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Quotes of the Day:
“Forgetting our objectives. —During the journey we commonly forget its goal. Almost every profession is chosen and commenced as a means to an end but continued as an end in itself. Forgetting our objectives is the most frequent of all acts of stupidity. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, 1844”
- Robert Greene, The 33 Strategies of War
“Learn from yesterday, live for today, hope for tomorrow.”
- Albert Einstein
We make war that we may live in peace.
~ Aristotle
1. Ukraine: WAR BULLETIN January 2, 5.00 pm EST. The three-hundred-thirteenth (313) day of the resistance of the Ukrainian people to russian military large-scale invasion.
2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 3, 2023
3. Beijing spies stole bomb secrets on every U.S. warhead to build nuclear forces
4. Refuting the Irregular Warfare Pipedream
5. US top Middle East commander tests new model of deterring Iran
6. A new world energy order is taking shape
7. The Bird Has Been Freed, and So Has a New Era of Online Extremism
8. In search of America’s next ‘grand strategy’
9. The Fallout of a Failed Jihadist Insurgency in the Philippines
10. The Myth of America’s Ukraine Fatigue
11. America’s ‘strategic ambiguity’ on Taiwan gets more dangerous by the day
12. Ex-NATO secretary-general arrives in Taiwan
13. An unexpected glimpse of disillusionment in Russia’s trenches
14. What Explains Chinese Aggression?
15. Russia’s Rebound
16. Dollar’s demise about to explode Asia’s 2023
1. Ukraine: WAR BULLETIN January 2, 5.00 pm EST. The three-hundred-thirteenth (313) day of the resistance of the Ukrainian people to russian military large-scale invasion.
Also posted on the Small Wars Journal here: https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ukraine-war-bulletin-january-2-500-pm-est-three-hundred-thirteenth-313-day-theresistance
Embassy of Ukraine in the USA
WAR BULLETIN
January 2, 5.00 pm EST
Russia launched missile and 28 air strikes. Russian occupiers carried out 27 airstrikes against civilian infrastructure using the Shahed-136 UAV. All drones were shot down.
On December 31, up to 10 units of enemy military equipment of various types were destroyed and damaged in the area of concentration in the settlement of Makiivka, Donetsk region, the losses of personnel of the occupiers are being specified.
Ukrainian military liberated 40 % of the territories occupied after February 24 and 28 % of all territories occupied by Russia.
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy had the first phone conversation of the year with President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. The parties discussed expected results of the next Ukraine-EU summit to be held on February 3 in Kyiv and agreed to intensify preparatory work.
President of Ukraine: Our sense of unity and authenticity contrasts dramatically with the fear that prevails in Russia.
WAR ROOM
General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.2022 to 02.01.2023:
personnel ‒ about 107440 (+720) killed,
tanks ‒ 3031,
APV ‒ 6093 (+9),
artillery systems – 2027 (+6),
MLRS – 423,
Anti-aircraft warfare systems ‒ 213,
aircraft – 283,
helicopters – 269,
UAV operational-tactical level – 1836 (+44),
cruise missiles ‒ 723,
warships / boats ‒ 16,
vehicles and fuel tankers – 4725 (+5),
special equipment ‒ 181.
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04JXDd6HV3Ve6yKtmyPBZ7B4gw5NPKcV5SYtPmk1cd5qX3MhmHJUUmALr99X6SHF6l
The three-hundred-thirteenth (313) day of the resistance of the Ukrainian people to russian military large-scale invasion.
The enemy launched missile and 28 air strikes. It should be noted that the russian occupiers carried out 27 airstrikes against civilian infrastructure using the Shahed-136 UAV. All these drones were shot down.
The threat of further air and missile strikes remains on the entire territory of Ukraine.
The enemy, losing a lot of manpower, continues to focus on conducting offensive actions on the Bakhmut and tries to improve the tactical position on the Kupyansk and Avdiivska directions.
The situation has not changed significantly in the Volyn, Polissya, Siverskyi and Slobozhanskyi directions. No signs of the formation of hostile offensive groups were detected.
On the Siverskyi and Slobozhanskyi directions, the areas of Yelina settlements of the Chernihiv oblast were hit by shelling; Maiske - Sumy oblast, as well as Strilecha, Starytsa, Vovchansk and Kamianka in Kharkiv oblast.
In the Kupyansk direction, the enemy fired mortars and rocket artillery at the districts of Novomlynsk, Dvorichna, Liman Pershyi, Vilshana, Kupyansk, Orlyanka, Kotlyarivka of the Kharkiv oblast, and Andriivka and Stelmakhivka of the Luhansk oblast.
On the Lyman direction, Makiyivka, Chervonopopivka and Dibrova in the Luhansk oblast, as well as Terny in the Donetsk oblast, came under enemy fire.
In the direction of Bakhmut, the occupiers continue to shell the areas of the settlements of Spirne, Bilohorivka, Vesele, Soledar, Bakhmut, Kostyantynivka, Stupochki, Klishchiivka, Bila Hora, Kurdyumivka, Mayorsk and New York in Donetsk oblast.
Enemy fire was recorded in the Avdiivka direction in Berdychi, Avdiivka, Heorhiivka, Marinka, and Vodyane in the Donetsk oblast.
In the Novopavlovsk direction, Vuhledar, Zolota Nyva, Velyka Novosilka and Vremivka in Donetsk oblast were affected by the fire.
In the Zaporizhzhia direction, the enemy inflicted fire damage on the Novopil settlements of Donetsk oblast; Olhivske, Hulyaipole, Dorozhnyanka, Hulyaipilske, Charivne, Novodanylivka, Orihiv, Mali Shcherbaki, Stepove, Kamianske and Plavni in the Zaporizhzhia region and Musiivka in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast.
In the Kherson direction, the enemy continues shelling populated areas along the right bank of the Dnipro River. In particular, the civil infrastructure of Kherson, Antonivka, and Beryslav was damaged by artillery shelling. There are wounded among the civilian population.
On December 31, up to 10 units of enemy military equipment of various types were destroyed and damaged in the area of concentration in the settlement of Makiivka, Donetsk oblast, the losses of personnel of the occupiers are being specified.
russian invaders continue to commit illegal actions against local residents in the temporarily occupied territory of the Kherson oblast. The occupiers collect information about persons engaged in business activities and seize their vehicles and goods.
During the day, the Ukrainian aviation made 10 strikes on enemy concentration areas and 5 strikes on the positions of its anti-aircraft missile systems.
https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=497757319204018&set=a.229159252730494
POLICY
President of Ukraine
Volodymyr Zelenskyy had a phone call with the President of the European Commission
02.01.2023 15:55 CET
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy had the first phone conversation of the year with President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. The leaders agreed to maintain the dynamics of cooperation between Ukraine and the EU in the new year.
The Head of State informed the President of the European Commission on the situation on the battlefield and consequences of regular Russian shelling of civilian infrastructure of our state with missiles and drones.
The President of the European Commission assured of unwavering solidarity with Ukraine and stressed that the EU would stand with our state in the struggle against the aggressor in 2023 as well, until Ukraine's victory. The parties discussed ways to further strengthen the capacity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by supplying appropriate weapons.
A separate topic of conversation was the implementation of a new macro-financial assistance program for Ukraine in the amount of EUR 18 billion. Volodymyr Zelenskyy stressed the importance of receiving the first tranche of this assistance in the amount of EUR 3 billion already in January.
The Head of State expressed gratitude for the active involvement of the European Commission in the implementation of a number of humanitarian initiatives in our country. The parties agreed that the first 15 million LED lamps financed by the EC would be delivered to Ukraine in January. Volodymyr Zelenskyy noted the importance of quick practical implementation and involvement of the EU member states in the initiative of the First Lady to purchase school buses for the affected regions of our country. The parties discussed the implementation of the project on the reconstruction of 74 destroyed Ukrainian schools, for the financing of which the EU has allocated EUR 100 million. The President of Ukraine is hopeful that these institutions will be reconstructed by September this year.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy informed Ursula von der Leyen of the progress of Ukraine's implementation of the seven recommendations of the European Commission provided in the context of Ukraine’s acquisition of the EU candidate status. The President of the European Commission noted the great progress made by Ukraine on that path. The Head of State emphasized the willingness of the Ukrainian party to complete the relevant work shortly in order to start pre-accession negotiations this year.
The parties discussed expected results of the next Ukraine-EU summit to be held on February 3 in Kyiv and agreed to intensify preparatory work.
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/volodimir-zelenskij-proviv-telefonnu-rozmovu-z-prezidentom-y-80205
President of Ukraine: Our sense of unity and authenticity contrasts dramatically with the fear that prevails in Russia
New year, new day, new summaries. 45 "Shaheds" were shot down on the first night of the year.
I thank our Air Forces - pilots, anti-aircraft warriors. 33 "Shaheds" are on their account. Gratitude to the air defense of our Ground Forces for another 12 downed Iranian drones. Well done, guys!
Russian terrorists were pathetic, and they entered this year staying the same. Our defenders were awesome, and on January 1 they showed themselves very well.
You know, these days it was clearly seen how far we have moved away, mentally, humanly from what Russia is "boiling" in. Our sense of unity, authenticity, life itself - all this contrasts dramatically with the fear that prevails in Russia.
They are afraid. You can feel it. And they are right to be afraid. Because they are losing. Drones, missiles, anything else will not help them. Because we are together. And they are together only with fear.
And they will not take away a single year from Ukraine, they will not take away our independence. We will not give them anything.
I thank everyone who is fighting the enemy at the frontline every day and every night! We respond to every Russian strike at Kherson, Nikopol, Kharkiv region, all our cities and communities. It is very tangible for them.
I am grateful to all our energy workers, utility workers for stable energy supply and a minimum of outages - taking into account all the existing circumstances. Wherever transmission lines and other energy facilities are damaged by shelling, the restoration continues around the clock. Today as well.
And it is very important how all Ukrainians recharged their inner energy this New Year's Eve.
And how we thanked our warriors. How we thanked our loved ones. How millions of times all over Ukraine, all over the free world, our wish - the wish of victory - has sounded and still sounds.
We will do everything to make it so!
Glory to all our warriors!
Glory to each and everyone who works for the victory of Ukraine!
Glory to Ukraine!
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/nashe-z-vami-vidchuttya-yednosti-spravzhnosti-tak-kontrastuy-80201
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba
January 2, 2023: As we brace for two more winter months and head into the new year of 2023, we call upon Ukraine’s partners to stand strong and continue to support our nation. The victory of Ukraine will be a victory for the whole world, and it will bring peace and prosperity to us all.
https://twitter.com/DmytroKuleba/status/1609977097379844096?s=20&t=7fXPZfjIavt0po3MSLBu8w
December 31, 2022: This time, Russia’s mass missile attack is deliberately targeting residential areas, not even our energy infrastructure. War criminal Putin “celebrates” New Year by killing people. Russia must be kicked out of its UN Security Council seat which it has always occupied illegally.
https://twitter.com/DmytroKuleba/status/1609180784736206851?s=20&t=7fXPZfjIavt0po3MSLBu8w
2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 3, 2023
Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2023
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a series of instructions for Russian agencies and high-level officials likely aimed at appeasing widespread criticisms of the provisioning and payment of benefits to Russian military personnel and propagandizing the war.
- Putin confirmed that Russia is using a variety of social schemes to justify the transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia.
- Systemic failures in Russia’s force generation efforts continue to plague Russian personnel capabilities to the detriment of Russian operational capacity in Ukraine.
- Degraded Russian military personnel capabilities will likely further exacerbate Russian milblogger criticism of Russian force generation efforts and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
- Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin attempted to justify the Wagner Group’s lack of progress in Bakhmut, partially supporting ISW’s assessment that Russian forces in Bakhmut are culminating.
- Russian forces continued limited counterattacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line as Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian military logistics in Luhansk Oblast.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and Avdiivka and may be reinforcing their grouping in western Donetsk Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces have reportedly established positions on the Velikiy Potemkinsky Island in the Dnipro River delta as of January 2.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree that promises additional benefits to Russian forces personnel and Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) who defend the Russian-Ukrainian border.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 3, 2023
understandingwar.org
Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, George Barros, Madison Williams, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 3, 6:45 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a series of instructions for Russian agencies and high-level officials on January 2 likely to address criticisms of the Kremlin’s treatment of military personnel and portray the Kremlin as an involved war-time apparatus.[1] These instructions are ostensibly an effort to address grievances voiced by mothers of servicemen during a highly staged November 25 meeting with Putin.[2] The 11 instructions direct several high-ranking members of the Russian government—including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, and Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin—and government agencies (including the Russian Ministry of Defense) to collaborate with other agencies and non-government organizations to generate a list of recommendations for addressing and improving supply, benefits, and healthcare processes for military personnel.[3] Putin instructed the Ministry of Culture to assist the nongovernmental organization “Committee of the Fatherland Warrior’s Families” to help create documentaries and other material to showcase the “courage and heroism” of Russian forces in Ukraine and to screen domestic documentaries to “fight against the spread of neo-Nazi and neo-fascist ideology.” These instructions are unlikely to generate significant changes and will likely take significant time to implement.
Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed that Russia is using a variety of social schemes to justify the transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia. In his annual New Year's speech, Putin thanked Russians for their efforts to send children from occupied Ukrainian territory on “holidays.”[4] ISW has previously reported instances of Russian officials using the guise of “holidays” and vacation schemes to justify the transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia and Russian-occupied Crimea.[5] Putin’s list of instructions also directs Russian Commissioner for the Rights of the Child Maria Lvova-Belova and the occupation heads of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts to "take additional measures to identify minors...left without parental care” in occupied areas to provide them with ”state social assistance” and ”social support.”[6] The Kremlin may seek to use this social benefit scheme to tabulate the names of children it deems to be orphans to identify children for deportation to Russia and potentially open avenues for their adoption into Russian families. ISW continues to note that the forced adoption of Ukrainian children into Russian families may constitute a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[7]
Systemic failures in Russia’s force generation apparatus continue to plague personnel capabilities to the detriment of Russian operational capacity in Ukraine. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 3 that the Russian military has sent recently mobilized personnel trained as artillerymen and tankers following their mobilizations to infantry divisions in Ukraine with no formal infantry training.[8] Although the use of personnel in non-infantry branches in infantry roles is not unusual, the Russian military’s practice in this case is likely very problematic. The Russian Armed Forces devoted too little time to training mobilized personnel for use in the branches they had previously served in before sending them to the front lines. They certainly did not have time to train them in additional specialties.
Russian forces have suffered significant losses of artillery systems and armored vehicles in operations in Ukraine since the start of partial mobilization in September of 2022, and, therefore, likely have excess personnel trained in the use of specific military equipment.[9] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhii Cherevaty reported that Russian forces in eastern Ukraine are currently firing artillery shells at roughly one-third the rate of the summer of 2022.[10] The reduced rate of Russian artillery fire is likely a result of the depletion of ammunition stocks, given reports that Russian forces are deliberately transferring ammunition from one sector of the front to another.[11] Putting poorly-trained artillerymen into infantry units without training them for infantry combat operations will likely make them little more than cannon fodder.
Degraded Russian military personnel capabilities will likely further exacerbate Russian milblogger criticism of Russian force generation efforts and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). One Russian milblogger argued that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s proposals to create five new artillery divisions and the recent creation of an artillery division in the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 2nd Army Corps will be a waste of personnel and artillery munitions if the Russian MoD continues to train these personnel in just an artillery capacity without infantry training.[12] Another Russian milblogger argued inaccurately that putting a tanker or an artilleryman in service as a simple infantryman is a war crime that even Soviet commanders did not commit in the most difficult months of the Second World War in 1941.[13] (It certainly is not any sort of crime to allocate individuals with certain specialties to perform different roles and missions in war, and tankers and gunners in all armies at war have sometimes fought as infantry when their systems were destroyed or unavailable.) The Russian milblogger compared the current situation to a similar incident in 2015 when the Russian deployment of an artillery unit as infantry in the operation to capture Debaltseve, Donetsk Oblast, led to the death of 80 percent of the unit to argue that Russian commanders who make such decisions should face criminal prosecution.[14] Russian milbloggers have routinely criticized the Russian MoD for the poor conduct of partial mobilization and will likely continue to do so as Russian force generation efforts produce degraded personnel capabilities that will likely further constrain the Russian military’s ability to achieve any operational success in Ukraine. The hyperbole of milblogger criticism of the MoD’s personnel practices highlights the ever-increasing hostility toward and skepticism of the MoD among elements of the milblogger community.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin attempted to justify the Wagner Group’s lack of progress in Bakhmut, partially supporting ISW’s assessment that Russian forces in Bakhmut are culminating.[15] Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti amplified a December 31 interview with Prigozhin on January 3 in which Prigozhin stated that Wagner Group forces in Bakhmut are unable to break through Ukrainian defenses in Bakhmut.[16] Prigozhin stated that Wagner's offensive operations in Bakhmut are highly attritional because each house in Bakhmut is a “fortress,” that Ukrainians have defensive lines every 10 meters, and that Russian forces must clear building-by-building.[17] This is a significant inflection for Prigozhin and the first time he has framed Wagner forces in Bakhmut as making effectively no gains. Prigozhin previously stated in October 2022 that Wagner forces operating in the Bakhmut area advance 100–200 meters a day.[18] The Wagner Group conducted information operations to assert that Wagner Group forces exclusively made gains in Bakhmut without the assistance of other Russian elements in December.[19]
Prigozhin is likely setting information conditions to blame Wagner Group's failure to take Bakhmut on the Russian Ministry of Defense or the Russian industrial base. Wagner Group soldiers told Prigozhin that they were unable to break through Ukrainian lines in Bakhmut due to insufficient armored vehicles, ammunition, and 100mm shell supplies during a likely scripted segment in the clip. This statement seeks to absolve the Wagner Group and Prigozhin of personal responsibility by attributing their failure to capture Bakhmut to the larger Russian resource allocation problems that Russian and Ukrainian sources have been increasingly discussing since late December.[20]
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a series of instructions for Russian agencies and high-level officials likely aimed at appeasing widespread criticisms of the provisioning and payment of benefits to Russian military personnel and propagandizing the war.
- Putin confirmed that Russia is using a variety of social schemes to justify the transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia.
- Systemic failures in Russia’s force generation efforts continue to plague Russian personnel capabilities to the detriment of Russian operational capacity in Ukraine.
- Degraded Russian military personnel capabilities will likely further exacerbate Russian milblogger criticism of Russian force generation efforts and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
- Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin attempted to justify the Wagner Group’s lack of progress in Bakhmut, partially supporting ISW’s assessment that Russian forces in Bakhmut are culminating.
- Russian forces continued limited counterattacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line as Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian military logistics in Luhansk Oblast.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and Avdiivka and may be reinforcing their grouping in western Donetsk Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces have reportedly established positions on the Velikiy Potemkinsky Island in the Dnipro River delta as of January 2.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree that promises additional benefits to Russian forces personnel and Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) who defend the Russian-Ukrainian border.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
- Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Stelmakhivka (16km northwest of Svatove), Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna), Ploshchanka (17km northwest of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[21] Geolocated footage posted on January 3 shows Russian forces operating 1km north of Bilohorivka, indicating that Russian forces have made marginal advances around the settlement.[22] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces used thermobaric artillery systems, a high-value military district-level asset, to strike Ukrainian forces in the Kreminna area.[23] The Russian military’s use of a military district-level asset in the Kreminna area indicates that Russian forces are likely continuing to prioritize operations along the Kreminna-Svatove line amidst the Russian military’s potential preparation for a decisive effort in Luhansk Oblast.[24]
Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian military logistics in Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhii Cherevaty reported on January 3 that Ukrainian forces destroyed Russian ammunition field warehouses and a fuel and lubricants storage area in the Svatove direction.[25]
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on January 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks near Bakhmut itself; northeast of Bakhmut near Rozdolivka (18km northeast), Soledar (10km northeast), and Krasna Hora (5km northeast); and south of Bakhmut near Kurdyumivka (12km southwest) and Klishchiivka (6km southwest).[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group forces launched an assault toward Krasna Hora and are continuing attempts to push north towards Bakhmut from positions near Klishchiivka, Ozeryanivka (14km southwest of Bakhmut), and Opytne (3km south of Bakhmut).[27] Geolocated combat footage shows Ukrainian strikes on Russian vehicles and infantry elements north of Soledar, indicating that Russian forces have established positions in this area.[28]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on January 3. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian troops conducted assaults near Avdiivka (just north of Donetsk City) and Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops also attacked Ukrainian fortifications along the western outskirts of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and attempted to push on Nevelske and Pervomaiske.[30] Another Russian source reported that elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 9th Regiment are advancing toward Avdiivka and fighting in small groups to avoid personnel losses.[31] Russian sources continued to claim that street fighting is ongoing in Marinka.[32]
Russian forces may be reinforcing their grouping in western Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff noted on January 3 that Russian forces are strengthening their grouping in the Novopavlivka direction (the operational direction used to refer to the area southwest of Donetsk City) at the expense of units transferred from the Kherson direction.[33] This statement is consistent with ISW’s previous observations that Russian forces are continuing to reinforce positions throughout eastern Ukraine with elements previously deployed to Kherson Oblast.[34] Geolocated footage posted on January 3 shows Ukrainian artillery stopping a Russian infantry rotation near Pavlivka (40km southwest of Donetsk City).[35] Russian forces continued routine artillery fire in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[36]
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Ukrainian forces claimed they established positions on the Velykyi Potomkin Island in the Dnipro River delta southwest of Kherson City as of January 2. Geolocated footage shows that Ukrainian forces reached the northeastern part of the island as of January 2, and some social media users claimed that Ukrainian forces captured parts or all of the island.[37] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on January 3 that ”there is information” that Ukrainian forces have captured the island but there is currently no official confirmation.[38] Geolocated footage posted on January 2 shows that Russian forces still operate in other areas of the delta.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that the island remains a contested zone and that reports of Ukrainian forces capturing the island are a Ukrainian information operation.[40]
Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian force concentrations in the rear areas of southern Ukraine. Geolocated footage posted on January 2 shows the destroyed “Gran Prix” stud farm complex in Oleshky, Kherson Oblast following a Ukrainian strike.[41] A Russian soldier had previously posted a picture of himself standing in front of the complex’s logo, a violation of operational security principles that likely aided Ukrainian troops in targeting the strike.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian force concentration in Chukalivka, Kherson Oblast (35km southwest of Kherson City on the T2216 highway) on December 31, killing and wounding 500 Russian military personnel.[43] Russian milbloggers denied reports of the strike.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian force concentration in Fedorivka (likely referring to a settlement along either the E58 or R47 highways in eastern Kherson Oblast) on January 1 and are still determining Russian casualties.[45] A Ukrainian source reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian forces in Chaplynka, Kherson Oblast (69km south of the Dnipro River on the T2202 Nova Kakhovka-Armiansk highway).[46] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on January 3 that Ukrainian forces shelled a hospital in Tokmak, and geolocated footage shows damage to a medical facility where Russian forces reportedly had positions.[47] Russian sources reported that Russian air defenses shot down likely Ukrainian drones over Sevastopol and Dzhankoi, Crimea, on January 2 and 3.[48]
Ukrainian officials stated that Russian occupation officials are working to strengthen their administrative control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). The Ukrainian Resistance Center warned on January 3 that Russian occupation officials plan to appoint Dmitry Minyaev, a Rosenergoatom (a subsidiary of Russian nuclear energy agency Rosatom) special security services official, as the ZNPP deputy director for physical protection and regime issues sometime in January 2023.[49]
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree that promises additional benefits to Russian forces personnel and Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) special police on January 3.[50] Putin signed a decree that promises a 5-million-ruble (about $69,000) payout to the families of medically-discharged or killed-in-action Russian personnel who served in border regions—including occupied Ukrainian territories—since February 24.[51] The decree also promises a 3-million-ruble payment (about $41,000) to those serving in border regions who were injured during service.[52] These payouts are likely a Kremlin attempt to mitigate milblogger criticism of the underfunding of the Russian border guard service.
Russian military officials continue to find sneaky means to continue mobilization. The Central Bank of the Russian Federation ordered its branches on December 27, 2022, to send mobilization summonses to all “male debtors” in their system and to present the male debtors with service contracts.[53] The official Central Bank of the Russian Federation letter advised employees to threaten police intervention should any of the male debtors resist or refuse to accept the summonses, but reassured employees that the risk of participating in mobilization recruitment efforts is "minimal.”[54] A Russian source reported on January 2, 2023, that the military registration and enlistment office in Krasnodar Krai sent a letter to a local enterprise demanding that 20 of its employees go to a "45-day military training camp.”[55] The source assesses that this is likely a mobilization scheme.[56]
The Kremlin continues to expand the legal framework for mobilizing residents of occupied territories. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on December 30, 2022, that suspended the previous age limits for mobilization in occupied territories until at least 2026 and promised higher ranks to those who have previously served in the Russian forces or law enforcement.[57] ISW previously assessed that Putin has heavily drained the pool of available combat-ready reservists.[58] This decree is likely a desperate attempt to expand the pool of those eligible for mobilization.
Russian forces may be falsifying the death certificates of Russian personnel killed in action in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) shared intercepted audio on January 2 of a Russian servicemember claiming that the Russian forces have been falsifying death certificates for Russian soldiers by falsely claiming that Russian personnel who died in Ukraine died in Belgorod Oblast instead.[59] ISW is unable to verify this Russian servicemember’s claim.
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Ukrainian officials in formerly occupied areas continue to unearth Russian torture chambers. The Kherson Oblast Police reported on January 3 that Ukrainian police officers discovered a Russian torture chamber in the basement of the main police department building of Kherson Oblast in Kherson City.[60] Kherson Police stated that officers found objects indicating that Russian forces conducted torture and interrogations in the chamber and held retired law enforcement officers, those identified to hold pro-Ukrainian sentiments, and ordinary Kherson citizens who refused to cooperate with Russian occupation officials there.[61] Ukraine's State Security Service (SBU) reported that SBU personnel discovered a torture chamber in the liberated village of Oleksandrivka in Horokhiv Hromada, Mykolaiv Oblast.[62] The SBU reported that Russian forces tortured residents whom they deemed to be uncooperative using suffocation, beatings, and electric shocks.[63] This is a direct violation of the laws of armed conflict and Article III of the Geneva Convention.[64]
Russian officials are continuing efforts to deport children to Russia under the guise of cultural programs. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration head Yevheniy Balitsky stated on January 3 that the occupation Ministry for Youth Policy, under the purview of the Russian federal project “We Are Together,” plans to take children and families of participants in the conflict to Moscow to attend “The Nutcracker.”[65] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik stated on January 2 that Russian occupation officials sent 44 children from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Moscow for the New Year holiday through the cultural program “Moscow - Open City.”[66] It is unclear whether and under what circumstances these children and their families will return to Ukraine. ISW has previously assessed that Russian officials are conducting a deliberate depopulation campaign in occupied territories and notes that forced deportation of children is a potential violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, as well as a constituent element of a broader ethnic cleansing campaign.[67]
ISW will continue to report daily observed indicators consistent with the current assessed most dangerous course of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv.
ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast about a potential Russian offensive against northern Ukraine in winter 2023 remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible, and the risk of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. This new section in the daily update is not in itself a forecast or assessment. It lays out the daily observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly. Our assessment that the MDCOA remains unlikely has not changed. We will update this header if the assessment changes.
Observed indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:
- Nothing significant to report.
Observed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA in the past 24 hours:
- Nothing significant to report.
Observed counter-indicators for the MDCOA in the past 48 hours:
- The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 3.[68]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/23160; http://www.kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/70322; https://t.me/mod_russia/22080
[3] https://t.me/mod_russia/23160; http://www.kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/70322; https://t.me/mod_russia/22080
[6] http://www.kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/70322
[10] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/01/03/sposterigayetsya-stijka-tendencziya-do-vynyknennya-v-rosiyan-deficzytu-snaryadiv-ta-riznyh-naboyiv-sergij-cherevatyj/
[25] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/01/03/pvk-vagner-sergij-cherevatyj/
[49] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/03/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-zvozyty-svij-personal-na-zaes/
[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/23157; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202301030003; https://interfax dot ru/russia/879569
[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/23157; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202301030003; https://interfax dot ru/russia/879569
[52] https://t.me/mod_russia/23157; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202301030003; https://interfax dot ru/russia/879569
[53] https://abif dot ru/info/news/vydacha-mobilizatsionnykh-povestok-v-bankakh-sushchestvenno-ne-otrazitsya-na-bankovskoy-sisteme-ross/; https://t.me/msk_gde/3561
[54] https://abif dot ru/info/news/vydacha-mobilizatsionnykh-povestok-v-bankakh-sushchestvenno-ne-otrazitsya-na-bankovskoy-sisteme-ross/
[57] https://t.me/kommunist/14651; https://kremlin dot ru/acts/news/7-311; https://lug-info dot com/news/putin-ustanovil-osobennosti-postupleniya-na-sluzhbu-v-organy-vnutrennih-del-v-novyh-regionah-rf
[59] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/staviat-chto-pohyb-v-belhorode-a-ne-v-ukrayne.html; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WVbCmJU26qw&ab_channel=%D0%93%D0%BE%D0%B...
understandingwar.org
3. Beijing spies stole bomb secrets on every U.S. warhead to build nuclear forces
Did those stolen secrets inform the nuclear weapons designed by China and used in the A.Q. Khan network? If so, does that mean in effect north Korea's nuclear weapons are based on US designs.?
Beijing spies stole bomb secrets on every U.S. warhead to build nuclear forces
washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz
Subscriber-only
Beijing‘s rapid buildup of nuclear forces has been assisted by American nuclear and missile technology obtained by Chinese spies and through U.S. space and nuclear cooperation in the 1990s, according to a review of Chinese technology records and internal U.S. government documents.
The Pentagon disclosed last month that China‘s warhead stockpile will reach at least 1,500 strategic nuclear warheads by 2035, up from 200 just a few years ago and 400 warheads today.
Adm. Charles Richard, until Dec. 9 the commander of the U.S. nuclear forces, further sounded the alarm on the Chinese nuclear expansion last month when he formally notified Congress that the size of Chinese nuclear forces for the first time exceed those of the United States in one of three unspecified areas — warheads, long-range missiles or launchers.
A year earlier Adm. Richard notified Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin that China had formally reached “strategic breakout.”
“A strategic breakout denotes the rapid qualitative and quantitative expansion of military capabilities that enables a shift in strategy and requires the DoD to make immediate and significant planning and/or capability shifts,” he said in congressional testimony on April 5.
Peter Huessy, president of Geostrategic Analysis who has studied China’s nuclear buildup, said the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal is both alarming and based substantially on American know-how legally and illegally obtained by Beijing over the decades.
“The spectacular growth in Chinese nuclear forces as described recently by Adm. Richard highlights two things: First, the Chinese ambition to become a world military hegemon, and two, the unfortunate role of the often reckless transfer of nuclear applicable technology from the United States to China that facilitated this extraordinary growth,” Mr. Huessy said.
Under the Biden administration, no major shift in nuclear modernization plans has been made beyond a multibillion-dollar effort to field new missiles, bombers and submarines.
Adm. Richard and other military and defense officials point with alarm to the recent construction of three large bases in western China where up to 360 multi-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are being deployed.
“The new silos can be equipped with the solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 Mod 2 capable of reaching the continental United States,” Adm. Richard said, using the NATO terms for what the Pentagon also calls the DF-31AG ICBM. “With this discovery, it is clear the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) will soon achieve a robust ICBM capability,” he said.
The Pentagon’s annual report also said that in addition to the DF-31AG, China is expected to deploy a newer, longer-range ICBMs in the silos of western China called the DF-41, that will carry up to three warheads.
Modest beginnings
By contrast, China’s long-range missile force just three decades ago included seven relatively inaccurate single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles, according to an internal 1993 White House document. The document, known as Presidential Review 31, said that by 2000 China would have 24 to 28 ICBMs capable of reaching the United States “some of which may be MIRVed” — the term for multiple, independently-targetable reentry vehicles.
But two key Chinese technology coups targeting advanced American technology greatly accelerated the pace of the buildup of nuclear forces during the 1990s.
The first was a large-scale espionage program to steal nuclear warhead secrets. The CIA concluded in a public assessment that China through espionage obtained information on every deployed U.S. warhead, in particular the compact W-88 warhead that can be used on multiple-warhead missiles.
The second coup involved knowledge gleaned from U.S.-China space cooperation during the Clinton administration, the result of a new policy that loosened national security export controls to permit greater joint efforts with Beijing in space. Under the new policy, U.S.-based Motorola and China’s Great Wall Industry agreed in 1993 to launch Iridium satellites on Chinese rockets.
Under the deal, China built a “smart dispenser” to Motorola’s specifications that allowed launching two satellites on a single rocket. Motorola denied it had acted improperly in helping the Chinese build the dispenser.
But a 1996 report by the National Air Intelligence Center found that the smart dispenser could be used as a post-boost vehicle China’s DF-5 ICBM.
The report concluded that with minimal modifications the smart dispenser “could be used to deploy multiple reentry vehicles” for ICBMs. By 2015, the Pentagon’s annual report revealed that the once single-warhead DF-5 now included a modified version with multiple warheads.
Chinese nuclear expert Li Bin expressed Beijing’s reasoning on multiple warheads in a report published by the Carnegie Endowment in 2019.
“If we increase the number of warheads per missile, then this would clearly increase our nuclear strike capability,” he stated. “However, it would also increase the value of striking each MIRVed missile for China’s opponents.”
Mr. Li said China in the past avoided multiple-warhead missiles to reduce the threat of preemptive attacks.
“Deploying several warheads on a single delivery system is like putting many of your eggs in one basket,” he stated. “Thus, when the risk of an incoming attack increases, decision-makers will be under pressure to use their MIRVed missiles as early as possible to prevent their baskets, and their eggs, from being destroyed.”
China’s official military newspaper, People’s Liberation Daily, has dismissed the Pentagon’s recent assertions about the challenges posed by China’s steady nuclear buildup, accusing U.S. military officials under both President Trump and President Biden of fabricating a “China threat” to get more funding from Congress.
“The Biden administration has further detailed the nuclear deterrence strategy customized by the Trump administration to target China and Russia,” the outlet reported on Dec. 12.
But Adm. Richard said he believes the strategic breakout by China is for use in a “coercive nuclear strategy.” Such a strategy could allow Beijing to intimidate the U.S. and its regional allies in standoffs over such issues as the future of Taiwan and control of the South China Sea and East China Sea.
Shift to multi-warhead missiles
As it accumulates wealth and technological expertise, China is moving away from single-warhead missiles, according to the Pentagon. The latest annual report says the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will place multiple warheads on its 20 DF-5s and will add at least three warheads to the DF-31AG and DF-41 land-based missiles and the new JL-3 submarine-launched missile.
Critics say the progress is especially galling because Chinese nuclear warhead technology was greatly assisted by espionage that targeted U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories and through another Clinton administration program that promoted exchanges between U.S. nuclear scientists and their Chinese counterparts.
In September, a study produced by the private intelligence firm Strider revealed that China’s targeting of nuclear laboratories for secrets began in the 1980s and was later modified to more efficiently recruit nuclear scientists. Between 1987 and 2021, at least 162 scientists who had worked at Los Alamos traveled to China for work on sensitive projects, including 15 who were formerly on the staff at the lab.
“The Los Alamos case shows how China’s rapid advances in certain key military technologies are being aided by individuals who participated in sensitive U.S. government-funded research,” the report said.
The loss of W-88 warhead design information first came to the attention of U.S. counterintelligence officials at the Energy Department in 1992 when they learned that China had tested a nuclear warhead that appeared similar in design to the W-88. Three years later, a nuclear defector provided the CIA with an official classified Chinese document that revealed specific design information on the W-88 and other warheads.
The officials learned from the Chinese defector that the test involved a 150-kiloton explosion that used a special oval-shaped core, leading analysts to conclude China had copied the warhead design from the American design.
Missile secrets compromised
The revelations led to an uproar on Capitol Hill. A special congressional investigative committee led by Rep. Chris Cox, California Republican, concluded in its 1999 final report that China intelligence agents had obtained secrets on seven U.S. thermonuclear nuclear bombs, including the W-88.
“The PRC stole classified information on every currently deployed U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM),” the congressional committee report said.
A 2001 Congressional Research Service report said two U.S.-based companies, Space Systems Loral and Hughes Electronics Corp., had helped develop Chinese missiles.
The report cited a 1997 classified analysis by the Pentagon’s Defense Technology Security Administration that Loral and Hughes had transferred expertise to China that “significantly enhanced the guidance and control systems of its nuclear ballistic missiles” and that “United States national security has been harmed.”
The list of classified U.S. material obtained by China included information on the W-56 Minuteman II ICBM; the W-62 Minuteman III ICBM; the W-70 Lance short-range ballistic missile (SRBM); the W-76 Trident C-4 SLBM; the W-78 Minuteman III Mark 12A ICBM; the W-87 Peacekeeper ICBM; and the W-88 Trident D-5 SLBM.
The W-88 is the most sophisticated strategic nuclear warhead in the U.S. arsenal and is deployed on the Trident D-5 submarine-launched missiles
An intelligence report on Chinese intelligence targeting of U.S. nuclear weapons stated that from 1984 to 1988 Chinese spies were able to steal the design information for the W-88. “To obtain this information the United States conducted tens of nuclear tests,” the report said. “Once obtained, the Chinese were able to accelerate their research and advance their nuclear weapons program well beyond indigenous capabilities.”
The report stated that Peter Lee, a contract employee at the Los Alamos National Laboratory traveled to China in 1985. During a meeting in his Beijing hotel room, Lee was approached by two Chinese officials who convinced him to provide China with classified information on nuclear weaponry.
Lee pleaded guilty to passing defense secrets to China in 1998 and was sentenced to one year in prison.
The secrets provided to the Chinese by Lee included information on an advanced radar technology being developed to track submarines.
Lee was part of a U.S.-China nuclear exchange program that began in the 1980s that ended in 1983 and resumed in 1993.
Another Los Alamos nuclear scientist, Wen Ho Lee, was investigated by the FBI in 1999 on suspicion he was a suspect in the loss of warhead secrets.
Lee was charged with removing magnetic computer tapes from Los Alamos’s X Division, where nuclear weapons are designed. According to court papers in the case, the missing tapes, which were never recovered from Lee, contained blueprints of the entire U.S. nuclear warhead arsenal, including the exact shapes and dimensions and the materials used in design and construction.
Lee would allege that he was improperly targeted by FBI counterspies because he was Chinese-American. He sued the Justice Department claiming his privacy rights were violated by disclosures to the press. The civil case was settled in 2006 within an award of $1.6 million.
He pleaded guilty in 2000 to lesser charges of mishandling classified information, specifically unauthorized possession and control of national defense documents and restricted data on a tape.
CIA damage assessment
In 1999, U.S. intelligence agencies conducted a damage assessment of China’s theft of nuclear weapons data and the impact on the future development of Chinese weapons, concluding that the stolen information “allowed China to focus successfully down critical paths and avoid less promising approaches to nuclear weapon designs.”
Beijing’s quest for critical nuclear technology was broad-based and tapped multiple sources, U.S. agencies said.
“China obtained at least basic design information on several modern U.S. nuclear re-entry vehicles, including the Trident II (W88),” the CIA said. “China’s technical advances have been made on the basis of classified and unclassified information derived from espionage, contact with U.S. and other countries’ scientists, conferences and publications, unauthorized media disclosures, declassified U.S. weapons information, and Chinese indigenous development.”
The weapons information “made an important contribution to the Chinese objective to maintain a second-strike capability and provided useful information for future designs,” the assessment said.
China’s ICBM force today is backed by over 900 theater-range intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles that, outfitted with nuclear warheads, “are capable of doing catastrophic damage to United States, allied and partner forces in the region,” Adm. Richard said. “Combined, this formidable arsenal is cause for concern.”
To provide missile warning, China in the last year deployed large phased-array radars, the admiral added — yet another key technological advance where sensitive U.S. technology played a role.
Technology for phased-array radars was obtained by China in 2005 from a defense contractor, Power Paragon, a unit of L-3 Communications, in the spy case involving Chinese-American electrical engineer Chi Mak. Mak was convicted of conspiring to send defense technology to China in 2007 and sentenced to 24 years in prison. He died in prison in October.
China military affairs expert Rick Fisher said he believes it is highly likely that U.S. nuclear warhead design insights boosted China’s current breakout to nuclear superiority over the United States.
China’s warhead stockpile could eventually exceed 4,000 warheads in the coming years based on the country’s development and deployment of small MIRVs, he said. A Chinese source in 2017 asserted the DF-41 ICBM could carry up to 10 warheads weighing 165 kilos each, he said, adding that the source’s information could not be confirmed.
“But in 1999 the Cox Commission stated that China had obtained critical information on the W-76 warhead of the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile,” said Mr. Fisher, a senior fellow with the International Strategic Assessment Center. “Though its true weight is classified, some observers note the W-76 weighs less than 165 kilos, which may mean that China was able to help its design of lightweight warheads after gaining access to design information from U.S. warheads like the W-76.”
The Arms Control Association stated in a 2019 fact sheet that the DF-41 could carry up to 10 warheads.
The Pentagon report stated that the DF-41 is expected to be armed with three warheads.
• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.
Copyright © 2023 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.
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4. Refuting the Irregular Warfare Pipedream
Some responses to the article on the "IW Pipedream"
Below the article is a detailed critical comment from the pipedream article.
Tue, 01/03/2023 - 9:31pm
Refuting the Irregular Warfare Pipedream
(Response to “Developing Mastery of Irregular Warfare is a Pipe Dream if the DOD is Forced to Rely on SOCOM”)
By Charlie Black
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/refuting-irregular-warfare-pipedream
Let’s begin with stating that this forum is great for candid debate. I applaud James Armstrong who came out swinging in his recent rebuttal to an article authored by LTG Cleveland et al. Unfortunately, his article mischaracterizes the many causal factors of a two-decade long war and misplaces blame for associated military failures that are shared by many, elected and appointed.
First, war of any character is ultimately pursued for political purposes with the uniformed military as only one among many instruments to achieve desired outcomes. This is especially stark when conducting an irregular war. Armstrong’s first elephant isn’t. No executive department and certainly no single military service has “the” responsibility for irregular warfare (IW). Additionally, we are reminded that the development of IW capabilities and the conduct of irregular warfare are two different roles as clearly delimited between Warfighters and the services. Ultimately the responsibility, authority, and accountability reside with the Commander-in-Chief.
Second, there is also no 2nd elephant. We can argue for eternity about the numerous success and failures consequent to the employment of joint forces over the past twenty years. It has been a long war with well-known and lesser known operations conducted across the globe. There are many tactical to strategic level examples of success and failure over the conduct of many campaigns. A broad and deep exploration of this episode of war might best be distributed to the academe and military schoolhouses, conducted by scholars and military practitioners alike. There is much to be learned and the new Irregular Warfare Functional Center (IWFC) has a key role to that end no matter where its final home.
Placing blame on any single Combatant Command, especially USSOCOM as a functional command, for the many failures in our recent war experience comes off as parochially naïve. The overarching theme of his rebuttal reads as if USASOC, seen as a proxy of USSOCOM, has somehow displaced the US Army’s rightful place to lead IW. We should be cautious not to conflate irregular warfare and the subordinate role of special operations within such an undertaking. Most troublesome is an invalid attempt to simplify cause-effect that ignores the irreducible complexity of war, shows a misunderstanding of jointness, and undervalues the contributions of partners.
To be clear, I do agree that the U.S. has often failed to achieve political outcomes in over two decades of conflict. We might avoid framing our recent “war” as a single coherent policy- clearly it was not. Perhaps an alternative interpretation is to frame this war period as the aggregate of campaigns and operations with different geography, time, constraints, enemy, and purposes. We’ve too often conflated and oversimplified. There is much to be learned by the uniformed military, policy makers, appropriators, and American citizens. In my view the IWFC should not be subordinated to a service or unified command. Both Cleveland and others have offered propositions worthy of consideration. The IWFC has a role to inculcate the entire Department in the ways of irregular warfare, as well to be a bridge to and from a broad range of partners for IW endeavors.
About the Author(s)
Charlie Black
Charlie Black is the Managing Partner of Xundis Global, an advisory firm that helps partners successfully navigate complexity and change. He is a retired Marine Corps Infantry and Special Operations Officer, who draws on over thirty-five years of diverse executive to tactical level experiences across the Intergovernmental, Defense, Commercial, and Academic ecosystems. His research endeavors include integrated statecraft, social resilience, human security and the future of special operations.
From the Comments Section of the article: "Developing Mastery of Irregular Warfare is a Pipe Dream if the DOD is Forced to Rely on SOCOM"
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/developing-mastery-irregular-warfare-pipe-dream-if-dod-forced-rely-socom
As I read this article, my hopes that this could be the beginning of a great discussion between special operations and non-special operations thinkers, was quickly dashed after I read the second paragraph. I should have stopped reading, for the remainder of the article devolved into nonsense with a misrepresentation of the facts and a complete reversal of where the blame for failures over the past 20 years should be, that is if blame is to be assigned.
As I mentioned in my opening line, the author demonstrated quite clearly in his second paragraph his lack of understanding of Irregular Warfare, and I would argue that this thinking is prevalent with in the US Army and is one of the reasons the Army failed to learn in both Afghanistan and Iraq, in fact I would take it all the way back to Vietnam. His lack of education in Irregular Warfare is not his fault. The services in many respects, treat Irregular Warfare not as a type of war but as a type of operation. This is quite evident in the resent effort in the Pentagon to change the definition of Irregular Warfare from a form of warfare to a form of operation such that it is another tool to be used by the services to identify required capabilities for justifying budget lines and requesting funding from congress. When in fact Irregular Warfare is a form of warfare that requires a strategy, and the art of Irregular Warfare is underpinned by a completely different science.
Joint Pub 1 identifies two types of warfare, Traditional Warfare, and Irregular Warfare. Traditional Warfare is one nation state forcing its will on another. The mechanisms of victory for Traditional Warfare are to be close with the enemy, to destroy his will and capability to fight and to occupy his terrain. When you have achieved these three conditions you have victory. Traditional Warfare occurs in the physical domains, it is about the terrain. The education system in the department, regardless of the service, is focused on traditional warfare and all official education is based on the study of the science of traditional warfare. Irregular Warfare is a competition for power between a governing authority-whether the legal government or occupying power and an element of the population.
This type of warfare, while many actions occur in the physical and cyber domains, is waged in the minds of the people. Irregular Warfare is about the population, the mass base, not about the terrain. A long-standing principle of resistance forces is not to hold terrain. The mechanism of victory in IW for both the opposition and the governing authority, while not described in the Joint Pub, is to obtain the active support of most of the population and to use that weight to force the desired outcome.
As I argued in my February 2017 SWJ article, The Science of Resistance, waging this type of war is based on a different science that results in applying a different art than the one used for Traditional Warfare. While traditional warfare predominately occurs in the physical domains, Irregular Warfare occurs in minds of the effected population, it is about the narrative, the story being told by each side, and to convince or force the mass base to engage. I would call this the Human Terrain not the Human Dimension as mentioned by the author which if I remember correctly is primary focused on the human condition of the enemy’s soldiers and maybe dealing with refugees within the context of Traditional Warfare. We have seen the results of applying the wrong art to the war we are engaged in; it is time we start getting it right.
5. US top Middle East commander tests new model of deterring Iran
"Deterrence works, until it doesn't."- Sir Lawrence Freedman
Excerpts;
The Pentagon has withdrawn thousands of its forces from Afghanistan, Iraq and the Persian Gulf region over the past three years, even as Iran’s clandestine attacks on its neighbors have continued. That, along with new restrictions on US arms sales to the Saudi-led coalition countries, helped drive trust among some US partners in the Middle East to new lows, analysts and former officials say.
Savvy bureaucratic moves by Kurilla’s predecessor, retired Marine Corps Gen. Kenneth “Frank” McKenzie, helped ensure top brass approved his bevy of requests for B-52 bomber fly-overs and aircraft carrier deployments in a high-stakes bid to deter Iranian attacks and reassure allies during the Trump years.
But critics say those tactics — the effectiveness and sustainability of which were controversial even within the Pentagon at the time — created false expectations among leaders in the region who have come to equate the size of the US military's local footprint with Washington’s dedication to its defense partnerships, a perception that Biden administration officials have striven to dispel.
Earlier this month, McKenzie went so far as to admit that reliance on conventional shows of force “has failed” to stop attacks by Iran and its proxies.
US top Middle East commander tests new model of deterring Iran
As the Pentagon shifts focus to China and Russia, CENTCOM’s chief is banking on experimentation with unmanned surveillance and artificial intelligence to offset a smaller US footprint in the Middle East.
al-monitor.com
In an auditorium-style conference room at US Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters, the top general overseeing all American military forces in the Middle East was beaming.
Flanked by executives from Microsoft, Google and Blue Origin, US Army Gen. Michael “Erik” Kurilla had just been presented with the best idea he had heard in long time — by a buck sergeant still in his 20s.
Sgt. Mickey Reeve of the Massachusetts Army National Guard had coded his own computer program, a simulator to train soldiers to respond to incoming drone attacks, using only an aging laptop during downtime in his bunk at Prince Sultan air base in Saudi Arabia over the prior two months.
“Unmanned aircraft systems have been called the most dangerous threat to American soldiers since IEDs,” Reeve pitched to his hosts at the October event.
“This will allow us to train our battle drills, because that’s what we can’t do right now [while deployed in the field]," he explained. “Without that, we’re not going to be capable of engaging these drones effectively … when there are just minutes to save American lives.”
Kurilla was thrilled. “This is a significant problem,” the four-star general told the audience. “There’s a real need for this.”
What's more, Reeve estimated a team of no more than five developers could ready the simulator for military-wide distribution within six months.
“That’s lightning-fast in the military,” Kurilla boomed. “That’s like, tomorrow.”
The general and his guests from Silicon Valley chose the 24-year-old sergeant’s idea over some 160 other submissions to CENTCOM’s first “Innovation Oasis,” a semi-annual command-wide contest of ideas modeled after the popular TV show “Shark Tank.”
Development of the simulator remains on schedule to be completed within 90 days, thanks to support from Army Futures Command's Software Factory, CENTCOM's Chief Technology Officer Schuyler Moore told reporters at the Pentagon on Dec. 7.
Military officials hope to ready the training program for upcoming multinational exercises of Red Sands, a new CENTCOM-led consortium to test counter-drone technology at various sites in the Middle East.
It’s an unconventional — and largely untested — approach aimed at netting ideas from commercial industry, academia and the 55,000 members of CENTCOM’s own rank-and-file as the Pentagon gears up for a new era of military cooperation in the Middle East.
“This is about changing culture,” said Kurilla, a veteran of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) who took the helm at CENTCOM in April after leading the XVIII Airborne Corps.
“If you’ve got an E-4 [corporal] that knows how to solve a problem, we want to make sure we can harness that,” Kurilla told Al-Monitor.
And CENTCOM, which oversees the US military’s engagements from Egypt to Central Asia to Pakistan and the Arabian Sea, has its share of problems.
Flush with funds and allocations of military hardware during the prior two decades of counterterrorism wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, CENTCOM's mission of combatting Sunni jihadist groups and deterring Iran’s provocations remains largely unchanged today.
But the region in which Kurilla’s forces operate is no longer the top strategic priority for policymakers in Washington.
The Pentagon has withdrawn thousands of its forces from Afghanistan, Iraq and the Persian Gulf region over the past three years, even as Iran’s clandestine attacks on its neighbors have continued. That, along with new restrictions on US arms sales to the Saudi-led coalition countries, helped drive trust among some US partners in the Middle East to new lows, analysts and former officials say.
Savvy bureaucratic moves by Kurilla’s predecessor, retired Marine Corps Gen. Kenneth “Frank” McKenzie, helped ensure top brass approved his bevy of requests for B-52 bomber fly-overs and aircraft carrier deployments in a high-stakes bid to deter Iranian attacks and reassure allies during the Trump years.
But critics say those tactics — the effectiveness and sustainability of which were controversial even within the Pentagon at the time — created false expectations among leaders in the region who have come to equate the size of the US military's local footprint with Washington’s dedication to its defense partnerships, a perception that Biden administration officials have striven to dispel.
Earlier this month, McKenzie went so far as to admit that reliance on conventional shows of force “has failed” to stop attacks by Iran and its proxies.
“The Iranians fully understand overmatch,” said Jonathan Lord, director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for New American Security.
“Flying strategic bombers in from Minot Air Force base to run routes along Iran’s coast has only served to push Iran further toward asymmetrical solutions and to lean harder into proxies that extend deniability,” Lord said. “It was a conventional solution to an unconventional threat, and proved ineffective.”
Conscious of this, Kurilla and his staff have over the past year drafted a new path forward, one that strives to stitch together the region’s air defenses with Israeli tech to neutralize Tehran’s drone and missile threats, all the while leveraging new congressional authorities to bring in commercially-available, US-made unmanned sensors linked with artificial intelligence to surveil the region’s waterways, skies and desert smuggling routes.
CENTCOM officials hope the approach will convince regional leaders that Washington can still offer better defense solutions than China and Russia by tapping into the Pentagon’s innovation bureaucracy in order to develop new manned-unmanned teaming tactics in the field.
“We’re still structured as a warfighting headquarters, but the experimentation is our comparative advantage — that’s what we offer,” Brig. Gen. John Cogbill, the command’s deputy director of operations, told Al-Monitor in an exclusive interview at CENTCOM’s headquarters during Innovation Oasis.
To that end, CENTCOM staff have been consulting with JSOC, the tech industry and researchers at Vanderbilt, Penn State and other universities to scout new talent and identify devices that can be field-tested in the region by one of CENTCOM’s three new experimental units: the Navy’s Task Force 59, the Air Force’s Task Force 99 and the Army’s Task Force 39.
“It’s really about creating an ecosystem around our problems so you can leverage non-DOD resources and capabilities in order to help us do our mission better,” Cogbill said.
Deterrence by detection
Despite run-ins with Iranian naval ships in August and September last year, US Navy officials insist the surveillance methods spearheaded by TF 59 are already beginning to have an effect.
“We knew that we were making them nervous,” Moore told Al-Monitor, declining to cite specific incidents.
The Navy stood up TF 59 in September 2021 after Fifth Fleet commander Vice Adm. Brad Cooper recommended to McKenzie that the fleet turn to the private sector to help plug gaps in coalition patrols in waters traversed by smugglers, some backed by Iran.
Within a month, the new unit had begun deploying unmanned, unarmed, camera-laden sea drones linked by artificial intelligence into the Persian Gulf.
“That’s unheard-of speed for the Defense Department,” stressed Moore, previously TF 59’s chief tech officer.
TF 59 has since conducted exercises with Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and has deployed some two dozen drones — among them Saildrones, MARTAC Mantas T12s, T38 Devil Rays — with the goal that regional navies will contribute 80 such devices by the end of 2023.
Only Bahrain and Kuwait have signaled intent to obtain US-made sea drones, Cooper told reporters in October, however, expressing confidence that other countries would follow suit. TF 59 has already tested the drones’ mesh network link with Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
“If you’re more dependent on partners, you have to be interoperable. On the modern battlefield, that means you have to be able to pass data. Because that’s what we’re trying to get at, is data-centric war-fighting,” Cogbill told Al-Monitor.
“How do you come up with cross-domain solutions when there’s no regional Five Eyes [intelligence alliance], and some of these countries don’t necessarily trust each other?” he added.
It’s a problem that has dogged CENTCOM planners for more than a decade, and one on which Kurilla and his staff are determined to make strides. “At the end of the day, the only way is with exercises,” Cogbill said.
While officials say the deterrence-by-surveillance approach is not a panacea to disrupting Iran's covert activities, it has earned the increasing approval of strategists in Washington.
Throughout this past year, the White House's National Security Council spearheaded the declassification of intelligence about Russia’s war plans in Ukraine in a groundbreaking attempt to thwart the Kremlin’s moves. Policymakers have since applied the tactic to Iran’s transfer of hundreds of armed drones to Russia for use in the war.
Earlier this month, the Pentagon’s No. 3 top official Colin Kahl credited the leak of intelligence detailing Iranian plans to attack Saudi Arabia with averting that incident.
“The IRGC prefers to operate with plausible deniability,” Jonathan Lord told Al-Monitor, referring to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
“Task Force 59 is about developing relatively low-cost and operationally sustainable ways to turn the sensitive waterways around the Gulf into a panopticon, robbing Tehran of the ability to threaten commercial shipping or to smuggle weapons with impunity,” he said.
Navy officials have been reluctant to credit TF 59 with last year’s surge in drug and arms seizures, but CENTCOM has already stood up two additional task forces to replicate TF 59’s acquisitions and testing model.
“For pennies on the dollar, we can put unmanned platforms out there, we can couple it with artificial intelligence, and we can really get a sense for what’s happening,” Cooper told reporters during a visit to the Pentagon in October.
“The end result of that is you simply can advance your capability on orders of magnitude faster by this close connection with industry,” he said.
The Air Force's TF 99, established in October at al-Udeid air base in Qatar, aims to test commercially-available small, high-altitude drones linked by the same mesh network used by — and eventually Starlink systems — TF 59 in order to compensate for fewer US ISR assets in the region.
By November, the Army had tapped Col. Adontis Atkins, chief of operations at US Cyber Command, to lead its TF 39. Defense officials say the newest unit, based out of Shaw Air Force base in North Carolina, will experiment with unmanned ground vehicles, remote sensors and weapons that can disable small drones (C-sUAS) at bases throughout the Middle East.
Thus far, TF 59 has overseen the testing of unclassified, contractor-owned and -operated technology, which defense officials see as a model to be emulated by TF 99 and TF 39 over the coming year. The aim is to eventually synchronize the task forces and fully integrate the data they gather.
But will it be enough to sell Arab allies and partners on the superiority of US and Israeli tech?
All eyes will be on the first iteration of Red Sands, to be held early this year in Saudi Arabia. Alongside accelerated multinational exercises, the testing program is poised to become CENTCOM’s flagship forum for building confidence in its vision for a new regional security architecture.
“You can start to see how Gen. Kurilla is playing matchmaker,” Lord said. “He is setting the conditions for that and building a market.”
al-monitor.com
6. A new world energy order is taking shape
End petrodollars and remove the dollar as the reserve currency and we will be bankrupted. I have always wondered if that is Chin'a pan.
Excerpts;
That trend may now start to go into reverse. Already, there are fewer foreign buyers for US Treasuries. If the petroyuan takes off, it would feed the fire of de-dollarisation. China’s control of more energy reserves and the products that spring from them could be an important new contributor to inflation in the west. It’s a slow-burn problem, but perhaps not as slow as some market participants think.
What should policymakers and business leaders do? If I were chief executive of a multinational company, I’d be looking to regionalise and localise as much production as possible to hedge against a multipolar energy market. I’d also do more vertical integration to offset increased inflation in supply chains.
If I were a US policymaker, I’d think about ways to increase North American shale production over the short to medium term (and offer Europeans a discount for it), while also speeding up the green transition. That’s yet another reason why Europeans shouldn’t be complaining about the Inflation Reduction Act, which subsidises clean energy production in the US. The rise of the petroyuan should be an incentive for both the US and Europe to move away from fossil fuels as quickly as they can.
A new world energy order is taking shape
Global oil trade is de-dollarising slowly but surely
Financial Times · by Rana Foroohar · January 3, 2023
On Valentine’s Day in 1945, US president Franklin Delano Roosevelt met Saudi King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud on the American cruiser USS Quincy. It was the beginning of one of the most important geopolitical alliances of the past 70 years, in which US security in the Middle East was bartered for oil pegged in dollars.
But times change, and 2023 may be remembered as the year that this grand bargain began to shift, as a new world energy order between China and the Middle East took shape.
While China has for some time been buying increasing amounts of oil and liquefied natural gas from Iran, Venezuela, Russia and parts of Africa in its own currency, President Xi Jinping’s meeting with Saudi and Gulf Co-operation Council leaders in December marked “the birth of the petroyuan”, as Credit Suisse analyst Zoltan Pozsar put it in a note to clients.
According to Pozsar, “China wants to rewrite the rules of the global energy market”, as part of a larger effort to de-dollarise the so-called Bric countries of Brazil, Russia, India and China, and many other parts of the world after the weaponisation of dollar foreign exchange reserves following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
What does that mean in practice? For starters, a lot more oil trade will be done in renminbi. Xi announced that, over the next three to five years, China would not only dramatically increase imports from GCC countries, but work towards “all-dimensional energy co-operation”. This could potentially involve joint exploration and production in places such as the South China Sea, as well as investments in refineries, chemicals and plastics. Beijing’s hope is that all of it will be paid for in renminbi, on the Shanghai Petroleum and Natural Gas Exchange, as early as 2025.
That would mark a massive shift in the global energy trade. As Pozsar points out, Russia, Iran and Venezuela account for 40 per cent of the world’s proven oil reserves, and all of them are selling oil to China at a steep discount. The GCC countries account for another 40 per cent of proven reserves. The remaining 20 per cent are in north and west Africa and Indonesia, regions within the Russian and Chinese orbit.
Those who doubt the rise of the petroyuan, and the diminution of the dollar-based financial system in general, often point out that China doesn’t enjoy the same level of global trust, rule of law or reserve currency liquidity that the US does, making other countries unlikely to want to do business in renminbi.
Perhaps, although the oil marketplace is dominated by countries that have more in common with China (at least in terms of their political economies) than with the US. What’s more, the Chinese have offered up something of a financial safety-net by making the renminbi convertible to gold on the Shanghai and Hong Kong gold exchanges.
While this doesn’t make the renminbi a substitute for the dollar as a reserve currency, the petroyuan trade nonetheless comes with important economic and financial implications for policymakers and investors.
For one thing, the prospect of cheap energy is already luring western industrial businesses to China. Consider the recent move of Germany’s BASF to downsize its main plant in Ludwigshafen and shift chemical operations to Zhanjiang. This could be the beginning of what Pozsar calls a “farm to table” trend in which China tries to capture more value-added production locally, using cheap energy as a lure. (A number of European manufacturers have also increased jobs in the US because of lower energy costs there.)
Petropolitics come with financial risks as well as upsides. It’s worth remembering that the recycling of petrodollars by oil-rich nations into emerging markets such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Zaire, Turkey and others by US commercial banks from the late 1970s onwards led to several emerging market debt crises. Petrodollars also accelerated the creation of a more speculative, debt-fuelled economy in the US, as banks flush with cash created all sorts of new financial “innovations”, and an influx of foreign capital allowed the US to maintain a larger deficit.
That trend may now start to go into reverse. Already, there are fewer foreign buyers for US Treasuries. If the petroyuan takes off, it would feed the fire of de-dollarisation. China’s control of more energy reserves and the products that spring from them could be an important new contributor to inflation in the west. It’s a slow-burn problem, but perhaps not as slow as some market participants think.
What should policymakers and business leaders do? If I were chief executive of a multinational company, I’d be looking to regionalise and localise as much production as possible to hedge against a multipolar energy market. I’d also do more vertical integration to offset increased inflation in supply chains.
If I were a US policymaker, I’d think about ways to increase North American shale production over the short to medium term (and offer Europeans a discount for it), while also speeding up the green transition. That’s yet another reason why Europeans shouldn’t be complaining about the Inflation Reduction Act, which subsidises clean energy production in the US. The rise of the petroyuan should be an incentive for both the US and Europe to move away from fossil fuels as quickly as they can.
rana.foroohar@ft.com
Financial Times · by Rana Foroohar · January 3, 2023
7. The Bird Has Been Freed, and So Has a New Era of Online Extremism
Conclusion:
By “freeing the bird,” Musk is not only risking the spread of hateful ideas or the accelerated radicalization of future terrorists, but he is risking the integrity of Twitter as a social media giant. By reinstating the accounts of individuals espousing FRE ideas -including former President Donald Trump- Musk is sending a message that he encourages such rhetoric on his platform, regardless of the consequences. The case of Twitter calls for a fundamental change in content moderation standards to counter violent extremism, perhaps similar to those seen in the European Union. In his pursuit of absolute free speech, Musk has “sent up the batsignal to every kind of racist, misogynist, and homophobe that Twitter was open for business, and they have to react accordingly.” [57] This has paved the way for the proliferation of far-right extremism -the most pressing counterterrorism issue facing our country- on one of the world’s most popular social media websites.
Mon, 01/02/2023 - 11:59am
The Bird Has Been Freed, and So Has a New Era of Online Extremism
By Ella Busch
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/bird-has-been-freed-and-so-has-new-era-online-extremism
FREEING THE FAR RIGHT
“The bird is freed.” With these words, @elonmusk announced his official takeover of the Twitter platform on October 27, 2022 at 11:49pm.[1]Elon Musk, the CEO of Tesla -and now Twitter- bought the company for $44 billion this fall. His implementation of a “Twitter 2.0” has been nothing short of problematic, with his self-proclaimed “extremely hard-core” workplace strategy[2] resulting in the resignations of half of the company’s previous 7,500 employees. As the company’s sole board member, Musk has used this authority to apply his personal ideology of unmoderated speech, or “free speech absolutism” to Twitter. The company has already stopped enforcing its previous Covid-19 misinformation policy, reinstated formerly-banned accounts (including that of former President Donald Trump), and has scaled back its moderation efforts.[3] This lack of moderation risks more than the circulation of false or hurtful communications: it is likely to cause extremists to flock to the platform in order to take advantage of unregulated speech, disseminate propaganda, and radicalize potential recruits to terrorist groups. Twitter’s new ownership and content moderation standards will worsen far right extremism in the US because they allow for the creation and spread of far-right extremist (FRE) propaganda as well as the reemergence of figures that inspire and unify the far-right. To mitigate this risk across all social media platforms, the United States must amend its current legislation relating to corporate responsibility in moderating hate speech online.
Social media plays a large role in the radicalization of far-right extremists, the largest category of domestic terrorists in the United States. 18 US Code 2231 defines domestic terrorism as “acts dangerous to human life that occur primarily within US territory and are intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”[4] Right-wing extremism is defined as “the use or threat of violence by subnational or non-state entities whose goals may include racial or ethnic supremacy; opposition to government authority; anger at women, including from the involuntary celibate ( or “incel”) movement; and outrage against certain policies, such as abortion.”[5] This group poses the greatest threat to national security, as 90% of all terrorist attacks in the United States in 2019 were perpetrated by far-right adherents.[6] The prevalence of the far-right can be largely attributed to the popularity of social media, which serves as a platform for extremists to share their views and indoctrinate others into their ideology. In 2016 alone, 90% of extremists were radicalized at least partially via social media, 23.4% of which utilized Twitter as a primary source of extremist content.[7]
Terrorists use the internet for many purposes, just as ordinary people do. They use social media to host content, whether through images, videos, or live-streams of propaganda. They target a variety of audiences, including potential recruits, the media, and their enemies.[8] The online extremist community serves as an ‘echo chamber’ for hateful ideas; it confirms pre-existing radical beliefs by providing a sense of community by connecting individuals with these shared beliefs. The rapid spread of extremist ideas facilitated by social media in turn facilitates the process of indoctrination into violent groups.[9] In 2019, J.M. Berger concluded, “it is safe to assume that the total number of alt-right adherents on Twitter, including deceptive accounts such as bots and sock puppets, exceeds 100,000 and probably exceeds 200,000.”[10] Twitter’s significant far-right community is aided by the platform’s hashtag feature, which allows followers to attract attention to and create communities around certain shared views. Data shows that the most common ideas promoted by the far-right Twittersphere are Pro-Trump, white nationalist, general far-right, anti-immigrant & anti-Muslim, trolling/shitposting, and conspiracy & fake news content.[11]
MUSK & MODERATION
On November 16, 2022, in an effort to downsize Twitter’s global workforce, Musk sent a late-night ultimatum to his staff. “Going forward, to build a breakthrough Twitter 2.0 and succeed in an increasingly-competitive world, we will need to be extremely hardcore. This will mean working hard hours at a high intensity. Only exceptional performance will constitute a passing grade.”[12] After a mere twenty-four hours to make their decision, the majority of Twitter’s senior staff decided to resign -including its former Head of Safety and Integrity, Head of Global Ad Sales, Chief Privacy Officer, Chief Security Officer, and Chief Compliance Officer-[13]largely out of concern for Musk’s ideology of free speech absolutism and its potential ramifications for the platform. He has since dismissed the platform’s former content moderation team, stating that a “content moderation council with widely diverse viewpoints'' would be created in its place to determine moderation issues such as the suspension and reinstatement of Twitter accounts. One month later, Musk reneged on this promise, claiming that a group of investors barred him from creating such a council. He retweeted his former post announcing his visions for the council, adding, “A large coalition of political/social activist groups agreed not to try to kill Twitter by starving us of advertising revenue if I agreed to this condition [of creating the council]. They broke the deal.”[14] Instead, such content-related decisions would be made by Musk himself.
The absence of content moderation will allow far-right extremists to populate the platform and spread their ideologies to a wider audience. Twitter’s former Policy on Violent Organizations gave the company the right to permanently suspend accounts that “identify through their stated purpose, publications, or actions as an extremist group; have engaged in or currently engage in violence and/or the promotion of violence as a means to further their cause, and target civilians in their acts and/or promotion of violence.”[15] Twitter has cited such policies in the termination of over 1.7 million of such accounts since August 2015.[16] Under Musk, there are no such rules. He describes the content moderation policy of Twitter 2.0 as “freedom of speech, but not freedom of reach,” stating that tweets deemed ‘negative’ or ‘hateful’ would be allowed on the site, but only to people who search for them.[17] Previously-suspended accounts, meanwhile, would be granted “general amnesty, provided that they have not broken the law or engaged in egregious spam.”[18] In the twelve hours following Musk’s takeover of Twitter, the platform saw a 500% increase in the use of the “N Word;”[19] anti-Black slurs overall rose 5000%.[20] Dozens of accounts espousing racially-charged and neo-Nazi commentary were created on the platform, thanking Musk for reinstating their moderated speech.[21] Within one week of Musk’s acquisition, posts containing the word “Jew” increased fivefold, the majority of which were anti-Semitic in nature.[22] Slurs against gay and trans persons have increased by 58% and 62%, respectively.[23] These groups are all specifically targeted by FREs. According to the Anti-Defamation League, “These changes are already affecting the proliferation of hate on Twitter, and the return of extremists of all kinds to the platform has the potential to supercharge the spread of extremist content and disinformation.”[24]
REPERCUSSIONS OF ACCOUNT REINSTATEMENT
The reinstatement of previously-banned accounts will allow for a reemergence of important, unifying figures among the far-right, including that of former President Donald Trump. Trump was one of the most controversial members of the ‘Twittersphere’ throughout his term. The majority of his posts attacked Democrats, minorities, immigration, or US allies. 1,710 of these tweets promoted conspiracy theories, an additional 40 of which promoted allegations of voter fraud.[25] Trump’s views and campaign of misinformation did not immediately result in his online suspension, but they did earn him a loyal follower base, primarily among the far-right. Trump was officially removed from Twitter for inciting this group to violence in what was arguably an act of terror: the storming of the US Capitol on January 6, 2021 by a pro-Trump mob. The movement began on Twitter when Trump rallied his followers to “fight like hell” in protest of the inauguration of President Joseph Biden, which was viewed as an instance of election fraud. The viral hashtag, #StopTheSteal, resulted in an insurrection of far-right extremist groups -mainly the anti-government Proud Boys and Oath Keepers- as well as “spontaneous clusters” of non-affiliated lone wolf actors who collaborated in using violent force to destroy property, assault law enforcement, and disrupt the electoral process.[26] Trump’s role in the event resulted in his removal from Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, and Snapchat for the past 22 months. Musk reinstated Trump's Twitter account through a singular ‘yes or no’ poll -with 51.8% voting yes- on November 19, 2022, complete with his former 59,000 posts and 72,000,000 followers.
It is unclear, however, if Trump will actually rejoin Twitter; following his online suspension, Trump as he created his own social media platform, Truth Social,[27] which has become a hotspot for unregulated FREs content. The most common topics discussed on Truth Social concern gun rights, the January 6 insurrection, vaccines, LGBTQ issues, and abortion.[28] Truth Social is known to espouse the far-right conspiracy theory, QAnon,[29] which believes that Donald Trump is waging a secret war against satanic pedophiles within the Democratic party and remains the legitimate president of the United States.[30]Truth Social was found to have at least 88 users promoting QAnon ideology on their accounts, 32 of which were previously banned by Twitter. In August 2022, Trump was found to have reposted 65 QAnon-related messages over a four-month period, resharing the QAnon slogan WWG1WWGA (Where We Go One Where We Go All), as well as messages relating to “a war against sex traffickers and pedophiles.”[31]
Trump is not the only controversial character who is rejoining the Twittersphere. Musk has reinstated a plethora of controversial far-right-leaning accounts to Twitter. Among these include the accounts of Jordan Peterson, a Canadian psychologist that champions misogyny;[32] the conservative Christian satire website, Babylon Bee, which mockingly awarded the transgender US Assistant Secretary for Health and Human Services, Rachel Levine, with the title of “Man of the Year;”[33] Senator Marjorie Taylor-Greene, a known QAnon adherent who had repeatedly violated Twitter’s Covid-19 misinformation policy[34]; and Andrew Anglin, the founder of the Daily Stormer, a neo-Nazi website.[35] The provision of ‘general amnesty’ to these hateful accounts sets a dangerous precedent in favor of the proliferation of FRE views on Twitter.
CODIFYING CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
Corporate responsibility to moderate extremist content must be codified through amendments to our current communications-related laws. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) states that companies are not responsible for user-generated content in the United States.[36] However, this law is thirty years old, and technology has come a long way since 1996. The need for reform is putting policymakers in a bind, wrestling the need to place greater restrictions on the ever-changing social media landscape with the risk of violating current policy. Section 230 is currently drafted in a way that enables Elon Musk to continue his pursuit of free-speech absolutism.[37] Two pending Supreme Court cases may challenge Musk’s current sense of security: Gonzalez v Google and Twitter v Taamneh. In both cases, the families of terrorist victims filed actions against Google, Facebook, and Twitter for aiding and abetting in the radicalization of the terrorists who carried out the attacks. The Supreme Court will decide whether these services should be held accountable for knowingly aiding terrorism.[38]These cases present an opportunity for the United States to strengthen its counterterrorism efforts online, possibly through mechanisms similar to those of the EU’s Digital Services Act. If nothing is done to change current legislation, the government risks a spike in far-right terror attacks in the United States, a phenomenon that is correlated with social media use.[39]
Even prior to Musk’s acquisition of Twitter, the social media industry has faced great obstacles to effectively address online extremism because it requires international and transplatform cooperation. All social media companies vary in their rules and terms of service, yet online terrorist campaign typically cross three or more platforms: one smaller, less-regulated platform for private coordination, a second platform to store copies of data, and a third, large social media platform (such as Twitter) to amplify their message. This means that, even if one platform suspends an account or removes terrorist content from their platforms, terrorists can easily move to another platform. Although regulators usually focus on user-generated content, many terrorist efforts on social media are related to funding and coordination, rather than official propaganda, meaning that much of terrorist content goes unnoticed by algorithms or human moderators. According to Dr. Erin Saltman, the Director of Programming at the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, ultimate privacy policies -such as those promoted by Musk- give terrorists a “free pass” to post dehumanizing and violent content.[40]Brian Fishman, who leads Facebook’s counterterrorism efforts, says that policymakers’ pleas to “do better” are no longer enough; policymakers and academics must directly work alongside tech companies to come up with best practices against online extremism. The scale of the online counterterrorism challenge is massive, exacerbated by terrorists’ abilities to circumvent online enforcement efforts.[41]In addition to platform-wide rules, regulations, and transparency measures, companies must interact regularly with policymakers to adapt to the ever-changing technological landscape.
THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Twitter is facing legal and financial repercussions due to the dismantling of its content moderation policies. The European Union (EU), has warned Twitter that it risks heavy fines -up to 6% of the company’s annual global operations revenue- or a complete operations ban if it fails to meet the content moderation standards set by the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA). This law will take effect early next year, requiring that companies police content that promotes terrorism, child sexual abuse, hate speech, and commercial scams.[42]Germany in particular has taken issue with Twitter’s lack of regulations, as the country has some of the strictest anti-hate speech laws in the Western world. Its Enforcement on Social Networks Law (NetzDG) allows for fines of up to €50 million for failure to comply with content moderation standards.[43]
It is less clear how the United States will respond to such violations; while legislation has been proposed to counter hate speech online, free speech laws greatly inhibit their ratification. In March 2021, US Democrats reintroduced the Protecting Americans from Dangerous Algorithms Act, which will “hold large social media platforms accountable for their algorithmic amplification of harmful, radicalizing content that leads to online violence.” In another bipartisan effort, Senators Amy Klobuchar and Cynthia Lummis introduced the NUDGE Act (Nudging Users to Drive Good Experiences on Social Media) in February 2022, which aims to study interventions against harmful language on social media.[44]To date, neither bill has been passed.
The quantity of resignations by senior leadership has been an additional source of concern from the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC), particularly in the wake of another FTC dispute in May, in which Twitter paid a $150 million fine to settle allegations of misusing users’ private information.[45]As part of this deal, Twitter agreed to a condition upon which it must report all changes in company structure to the FTC within fourteen days of such a change. Such consent orders carry the force of law; if violations are proven, they may result in fines, restrictions, and even sanctions on individual executives.[46]Since Musk neglected to inform the FTC of the company’s mass layoffs, Twitter faces the possibility of incurring such sanctions. Similarly, Musk faces the scrutiny of Apple and Google, which have the power to remove apps that violate their content moderation standards. Apple’s developer standards state that apps cannot include sexually-explicit, discriminatory, or “just plain creepy” content, including rhetoric against users’ “religion, race, sexual orientation, gender, [or] national ethnic origin.”[47] Due to the rapid increase in hateful and discriminatory rhetoric on Twitter, it is highly likely that Apple may bar the app altogether.
THE FUTURE OF TWITTER
Racist and anti-Semitic trolls have caused some of Twitter’s largest advertisers to leave the platform for its lesser-known rival app, Mastodon,[48] including entities such as General Mills, Pfizer, Chipotle, United Airlines, and Audi.[49] IPG, one of the world’s largest advertising companies, has also warned its clients against advertising on Twitter out of moderation concerns.[50]This advertising exodus has cost Twitter roughly $4 million per day in advertising revenue; Musk himself has admitted that the company faces bankruptcy. The Global Alliance for Responsible Media, an influential ad industry trade group, appealed to the possibility of bankruptcy in an open letter pleading for Twitter “to adhere to existing commitments to ‘brand safety.” [51] Instead of responding with strengthened free speech measures, Musk has made plans to reduce the company’s reliance on advertising and instate a “Twitter Blue” subscription to boost revenues. This system will provide users with the blue check signaling account-verification for the fee of $7.99/month. The program’s launch has been delayed, however, in an attempt to avoid a 30% App Store fee, which is standard for apps requiring in-app purchases. [52]
There are various hypothetical scenarios regarding the future of Twitter. According to the company’s former Head of Trust and Safety, Yoel Roth, so long as the company faces political scrutiny and relies upon advertising for 90% of its revenue, Twitter will face “unavoidable limits” to the extent of its free speech policy. “In the longer term, the moderating influences of advertisers, regulators, and, most critically of all, app stores may be welcome for those of us hoping to avoid a dangerous escalation in the volume of dangerous speech online.”[53]
Bloomberg’s Parmy Olsen disagrees, comparing the case of Twitter to that of Telegram, an encrypted instant messaging service founded by libertarian billionaire Pavel Durov. Like Musk, Durov is a staunch advocate for free speech, as reflected in the platform’s incredibly scant content moderation policy. Twitter, she says, has sixteen rules regarding content; Telegram has three. Despite being relatively unknown in the United States, Telegram is twice the size of Twitter and its lack of moderation has not impeded its popularity, [54] suggesting that Twitter 2.0 may continue to thrive, albeit in a different way than before. It is important to note, however, that Telegram has its own thriving online terrorist community. [55] Darrell M. West from the Brookings Institution, meanwhile, outlines five potential scenarios for the future of Twitter: bankruptcy, little content moderation coupled with lots of extremism, difficulty in maintaining technical infrastructure (due to the terminations of engineers and policy-related staff), a reliance on premium services to fund the platform, or a combination of these possibilities. [56] No matter what the outcome, Elon Musk’s Twitter takeover has done irreparable damage to the platform’s reputation and future endeavors.
By “freeing the bird,” Musk is not only risking the spread of hateful ideas or the accelerated radicalization of future terrorists, but he is risking the integrity of Twitter as a social media giant. By reinstating the accounts of individuals espousing FRE ideas -including former President Donald Trump- Musk is sending a message that he encourages such rhetoric on his platform, regardless of the consequences. The case of Twitter calls for a fundamental change in content moderation standards to counter violent extremism, perhaps similar to those seen in the European Union. In his pursuit of absolute free speech, Musk has “sent up the batsignal to every kind of racist, misogynist, and homophobe that Twitter was open for business, and they have to react accordingly.” [57] This has paved the way for the proliferation of far-right extremism -the most pressing counterterrorism issue facing our country- on one of the world’s most popular social media websites.
Notes
1 “Elon Musk Declares Twitter 'Moderation Council' – as Some Push the Platform's Limits.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, October 29, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/oct/28/elon-musk-twitter-moderation-council-free-speech.
2 O'Sullivan, Donie, and Clare Duffy. “Elon Musk Gives Ultimatum to Twitter Employees: Do 'Extremely Hardcore' Work or Get out | CNN Business.” CNN. Cable News Network, November 16, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/16/tech/elon-musk-email-ultimatum-twitter/index.html.
3 Powers, Benjamin. “Will Elon Musk's Lax Twitter Content Moderation Help Ignite Violence around the World?” Grid News. Grid News, December 2, 2022. https://www.grid.news/story/technology/2022/12/01/will-elon-musks-lax-twitter-content-moderation-help-ignite-violence-around-the-world/.
4 Jones, Seth G. “The Evolution of Domestic Terrorism.” The Evolution of Domestic Terrorism | Center for Strategic and International Studies. Center for Strategic and International Studies , February 17, 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-domestic-terrorism.
5 Jones, Seth G, Catrina Doxsee, and Nicholas Harrington. “The Tactics and Targets of Domestic Terrorists.” The Tactics and Targets of Domestic Terrorists . Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 22, 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/tactics-and-targets-domestic-terrorists.
6 Baele, Stephane J, and Lewys Brace. “Uncovering the Far-Right Online Ecosystem: An Analytical Framework and Research Agenda.” Translated by Travis G Coan. Taylor & Francis Online, July 17, 2020. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1862895.
7 Jenson, Michael, Patrick James, Gary LaFree, Aaron Safer-Lichtenstein, and Elizabeth Yates. “Use of Social Media by US Extremists - UMD.” Use of Social Media by US Extremists. University of Maryland . Accessed December 3, 2022. https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_PIRUS_UseOfSocialMediaByUSExtremists_ResearchBrief_July2018.pdf.
8 Fishman, Brian. “Crossroads: Counter-Terrorism and the Internet.” Texas National Security Review, February 16, 2022. https://tnsr.org/2019/02/crossroads-counter-terrorism-and-the-internet/.
9 Von Behr, Ines, Anais Reding, Charlie Edwards, and Luke Gribbon. “Radicalization in the Digital Era.” RAND Corporation, November 5, 2013. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR453.html.
10 Berger, J.M. “New Research Report: The Alt-Right Twitter Census by JM Berger - Vox - Pol.” VOX, August 13, 2019. https://www.voxpol.eu/new-research-report-the-alt-right-twitter-census-by-j-m-berger/.
11 Baele, Stephane J, and Lewys Brace. “Uncovering the Far-Right Online Ecosystem: An Analytical Framework and Research Agenda.” Translated by Travis G Coan. Taylor & Francis Online, July 17, 2020 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1862895.
12 Kolodny, Lora. “Elon Musk Demands Twitter Staff Commit to 'Long Hours' or Leave: Read the Email.” CNBC. CNBC, November 17, 2022. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/11/16/elon-musk-demands-twitter-staff-commit-to-long-hours-or-leave.html.
13 Powers, Benjamin. “Will Elon Musk's Lax Twitter Content Moderation Help Ignite Violence around the World?” Grid News. Grid News, December 2, 2022. https://www.grid.news/story/technology/2022/12/01/will-elon-musks-lax-twitter-content-moderation-help-ignite-violence-around-the-world/.
14 Sharma, Bharat. “Elon Musk Blames His Failure to Set up Twitter Content Moderation Council on 'Activists'.” India Times, November 23, 2022. https://www.indiatimes.com/technology/news/elon-musks-promise-of-content-moderation-on-twitter-585527.html.
15 “Our Policy on Violent Organizations | Twitter Help.” Twitter. Twitter. Accessed December 3, 2022. https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/violent-groups.
16 Lima, Cristiano, and Aaron Schaffer. “Analysis | As Twitter Defends Its Counterterror Work, Experts Fear a Spike under Musk.” The Washington Post. WP Company, November 30, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/11/30/twitter-defends-its-counterterror-work-experts-fear-spike-under-musk/.
17 “Elon Musk Reinstates Trump's Twitter Account 22 Months after It Was Suspended.” CBS News. CBS Interactive, November 20, 2022. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/elon-musk-says-donald-trump-reinstated-twitter/.
18 Lima, Cristiano, and Aaron Schaffer. “Analysis | As Twitter Defends Its Counterterror Work, Experts Fear a Spike under Musk.” The Washington Post. WP Company, November 30, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/11/30/twitter-defends-its-counterterror-work-experts-fear-spike-under-musk/.
19 Ray, Rashawn, and Joy Anyanwu. “Why Is Elon Musk's Twitter Takeover Increasing Hate Speech?” Brookings. Brookings, December 1, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/how-we-rise/2022/11/23/why-is-elon-musks-twitter-takeover-increasing-hate-speech/.
20 Ayad, Moustafa. “Islamic State Supporters on Twitter: How Is 'New' Twitter Handling an Old Problem? .” GNET. Global Network on Extremism and Technology, November 18, 2022. https://gnet-research.org/2022/11/18/islamic-state-supporters-on-twitter-how-is-new-twitter-handling-an-old-problem/.
21 “Elon Musk Declares Twitter 'Moderation Council' – as Some Push the Platform's Limits.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, October 29, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/oct/28/elon-musk-twitter-moderation-council-free-speech
22 Ray, Rashawn, and Joy Anyanwu. “Why Is Elon Musk's Twitter Takeover Increasing Hate Speech?” Brookings. Brookings, December 1, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/how-we-rise/2022/11/23/why-is-elon-musks-twitter-takeover-increasing-hate-speech/.
23 Darcy, Oliver. “Hate Speech Dramatically Surges on Twitter Following Elon Musk Takeover, New Research Shows | CNN Business.” CNN. Cable News Network, December 2, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/02/tech/twitter-hate-speech/index.html.
24 Darcy, Oliver. “Hate Speech Dramatically Surges on Twitter Following Elon Musk Takeover, New Research Shows | CNN Business.” CNN. Cable News Network, December 2, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/02/tech/twitter-hate-speech/index.html.
25 Harris, Rich, Blacki Migliozzi, Matthew Rosenburg, and Rachel Shorey. “How Trump Reshaped the Presidency in over 11,000 Tweets.” The New York Times. The New York Times, November 2, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/02/us/politics/trump-twitter-presidency.html.
26 Clifford, Bennett, and Jon Lewis. “Assessing Domestic Violent Extremism One Year after the Capitol Siege.” Lawfare. Lawfare, January 18, 2022. https://www.lawfareblog.com/assessing-domestic-violent-extremism-one-year-after-capitol-siege.
27 “Elon Musk Reinstates Trump's Twitter Account 22 Months after It Was Suspended.” CBS News. CBS Interactive, November 20, 2022. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/elon-musk-says-donald-trump-reinstated-twitter/
28 Forman-Katz, Naomi, and Galen Stocking. “Key Facts about Truth Social.” Pew Research Center. Pew Research Center, December 2, 2022. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/11/18/key-facts-about-truth-social-as-donald-trump-runs-for-u-s-president-again/.
29 Bond, Shannon. “Elon Musk Allows Donald Trump Back on Twitter.” NPR. NPR, November 20, 2022. https://www.npr.org/2022/11/19/1131351535/elon-musk-allows-donald-trump-back-on-twitter.
30 Roose, Kevin. “What Is QAnon, the Viral pro-Trump Conspiracy Theory?” The New York Times. The New York Times, August 18, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/article/what-is-qanon.html.
31 Hsu, Tiffany. “Qanon Accounts Found a Home, and Trump's Support, on Truth Social.” The New York Times. The New York Times, August 29, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/29/technology/qanon-truth-social-trump.html.
32 Beauchamp, Zack. “Jordan Peterson, the Obscure Canadian Psychologist Turned Right-Wing Celebrity, Explained.” Vox. Vox, March 26, 2018. https://www.vox.com/world/2018/3/26/17144166/jordan-peterson-12-rules-for-life.
33 Suciu, Peter. “The Babylon Bee's Twitter Account Was Suspended, but That Made Its Story Go Viral.” Forbes. Forbes Magazine, March 23, 2022. https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2022/03/21/the-babylon-bees-twitter-account-was-suspended-but-that-made-its-story-go-viral/?sh=7fec6d3f209d.
34 Blistein, Jon. “Elon Musk Hasn't Been Able to Woo Trump Back to Twitter, so He's Trying Marjorie Taylor Greene Instead.” Rolling Stone. Rolling Stone, November 21, 2022. https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/elon-musk-reinstates-marjorie-taylor-greene-twitter-account-1234634659/.
35 Hatmaker, Taylor. “Elon Musk Just Brought an Infamous Neo-Nazi Back to Twitter.” TechCrunch, December 2, 2022. https://techcrunch.com/2022/12/02/elon-musk-nazis-kanye-twitter-andrew-anglin/.
36 Mackey, Aaron, and Meri Baghdasaryan. “Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.” Electronic Frontier Foundation. Accessed December 4, 2022. https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230.
37 Solomon, Aron. “Why Elon Musk Banned Ye for 'Inciting Violence'–and What It Means for the Future of Twitter's Content Moderation Policy.” Fortune. Fortune, December 2, 2022. https://fortune.com/2022/12/02/why-elon-musk-banned-ye-inciting-violence-twitter-content-moderation-policy-tech-politics-aron-solomon/.
38 Neschke, Sabine, Danielle Draper, Sean Long, Sameer Ali, and Tom Romanoff. “Gonzalez v. Google: Implications for the Internet's Future.” Bipartisan Policy Center, November 29, 2022. https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/gonzalez-v-google/.
39 Grelicha, Keanna, Indirah Canzater, Tiffany Dove, Dyuti Pandya, Clea Guastavino, and Cassandra Townsend. “Far-Right Extremists' Use of Social Media Platforms to Communicate and Spread Radicalized Beliefs.” The Counterterrorism Group. The Counterterrorism Group, December 20, 2021. https://www.counterterrorismgroup.com/post/far-right-extremist-use-of-social-media-platforms-to-communicate-and-spread-radicalized-beliefs.
40 Saltman, Erin. “Challenges in Combating Terrorism and Extremism Online.” Lawfare. Lawfare, October 16, 2021. https://www.lawfareblog.com/challenges-combating-terrorism-and-extremism-online.
41 Fishman, Brian. “Crossroads: Counter-Terrorism and the Internet.” Texas National Security Review, February 16, 2022. https://tnsr.org/2019/02/crossroads-counter-terrorism-and-the-internet/.
42 Betz, Bradford. “Eu Warns Musk It May Ban Twitter over Concerns about Content Moderation.” Fox Business. Fox Business, November 30, 2022. https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/eu-warns-musk-ban-twitter-concerns-about-content-moderation
43 Lomas, Natasha. “Musk's Impact on Content Moderation at Twitter Faces Early Test in Germany.” TechCrunch, November 21, 2022. https://techcrunch.com/2022/11/21/elon-musk-twitter-netzdg-test/.
44 Ray, Rashawn, and Joy Anyanwu. “Why Is Elon Musk's Twitter Takeover Increasing Hate Speech?” Brookings. Brookings, December 1, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/how-we-rise/2022/11/23/why-is-elon-musks-twitter-takeover-increasing-hate-speech/.
45 Dave, Paresh, and Katie Paul. “Musk Warns of Twitter Bankruptcy as More Senior Executives Quit.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, November 11, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/technology/twitter-information-security-chief-kissner-decides-leave-2022-11-10/.
46 Fung, Brian. “Musk's Twitter May Have Already Violated Its Latest FTC Consent Order, Legal Experts Say | CNN Business.” CNN. Cable News Network, November 11, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/11/tech/musk-twitter-ftc/index.html.
47 Rainey, Clint. “Why Apple and Google Could Be the Biggest Threats to Elon Musk's Anything-Goes Version of Twitter.” Fast Company, November 21, 2022. https://www.fastcompany.com/90815181/why-apple-and-google-could-be-the-biggest-threat-to-elon-musks-anything-goes-version-of-twitter.
48 Ayad, Moustafa. “Islamic State Supporters on Twitter: How Is 'New' Twitter Handling an Old Problem? .” GNET. Global Network on Extremism and Technology, November 18, 2022. https://gnet-research.org/2022/11/18/islamic-state-supporters-on-twitter-how-is-new-twitter-handling-an-old-problem/.
49 Porterfield, Carlie. “Musk Wars with the Left: Suggests 'Activists' Killed Moderation Plan and Baits Black Lives Matter Supporters.” Forbes. Forbes Magazine, November 24, 2022. https://www.forbes.com/sites/carlieporterfield/2022/11/23/musk-wars-with-the-left-left-suggests-activists-killed-moderation-plan-and-baits-black-lives-matter-supporters/?sh=3d87e9bf2aaf.
50 Conger, Kate, Tiffany Hsu, and Ryan Mac. “Elon Musk's Twitter Faces Exodus of Advertisers and Executives.” New York Times. New York Times, November 1, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/01/technology/elon-musk-twitter-advertisers.html.
51 Roth, Yoel. “Opinion | I Was the Head of Trust and Safety at Twitter. This Is What Could Become of It. .” New York Times. New York Times, November 18, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/18/opinion/twitter-yoel-roth-elon-musk.html.
52 Duffy, Kate. “Elon Musk Has Delayed Twitter's Launch of Its Verified Subscription Service Again as It Tries to Bypass Apple's 30% App Store Fees, Report Says.” Business Insider. Business Insider, November 30, 2022. https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-delays-twitter-blue-launch-avoid-apple-store-fees-2022-11.
53 Roth, Yoel. “Opinion | I Was the Head of Trust and Safety at Twitter. This Is What Could Become of It. .” New York Times. New York Times, November 18, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/18/opinion/twitter-yoel-roth-elon-musk.html.
54 Olson, Parmy. “Parmy Olson: Musk's Twitter Won't Die. Look at Telegram.” Lowell Sun. Lowell Sun, December 3, 2022. https://www.lowellsun.com/2022/12/03/parmy-olson-musks-twitter-wont-die-look-at-telegram/.
55 “Terrorists on Telegram.” Counter Extremism Project. Counter Extremism Project, May 2017. https://www.counterextremism.com/terrorists-on-telegram.
56 West, Darrell M. “The Future of Twitter: Four Scenarios.” Brookings. Brookings, November 22, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2022/11/22/the-future-of-twitter-four-scenarios/.
57 Darcy, Oliver. “Hate Speech Dramatically Surges on Twitter Following Elon Musk Takeover, New Research Shows | CNN Business.” CNN. Cable News Network, December 2, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/02/tech/twitter-hate-speech/index.html.
About the Author(s)
Ella Busch
Ella Busch is a researcher at Georgetown University studying Government and Psychology. She has a particular interest in domestic terrorism and hopes to specialize in security in the future.
8. In search of America’s next ‘grand strategy’
If I were king for a day I would legislate a requirement for the president to convene a Solarium Commission twice during her or his term: the summer following the election and the summer following the mid term election.
The president would convenes a group of scholars, practitioners, and policymakers at the National War College to do six things:
1. Assess the global security environment
2. Assess US national security interests
3. Identify or reaffirm assumptions (and constraints, restraints, and limitation)
4. Develop a new grand strategy
5. Or re-affirm the current strategy
6. Or make adjustments to the current strategy based on evolving conditions and updated assumptions
This strategy should inform resourcing decisions, force posture decisions, the application of all elements of national power, NDAA debate, etc.
Excerpts:
Precisely how this debate will play out remains uncertain. That the future course of U.S. grand strategy will be shaped by a degree of continuity seems unquestionable — the liberal internationalist and deep engagement instincts of the U.S. foreign policy establishment remain as strong as ever. But there are powerful systemic pressures (most emanating from the return of multipolar great-power competition) that are pushing in the direction of change.
If the past is any guide, these new systemic pressures are likely to result in a major shift in U.S. grand strategy — one akin to the shift to containment as the bipolarity of the Cold War era set in, and the shift to liberal internationalism as that bipolarity gave way to the unipolarity of the post-Cold War era.
While the precise outcome of this process of strategic reorientation is impossible to predict, I for one am rooting for restraint.
In search of America’s next ‘grand strategy’
BY ANDREW LATHAM, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 01/03/23 1:30 PM ET
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3796436-in-search-of-americas-next-grand-strategy/?mc_cid=63d72df525
Since the end of World War II, there have been three occasions when American policymakers have had the motive, means and opportunity to forge a new “grand strategy.”
The first was in the late 1940s, when American policymakers were forced to confront the new reality of an ideologically inflected bipolar competition with the Soviet Union. In this case, U.S. policymakers adopted a grand strategy of “containment,” defined broadly as the use of American power to check the expansion of Soviet influence and prevent the spread of communism more generally.
The second occasion was in the early 1990s, when American policymakers seized the opportunity presented by the end of the Cold War and the onset of the so-called Unipolar Moment. On this occasion, as the structural conditions of American geopolitical primacy and ideological hegemony became clear, U.S. policymakers settled on a grand strategy of liberal internationalism — that is, a strategy of U.S. military primacy in the service of creating and upholding a truly global liberal international order.
The third occasion, still ongoing, began in the mid-2010s, when unipolarity decisively gave way to the current era of multipolar great-power competition. A decade or so into this new era, the debate over how best to adapt to this new geopolitical reality has yet to be settled, with at least five competing visions of what the United States’s next grand strategy ought to look like remaining in contention.
The first of these is liberal internationalism. This strategy represents a continuation of the U.S. strategy of the post-Cold War years, but adapted to the realities of the new international order. It focuses on using American power to uphold what is now called the rules-based international order (RBIO). In its contemporary form, liberal internationalism envisions a worldwide U.S. military presence in support of an international order built on open and free trade, democracy and human rights.
While conceding that the unipolar moment has passed and that the rise of rival great powers is inevitable, liberal internationalism envisions enmeshing those powers in a dense web of U.S.-led institutions that will limit rivalry, facilitate cooperation and dissuade potentially revisionist powers from attempting to overthrow the existing international order. It also holds that, as U.S. primacy underpins the RBIO, Washington must maintain unrivaled military forces capable of deterring or defending against any potential threat to that order.
The second grand strategy currently in contention is that of deep engagement, which is similar in some respects to liberal internationalism but differs from it in important ways. It is similar in that it advocates U.S. primacy and a robust forward presence of U.S. forces.
But deep engagement differs from liberal internationalism in that it focuses more tightly on those regions of the world – Asia, Europe and the Middle East – that its advocates hold to be of particular importance to the United States. It further holds that Washington should maintain military forces in those regions not only to prevent hostile regional hegemons from emerging but generally to dampen any potential regional rivalries that could erupt absent the reassuring presence of U.S. forces. While one of its objectives is a stable, U.S.-led international order, unlike liberal internationalism, deep engagement tends to downplay the promotion of democracy and human rights as strategic goals.
A third contending grand strategic vision is that of strategic competition. This is a grand strategy that fully embraces the idea that the current international order is one of multipolar great power competition and recommends that the United States compete more purposefully and effectively. It comes in both minimalist and maximalist versions.
The minimalist version – managed strategic competition – emphasizes that the goal of strategic competition with the United States’s only real rival, China, is a stable form of competition in which the adversary is neither demonized nor treated as an existential threat, and the objective of which is not total victory. Another, more maximalist, variant frames the new strategic context as “Cold War II” and calls for adopting an updated version of the Cold War grand strategy of containment, with China as its new object.
Restraint, the fourth contending vision, is a grand strategy premised on the assumption that the United States should not use its national power resources to uphold and defend the rules-based international order, but instead use that power to pursue the more limited objectives of defending the U.S. homeland, securing the global commons and otherwise maintaining a stable balance of power in the world’s key regions.
While this overlaps somewhat with deep engagement, it differs from that grand strategy in that it rejects the argument that maintaining such a stable balance requires a robust forward military presence with its associated extensive web of alliance and basing agreements. Realist-restraint grand strategy favors instead securing the United States’s home region (North America or the Western Hemisphere) and deploying forces abroad only to prevent the emergence of a hegemon in the key regions of Europe, Northeast Asia or the Persian Gulf, or to prevent a state from dominating the global commons. Instead of policing the world, the United States would encourage other countries to take the lead in checking potential regional hegemons, intervening itself only when necessary.
The final contender goes by the label of “progressive” grand strategy. This vision (currently on the margins of the debate, but an intellectually serious contender nonetheless) bears a superficial resemblance to restraint in that both advocate reducing defense spending, shrinking the United States’s military footprint abroad and abjuring wars of choice and other forms of military adventurism.
The two grand strategies differ fundamentally, however, in terms of their underlying theoretical logic. Whereas restraint grand strategy proper is grounded in realism, progressive grand strategy is anchored in a more progressive social theory — one that sees both domestic and international society as shot through with structural inequalities and that sees the point of grand strategy as working to end these inequalities on a global level. As a result, progressive grand strategy tends to prioritize objectives such as environmental justice, countering authoritarianism and in general addressing the world’s social ills in ways that realist-restrainers do not.
Precisely how this debate will play out remains uncertain. That the future course of U.S. grand strategy will be shaped by a degree of continuity seems unquestionable — the liberal internationalist and deep engagement instincts of the U.S. foreign policy establishment remain as strong as ever. But there are powerful systemic pressures (most emanating from the return of multipolar great-power competition) that are pushing in the direction of change.
If the past is any guide, these new systemic pressures are likely to result in a major shift in U.S. grand strategy — one akin to the shift to containment as the bipolarity of the Cold War era set in, and the shift to liberal internationalism as that bipolarity gave way to the unipolarity of the post-Cold War era.
While the precise outcome of this process of strategic reorientation is impossible to predict, I for one am rooting for restraint.
Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minn., a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities in Washington, D.C., and a Senior Fellow with the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy in Ottawa, Canada. Follow him on Twitter @aalatham.
TAGS CHINA COLD WAR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT DEFENSE SPENDING GREAT POWER COMPETITION NATO RUSSIA US-CHINA RELATIONS
9. The Fallout of a Failed Jihadist Insurgency in the Philippines
Guerrilla or insurgent forces are most vulnerable to defeat (often at high cost on both sides and to civilians) when they transition from guerrilla warfare to conventional combat operations / (war of maneuver/movement).
I recall visiting our SF ODA in Marawi in 2007 with our Ambassador and listening to students at Mindanao State University. One of them reminded us that the US has "baggage" in Mindanao in that the people of Mindanao did not want to be part of the Philippines but in 1945 wanted to remain (or return to being) a colony of the US
The Fallout of a Failed Jihadist Insurgency in the Philippines
The Battle of Marawi is a stark reminder of a forgotten conflict at the edge of the Islamic world
Georgi Engelbrecht
Georgi Engelbrecht is a senior analyst at the Crisis Group with a focus on the Philippines and the South China Sea.
newlinesmag.com · by New Lines magazine · January 2, 2023
In the early afternoon of May 23, 2017, right before a lunch break in a small seaside village on Mindanao, an island in the southern Philippines, I received a text message that told me something had happened in Marawi, a town I had visited just hours earlier. My police contact offered few details on the phone, but he sounded troubled. There were reports of gunfire in the city. An hour later, the first images went viral on social media. The entire world could see armed men in black carrying high-powered firearms taking control of the Philippines’ so-called “Islamic City.” What followed was a five-month nightmare in a town 5,000 miles from the dying caliphate of the Islamic State group in the Middle East. The battle would obliterate 24 districts, kill more than 1,000 and displace over 200,000 Maranao or Mëranaw people, members of the ethno-linguistic community living in the Lanao provinces of Mindanao.
The history of Marawi and the wider majority-Muslim Bangsamoro region in Mindanao has been intertwined for centuries. If Aceh in Indonesia was Mecca’s veranda, then Mindanao might be Islam’s farthest outpost. Moro sultanates existed long before the Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan landed on the Philippine islands, and indigenous Muslims continued to resist Spanish and American rule. Two decades after Philippine independence in 1945, violence surged after Manila encouraged and supported Christian settlers migrating to Mindanao, building on initial migration that commenced during American rule, and the Bangsamoro lost their land and political power. One of the first clashes between the military and loosely allied insurgents occurred in October 1972 in Marawi, when seven armed groups tried to occupy the city’s university and fought with security forces. In the next decades, the Mindanao wars would lead to around 120,000 deaths. Marawi itself was free from combat in the following years, however. It offered shelter to displaced families and served as a refuge for rebel commanders. Former guerrillas ended up ruling the city even as conflict scarred the countryside.
A landmark peace agreement in 2014 reconciled the Philippine government with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the largest — and formerly secessionist — Moro Muslim rebel group. Bringing about peace, however, has been more complicated. Islamist outfits have formed outside the MILF and gained increasing popularity as the pact was delayed and formal Moro autonomy slowed despite the peace deal.
The southern Philippines may be on Islam’s periphery, but Mindanao holds a special place in jihadi imagination. The Palestinian cleric Abdullah Azzam mentioned Mindanao in his writings along with Kashmir and Chad as occupied lands to be restored to Islam. The Yemeni-American preacher Anwar al-Awlaki was also aware of the plight of Filipino Muslims and sympathetic to their cause. For most Moro militants, the struggle was not in the Levant but in the Bangsamoro homeland. A new Islamist sentiment, different from the MILF’s discourse of self-determination and commitment to peace talks, was brewing.
One prominent faction at the core of the jihadist coalition that unraveled Marawi was the so-called Maute group. Central to the story are Omar Khayyam Maute and his brother Abdullah, the well-spoken religious scions of an influential clan from the town of Butig in Lanao del Sur. Omar studied at Al-Azhar in Cairo, while Abdullah pursued his education in Jordan and worked in Indonesia as a teacher at an Islamic school. Upon returning, the brothers linked up in around 2011 or 2012 with the jihadist Abu Dar, who allegedly trained in Afghanistan. At first, the nascent group was fighting political rivals, but the Salafi-jihadist creed soon merged with local frustrations. It went by the names Khilafah Islamic Movement, Jamal al-Tawhid wal-Jihad or Ghuraba, but the military labeled it the “Maute group” and later “Daulah Islamiyah.” Locals came to know it as “local ISIS” or “IS Ranao.”
In 2014, the millennial jihadists set up training camps in Butig, a mountainous town known for clan feuds and weak local governance, as well as being the MILF founder Salamat Hashim’s place of death. Butig was also one of the oldest towns in Lanao. The Maute brothers and their followers soon claimed the MILF had abandoned the path of jihad and declared them munafiqs or hypocrites. They stepped up recruitment of both men and minors. In 2015, they pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and scaled up their actions, bombing transmission towers, shooting military and police personnel and targeting religious minorities. In February, June and November of 2016, the group clashed with the Philippine military and attempted to raise the black flag on Butig’s town hall. The fighting motivated hitherto disinterested locals to join in for a mix of ideological and worldly motives.
Things escalated after the third battle in Butig in November 2016. Isnilon Hapilon, one of the few surviving leaders of the infamous Abu Sayyaf Group, a loose network of criminal and militant cells in the Sulu Archipelago, arrived in Lanao and was appointed emir (commander) of the local Islamic State franchise. Hapilon had left his home island, Basilan, when his group came under military pressure. Details remain murky, but the plan to take over Marawi likely emerged around this time, with militants linking up with criminal syndicates. Local politicians supported the militants with cash and protection. Foreign money was arriving through remittance centers and bank accounts.
With more recruits and firepower, militants started infiltrating Marawi and nearby villages. Some of the town’s civilians were alarmed; others remained in denial. The military did not seem too worried, even though an intelligence officer monitoring the group had been killed in Marawi three months before the battle. In April 2017, airstrikes finally targeted Hapilon and the Mautes in Piagapo town.
Divided by the Agus River into two halves, bound to each other by three bridges, Marawi sits above the edge of Lake Lanao, one of the world’s oldest lakes. Although mountains cut through nearby areas and hills stand out in parts of the city, the old town’s districts edging the shoreline are flat. The city is Lanao del Sur’s geographical, cultural and historical bottleneck, home to a community with a deep Islamic history known for its mercantile culture and close kinship ties. Officially labeled the “Islamic City” by its city council, Marawi is home to dozens of mosques.
The final battle in Marawi started with an afternoon raid by Philippine forces on Hapilon’s hideout in Basak Malutlut district. The fighting preempted the jihadists’ plan to occupy Marawi on the first day of Ramadan, but it stirred a hornets’ nest. Hundreds of fighters surged through the streets, occupying key buildings and calling on locals to join them. Clashes erupted in multiple areas. Militants set up checkpoints across town and freed prisoners from the city’s jails. They executed Christian residents of Marawi who could not recite the shahada, the Muslim declaration of faith. Others were taken hostage. Fighters set fire to a college, a church, hospitals and the emptied city jail. Some military units were trapped and many citizens started fleeing. By the evening, President Rodrigo Duterte had declared martial law. A few days later, the first airstrikes pummeled the town, engulfing it in black fog.
The military, which claimed to be in control of the situation, took time to realize how difficult the battle was going to be. Meanwhile, the Islamic State used social media to amplify its successes. It would take months of bloody fighting for government forces to regain control. One military unit used over 10,000 mortar rounds in three months alone; others used slingshots to throw grenades at high-rise buildings. At the end of July, the marines took the first of the three bridges leading to Marawi’s old town, the jihadist defense line. By August, a three-pronged assault had confined the fighters to a few blocks. Fewer than 100 made a last stand. In mid-October, government sharpshooters killed Abdullah Maute and Isnilon Hapilon. Duterte declared the city’s liberation. In a strange coincidence, combat ended on the same day as the city of Raqqa was recaptured from Islamic State militants in Syria. Marawi’s old town had been reduced to rubble and dust; the dream of a caliphate evaporated.
The crisis had severe consequences for the Philippines, which are still being felt and understood years later. Two new books tackle the battle for Marawi from related yet different perspectives. “The Battle of Marawi,” by Criselda Yabes, is a chronological tour de force of the military’s campaign to retake the town. “Stories from the Front Lines,” by Carmela Fonbuena, is a layered account of the conflict that draws on voices from civilians to ex-militants, even if the military remains its main protagonist. Fonbuena and Yabes have delivered some of the best war reportage from the Philippines and Southeast Asia. They are among the most knowledgeable writers on Mindanao. Their books provide vivid accounts of the most devastating urban battle in the Philippines’ history since World War II, reconstructing in painstaking detail what transpired in Marawi. Yabes tackles the subject from the vantage points of commanders and grunts (and a stint with elite snipers in Marawi in early August), while Fonbuena builds on her reporting during the battle, including a visit to the battle zone in the fourth month of combat, with additional material from later interviews. The visceral nature of the accounts and their sense of immediacy are the books’ greatest strengths.
The Hapilon raid, which set the events of May 23 in motion, is the natural beginning for the two stories. While the narratives end differently, they both close on a somber note. In a grisly epilogue, Fonbuena writes about the difficulties of Marawi’s reconstruction and flashes forward to the island of Sulu, where several suicide bombings — including the first by a Filipino — have occurred in the years since. Yabes goes back in time to Butig and grapples with the background and motivations of the brothers who started it all. Fonbuena takes a wider perspective, having interviewed not just soldiers and militants, but also civilians, moderate Islamist rebels and politicians.
Yabes is familiar with Philippine military culture. A decade ago, she wrote “Peace Warriors,” a splendid book about the experience of officers and enlisted men deployed in the country’s Muslim south. Unsurprisingly, her book centers on the experience of soldiers, their tactics and the confusion of actual combat. With an ear for dialogue and atmosphere, she reproduces the inner struggles of men facing impossible situations. In other sections, Yabes captures chilly moments, such as when a sergeant trapped in the bathroom of an embattled building is taunted by a militant who wishes him death.
Fonbuena’s book features episodes outside the main narrative of the city’s recapture by the military. It becomes clear that Marawi’s war has affected people in different ways. One chapter describes trapped civilians, their displacement and the role of both civil society and the MILF in setting up a humanitarian corridor. Another describes the so-called “suicide squad” of rescue volunteers and their superhuman task to save the lives of hostages. The book reconstructs the chain of events leading to the battle and describes the genesis of the group acting in the name of the Islamic State. “Any new system you offer becomes attractive if the present system is broken beyond repair,” one ex-fighter tells Fonbuena.
Understanding the intricacies of the battle is essential to understanding what went wrong before and since. The war the authors describe is brutal. The military used air power against the militants freely, with devastating results. The laws of war protect mosques and schools, but the military claimed these buildings were occupied by militants and targeted them. At the height of the battle, a community leader told me bombs were “dropping like strong rain.” One young bureaucrat, who appealed to the military to cease the airstrikes, says, “The anticipation of death is worse than death itself.” Both authors also describe the moment friendly fire hit soldiers and when militants wiped out a dozen marines at the Mapandi Bridge one day in June. Yabes’ account reveals the emotional toll on troops, including the tension among officers, who debated the best way forward to break the impasse. Fonbuena, meanwhile, describes the plight of displaced civilians and those suspected to be enemies by the government.
Some questions linger, however. The exact roles of local politicians and drug syndicates in the build-up to the battle remain unclear, for example. In a similar vein, the books reveal little about the foreign fighters who joined the battle, possibly infiltrating Marawi under the guise of an Islamic convention. Was the battle avoidable? Was negotiation possible to de-escalate after a few days of the conflict? The books offer little insight on these aspects. Voices from Marawi could also tell us more about the experiences of civilians within the battle area and local perceptions of the battle. Yet, taken together, both books offer significant insight into the battle and help illuminate what happened after.
The battle for Marawi marked something of a last stand. After the defeat, the insurgency failed to revitalize. The Maute remnants suffered a fatal blow when the military killed Abu Dar two years after the battle. Marawi discredited some of the appeal of the jihadist vanguard as an alternative to the ex-rebels who have been governing the region since 2019. In addition, the Philippine government has weakened Moro militants not only on the battlefield but also through clever counterinsurgency: dole-outs for surrenders and promises of pardon. Still, the autonomous region’s track record has been mixed. Should the political transition be affected by instability, weak peace dividends and overall delays, it will only be a matter of time before another jihadist avatar emerges. Militants thrive in periods of doubt and crisis.
Marawi is returning to a kind of normalcy. But while some infrastructure has been rebuilt, progress remains slow. According to U.N. statistics, over 80,000 displaced persons cannot return to their homes. The delays are symbolic of the incomplete efforts of the Philippine state to come to terms with the events of 2017. Calls for an official inquiry into Marawi’s conflict failed to gain momentum in the Philippine congress. Up to 100 people are still missing or unaccounted for. Lacking closure, the people of Marawi move on into an uncertain future.
newlinesmag.com · by New Lines magazine · January 2, 2023
10. The Myth of America’s Ukraine Fatigue
Tell that to some of the members on both sides of the aisle in Congress.
The Myth of America’s Ukraine Fatigue
No, the U.S. public isn’t giving up on Ukraine.
By Raphael S. Cohen, the director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program at the Rand Corporation’s Project Air Force, and Gian Gentile, the deputy director of the Rand Corporation’s Army Research Division.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/02/ukraine-russia-war-fatigue-myth-us-public-opinion/
JANUARY 2, 2023, 8:00 AM
As the Ukraine war grinds into its second year, one of the big strategic questions is whether or not Americans and their allies are growing tired of the war. Indeed, there are media accounts of unnamed senior U.S. officials warning Kyiv about this concern—and Ukrainians, understandably, also worry that their Western backers might grow tired of the war. The question of whether Western support for Ukraine is waning has kept the pollsters busy and dominated the opinion pages. In all likelihood, this was a major reason why Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky traveled to Washington earlier this month, leaving his country for the first time since the war began.
But just how real is Americans’ war fatigue? Less than it seems, most likely.
Much of the concern about the United States suffering from war fatigue stems from a series of polls of the American electorate that found popular support for Ukraine slipping. Separate surveys from the Wall Street Journal, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute found that, while an overwhelming majority of Americans still backed Ukraine and believed Russia was the aggressor, a growing minority—particularly among Republicans—believed the United States was providing too much aid and that the war was costing the United States too much.
These numbers need to be taken in context. First, in absolute terms, support for Ukraine among Americans remains relatively robust—hovering at 57 percent or more, depending on the poll. This is a remarkable fact, particularly now that the war is nearly a year old. Nor is it unusual for there to be a partisan skew in opinion on a war. Conflicts—including in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan—often begin with support from both sides of the aisle. But as wars draw on, and as the original motive for the intervention begins to fade from collective memory, partisan divides creep in.
Yet U.S. political support for Ukraine remains bipartisan. Congress passed multiple aid packages for Ukraine by bipartisan majorities multiple times this year, including another $45 billion as part of a broader government funding bill last week. And although there have been calls by some on the right for more scrutiny of Ukraine aid, Zelensky received a warm welcome from both sides of the aisle when he addressed a joint meeting of Congress.
Political support for Ukraine will in all likelihood continue. True, the Republicans won control of the House of Representatives in November, and likely Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy promised that Ukraine would no longer receive a “blank check.” And yes, some of Ukraine’s staunchest legislative supporters will not return for the next congressional session. But at the same time, some of the candidates from the Republican Party’s isolationist wing lost their bids in November. And plenty of Republican leaders still support more Ukraine military aid, even if they want increased oversight about how that money is spent.
What’s more, U.S. foreign policy has rarely perfectly followed the polls. Although successive presidential administrations have complained about the “blob” or “deep state” that blocks their foreign-policy agendas, the fact remains that Americans, for the most part, have allowed their leaders more latitude on foreign than domestic matters. That’s partly because Americans tend to care less about foreign-policy issues than they do about domestic ones—particularly those that directly impact their pocketbooks.
That’s not to say that Americans don’t have views about foreign policy. They do. Ask Americans about any particular issue—especially one that has attracted as much media attention as Ukraine—and most will offer an opinion. But polls are a snapshot in time and often change with events. Should Russia do something shocking—such as employing a nuclear weapon or trying to capture Kyiv again—support for Ukraine among the naysayers may well rebound.
Another thing worth remembering is that Americans hate to lose. Case in point: Americans overwhelmingly approved then-President Barack Obama’s withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq in 2011—only to slam his handling of Iraq when the Islamic State nearly overran the country in 2014. President Joe Biden’s own tenure follows a similar course: Americans supported withdrawing from Afghanistan, but they blamed him for the debacle that followed. In war, from a purely political perspective, it’s usually safer for politicians to stay the course.
Perhaps this is why democracies’ track records of playing the long game in armed conflicts is actually pretty good. From the ancient Athenians during the Peloponnesian War on through to the present day, democracies have not usually been the fickle, shrinking violets their detractors make them out to be. In the United States, the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan were all eventually deeply unpopular. Yet the United States fought for three years in Korea, almost nine years in Iraq (before going back in after the initial withdrawal), and almost 20 years in both Vietnam and Afghanistan. All these campaigns involved significantly more investment of American blood and treasure than the U.S. commitment to Ukraine has demanded thus far.
Finally, the most important reason to be skeptical of Americans’ supposed Ukraine fatigue is, quite simply, that there is no such thing. Americans are not, in literal fact, exhausted by this war. With the possible exception of the handful of U.S. policymakers directly engaged in U.S. policy toward Ukraine, as well as those U.S. forces elsewhere in Europe providing security assistance and humanitarian relief, few Americans are actively engaged in the conflict. The United States is not suffering losses on the battlefield, nor is it enduring energy shortages. For most Americans, gas prices today average a few cents less than a year ago. And Americans aren’t paying higher taxes due to the war, either. Since Congress does not need to balance the federal budget, aid for Ukraine is not coming at the expense of domestic spending, at least for the moment.
Democracies’ track records of playing the long game in armed conflicts is actually pretty good.
A variety of American opinionmakers have their own reasons for amplifying the Ukraine fatigue narrative. Some “America first” Republicans may find the war a distraction and would prefer to talk about domestic issues, such as immigration and crime. Certain liberal anti-war activists may have a knee-jerk reaction to any U.S. military involvement, however indirect. For some media commentators, the war fatigue narrative is an easy way to frame a complex foreign topic as a domestic political debate. And a handful of voices may genuinely sympathize with Russian talking points, which regularly include the idea that the West will tire of helping Ukraine. Some Americans may really believe that they are paying more of a price for the conflict than they in fact are, but this is primarily based on perceptions—not facts.
In other words, the United States’ Ukraine fatigue is more myth than reality. This has important implications for the war itself. Right now, Russia’s strategy seems to be largely based on protraction: Let the war grind on, and eventually the United States and its allies will lose interest, and the Ukrainians will cave. In all likelihood, this strategy will not work. If past is precedent, and present trends continue, it could be years before any of the declines in the American public’s support actually result in a change of policy.
At the same time, these polls should be a clarion call for U.S. leaders and the United States’ allies and partners all over the world. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was more than just a dispute of borders and political allegiances: It was an attack on the liberal international order itself. To their great credit, democracies all over the world responded appropriately. As the war drags on, the leaders of the free world need to remind their publics what is at stake in Ukraine—not just for European and global security, but for democracy at large.
Zelensky’s visit to Washington was one important step in reminding Americans what is at stake, but it was only a beginning. The war in Ukraine, unfortunately, does not seem likely to end soon. As long as the fight continues on the battlefield, the battle for Western opinion must go on as well.
Raphael S. Cohen is the director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program at the Rand Corporation’s Project Air Force.
Gian Gentile is the deputy director of the Rand Corporation’s Army Research Division.
11. America’s ‘strategic ambiguity’ on Taiwan gets more dangerous by the day
Excerpts;
Yet, Biden is reluctant to criticize Beijing’s sleight-of-hand, even though it is consistent with China’s “moral,” political and diplomatic support for Russia. The joint statement by Xi and Putin in February, declaring the new cold war that both have been waging against the West for years, is now openly coordinated as a “no limits strategic partnership.” In Putin’s war against Ukraine and Xi’s rising threats against Taiwan, each supports the other against the West’s rules-based international order.
Last week, the two dictators held a virtual meeting where they reinforced their deepening alliance and blamed the West’s sanctions and “containment” policies for the increase in international tensions. Putin called for even closer military cooperation after the two militaries conducted joint live-fire exercises in the East China Sea last month.
The State Department expressed its “concern” about the ominous burgeoning relationship: “Beijing claims to be neutral, but its behavior makes clear it is still investing in close ties to Russia.”
Xi and Putin have learned that the one Biden signal they can rely on are statements of what he will not do. The shameful Afghanistan debacle after the Trump-Biden fulminations against “forever wars” remains a stain on U.S. credibility. Now they note his visceral aversion to either direct U.S. military intervention in Ukraine or to the provision of weapons Kyiv could use to strike military targets in Russia that are systematically destroying Ukraine’s vital infrastructure and threatening the survival of millions of men, women and children.
Observing Biden’s stalemate strategy in Ukraine, Xi is no doubt updating his plans for China’s aggression against Taiwan. Only a formal declaration of American determination to defend Taiwan will avoid a catastrophic Chinese miscalculation.
America’s ‘strategic ambiguity’ on Taiwan gets more dangerous by the day
BY JOSEPH BOSCO, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 01/03/23 10:00 AM ET
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3795774-americas-strategic-ambiguity-on-taiwan-gets-more-dangerous-by-the-day/
More than 24 years ago, The Washington Post became the first major newspaper to publish an opinion piece calling for an open U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan’s democratic sovereignty. It argued, “America’s policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ has failed. Only strategic clarity will prevent another dangerous miscalculation.”
The 1998 article followed the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1995-1996, when China fired missiles toward Taiwan, Washington sent carrier battle groups to the region, and a Clinton administration official called it “our own Cuban missile crisis; we had stared into the abyss.” But when Chinese officials asked how the U.S. would respond to an outright attack on Taiwan, a more senior official said, “We don’t know. … It would depend on the circumstances.”
Since then, scores of articles have appeared defending or assailing the ongoing ambiguity about Washington’s intentions to defend Taiwan. At the same time, the circumstances surrounding the situation across the Taiwan Strait have changed dramatically over the ensuing decades.
The danger to Taiwan and regional security has increased significantly, even beyond that fraught episode. Last week, a Chinese fighter jet aggressively maneuvered within 20 feet of a U.S. reconnaissance plane over the South China Sea, evoking the 2001 EP-3 collision under similar circumstances.
No longer is the Seventh Fleet present in force to guarantee Taiwan’s security, and Chinese submarines constantly patrol the waters. Anti-ship ballistic missiles of the People’s Liberation Army threaten U.S. and allied vessels with a “sea of fire” if they intervene to defend Taiwan.
Indeed, over the past 27 years, only one carrier battle group, the USS Kitty Hawk in 2007, has made the transit through the international Strait that the Seventh Fleet kept safe and open for decades until it was withdrawn as a preemptive concession to China by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in 1972.
Except for a single passage by the USS Nimitz battle group in 1996, the U.S. Navy mostly avoided the Strait until 2006, when the George W. Bush administration learned of the self-imposed restraint and abruptly ended it.
When Beijing protested the Kitty Hawk’s 2007 passage through “Chinese waters,” Adm. Timothy Keating, commander of the Pacific Command, responded, “We don’t need China’s permission to go through the Taiwan Strait; it is international waters. We will exercise our free right of passage, whenever and wherever we choose, as we have done repeatedly in the past and will do in the future.”
Unfortunately, during the remaining two years of the Bush administration, eight years of Barack Obama, four years under Donald Trump, and two years so far of Joe Biden’s administration, no Navy battle group has returned to the Strait — even though at least two of China’s three new aircraft carriers pass unimpeded through those waters on a frequent basis.
U.S. carriers stayed away even during the “Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis” in August when China fired missiles and conducted air and sea maneuvers over and around Taiwan to protest a visit by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.). Beijing’s show of force demonstrated that China has the ability and the will to attack Taiwan and/or to impose a strangling blockade on the island if it chooses.
Three weeks after the Chinese exercise, the U.S. sent two cruisers through the Strait to resume scheduled Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) by combatant ships other than carriers, a program that was regularized by the Trump administration and expanded to monthly transits under Biden. But Beijing still entertains the wishful delusion that Washington may be bluffing. Under those conditions, a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan seems inevitable.
Biden has made several personal attempts to redress the harm caused by longstanding U.S ambiguity on Taiwan. Four times, he has pledged that the U.S. will defend Taiwan. But, as occurred when Bush and Trump gave similar indications, State Department and White House spokespersons repeatedly stated there was no change in U.S. policy. To add to the confusion, Biden himself has repeated the disclaimer of his own remarks.
Xi Jinping and his colleagues have grown accustomed to observing the disparity between U.S. actions and its rhetorical flourishes. They saw it when Washington guaranteed Ukraine’s security in 1997, prevailed upon NATO in 2008 to invite Ukraine and Georgia into the Alliance, and then acquiesced to Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014.
They saw it in 2012 when Obama, with Biden as his vice president and foreign policy guru, set down an evanescent “red line” on Bashar al-Assad’s chemical weapons attacks against the Syrian people and on his regime’s tenure in power. Both “red lines” vanished when Putin sent Russian forces to prop up Assad.
They saw it again in 2021, when Biden and his team tried to deter Putin from invading Ukraine by threatening “harsh” and “extreme” economic sanctions, and then stood by as China technically complied while dramatically expanding its imports of discounted Russian oil. That financial workaround, legal under current sanctions regimes, effectively undermines the sanctions and keeps Putin’s war well-funded with Chinese money.
Yet, Biden is reluctant to criticize Beijing’s sleight-of-hand, even though it is consistent with China’s “moral,” political and diplomatic support for Russia. The joint statement by Xi and Putin in February, declaring the new cold war that both have been waging against the West for years, is now openly coordinated as a “no limits strategic partnership.” In Putin’s war against Ukraine and Xi’s rising threats against Taiwan, each supports the other against the West’s rules-based international order.
Last week, the two dictators held a virtual meeting where they reinforced their deepening alliance and blamed the West’s sanctions and “containment” policies for the increase in international tensions. Putin called for even closer military cooperation after the two militaries conducted joint live-fire exercises in the East China Sea last month.
The State Department expressed its “concern” about the ominous burgeoning relationship: “Beijing claims to be neutral, but its behavior makes clear it is still investing in close ties to Russia.”
Xi and Putin have learned that the one Biden signal they can rely on are statements of what he will not do. The shameful Afghanistan debacle after the Trump-Biden fulminations against “forever wars” remains a stain on U.S. credibility. Now they note his visceral aversion to either direct U.S. military intervention in Ukraine or to the provision of weapons Kyiv could use to strike military targets in Russia that are systematically destroying Ukraine’s vital infrastructure and threatening the survival of millions of men, women and children.
Observing Biden’s stalemate strategy in Ukraine, Xi is no doubt updating his plans for China’s aggression against Taiwan. Only a formal declaration of American determination to defend Taiwan will avoid a catastrophic Chinese miscalculation.
Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He served in the Pentagon when Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia and was involved in Department of Defense discussions about the U.S. response. Follow him on Twitter @BoscoJosephA.
12. Ex-NATO secretary-general arrives in Taiwan
Ex-NATO secretary-general arrives in Taiwan
https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202301030005
01/03/2023 11:13 AM
Taipei, Jan. 3 (CNA) Former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen arrived in Taiwan on Tuesday morning for a three-day visit, during which he will meet with President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).
Rasmussen, who also served as Denmark's prime minister, was welcomed by MOFA Department of European Affairs chief Vincent Yao (姚金祥) upon his arrival at Taoyuan International Airport at around 7:08 a.m.
During his scheduled stay from Tuesday to Thursday, Rasmussen, founder of the Alliance of Democracies Foundation (AoD), will also meet with Vice President Lai Ching-te (賴清德), Foreign Minister Joseph Wu (吳釗燮), lawmakers and think tank scholars, MOFA said in a statement.
In a separate press release issued by the AoD, the foundation said the visit was the first official visit by a former NATO secretary-general to Taipei.
"The visit will focus on support from the democratic world for Taiwan and closer EU-Taiwan relations," it said.
Rasmussen was cited as saying in the AoD statement that he looked forward to the Taiwan visit, the first for him in nearly three decades since he last was in Taiwan in 1994 as a member of the Danish parliament.
"The changes in Taiwan in the intervening 30 years have been immense," Rasmussen was quoted as saying in the statement.
"Taiwan's democratic transformation would be impressive under any circumstances. The fact it has happened while facing daily threats and provocations from a nuclear armed neighbor make it remarkable."
He said the trip was a chance to show his support for Taiwan and "its ability to choose its own future freely, peacefully, and independently."
The Danish politician was the 24th prime minister of Denmark from November 2001 to April 2009 and the 12th secretary-general of NATO from August 2009 to October 2014.
In 2017, Rasmussen founded the AoD, a non-profit organization dedicated to the advancement of democracy and free markets across the globe.
In this role, he hosts the annual Copenhagen Democracy Summit, which was first held in 2018.
Wu personally visited Denmark for the annual summit in 2019 while President Tsai has also been invited to give a virtual speech at the summit annually since 2020, according to MOFA.
(By Joseph Yeh)
Enditem/ls
> Chinese Version
13. An unexpected glimpse of disillusionment in Russia’s trenches
Can the Ukrainian give them a way out? Is there a path to surrender for them?
An unexpected glimpse of disillusionment in Russia’s trenches
militarytimes.com · by Neil Hauer · January 3, 2023
NOVOPETRIVKA, Ukraine — Few jobs are less enviable these days than that of a Russian mobilized soldier deployed to Ukraine.
Since Vladimir Putin’s declaration of partial military mobilization on Sept. 21, dozens of videos have emerged showing the dire conditions in which those drafted into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are forced to serve. Conscripts have been sleeping under the open sky, given paltry food and faulty weapons, and their officers concern themselves with drinking rather than providing any sort of training before they are sent to the front.
Yet others even further down the socioeconomic pecking order have been forced into service: the men of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, the Russian puppet states in eastern Ukraine whose male population was press-ganged en masse this summer. Interviews with locals and documents recently recovered by Military Times from abandoned Russian positions in the former frontline village of Novopetrivka, in southern Ukraine’s Mykolaiv oblast, offer a glimpse of the day-to-day existence.
Located 40 kilometers north of the city of Kherson, Novopetrivka sat in the heart of Russia’s defensive line on the right bank of the Dnipro River for over six months. After Russian troops captured Kherson in the opening days of the war in early March, their advance on the city of Mykolaiv was repulsed by Ukrainian defenders. They quickly settled into Novopetrivka.
Military Times visited the village on Nov. 12, just two days after its liberation by Ukrainian forces. The signs of occupation were fresh, particularly a series of Z’s - the symbol of the Russian campaign - spray-painted on tractors and other vehicles.
“[The Russians] came on the 27th or 28th of February,” said Viktor, a 50-year old villager. “Columns were passing through the village night and day, as they attacked Mykolaiv. But then our guys beat them there [at Mykolaiv], and they ran back here and entrenched. There was a heavy battle here - a tank was destroyed over there, my house was hit by a shell - but [Ukrainian forces] couldn’t push them out,” he says.
In these early days, the Russians were interested in attempting to win over the local populace. Viktor and others in Novopetrivka describe good treatment and genuine friendliness shortly after the occupation. But the mood quickly shifted.
“[The Russians] could see that we were not interested in their propaganda,” Viktor said. “They started to lose their temper, especially as they could no longer beat [Ukrainian forces] on the battlefield. By the summer, they were regularly taking people for torture - most of them simply disappeared,” he said.
There was also resentment among different sections of the Russian and pro-Russian forces stationed in Novopetrivka, with stark differences in living conditions leading to tension.
“The Russians [and Donetsk/Luhansk troops] were living in the trenches, doing the actual fighting,” Viktor says. “But in the village itself, Chechens and Buryats were staying in people’s houses, not fighting at all. They would just go around the village and rob as they pleased and threaten anyone who tried to stop them - both locals and Russians. The Russians did not like them at all,” he says.
The trenches themselves start on the northern outskirts of Novopetrivka, an extensive series of positions arranged in two lines. Scattered around the trenches are the standard assortment of basic supplies: discarded cans of food, dirty clothes, and packets of medication of dubious quality. One item, however, offers a more insightful look at the conditions of life there: a serviceman’s half-filled notebook left in one of the sleeping bunkers.
Much of the notebook’s contents are mundane. Many pages list food rations or patrol schedules. But one contains a full description of the size and disposition of the unit located there. “2nd Rifle Company, 57 people,” the opening line reads, revealing that this was an infantry unit without armored vehicles - likely drawn from mobilized or volunteer personnel. The next lines tell that there are 16 people per subunit, of which 27 are currently resting after duty, doing upkeep work like cleaning and repairs. There is also a grenade launcher platoon, from whom five people are presently at combat posts with nine others doing chores.
Other pages of the notebook provide further clues as to the unit stationed here. On one sheaf, a series of phone numbers of other men in the unit are listed. All of them begin with the Russian international calling code +7, but more interesting is the area code for each: 990. A quick search reveals that this area code was issued by two Russian telecoms companies beginning in May 2022 for the occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhye regions. That these soldiers were using personal cell phones for military communications - and forced to write down their comrades’ numbers on paper - is another indictment of the paucity of basic equipment these soldiers had.
Finally, the most interesting page yet captures the mood of the soldier who owned it. There is a crude poem scrawled in Russian, lamenting the “civilian guys on their fancy motorcycles [back home],” the ones who did not come to the war. “Fuck you, I fought hard,” the author repeats several times, also saying that he “did not get buckets of unearned medals.” The text itself has numerous spelling and grammar errors, of the sort a Ukrainian speaker of Russian might make - suggesting heavily that the author is a native of the occupied Luhansk or Donetsk oblasts, in Ukraine’s east. It’s clear that he was not particularly pleased with the lot he found himself in - and that he had little love for those meanwhile enriching themselves in peaceful Moscow.
In the end, the sacrifices of the author and his comrades were in vain, as they were forced to abandon their hard-defended positions. Viktor, the local man, says the withdrawal was just as surprising to the Russian servicemen as it was to Novopetrivka’s residents.
“They were shocked,” Viktor says, when asked how the Russian and LNR/DNR troops in the village responded to the withdrawal. “They had been telling us, ‘Russia is here forever,’ and suddenly it turns out the opposite,” he said. “But then, they never really knew what they were doing here in the first place. We are fighting for our land. They are simply dying as slaves for Putin.”
About Neil Hauer
Neil Hauer is a freelance reporter covering the war in Ukraine and the Caucasus at large. You can follow him on Twitter at @NeilPHauer.
14. What Explains Chinese Aggression?
(Note this is Denny Roy and not Stapleton Roy - this has caused some past confusion)
Conclusion:
A state’s internal political dynamics affect its foreign relations. Newly ascendant, Xi-led China is an arrogant and angry great power, simultaneously thin-skinned and callous. Successfully navigating through the challenges caused by the rise of a nascent great power in a region long patrolled by another great power would be difficult in any case, but these PRC domestic characteristics, unfortunately, make the task harder.
What Explains Chinese Aggression?
Do tensions between China and other states stem from Beijing simply being a great power, or from its unique internal characteristics?
by Denny Roy
The National Interest · by Denny Roy · January 3, 2023
The consensus among outside analysts that China’s foreign policy has recently (since about 2010) become more “assertive” has fueled a new round of discussion on the possible causal relationship between China’s domestic politics and its external behavior. The issue is whether tensions between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and other states stem from China simply being a great power, or from China’s unique internal characteristics—an authoritarian state, ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with a particular historical background. Both explanations are partially correct.
The two most recent U.S. presidential administrations have embraced the idea that China’s domestic political characteristics generate external conflict. Under the Trump administration, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo argued that the United States and other free countries could not be safe in a world where the CCP controls China. President Joe Biden has attributed the crisis in U.S.-China relations to the PRC’s authoritarian political system.
Much of China’s foreign policy, however, is not idiosyncratic, but is typical of relatively large and powerful countries. This may be called “great power behavior with Chinese characteristics.” Beijing has its own unique way of describing its behavior, but the bottom line is pressuring or forcing smaller and weaker countries to accept a self-interested Chinese agenda while arguing that this agenda makes the world a better place—just as previous great powers such as Britain, the United States, Russia, and Japan have done. Where America had the Monroe Doctrine, China similarly demands a sphere of influence on its periphery, sometimes using the justification of irredentism, but if necessary by getting right to the point that “China is a big country, and other countries are small countries.”
Nevertheless, there are five aspects of the PRC’s unique domestic political milieu that generate conflict with other states.
First, the over-concentration of power in a single paramount leader sets up the country for disastrous policy decisions. A notorious example was the Great Leap Forward of 1958–1960, when Mao Zedong tried to accelerate China’s industrialization by mobilizing peasants to produce steel in their backyards. Without proper training or equipment, the farmers predictably delivered large amounts of useless pig iron rather than steel, and the decrease in agricultural production led to mass starvation, with estimates of the consequent deaths starting at 20 million. Mao’s unchecked powers not only created but also worsened the situation. Many subordinates were afraid to tell Mao his policies were failing, and even Mao’s senior general, Peng Dehuai, suffered punishment for dissenting. These abuses of power resulted in Mao’s successors instituting a rule-by-committee approach, in which the Party’s general secretary would counsel with the other Politburo Standing Committee members before announcing major decisions. The Post-Mao leadership also eschewed wrapping the general secretary in a personality cult.
Xi Jinping has, in effect, re-instituted a governance model that is a proven failure. It should not be surprising, then, that despite starting with a position of immense Chinese global prestige and economic leverage, “chairman of everything” Xi has lowered China’s international reputation, persuaded many of the world’s leading economies to partially decouple from China, and stimulated a wave of both internal and external balancing against the PRC. An autocrat who makes all the decisions relies on the strength of only one brain rather than many. And contrary to PRC propaganda, Xi is clearly not the smartest man in the universe, as anyone who has read the much-celebrated (by PRC officials and media) Xi Jinping Thought can confirm.
Second, PRC foreign policy primarily plays to the home crowd. In foreign policy, effectiveness (i.e., advancing the state’s interests in security, prosperity, and prestige) and popularity (the citizenry believing the government is standing up for the country’s rights and dignity) are often at odds. In some cases, the government understands that smoothing over conflicts and facilitating cooperation is in the country’s best interests, but the public wants to see a demonstration of national strength of outrage that will damage important international relationships.
To bolster Party legitimacy, the PRC government has cultivated an ethos of grievance against foreigners who have allegedly wronged China. Consequently, instead of maintaining a careful balancing act, the Xi regime’s conduct of foreign affairs is excessively and unhealthily weighted toward impressing the Chinese domestic audience.
The result is that much of China’s diplomacy panders to Chinese nationalism. This is manifested in Chinese overreaction to perceived slights and reduced space for Beijing to compromise on territorial issues that are closely watched by the Chinese public. It also explains the phenomenon of “Wolf Warriorism,” in which PRC officials have turned the traditional idea of diplomacy on its head by intentionally aggravating foreign relationships in order to curry favor with the Chinese mass public.
The third feature of PRC domestic politics that negatively impacts China’s foreign relations is perpetual one-party rule. Internal sclerosis carries over into China’s external behavior. In a competitive system, two or more parties would try to out-compete each other in putting forward good foreign policy ideas and calling each other out for bad ideas. But there is no such thing in the PRC political system as a “loyal opposition,” an absence that limits constructive policy criticism. China’s system also lacks the natural periodic re-evaluations and course corrections that result from the replacement of one ruling party by another. With no possibility of obtaining an electoral mandate, the Party tries to compensate by doubling down on virtuocracy. China “always stands for peace, stability, and justice,” and the PRC government does not acknowledge that any of its foreign policies have ever been flawed, mistaken, or botched.
The result is a risk-averse incapacity for negotiated compromises or creative solutions to difficult foreign policy problems. Beijing’s Taiwan problem is an example. In recent decades the Party has trapped itself into the position that Taiwan must officially become a province of the PRC or face war. This is based on a nineteenth-century view of sovereignty that disregards the twentieth-century principle of self-determination. In 1979, PRC leaders first suggested the idea that Taiwan should accept unification under the principle of “one country, two systems.” At no time since then has the idea attracted significant support in Taiwan. Incredibly, Beijing continues to this day promoting “one country, two systems” as the solution to the cross-Taiwan Strait tensions, even after China has made a mockery of this idea by dismantling civil liberties in Hong Kong in violation of previous pledges.
Fourth, much of the historical baggage that Chinese leaders carry—and it’s a lot of baggage, given China’s claimed history of 5,000 years—encourages conflictual interaction with foreign governments.
The Chinese have traditionally viewed international relations as hierarchical. They believe that for centuries China was the most advanced, powerful, and influential state and that the Chinese emperor was the rightful ruler of tianxia (“everything under heaven,” or the entire known world). Furthermore, many Chinese believe Asia’s golden age featured an arrangement in which neighboring kingdoms paid tribute to China in exchange for protection and trading privileges.
This inherited outlook adds friction to the PRC’s relations with other Asia-Pacific states. Most Southeast Asian elites fear a reprise of Chinese domination. China has resumed employing its economic power to force other states to pay tribute in the form of recognizing Chinese sovereignty over disputed territory. China is hostile toward U.S. strategic influence in the region, seeing America as a usurping outsider, and cannot accept Japan or other major regional states as equals.
The CCP promulgates a questionable interpretation of pre-modern Chinese history in which China was a peace-loving country that never committed aggression against another kingdom. Then, in the modern era, China suffered the “Century of National Humiliation” (bainian guochi), with European colonialism and the Japanese invasion. This historiographical package is the basis of the widespread inability of today’s Chinese to empathize with neighbors, who perceive their security threatened by some PRC actions. Chinese, in turn, typically believe that, since they are culturally and historically proven to be non-aggressive, but rather have only been victims of other countries’ aggressions, Chinese actions are thus almost by definition defensive and therefore justified—and any arguments to the contrary reflect “ulterior motives.”
Finally, the PRC’s authoritarian government sees political liberalism as a threat. Xi’s government has specifically identified liberal thought as a grave danger to the Party’s monopoly of power, which is the overriding objective of all PRC policies, both domestic and foreign. The CCP has long believed the United States tries to use democratization as a tool to overthrow the Party, with the ultimate goal of weakening China and maintaining U.S. leadership in Asia. Accordingly, PRC propaganda disparages “Western-style democracy” and what it calls “interference in other countries’ internal affairs in the name of so-called democracy.” The advance of liberalism internationally would isolate the PRC and undercut Beijing’s influence and prestige, while increasing the demand by Chinese citizens for political liberalization inside China. Democratization in PRC partner countries would disrupt the Chinese government’s preferred mode of conducting business, which can generally be described as “corruption of local elites.” Hence the permanent PRC hostility toward liberal currents in global affairs that many other countries regard as positive, such as encouragement of transparency and accountability in government, promotion of civil liberties, and acceptance of the principle of “responsibility to protect.”
A state’s internal political dynamics affect its foreign relations. Newly ascendant, Xi-led China is an arrogant and angry great power, simultaneously thin-skinned and callous. Successfully navigating through the challenges caused by the rise of a nascent great power in a region long patrolled by another great power would be difficult in any case, but these PRC domestic characteristics, unfortunately, make the task harder.
Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu.
Image: Shutterstock.
The National Interest · by Denny Roy · January 3, 2023
15. Russia’s Rebound
Excerpts:
Russia’s war appears to have morphed from a regime change into a land grab. If the Kremlin can continue to make military decisions that are merely sensible and act on them in ways that are merely competent, a year from now, Western intelligence agencies may be counting another 50,000 to 100,000 casualties for each side, and Western legislatures may be debating another $100 billion of economic and military assistance for Ukraine. For now, diplomacy has little chance of altering this trajectory because both sides are so politically invested in the war. Each thinks that victory is possible and defeat unthinkable.
If it wanted to, the United States could develop a diplomatic strategy to reduce maximalist thinking in both Ukraine and Russia. But to date, it has shown little interest in using its leverage to even try to coax the two sides to the negotiating table. Those of us in the West who recommend such a diplomatic effort are regularly shouted down. If this bloody, costly, and risky stalemate continues for another year, perhaps that will change.
Russia’s Rebound
How Moscow Has Partly Recovered From Its Military Setbacks
January 4, 2023
Foreign Affairs · by Barry R. Posen · January 4, 2023
“All the dumb Russians are dead.” So said Ukrainian officials in July 2022 as they sought to explain why the Russian army had abandoned the overambitious strategy and amateurish tactics that defined its conduct in the early weeks of the war. It was probably too early to make this quip. The Russians continued to do many dumb things and indeed still do. But broadly speaking, the Ukrainians’ intuition in the summer now appears correct: when it comes to overall military strategy, Moscow seems to have gotten smarter.
Russian strategic decisions are finally starting to make military sense. The partial mobilization of reservists that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered in September has strengthened Russian forces at the front. The bombing campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure that began in October is forcing Ukraine and its allies to divert resources toward the defense of the country’s urban population, vulnerable to bitter winter weather in the absence of electricity. And the withdrawal of Russian forces from the city of Kherson in November has saved capable units from destruction and freed them for action elsewhere.
In July, I argued that the war was stalemated. Given Ukraine’s subsequent successes in liberating territory in and around the cities of Kherson and Kharkiv, my assessment was clearly premature. But it is worth noting that Ukraine achieved these successes during the period in which Russia’s forces were at their weakest and its leadership was at its poorest. Despite Kyiv’s advances, the grim truth remains that then and now, the ratio of Russian casualties to Ukrainian casualties stands at one to one, according to U.S. estimates.
This is not a war that is simply cascading in Ukraine’s favor. Rather, it is turning into a war of attrition, a contest in which any gains by either side will come only at great cost. Even the dim outlines of this future should make both Ukraine and Russia wish to avoid it, but neither country seems ready to negotiate, much less make the difficult compromises that might provide the ingredients of a settlement.
Ukraine and its backers may hope that Russia comes to its senses and simply abandons the war, but that outcome looks unlikely. They may also hope for a Russian collapse at the front or at home, but the chances of either scenario are also slim. The most promising course would be for the United States to nudge the two sides to the negotiating table, since only Washington has the power to do so. But it has decided not to do so. And so the war goes on, at a tragic human cost.
FRESH FORCES
Putin’s initial plan—to overthrow the Ukrainian government in a raid by special operations and airborne forces—failed spectacularly. The Russians tried to salvage the campaign by moving large numbers of tanks, artillery, infantry, and supporting troops overland, but that effort fared little better in the face of constant Ukrainian ambushes.
As Putin’s hopes for a quick and easy victory vanished on the battlefield, losses on both sides mounted. Calculating casualty figures is hard. The U.S. intelligence community has released estimates that put the number of total casualties at 100,000 for the Russians and 100,000 for the Ukrainians. It is not clear how these numbers are derived, but on the Ukrainian side, they are roughly consistent with the 13,000 military deaths that Ukrainian officials state their army has suffered and track with the ratio of dead to wounded that U.S. forces experienced in Iraq. If one uses the ratio that U.S. forces experienced in the European theater of World War II, the number of Ukrainian casualties is probably closer to 50,000. Given U.S. officials’ view that casualties have been roughly comparable, Russian losses should lie in the same range: 50,000 to 100,000 casualties.
Since most casualties fall in combat units, for both Ukraine and Russia, this estimate would mean that each army has lost to death or injury nearly as many combat soldiers as it fielded at the beginning of the war. True, the lightly wounded may have returned to the front or will do so soon. But even if that factor effectively erases half of each side’s losses, each side has still permanently lost half the initial personnel in its tank and infantry battalions—a major reduction in combat power.
To restore that power, both Ukraine and Russia scrambled to refill their ranks. Ukraine managed to replenish its army relatively effectively. Part of its advantage came from the tens of thousands of Ukrainians who, eager to defend their country, volunteered for combat in those early months. But it is likely that Ukraine’s real ace in the hole was the tens of thousands of experienced veterans who had fought in the Donbas since 2014 and were drawn into the Ukrainian army’s reserve structure once they completed their initial period of duty. Many of them were used to bring Ukraine’s initial forces up to full strength at the time of the invasion, but some probably remained available to serve as replacements for killed and wounded soldiers as the months went on.
Russia has announced a target of 300,000 additional troops.
In the race to make up for battlefield casualties, Russia had a distinct disadvantage because Putin had sent his best forces to Ukraine. For the initial phase of the invasion, the Russian military appears to have committed about half of its major formations—some 40 brigades. It is likely that those 40 brigades included most of Russia’s experienced soldiers. Most Russian combat units feature a large number of drafted troops serving alongside professional troops, but Putin had insisted that no conscripts be sent to the front. By necessity, then, the 40-odd brigades left behind were denuded of their best-trained personnel.
The hodgepodge replacement force that Russia scrounged up in the early summer failed badly on the battlefield. Russian units became weaker and weaker, and Russian commanders had to rob forces from one part of the front to reinforce other parts. The Ukrainians pounced, taking advantage of thin Russian defenses, particularly in Kharkiv, to liberate more territory in their impressive drive in early September. Putin realized that he needed more troops.
Hence his order to mobilize Russian reservists, announced in late September. For all the anecdotes about inexperienced recruits, substandard barracks, inadequate equipment, and limited training, the mobilization seems to be a reasonable response to the Russian army’s operational and tactical problems. Russia has announced a target of 300,000 additional troops, and the math adds up. The army needs 200,000 new soldiers to bring the 40 brigades that were left behind in Russia back to full strength, plus 100,000 to make up for the troops killed or wounded in battle.
Although some mobilized Russian reservists may have no military skills, many likely do. Even before the invasion, the Russian military was training some 250,000 conscripts every year and sending them back to civilian life. The mobilization surely found many of these men. Admittedly, to avert immediate disaster, Russia has been sending to the front a mix of the trained and untrained, the competent and incompetent, without much refresher training. But some 200,000 troops are receiving more substantial training in Russia and Belarus.
U.S. intelligence agencies are no doubt doing what they can to figure out whether this effort is serious. In 1982, an interagency intelligence memorandum concluded that the Soviets could mobilize reservists, retrain them, and be ready for offensive operations in roughly a month. If today’s Russian training effort is more than mere theater—building in extra time to account for the fact that the Russian army is in worse shape than its Soviet predecessor—40 fresh and moderately well-trained brigades should be ready for combat within several months. What the Russians will do with these forces remains to be seen. At a minimum, these brigades will stiffen the defense at the front and significantly raise the cost of Ukrainian efforts to recover their land in the four districts that Russia has claimed. They might even be used to renew the offensive, although given the strength and determination that the Ukrainian military has demonstrated, such a move would be unwise.
A SMART RETREAT
Like the mobilization, Russia’s withdrawal from the city of Kherson in November made military sense. As Putin himself observed, the line of contact between Russian and Ukrainian forces was long, stretching nearly 1,000 miles, and Russian forces were spread thin. Ukraine’s successful breakthrough in Kharkiv in September shortened the front that Russia had to defend to roughly 600 miles. But even that was not short enough. Russian forces had their necks stuck out on the west side of the Dnipro River at Kherson. The intelligent decision militarily was to withdraw them, and after much vacillation and considerable Ukrainian military pressure, that was exactly what Russia did. That Putin was willing to do something that he clearly did not wish to do suggests that he now has some confidence in his commanders—and that some of them are giving sound military advice.
There is no denying that the Russians were forced to retreat, and the mere fact that they had to do so no doubt upset Putin. But the Russians pulled off one of the hardest military operations: retreating during a major attack without suffering the disintegration or annihilation of their forces. It was no small feat to move some 20,000 soldiers and most of their combat equipment across the Dnipro after Ukrainian forces had destroyed key bridges. And even while under intense intelligence surveillance by the West and Ukraine, they managed to maintain the element of surprise. Up to the end, no one in Ukraine or in NATO seemed to be quite sure that Russian forces were leaving. Their rear-guard units maintained a coherent defense, even though they must have known that their comrades closer to the river were escaping.
Somehow, the Russians managed to repair damaged bridges while under fire, throw up pontoon bridges, and employ ferries to get their people and equipment out, defending each avenue of escape from Ukrainian attack. The Ukrainian army will now have to fight these units somewhere else, perhaps under less favorable conditions. If only through a Darwinian process, the Russian army has at last found some competent planners and battlefield commanders.
By all accounts, the Russians are settling in to defend the shorter front that their tactical defeats and retreats have produced—and doing so with newly reinforced combat units. According to press reports and satellite imagery, Russian troops are digging defensive positions all along the line of contact and constructing sequential barriers of concrete obstacles and bunkers. They are also presumably seeding the ground with mines, a simple and time-honored weapon of the Russian military. More fully manned units on shorter fronts and well-prepared defensive positions are the ingredients of a potentially effective defense. Unless Russian military morale truly collapses and produces mass mutinies and desertions, the Ukrainians will have to undertake the bloody work of evicting those units from their new positions.
BOMBING TO WIN?
Finally, the Russians have launched a cunningly effective bombing campaign against Ukraine’s electricity generation, transmission, and distribution system. The strikes against Ukraine’s electrical grid are particularly effective—and not just because they could turn the winter into a brutal struggle for survival for Ukrainian civilians. This campaign has not proved decisive so far, but like most strategic bombing campaigns, it imposes direct and indirect military costs.
Modern military systems for air defense, command and control, and intelligence gathering run on electricity, and if they cannot get it from the grid, they must get it from generators. But making that transition is not as easy as flipping a switch, and it can degrade these systems’ performance. Moreover, relying on generators places additional demands for fuel on the Ukraine’s military logistics system. The heat signatures produced by generators, meanwhile, add yet another data point that Russian intelligence can use to produce a more accurate picture of Ukrainian forces.
Russia’s bombing campaign also imposes opportunity costs: the Ukrainians must expend resources to adapt to the attacks, and already they have made defending electricity infrastructure from air strikes a military and diplomatic priority. The country’s substantial weapons and ammunition industry depends on electricity, as does much of the rail system that moves war materiel around the country. With a damaged electricity grid, Ukraine’s soldiers and civilians will have to rely more on diesel-powered trains and diesel generators or shift to generators powered by scarce natural gas. These exigencies will divert still more fuel that could otherwise have been used for military operations, or they will simply impose more costs on Ukraine’s allies, which will need to deliver the fuel. The West is helping Ukraine repair the grid as best it can while under constant attack. But from the Russian perspective, this is good news, as the repairs consume resources that cannot be used to support fighting at the front.
The most alarming thing about Russia’s bombing campaign is that Moscow knows what it is doing. The Russians are hitting a small number of targets with relatively few weapons and producing disproportionate effects. Even though U.S. and British officials have regularly predicted that the Russian military would exhaust its supply of munitions, it evidently has found them somewhere. Russia’s well-executed campaign suggests that its air force, which has so far had little success when it comes to attacking Ukraine’s ground forces, has learned from something its past mistakes.
NO END IN SIGHT
Moscow now seems reconciled to a simple war aim: to hold on to the land it has seized. And it appears to have settled on two new military strategies to pursue this objective. The first, as exemplified by the retreat from Kherson, the mobilization of reservists, and the construction of new barriers, is to create a dense defense and make the Ukrainians pay dearly for every effort to recover territory. The second, as exemplified by the bombing campaign, is to exploit the vulnerability of Ukraine’s electrical infrastructure to divert resources from the Ukrainian war effort at the front while making continuation of the war painful for Ukrainian society and ever most costly for allies.
Putin may hope that this approach ultimately brings Ukraine to the bargaining table. Or he may simply hope that the never-ending costs will cause Ukraine to gradually cease its attacks without conceding anything, resulting in another frozen conflict. Very few people know what Russia’s overall war strategy is, if it even has one. It is also possible that the recent period of reasonable military decisions and competent implementation will turn out to be a blip rather than a harbinger. The most mysterious question now is whether Russia’s efforts to train large numbers of combat capable units will work. And it is an open question whether Moscow has, or can manufacture or import, the weapons and ammunition needed for another year of intense combat. But if it can generate these new units and continue to fight sensibly, the war may continue in its present form: a brutal slugfest.
Russia’s war appears to have morphed from a regime change into a land grab. If the Kremlin can continue to make military decisions that are merely sensible and act on them in ways that are merely competent, a year from now, Western intelligence agencies may be counting another 50,000 to 100,000 casualties for each side, and Western legislatures may be debating another $100 billion of economic and military assistance for Ukraine. For now, diplomacy has little chance of altering this trajectory because both sides are so politically invested in the war. Each thinks that victory is possible and defeat unthinkable.
If it wanted to, the United States could develop a diplomatic strategy to reduce maximalist thinking in both Ukraine and Russia. But to date, it has shown little interest in using its leverage to even try to coax the two sides to the negotiating table. Those of us in the West who recommend such a diplomatic effort are regularly shouted down. If this bloody, costly, and risky stalemate continues for another year, perhaps that will change.
- BARRY R. POSEN is Ford International Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Foreign Affairs · by Barry R. Posen · January 4, 2023
16. Dollar’s demise about to explode Asia’s 2023
Excerpts:
China wants its currency to replace the dollar in international affairs – but it’s not that simple
Pozsar wonders “what are G7 policymakers, rates traders, and strategists to do when threats to the unipolar world order are coming from every angle? They should definitely not ignore the threats, but they still do.”
For two generations, Pozsar continues, “we did not have to discount geopolitical risks. Since the end of WWII, the only Great Power conflict investors really had to deal with was the Cold War, and since the conclusion of the Cold War, the world enjoyed a unipolar moment: the US was the undisputed hegemon, globalization was the economic order and the US dollar was the currency of choice.”
Today, though, Pozsar continues, “geopolitics has reared its ugly head again: for the first time since WWII, there is a formidable challenger to the existing world order, and for the first time in its young history, the US is facing off against an economically equal or, by some measures, superior adversary.”
China, Pozsar notes, is “proactively writing a new set of rules as it replays the ‘Great Game,’ creating a new type of globalization” via newish institutions like the Belt and Road Initiative, BRICS+, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Whether this bipolar or multipolar world comes into clearer view in 2023 is anyone’s guess. What’s not debatable is that a series of daunting dilemmas are converging to make the year ahead uniquely challenging for Washington and the dollar. And all this puts Asia directly in harm’s way.
Dollar’s demise about to explode Asia’s 2023
Negative growth, high inflation, unsustainable debt and poison politics in the US will all drive investors to dump the dollar
asiatimes.com · by William Pesek · January 4, 2023
TOKYO — If you want to know how worried Asian officials are over a sliding US dollar this year, look no further than the frantic scene at Bank of Japan (BOJ) headquarters.
For at least five days now, BOJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda’s team has been making massive unscheduled bond purchases. The reason: the yen’s surge in the two weeks since Kuroda announced a widening of the range in which the 10-year yield can trade to about 0.5% from 0.25%.
For the BOJ, it was the monetary equivalent of opening a can of worms. The December 20 shift aimed to reduce strains as US and Japanese rates pulled in diverging directions.
But Kuroda leaned into an already sliding dollar amid US recession fears. Now the BOJ is struggling to keep the yen from rallying too much, too fast and slamming Japan’s exporters.
It’s a preview of the year to come for Asia. “The table is set for continued dollar weakness,” says Michael Purves, chief executive officer at Tallbacken Capital Advisors.
From Beijing to Jakarta, 2023 is looking like the flip side of 2022. Over the last 12 months, the region dealt with the fallout from the dollar’s 8% trade-weighted rise that siphoned tidal waves of capital from markets everywhere. Driven by the most aggressive US Federal Reserve tightening in 27 years, the dynamic caused extreme volatility in currency and asset values.
Now, it’s time for Asia to brace for a falling dollar, a perhaps chaotic downward move that has global investors pivoting to an even more aggressive “risk-off” crouch.
The big worry is that investors have at least four good rationales to dump dollars. One is the fast-rising odds of negative US growth this year. Two, the worst inflation in 40 years that will probably prove stickier than markets believe. Three, an unsustainable national debt rising toward US$32 trillion. Four, toxic partisanship on a level Capitol Hill not seen in a dozen years.
This quadruple whammy of internal risks is colliding with a gloomy external scene. China’s Covid reopening gambit remains wildly uncertain, with Beijing’s Covid case tolerance veering from zero to 100 at bewildering speed.
Demonstrators protesting against strict Covid measures in the capital Beijing before the government pivoted to reopening. Image: Screengrab / RNZ
Yet speed doesn’t equal success. Surging infection rates will test Communist Party leader Xi Jinping’s mettle as rarely before. Even if Xi can resist pressure to revert to lockdown mode, the volatility to come for Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) will dominate Asian markets in 2023.
And it’s not just the risk of big policy zigs and zags in Beijing that are cause for alarm. On the one hand, chaos from big Covid outbreaks could create fresh uncertainty about Chinese factory operations and, by extension, new trouble for global supply chains. On the other, booming Chinese demand could exacerbate global inflation pressures.
Economist Chris Turner at ING Bank says that “investors will continue to focus on China as a potential engine of growth in 2023, but for the time being, we have yet to see any material outperformance of the Chinese renminbi or local equity markets.”
This, Turner adds, “suggests that the risk of a disorderly exit from ‘zero-Covid’ policies for the time being trumps the reopening story and perhaps Beijing’s re-orientation to growth policies. That leaves the market to focus on the tighter monetary policy being implemented around the world.”
Meantime, Europe’s inflation troubles will remain acute.Energy market dynamics are expected to be just as challenging as in 2022 as Russia doubles down on its Ukraine invasion, leaving the continent less competitive.
“We expect the euro area to go into a mild recession by year-end and GDP to contract by 0.5% in 2023,” says strategist Eoin O’Callaghan at Wellington Management.
The problem, he explains, is a “sharp squeeze in households’ real incomes and firms’ margins has pushed sentiment to the lowest levels since the 2008/09 global financial crisis.”
ING’s Turner adds that the recent “hawkish shift from the European Central Bank has dented eurozone and global growth prospects for 2023 and leaves the dollar in a rather mixed position. On the one hand, the ECB wants tighter monetary conditions, including a stronger euro. On the other, the Federal Reserve is not done with its tightening cycle and a global slowdown typically is not a good story for a pro-cyclical currency like the euro.”
Japan is struggling to fend off its own recession at the same time Asia’s No 2 economy suffers near 4% inflation for the first time in decades. Count Marcel Thieliant at Capital Economics among those who think “the Japanese economy will enter a recession sometime” this year.
Hence the BOJ’s urgent effort to cap exchange rates so as not to kill the all-important export engine. There may indeed be natural limits to how much the yen rises. “Japan’s trade balance, now in the red, is unlikely to improve, limiting the upside of the yen,” says analyst Teppei Ino at MUFG Bank.
Yet as Kuroda is learning before his retirement in March, dollar-yen dynamics going forward owe more to investors’ perceptions about Washington’s finances and politics. This will surely be the case, too, for whomever Prime Minister Fumio Kishida chooses as the BOJ’s next leader.
Federal Reserve chairman Jerome Powell is in the hot seat. Photo: Pool
US Fed Chair Jerome Powell hasn’t yet signaled an end to the most aggressive US tightening since the 1994-95 period. But leading economic indicators suggest the US is ripe for at least a moderate downturn.
It could be ripe, too, for the biggest market stumbles since the 2008-09 Lehman Brothers-induced global economic crisis. Only this time, it might come with a side order of surging inflation.
“The US is in recession by any definition,” explains Scion Asset Management founder Michael Burry, who actor Christian Bale portrayed in the 2015 film The Big Short. The “Fed will cut and government will stimulate. And we will have another inflation spike.”
Hopes US inflation already peaked enabled the US Treasury bond market to register its strongest start of any year since 2001. So far, 10-year yields have fallen about 15 basis points to 3.74%.
One snag, though: the 2001 rally was driven by expectations that then-Fed chairman Alan Greenspan would be slashing interest rates amid stable-to-weaker consumer price trends. That expectation isn’t a live one at this moment given the galaxy of moving parts driving Fed decision-making.
What’s more, 2023 is likely to be “tougher than the year we leave behind,” International Monetary Fund managing director Kristalina Georgieva recently told CBS News. “Why? Because the three big economies – the US, EU and China – are all slowing down simultaneously.”
The IMF’s China take is that the overhang from Xi’s strategy of locking down entire metropolises — tens of millions of people at a time — will act as a drag on GDP for some time. So will exploding Covid cases across a nation that until now has relied on subpar vaccines.
Georgieva adds that “we expect one-third of the world economy to be in recession. Even countries that are not in recession, it would feel like a recession for hundreds of millions of people.”
The cumulative effect of aggressive Fed rate hikes also will act as a drag. With a pro-Donald Trump faction of Republicans now holding the House of Representatives’ gavel, attacks on Fed independence are likely to come early and often. That’s unlikely to sit well with global investors or Asian central banks sitting on large dollar holdings.
Trumpian attacks on institutions raise concerns about whether Republicans might again play politics with the US debt ceiling. The last time that happened, in 2011, House Republicans threatened to let the US default on its debt if Democrats refused massive social spending cuts. S&P Global reacted by stripping Washington of its AAA credit rating.
Might it happen again in 2023? On his annual list of top-10 risks for the new year, Eurasia Group CEO Ian Bremmer includes the “Divided States of America.”
As Bremmer puts it, “the 2022 midterm elections halted the slide toward a constitutional crisis at the next US presidential election as voters rejected virtually all candidates running for state governor or state attorney general who denied or questioned the legitimacy of the 2020 presidential election.”
But, he adds, “the US remains one of the most politically polarized and dysfunctional of the world’s advanced industrial democracies heading into 2023. Extreme policy divergences between red and blue states will make it harder for US and foreign companies to treat the United States as a single coherent market, despite obvious economic strengths. And the risk of political violence remains high.”
A pro-Trump protester in front of Capitol Hill. Photo: AFP via Zuma / Joel Marklund
That would be dollar-negative. So would volatility in markets if Congress draws the ire of analysts at S&P, Moody’s Investors Service or Fitch Ratings. Already, there are clear signs Washington’s top holders of US Treasuries — Japan and China — are reducing their exposure to the dollar.
The worry for officials at the BOJ and the People’s Bank of China is that the dollar is at risk no matter what the Fed does. On the one hand, “recessionary worries are going to drive the Fed to pause — this is why the dollar is weakening here,” says analyst Edward Moya at OANDA.
On January 4, the Bank of Korea announced that Seoul’s overall foreign-exchange reserves are expanding apace as the sliding dollar converts into increases in the rest of its currency portfolio. At the end of December, South Korean reserves totaled $423.16 billion, up $7.06 billion from November.
A big acceleration in dollar losses, though, would have officials from Seoul to Singapore scrambling. That’s a serious risk as an acceleration in inflation from the current 7% rate could tip the US toward stagflation. “If you’re an investor, you need to play off expectations as much as reality,” says Brad McMillan, chief investment officer at Commonwealth Financial Network.
Economist Louis-Vincent Gave at Gavekal Research thinks markets in 2023 will be asking the difficult questions of the globe’s biggest economy for which investors lacked enough bandwidth to weigh in recent years.
“In the absence of a recession, over the next few years the US will be running twin deficits totaling 8-10% of GDP,” Gave explains. “Who will fund these deficits? If it is to be foreigners, the US dollar will stay strong and US interest rates will remain relatively stable. But what if the numbers start to get too large for foreign buyers?”
Or more likely, Gave says, “what if the foreigners on the other side of the US deficits, including China and Saudi Arabia, no longer feel as confident deploying capital in the US? In either case, the deficits will have to be funded either by the resumption of quantitative easing by the Fed, or by a surge in treasury purchases by US commercial banks. Either of these would be negative for long yields and the US dollar.”
This view scratches at perhaps the biggest wildcard for 2023: how geopolitical megatrends play out.
It’s well understood how Xi’s PBOC has been working to internationalize the yuan and transform Beijing into the global lender of last resort. Yet when considered in the context of monetary, fiscal and political dislocations preoccupying Washington, all indications are that “de-dollarization is about to accelerate from here,” economist Zoltan Pozsar at Credit Suisse writes in a December 29 report.
China wants its currency to replace the dollar in international affairs – but it’s not that simple. Image: iStock
Pozsar wonders “what are G7 policymakers, rates traders, and strategists to do when threats to the unipolar world order are coming from every angle? They should definitely not ignore the threats, but they still do.”
For two generations, Pozsar continues, “we did not have to discount geopolitical risks. Since the end of WWII, the only Great Power conflict investors really had to deal with was the Cold War, and since the conclusion of the Cold War, the world enjoyed a unipolar moment: the US was the undisputed hegemon, globalization was the economic order and the US dollar was the currency of choice.”
Today, though, Pozsar continues, “geopolitics has reared its ugly head again: for the first time since WWII, there is a formidable challenger to the existing world order, and for the first time in its young history, the US is facing off against an economically equal or, by some measures, superior adversary.”
China, Pozsar notes, is “proactively writing a new set of rules as it replays the ‘Great Game,’ creating a new type of globalization” via newish institutions like the Belt and Road Initiative, BRICS+, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Whether this bipolar or multipolar world comes into clearer view in 2023 is anyone’s guess. What’s not debatable is that a series of daunting dilemmas are converging to make the year ahead uniquely challenging for Washington and the dollar. And all this puts Asia directly in harm’s way.
Follow William Pesek on Twitter at @WilliamPesek
asiatimes.com · by William Pesek · January 4, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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