Quotes of the Day:

“KEYS TO WARFARE The world is full of people looking for a secret formula for success and power. They do not want to think on their own; they just want a recipe to follow. They are attracted to the idea of strategy for that very reason. In their minds strategy is a series of steps to be followed toward a goal. They want these steps spelled out for them by an expert or a guru. Believing in the power of imitation, they want to know exactly what some great person has done before. Their maneuvers in life are as mechanical as their thinking. To separate yourself from such a crowd, you need to get rid of a common misconception: the essence of strategy is not to carry out a brilliant plan that proceeds in steps; it is to put yourself in situations where you have more options than the enemy does. Instead of grasping at Option A as the single right answer, true strategy is positioning yourself to be able to do A, B, or C depending on the circumstances. That is strategic depth of thinking, as opposed to formulaic thinking.”

- Robert Greene, The 33 Strategies Of War

"I could not understand why men who knew all about good and evil could hate and kill each other."

- Mary Shelley

"Man is free at the instant he wants to be."

- Voltaire

1. Ukraine: WAR BULLETIN January 3, 6.00 pm EST The three hundred and fourteenth day of the russian large-scale invasion.

2. Ukraine: WAR BULLETIN January 4, 6.00 pm EST:The three hundred and fifteenth day of the russian large-scale invasion continues.

3. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 4, 2023

4. Washington substation attacks' alleged motive revealed

5. Russian soldier gave away his position with geotagged social media posts

6. Year in Review: Poland and Ukraine defy Putin to emerge as 'new powers in defense in Europe' (And relations with US Asian allies)

7. The foreign policy issues keeping experts up at night in 2023

8. The fatal flaw in US Indo-Pacific strategy

9. Irregular Warfare Center 2023 Book Recommendations

10. Part of Taiwan’s most advanced anti-ship missile sent to mainland China for repairs

11. France to send light battle tanks to Ukraine in first for Kyiv

12. Ukraine receives hundreds of Senator armored vehicles from Canada

13. This unusual new Air Force tactic is likely raising alarms in China, expert says

14. Marcos gets $22 billion in 'investment pledges' after China state visit

15. Guardians of the Republic: Only a Nonpartisan Military Can Protect American Democracy

16. A New Cyber Strategy To Restore Civil-Military Normalcy

17. Working Back From "What If?"

18. Ukraine and the New Two War Construct

19. Toward a Values-Based Foreign Policy: Developing an Ethical Checklist

20. The Consequences of Divided Government for U.S. Foreign Policy

21. Kevin Rudd: US needs to stop throwing allies ‘under a bus’

22. Ukraine Needs Long-Range Firepower for Victory

23. Biden weighs sending Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Ukraine

1. Ukraine: WAR BULLETIN January 3, 6.00 pm EST The three hundred and fourteenth day of the russian large-scale invasion.

Also posted on the Small Wars Journal here:  https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ukraine-war-bulletin-january-3-600-pm-est-threehundred-and-fourteenth-day-russian-large-scale

Embassy of Ukraine in the USA

WAR BULLETIN

January 3, 6.00 pm EST

Russia does not give up its plans to enter the administrative border of Donetsk region. The main efforts are focused on maintaining offensive potential and replenishing losses.

In order to exert pressure on the population of Ukraine, Russia carries out air and missile strikes, as well as carries out artillery shelling of critical infrastructure and population centers across the country.

During this day, Russian forces carried out 8 airstrikes and launched 18 attacks from MLRS systems.

We must disrupt the Russian scenario, the terrorists must lose - address by the President of Ukraine

WAR ROOM

General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

The total combat losses of the Russian forces from 24.02.2022 to 03.01.2023:

personnel ‒ about 108190 (+750) killed,

tanks ‒ 3036 (+5),

APV ‒ 6100 (+7),

artillery systems – 2033 (+6),

MLRS – 424 (+1),

Anti-aircraft warfare systems ‒ 214 (+1),

aircraft – 283,

helicopters – 270 (+1),

UAV operational-tactical level – 1839 (+3),

cruise missiles ‒ 723,

warships / boats ‒ 16,

vehicles and fuel tankers – 4735 (+10),

special equipment ‒ 181.

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FENtHr3cyr9tDLPVnoTQer6Nbkrh4ZQraND79k42AWGBGqahxxh2CUo8dfnrfJF5l

The three hundred and fourteenth day of the russian large-scale invasion.

The russian occupiers continue to wage full-scale armed aggression against our state. The enemy does not give up its plans to enter the administrative border of Donetsk region. The main efforts are focused on maintaining offensive potential and replenishing losses.

In order to exert pressure on the population of our country, the enemy carries out air and missile strikes, as well as carries out artillery shelling of critical infrastructure and population centers on the territory of Ukraine, violating the norms of international humanitarian law, laws and customs of warfare.

During this day, the enemy carried out 8 airstrikes and launched 18 attacks from MLRS systems.

The threat of enemy air and missile strikes on critical infrastructure remains throughout Ukraine.

The enemy, trying to take full control of the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, is concentrating its efforts on conducting offensive actions in the Bakhmut direction. The russian occupiers are trying to improve the tactical position in the Lyman and Avdiivka directions, they are strengthening the groups in the Novopavlivka direction at the expense of units transferred from the Kherson direction.

The situation remains unchanged in the Volyn, Polisiya, Siverskyi and Slobozhanskyi areas. The russian occupiers maintain a military presence in the border regions of the republic of belarus and the russian federation. There were no signs of the formation of enemy offensive groups.

The enemy fired from the entire range of artillery in the areas of the settlements of Strelecha, Krasne, Zelene, Ternova, Staritsa, Ohirtseve, Vovchansk, Karaichne, Okhrimivka, Ambarne of the Kharkiv region.

In other directions, the enemy defends previously occupied lines, concentrates efforts on restraining the actions of units of the Defense Forces of Ukraine, and fires at the positions of our troops and civilian objects along the contact line.

On the Kupyansk and Lyman directions, the areas of 14 settlements were shelled by mortars, barrel artillery and MLRS, in particular: Novomlynsk, Tavilzhanka, Dvorichna, Kupyansk, Kotlyarivka, Tabaivka, Pershotravneve of the Kharkiv region and Makiivka, Ploshanka, Dibrova of the Luhansk region.

In the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions, the enemy fired at the positions of our troops from tanks and artillery of various types in the areas of more than 20 settlements, in particular: Spirne, Bilogorivka, Yakovlivka, Soledar, Bakhmut, Klishchiivka, Vodyane, and Maryinka of the Donetsk region.

In the direction of Novopavlivka, the enemy fired from tanks, mortars, barrel and rocket artillery in the areas of Vremivka, Velyka Novosilka, Neskuchne, Vugledar, Mykilske settlements of the Donetsk region.

In the Zaporizhia and Kherson directions, the enemy shelled the positions of our troops with tanks and the entire range of artillery in the areas of more than 25 settlements, and also continues to shell the civilian infrastructure of cities and towns along the right bank of the Dnipro River. The civilian infrastructure of the settlements: Kherson, Molodizhne, Antonivka and Beryslav of the Kherson region was damaged by artillery shelling.

During the day, the aviation of the Defense Forces of Ukraine carried out 4 strikes on areas where the enemy's personnel, weapons and military equipment were concentrated.

During the current day, units of missile troops and artillery of the Defense Forces of Ukraine carried out fire damage to 2 control points and 4 areas of concentration of manpower and military equipment of the russian occupiers.

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NTR6eG4hhZS24wEqopQGSHw1bnYgMJro3pnTRzxiCrjsgQWPaR4yuusLQzmJ83YEl

Defence Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine

russia Does Not Plan to End War against Ukraine

The terrorist country will try to conduct new attacks on the front. This was stated by Andrii Cherniak, a representative of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, in a comment for RBK-Ukraine.

“According to Ukraine’s military intelligence estimates, the russians will try to continue conducting offensive operations next year. They have not managed to achieve their goal on any of the fronts. They understand that they are losing, but they do not plan to end the war. We are considering the possibility that they can attack from the north or east at the same time,” the representative of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine said.

Cherniak also expressed a belief that the Russians will try to hold the land corridor to Crimea and seize the whole of Donetsk region. At the same time, he believes that the invaders will not be able to cross the Dnipro River to recapture the city of Kherson.

“According to assessments of Ukraine’s military intelligence, over the next four–five months, the russian army may lose up to 70,000 more servicemen. And the leadership of the occupying country is ready for such losses,” Andrii Cherniak summarized.

https://gur.gov.ua/en/content/rosiia-ne-planuie-zavershuvaty-viinu-proty-ukrainy.html

russia Began to Change Tactics of Attacks against Ukraine

This was stated by Vadym Skibitskyi, a representative of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, on the air of the nationwide telethon.

"We see the impact of economic sanctions on the russian federation. They are trying to circumvent sanctions and import components, but it's not so easy to do. First of all, we collect such information and share it with our partners. [...] In addition, other measures are being taken to prevent the production of any weapons in the territory of the russian federation from increasing. Today's russian deficit is related to 'Iskander' ballistic missiles, the stocks of 'Kalibrs' are depleting, and the number of Kh-101, Kh-555 air-based cruise missiles is decreasing. The most that russia is capable of is two or three such powerful strikes, as we have seen recently," Skibitskyi said, clarifying that the issue concerns high-precision weapons.

At the same time, he noted that the production of missiles in russia does not stop. "Unfortunately, production does not stop. Their volume is not that big, but they are produced. We now find debris from missiles made in the fourth quarter of 2022. Therefore, they are produced and immediately given to the troops for the shelling of our facilities," Skibitskyi said.

He noted that the enemy began to combine and change tactics, using in various configurations both Iranian-made UAVs, old-type missiles, high-precision ballistic missiles and modified S-300 missiles.

Skibitskyi also stated that the enemy began to face a shortage of MLRSs. "If we talk about land, then it is, first of all, the 'Smerch', 'Urahan' and even 122-mm, 152-mm artillery shells. The Defence Intelligence of Ukraine constantly records russia's measures to replenish these ammunitions from other countries. They brought a large amount from belarus and are very actively working with other countries to find stocks," Skibitskyi said.

He added that the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine is also working to obtain information from russia in order to timely expose the plans of the enemy, to warn the state and its military leadership, so that Ukraine's response could be adequate.

https://gur.gov.ua/en/content/rosiia-pochala-zminiuvaty-taktyku-obstriliv-ukrainy.html

POLICY

President of Ukraine

We must disrupt the Russian scenario, the terrorists must lose - address by the President of Ukraine

I wish you health, dear Ukrainians!

I have just finished a conversation with the Prime Minister of Canada, and this is the fourth international conversation today. The Prime Minister of the Netherlands, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Prime Minister of Norway. And now Justin Trudeau.

We started this year with what Ukraine needs most right now - on the eve of new mobilization processes being prepared by the terrorist state. Now is the moment when together with our partners we must strengthen our defense.

We have no doubt that the current masters of Russia will throw everything they have left and everyone they can muster to try to turn the tide of the war and at least postpone their defeat.

We have to disrupt this Russian scenario. We are preparing for this. The terrorists must lose. Any attempt at their new offensive must fail. This will be the final defeat of the terrorist state. I thank all partners who understand this.

Russia mobilizes those whom it wants to throw to death, we mobilize the civilized world. For the sake of life.

I am grateful to Canada for its unwavering defense, sanction and financial support. Today we discussed with Prime Minister Trudeau how we can further increase pressure on Russia. I feel that Canadian assistance to our defense will remain strong this year.

I thank Norway for the very powerful decisions that have already been taken and that are still being prepared. This applies to armed support as well - Norway's role can become truly historic in the defense of Europe if we implement everything we are talking about now. This also applies to the support of our energy system. In particular, I thank Norway for its readiness to help provide Ukraine with the necessary volume of gas for this winter.

I am grateful to the UK for the fully concrete agreements reached, first of all in the defense sphere. Today, in the conversation with Prime Minister Sunak, I felt that we equally perceive the importance of this year, the prospects of this year. The fact that it is possible to achieve a pivotal advantage right now, not allowing Russia to win back on this or that front direction.

I am grateful to the Netherlands for sharing with us the same understanding of justice, of how this war should end. Today I have informed Mr. Prime Minister Rutte on the nearest intentions of the enemy, on what Russia is preparing for the winter months and the beginning of spring. I am confident that Ukraine will be heard in Europe.

And every day I will continue such diplomatic activity - both formal and informal, both public and non-public.

This morning, I held a regular meeting of the Staff. A long one. There were reports from the Commander-in-Chief on the operational situation at the front, the head of intelligence - on what to expect from the enemy in the coming weeks and months. We determine the needs of Ukraine, our defense, our energy sector in great detail. And we are working to meet each of the needs, in particular with partners.

And one more thing.

Yesterday Russian terrorists destroyed the ice arena in Druzhkivka, Donetsk region. With a missile.

This ice arena - "Altair" - started working before the war, when Donbas had a normal life before Russia came. Children trained there. There was a children's sports school. Hockey competitions were held there. People played sports there, celebrated and just enjoyed life. Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, Kostyantynivka, Bakhmut, Pokrovsk, Donetsk, Toretsk and other cities and villages of Donbas - everyone knew what kind of arena it was, and many people visited it. Last year it was used to collect and distribute humanitarian aid.

The Russian missile against Altair in Druzhkivka is another confession of the terrorist state. It is a confession of what it came to Donbas with and what we will definitely oust from there. Death will not prevail in Donbas, and we must do everything to throw out its tricolor from Donbas and other lands of Ukraine.

I thank everyone who fights and works for our victory!

I thank everyone who helps protect life!

Glory to Ukraine!

https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mayemo-zirvati-rosijskij-scenarij-teroristi-povinni-prograti-80217

Prime Minister of Ukraine

 In the near future, we expect to start the restoration at the expense of funds seized from russian banks: Denys Shmyhal

The state budget for the current year provides UAH 35.5 billion for the Fund for the Elimination of the Consequences of Armed Aggression. This envisages the construction and repair of public buildings, critical infrastructure facilities, provision of housing for IDPs. This was stressed by Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal at a Government session on January 3.

“Also, in the near future, we expect to start the restoration at the expense of funds seized from russian banks - there is already a sum worth UAH 17 billion on the special account for this purpose. The primary concern is the destroyed housing of citizens,” highlighted Denys Shmyhal.

According to the Prime Minister, attraction of foreign investments into the Ukrainian economy will be a part of the major reconstruction. Therefore, this year Ukraine must complete the negotiations on the insurance of military risks for foreign investors.

“Inside the country, the priority is to create the most favorable conditions for investment. In particular, simplification of preparation and implementation of public-private partnership projects. As well as minimization of requirements for investment projects with significant investments and further simplification of permitting and licensing conditions,” noted Denys Shmyhal.

In 2023, according to the PM, the Government will continue the most effective programs to help the private sector. These are soft loans at 5-7-9%, grants under the eRobota (eWork – ed.) project, state support for Ukrainian processing industry and domestic producers in general. A program of affordable mortgage lending, eOselia (eHousing – ed.), will be activated to stimulate the construction sector.

Besides, the CMU is working with partners to attract USD 38 billion to finance the budget deficit this year. These are primarily funds from the EU, the USA, and the IMF.

“Macro-financial stability is the foundation of our economic recovery. We have a clear plan to fully finance all critical expenditures just like last year,” summed up the Prime Minister.

https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/denys-shmyhal-uzhe-naiblyzhchym-chasom-rozrakhovuiemo-pochaty-vidnovlennia-ukrainy-za-rakhunok-koshtiv-konfiskovanykh-u-rosiiskykh-bankiv

The year of 2023 will be the year of continuation of reforms of decentralization, state property management and public administration, says Prime Minister

The decentralization reform is to prolong in 2023. It is about introducing the prefects institution – officials who will carry out administrative supervision on the ground, told the Prime Minister during the Gov’t session.

“Prefects are non-political persons who will represent the state and monitor the constitutionality of local decisions. Our model is based on the best European practice that has proven its effectiveness. After the end of martial law, it will be a good time to amend the Constitution, thereby allowing us to finalize the decentralization reform. As a result, we will get a balanced, efficient and European-like system of governance with capable hromadas,” emphasized the Prime Minister.

Besides, a reform of state property management will continue. According to the Head of Government, the country will keep the course on privatization. At the same time, the State will be an active player in some sectors primarily due to the sensitivity of these sectors to national security issues.

“In 2023, we will move towards establishment of unified state-owned companies in the field of three strategic resources: land, water, and forests. Instead of dispersion, which breeds corruption, unification and strict control over the actions of managers. State property should bring profit to Ukraine to ensure its sustainability today and its development tomorrow,” underlined Denys Shmyhal.

Prime Minister added that the reform of public administration would prolong as well. There should be fewer officials. Ministries should be engaged in development of policies and rules, instead of into management of the real sector, the Head of Government emphasized.

https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/denys-shmyhal-u-2023-rotsi-prodovzhytsia-reforma-detsentralizatsii-derzhavnoho-upravlinnia-ta-upravlinnia-derzhvlasnistiu

This year, we will allocate half of the budget to provide everything our Armed Forces need: Denys Shmyhal

The topmost priority on the agenda of the Government in 2023 is the support of the army, maintaining defense and security, announced Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal at a session of the Government on January 3.

“This year, we will allocate half of the budget to provide everything our Armed Forces need. All taxes paid by citizens and businesses will go to defense and security. Our army will become even stronger. We will accelerate new programs of production and procurement of weapons and equipment,” accentuated the Head of Government in a statement.

At the same time, in 2023, we will be actively creating a security infrastructure. This is an extensive network of modern equipped shelters within walking distance, noted the Prime Minister.

In particular, the Cabinet of Ministers has adopted a decision to improve the design of buildings. The Government officials determined the list of facilities, the construction of which must include shelters and other elements of protection. These are educational institutions, hospitals, residential and public buildings, critical infrastructure facilities.

According to the Prime Minister, among other priorities is Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO. Keeping in mind the launch of negotiations in the European Union, the CMU plans to develop a position on all 35 sections of the future Membership Agreement.

“The next NATO summit will be held in July in Vilnius. We have started preparing for it already. We strive to consolidate Ukraine's place in the transatlantic security system. The Ukrainian army directly on the battlefield is switching to NATO standards. We are already using NATO principles of strategic planning, education, training of personnel and units, warfare. Thanks to this, apart from succeeding in deterring the enemy, we are liberating the territories captured by it,” emphasized Denys Shmyhal.

The Head of Government added that the veterans’ policy was included in the essential direction of work this year. Inter alia, a Strategy of transition from military service to civilian life and an action plan for its implementation is planned to approve in 2023. It will be based on 4 key needs: economic independence, funds, housing, and medical services.

“Our veterans are our pride. And the state will create the best opportunities for them,” stressed Denys Shmyhal.

https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/denys-shmyhal-tsohorich-polovyna-biudzhetu-bude-spriamovana-na-zabezpechennia-vsim-neobkhidnym-zbroinykh-syl

Prime Minister voices 10 priorities in activities for the Government in 2023

Provision of the army, integration into the EU and NATO, energy sector, and recovery are among the core priorities and directions Ukraine will pursue in 2023. The Prime Minister of Ukraine Denys Shmyhal announced in a statement during a Government meeting on January 3.

"We are all continuously working to make this year the year of our victory.

We have a clear understanding of how to counteract the enemy, how to secure the front and hold the rear starting this year. We must remain united and continue to act as one. Therefore, today I will announce the government's priorities and the main directions along which we will move forward in 2023, with the key ones announced by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy in his annual address," stressed Denys Shmyhal.

According to the Prime Minister, the Government's priorities for 2023 are as follows:

1. Support of the army, maintaining defense and security.

2. Integration of Ukraine into the EU and NATO.

3. Energy front.

4. Restoration of Ukraine.

5. Macrofinancial stability and business support programs.

6. Veteran policy.

7. Education.

8. Continuation of decentralization reform.

9. Introduction of mandatory pension accumulation, and reform of the stock and capital markets.

10. Reform of state property management and public administration reform.

Denys Shmyhal stressed that 2023 will be the year of Ukraine's victory: "We are doing everything possible for this purpose. We help the Armed Forces, on whose shoulders our freedom rests and whose hands will forge our victory."

https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/premier-ministr-nazvav-10-priorytetiv-uriadu-na-2023-rik

2. Ukraine: WAR BULLETIN January 4, 6.00 pm EST:The three hundred and fifteenth day of the russian large-scale invasion continues.

Also posted at the Small Wars Journal: https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ukraine-war-bulletin-january-4-600-pm-estthe-three-hundred-and-fifteenth-day-russianlarge

Embassy of Ukraine in the USA

WAR BULLETIN

January 4, 6.00 pm EST

Russia continues to move personnel, weapons, military equipment and ammunition to the areas of hostilities. In addition to rail transportation, it uses military transport and civil aviation.

During the current day, Russia launched 3 missile strikes on civilian objects in the city of Kostyantynivka, Donetsk region, carried out 9 airstrikes and 14 attacks from rocket salvo systems.

Russia is concentrating its efforts on conducting offensive actions in the Lyman, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka areas and is trying to improve the tactical position in the Kupyansk areas. In Novopavlovka, Zaporizhzhya and Kherson - leads the defense. Conducts engineering equipment of positions and mining of terrain along the left bank of the Dnipro River.

President: We must put an end to the Russian aggression this year exactly

WAR ROOM

General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

The total combat losses of the Russian forces from 24.02.2022 to 04.01.2023:

personnel ‒ about 108910 (+720) killed,

tanks ‒ 3038 (+2),

APV ‒ 6106 (+6),

artillery systems – 2039 (+6),

MLRS – 424,

Anti-aircraft warfare systems ‒ 215 (+1),

aircraft – 283,

helicopters – 270,

UAV operational-tactical level – 1842 (+3),

cruise missiles ‒ 723,

warships / boats ‒ 16,

vehicles and fuel tankers – 4745 (+10),

special equipment ‒ 181.

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Y5NUpveNakYSCJvyiB9BSjKRWhyftSAoyN2pEPHiZcALtM9VfhPMCYkfUQMkTGmql

The three hundred and fifteenth day of the russian large-scale invasion continues.

The enemy continues to move personnel, weapons, military equipment and ammunition to the areas of hostilities. In addition to rail transportation, it uses military transport and civil aviation.

During the current day, the enemy launched 3 missile strikes on civilian objects in the city of Kostyantynivka, Donetsk region, carried out 9 airstrikes and 14 attacks from rocket salvo systems.

The threat of enemy air and missile strikes on critical infrastructure remains throughout Ukraine.

The enemy is concentrating its efforts on conducting offensive actions in the Lyman, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka areas and is trying to improve the tactical position in the Kupyansk areas. In Novopavlovka, Zaporizhzhya and Kherson - leads the defense. Conducts engineering equipment of positions and mining of terrain along the left bank of the Dnipro River.

The situation is stable in the Volyn, Polisiya, Siverskiy and Slobozhanskiy directions, and no signs of the formation of enemy offensive groups have been detected.

On the Siverskyi and Slobozhanskyi directions, areas of Karpovychi, Leonivka, and Gremyach settlements of Chernihiv region were hit by tank, mortar, and artillery shelling; Novovasylivka - Sumy and Krasne, Staritsa, Ohirtseve, Gatyshche, Vovchansk, Ustinivka, Figolivka and Dvorichna in Kharkiv Oblast.

Areas of 15 settlements were shelled by tanks and the entire spectrum of artillery in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions. Among them are Masyutivka, Zapadne, Kup'yansk, Kotlyarivka, Berestov in the Kharkiv region and Ivanivka, Ploshanka, Nevske, Chervopopivka and Dibrova in the Luhansk region.

Areas of more than 30 settlements were shelled in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions. In particular, these are Spirne, Berestov, Vesele, Bakhmut, Chasiv Yar, Berdychi, Avdiivka, Nevelske, Krasnohorivka and Maryinka of the Donetsk region.

Zolota Niva, Vugledar, Mykilski Dachi and Prechistivka in Donetsk region came under the fire of the occupiers in the Novopavlovka direction.

In the Zaporizhzhya and Kherson directions, the enemy shelled the positions of our troops with tanks, mortars, barrel and rocket artillery in the areas of more than

40 settlements. It does not stop terrorizing the civilian population of cities and towns along the right bank of the Dnipro River. The civil infrastructure of Dorozhnyanka, Zaliznychny, Biloghirya, Lukyanivskyi and Kamianskyi in the Zaporizhzhya region and Havrylivka, Dudchan, Ivanovka, Antonivka and Dniprovskyi in the Kherson region were damaged by the artillery shelling of the russian occupiers.

In the city of Luhansk, in the neurological department of the Luhansk Regional Clinical Hospital, the occupiers are treating more than 100 mercenaries of the private military company "Wagner".

Regarding enemy losses. On January 3, fire damage was confirmed to the concentration of manpower and military equipment of the occupiers in the Tokmak settlement of the Zaporizhzhia region. The losses of the enemy amounted to about 80 soldiers wounded and dead.

During the day, our aviation made 17 strikes on the areas where the invaders were concentrated, as well as 4 strikes on the positions of the enemy's anti-aircraft missile systems.

Units of missile troops and artillery of the Defense Forces during the current day carried out fire damage to the command post, 2 areas of concentration of manpower and military equipment, and the enemy's ammunition warehouse.

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dS5KoyQT4gYyppNZPt94Y8VRe1TVrgfGBagnuQ82vZe3pRjptS9xKWB4xxtULpkql

POLICY

President of Ukraine

President: We must put an end to the Russian aggression this year exactly

Good health to you, fellow Ukrainians!

Today we have new and powerful results from our diplomatic marathon.

France takes European defense support for Ukraine to a new level, and I thank President Macron for this leadership.

We will receive more armored vehicles, in particular wheeled tanks of French production. This is what sends a clear signal to all our other partners: there is no rational reason why Ukraine has not yet been supplied with Western-type tanks. And this is very important to restore security for all Ukrainians and peace for all Europeans.

Before the new "Ramstein" such signal is extremely relevant. We must put an end to the Russian aggression this year exactly and not postpone any of the defensive capabilities that can speed up the defeat of the terrorist state. Modern Western armored vehicles, Western-type tanks are just one of these key capabilities.

I want to thank Denmark today after the conversation with Prime Minister Frederiksen. I informed her of the current situation on the frontline, that Russia is planning another wave of aggression for the coming months. We must make this wave the last one - no chance for revenge for terrorists.

Today, I have heard strong support for Ukraine from Denmark, readiness to strengthen our positions in the fight against aggression together. And it is very important that this year Denmark will defend the security and interests of Europe and international law just as after February 24.

I had a conversation with the President of Romania today. It was a meaningful and multifaceted conversation. I thanked Mr. President for the level of cooperation we achieved last year. This applies to political, defense and economic cooperation as well. We have done a lot together to protect the Black Sea region. I am confident that this year we will do even more.

As I have already said, I will continue such diplomatic activity every day - this marathon of negotiations with the leaders of partner states and friends of Ukraine around the world. We are already responding and will respond very concretely and effectively to any new attempt of the aggressor to additionally mobilize and throw something more against Ukraine. Exactly with what is necessary on the battlefield and for the protection of the entire territory of our state.

Each of our partners will have very specific information about our defense needs. And we all have the same goal: to put an end to Russian aggression as soon as possible, to restore reliable and lasting peace.

We are discussing our initiative - our Peace Formula - with all leaders. These are ten clear points. All security elements, our territorial integrity, complete withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine and full guarantee of justice, that is, punishment of all those guilty of this aggression and crimes against Ukraine and Ukrainians, as well as compensation for all damages caused to Ukraine at the expense of the assets of the terrorist state.

Today, I would like to praise our warriors in the Bakhmut direction, in particular, the special unit of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine "Shaman", as well as the border guards of the Luhansk detachment, who, together with the fighters of the International Legion of Defense of Ukraine, inflict numerous losses to the enemy and drive the occupants out of their positions on the outskirts of Bakhmut. This is a good result, and I am grateful for it.

Each such result and each day of the enemy's failures in the Bakhmut direction and in Donbas in general is a significant weakening of the aggressor state. The occupants have been postponing the date when they expect to capture the entire Donbas for six months. They have been expecting to do it by the New Year - and our defenders are demonstrating success again. The invaders are constantly increasing their forces in the Donetsk region - they are doing it now as well. And every such day with our successes is a new proof of the insanity of the very idea to attack Ukraine. If only such news from the front can return a sense of reality to everyone in Russia, we will have to ensure it as much as possible.

And we must understand how difficult and painful this task is. But it cannot be otherwise. Terrorists must lose despite everything they try to do to strengthen themselves.

I am grateful to our defenders of the Bakhmut fortress!

I am grateful to all our warriors who withstand the pressure in the Soledar direction and defend their positions!

I am grateful, of course, to all our fighters who provide quite encouraging news from the Luhansk region and certain southern areas of our country!

Thank you to all who fight for Ukraine!

Thank you to all who help us!

Glory to Ukraine!

https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/treba-postaviti-krapku-v-rosijskij-agresiyi-same-cogo-roku-z-80225

Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine

 Grain Initiative: Over the holiday weekend 9 vessels exported 432,000 tonnes of Ukrainian products

During the holiday weekend 9 vessels exported 432,000 tonnes of Ukrainian products to Africa, Asia, and Europe.

In particular, bulk carrier HONORINE with 27,500 tonnes of Ukrainian grain was on its way to Tunisia, bulk carrier VELVET with 57,000 tonnes of wheat was sent to Bangladesh.

Today, 630,000 tonnes of agricultural products are loaded on 19 vessels in the ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdenny. No new vessels are expected to arrive for loading.

In the Bosporus, 94 vessels are waiting for inspection (69 vessels are empty for loading, and 25 are already loaded with agricultural products). The russian side in the JCC systematically slows down the inspections. Vessels are waiting for an average of more than a month. However, the bulk carrier T-Med with wheat on board has been waiting for inspection since the beginning of November last year.

Since August 1, 620 vessels have left the ports of Greater Odesa, exporting 16.5 million tonnes of Ukrainian food to Asia, Europe and Africa.

https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/zernova-initsiatyva-za-sviatkovi-vykhidni-9-suden-eksportuvaly-432-tys-tonn-ukrainskoi-produktsii

3. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 4, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2023

Key Takeaways

• The Russian milblogger information space continues to seize on official responses to the Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian base in Makiivka to criticize endemic issues in the Russian military apparatus and its unwillingness to address systemic failures.
• The continued construction of Russian units using solely mobilized recruits will not generate combat power commensurate with the number of mobilized personnel deployed.
• The Russian MoD has again shifted the rhetoric and format of its daily situational reports (SITREPs) likely to flood the information space with insignificant claimed successes and distract from its significant military failures.
• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Chief Kyrylo Budanov stated that Ukrainian forces intend to launch a major counteroffensive throughout Ukraine in the spring of 2023.
• Russian forces are increasingly reliant upon Iranian-made drones to strike Ukrainian critical infrastructure, and Russia will likely seek further bilateral cooperation with Iran in order to secure a greater number of high-precision weapons systems for use in Ukraine.
• Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line as Ukrainian strikes reportedly damaged Russian military logistics in Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut amid continued indicators that the broader offensive may be culminating.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations on the western outskirts of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces continued to rebuild force capability and conduct defensive operations in Kherson Oblast on January 4.
• Select Russian private armament manufacturers are continuing to criticize the Russian military campaign.
• Russian occupation authorities continued to take measures to resolve administrative issues associated with consolidating Russian control of occupied territories on January 4.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 4, 2023

understandingwar.org

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 4, 2023

Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Madison Williams, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 4, 7:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Russian milblogger information space continues to seize on official responses to the Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian base in Makiivka to criticize endemic issues in the Russian military apparatus. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) released an official response to the strike on January 4 and attributed it to the "presence and mass use by personnel, contrary to prohibitions, of mobile telephones within range of enemy weapons systems."[1] The Russian MoD also claimed that the death toll of the strike is now 89, including a deputy regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Bachurin.[2] The clear attempt by the Russian MoD to blame the strike on individual mobilized servicemen, as ISW assessed the Russian MoD would likely do on January 2, drew immediate ire from Russian milbloggers.[3] One milblogger emphasized that it is "extremely wrong to make mobile phones guilty for strikes" and concluded that "it is not cell phones and their owners that are to blame, but the negligence of the commanders."[4] Several milbloggers noted that the use of cell phones on the frontline in the 21st century is inevitable and that efforts to crack down on their use are futile.[5] The milblogger critique of the Russian MoD largely converged on the incompetence of Russian military command, with many asserting that the Russian military leadership has no understanding of the basic realities faced by Russian soldiers on the frontline and is seeking to shift the blame for its own command failures on the "faceless masses" of Russian mobilized recruits.[6]

The Russian milblogger response to the Russian MoD deflection of blame onto individual servicemen accurately identifies the endemic unwillingness or inability of the Russian military apparatus to address systemic failures. Cell phone use may have aided the Ukrainian strike to some degree, but the Russian MoD’s fixation on this as the cause of the strike is largely immaterial. An appropriately organized and properly trained and led modern army should not permit the convergence of the factors that contributed to the Makiivka strike in the first place. The Russian command was ultimately responsible for the decision to pack hundreds of mobilized men into non-tactical positions within artillery range of the frontline and near an ammunition depot.[7] The Russian MoD is likely using the strike to further deflect blame for its own institutional failures in the conduct of the war onto mobilized forces, whose own conduct is additionally emblematic of the Russian force generation failures.[8]

The continued construction of Russian units using solely mobilized recruits will not generate combat power commensurate with the number of mobilized personnel deployed. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin remarked in the wake of the Makiivka strike on January 4 that some of the officers of the targeted regiment were mobilized servicemen.[9] Pushilin’s indication that certain Russian units are relying on newly mobilized and poorly trained recruits for leadership roles, as opposed to drawing from the combat-hardened officer cadre, adds further nuance to the poor performance of and high losses within units comprised of mobilized recruits. Mobilized servicemen with minimal training and degraded morale in the role of officers are likely contributing to poor operational security (OPSEC) practices and lack the basic acumen to make sound tactical and operational decisions.

The Russian MoD has again shifted the rhetoric and format of its daily situational reports (SITREPs) likely to flood the information space with insignificant claimed successes and distract from its significant military failures. The Russian MoD instituted this shift on January 3, doubling the length of its previous SITREPs and focusing on claimed strikes against Ukrainian military assets that often lack operational significance rather than on its largely unsuccessful ground attacks.[10] These SITREPs focus on small settlements and group strikes by target type rather than location, making it difficult for its audience to geographically orient the SITREP and verify the claimed strikes. The Russian MoD also dedicated multiple Telegram posts to featuring a new missile carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov, that is very unlikely to conduct operations supporting Russian forces in Ukraine, a performative measure similar to those that Russian milbloggers have recently criticized, as ISW has previously reported.[11] The Russian MoD had previously attempted to emulate the Ukrainian General Staff’s SITREPS in response to widespread milblogger criticism of the lack of transparency in official war coverage following Russia’s military failures in the fall of 2022.[12]

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Chief Kyrylo Budanov stated that Ukrainian forces intend to launch a major counteroffensive throughout Ukraine in the spring of 2023. Budanov stated in an interview with ABC News published on January 4 that he expects fighting to be the most intense in March of 2023 and that the Ukrainian military is planning a major push in the spring that will liberate territory "from Crimea to Donbas" and deal "the final defeats to the Russian Federation."[13] Ukrainian officials have previously indicated that Ukrainian forces will attempt to maintain the initiative through a series of ongoing and subsequent counteroffensive operations in the winter of 2023.[14] This reportedly planned major Ukrainian counteroffensive in the spring of 2023 would not be mutually exclusive with Ukrainian counteroffensive operations continuing this winter, as Ukrainian forces could use ongoing and subsequent counteroffensive operations this winter to set conditions for a larger counteroffensive operation in the spring. ISW has not observed any indicators that Ukrainian forces intend to halt counteroffensive operations this winter in order to conduct a major counteroffensive this spring. Budanov stated that there would be further strikes "deeper and deeper" inside Russia but declined to comment on Ukraine’s involvement in previous strikes on Russian rear areas in Russia.[15]

Russian forces are increasingly reliant on Iranian-made drones in their campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure and have likely significantly depleted their current stock of these systems. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Vadym Skibitsky reported on January 4 that Russian forces have used about 660 Iranian-made Shahed-131 and -136 drones in Ukraine since their first use in September of 2022.[16] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces have increased the pace of drone attacks against Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the past month primarily using Shahed drones.[17] Ukrainian Air Force Command Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat reported on January 4 that Russian forces use Shahed drones because they can better evade detection on radar because of how low they fly to the ground, particularly along the Dnipro River in attack routes focused on targets in Kyiv.[18] Ihnat reported that Ukrainian air defenses have shot down 540 Russian strike drones but stated that even at a 100 percent shoot-down rate Shaheds are still able to damage Ukrainian cities as their warheads do not necessarily always explode when intercepted by Ukrainian anti-aircraft missiles and can detonate upon falling to the ground.[19] Skibitsky reported that Russian forces use massive swarms of Shahed drones to break through Ukrainian air defenses and noted that Russian forces could not achieve similar results if they use five to 10 drones at a time.[20] Russian forces, as a result, are running through a significant number of these drones that arrive from Iran in batches of 200 and 300 units.[21]

Skibitsky reported that Russia’s contract with Iran stipulates the transfer of 1,750 drones and that Russian forces currently need to replenish their stocks following a high use of these systems in previous days.[22] Skibitsky also reported that the GUR has intelligence that suggests that Russia will receive another shipment of Iranian-made drones on an unspecified date.[23] Russian forces have likely become reliant on the use of Iranian-made drones because they are a cheap alternative to more conventional high-precision missiles, the stock of which the Russian military has likely significantly depleted.[24]

Russia will likely seek further bilateral cooperation with Iran in order to secure a greater number of high-precision weapons systems for use in Ukraine. An Iranian state-run media source claimed on December 28 that Iran will soon receive 24 Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets from Russia likely in exchange for Iranian-made drones and ballistic missiles.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that these high-precision weapon systems will allow Russian forces to more effectively target Ukrainian rear areas defended by Western anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems than their current manned aircraft.[26] Senior US officials reported on December 9 that Russia is providing an unprecedented level of military and technical support to Iran in exchange for Iranian-made weapons systems.[27]

Russian forces would use all the pledged 1,750 Iranian-made drones in Ukraine by May 2023 if they consume them at the same rate as between September and December 2022. Russia will therefore likely look to secure further agreements with Iran on the provision of Iranian-made high-precision weapons systems in order to augment its campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. The Iranian government’s Islamic Republic News Agency claimed on January 1 that Russia and Iran are building a new transcontinental trade route to bypass sanctions and "foreign interference."[28] Russian and Iranian officials may be negotiating a trade route in part to support more consistent arms transfers between the two countries. ISW has previously assessed that Iran may be supplying drones and potentially ballistic missiles to the Russian Federation to more clearly establish an explicitly bilateral security relationship with Russia in which Iranians are more equal partners.[29]

Key Takeaways

• The Russian milblogger information space continues to seize on official responses to the Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian base in Makiivka to criticize endemic issues in the Russian military apparatus and its unwillingness to address systemic failures.
• The continued construction of Russian units using solely mobilized recruits will not generate combat power commensurate with the number of mobilized personnel deployed.
• The Russian MoD has again shifted the rhetoric and format of its daily situational reports (SITREPs) likely to flood the information space with insignificant claimed successes and distract from its significant military failures.
• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Chief Kyrylo Budanov stated that Ukrainian forces intend to launch a major counteroffensive throughout Ukraine in the spring of 2023.
• Russian forces are increasingly reliant upon Iranian-made drones to strike Ukrainian critical infrastructure, and Russia will likely seek further bilateral cooperation with Iran in order to secure a greater number of high-precision weapons systems for use in Ukraine.
• Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line as Ukrainian strikes reportedly damaged Russian military logistics in Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut amid continued indicators that the broader offensive may be culminating.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations on the western outskirts of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces continued to rebuild force capability and conduct defensive operations in Kherson Oblast on January 4.
• Select Russian private armament manufacturers are continuing to criticize the Russian military campaign.
• Russian occupation authorities continued to take measures to resolve administrative issues associated with consolidating Russian control of occupied territories on January 4.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 4. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi reported that fierce fighting is ongoing along the Savtove-Kreminna line and in the direction of Lysychansk (15km southeast of Kreminna).[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Stelmakhivka (16km northwest of Svatove).[31] A Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 2nd Army Corps officer claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted maneuver defense in the vicinity of Kuzemivka (15km northwest of Svatove) to restrain Russian advances in the area.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also conducted assaults near Ploshchanka (17km northwest of Kreminna) and in the direction of Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna).[33] The Russian milblogger described these actions as tactical in nature but stated that soon Russian forces may be able to develop them into supporting a larger operation along the Svatove-Kreminna line.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[35]

Ukrainian strikes are reportedly degrading Russian military logistics in Luhansk Oblast. Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on January 4 that Russian forces must now deliver ammunition to the grouping in the Svatove area directly from Luhansk City because Ukrainian forces defeated Russian attempts to build warehouses near Svatove.[36] ISW reported on January 3 that Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed Russian ammunition field warehouses in the Svatove direction.[37]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on January 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Bakhmut, north of Bakhmut near Krasna Hora, northeast of Bakhmut near Soledar, and south of Bakhmut near Mayorsk.[38] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces captured three unspecified former Ukrainian defensive positions south of Soledar and seized the Deksonska railway station on the southern outskirts of Soledar.[39] Russian forces likely hope to capture Soledar northeast of Bakhmut in order to reach the T0513 Bakhmut-Siversk highway, one of two major logistics lines supplying Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut. Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces Colonel-General Oleksandr Syrsky stated that Russian forces failed to meet their command’s deadline of capturing Soledar and encircling Bakhmut by December 26.[40] Russian sources claimed that fighting is ongoing north of Bakhmut near Krasna Hora and Pidhorodne, and south of Bakhmut near Kishchiivka, Kurdyumivka, and Opytne.[41] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made unspecified advances towards Pidhorodne and that Wagner Group forces broke through Ukrainian defensive lines near Opytne, but ISW cannot verify these claims.[42]

Continued Russian offensive operations around Bakhmut, particularly claims of marginal tactical gains around Soledar, are not incompatible with ISW’s standing assessment that the Russian offensive in Bakhmut is likely culminating. Spokesperson for Ukraine's Eastern Group of Forces Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated on January 4 that Ukrainian and Russian forces clashed on the ground 22 times in the past day and that Russian forces conducted over 238 artillery, MLRS, and tank strikes in the same period.[43] The Ukrainian Border Guards Service shared footage on January 4 that shows Ukrainian journalists driving into Soledar without fear of Russian fire.[44] Ukrainian soldiers in the video near Soledar said that Russian forces changed tactics and now throw infantry into battle without preparatory artillery fire, and that Ukrainian forces shoot 15-person Russian infantry groups from 20 meters away.[45]This apparent change in tactics suggests that Russian forces in the Soledar-Bakhmut area may be intensifying attempts to gain ground on the tactical level but remain unlikely to secure operationally significant terrain. The culmination of an offensive does not mean that all tactical activity will cease, and such activity could even increase in intensity—but the activity is unlikely to produce meaningful results. Continued Russian tactical operations and claimed gains around Soledar do not preclude the likely culmination of the ongoing offensive.

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the western outskirts of Donetsk City on January 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Krasnohorivka (on the western outskirts of Donetsk City) and Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City) and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Pobieda.[46]

Russian forces did not conduct any reported ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on January 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka, Zaporizhia Oblast.[47] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire in western Donetsk Oblast, including Vuhledar and its environs.[48]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued to rebuild force capability and conduct defensive operations in Kherson Oblast on January 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage of Russian forces defending the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast with the claim that Ukrainian forces "will not pass" because the "lines of defense are constructed perfectly" and communication between units there is strong.[49] The Head of the Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavrisk Direction Defense Forces, Yevhen Yerin, stated that Russian forces continue to rebuild force capacity in separate directions – Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts—and that Russian forces are active on the islands near Kherson City.[50] Yerin stated that Ukrainian forces are prioritizing taking the east bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast before considering taking control over these nearby islands.[51] Yerin stated that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces control the islands and the visibility there means that either side has the ability to destroy manpower accumulations on the islands.[52] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan also stated on January 4 that Russian forces continued to shell the Nova Kakhovka area in an attempt to intimidate residents into evacuating the area.[53] ISW is unable to verify the veracity of this claim and it is unclear whether Russian forces are actually shelling a settlement currently under Russian control.

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian concentration areas in Zaporizhia Oblast on January 4. The Ukrainian General Staff and other official Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian military equipment and personnel concentration areas in Tokmak, Melitopol, Berdyansk, Polohy, and Vasylivka; hitting a command post, wounding over 260 servicemembers, and destroying up to 10 pieces of military equipment.[54] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces shelled Polohy and struck a military hospital in Tokmak and a command post in Vasylivka, Zaporizhia Oblast.[55] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces did not hit a military command post, but instead hit a residential building in Vasylivka.[56]

Russian sources claimed that Russian air defenses activated north of Sevastopol near Belbek Air Base, Crimea on January 4. Russia-backed Sevastopol Governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed that Russian air defenses shot down two unidentified (presumably Ukrainian) drones near the Belbek Air Base.[57] A Russian milblogger amplified this claim and a Ukrainian Telegram account reported explosions near the air base in the early morning hours on January 4.[58]

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on January 4 that Russian forces are moving units to northern Crimea. GUR representative Andriy Chernyak stated that Russian forces are making every effort to preserve the so-called land corridor [сухопутный коридор] to Crimea by transferring units to northern Crimea and building fortifications in the area and in Kherson Oblast.[59] Chernyak stated that maintaining the land corridor was the foundational concept that drove Russian efforts to capture Donetsk Oblast—as they planned to seize the coast of the Sea of Azov and cut off Ukrainian access to the Black Sea—but noted that Western military equipment made the corridor unsafe for Russian forces.[60] Chernyak added that Russian forces are building fortifications and transferring units to northern Crimea because they understand that they will have to fight along these lines eventually.[61]

Russian forces continued routine shelling in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Mykolaiv oblasts on January 4.[62]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Select Russian private armament manufacturers are continuing to criticize the Russian military campaign. The owner of the Lobayev Arms precision grade rifle ammunition manufacturer, Vladimir Lobayev, commented on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s order for Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu to submit a report on the provisions for the Russian Armed Forces by February 1.[63] Lobayev claimed that the Kremlin has not been submitting orders for rifles from his company despite the "enormous and constantly growing need for high-precision and long-range rifles" to sustain the war effort in Ukraine, noting that Shoigu should add that to his report. Lobayev added that the government only commissioned one state order with the company and noted that private sponsors and non-government crowdfunding organizations place 99.9% of all orders in support of the Russian "special military operation" in Ukraine. Lobayev noted that private sponsors include some governors and members of the government who pay for this equipment with their own funds and acknowledged that his post will likely upset "higherups."

The Kremlin’s treatment of Lobayev Arms resembles its offhand information space approach to its handling of the Wagner Group. Lobayev Arms was established in 2013 and is an offspring of a small arms company called "Tsar Pushka" (Tsar Cannon), which previously moved to the United Arab Emirates following the Kremlin’s decision to decline the renewal of its license in 2010.[64] Lobayev reestablished the company in Russia in 2013.[65] Lobayev has adopted a milblogger persona on Telegram and frequently joins criticism from other pro-war nationalist figures including former officer and war criminal Igor Girkin.[66] Lobayev and prominent Russian milbloggers also claimed that Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) conducted several searches of his company in early October 2022 despite the company not having received an official state order from the Kremlin that would warrant such a search.[67] These milbloggers also noted that Rosgvadia ended its searches within an hour of the publication of their criticism of the difference in treatment of the state military-industrial complex compared with private companies and accused the Kremlin of purchasing cheap Chinese guns to cut the cost of the war effort.[68] Lobayev frequently crowdfunds for the war effort with other pro-war milbloggers and appears on some state media broadcasts.[69]

Lobayev, just like Wagner Group financier Yevheniy Prigozhin, is likely exploiting the criticism wave among milbloggers to benefit their private businesses. The Kremlin, in turn, is attempting to appease these individuals by allowing them a prominent position in the Russian information space while refraining from elevating them to an official status. The Kremlin may be refraining from publicly affiliating with Lobayev Arms in an effort to deprive Lobayev of the legitimacy and business benefits associated with working with the Russian MoD, despite reportedly failing to properly equip its mobilized servicemen. ISW had previously observed that Russian airborne units used Lobayev armaments over the summer, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian leadership deliberately prevented proxy formations from using Lobayev sniper rifles as these units suffered an "acute shortage" of advanced weapons.[70] Prigozhin is also criticizing the Russian military command in an ongoing effort to legalize his mercenary organization in Russia even as the Kremlin continues to snub these efforts despite Wagner Group’s involvement in Putin’s war in Ukraine.

Russian businessmen may continue to use the social media algorithms and lack of credible official war coverage to their advantage, while inadvertently undermining the Kremlin’s core institutions and Putin’s regime. A prominent milblogger observed that his critiques of the Russian military command receive millions of views, warning that the algorithm may lead some individuals to exaggerate their criticism to benefit their agendas.[71] Milbloggers are also using the coverage of "special military operation" as clickbait to encourage their audiences to purchase a sponsored product or subscribe to private Telegram channels.[72] The Kremlin’s months-long appeasement of the pro-war milblogger community may continue to give rise to financial and political incentives to criticize the Russian MoD, which can reflect poorly on Putin’s leadership.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continued to take measures to resolve administrative issues associated with consolidating Russian control of occupied territories on January 4. A Russian milblogger who is notably a member of the Russian Human Rights Council claimed on January 4 that residents of Kalynivske (a settlement in western Kherson Oblast now under Ukrainian control) who evacuated to Russian-held territory on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro in the autumn have not received social payments or housing certificates because occupation officials did not add residents of Kalynivske to the list of eligible applicants.[73] The Russian milblogger also claimed that the Kherson occupation deputy for evacuees Tatyana Kuzmich spoke with residents of Kalynivske to address their concerns and emphasized that Kalynivske residents now have the legal mechanism to process payments and housing certificates. Kherson Occupation Administration Head Vladimir Saldo emphasized on January 3 that residents from the west (right) bank and 15km zone on the east bank of the Dnipro River have the right to receive housing certificates from Russian officials per a Russian government resolution.[74] Saldo stated that many residents who have already evacuated the area have applied for housing certificates per the resolution but acknowledged that some have not been able to receive the promised payments.[75] Russian occupation officials evidently are continuing to struggle with the administrative ramifications of the earlier wave of evacuations from the west bank of Kherson Oblast.

Russian forces and occupation authorities are continuing to intensify filtration measures in occupied territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 4 that Russian occupation officials forcibly took approximately 30 residents from suburbs in Bakhmut, Donetsk Oblast, to filtration camps in Rostov Oblast, Russia, under the guise of protecting civilians from hostilities.[76] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported on January 4 that Russian forces have blocked the entrance to and exit from Tytarivka, Luhansk Oblast, and arrested dozens of local civilians on allegations that they collaborated with Ukrainian forces. [77] Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov stated on January 4 that Russian occupation authorities are demanding that residents in territories of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast obtain passes from local commandants to leave populated areas and that officials are imposing a curfew in and around Tokmak, restricting residents from leaving their villages until January 8.[78]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing to take measures to consolidate legal control of occupied territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 4 that Russian occupation authorities collect personal information on residents engaged in entrepreneurial activities in occupied territories, seize their personal property, and force them to re-register their property under Russian legislation.[79] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also stated that Russian officials will nationalize any property not re-registered according to Russian law.[80]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing to intensify law enforcement crackdowns in occupied territories. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated on January 4 that Russian occupation authorities have waived age requirements and psychological evaluations to attract residents in occupied Luhansk Oblast to serve in internal affairs enforcement positions in an effort to legalize forced mobilization in occupied territories.[81] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 4 that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and occupation law enforcement are more actively checking local residents’ phones and conducting illegal raids in the occupied Kakhovka region of Kherson Oblast due to recent Ukrainian partisan activities and strikes on Russian military facilities.[82]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing to seize and repurpose civilian medical facilities into military hospitals in occupied territories. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 4 that Russian forces are treating over 100 wounded Wagner servicemen in the neurological department of a hospital in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[83]

ISW will continue to report daily observed indicators consistent with the current assessed most dangerous course of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv.

ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast about a potential Russian offensive against northern Ukraine in winter 2023 remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible, and the risk of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. This new section in the daily update is not in itself a forecast or assessment. It lays out the daily observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly. Our assessment that the MDCOA remains unlikely has not changed. We will update this header if the assessment changes.

Observed indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

• Nothing significant to report.

Observed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

• Social media footage circulated on January 4 shows an announcement at the Barysau bus station in Minsk Oblast calling for all male citizens aged 18 to 60 to report to a military enlistment office or village executive committee to clarify personal data.[84]

Observed counter-indicators for the MDCOA in the past 48 hours:

• The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed any signs of the formation of Russian offensive groups along the border regions of northern Ukraine.[85]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[2] https://lenta dot ru/news/2023/01/04/makeevka/; https://radiosputnik dot ria dot ru/20230104/makeevka-1843005871.html; https://t.me/mod_russia_en/5657; https://t.me/mod_russia/23167

[16] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rosiiski-terorysty-vykorystaly-blyzko-660-iranskykh-shakhediv.html

[18] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/04/chomu-drony-kamikadze-vazhko-zbyvaty/ ; http://www.nrcu.gov dot ua/schedule/play-archive.html?periodItemID=3330162 ; https://suspilne dot media/352324-osnovna-meta-stolica-u-povitranih-silah-rozpovili-ak-ppo-vidbivae-ataki-sahediv/

[19] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/04/z-veresnya-ukrayinski-vijskovi-zbyly-blyzko-500-rosijskyh-raket-vypushhenyh-po-obyektah-krytychnoyi-infrastruktury-yurij-ignat/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/04/chomu-drony-kamikadze-vazhko-zbyvaty/

[20] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rosiiski-terorysty-vykorystaly-blyzko-660-iranskykh-shakhediv.html

[21] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rosiiski-terorysty-vykorystaly-blyzko-660-iranskykh-shakhediv.html

[22] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rosiiski-terorysty-vykorystaly-blyzko-660-iranskykh-shakhediv.htm

[23] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rosiiski-terorysty-vykorystaly-blyzko-660-iranskykh-shakhediv.html

[25] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2022/12/28/2828218/dozens-of-sukhoi-su-35-fighter-jets-to-be-delivered-to-iran-by-russia-soon

[28] https://ru.irna dot ir/news/84985855/; https://t.me/strelkovii/3656; https://t.me/Irna_ru/4246

[32] https://tass dot ru/politika/16739099; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/35488

[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/01/03/pvk-vagner-sergij-cherevatyj/ ;

[40] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/04/komanduvach-suhoputnyh-vijsk-prokomentuvav-operatyvnu-sytuacziyu-v-rajoni-vedennya-bojovyh-dij/

[43] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/04/oborona-bahmuta-za-dobu-vorog-zavdav-238-udariv-iz-vazhkogo-ozbroyennya/

[49] ttps://t.me/mod_russia/23186

[50] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/04/vorog-prodovzhuye-posylyuvaty-okremi-rubezhi-na-tavrijskomu-napryamku-yevgen-yerin/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA&ab_channel=%D0%A2%D0%A1%D0%9D; https://suspilne dot media/352432-sili-oboroni-maksimalno-nisat-vijska-rf-abi-nastup-projsov-z-minimalnimi-zertvami-erin/

[51] https://suspilne dot media/352432-sili-oboroni-maksimalno-nisat-vijska-rf-abi-nastup-projsov-z-minimalnimi-zertvami-erin/

[52] https://suspilne dot media/352432-sili-oboroni-maksimalno-nisat-vijska-rf-abi-nastup-projsov-z-minimalnimi-zertvami-erin/

[59] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/dlia-utrymannia-terytorii-rf-peredyslokovuiut-na-pivnich-krymu-novi-viiskovi-pidrozdily.html

[60] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/dlia-utrymannia-terytorii-rf-peredyslokovuiut-na-pivnich-krymu-novi-viiskovi-pidrozdily.html

[61] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/dlia-utrymannia-terytorii-rf-peredyslokovuiut-na-pivnich-krymu-novi-viiskovi-pidrozdily.html

[64] https://live-yarillo dot livejournal dot com/289466.html; https://bethplanet dot ru/forum/49-291-5#14231

[65] https://www.techinsider dot ru/weapon/461032-shepot-kotoryy-ubivaet-vintovka-lobaeva/

[69] https://radiokp dot ru/podcast/utrenniy-mardan/657553; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/10266 ; https://t.me/voenacher/35641

[76] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2023/01/04/vagnerovczi-vyvezly-lyudej-z-peredmistya-bahmuta-na-filtracziyu/

[77] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2023/01/04/vagnerovczi-vyvezly-lyudej-z-peredmistya-bahmuta-na-filtracziyu/

[79] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2023/01/03/okupanty-vyluchayut-majno-pidpryyemcziv-na-hersonshhyni/

[80] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2023/01/03/okupanty-vyluchayut-majno-pidpryyemcziv-na-hersonshhyni/

[82] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2023/01/04/okupanty-vchynyayut-represiyi-na-tot/

understandingwar.org

4. Washington substation attacks' alleged motive revealed

The. rest of the story?

Washington substation attacks' alleged motive revealed

Homeland Security warns better security needed for US electric grid to prevent domestic terrorism

foxnews.com · by Danielle Wallace | Fox News

Video

2 suspects in Washington substation attacks on Christmas arrested

Two suspects have been arrested in the Christmas Day Washington substation attacks, KCPQ's Franque Thompson reports.

The FBI has revealed the alleged motive for four substation attacks in Washington state that cut power for thousands on Christmas Day, yet still no arrests have come a month after electric grid sabotage knocked out power for days for an entire North Carolina county amid nationwide concerns of domestic terrorism.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Washington announced Tuesday that two men – Matthew Greenwood, 32, and Jeremy Crahan, 40, both of Puyallup – were to appear in Tacoma federal court on the charge of conspiracy to damage energy facilities. Greenwood is also charged with possession of an unregistered short-barreled rifle and a short-barreled shotgun.

The criminal complaint revealed the alleged motive for the attacks on four substations dozens of miles apart within a 12-hour time frame on Dec. 25, 2022, was to commit a burglary at a business while power was down for some 15,000 customers in the area.

The Department of Homeland Security warned last month that the U.S power grid is vulnerable to domestic terrorism, noting online calls to sabotage critical infrastructure. Officials have not publicly cited domestic terrorism in the Washington case.

TWO WASHINGTON MEN CHARGED IN 4 SUBSTATION ATTACKS ON CHRISTMAS THAT CUT POWER FOR THOUSANDS: FBI

In the early morning hours of Christmas Day, the perimeter chain-link fence was cut to gain entry to the Hemlock substation, operated by Puget Sound Energy. A "bank high side switch" was manipulated, causing an outage for some 8,000 customers. The criminal complaint noted suspects did not steal any copper or cut any wires.

On Dec. 26, 2022, Tacoma Power provided the FBI with surveillance footage of a suspect seen at the Elk Plain substation at the time of the attack. Federal agents and local law enforcement later conducted search warrants on Dec. 31 and found a short-barreled rifle with what appears to be a homemade silencer inside a trailer. (Department of Justice )

The Elk Plain substation was struck next. Padlocks were cut on the pedestrian gates to gain entry to the substation, where high side breakers were manipulated, causing an outage. The third attack happened at the Graham substation, where a chain-link fence was cut, and high side breakers were manipulated.

One of the power substations in Graham, Washington, that was targeted on Christmas Day, according to police. (Google Maps)

The damage on those two substations, both operated by Tacoma Power, was estimated at $3 million and caused outages for 7,500 customers. The complaint notes damage to both "de-energizer taps" for each impacted transformer requires replacement, resulting in up to 36 months' repair time.

Two mobile transformers at each facility now maintain power to customers, and combined output went from 50 megawatts to 15.

PSE provided the FBI a map showing the proximity of all four substations attacked on Dec. 25, 2022. (Department of Justice)

Later that evening on Dec. 25, the fourth attack happened at Kapowsin substation, operated by Puget Sound Energy. A chain-link fence was cut to gain entry. According to the complaint, suspects tampered with the bank high side switch and tried to pry the linkage open, causing the substation to start arcing and sparking.

After being advised of his Miranda rights, Greenwood stated that he and Crahan "have been planning to disrupt power to commit a burglary," FBI Special Agent Mark Tucher wrote in a probable cause summary. Crahan allegedly drove them both to the first three facilities, acting as the getaway driver while Greenwood entered the substations using bolt cutters provided by Crahan.

Tacoma Power provided the FBI with video footage of a vehicle that arrived at the Elk Plain substation at the time of the attack on Dec. 26, 2022. (Department of Justice)

Crahan allegedly entered the fourth substation. While the power was out, after the Graham and South Hill attacks, the two went to a local business, where Crahan drilled out a lock, and Greenwood entered to steal from the cash register, Tucher said. The complaint does not name that business.

The FBI said cellphone records placing the suspects at all four substations and surveillance camera footage of one of the suspects and the getaway truck led to the arrests. A search warrant of the trailer where both men lived uncovered an illegally possessed short-barreled rifle with a homemade silencer, the complaint says.

Work to restore power is in progress on Dec. 5, 2022, in Moore County, North Carolina, after two substations operated be Duke Electric were shot at in Carthage. (Peter Zay/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

Despite federal prosecutors applauding the FBI’s swift work in securing arrests in the Washington case on New Year's Eve, they acknowledged no suspects have been apprehended in the Dec. 3, 2022, attacks on two substations in Moore County, North Carolina, that left some 45,000 customers without power.

CLICK TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP

"We are still getting into the facts obviously, we are paying attention to what happened in North Carolina. There have been prior attacks here in the Northwest as well, not just most recently, this is a national problem, but we are still investigating this case and a lot to be determined about the facts," Nick Brown, U.S. attorney for the Western District of Washington, said Tuesday, according to KOMO.

Authorities said someone or a group drove up to two substations operated by Duke Energy and opened fire, causing extensive damage. The incident is being investigated as a "criminal occurrence." In that case, the Moore County Sheriff’s Office asked for court approval for several search warrants, and the FBI was also looking into cellphone records. The motive remains unclear.5Danielle Wallace is a reporter for Fox News Digital covering politics, crime, police and more. Story tips can be sent to danielle.wallace@fox.com and on Twitter: @danimwallace.

foxnews.com · by Danielle Wallace | Fox News

5. Russian soldier gave away his position with geotagged social media posts

But will we be wise?

"Intelligent men learn from their mistakes and wise men learn from the mistakes of others."

Russian soldier gave away his position with geotagged social media posts

Cell phones and combat zones don’t mix.

BY JEFF SCHOGOL | PUBLISHED JAN 3, 2023 12:34 PM

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · January 3, 2023

A Russian volunteer in eastern Ukraine has single-handedly justified every U.S. military commander’s fear that American troops could unwittingly reveal their position to the enemy by posting selfies on social media.

Because this Russian service member is the epitome of “Carl,” — the U.S. Army’s nickname for a soldier who always screws up — Task & Purpose is referring to him as “Russian Carl” to drive home just how epic his OPSEC failure is.

Last month, Russian Carl posted pictures and videos of himself and members of the 10th Spetsnaz Brigade on VKontakte — Russia’s equivalent of Facebook, said former Marine Capt. Rob Lee, who shared another Russian social media user’s account of the debacle on Twitter.

Anatomy of an OPSEC failure. A Russian volunteer posted photos on VK in Sahy, Kherson Oblast with member of the GRU's 10th Spetsnaz Brigade. He left the location tagging on, which makes it very easy to geolocate the Grand Prix country club from the tiles.https://t.co/NrnmXC0HtP pic.twitter.com/DG8AtMObY2

— Rob Lee (@RALee85) January 2, 2023

Some of the images and videos that Russian Carl posted had the geolocation tag turned on, making it easy for anyone to pinpoint the exact location of a country club where Russian troops were billeted at the time, said Lee, who spent a year with a defense-focused think tank in Moscow.

Subscribe to Task & Purpose Today. Get the latest military news, entertainment, and gear in your inbox daily.

On Dec. 20, the Ukrainians destroyed that country club, and while it is unclear whether Russian Carl’s OPSEC failure was directly responsible for the Ukrainian attack, he was kind enough to post video of the ruined building afterwards, providing Ukrainians with a battle damage assessment that showed their strikes were successful, Lee said.

“He left a trail of easy clues to determine where he was and was posting them openly on his Vk page,” Lee told Task & Purpose. “This Russian Vk page where I found the info was angry at him and other soldiers or supporters who commit OPSEC mistakes and get Russian soldiers killed.”

The U.S. military has long worried about just such a scenario involving American troops taking place. In 2020, a Marine unit was “killed” during a training exercise after a lance corporal posted a selfie on social media. Separately, the I Marine Expeditionary Force conducted an exercise a few years ago that showed how the billeting area of a Marine base had the largest electronic signature because the Marines were constantly using their phones.

OPSEC has proven to be one of Russia’s most glaring weaknesses since Russian forces invaded Ukraine in late February. When their communications systems failed, Russian troops started using cell phones. Since those mobile devices used Ukraine’s cellular network, Ukrainian forces were able to triangulate Russian positions with ease.

It is unclear whether such OPSEC failures allowed the Ukrainians to target a building in Makiivka in eastern Ukraine that housed Russian soldiers on New Year’s Day. The Ukrainians have claimed that hundreds of Russian troops were killed in the strike. On Wednesday, Russia’s defense ministry increased its estimate of how many Russian troops were killed in the strike from 63 to 89 in a rare acknowledgment of its combat losses.

Russian state media has reported that “active use of cellular phones by the newly arrived servicemen” had helped the Ukrainians to target the Russian troops at Makiivka, the New York Times reported.

Such statements by state-run media and pro-war Russian military bloggers are likely part of the Russian defense ministry’s efforts to defect blame for OPSEC failures on Russian troops themselves as well as officials with the separatist Donetsk People’s Republic, according to the Institute for the Study of War think tank in Washington, D.C.

However, Russian milbloggers affiliated with the Wagner Group have argued that the Russian troops’ cell phone use was not a factor in the attack, placing blame on Russia’s military command for concentrating so many Russian troops in one location, making them vulnerable to attack, according to ISW’s latest report on the war in Ukraine.

A Ukrainian military official told Task & Purpose that the Ukrainians have several methods to target Russian forces other than following Russian troops on social media and triangulating their cell phone calls.

For example, the Ukrainians have a network of human intelligence sources in occupied parts of the country to help identify where to strike the Russians, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue.

“With or without their cellphones, they are always vulnerable,” the official said.

UPDATE: This story was updated on Jan. 4 after Russia’s defense ministry increased its estimate of how many Russian troops were killed at Makiivka from 63 to 89.

The latest on Task & Purpose

• This is what happens when Navy pilots land on the wrong aircraft carrier
• Air Force special ops vet Dan Schilling wrote a rock epic about the experience of war
• How airmen overcame -77 degree weather, frostnip to fix a C-130 in Antarctica
• Why Navy ships make their first deck log of the New Year rhyme
• The complicated truth about the famous ‘Christmas Truce’ of World War I

Want to write for Task & Purpose? Click here.

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · January 3, 2023

6. Year in Review: Poland and Ukraine defy Putin to emerge as 'new powers in defense in Europe' (And relations with US Asian allies)

An important article here that discusses the relationship between NATO allies and US allies in Northeast Asia.

South Korea is emerging as a partner in the Arsenal of Democracy.

Excerpts:

“Japan and South Korea are increasingly realizing that their security is going to be tied up with the degree to which the United States remains internationalist,” the American Enterprise Institute’s Zack Cooper said. “That means that they can’t just focus on East Asia. They have to focus on supporting some U.S. allies as well, both as a hedge against the possibility that the U.S. wouldn’t be as engaged, but also as a forcing function to ensure ... that it’s a little easier for the U.S. to stay engaged, because its allies are picking up a little more of the burden than they have heretofore."

Japan has played an important role in the Group of Seven, the format by which the world’s seven largest industrialized democracies have imposed severe economic penalties on Russia. Meanwhile, South Korea has emerged as “the fastest growing kid on the block of the European defense market,” according to Kopecny, who oversees Czech defense industrial cooperation.

“The confidence of Europeans towards South Korean defense industry has grown substantially,” Kopecny said. “It started with Estonia, Finland, then Norway, then Poland with howitzers. Now, main battle tanks. Those are all products that are very well perceived and ... those products will be the building blocks of the new axis of military power of Poland, as well as some of the other countries.”

Year in Review: Poland and Ukraine defy Putin to emerge as 'new powers in defense in Europe'

by Joel Gehrke, Foreign Affairs Reporter |  December 31, 2022 02:00 PM

Washington Examiner · December 31, 2022

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has wrought “a new geopolitical reality” in Europe, according to a senior European defense official, but not the one that Kremlin officials expected.

"The balance is definitely being shifted towards the east,” Czech Deputy Defense Minister Tomas Kopecny told the Washington Examiner, referring to “the rise of Poland and, of course, Ukraine as the new powers in defense in Europe.”

BIDEN TELLS ZELENSKY UKRAINE ‘WILL NEVER STAND ALONE’

Russian President Vladimir Putin expected the invasion would “return and strengthen” Russia’s dominion over the territories conquered at the founding of the modern Russian Empire under Peter the Great. Instead, the Kremlin accelerated the coalescence of power in Central and Eastern European states once erased from political maps by Russian imperialists of centuries past.

Kopecny is wary of any direct analogies to the historic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, whose boundaries once included most of modern Ukraine — “historical analogies are very, a very sensitive issue in Europe,” he explained — but he isn’t shy about the latent potential of Central European capitals willing to pool their resources in a crisis.

“At the same time, this union was the only one that captured and kept Moscow for some time in history,” he said, referring to an early 17th-century conflict. "Regardless of how it was formed in the history, this unity and brotherhood between Poland and Ukraine is just indisputable. And it will remain for a very, very long time because every single Ukrainian knows that it was thanks to Poland that some of his relatives were safe.”

The states of the region have had their own difficulties, but they have set aside those bad memories, by and large, due to a common recognition of the threat posed by the Kremlin.

That dynamic has received less global attention than German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s stunning announcement of “Zeitenwende,” the impending rearmament of Germany in response to the Kremlin’s breaking of the peace between states in Europe. But it could be more consequential on the continent.

“There have been some very, very important changes for the good, for the positive side, in how we perceive it, in Germany and in Germany's defense posture,” Kopecny said. "They could start to be an important player, but not the leading one. Really, the most heavyweight bloc will be the one of Ukraine and Poland because, together, they will be far more powerful.”

The resuscitation of such a bloc has a historical precedent, though not quite a successful one. "In 1922 there existed a wise plan for a great Baltic bloc from Poland to Finland, a joint defensive alliance; discussions culminated at a conference held in Warsaw," historian John Lukacs recalled in his 1953 history of The Great Powers and Eastern Europe. "But political squabbles within Finland and Poland, the two anchor states, and Lithuanian-Polish enmity made all plans dissolve into thin air; only a frail Estonian-Latvian Alliance remained."

Most of those states now are members of NATO, except for Finland (which is in the process of joining NATO, alongside Sweden) and Ukraine, which aspires to join NATO. "That was unfortunate that this alliance [described by Lukacs] could not be built," another senior European official said. "But we are building another one at the moment while Finland and Sweden are joining NATO. Anchor nation is U.S."

Poland, as another member of the trans-Atlantic alliance, relies on the nuclear guarantee provided by the United States in conjunction with France and the United Kingdom. Yet Warsaw’s conventional military interests now far surpass what it obtains from the U.S., leading to new links between U.S. allies in Central Europe and Northeast Asia.

“Japan and South Korea are increasingly realizing that their security is going to be tied up with the degree to which the United States remains internationalist,” the American Enterprise Institute’s Zack Cooper said. “That means that they can’t just focus on East Asia. They have to focus on supporting some U.S. allies as well, both as a hedge against the possibility that the U.S. wouldn’t be as engaged, but also as a forcing function to ensure ... that it’s a little easier for the U.S. to stay engaged, because its allies are picking up a little more of the burden than they have heretofore."

Japan has played an important role in the Group of Seven, the format by which the world’s seven largest industrialized democracies have imposed severe economic penalties on Russia. Meanwhile, South Korea has emerged as “the fastest growing kid on the block of the European defense market,” according to Kopecny, who oversees Czech defense industrial cooperation.

“The confidence of Europeans towards South Korean defense industry has grown substantially,” Kopecny said. “It started with Estonia, Finland, then Norway, then Poland with howitzers. Now, main battle tanks. Those are all products that are very well perceived and ... those products will be the building blocks of the new axis of military power of Poland, as well as some of the other countries.”

Those relationships could ease the strain on the U.S. defense industrial base, which has expanded and directed vast military stockpiles toward Ukraine, even as U.S. strategists brace for the possibility of a clash with China over Taiwan in the years to come.

“For a long time, the U.S. didn't have to worry so much about whether it could manage challenges in two regions at the same time,” Cooper said. “And so I do think there's a realization that the U.S. maybe can't do it all. And so, both, the allies are going to have to help each other more, but also to the extent that the allies can make it easier for the U.S. to pivot from one region to another when there's need to do so — that really is a force multiplier.”

The most visible example of forces multiplying will come in Ukraine, Kopecny predicted.

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER

"They will be buying them for the next war to come, and the structure of the military will be so huge that this will be what will make them the biggest," he said, before acknowledging that this dynamic could make some traditional European powers uncomfortable. "It's natural for, say, the current powers not to want to be overshadowed in some respects. But at the same time, it's for the better for all of us here in the EU, so at the end of the day, I believe that it will also be seen as a good thing in Paris and Berlin."

Washington Examiner · December 31, 2022

7. The foreign policy issues keeping experts up at night in 2023

Conclusion:

Identifying what to worry about in 2023 is arguably the easy part. How to lessen the risk in a deliberate fashion is a much harder task. With careful planning and preparation guided by high-level engagement, much can be accomplished to avert the worst from happening. Given what is now at stake, no one can question the imperative of making the effort.   

The foreign policy issues keeping experts up at night in 2023

BY PAUL B. STARES, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 01/04/23 10:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3796952-the-foreign-policy-issues-keeping-experts-up-at-night-in-2023/

The world took a dangerous turn in 2022.  

Full-scale war broke out in Europe, something widely considered to be unimaginable just a few years ago, while relations between China and the United States plummeted to their lowest level in decades, mostly because of differences over Taiwan. And, as if these developments weren’t bad enough, the threat from North Korea and Iran grew more menacing as both moved ahead with their nuclear and missile development programs. Many humanitarian crises, moreover, across the globe — whether in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Yemen, Haiti or Myanmar — also showed no sign of abating.

All this begs the question of what the United States should worry about the most in the coming year. With its unparalleled set of global interests and security commitments, the U.S. has to be concerned about harmful developments in a lot of places. But resources are finite and busy policymakers have a limited bandwidth to manage not just ongoing crises but also to avert potential new ones. Hard choices, in other words, have to be made. 

For the last 15 years, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) has tried to help U.S. policymakers make these difficult decisions. Unlike most year-end prognostications, which typically list growing concerns according to what seems the most likely to occur, CFR polls hundreds of American foreign policy experts to assess both the probability of 30 plausible contingencies over the next 12 months and their likely impact on U.S. interests. The results are then combined and the contingencies are sorted into three tiers of relative priority for U.S. policymakers.  

So what are the main takeaways for 2023? Three stand out. 

First, the risk of a major military confrontation between the U.S. and either Russia or China — and conceivably both simultaneously — has replaced a mass casualty attack on the homeland as the primary concern for American foreign policy experts. For the first time in 15 years, a 9/11-type contingency wasn’t even considered plausible enough to make it into the 2023 survey. A highly disruptive cyberattack targeting U.S. critical infrastructure by a state or nonstate actor is now the top homeland security concern, followed by potential unregulated migration as a result of drug trafficking-related violence and instability in Mexico and Central America.

Second, while the ongoing Ukraine conflict and growing differences over Taiwan represent the most worrisome flashpoints involving nuclear armed powers, they are not the only ones. An additional six contingencies deemed plausible in 2023 could conceivably lead to the use of nuclear weapons — growing political instability in Russia, renewed conflict on the Korean peninsula, a clash between Israel and Iran, war between India and Pakistan, a U.S.-China confrontation in the South China Sea, and further border skirmishes involving China and India. Although none of them were judged to be “very likely” by survey respondents, it is still sobering that several were rated as having an even chance of occurring.

Third, while attention has clearly shifted to the growing risk of major power war and nuclear proliferation, the majority of conflict-related threats around the world continue to be caused by poor governance and state fragility. Increasingly, the effects of climate change and other environmental-related stressors are playing a role, as seen in the Sahel, Somalia, and Central America. 

Climate crisis: 4 reasons for hope in 2023

Latin America’s challenges and changes ahead

Judging by the survey results, however, these types of conflicts are no longer viewed with the same level of concern as they were only a few years ago even though the humanitarian consequences have not lessened. Indeed, the majority of contingencies identified in the 2023 survey are judged to be tertiary priorities for the United States including three — Libya, Haiti and Mozambique –– that were singled out by the Biden administration for special attention and long-term U.S. foreign assistance under the 2019 Global Fragility Act (GFA). 

Identifying what to worry about in 2023 is arguably the easy part. How to lessen the risk in a deliberate fashion is a much harder task. With careful planning and preparation guided by high-level engagement, much can be accomplished to avert the worst from happening. Given what is now at stake, no one can question the imperative of making the effort.    

Paul B. Stares is the General John Vessey senior fellow in conflict prevention and director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of “Preventive Engagement: How America Can Avoid War, Stay Strong, and Keep the Peace.” Follow him at @PaulBStares. 

8. The fatal flaw in US Indo-Pacific strategy

Excerpts:

Yet the National Security Strategy released by the White House last October says, “Recognizing we have to move beyond traditional Free Trade Agreements, we are charting new economic arrangements to deepen economic engagement with our partners, like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF)…”

But why are no U.S. trading partners moving away from such trade arrangements? According to the WTO, there are 355 regional trade agreements and more pending. Is the U.S. right and everyone else wrong?

The administration invented IPEF to fill the economic hole in U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. It intends several useful things, such as trade facilitation, digital standards, clean energy, tax and anti-corruption. It is voluntary, not a binding accord, and Asian partners can pick and choose which areas to cooperate with. But there is no market access or tariff reductions. Its impact remains to be seen.

IPEF neglects one of the secrets of U.S. success in Asia — access to U.S. markets. It was this lure and a U.S. regional security umbrella that fostered the economic miracles of Japan and South Korea after World War II, and later of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and China itself. But as Asia thrived, globalization ravaged the U.S. middle class, fostering anti-trade views.

The U.S. remains the region’s key security provider. This contradiction between an increasingly fraught “Security Asia” and “Economic Asia” may not be sustainable. Most Asian states are as uncomfortable about China’s aggressive intentions as the U.S. But they know that China has been there for 4,000 years and that the U.S. may not prove reliable. In any case, many Asians do not want to choose between the U.S and China but would rather play the major powers against each other.

The fatal flaw in US Indo-Pacific strategy

BY ROBERT A. MANNING, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 01/04/23 8:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3796617-the-fatal-flaw-in-us-indo-pacific-strategy/

The law of unintended consequences is undermining U.S. strategy for the Indo-Pacific, as trade ties between U.S. allies and partners in Asia with China are growing despite U.S. admonitions against dependence on China. 

Recent data show that China’s trade with all 10 ASEAN nations rose 71 percent last year and grew 49 percent with India. In fact, despite sanctions and tariffs, China’s trade with the U.S. grew to $657 billion in 2021, a 28 percent increase over 2020, and was projected to increase in 2022.

Aligning global trade and investment with geopolitical goals rather than market forces is often problematic. In the case of U.S. policy toward Asia, there is a lack of appreciation for the degree to which Washington is fighting geography and economic gravity.

Geography (time and distance) is an important factor in trade, especially between major powers like China and the 14 smaller nations with which it shares borders.

Similarly, it is no accident that U.S. trade with Canada and Mexico accounted for 41 percent of the $4.6 trillion in U.S. global trade in 2021. NAFTA and its successor, the U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) trade agreement, arose to regulate booming market-driven trade and investment, not the other way around. As U.S. firms shift production from China and rewire supply chains, Mexico and Canada are becoming still more important in the near-shoring of production.

Complex supply chains with hundreds of components, often going back and forth across borders, are not easily reconfigured. Moreover, as China is a key supplier of a number of materials and components, even friend-shored supply chains may need some components from China.

The Biden administration is trying to include ASEAN nations in “friendshoring.” But as the U.S. and others redirect supply chains away from China, Southeast Asian nations may lose out, as will U.S. businesses outside regional trade arrangements.

There is a growing trend not just of friend-shoring but of weaponizing economic interdependence. The Ukraine war, where trade, financial and technology sanctions have unplugged Russia from the international economic system, is a prime example of sanctions as the U.S. weapon of choice.

China has honed to an art form economic coercion against those that criticize it, conveniently banning goods — pineapples from Taiwan, bananas from the Philippines and rare-earth minerals and fruits and vegetables from Japan.

Economic coercion is just one aspect of growing economic nationalism that is rewiring trade and investment patterns. Contrary to popular opinion, these trends don’t signal the end of globalization. Despite increased protectionism, global trade continues to grow. The World Trade Organization (WTO) forecasts 3 percent trade growth in 2023.

But globalization is diminishing with regard to capital flows, while trade and investment patterns are shifting dramatically. It is less global and more centered on regional networks. Here, the contradictions in Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy come into sharp relief. The combination of a bipartisan trade allergy, near-shoring and “Buy American” policies while Asia is deepening its economic integration is reducing U.S. economic centrality in a region where, as they say, “the business of Asia is business.”

Witness the growing regional trade arrangements, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) of 15 Asia-Pacific nations — including all U.S. allies and China. RCEP lowers tariffs and regularizes rules and standards for trade, making it easier to trade with China, not with the U.S., which is absent from the arrangement. Thus, China offers cheap electronics and other consumer goods and equipment popular in Asia.

Similarly, a higher standard trade accord, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), boosts trade among 11 Asia-Pacific nations. The Bush administration started the accord as TPP, and President Obama finalized it. It was conceived as a pillar of U.S. Asia strategy to set rules and standards pressuring China to reform or be isolated. But President Trump withdrew from TPP, and bold leadership by Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe renamed it and brought it to life, absent the U.S. Ironically, China has applied for membership in CPTPP.  

Yet the National Security Strategy released by the White House last October says, “Recognizing we have to move beyond traditional Free Trade Agreements, we are charting new economic arrangements to deepen economic engagement with our partners, like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF)…”

But why are no U.S. trading partners moving away from such trade arrangements? According to the WTO, there are 355 regional trade agreements and more pending. Is the U.S. right and everyone else wrong?

The administration invented IPEF to fill the economic hole in U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. It intends several useful things, such as trade facilitation, digital standards, clean energy, tax and anti-corruption. It is voluntary, not a binding accord, and Asian partners can pick and choose which areas to cooperate with. But there is no market access or tariff reductions. Its impact remains to be seen.

IPEF neglects one of the secrets of U.S. success in Asia — access to U.S. markets. It was this lure and a U.S. regional security umbrella that fostered the economic miracles of Japan and South Korea after World War II, and later of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and China itself. But as Asia thrived, globalization ravaged the U.S. middle class, fostering anti-trade views.

The U.S. remains the region’s key security provider. This contradiction between an increasingly fraught “Security Asia” and “Economic Asia” may not be sustainable. Most Asian states are as uncomfortable about China’s aggressive intentions as the U.S. But they know that China has been there for 4,000 years and that the U.S. may not prove reliable. In any case, many Asians do not want to choose between the U.S and China but would rather play the major powers against each other.

Some have proposed that the U.S. renegotiate and join CPTPP to address feared consequences. Absent a push to integrate itself more deeply economically into the region, U.S. Indo-Pacific policy has a flaw that could prove fatal.

Robert A. Manning is a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center. He served as senior counselor to the Undersecretary of State for global affairs, as a member of the U.S. secretary of state’s policy planning staff, and and on the National Intelligence Council Strategic Futures Group. Follow him on Twitter @Rmanning4.

9. Irregular Warfare Center 2023 Book Recommendations

Here are my "foundational" recommendations:

•In addition to Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, ARIS, Mao, The USMC Small Wars Manual, Sam Sarkesian, Jack McKuen, and existing Military and Civilian Reading Lists:

1. Ted Gurr – Why Men Rebel, 1970

2. Eric Hoffer – The True Believer, 1951 (23d ed., 2002)

3. Crane Brinton – Anatomy of a Revolution, 1965

4. Anna Simons – “21st Century Cultures of War: Advantage Them,” (FPRI, April 1013)

5. Montgomery McFate – Military Anthropology: Soldiers, Scholars, and Subjects the Margins of Empire (2018) (the chapter on "UW")

1. China’s Unrestricted Warfare , 1999

2. Gene Sharp – From Dictatorship to Democracy, 2002

3. Saul Alinksy – Rules for Radicals, 1971

4. Mark Boyatt: Special Forces: A Unique National Asset "Through, With and By."

5. Current USAJFKSWCS UW doctrine (Note: USSOCOM UW Doctrine is FOUO)

Irregular Warfare Center 2023 Book Recommendations – Irregular Warfare Center

irregularwarfarecenter.org

January 3, 2023

Irregular Warfare Center 2023 Book Recommendations

Kevin D. Stringer, PH.D. – Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired

Madison Urban – IWC Analyst

In the spirit of the Chairman of the Joint Chief’s reading list and the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program, the leadership of the Irregular Warfare Center offers its irregular warfare reading recommendations for 2023. A host of scholars and practitioners have written innumerable books about irregular warfare (IW) and its constituent historical, cultural, economic, tactical, and diplomatic components. Like many areas of human endeavor that are more art than science, the practitioner or researcher faces the challenge of searching through a vast literature reservoir in the quest for irregular warfare knowledge and enlightenment. This IWC Insights paper provides ten selected titles that support the exploration of the IW sphere and establish a cornerstone for dialogue on the nexus of IW and great power competition. While the following recommendations are by no means a comprehensive or conclusive list, they represent a medley of foundational IW texts, both historical and directional. Each title highlights a certain aspect of IW that promotes further research, challenges assumptions, or instigates debate about the dynamic nature of conflict and the best means for the United States to conduct irregular operations. Each selection has a short overview of the content plus a brief explanation why it is on the list. Where possible, substantive reviews for each book are cited in the endnotes.

1. Rediscovering Irregular Warfare: Colin Gubbins and the Origins of Britain’s Special Operations Executive

Author: A.R.B. Linderman

Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016

In this slim and well-written volume, A.R.B. Linderman traces the development of British Special Operations Executive (SOE) organization and doctrine by following the biography of Major General Colin Gubbins, the founder of SOE and an understudied figure in the history of modern irregular warfare. The doctrine, training structure, and tactics developed and utilized by SOE were foundational for the development of the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to the modern Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Army Special Forces. Linderman, through the lens of Gubbins—his writings, public documents, and career experiences—illustrates the establishment and growth of the SOE. Gubbins in fact, presents an excellent example of an officer whose unconventional career path provided him the foundational knowledge needed for leading the SOE effectively. His career history importantly highlights key conflicts that are often overlooked by modern scholars in the study of IW, including the Irish War of Independence and tribal wars in British India during the 1920s, which were both formative to Gubbins’ development as the leader of a pioneering irregular warfare organization.

The following three titles constitute the Stejskal Trilogy, whose author James Stejskal served with the U.S. Army Special Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency. These concise volumes contribute individually to the study and practice of irregular warfare in the areas of advising irregulars and proxies, unconventional warfare, and resistance. The recommended reading sequence would be in historical chronological order.

2. Masters of Mayhem: Lawrence of Arabia and the British Military Mission to the Hejaz

Author: James Stejskal

Havertown: Casemate, 2018

While there have been many books written about T.E. Lawrence’s actions in the Middle East during World War I, in Masters of Mayhem, James Stejskal provides a fresh perspective on the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire during the Great War. This concise work details the evolution of an early example of a combined special operations campaign in the modern era. Taking the lessons of the history of T.E. Lawrence and General Edmund Allenby’s Palestinian operations, Stejskal concludes “War is more than the science and art of disposing and maneuvering forces in combat. It consists of continuous innovation, adaptation and modification of techniques, tactics, and procedures. It is a process of merging new with old. What works is kept, what doesn’t is disposed of.” Through the storytelling of this IW effort, this short history highlights the importance of an agile irregular warfare campaign plan that allows for the melding of innovative tactics with new technology, including armored cars and aircraft, while never wavering from the overall goal of the campaign. The book also provides essential insights for modern advisors tasked with working with proxies and irregulars. For a perceptive and concise overview of this pioneering British military mission and its irregular contributions, it’s a must-read for all students of irregular conflict.

3. No Moon as Witness: Missions of the SOE and OSS in World War II

Author: James Stejskal

Havertown: Casemate, 2021

No Moon as Witness is a brief history and overview of the development and deployment of British SOE and American OSS during World War II (WWII). It serves as a primer for those who want to later read the more detailed histories of the SOE and OSS by M.R.D. Foot and others. While both the British and the Americans had fought in guerrilla wars before WWII, the military institutional memory was weak and the capability to conduct irregular war was largely invented as the war went on. Through the detailing of early assessment and training processes, descriptions of the research and development efforts that produced new innovations, and the storytelling of various operations, this work provides a short, easy-to-read introduction to the origins of the United Kingdom and United States’ efforts to develop intelligence and military irregular warfare capabilities in a great power war.

4. Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War Operations of the US Army’s Elite, 1956-1990

Author: James Stejskal

Havertown: Casemate, 2017

With the current Russo-Ukraine War ongoing and the threat of further Russian aggression possible on the Eastern Front, James Stejskal’s book chronicles the timely history of a little-known special forces unit that applied the concepts of stay-behind forces, clandestine operations, and intelligence tradecraft against the Soviet Union in its heyday. The Special Forces Detachment-Berlin was one of the first units tasked with urban guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and intelligence operations in the event of war in Europe. Interestedly, the formation would later evolve to assume early counterterrorism functions now centralized with Joint Special Operations Command. The book tracks the evolution of the tactics, personnel, foreign partnerships, and mission set across four decades of service. It highlights the importance of developing cultural expertise and language proficiency as well as the benefits of developing training relationships with other countries and units. An added value is that the author is a veteran of the unit, which provides a unique historical perspective.

5. Non-State Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerrillas, Warlords, and Militias

Author: Stephen Biddle

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021

Current deliberations of national security strategy encourage a shift away from irregular warfare with non-state actors to great power competition with state actors. However, in Non-State Warfare, Stephen Biddle laments that “There is a widespread assumption that state and nonstate warfare are profoundly different phenomena,” when in fact they are not.

Relying on his years as a scholar and strategist, he articulates a continuum of operations that both state and non-state actors employ, often in ways that mimic one another. In challenging irregular warfare assumptions, Biddle helps to articulate a vision for how the American experience and the lessons learned fighting non-state actors in the Middle East can be best understood and properly adapted to great power competition. Amid dramatic pronouncements and calls for drastic changes, Biddle provides a thoughtful, historically grounded approach that emphasizes points of continuity and pushes against siloing the study of conflicts based on the opponent’s status as a state or non-state actor. In fact, he rightly rejects the “widespread assumption that conventional and irregular warfare constitute autonomous, exclusive categories of distinct military conduct,” and challenges the U.S. Department of Defense to think differently and address warfare as a unified whole.

6. The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder

Author: Sean McFate

New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2019

Sean McFate is a veteran of the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division and is a former private military contractor who now serves as a professor of strategy at the National Defense University and Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Written from a practitioner-scholar perspective, his book is framed by the diagnosis that the West loses wars because “we do not know what war is, and if we do not understand it, then we cannot win it.” Seeing this deficit, coupled with idealistic projections about future conflicts that are grounded in the wisdom of conventional war, McFate provides ten rules to describe today’s strategic environment which he argues should provide the basis for realistic planning. McFate’s articulation of the future of warfare confronts assumptions and is primarily descriptive, aimed at outlining the contours of warfare without necessarily prescribing specific solutions. He gives a nod to a challenge his book raises: the temptation for democracies “to sacrifice their values in the name of victory” in light of the complexities of conflict that intentionally subvert the ethics and norms the West promotes. This provocative book is accessible and written to engage a variety of readers–a must-read for both policymakers and practitioners.

7. The American Way of Irregular War: An Analytical Memoir

Author: Charles Cleveland & Daniel Egel

Santa Monica: Rand, 2020

Lieutenant General (LTG), Retired Charles Cleveland’s analytic memoir is unique among biographies and reports alike. Taking his years of direct experience campaigning in Latin America and commanding the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, LTG (R) Cleveland exposes and diagnoses the United States’ failure to achieve strategic victories in irregular conflicts. He describes his bibliographic memoir as “a story of the waxing and waning of interest and support for IW and the vulnerability that this lack of commitment created. It is a story of strategic successes and failures that have their root, at least in part, in the strengths and weaknesses of that IW capability. It is a story of what the American way of irregular war might look like and how that would enable us to contest the threats that we face today.” Each chapter follows his deployments in Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East, includes six observations from his career, and concludes with recommendations for how the United States should develop IW capability. With decades of experience in IW campaigning, supported by credible research sources, LTG (R) Cleveland provides critical insights into the United States’ failures with a practitioner’s perspective on how to increase its IW capability.

8. The Coming Anarchy

Author: Robert Kaplan

New York: Random House, 2000

Written after the fall of the Soviet Union and amid rosy predictions of peace, democracy, prosperity, and Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history,” Robert Kaplan’s “The Coming Anarchy” cautions against complacency in peacetime or growing overly optimistic about a peaceful future. This work is a collection of long-form articles and essays that predict a complex world full of socio-political challenges driven by crime, disease, tribalism, limited wars, and economic and resource rivalries. After observing the wars in the Balkans, the enduring autocracies in the post-Soviet space, and deep poverty and tribalism in the developing world, Kaplan calls for a realist approach to foreign policy. Like other books on this list, he warns about an overturning of democratic norms, a world where nation-states do not dominate, and conflicts over natural resources. This book remains a valuable reference for IW researchers and practitioners.

9. The Sling and the Stone

Author: T.X. Hammes

St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2006

In this foundational IW book, T.X. Hammes argues that the U.S. and its allies are unprepared for fourth-generation warfare (4GW). Written in the early years of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Hammes paints a picture of innovative, low-tech, human-centric warfare that is the antithesis to the overwhelming conventional, high-tech military force upon which the U.S. military’s success is based. While a book about the impact of insurgent forces defeating conventional military capabilities may appear irrelevant as the Department of Defense’s reorients to state-on-state conflict, the likelihood of small, messy, and overwhelmingly irregular conflicts is not diminishing. Furthermore, Hammes provides a framework for understanding the social, economic, and political factors that shape the evolution of warfare and illuminates the factors that contributed to prior strategic shifts. Analyzing why conventional force has failed in the past, Hammes offers an enduring perspective with important lessons for navigating future geopolitical conflict.

10. The Transformation of War

Author: Martin van Creveld

New York: The Free Press, 1991

Written by one of the foremost Israeli military historians and strategists in 1991, The Transformation of War challenges the traditional Clausewitzian view of war. van Creveld examines the nature of future conflict and the changes in the fundamental questions that undergird war. He argues that traditional answers to these questions are shaped by a world that is fading away or no longer exists, and that when the presumptive answers are wrong, strategies and planning efforts fail. At a macro level, he suggests that the assumption that nation-states fight is an anachronism, and that ethnic and religious tensions will dominate world politics and warfare. He also argues that military tactics will change given this new world. In essence, van Creveld offers “a non-Clausewitzian framework for thinking about war, while…trying to look into its future.” In light of these projections, van Creveld challenges his readers to resist complacency, adjust expectations, and to innovate to prepare for the transformation of war.

Download a PDF of this publication by clicking the icon to the left.

Substantive Review: Simon Anglim, review of Rediscovering Irregular Warfare: Colin Gubbins and the Origins of Britain’s Special Operations Executive, by A.R.B. Linderman, British Journal for Military History 2 no. 3 (2016): 122-123, https://bjmh.gold.ac.uk/article/view/670/792.

Substantive Review: John Friberg, review of No Moon as Witness: Missions of the SOE and OSS in World War II, byJames Stejskal, SOF News, July 15, 2021, https://sof.news/books/no-moon-as-witness/.

Substantive Reviews: David Oakley, review of Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War Operations of the US Army’s Elite, 1956-1990, by James Stejskal, Parameters 51 no. 3, (2021) 147-148, doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3085; James Crabtree, review of Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War Operations of the US Army’s Elite, 1956-1990, by James Stejskal, Army University Press, August 7, 2020, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/MR-Book-Reviews/August-2020/Book-Review-002/.

Substantive Reviews: Andrew Maher, review of Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerrillas, Warlords, and Militias, by Stephen Biddle, Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies 3, no. 2 (2021): 278-282, https://defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/AJDSS/documents/volume3-number2/review-nonstate-warfare.pdf; Lionel Beehner, review of Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords, and Militias by Stephen Biddle, Stephen, Political Science Quarterly 137 (2022): 189-192, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/polq.13283.

Substantive Reviews: Albert Palazzo, review of The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder, by Sean McFate, Australian Army Research Centre, November 18, 2020, https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/land-power-forum/book-review-new-rules-war-victory-age-durable-disorder; Reed Bonadonna, review of The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder, by Sean McFate, Carnegie Council for Ethics & International Affairs, December 3, 2019, https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2019/the-new-rules-of-war-victory-in-the-age-of-durable-disorder/; Jared Helle, review of The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder, by Sean McFate, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 20 no. 3 (2021): 121-125, https://jmss.org/article/view/72877/54983.

Substantive Reviews: Dave Maxwell, review of The American Way of Irregular War: An Analytical Memoir, by Charles Cleveland & Daniel Egel, Small Wars Journal, July 30, 2020, https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/american-way-irregular-war-ltg-charles-cleveland-and-daniel-egel; Lt. Col. Gregory Banner, review of The American Way of Irregular War: An Analytical Memoir, by Charles Cleveland & Daniel Egel, Association of the United States Army, April 21, 2021, https://www.ausa.org/articles/may-2021-book-reviews.

Substantive Review: Richard Bernstein, “‘The Coming Anarchy’: Dashing Hopes of Global Harmony,” New York Times, February 23, 2000, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/books/022300kaplan-book-review.html.

irregularwarfarecenter.org

10. Part of Taiwan’s most advanced anti-ship missile sent to mainland China for repairs

Excerpts:

On Wednesday, the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) said the theodolite had been bought in 2021 from Swiss company Leica and it was sent back to the manufacturer for repair recently.

The agency said the unit’s memory storage cards had been removed before it was sent back and it had asked the agent to send the part to Switzerland

But after the repaired theodolite was returned, it was found that the unit had been sent to Taiwan from an airport in Shandong.

Leica explained that its maintenance centre for Asia is in the east coast city of Qingdao so it had been sent there for repairs, the NCSIST said.

Part of Taiwan’s most advanced anti-ship missile sent to mainland China for repairs

• The island’s top military research unit said it had determined that no data had been leaked or malware installed on the optical instrument
• The Swiss manufacturer Leica has a repair facility in Shandong province and it was sent there after it was returned to the maker for repairs, Taiwan says

Liu Zhen

+ myNEWS

Published: 10:00pm, 4 Jan, 2023

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3205597/part-taiwans-most-advanced-anti-ship-missile-sent-mainland-china-repairs

Taiwan’s top military research unit on Wednesday denied there had been any data leaks after it confirmed that a key component of its most advanced locally developed missile has been sent to mainland China for repairs.

Earlier local media had reported that a theodolite – a precision optical instrument – from the Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missile had been sent to Shandong province for repair.

On Wednesday, the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) said the theodolite had been bought in 2021 from Swiss company Leica and it was sent back to the manufacturer for repair recently.

The agency said the unit’s memory storage cards had been removed before it was sent back and it had asked the agent to send the part to Switzerland.

Taiwan’s extended conscription includes lessons in how to fire missiles

31 Dec 2022

But after the repaired theodolite was returned, it was found that the unit had been sent to Taiwan from an airport in Shandong.

Leica explained that its maintenance centre for Asia is in the east coast city of Qingdao so it had been sent there for repairs, the NCSIST said.

“The NCSIST immediately ran an information security check on the equipment and made sure no malware had been installed, thus effectively clearing security concerns,” the statement said.

The NCSIST also said that it was discussing measures to make sure that similar sensitive equipment would not be sent to mainland China for maintenance in the future for national security reasons.

Taiwan extends mandatory military service as tensions with mainland China increase

A theodolite is a precision optical instrument for measuring angles between designated points.

Following local media reports that the part might contain information such as the locations of missile positions, the NCSIST stressed that the theodolite in question is used to launch the missiles, not for flight control positioning.

The incident underscores the interdependence of economies in a globalised environment.

Taiwan’s Chinese-language Mirror Media Weekly, which broke the story, said that Chinese-made semiconductor chips and parts were used in other NCSIST products, including a surveillance system.

The NCSIST however said no essential components for its other products were sourced from mainland China.

Latest Taiwan arms sale reflects US indifference to mainland China’s reaction

30 Dec 2022

The Hsiung Feng III, or Brave Wind 3, is a supersonic anti-ship cruise missile and has been touted as the island’s best way of deterring an attack from the PLA Navy.

The missile has an operating range of 400km (320 miles) and is believed to be able to reach a maximum range of 1,500km with boosters. It can also attack targets on land.

The Hsiung Feng III was first tested in 1997, and it has been deployed on the Taiwanese navy’s Kang Ding and Cheng Kung-class frigates since 2007.

In 2016, a Hsiung Feng III misfired during a training exercise, hitting a fishing boat about 75km away, killing the captain and injuring its three crew members.

CONVERSATIONS (17)

Liu Zhen

+ myNEWS

Liu Zhen joined the Post in 2015 as a reporter on the China desk. She previously worked with Reuters in Beijing.

11. France to send light battle tanks to Ukraine in first for Kyiv

Ukraine is like the melting pot for defense articles and equipment.

You have to admire how well they are handling the procurement of so many different types of systems from so many different countries during war, learning to use that equipment, and maintaining all the different systems. It is quite amazing what they have been able to do.

France to send light battle tanks to Ukraine in first for Kyiv

BY BRAD DRESS - 01/04/23 5:54 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3799053-france-to-send-light-battle-tanks-to-ukraine-in-first-for-kyiv/?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

France will send light battle tanks to Ukraine, becoming the first nation to arm Kyiv with Western-style combat tanks in the war against Russia.

French President Emmanuel Macron agreed to supply Ukraine with the light tanks along with more armored carrier vehicles called Bastions after a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on Wednesday.

The Ukrainian leader shared the news on Twitter.

“Had a long and detailed conversation with President of France @EmmanuelMacron

on the current situation,” Zelensky tweeted. “Thanked for the decision to transfer light tanks and Bastion APCs to Ukraine, as well as for intensifying work with partners in the same direction.”

Zelensky also said he and Macron agreed to strengthen air defenses and other defense capabilities in the wake of Russia’s continued missile attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure and energy grids.

Officials with the Élysée Palace on Wednesday confirmed that France would ship the tanks to Ukraine, according to France24.

The AMX-10 RC is extremely mobile and can be used for reconnaissance missions as well as fire support in combat.

The combat tanks come equipped with a 105 mm firing cannon and an attached machine gun.

The AMX-10 RC will be the first Western-designed battle tanks supplied to Kyiv since the invasion nearly a year ago, but the Czech Republic has modified Soviet-era T-72 tanks for use in Ukraine, which the U.S. has helped pay for.

The Biden administration is also mulling whether to ship over Bradley Fighting Vehicles, medium armored combat vehicles that are lighter and more agile than tanks.

President Biden on Wednesday said he was considering offering Kyiv the Bradley vehicles, The Associated Press reported.

Ukraine has been pressing for more defense systems and tanks for months as fighting continues to drag out in the eastern region of the country.

The Biden administration delivered the sought-after Patriot missile defense system to Ukraine after Zelensky paid a visit to Washington last month.

12. Ukraine receives hundreds of Senator armored vehicles from Canada

Ukraine receives hundreds of Senator armored vehicles from Canada

defence-blog.com · January 2, 2023

Canadian armored vehicle maker Roshel has delivered a hundred Senator high-tech armoured personnel carriers to Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Armoured, troop-carrying vehicles were delivered to Ukraine as part of Ottawa’s military aid to Ukraine and the support of patrons from Eastern Europe.

“Roshel company delivered over 100 vehicles. Over 300 on their way to Ukraine,” senior company representatives said.

- ADVERTISEMENT - CONTINUE READING BELOW -

The Senator is a newly developed armoured vehicle (the first Senator rolled off the line in 2018) designed for law enforcement and border patrol use.

The Ukrainian military actively used these vehicles during the counteroffensive in the East and South of the country. In addition, a batch of armored vehicles was handed over to the border troops to ensure security at the border with Belarus.

— UkraineNewsLive (@UkraineNewsLive) December 18, 2022

The military notes the good maneuverability characteristics of the Senator compared to the heavier American and Ukrainian armored vehicles.

The company said the body of the vehicle has been specifically designed to incorporate advanced heat and noise insulation materials providing an uncompromised level of comfort to its occupants. The vehicle is fully air-conditioned for comfort use in harsh environments.

The Senator’s perimeter armouring of the passenger compartment and engine bay is designed to provide protection up to CEN B7 ballistic protection level, but the Senator’s armour withstands stronger impact. The floor is fitted with blast protection to defend occupants in case of a simultaneous explosion of 2 DM-51 German ordnance hand grenades or equivalent light anti-personnel mines.

Image by Suspilne

defence-blog.com · January 2, 2023

13. This unusual new Air Force tactic is likely raising alarms in China, expert says

Excerpts:

“[I]n this case, the PLA likely regards Rapid Dragon in particular as a credible threat,” he wrote. “The PLA is likely to regard the seriousness of that threat as significantly greater if Rapid Dragon is shared with American allies.”

Rapid Dragon is not the only U.S. Air Force effort to get more use out of its aging fleet of aircraft. Last August, the service also tried out using the venerable B-52 bomber as a cargo hauler in order to bring maintenance equipment out to the battlefield with them. In December, the Air Force also tried using a C-17 transport jet to refuel a B-2 stealth bomber, which “had never been done before,” according to a press release.

Top Air Force leaders are working hard to encourage a climate of experimentation among the rank-and-file, with many officials framing it as a requirement if the service hopes to defeat China in a possible war. Gen. Mike Minihan, the head of Air Mobility Command, which controls many of the Air Force’s C-130s and C-17s, said the time to conduct such experiments is now.

“I’d rather test that out now than try to figure that out when the shooting’s going on,” he said in front of thousands of airmen and aerospace industry members in September.

“Nobody is going to care what our plans are for five to 10 years if we lose tomorrow,” he added. “Our toys, our training, our desires are meaningless unless we maneuver them to unfair advantage and unrepentant lethality.”

This unusual new Air Force tactic is likely raising alarms in China, expert says

“The agility of the U.S. military’s distributed method for strike missions and the suddenness of those strikes will increase immensely.”

BY DAVID ROZA | PUBLISHED JAN 4, 2023 8:54 AM

taskandpurpose.com · by David Roza · January 4, 2023

The U.S. Air Force is thinking outside the box, and it is probably keeping Chinese military leaders up at night.

Chinese military officials are likely alarmed by the Air Force’s efforts to launch cruise missiles out of cargo aircraft, according to an analysis by a U.S. Air Force civilian researcher who specializes in Chinese aerospace studies.

Launching weapons out of cargo aircraft could complicate an enemy’s targeting priorities, make it more difficult for them to detect an incoming threat, and give the U.S. and its allies more options for striking the enemy at a low cost.

That enemy may be China’s People’s Liberation Army in the near future, if the predictions of U.S. national security officials prove accurate.

“[T]he PLA likely regards Rapid Dragon in particular as a credible threat,” wrote Derek Solen, a senior researcher at the U.S. Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute, in a Dec. 22 article for The Jamestown Foundation, a national security think tank based in Washington, D.C.

A palletized munitions system falls from the cargo hold of a 352d Special Operations Wing MC-130J Commando II during a live-fire demonstration for ATREUS 22-4 at Andøya Space Defense Range, Norway, Nov. 9, 2022. (Tech. Sgt. Brigette Waltermire/U.S. Air National Guard)

Rapid Dragon is the name for the Air Force effort to launch long-range missiles from cargo pallets dropped out of the back of cargo aircraft. In November, two Air Force MC-130Js successfully conducted a live-fire demonstration of Rapid Dragon using a Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile over Norway.

“An MC-130J is the perfect aircraft for this capability because we can land and operate from a 3,000-foot highways and austere landing zones whereas a bomber cannot,” said Air Force Lt. Col. Valerie Knight, commander of the 352d Special Operations Wing, in a November press release following the successful Rapid Dragon test.

Subscribe to Task & Purpose Today. Get the latest military news, entertainment, and gear in your inbox daily.

The JASSM’s long range, combined with the MC-130J’s ability to land where bombers cannot, would be bad news for any possible enemies, and PLA leaders seem to have noticed, according to Solen’s analysis.

Solen drew his observations from an article published Nov. 22 in the Science and Technology Section of China National Defense News, which the researcher described as “a sister publication of the PLA Daily, the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Military Commission, which is equivalent to the U.S. Defense Department.”

The article, written by a man named Xi Qizhi, was “almost alarmist,” wrote Solen.

“In a state of war, sorties by transport aircraft far exceed those of bombers, and opponents have difficulty tracking them closely,” wrote Xi, according to Solen. “When a transport aircraft carrying palletized munitions flies to just outside a defensive perimeter and fires stealth cruise missiles, it is generally difficult to detect and discover it.”

Airmen and riggers with the 1st Special Operations Squadron Logistics Readiness Squadron load a Rapid Dragon Palletized Weapon System aboard an MC-130J Commando II at Hurlburt Field, Florida, Dec. 13, 2021. (Staff Sgt. Brandon Esau/U.S. Air Force)

Xi predicted that once a transport aircraft is armed with palletized munitions, “the agility of the U.S. military’s distributed method for strike missions and the suddenness of those strikes will increase immensely.”

Indeed, increasing strike agility is part of the goal of Rapid Dragon.

“Rapidly deployable palletized munitions can saturate the airspace with multiple weapons and effects, complicate adversary targeting solutions, help open access for critical target prosecution, and deplete an adversary’s air defense munitions stockpile,” wrote the Air Force Research Laboratory on its website page about the program.

In fact, the reason why the program revolves around putting missiles on cargo pallets is so that the weapons can be rolled on and off a cargo transport without any modifications to the aircraft. The Air Force alone has more than 200 C-130s, while the Navy and Coast Guard have a few dozen more. More than 40 countries fly the C-130, the Air Force wrote, so if U.S. allies want to drop palletized munitions, they likely have the means to do so.

“It’s really easily exportable to our partners and allies around the globe that may want to increase the utility of their air force,” said then-head of Air Force Special Operations Command Lt. Gen. Jim Slife last year about Rapid Dragon. “When you look at partner capability, we have a lot of partners around the globe that don’t have heavy bomber-type platforms that would be traditional carriers of those types of munitions, but they’ve got plenty of C-130s proliferated around the world.”

A 352d Special Operations Wing MC-130J Commando II conducts a rehearsal flight in preparation for a live-fire demonstration of a palletized munitions system during ATREUS 22-4 at Andøya Space Defense Range, Norway, Nov. 8, 2022. (Tech. Sgt. Brigette Waltermire/U.S. Air National Guard)

The proliferation of C-130s is one of the factors that makes Xi worried about Rapid Dragon, Solen wrote. Still, not all Chinese writers appear to share that view. Solen noted an article that appeared on Nov. 16 in the international section of China National Defense News where the writer, Liu Haochang, cited unnamed “analysts” saying that it would be “excessively wishful thinking” for U.S. military planners to hope that efforts like Rapid Dragon would complicate an enemy’s targeting picture.

“To a military with sufficient air defense forces, any enemy military aircraft in the midst of an armed clash is a target for strikes,” Liu cited the analysts saying, according to Solen.

However, Solen pointed out a factor that appears to hurt the credibility of Liu’s analysis. The international section of China National Defense News “usually downplays the efforts of Beijing’s enemies,” while the science and technology section in which Xi’s article appeared “tends to publish straight news,” he said. The downplaying is evident when Liu tries to quote a U.S. defense industry official’s doubts about efforts such as Rapid Dragon, but the writer ends up misattributing the quote and embellishing its meaning.

Liu tried to quote an executive from defense company L3Harris saying that Rapid Dragon “will not help resolve the compositional problem of its fleet of military aircraft,” Solen said. However, the Defense News article that Liu cites does not feature such a quote from a L3Harris official. The Defense News article does cite Heather Penney, an analyst for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, who said that the Air Force still suffers from having a too-small, too-old aircraft fleet. However, Liu may have “intentionally misattributed this remark to the executive in order to create the impression that greater doubt exists about the USAF’s endeavor within the U.S. itself,” Solen said.

It is true that the Air Force fleet is no spring chicken, but Solen remarked that getting more use out of aircraft by expanding their mission sets would be welcome even in a younger fleet. More individuals within the Chinese defense establishment probably agree with Xi rather than Liu, Solen argued.

“[I]n this case, the PLA likely regards Rapid Dragon in particular as a credible threat,” he wrote. “The PLA is likely to regard the seriousness of that threat as significantly greater if Rapid Dragon is shared with American allies.”

Rapid Dragon is not the only U.S. Air Force effort to get more use out of its aging fleet of aircraft. Last August, the service also tried out using the venerable B-52 bomber as a cargo hauler in order to bring maintenance equipment out to the battlefield with them. In December, the Air Force also tried using a C-17 transport jet to refuel a B-2 stealth bomber, which “had never been done before,” according to a press release.

Top Air Force leaders are working hard to encourage a climate of experimentation among the rank-and-file, with many officials framing it as a requirement if the service hopes to defeat China in a possible war. Gen. Mike Minihan, the head of Air Mobility Command, which controls many of the Air Force’s C-130s and C-17s, said the time to conduct such experiments is now.

“I’d rather test that out now than try to figure that out when the shooting’s going on,” he said in front of thousands of airmen and aerospace industry members in September.

“Nobody is going to care what our plans are for five to 10 years if we lose tomorrow,” he added. “Our toys, our training, our desires are meaningless unless we maneuver them to unfair advantage and unrepentant lethality.”

The latest on Task & Purpose

• This is what happens when Navy pilots land on the wrong aircraft carrier
• Air Force special ops vet Dan Schilling wrote a rock epic about the experience of war
• How airmen overcame -77 degree weather, frostnip to fix a C-130 in Antarctica
• Why Navy ships make their first deck log of the New Year rhyme
• The complicated truth about the famous ‘Christmas Truce’ of World War I

Want to write for Task & Purpose? Click here.

taskandpurpose.com · by David Roza · January 4, 2023

14. Marcos gets $22 billion in 'investment pledges' after China state visit

How much will they really receive and what will be the real "cost" to the Philippines?

Marcos gets $22 billion in 'investment pledges' after China state visit

Katrina Domingo, ABS-CBN News

Posted at Jan 05 2023 06:24 PM | Updated as of Jan 05 2023 06:35 PM

https://news.abs-cbn.com/business/01/05/23/marcos-gets-22-b-in-investment-pledges-from-china?utm_campaign=2023-January5-Viber-promo-marcos-gets-22-b-in-investment-pledges-from-china-link-without-art-card&utm_source=viber&utm_medium=organic&utm_type=native&utm_content=text

BEIJING — President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. on Thursday said the Philippines received about $22 billion worth of investment pledges after his 48-hour state visit to China.

These are investments from new and existing Chinese-owned businesses in the Philippines, Marcos said in a press conference here.

“The pledges amount to about $22 billion… These are pledges that are already backed up already by concrete actions in the Philippines,” he said.

“Nagbubukas na sila ng opisina, kumukuha na sila ng mga permit. Yung mga nakakuha na ng permit nag-uumpisa na sila ng construction,” he said.

He added that the government has also been trying to convince more businesses involved in the processing of minerals, battery production and electric vehicle manufacturing to come to the Philippines. Marcos said the government is studying giving concessions to these firms.

• PH gets $13.7 billion 'investment pledges' from China firms for renewable energy: Palace

“It is important for the Philippines na maipasok natin ang ganoong klaseng industriya because that is the green economy,” he said.

The Chinese investment pledges are expected to generate thousands of jobs for Filipinos, Marcos said.

“That will be starting very soon. Let’s watch and wait because some of the estimates are a little optimistic so I don’t want to put new job numbers,” he said.

Aside from generating jobs, the incoming investments are also expected to help Filipinos gain more skills through training and transfers of knowledge that would be provided by these employers, he said.

During his state visit, Marcos repeatedly said that his administration seeks to forge closer ties with Asia’s largest economy on multiple fronts.

“Ipinakita natin sa mga present and potential Chinese investors… Ang sinasabi natin sa kanila ay palakihin na ang involvement nila sa Pilipinas,” the President said.

“Maganda ngayon ang investment climate sa Pilipinas. Marami tayong opportunity na puwedeng magpartner… kung ano man sa kanilang palagay ang pinaka bagay sa kanilang operation,” he said.

Aside from investment pledges, the Philippines also received some 1.5 billion renminbi (around $220 million or P12.2 billion) in grants for the construction of several bridges in the country.

Marcos' predecessor, former President Rodrigo Duterte, also boasted about bringing home $24 billion in investment pledges during his state visit to China in 2016. 

But years later only a small fraction of the pledged investments and loans had been delivered. 

In 2020, Duterte’s own Socioeconomic Planning Secretary Ernesto Pernia said China was “slow” in providing funding for the country’s infrastructure projects. 

The National Economic and Development Authority said that as of August 2020, or 4 years after Duterte’s China visit, the country had received only P5.9 billion for the Binondo-Intramurous and Estrella-Pantaleon bridges, P1 billion for the rehabilitation of conflict-stricken Marawi City, P4.4 billion for the Chico River Pump Irrigation Project, and P12 billion for the New Centennial Water Source Kaliwa Dam. 

In July this year, the Department of Transportation said the construction of several China-backed railway projects under the "Build, Build, Build" program could not move forward because they have yet to be funded.

​15. Guardians of the Republic: Only a Nonpartisan Military Can Protect American Democracy

Excerpts:

But as surely as U.S. institutions were built by human hands, they can be undermined by the choices of leaders and citizens. One urgent task, therefore, is to reaffirm the centrality of nonpartisanship in the military and to reestablish the behavior required of military personnel, including by developing guidelines for political activity once officers retire. A strong starting point is a recently published letter co-authored by 13 former secretaries of defense and chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that outlines first principles of civilian control and best practices of civil-military relations. Active-duty personnel, retired officers, and political leaders must appreciate the importance of a nonpartisan military to the country’s survival, seek to counter the forces that threaten the military’s nonpartisan ethos, and take it as their personal responsibility to act within the norms of nonpartisanship. When those norms are violated, political leaders and members of the media should call out the offenders.

Political leaders must not drag the military into partisan activity. Doing so risks eroding an essential bulwark against the splintering of the republic. As Marshall understood, maintaining a nonpartisan military is a matter of “sacred trust”—not just for officers but also for political leaders and citizens, who must attend to the foundations of democracy and guard against the forces that risk undermining them. They should be comforted by the country’s resilience, but not complacent. In the absence of responsible leadership and informed and engaged citizens, the Constitution is a piece of paper that by itself is powerless. Combined with principled leaders and committed citizens, it can continue to sustain the United States’ remarkable democratic experiment.

Guardians of the Republic

Only a Nonpartisan Military Can Protect American Democracy

By Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., Graham Allison, and Jonah Glick-Unterman

January 5, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., Graham Allison, and Jonah Glick-Unterman · January 5, 2023

The central institutions of American democracy are under assault, as deepening divisions and poisonous politics paralyze Washington and tug at the seams of society. The U.S. military is not immune to this threat. The nonpartisan ethic of the armed forces is at greater risk today than it has been in our lifetimes, and maintaining it is essential for the survival of American democracy.

Although the Founding Fathers worried that a large standing army in peacetime would be a danger to liberty, the truth is that today’s U.S. military is more a protector of democracy than a threat to it. The reason for this is the institution’s disciplined ethic and practice of nonpartisanship. Over the centuries, American political and military leaders ingrained in the U.S. military a nonpartisan commitment to support and defend not any person or party but the Constitution itself. This nonpartisan commitment, embodied in every officer’s solemn oath, makes the U.S. military unique. It also mitigates against the most extreme threats to the republic, from insurrection to civil war. Since the U.S. military has a monopoly on the use of force within the country’s borders, any sane governor of a state or militant group considering taking up arms to splinter the nation will have second thoughts about doing so.

Many commentators use “nonpartisan” and “apolitical” as if they were synonymous, but they are not. U.S. military officers are not required to be apolitical. They do not forfeit their rights as citizens to vote, belong to a political party, or give money to a candidate of their choice. But in their professional lives, they are committed to being nonpartisan. Whatever their personal political opinions, whether they voted for or against their commander in chief, they must give the president (and their appointed civilian subordinates) their best professional military advice. They must execute lawful orders, even when they believe such orders are mistaken. This ethic of nonpartisanship is embedded in a thick web of laws, regulations, practices, and norms that has been woven over generations.

But this practice of nonpartisanship is not set in stone. Over the past three decades, as partisan divisions have become more intense, political leaders from both parties have increasingly misused the military for personal political gain. They have presented themselves as champions of the military, enlisted former officers in their political campaigns, and encouraged retired officers to speak publicly on partisan issues. Such actions, which are only growing more common, erode the military’s nonpartisan ethic and threaten its ability to play its essential role in society.

AN ARMED PRIESTHOOD

The U.S. military’s nonpartisan professional ethic has evolved over centuries. Having read of Oliver Cromwell’s use of the British Army to disband the English Parliament in 1653 and just recently defeated that same army, the founders of the United States knew that “despotism often wears a uniform,” as the military historian Eliot Cohen memorably put it. Thus, after the Continental Army won the country’s independence, it was essentially disbanded.

Once the founders had created a political system of checks and balances, they applied the same principle in assigning authority over the military. To ensure civilian control and unity of command in military operations, Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution designates the president as commander in chief. Article I, Section 8, however, gives the legislative branch the exclusive right to declare war, raise and support armies, and maintain a navy.

The congressional act that created a permanent military in 1789 laid the foundation for a nonpartisan professional ethic. It specified procedures for raising a standing army and articulated an oath of office committing every officer to “support the constitution.” Over the centuries, as the country faced new threats, the oath evolved to reflect the expanding responsibilities of the armed forces—adding the phrase “against all enemies, foreign and domestic” during the Civil War to recognize the military’s role in preserving the Union.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the ranks of the U.S. military expanded dramatically as the United States began to fight more offshore wars against other powerful countries. After a mine sank the USS Maine in Havana Harbor in 1898, killing 266 Americans, President William McKinley declared war on Spain. When Europe descended into World War I, President Woodrow Wilson marshaled three million troops to defend the Allied powers. And after the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt raised 12 million troops to respond to Japanese aggression and wage an epochal war against Nazi Germany. The formation of NATO and other alliances, reinforced by a network of military bases on almost every continent, cemented the United States’ status as a global power with interests around the world whose defense required a military that could project power. Since 1941, the U.S. military has never had fewer than one million active-duty troops.

The practice of military nonpartisanship is not set in stone.

As the U.S. military grew to 2,000 times its original size, wise leaders attempted to mitigate the risks that had worried the founders by creating a disciplined, deeply rooted ethic of nonpartisanship. Considered legislative and institutional efforts limited the military’s involvement in domestic affairs, distinguished its authorities from those of civilian leaders, and proscribed specific partisan activities. For instance, the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act forbade the U.S. Army from enforcing civil laws without authorization from Congress or the president. Subsequent legislation and administrative actions extended the Posse Comitatus Act to the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marines. In 1939, as the prospect of a second world war increased, Congress passed the Hatch Act—the central piece of legislation regulating all federal employees’ partisan activities—which prohibits military officers from interfering in elections and engaging in partisan activities while in uniform. General George Marshall, who became chief of staff of the army in 1939, stands as the emblem of the modern ethos of nonpartisanship. As he preached to his officers, “We are completely devoted, we are a member of a priesthood really, the sole purpose of which is to defend the republic.”

After World War II, U.S. military and political leaders undertook an extensive review of the country’s national security institutions. The product was the 1947 National Security Act, which established the Department of Defense, created distinct responsibilities for civilian and military leaders, and helped clarify the limits of uniformed officers’ authority. For example, the act states that the secretary of defense should be “appointed from civilian life” and serve as the “principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff, meanwhile, were to serve as “principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense.” In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act further refined the roles of military officers—for instance, by formally removing the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the chain of command.

Policies and practices flowing from this legal foundation have strengthened the military’s nonpartisan commitment. The Uniform Code of Military Justice, which is the basis of U.S. military law, forbids service members from expressing “contempt toward officials,” from state legislators to the president. And Department of Defense instructions and directives prohibit active-duty personnel from engaging in a variety of political activities, including attending political events in uniform, making endorsements, and fundraising for partisan causes. Each service has academies where officers learn not just strategy, tactics, and the demands of leadership at each rank but also professional responsibility. They learn that for the force to be the best that it can be, officers must be promoted by review processes that are impartial—based on performance, not political patronage. Nominations for the most senior positions—from combatant commanders to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—must be reviewed and recommended by the Senate Armed Services Committee and approved by the Senate. Although public confidence in the military has eroded slightly in recent years, it remains the most trusted U.S. government institution. According to the 2022 Gallup poll, 64 percent of Americans have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the military—compared with 23 percent for the presidency and just seven percent for Congress.

METTLE TESTED

The United States is not facing a full-blown crisis in civil-military relations as a result of partisan activity by military personnel, as some analysts and members of the media have claimed. Although there are serious threats to military nonpartisanship, they are not primarily from active-duty service members. Indeed, the 2020 presidential election served as an extreme test case. The U.S. military not only withstood the pressure and did its job; it emerged stronger and even more committed to maintaining its unique nonpartisan role. If it were subjected to a similar test today or during the 2024 election cycle, we are confident it would pass again.

Supporters of former President Donald Trump and some members of the media have alleged that, in 2020 and 2021, the military significantly overstepped its constitutional authority. In September 2021, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley became a subject of controversy for a conference call he held in January 2021 with officers from the National Military Command Center. After the journalists Bob Woodward and Robert Costa described the call as part of a secret plan to rein in the president if he were to “go rogue” and order a nuclear strike, politicians and pundits on the right accused the chairman of insubordination and even called for his indictment. In reality, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not have the authority to direct U.S. forces—and he did not pretend to have it in this case. As the evidence from subsequent investigations clearly shows, the call was simply intended to refresh officers on procedures for conducting a nuclear launch—procedures practiced regularly to maintain a reliable nuclear system that will under all conditions give the president feasible nuclear options. Combatant commanders must stand ready every day to carry out presidential orders, and regular reviews of procedures are an essential part of the chairman’s job.

A second narrative that has taken hold among some analysts and members of the media insists that military nonpartisanship and civil-military relations are in crisis because military officers have undermined civilian supremacy. As Risa Brooks, Jim Golby, and Heidi Urben have argued in Foreign Affairs, military officers have “played a role in the degradation of civilian control”—for instance, by intervening in policy decisions and replacing civilians in policy roles. The most conspicuous cases that such critics cite are the appointments of two retired generals, Jim Mattis and Lloyd Austin, as secretary of defense. By law, former military officers are required to wait seven years before taking office as secretary of defense. But Congress reserves the right to grant exemptions in exceptional circumstances—as it did for Mattis and Austin. A sustained pattern of exceptions would risk eroding the norm of nonpartisanship and might even encourage current officers to “color military advice” or engage in partisan behavior in the hope of obtaining future appointments, as the military analyst Caitlin Talmadge has argued. But both Mattis and Austin are highly unusual cases. A more serious issue raised by Brooks, Golby, and Urben concerns the relative influence of the Joint Staff and the civilian staff of the office of the secretary of defense. The Joint Staff is certainly a reservoir of talent, and the question of “institutional parity,” as Brooks, Golby, and Urben put it, is a debate worth having. But it is not grounds for arguing that the president or secretary of defense has lost control of the military.

A third narrative about creeping partisanship within the ranks holds that the military has been infected by political extremism—by “wokeism,” according to pundits on the right, and by far-right nationalism, according to pundits on the left. Such claims are mostly bunk. The military recruits nearly 150,000 new members each year. They come from every corner of U.S. society, with views they have formed in their homes, high schools, and colleges across the country. But extremist sentiments among service members are relatively rare—which, as the defense analyst Kori Schake has argued, is a “tribute to the strength of the U.S. military’s professionalism.”

THREATS TO NONPARTISANSHIP

The main threat to the military’s ethic of nonpartisanship comes not from within the armed forces but from political leaders seeking personal advantage without thinking about the larger consequences for American democracy. Over the last 30 years, politicians from both parties have increasingly sought to exploit the public’s trust in the military by attempting to wrap themselves in the flag and encouraging former officers to speak publicly on partisan issues. This behavior sows confusion about the role of the military and chips away at the public’s perception of its nonpartisanship. Although this trend does not yet suggest that the military would act in a manner inconsistent with its constitutional duties, it is clearly heading in the wrong direction.

Such damaging behavior can be traced back to the 1992 presidential election, when a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed Bill Clinton—and was subsequently rewarded with the post of ambassador to the United Kingdom. Thus began a contest during successive presidential elections to amass as many endorsements from retired military officers as possible. In 2000, George W. Bush narrowly beat Al Gore with over 80 individual endorsements from former officers, including a general who had until two months before endorsing Bush served as a combatant commander. In the lead-up to the 2004 election, 12 former flag officers endorsed John Kerry onstage at the Democratic National Convention—an event that also featured an address by a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At almost every nominating convention since, retired flag officers have made public endorsements, with some of the most vocal receiving prominent positions in the winning candidate’s administration.

Political leaders have increasingly used active-duty officers as props in other inappropriate settings. In June 2020, after police cleared protesters from Lafayette Square in Washington, D.C., military personnel flanked Trump as he walked to St. John’s Church, giving the impression that the use of force had been sanctioned by the U.S. military. Trump wasn’t unique in using military officers for political gain: in Philadelphia in September 2022, President Joe Biden gave a political speech while uniformed U.S. Marines stood in the background.

Politicians from both parties have increasingly sought to exploit the public’s trust in the military.

Friction in relations between civilians and military advisers has also grown more conspicuous. For example, at the beginning of his administration in 2009, President Barack Obama considered his options in Afghanistan, including scaling down the war effort, as then Vice President Biden advocated. Several military advisers who strongly opposed this option made their case publicly, leaving White House staff feeling that the president had been “boxed in” by the armed forces. As then Secretary of Defense Bob Gates writes in his memoir, one of Obama’s closest advisers would say every day that “the military can’t be trusted.”

These trends have led to a number of disturbing developments, including a retired general recommending in 2020 that the U.S. military be deployed to seize ballot boxes and overturn the results of the election, and 124 retired generals and admirals signing a letter in 2021 questioning Biden’s fitness for office. As the 2022 Reagan National Defense Survey observed, the primary reason for declining public trust in the military is a perception that its leaders are being politicized. Should citizens come to distrust the military or see it as a threat to their way of life, not only will the services struggle to recruit the personnel they need to defend against foreign enemies but an essential guardrail against the splintering of the union will have been undermined.

A HUMAN INSTITUTION

The military’s nonpartisan core is also vulnerable to destructive forces now evident in our society. The military is a human institution—subject to human leaders, their frailties, and the political forces that amplify them. Its operational effectiveness and nonpartisan character depend on responsible public servants performing their duties and a properly functioning constitutional system that maintains legitimate civilian authority to which the military is loyal. Neither is guaranteed; both require constant renewal.

Recent events have forced Americans to consider the risks posed by a president intent on politicizing the military. Could such a president manipulate the appointment process to replace the military leadership with partisan loyalists? Since the president must approve all promotions of uniformed personnel to the position of general or flag officer, the president also has the discretion to nominate any general or flag officer for promotion to four-star. If the Senate were controlled by likeminded leaders, a president could conceivably install devotees in all the most senior military positions. Since there are only seven joint chiefs and 11 combatant commanders, the military’s highest echelons could be filled with partisan supporters even if the vast majority of officers did not share the president’s political beliefs or refused to be appointed. And if senior military leaders whose first loyalty was to the person who appointed them were put to tests such as the 2020 election, the republic could indeed be at risk.

The Insurrection Act, which gives the president authority to deploy active-duty troops domestically in cases of civil disorder and rebellion, could be similarly misused by a president to politicize the military. Ratified in 1807, the act was not intended to transform the military into a domestic political tool. Nonetheless, it gives the president considerable discretion. Even before the president has received a request for assistance from a state experiencing what its governor believes is an insurrection, the president has the authority to issue a proclamation ordering insurgents to disperse by a certain deadline. If they fail to comply, the president can issue an executive order deploying troops. Although that order can be reviewed by the courts, the review would likely happen after the troops had already been deployed. Thus, even with healthy institutions and loyal public servants, the U.S. constitutional system remains vulnerable to a president determined to abuse the power of the office.

Among the hardest questions the founders confronted was how to create a government that was powerful enough to protect Americans and ensure their rights but not so powerful that it would threaten their liberties. To do this, they created what the American presidential scholar Richard Neustadt has called a government not just of separated powers but also of “separated institutions sharing power.” As the head of the executive branch and commander in chief of the military, the president is the most powerful person in the country. But in every realm, that power is shared by Congress (which alone can declare war and raise revenues) and the courts (which can overrule the president and Congress if either violates the Constitution). The process of governing was not meant to be pretty. As the Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once observed, the founders’ aim was “not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.” Nevertheless, repeatedly and almost miraculously, the founders’ design has demonstrated a capacity for renewal and reinvention.

Today, this remarkable system is seriously threatened by declining confidence in its capacity to deliver and by extreme partisanship. Three-quarters of Americans believe the country is headed in the wrong direction, as a 2022 NBC survey found. According to a 2022 Pew poll, nearly two-thirds of Republicans and a majority of Democrats view members of the other party as “very unfavorable.” And a 2021 survey by CBS and YouGov observed that 54 percent of Americans considered the biggest threat to the country’s way of life to be “other people in the country.” In times of crisis, the American military answers to legitimate civilian authority as identified by the U.S. constitutional system. If that system of government came to be regarded as illegitimate, the military’s loyalty could be called into question, thereby obstructing its operations and imperiling the nation.

A SACRED TRUST

Abraham Lincoln’s 1858 warning that a “house divided against itself cannot stand” remains as relevant today as it was on the eve of the Civil War. If American society becomes so polarized that large numbers of citizens are prepared to take up arms against each other, the United States’ experiment in self-government could ultimately fail. Fortunately, in building a military to defend against foreign enemies, the country created a fighting force steeped in nonpartisanship and committed to upholding the Constitution—traits that create a thick buffer against the most extreme threats to American democracy.

But as surely as U.S. institutions were built by human hands, they can be undermined by the choices of leaders and citizens. One urgent task, therefore, is to reaffirm the centrality of nonpartisanship in the military and to reestablish the behavior required of military personnel, including by developing guidelines for political activity once officers retire. A strong starting point is a recently published letter co-authored by 13 former secretaries of defense and chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that outlines first principles of civilian control and best practices of civil-military relations. Active-duty personnel, retired officers, and political leaders must appreciate the importance of a nonpartisan military to the country’s survival, seek to counter the forces that threaten the military’s nonpartisan ethos, and take it as their personal responsibility to act within the norms of nonpartisanship. When those norms are violated, political leaders and members of the media should call out the offenders.

Political leaders must not drag the military into partisan activity. Doing so risks eroding an essential bulwark against the splintering of the republic. As Marshall understood, maintaining a nonpartisan military is a matter of “sacred trust”—not just for officers but also for political leaders and citizens, who must attend to the foundations of democracy and guard against the forces that risk undermining them. They should be comforted by the country’s resilience, but not complacent. In the absence of responsible leadership and informed and engaged citizens, the Constitution is a piece of paper that by itself is powerless. Combined with principled leaders and committed citizens, it can continue to sustain the United States’ remarkable democratic experiment.

• JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., is a Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. From 2015 to 2019, he served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
• GRAHAM ALLISON is Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the Harvard Kennedy School and the author of Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?
• JONAH GLICK-UNTERMAN is a former defense policy researcher at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Foreign Affairs · by Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., Graham Allison, and Jonah Glick-Unterman · January 5, 2023​

​16. A New Cyber Strategy To Restore Civil-Military Normalcy

Contusion:

At a minimum, President Biden’s National Cybersecurity Strategy needs to address three problems to restore civil-military normalcy. First, the strategy should address the Pentagon’s sprawling ecosystem of cyber-related entities and advisors by establishing civilian control. The Cyberspace Solarium Commission entertained the idea, but now is the time to establish a “service like” secretary—Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber—as a principal staff assistant with full access to the same fora that the service secretaries have. Second, the strategy should frame internal coherence by addressing the competing roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in cyberspace. Our adjustments of cyber policy over time have created a patchwork of byzantine line-and-block charts creating uncertainty of how these roles would interact in the face of an incident response. Last, the strategy should advance the non-military cyber instruments of power to reflect the President’s National Security Strategy shift of restoring faith in diplomacy. Ideally, the State Department’s newly created Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy would take the lead in addressing national security challenges abroad.

A New Cyber Strategy To Restore Civil-Military Normalcy

By Marc Losito

January 05, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/01/05/a_new_cyber_strategy_to_restore_civil-military_normalcy_873896.html?mc_cid=8bc52b1cf4

Milton Friedman, the late-Nobel laureate, used the analogy of "a fool in the shower" to describe the scalding consequence of policy overcorrection. When the fool in a shower attempts to reach the proper water temperature, they make repeated minor corrections, expecting immediate change. Hotter water is on the way, but the fool is impatient, thinking each turn of the dial will bring the desired end. The result is foolish overcorrection and scalding consequence making its way through the pipes. Cyber policies in response to the shock of September 11^th, the failure to enact the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, and Russia's election meddling portend a potential "fool in the shower" attempting to address the looming threats in the cyber domain. The policy choices in response to these events have unequivocally moved the military closer to cyberwarfare with less oversight by elected civilian leaders, which is a departure from the civil-military norm. Further, these corrections have slowly increased the water temperature over time, and we may already be engaging in cyber warfare without Congress's delegated war power approval.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002

Arguably, the first correction in the modern cyber policy era was the U.S. national security establishment's response to the shock of September 11^th. The federal government rightly acknowledged inequities in how the nation was postured to defend its citizens against terrorism and cyber-attacks. The U.S. responded with the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which consolidated 22 diverse agencies and bureaus into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); the act also established the Homeland Security Council as a statutory component of the National Security Council. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 marked the largest reorganization of the federal government in more than half a century, responding to new, post-Cold War vulnerabilities. Chief among these vulnerabilities were U.S. critical infrastructure sectors with special concern for cyberterrorism and securing cyberspace. Consequently, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 included the addition of a centralized cybersecurity organization within DHS. The National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) was created as an amalgamation of previously existing federal directorates performing disparate functions without coordination or communication.

While the policy reaction was appropriately achieved within a strict framework through congressional legislation, organizational and leadership challenges plagued policy implementation. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 imbued the NCSD with inherent contradictions, likely due to committee compromises required for passage. As the first significant restructuring of federal cybersecurity functions in the United States, the Act failed to provide consistent language and delineate authorities of cybersecurity functions. Namely, the act identified DHS's first responsibility as preventing terrorism and cyberattacks in the United States but only assigned DHS an analytical and advisory role for intelligence activities concerning terrorism and cyber activity. In addition, the Act's language made clear the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) maintained investigatory and prosecution authorities. In this same vein, the Act gave DHS a broad mandate to minimize damage to U.S. critical infrastructure but only limited authority to share information and coordinate with the private sector—a major stakeholder in the operation of U.S. critical infrastructure.

In the wake of September 11^th, Congress and the Executive branch violently turned the shower gauge seeking immediate change. Unfortunately, guided by righteous intent, the policy correction was fraught with inadequacy, contradictions, authority and delineation issues, and compromise resulting in inept organizations standing guard in our cyber defense. Punctuated by legislative and policy challenges, the newly created NCSD would be excoriated by the DHS Inspector General as an organization without vision or tangible results. The U.S. Government would need to go back to the tap, adjust the temperature again, and wait for warmer water.

The Cybersecurity Act of 2012 and Executive Policy Actions

The second correction occurred in response to Congress's failure to enact the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, which bears mentioning because it appeared to be the policy correction we'd needed all along. This comprehensive proposal, from Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) and Susan Collins (R-ME), sought to protect both government and private industry from foreign cyberattacks by achieving three ends: (1) new threat-information-sharing between government and private industry, (2) better protection of critical infrastructure, and (3) DHS authority to unite federal resources to lead U.S. cybersecurity. Given the disjointed state of cybersecurity at the federal level, partly due to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the overarching policy goals of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 appeared to right-size ten years of legislation and policy neglect toward a unified cyber defense. In response to Congress's inability to move this keystone legislation across the goal line, President Barrack Obama used executive authority to end-run the gap by establishing Presidential Policy Guidance 20 (PPD-20).

In lieu of a defensive framework, PPD-20 directed an offensive framework directing the Pentagon to take aim at our enemies with cyberweapons and set the stage for DoD cyber "mission creep" into foreign locations that are not combat zones. This clever use of executive policymaking marked a momentous departure from civilian execution of U.S. cyber defenses, albeit unclear which civilian agency led the cyber enterprise, to consolidated military execution with civilian oversight of cyber defenses. Now declassified, PPD-20 imposed a strict regime of civilian oversight on military cyber operations requiring intense interagency vetting of planned operations. Moreover, PPD-20 tacitly advanced a militaristic lexicon and the notion of the cyber domain as a battlefield requiring capabilities for the "full spectrum of conflict." This lexicon was further crystalized in the 2018 National Cyber strategy as "continuous competition…in cyberspace" and the 2018 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy in a concept known as "defend forward." The failure to pass the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 and implementing the offensive military framework of PPD-20, despite intense interagency vetting and a rigorous legal regime, would set U.S. cyber policy on a foolish trajectory toward militarization of the cyber domain.

With three executive policy actions—PPD-20, the National and Defense Cyber Strategies—the water temperature may change, but to what end? The fool, continually increasing the temperature, never expects to be scalded, but the over-militarization of cyber policy portends scalding results. Up to this point, the militarization of cyber policy is contained within executive policymaking, which is tenuous at best. Executive policies are routinely rescinded, repealed, or stricken down by the courts. The final correction would have to be through legislation to determine the fool's fate.

John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act and NSPM-13

The final corrections in modern cyber policy were in tandem with the cyber strategies and direct response to the Russian election meddling in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. Collectively, the John McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA'19) and President Donald Trump's National Security Presidential Memorandum 13 (NSPM-13) snatched cyberwarfare away from the purview of U.S. elected civilian leadership and placed the DoD firmly in charge of cyber activities abroad with only post-facto oversight—referred to as "defend forward.” Then-National Security Advisor John Bolton best summarized these consequences when he outlined how the President Trump’s cyber strategy and forthcoming NSPM had replaced restrictions on the use of offensive cyber operations with a legal regime that enabled the DoD and other relevant agencies to operate with a greater authority to penetrate foreign networks and deter hacks on U.S. systems. Bolton dropped the civil-military bomb that “decision-making for launching [cyber] attacks will be moved down the chain of command from requiring the president's approval.” This was a wholesale change from the PPD-20 legal regime with authority withheld at Presidential levels and was a dramatic wrenching of the hot water tap.

The legal concept of “defend forward” builds on the offensive notion underpinning NSPM-13 and the policy pretexts of the national cyber documents; more importantly, it contemplates DoD cyberwarfare activities that are not part of an armed conflict. First, Section 1632 of NDAA’19 eliminates all doubt that DoD is precluded from conducting unattributed cyber operations with effects outside of combat zones. Historically, unattributed operations outside of combat zones required a covert action finding and congressional notification under Title 50. Therefore, Section 1632 is an unprecedented shift in civil-military balance, categorizing DoD offensive cyber operations outside of combat zones as Traditional Military Activity (TMA) which does not require a finding or prompt congressional notification. Second, Section 1642 of NDAA’19 provides expressed authority—referred to as “active defense”—for DoD “to take appropriate and proportional action in foreign cyberspace to disrupt, defeat, and deter” cyberattacks involving China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, previously enumerated as the “Big 4” cyber competitors. At first glance, Section 1642 reads as a Cyber Authorized Use of Military Force (AUMF) prescribing pre-authorized cyberwarfare actions based on Section 1642 criteria. Section 1642 should sound alarm bells as the cyber-version of the 60-word AUMF, written just hours after September 11, 2001.

Finally, the notification and reporting requirements levied by NDAA’19 for cyber warfare activities considered “active defense” should give pause and concern. NDAA’19 requires Commander, U.S. Cyber Command to provide a quarterly, post-facto summary of cyber warfare activities to congressional defense committees and an annual, post-facto summary to congressional intelligence committees and the Senate Foreign Relations committee. Considering the ever-changing political and technical dynamics involved in cyber warfare, vis-à-vis election meddling or theft of national security information, post-facto reporting of cyberwarfare activities seems too great a tradeoff for “active defense.” Speed is often quoted as the quintessential element of preparedness against cyberattacks. However, the environment is less like a battlefield and more like a china shop, where care and calculation matter. For all its flaws, specifically as the impetus for this militarized trajectory, PPD-20 did adhere to a rigorous vetting process and intense legal regime, missing in NDAA’19 and NSPM-13.

The Right Temperature is Nigh but Not Quite

Milton Friedman’s analogy of the fool in a shower paints a cartoonish picture of a buffoon scalded by his own actions. A similar fate is approaching within U.S. cyber policy the cyber domain. While we may not have scalded ourselves yet, the militarization of cyberspace—such as the de facto Cyber AUMF of Sections 1632 and 1642 of NDAA’19—foretell a forever war in the cyber domain familiar to the 2001 AUMF being exercised across the globe. We must restore civil-military normalcy in cyberspace, less we be the fool in the shower.

Admittedly, we’ve seen a positive trend of returning to civil-military normalcy in the cyber domain. This is in part due to the Cyberspace Solarium Commission’s (CSC) sobering assessment that despite authorities granted in NDAA’19 and NSPM-13 to conduct offensive cyber operations abroad, the U.S. continues to struggle to secure its interests in cyberspace. The commission identified “defend forward” as a step short of the whole-of-government approach to a “layered cyber defense” that requires more than the military instrument of national power. Accordingly, subsequent NDAAs incorporated essential recommendations from the commission that strengthen diplomatic, information, and economic instruments of power while normalizing the military instrument of power. NDAA’20 leverages Defense and Congressional oversight to place a governor on U.S. military operations in the cyber domain. NDAA’21, a hallmark piece of legislation and the namesake of Congressman William “Mac” Thornberry, recertified the concept of a layered cyber defense utilizing non-military instruments. Finally, NDAA’22 included amendments focused on strengthening civilian executive agencies through an improved cyber workforce, capacity, and organizational structures. Moreover, these pieces of legislation incorporate 33 bipartisan Cyberspace Solarium Commission recommendations to reform the U.S. Government’s organization for cyberspace and strengthen non-military tools. We have yet to see the measurements of effectiveness of these efforts, but we can be sure that they have not limited the U.S. military’s autonomy in cyberspace.

Likewise, President Joseph Biden’s National Security Strategy signals a return to tech diplomacy to navigate digital challenges. The strategy signals a significant pivot back to a sustainable path in the cyber domain by calling for renewed cyber cooperation among allies and partnering to combat Chinese and Russian influence on tech and the internet. President Biden’s impending National Cybersecurity Strategy, not yet released but gaining public fanfare, will be a critical indicator of how much autonomy the military will have in cyberwarfare activities. While the strategy will undoubtedly ask more of private industry, it must highlight and adjust civil-military relations in the cyber domain. The strategy will be all but complete unless it reflects the cyber paradigm of a healthy democracy with a division of labor between military leaders—who are trained to follow orders and win battles—and civilian ones, who are tasked with asking hard questions about why those battles are being fought in the first place.

At a minimum, President Biden’s National Cybersecurity Strategy needs to address three problems to restore civil-military normalcy. First, the strategy should address the Pentagon’s sprawling ecosystem of cyber-related entities and advisors by establishing civilian control. The Cyberspace Solarium Commission entertained the idea, but now is the time to establish a “service like” secretary—Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber—as a principal staff assistant with full access to the same fora that the service secretaries have. Second, the strategy should frame internal coherence by addressing the competing roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in cyberspace. Our adjustments of cyber policy over time have created a patchwork of byzantine line-and-block charts creating uncertainty of how these roles would interact in the face of an incident response. Last, the strategy should advance the non-military cyber instruments of power to reflect the President’s National Security Strategy shift of restoring faith in diplomacy. Ideally, the State Department’s newly created Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy would take the lead in addressing national security challenges abroad.

Marc Losito is a graduate of Duke University’s Sanford School of Public Policy, where he focused on the intersection of technology and national security policy. He is also an alumnus of Norwich University, an active-duty U.S. Army Chief Warrant Officer 5, and has served in the military and Special Operations Forces for 22 years specializing in strategy and policy, counterterrorism, irregular warfare, and intelligence operations. You can find him on Twitter @MarcInThePines and on LinkedIn

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of Duke or Norwich Universities, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or any other office or organization.

17. Working Back From "What If?"

​

Charts at the link: https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/what-if/

Conclusion:

Obviously, an analyst could easily develop additional indicators and potential targets, or different variables for generating scenarios. Hopefully, this article has demonstrated the basic what-if analysis approach. It is a useful structured analytic technique and to act as a guidepost for use by the military, intelligence, and law enforcement communities.

WORKING BACK FROM “WHAT IF?"

warroom.armywarcollege.edu · by Nate Huber · January 5, 2023

One advantage of the technique is that it mitigates cognitive bias by focusing attention on the indicators and variables that would lead up to the event rather than focusing on the consequences of the event.

“What If analysis” is a structured analytic technique employed by intelligence professionals to think about the future. To use the technique, an analyst assumes some future event of interest has occurred and then works their way back, plotting the course of events that would be necessary to get to that future point. What if analysis is a particularly useful tool for thinking about low-probability/high-impact events. One advantage of the technique is that it mitigates cognitive bias by focusing attention on the indicators and variables that would lead up to the event rather than focusing on the consequences of the event.

This article demonstrates the use of what if analysis by examining the possibility of a terrorist attack that weaponizes, a potent narcotic whose legal use is as a tranquilizer for very large animals. In the last few years, drug cartels have begun to lace narcotics such as heroin with fentanyl and its analogues, one of which is carfentanil. Among individual drug users, the potency of these substances has led to a widely reported and tragic increase in drug overdoses. This article considers another potential danger posed by carfentanil, its potential use as a method of attack by terrorists. This is precisely the kind of low-probability/high-impact event for which what if analysis is so well suited to analyze. It should be noted that this article is not based on any knowledge that such an attack is imminent. Indeed, drug cartels would have a strong interest in not allowing carfentanil to be used for terrorist purposes, because such an attack would inevitably lead to a strong response. This case is simply used to demonstrate a technique that might be of interest to readers.

What If?

The first step is to develop the overall structure that will help develop the different scenarios. In this case, the structure will be based on different indicators of attack planning, such as material acquisition, targets involved, and facilitation platforms. These indicators would vary according to two different variables– the scale of organization of the terrorists (from large group to single individual) and their level of technical sophistication.

The various combinations of these two major variables produces four scenarios differentiated by the scale of organization and the technical sophistication of the terrorists. The next step is to develop our understanding of the commonalities and differences among these four scenarios. The scenario generation method lends itself to organizing the analysis in two-by-two matrices. Two examples of these are depicted below. The first matrix lays out the characteristics of the attack and the attackers; the second matrix highlights the implications of an attack for each scenario. In combination, these matrices help the analyst develop a brief prose description of each of these scenarios. When developing these descriptions, the analyst also considered various indicators that would accompany the attack preparations. It is important to note that some of the indicators could be associated with more than one scenario.

Fig. 1 Characteristics organized by Sophistication and Organization

Highly Sophisticated and Well Organized. If highly sophisticated and well organization threat actors carried out an attack using carfentanil, some of the indicators for law enforcement could include large purchases of carfentanil via the dark web or its precursors or sources reporting the purchasing of do-it-yourself lab equipment; the purchasing of carfentanil precursors; and surveillance by multiple individuals of multiple sites. This type of attack would likely see many attackers targeting a large venue or multiple locations, possibly through aerial dispersion using an unmanned aerial vehicle or dispersal through a ventilation system. If the attack was successful, medical emergency teams would likely be overwhelmed with large numbers of victims experiencing symptoms such as respiratory distress and lethargy.

Highly Sophisticated and Less Organized. In contrast to the previous scenario, an attack by a highly sophisticated individual (or small cell) would be quite different in both indicators and targets. Even someone with expertise in the development and dispersal of carfentanil would probably be limited to a “target of opportunity” rather than an extensively planned attack. Law enforcement would need to look for an individual with the technical training, potentially in chemical warfare, though such an individual would also likely have knowledge in how to acquire the materials so as to avoid law enforcement scrutiny. In short, an attack by a lone individual or small cell would be difficult to detect, particularly if they develop the carfentanil in their own laboratory. The individual could either focus on one target or perhaps attack multiple targets over an extended period of time.

Fig. 2 Indicators organized by Sophistication and Organization

Less Sophisticated and Well Organized. The third scenario — a large terrorist group but one lacking technical sophistication — would present another distinct set of indicators and targets. In this case, it is possible that some of the attackers would demonstrate symptoms of carfentanil exposure. They would also be likely to attempt to purchase carfentanil online because they would lack the ability to manufacture it. They may also lack skill in basic operations security and so provide more indicators for law enforcement. As with the first scenario, this group might try to attack multiple venues, but would lack the ability to employ a sophisticated dispersal method.

Less Sophisticated and Less Organized. The final scenario is an individual lacking technical sophistication. This actor would be likely to purchase the carfentanil online or on the street, which would offer an opportunity for law enforcement. It is also possible that they might inadvertently poison themselves or exhibit symptoms of carfentanil exposure. Otherwise, as with the second scenario, this kind of attack might offer few indicators. The attack would likely be small scale and might be rather spur-of-the-moment based on opportunity.

Conclusion

Obviously, an analyst could easily develop additional indicators and potential targets, or different variables for generating scenarios. Hopefully, this article has demonstrated the basic what-if analysis approach. It is a useful structured analytic technique and to act as a guidepost for use by the military, intelligence, and law enforcement communities.

Nate Huber is a former FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst who led a team responsible for providing strategic intelligence to FBI executives regarding current and emerging threats. He left the FBI in April 2022 and is currently a Customer Success Manager with Anomali, a threat intelligence solutions provider.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.

Photo Description: Potential targets of the WMD attack described by the author, overshadowed by the carfentanil molecule.

Photo Credit: Top Left: via Flickr, Center: gigi_nyc, Top Right: alex grichenko, Bottom Right: Pixabay, Bottom Left: Anirudh Koul, Overlay: Mplanine via Wikimedia Commons

warroom.armywarcollege.edu · by Nate Huber · January 5, 2023

​18. Ukraine and the New Two War Construct

Excerpts:

The New Two-War Construct and a Return to the Arsenal of Democracy

The United States will always need to be able to fight and win at least one major war on its own. Like any sovereign country, the United States has its own interests and needs to be able to protect them alone, if it must. It cannot always assume that it will have as motivated and as a capable of allies and partners as Ukraine as proven to be. And in some cases, especially when it comes to countries as formidable as China, the threat may be so great that any amount of military aid — absent direct American military involvement — might be insufficient.

Still, the Ukraine war offers a potential model of how the United States could deal two conflicts as once, especially if one of those conflicts is against one of America’s secondary adversaries — the Russias, Irans, and North Koreas of the world. Even if the United States is tied up with one conflict in one theater, then at the very least, the United States can offer its allies and partners the military wherewithal to win if they choose to fight. In this sense, the United States might not look at its support of Ukraine as a one-off response but rather as a potential model for future defense strategy — and as a way to hedge against the simultaneity problem.

Such a move would not be cost-free. Most notably, it would require a substantial expansion of the defense industrial base, which has been struggling to provide munitions for the Ukraine war. Whatever the cost may be, it would still be but a fraction of building out the force structure required to fight two wars at once and is considerably less risky than ignoring the problem altogether. In other words, it might offer a plausible way to keep American objectives and resources in line without sacrificing too much in either.

Over 80 years ago, Franklin Delano Roosevelt pledged that “[w]e must be the great arsenal of democracy.” Today, it could be time for the United States to renew that pledge — if not for the world’s sake, then perhaps for ours.

Ukraine and the New Two War Construct - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Raphael Cohen · January 5, 2023

How much security is enough security? During the Cold War, the question was rather straightforward. The United States had one adversary — the Soviet Union — which it would need to deter and if necessary, defeat. For the last three decades, this deceptively simple question has proven exceedingly difficult to answer. For years, American defense strategy argued for a “two-war construct,” namely that United States should have sufficient military capability and capacity to fight and win two simultaneous wars in different theaters against major regional powers, like Iraq and North Korea. Over the last decade, though, as America’s military shrank in size and its adversaries grew increasingly capable, it backed off such aspirations.

Today, the prospect of America’s needing to confront a multi-front, multi-adversary set of conflicts has grown. By its own admission, the United States has a “pacing” challenge in China, an “acute threat” in Russia, and a host of lesser problems in the form of Iran, North Korea, and terrorism. Buying enough weapons and platforms to field a military to defeat all, or even two of these foes simultaneously, would likely be prohibitively expensive. By contrast, focusing only on one — to the exclusion of others — carries its own risks of encouraging an adversarial power to try and take advantage of perceived American weaknesses.

Become a Member

The Ukraine war has suggested a new “two-war” construct, one that may square this strategic circle while also allowing for the United States to guard against the possibility of multiple simultaneous crises without doubling the defense budget. Specifically, the United States should size its military to win one war against one major power but size its defense industrial base to provide the wherewithal to win two wars simultaneously — allowing the United States to fight one war directly and another by proxy.

The Rise and Fall of the Two War Force

The idea that Washington should be able to fight multiple wars in multiple theaters dates as far back as World War II when the United States and its allies fought Nazi Germany in Europe and Imperial Japan in the Pacific. During the Cold War, the United States codified the principle that it should be able to fight multiple wars at once into its defense strategy, although what that meant in practice was left open to interpretation. Successive administrations debated on what the appropriate combination of multiple major wars and smaller other “brushfire” conflicts should be to benchmark for the American military. As a result, the force-sizing conflict varied widely over the decades from a one-and-a-half-war construct (one major war in one theater and one brushfire conflict elsewhere) under the Nixon administration to two major wars and two brushfire conflicts under the Reagan administration.

When the Cold War ended, the United States needed a new benchmark for how much security to buy and what resources could be redirected away from defense and toward domestic priorities. Instead of a single peer adversary, the United States faced a series of lesser challenges from states like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. While any one of these states could not match the American conventional military might, the United States could be repeatedly challenged to fight several conflicts simultaneously. And so, American defense strategies — like the Clinton-era Bottom Up Review —proposed that the United States military should be sized to tackle both the Persian Gulf and Korea scenarios at the same time.

For the next two decades, this two-war framework remained the essential building block of American strategy. While different Defense Department leaders tweaked the verbiage, the basic idea that the United States should be able to fight two wars at once remained constant.

By the early 2010s, however, calls for the “nation’s armed forces to be able to fight and win two major regional conflicts” were ringing increasingly hollow. For years, the United States has privileged capability over capacity in its force design. As result, the military shrank to a fraction of its Cold War strength by almost every measure: in personnel, aircraft, and vessels, for starters, even as it grappled with strains of near continuous employment beginning with the first Gulf War, the crises in the Balkans, and then the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. While the platforms may have become more advanced, even the most capable tank, ship, or aircraft can only be in one place at a time. As a result, fighting the Iraq and Afghanistan wars simultaneously nearly stretched the United States military to its breaking point. And those wars were both counterinsurgencies against terrorist groups — not high-end conventional conflicts against states with modern armies.

During the same period, America’s adversaries were growing more formidable. China was coming into its own as a military power, blunting the conventional U.S. military advantage in East Asia. After a decade of sharp decline following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia embarked on its own large-scale modernization effort, shedding its Soviet roots and adding new capabilities. North Korea developed nuclear weapons and a vast array of delivery vehicles to deter pre-emptive U.S. military action. While the United States was still the world’s dominant military, the idea that the United States could fight both adversaries at once was increasingly a herculean assumption.

And so the Department of Defense slowly backed off from its two-war force. The Obama, Trump, and now Biden administrations have all acknowledged that the United States faced multiple threats — specifically from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and terrorism. Each administration demurred, however, from stating that the U.S. military would ever need to fight two of these actors at the same time.

Instead, defense strategies talked of winning a war against one adversary at time while trying to hold the others in check. The Obama-era 2011 Defense Strategic Guidance talked of “defeating aggression by any potential adversary” while “impos[ing] unacceptable costs” on another. The Trump-era 2018 National Defense Strategy argued that the military should be able to be capable of “defeating aggression by a major power; [while] deterring opportunistic aggression elsewhere.” And the Biden-era 2022 National Defense Strategy similarly called for the need to “prevail in conflict” yet still “deter opportunistic aggression elsewhere.” The two-war force construct had yielded — both in deed and word — a one-war force, and noted defense analysts were writing a “eulogy” for the concept.

An Increasing Risky Bet

Underlying the shift to a one-war force was a big strategic bet — namely that U.S. adversaries are internally divided and therefore unlikely to launch wars simultaneously. For a time, the premise seemed reasonable. China and Russia, after all, fought a war against one another. China and Russia also joined the West in negotiating a deal to curb Iran’s nuclear program. North Korea and Iran are half a world apart. Even relations between China and North Korea have been strained at times.

Moreover, each of the adversaries appeared to operate on different timelines. Iran and North Korea seemed to be the most immediate threats, given the former’s ongoing proxy war activity and the latter’s regular missile and nuclear tests. While Russia — at least prior to February 2022 — and China posed longer term challenges. Even the most recent 2022 National Defense Strategy includes some of this sequential thinking: China is “the pacing challenge,” while Russia is merely an “acute” — or short term — one. And if threats only reared up sequentially, then the United States could reasonably assume that it would only need to tackle one adversary in one theater at a time.

But the geopolitical winds are changing. For starters, American adversaries are increasingly militarily intertwined. Russia has long been in the arms business — selling air defense systems to Iran and aircraft engines to China, among other items. Today, though, the relationships are more bidirectional. Iran gave drones and North Korea shipped artillery shells to Russia to support its war in Ukraine. China supplied Iranian proxies with drones. North Korea proliferated missile technology to Iran and potentially offered its nuclear know-how as well.

Military cooperation between American adversaries now goes beyond mere weapons sales. Iran and Russia supposedly colluded on the response to the Syrian civil war, coordinating their military activities in the country. More recently, Iran provided advisors to assist Russia in using its drones in Ukraine. In return, Tehran has reportedly asked Moscow for help quelling protests. As National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby said recently, Russo-Iranian ties are deepening into a “full-fledged defense partnership.”

Meanwhile, China and Russia have said their friendship has “no limits.” While China only has offered tepid support for Russia in its war in Ukraine, Beijing still has an interest in deepening military ties with Moscow. In fact, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has — at least in some estimations — doubled down on his relationship with Russia. The two have conducted multiple joint bomber patrols and participated in military exercises with much fanfare.

And the timelines for each of these threats are accelerating. Iran now regularly engages in low-level military aggression, including missile attacks near American diplomatic facilities. North Korea has hit another record year of missile tests. Russia is fighting a war in Ukraine and has threatened nuclear war. And the timeline for a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan may have accelerated. Consequently, it is no longer implausible that more than one threat would bubble up at once. Indeed, several seem to already be bubbling.

Looking ahead, then, the premise that the United States will only need to fight one adversary in one part of the of the world seems like a bad bet. The United States may not yet be confronting a true “axis of evil,” but American adversaries are becoming more tightly aligned, leaving the United States with a one-war force for an increasingly multi-war world.

Solving the Simultaneity Problem

In general terms, the United States seems to have four options to confront the prospect of two simultaneous conflicts. First, the United States could limit its ambitions and say that certain threats don’t matter. Indeed, some China hawks made precisely this argument for why the United States should not intervene in the run up to the Ukraine war. Any conflict with Russia, they claim, would distract from the main adversary: China.

As tempting as this strategic reductionism may be, it is also impractical. Leaving aside the moral equities at play, the United States is a global power with global interests that cannot simply be abandoned. Moreover, if American adversaries are becoming an increasingly unified bloc, then focusing on one is simply not viable, even if the United States adopts a realpolitik approach.

Alternatively, the United States could try to deter a second war, as the 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies propose. Deterrence, however, is a notoriously difficult concept. Ultimately, the difference between whether an action deters, provokes, or is simply ignored depends less on what the United States does and more on how a handful of dictators perceive these actions. Consequently, there are plenty of examples of American deterrence failing — be it with Iranian actions throughout the Middle East, China’s increasing incursions around Taiwan, or most spectacularly, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While deterring conflict is always preferable, the United States needs a viable plan B should deterrence fail.

A third option is for the United States to actually build a full-fledged, two-war force — which is what some defense hawks propose. This is, however, a hugely costly proposition. Over the last 70 years, the cost of the average servicemember has more than doubled and by some estimates is nearing $140,000 per active-duty servicemember. There are good reasons for this growth. Attracting and retaining the high-quality talent necessary to fight modern wars is expensive. And building a true two-war force would require a lot more people. The People’s Liberation Army is larger by some dimensions — like personnel and fleet — even as its platforms may not be as capable. If the United States tries to build a military large enough to blunt a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, plus another contingency, it would truly come at an eye-watering price.

Moreover, even if the United States could pay such a bill, it is not clear that such a cost would a priori serve America’s strategic interests in the long run. Long-term competition with China, after all, is not just a military race but a battle for global influence playing out over a variety of other domains — economic, diplomatic, technological. Given the financial constraints on the United States, such a massive military expansion may come at the expense of these other forms of power — or at the risk of America’s overall economic vitality.

But perhaps there is a fourth option: the Ukraine model. Sometimes lost in the debate over military aid to Ukraine is that the war — from a cold-hearted realpolitik perspective — has offered the United States a great return on its strategic investment. For roughly $20 billion so far, the United States has been able to help Ukrainian forces defend its territory and by so doing decimate the Russian military, its second-most militarily formidable adversary. Of course, the $20 billion does not reflect the full cost of the war for the United States: There is the humanitarian aid to Ukraine, the cost of the additional 20,000 troops the United States sent to Europe to bolster deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank, and further wear and tear on assets sent to defend NATO airspace. But even accounting for the total $100 billion that Congress has allocated to Ukraine, it is not a lot — at least, not in comparison to the overall American defense budget, which is set to approach nearly $860 billion next year. All in all, Ukraine provides a model for what a reasonably cost-effective way of fighting a second conflict might look like in the future.

Beyond the cost savings, though, the Ukraine model also offers strategic flexibility. With China, Russia, North Korea, and perhaps in the future Iran having nuclear arsenals, there are plenty of reasons why future American policymakers may want to avoid direct American military intervention. Indeed, even bracketing nuclear questions, large-scale conventional conflict would almost certainly be a bloody affair. Building the capability to fight indirectly at the very least provides another option.

Of course, the viability of such a strategy depends somewhat on finding future Ukraine-type scenarios — that is, countries with the leadership and national resolve to effectively employ such military aid. Other attempts to equip militaries and let them fight the wars have ended in calamity, most notably in Iraq and Afghanistan. And yet, there is reason to believe that the United States might have more Ukraines, and fewer Iraqs and Afghanistans, going forward. For starters, the United States presumably will not be trying to rebuild militaries from scratch anymore, like it did in Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, foreign invasions are also more likely to produce a rally-around-the-flag effect than internal conflicts as populations unite against a common enemy, as the Ukrainians did against the Russian onslaught.

In other words, the United States cannot always assume that it finds another Ukraine — a partner that is willing to fight and capable enough to do so successfully, if only given the right tools. Still, Ukraine may not be a unicorn, either. And as a means of balancing in a multi-threat but still fiscally constrained world, the Ukraine approach may be best available approach.

The New Two-War Construct and a Return to the Arsenal of Democracy

The United States will always need to be able to fight and win at least one major war on its own. Like any sovereign country, the United States has its own interests and needs to be able to protect them alone, if it must. It cannot always assume that it will have as motivated and as a capable of allies and partners as Ukraine as proven to be. And in some cases, especially when it comes to countries as formidable as China, the threat may be so great that any amount of military aid — absent direct American military involvement — might be insufficient.

Still, the Ukraine war offers a potential model of how the United States could deal two conflicts as once, especially if one of those conflicts is against one of America’s secondary adversaries — the Russias, Irans, and North Koreas of the world. Even if the United States is tied up with one conflict in one theater, then at the very least, the United States can offer its allies and partners the military wherewithal to win if they choose to fight. In this sense, the United States might not look at its support of Ukraine as a one-off response but rather as a potential model for future defense strategy — and as a way to hedge against the simultaneity problem.

Such a move would not be cost-free. Most notably, it would require a substantial expansion of the defense industrial base, which has been struggling to provide munitions for the Ukraine war. Whatever the cost may be, it would still be but a fraction of building out the force structure required to fight two wars at once and is considerably less risky than ignoring the problem altogether. In other words, it might offer a plausible way to keep American objectives and resources in line without sacrificing too much in either.

Over 80 years ago, Franklin Delano Roosevelt pledged that “[w]e must be the great arsenal of democracy.” Today, it could be time for the United States to renew that pledge — if not for the world’s sake, then perhaps for ours.

Become a Member

Raphael S. Cohen is a senior political scientist and the director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program at Project AIR FORCE at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Raphael Cohen · January 5, 2023​

​19. Toward a Values-Based Foreign Policy: Developing an Ethical Checklist

Conclusion:

The objective of U.S. foreign policy will remain the defense and advancement of U.S. interests in the world. A checklist methodology does not favor a particular outcome, only well-informed, ethically-sensitive, decisions that are not skewed in favor of short-term outcomes. Adopting the framework would naturally bring all eyes back to the ball, anchoring policy decisions to the strategic vision. Like a pilot before take-off, it’s important not to have overlooked anything essential. At that point, a decision still requires policymakers to exercise sound political judgment to weigh various scenarios. Sometimes, their judgment may be to opt for a politically expedient action when there is no suitable alternative. Ultimately, if the overall result of an enhanced decision-making process is a foreign policy that gives greater emphasis to values and avoids misjudgments, misunderstandings, and blind spots, both the United States and the world will be better off. Global leadership depends upon values-driven policy and trust.

Toward a Values-Based Foreign Policy: Developing an Ethical Checklist

by Ambassador Peter Mulrean (ret.) and William J. Hawk

January 4, 2023

justsecurity.org · by Ambassador Peter Mulrean (ret.) · January 4, 2023

January 4, 2023

Editor’s note: This article is the first installment of our Values in Foreign Policy symposium.

Values: Easier Said than Done

As the Biden administration approaches the end of its second year in office, it is time to consider whether it is delivering on its promise of pursuing a “values-based” foreign policy. While all administrations stake claim to pursuing American values, President Joe Biden came to office particularly vocal about the need to place values at the core of U.S. policy. His National Security Strategy repeats the word 29 times, with Biden stating up front that, faced with “a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order…the United States will lead with our values.” The term “values” is never precisely defined, and is sometimes preceded by “democratic” or followed by “and interests.” Values are invoked in relation to human rights, economic growth, international finance, the military, migration, and international cooperation. A bit like the air around us, values are everywhere, but hard to pin down.

At first blush, it appears that in its first two years, the Biden administration’s actions have often fallen short of its repeated lofty rhetoric about putting values first. A high-profile example would be Biden’s engagement with Saudi Arabia, despite having promised to treat it like a pariah because of Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman’s (MBS) role in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Biden’s famous fist-bump with MBS seems particularly egregious in hindsight, as he appears to have gotten nothing from the Saudis in return. Another example would be the administration’s handling of the migrant situation at the southern border, and in particular its shifting position on the use of Title 42’s authority to expel migrants on public-health grounds that were no longer extant.

Why is it so hard to pursue a values-based approach to foreign policy? A lot can be attributed to when soaring aspirations meet unyielding realities, both practical (how to manage thousands of migrants in a highly politicized atmosphere and with inadequate tools) and in degree of complexity (the United States has many significant, and sometimes competing, interests in Saudi Arabia). Still, some U.S. administrations appear to achieve better alignment between their foreign policy implementation and their stated ambitions to put core values first. Joseph Nye evaluated the ethics of prior U.S. administrations’ foreign policy in Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump (2020). Nye identifies criteria and uses his framework to evaluate presidential administrations’ ethical shortfalls and successes. He embraces the prevalent conception that the role of ethical analysis of foreign policy involves after-the-fact conclusory judgments of right or wrong, good or bad.

That approach is more helpful to the foreign policy academic than to the practitioner. We advocate a different role for ethics, not as hindsight moral appraisal, but rather as forward looking, in which ethical reasoning guides and shapes foreign policy decisions not yet made. In our collective experience as a former senior government official and ethical consultant, we believe that the United States lacks a disciplined process for ensuring that its foreign policy decisions align with its priorities and values. In what follows, we recommend a practical decision-making methodology to do just that.

Three Essential Pillars

Reviewing the record of past administrations, two elements have been essential for pursuing successful, ethical foreign policies: articulating a strategic vision and developing (and maintaining) trust with allies and adversaries. We believe a third element is also required: defining decision-making processes that align foreign policy actions with stated values.

The first element is a fully formed strategic vision that is based on values, focused on long-term objectives, and anchored in an understanding of the foreign policy context, including that of the other interested parties.

Consider the Marshall Plan, the Truman administration’s comprehensive strategy for using large-scale economic assistance to avoid economic ruin and promote development and stability in Europe. Though developed in a short period of time, the Marshall Plan was the result of multiple sets of U.S. officials debating various scenarios to ensure that the process implementing the plan would succeed, such as by allowing each European country to determine how best to use the U.S. funds provided. The Marshall Plan fit into a broader strategic vision for a liberal international order, which would promote rules-based economic global development and work as a pro-western bastion against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Contrast the Marshall Plan with the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was also a deliberate and premeditated foreign policy decision, although it was launched on the faulty premise of an active Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program and based on a wholly unrealistic interpretation of the context and interested parties. The Bush administration dismissed warnings about the potential long-term negative consequences, and, beyond the initial invasion, subsequent administrations often substituted wishful thinking for hard analysis about whether they were advancing toward their stated objectives in Iraq.

The second key ingredient to foreign policy success is trust, which is essential for implementing a strategic vision. Predictability and dependability are the cornerstones of trust. Foreign policy is built on a cumulative record, not one-off transactions—the willingness of others to support U.S. policy priorities today is closely tied to its actions yesterday and behavior in general.

Unfortunately, the U.S. record on both counts has been badly tarnished in recent decades. The botched invasion of Iraq not only failed to achieve any stated objectives beyond the departure of Saddam Hussein, but its continuing trail of death, destruction, and instability has been devastating to U.S. credibility and leadership around the world. Even our closest allies openly question American reliability, particularly since the Trump administration. Regaining lost trust takes considerable time and consistent effort. As the Dutch say, trust comes on foot and leaves on horseback.

The record is at best mixed on how well different administrations have upheld the values they profess underpin U.S. foreign policy. The path from rhetorical flourish to a record of foreign policy success is long, perilous, and often obscure. It requires overcoming internal political and bureaucratic roadblocks, as well as external opposing actors and unexpected developments, without losing sight of long-term policy objectives in a flurry of daily distractions. Every administration faces the frustration that its own priorities are in constant competition with a steady flow of foreign policy matters that are not part of the plan, as other countries pursue their strategic interests, crises occur, and global developments play out. These extraneous matters may absorb huge amounts of bureaucratic time and energy, distracting from other foreign policy priorities.

For that reason, we believe there is a third essential ingredient for success that has thus far been missing in U.S. foreign policy— a structured decision-making process for ensuring that values, long-term strategic objectives, and the policy context are consistently factored into all foreign policy decisions. Such a mechanism would provide the administration with the means to keep its eye on the ball, addressing exogenous or unexpected issues that arise in a manner consistent with its strategic vision.

There are examples where Washington has dealt with new developments through the prism of its defined values and long-term objectives, with a solid understanding of the foreign policy context. The resulting action was consistent with its strategic vision and thereby enhanced the overall coherence of its foreign policy and its reputation for dependability. The Kennedy administration’s response to the Cuban Missile Crisis is a case in point, as is the George H. W. Bush administration’s approach to German reunification. In both cases, the administrations were clear about the values and principles that mattered, but also understood the context and how to address Moscow’s concerns. On the other hand, the Obama administration’s approach to Libya or the Reagan administration’s handling of Nicaragua were examples where Washington took short cuts on the respect for values and misjudged the context and other actors. The results were harmful to Libyans and Nicaraguans, as well as to the U.S. reputation, and therefore also detrimental to those administrations’ ability to pursue other policy priorities.

The U.S. government has a well-developed wiring diagram designating “who” is involved in foreign policy decisions, through a system of interagency coordination, generally led by the National Security Council (NSC). What is missing, however, is a well-defined procedure for determining the “what,” the factors under consideration in decisions. Given the fast-moving and overloaded foreign policy agenda, the absence of a methodology to ensure the quality of the decision-making substance through a consistent review of core principles can lead to myopic, transactional decisions that define national security interests too narrowly and favor short-term considerations.

A process that casts all decisions in the context of the country’s shared values and long-term interests increases the overall quality and coherence of its foreign policy. Such decision-making methodologies exist and work in the private sector.

Developing an Ethical Checklist

We recommend a decision-making framework, amounting to an ethical checklist, that is based on extensive research regarding human psychology and institutional design. Apart from the specific procedural recommendations that we make, the key is to design, adopt and practice a disciplined methodology for all decisions that is based on values and principles, as well as a deeper appreciation of the strategic policy-making context. Counting on the expertise of even the most capable foreign policy professionals is not enough. Groupthink and blind spots are inevitable even in the most well-functioning bureaucracies.

One might think a “checklist” unnecessary in a policy system that is staffed by foreign policy professionals and already requires various levels of clearances and approvals across the interagency process before reaching a decision point. But, as numerous studies have demonstrated, checklists are invaluable in ensuring the quality and integrity of processes, even among the most accomplished professionals, such as surgeons, architects, and pilots. In busy, overtaxed bureaucracies, expediency lurks at every turn—in bureaucratic cultures that promote consensus, when there is little bandwidth to consider all the angles or seek out all the necessary information, or when employees are discouraged from questioning conventional wisdom or their superiors. Less important issues requiring time-sensitive attention often crowd out identified priorities that are more complex but require no immediate action. The costs of expediency are considerable in terms of policy success and are particularly damaging to reputation, as it is often our more overarching professed values (such as environmental protection, human rights, global health), which suffer most in decision-making processes that favor short-term policy wins.

For students of the psychology of decision-making, the behaviors cited above are familiar. The human brain daily faces thousands of decisions, large and small. Left to its own devices, it will make these decisions on autopilot, often based on incomplete information at best, or misinformation at worst. Human brains seek efficiency and prefer shortcuts, hunches, and prejudices over hard work. Decisions are largely intuitive and emotional, trusting previous experience over new information. Our brains resist information that contradicts both our self-image as well as our prior beliefs and choices. We add to sunk costs, where we maintain an approach in which we have already invested heavily, even when there is information showing that it is not working. In fact, the brain will make decisions based exclusively on the information put before it at the decision point, even if it is aware of additional relevant information. Once an autopilot or near-automatic decision has been made, we build elaborate post-hoc narratives to justify it.

But the brain is also capable of making well-informed, rational decisions, consistent with settled values. There are empirically-demonstrated methods for switching from autopilot to a more deliberative information-gathering approach. For example, the Eight Key Questions (8KQ), developed over a decade ago at James Madison University, enhances university students’ capacities to analyze thorny ethical problems and act on better information. It also has been adopted in business, government and even prison systems to ensure that their decision-making processes reflect the priorities and principles of those organizations.

There are many methods for making better informed decisions. These frequently call for steps such as collecting information, identifying stakeholders, anticipating possible outcomes, and creating action alternatives. These are essential steps to take before making decisions. However, these steps are inadequate for making ethical decisions. The 8KQ process is distinctive in bringing explicit attention to ethical considerations and doing so through a collaborative question-asking method. Catalyzing conscious and non-conscious deliberation on common ethical values initiates dialogue that produces various perspectives and diverse approaches to complexity in real world circumstances.

The 8KQ critical-thinking process is based on extensive research of how the brain actually makes decisions and is designed to disrupt and interrogate quick, “biased” intuitions through reflection at the decision point. Asking questions cues deliberation. The shared values both prime and prompt conscious and unconscious attention. The all-too-common phenomenon of moral “blind spots” is mitigated by calling to mind the shared values which then focus both perception and attention on what might otherwise be ignored. Personal biases may be mitigated by diverse group processes. The tendency to rationalize immediate intuitions is challenged by questioning. These faulty decision sources, features that generate unpredictability and undermine trust, can be mitigated by consistent practice of the 8KQ question-asking strategy.

The 8KQ questions are:

Fairness: What decision results in an equitable approach, balancing all legitimate interests?

Outcomes: What actions achieve the best short and long-term outcomes for everyone?

Responsibilities: What duties or obligations apply?

Character: What actions best express a personal or collective ideal?

Liberty: What actions best respect autonomy, integrity, dignity, and choice of all involved?

Empathy: Do the actions reflect empathy and care for all parties?

Authority: What legitimate authorities should be considered?

Rights: What rights, if any, apply?

Applying the Checklist to Saudi Arabia

The Biden administration has a highly experienced foreign policy team that has made considerable efforts to reach out to countries across the globe to advance administration priorities while rebuilding trust. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken speaks regularly of the importance and the complexity of pursuing a values-based foreign policy. For example, prior to Biden’s trip to Saudi Arabia in July, 2022, Blinken outlined the complexity of getting the balance right among different objectives in the U.S.-Saudi Arabia relationship, stating: “President Biden was determined that we recalibrate the relationship with Saudi Arabia and to make sure that that relationship was serving our own interests as well as our values.” Blinken went on to cite some of the ethical and policy issues in play: the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and human rights more generally, the war in Yemen, counterterrorism cooperation, protecting 70,000 Americans living in Saudi Arabia, relations with Israel, and oil production in the context of the war in Ukraine. He concluded, “we want to make sure that through the relationship we are addressing the totality of our interests… and take a comprehensive approach to Saudi Arabia as we do with any other country.”

In the end though, Biden’s visit gave MBS the legitimacy he sought from the United States, without achieving a key strategic priority for the United States—convincing the Saudis to delay an OPEC+ reduction in oil production at least until after the mid-term elections. Did the Biden team misjudge the mix of factors at play in the U.S.-Saudi relation? Was the perception of Washington “giving up” on pursuing accountability for the Khashoggi murder worth the gamble of getting a short-term extension of OPEC+ production levels? These are the types of questions that the 8KQ is designed to raise. The process was not created with foreign policy in mind. However, it could serve as a model for a structured, questioning method to ensure values consistency over the long-term in policy development and implementation.

It is not possible in a few paragraphs to capture the breadth of reflection and interaction in an 8KQ exercise, considerations that would likely have been part of an 8KQ-type process for deciding, for example, whether Biden should have visited Saudi Arabia and met with Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman in July.

Under “fairness,” one might first consider the various U.S. interests, certainly those mentioned above by Blinken, but also including Iran, regional stability, and so forth. Next would come “other legitimate interests,” starting with Riyadh’s own concerns (e.g., its autonomy as an energy producer, its economic well-being, or its role in the region), but also the interests of the human rights community, Khashoggi’s family, those supporting strong action on climate change, and more. The later 8KQ questions of “liberty” and “empathy” cover similar ground but examine to what extent one understands and respects the legitimate interests and situation of other parties. By asking explicitly about “fairness,” decision-makers are prompted to explore and investigate a broad range of factors beyond short-term considerations.

The analysis of “outcomes” would review the range of possible results from the visit and which interests were advanced. For example, if Biden’s visit embraced MBS and played down the questions of human rights and the Khashoggi murder, but achieved Saudi agreement on increasing oil production and ending the war in Yemen, it would represent a negative outcome for the long-term interests of justice and respect for human rights; a significant short-term victory for Biden in managing the consequences of the war in Ukraine and its impact on the global energy markets; and a mixed outcome on Yemen, representing an important end to human suffering and destruction, but without much hope for eventual accountability for the atrocities that took place during the conflict.

The key question of “character” provides a different perspective on outcomes, analyzing whether a decision is consistent with the values and self-image one wishes to project and what impact it could have on one’s reputation with different audiences. For example, how does it affect Washington’s claim to global leadership in defending human rights and accountability when President Biden appears willing to downplay the Khashoggi murder as part of a deal on oil-production levels?

“Responsibilities” could include the president’s obligation to protect U.S. citizens overseas; laws and public commitments to uphold human rights and pursue justice, to reduce the use of fossil fuels vs. the duty to prevent economic decline and hardship at home, to reduce human suffering, or to support international humanitarian law. In parallel, the 8KQ questions of “rights” and “authorities” examine whether other legal or moral rights arise in the actions under consideration and whether there are other authorities that could be affected, such as treaties and agreements, but also political or consultative groups with significant standing, (e.g., the United Nations and NATO).

Institutionalizing Ethical Decision-Making

An 8KQ-style ethical decision-making checklist injects values, principles, and shared ethical considerations to guide foreign policy decisions and actions. The eight areas of inquiry have been identified in scholarly research as the range of moral considerations needed to form the basis of an ethical decision. It is not a means of imposing either external moral principles or specific decisions. Rather, habitually raising thoughtfully designed questions provides a disciplined, pragmatic process for ensuring that officials consider different relevant factors, including principles and commitments, before making a decision.

The proposed framework represents a dynamic approach that requires complex judgments—it is not a magic formula that produces one right answer. What represents the “most ethical” decision may be different for different people. What makes a decision ethical, however, is that it takes into account the identified areas of inquiry.

The 8KQ framework can easily be adopted in practice. The framework could be incorporated into training programs for incoming State Department and other policy and intelligence officials, as well as reinforced as part of continuing leadership training throughout their careers. Experience with university students, businesses, and other institutions demonstrates that the ethical questioning process is useful at both the individual level—when facing difficult professional or personal challenges—and at the systemic level, from human-resource management to developing and implementing complex policies.

Following the 8KQ questions would help concretize and implement the lofty goals contained in Biden’s National Security Strategy. A custom question-based methodology could be tailored to the decision-making procedures in relevant U.S. Government agencies and become the basis for consistently ethical decision-making across the Interagency. At first, it may seem either artificial or just one more hoop to jump through, but, as with all new best practices, it would eventually become second nature and produce tangible benefits. Using the ethical checklist, not only when establishing an overall policy, but also during the many big and small decisions implementing that policy over the years, would help ensure that the overall policy approach is consistent with stated values and principles, even when circumstances have changed. A formal ethical reasoning strategy could achieve the integrity in foreign policy that the Biden administration says it aims to achieve.

* * *

The objective of U.S. foreign policy will remain the defense and advancement of U.S. interests in the world. A checklist methodology does not favor a particular outcome, only well-informed, ethically-sensitive, decisions that are not skewed in favor of short-term outcomes. Adopting the framework would naturally bring all eyes back to the ball, anchoring policy decisions to the strategic vision. Like a pilot before take-off, it’s important not to have overlooked anything essential. At that point, a decision still requires policymakers to exercise sound political judgment to weigh various scenarios. Sometimes, their judgment may be to opt for a politically expedient action when there is no suitable alternative. Ultimately, if the overall result of an enhanced decision-making process is a foreign policy that gives greater emphasis to values and avoids misjudgments, misunderstandings, and blind spots, both the United States and the world will be better off. Global leadership depends upon values-driven policy and trust.

IMAGE: Close-up of a handshake of two politicians after negotiations on a blue background with a US flag.

justsecurity.org · by Ambassador Peter Mulrean (ret.) · January 4, 2023

20. The Consequences of Divided Government for U.S. Foreign Policy

Excerpts:

1. President Joe Biden will face far stronger political headwinds in his second two years in office than he did in his first two.

2. The 118th Congress could become, possibly literally, the “Do-Nothing Congress.”

3. Congress will embrace Biden’s get-tough policy on China, perhaps too much so, and it might complicate but won’t end support for Ukraine.

Meanwhile, much has been made of flagging support within the Republican Party for aiding Ukraine. Republican voters do seem to be less supportive of Ukraine, but most Republican lawmakers continue to back Kyiv. The challenge that Biden faces isn’t that the House will vote outright to end U.S. support for Ukraine. It’s that the small but vocal anti-Ukraine bloc in the House will succeed in tying support for Ukraine to making big changes to U.S. immigration and asylum policy, changes that most Democrats will find unacceptable. The argument that the Biden administration wants to secure Ukraine’s borders but not America’s is factually inaccurate but it could be politically powerful. Some pro-Ukraine Republicans in both chambers may join the effort to avoid antagonizing their base. The question would then become how to craft a deal that gives all sides something of what they want. That could prove difficult.

In all, the 118th Congress looks set to produce more turbulence than progress.

The Consequences of Divided Government for U.S. Foreign Policy

Here are three things to watch for on the foreign policy front in the 118th U.S. Congress.

President Joe Biden delivers his first State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress in March 2022. Chip Somodevilla/REUTERS

Blog Post by James M. Lindsay

January 4, 2023 10:08 am (EST)

cfr.org · by Lindsay Maizland

Divided government is back! After two years of Democratic control of the presidency and both houses of Congress—just barely in the case of the Senate—the 118th Congress that opened yesterday puts Republicans in charge of the U.S. House of Representatives. A single party has controlled the White House and Congress only three times in the last three decades.

So what will divided government mean for U.S. foreign policy? Here are three things to watch.

1. President Joe Biden will face far stronger political headwinds in his second two years in office than he did in his first two. Biden’s legislative agenda is dead in the water. House Republicans simply won’t go along. The question now is how well Biden can defend his legislative achievements of the past two years. House Republicans will be seeking to dismantle many of them, especially those dealing with climate change. Beyond that, House Republicans will hold a range of hearings designed to highlight what they argue are the administration’s foreign policy misdeeds and missteps. Likely topics include the disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the flood of migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border, and Hunter Biden’s business dealings. These hearings won’t be dispassionate inquiries but partisan efforts to damage Biden and the Democrats more broadly heading into the 2024 election.

A curation of original analyses, data visualizations, and commentaries, examining the debates and efforts to improve health worldwide. Weekly.

By entering your email and clicking subscribe, you're agreeing to receive announcements from CFR about our products and services, as well as invitations to CFR events. You are also agreeing to our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use.

View all newsletters >

Biden can take some comfort in the fact that, like all presidents, he has more discretionary authority in foreign policy than in domestic policy. However, his leeway isn’t infinite. Some matters—appropriations, trade agreements, treaties, and nominations—require congressional—or in the case of treaties and nominations, Senate—consent. Appropriations will be a problem. (More on that in a moment.) However, Biden isn’t looking to negotiate trade agreements or secure Senate consent for any major treaties. And now that Democrats have a two-seat majority in the Senate, confirming nominees for ambassadorships and executive branch positions will be easier than in a 50-50 Senate. Republican senators will no longer be able to bottle up nominees in evenly divided committees.

2. The 118th Congress could become, possibly literally, the “Do-Nothing Congress.” Congress can act only when the House and Senate agree. But agreement could be scarce over the next two years. Indeed, just getting House Republicans to agree among themselves will be a challenge, as the ongoing battle over selecting a speaker shows. With just a narrow, ten-seat margin, which is likely to shrink by one after a special election in Virginia next month, and almost all significant House business conducted on a party-line basis, Republican leaders will need nearly every Republican vote to pass legislation. That gives rank-and-file Republicans who are willing to defy their colleagues, as is the case with many members of the ultra-conservative Freedom Caucus, leverage over which bills pass.

So the House is likely to operate as the Senate did during Biden’s first two years in office. Then Democrats could go only as far as Senators Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema were willing to travel. Now a rump group of House Republicans will have an outsized influence on policy. The two situations differ in one critical respect, though. Manchin and Sinema wanted the government to work and pulled Democrats toward the center. Defiant House Republicans instead want to pull their party to the far right, and they have shown that they will shut down the government to get what they want. (It’s why former Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner once called Jim Jordan, then the leader of the Freedom Caucus and presumptive chair of the House Judiciary Committee, a “legislative terrorist.”)

Whoever inherits the speaker’s gavel won’t be able to force holdout Republicans into line. Indeed, the holdouts will have leverage over the speaker. They are insisting that the House reinstate the so-called motion to “vacate the chair.” If they get their way, the holdouts will have the right to force a floor vote at any time to remove the speaker. That threat guarantees a weak speakership.

Democratic strategists may be tempted to applaud the disarray among House Republicans, calculating it will help their candidates in 2024. That might be true. But it will come at the price of massive political dysfunction. Gridlock may the best outcome; chaos the worst. One critical challenge will be the debt ceiling, which the U.S. government could hit as early as this summer. A failure to raise the debt ceiling would be calamitous. Some Republicans already say that they won’t vote to raise the debt ceiling unless Democrats agree to slash an array of spending programs. Democrats are saying they will not negotiate at all. The game of chicken is on.

3. Congress will embrace Biden’s get-tough policy on China, perhaps too much so, and it might complicate but won’t end support for Ukraine. Bipartisanship may be an endangered species on Capitol Hill today, but it is alive and well when it comes to U.S. policy toward China. Both parties have abandoned strategic engagement with Beijing and embraced geopolitical competition. The risk now is that U.S. policy will, as has happened so many times before, overcorrect. Republicans are pushing a hard line on China and will attack any steps the Biden administration takes that can be interpreted as being “soft” on Beijing. That pressure can strengthen the administration’s bargaining position by signaling U.S. resolve. It can also escalate tensions if determination is seen as provocation. On that score, a decision by the new speaker to travel to Taiwan could be critical. Beijing will likely react even more aggressively than it did after Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit last August.

Meanwhile, much has been made of flagging support within the Republican Party for aiding Ukraine. Republican voters do seem to be less supportive of Ukraine, but most Republican lawmakers continue to back Kyiv. The challenge that Biden faces isn’t that the House will vote outright to end U.S. support for Ukraine. It’s that the small but vocal anti-Ukraine bloc in the House will succeed in tying support for Ukraine to making big changes to U.S. immigration and asylum policy, changes that most Democrats will find unacceptable. The argument that the Biden administration wants to secure Ukraine’s borders but not America’s is factually inaccurate but it could be politically powerful. Some pro-Ukraine Republicans in both chambers may join the effort to avoid antagonizing their base. The question would then become how to craft a deal that gives all sides something of what they want. That could prove difficult.

In all, the 118th Congress looks set to produce more turbulence than progress.

Creative Commons: Some rights reserved.

This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License.

View License Detail

cfr.org · by Lindsay Maizland

21. Kevin Rudd: US needs to stop throwing allies ‘under a bus’

Excerpt:

“For the future, what is the missing elements in US grand strategy? It’s called the economy, stupid,” Rudd told Bloomberg TV, quoting a famous dictum attributed to former Bill Clinton adviser James Carville.

​

Kevin Rudd: US needs to stop throwing allies ‘under a bus’

The Sydney Morning Herald · by Matthew Knott · January 4, 2023

Updated January 4, 2023 — 3.37pmfirst published at 3.27pm

, register or subscribe to save articles for later.

Australia’s incoming ambassador to the United States, Kevin Rudd, has declared America needs to stop throwing its allies “under a bus” if it wants to counter China’s economic influence in the Asia-Pacific.

Rudd, who will take up his Washington posting in March, said the US was operating with “one arm tied behind its back” in Asia because it had neglected the importance of trade in favour of a narrow focus on defence and national security.

Kevin Rudd said the US was operating with “one arm tied behind its back” in Asia because of its neglect of economics. Credit:Darren England

“For the future, what is the missing elements in US grand strategy? It’s called the economy, stupid,” Rudd told Bloomberg TV, quoting a famous dictum attributed to former Bill Clinton adviser James Carville.

“You cannot continue to assume that there’ll be collective solidarity on security questions, but on the economy, the United States is happy to throw some of its allies under a bus.”

Rudd was echoing recent statements by Foreign Minister Penny Wong, who last month made a similar argument in a speech in Washington, albeit using more diplomatic language.

“On the economy, the United States is happy to throw some of its allies under a bus.”

Kevin Rudd

The former prime minister stressed he was speaking in his capacity as President of the Asia Society and had not begun his ambassadorial role, noting it was “three months before I turn into a pumpkin”.

Rudd noted the US political class was now dominated by an “overriding protectionist sentiment”, but urged the Congress to do more to open American markets to allies in Asia and Europe.

The Biden administration has stuck with former president Donald Trump’s decision to ditch the Trans-Pacific Partnership, reflecting a recent turn away from free trade in the US.

The Biden administration is not renewing the Trans-Pacific partnership, which Donald Trump dumped in his first week in office.Credit:AP

It has been 10 years since the US entered into a free trade agreement with a new trading partner.

Foreign affairs expert Ian Bremmer, the chair of political-risk consultants Eurasia Group, said Rudd was “completely right” in his assessment.

“We, the United States, do not have a trade policy,” he said.

“As Kevin said, unless Congress – the Democrats, the Republicans – are prepared to actually speak coherently about a long-term US economic strategy, the national security strategy doesn’t get you where you need to go.”

Wong said last month that nations in the Indo-Pacific see “development, connectivity, digital trade and the energy transition as vital domains in which consistent US leadership and influence would be welcome”.

Australia and the US need to demonstrate to countries in the region that “we want to do business and create wealth with them”, Wong told the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“Second, we need to demonstrate that we have interests we want to nurture beyond security interests,” she said.

“That their interest in stability and development is an interest we share – that we have skin in the game.”

When Prime Minister Anthony Albanese appointed Rudd to the role last month, he said he brought “unmatched experience to the role”.

“He has served as prime minister, foreign minister, held prominent academic roles and worked extensively in the United States,” Albanese said.

“Kevin Rudd will be seen in the United States as a very significant appointment.”

Rudd will replace former Liberal Senator Arthur Sinodinos, who has served as US ambassador since 2020.

Cut through the noise of federal politics with news, views and expert analysis from Jacqueline Maley.

, register or subscribe to save articles for later.

License this article

• Trade
• Foreign relations

Matthew Knott is the foreign affairs and national security correspondent for The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age.Connect via Twitter or Facebook.

The Sydney Morning Herald · by Matthew Knott · January 4, 2023

22. Ukraine Needs Long-Range Firepower for Victory

Excerpts:

As referenced above, Kyiv is already laying the technological groundwork for this shift, but it likely will not be able to scale it up to a strategically impactful level without NATO support. A Ukrainian deep drone strike campaign should be a Ukrainian enterprise from build to bang, but this would not preclude NATO countries from providing component parts, especially since they have already collectively provided Ukraine with systems responsible for killing thousands of Russian soldiers to date. Yet Moscow has not crossed the nuclear threshold or otherwise sought direct military conflict with the alliance. Key inputs would include guidance systems, motors, and multi-effect warheads. Loitering munitions capable of accurately delivering 40 kilograms (or 88 pounds) or more of explosives to a target 1,000 kilometers away at a unit cost of $100,000 or less would not be out of the question. That would mean delivering a warhead akin to a Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb over a cruise missile range at a cost roughly equivalent to a Javelin missile round.

The stakes are high—and likely generational. Ukraine has an uninvited but real chance to build back stronger—if Russia is pushed completely out. If, however, Russia retains a foothold (including in Crimea), investors will avoid Ukraine, a Texas-sized void of instability will plague the remainder of Europe, and other Russian neighbors—including the Baltics, Poland, and Kazakhstan—will face a Kremlin emboldened to again trade blood and treasure for soil. Moreover, if the United States does not step up in 2023, then the war and its consequences will not somehow disappear. They will instead be amplified in the present and compounded for future leaders to face, likely on much more unfavorable terms.

Shifting strategy and expanding U.S. support for Ukraine to include high-volume, longer-range precision fires would be an investment in Eurasian and global security and well-being. Simply staying the course and failing to offset Russia’s strategic shift of recent weeks would (in fact) amount to making a decision—albeit one that imperils longer-term regional and American security interests. The West cannot hide from the ugliness Russia chose to unleash, but it has the capacity to help Ukraine defeat it and set the conditions for a lasting peace. Decisions Washington makes in the coming 12 months—and that American voters have a voice in and should speak in support of—will shape Eurasia and core American economic and security interests for the next 25 years and perhaps longer.

Ukraine Needs Long-Range Firepower for Victory

Kyiv’s allies should give it the ability to shift strategic gears.

By Gabriel B. Collins, the Baker Botts fellow in energy and environmental regulatory affairs at Rice University’s James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/04/ukraine-long-range-firepower-victory/

JANUARY 4, 2023, 10:42 AM

Ending the war in Ukraine and saving lives requires decisively defeating Russia. But exceedingly difficult decisions lie ahead. Moscow’s campaign of destruction against Ukraine’s energy system weaponizes winter against Ukrainian civilians, seeks to exhaust Ukraine’s air defenses, and sets the stage for a significantly more severe European and global energy crisis in the winter of 2023 and 2024. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s likely goals are to make Ukraine uninhabitable and destabilize European politics through a refugee crisis, break the political will of Ukraine’s military benefactors, and force a cease-fire that allows Russia to retain stolen territory. As a backstop, Russia aims to destroy Ukraine’s infrastructure so thoroughly as to render it an economically failed state ripe for re-invasion after a temporary peace.

Ukraine thus finds itself on the wrong side of a highly consequential law of conflict: The offensive (Russia) has the initiative in altering its strategy and only needs to be right once to inflict massive, potentially existential harm. Kyiv needs a strategic shift in 2023 to save its citizens’ lives and spare the country further destruction by “defending forward,” taking a offensive approach to shield its citizens, but it will be hard pressed to do so without political assent from key NATO parties, especially the United States. The status quo approach favors Russia over time. How, therefore, might American and other NATO decision-makers think about accepting incremental risk in the near term versus deferring a strategy shift decision now and instead accepting future risk?

To start, Russia’s escalatory shift—if successful in retaining seized Ukrainian territories—would very plausibly embolden it for further revisionist actions. This would open pathways to direct NATO-Russia military confrontation that have not yet arisen even in today’s tense environment. Future campaigns of conquest would in many cases leave the United States and its allies with far fewer and much worse options than what they face now. Imagine a future attack on the Suwalki Gap to create a land bridge from Kaliningrad, Russia, to Belarus, for instance.

This means policy decisions on Ukraine must look at today—but with an eye to deterring wars of tomorrow. As recent history shows, any remnant Russian territorial foothold within Ukraine’s 1991 borders will likely become Moscow’s pretext for its next conflict, just as Russia’s seizure of Crimea and parts of the Donbas in 2014 helped set the stage for the current war. For centuries, Moscow has displayed a pattern of seeking “security through conquest.” These actions have, at various times, included expanding into the Baltics, Moldova, Finland, and much of modern Ukraine; participating in several partitions of Poland; conquering much of the Caucasus and Central Asia; and executing multiple takeovers of Crimea—most recently in 2014. Russian political figures may disagree on internal governance, but their relative alignment on territorial expansion in the former Soviet and Russian imperial zones suggests that even significant changes to who runs Russia would not assure neighbors’ security.

Deterring a future war means Ukraine will first need to recapture a nearly Hungary-sized portion of its territory that remains under Russian control. This will likely require main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, lots of artillery, and the ability to interdict Russian troops and supplies 30 miles (and ideally, much farther) behind the front lines. I focus on the last item—long-range precision strike capacity—because Ukraine cannot win without it, and only the United States can both provide it at scale and inspire other alliance partners to join in.

Longer-range precision fires do two key things. First, on the tactical level, they allow Ukraine to expend munitions rather than soldiers and can make Russia’s occupation of the Donbas, Sea of Azov coast, and eventually Crimea untenable. The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (known as HIMARS) has been critical to date. HIMARS’s lethality would rise to a whole new level if NATO provides the Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb system—which offers roughly twice the range of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System weapons that Ukraine now uses, high accuracy, formidable hard target destruction capabilities, and an existing “ready to go” inventory of thousands of munitions. In short, the Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb would turn a HIMARS truck into a poor man’s tactical jet—without the associated vulnerabilities to Russian air defenses.

Second, much longer-range fires could help Ukraine curtail strikes on its battered civilian and industrial infrastructure as well as interdict Russian military regeneration and reinforcement capacities before they reach the battlefield, goals that upgraded air defenses alone cannot achieve. Kyiv now pursues a 1,000-kilometer (or 621-mile) range indigenous drone system, which could target airfields in Belarus and deep into Russia as well as munitions plants, naval bases, fuel storage, military depots, staging areas, and railways. Deep strikes—at an intensity of dozens or more per month—would be a proportional response against Russia’s now monthslong campaign against Kyiv’s industrial base and energy system. They would also erode Russia’s offensive warfare capacity without directly targeting Russian civilians or political leadership, thus advancing military aims while managing escalation potential.

Ukrainian deep strikes aiming to degrade Russia’s offensive military potential would borrow from NATO’s 1980s Follow-On Forces Attack concept. This approach sought to first hold ground and then facilitate battlefield victory by disrupting and destroying follow-on Soviet forces and logistical links up to at least 800 kilometers (or 497 miles) behind the front lines, defending forward to help reduce nuclear escalation risks. A modern higher-intensity Ukrainian deep interdiction campaign would also seek to facilitate battlefield victory while simultaneously being self-defensive. The objective would be a secure peace for both Ukraine and Russia based on restoration of—and respect for—pre-2014 borders. Public and private diplomacy can and should emphasize that point.

Deep interdiction is not by itself a war-ender. But it would turn time and defense burdens against Russia by reducing ammunition availability as well as facilitate Ukraine’s battlefield gains by forcing Russia to choose between allocating air defense resources to protect its military sustainment base or forces on the battlefield. Scalable 1,000-kilometer-range loitering munition production would also give Ukraine the ability to credibly retaliate if Russia began using ballistic missiles imported from Iran to strike targets in Ukraine.

As referenced above, Kyiv is already laying the technological groundwork for this shift, but it likely will not be able to scale it up to a strategically impactful level without NATO support. A Ukrainian deep drone strike campaign should be a Ukrainian enterprise from build to bang, but this would not preclude NATO countries from providing component parts, especially since they have already collectively provided Ukraine with systems responsible for killing thousands of Russian soldiers to date. Yet Moscow has not crossed the nuclear threshold or otherwise sought direct military conflict with the alliance. Key inputs would include guidance systems, motors, and multi-effect warheads. Loitering munitions capable of accurately delivering 40 kilograms (or 88 pounds) or more of explosives to a target 1,000 kilometers away at a unit cost of $100,000 or less would not be out of the question. That would mean delivering a warhead akin to a Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb over a cruise missile range at a cost roughly equivalent to a Javelin missile round.

The stakes are high—and likely generational. Ukraine has an uninvited but real chance to build back stronger—if Russia is pushed completely out. If, however, Russia retains a foothold (including in Crimea), investors will avoid Ukraine, a Texas-sized void of instability will plague the remainder of Europe, and other Russian neighbors—including the Baltics, Poland, and Kazakhstan—will face a Kremlin emboldened to again trade blood and treasure for soil. Moreover, if the United States does not step up in 2023, then the war and its consequences will not somehow disappear. They will instead be amplified in the present and compounded for future leaders to face, likely on much more unfavorable terms.

Shifting strategy and expanding U.S. support for Ukraine to include high-volume, longer-range precision fires would be an investment in Eurasian and global security and well-being. Simply staying the course and failing to offset Russia’s strategic shift of recent weeks would (in fact) amount to making a decision—albeit one that imperils longer-term regional and American security interests. The West cannot hide from the ugliness Russia chose to unleash, but it has the capacity to help Ukraine defeat it and set the conditions for a lasting peace. Decisions Washington makes in the coming 12 months—and that American voters have a voice in and should speak in support of—will shape Eurasia and core American economic and security interests for the next 25 years and perhaps longer.

Gabriel B. Collins is the Baker Botts fellow in energy and environmental regulatory affairs at Rice University’s James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, whose funding sources are listed here, and a senior visiting research fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.

23. Biden weighs sending Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Ukraine

​I recall turning in our M113 APCs in Germany in 1983 and receiving our new M2 Bradleys​. It has been around for a long time.

Biden weighs sending Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Ukraine

AP · by AAMER MADHANI and TARA COPP · January 4, 2023

WASHINGTON (AP) — President Joe Biden said Wednesday that the U.S. is considering sending Bradley Fighting Vehicles to help Ukraine combat Russia’s ongoing invasion.

Biden was asked during an exchange with reporters while traveling in Kentucky whether providing the tracked armored fighting vehicle to Ukraine was on the table. He responded “yes,” without offering further comment.

With Russia’s war on Ukraine now in its 11th month, Kyiv has been pressing the U.S. for tanks, longer-range missiles, armor and air defense systems. Intense fighting has continued in eastern Ukraine despite the onset of winter.

The Bradley is a medium armored combat vehicle that can serve as a troop carrier. It has tracks rather than wheels, but the vehicle is lighter and more agile than a tank. It can carry about 10 personnel, or be configured instead to carry additional ammunition or communications equipment.

ADVERTISEMENT

Bradleys are still used by the U.S. Army, although the military has been looking for a replacement for years.

The Pentagon has already provided Ukraine with more than 2,000 combat vehicles, including 477 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles and more than 1,200 Humvees.

Biden announced last month that the U.S. would for the first time send Ukraine a Patriot missile battery, the most advanced surface-to-air missile system the West has provided to help repel Russian aerial attacks.

Joe Biden

New Biden-picked majority sworn in for federal utility

Biden's agenda, lithium mine, tribes, greens collide in Reno

Biden intends to make his first visit to US-Mexico border

Jill Biden to have lesion removed from above right eye

The U.S. Congress last month approved nearly $44.9 billion in military and economic aid for a war that has no end in sight.

The same day Biden acknowledged that he was weighing sending Bradleys to Ukraine, France announced it would send French-made AMX-10 RC light tanks to Ukraine — the first tanks to be supplied by a Western European country. That announcement followed a phone call between French President Emmanuel Macron and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

The French presidency didn’t say how many tanks would be delivered and when. The NATO member has given Ukraine anti-tank and air defense missiles and rocket launchers.

Zelenskyy, who visited Washington last month, has made clear to the U.S. and Western allies that Ukraine needs more sophisticated weaponry.

“I assure you that Ukrainian soldiers can perfectly operate American tanks and planes for themselves,” Zelenskyy said during an address to American lawmakers during the visit.

AP · by AAMER MADHANI and TARA COPP · January 4, 2023

​

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com