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Quotes of the Day:
"People seem not to see that their opinion of the world is also a confession of character."
– Ralph Waldo Emerson
"You see saints everywhere. They can be anywhere. They are the people behaving decently in an indecent society."
– Kurt Vonnegut
"Government is not reason; it is not eloquent; it is force. Like fire, it is a dangerous servant and a fearful master."
– George Washington
1. N. Korea's Kim attends ceremony for this year's 1st regional development project
2. N. Korean ruling party's central committee elects delegates to upcoming congress
3. ROK, Japan defense chiefs back ‘denuclearization of Korean Peninsula’
4. Hanwha Aerospace signs US$1.9 bln contract to supply Norway with Chunmoo rocket systems
5. S. Korean nanosatellite establishes contact after successful launch
6. Hyundai Steel net profit plunges 84 pct in 2025 on construction downturn, protectionism
7. Exclusive: Army Launches Experimental Drone Unit Amid Drone Command Dissolution
8. Kim Jong Un kicks off 3rd year of rural project with focus on military towns
9. Why the U.S. and South Korea Will Not Jointly Construct Nuclear Submarines
10. Why Seoul’s push for greater control over the DMZ is unlikely to succeed
11. ＜Inside N.Korea＞Armored Vehicles Deployed: Police Conduct Lockdown Drills in Preparation for Unrest — "Sirens Create Strong Sense of Intimidation" in Hyesan
12. Transparency or unrefined messages? President's social media use stirs debate
1. N. Korea's Kim attends ceremony for this year's 1st regional development project
Summary:
Kim Jong Un attended a Jan. 29 groundbreaking in Unnyul County, launching 2026’s first project under his regional development drive, KCNA said. Begun in 2024, the plan promises modern factories and added health and leisure facilities in 20 counties per year for 10 years. Kim claimed this year’s buildout will “transform” nearly one-third of cities and counties. He praised mobilized soldiers and framed the program as proof of “people-first” politics, likely to build support ahead of a possible party congress.
Comment: Getting ready for a party congress.
N. Korea's Kim attends ceremony for this year's 1st regional development project | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · January 30, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260130001500315?section=nk/nk
SEOUL, Jan. 30 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has attended the groundbreaking ceremony for a construction project, the first this year under his regional development drive, saying his policy will transform one-third of the country, state media said Friday.
Kim attended the ceremony the previous day to mark the start of a regional development construction project in Unnyul County in South Hwanghae Province, and dug the first spadeful of earth, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said, announcing the first regional construction campaign for 2026.
Kim began his signature regional development policy in 2024, pledging to build modern factories in 20 cities and counties across the country every year for a 10-year period, in a bid to improve living standards for the people.
"This is the third year for implementing the regional development policy, and public health facilities and leisure complexes, together with regional-industry factories, will be built in 20 regions of the country including this Unnyul County," the KCNA quoted Kim as saying at the ceremony.
"This means that nearly one-third of the cities and counties across the country will have been transformed," he said.
The leader said the policy is a "testimony to our firm will to transform and improve the people's living fundamentally and simultaneously throughout the country," adding that it also demonstrates the country's development potential.
Kim also extended thanks to soldiers mobilized at construction sites under the policy, calling them "creators of the people's wellbeing."
"I am sure that our party, whose political ideal is the people-first principle, will continue ... to tap all potentialities for regional development and carry out the annual plans for it in a forceful and thoroughgoing way," Kim noted.
While visiting sites related to the regional development policy, Kim has touted its results on several occasions recently in what was seen as an effort to drum up public support as the country prepares to hold a key party congress possibly next month.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attends the groundbreaking ceremony for a construction project in Unnyul County under his signature regional development policy on Jan. 29, 2026, in this Korean Central News Agency photo released the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
This image by the Korean Central News Agency on Jan. 30, 2026, shows a groundbreaking ceremony for a construction project in Unnyul County under North Korea's regional development policy, held the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · January 30, 2026
2. N. Korean ruling party's central committee elects delegates to upcoming congress
Summary:
KCNA says the Workers’ Party Central Committee held a headquarters conference on Jan. 28 and elected delegates for the Ninth Party Congress, a procedural marker that final preparations are closing. City and county committees have already selected representatives, and a Politburo meeting typically follows to set the date. South Korea expects an early February congress. The gathering will set five-year lines for defense, economy, and foreign affairs, as Pyongyang repeats that its nuclear program is non-negotiable.
N. Korean ruling party's central committee elects delegates to upcoming congress | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · January 30, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260130000800315?section=nk/nk
SEOUL, Jan. 30 (Yonhap) -- The central committee of North Korea's ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) has elected its delegates for the party's upcoming congress, state media reported Friday, signaling that the key event is near.
The party held a conference of the headquarters of the party's Central Committee on Wednesday and elected delegates to be sent to the ninth party congress, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.
The election of central committee delegates typically indicates that working-level preparations for a party congress are in the final stage, a sign that the party congress is likely to take place soon.
Last week, North Korea said its city and county party committees had elected representatives to a meeting of lower-level provincial organizations as part of preliminary congress preparations.
Given typical procedures leading up to a party congress, North Korea is expected to convene a meeting of the WPK's politburo to set the date of the impending congress after electing final delegates at meetings of province-level party representatives.
South Korea's intelligence agency and government have predicted the key party meeting may take place in early February.
The once-every-five-years congress, the first since 2021, is the North's highest decision-making body and sets the key policies on defense, the economy and foreign relations for the next five years.
This year's meeting comes as Seoul and Washington have repeatedly attempted to reopen dialogue with Pyongyang as part of efforts to address the North's ever-increasing nuclear and missile threats.
North Korea has warned its nuclear program will never be subject to negotiations.
A conference of the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea takes place Jan. 28, 2026, in this photo published by the Korean Central News Agency two days later. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · January 30, 2026
3. ROK, Japan defense chiefs back ‘denuclearization of Korean Peninsula’
Summary:
South Korea’s defense minister Ahn Gyu-back met Japan’s defense minister Shinjiro Koizumi in Yokosuka and reaffirmed support for the “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” plus continued trilateral cooperation with the United States. Their joint statement emphasized expanding bilateral defense exchanges, regularizing reciprocal visits, and holding annual ministerial talks, while broadly citing “regional security challenges” without naming north Korea. A separate ROK release said they agreed to sustain bilateral and trilateral cooperation to counter north Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. Ahn also toured the USS George Washington and met Seventh Fleet commander Vice Adm. Patrick Hannifin, underscoring alliance readiness.
Comment: Just in time for north Korea's party congress where they will state the opposite.
ROK, Japan defense chiefs back ‘denuclearization of Korean Peninsula’
Two sides also reiterate commitment to trilateral cooperation with US, without directly addressing North Korean threats
Joon Ha Park January 30, 2026
https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/rok-japan-defense-chiefs-back-denuclearization-of-korean-peninsula/
ROK Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back and his Japanese counterpart Shinjiro Koizumi at the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Yokosuka District Headquarters on Jan. 30, 2026 | Image: ROK Ministry of National Defense
The defense ministers of South Korea and Japan reaffirmed their shared commitment to the “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” and trilateral cooperation with the U.S. on Friday, meeting against the backdrop of North Korea’s nuclear advancements.
South Korean defense minister Ahn Gyu-back and his Japanese counterpart Shinjiro Koizumi held talks in the Japanese city of Yokosuka, south of Tokyo, marking Ahn’s first visit to Japan since taking office last year.
The joint statement further noted that the two ministers agreed on the importance of steadily advancing bilateral defense exchanges and decided to regularize mutual visits and hold annual defense ministerial talks.
They also pledged to strengthen communication between their defense authorities as “regional security challenges” intensify, though the statement did not explicitly mention North Korea or its advancing nuclear and missile programs.
However, a supplementary press release from the ROK defense ministry said the two ministers agreed to continue bilateral and trilateral cooperation with the U.S. to combat North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat.
The language “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” rather than of the DPRK in particular, aligns with Pyongyang’s past preference in negotiations with Seoul and Washington.
It appears to reflect South Korea’s efforts to revive diplomacy with the North, which has denounced all inter-Korean ties and now maintains it will never give up its nuclear weapons.
South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back shakes hands with U.S. Navy Vice Adm. Patrick Hannifin, commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, aboard the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington on Jan. 30, 2026. | Image: ROK Ministry of National Defense
The meeting’s results followed a summit between South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi earlier this month, where they similarly reaffirmed their commitment to denuclearization. While that summit focused largely on economic issues, both leaders underscored coordination on North Korea and regional security.
On Friday, photos released by the South Korean defense ministry showed that Ahn also visited the U.S. Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington, meeting with Seventh Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Patrick Hannifin.
Ahn emphasized the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance and combined operational readiness, urging close cooperation between the South Korean navy and the U.S. 7th Fleet, according to his ministry. Hannifin reportedly reaffirmed the alliance and pledged continued efforts to strengthen combined capabilities.
Edited by Bryan Betts
4. Hanwha Aerospace signs US$1.9 bln contract to supply Norway with Chunmoo rocket systems
Summary:
Hanwha Aerospace signed a 19 billion Norwegian kroner (about US$1.9 billion) contract to supply Norway with its K239 Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher system. The deal covers mobile launchers, a large quantity of precision-guided missiles, plus training and logistics support. Norway’s Defence Materiel Agency said Chunmoo offered the best mix of performance, cost, and delivery, and was the only bid to meet all requirements. The system gives Norway a long-range strike option, with missiles reaching up to 500 km. Deliveries of launchers and training gear are slated for 2028–2029, with missiles in 2030–2031, with missile production planned in Poland.
Comment: The ROK defense industry just keeps chugging along with sale after sale of high end systems.
Hanwha Aerospace signs US$1.9 bln contract to supply Norway with Chunmoo rocket systems | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Chang Dong-woo · January 30, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260130012100320
SEOUL, Jan. 30 (Yonhap) -- Hanwha Aerospace Co., a South Korean defense giant, on Friday signed a major defense contract to supply land-based long-range precision artillery systems to Norway, Oslo's arms procurement agency said.
Under the deal worth 19 billion Norwegian kroner (US$1.9 billion), Hanwha Aerospace will provide the Norwegian Armed Forces with its K239 Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher system (MRLS), the Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency (NDMA) said in a press release.
A formal contract signing ceremony was held in Oslo attended by senior officials from South Korea and Norway.
The Chunmoo systems will give the Norwegian Army a new long-range strike capability, with missiles offering a range of up to 500 kilometers.
This photo provided by the Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency shows Gro Jaere (L), director general of the agency, and Hanwha Aerospace Co. President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Son Jae-il at a K239 Chunmoo supply deal signing ceremony in Oslo on Jan. 30, 2026. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The deal includes mobile launchers, a substantial number of precision-guided missiles, training and logistical support.
"Based on the bids we received, our assessment is that Hanwha's Chunmoo system provides the Norwegian Armed Forces with the best combination of performance, cost and ability to deliver. We greatly appreciate the transparency, competence and professionalism Hanwha Aerospace has demonstrated throughout this process," said NDMA Director General Gro Jaere.
"Through this contract, Hanwha Aerospace plans to further strengthen its partnership with Norwegian industry, including through cooperation on local testing and joint development," said Son Jae-il, president and chief executive officer (CEO) of Hanwha Aerospace.
Norway selected Hanwha Aerospace following an international competition launched in November 2024 also involving European and U.S. defense firms. Oslo said Hanwha was the only supplier that met all requirements related to performance, delivery schedule and cost.
This photo provided by Hanwha Aerospace Co. shows the South Korean arms maker's Chunmoo multiple launch rocket system. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
According to the Norwegian government, deliveries of launch systems and training equipment are scheduled for 2028-2029, while missile deliveries are expected in 2030-2031.
Missile production is planned to be established in Poland, where the same system is also being procured.
Hanwha Aerospace has also proposed an industrial cooperation program with Norwegian companies equivalent to 120 percent of the contract value.
The agreement marks Hanwha Aerospace's latest major success in the Nordic defense market, following its previous contracts to supply K9 Vidar self-propelled howitzers to Norway in September.
Industry observers say the deal further underscores Hanwha's growing footprint in Europe and its ability to meet stringent operational and industrial requirements set by European defense customers.
odissy@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Chang Dong-woo · January 30, 2026
5. S. Korean nanosatellite establishes contact after successful launch
Summary:
South Korea’s NEONSAT-1A nanosatellite reached orbit after launching on Rocket Lab’s Electron from Mahia, New Zealand at 2:21 p.m. local time (10:21 a.m. Korea time). Korea’s space authorities confirmed successful deployment when the satellite made first contact with a Daejeon ground station at 1:12 p.m. Korea time. Built by KAIST, it begins a six-month checkout, then starts Earth-observation operations in July. NEONSAT-1A is the second of 11 nanosatellites planned for a Korean Peninsula-focused imaging constellation targeted for completion by 2027.
(LEAD) S. Korean nanosatellite establishes contact after successful launch | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Boram · January 30, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260130003651320?section=economy-finance/economy
(ATTN: UPDATES with new developments throughout; RECASTS headline)
SEOUL, Jan. 30 (Yonhap) -- A South Korean nanosatellite has successfully entered orbit after lifting off from a launch site in New Zealand, as part of the nation's project to create a satellite constellation for Earth observation by 2027, officials said Friday.
The NEONSAT-1A was deployed to a 540-kilometer low Earth orbit from the Electron rocket of U.S. space company Rocket Lab Corp. after launching from the company's Mahia Launch Complex in New Zealand at 2:21 p.m. (local time), or 10:21 a.m. (Korean time), according to the Korea AeroSpace Administration (KASA).
KASA confirmed the satellite's successful deployment after it made its first contact with the Korea Aerospace Research Institute's ground station in the central South Korean city of Daejeon at 1:12 p.m. (Korean time).
The satellite is scheduled to begin its observation mission from July following a six-month test run conducted by the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), the developer of the nanosatellite, KASA said.
It is the second among a total of 11 nanosatellites to form a satellite constellation aimed at monitoring and taking images of the Korean Peninsula and its surrounding regions.
This image captured from the YouTube site of Rocket Lab shows the launch of the Electron rocket carrying a nanosatellite developed by South Korea's KAIST on Jan. 30, 2026, from Mahia Launch Complex in New Zealand. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
odissy@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Boram · January 30, 2026
6. Hyundai Steel net profit plunges 84 pct in 2025 on construction downturn, protectionism
Summary:
Hyundai Steel said 2025 net profit collapsed 84% to 1.4 billion won (about $970,000), down from 8.8 billion won, blaming a sustained construction slump and rising protectionism, including U.S. steel tariffs as high as 50%. Despite that, operating profit rose 37% to 219.2 billion won, helped by higher-end product sales and South Korean measures curbing cheap imports, while revenue slipped 2.1% to 22.73 trillion won. To improve margins, Hyundai Steel plans to mass-produce third-generation AHSS in Q1 and expand heavy plate for offshore wind and nuclear uses, while building a Louisiana EAF plant by 2029.
Comment: Unfortunately not all good news for the ROK economy. One effect of US tariffs I suppose. Is this a good result for the US?
Hyundai Steel net profit plunges 84 pct in 2025 on construction downturn, protectionism | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Choi Kyong-ae · January 30, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260130007600320
SEOUL, Jan. 30 (Yonhap) -- Hyundai Steel Co., South Korea's second-largest steelmaker, said Friday its net profit plunged 84 percent in 2025 from a year earlier due to a downturn in the construction sector and rising protectionism.
Net profit fell to 1.4 billion won (US$970,000) last year from 8.8 billion won the previous year, the company said in a press release.
"A prolonged slump in the construction industry and growing protectionism, including U.S. import tariffs, weighed on earnings," a company spokesperson said.
The United States currently imposes tariffs of up to 50 percent on steel products imported from South Korea.
Operating profit rose 37 percent to 219.2 billion won from 159.5 billion won during the same period. Sales fell 2.1 percent to 22.73 trillion won from 23.22 trillion won.
Increased sales of high-end products and government measures aimed at curbing an influx of low-priced steel imports helped lift operating profit, the company said.
To improve profitability, Hyundai Steel said it plans to begin mass production of third-generation advanced high-strength steel (AHSS) in the first quarter and expand supplies of thick steel plates for offshore wind power facilities and nuclear reactors this year.
Hyundai Steel is also building a 2.7 million-ton-per-year electric arc furnace (EAF) steel mill in Louisiana, scheduled for completion by 2029, to supply automotive steel to U.S. plants operated by its affiliates -- Hyundai Motor Co. and Kia Corp.
The company has said it aims to begin construction of the plant in the third quarter and start commercial production in the first quarter of 2029.
Hyundai Steel announced the $5.8 billion investment plan in March last year as part of Hyundai Motor Group's broader U.S. investment strategy.
This file photo taken April 1, 2025, shows Hyundai Steel Co.'s steel reinforcement bar plant in Incheon, just west of Seoul. (Yonhap)
kyongae.choi@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Choi Kyong-ae · January 30, 2026
7. Exclusive: Army Launches Experimental Drone Unit Amid Drone Command Dissolution
Summary:
South Korea’s Army has stood up a tactical experimental “Drone Unit” inside a mechanized infantry formation in the 11th Division, even as a defense advisory panel urges dissolving the joint Drone Operations Command due to overlap with service programs. The Army says the new unit is different: it will fuse small drones with AI-enabled networking, robots, and cyber and electromagnetic effects to test future combat structures. Critics counter that the Army already has a Dronebot Combat Unit and a 36th Division test formation, so adding another pilot looks rushed and political, especially given gaps in strike-drone fielding and lingering integration plans after Drone Command.
Comment. Do you need a command or do you need drones integrated across the services and throughout the combat units? If Drone Command goes away, who owns joint drone doctrine, authorities, and resourcing when the next crisis compresses decision time?
Exclusive: Army Launches Experimental Drone Unit Amid Drone Command Dissolution
New unit integrates AI, robots, and cyber capabilities despite criticism over overlapping roles and rushed policies
By Yang Ji-ho
Published 2026.01.30. 05:42
Updated 2026.01.30. 10:50https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/01/30/5LULFLUVZ5AKNI5ANNLYN6SYS4/
The Army’s establishment of a ‘Drone Unit’—a test unit for operating unmanned systems such as small drones and robots—was recently revealed. This comes as the Future Strategy Subcommittee of the Defense Minister’s Joint Civil-Military Advisory Committee recommended on the 20th the abolition of the ‘Drone Operations Command’ (Drone Command) due to “inefficiency caused by functional overlaps with each military branch.” The Army has independently launched the experimental unit to strengthen its drone capabilities. Concerns about “functional overlaps” have resurfaced as the Drone Command moves toward dissolution. The Army already operates the ‘Dronebot Combat Unit’ under the Ground Operations Command and the 36th Division, a dedicated unit for small and counter-drone field testing.
At the opening ceremony of the 2023 Army Tiger Dronebot Festival held at Ganap-ri Airfield in Yangju-si, Gyeonggi-do, over 600 drones take off for a Guinness challenge for simultaneous drone takeoff, reference photo. /Ko Un-ho
According to sources familiar with the matter on the 29th, the Army designated one company within a mechanized infantry unit under the 11th Division as the ‘Drone Unit’ on the 28th. A military official described it as a “tactical-level experimental unit to transition combat methods in line with future battlefield environments.” The Army also operates the ‘Dronebot Combat Unit’ under the Ground Operations Command. In September of last year, the 36th Division was designated as the first dedicated unit for small and counter-drone field testing. When asked about functional overlaps, the Army explained, “The Drone Unit differs in role, integrating advanced technologies such as AI-based networks, robots, and cyber/electromagnetic capabilities to apply future military structures.”
Experts criticized, “Concerns have become reality.” Shin Jong-woo, Secretary-General of the Korea Defense and Security Forum, stated, “After completing combat experiments and analyzing results, drone utilization plans should be expanded. However, with the Dronebot Combat Unit and the 36th Division’s dedicated unit already in place, the sudden push for drone-related achievements—amid fears of the Drone Command’s abolition—is hasty. Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back advocated for training ‘500,000 drone warriors,’ leading each military branch to hastily propose immature policies that may yield no significant results.”
Minister Ahn previously emphasized training “500,000 drone warriors,” and the advisory committee also recommended “integrated promotion of drone combat development plans” after the Drone Command’s dissolution. However, concerns about unclear “integration plans” after abolishing the Drone Command—the first joint combat unit formed by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines for integrated operations—have materialized.
At the designation ceremony of the first dedicated unit for small drones and counter-drone fields in September last year, with the attendance of Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back, the Army’s 36th Division is designated as the dedicated unit for drone demonstration. /Army
Critics argue that accelerating the deployment of ongoing unmanned systems and expanding projects to meet demand for various unmanned systems, including drones and ground equipment, is necessary.
The 11th Division’s ‘Drone Unit’ reportedly possesses short-range reconnaissance drones, rifle-sight shooting drones, multi-legged walking robots, and prototype equipment not yet fully operational. However, it lacks small attack drones like the Polish-made ‘Warmate’—a star of modern warfare—introduced by the Drone Command. The multi-purpose unmanned vehicles used in military training promotional videos are expected to be utilized by the ‘Drone Unit,’ but they remain prototypes before mass production.
A military source remarked, “There’s almost no change from drones previously used by the military. What’s the point of increasing experimental units when unmanned drone introduction projects remain stagnant?”
In scenes released last year by North Korea during comprehensive tactical training by military branch, North Korean soldiers utilize small drones. /Rodong Sinmun
An Army official stated, “The Drone Unit was prepared before the Drone Command’s abolition recommendation and is unrelated. The 11th Division, a mechanized infantry unit where soldiers operate armored vehicles, differs in experimental scope from the infantry-centric 36th Division.” Regarding equipment, they added, “We plan to supplement and expand it through future experiments.”
A frontline unit official noted, “North Korean forces are conducting daily, simultaneous drone training near our frontline areas, based on combat experiences from the Russia-Ukraine war during winter exercises. The South’s conventional military superiority could be significantly reduced through drones.”
8. Kim Jong Un kicks off 3rd year of rural project with focus on military towns
Summary:
NK News reports that north Korea has begun the third year of Kim Jong Un’s “20×10” regional development push, with construction activity visible in at least seven counties even before full state announcements. Kim used a high-profile groundbreaking in Unnyul County to kick off the cycle, while satellite imagery indicates parallel early moves elsewhere: worker camps, demolition, and land clearing in multiple town centers. The targeting pattern matters. The counties showing early activity tend to align with military bases, weapons industry nodes, or supporting heavy industry, suggesting the program doubles as rear-area resilience and regime control, not only rural welfare.
Comment: Who says military first politics is dead?
Kim Jong Un kicks off 3rd year of rural project with focus on military towns
NK News identifies at least seven counties where construction has begun for ‘20x10’ development push
Colin Zwirko January 30, 2026
https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/kim-jong-un-kicks-off-3rd-year-of-rural-project-with-focus-on-military-towns/
North Korean soldiers gather at the 20x10 project site in Unnyul as explosions ring out for the construction groundbreaking | Image: KCNA (Jan. 30, 2026)
North Korea has started construction in at least seven towns across the country to kick off the third year of leader Kim Jong Un’s “20×10” rural development project, according to NK News analysis, with the focus still on populations working at key weapons factories and military bases.
Kim attended a groundbreaking ceremony for new factories in Unnyul County, southwest of the capital, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Friday.
NK News analysis of Planet Labs satellite imagery shows that military construction workers have set up camps and begun demolishing buildings or clearing land in recent weeks in the town centers of Sinhung, Sonchon, Phyonggang, Phyongwon, Pongsan and Taean counties as well.
The North Korean leader claimed in a speech at the Unnyul ceremony that the 20×10 project has already “transformed the backward regional economic foundations of the previous century.”
Kim said he wants to “raise to a higher stage the basic material and cultural standards of living of the regional people” and that the building of small factories making clothes and snacks has allowed rural areas to start “gaining competitive edge” on the national market.
The 20×10 project set out in 2024 to build modern health facilities and two to three factories in 20 locations per year for 10 years, targeting all 200-plus cities and counties in North Korea. The factories produce goods like plastic buckets, soap, crackers, simple clothing, furniture and fish products.
This year will mark the first time that hospitals and “leisure complexes” will be built in addition to light industry factory clusters in all 20 counties and cities selected as part of the “Regional Development 20×10 Policy.”
The 3D rendering displayed behind the leader depicts a hospital, leisure complex and three light industry factories slated for construction in Unnyul this year. | Image: KCNA (Jan. 30, 2026)
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Each leisure complex appears to house a library, a few shops, a supermarket, an outdoor flea market, a small gym with a few machines, a hair salon, a one or two-room movie theater and other basic amenities.
These facilities were only included in a handful of counties last year on a trial basis, but Kim confirmed at Thursday’s ceremony in Unnyul that the project will commence at full scale in 2026.
Kim did not mention “grain management centers,” which he vowed in 2024 would be built in all locations each year as well.
He added that besides improving rural living conditions, he is using the project as a form of ideological training to ensure absolute obedience of conscripted soldiers who have been tasked with construction in special “124th regiments.”
State media has yet to announce all 20 locations selected for 2026.
NK News surveyed dozens of counties in Planet Labs satellite imagery but found only seven with activity indicative of typical 20×10 project preparations, and most of these have ties to the military and weapons industry.
Unnyul, the first county selected for promotion under this year’s 20×10 project, appears to be important to the DPRK leadership for its mines connected to the iron and steel industry, which authorities typically prioritize for weapons production.
This comparison of images taken in December and January shows new demolition, land clearing and the appearance of construction worker camps in Sonchon. | Image: Planet Labs (Dec. 12, 2025), edited by NK News
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Sinhung County on the east coast is one of the most important military factory towns in the country, hosting plants that build missile launch vehicles and armored personnel carriers (APCs), as well as a sprawling unidentified complex to the east with visual signatures similar to plants dealing with chemicals and explosives.
Sonchon County in the northwest is home to the October 8 Factory, which state media has claimed is a “daily necessities” factory. However, the factory exhibited some relevance to the country’s missile program, due to key weapon development officials like Hong Yong Chil and Jong Sung Il visiting there with Kim in 2013 and 2014, according to NK News analysis.
Phyonggang County hosts the Korean People’s Army (KPA) 5th Corps command headquarters, which is one of the corps responsible for front-line operations against South Korea as it is near the border.
Phyongwon County to the north of the capital hosts a sprawling military site that may be a missile base, as well as a large artillery training site on the coast.
Taean, located between Pyongyang and Nampho, hosts a key heavy machinery factory that may have military ties, as well as electronics and glass factories.
There are missile and military bases within Pongsan County boundaries, near Sariwon, but their administrative connections to the town center are less clear.
State media is likely to report on groundbreaking ceremonies in at least 19 other towns in the coming weeks, with leader Kim Jong Un potentially attending some.
The counties selected in 2024 and 2025 similarly appear to have been selected with weapons and the military in mind, despite Kim Jong Un’s initial vow to focus on rescuing areas with the “most backward” and failing economic conditions first.
Edited by Bryan Betts
9. Why the U.S. and South Korea Will Not Jointly Construct Nuclear Submarines
Summary:
Lyle Goldstein argues that the much-touted plan for South Korea and the United States to jointly build nuclear attack submarines in Philadelphia is not going to happen, because the industrial and security hurdles are too steep. The Hanwha yard is not positioned to handle nuclear work, the U.S. submarine enterprise is already labor constrained, and the technology involved is the Navy’s crown-jewel domain. He adds that the strategic upside is overstated since high-end conventional submarines may be better suited to East Asian littorals, while a nuclear push could spark countervailing moves by Beijing. So the practical near-term path is commercial shipbuilding, plus limited defense work like modules, not full boats.
Comment: How will the South develop its nuclear powered submarine "fleet?" (they need more than one to be operational) If this joint construction does not take place what will be the impact on the alliance?
Why the U.S. and South Korea Will Not Jointly Construct Nuclear Submarines
The Hanwha yard in Philadelphia will logically focus on commercial shipbuilding for the foreseeable future.
By Lyle Goldstein
January 2026 Proceedings Vol. 152/1/1,475
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2026/january/why-us-and-south-korea-will-not-jointly-construct-nuclear
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Perhaps the biggest news to emerge from President Donald Trump’s 2025 visit to East Asia was his announcement in late October that South Korea and the United States would jointly construct nuclear attack submarines in Philadelphia. However, in the weeks that followed, it became clear this shipbuilding cooperation will not be realized.
Before the Thanksgiving holiday, I visited not only South Korea but also Japan and China, partly with the aim of assessing whether the agreement between Seoul and Washington makes sense. I walked away thinking U.S. strategists should carefully consider the risks and realities of the proposed partnership.
There is much to like in the initiative. The Biden administration prioritized cooperation on nuclear submarines with Australia and the United Kingdom through AUKUS. While that agreement is still very far from delivering tangible assets, it has withstood the test of time—AUKUS might prove to be a useful hedge against Chinese naval ambitions.
A Seat at the Table
South Korea looks on with some envy at the AUKUS partnership. Seoul wants a seat at the table with the leading Asia-Pacific maritime powers. As I was frequently told during my trip to South Korea, the idea of a South Korean nuclear submarine goes back more than a decade. The fundamental argument in favor of such a move resembles the logic that underpins AUKUS, namely that upgraded capabilities enhance deterrence.
As one South Korean warship-design expert told me, nuclear-powered submarines would bring “game-changing” capabilities to the South Korean Navy, significantly extending the payload, range, and speed of South Korean subs.
Under the most optimistic assessment, a new deal with South Korea would fit seamlessly into AUKUS and might encourage other allied states, including Japan and Canada, to sign up as well. Such close naval cooperation could trigger benefits from economies of scale and increased interoperability.
Perhaps most important, South Korea has emerged as a leading shipbuilder. Thus, the hopeful vision of a U.S.-South Korean strategic naval partnership is not just about nuclear submarines patrolling in tandem. It also promises help for the flagging U.S. maritime industry to address the yawning warship-production gap between the United States and China. The South Korea-owned Hanwha Yard in Philadelphia is producing a couple of vessels per year now, but it aims to increase that number in coming years.
A Steep Hill to Climb
But the Philadelphia yard will not yet be building any submarines—let alone nuclear submarines—because it is much too difficult from an industrial and technological standpoint. As one expert in Seoul explained, it would likely take up to two decades before any nuclear submarines could be completed there, primarily because the yard is not certified to handle nuclear material; attaining the related capabilities would be a steep hill to climb.
South Koreans do not consider it remotely realistic to build nuclear submarines in the United States, and American strategists seem to agree on this point, since all the spare labor and capital available for submarine production is now fully tapped out. U.S. shipyards are already struggling mightily to hire the necessary workers to fulfill current contracts on time.
There are many other additional problems to consider. As with the AUKUS deal, there would be safety and security concerns in a joint effort, because nuclear submarines are the crown jewels of U.S. naval technology. Moreover, there would be a significant language barrier that does not affect AUKUS.
Other problems crop up at the strategic level. For example, Chinese experts I met with made clear they would not consider improved South Korean naval capabilities to be especially threatening, but Beijing would see similar movement by Japan’s maritime forces as a grave threat. A Shanghai-based strategist noted that China would likely answer this new partnership by doubling down on its own nuclear submarine outlays, including in collaboration with Russia.
Additional doubts relate to the cost-effectiveness of a joint nuclear program—highly capable conventional submarines can be built for a much cheaper price, and these smaller boats could be better suited for the confined, shallow waters of the East Asian littoral. Indeed, South Korean experts candidly said the proposed plan might serve as cover for a future nuclear weapons program. Alternatively, it might reflect an emotional decision by Seoul to increase its political leverage against North Korea.
Despite these troubling concerns, Americans should remain open to the prospect of enhanced naval cooperation with South Korea. If nothing else, U.S. shipyards and the United States’ anemic maritime industries could benefit by learning from South Korea’s shipbuilding prowess.
A Commercial Shipbuilding Focus, For Now
In early December, Hanwha CEO Mike Coulter outlined the vision for the Philadelphia yard at a forum convened by the Center for Maritime Strategy. He noted that that the yard has already increased its workforce from 900 to 2,200 workers and said benefits had already accrued from introducing this workforce to automation-heavy Korean shipbuilding techniques.
The Hanwha yard in Philadelphia will logically focus on commercial shipbuilding for the foreseeable future, with the ambitious aim of lifting the yard’s output from 1.5 ships per year, to 20. Coulter did not directly mention submarine production, though he did note that he has discussed the possibility of building modules for various U.S. Navy warship programs. Perhaps the optimal partnership is something of a compromise wherein the United States shares nuclear-submarine technology with South Korea, and in return receives the capability to rapidly build up a diesel-submarine force for the U.S. Navy.
South Korea is a model ally, and a shipbuilding partnership with Seoul can be fruitful. Nevertheless, it is important to guard against unrealistic expectations, and this means dampening the scenario, apparently popular within the Pentagon’s top brass, of the United States playing a South Korean card against China. In fact, the new South Korean President, Lee Jae-myung, is seeking to mend some fences with Beijing. U.S. leaders should welcome this effort to lower regionwide tensions that have flared dangerously in the last decade and intensified in the recent months.
Lyle Goldstein
Lyle Goldstein is a national security specialist focusing on China and Russia. At U.S. Naval War College, he served as director of the China Maritime Studies Institute and earned the Superior Civilian Service Award. He now leads the China Initiative at Brown University and directs Asia studies for Defense Priorities.
10. Why Seoul’s push for greater control over the DMZ is unlikely to succeed
Summary:
NK News reports that Seoul’s bid to expand civilian and ministerial access to the DMZ is unlikely to succeed and risks friction with the U.S.-led UN Command. The UNC has reaffirmed its authority under the Armistice Agreement, arguing that even nonmilitary activity in the DMZ falls within its remit. South Korea’s defense ministry has sided with the UNC, undercutting the unification ministry’s legal argument. Experts warn the bill would have little practical effect, could strain alliance coordination, and might advantage north Korea by exposing seams between Seoul and the multinational command that manages the armistice regime.
Comment: But what will be the impact on the alliance due to this misguided effort? Again, this action is in line with Kim Jogn Un's objectives. It supports his political warfare strategy to drive a wedge in the alliance to remove US forces from the Peninsula.
Why Seoul’s push for greater control over the DMZ is unlikely to succeed
Experts warn that ROK bill to increase civilian access risks a rift with UN Command and could benefit North Korea
Jooheon Kim January 30, 2026
https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/why-seouls-push-for-greater-control-over-the-dmz-is-unlikely-to-succeed/
Buildings in the Joint Security Area | Image: U.N. Command via Facebook (July 31, 2024)
The dispute between South Korea’s unification ministry and the U.N. Command (UNC) over access to the demilitarized zone (DMZ) ratcheted up this week, after the multinational command reaffirmed its unilateral authority over the border in a rare rebuke.
But experts told NK News that Seoul’s push for greater control is unlikely to succeed, while raising concern that it could damage ties with the U.S.-led military force and even play into North Korea’s hand.
On Wednesday, the UNC criticized a bill introduced by Seoul’s ruling Democratic Party that would grant the unification minister limited authority over the DMZ, stating that the measure would violate the Korean War Armistice Agreement.
The pending bill in the National Assembly would allow the minister access to the DMZ for some non-military purposes, including the shipment of goods and equipment for peaceful purposes.
The unification ministry has argued that the Armistice Agreement is limited to military matters and does not prohibit peaceful activities in the DMZ.
However, the UNC maintains that the agreement’s preamble — which describes its provisions as “purely military in character” — underscores that the accord is not a peace treaty, asserting its commander’s purview over civil administrative matters.
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young (right) visits the Joint Security Area on his first day in office. | Image: Ministry of Unification (July 25, 2025)
Seoul’s defense ministry appeared to side with the UNC amid its own dispute with the unification ministry, stating at a press briefing on Thursday that it “respects the UNC’s authority under the Armistice Agreement and will work closely with the UNC on all matters related to DMZ use.”
Ban Kil-joo, an assistant professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, told NK News that the pending National Assembly bill is unlikely to have much of an impact even if passed, given that the UNC is a multinational platform representing the U.S. and 17 other member states.
“Even if the bill is approved by the National Assembly, the UNC may view it as simply a domestic law of a single country,” he told NK News.
The expert, who served as an ROK military officer at the UNC during the Moon Jae-in administration, noted that any entry into the area would inevitably be linked to military purposes since the DMZ is inherently a military zone.
“Civilians can’t really conduct business there,” he said, adding that it is “impossible to change the Armistice Agreement itself” without North Korea’s input. While the DPRK is a signatory to the armistice, South Korea is not.
Despite the unlikelihood that Seoul’s proposals will succeed, Ban said they risk sparking conflict with the U.S.-led command, a scenario North Korea would likely welcome.
ROK soldiers carry out excavations to recover Korean War service members in the DMZ. | Image: U.N. Command via Facebook (Dec. 3, 2025)
NOT THE FIRST TIME
The unification ministry’s push for greater access to the DMZ is not the first time South Korea has clashed with the UNC, highlighting the lack of progress on the issue.
Steve Tharp, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who served on the UNC Military Armistice Commission, said South Korea’s progressive administrations have consistently sought greater independence from foreign forces in the country.
“After Roh Moo-hyun was elected, he said, ‘Oh yeah, I’m going to take over operational command,’” Tharp said.
Min Tae-eun, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), explained that progressive administrations have traditionally been keen on promoting an independent national defense.
“Since the South Korean government now leans more toward peaceful coexistence rather than unification [with North Korea], I see the unification ministry’s requests as consistent with the progressive administration’s aim to secure peaceful zones,” she said.
One previous clash took place in 2019, when there were reports that the UNC had blocked Seoul from sending antiviral medication to Pyongyang. The UNC denied the allegation.
A year earlier, the command allegedly refused to allow a South Korean train to cross into North Korea, delaying a planned railway survey.
The latest dispute flared up after unification minister Chung Dong-young accused the UNC of blocking a presidential security from entering the DMZ.
U.N. Command personnel with yellow armbands | Image: U.N. Command via Facebook (Nov. 14, 2025)
“Proposals for DMZ use have been under discussion for over 10 years across different administrations, and the lack of progress highlights the difficulty of the issue,” the expert Min said.
Ban of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy suggested it would be far more advantageous for Seoul to find ways to work collaboratively with the UNC, rather than trying to gain authority over access.
One approach could be requesting permanent access for certain ROK officials, similar to the access granted to UNC personnel, he said.
“UNC personnel wear yellow armbands and they can enter DMZ areas immediately without having to notify anyone 48 hours in advance or go through Joint Security Area checkpoints,” he told NK News. “They just show their yellow armbands and go in.”
For ROK officials, requesting special provisions to allow permanent access could be a practical solution, the expert said, although such proposals would likely only be possible once the two sides reach a “policy consensus.”
Edited by David Choi and Bryan Betts
11. ＜Inside N.Korea＞Armored Vehicles Deployed: Police Conduct Lockdown Drills in Preparation for Unrest — "Sirens Create Strong Sense of Intimidation" in Hyesan
Summary:
Asia Press reports that security forces in Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, have begun large scale “mobile strike team” drills aimed at suppressing potential civil unrest. About 150 Safety Bureau personnel are conducting lockdown and area control exercises using armored vehicles, armed motorcycles, checkpoints, and arrest simulations. Authorities frame the drills as winter training, but residents say the real purpose is to deter smuggling, defections, and dissent along the China border. Sirens, visible force, and street encirclement tactics are creating fear and signaling regime resolve ahead of possible instability in this sensitive border city.
Comment: "Security" in the north, the far north.
＜Inside N.Korea＞Armored Vehicles Deployed: Police Conduct Lockdown Drills in Preparation for Unrest — "Sirens Create Strong Sense of Intimidation" in Hyesan
asiapress.org
Border guard soldier patrolling the Yalu River bank in Hyesan. He is not a Safety Bureau unit member. Photographed from the Chinese side of the border in September 2025 (ASIAPRESS)
Ryanggang Province’s Safety Bureau in Hyesan began conducting "mobile strike team drills" with about 150 personnel starting January 15. A reporting partner who witnessed the drills explained that authorities are preparing for potential civil unrest, and reported that the highly intimidating drills mobilized armored vehicles and armed motorcycles. (ISHIMARU Jiro / KANG Ji-won)
◆Authorities Explain It's to Prepare for Potential Civil Unrest
Hyesan is the provincial capital of Ryanggang Province, located on the upper Yalu River bordering China, and has been one of the major defection points in the North Korea-China border region for about the past 15 years. It's also a route for illegal distribution of goods, funds, and information with the outside world. The Kim Jong-un regime, which launched in 2012, completely sealed off the Yalu River banks with barbed wire fencing to block these "subversive activities." Along with the capital Pyongyang, it's a city with the strictest daily control over its residents.
What do these large-scale drills being conducted by the Ryanggang Province Safety Bureau in Hyesan look like? Reporting Partner A, who lives in the city, shared the following:
"Starting January 15, the Safety Bureau's mobile strike team began mobile deployment drills. About 150 people are participating, conducting lockdown drills, area control drills, and so on. They're mobilizing armored vehicles, combat vehicles, and even armed motorcycles.
Nominally it's winter training, but authorities say it's to prevent subversive activities and prepare for potential civil unrest, so I think it's training to monitor and control border crossings to China, smuggling, and public discontent. Even soldiers who were just recently assigned to the Safety Bureau through conscription are participating."
The upper Yalu River is only several dozen meters wide. The riverbank is surrounded by fencing and double barbed wire. Wiyeon-dong, Hyesan, photographed from the Chinese side of the border in October 2024 (ASIAPRESS)
◆Witnessed Drills on Encircling and Arresting from Both Sides of the Street
This reporting partner encountered the drills while moving through Hyesan.
"They set up checkpoints by placing armed military motorcycles on empty lots on both sides of the street, stopped people passing by, then conducted drills on encircling from both sides and making arrests. They explained it as a 'lockdown operation to crush subversive activities.'"
On January 24, we confirmed with another reporting partner living in Hyesan, who told us "the drills in the city are still continuing with sirens blaring."
These drills appear to create a strong sense of intimidation among Hyesan residents. Our reporting partner said, "I feel the purpose is to pressure locals and display power."
※ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.
North Korea map (ASIAPRESS)
asiapress.org
asiapress.org
12. Transparency or unrefined messages? President's social media use stirs debate
Summary:
POTROK has intensified his use of social media to float policy ideas and engage citizens directly, reviving a style he used as a local leader. Supporters argue this promotes transparency, gathers public sentiment, and sharpens bureaucratic focus. Critics warn it risks policy confusion when presidential remarks are mistaken for decisions, as seen in the recent sugar levy controversy. Experts caution that bypassing institutional channels can amplify misunderstanding and polarization, turning governance into personality driven politics. The debate centers on whether Lee’s digital engagement strengthens democratic responsiveness or undermines disciplined policy making at the presidential level.
Comment: Are POTUS and POTROK sharing their social media TTPs - tactics, techniques, and procedures?
Transparency or unrefined messages? President's social media use stirs debate
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By Anna J. Park
- Published Jan 30, 2026 5:15 pm KST
Direct communication helps gather public opinion, but experts urge caution to prevent policy confusion
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/politics/20260130/transparency-or-unrefined-messages-presidents-social-media-use-stirs-debate
President Lee Jae Myung speaks at a meeting of senior presidential aides at Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul, Thursday. Yonhap
President Lee Jae Myung, long known for his prolific use of social media, has recently stepped up his online activity, signaling a renewed push to share policy ideas with citizens and engage public debate directly through digital platforms.
As of 3 p.m. Friday, Lee already uploaded three posts on X (formerly Twitter) that day alone. He posted twice Thursday and eight times on Wednesday. The topics of the posts vary — the expansion of subsidized menstrual products, interest rates on local government treasury funds, a possible introduction of a sugar levy, warnings against Cambodian criminal syndicates, the delisting of underperforming firms from the stock exchange and the effectiveness of balanced regional development policies.
The president’s recent posting patterns mark a clear change from his early days in office last June. After assuming the presidency, Lee initially used social media primarily to share updates on diplomatic efforts, including phone calls and meetings with world leaders. He later turned to longer, reflective posts about Cabinet meetings, overseas trips, and town hall-style engagements.
More recently, however, Lee appears increasingly confident in his policy footing, broadening the range of social and policy issues he raises online. It is a shift reminiscent of his early days as mayor of Seongnam in Gyeonggi Province, when he enthusiastically embraced social media as a rising political figure.
A screenshot image of President Lee Jae Myung's X account
At the time, Lee famously used Twitter to receive civil complaints and issue administrative instructions, drawing praise for “communicative administration,” while also facing criticism for what critics labeled “performative governance.” In a 2012 interview with local media, Lee said he believed social media was “extremely useful for open administration and transparency in political processes,” adding that he used it relentlessly, “whether it’s 2 a.m. or 6 a.m., whenever I have time.” Lee joined Twitter in January 2010, had about 16,000 followers in 2012 and now has more than 970,000 followers.
His trust in social media remains firm. At a recent meeting of senior presidential aides, he said, “You always have to look at things from the perspective of the people, who are the end users. If you can’t meet them directly, you should observe them where they gather. And if nothing else, you should at least read the online comments,” reflecting his belief that public sentiment can be gauged through digital platforms.
A presidential official familiar with Lee’s habits described him as a “night owl” who frequently reads social media posts and comments in the early morning hours. In recent remarks, Lee has also described online comments as a form of the public’s “collective intelligence.”
Still, the president's social media-friendly approach has sparked controversy. Critics argue that presidential policy ideas carry significant weight and should not be casually floated online with an “if not, never mind” attitude.
A recent example drawing intense media confusion and attention involved a series of postings about sugar. He first shared a news article that 80 percent of citizens support introducing a sugar tax, adding, “Like tobacco, should we curb sugar use through a levy and reinvest the funds to strengthen regional and public health care? What do you think?”
A screenshot image of President Lee Jae Myung's X (formerly Twitter) account
When media outlets reported this as a move toward introducing a sugar tax, Lee pushed back, saying he was merely asking for public opinion and accused the coverage of distortion, calling it “fake news.”
The episode went on to spark a debate over terminology, specifically whether a “sugar levy” differs from a “sugar tax” and how any resulting funds would be used, prompting presidential spokespersons to step in and explain the distinction. The dispute, however, largely sidelined the broader public health discussion Lee had intended to raise about the harmful effects of excessive sugar consumption.
Some argue that Lee’s direct engagement bypasses bureaucratic filters and allows him to hear citizens’ voices more directly. Lee Han-joo, chair of the National Research Council for Economics, Humanities and Social Sciences, welcomed the approach. “He’s doing well. When the president personally throws out an agenda, it raises tension and focus within the public service.”
Political experts, however, urge caution. Shin Yul, a political analyst and politics professor at Myongji University, said that among major world leaders, only two are particularly conspicuous in their use of social media: U.S. President Donald Trump and Lee.
“Presidents have many ways to deliver messages, including through official communication channels,” Shin said. “Using established organizational routes matters because it reduces mistakes. Messages are refined, unnecessary misunderstandings are minimized and there is a gatekeeping function. That’s why traditional channels exist.”
Shin also warned that social media politics can foster fandom-driven polarization.
“Voters who encounter the president directly on social media may feel a sense of personal closeness, which can evolve into fandom. That may deepen loyalty among supporters, but it can also alienate those with different views and intensify political polarization.”
He added that if Lee truly believes governance should not be driven by a single viewpoint, reducing reliance on social media may better align with that principle.
Lee Jun-han, a politics professor at Incheon National University, acknowledged that the president’s engagement is preferable to leaders who show little interest in policy at all, but cautioned against posting half-formed ideas online.
“If issues requiring legislation or budget allocations are raised impulsively or outside established procedures, confusion can arise,” he said. “When informal channels begin to outweigh official opinion-gathering processes, that’s something to watch closely.”
He emphasized that while social media may have been highly effective during Lee’s time as a local government leader, the presidency carries a different weight.
"Finding the right balance between policy agility and institutional stability will be key to effective governance going forward," he pointed out.
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Anna J. Park
Anna Jiwon Park has been covering the politics at The Korea Times since the summer of 2024, when she joined the press pool for the Office of the President in Korea. Prior to that, she spent about five years reporting extensively on financial markets, regulatory authorities and the financial industry. She joined The Korea Times in 2019 after spending eight years as a broadcast journalist at Arirang TV, Korea’s leading global broadcaster, covering politics, defense and culture.
annajpark@koreatimes.co.kr
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David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
https://apstrategy.org/
Executive Director, Korea Regional Review
https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/
Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal
https://smallwarsjournal.com/
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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