAWRENCE: We're putting that on the air.
WOLGEMUTH: ...With the Neil Blumenthal - Warby Parker.
LAWRENCE: How I Built This tells the story of successful businesses. Warby Parker is an eyeglass company that lets you order five pairs, try them on at home and then decide which one you want.
WOLGEMUTH: Wow. Like, you know, we did this thing in Afghanistan with these rings. Well, what if we built the same experience for engagement rings?
LAWRENCE: Wolgemuth says he knew he couldn't send five diamond rings in the mail. Even back in the States, the insurance bill would be crippling. But with 3D printing, he could make inexpensive models people could see and then revise before they bought the real thing. He called Brian Elliot, who was also out of the Ranger regiment and also trying to get into business.
ELLIOTT: I've been in a couple startups, so he called me. And a couple days later, I'm on a flight down to Lancaster, Pa., to see how jewelry is made.
LAWRENCE: That was two years ago. They're all online, so they weren't much affected by the pandemic. They called their company WOVE. Some people make the ring a surprise, like the way they did it in Afghanistan. But Wolgemuth says more people want to design their real ring together.
WOLGEMUTH: The jewelry industry really has hardly changed in the last hundred years, and it's highly patriarchal. And so I love the collaborative approach that we offer, kind of equal partners coming together. Keep the proposal a surprise. But they also get to wear a ring that they actually want to wear.
LAWRENCE: They're banking on this cultural shift, says Brian Elliott.
ELLIOTT: You know, man surprises woman with rock. Now we stay together. Like, it's, like, 2023 now. Like, the fact that both partners are involved is so much more equitable and so much more meaningful because, like, that represents, you know, how they're going to make decisions when they buy the house, get the car, have the child. It's a collaborative decision.
LAWRENCE: Elliott himself is part of that trend. His trip to the shopping mall diamond store near Fort Benning, that engagement didn't work out. But this spring, he's getting married, and he designed the ring with his fiance.
Quil Lawrence, NPR News, New York.
NPR · by Quil Lawrence · January 27, 2023
21. Former US Defense Secretary Robert Gates says Putin believes it's his 'destiny' to 'recreate the Russian Empire'
Former US Defense Secretary Robert Gates says Putin believes it's his 'destiny' to 'recreate the Russian Empire'
Business Insider · by John L. Dorman
Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates endorses retired Marine Gen. John F. Kelly during the Senate Homeland Security Committee hearing on Kelly's confirmation to be Secretary of Homeland Security on Capitol Hill on January 10, 2017.
AP Photo/Cliff Owen
- Putin sees Ukraine as part of his "destiny" to "recreate the Russian Empire," said ex-Defense Secretary Gates.
- "He is obsessed with retaking Ukraine. He will hang in there," Gates said on Sunday on NBC News.
- The US and other military allies are sending tanks to Ukraine to aid the country against Russia's advances.
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Russian President Vladimir Putin believes it's his "destiny" to recreate the Russian Empire, according to former US Defense Secretary Robert Gates.
During a Sunday interview on NBC's "Meet the Press," Gates said that Putin had made it part of his vision to retake old territories to recreate Russia's former geographic sphere of influence.
"Putin believes it's his destiny to recreate the Russian Empire. And as my old mentor, Zbig Brzezinski, used to say, 'Without Ukraine, there can be no Russian Empire,'" Gates said. "So he is obsessed with retaking Ukraine. He will hang in there."
"I think that he does believe that time is on his side, that support in the US, support in Europe, and so on, will fray. And he's doing what Russian armies have always done, and that is sending large numbers of relatively poorly equipped, poorly trained conscripts to the frontlines, in the belief that mass will overcome," he added.
Ukraine will soon receive a set of critical tanks from military allies — including the United States and the United Kingdom — in the country's continued efforts in warding off Russian forces.
Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine last February, and in the coming weeks, it will mark a full year since the beginning of the conflict.
Business Insider · by John L. Dorman
22. How to Get a Breakthrough in Ukraine
Excerpts:
Harsher sanctions work to cut off Russia from the world, but the West should simultaneously do more to reach the hearts and minds within Russia. The U.S.-government-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty nearly tripled its audience, most of it in Russia and Ukraine, after the war began. Russian independent media now operating outside of Russia also expanded their audiences. Viewership of YouTube channels operated by colleagues of jailed opposition leader Alexei Navalny also jumped dramatically in 2022. The two channels Navalny originally created have at least 9.5 million subscribers. But every one of these outlets would benefit from more resources, new methods of financing, easier access to work visas, and technologies to help them penetrate Putin’s informational Iron Curtain. New modalities for reaching Russians—be it through text messaging, greater use of TikTok, and Telegram channels, or more subtle cultural messaging rather than direct news—should be attempted.
As long as Russian soldiers occupy their country, Ukrainians will fight. They will fight with or without new advanced weapons, with or without harsher sanctions, with or without money to help them run their country. Understanding this key insight about the Ukrainian mentality today leads to an obvious policy recommendation for the West: help Ukraine win as fast as possible.
The best way to commemorate February 24, the anniversary of Putin’s invasion, is to make clear that this is the West’s strategy. This requires a rollout—coordinated by dozens of countries on the same day—of more and better weapons, tougher sanctions, new economic assistance, greater public diplomacy efforts, and a credible commitment to postwar reconstruction. This is also the best way to avoid being in the same place when February 24, 2024, rolls around.
How to Get a Breakthrough in Ukraine
The Case Against Incrementalism
January 30, 2023
Foreign Affairs · by Michael McFaul · January 30, 2023
Nearly a year after he invaded Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has failed to achieve any of his major objectives. He has not unified the alleged single Slavic nation, he has not “denazified” or “demilitarized” Ukraine, and he has not stopped NATO expansion. Instead, the Ukrainian military kept Russian troops out of Kyiv, defended Ukraine’s second-largest city, Kharkiv, and launched successful counteroffensives in the fall so that by the end of 2022, it had liberated over 50 percent of the territory previously captured by Russian soldiers that year. In January, Putin removed the general in charge of the war in Ukraine, Sergei Surovikin, whom he had appointed just a few months earlier. Wartime leaders change their top generals only when they know they are losing.
Ukraine is doing so well in part thanks to the unified Western response. Unlike reactions to Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 or Ukraine in 2014, the Western pushback against Putin’s latest war has been strong along multiple fronts. NATO enhanced its eastern defenses and invited Sweden and Finland to join the alliance. Europe has provided shelter to hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees. Led by the Biden administration, the West has provided massive amounts of military and economic support at amazing speed, levied punishing sanctions, and begun a difficult shift away from Russian energy. Even Chinese leader Xi Jinping has offered Putin only faint rhetorical support for his war. He has not provided Russia with weapons and has cautiously avoided violating the global sanctions regime.
These are the reasons for optimism. The bad news, however, is that the war continues, and Putin has shown no signs of wanting to end it. Instead, he is planning a major counteroffensive this year. “The Russians are preparing some 200,000 fresh troops,” General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the commander in chief of Ukraine’s armed forces, warned in December. “I have no doubt they will have another go at Kyiv.” Even though Putin must understand by now that Ukrainians are willing to fight for as long as it takes to liberate their country, he still believes that time is on his side. That is because Putin expects Western governments and societies to lose their will and interest to keep helping Ukraine. If Putin or his aides watch the television personality Tucker Carlson on Fox News or saw the protests last fall in Prague, their hunch about waning Western support would be confirmed.
If Russia starts winning on the battlefield, or even fights to a stalemate, few will remember U.S. President Joe Biden’s remarkable leadership in galvanizing the world to assist Ukraine in 2022. This is why Western leaders need to shift how they approach the conflict. At this stage, incrementally expanding military and economic assistance is likely to only prolong the war indefinitely. Instead, in 2023, the United States, NATO, and the democratic world more broadly should aim to support a breakthrough. This means more advanced weapons, more sanctions against Russia, and more economic aid to Ukraine. None of this should be doled out incrementally. It needs to be provided swiftly, so that Ukraine can win decisively on the battlefield this year. Without greater and immediate support, the war will settle into a stalemate, which is only to Putin’s advantage. In the end, the West will be judged by what happened during the last year of the war, not by what happened in the first.
THE BIG BANG THEORY
The most important step the United States and NATO allies can take this year is to provide Ukraine with weapons that will allow its armed forces to go on the offensive sooner and more successfully in eastern Ukraine. This year started with much encouraging news. The United States, France, and Germany announced plans to provide Ukraine with infantry fighting vehicles, including M2 Bradleys and Strykers, AMX-10 RCs, and Marders, respectively. The United Kingdom decided to provide a dozen Challenger II tanks and 30 AS-90 155mm self-propelled howitzers. The United States and Germany announced plans to give Ukraine one battery each of the Patriot air defense system, and the Netherlands pledged to contribute Patriot missiles and launchers. And finally, the United States made the decision last week to provide Ukraine a few dozen M1 Abrams tanks, which paved the way for Germany and other European countries to send the coveted German-made Leopard 2 tanks.
This is a strong way to start the year, but our support should not stop there. Ukraine needs more of everything that has already been supplied. It especially needs more High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and more Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLR) munitions, which have proved so effective on the battlefield. If more HIMARS are not available, then the United States should send M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems. The more loitering munitions that can be supplied to Ukraine, the better. The number of tanks announced so far is substantial, but still falls multiples short of what the Ukrainian military needs to push Russian occupiers out of their country, especially because the Abrams tanks will take many months to be built, trained on, and deployed. Ukraine could also use several hundred infantry fighting vehicles, which far surpasses those pledged by the United States and other NATO allies in January. Ukraine could also use more Patriot batteries, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, and other air defense systems.
In addition to greater quantities of weapons, the United States and its allies should upgrade the quality of weapons being supplied. At the top of this list should be the long-range missile system called ATACMS. It fires missiles that can travel nearly 200 miles and would thus allow Ukrainian forces to attack Russian airfields and ammunition sites in Crimea and elsewhere that are now out of range and offer sanctuary for Russian soldiers using long-range weapons to attack Ukrainian towns. The provision of long-range strike weapons, including the Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb, could be a game-changer in a Ukrainian offensive this spring. The Ukrainian military also needs much stronger offensive air capabilities, including Soviet-made MiG-29 fighter jets and advanced drones such as the U.S. Gray Eagle and Reaper models.
Putin still believes that time is on his side.
Ukrainian pilots also should begin training to fly F-16 fighter jets. Eventually, either in later stages of this war or for enhanced deterrence after the war, Ukraine’s air force will need to switch from Soviet- or Russian-made planes to U.S. fighter aircraft. In return for receiving these weapons, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy could sign a legally binding agreement to not use these weapons to strike targets inside Russia.
The way this new military assistance is announced also matters. Rather than providing ATACMs in March, Reapers in June, and jets in September, NATO should go for a Big Bang. Plans to provide all these systems should be announced on February 24, 2023, the first anniversary of Putin’s invasion. An announcement of this size will produce an important psychological effect inside the Kremlin and Russian society, signaling that the West is committed to Ukraine’s ambition to liberate all occupied territories. Already Kremlin propagandists on television lament that they are fighting a well-armed and rich NATO, which has greater resources than Russia. On February 24, Biden and NATO allies could fuel this perception that it would be futile for Russia to continue its fight.
RISK CALCULUS
Soon after the war began, many observers, including me, worried that Putin would view the provision of these kinds of offensive weapons as escalatory. And yet, after deployment of these major weapons systems, Putin so far still has not escalated. The reason is simple: Putin has no good way of doing so. He is already using very expensive cruise missiles to attack apartment buildings. He cannot attack NATO, lest he risk a broader war that Russia would lose quickly. That leaves him with only the nuclear option, but even that would not serve him well. Everyone agrees that a nuclear attack against the United States or other NATO countries is off the table because mutual assured destruction is still in place. The probabilities of Putin using a tactical nuclear weapon inside Ukraine is also very unlikely as it would serve no obvious battlefield objective. It would not stop Ukrainians from fighting. Just the opposite: they would recommit to defeating Russia, and even unleash more attacks, including covert operations against targets inside Russia. Using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine also would rally greater opposition to the war around the world, including in Beijing, within Russian society, and maybe even among Russia’s generals. Obviously, Ukrainians would suffer most from such an attack, and yet they are the ones urging the West not to be deterred by Putin’s nuclear blackmail.
There are risks to providing more and better weapons to Ukraine, but there are also risks to not doing so. If the war in Ukraine drags on for years, so many more people—Ukrainians first and foremost, but also Russians—will die. “Stalemate” on the battlefield is a euphemism for continued death and destruction. This is the cost of incrementalism.
Protracted war also risks losing public support in the United States and Europe. At the end of 2022, Biden signed into law a new $45 billion aid package for Ukraine. This should fund U.S. military assistance until the end of this year, including new weapons systems such as ATACMs and fighter jets, should they be given the green light. But now that the House of Representatives is under Republican control, future appropriations could be less forthcoming. If the war drags through the end of the year without major Ukrainian victories, the Biden administration will struggle to obtain congressional renewal for a new military and economic assistance package, especially as the presidential election heats up with at least one major candidate, Donald Trump, who is not a fan of aid to Ukraine. Debate over aid will become fiercer in European capitals, too, if 2023 results in only minor changes on the battlefield. The dangers of incrementalism grow over time.
TIGHTENING THE VISE
Governments supporting Ukraine also need to ratchet up dramatically sanctions. The United States should lead the way by designating the Russian Federation a state sponsor of terrorism. Doing so would first amplify American condemnation of Russian terrorist acts in Ukraine and other countries. But there are also practical effects: U.S. citizens and companies would no longer be able to engage in financial transactions with the Russian government. Higher scrutiny would be given to transactions with Russian state-owned banks, state-owned enterprises, and government-related individuals. Controls over exports, re-export, and transfer of dual-use items would be strengthened.
But a terrorist designation would not close all loopholes. The United States, together with other countries in the sanctions coalition, should enact full-blocking sanctions on all major Russian banks, such as Gazprombank, as well as all state-owned enterprises—all of them—including Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy company. Of course, exemptions for the financing of Russian exports of food and fertilizer should remain, but the West must make it more difficult, and therefore more expensive, for Russian companies to transact with the outside world.
New sanctions must be imposed to cut off all critical technologies helping Putin’s war machine, from microprocessors needed to build smart weapons to all forms of imported information technology on which the Russian government and economy relies. The G-7 should reduce the price cap on Russian oil exports further, from today’s $60 limit to $30 a barrel, and introduce greater penalties for shipping companies, insurance agencies, and banks that violate the price cap. And they must apply more pressure on U.S. and European companies still doing business in or with Russia. These companies cannot continue to pay taxes to a terrorist state. They must leave.
The dangers of incrementalism grow over time.
Individual sanctions must be expanded dramatically to include all Russian oligarchs still not sanctioned but supporting Putin, all government officials, all top managers and board members of the state-owned enterprises, all propagandists advocating for the war, all Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine, and the family members of everyone in these categories. Sanctioning categories of people, —United Russia party members, government officials, soldiers, and so on— and not specific individuals has the added advantage of giving Russians the option of resigning as a way to get off the sanctions list. At a minimum, countries involved in the sanctions regime could start expanding their lists to include everyone already identified by Ukraine’s National Agency on Corruption Prevention as deserving of sanctions. Countries imposing sanctions also must coordinate their activities so that if a Russian is sanctioned in one country, that person immediately appears on the sanction list of all countries participating in the sanctions regime.
New travel restrictions should also be imposed on all Russian citizens. A complete travel ban to all democratic countries is one option, although it risks alienating Russians opposed to the war. Another is to make all Russians wanting to travel to democratic countries pay an additional “Ukrainian reconstruction fee” on top of the cost of their visas. If they do not want to pay such a fee for fear that it signals support for Ukraine, then they can vacation in Minsk instead of Barcelona. The way these new sanctions are announced also matters. It is best done all at once by participating countries on February 24.
At the same time, democracies should make it easier for Russians opposed to the war to defect. The tens of thousands of Russia’s best and brightest who have already fled should be given work visas to stay in Europe and the United States. Men who fled Russia to avoid the draft should be given incentives to not return until the war is over. Russian opposition leaders and independent journalists living in exile should be able to obtain visas and work permits, open bank accounts, use credit cards, and monetize their YouTube channels with much greater ease than can be done today.
MONEY AND MESSAGES
Ukraine needs more money, and the West needs to find new ways to provide it. The obvious place to start is to transfer the over $300 billion in Russian Central Bank reserves currently held by the West to the government of Ukraine. Treasury and finance officials in the United States and Europe are nervous about such moves. But state assets have been seized legally in the past, in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and it should be done now. (Moreover, doing so now has the added advantage of sending a deterrent message to China about invading Taiwan, as Beijing has many more financial reserves invested in the West.) In addition, following the lead of the Canadian government, frozen assets of Russian oligarchs should also be considered for confiscation and transfer to Ukraine. Western countries should impose an import tax on all Russian goods and an export tax on all goods and services provided to Russia, the proceeds of which would be transferred to a Ukrainian reconstruction fund. And comprehensive planning for the hundreds of billion dollars postwar reconstruction of Ukraine should begin today—an effort that should include an international pledging conference.
Harsher sanctions work to cut off Russia from the world, but the West should simultaneously do more to reach the hearts and minds within Russia. The U.S.-government-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty nearly tripled its audience, most of it in Russia and Ukraine, after the war began. Russian independent media now operating outside of Russia also expanded their audiences. Viewership of YouTube channels operated by colleagues of jailed opposition leader Alexei Navalny also jumped dramatically in 2022. The two channels Navalny originally created have at least 9.5 million subscribers. But every one of these outlets would benefit from more resources, new methods of financing, easier access to work visas, and technologies to help them penetrate Putin’s informational Iron Curtain. New modalities for reaching Russians—be it through text messaging, greater use of TikTok, and Telegram channels, or more subtle cultural messaging rather than direct news—should be attempted.
As long as Russian soldiers occupy their country, Ukrainians will fight. They will fight with or without new advanced weapons, with or without harsher sanctions, with or without money to help them run their country. Understanding this key insight about the Ukrainian mentality today leads to an obvious policy recommendation for the West: help Ukraine win as fast as possible.
The best way to commemorate February 24, the anniversary of Putin’s invasion, is to make clear that this is the West’s strategy. This requires a rollout—coordinated by dozens of countries on the same day—of more and better weapons, tougher sanctions, new economic assistance, greater public diplomacy efforts, and a credible commitment to postwar reconstruction. This is also the best way to avoid being in the same place when February 24, 2024, rolls around.
Foreign Affairs · by Michael McFaul · January 30, 2023
23. The Trust Gap: How to Fight Pandemics in a Divided Country
Conclusion:
COVID-19 has held a mirror up to societies, revealing that many communities are too divided and riven by mistrust to mobilize their citizens to protect themselves and others. Once this truth is acknowledged, the problem of public trust becomes clearer and easier to solve in the context of pandemic preparedness. Restoring faith in public institutions and one another is essential, but countries must also prepare for failure. To that end, governments should treat doubt in institutions as a health risk, monitoring and developing pandemic plans that can succeed even in the communities where distrust runs the deepest.
The Trust Gap
How to Fight Pandemics in a Divided Country
January 30, 2023
Foreign Affairs · by Thomas J. Bollyky, Ilona Kickbusch, and Michael Bang Petersen · January 30, 2023
At the end of 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden signed into law a bipartisan package of reforms to make the United States and the world safer from future pandemics. The new law encourages faster development of vaccines and diagnostic tests, bigger stockpiles of protective equipment, and greater surveillance to more swiftly detect deadly viruses.
These and the other countermeasures are sensible, but they are not enough. A key lesson of the COVID-19 pandemic is that better vaccines and tests, more plentiful masks, and earlier warnings only work if people are willing to make use of them—and that willingness depends on a level of public trust that many Americans no longer have.
In the United States and other democracies, responding effectively to pandemics depends on persuading people to protect themselves and others. Measures such as contact tracing, gathering restrictions, and vaccination involve behaviors that free societies cannot easily compel or monitor. Trust, therefore, is vital at every stage of a pandemic response. And governments will need to find ways to fight pandemics, even when trust is low.
TRUST ISSUES
Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, people who reported higher levels of trust in others and in their governments tended to be more compliant with stay-at-home measures. Once vaccines became available, these more trusting individuals were more likely to heed public health advice around immunization (and countries with greater public trust tended to have higher vaccination rates.) After three years of COVID-19, the level of trust in both government and other people, as measured by leading surveys, has proven to be the best explanation for the differences among countries in COVID-19 outcomes.
Many assessments of how well countries responded to COVID-19 acknowledge the importance of public trust. But few governments have included concrete proposals for how to increase trust in their preparations for the next pandemic. That is because the process of building confidence between people and their governments is rightly perceived as slow, painstaking, and even generational.
But that doesn’t mean governments can afford to ignore the role of social solidarity in effective pandemic response. Low public trust is a risk factor that must be mitigated, which means it must be monitored at the local level. Public trust can vary widely within countries—domestic trust gaps sometimes exceed international ones. For that reason, democracies need pandemic strategies that can succeed in the divided communities they have, not just in the cohesive ones they hope to build.
HOW TO REBUILD
Incorporating concerns about public trust into preparations for pandemics would mean planning for the effects of polarization, partisanship, and misinformation. Few studies have looked at how to foster cooperation in low-trust societies, but researchers have analyzed communities in southern Italy, Northern Ireland, and rural Romania, where people have historical reasons to mistrust their governments and neighbors but nonetheless cooperate with them every day. There are also lessons to be drawn from responses to health emergencies in post-conflict and post-communist nations.
These cases show that mandates, moral condemnation, and punishment can generate instability, pushback, and conflict in divided communities. Although such measures can spur cooperation in more harmonious societies by convincing potential holdouts that everyone else will comply, they may have the opposite effect in low-trust communities, according to researchers at the University of Konstanz in Germany. Another study published in the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology found no link between stringent rules and greater cooperation with handwashing or social distancing in low-trust communities during the pandemic.
What does spur cooperation in low-trust communities is shared material interest. As the Italian sociologist Diego Gambetta has shown, southern Italians have cooperated with the Mafia not primarily because they fear violent reprisals but because it is a source of trust and accountability in a regional economy with few alternatives. Similarly, cultural, religious, and kinship ties help low-trust communities set aside their suspicions. During the 2014 Ebola virus epidemic in Liberia, for instance, transmission rates started falling after governments and nongovernmental organizations recruited community youth leaders, pastors, and imams to check households for infected patients. Likewise, in Sierra Leone, community liaisons increased participation in Ebola vaccine trials. To enable cooperation in low-trust communities, democratic governments need to tap into these forces for solidarity as part of their preparation for future pandemics.
PARTNER UP
U.S. officials did too little to mitigate the health risks associated with low public trust during the pandemic. Only a quarter of U.S. states included community engagement strategies to encourage vaccination in racial and ethnic minority groups as part of their vaccine rollout plans, despite ample data showing that those communities have good reason to mistrust public health initiatives. One way officials could have improved vaccine uptake among marginalized groups would have been to invest in community-based organizations, such as local clinics or faith-based institutions, as the Commonwealth Fund has recommended. Doing so would have allowed state governments to improve public health provisions, collect data, solicit feedback, and communicate with constituents, but most did not conduct such outreach. And many states did not employ policies such as paid family and sick leave, which might have increased compliance with health measures among people who couldn’t afford to do so.
Nor did the U.S. federal or state governments engage many high-profile emissaries, such as business leaders or talk show hosts, who might have appealed to those who doubt the current government on the safety and efficacy of vaccines, masking, and other pandemic prevention strategies. Government trust has long been partisan in the United States, with citizens reporting less faith in government when the president comes from a different party than their own. Stocking early COVID-19 advisory committees with medical experts and former government officials emphasized a reliance on a science-based approach, but it missed an opportunity to incorporate the representatives of communities where that science is contested.
Over the past three years, the crisis of public trust has only deepened. Pandemic fatigue has corroded people’s faith in government, even in countries that responded relatively effectively to the virus. In the United States, COVID-19 vaccines have become highly politicized, and only one out of three Americans reports trusting the national public health system. But trust in local physicians, community health centers, hospitals, and nurses remains consistently high and bipartisan. The U.S. government should build on these local networks, especially as misinformation and skepticism surrounding COVID-19 vaccines now threaten to undermine flu and childhood vaccinations and other U.S. public health priorities. Partnering with local cultural, ethnic, or faith-based institutions and leaders in divided communities can help identify trusted messengers and improve the response to the next public health crisis. Baltimore exemplified such an approach when it recruited locals to be vaccine ambassadors who went door-to-door in their communities sharing reliable information about the shots, boosting uptake rates.
Effective pandemic response requires the cooperation of billions of people. If today’s governments and public health institutions can’t inspire that kind of cooperation, they will need to be reformed or replaced with more effective and transparent institutions—ones that are better able to demonstrate their trustworthiness to the public.
COVID-19 has held a mirror up to societies, revealing that many communities are too divided and riven by mistrust to mobilize their citizens to protect themselves and others. Once this truth is acknowledged, the problem of public trust becomes clearer and easier to solve in the context of pandemic preparedness. Restoring faith in public institutions and one another is essential, but countries must also prepare for failure. To that end, governments should treat doubt in institutions as a health risk, monitoring and developing pandemic plans that can succeed even in the communities where distrust runs the deepest.
- THOMAS J. BOLLYKY is Director of the Global Health Program at the Council on Foreign Relations.
- ILONA KICKBUSCH is a member of the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board and Chair of the advisory group of the Global Health Centre at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.
- MICHAEL BANG PETERSEN is a Professor of Political Science at Aarhus University. He advises the Danish government on COVID-19 policy and runs a study of COVID-19 behaviors and attitudes in Denmark, six other European countries, and the United States.
Foreign Affairs · by Thomas J. Bollyky, Ilona Kickbusch, and Michael Bang Petersen · January 30, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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