Quotes of the Day:
"Empty your mind. Be formless, shapeless, like water. You put water into a cup, it becomes the cup. You put water into a bottle, it becomes the bottle. You put it into a teapot, it becomes the teapot. Now water can flow or it can crash. Be water, my friend."
- Bruce Lee
"In the depths of Winter, I finally learned that within me there lay an invincible summer."
- Albert Camus
"This struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, and it may be both moral and physical, but it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will."
- Frederick Douglass
1. N. Korea confirms test of missile capable of striking Guam
2. Hwasong-12 Ground-to-Ground Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile Held for Evaluation (north Korea official statement)
3. North Korea missile tests: Photos from space released
4. Kim Jong Un wants the world to know he still matters. Seven missile tests in a month may prove it
5. N.K. missile frenzy highlights 'go-it-alone' drive for weapons buildup: analysts
6. North Korea's Hwasong-12 IRBM Missile Test: The Road Back to 2017?
7. US worried North Korea could return to nuclear and ICBM tests
8. Tank attached to famous North Korean armored division suffers serious accident
9. How Kim Jong Un runs the world’s most successful failed state
10. Defense minister visits Army missile command to check combat readiness
11. Korea urged to explore ways to reduce China reliance
12. Korea Has Surpassed Japan in Per Capita GDP
13. North Korea's IRBM Missile Test: What Is Kim Jong Un's Goal?
14. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Plummeting Won Causes Market Confusion; Panicked Authorities Crack Down on Black Market Money Changers. There are fears of inflation too.
1. N. Korea confirms test of missile capable of striking Guam
Kim Just will not stop. from the intro of a paper I wrote yesterday that should be published today:
On 30 January Kim Jong-un conducted another test launch of what is suspected to be an intermediate range ballistic missile. This is the seventh event of 2022. With his recent statements implying he is considering ending his self-imposed moratorium on ICBM and nuclear tests, it appears Kim is doubling down on his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategy while he simultaneously works to increase his warfighting capabilities. Kim continues to seek his short-term objective of coercing the U.S. and UN into providing sanctions relief, his intermediate objective of driving a wedge in the ROK/U.S. alliance, and his long-term objective of seeking to dominate the Korean peninsula.
It is possible that Kim will continue to escalate his tests in the near to mid-term from the Lunar New Year holiday on 1 February to the birthdays of Kim Jong-il (16 February) and Kim Il-sung (15 April) among other upcoming important dates. He is likely escalating because he is not successfully coercing the ROK, the U.S., and the international community into providing concessions. However, if nations decide to appease him it is very likely that he will judge his strategy a success and continue to execute from the seven decades old Kim family regime playbook that calls for increased tensions, threats, and provocations to gain political and economic concessions.
N. Korea confirms test of missile capable of striking Guam
AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM · January 31, 2022
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korea confirmed Monday it test-launched an intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of reaching the U.S. territory of Guam, the North’s most significant weapon launch in years, as Washington plans steps to show its commitment to its Asian allies.
Sunday’s launch could be a prelude to bigger provocations by North Korea such as nuclear and long-range missile tests that pose a direct threat to the U.S. mainland, as the North tries to further pressure the Biden administration to win sanction relief or international recognition as a legitimate nuclear state.
The official Korean Central News Agency said the purpose of the test was verifying the overall accuracy of the Hwasong-12 missile that is being deployed in its military.
KCNA published two sets of combination photos — one showing the missile rising from a launcher and soaring into space and the other showing North Korea and nearby areas that it said were photographed from space by a camera installed at the missile’s warhead. The Associated Press decided not to use the images because the authenticity of the photos couldn’t be verified.
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Lee Choon Geun, a missile expert and honorary research fellow at South Korea’s Science and Technology Policy Institute, said he thinks the photos were taken from space — especially when the missile was soaring to its apogee, though he cannot independently prove there was no adjustment on the images. While it’s rare to place a camera on a weapon, Lee said North Korea likely wanted to demonstrate its technological advancement to both foreign and domestic audiences.
North Korea said the missile was launched toward waters off its east coast on a high angle to prevent flying over other countries. It gave no further details.
According to South Korean and Japanese assessments, the missile flew about 800 kilometers (497 miles) and reached a maximum altitude of 2,000 kilometers (1,242 miles) before landing in waters between the Korean Peninsula and Japan.
The reported flight details make it the most powerful missile North Korea has tested since 2017, when the country launched Hwasong-12 and longer-range missiles in a torrid run of weapons firings to acquire an ability to launch nuclear strikes on U.S. military bases in Northeast Asia and the Pacific and even the American homeland.
The Hwasong-12 missile is a nuclear-capable ground-to-ground weapon with a maximum range of 4,500 kilometers (2,800 miles) when it’s fired on a standard trajectory. It’s a distance sufficient to reach Guam, home to U.S. military bases that in past times of tensions sent advanced warplanes to the Korean Peninsula in shows of force. In August 2017, at the height of animosities with the then-Trump administration, North Korea threatened to make “an enveloping fire” near Guam with Hwasong-12 missiles.
In 2017, North Korea also test-fired intercontinental ballistic missiles called Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 that experts say demonstrated their potential capacity to reach the mainland U.S. Some analysts say North Korea still needs to conduct additional ICBM test-flights to prove it has overcome the last remaining technological hurdles, such as protecting a warhead from the extreme heat and pressure of reentering the Earth’s atmosphere.
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In recent months, North Korea has launched a variety of weapons systems and threatened to lift a four-year moratorium on more serious weapons tests such as nuclear explosions and ICBM launches. Sunday’s launch was the North’s seventh round of missile launches in January alone, and other weapons tested recently include a developmental hypersonic missile and a submarine-launched missile.
Analyst Cheong Seong-Chang at the private Sejong Institute in South Korea said the Hwasong-12 launch was seen as partially breaking North Korea’s weapons test moratorium. In April 2018, when North Korea suspended nuclear and ICBM tests ahead of now-dormant diplomacy with the Trump administration, Kim said North Korea didn’t need to test intermediate-range missiles any longer as well.
Cheong said North Korea will likely test-launch its existing long-range missile if the United States spearheads fresh sanctions on it. Other experts said North Korea could also conduct a nuclear test.
North Korea has publicly vowed to add more powerful ICBMs and nuclear warheads in its arsenal. They include a longer-range ICBM with precision strike capability, a solid-fuel ICBM that improves a weapon’s mobility, a multi-warhead missile, a spy satellite and a super-sized warhead.
After Sunday’s launch, White House officials said they saw the latest missile test as part of an escalating series of provocations over the last several months that have become increasingly concerning.
The Biden administration plans to respond to the latest missile test in the coming days with an unspecified move meant to demonstrate to the North that the U.S. government is committed to allies’ security in the region, according to a senior administration official who briefed reporters on the condition of anonymity.
The official said the administration viewed Sunday’s missile test as the latest in a series of provocations to try to win sanctions relief from the U.S. The Biden administration again called on North Korea to return to talks but made clear it doesn’t see the sort of leader-to-leader summits Donald Trump held with Kim as constructive at this time.
South Korean and Japanese officials also condemned Sunday’s launch, which violated U.N. Security Council resolutions that bans the country from testing ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.
U.S.-led diplomacy aimed at convincing North Korea to abandon its nuclear program largely remains stalled.
“Even if Washington had the bandwidth to pay more attention to the North Korean nuclear issue, Pyongyang would likely continue to refuse direct talks because of the pandemic, keep perfecting its weapons technology, and maintain its high price tag for talks,” said Duyeon Kim, an analyst at Washington’s Center for a New American Security.
Observers say North Korea could suspend weapons tests during the Beijing Winter Olympics because China is its most important ally. But they say North Korea could test bigger weapons when the Olympics end and the U.S. and South Korean militaries begin their springtime military exercises.
___
Associated Press writer Aamer Madhani in Washington contributed to this report.
AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM · January 31, 2022
2. Hwasong-12 Ground-to-Ground Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile Held for Evaluation (north Korea official statement)
Note that there is no report of Kim Jong-un at the launch. Perhaps the regime is trying to show this is now business as usual and the new normal. The use of a camera on the warhead seems to be purely for propaganda purposes and the fact that the photos were released so quickly to the international media may mean they are really putting on a full court propaganda press.
I will forward the BBC link that has the photos.
Hwasong-12 Ground-to-Ground Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile Held for Evaluation
The test-fire of Hwasong-12 ground-to-ground intermediate-range ballistic missile for evaluation was conducted on January 30 according to a plan of the Academy of Defence Science, the Second Economy Commission and other institutions concerned.
The test-fire was aimed at selectively evaluating the ballistic missile under production and deployment and verifying the accuracy of the overall weapon system.
It was conducted at the highest-angle launch system from the northwestern part of the country toward the waters of the East Sea of Korea in consideration of the security of neighbouring countries.
The Academy made public the photographic images of the earth taken from space by a camera installed at the missile warhead.
It confirmed the accuracy, security and operation efficiency of the of the Hwasong-12 weapon system under production.
3. North Korea missile tests: Photos from space released
Please go to the link to view the photos and other graphics.
North Korea missile tests: Photos from space released
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2 hours ago
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IMAGE SOURCE,REUTERS
Image caption,
Japan and South Korea say the missile reached a maximum altitude of 2,000km
North Korea has released photographs which it said were taken from its most powerful missile launch in five years.
The unusual pictures taken from space show parts of the Korean peninsula and surrounding areas.
At its full power it can travel thousands of miles, putting areas like US territory Guam within striking distance.
The latest test has raised alarm again among the international community.
Pyongyang has conducted a record number of seven missile launches in the past month alone - an intense flurry of activity that has been strongly condemned by the US, South Korea, Japan, and other nations.
The UN prohibits North Korea from ballistic and nuclear weapons tests, and has imposed strict sanctions. But the East Asian state regularly defies the ban.
US officials on Monday said the recent step up in activity warranted renewed talks with Pyongyang.
What happened at the Hwasong-12 launch?
South Korea and Japan were both the first to report the launch on Sunday after detecting it in their anti-missile systems.
They estimated it had flown a moderate distance for an IRBM, covering a distance of about 800km (497 miles) and reaching an altitude of 2,000km before it landed in waters off Japan. At full power and at a standard trajectory, the missile can travel as far as 4,000km.
IMAGE SOURCE,REUTERS
Image caption,
Images released by the North Korean news agency show the missile launch, and pictures taken from the missile in space
North Korea confirmed the missile launch on Monday through its state-run media reports. The country's rogue tests are typically disclosed by state media a day after their occurrence.
State news agency KCNA said the missile test had been launched to "verify its accuracy". It had been deliberately angled to land away "in consideration of the security of the neighbouring countries".
State media also printed rare imagery, some which they said were shots taken by a camera fitted to the missile's warhead.
One of the images shows the moment of launch and another apparently shows the missile in mid-flight, taken from above.
Leader Kim Jong-un was not present to observe Sunday's launch, compared to three weeks ago, when pictures showed his attendance at the launch of a hypersonic glide missile test - a more advanced type of missile technology designed to circumvent missile-detection systems. Those missiles have only been tested by North Korea three times in total.
Why did North Korea fire the missile?
North Korea analyst Ankit Panda said Mr Kim's absence, and the language used in the media to describe the launch, suggest that this test was intended to verify the missile system worked as it should, rather than to show off new technology.
The BBC is not responsible for the content of external sites.
Still, it is the first time that the Hwasong-12, a nuclear-capable missile of a significant size, has been launched since North Korea held talks with the US under the former administration of US President Donald Trump - which led to a slowdown in missile activity.
Advances in N Korea's missile technology
Analysis by Sangmi Han, BBC Korean Service
During the 8th Party Congress in January, Kim Jong-un said the development of military reconnaissance satellites and hypersonic missiles, along with unmanned attack drones, are the major goals for the next five-year plan.
The country has already conducted two hypersonic missile tests in January this year and experts believe, given the fact that the North released pictures from outer space, they will soon launch a reconnaissance satellite.
But that would be seen by the US and its allies as crossing a red line. A satellite rocket uses near-identical technology as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) - the difference is only in their payload.
The images, reportedly taken from a camera fitted to the missile's test warhead, are rare and could mean that the country has made advances in its missile re-entry technology.
To carry an explosive payload, a ballistic missile must withstand immense structural and temperature pressures during its descent through the earth's atmosphere to its intended target.
Experts are still wary of saying that the North indeed has perfected re-entry capabilities. But at least the images, showing parts of the Korean peninsula and Japan from space, could be awake-up call for its neighbours.
The last time the Hwasong-12 was tested was in 2017, when Pyongyang launched it six times including sending it twice over the Japanese island of Hokkaido, which triggered alarms for residents there.
In 2018 after Mr Kim met Mr Trump, North Korea announced a moratorium on testing nuclear weapons and its longest range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). But by the following year, as relations soured, Mr Kim said they were no longer bound by the declaration.
On Sunday, South Korean President Moon Jae-in said that with the latest launch, North Korea has "come close to destroying the moratorium declaration".
There are multiple reasons for the ramp up in North Korea's missile activity this year, which was first flagged by Kim in his New Year speech.
Analysts say the tests reflect Kim's desire to pressure the US back into long-stalled nuclear talks, present a show of strength to regional and global powers, and could be borne out of a practical need to test out new engineering and military command systems.
Media caption,
Why does North Korea keep launching missiles?
The timing is also significant with Beijing's Winter Olympics kicking off later this week, and South Korea's presidential election in March.
"This is consistent with their past behaviour to try and intimidate South Korea and the incoming president," said Dr Daniel Pinkston, an international relations professor from Troy University who lives in South Korea.
There's also been a surge in tests as the North Korean economy struggles under US-led sanctions, pandemic difficulties and decades of mismanagement.
Earlier this month, the US imposed more sanctions on North Korea.
4. Kim Jong Un wants the world to know he still matters. Seven missile tests in a month may prove it
I would not be surprised iof Kim continued to test during the Olympics. We must understand north Korea as a spoiler (and not just for the US and ROK/US alliance).
Excerpts:
With the Winter Olympics starting in just days in the capital of North Korea's main ally, China, the world may see Kim take a breather from testing and let his friends in Beijing bask in the international attention.
But Pyongyang picking up the weapons testing pace again after the Games may suit Beijing just fine.
"For China, as North Korea's military power increases, the US has to pay more attention to the Korean Peninsula, so it can be expected to have the effect of distracting attention on Taiwan in this region," said Park Won-gon, associate professor in North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University.
If that doesn't give Kim a seat at the table, it at least gives him a foot in the door -- and all the more reason to keep that door swinging wider.
Kim Jong Un wants the world to know he still matters. Seven missile tests in a month may prove it
CNN · by Analysis by Brad Lendon and Yoonjung Seo, CNN
Seoul, South Korea (CNN)Since the turn of the year, North Korea has ramped up missile tests in defiance of international law at a frenetic pace that many who keep a close eye on the rogue state expect to continue.
According to analysts, seven North Korean missile tests in the first four weeks of 2022 suggest the country's leader, Kim Jong Un, is both striving to meet domestic goals and show an increasingly turbulent world that Pyongyang remains a player in the struggle for power and influence.
"By threatening to destabilize Asia while global resources are stretched thin elsewhere, Pyongyang is demanding the world pay it to act like a 'responsible nuclear power,'" said Leif-Eric Easley, associate professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul, South Korea.
Those seven missile tests have run the gamut, from what is believed to be a hypersonic glide vehicle -- potentially one of the most powerful weapons on the planet -- to an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), Pyongyang's longest range missile tested since 2017 -- to cruise missiles, arms that powers like the US have had in their inventory for decades.
North Korea says it test-fired an intermediate missile, the Hwasong-12, on Sunday, January 30 (local time).
But all fall into Kim's pledge to make North Korea a power that can stand up to not only to its southern neighbor, but also to foes further afield, such as the United States. The IRBM that was tested Sunday, named in state media as a Hwasong-12 type missile, could have the range to hit the US island territory of Guam in the Pacific Ocean. Images released by North Korean state media, purportedly taken using a camera installed on the Hwasong-12, appear to show the missile in space looking back down at Earth.
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Kim has reason to be concerned about a possible government change in Seoul in March's presidential election. Conservatives behind presidential candidate Yoon Suk Yeol have a chance to unseat the current ruling democrats, fronted by Lee Jae-myung, who would succeed party colleague President Moon Jae-in if elected.
Analysts say a Yoon-led government could be expected to take a much harder line against the North compared to one led by Lee.
Yoon even planted the idea that South Korea could strike first against a perceived threat from the North, before the South might suffer a catastrophic loss.
"I think it is a very important attitude for us to have," Yoon said last week.
And while Moon has held summits with Kim, a Yoon government could very well just ignore the North Korean leader's regime, according to Andrei Lankov, a professor at Kookmin University in Seoul.
"Conservatives are supporters not so much of a tough position in relations with North Korea as of the maximum disregard for the very fact of the existence of another Korean state," Lankov wrote on a blog for the Valdai Club, a Russian think tank.
Kim certainly got the attention of Moon with Sunday's IRBM test.
The South Korean President said in a statement that the IRBM firing could be considered as a signal the Kim regime is preparing to scrap its moratorium on intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and nuclear testing.
That moratorium has largely kept North Korea out of the international spotlight, but longer range missile tests could reverse that trend.
'No fire, no fury'
As for the US, President Joe Biden's administration has largely put North Korea on the back burner, with foreign policy issues like China, Taiwan and most recently Ukraine dominating attention along with the coronavirus pandemic.
Washington's responses to North Korean launches in January are nowhere near its reaction to Pyongyang's provocations in 2017, when Donald Trump was the US President.
That has to be frustrating for the first North Korean leader to meet face-to-face with a sitting American President not once, but three times.
"For better and for worse, Biden is showing no fire and no fury," Easley said.
People watch a TV showing a file image of North Korea's missile launch during a news program at the Seoul Railway Station in Seoul, South Korea, Sunday, Jan. 30, 2022.
Leading up to his summits with Trump, analysts noted how Kim had finally succeeded in getting a seat at the table, a position he leveraged by testing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) that could theoretically reach the continental US. But when that seat did not yield any concessions from Washington, North Korea gradually resumed missile tests, albeit of a much shorter range.
Last year, Biden's first in office, North Korea staged eight tests -- none in the range of an ICBM. But Sunday's IRBM tests indicates that capability is still in the North's inventory, and analysts say testing one now could be a big blow to a Biden administration already rocked by perceived foreign policy missteps like the US pullout from Afghanistan and the threat of war in Europe posed by Russia massing troops on its borders with Ukraine.
Those situations are bound to play some role in congressional campaigns that may see Biden's Democrats lose majorities in both the US House and Senate and impact the President's chance of achieving any of his goals in the remainder of his term.
A North Korean ICBM test could accelerate this trend, further damaging Biden's and his party's foreign policy credentials.
North Korea's nuclear weapons milestones
While some analysts suggest North Korea's current spate of testing leaves the door open for dialogue with Biden, others say it's a matter of when, not if, Kim will order the testing of stronger weapons.
They say the Kim regime always does what it says it will do. And if you look at the goals set forth at North Korea's 8th Party Congress in January 2021, Kim has begun to tick the boxes.
The first goal was to test a hypersonic warhead. That's been done, most recently this month.
Another goal was testing a submarine-launched missile. That was achieved in October.
Author on what Kim Jong Un's series of missile tests may mean 02:31
Yet another goal was to "to develop tactical nuclear weapons which can be used for various missions," according to North Korean state media. One of this month's tests has been of "tactical missiles."
As an ICBM was on that list too, a test is "just a matter of time," said Duyeon Kim, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).
The North has previously tested an ICBM, but analysts say it could try to test a solid-fueled version. Solid-fueled ICBMs can be readied for action quicker than the liquid-fueled ones fired by Pyongyang to date.
"Last January, Kim Jong Un already revealed goals to develop and test new ICBMs among other high-tech weapons as part of his five-year plan," the CNAS analyst said.
"It doesn't matter what the US does or does not do ... Pyongyang is squarely focused on meeting its nuclear weapons milestones," she said.
With the Winter Olympics starting in just days in the capital of North Korea's main ally, China, the world may see Kim take a breather from testing and let his friends in Beijing bask in the international attention.
But Pyongyang picking up the weapons testing pace again after the Games may suit Beijing just fine.
"For China, as North Korea's military power increases, the US has to pay more attention to the Korean Peninsula, so it can be expected to have the effect of distracting attention on Taiwan in this region," said Park Won-gon, associate professor in North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University.
If that doesn't give Kim a seat at the table, it at least gives him a foot in the door -- and all the more reason to keep that door swinging wider.
CNN · by Analysis by Brad Lendon and Yoonjung Seo, CNN
5. N.K. missile frenzy highlights 'go-it-alone' drive for weapons buildup: analysts
"Go-it-alone" is the heart of juche ideology.
Excerpts:
"Through the development of weapons, the North appears to have boosted the morale of its people when the country as a whole is grappling with worsening economic hardships in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic," the security expert said.
"It's a typical pattern in which the North highlights external threats to reinforce internal cohesion, engages in provocations and then utilizes subsequent international sanctions to underscore the threats from without," he added.
The North's apparent move to brinkmanship comes in the lead-up to the country's major holidays when there is an apparent political imperative for the regime to instill a sense of pride into its citizens struggling with ever-worsening economic travails.
"Pyongyang also wants to boost national pride as it gears up to celebrate political anniversaries in the context of economic struggles," Leif-Eric Easley, associate professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University, said.
(News Focus) N.K. missile frenzy highlights 'go-it-alone' drive for weapons buildup: analysts | Yonhap News Agency
By Song Sang-ho
SEOUL, Jan. 31 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's weekend launch of an "intermediate-and long-range" ballistic missile underscores the intransigent regime's stated arms buildup in progress under a go-it-alone approach and its eagerness to tighten internal solidarity ahead of key political events, analysts here said Monday.
In its seventh show of force this year, Pyongyang launched the Hwasong 12-type missile Sunday, just days ahead of the Beijing Olympics and despite dialogue overtures by Seoul and Washington.
The latest launch came as North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is apparently intent on whipping up national pride ahead of major holidays -- the 80th birthday of his late father, Kim Jong-il, on Feb. 16 and the 110th birthday of his late grandfather Kim Il-sung on April 15, the analysts said.
The North's saber-rattling has posed an unsettling setback for Seoul striving to salvage its fragile peace drive, Washington preoccupied with tensions between Russia and Ukraine, and Beijing setting the mood for its successful hosting of the Winter Olympics set to begin Friday.
"The North appears to be moving under its own timelines for its weapons development projects unveiled at the eighth ruling party congress last year and for its major political events," a security expert said on condition of anonymity. "Internal factors appear to have much influence on its course of action."
Amid a protracted deadlock in nuclear talks with the United States, the North has been doubling down on the five high-stakes defense projects it put forward at the eighth congress of the ruling Workers' Party in January last year.
The projects include developing a hypersonic warhead, raising the "hit rates" of missiles with the range of 15,000 kilometers, producing a "super-large" nuclear warhead and developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) using an "underground or ground solid-fuel engine."
At the congress, the North also stressed the need to develop tactical nuclear weapons, and secure a nuclear-powered submarine and a nuclear strategic weapon capable of being launched underwater as it castigated the "military threat from the U.S."
Evidence has been mounting that the North has been trying to accomplish those projects.
Sunday's launch of what South Korea's military categorizes as an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) might be part of efforts to enhance the accuracy of a longer-range missile and its atmospheric reentry technology, and develop a vehicle capable of delivering a tactical nuclear weapon, experts said.
The North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) stressed Monday that the Hwasong-12 missile is "being produced and deployed" -- an indication that it has completed its operational deployment following its 2017 claim to have completed its development.
The KCNA also released images of its liftoff from a mobile launcher and flight during the boost phase, as well as those of the Earth taken in space. The images appear to have been taken by drones and a camera installed in the payload.
Pyongyang also conducted self-proclaimed hypersonic missile tests on Jan. 5 and 11 following the first such test last September.
"Through the development of weapons, the North appears to have boosted the morale of its people when the country as a whole is grappling with worsening economic hardships in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic," the security expert said.
"It's a typical pattern in which the North highlights external threats to reinforce internal cohesion, engages in provocations and then utilizes subsequent international sanctions to underscore the threats from without," he added.
The North's apparent move to brinkmanship comes in the lead-up to the country's major holidays when there is an apparent political imperative for the regime to instill a sense of pride into its citizens struggling with ever-worsening economic travails.
"Pyongyang also wants to boost national pride as it gears up to celebrate political anniversaries in the context of economic struggles," Leif-Eric Easley, associate professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University, said.
Domestic factors have emerged as a crucial variable in the analysis of motives behind the North's weapons tests as a set of external elements, including the Beijing Games, had been expected to deter Pyongyang's military moves.
This month, the North conducted four known rounds of missile tests in sites close to the border with China, although it might be aware Beijing does not want the launches to overshadow the Olympics, especially following the U.S.' diplomatic boycott of the event.
In particular, the move is a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions banning any launch using ballistic missile technology, which would force China into joining the global move to consider or roll out new punitive measures against its neighbor.
Observers said the launches close to the border could signal either the North's possible friction with its patron, China, or Beijing's acquiescence to the weapons tests.
The North's missile testing frenzy has also stumped some analysts that had thought Pyongyang could take a wait-and-see stance for the time being as its year-end ruling party plenary did not send any particular message to Seoul and Washington while focusing on chronic food shortages and other domestic issues.
The provocative mode is seen as an ominous sign that the North could further ratchet up tensions with more powerful weapons tests as it issued a thinly veiled threat on Jan. 20 to lift a voluntary moratorium on nuclear and ICBM tests declared in April 2018.
Park Won-gon, professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University, said that the test of the latest IRBM potentially capable of delivering a tactical nuclear warhead could mark a culmination of the North's decadeslong drive for nuclear armament.
"The nuclear-tipped IRBM and other missiles could keep South Korea, Japan and even Guam hostage, and lead to a situation in which the removal of such tactical arms becomes impossible, meaning the North cannot help but be viewed as a de facto nuclear power," Park said.
"Then would come the next stage of nuclear arms restrictions (between the U.S. and the North) rather than the North's denuclearization," he added.
For South Korean President Moon Jae-in, the North's escalatory military actions mean a major blow to his peace initiative where he has put much political capital.
But those actions might have served as a sobering reminder for the Joe Biden administration whose repeated dialogue offers to the North have started to be taken with a grain of salt or written off as perfunctory, observers noted.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. North Korea's Hwasong-12 IRBM Missile Test: The Road Back to 2017?
Excerpts:
Looking ahead, there is much cause for concern. First, whatever one’s interpretation of the precise contours of Kim’s April 2018 moratorium, there’s little doubt that those assurances are now crumbling. North Korea’s ongoing missile campaign should be expected to pick up in the coming months—particularly as Kim has emphasized the need to commemorate Kim Jong Il’s 80th birthday and Kim Il Sung’s 110th birthday with “splendor” this year.
Second, these tests have tremendous technical value for North Korea as it seeks to improve the reliability of its long-range missiles, which have still only seen limited testing. Other areas for technical progress, including reentry vehicle technology, will also benefit.
North Korea's Hwasong-12 IRBM Missile Test: The Road Back to 2017?
North Korea has conducted what appears to be the launch of its longest-capable missile since the November 2017 test of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental-range ballistic missile. On Monday, state media confirmed that the launch involved a Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile—one of the major new capabilities that had first been demonstrated in 2017.
According to South Korean authorities, the Hwasong-12 covered a range of 800 kilometers, and reached an altitude of more than 2,000 kilometers.
This type of launch, involving a ‘lofted’ trajectory, shortens the demonstrated range of a given missile. If launched on a normal trajectory, the recently tested missile would range in excess of 3,500 kilometers, enough to reach Guam from North Korea.
North Korean state media released details about what was tested. Kim Jong Un was not present to guide the test and it was presented as a routine operational trial. The Hwasong-12 test appeared to be unchanged from previous tests in 2017. The Academy of Defense Science oversaw the test.
This latest test augurs poorly for 2022. These types of lofted launches of long-range missiles were what made 2017 a particularly notable year for the country’s missile program.
The latest launch indicates the fraying of Kim’s April 2018 moratorium on long-range missile testing better than anything else since then. Earlier this month, at a Politburo meeting, Kim indicated that he saw reason to revisit all “temporarily” suspended military activities, including long-range missile and nuclear testing, in light of the United States’ behavior. (North Korea reacted poorly to new sanctions announced this month by the Biden administration, following its testing of a new maneuverable reentry vehicle.)
According to state media, the Politburo “gave an instruction to a sector concerned to reconsider in an overall scale the trust-building measures that we took on our own initiative on a preferential ground and to promptly examine the issue of restarting all temporally-suspended activities.” The word “promptly” was significant here, as we’re now seeing with the test of an intermediate-range ballistic missile just days later.
The matter of Kim’s April 2018 moratorium is likely to grow in importance in the coming days and weeks. In the aftermath of this latest missile test, South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s administration has described North Korea’s position as close to violating the moratorium.
“North Korea has kept the moratorium on nuclear tests and ICBM launches so far while expressing a willingness for dialogue. But if it did fire an intermediate-range ballistic missile, we can consider they have moved closer to scrapping the moratorium,” Moon said at a plenary meeting of South Korea’s National Security Council on Sunday.
It’s worth recalling what exactly Kim said in April 2018. His moratorium was announced at the 3rd Plenary meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. In describing recent military accomplishments, Kim said that both the testing of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles—along with nuclear weapons—was no longer necessary because sufficient capability had been demonstrated.
But Kim followed this by announcing six “resolutions”, or decisions, at the same plenary. The second resolution included the following language: “We will discontinue nuclear test and inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire from April 21, Juche 107 (2018).” This notably excluded intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
However, the North Koreans would later themselves indicate that the moratorium did include intermediate-range ballistic missiles. For instance, a May 8, 2019, statement, albeit at a far less authoritative level than from Kim Jong Un himself, after the resumption of short-range missile testing pointed out that the United States and Japan, for instance, didn’t see the moratorium as being violated “as the firing of the intermediate and long-range missile and the ICBM was not involved in it.”
Former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo similarly implied, in the aftermath of the final meeting between former President Trump and Kim Jong Un on June 30, 2019, that Kim had committed “not to conducting nuclear tests, and that he would continue to avoid launching intermediate-range and long-range ballistic missiles.”
It’s unclear if this was a private assurance given from Kim to Trump at either that meeting or the Hanoi summit in February 2019; no public readouts followed either of those meetings, leaving some ambiguity around this matter.
Looking ahead, there is much cause for concern. First, whatever one’s interpretation of the precise contours of Kim’s April 2018 moratorium, there’s little doubt that those assurances are now crumbling. North Korea’s ongoing missile campaign should be expected to pick up in the coming months—particularly as Kim has emphasized the need to commemorate Kim Jong Il’s 80th birthday and Kim Il Sung’s 110th birthday with “splendor” this year.
Second, these tests have tremendous technical value for North Korea as it seeks to improve the reliability of its long-range missiles, which have still only seen limited testing. Other areas for technical progress, including reentry vehicle technology, will also benefit.
Image of Hwasong-12 IRBM. Image Credit: KCNA.
Hwasong-12. Image: YouTube Screenshot.
Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. An expert on the Asia-Pacific region, his research interests range from nuclear strategy, arms control, missile defense, nonproliferation, emerging technologies, and U.S. extended deterrence. He is the author of Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea (Hurst Publishers/Oxford University Press, 2020).
A widely published writer, Panda’s work has appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the Diplomat, the Atlantic, the New Republic, the South China Morning Post, War on the Rocks, Politico, and the National Interest. Panda has also published in scholarly journals, including Survival, the Washington Quarterly, and India Review, and has contributed to the IISS Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment and Strategic Survey. He is editor-at-large at the Diplomat, where he hosts the Asia Geopolitics podcast, and a contributing editor at War on the Rocks.
7. US worried North Korea could return to nuclear and ICBM tests
The age old question: What do you do now lieutenant?
Excerpts:
The official said the latest North Korean test was part of an "increasingly destabilizing" pattern and in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions and therefore international law.
"It requires a response," he said. "You will see us taking some steps that are designed to show our commitment to our allies ... and at the same time we reiterate our call for diplomacy. We stand ready and we are very serious about trying to have discussions that address concerns on both sides."
The official did not detail the nature of the response.
US worried North Korea could return to nuclear and ICBM tests
U.S. President Joe Biden walks on the South Lawn of the White House before boarding Marine One in Washington, Jan. 28. UPI-Yonhap
The United States is concerned North Korea's escalating missile tests could be precursors to resumed tests of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, a senior U.S. official said Sunday (local time), while urging Pyongyang to join direct talks with no preconditions.
North Korea conducted a test of one of its largest missiles Sunday, sending a suspected intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) soaring into space for the first time since 2017.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in said the recent flurry of North Korean missile tests was reminiscent of heightened tensions in that year, when North Korea conducted multiple nuclear tests and launched its largest missiles.
He said the latest launch took North Korea a step closer to fully scrapping a self-imposed moratorium on testing its longest-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which it hasn't tested since 2017.
A senior official of the Biden administration was asked in a briefing for journalists whether Washington shared the concern that Pyongyang might resume ICBM and nuclear weapons testing.
"Of course, we're concerned," he said. "It's not just what they did yesterday, it's the fact that this is coming on the heels of quite a significant number of tests in this month. And that follows on tests at the end of the year going back to September, of a variety of systems."
"We obviously don't want to see further testing and we've called upon to DPRK to refrain from further tests," he said, referring to North Korea by the initials of its official name.
A TV screen at Seoul Railway Station shows a file image of North Korea's missile launch during a news program, Jan. 30. AP-Yonhap
North Korea's testing spree is a major unwanted headache for the Biden administration as it seeks to head off any plans by Russia to invade Ukraine and contends with relations with China at their worst level in decades.
Under President Joe Biden, Washington has repeatedly sought talks with North Korea but has been rebuffed. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un held three summits with Biden's predecessor, Donald Trump, but the talks did not realize Kim's demand for a removal of sanctions on Pyongyang.
The official said the latest North Korean test was part of an "increasingly destabilizing" pattern and in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions and therefore international law.
"It requires a response," he said. "You will see us taking some steps that are designed to show our commitment to our allies ... and at the same time we reiterate our call for diplomacy. We stand ready and we are very serious about trying to have discussions that address concerns on both sides."
The official did not detail the nature of the response.
Despite urging dialogue, Washington has maintained sanctions on North Korea and imposed more following recent tests and sought to encourage the U.N. Security Council to follow suit.
However, China and Russia delayed a U.S. bid to impose U.N. sanctions on five North Koreans whom Washington has accused of procuring goods for the North's weapons programs.
Asked whether the United States could secure Chinese and Russian support for new sanctions, the official replied:
"Our belief is that they understand their responsibilities as Security Council members to make sure that the Council's resolutions are enforced and the Council takes up its responsibility promote peace and stability in the region." (Reuters)
8. Tank attached to famous North Korean armored division suffers serious accident
Something under reported (and almost not reported at all) is the north Korean Winter Training Cycle.While all the focus is on the ROK/US alliance combined command post training twice per year few people acknowledge the north Korean Winter and Summer Training Cycles which are designed to bring tier forces to the highest state of readiness to be able to attack the South. We should keep in mind which side maintains the real "hostile policy." The dual track strategy of the regime: political warfare and preparation for warfighting.
Tank attached to famous North Korean armored division suffers serious accident
The military has gone into “crisis mode” given that such a major accident took place just ahead of the birthdays of the country's former leaders, a source said
A tank attached to the 105th Guards Seoul Ryu Kyong-Su Armored Division — one of the North Korean army’s most illustrious units — recently flipped over during maneuver training.
According to a Daily NK source last Thursday, the accident occurred during the first maneuver training of the new year. North Korean mechanized units usually carry out such exercises during the winter and summer seasons.
During nighttime mountain maneuver training, one tank flipped over at a mountain bend. Two tankers suffered serious injuries and the damaged tank immediately underwent repairs.
The accident was then reported up the chain of command, and as it was the first accident of the year, the General Staff Department immediately formed an inspection team to send to the accident site.
The source said the inspection team concluded that the tank tumbled down the hillside because of inexperienced drivers. The inspectors ignored the fact that commanders had ordered an unreasonable exercise on steep terrain, he added.
Armored vehicles in a 2013 Victory Day parade. / Image: Wikimedia Commons, Uri Tours
North Korean mechanized units regularly suffer flip overs in training every year, including during maneuver training.
However, given how several generations of North Korean leaders have praised the 105th Guards Seoul Ryu Kyong-Su Armored Division’s combat strength, military authorities are keeping the accident under tight wraps.
The military has reportedly gone into “crisis mode” given that such a major accident took place just ahead of the 110th birthday of national founder Kim Il Sung and 80th birthday of late leader Kim Jong Il. The source said the unit’s cadres will likely face punishment over the accident.
The 105th Guards Seoul Ryu Kyong-Su Armored Division is considered North Korea’s first armored unit. North Korean authorities have apparently used the unit identification since the Korean War, when the division took part in the capture of Seoul.
9. How Kim Jong Un runs the world’s most successful failed state
Another oxymoron (and as George Carlin used to say words you should never hear together) "Most successful failed state"
As an aside I am not sure I have ever heard of any plans for regime change by force in north Korea. Yes, if the north attacks the South, the regime will be destroyed.
But I absolutely concur we need to be prepared for instability and regime collapse and for war.
Excerpts:
The United States and its allies should abandon any idea of regime change by force, but they can take steps to loosen the regime’s grip on its people by pursuing an information campaign that aims to get news into North Korea, and allows North Koreans to safely communicate with one another and with outsiders. Despite the regime’s extreme efforts to block outside information, there have been small cracks in the firewall. Recent surveys of defectors indicate that before leaving the North, more than 92 percent had watched a foreign DVD; nearly 30 percent had listened to a foreign radio broadcast. A separate survey of a small number of North Koreans still inside the country found that 9 in 10 had consumed foreign media at least once a month. The U.S. should aid this effort in every way possible.
We also need to be ready for the day when North Korea eventually collapses of its own accord. This may seem a distant hope — odds are that Kim will continue to terrorize his people for decades, as long as his health holds — but it is important to remember how the world was caught off-guard by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union two years later. Dictatorships do collapse — and the moment can come suddenly.
We must prepare for the moment when the North is reunited with the far more successful, far more democratic and far more wealthy state of South Korea. That day may not come for 100 years — but it will come, and it might come much sooner. When it does, the infrastructure of terror and coercion built by three generations of Kims will eventually come crashing down. And long after the Kim regime falls, it will still be studied both as an exemplar of repression — and a regime that failed at every task except maintaining its military might. And its own existence.
How Kim Jong Un runs the world’s most successful failed state
North Korea is a failure by almost every global metric save one: the power of its military.
Special Contributor
By most measures, North Korea is a failed state. It ranks near the bottom of the world’s countries in GDP and per capita income. Its health system is one of the world’s worst (Johns Hopkins University’s 2021 survey of global health security ranked North Korea at 193 of 195 countries — tied with Yemen; only Somalia fared worse), and it has regularly had trouble feeding its people. Since 2020, the country’s economic woes have been exacerbated by the closing of its borders to stop the spread of covid-19 — a shutdown that has cut off North Korea from China, its only real trade partner. And North Korea is one of only a few countries that has not vaccinated any of its population against covid-19.
Yet North Korea excels in other, more sinister respects: It has created and maintained the most totalitarian regime on the planet and amassed a military arsenal to match all but a few of the world’s great powers. It has one of the world’s largest conventional military forces, with thousands of artillery tubes aimed at the South Korean capital, Seoul, along with a growing stockpile of nuclear weapons and missiles that can deliver them. North Korea is today one of only three states — the others are Russia and China — that has a credible capability to strike the continental United States with nuclear-tipped missiles.
Since the death of second-generation strongman Kim Jong Il in late 2011, the country has been led by his son Kim Jong Un. A decade ago, few analysts gave the younger Kim much chance of success. He was a chubby, little-known 27-year-old NBA fan, a new head of state who had previously evinced little interest in the rest of the world, and his ascension was greeted with predictions of regime collapse. Even many who thought the dysfunctional North Korean regime would survive expected Kim to become a figurehead for older, more experienced generals and political figures who would rule from behind the scenes. Others suggested that Kim, who had been educated abroad, might become a reformer — in the style of Mikhail Gorbachev or Deng Xiaoping — and move North Korea in a more capitalist and liberal direction.
Instead, Kim has become the absolute master of a state that remains every bit as dictatorial and illiberal as it was when he took over — perhaps even more so. He has purged every possible competitor, going so far as to publicly execute his uncle, while ramping up North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction to new heights. More than a decade after his father’s death, Kim’s North Korean state appears more entrenched — and resistant to reform or moderation — than it has ever been.
How did he do it? How did this failed state achieve its “success”? And what does that success mean for South Korea, the United States, Japan and other countries that feel threatened by the man and his country?
Rule by terror
The first answer involves a family tradition. The underpinning of Kim Jong Un’s rule, as it was for his father and grandfather (state founder Kim Il Sung), has been pervasive state surveillance and terror. North Korea has multiple overlapping security and intelligence agencies keeping tabs on the population and overseeing a vast network of informers. Anyone considered even the remotest danger to the absolute ruler is likely to wind up in a prison camp or a grave — along with multiple family members.
This threat of collective punishment helps keep the population in line and prevents the rise of any dissent or opposition. Many North Koreans may be skeptical of the regime; surveys conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies reveal that North Koreans complain or make jokes about the regime in private among family and close friends. But they dare not voice those complaints or skepticism for fear they will be turned in to the state security service along with their spouses, parents, siblings or children.
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Today, as many as 100,000 North Koreans are imprisoned in concentration camps, and Kim Jong Un has gone to extreme lengths to make clear that no one is immune to state terror; he executed his uncle, Jang Song Taek, reportedly with anti-aircraft guns, and sent assassins to kill his half brother, Kim Jong Nam, with a nerve agent in the Kuala Lumpur airport in Malaysia.
Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un has maintained and upgraded a program of indoctrination that is straight out of George Orwell’s “1984.” North Koreans are taught to venerate the three Kims as virtual deities. There are more than 30,000 statues scattered across the country of Kim’s grandfather; every North Korean adult is still required to wear a badge of Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong Il, to keep a portrait of at least one of the Kims displayed in their homes and to study “Kim Il Sung Thought” in school.
Kim Jong Un’s main innovation has been to order that high schools must teach an 81-hour course devoted to his own life and philosophy. And in the age of smartphones and social media, other sources of information are almost nonexistent. Most North Koreans have no access to the internet or any television or radio, save the channels that broadcast regime propaganda — and some smuggled DVDs and USBs.
Following the money
Kim has tinkered at the edges with North Korea’s Marxist economic model — just enough to create a small informal market economy. He has allowed the opening of more than 400 private marketplaces known as Jangmadang, where merchants can sell everything from food to clothing while paying 10 percent of their take to the state. These markets have become a lifeline of sorts for many North Koreans. But there has been no attempt to implement the kind of market reforms that Deng pioneered in China in the 1980s.
There is virtually no foreign investment in North Korea — and Kim has shown little interest in restarting the limited economic cooperation with South Korea that began during the Sunshine Policy years from 1998 to 2018. The one major North-South venture, the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which was a source of key hard-currency income for Pyongyang, was shuttered in 2016.
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How then does Kim pay for all those missiles? How is North Korea so militarily advanced — given its near-last place in those global GDP rankings and the tight noose of international sanctions?
First, there is China — today the only real patron the country has. China is North Korea’s biggest trading partner and primary source of food, arms and fuel. By some estimates, Beijing provides 80 percent of North Korea’s consumer goods, 45 percent of its food and 90 percent of its energy imports. Sino-North Korean trade accounts for nearly 90 percent of North Korea’s global trade; official Chinese investment accounts for almost 95 percent of foreign direct investment in the North. In 2019 — the last pre-pandemic year — North Korean exports to China were valued at $207 million while imports from China amounted to $2.59 billion.
In Kim’s early years at the helm, North Korea also relied on remittances from forced laborers sent to China and Russia, workers who sent desperately needed cash — several billion dollars a year — home to their families. Some 50,000 workers from the North worked abroad in mining, logging, textile and construction industries, until the U.S. targeted these remittances as part of its 2017 sanctions.
But Kim has found multiple ways around international sanctions. In this respect, he has been an innovator, more adept perhaps than his father or grandfather.
He has built on long-running illicit moneymaking activities — cigarette smuggling (estimated to net more than $100 million a year), counterfeiting currency (an estimated $15 million to $25 million annually), producing and exporting crystal methamphetamine (estimated $100 million to $200 million a year), and selling ballistic missiles to countries including Syria and Iran (estimated to net the North $1.5 billion a year).
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In the past decade, Kim has added a highly lucrative high-tech component to this revenue mix: educating and cultivating computer hackers. The country has built a kind of cottage industry in the hacking of international financial institutions and networks. In early 2016, North Korea obtained the Bangladesh central bank’s credentials for the SWIFT interbank messaging system and nearly succeeded in transferring $81 million to North Korean-controlled accounts. That plot was foiled, but many others have succeeded.
The New Yorker reported on a 2017 North Korean ransomware scheme known as WannaCry 2.0, which crippled networks in the U.S., Europe and Asia, including the computer systems of Boeing, Britain’s National Health Service and German’s federal railway. The hackers ultimately demanded payment in bitcoin to unfreeze computer systems they had encrypted, and many of the victims paid up. In 2019, a U.N. panel of experts report estimated that North Korea had raised $2 billion through cybercrime.
Kim has made other forays into cryptocurrency: According to the 2022 Crypto Crime Report from Chainalysis, the regime obtained nearly $400 million in stolen cryptocurrency last year alone. North Korea has also legally bought crypto assets such as bitcoin, which is not controlled by governments or banks, hard to trace, and thus a sanctions-proof investment.
The provocation game
For all these high-tech touches, Kim’s relations with the outside world have been governed by the same playbook pioneered by his father and grandfather. This means mixing provocations with diplomatic outreach to keep South Korea, Japan and the United States — the regime’s principal enemies — off-balance. It can mean firing off missiles as ways to coerce concessions from the rest of the world.
Those provocations have been dramatic. Kim has conducted four nuclear tests and more than 130 missile tests to show off his increasingly powerful arsenal. In the past year alone, North Korea has tested a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, a train-mounted ballistic missile, a new surface-to-air defense missile system, a long-range cruise missile and three hypersonic missiles. This is all part of the North’s broader effort to diversify its missile arsenal, to evade American missile defenses and — perhaps as important — to get the world’s attention.
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The Trump summits
The pace of North Korean military expansion has not been slowed by the three widely publicized summits that President Donald Trump held with Kim in 2018 and 2019. Trump believed he had brought Kim to the negotiating table with his threats to rain “fire and fury” upon North Korea, but from Kim’s vantage point, it was his acceleration of the North’s nuclear and missile programs that forced the issue. In other words, the provocations worked. While Trump saw the negotiations as a way to “denuclearize” North Korea, Kim saw them as a chance to legitimize North Korea’s standing as a nuclear power.
Kim came much closer than Trump to achieving his objectives. As the first North Korean leader to hold a summit with a U.S. president, Kim reaped the considerable rewards at home of having his regime legitimized by the meetings. (Trump went so far as to say that he and Kim had fallen in “love”). But Kim refused to make any concessions toward the vague goal of “denuclearization.” Negotiations, never that advanced to begin with, broke down in Hanoi, Vietnam, in 2019, when Kim made clear that he would be willing to shut down only part of his nuclear program in return for a near-total lifting of international sanctions — conditions that were clearly unacceptable to the United States.
For the U.S., no good options — and one distant hope?
The Biden administration, like its predecessors, has few good options when it comes to North Korea. This may explain why the White House has unveiled no significant new initiatives. The stated U.S. policy is a “calibrated, practical approach,” a halfway house between President Barack Obama’s “strategic patience” and Trump’s all-or-nothing “grand bargain.” Biden has made clear that he is willing to talk to the North Koreans without conditions, but the North Koreans have shown little interest in further dialogue with the United States.
Almost every policy option short of preemptive war — which would be catastrophic — has already been tried, and none has worked. Threats of force, sanctions, diplomacy and foreign aid — all these efforts have run aground. For now, Biden has little choice but to maintain sanctions, shore up deterrence, defense and counter-proliferation measures, while keeping a door open for yet another round of diplomatic efforts. The United States may try to test Kim’s willingness to bargain for a nuclear freeze in return for a reduction in sanctions, but even such negotiations are likely to founder given Kim’s unwillingness to agree to intrusive verification measures. North Korea is unlikely to use its WMD as long as it faces the credible threat of American nuclear annihilation — but it is also not about to surrender those weapons, which Kim sees as his ultimate guarantee of regime survival.
The United States and its allies should abandon any idea of regime change by force, but they can take steps to loosen the regime’s grip on its people by pursuing an information campaign that aims to get news into North Korea, and allows North Koreans to safely communicate with one another and with outsiders. Despite the regime’s extreme efforts to block outside information, there have been small cracks in the firewall. Recent surveys of defectors indicate that before leaving the North, more than 92 percent had watched a foreign DVD; nearly 30 percent had listened to a foreign radio broadcast. A separate survey of a small number of North Koreans still inside the country found that 9 in 10 had consumed foreign media at least once a month. The U.S. should aid this effort in every way possible.
We also need to be ready for the day when North Korea eventually collapses of its own accord. This may seem a distant hope — odds are that Kim will continue to terrorize his people for decades, as long as his health holds — but it is important to remember how the world was caught off-guard by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union two years later. Dictatorships do collapse — and the moment can come suddenly.
We must prepare for the moment when the North is reunited with the far more successful, far more democratic and far more wealthy state of South Korea. That day may not come for 100 years — but it will come, and it might come much sooner. When it does, the infrastructure of terror and coercion built by three generations of Kims will eventually come crashing down. And long after the Kim regime falls, it will still be studied both as an exemplar of repression — and a regime that failed at every task except maintaining its military might. And its own existence.
10. Defense minister visits Army missile command to check combat readiness
Missile defense is hard.
Defense minister visits Army missile command to check combat readiness | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Jan. 31 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's Defense Minister Suh Wook inspected the combat readiness of the military's missile command Monday amid a recent series of North Korea's missile launches, the ministry said.
"Understanding the gravity of the current situation, the troops must maintain a thorough readiness position against any situations," Suh was quoted as saying during his visit to the Army Missile Command.
He said the military's ability to detect missiles and respond to possible attacks is more crucial than in the past, as North Korea's recent provocations pose a serious threat to the peace and security of South Korea and the world.
Military tensions have intensified on the Korean Peninsula as North Korea has fired missiles seven times in 2022, including a Hwasong-12 intermediate and long-range ballistic missile (IRBM) Sunday.
brk@yna.co.kr
(END)
11. Korea urged to explore ways to reduce China reliance
Korea urged to explore ways to reduce China reliance
Getty images
Korean firms need to diversify production bases abroad
By Yi Whan-woo
Korea is being urged to sharpen its strategy to reduce economic dependence on China more than ever, as China is feared to mark its third-slowest growth performance in 2022 since its economy first started taking off in the late 1970s.
True, diversification of export markets has been taken as gospel when forging a breakthrough strategy to tackle risks associated with a heavy reliance on China, especially over Beijing's weaponization of trade in the form of export bans or consumer boycotts.
Such strategy, however, appears to have resulted in little progress, as implicitly noted by Joo Won, a senior economic researcher at Hyundai Research Institute.
"I can't think of any countermeasure that hits the spot in the short term if the Chinese economy gets worse and haunts us," he said.
Under the circumstance, other economists contacted by The Korea Times underlined a need to capitalize on the U.S.-China decoupling in supply chains.
They also suggested shifting away from an export pattern characterized with heavy sales of intermediate goods to China and instead expand sales of consumer goods.
Owners of diesel cars and trucks are lined up in Iksan, North Jeolla Province, to buy diesel exhaust fluid (DEF) ― sometimes called "urea water" ― in the midst of the DEF shortage over China's tightening of its export in November 2021. Korea Times file"You can't give up on China, because it remains the world's most lucrative market, despite its rapid slowdown in growth most recently," said Jun Bo-hee, a senior researcher at the Korea International Trade Association (KITA).
She went on to say, "The pullout of factories and other drastic measures to cut reliance on China will therefore be unrealistic, and it is preferred to make adjustments on our investment infrastructure in China in accordance with the changing global business environment."
The KITA economist explained this is where the U.S.-China decoupling in supply chains can come in handy for Korean businesses to restructure their China-centered factory operation and "dualize" it between the world's two largest economies.
A container ship moves down river past the Georgia Ports Authority's Port of Savannah in this photo taken in September 2021. A World Trade Organization arbitrator in January decided that China can impose retaliatory tariffs on imports from the United States totaling up to $645 million a year, capping a decade-long dispute over U.S. duties on some Chinese goods. AP-Yonhap
The decoupling is a result of the Washington-Beijing trade row, one of the factors that are attributed to China's projected economic slowdown after its growth hit a one-and-a-half year low at 4 percent in the final quarter of 2021.
Among other aforementioned factors in the short-to long term is the prolonged COVID-19 pandemic, the looming property crisis triggered by the collapse of the real estate giant Evergrande, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) tightening grip on tech start-ups and other promising private enterprises, the plummeting birthrate and deepening wealth gap.
Multiple international financial institutions accordingly forecast the world's second-largest economy will expand in the range of four to five percent, which will be the lowest in 32 years, other than 1990 at 3.8 percent and 2020 at 2.3 percent.
Specifically, the World Bank has revised down its 2022 outlook on China from 5.4 percent to 5.1 percent. The International Momentary Fund (IMF) has it from 5.6 percent to 4.8 percent.
"Taking such background into account, forming a two-track manufacturing structure abroad in line with two envisioned supply chains will be helpful, with one to be led by the U.S. and the other by China," Jun said.
She said it does not mean each of the structures will solely be built in the U.S. and China, respectively, but rather, on the soil of their respective allies or economic partners as well.
For instance, the factories exporting to the U.S. can be set up in West European nations, and the ones for export to China can be built in Southeast Asian or Latin American countries.
Lee Sang-ho, head of the Korea Economic Research Institute's (KERI) economic policy team, voiced a similar view, with reference to developing countries in Southeast Asia being touted as Korea's next manufacturing destinations in replacement of China.
"Vietnam and other ASEAN countries have been mentioned whenever issues of diversification of export markets was brought up. And for this reason, forming a two-track manufacturing structure can be helpful on our path to such a goal."
Concerning intermediate goods, Lee said it accounts for most exports to China and such a pattern should be revised.
According to the Bank of Korea (BOK) in November 2021, 80.6 percent of the export items were intermediary goods while only 3.8 percent were finished goods.
The trade risk linked to intermediate goods is also serious in terms of imports.
In its November 2021 report, the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET) listed 1,088 items as "sensitive" for trade with China, meaning Seoul relies on more than half of their supplies from Beijing while maintaining a trade deficit.
The items included urea, silicon, lithium and magnesium, which collectively formed one-fifth of the 5,300 imports goods in total from China.
"You can see that China can exploit our dependence on intermediary goods, in both export and import, in case bilateral ties worsens as witnessed in the past," the KERI economist said.
Lee Geun-tae, a senior research fellow at the LG Economic Research Institute, suggested enhancing cooperation between businesses and trade authorities as a way to overcome problems caused by China's economic slowdown.
Asked whether Korea's export reliance on China has been on an upward trajectory, all experts said, "No," and that it brings a slight hope in tackling the overly China-dependent economy.
The Korea Customs Service 2021 data showed China accounted for 25.2 percent of Korea's export worth $644.4 billion.
For every 1 percentage point fall in Chinese GDP growth, Korea's economy will contract by 0.5 percentage points, according to Hyundai Research Institute.
12. Korea Has Surpassed Japan in Per Capita GDP
Some interesting data.
Korea Has Surpassed Japan in Per Capita GDP
It was headline news when the Japan Center for Economic Research predicted that Korea would surpass Japan in nominal GDP per capita in 2027 and Taiwan would do so in 2027. However, according to the World Bank, in real terms, Korea already surpassed Japan in 2018 and, with its better performance in the COVID era, its lead is growing. The IMF projects that, in 2023, Japan’s GDP (total, not per capita) will be only 0.2% above its 2019 level whereas Korea’s will be up 6%.
(The real measure—called Purchasing Power Parity with a 2017 base year—provides a better portrait of living standards than the nominal measure. That’s because the gyrations of a country’s currency can abruptly send a dollar-based comparison of nominal GDP up or down by several percent of GDP. The PPP measure avoids this statistical illusion.)
The main reason Korea has passed Japan in per capita GDP is that its productivity—i.e., GDP per work-hour—has been growing much faster than Japan’s during the latter’s “lost decades.” Until the mid-1990s, Japan was rapidly catching up to the US in productivity, rising to a peak of 71% of the US level in 1997. Since then, it has fallen back to just 63%. Japan has also fallen back relative to Europe. By contrast, Korea’s catchup has continued and it now just a percentage points below Japan. If current trends continue, its only a matter of several years before Korea surpasses Japan by this measure as well.
Moreover, unlike Japan, Korea has passed on the fruits of its productivity growth to its workers. For the three decades from 1990 through 2020, annual real wages (not including benefits) barely increased in Japan, whereas they almost doubled in Korea. Korean workers now enjoy higher wages than their Japanese counterparts. (This is not a statistical distortion caused by the growth of low-paid part-time workers in Japan since Korea has the same pattern.)
None of this means Korea is without problems. In fact, it shares some of the same structural defects that eventually hobbled Japan’s growth. As noted above, a third of its labor force consists of low-paid non-regular workers. It, too, suffers from extreme “dualism” in the economy: i.e., a combination of super-efficient and innovative high-tech sectors and far less productive sectors in parts of manufacturing and assorted services. In fact, Korean growth is slowing down. As economies mature, growth does slow. How much of Korea’s deceleration is simply due to that maturation and how much due to structural defects needs more examination. Still, its average per capita growth in the five years prior to COVID was 2.4%, a good number for a rich country.
I’ll be taking a further look at Korea-Japan comparisons as part of a forthcoming piece in Toyo Keizai on the pros and cons of Tokyo’s weak yen strategy. Part of the piece will examine why Japan has trouble growing despite lowest “real yen” rate in a half-century and why Korea sails along even with a strong currency. It will be posted in the blog.
13. North Korea's IRBM Missile Test: What Is Kim Jong Un's Goal?
north Korean transformation likely? I think this is more than a little wishful thinking:
Excerpt:
Which highlights the importance of thinking seriously about how to live, even uneasily, with a nuclear North Korea, negotiating for arms control, to limit the size and reach of Pyongyang’s arsenal, and promoting a stable, peaceful future, in which the North’s transformation is possible if not likely. Policies obviously should be coordinated with South Korea and Japan.
North Korea's IRBM Missile Test: What Is Kim Jong Un's Goal?
North Korea’s Kim Jong-un won’t wait quietly for his turn as the center of international attention. On Sunday he shot off his seventh missile of the month, starting 2022 with a literal bang. South Korea’s Joint Chief of Staff figured the missile was of intermediate-range, the most powerful tested since 2017.
The test was noteworthy for another reason: South Korean President Moon Jae-in sharply criticized the North. Perhaps finally having lost patience with North Korea, he instructed Pyongyang to “stop raising tensions and pressure” and return to negotiations. He even said the latest test meant “that North Korea has come close to abandoning its moratorium,” Kim’s 2018 voluntary test suspension. Although the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea explicitly excluded intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) from that pledge, none had been launched during that time.
The US Indo-Pacific Command criticized the test but noted that it posed no threat to America. With Washington convulsed over a possible war in Europe, little reaction is likely. Even this month’s earlier tests earned no more than a verbal complaint. State Department spokesman Ned Price emphasized that the Biden administration remained committed to negotiation.
Of possibly greater significance will be the reaction of China. The shot came shortly before the start of the Beijing Olympic Games. Although the state of the current bilateral relationship remains speculative, after a period of at best frigid contact from 2011 to 2017 China’s Xi Jinping rushed to make up for a lost time after the announcement of the first planned Trump-Kim summit. The People’s Republic of China likely has been helping the North with food and energy shipments. Moreover, rail traffic appears to have reopened between the two countries.
However, the PRC almost certainly doesn’t want its small neighbor to upstage the Olympics, already beset with difficulties, ranging from the COVID-19 pandemic to the US-led diplomatic boycott. So Kim may be rushing to finish his current tranche of tests before the competition’s start. Or Kim may have decided, given the current poor state of Washington-Beijing relations, that China is not likely to make him pay a price whenever he tests.
The most important question is Kim’s objective. Ewha University’s Leif-Eric Easily offered a medley of possible motives: aiding military modernization, boosting national pride, deterring attempted regime change, and extorting benefits to ensure good behavior. All are possible, but none explain the dramatic increase in testing this month.
Modernization is an ongoing process. At the margin, the fifth, sixth, and seventh shots don’t add much to the North’s self-image. Pyongyang has long established its ability to hit nearby targets, so the latest tests add little to its deterrent capabilities. Extortion is always a good assumption, but without engagement it is difficult for the DPRK to request let alone collect any tribute. Perhaps Kim plans to ask soon, but his most pliable potential partner, South Korea’s Moon, will soon be out of office. Moreover, the tests likely hurt the South’s ruling party, which has spent five years promoting détente, in the upcoming vote and the opposition, if victorious, likely will take a much tougher stance toward the North.
Closer to the truth might be the Asan Institute’s Cheon Seong-whun: Pyongyang’s “goal is to make the United States and its allies accept its nuclear arsenal as a fait accompli.” Believing that sanctions relief was unlikely, certainly in the near-term, Kim might have decided to switch to a long game.
He cut his country off from much of the world, ostensibly to battle COVID-19, but also enabling him to sharply limit foreign, and especially South Korean, influences. He went from hosting a K-Pop concert in 2018 to waging war on North Korean teenagers listening to K-Pop, which he apparently came to view as a threat to his regime. He cemented his government’s relationship with Beijing, assuring his regime’s economic survival despite having essentially sanctioned his own nation.
And he embarked upon a military build-up to provide both a robust deterrent and significant negotiating leverage. Last year he called creating nuclear weapons “the exploit of greatest significance in the history of the Korean nation.” He included a lengthy wish list of weapons supposedly under development. Last fall he said the DPRK required an “invincible military capability.” At the party plenum last month Kim announced that “The military environment of the Korean peninsula and the trend of the international situation getting instable day after day demand that bolstering the state defense capability be further powerfully propelled without a moment’s delay.”
Earlier this month he summoned the Politburo, which “instructed the field concerned to reconsider all the confidence-building measures previously and voluntarily taken by our state and rapidly examine the issue on resuming all actions which had been temporarily suspended,” meaning nuclear and ICBM tests. The ruling body also promised to “strengthen and develop without delay more powerful physical means to definitely overpower the daily intensifying hostile moves of the United States.”
About the same time the regime criticized new sanctions imposed by the Biden administration in response to short-range missile tests. Pyongyang threatened: “If the U.S. adopts such a confrontational stance, the DPRK will be forced to take stronger and certain reaction to it.” The latest tests kill the proverbial two birds with one stone—punished the Biden administration and improved the North’s military arsenal.
Estimates of Kim’s current nuclear weapons potential range up to about 65. However, he could grow the stockpile substantially. A study by the Rand Corporation and Asan Institute figured that by 2027 the DPRK could have some 200 nuclear weapons and hundreds of missiles. Those numbers would provide both a powerful deterrent, placing the North well within the second tier of nuclear powers, as well as sufficient bargaining chips for sanctions relief.
Kim might be prepared to stop short of that level, but maybe not. Of course, much could happen before then. The regime might implode, Kim might die, Beijing might pull its aid, influential elites might demand a policy reversal. All plausible, but the Kim dynasty has survived everything so far, including a botched war, mass starvation, and self-isolation. While by no means certain, the odds favor Kim being in power five, ten, and fifteen years from now.
Which highlights the importance of thinking seriously about how to live, even uneasily, with a nuclear North Korea, negotiating for arms control, to limit the size and reach of Pyongyang’s arsenal, and promoting a stable, peaceful future, in which the North’s transformation is possible if not likely. Policies obviously should be coordinated with South Korea and Japan.
It also will be vital to talk with Beijing, which will have substantial influence over the Korean peninsula’s future. China would prefer to keep a buffer state, though one less obstreperous. Almost certainly Beijing would oppose a unified Korea allied with America but might tolerate Korean reunification with a South Korean pledge of neutrality and withdrawal of US troops. If the Kim dynasty became unstable, Washington and Seoul might not oppose intervention by the PRC to prevent civil war and secure nuclear weapons. The potential scenarios are many and the likelihood of Washington getting the result that it wishes are small. However, diplomacy might result in a second-best solution that everyone can live with.
Image of Hwasong-12 IRBM. Image Credit: KCNA.
Hwasong-15 ICBM. Image: KCNA.
North Korean provocations are unwelcome at any time. But especially now. US policymakers are preparing for a potential war in Europe, debating an explicit defense guarantee for Taiwan, and threatening Iran should it fail to return to the nuclear deal that the Trump administration abandoned. Who wants to take on the possibility of confrontation and conflict in Northeast Asia?
The good news, in the short term, at least, is that Kim Jong-un doesn’t want war. The bad news is that he might have lost interest in diplomacy while planning a long-term arms build-up. No doubt, at some point he will return to the negotiating table. However, by then his demands might swamp those made only a few years ago.
A 1945 Contributing Editor, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry. He writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National Interest, the Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Times. Bandow speaks frequently at academic conferences, on college campuses, and to business groups. Bandow has been a regular commentator on ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC. He holds a JD from Stanford University.
14. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Plummeting Won Causes Market Confusion; Panicked Authorities Crack Down on Black Market Money Changers. There are fears of inflation too.
All a result of KIm jong-un's deliberate (and inept) policy decisions.
＜Inside N. Korea＞ Plummeting Won Causes Market Confusion; Panicked Authorities Crack Down on Black Market Money Changers. There are fears of inflation too.
(Photo) A merchant woman tries to give change in 1 RMB banknote. Foreign currency used to be used openly on the streets, but now it is no longer allowed to be used openly due to a draconian crackdown that even confiscates it. Photographed in October 2013 in Ranggang Province (ASIAPRESS).
As the real exchange rate of the RMB and the USD continues to rise in North Korea, there is a growing trend to sell won on the black market to buy foreign currency. The falling won has led to a rise in food and gasoline prices, and the authorities have launched a crackdown on the illegal exchange and use of foreign currencies (Kang Ji-won / ISHIMARU Jiro).
◆ Won Plummets 35% in Two Weeks
Based on comprehensive research conducted by our reporting partners living in North Pyongan Province, Ryanggang Province and North Hamkyung Province in North Korea, the exchange rate for foreign currencies has changed as follows.
〇 1 RMB
Jan. 14, 640 won Jan. 22, 750 won Jan. 28, 860 won
〇 1 USD
Jan. 14, 4750 won Jan. 22, 5900 won Jan. 28, 6600 won
The surge in foreign currencies began after the resumption of railroad trade between Sinuiju, North Korea, and Dandong, China, on January 17.
◆ The authorities have ordered a substantial restriction on the use of foreign currencies, but...
"As trade with China is expected to expand, everyone is trying to convert as much as possible into RMB and USD. Especially the Tongchu (newly wealthy) are buying on a large scale. Everyone has remembered that domestic currency is unreliable. The money changers are reluctant to sell foreign currencies because they think the won will still fall."
This is what our reporting partner in Ryanggang Province told us about the current situation.
Along with the decline in the won, the market prices of essential commodities such as food, gasoline, and diesel fuel have risen. As a result, there are fears of inflation.
〇 1kg of white rice
Jan. 14, 4700 won Jan. 28, 5000 won
〇 1kg of gasoline (Note: Oil is sold in kilograms in North Korea)
Jan. 14, 7700 won, Jan. 28, 10000 won
On the other hand, the authorities are in a panic. They issued a notice strictly regulating the use of foreign currency and black market exchange to protect the won. Our reporting partner explained the situation as follows:
"The Dong Office (government office) issued a notice through the people's group, saying, 'We will not tolerate money-changing because it is an unsocialized act and it interferes with the country's economic activities. Those who exchange money should report it to the authorities.'"
The future of the won's decline is unpredictable, and the market turmoil may continue for a while.
※ASIAPRESS contacts its reporting partners in North Korea through smuggled Chinese mobile phones.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
