Quotes of the Day:

“History does not repeat, but it does instruct. As the Founding Fathers debated our Constitution, they took instruction from the history they knew. Concerned that the democratic republic they envisioned would collapse, they contemplated the descent of ancient democracies and republics into oligarchy and empire. As they knew, Aristotle warned that inequality brought instability, while Plato believed that demagogues exploited free speech to install themselves as tyrants. In founding a democratic republic upon law and establishing a system of checks and balances, the Founding Fathers sought to avoid the evil that they, like the ancient philosophers, called tyranny. They had in mind the usurpation of power by a single individual or group, or the circumvention of law by rulers for their own benefit. Much of the succeeding political debate in the United States has concerned the problem of tyranny within American society: over slaves and women, for example.”

– Timothy Snyder

"When any government, or any church for that matter, undertakes to say to its subjects, This you may not read, this you must not see, this you are forbidden to know, the end result is tyranny and oppression no matter how holy the motives."

– Robert A. Heinlein

"A democracy thrives on diversity. Tyranny oppresses it."

– Sam Brownback

1. Sydney Seiler: "Trump is busy, Korea is vulnerable… North Korea's provocation is a good time" [Washington Report]

2. Trump picks aide involved in planning summits with Kim as senior White House official

3. Zelenskyy says Russia lost battalion of N. Korean soldiers in 2 days in Kursk region: report

4. Court dismisses Yoon's objection to execution of detention warrant

5. Presidential security chief booked for insurrection charges in martial law probe

6. Yoon to testify at his impeachment trial: lawyer

7. Rallies for, against Yoon's impeachment take place for 3rd day near presidential residence

8. Blinken wades into political crisis with stop in South Korea

9. Choi calls for safety of civil servants, citizens during law execution

10. Navy conducts first maritime drills this year

11. 2 engines of crashed Jeju Air jet moved to hangar for investigation

12. 8 Simmering Threats You Shouldn’t Ignore in 2025

13. U.S. Congress “Renews Adoption of Bill to Reauthorize North Korean Human Rights Act”

14. Who is Kim Jong-un's next military target for Russia?

1. Sydney Seiler: "Trump is busy, Korea is vulnerable… North Korea's provocation is a good time" [Washington Report]

​This is Google translation of a Naver News Report. The original Korean is at the link below.

Syd Seiler covers a lot of ground (including some biographical information I was not aware of - he has a fascinating personal history).

Sydney Seiler: "Trump is busy, Korea is vulnerable… North Korea's provocation is a good time" [Washington Report]

Entered 2025.01.05. 8:00 AM  Last modified 2025.01.05. 8:45 AM Original article

Reporter Lee Yoon-hee

https://n.news.naver.com/mnews/article/003/0012997918?utm

A Korean Peninsula expert with 40 years of experience, serving as the U.S. State Department's Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks

"A surprise event between North Korea and the U.S. cannot be ruled out, but it is unlikely to be meaningful."

"Debate on South Korea's nuclear armament is necessary... Trump expected to pressure defense spending."

[Washington = Newsis] Correspondent Lee Yoon-hee = Sidney Seiler, former Director of National Intelligence ( DNI ) and National Intelligence Council ( NIC ) North Korea Officer and special envoy for the U.S. State Department's Six-Party Talks, is being interviewed by Newsis in Bethesda, Maryland, U.S. on the 2nd (local time). 2025.01.05.

[Washington=Newsis] Correspondent Lee Yoon-hee = Sidney Seiler, former Director of National Intelligence ( DNI ) and National Intelligence Council ( NIC ) North Korea Affairs Officer and a leading Korean Peninsula expert in the United States, warned that the inauguration of the Donald Trump administration in the United States this year and the domestic chaos in South Korea have created an environment in which North Korea can engage in provocations without hesitation.

When meeting with Newsis at a cafe in Bethesda, Maryland, USA on the 2nd (local time), when asked if there were concerns that tensions on the Korean Peninsula would heighten this year, the former officer said, “I think it’s possible,” and gave this answer.

Trump is busy going… “I will pressure Korea to refrain from expanding the war”

Former Sidney said, “If Kim Jong-un wants to influence (North Korea) policy in the long term, he will wait and see how the impeachment process goes (in South Korea) and the elections go before taking action,” but added, “I don’t know if he can wait that long.” He continued,

“Kim Jong-un will have a very rare opportunity if Trump takes office,” and “Trump will be distracted by Ukraine, Gaza, and China while also dealing with all domestic issues, and the South Korean government is vulnerable.” Therefore, even if North Korea engages in provocations, the Trump administration, which does not want attention and capabilities to be diverted to the Korean Peninsula, is likely to demand that South Korea refrain from retaliatory responses. There is also a question mark over whether South Korea, suffering from the aftermath of martial law, can properly respond to North Korea’s provocations. "There is no better time to take provocative action to create confusion. The US is likely to put significant pressure on South Korea to avoid escalation in retaliation," said former Sidney. "So the North will want to embarrass and humiliate the South Korean government and military, and reinforce the impression that with their nuclear weapons, they can do whatever they want without retaliation or cost," he predicted. "That is the likely scenario in March, April, May."

President-elect Trump will take office on the 20th, and his top priorities in the diplomatic field are the war in Ukraine and Russia and resolving the Gaza conflict.

[Seoul = Newsis] On July 27, 2015, Sydney Seiler, then U.S. State Department Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks, answers reporters' questions after meeting with Kim Gunn, then Director of the North Korean Nuclear Diplomacy Planning Team at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building in Jongno-gu, Seoul. 2025.01.05.

"Trump-Kim Jong-un, Meaningful Meeting Likelihood Low"

There are many observations that the Trump administration will not address the North Korea issue right away, but will attempt to talk to North Korea at some point during its term. However, former Sidney believes that meaningful dialogue is unlikely. However, it is nearly impossible for the United States, an ally of South Korea, to officially recognize North Korea as a nuclear state. The reason that President-elect Trump met with Chairman Kim Jong-un several times during his term in office without any results was because their positions did not narrow, and this time, Sidney analyzes that this will be no exception. “In Singapore and Hanoi, North Korea’s goal was to solidify its status as a nuclear state and start a new relationship with the United States that recognizes North Korea’s nuclear status, but Trump made it clear that he would not do that,” Sidney explained. He added, “I have repeatedly argued that it is unlikely that Kim Jong-un and Trump will have a meaningful meeting,” and “A surprise event such as a phone call or a congratulatory message for his birthday or inauguration cannot be ruled out, but that is as far as it goes. Why would Kim Jong-un, who has a new friend in Vladimir Putin, rely on Trump?” He believes that cooperation between North Korea and Russia is increasingly strategic in nature, and there is a possibility that it will continue as a fundamental cooperative relationship even after the end of the Ukraine war.

He pointed out that "there are those who say that North Korea has been trying to improve relations with the United States for the past 30 years, but that is absolutely not true. North Korea has been trying to develop and deploy nuclear missile programs for 30 years, and in the process, as a nuclear power, they hoped to normalize relations with the United States."

He added that "Kim Jong-un left the meeting when he judged that such a relationship was not possible, and that is why we have not talked (with North Korea) since 2019."

[Seoul = Newsis] On October 29, 2014, Sydney Seiler, then US State Department Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks, meets with Shin Jae-hyun, then Director of the North Korean Nuclear Diplomacy Planning Team at the Korean Peninsula Peace Negotiation Headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building in Sejong-ro, Seoul. 2025.01.05.

"Need to discuss nuclear armament in Korea? Could lead to war between North and South Korea?"

As North Korea's nuclear capabilities continue to develop and the security threat to the Korean Peninsula increases, voices calling for its own nuclear armament are louder than ever in South Korea. Survey results have shown that a significant number of the public agrees with the necessity, and some politicians are actively advocating for the necessity. Regarding the argument for South Korea's nuclear armament, former Director Seiler said, "I welcome the debate. I think this is an area that requires serious discussion." However, at the same time, former Director Seiler points out that South Korea's nuclear development could encourage North Korea to use nuclear weapons first. continued, "They know that South Korea will build more nuclear weapons because it has more resources," and warned, "But that takes time, so it gives North Korea an incentive to take advantage of the situation before South Korea can build its own deterrent. This is a real risk." He also pointed out that we should consider what would happen if an actual nuclear war between the two Koreas broke out after South Korea arming itself with nuclear weapons. Former Director Seiler said, “Let’s say North Korea attacks a city with a smaller population than Seoul, like Gangneung or Chuncheon. South Korea might consider retaliation, but what if North Korea says, ‘If you retaliate, we’ll attack Seoul this time?’” He explained, “There are such considerations when looking at a nuclear war scenario.” He added, “It’s hard to believe that the U.S. military would still be stationed in a nuclear-armed South Korea,” and “South Korea’s nuclear armament would mean that the U.S. would not station troops on the Korean Peninsula.”

On the other hand, the United States has consistently opposed South Korea's nuclear armament, which could shake the global non-proliferation regime ( NPT ). Opponents worry that if South Korea pushes ahead with nuclear development, it will face economic sanctions and cracks in the South Korea-US alliance. There are also concerns that it will deepen tensions with existing nuclear powers such as China and Russia and lead to a chain of nuclear development by neighboring countries such as Japan.

Previously, there was a high perception that "North Korea would never use nuclear weapons against its own people. They are trying to use them as bargaining chips," but he mentioned that it has become clear that North Korea has developed these weapons in order to attack South Korea. He also said that the intercontinental ballistic missiles ( ICBMs ) aimed at the United States are ultimately intended to weaken South Korea's security capabilities.

He said, "We call it 'Use or lose . ' North Korea naturally has more nuclear weapons than South Korea, and if South Korea goes down that path, North Korea will fall into a dilemma (of losing if it doesn't use its nuclear weapons)."

[Seoul = AP/ Newsis] On October 28, 2014, then US State Department Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks Sidney Seiler attended the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative meeting held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building in Seoul. 2025.01.05.

"Trump Era, Defense Budget and Trade Balance to Be Under Pressure"

Meanwhile, former Director Seiler predicted that the Trump administration’s re-launch would likely lead to discussions on increasing the cost-sharing between South Korea and the U.S. and adjusting the number of U.S. President-elect Trump nominated Elbridge Colby, who has been advocating for the adjustment of the role of USFK, as the undersecretary of defense for policy. Colby has expressed the opinion that the US should leave the response to North Korea to South Korea and focus on issues such as China and Taiwan, and he is likely to lead the discussion on the adjustment of USFK in the future. "What I think Colby is trying to say is that we need to have a conversation to understand (the situation)," he said. "We need to seriously consider what the role of USFK is with respect to Taiwan, and whether we need to at least discuss whether we can use the base for things like forward deployment or logistical transport."

He said, "Trump is very serious about solving tariffs and the trade deficit, and he will look into the fact that South Korea's trade surplus with the U.S. was $51 billion and that defense spending is less than 3% of GDP ," adding, "So I think there will be pressure for a more equitable distribution."

However, he was optimistic, saying, "I was in South Korea when the Special Measures Agreement ( SMA ) negotiations were underway under the previous Trump administration. After the negotiations, the South Korea-U.S. alliance was still intact, and South Korea's support for the U.S. military was high and hardly affected by the SMA

negotiations. " Regarding the adjustment of the U.S. Forces Korea, he said, "I first looked into this issue in 1982, before we could even imagine that North Korea would have nuclear weapons. Now, 40 years later, it makes sense to look into how many troops South Korea needs and what the right composition is." Former Director Seiler worked with

Colby at the DNI . "Colby is a realist, not an isolationist," he said, explaining that analysts make such claims because there are clear signs that China is preparing to invade Taiwan, while North Korea does not.

[Washington = Newsis] Correspondent Lee Yoon-hee = Sidney Seiler, former Director of National Intelligence ( DNI ) and National Intelligence Council ( NIC ) North Korea Officer and special envoy for the U.S. State Department's Six-Party Talks, is being interviewed by Newsis in Bethesda, Maryland, U.S. on the 2nd (local time). 2025.01.05.

Due to circumstances, he dropped out of school and enlisted… After being dispatched to Korea, he became a top expert in the US

Former Director Seiler is a former member of the Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA ). He worked as the White House National Security Council Korea Affairs Officer, the State Department Six-Party Talks Special Envoy, the Senior Analyst for US Forces Korea, and the NIC

North Korea Officer until 2023, before retiring from public office. He is currently a Senior Advisor (Non-Permanent) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ). CSIS describes him as “one of the best North Korea experts in the United States.”

Having studied the Korean Peninsula issue for over 40 years, he is evaluated as someone with diverse practical experience in not only analysis but also information gathering, policy making, contact with North Korea, and negotiation. He

did not set out to become a Korean Peninsula expert from the beginning. In the early 1980s, due to difficult family circumstances, he dropped out of school and enlisted in the military. He was dispatched overseas in 1982, and that was Korea. At

the age of 19, with no knowledge of Korea, he studied Korean on orders from his superiors, and he says, “For some reason, Korean was very easy.” Afterwards, he lived in Korea for over 15 years, including receiving a master's degree from Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Relations.

He often spoke fluent Korean during interviews, and on New Year's Day, he cooked and ate tteokguk with his wife.

Correspondent Lee Yoon-hee (sympathy@newsis.com)

2. Trump picks aide involved in planning summits with Kim as senior White House official

As an aside his wife, Hayley D'Antuono Harrison, as her chief of staff. has been named chief of staff to the First Lady.

Other than planning events I do not think Mr. Harrison has any other relevant Korea experience from what I could find out about him.

Trump picks aide involved in planning summits with Kim as senior White House official | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 5, 2025

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Jan. 4 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President-elect Donald Trump has picked an aide, who was involved in planning summits with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during his first term, as a senior White House official, his transition team said Saturday.

The team issued a statement on the incoming president's decision to appoint William Beau Harrison as an assistant to the president and deputy chief of staff for operations, noting that Harrison played a "critical" role in the planning of in-person meetings with the North Korean leader.

The decision came amid expectations that Trump might seek to revive his personal diplomacy with Kim after taking office on Jan. 20. During his election campaign, Trump repeatedly boasted about his ties with Kim, saying he "got along very well" with the reclusive leader.

"During President Trump's first term, Mr. Harrison served as the liaison between the operational elements of the Executive Office of the President and was charged with the coordination and execution of all presidential travel, including dozens of complex international visits," the team said.

"He has participated in and led multiple U.S. delegations across the globe in countries such as North Korea, Iraq and Afghanistan and played a critical role in planning each of the historic summits with DPRK leader Kim Jong-un," the team added. DPRK is short for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Last month, Trump named former Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell as his presidential envoy for special missions that he said covers "some of the hottest spots" around the world, including North Korea.

Trump has also named Alex Wong, who was engaged in working-level nuclear talks with Pyongyang during his first term, as his principal deputy national security adviser.

Some observers said his selection of Grenell and Wong bodes well for the resumption of U.S. diplomacy toward Pyongyang, though skepticism lingers over whether Pyongyang would accede to any diplomatic feelers from Washington given its deepening partnership with Moscow.

In December, North Korea declared its "toughest" counteraction strategy toward the United States during a key meeting of the ruling Workers' Party, presided over by Kim.

While in office, Trump had three in-person meetings with the North Korean leader, including the first summit in Singapore in 2018. Since the no-deal summit in Hanoi in 2019, meaningful nuclear negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang have been stalled.

This AFP file photo shows U.S. President Donald Trump (R) shaking hands with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un after signing a joint statement at the Capella Singapore hotel on Sentosa Island in Singapore on June 12, 2018. (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 5, 2025

3. Zelenskyy says Russia lost battalion of N. Korean soldiers in 2 days in Kursk region: report

Zelenskyy says Russia lost battalion of N. Korean soldiers in 2 days in Kursk region: report | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · January 5, 2025

SEOUL, Jan. 5 (Yonhap) -- Russia has lost up to a battalion of North Korean soldiers over the past two days in its western Kursk border region in the ongoing war against Ukraine, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said.

Zelenskyy made the claim citing the report he received from his military, saying that the Russian army "lost up to a battalion of infantry North Korean soldiers and Russian paratroopers today and yesterday," Ukrainian media RBC reported Saturday (local time).

Zelenskyy's latest remark came after South Korea's spy agency confirmed Ukraine's capture of an injured North Korean soldier who later died, in the first reported instance of its kind.

Some 11,000 North Korean troops have been sent to Russia so far, with signs of preparations for additional deployment of troops and military equipment, according to South Korean officials.

Zelenskyy said earlier that North Korea has suffered more than 3,000 casualties in the Kursk region.

This file photo, released by the Associated Press, shows Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy speaking with the media as he arrives for a European Union summit in Brussels on Dec. 19, 2024. (Yonhap)

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · January 5, 2025

4. Court dismisses Yoon's objection to execution of detention warrant

Court dismisses Yoon's objection to execution of detention warrant | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · January 5, 2025

SEOUL, Jan. 5 (Yonhap) -- A Seoul court on Sunday dismissed the injunction filed by President Yoon Suk Yeol that sought to invalidate the court warrants to detain him and search the presidential residence, court officials said.

The Seoul Western District Court made the decision days after Yoon's legal defense team lodged the objection to suspend the effect of the warrants that they called "illegal."

No details on the grounds for the court's dismissal were immediately available.

The same court approved the warrant to detain Yoon for questioning over his role in the failed Dec. 3 martial law bid. It also issued a warrant to search the presidential residence compound in central Seoul.

The Corruption Investigation for High-ranking Officials handling Yoon's martial law case attempted to execute the warrants Friday, but it withdrew its officials from the site after a six-hour standoff with the Presidential Security Service blocking the entry.

Yoon's legal team has argued that the warrants were legally flawed, claiming the judge who issued them arbitrarily ruled that the criminal law prohibiting the execution of search or arrest warrants in restricted military and security areas does not apply to Yoon's case.

President Yoon Suk Yeol (Yonhap)

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · January 5, 2025

5. Presidential security chief booked for insurrection charges in martial law probe

Presidential security chief booked for insurrection charges in martial law probe | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 5, 2025

SEOUL, Jan. 5 (Yonhap) -- The head of the Presidential Security Service (PSS) has been booked on suspicions of insurrection in an ongoing probe into President Yoon Suk Yeol's short-lived martial law imposition last month, police said Sunday.

Park Chong-jun, chief of the PSS, has been additionally booked for insurrection charges, a police official told Yonhap News Agency.

Park is known to have called in Cho Ji-ho, commissioner general of the National Police Agency, to the presidential safe house three hours before Yoon declared martial law on Dec. 3.

Last week, Park was booked on suspicion of obstructing special official duties, as PSS officials, along with military personnel, blocked the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials from executing a warrant to detain Yoon.

Police have requested Park to appear for questioning on Tuesday after he snubbed an initial request made for Saturday.

Park was previously questioned by the police over two occasions as a witness in the martial law probe.

This photo, provided by the Presidential Security Service, shows its chief Park Chong-jun announcing a statement in an unspecified area near the presidential residence in Seoul on Jan. 5, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 5, 2025

6. Yoon to testify at his impeachment trial: lawyer

Yoon to testify at his impeachment trial: lawyer | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · January 5, 2025

SEOUL, Jan. 5 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol plans to testify at his impeachment trial before the Constitutional Court regarding his failed attempt to impose martial law early last month, Yoon's lawyer said Sunday.

The top court has set the dates to hold five court hearings for Yoon's impeachment trial until early February, with the first hearing scheduled to take place Jan. 14.

The other four sessions are due on Jan. 16, 21 and 23, and Feb. 4.

"The president plans to attend on an appropriate date and state his position," Yun Gap-geun, Yoon's legal counsel, said in a message to reporters.

Yun's message suggests that the president may be present at the first hearing.

President Yoon Suk Yeol (Yonhap)

Under the law regarding Constitutional Court proceedings, the president must attend the hearings, while his presence is not required for the preparatory hearings that take place prior to the start of the formal proceedings. Yoon did not attend the preparatory sessions.

If he does not appear for the first hearing, the court can reschedule the date. The court will move on with the proceedings if he fails to appear at the trial for the second time.

Since Yoon was suspended from his duties following the impeachment, he has stated through his defense team that he will focus on the impeachment trial.

Yoon has refused to comply with all summonses and other procedures requested by the law enforcement agencies investigating the martial law case, with his presidential security service blocking investigators' attempt Friday to execute the court warrant to detain Yoon.

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · January 5, 2025

7. Rallies for, against Yoon's impeachment take place for 3rd day near presidential residence

Rallies for, against Yoon's impeachment take place for 3rd day near presidential residence | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 5, 2025

SEOUL, Jan. 5 (Yonhap) -- Tens of thousands of people gathered near the presidential residence Sunday to rally for or against the detention of President Yoon Suk Yeol for a third consecutive day, with just a day left for investigators to execute a warrant to formally detain Yoon.

The Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO), handling the probe on Yoon's short-lived martial law imposition, has only until the end of Monday to execute the warrant, based on which it can either decide to file a court warrant for Yoon's formal arrest or release him.

On Sunday, protesters calling for Yoon's detention staged a rally near the presidential residence for a third day and vowed to extend the rally for another day.

Around 400 meters away, near Hangangjin subway station, Yoon's supporters also held a rally calling for invalidating the motion to impeach Yoon and his immediate return to office.

No clashes occurred, with police installing fences and mobilizing buses to keep the two groups of protesters apart.

On Friday, the CIO unsuccessfully attempted to execute the court warrant for Yoon's detention, engaging in a standoff with the Presidential Security Service that ended after six hours as the CIO decided to withdraw its officials, citing safety concerns.

Investigators were reportedly expected to make another attempt Monday to carry out the court warrants to detain the impeached president and search his residence.

The CIO was also reportedly considering refiling the detention warrant to extend its validity, or file a new warrant to pursue Yoon's formal arrest.

Yoon has not complied with the investigation, arguing the CIO lacks legal authority to investigate the case.

Groups of people call for (R) and oppose (L) President Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment and detention in separate rallies held near the presidential residence in Seoul on Jan. 5, 2024. (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 5, 2025

8. Blinken wades into political crisis with stop in South Korea

​What can the SECSTATE do about the domestic crisis? He must stay above the fray. He can only focus on north Korea and security issues.

Excerpts:

Blinken may face some criticism from the South Korean left for the visit but should be able to navigate the political crisis, said Sydney Seiler, a former US intelligence officer focused on Korea now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Blinken has a high enough profile to be above the fray, and can keep the focus on challenges such as China and North Korea, he said.

“Blinken can dodge a lot of these domestic South Korean landmines relatively easily and contextualise it not as trying to help the ruling party or artificially create a sense of normalcy where it otherwise isn’t,” Seiler said.

In a statement, the State Department did not directly mention the political crisis but said Blinken would seek to preserve trilateral cooperation with Japan, which has included enhanced intelligence sharing on North Korea.

Blinken’s visit comes at a time of change for both countries, with Trump returning to the White House on January 20.

Blinken wades into political crisis with stop in South Korea

Analysts expect Blinken to sidestep the crisis engulfing South Korea to keep the focus on Pyongyang and other security issues

https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/3293469/blinken-wades-political-crisis-stop-south-korea?utm_source=rss_feed

Agence France-Presse

Published: 10:29am, 5 Jan 2025

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken arrives late on Sunday in crisis-riven South Korea where he will seek delicately to encourage continuity with the policies, but not tactics, of the impeached president.

Blinken will hold talks with his South Korean counterpart Cho Tae-yul on Monday, the same day a warrant expires to arrest suspended President Yoon Suk-yeol who unsuccessfully tried to impose martial law on December 3.

Seoul is the first stop on what is likely to be Blinken’s final trip as the top US diplomat as he seeks to highlight President Joe Biden’s record rallying democratic allies before the return of the more mercurial Donald Trump.

Blinken will head afterwards to Tokyo, making it crucial in the eyes of his advisers not to snub South Korea, which has a fraught and often competitive relationship with Japan, a fellow US ally also home to thousands of American troops.

Yoon had once been a darling of the Biden administration with his bold moves to turn the page on friction with Japan and his eye on a greater role for South Korea on global issues.

Yoon joined Biden for a landmark three-way summit with Japan’s prime minister and – months before declaring martial law – was picked to lead a global democracy summit, a signature initiative for the outgoing US administration.

Yoon also memorably charmed his hosts on a state visit by belting out “American Pie” at a White House dinner.

Blinken may face some criticism from the South Korean left for the visit but should be able to navigate the political crisis, said Sydney Seiler, a former US intelligence officer focused on Korea now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Blinken has a high enough profile to be above the fray, and can keep the focus on challenges such as China and North Korea, he said.

“Blinken can dodge a lot of these domestic South Korean landmines relatively easily and contextualise it not as trying to help the ruling party or artificially create a sense of normalcy where it otherwise isn’t,” Seiler said.

In a statement, the State Department did not directly mention the political crisis but said Blinken would seek to preserve trilateral cooperation with Japan, which has included enhanced intelligence sharing on North Korea.

Blinken’s visit comes at a time of change for both countries, with Trump returning to the White House on January 20.

North Korea holds live-fire drills as US Secretary of State Blinken attends Seoul democracy summit

Paradoxically, while Biden worked closely with the conservative Yoon, Trump in his first term enjoyed a warm relationship with then-progressive president Moon Jae-in, who encouraged the US president’s groundbreaking personal diplomacy with North Korea.

The Biden administration has stressed since the crisis that it is reaching out to South Korean politicians across the divide, amid the uncertainties on who will lead Asia’s fourth-largest economy.

Progressive opposition leader Lee Jae-myung – who himself faces election disqualification in a court case – supports diplomacy with North Korea.

But the former labour activist has also taken stances that differ from those of both Biden and Trump.

Lee has criticised deployment of US-made THAAD missile defences, which Washington says are meant to protect against North Korea but which China sees as a provocation.

South Korea’s left has long championed a harder stance on Japan over its brutal 1910-1945 occupation of the Korean peninsula.

US officials said they had no warning of Yoon’s imposition of martial law, which brought masses of protesters to the streets.

Blinken, addressing reporters last month, said the crisis showed the strength of South Korea’s institutions built in the three decades since it embraced democracy.

“I think Korea is one of the most powerful stories in the world about the emergence of democracy and democratic resilience, and we’ll continue to look to Korea to set that example,” Blinken said.

9. Choi calls for safety of civil servants, citizens during law execution

The professionals doing their jobs and keeping the government working.

Choi calls for safety of civil servants, citizens during law execution | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Yoon-seung · January 5, 2025

SEOUL, Jan. 5 (Yonhap) -- Acting President Choi Sang-mok on Sunday urged government officials to take "extra caution" to prevent injuries to both civil servants and citizens during law enforcement activities.

"In such challenging situations, injuries to civil servants carrying out public duties should never occur," Choi said in a brief statement issued by the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

The acting president also emphasized the importance of ensuring the safety of both citizens and public officials during the enforcement of the law.

Although Choi did not refer to a specific case, there was a physical clash between members of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) and the police the previous day.

KCTU members attempted to march near President Yoon Suk Yeol's residence, but they were blocked by police. Over the course, two were detained for allegedly assaulting police officers.

Members of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions stage a rally near the residence of President Yoon Suk Yeol in Seoul on Jan. 4, 2025. (Yonhap)

colin@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Yoon-seung · January 5, 2025

10. Navy conducts first maritime drills this year

Navy conducts first maritime drills this year | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · January 5, 2025

SEOUL, Jan. 5 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's Navy said Sunday it has conducted its first maritime drills in 2025 across all seas in the east, west and south.

The drills took place Friday, involving a total of nine naval vessels and two aircraft from the First Fleet in the East Sea, the Second Fleet in the Yellow Sea and the Third Fleet in waters off the country's southern coast, the Navy said.

The Gwanggaeto the Great destroyer, the Chuncheon frigate and others of the First Fleet carried out an anti-submarine exercise, live-fire anti-ship drill and tactical maneuver training.

Frigates of the Second Fleet, along with the guided missile patrol ship and an AW-159 maritime operations helicopter, also took part in the drills.

The Third Fleet mobilized the Gyeongnam frigate and others for the exercises.

Yang Young-mo, the Navy's chief of staff, oversaw the drills aboard a P-8A maritime patrol aircraft and ordered a "staunch readiness posture through live environment training," according to the Navy.

This photo, provided by South Korea's Navy on Jan. 5, 2025, shows the Second Fleet conducting a live-fire exercise in the sea. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · January 5, 2025

11. 2 engines of crashed Jeju Air jet moved to hangar for investigation

2 engines of crashed Jeju Air jet moved to hangar for investigation | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Yoon-seung · January 5, 2025

SEOUL, Jan. 5 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's transport ministry said Sunday that authorities have moved two engines from the Jeju Air jet involved in a deadly crash last weekend to a hangar for a full-scale investigation.

The Jeju Air plane, with 181 people onboard returning from Bangkok, crashed while landing at Muan International Airport in the southwestern county of Muan on Dec. 29, killing all but two aboard.

One of the engines was transported to the hangar Friday, while the other was moved the previous day, the transport ministry said.

Authorities have also completed transcribing the two-hour audio recorded in the cockpit voice recorder, which may provide more clues about the cause of the accident.

The ministry said two aviation investigators plan to take the flight data recorder to the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board on Monday for analysis.

South Korea will also carry out a special investigation into 101 B737-800 planes, the same model of the crashed jet, currently operated by six South Korean air carriers, through Friday.

A police forensic team conducts an on-site investigation at the scene of the Jeju Air crash at Muan International Airport in southwestern South Korea on Dec. 31, 2024. (Yonhap)

colin@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Yoon-seung · January 5, 2025

12. 8 Simmering Threats You Shouldn’t Ignore in 2025

M​y two concerns with Korea.

One: why would Kim need to conduct an attack on the South to drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance when the current political turmoil (as well as the perception of a Trump administration that is not favorable to the alliance) will likely lead to a new ROK administration that will be favorable to continue north Korean subversion activities to achieve the saem effects without a kinetic strike?

Second: My real concern is an actual attack of the South due to Kim 's internal instability that he can no longer control. We are not paying attention to the growing internal instability in north Korea and what very well may be the effects when Kim no longer has any choices remaining.

Excerpts:

Politically, Kim’s international backing has also never been stronger. His new alliance with Moscow has given him access to resources and technology in exchange for munitions, equipment, and troops. A Beijing-Washington confrontation that Kim could exploit also appears to be brewing once the new U.S. administration takes office—if Kim sees the opportunity to drive a wedge between the U.S. and South Korea.

If Kim strikes, the risk is high that Seoul would feel forced to either accede to Kim or respond disproportionately and unilaterally show strength and force Kim to back down. Either outcome could destabilize the entire region.

T​he threats:

U.S. Military Strikes Targeting Mexico’s Cartels

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front Destabilizes the Philippines—Again

Norwegian Fishermen Take on the Kremlin

A Plausibly Deniable Russian War Against Europe

A North Korean Strike on a Divided and Distracted South

The Houthis Conquer All of Yemen

Russian Destabilization of Moldova

Manipur Violence Undermines Modi’s Regional Ambitions

8 Simmering Threats You Shouldn’t Ignore in 2025

From Moldova to Mexico, these conflicts are currently flying under the radar but could emerge as major flash points.

January 2, 2025, 6:00 AM

By Emma Ashford, Nick Aspinwall, Elisabeth Braw, John R. Deni, Markus Garlauskas, Mina Al-Oraibi, Natia Seskuria, and Sushant Singh

Foreign Policy

FP Live:

The International Crisis Group’s president and CEO, Comfort Ero, joins FP Live on Jan. 9 to discuss 10 conflicts to watch in the year ahead. Register now.

2025

FP’s look ahead

Earlier this week, Foreign Policy featured 10 conflicts to watch in 2025. Here, we are focusing on those international disputes that have been flying under the radar but could emerge as full-blown conflicts in the coming year.

This list is not intended to be predictive; rather, it is a warning from FP’s columnists and contributors that there are a number of flash points—from Manipur to Mindanao—that deserve more attention than they have received from experts on geopolitical risk.—Sasha Polakow-Suransky, deputy editor

Earlier this week, Foreign Policy featured 10 conflicts to watch in 2025. Here, we are focusing on those international disputes that have been flying under the radar but could emerge as full-blown conflicts in the coming year.

This list is not intended to be predictive; rather, it is a warning from FP’s columnists and contributors that there are a number of flash points—from Manipur to Mindanao—that deserve more attention than they have received from experts on geopolitical risk.—Sasha Polakow-Suransky, deputy editor

JUMP TO

U.S. Military Strikes Targeting Mexico’s Cartels

By Emma Ashford

A man holds two small children as others look into the burned-out shell of a car.

Members of a family look at one of the burned-out cars where nine people were killed during an ambush in Bavispe, Sonora mountains, Mexico, on Nov. 5, 2019. U.S. President Donald Trump offered to help Mexico “wage war” on its drug cartels after three women and six children from an American Mormon community were killed in an area notorious for drug traffickers. HERIKA MARTINEZ/AFP/Getty Images

During U.S. President Donald Trump’s first term, one often heard that his statements should be taken “seriously, but not literally.” Therefore, it’s surprising that so many people ignore the risk of conflict in one area where Trump has threatened the use of military force both literally and seriously: his threat to invade Mexico.

More precisely, during the 2024 presidential campaign, Trump repeatedly proposed the use of special forces, drones, and other tactics commonly used against terrorist groups for Mexican cartels to inhibit the smuggling of drugs and humans across the U.S. border. This is not a new idea: former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper wrote in his 2022 book that Trump once asked whether he could launch missiles into Mexico to destroy drug labs—and whether such strikes could be kept secret.

The idea has only grown more popular in conservative media and foreign-policy circles. Vice President-elect J.D. Vance, for example, has argued that the U.S. government should have the power to deploy troops to Mexico to restrain the flow of fentanyl. Trump’s incoming National Security Advisor Mike Waltz introduced a bill in 2023 that would have authorized the use of military force against the cartels, and an anonymous source recently told reporters that plans to send U.S. special forces to assassinate cartel leaders were being widely discussed within Trump’s transition team.

It might sound patently illegal—or even ridiculous—to suggest that the United States wage war on its neighbor, but the truth is that during the global war on terror, drone strikes and targeted assassinations of the kind that killed Osama bin Laden and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi have occurred in a legal gray zone. Presidents from both political parties have authorized missions that clearly violate the sovereignty of other states in the name of counterterrorism.

If the U.S. military can conduct drone strikes inside Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia without permission from their governments—so the logic goes—then why not Mexico? Many of the justifications already emerging from Trump’s circle sound like those advanced during the war on terror: The cartels do pose some direct threats to U.S. national security—whether from drugs, migrant flows, or other concerns—and Mexico has been unable to entirely control actors within its own territory.

Washington probably wouldn’t succeed either. Research suggests that targeted so-called decapitation strikes tend not to degrade terrorist groups, and the cartels have grown stronger in recent years even as several key leaders have been captured or killed. The United States struggled for years to contain the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) using similar methods. More worrisome is the risk that as further targeted or hands-off attacks fail, the more pressure the Trump administration might feel to move toward a larger-scale U.S. military role in Mexico.

If the incoming president’s statements and inclinations mean anything, the possibility that the Trump administration will engage in military action in Mexico in 2025 is a threat to be taken both seriously and literally.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front Destabilizes the Philippines—Again

By Nic Aspinwall

A man in uniform holds on to a gate behind yellow police tape.

A member of the military stands guard at the entrance to a gymnasium while police investigators look for evidence after a bomb attack at Mindanao State University in Marawi, Philippines, on Dec. 3, 2023. MERLYN MANOS/AFP/Getty Images

Geopolitical analysts who worry about the Philippines tend to focus on the contested South China Sea, where the Chinese coast guard and navy have attacked Philippine vessels in numerous clashes that the United States has called “unlawful” and “dangerous.” Manila, backed by Washington, has emphasized a shift to external defense and away from the internal conflicts with communist and Islamist insurgents that have preoccupied its military for decades.

But in the southern island of Mindanao’s Bangsamoro region, a historic election scheduled for May 2025 threatens to reignite a deadly conflict the country hoped it had left behind.

In 2014, the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed a peace agreement that ended a 50-year insurgency and eventually led to the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The region was legally established in 2019, but its inaugural elections were delayed when the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the process of decommissioning rebels, raising concerns of election violence.

But the Bangsamoro region’s deep regional, ethnic, and ideological fissures have yet to heal, and violent incidents are rising ahead of the 2025 elections, according to a report from crisis group Conflict Alert. Violence in the Philippines spiked during the 2022 national and 2023 regional elections, and the report warned that political feuds between families and clans will “contribute to the anticipated deadly nature” of the 2025 elections. Several local politicians have been killed or targeted in ambushes in recent months.

Plans for a peaceful vote took another hit in September when the Supreme Court ruled to exclude the region of Sulu from the Bangsamoro, rendering Sulu Gov. Abdusakur Tan—a leading candidate for Bangsamoro’s chief minister—ineligible to run for the post. Allies of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. recently introduced legislation to postpone elections yet again to 2026, citing Sulu’s exclusion. But further postponement could produce even more violence, as the path to a functioning autonomous region becomes hazier.

“Time is running out for completion of the roadmap set out by the 2014 [peace] agreement,” the International Crisis Group warned in January, citing feuds between former rebels and local politicians, along with the presence of jihadist groups that oppose the peace agreement. In December 2023, Islamic State-inspired militants killed four people in Marawi, a city that was all but destroyed during a siege in 2017.

At a time when Manila and Washington are desperate to leave internal conflicts behind and focus on countering China, a resurgence of violence throughout the Bangsamoro region would be a stark reminder of the fragility of peace in the Philippines.

Norwegian Fishermen Take on the Kremlin

By Elisabeth Braw

A port hole looks out onto a Russian flag amid the seascape.

A Russian flag hangs from outside a fishing trawler docked in Kirkenes, Norway, on Oct. 22, 2019. Maxim Shemetov/Reuters

During the Cold War, the friendly Norwegians even managed to maintain workable relations with the Soviet Union (granted, from a safe position underneath NATO’s protective umbrella). But these days, things are more tense. Russia is very interested—for not so friendly reasons—in the pipelines and undersea cables that dot the seabed off the Norwegian coast, and it’s equally interested in Norway’s military installations on the coast.

That means more Russian activity in the waters that Norwegian fishermen depend on for their livelihood, and they’ve already demonstrated that they won’t ignore threats to their bottom line.

The fishermen may decide that they need to stand up for themselves, because naval exercises with live fire mean people have to vacate the waters for safety—and such exercises scare fish away.

In recent months, astute journalists at NRK have been documenting all manner of mysterious maritime Russian visits to Norwegian waters. There have been fishing vessels with communications equipment going far beyond what a fishing boat needs. There have been ships loitering near Norwegian military installations and others hanging around Norwegian pipelines and communications cables.

In August 2023, Russia launched a naval exercise in the Barents Sea. The body of water, part of the Artic Ocean, is divided into a Russian side and a Norwegian side. The exercise was going to cover the Norwegian side, and it was going to be a major undertaking that involved 20 warships, support vessels, submarines, and some 8,000 military personnel. Because the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) doesn’t ban countries from conducting naval exercises in other nations’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs), there wasn’t much Oslo could do.

Norwegian fishermen, who fish in the Barents Sea, were aghast. Even though they were aware that foreign countries were allowed to conduct these exercises, they knew they would lose income as a result. Taking a page from their Irish brethren, who managed to get Russia to move a planned exercise in Ireland’s EEZ back in January 2022, they stayed put.

Things ended peacefully, but they may not go so well next time. Norway’s fishermen are understandably determined to continue plying their trade along their country’s coast, while Russia is likely to keep sending military vessels and civilian ones with mysterious capabilities to the very same waters.

If Russia launches another exercise and some fishermen decide to stay put, the Kremlin may conclude that withdrawing, as it did in Irish waters, would send a message of weakness. Then Norway would face the prospect of its citizens harmed by Russian ammunition in Norwegian waters. Countries have far fewer rights in an EEZ than in territorial waters, so Norway and its NATO allies would face a difficult choice: how to respond.

A Plausibly Deniable Russian War Against Europe

By John R. Deni

A destroyed and burned-out building lies in run behind a yellow excavator.

An excavator stands at the Diehl Metal Applications facility following a fire that gutted the building in Berlin on June 24. Though investigators categorized the May 3 fire as an accident, media reports cited intelligence sources as being convinced that Russia was behind the fire. Sean Gallup/Getty Images

The sabotage of undersea communications cables in the Baltic Sea by the cargo ship Yi Peng 3 is only the latest in a series of asymmetric attacks against Western interests and infrastructure that appear to be connected in one way or another to Moscow. The Kremlin has clearly ratcheted up efforts to intimidate and coerce Europe, hoping to frustrate—and ultimately force an end to—Western support for Ukraine. But what if Putin orders his minions to turn the temperature up even more?

It could all start if Putin senses the right opportunity, such as an increasing American indifference toward Europe. Putin may seize the moment and seek to clear the Europeans from the field as well, before any new aid package materializes on the battlefields of Ukraine. Ironically, a major effort by Europeans to fill the Ukraine assistance gap created by the Americans might function as a red cape does in the bullring—goading the aggressor to charge.

To date, Russian hybrid operations against European targets have generally focused on the infrastructure, entities, and countries most closely tied to Ukraine’s war effort—an assassination plot against the CEO of Germany’s leading defense contractor sending arms to Ukraine, an explosion at a Bulgarian ammo depot owned by a company that supplies Ukraine, and attempts to sabotage Polish rail lines used to send military equipment to Ukraine.

A dramatically ramped-up Russian-organized hybrid campaign designed to convince Europeans to pull the plug on Ukraine assistance would likely consist of a far broader array of targets.

For example, an unattributable kamikaze drone or a debilitating cyber-attack against a major power plant or a critical electrical substation; the introduction of disease-spreading pathogens into a water treatment plant; or deep-fake videos depicting a centrist political candidate engaged in corrupt activities at the height of an election campaign could all cause substantial damage and disruption.

Just as wolves hunt the weakest of the herd, it’s reasonable to assume that Russia would aim an expanded hybrid campaign against the more vulnerable countries in Europe, politically or otherwise, in hopes that they would eliminate bilateral support or break consensus in NATO or the EU.

The target list might include France, where political instability is particularly acute these days; Belgium, which has a notoriously decentralized governance structure and deep linguistic fault lines; or Romania, where an annulled election—due to alleged Russian interference—has placed the country in uncharted waters and threatens political stability.

To achieve its goals, Moscow would likely need to reach beyond its own network of spies and operatives. Russia might leverage its relationship with Libya’s warlord, Gen. Khalifa Haftar, to enlist Libyan operatives to conduct a sabotage operation against a Greek port, or the Kremlin could tap into organized crime networks to assassinate media, business, or political elites on the streets of Brussels or Madrid.

Europeans need to prepare for a desperate Kremlin doubling down on hybrid warfare.

A North Korean Strike on a Divided and Distracted South

By Markus Garlauskas

A man stands in front of a large television set airing video of a missile launch.

A TV at Yongsan Railway Station in Seoul airs footage of a test launch of the new intercontinental ballistic missile Hwasong-19 at an undisclosed place in North Korea on Nov. 1.Kim Jae-Hwan/SOPA Images/Reuters Connect

The ever-present potential for renewed warfare on the Korean Peninsula has been overshadowed by South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s failed attempt to declare martial law in order to crush the opposition. Though the headlines are likely to remain dominated by political crisis, this would conceal the rising risk of North Korean aggression—particularly in the disputed Yellow Sea waters off South Korea’s west coast.

A prolonged period of division and uncertainty is likely in South Korea. This will make it difficult for Seoul to deter Pyongyang’s aggression and coordinate with the incoming U.S. administration

Though North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has been largely silent on the events in South Korea, probably to avoid bolstering hawkish conservatives backing Yoon, he is likely looking for an opportunity to exploit. Once Yoon has been replaced—or appears set to hang on—the moment will be ripe for Kim to force a confrontation.

The disputed waters of the Yellow Sea, a longtime flashpoint for limited military clashes between North and South, seem tailor-made for North Korea to initiate such a military confrontation on favorable terms, politically and militarily.

The most intense North Korean aggression there to date—Pyongyang’s submarine sinking Seoul’s warship, followed by rocket and artillery attacks on a South Korean island—killed dozens but ultimately did not escalate further. However, much has changed since 2010 to increase North Korea’s incentive and ability to strike.

North Korea’s capability to launch surprise military strikes has advanced dramatically in the last decade and a half, with new rockets, short-range missiles, and drones. These are backed by an increasingly credible nuclear threat—underscored by multiple nuclear tests, repeated intercontinental ballistic missile launches, and displays of tactical nuclear weapons—which could give Seoul and Washington pause about responding. Geography also stacks the deck here in North Korea’s favor, with the North’s mountainous Hwanghae Peninsula providing numerous launching points for attacks onto and around South Korea’s tiny and isolated northwest Islands.

Politically, Kim’s international backing has also never been stronger. His new alliance with Moscow has given him access to resources and technology in exchange for munitions, equipment, and troops. A Beijing-Washington confrontation that Kim could exploit also appears to be brewing once the new U.S. administration takes office—if Kim sees the opportunity to drive a wedge between the U.S. and South Korea.

If Kim strikes, the risk is high that Seoul would feel forced to either accede to Kim or respond disproportionately and unilaterally show strength and force Kim to back down. Either outcome could destabilize the entire region.

The Houthis Conquer All of Yemen

By Mina Al-Oraibi

An elderly man with a gray beard holds a giant missile.

An elderly Houthi fighter mans a cannon mounted on a vehicle at a rally on the outskirts of Sanaa, Yemen, on Feb. 4. The rally was in support of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the recent Houthi strikes on shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images

Yemen’s Houthi militants targeting ships in the Red Sea made global headlines, yet too little attention has been paid to the precarious situation inside the country.

After years of criticizing the Saudi Arabia-led coalition—and refusing to get directly involved in the war to restore the internationally-recognized Yemeni government in the capital of Sana’a—the United States, United Kingdom, and several of their allies launched a military operation to stop Houthi attacks in the Red Sea in December 2023. Even so, the Iranian-backed group has managed to launch dozens of attacks this year on ships it accused of being Israeli or in aid of Israel.

Saudi Arabia and the Houthis held a number of talks last year aimed at ending the war that started after the militant group conquered Sana’a in 2014 and forced then-President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi to step down in 2015. Those talks stalled in the aftermath of Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel.

Developments within Yemen are largely forgotten or ignored—at the world’s peril. The Houthis feel emboldened despite Israeli and U.S. strikes. And while the Yemeni people suffer from disease, poverty, and malnutrition—the United Nations World Food Program estimates that 17.1 million Yemenis will be food insecure in 2025—Houthi local weapons production and smuggling continues unabated.

With less and less external support for the internationally-recognized authorities in Aden, the government of Prime Minister Ahmed bin Mubarak is under increased pressure from the Houthis. The group has also been able to claim propaganda wins by standing up to Israel, whose wars in Gaza and Lebanon are deeply resented in Yemen, and surviving in the face of major military operations by Western powers.

Without serious efforts to support the prime minister’s government, the Houthis could decide to push further south into the country with the help of other militants. Arms proliferation and broken state institutions mean these threats are very real. If the Houthis were to secure power over all of Yemen, a militant and Iranian-aligned Arab state would emerge.

Such a scenario would not only mean greater suffering for the Yemeni people but also a greater strategic threat to the Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and global shipping. While the Houthis and its allies could sweep through Yemen, they would struggle to hold it, leading to greater bloodshed and internal fighting. If sectarian tension mounts, groups like al Qaeda will seek to take advantage and ignite new battles—and reignite old ones—while continued war in nearby Sudan could spill over into the country.

Russian Destabilization of Moldova

By Natia Seskuria

The shadow of a man holding a microphone appears before a campaign poster.

Alexandr Stoianoglo, a Moldovan presidential candidate representing the pro-Russian and anti-European Union party, delivers a speech in Comrat, Moldova, on Oct. 18.Pierre Crom/Getty Images

Moldova’s pro-Western incumbent president, Maia Sandu, recently won a closely watched runoff in the country’s presidential elections, gaining 55 percent of votes against pro-Russian candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo.

In a recent referendum, Sandu also secured a constitutional change that would enshrine Moldova’s commitment to join the European Union. Despite a large-scale Russian campaign that included election interference, vote buying, and disinformation, Moldova’s EU aspirations have prevailed for now. However, it is highly likely that the country, which is sandwiched between Ukraine and Romania and has a presence of around 1,500 Russian troops in the breakaway region of Transnistria, will remain at the forefront of Russian influence and sabotage operations.

Moscow has traditionally seen Moldova as falling within its sphere of influence, yet the country has made significant progress on its path to European integration by opening accession talks with the EU through the efforts of its pro-Western government.

Since Russia began its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin’s hybrid attacks have significantly increased . According to Moldova’s Security and Intelligence Service, Moscow spent around $55 million to destabilize the country—seeking to spread disinformation and manipulate election outcomes in favor of pro-Kremlin candidates. In April, Moldovan authorities seized around $1 million in cash from more than 100 passengers at Chisinau airport; the money was believed to be for vote-buying and sabotage operations through Russian proxies.

Moscow will keep investing significant resources to undermine growing pro-EU sentiment among Moldova’s population by spreading disinformation, including the idea that pursuing pro-Western foreign policy will risk a war in Transnistria. Even though Moldova is militarily neutral, Russia wants to deter the country from pursuing NATO membership by creating fear of a potential spillover from its war with Ukraine. Meanwhile, any success on Moldova’s EU integration path would be seen as a major defeat for Russia, which means the country will remain a high-priority target for Moscow.

A Russian invasion of Moldova through Ukraine remains highly unlikely. But the Kremlin will try to take advantage of weak institutions by attempting to capture them through its proxies, weaponizing its leverage in Transnistria and the predominantly Russian-speaking autonomous region of Gagauzia, and by using economic pressure, cyberattacks, and sophisticated information operations.

Manipur Violence Undermines Modi’s Regional Ambitions

By Sushant Singh

Two women sit on the ground next to razor wire as members of the military surround them.

Family members sit in protest as army personnel stand guard at a checkpoint in Manipur, India, on Nov. 30. The people were demonstrating after a man from the Meitei community went missing. AFP/Getty Images

The conflict in Manipur, a northeastern state in India bordering Myanmar, is complex and multifaceted. While the crisis there—primarily involving the Meitei, Naga, and Kuki communities—may seem like a localized ethnic rivalry, the implications of this conflict could have significant geopolitical ramifications in 2025.

Manipur has been a hotspot of ethnic conflict for decades. The roots of the violence can be traced back to the controversial merger of the princely state of Manipur with post-colonial India in 1949. The recent violence, which started in May 2023 between the Meitei and Kuki communities, has resulted in at least 250 deaths, the displacement of 60,000 people from their homes, the loss of over 6,500 weapons from state police armories, social tensions, and a geographical split of the state between the two warring groups. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has appeared largely apathetic toward the crisis, which saw further death and destruction in November.

The conflict in Manipur is part of a broader pattern of unrest in northeast India, a region characterized by ethnic diversity and historical insurgencies. The political instability in Manipur has already spilled over into neighboring states such as Nagaland, Assam, and Mizoram, creating a broader security crisis that can reignite dormant local conflicts. That could serve as a major drain on New Delhi’s energies and resources, diverting its attention from other security challenges like the border with China or Kashmir, which has been the cause of long-standing enmity with nuclear-armed Pakistan.

The ethnic groups involved in the conflict, such as the Nagas and Kukis, have ethnic brethren across international borders in Myanmar and Bangladesh. The conflict could therefore exacerbate tensions in these countries, complicating bilateral relations and worsening an unstable regional situation. The ongoing civil war in Myanmar, which began after a military coup in 2021, has already created a volatile situation and provides a breeding ground for insurgent groups that can operate across borders.

The recent political upheaval in Bangladesh, which brought in a new government less friendly to India, complicates the picture. Anti-India sentiment and potential support for insurgent groups in the area could increase, further destabilizing the region.

The conflict in Manipur and broader instability in northeast India will hinder major infrastructure projects and trade routes that are key to unlocking the region’s economic potential and integrating it with the rest of India.

The success of initiatives like the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway—which will provide India with direct land access to the ASEAN region that bypasses China-dominated maritime channels—and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project—which connects India and Myanmar with a network of roads and waterways to facilitate the movement of people and goods—depends on regional stability that is unlikely in the new year unless New Delhi demonstrates political will, administrative competence, and a rubric for regional diplomacy.

Foreign Policy

13. U.S. Congress “Renews Adoption of Bill to Reauthorize North Korean Human Rights Act”

​Hopefully Congress will get this done soon.

We need to sustain a human rights upfront approach.

This is a Google translation of an RFA report.

U.S. Congress “Renews Adoption of Bill to Reauthorize North Korean Human Rights Act”

https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/congress-human-right-01032025135039.html

WASHINGTON-Lee Sang-min lees@rfa.org

2025.01.03

The U.S. House of Representatives is in session.

/ AP

00:00 /02:38

Anchor :  The 119th U.S. Congress opened on  the 3rd . The adoption of the  ' North Korean Human Rights Act Reauthorization Bill ' , which was abandoned in the last session, is expected to be pursued again in this new session .   Reporter Lee Sang-min reports .

 The ' North Korea Human Rights Act Reauthorization Act ' extends the North Korea Human Rights Act, enacted in 2004, for another  five years .

The bill passed the House of Representatives during the  118th U.S. Congress but was not voted on in the Senate, preventing its adoption .

The office of Rep. Ami Bera ( D -  Calif. )  , a co-sponsor of the bill that passed the House at the time, told Radio Free Asia (RFA) on  the 3rd that Rep. Bera plans to re-introduce the bill during the 119th session .

He explained that the bipartisan bill maintains strong support in both houses of Congress .

Rep. Young Kim ( R- Calif  . )  , another co-sponsor of the bill, told  RFA on March 24 that he was deeply disappointed that the Senate failed to take up the House-passed bill, but that passing the bill remained his top priority .

A view of the U.S. Capitol. /ap

Greg Scarlatoiu, president of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) , told Radio Free Asia (RFA) on  the 3rd that the reason the North Korean Human Rights Act reauthorization bill was not dealt with in the Senate during the last session was because it was lower in priority .

[ Chairman Scalatiu ] We're dealing with a lot of other issues around the world .  There's the war in Ukraine. There's other foreign policy priorities .  There may be some fatigue .  But  [ the adoption of the North Korea Human Rights Act ] will be resolved ,  because the connection between the security issues that North Korea poses and human rights abuses is going to be very important in the coming weeks and months . 

Chairman Scaliatu emphasized that the North Korean human rights violations and the threat North Korea poses to international peace and security have become more closely linked due to the dispatch of North Korean troops, and that this content should be newly included in the bill to reauthorize the North Korean Human Rights Act .

U.S. North Korea Human Rights Act Reauthorization Bill Failed to Pass This Session Rep. Young Kim: “I Will Request Secretary of State Rubio to Appoint Special Envoy for North Korea Human Rights”

In the last  118th Congress, Senator Marco Rubio introduced this bill in the Senate .  However, attention is focused on which senator will introduce this bill if Senator Rubio becomes the next Secretary of State .

In response, House Representative Ami Bera's office speculated that there is a possibility that one of the following senators may introduce the bill: Tim Kaine ( Democrat , Virginia ),  Chris Van Hollen ( Democrat ,  Maryland ), and  Marsha Blackburn ( Republican ,  Tennessee )  co-sponsored the bill when Senator Rubio introduced it . The North Korea Human Rights Act reauthorization bill was introduced in both the House and Senate during the 117th Congress ,  but it passed only the Senate and was automatically killed in the House without even a full vote due to being pushed back by other bills, never becoming law .

Editor Park Jeong-woo ,  Web Editor Lee Gyeong-ha

14. Who is Kim Jong-un's next military target for Russia?

​This is a Google translation of an RFA report.

This covers a good bit of ground. 

History rhymes:

( Lee Il-woo )  The year  2025 is the Year of the Blue Snake , the Year of Eulsa, which comes once every 60 years in the sexagenary cycle . 60 years ago, in 1965, the Year of Eulsa, was the first year when South Korea restored diplomatic relations by signing the ROK-Japan Basic Treaty , dispatched its first combat troops to Vietnam, and began to rapidly increase its national power with the help of the United States and Japan , using these two incidents as an opportunity. It was also the year of gambling when North Korea prepared for a second invasion and requested troops from China .     

The previous year,  1905 , was a year of humiliation when the Katsura - Taft Secret Agreement was signed between the United States and Japan , and as a result, the Korean Empire signed the Eulsa Treaty with Japan, losing its national sovereignty . This year, Eulsa, is an extremely important year in which the fate of the two countries could be determined by the decisions made by the national leadership of South Korea and North Korea .   

Who is Kim Jong-un's next military target for Russia?

https://www.rfa.org/korean/weekly_program/c2e0bc15d55cd55cbc18b3c4c2e0bb34ae30b300bc31acfc/north-korea-new-year-strategy-01032025173325.html

WASHINGTON-Kim Jin-guk kimj@rfa.org

2025.01.05

North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin

/ Yonhap News

00:00 /13:14

( Host ) We will accurately grasp the current state of the military standoff  on the Korean Peninsula and seek a path to peace . This is Kim Jin-guk, presenting 'Encyclopedia of New Weapons on the Korean Peninsula' from Washington D.C., USA. We will connect with Lee Il-woo, Secretary General of Korea's 'Independent Defense Network.'           

Korea Discount 2025 : North Korea Food Shortage , South Korea Impeachment   

( Host )  The eventful year of  2024 has passed , and now the new year of 2025 has dawned . Last week, we looked back on the year 2024 and evaluated it as an important year that brought about great changes in the security environment on the Korean Peninsula . What kind of year do you think 2025 will be for South and North Korea ?    

( Lee Il-woo )  The year  2025 is the Year of the Blue Snake , the Year of Eulsa, which comes once every 60 years in the sexagenary cycle . 60 years ago, in 1965, the Year of Eulsa, was the first year when South Korea restored diplomatic relations by signing the ROK-Japan Basic Treaty , dispatched its first combat troops to Vietnam, and began to rapidly increase its national power with the help of the United States and Japan , using these two incidents as an opportunity. It was also the year of gambling when North Korea prepared for a second invasion and requested troops from China .     

The previous year,  1905 , was a year of humiliation when the Katsura - Taft Secret Agreement was signed between the United States and Japan , and as a result, the Korean Empire signed the Eulsa Treaty with Japan, losing its national sovereignty . This year, Eulsa, is an extremely important year in which the fate of the two countries could be determined by the decisions made by the national leadership of South Korea and North Korea .   

North Korea reported unprecedented food price spikes late last year, even after the fall harvest . If this is simply a crop problem and not due to other factors , North Korea could face a very serious food shortage before the fall harvest this year .   

It is important for South Korea to decide how to end the chaos of the presidential impeachment.  Depending on the policies of the new administration, the ROK-US alliance could be in jeopardy, and it is expected that the country could face unprecedented military difficulties since its founding . 

President Yoon Seok-yeol delivers a special emergency address to the nation at the Blue House in Yongsan, Seoul, on the evening of December 3 last year. /Yonhap

[ Encyclopedia of New Weapons on the Korean Peninsula ] What will happen in the skies of the Korean Peninsula when the F-15K is improved 

[ Encyclopedia of New Weapons on the Korean Peninsula ] Is the Price of Deploying the North's Storm Corps to Russia Strategic Nuclear Submarines ? 

Will Trump's  bold promise of " ending the war in Ukraine " come true ?    

( Host )  The Trump administration will soon be launched in the United States. President-elect Trump has repeatedly declared an early end to the Ukraine war , but from North Korea’s perspective, which is receiving huge profits by sending weapons and troops to Russia, it seems inevitable that they will want the war to be prolonged . Will this war end as quickly as President-elect Trump says ?    

( Lee Il-woo )  President-elect Trump's peace plan is to have Ukraine give up on recapturing the four regions of Donetsk, Luhansk , Zaporizhzhia , and Kherson that were taken from Russia, and instead agree to peace talks , create a buffer zone along the Ukrainian - Russian border like the demilitarized zone on the Korean Peninsula , and send a peacekeeping force comprised mainly of European countries to maintain the peace .      

The problem is that both Ukraine and Russia are against this proposal. If Ukraine accepts this proposal , not only will the three years of fighting that have been so devastating be in vain , but it will also inevitably deal a fatal blow to President Zelensky’s leadership . The Ukrainian Foreign Minister has repeatedly stated that he will not accept Trump’s peace proposal until Ukraine’s NATO membership is confirmed , saying, “We were fooled once in Budapest . ”       

Russia, too, has made it clear through its Kremlin spokesman that it cannot accept  NATO troops advancing to its doorstep . If European troops enter Ukraine , Russia will face the worst-case scenario of Moscow being within the tactical missile range of European troops . The Kremlin has also repeatedly stated that it cannot accept this temporary ceasefire, criticizing it as an attempt to buy time for Ukraine to rearm with Western weapons .        

Even if President-elect Trump cuts off arms aid to Ukraine after taking office, Ukraine will still be able to fight for at least another year  , as it continues to receive cash aid of more than $ 1.5 billion per month from frozen Russian foreign funds , and several European countries have pledged continued military support . In fact, the legislature passed a budget late last year .   

Of course, the war could continue until the end of this year, but the variable here is that President-elect Trump may think of collapsing Russia through the Ukraine war, contrary to his previously stated position . Russia’s economy is currently in shambles due to the prolonged war. Inflation has become severe , and there are no workers to be deployed in agriculture and industry, so there have even been calls from State Duma members to reintroduce the rationing system for basic necessities, which is currently limited to some regions such as Kaliningrad and Kamchatka . If the war drags on any longer, Russia could collapse like the former Soviet Union, so President-elect Trump may aim for that and pressure Russia further by providing minimal support to Ukraine and inducing a prolonged war . If this happens, the Russian situation will only get worse , and North Korea may strengthen its position as a weapons supplier to Russia . In other words , it is highly likely that North Korea will receive higher-level military technology and equipment than it has received from Russia so far .         

In 2017, Kim Yong-nam (left), then president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea, visited Tehran to attend the inauguration ceremony of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and met with President Rouhani. / Reuters

2025 North Korea's Foreign Cooperation Direction , What Does ' Iran ' Mean to North Korea  ? 

( Host )   In  the last  last year, 2024 was evaluated as the year in which the new Cold War system intensified . “ Yes ” seems to mean that not only North Korea - Russia cooperation, but also cooperation between North Korea and China , and North Korea and Iran will be strengthened . In what direction do you think North Korea’s external cooperation will develop in 2025 ?    

( Lee Il-woo )   2024 is a year that opens a window of opportunity for North Korea , and 2025 could be a year that could further expand that window . As mentioned earlier, the war in Ukraine will not end immediately, so North Korea’s position vis-à-vis Russia will become stronger , and furthermore, there is another North Korean ally that desperately wants North Korea’s help : Iran .   

Iran is in a very desperate situation right now. On December 8 , Syrian President Assad, who had been very close to Iran, was overthrown by rebels supported by Turkey . And in the past week , Israel has carried out more than 800 airstrikes, destroying most of the Syrian government's air defense weapons , and in addition, most of the Russian troops stationed in Syria have withdrawn with their equipment .       

If you spread out a map and look at the location of Syria, you can see that it, along with Iraq, serves as a buffer zone between Israel and Iran. In the past, the fighter jets and air defense weapons of the Assad government forces , which were allies of Iran, and the Sukhoi fighter jets and air defense weapons such as S-400 of the Russian forces stationed in Syria, which protected the Assad regime , were blocking the path for Israeli fighter jets to pass through Syrian airspace to Iran to some extent . However, with the collapse of the Assad regime and the withdrawal of the Russian forces, the Syrian airspace became completely defenseless . The same is true of Iraq , which also has no air defense weapons to stop Israeli fighter jets .       

In this situation, on  December 18th , the ambassadors of Britain , France , and Germany at the UN raised the issue of Iran’s rapidly increasing stock of highly enriched uranium and denounced the need for additional sanctions , and the Iranian ambassador immediately responded that he would retaliate if there were additional sanctions . At that time, the Israeli ambassador who was nearby urged the Iranian people to rise up and overthrow the Iranian regime, saying that Israel would help them .       

The only way for the Iranian regime to prevent an Israeli attack and ensure its own security is through nuclear weapons . However, time is running out, so they need outside help to acquire nuclear weapons in a short period of time . For this reason, Iran, like Russia, may ask for help from North Korea .   

In 2024 , South Korea failed to prevent deepening cooperation between Russia and North Korea, creating a cooperative system that allowed Russia's advanced military technology to flow to North Korea . In 2025, South Korea must do everything it can to prevent North Korea's external military cooperation from leading to nuclear cooperation with Iran  .

North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin spend time together in the garden area of ​​the Kumsusan State Guest House in June last year, deepening their friendship. /Yonhap

We must prepare for the North's long-range artillery strike and take strong measures to check cooperation between North Korea and Russia / North Korea and Iran

( Host )   North Korea seems to be responding very quickly to the rapidly changing international situation. As North Korea's role in the international community grows , South Korea will also have to do more to ensure peace on the Korean Peninsula and to play a role as a pillar of the liberal democratic camp . What should South Korea be most concerned about in the security field in 2025 ?    

( Lee Il-woo )   We need to consider both the situation inside and outside the Korean Peninsula. First, inside the Korean Peninsula, we need to prepare for the era of Seoul Fire 2.0 , which will change from the old long-range artillery to tactical ballistic missiles . To this end, we need to urgently and seriously consider introducing a new defense system that has been proven in actual combat .     

Off the Korean Peninsula, we must also pursue aggressive diplomacy and policies to prevent further strengthening of North Korea-Russia cooperation and North Korea - Iran cooperation . We must actively appeal to Russia that if it transfers sensitive military technology to North Korea, South Korea can take corresponding actions ( such as directly providing weapons to Ukraine ) to weaken North Korea-Russia cooperation , while cooperating with allies such as the United States and Israel to block the possibility of expanded military cooperation between North Korea and Iran .     

As mentioned earlier, the year 2025 will be a very important crossroads year for both South Korea and North Korea , and South Korea in particular should brace itself, keeping in mind that if it makes the wrong decision, it could end up in ruins just like it did 120 years ago .   

( Host )  This was Lee Il- woo, Secretary General of the Korea Independent  Defense  Network . Now, with Kim Jin-guk from RFA in Washington ,  D.C.     

Editor Lee Jin-seo, Web Editor Lee Gyeong-ha

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com