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Quotes of the Day:
"All men make mistakes, but a good man yields when he knows his course is wrong and repairs the evil. The only crime is pride."
- Sophocles
"A reliable way to make people believe in falsehoods is frequent repetition, because familiarity is not easily distinguished from truth. Authoritarian institutions and marketers have always known this fact."
– Daniel Kahneman
"No man is truly free. All are slaves of money or necessity. Public opinion or fear of prosecution forces each one, against his conscience, to conform."
– Euripides
1. U.S., Taiwan Establish Joint Command for 2027 Defense
2. What May Be Driving Trump's Latest Tariff Threat Against South Korea
3. Tariff talks between industry minister, Lutnick conclude without agreement
4. Industry minister says 'unnecessary misunderstandings' resolved via tariff talks with U.S.
5. Trump's Fed pick Warsh serves on board of firm at center of US-Korea trade spat
6. Coupang's interim chief questioned for 12 hours over data breach probe
7. Editorial: "Extermination of Three Generations, No Choice but to Die": Neglecting North Korean Prisoners' Repatriation Is a State Crime
8. Lee Jae Myung Tests South Korea’s Pragmatic Diplomacy Between China and Japan
9. Security expert urges Korea to lead middle-power coalition
10. Hyundai Motor’s humanoid push meets labor wall
11. No more Mr. 'Very Nice' Guy? Trump warns that U.S. tariffs could be 'much steeper.'
12. Assessing North Korea’s Five-Year Effort to Develop 13 New Nuclear and Missile Systems
13. North Korean Cellular Coverage in 2026
14. The Northeast Asian Security Dilemma: Does European Experience Show the Way Out?
15. The America People Once Longed to Live In (A view from Korea)
1. U.S., Taiwan Establish Joint Command for 2027 Defense
Summary:
Taiwan and the U.S. have reportedly set up a joint operational posture by creating a “Joint Fire Coordination Center” that integrates U.S. reconnaissance target data with Taiwan’s missile strike systems in real time. Taiwanese reporting says the center includes dedicated seats for U.S. personnel and was active during China’s encirclement drills late last year. A digital countdown clock is set to January 1, 2027 as a presumed invasion “D-Day.” The center is meant to fix Taiwan’s weaknesses: limited joint command across services and no indigenous reconnaissance satellites. Taiwan has acquired or built missiles with 700 to 1,000 km range. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said China will pursue unification regardless of global events.
Comment: In the Korean press reporting on a Taiwan report. This is the only report I have seen of this in the media and I asked my research assistant (AI) to scour the net for anything on this and this is the only report it could find. I have checked the White House, Pentagon, and State Department web sites and there is no reporting on.
I think this report would launch Xi into orbit if the headline were true. But the Korean press may be over-sensationalizing this I think as this appears to be jumping to conclusions. But it is likely jumping to conclusions based on the US strategic doctrine being applied to South Korea - CMBLS - "critical but more limited support." (the phrase used 9 times in the NDS) I think we are seeing the beginning of the fears of "Korea passing."
U.S., Taiwan Establish Joint Command for 2027 Defense
Integrated center links U.S. reconnaissance, Taiwan missiles, counts down to January 1, 2027 invasion
By Ryoo Jae-min,
Kim Eun-joong
Published 2026.01.31. 00:45
Updated 2026.01.31. 12:40https://www.chosun.com/english/world-en/2026/01/31/N3UNDZEFNFFD5MTNW4C4LMTAXM/
On the 27th, pilots and ground crew rush toward an F-16 fighter jet during combat readiness training at an air force base in Taoyuan City, Taiwan. The Taiwanese military assumes January 1, 2027, as a potential Chinese invasion date and has reportedly established a joint operations command structure to share U.S. military target information in real time and integrate it with domestic missile systems. /EPA-Yonhap
Taiwan and the U.S. have reportedly established a joint operational posture linking U.S. military reconnaissance assets with Taiwan’s strike systems, assuming an imminent Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Both sides are also observed to be placing weight on the possibility of an invasion occurring in 2027, which marks the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and the end of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s third term. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on the 28th, “The Taiwan issue is a historical task that Xi Jinping has vowed to accomplish. China will pursue unification with Taiwan regardless of what happens in the world,” suggesting that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is being treated as a fait accompli.
Taiwan’s daily United Daily News reported on the 29th, citing military insiders, that the Taiwan military established the ‘Joint Fire Coordination Center’ last year to integrate command and control systems with the U.S. military. It is essentially a joint operational command structure. The center reportedly has multiple dedicated seats for U.S. military personnel. During the period of the Chinese military’s encirclement drills around Taiwan late last year, U.S. personnel were frequently observed entering and exiting the center, conducting joint operations with Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and General Staff Department. The newspaper, citing multiple sources, reported that the center has a digital countdown clock set to ‘January 1, 2027,’ the designated ‘D-Day’ for a Chinese invasion, with the time decreasing by the second.
Graphics by Yang In-sung
The Taiwan military has secured missiles with a range of 700 to 1,000 km capable of reaching major cities on mainland China, such as Shanghai and Nanjing. These were either imported from the U.S. or domestically produced. However, the lack of an integrated control system for the army, navy, and air force made real-time coordination and unified command impossible during wartime. This led to persistent concerns about redundant firepower deployment or missing critical targets due to hesitation. Additionally, Taiwan lacks its own military reconnaissance satellites, making it impossible to obtain strategic target information about the enemy.
The newly established Joint Fire Coordination Center is understood to serve as a control tower that integrates scattered military strike assets under a single ‘integrated command system’ to address these weaknesses. Beyond merely integrating Taiwan’s military forces, the center is analyzed to play a key role in U.S.-Taiwan cooperation by receiving real-time target information from the U.S. military and linking it with Taiwan’s missile systems. The United Daily News stated, “The joint information coordination work between Taiwan and the U.S. means that the U.S. military will provide Taiwan with target information for various long-range missiles through joint operations when necessary. This is the most sincere measure to actualize deterrence capabilities after the U.S. sold a large quantity of missiles to Taiwan.”
On the 29th, Taiwan's first domestically developed defense submarine 'Narwal' (Chinese name: Haijun) conducts its first sea trial in Kaohsiung. /AFP-Yonhap
Unlike South Korea, which has maintained a ‘ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command’ system under the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty for decades, Taiwan had no formal joint operational command structure with the U.S. since the two countries severed diplomatic relations in 1979. While the U.S. has been proactive in selling ‘defensive’ weapons such as fighter jets and missiles, it has been extremely cautious about providing an integrated command system that links these assets with U.S. military resources. The integration of command and control systems would elevate Taiwan’s military to the status of a formal ally, which the U.S. judged could unnecessarily provoke China, emphasizing the ‘One China’ policy. As a result, Taiwan’s military has long maintained a deformed structure with firepower but lacking the ‘eyes’ to see the enemy and the ‘brain’ to make judgments.
The recent shift in the U.S. Department of Defense’s stance is analyzed to stem from the growing recognition that the ‘2027 invasion scenario’ is not merely a hypothesis but an imminent reality. Faced with the rapid military buildup by the Chinese military coinciding with the end of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s third term, the U.S. has judged that Taiwan’s defense is impossible in its current state, leading to a heightened sense of crisis.
While U.S. President Donald Trump has publicly claimed that Xi Jinping will not invade Taiwan until the end of his second term in 2029, frontline assessments view the threat as significantly higher. In 2023, then-Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Bill Burns revealed an intelligence analysis indicating that Xi Jinping had ordered the People’s Liberation Army to prepare for a successful Taiwan invasion by 2027. Secretary of State Rubio’s remarks on the 28th during a Senate hearing, stating that ‘China will inevitably invade Taiwan,’ align with this context. Rubio’s comments came in response to a question about whether the U.S. ousting of Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro would justify China’s invasion of Taiwan, emphasizing that Xi Jinping’s resolve to invade Taiwan is so firm that it would not be affected by other international developments.
2. What May Be Driving Trump's Latest Tariff Threat Against South Korea
Summary:
On January 26, 2026, POTUS said he would raise tariffs on South Korea from 15% to 25%, including some Section 232 sectors such as autos, lumber, and pharmaceuticals, citing the National Assembly’s failure to codify parts of last summer’s trade deal. The article notes no official tariff change yet, only a threat. It argues friction stems from the deal’s legal form: a White House fact sheet plus a USD 350 billion investment MOU, unlike an FTA with clear ratification precedent. South Korean parties disagreed on whether ratification was needed; an implementing “Special Act” was submitted but is stalled in the finance committee. The piece adds possible drivers: Coupang data-breach investigations, investor arbitration filed January 22, Vice President JD Vance raising the issue with Prime Minister Kim Min-Seok, and broader U.S. concerns about alleged discrimination against U.S. digital firms.
Comment What will break the alliance: Economic issues or security issues?
What May Be Driving Trump's Latest Tariff Threat Against South Korea
Published January 27, 2026
Author: Tom Ramage
https://keia.org/the-peninsula/what-may-be-driving-trumps-latest-tariff-threat-against-south-korea/?utm
Category: Economics, Indo-Pacific, South Korea, The United States, U.S. Foreign Policy, United States, US-Korea alliance
On Monday, January 26, 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump announced he would raise tariffs on South Korea, including on certain Section 232 sectors such as autos, lumber, and pharmaceuticals, from 15 percent to 25 percent. Trump cited inaction by the Korean National Assembly to codify portions of the trade deal the two countries agreed to last summer.
As of this writing, there have been no official adjustments to the U.S. tariff schedule; the higher tariffs remain just a threat. But Trump’s Truth Social post suggests a troubling path ahead for the U.S.-Korea economic relationship and the rollout of a USD 350 billion domestic investment fund meant to usher investment into the United States.
A lot of the president’s consternation with how the deal is being handled in Korea may come from the type of deal it was and the legal avenues it used. The main document was a White House joint fact sheet, while the investment fund operated—in name and practice—under a memorandum of understanding (MOU). Although the fact sheet functionally acts as the deal securing 15 percent tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)—and the investment MOU sets the Section 232 auto tariffs at the same level—both differ radically from the traditional free trade agreement (FTA) method of forming bilateral deals, which has a set precedent for legislative ratification.
Accordingly, there was an apparent parliamentary split as to how the investment deal should be processed, with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s Democratic Party initially labeling it as a “non-binding agreement” that does not require ratification by the National Assembly, while the opposing People Power Party (PPP) called for formal legislative ratification, citing the potential negative impact such a fund could have on the Korean economy. Subsequently, on November 26, the ruling party submitted a “Special Act on Strategic Investment Management between South Korea and the United States,” which outlines the procedures for implementing the USD 350 billion investment MOU. The MOU terms, which noted that an implementation bill would be submitted to the National Assembly, stated that the 15 percent tariffs would go into effect retroactively from the first day of the month. Even though a bill has been submitted, it is now stalled in the National Assembly’s finance committee, which is chaired by a PPP representative.
President Trump’s January 26 Truth Social post announcing 25 percent tariffs.
Other developments may have informed President Trump’s thinking about tariffs against South Korea. Following a December data breach at Coupang, a Seattle-based e-commerce company, the Korean government launched an investigation into the firm, with President Lee calling for tougher penalties for dealing with “corporate negligence” in data breaches. The Korean government’s response led to public backlash in both countries over alleged country-specific discrimination, alongside questions about whether those claims are true. U.S. investors in Coupang, alleging discrimination against the company amid the investigation, subsequently asked the Trump administration to intervene, specifically calling for the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to impose trade remedies. The investors (Greenoaks Capital Partners and Altimeter Capital Management) subsequently filed arbitration claims against the Korean government on January 22. Along these lines, Vice President JD Vance raised the issue with Korean Prime Minister Kim Min-Seok during the latter’s visit to Washington, DC, last week, noting possible “legal issues under South Korea’s system” when discussing the ongoing dispute over Coupang. He went on to state that, “it would be preferable to manage matters so that misunderstandings do not escalate between the two governments.”
Peripherally, cross-border disputes involving U.S. technology companies and allegations of “discrimination” against U.S. firms had been a controversial aspect of U.S. economic discussions with Korea. In the lead-up to the U.S.-Korea economic negotiations last year, several dozen U.S. representatives sent a letter to the Trump administration urging it to use the negotiations to “address remaining barriers imposed by the South Korean government unfairly targeting American service providers and innovators in digital industries”—specifically targeting Korea’s online platform legislation and regulatory powers by the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC).
Although the joint fact sheet subsequently included language stating that the two sides would “commit to ensure that U.S. companies are not discriminated against and do not face unnecessary barriers in terms of laws and policies concerning digital services,” the two countries left the deal without any formal commitment to address the issue. Furthermore, almost immediately after leaving his August meeting with President Lee, President Trump posted on his Truth Social account that he would impose tariffs on countries that impose digital services taxes, or otherwise “discriminate against American technology.”
President Trump’s Truth Social post on August 25 announcing tariffs on countries that “discriminate against American Technology.”
Separately, rumors (which the Korean government subsequently denied) that Korea would hold off on transferring its first USD 20 billion installment of the investment package due to the weak exchange rate likely did not help alleviate President Trump’s frustrations with the Korean National Assembly’s delay. This, taken together with any of the other factors, could have been enough to prompt the president’s indignance, especially as the White House physically logs such investment commitments as part of a running track record of the Trump administration’s performance.
What It Means
The main takeaway is that the original “Trump Round” deal in July, taking place in record time as far as official trade negotiations go, may have failed to resolve some significant economic issues due to the priority placed on finalizing what was in effect a bilateral FTA ahead of an arbitrary summer deadline. More than anything, this may underscore the challenges facing the United States when bypassing pre-existing legal vehicles, such as the U.S.-South Korea FTA, in opening economic negotiations with partner countries.
The discussions between Washington and Seoul held in advance of and following the bilateral trade deal may only signal more of what is to come in the diplomatic and trade relationship. Investment commitments, tariff deals, and bilateral MOUs may now have to be completed with the caveat in mind that anything can change at a moment’s notice.
Tom Ramage is Economic Policy Analyst at KEI. The views expressed are the author’s alone.
Feature image from The White House.
KEI is registered under the FARA as an agent of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, a public corporation established by the government of the Republic of Korea. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
3. Tariff talks between industry minister, Lutnick conclude without agreement
Summary:
South Korea’s Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan said talks with U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick ended without an agreement, though both sides better understand each other’s positions. The meetings followed POTUS’s threat to raise reciprocal tariffs and auto duties on South Korea to 25% from 15%, citing delays in Korea’s legislative process for implementing a bilateral trade deal. Kim said negotiations continue and they will keep talking by video after he returns home. South Korea plans to stress its USD 350 billion U.S. investment pledge under the deal.
(LEAD) Tariff talks between industry minister, Lutnick conclude without agreement | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · January 31, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260130012451315?section=national/diplomacy
(ATTN: CHANGES photo, headline, lead; UPDATES throughout)
By Song Sang-ho and Cho Joon-hyung
WASHINGTON, Jan. 30 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan said Friday that his talks with U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick over renewed trade tensions ended without reaching a conclusion, but their understanding of each other's positions has "deepened."
They met at the Commerce Department in Washington for the second straight day, after U.S. President Donald Trump's threatened on Monday to raise "reciprocal" tariffs and auto duties on Korea to 25 percent from 15 percent, citing a delay in the Asian country's legislative process supporting the implementation of a bilateral trade deal.
"Our understanding of each other's positions has deepened. There were discussions on how to find a middle ground," Kim told reporters as he walked out of the Commerce Department.
"We need more talks. We have not yet reached a conclusion," he added.
South Korea's Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan speaks to the press outside the Commerce Department in Washington on Jan. 30, 2026. (Yonhap)
Asked if there were discussions about when the U.S. will actually raise the tariffs, he refused to elaborate.
"Negotiations are ongoing," he said.
Kim and Lutnick plan to continue talks via video link after Kim returns home, the minister said.
During this week's talks with Lutnick, Kim was expected to underscore Seoul's commitment to fulfilling its investment pledge under the trade deal with Washington that was first struck in late July and finalized months later.
Under the deal, South Korea has committed to investing US$350 billion in the United States, among other pledges, in return for the U.S. lowering of reciprocal tariffs on South Korea.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · January 31, 2026
4. Industry minister says 'unnecessary misunderstandings' resolved via tariff talks with U.S.
Summary:
South Korea’s industry minister said tariff talks with the United States resolved “unnecessary misunderstandings,” even though no final agreement was reached. He said dialogue clarified positions after POTUS threatened higher tariffs tied to delays in implementing a bilateral trade deal, and confirmed negotiations will continue to seek a compromise.
Industry minister says 'unnecessary misunderstandings' resolved via tariff talks with U.S. | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kang Yoon-seung · January 31, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260131001800320
SEOUL, Jan. 31 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan said Saturday he thinks "unnecessary misunderstandings" were resolved through his talks with U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick in Washington over renewed trade tensions this week.
Kim made the remark upon his return home at Incheon International Airport in Incheon, west of Seoul, after holding meetings at the Commerce Department on Thursday and Friday (U.S. time), which ended without reaching a conclusion.
"Our mutual understanding has deepened significantly," Kim said. "I believe some unnecessary misunderstandings have been resolved."
Kim's trip came after U.S. President Donald Trump threatened Monday to raise "reciprocal" tariffs and auto duties on South Korea to 25 percent from 15 percent, citing delays in the Asian country's legislative process supporting the implementation of a bilateral trade deal.
Last year, the two countries agreed on a trade deal under which South Korea would invest US$350 billion in the United States in return for a cut in tariff rates.
The ruling Democratic Party submitted a bill to parliament in November to implement the bilateral trade and investment deal, which has yet to be passed.
"We have sufficiently explained that the South Korean government has no intention at all not to implement the tariff agreement (reached then) nor delay it," Kim said.
The industry minister noted that the special bill is expected to be processed quickly and explained the background of the delay to the U.S. side.
South Korea's Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan (C) speaks to the press at Incheon International Airport in Incheon, west of Seoul, on Jan. 31, 2026. (Yonhap)
colin@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kang Yoon-seung · January 31, 2026
5. Trump's Fed pick Warsh serves on board of firm at center of US-Korea trade spat
Summary:
A Reuters report says POTUS’s pick to lead the Federal Reserve, Kevin Warsh, has earned over $1 million since 2020 as a board member of Coupang, which sits at the center of U.S.-South Korea trade tensions after a mass data leak and a Korean regulatory investigation. Some U.S. investors allege discrimination and urged U.S. scrutiny; JD Vance raised the issue with South Korean Prime Minister Kim Min-seok shortly before POTUS threatened to raise tariffs on Korean autos and other imports to 25% from 15%. The piece notes legal and ethics constraints: the Federal Reserve Act bars outside employment for governors, and Fed rules restrict asset holdings and trading, with new members given time to comply. Warsh also serves on UPS’s board.
Comment: Oh no. Will there be any impact on the relationship?
Trump's Fed pick Warsh serves on board of firm at center of US-Korea trade spat
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By Reuters
- Published Jan 31, 2026 5:08 pm KST
- Updated Jan 31, 2026 5:51 pm KST
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/world/20260131/trumps-fed-pick-warsh-serves-on-board-of-firm-at-center-of-us-korea-trade-spat
Kevin Warsh speaks to the media about his report on transparency at the Bank of England in London, Dec., 11, 2014. AP-Yonhap
WASHINGTON — Kevin Warsh, President Donald Trump's pick to head the Federal Reserve, has earned over $1 million since 2020 as a member of the board of e-commerce company Coupang, now at the center of trade tensions between the U.S. and South Korea.
Warsh has served on the board of the Seattle-based company since October 2019, earning nearly $325,000 in total compensation each year since 2022. The company has been under investigation by Korean regulators after a mass data leak, but some U.S. investors have asked the Trump administration to scrutinize the probe, which they say discriminates against an American company.
Vice President JD Vance and Korean Prime Minister Kim Min-seok discussed the issue last week, days before Trump announced a sharp increase in U.S. duties on Korean autos and other imports to 25 percent from 15 percent, saying Seoul was not living up to commitments under a trade deal reached last year. Korean officials are in Washington this week to discuss the trade deal, but have failed to resolve the dispute.
Warsh, 55, is a former Fed governor who currently lectures at Stanford University.
The Federal Reserve Act bars members of the Fed's Board of Governors from other employment, stating "members of the Board shall devote their entire time to the business of the Board."
The White House had no immediate comment on whether Warsh would be required to divest any holdings, or when that could occur. Warsh did not respond immediately to questions about his intentions. The Fed also did not respond immediately.
The Federal Reserve's rules ban any member from holding positions or stock in any bank, banking institution, or trust company. They are generally ineligible to work for a member bank for two years after serving unless they completed a full term.
Under rules strengthened a few years ago after a trading scandal resulted in the resignations of two regional reserve bank presidents, Fed officials are barred from purchasing individual stocks or entering into derivatives, or from holding individual bonds and agency-backed securities. New members of the Fed have six months from their start date to come into compliance.
Warsh, who served on the Fed Board of Governors from 2006-2011, has also served on the board of UPS since 2012, where his compensation has ranged between nearly $285,000 and $305,000 from 2021-2024, the latest data available.
6. Coupang's interim chief questioned for 12 hours over data breach probe
Summary:
Coupang’s interim CEO, Harold Rogers, underwent about 12 hours of police questioning over alleged destruction of evidence tied to a massive data breach. Police suspect over 30 million accounts were affected, disputing Coupang’s claim that only 3,000 accounts leaked, and are probing the reliability of the company’s internal investigation. Investigators focused on a laptop recovered in China from a former employee, and on Coupang’s undisclosed forensic analysis and contact with the suspect. Rogers declined to answer questions afterward. He had skipped two prior summonses, briefly left South Korea, and may be called again. He also faces perjury allegations over claims the NIS directed the probe, which the NIS denies.
Comment: This is really turning ugly.
Coupang's interim chief questioned for 12 hours over data breach probe | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Shim Sun-ah · January 31, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260131000800315?section=national/national
SEOUL, Jan. 31 (Yonhap) -- The interim CEO of Coupang underwent 12 hours of intensive police questioning over allegations of destruction of evidence linked to a massive data breach at the e-commerce company.
Harold Rogers emerged from the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency on Saturday at 2:22 am, declining to answer reporters' questions on whether he admitted to the charges or intended to leave the country.
Rogers faces accusations of obstructing official investigations into the breach estimated to have affected nearly 33 million users. Coupang had independently announced that data from only 3,000 accounts was leaked, a figure authorities dispute.
Police, who suspect more than 30 million accounts were affected, are investigating the reliability of Coupang's internal probe. The government has criticized the company's findings as one-sided.
Harold Rogers, interim CEO of Coupang Corp., arrives at the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency's headquarters in central Seoul on Jan. 30, 2026, to be questioned about allegations of destruction of evidence in connection with a massive data breach at the company. (Yonhap)
Investigators focused on the company's handling of a laptop allegedly used in the hacking. Coupang recovered the device in China last month from a former employee responsible for the breach and submitted it to police.
However, the company reportedly failed to disclose that it had already conducted its own forensic analysis on the computer. Police questioned Rogers regarding the motives behind the company's undisclosed contact with the suspect and its handling of the evidence.
"Coupang has fully and will continue to fully cooperate with all of the government investigations that are looking into us. We will also fully cooperate with the police investigation today," Rogers said upon arriving at the agency Friday.
Rogers, who defied two previous police summonses, had left South Korea on Jan. 1, a day after attending a two-day parliamentary hearing into the retail giant's leak, before returning to the country last week.
While there is speculation he may exit the country immediately following the questioning, police are reportedly considering calling him in for further interrogation.
He also faces allegations of perjury regarding his parliamentary testimony, where he claimed the internal probe was conducted at the instruction of the National Intelligence Service (NIS). The NIS has denied the claim.
Separately, he is accused of ordering a report to shield the company from liability after a logistics center worker's death in 2020.
Harold Rogers, interim CEO of Coupang Corp., arrives at the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency's headquarters in central Seoul on Jan. 30, 2026, to be questioned about allegations of destruction of evidence in connection with a massive data breach at the company. (Yonhap)
sshim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Shim Sun-ah · January 31, 2026
7. Editorial: "Extermination of Three Generations, No Choice but to Die": Neglecting North Korean Prisoners' Repatriation Is a State Crime
Summary:
The editorial describes two north Korean soldiers in their 20s held in Ukrainian custody who say they desperately want to go to South Korea and fear death if repatriated. They warn that return to north Korea would mean “extermination of three generations” for their families. It argues that after north Korea confirmed troop dispatch to Russia in April 2025, the captives’ status became prisoners of war, and the Geneva Conventions bar forced repatriation. The piece criticizes the South Korean government for delaying transfer while repeating vague “diplomatic efforts,” and rejects excuses tied to domestic politics. It asserts the captives are South Korean citizens under the Constitution and urges President Lee Jae Myung to act decisively, including sending a special envoy.
Comment: I wonder if Russia is backchanneling threats against the South in support of Kim Jong un? These Koreans must not be forced to return to the north. And South Korea must do everything it can to bring them to the South, if they so choose, as they are Korean citizens.
South Korean government faces criticism for failing to protect North Korean defectors in Ukraine despite Geneva Conventions and constitutional obligations
By The Chosunilbo
Published 2026.01.31. 00:00
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/01/31/NMTUMEGZWVG4VEMCXC76BQWIWA/
A North Korean soldier POW at a Ukraine detention center writes a reply after seeing letters sent by domestic defectors. He writes in the letter, 'Thanks to the support from South Koreans, new dreams and aspirations begin to sprout.' /PD Cheomsuk
The recent appearance of two North Korean soldiers in their 20s held captive in Ukraine was featured on a domestic broadcast. They said, “We desperately want to go to South Korea, but we can’t go unless we’re sent there,” adding, “If we aren’t taken to South Korea, we have no choice but to die.” The prisoners, when asked if North Korea had officially confirmed its troop dispatch to Russia, said, “Then it’s obvious we’ll be repatriated to the North. If we return, our families will be exterminated for three generations,” trembling in fear. Initially wary of the media, the 20-something prisoner tearfully told a 50-year-old female journalist leaving, “I don’t want you to go. You feel like a mother.” The interview was conducted in Ukraine in October of last year.
The North Korean prisoners were captured in January of last year and first expressed their desire to go to South Korea in a February interview with this newspaper. After North Korea officially confirmed its troop dispatch to Russia in April 2025, their international legal status became that of “prisoners of war.” The Geneva Conventions prohibit the repatriation of prisoners against their will. Despite the North Korean prisoners having spent a year voicing their fear of repatriation and their wish to go to South Korea, their transfer has yet to occur. The government has only repeated its principled stance, stating, “We are making diplomatic efforts.” Recently, reports emerged that Kim Jong-un requested Russia block their transfer to South Korea, allegedly due to concerns about the negative impact it would have on North Korean residents.
The government has recently cited political factors like martial law and the impeachment crisis as reasons, but such excuses now lack persuasiveness. North Korean prisoners are South Korean citizens under the Constitution, and ensuring their safety is the duty of the South Korean president. President Lee Jae Myung recently said at a meeting, “I urge you to make it clear that harming South Korean citizens—whether domestically or abroad—will lead to ruin.” The North Korean prisoners who wish to go to South Korea cannot be an exception.
A 22-year-old youthful prisoner wrote in a letter to North Korean defectors in South Korea, “Thanks to the support of South Koreans, new dreams and aspirations have begun to sprout.” The prisoners tremble in fear of death on unfamiliar battlefields and suffer nightmares of repatriation to North Korea every night in the detention camp. Using excuses like international affairs or inter-Korean relations to neglect their repatriation is a criminal act. The president must resolve this issue by all means, including dispatching a special envoy.
8. Lee Jae Myung Tests South Korea’s Pragmatic Diplomacy Between China and Japan
Summary:
The article argues President Lee Jae Myung opened 2026 with active regional diplomacy, visiting China (Beijing and Shanghai, Jan. 4–7) and Japan (Nara, Jan. 13–14) to test whether South Korea can sustain pragmatic diplomacy amid rising China-Japan tensions over Taiwan. In China, Lee sought to stabilize ties strained since THAAD, pursue support on north Korea, and restore broader cooperation. Results were mixed: leaders discussed sensitive issues like a nuclear-powered submarine and Yellow Sea structures (China agreed to remove one), advanced FTA talks, and signed multiple cooperation and business deals, but Xi gave no explicit denuclearization backing and cultural exports did not resume. In Japan, Lee and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reaffirmed denuclearizing north Korea, adopted future-oriented language, began addressing history via DNA testing of 1942 laborer remains, discussed economic cooperation including CPTPP accession, and used symbolic cultural gestures to reinforce people-to-people ties.
Lee Jae Myung Tests South Korea’s Pragmatic Diplomacy Between China and Japan
Published January 27, 2026
Author: Tom Ramage, Ellen Kim
https://keia.org/the-peninsula/lee-jae-myung-tests-south-koreas-pragmatic-diplomacy-between-china-and-japan/?utm
Category: China, Indo-Pacific, Japan, South Korea
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung began 2026 with active regional diplomacy, visiting China and Japan in the first two weeks of the year. Lee’s trips were critical for assessing whether South Korea can sustain pragmatic diplomacy at a moment when tensions between China and Japan are intensifying over Taiwan, and both countries seek to draw South Korea closer to their respective orbits.
Lee’s travel to Beijing and Shanghai, China, from January 4–7, followed by a visit to Nara, Japan, from January 13–14, reflected his administration’s goal of stabilizing South Korea’s regional relations. South Korea’s relations with China have been strained for almost nine years since South Korea decided to deploy THAAD, a U.S. missile defense system meant to protect against North Korean ballistic missiles, to which China responded by banning or restricting travel, tourism, entertainment exports, and other economic activities between the two countries. Lee’s official state visit to China—the first by a South Korean president in six years—offered an opportunity for what Lee called the “full-scale restoration of South Korea-China relations.” Securing China’s support for the denuclearization of North Korea and peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula was another priority for the Lee administration as it seeks dialogue with North Korea this year, despite North Korea’s continued rebuffs.
While Lee and Xi shared the need to improve and normalize bilateral ties, the outcome of their summit was mixed. On the one hand, it was meaningful that the two leaders discussed thorny issues, such as South Korea’s plan to acquire a nuclear-powered submarine and China’s installation of three steel structures in the Provisional Maritime Zone (PMZ) in the Yellow Sea (China agreed to remove one of the structures during the summit). The two countries also agreed to conclude negotiations on their free trade agreement (FTA)—which has long been held up by its services and cross-border investment portions—and to enhance economic cooperation by concluding fifteen cooperation agreements across technology, transportation, trade, and the economy. An accompanying business delegation signed another thirty-two agreements, including USD 44 million in new export deals.
On the other hand, Xi’s lack of explicit support for the denuclearization of North Korea highlighted a clear gap between the two countries in their approach toward the North. Furthermore, Lee and Xi failed to resume Korean cultural exports to China, which the Chinese government has informally banned since the THAAD incident. The South Korea-China meeting also fell short of creating opportunities to expand market access for Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) and establishing a joint commitment to national-level projects on AI and semiconductor build-out, both of which may signal some hesitation from the Korean side in its relations with China. This can be due to the specter of U.S.-China competition, domestic company protections in South Korea—especially given Canada’s EV deal with China announced days later—or simply a lack of consensus on trade issues.
Meanwhile, Lee’s trip to Japan, at the invitation of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, provided an opportunity to sustain the positive momentum in South Korea-Japan relations and bolster U.S.-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation as the United States shifts its strategic focus to the Western Hemisphere. Lee’s summit meeting with Takaichi in Nara, the latter’s hometown, allowed the two leaders to reaffirm their strategic alignment on denuclearizing North Korea as a shared goal. The two leaders stated their commitment to a future-oriented working relationship and made an important first step in addressing history issues by agreeing to test the DNA of the remains of Korean laborers who died in a 1942 undersea mining incident.
The South Korea-Japan summit also played a broader role in bringing South Korea closer into the regional economy, where the leaders agreed to “further develop their current economic partnership to navigate the rapidly changing international situation and trade order.” National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac stated that the two sides discussed South Korea’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the U.S.-absent, Asia-Pacific-oriented trade bloc. More than signaling the renewed relevance of regional trade and economic security for Asian nations amidst growing threats to the global trade order from tariffs and economic coercion, this ensures further economic diplomacy between South Korea and Japan as South Korea’s accession bid—which needs Japan’s approval—likely necessitates mutual agreement surrounding its restrictions on Japanese seafood imports following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster. To this end, the Japanese side indicated that “Japan would communicate the safety of its food products based on scientific evidence.”
The highlight of the Lee-Takaichi summit was the “drumstick diplomacy.” After their joint press conference, the two leaders held an impromptu drum performance to K-pop music. Later, Lee wrote on X, “We were a bit off beat, but tried to stay in sync”—a wise metaphor that captured the current state of bilateral relations and the chemistry between the two leaders. As in the South Korea-China summit in Beijing, which, among other things, included shared bonding over eating jajangmyeon (black bean noodles) and taking selfies on a Xiaomi smartphone, these cultural gestures underline the importance that cultural and people-to-people ties play, driving home the fact that the relationships go beyond the policy confines of economics and security.
Ultimately, South Korea’s ability to independently engage with China and Japan amid an ongoing diplomatic row between the two countries was deft. President Lee did well to come away from each summit with forward-looking statements and agreements, each containing commitments to various forms of ongoing exchange, while avoiding disproportionate deference toward either country amid the regional political crisis.
No one summit can truly be compared with the outcome of the other—each contains its own historical and geopolitical nuances. But taken together, they may signal Seoul’s commitment to a regional policy of pragmatic diplomacy, economic security, and broader regional stabilization amid a highly volatile regional and global political order.
Ellen Kim is Director of Academic Affairs at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). Tom Ramage is Economic Policy Analyst at KEI. The views expressed are the authors’ alone.
Feature image from The Blue House.
KEI is registered under the FARA as an agent of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, a public corporation established by the government of the Republic of Korea. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
9. Security expert urges Korea to lead middle-power coalition
Summary:
In an interview, security scholar Moon Chung-in argues that cooperation among middle powers has become urgent as global politics grow more transactional and dominated by U.S.-China rivalry. He says middle powers are structurally “sandwiched” and need collective action to ease confrontation, restore multilateralism, and counter mercantilism. Moon calls for leadership to turn theory into practice and suggests South Korea is well positioned to lead such a coalition. He cites Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s Davos remarks on flexible, issue-based cooperation and warns that closer ties with China could trigger U.S. retaliation. Moon believes President Lee Jae Myung is capable of providing the necessary leadership, stressing that momentum and follow-through are essential.
Comment: For someone who I believe has a son who is an American citizen, Moon Chung In is a Korean with very hostile feelings toward America. he is ready to jump on Canada's bandwagon. I wonder how me he has POTROK's ear? If Korea leads a middle-power coalition to stabilize the order between Washington and Beijing, how can it increase collective bargaining power without provoking punitive retaliation from its principal ally? How will this affect the ROK/US alliance and Korean security?
Will the Canadian bandwagon grow with other middle powers joining? If so, is this the inflection point for the international rules based order?
InterviewSecurity expert urges Korea to lead middle-power coalition
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By Bahk Eun-ji
- Published Jan 31, 2026 1:00 am KST
- Updated Jan 31, 2026 9:12 am KST
Moon Chung-in calls for action for cooperation among countries 'sandwiched' between US, China
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/politics/20260131/security-expert-urges-korea-to-lead-middle-power-coalition
Moon Chung-in, James Laney distinguished professor at Yonsei University and former special adviser to then-President Moon Jae-in for foreign policy and national security, speaks during an interview with The Korea Times, Seoul, Wednesday. Korea Times photo by Choi Won-suk
The idea of cooperation among middle powers has circulated for years, often more in theory than in practice. But Moon Chung-in, a James Laney distinguished professor at Yonsei University, said the conversation is now entering a more urgent phase.
Speaking in an interview with The Korea Times, the former foreign policy and national security adviser to President Moon Jae-in, said the question is no longer whether such cooperation is desirable, but whether any country is willing to take the lead.
He said Korea should consider playing a more proactive role in uniting middle powers, as the global order becomes increasingly shaped by great-power rivalry and transactional diplomacy, with major powers relying on tariffs, financial pressure and security leverage to pursue their national interests.
“There has to be a leader who can bring middle powers together and push a middle-power coalition forward,” Moon said.
Saying that middle powers are effectively “sandwiched” between the U.S. and China, he said that this structural vulnerability is the reason why cooperation among them is no longer optional.
Moon said his thinking was shaped in part by recent remarks made by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January. In a speech, Carney warned that middle powers face growing vulnerability as global politics become less predictable and more transactional, and called for like-minded countries to work together through flexible, issue-based coalitions.
U.S. President Donald Trump, left, attends a session at World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Jan. 22. Canada's Prime Minister Mark Carney speaks in another session at the forum, Jan. 20. AFP-Yonhap
“The foundation of Carney’s speech comes from what Finnish President (Alexander) Stubb has been talking about,” Moon said. “It’s what he calls ‘value-based realism.’ But what U.S. President Donald Trump is doing right now is not value-based realism.”
He said the idea of a middle-power coalition is not rooted in ideology, but rather is a practical response to structural changes in global politics.
“The main reason for discussing such a coalition is to ease the U.S.-China confrontation and restore the multilateral order that is now under threat,” Moon said.
He added that cooperation among those countries should avoid exclusive regionalism.
“It’s not about creating closed regional blocs. It’s about moving toward open regionalism and sharing a common goal of preventing the resurgence of mercantilism.”
Moon cautioned, however, that efforts by middle powers to improve relations with China could invite pressure from Washington, such as the U.S. threatening a 100 percent tariff hike on Canadian goods after Carney sought to improve ties with China.
Moon stressed that without concrete follow-up, discussions about middle-power cooperation risk fading quickly. “The logic is there, but if there’s no follow-up, it just disappears,” he said. “If you want to make something happen, you need momentum.”
When asked who could provide the necessary leadership, Moon explicitly mentioned President Lee Jae Myung.
“In my view, Lee is fully capable of doing it,” he said. “Personally, I hoped Lee would take on that role, but it was Prime Minister Carney who raised the issue first in Davos.”
President Lee Jae Myung takes a selfie with Chinese President Xi Jinping after a state dinner at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Jan. 5. Joint Press Corps
Moon said the biggest challenge for any leader seeking to organize such a coalition would be managing potential retaliation from the U.S., calling it a critical test for Korea as well if Lee were to pursue a leadership role.
He emphasized that his remarks reflected a personal view rather than a formal policy proposal. Still, he said leadership from a sitting head of state would be essential if middle-power cooperation is to move beyond rhetoric.
“Someone has to bring people together and facilitate dialogue at the presidential level,” he said. “That’s how you create momentum.”
He also emphasized that a middle-power coalition should not be seen as an attempt to sideline major allies or replace existing alliances.
“This is not about excluding anyone or dismantling alliances,” Moon said. “It’s about creating space for middle powers to coordinate, increase their bargaining power and manage shared challenges more effectively.”
Moon added that such coordination could help stabilize global governance at a time when multilateral institutions are losing influence.
“If middle powers don’t step up, the system will continue to tilt even more toward raw power politics,” he said.
Moon said Canada's experience with U.S. tariff pressure shows that even influential political leaders encounter limitations when navigating relations with both Washington and Beijing. He added that balancing alliance management with strategic autonomy would remain a defining challenge.
With uncertainty growing across trade, security and diplomacy, Moon said the cost of inaction is rising.
“This is not a time for simply watching and waiting,” he said. “It’s a time when choices have to be made, and Korea is well positioned to consider making one of those choices.”
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Bahk Eun-ji
Bahk Eun-ji has been with The Korea Times since 2012, building a career across multiple desks. She began at the Business Desk, where she conducted in-depth interviews with key figures in Korea's corporate world. Later, she moved to the Politics & City Desk, focusing on education policy and social affairs. She later served as team leader of the digital content team, leading curation efforts on the newspaper’s homepage and reshaping print stories for social media audiences to enhance digital reach. Now back on the Politics Desk, she covers the National Assembly and the Ministry of National Defense, with a renewed focus on political developments.
10. Hyundai Motor’s humanoid push meets labor wall
Summary:
Hyundai Motor Group’s humanoid robot plan has hit a labor wall. The union says no Atlas robots will enter Korean factories without a labor-management agreement, warning that 24-hour robots could undercut human labor on cost and staffing. Hyundai plans to deploy Atlas at its Georgia Metaplant from 2028, using a non-union U.S. site as a proving ground before any domestic rollout. Experts argue true worker replacement is distant, since Atlas remains limited and factory-grade performance will take years. Still, Tesla is moving faster with Optimus, helped by the absence of unions.
Hyundai Motor’s humanoid push meets labor wall
koreaherald.com · Byun Hye-jin · January 30, 2026
https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10666647
Union backlash over Atlas robot highlights looming industry challenge — as Tesla pushes ahead
Hyundai Motor Group’s humanoid robot Atlas demonstrates car parts handling during CES 2026 at the company’s booth at the Las Vegas Convention Center on Jan. 7. (Yonhap)
“Not a single robot will be allowed onto the factory floor without a labor-management agreement.”
That warning, issued Jan. 22 by Hyundai Motor Group’s labor union and reiterated a week later, has cast a shadow over the automaker’s much-hyped push into humanoid robotics — and may offer a preview of a broader labor challenge facing the global auto industry.
At issue is Atlas, the humanoid robot developed by Boston Dynamics, which Hyundai plans to begin deploying at its new Metaplant in Georgia from 2028. While humanoid robots remain years away from mass deployment, Hyundai’s concrete timeline has pushed a largely theoretical debate into the real world, making its labor union the first at a global automaker to openly oppose the technology on production lines.
The standoff underscores a question the industry can no longer ignore: not whether humanoid robots will enter factories, but how — and on whose terms.
Cost fears fuel early backlash
For Hyundai’s union, concern centers less on Atlas’ current capabilities than on its long-term economics.
The union estimates that operating a 24-hour production line requires three workers at an average annual cost of about 300 million won ($69,400 per worker). By contrast, a humanoid robot — once purchased — requires only maintenance and electricity.
Industry estimates put Atlas’ price at roughly 200 million won per unit, with annual maintenance costs of about 14 million won. With no need for breaks or shift changes, the union argues that robots could eventually outcompete human labor on both cost and productivity, creating strong incentives for workforce reduction.
“For capital seeking long-term profit maximization, robots offer a compelling rationale,” the union said.
Experts: disruption is real — but distant
Yet experts caution that the feared displacement remains far off.
“Atlas may master one or two specific tasks in the near term,” said Chang Tai-woo, an industrial engineering professor at Kyonggi University. “But replacing skilled workers at scale would require breakthroughs approaching artificial general intelligence — a process likely to take decades.”
A robotics researcher at a state-run institute echoed that assessment, estimating it would take at least four to five years before Atlas becomes meaningfully usable in factory settings. It would be far longer to deliver a viable return on investment.
For now, experts say, cheaper and more specialized industrial robots remain far more practical for repetitive tasks.
Why Hyundai is feeling it first
Still, the momentum behind humanoid robots appears difficult to reverse.
Hyundai’s labor friction is less about technological readiness than timing. Unlike rivals, Hyundai has already set a clear deployment roadmap that starts overseas, turning a future concern into an immediate bargaining issue.
The company plans to pilot Atlas at its Georgia plant, where union resistance is absent, and proximity to Boston Dynamics offers logistical advantages. Domestic rollout, experts say, would likely follow only after extended negotiations.
Chang noted a familiar pattern: Hyundai’s union fiercely opposed smart factory initiatives when they were first introduced under a government program in 2014. Today, those technologies are embedded across Hyundai’s operations, including at its largest plant in Ulsan.
“Overseas facilities often become testing grounds,” Chang said. “By the time technologies reach domestic plants, they’re already proven.”
Tesla moves faster — without unions
Hyundai’s cautious approach contrasts sharply with Tesla, which is pushing ahead with its Optimus humanoid robot.
Unburdened by union opposition, Tesla plans to begin training Optimus and collecting manufacturing data at its Austin Gigafactory as early as February, according to Business Insider. CEO Elon Musk has targeted commercial rollout by late 2026, with broader sales from 2027 — a timeline that, if realized, would outpace Hyundai’s Atlas roadmap.
Experts warn that prolonged labor standoffs could slow Hyundai’s adoption curve relative to global competitors, even if humanoids take years to mature.
“In the short term, resistance protects jobs,” Chang said. “But in the long term, it risks hollowing out manufacturing leadership if core technologies are validated elsewhere.”
A test case for auto industry
For now, the humanoid debate remains embryonic. No automaker is close to replacing large numbers of workers with human-like robots.
But Hyundai’s experience suggests the issue will not remain theoretical for long. As humanoid robotics moves from lab demonstrations to pilot deployments, labor relations — not just technology — may determine who leads the next phase of manufacturing.
The issue has also drawn attention at the highest political level.
Speaking at a meeting with presidential aides at Cheong Wa Dae on Thursday, President Lee Jae Myung said the introduction of robots into production sites is an irreversible trend, underscoring the need for early preparation.
“It seems a labor union has declared it will not allow robots into worksites because of production robots. That may not be genuine, but rather part of a protest strategy,” Lee said, in remarks widely seen as referring to opposition from the Hyundai Motor labor union.
Drawing a historical parallel, he added, “When steam engines and machinery were introduced, there was the Luddite movement, where people called for machines to be destroyed out of fear of job losses. You cannot avoid the massive cart that is already rolling. In the end, society must adapt to it quickly.”
hyejin2@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · Byun Hye-jin · January 30, 2026
11. No more Mr. 'Very Nice' Guy? Trump warns that U.S. tariffs could be 'much steeper.'
Summary:
At a Cabinet meeting on January 29, 2026, POTUS said the tariffs he has imposed since January 2025 could become “much steeper,” framing past rates as him being “very nice.” He repeated that Korea could face 25 percent tariffs, though he also signaled a deal might be worked out. The new warning lands amid EU pushback tied to Greenland rhetoric and trade friction, Korea’s slow legislative follow-through on an investment pledge, and growing legal challenges to “reciprocal” tariffs under IEEPA. POTUS attacked plaintiffs as “China-centric,” pressured the Fed for rate cuts, and promised a Fed chair nominee.
Comment: Sigh....How is this going to play out for the ROK/US alliance?
No more Mr. 'Very Nice' Guy? Trump warns that U.S. tariffs could be 'much steeper.'
Published: 30 Jan. 2026, 12:57
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2026-01-30/world/world/No-more-Mr-Very-Nice-Guy-Trump-warns-that-US-tariffs-could-be-much-steeper-/2512590
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, right, smiles as President Donald Trump, center, speaks during a cabinet meeting at the White House on Jan. 29 in Washington. At left is Secretary of State Marco Rubio. [AP/YONHAP]
U.S. President Donald Trump said that the unilateral tariffs he has imposed on countries around the world could be “much steeper” than they are now. The remark was widely seen as signaling that, depending on circumstances, he could raise tariffs beyond the levels already in place to intensify pressure.
Speaking at a Cabinet meeting he chaired at the White House on Thursday, Trump said of the tariffs he has imposed since taking office in January 2025 that he had been “very nice,” again raising the possibility of applying higher rates.
Related Article
"They could be much steeper," Trump said. Ahead of the meeting, he posted on social media Thursday morning that he had been going easy on other countries and could raise tariffs at any time.
Trump said Monday he would raise tariffs on Korea by 10 percentage points, to 25 percent from 15 percent. A day later, on Tuesday, he said, “We'll work something out with Korea.”
Analysts say Trump’s renewed talk of tariff pressure comes as the European Parliament, pushing back against his demand that the United States annex Greenland and his tariff threats, has postponed approval of a trade deal between the European Union and the United States. It also comes as the pace of Korea’s implementation of an investment agreement with the United States has fallen short of Washington’s expectations.
Some also interpret the comments as an attempt to blunt the impact of his tariff threats, at a time when there is growing speculation that the U.S. Supreme Court could find the president’s reciprocal tariffs — imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (Ieepa) — to be unlawful.
At the meeting, Trump strongly criticized the plaintiffs in the tariff lawsuits, calling them “China-centric.” The plaintiffs include U.S. small businesses that say they were harmed by the tariffs, as well as 12 Democratic-leaning states.
President Donald Trump, right, speaks during a cabinet meeting at the White House on Jan. 29 in Washington. [AP/YONHAP]
"These are people that are China [centric], but they are also outside of the United States,” said Trump. “These are countries that have ripped us off for years and years, charging us tariffs.”
He has also continued making hard-line remarks about the Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision, at times saying that without tariffs, the United States will collapse, in what critics view as direct or indirect pressure on the court.
In a social media post Thursday morning, Trump described other countries hit by his tariffs as “low interest rate paying cash machines.”
Trump added that the only reason the countries are “thought of as elegant, solid, and prime" is because "the U.S.A. allows them to be.”
The comments echo remarks he made while campaigning for president, including in October 2024, when he referred to South Korea as a “money machine,” underscoring an unapologetic view of U.S. trading partners as a source of cash.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, right, looks on as United States President Donald J Trump speaks in a cabinet meeting in the Cabinet Room of the White House in Washington on Jan. 29. [UPI/YONHAP]
Trump also attacked Federal Reserve (Fed) Chair Jerome Powell over the decision to hold rates steady after Powell declined Trump’s calls for rate cuts.
“Jerome ‘Too Late’ Powell again refused to cut interest rates, even though he has absolutely no reason to keep them so high,” Trump wrote on Truth Social. “He is hurting our Country, and its National Security. We should have a substantially lower rate now that even this moron admits inflation is no longer a problem or threat.”
Trump said he plans to announce a new nominee for Fed chair on Friday.
Names floated as contenders include Kevin Hassett, director of the White House National Economic Council; Kevin Warsh, former member of the Fed Board of Governors; and current Fed governors Christopher Waller and Michelle Bowman.
While Trump has argued that tariffs have revived the U.S. economy, the Commerce Department said Thursday that the U.S. trade deficit in November 2025 totaled $56.8 billion — up $27.6 billion, or 94.6 percent, from October’s $29.2 billion deficit.
U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell gestures during a press conference following a two-day meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on interest rate policy in Washington on Jan. 28. [REUTERS/YONHAP]
It was the largest deficit in four months, since a $74.4 billion deficit in July 2025, and far exceeded the $42.9 billion deficit forecast by economists surveyed by Dow Jones.
Trump has repeatedly cited the October 2025 deficit — then at its lowest level in 16 years — as evidence that his tariff policy was producing results. Analysts said, however, that October’s narrower deficit reflected companies pulling pharmaceutical imports forward, ahead of Trump’s announcement that the United States would impose a 100 percent tariff on pharmaceuticals starting Oct. 1.
Trump later canceled the planned tariff. The larger deficit in November was linked to pharmaceutical imports returning to normal levels. Imports of pharmaceutical ingredients used for compounding rose again by $6.7 billion in November 2025, as the tariff was not implemented.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
BY KANG TAE-HWA [kim.minyoung5@joongang.co.kr]
12. Assessing North Korea’s Five-Year Effort to Develop 13 New Nuclear and Missile Systems
Summary:
North Korea’s five-year weapons plan has delivered uneven but consequential results. Of 13 nuclear and missile systems unveiled by Kim Jong Un in 2021, four are likely operational, including solid-fuel ICBMs, tactical nuclear weapons, and land-attack cruise missiles. These advances improve survivability, readiness, and escalation control. Others, such as hypersonic glide vehicles, MIRVs, and nuclear-powered submarines, remain aspirational or unproven, constrained by testing failures and technical complexity. The pattern suggests continuity more than breakthrough. Pyongyang is refining a mature force, not leaping ahead. The coming Party Congress may clarify priorities, but ambition still outpaces demonstrated capability.
Comment: A lot of information. But I will leave it to our missile experts to parse. Et tu, Bruce?
If solid ICBMs and tactical nukes are already sufficient for deterrence, what problem is Kim really trying to solve with MIRVs and SSBNs? (create the trading LA for Seoul dilemma?)
Does the gap between propaganda claims and tested performance create strategic caution, or dangerous overconfidence, inside north Korea’s leadership?
Assessing North Korea’s Five-Year Effort to Develop 13 New Nuclear and Missile Systems
By: Vann H. Van Diepen
January 30, 2026
https://www.38north.org/2026/01/assessing-north-koreas-five-year-effort-to-develop-13-new-nuclear-and-missile-systems/
In his January 2021 report to the Eighth Party Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party, Kim Jong Un set out goals to develop 13 previously unrevealed nuclear and missile weapons systems.[1] Four of those 13 systems probably have been operationally deployed over the subsequent five years, two may currently be operational, three are undergoing testing, and the status of the remaining four is unknown. These results reflect the high priority and resource allocations, steady efforts, and determined foreign technology acquisitions North Korea had been making since well before the Party Congress rather than new ambitions.
Solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), tactical nuclear weapons, and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)—all probably deployed since January 2021—have made the most important contributions to North Korea’s military capabilities. Of the other systems, multiple-warhead strategic missiles would offer the greatest potential to increase the North’s nuclear strike capability. Most of the remaining systems in Kim’s report would make only incremental contributions to the diverse force of road-mobile ballistic missiles and fission nuclear warheads North Korea has been deploying for over 30 years.
The Ninth Party Congress expected within a few weeks should provide further insights into the ongoing development programs and any new program goals, given Kim’s January 2026 statement that the upcoming Congress “will clarify the next-stage plans for further bolstering up the country’s nuclear war deterrent.”
Operationally Deployed (4 of 13 systems)
Solid ICBMs. Kim in January 2021 set a task to “push ahead with the development of solid-fuel engine-propelled inter-continental … ground ballistic rockets as scheduled.” North Korea’s first solid-propellant ICBM, the Hwasong-18 (HS-18), was initially flight-tested in April 2023 and probably was operationally deployed by December 2023. A longer solid ICBM, the Hwasong-19, had its first and thus far only flight-test in October 2024. The North displayed the “next generation” HS-20 solid ICBM, purportedly with a more powerful first stage motor, in October 2025, and indicated that same motor would be used in an upgraded version of the HS-19. The advent of solid ICBMs is a notable achievement underscoring North Korea’s prowess in solid-propellant technology established through a highly successful series of solid short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) developed since 2019. Solids are easier and safer to operate in the field than road-mobile liquid missiles, and have a smaller logistical footprint that makes them somewhat less vulnerable to detection when field-deployed.
Tactical nuclear weapons. Kim’s January 2021 report was the first to set out tactical nuclear weapons as a development objective; Kim also claimed the North had the technology to “miniaturize, lighten and standardize” nuclear weapons. By Fall 2022, the North was emphasizing that it had an operationally deployed, reliable, and varied delivery capability for such weapons. In March 2023, Pyongyang revealed a tactical nuclear weapon designated Hwason-31 said to be used interchangeably with several different types of delivery systems (i.e., “standardized”). According to the Institute for Science and International Security, the warhead had an outer diameter of some 40-45 cm and an estimated yield of about 10 kilotons. Outside analysts widely assess that such a warhead is within North Korea’s capabilities given the nuclear testing it has already conducted, even if the Hwason-31 itself has apparently not best tested. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that some number of “tactical nukes” have been produced and deployed.
Land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). Kim reported that the North had “proceeded to develop…intermediate-range cruise missiles whose conventional warheads are the most powerful in the world.” Pyongyang’s first LACM reportedly was flight-tested in September 2021 with a claimed range of 1,500 km. An updated missile with a claimed 1,800 km range was flown in January 2022. In February 2023, the North unveiled the Hwasal-2 LACM with a claimed 2,000 km range (thus implying the earlier models were Hwasal-1s), and suggested road-mobile ground-launched LACMs had been operationally deployed. A third model, the “Pulhwasal-3-31,” was unveiled in January 2024, including in a submarine-launched version (apparently fired from a torpedo tube), as well as a “super-large” LACM warhead (almost certainly conventional) in February 2024 for at least the “Hwasal-1 Ra-3” missile. The North also has launched LACMs from surface combatant warships, including the Amnok-class corvette in August 2023 and one of the new Choe Hyon-class destroyers in April 2025. LACMs provide an important supplement to North Korea’s much larger force of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, in both nuclear and conventional roles. Basing LACMs on different land and sea platforms adds to the survivability, diversity, and flexibility of the North’s overall missile force. Low-flying, maneuverable LACMs will further complicate Allied regional air and missile defense efforts— especially in attacks coordinated with ballistic missiles.
Reconnaissance satellite. Kim reported in January 2021 that the design of a military reconnaissance satellite had been completed and it was needed “in the near future.” After the North reported launches of testbed boosters for recon satellite development in February and March 2022 (which the US revealed actually were related to the HS-17 ICBM), Pyongyang attempted an unsuccessful launch of the “Malligyong-1” reconnaissance satellite in May 2023. The launch used the new three-stage liquid-propellant “Chollima-1” space launch vehicle (SLV), with its first stage based on the HS-17. After another failed attempt in August 2023, the Chollima-1 successfully orbited a Malligyong-1 in November 2023. The North announced in May 2024 that the launch of a “Malligyong-1-1” reconaissance satellite on a “new type carrier rocket” with a “newly developed liquid oxygen + petroleum engine” failed during first stage operation. There have been no subsequent known launch attempts despite Kim’s January 2021 goal and the North’s subsequent stated intentions to launch additional recon satellites. Such satellites remain a priority, however, and so further launches are highly likely. It is reasonable to assume that the current level of North Korean technology would yield an imaging satellite with modest resolution, helping Pyongyang detect and track a buildup of allied forces but probably making only a modest contribution to all the other intelligence information North Korea receives. Whether Russia has or will assist this program is unclear, as is the impact of any such assistance. The North would need an operational network of five or so satellites for regular coverage.
Possibly Operational (2 of 13 systems)
Nuclear-armed UUV. Kim’s report included a task to “possess … an underwater-launch nuclear strategic weapon which will be of great importance in raising the long-range nuclear striking capability.” At the time, Kim was assumed to be referring to an ICBM-range submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM; see below). But in retrospect, he probably was referring to the “Haeil” nuclear-armed unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) unveiled in March 2023. A “Haeil-5-23” variant was announced in January 2024, and Haeils have featured in North Korean parades as recently as October 2025. It is unknown whether North Korea considers the Haeil operational, how many are deployed, or where the UUVs would be launched from. In any case, the Haeil would still be substantially inferior to North Korea’s nuclear-armed ballistic and cruise missiles in terms of time-to-target, accuracy, and lethality. Its range limits it to coastal targets in South Korea and southeast Japan, where it would be vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) attacks. The UUV would appear to have much more political than military utility, allowing the North to show it has diverse nuclear delivery capabilities that cannot be prevented from retaliating.
Medium-range recon drones. Kim’s report referred to the need to “conduct in real earnest the most important research to develop reconnaissance drones and other means of reconnaissance capable of precisely reconnoitering up to 500 km deep into the front.” In July 2023, the North revealed at an arms expo and parade the medium-sized “Saetbyol-9 multi-purpose attack drone” akin to the US MQ-9 Reaper, and the large-sized “Saetbyol-4 strategic reconnaissance drone” akin to the US RQ-4 Global Hawk. Several of each type of unmanned air vehicle (UAV) have subsequently been shown in North Korean media, most recently at a display Kim visited in honor of the 80th anniversary of the Korean People’s Air Force in November 2025. It is unknown how many of these UAVs have been or will be produced, and more importantly how capable their reconnaissance sensors and underwing conventional weapons are. But the two new types of UAV would provide North Korea with worthwhile new capabilities compared to its previous drones if they are produced and deployed in sufficient numbers, although they would be extremely vulnerable over allied airspace in wartime.
Under Testing (3 of 13 systems)
Medium-sized submarine. Kim’s report noted that “the standard of the goal in the modernization of medium-sized submarine was set correctly and it was remodeled experimentally to open up a bright prospect for remarkably enhancing the existing subsurface operational capabilities of our navy.” In retrospect, it is now clear Kim was foreshadowing the conventionally-powered Sinpo-C class “tactical nuclear attack submarine” that was rolled out of its construction hall in September 2023. That sub, originally shown by the North under construction in July 2019, was almost certainly remodified since then (i.e., “remodeled experimentally”) from a configuration mounting three medium-sized ballistic missiles in its sail to the ultimately revealed lengthened hull having a “turtleback” section aft of the sail with launch tubes large enough for four small-to-medium ballistic missiles and six probable land-attack cruise missiles. The Sinpo-C has still not yet set out on sea trials, 6-12 months of which generally are required prior to deployment. Although Kim suggested all of the North’s remaining Romeo-class conventionally-powered subs would be converted to Sinpo-Cs, it is not clear whether any other conversions currently are under way.
Hypersonic glide vehicles. Kim reported that the North had “finished research into developing… hypersonic gliding flight warheads for new-type ballistic rockets and was making preparations for their test manufacture” and was to “develop and introduce hypersonic gliding flight warheads in a short period.” Pyongyang launched a medium-range liquid booster it called “Hwasong-8” in September 2021 carrying an arrowhead-shaped hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV)/boost glide vehicle (BGV) with stubby wings. Another HGV was launched in April 2024 on the solid-propellant Hwasong-16 IRBM, with a repeat HS-16 HGV launch in January 2025. In October 2025, the North claimed to have launched “hypersonic projectiles” to SRBM range, implying these were the “Hwasong-11E,” a newly-exhibited system using the larger, heavier-payload version of the KN-23 SRBM (designated HS-11C) to carry a small HGV. The North also claimed to have launched an unidentified type of hypersonic missile to a range of 1000 km on January 4, 2026. Although the North now routinely displays and parades theater missiles carrying HGVs, there is no clear open-source evidence it has ever successfully flown one. HGVs are a very demanding technology given the need to cope with the temperatures and pressures of sustained hypersonic flight, compounded by the maneuvering needed to evade missile defenses (the comparative advantage of HGVs over other payloads). Pyongyang would likely need at least several successful flight-tests to truly develop HGVs. It might choose for political and propaganda reasons, or in an effort to complicate allied planning, to claim HGVs are deployed even though they remain under development.
Multiple-warhead missiles. In 2021, Kim reported the North was in the final stage of “conducting research into perfecting the guidance technology for multi-warhead rocket.” It is possible that North Korean launches in February and March 2022, which the North said included testing of “attitude control systems” for reconnaissance satellites but subsequently were revealed by the US as likely intended to test elements of what apparently was the HS-17 large liquid ICBM, could have been useful in the development of a post-boost vehicle (PBV) to dispense multiple, independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). In June 2024, the North claimed to have launched a testbed booster that dispensed three reentry vehicles (RVs) and a decoy, but South Korean video of the launch shows it probably failed before any objects could have been released. Although the test shows that North Korea remains committed to developing multiple-warhead missiles, at least several successful flight tests over a minimum of a few years would likely be required before MIRVs could be deployed. Successful MIRV development would underscore North Korea’s technical prowess, further complicate the task of allied missile defenses, and increase the number of targets that its missile force can strike with a given number of missiles and launchers.
Status Unknown (4 of 13 systems)
Nuclear-powered submarine. Kim Jong Un reported in January 2021 that “the design of new nuclear-powered submarine was researched and was in the stage of final examination…And the tasks were brought up to… possess a nuclear-powered submarine.” In September 2023, Kim stated that “we should give greater impetus to the building of nuclear-powered submarine [sic].” In January 2024, Kim reportedly “learned in detail about the building of a nuclear submarine… discussed the issues related to the building of a nuclear-powered submarine… indicated the immediate tasks to be carried out by relevant sectors and state measures to be taken, and made an important conclusion on the ways to implement them.” In March 2025, Kim reportedly “learned about the building of a nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine, which is being pushed forward according to the decisions of the Eighth [Party] Congress.” That report was accompanied by photos that showed the lower portion of part of the hull of the reputed nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). North Korean press in December 2025 reported on a recent visit by Kim to the construction site for a “8,700-tonnage nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine.” Associated photos taken inside a construction hall showed most of the submarine looking up from below.
Although possibly retouched, the new photos appear credible. They reveal a high, extended-length sail containing 5-10 probable ballistic missile launch tubes. The high sail suggests the new sub is intended to accommodate SLBMs that are much longer in size—at least 0.5 m and even 4.5 m longer—than the 13.5 m SLBM displayed by the North in April 2022, the longest seen to date. A longer missile may be needed to reach intercontinental range, an objective set out by Kim in January 2021 (see below).
There is no open-source reporting that North Korea has yet built or tested a submarine nuclear reactor, and the new photos do not reveal whether one is installed in the new sub. At this point, the idea that the hull is equipped with an operable nuclear reactor should be regarded with great skepticism, although this possibility cannot be ruled out. There have been reports alleging Russia provided the North Koreans a reactor or extensive technical assistance, but these reports have not been corroborated. Even if the sub is reactor-equipped, a year or two of fitting out probably would be required before it rolled out of the construction hall ready to begin sea trials, with additional time required to reach operational status.
ICBM-range SLBM. Kim in January 2021 set a task to “push ahead with the development of solid-fuel engine-propelled inter-continental underwater … rockets as scheduled.” North Korea has not flight-tested a true submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)—as opposed to a sub-launched KN-23 SRBM—since October 2019, and that was the medium-range Pukguksong-3 solid SLBM. The best known candidate for a North Korean solid ICBM-range SLBM is the unnamed missile paraded in April 2022. That missile was about 2.21 m in diameter and 13.2 meter long, roughly the size of Russian, Chinese, and Western ICBM-range SLBMs. The reasons why the North has not yet flight-tested this or another such SLBM are unknown, but may be related to the current lack of a large enough submarine to serve as an operational deployment platform or (as noted above) that the North has shifted to developing an as-yet unseen longer SLBM.
ICBM accuracy. Kim’s January 2021 report “set a goal of…further raising the rate of precision good enough to strike and annihilate any strategic targets within a range of 15,000 kilometers with pinpoint accuracy.” Although the liquid Hwasong-17 and all of the North’s solid ICBMs are assessed to have a range of at least 15,000 km, there is no evidence any of its ICBMs have what would be commonly regarded as “pinpoint accuracy.” Pyongyang has not flown any ICBM on an operational trajectory that might permit drawing conclusions about accuracy at intercontinental range. Its current ICBMs probably use blunt, robust RVs that provide substantial confidence the payload would survive intercontinental-range reentry without full-range testing—but that impose substantial accuracy penalties.
North Korea’s use of maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs) on medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) might foreshadow a future ICBM MaRV with the potential for high accuracy, but its ICBMs have yet to be associated or tested with MaRVs and the accuracy such MaRVs actually could achieve at ICBM ranges is unclear. In any case, the North is unlikely to pursue a “counterforce” strategy against the continental US requiring high accuracy to destroy US ICBM silos and other hardened targets. A “countervalue” strategy targeting US cities and thus requiring only modest ICBM accuracy is much more likely. Kim’s claimed goal of “pinpoint accuracy” was thus much more likely advanced for political and propaganda purposes than to posit a serious design objective for North Korean ICBMs.
Super-large hydrogen bombs. In January 2021, Kim reported that Pyongyang had the technology to “complete the development of a super-large hydrogen bomb,” and that the ability to “make nuclear weapons smaller and lighter…will make it possible to…continuously push ahead with the production of super-sized nuclear warheads.” Since then, North Korean media has provided no more information on this project. Although the North claimed its January 2016 nuclear explosive test and its final such test in September 2017 were related to thermonuclear (hydrogen) weapons, it is unclear whether further explosive testing would be required for Pyongyang to be able to deploy such weapons. The large, liquid-propellant Hwasong-17 ICBM first flight-tested in March 2022 would be ideal for “super-large” warheads. Although such weapons would make great city-busters, the North’s current fission warheads may well provide an adequate countervalue capability against US, Japanese, and South Korean cities.
The Bottom Line
All 13 nuclear and missile systems reported as part of Kim Jong Un’s five-year plan were almost certainly under development to various extents before the 8th Party Congress in January 2021, and thus reflected the high priority and resource allocations, steady efforts, and determined foreign technology acquisitions North Korea had been making in the preceding years rather than new ambitions. They also reflected the maturity and natural diffusion of the 1940s- to 1970s-vintage technologies underlying these systems. Nonetheless, the addition of solid ICBMs, tactical nuclear weapons, and LACMs to the North’s arsenal since January 2021 can make important contributions—assuming deployment in substantial number—to the credibility and survivability of its nuclear force, its options for escalating and responding to escalation in a crisis or conflict, and (for LACMs) its conventional warfighting capabilities.
If the North can improve the resolution of its imagery reconnaissance satellites and put enough in orbit, it can make important improvements in its situational awareness and wartime targeting capabilities. Of the developmental systems, MIRVs offer the greatest potential to increase the North’s nuclear strike capability assuming successful testing and the production of enough nuclear warheads. Most of the other systems not yet deployed, even SSBNs carrying ICBM-range SLBMs, would make only incremental contributions to the diverse force of road-mobile ballistic missiles and fission nuclear warheads North Korea has been deploying for over 30 years. The Ninth Party Congress expected within a few weeks should provide further insights into the ongoing development programs and any new program goals, given Kim’s January 2026 statement that the upcoming Congress “will clarify the next-stage plans for further bolstering up the country’s nuclear war deterrent.”
- [1]
- Kim’s report also noted two types of missile systems that had already begun flight-testing or deployment by January 2021: the “super-large” multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) the US designated as KN-25, and “new-type tactical rockets” that presumably included the KN-23, KN-24, and small Hwasong-11D SRBMs.
13. North Korean Cellular Coverage in 2026
Summary:
Cellular coverage in north Korea has quietly expanded since 2022, with the most important shift being the rollout of 4G service. New base stations now reach deeper into rural provinces, while dense urban areas like Pyongyang add rooftop antennas to handle rising demand. The state’s push for e-government, electronic IDs, and digital services depends on this network growth. Using secondhand Chinese equipment, 4G speeds remain modest but sufficient for video calls and streaming. Smartphone use is clearly rising. Expansion is less about geography now and more about capacity, control, and integration of daily life into monitored digital systems.
Comment: Useful for our informational warfare campaign.
Does wider 4G access strengthen regime efficiency more than it risks information leakage and social awareness?
As mobile dependence grows, does the network become a tool of resilience or a strategic vulnerability for the regime?
Can we exploit these developments?
North Korean Cellular Coverage in 2026
By: Martyn Williams
January 29, 2026
https://www.38north.org/2026/01/north-korean-cellular-coverage-in-2026/
This article was written as part of NK TechLab, a project of 38 North that serves as a central hub for ongoing investigation and analysis into how North Korea uses technology to serve and suppress its citizens. To read other research like this, visit NK TechLab here.
North Korea’s cellular network has continued to expand since 38 North last mapped its footprint in late 2022, but the most significant change in the last several years has been the debut of 4G service. The launch of 4G brings faster data service that enables easier use of bandwidth-intensive applications such as streaming videos and making video calls.
For the North Korean government, network expansion is an important element of its drive to deliver more services to the public via electronic networks. The Law on Prevention of Procedural Order Violations provided the foundation for e-government, and subsequent laws have created legal frameworks for things such as electronic signatures and identification. But without a strong mobile network, the policy will be hampered.
Therefore, further enhancement of North Korea’s cellular network is expected, although with greater emphasis placed on technical and capacity enhancements rather than expansion of geographic coverage.
Cell Network Coverage
The biggest change to the map of cellular service access throughout the country has been the construction of new cellular base stations in rural areas. Additionally, access to higher resolution commercial satellite imagery has enabled the identification of a few pre-existing base stations. This has resulted in the addition of coverage in northern areas including North and South Hamgyong province and Ryanggang province.
Less obvious on the coverage map, but notable nonetheless, are efforts to increase network coverage in built-up areas, such as more populated cities. In North Korean media, for instance, it is becoming more common to see cellular antennas on the top of buildings in Pyongyang and other cities, supplementing areas that are already covered.
These efforts reflect the need to provide additional capacity in areas with many existing subscribers and are further evidence that smartphone use is expanding.
The map is based on locations of over 1,400 cellular base stations in North Korea identified on satellite imagery. This analysis includes around 400 more locations than the 2022 coverage map.
This analysis relies on recent high-resolution, commercial satellite imagery to capture the full extent of the network. As such, additional base stations have likely been missed in this analysis. It is also possible that some sites identified as cellular towers are for other purposes, such as broadcasting relay, however, North Korean cellular sites typically have a distinctive imagery profile, consisting of a small building, solar array and transmission tower.
Figure 1. A cell tower in Sinpyong, North Hamgyong province. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
The Debut of 4G
4G was launched in North Korea in September 2023 by Kangsong, one of the country’s two cellphone network operators. The 4G LTE network operated by Kangsong is likely capable of speeds of around 10-30Mbps, or about ten times that of 3G networks. This estimate is based on the reported use of used 4G equipment, which is likely earlier generation gear than current 4G networks in other countries.
The network first opened in Pyongyang, but coverage appears to have spread far beyond the capital.
It is unclear if Koryolink, North Korea’s other carrier, has also launched a 4G service and it is impossible to determine such information via satellite imagery.
The 2023 launch of 4G keeps North Korea one technology generation behind cellular services in most developed nations. That is not necessarily a bad thing for the country, which can benefit from wide access to second-hand cellular networking equipment. For instance, it was reported that Kangsong built its 4G network with second-hand Huawei equipment.
Handsets
After the launch of 4G, it appears that most—if not all—cellular handsets available in North Korea support 4G. Modern handsets based on Chinese Android designs from the last few years were recently on show at exhibitions in Pyongyang. All appeared to support 4G networks.
Figure 2. New phones on display at the Development of Light Industry 2025 expo in Pyongyang in November 2025. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Conclusion
With the state focused on using mobile communications to drive efficiencies in the economy and delivery of state services, and the apparent popularity of smartphones with the North Korean public, network expansion is expected to continue. This will be driven by both a desire to expand geographic coverage, and also a growing demand for increased network capacity in built-up areas.
14. The Northeast Asian Security Dilemma: Does European Experience Show the Way Out?
Summary:
The Northeast Asian security dilemma is tightening as US extended deterrence feels less certain and north Korea consolidates nuclear status with quiet backing from Russia and tolerance from China. Dan Smith argues Europe’s Cold War experience offers guidance, but only if misunderstood myths are stripped away. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe did not end the Cold War or transform regimes. It accepted borders, sovereignty, and division, then built modest guardrails to reduce risk. Its power lay in restraint and minimalism. For Northeast Asia, the lesson is coexistence before reconciliation, stability before transformation, and confidence-building without promises of regime change.
The Northeast Asian Security Dilemma: Does European Experience Show the Way Out?
By: Dan Smith
January 26, 2026
https://www.38north.org/2026/01/the-northeast-asian-security-dilemma-does-european-experience-show-the-way-out/Faced by growing insecurity and destabilizing uncertainties, Northeast Asia lacks a regional mechanism to establish guardrails to manage the risks. European experience in the 1970s offers an interesting model—but only if that model is properly understood.
Shifting Sands, Rising Tensions
Japan and South Korea (Republic of Korea or ROK) have long-benefitted from US extended deterrence not only for security, but also because the strategic weight of America’s regional presence keeps their differences in check. Both countries face uncertainties now arising from the behavior and imputed policy preferences of President Trump and the conditions that might be placed on continuing to offer extended deterrence. It is possible if not (yet) probable that the US will not play either the protective or the balancing role so willingly, successfully, or consistently in coming years.
Meanwhile, North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) has successfully edged out from under the most intrusive version of China’s wing. Its support for Russia’s aggression in Ukraine provides many benefits, both direct and indirect. It had already succeeded in developing and deploying its own nuclear missile force, which was long-opposed by its allies and adversaries alike. Today, Russia seems to support, and China has stopped publicly condemning, DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons.
The most worrisome possible consequence of this is the prospect that either the ROK or Japan or both may withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and develop their own nuclear forces. This is, presumably, more likely if the US commitment to regional stability and its allies’ security is seen to falter or weaken.
If either country pursues this path, it would weaken the international nuclear non-proliferation regime at best; at worst, it could shatter it and exacerbate regional arms racing. All the ingredients are in place—clashing national interests, divisive politics and rhetoric, sufficient economic resources, and the industrial and technological capacity to ramp up a nuclear weapons program relatively quickly and sustain it over time.
If that happens, the region will lock itself into a classic version of the security dilemma. The concept was coined—or, at least, given a name—in 1950 by John Herz in explaining what he called ‘the heartbreaking plight’ of the nuclear-armed world. It entails what US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara in 1967 referred to as the ‘action-reaction phenomenon.’[1] Actions undertaken for security look threatening to the other side, whose response looks threatening, so the first side counter-responds. And so on. Herz depicted this as “the extreme manifestation of a dilemma with which human societies have had to grapple since the dawn of history.”
Breaking the Cycle
Properly understood, the big challenge in Northeast Asian security is not how to respond to the other’s provocations, but how to break the logic of the security dilemma. Facing this challenge, one deficiency in the region is the lack of a regional security framework. There is a need for guardrails to minimize risk—or at least manage it—but no regional mechanism for establishing them. This deficiency is becoming widely evident, leading to a variety of proposals for rectifying it.[2] In this discussion, a common reference point is the European experience from a half-century ago in constructing a security framework in the form of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The reference is sometimes implicit or oblique, sometimes explicit.[3]
Its relevance to Northeast Asia is easy to grasp. For all the differences between the regions and the times, there was in Europe and is in Northeast Asia a prolonged military confrontation with a divided country, militarized borders, nuclear weapons, and mutual hostility and distrust. Despite all this, Europe found a means to keep enmity and hostility within bounds. Could Northeast Asia do likewise?
Notwithstanding the collapse of neighborly relations in Europe in the last decade, that experience is still potentially instructive. In the 1990s, the European precedent was used with fewer reservations than seems appropriate today.[4] Indeed, the ‘Sunshine Policy’ towards the North launched by ROK President Kim Dae-jung and reiterated in some form by subsequent progressive presidents was explicitly inspired by European experience.[5]
However, the parallel needs to be handled with care. In the current issue of Foreign Affairs, President Alexander Stubb of Finland bluntly states that the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 played a key part in bringing the Cold War to an end. He is one of many who make that argument. But it has a political downside when applied to Northeast Asia. The end of the Cold War and the end of the Soviet Union were approximately coterminous, so the idea of recreating something like the CSCE might just sound to Pyongyang like a plan for regime change. And that is unlikely to encourage their participation in a regional framework, which would lack purpose if any one of the relevant states stays out of it.
More importantly, perhaps, Stubb’s view is, in any case, a severe misreading of history—a classic case of teleology, looking at the past through a lens shaped by later events. Part of my own intellectual formation was in a school of thought that believes that the words ‘History teaches us that’ are generally followed by poor logic and worse history. Even so, interesting reflections can be drawn from the past. In this case, the most interesting is to do with borders and sovereignty.
Understanding Precedents in Context
The CSCE was not the West’s brainchild. The USSR wanted it so as to formalize borders. The West’s aim was to achieve conventional arms reductions to address what NATO saw as the Soviet bloc’s overwhelming superiority in land forces. There were numerous reasons for skepticism about that claim, but we need not go into that here.
In May 1972, Soviet leader Brezhnev and US President Nixon met in Moscow to sign the first bilateral nuclear arms control agreement. They also agreed to open two sets of talks on relations in Europe. One was to explore the political aspects—the CSCE—while the other focused on conventional forces.
The arms conference started in January 1973. There was a problem with the name. The NATO side opted for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). However, at the first meeting, the USSR rejected the “B” in that equation and argued for calling the talks simply for “MFR,” because the word “balanced” was thought to imply that Warsaw Pact forces should be reduced more than NATO’s. That disagreement was never resolved.
The CSCE opened six months later. In two years, the diplomats agreed to ten guiding principles, starting with recognition of all parties’ sovereignty on an equal basis. The principles were articulated in the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975.
The CSCE’s pre-history is important and was all about borders and sovereignty. German Chancellor Willy Brandt took office in 1969 and set out to ease tensions with the War Pact countries—the policy described then and ever since as Ostpolitik. A series of agreements regularized European relations starting with the Treaty of Warsaw in 1970. It acknowledged Poland’s western border with what was then East Germany. The 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin stabilized the divided city’s status, easing tensions that had been nagging since the Berlin Wall was built in 1961. Finally, in December 1972, six months after the Brezhnev-Nixon Moscow summit, West Germany and East Germany signed the Basic Treaty to develop normal good neighborly relations with each other. The principle of mutual recognition of sovereignty as the basis for peaceful relations was then incorporated into the CSCE.
In short, the CSCE process recognized and treated as permanent the borders and division of the Cold War. It was not intended to bring either the Cold War or the USSR to an end. It was neither transformational nor revolutionary. It was pragmatic and cautious, aimed at finding a way for two hostile alliance systems to co-exist reasonably safely. It was about guardrails, reducing risks, building confidence through political and economic interaction and through measures such as advanced warning of military maneuvers. If it didn’t quite break the logic of the security dilemma, it reduced the tightness of its grip.
The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the CSCE’s more ambitious offspring. It emerged only once the Cold War was over. A secretariat that opened in February 1991 became the vehicle for remaking the CSCE as a new organization. Until then, there was no organizational structure. The CSCE functioned only as a series of meetings at which the participating governments reviewed commitments, monitored implementation, and occasionally added to them. The framework the CSCE had provided for regional security was important but skeletal. Indeed, it was important and effective because it was skeletal.
Implications for Northeast Asia
In the 1970s and 1980s, the end of the Cold War was a dream for some but it was not the business of the CSCE. The CSCE’s history can usefully be called in aid of the idea of a regional security framework for Northeast Asia precisely because—and only because—of the modesty of its aims and work. It did not end the Cold War but made it appreciably less dangerous. It seemed more than worthwhile at the time and still does, looking both retrospectively at Europe 50 years ago and currently at Northeast Asia.
- [1]
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From a speech by US Defense Secretary Roibert McNamara on 18 Sept 1967: “Whatever be their intentions, whatever be our intentions, actions—or even realistically potential actions—on either side relating to the build-up of nuclear forces, be they either offensive or defensive weapons, necessarily trigger reactions on the other side. It is precisely this action–reaction phenomenon that fuels an arms race.” Read into the Congressional Record the same day by Congressman Carl Albert: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP70B00338R000300100105-8.pdf.
- [2]
-
See Jong Kun Choi, “Toward Mutual Reassurance on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia,” Toda Policy Brief No. 257, November 2025, https://toda.org/assets/files/resources/policy-briefs/tr-257_summary-report_toward-mutual-reassurance-on-the-korean-peninsula-and-in-northeast-asia_choi.pdf?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20251126; Frank Aum, ”Building Mutual Reassurance on the Korean Peninsula through Stable Coexistence,” Toda Policy Brief No. 254, October 2025, https://toda.org/assets/files/resources/policy-briefs/t-pb-254_building-mutual-reassurance-on-the-korean-peninsula-through-stable-coexistence_aum.pdf.
- [3]
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SeeKyung Hwan Cho, “Feasibility of Regional Security Framework in Northeast Asia,”, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 2019, 3:1, 129-143, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/25751654.2020.1747906?needAccess=true; and Han-UI Chang, ‘’The lessons of the Ostpolitik and successive Sunshine Policies in modern inter-Korean relationships,” Korean Monitor (Warsaw Institute), July 2025, https://warsawinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/RS_05-2025_EN.pdf.
- [4]
-
See J Dean, “Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula: How Is the European Experience Applicable?” Korean ]ournaI of Defense Analysis, 8(1), 67—84, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10163279109464230; and Trevor Findlay, :The European Cooperative Security Regime: New Lessons for the Asia-Pacific,” in Andrew Mack, ed, Pacific Cooperation (New York, Routledge, 1995).
- [5]
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As well as drawing on scholarly studies to support that point—e.g., Jeong-yong Kim, South Korea’s Sunshine Policy, 1998-2002. Domestic Imperatives and Private Interests, May 2002, pp. 196-199, https://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/78614. Here, I can cite my own experiencing of hearing Kim Dae-jung talk on this topic in Oslo in 1994, explicitly referring to European détente and the Helsinki Final Act.
15. The America People Once Longed to Live In (A view from Korea)
Summary:
Kang Chun-suk argues that the United States once drew the world’s best talent because it looked safe, lawful, and worth joining, but POTUS’s sharp-edged politics and talk of annexation and tariffs now make allies doubt the durability of the U.S.-led order. South Korea, he notes, rose under that umbrella, yet now faces a harsher bargain: higher defense burdens, tariff pressure, and a thinner sense of American steadiness, even as China presses in the Asia-Indo-Pacific and north Korea remains a nuclear threat. The warning is blunt: there is no clean replacement for American power, only riskier alternatives.
Comment: If Washington treats alliances like balance sheets, what is South Korea’s leverage besides money and market access? If “strategic autonomy” grows, how do South Korea prevent it from becoming "strategic loneliness" in the region with economic and security threats China and north Korea?
Opinion
The America People Once Longed to Live In
[Kang Chun-Suk Column] Trump's Policies and Declining Global Influence Challenge U.S.-Led Order's Sustainability
By Kang Chun-suk
Published 2026.01.30. 23:55
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/01/30/WBGHV5BFZJBU5A7PFGRNEV673M/
U.S. President Donald Trump. /Reuters-Yonhap
There was a time when people longed to go to the United States and live there. Thanks to this longing for America, the U.S. was able to vacuum up the world’s talent and rise to global leadership. A few days ago, after a friend called to say, “I can’t sleep well,” I began reflecting on the U.S. The friend’s daughter lives in Minneapolis, Minnesota, where Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents killed two citizens a few days apart. The daughter, anxious from occasional gunshots, asks, “Should I take the children and go to Korea?”
Since Trump became president, I’ve heard to the point of exhaustion that his unpredictable foreign policies have left large and small nations reeling. This chain reaction originating from the U.S. paradoxically reveals how deeply the world order has relied on America. South Korea preserved its nation from North Korea’s invasion with U.S. help and achieved today’s prosperity under the U.S.-led free trade system. If South Korea had been under Chinese or Soviet influence, would democratization have been possible? Many are shocked that Trump’s America is not the America of the past.
Robert Kagan, a longtime observer of U.S. foreign policy, cites Germany, Japan, and the EU as beneficiaries of the U.S.-led world order in *The World America Made*. These nations have nearly achieved the welfare state slogan “from cradle to grave,” with defense budgets under 2% of GDP. The U.S. spends around 3.5%. These achievements were possible by reallocating defense funds to welfare under the U.S. security umbrella. Under Trump’s pressure to increase defense spending, welfare budgets were the first to be cut.
Since the 1980s, U.S. presidential candidates have vowed to reduce global intervention and redirect budgets to domestic reforms like restoring industrial competitiveness and education. Some foreign policy experts supported this, saying, “Diplomacy starts at home.” Their alternative: If war breaks out, the regional nation takes responsibility first, with the U.S. providing external support. In this context, Trump’s foreign policy is not an abrupt shift.
Yet Trump’s visa sales scheme—offering permanent residency for $1 million—has underperformed. Doubts arise: Is the U.S. still a “country people want to live in”? In the 1950s, the term “Ugly American” emerged, often translated as “ugly” but implying arrogance or annoyance. This term, revived by Trump, reflects rejection of his vulgar remarks—like “We’ll annex Canada” or “Buy Greenland”—and his one-sided affection toward Putin, Xi Jinping, Kim Jong-un, and Netanyahu.
People visit the makeshift memorial for Alex Pretti set up in the area where he is recently shot and killed by federal immigration agents in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on January 29, 2026 /AFP-Yonhap
The U.S.-led world order after 1945 was called a “rules-based order.” A world of great, middle, and small powers is inherently chaotic. Might, not right, dictates influence. International law is like dressing this chaos in a suit. While the U.S. didn’t always use its power rightly, the world viewed it as better than the Soviet Union, which crushed democratization in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary with tanks and looted East German and North Korean factories post-WWII. This helped the U.S. suppress the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Now, Trump, criticized for “exploitative diplomacy,” has discarded the jacket of the suit. Since the U.S. became a hegemon, he’s the only president to appear in just pants. Trump runs the U.S. like a company: unprofitable agencies close, alliances are judged by profit. The U.S., once the world’s leader, has changed. The problem? There’s no alternative to the U.S.-led order. China cannot and should not fill the vacuum. The nation turning South China Sea rocks into territory, surrounding Taiwan with drills, and driving stakes into our West Sea is China.
This world isn’t for know-it-alls chasing empty justifications. Is returning wartime operational control a high ground worth any sacrifice? For Trump, who needs it to counter China but fears nuclear conflict with North Korea, is it not pants he hesitates to wear or remove? A question worth serious consideration.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
https://apstrategy.org/
Executive Director, Korea Regional Review
https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/
Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal
https://smallwarsjournal.com/
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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