Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“In politics, being deceived is no excuse."

– Leszek Kołakowski”

“Do not obey in advance. Most of the power of authoritarianism is freely given. In times like these, individuals think ahead about what a more repressive government will want, and then offer themselves without being asked. A citizen who adapts in this way is teaching power what it can do.”

– Timothy Snyder

"The next war... may well bury Western civilization forever."

– Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

1. Army Veteran Traveled to New Orleans Twice Before New Year’s Attack

2. ‘I Only Knew How to Do One Thing’: New Year’s Violence Resurrects the Dark Side of Military Life

3. Cold comfort: The latest attacks on America follow a familiar playbook

4. U.S. to Ease Aid Restrictions for Syria in Limited Show of Support for New Government

5. Oil tanker boss says UN maritime body ‘sleeping’ over dark fleet threat

6. Shaping the Narrative: America’s Struggle for Strategic Coherence

7. New Orleans attacker visited city twice in recent months, wore Meta glasses to record the scene in advance

8. The Man Who Predicted Today’s World Over a Century Ago

9. The Incredible, World-Altering ‘Black Swan’ Events That Could Upend Life in 2025

10. ‘Straight Talk’ on China’s Offensives in the American Homeland

11. Could a board game help prepare Taiwan for war with China?

12. 'Catastrophic impact': Trump aide worries about 'serious error' that could tank new term

13. China and Trump factor will heat up Asia-Pacific arms race, observers warn

14. Why are US flags being flown at half-staff on Inauguration Day?

15. Drones, Exploding Parcels and Sabotage: How Hybrid Tactics Target the West

16. Disseminate and Stimulate (Harding Project)

17. The PRC is Signaling its First Moves

18. The Missing Middle: Emphasizing Operational Expertise in the U.S. Air Force

19. Eurasia Group | The Top Risks of 2025

20. New Era, New Ethics? A German Perspective on Just War and Just Peace

21. the chimeras: lessons we just can’t seem to learn

22. Chinese ship cuts cable near Keelung Harbor

23. Trump aides ready ‘universal’ tariff plans — with one key changeTrump aides ready ‘universal’ tariff plans — with one key change

1. Army Veteran Traveled to New Orleans Twice Before New Year’s Attack

I do not think it was his Army training in human resources and IT that gave him these skills or prepared him for this operation. Not mentioned in this article is the report of explosive devices never before used in a US terror attack.

So where did a human resources, IT, real estate agent. and consultant guy acquire these skills? Was online radicalization sufficient?

Army Veteran Traveled to New Orleans Twice Before New Year’s Attack

Shamsud-Din Jabbar used smart glasses to record footage of city’s French Quarter during October trip, authorities say

https://www.wsj.com/us-news/army-veteran-traveled-to-new-orleans-twice-before-new-years-attack-02411e50?mod=latest_headlines

By C. Ryan Barber

Updated Jan. 5, 2025 4:15 pm ET

‘I Only Knew How to Do One Thing’: New Year’s Violence Resurrects the Dark Side of Military Life

The New Orleans attack and Las Vegas explosion, by men tied to the Army, have raised alarms about the pressures faced by service members

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/military-violence-new-orleans-las-vegas-982b23a9?st=6xRT62&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By Vera Bergengruen

Follow, Nancy A. Youssef

Follow and Tawnell D. Hobbs

Jan. 5, 2025 9:10 pm ET

The two men had vastly different military careers that seemed unlikely to intersect. Army Master Sgt. Matthew Livelsberger was an elite special forces soldier who repeatedly deployed to the front lines from Africa to Afghanistan, while Army Staff Sgt. Shamsud-Din Jabbar spent years quietly supporting troops through administrative work.

Their stories overlapped in two shocking acts in the early hours of 2025, with an exploded Tesla Cybertruck in Las Vegas, in what authorities have determined was a suicide, and a terrorist attack that killed 14 in New Orleans. The two episodes have become stark reminders of one of the most persistent and vexing threats facing the U.S. military: a tragic turn toward violence within the ranks, whether from extremist radicalization or mental-health struggles.

Military experts and veterans say that while Jabbar and Livelsberger’s actions aren’t representative of the men and women who serve, the struggles and pressures that haunted them are all too common. The Department of Defense has acknowledged for years that too many of its service members have fallen sway to extremist ideologies or resorted to violent outbursts. The New Year’s Day events are raising new questions about the government’s efforts to help service members and veterans and its ability to detect the warning signs.

Shamsud-Din Jabbar during his service in the 82nd Airborne Division in November 2013. Photo: U.S. army/Reuters

While authorities initially looked for a connection between the episodes, they appear to have “no definitive link,” according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation—and they reflect two different challenges.

Jabbar, a 42-year-old consultant retired from the Army, crashed a rented pickup truck into a crowd of revelers in New Orleans, killing 14 and injuring dozens more. In recent months, Jabbar had secretly been embracing Islamic State propaganda that inspired him to commit mass murder. Police recovered an ISIS flag from his truck, as well as social-media videos filmed in the hours before the attack in which Jabbar declared his allegiance to the terrorist group.

More than 1,500 miles away, Livelsberger, a 37-year-old Green Beret on leave, shot himself in the head and detonated the car full of fireworks mortars and camp fuel canisters outside the Trump International Hotel in Las Vegas. The explosion injured seven bystanders.

Livelsberger intended the act as a “wake-up call” for the country, which he said was “headed towards collapse,” according to notes on his phone shared by police.

“Fellow Servicemembers, Veterans, and all Americans, TIME TO WAKE UP!” he wrote on a note recovered by police. “We are being led by weak and feckless leadership who only serve to enrich themselves.”

Emails sent before his death—including claims about Chinese and American drones being powered by antigravity technology, and that he was being “followed”—suggest that Livelsberger was suffering from a mental-health episode and paranoia.

Firefighter vehicles in Las Vegas after a Tesla Cybertruck burned at the entrance of Trump Tower. Photo: ronda churchill/Reuters

‘I watched it happen to several people’

In the aftermath of the events, some veterans say they deplore the violence and yet see their own struggles reflected by these men, understanding how unresolved anger or mental-health struggles from military service can compound everyday stress.

“Transitioning out of the service is probably one of the most challenging things an individual could do,” said retired Army Lt. Col. Sam Andrews, who is on the board of directors for Bravo Zulu House, a transitional living facility for veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder and addiction. “We lose our sense of purpose, we lose our sense of tribe, we lose our sense of meaning.”

Adam Ramsey, a U.S. Army veteran who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, said some military members fear disapproval and being assigned lesser duties for needing therapy. “I watched it happen to several people,” he said, adding that he was lucky to have good leadership that supported his PTSD diagnosis and treatment.

Ramsey said he was quick to anger after serving. He wasn’t getting along with his wife and unrealistically expected his 5-year-old child to be more mature. He had flashbacks of firefights, including one that resulted in the killing of a child soldier in Afghanistan, and he said he felt like a monster.

“I didn’t realize it was even happening—it had become part of my personality,” he said. Eventually, his wife had had enough, he said.

“She sat me down, and basically said, ‘Look, you’re not who I married,’” said Ramsey, 35, who served 10 years in the Army.

Adam Ramsey re-enlisted during his deployment to Kandahar province in October 2011. Photo: Adam Ramsey

Desmond Cook, who joined the Marines three days after his high-school graduation and served various tours in war zones, said he felt like he’d lost his identity and the only career he’d known after retiring from the Marines in 2008.

“What do I do? I only knew how to do one thing. I knew how to blow stuff up, and I knew how to kill people,” he said.

Cook said he struggled during his service with what he now realizes was PTSD. He was short-tempered and looked for a reason to fight. The thought of being in a firefight in a war zone excited him. Large crowds made him angry. He tried to self-medicate with drugs and alcohol to feel normal.

He recalled a moment in Afghanistan when flashbacks of the faces of people he saw killed drove him to tears—but waited until he was alone to cry.

“I was in charge, so I didn’t want to look weak,” he said, choking back tears thinking back. He got help for PTSD after retiring, but not before nearly taking his own life on more than one occasion.

While Livelsberger’s friends said they saw signs of his declining mental health, the Army said in a statement that “he did not display any concerning behaviors at the time.” Livelsberger had earned a Bronze Star with valor and never had any disciplinary issues, Army officials said. But he told friends he had suffered several concussions, affecting his memory.

Livelsberger also seemed haunted by what he had witnessed during his deployments, and in the last days of his life sought to call attention to what he said were “war crimes.” He reached out to several veterans with prominent social-media platforms or podcasts, saying he wanted to blow the whistle on a 2019 U.S. strike in Afghanistan that killed at least 30 civilians.

A U.N. report described the U.S. strike in Nimruz province, which was targeting a drug facility, as unlawful. In his message, Livelsberger said he conducted targeting for over 60 buildings “that killed hundreds of civilians in a single day.”

“I needed to cleanse my mind of the brothers I’ve lost,” he wrote, “and relieve myself of the burden of the lives I took.”

Cook said that he isn’t surprised that some who knew Livelsberger were unaware of his mental-health issues, as working in special forces put him in a category of being the best of the best. “They’re definitely not going to show their weakness,” he said.

A soldier from 10th Special Forces Group set fire to a marijuana crop in Helmand province, Afghanistan, during counternarcotics operations in 2016. Photo: Sgt. Connor Mendez/U.S. Army

Lone wolves

The Pentagon and Department of Veterans Affairs have yet to find a way to consistently foresee the collapse of the fragile balance of many who served—carrying seen and unseen scars of war and longing for a community similar to the military. The lure of conspiracies or extremist ideologies can appeal to troops and veterans who miss a sense of purpose.

When it comes to terrorism, officials say the main threat is “lone wolf” actors who are often inspired by extremist rhetoric and self-radicalize online to carry out sudden acts of violence, making them more difficult to counter.

Jabbar posted at least five videos propagating the ideology of ISIS, which he claimed to have joined last year, according to Christopher Raia, the deputy assistant director of the FBI’s counterterrorism division. “A lot of questions we are still asking ourselves,” he said at a press conference on Thursday. “That’s the stuff that in the coming days, as far as that path to radicalization, that we’re really going to be digging into and make it a priority.”

And while serving in the military doesn’t make someone more likely to embrace violent extremist beliefs than the general public, those who do have the potential to carry out more devastating acts of violence, analysts say.

According to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, or Start, almost 16% of extremists who have committed criminal offenses in the U.S. since 1990 had military backgrounds.

Those with military backgrounds who are radicalized “are more likely to attempt and successfully commit mass casualty attacks, defined as four or more victims, than extremists without similar military training or expertise,” said Michael Jensen, who leads a team tracking military radicalization at Start.

A vigil in New Orleans on Jan. 4. Photo: shawn fink/epa/Shutterstock

Attacks by either active duty soldiers or veterans represent a minuscule fraction of those who serve. According to a 2023 Pew Research Center, there are roughly 18 million veterans in the U.S. and another two million currently in uniform. According to an October investigation by the Associated Press, 480 people with a military background have been accused of crimes associated with extremist views from 2017 through 2023, including more than 230 arrested after the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol.

“One reason veterans may struggle is the loss of comrades and structure when they leave the military, which terror groups can provide. That may explain motivation. The search for meaning and cohesion,” said Todd Helmus, a senior behavioral scientist at Rand. “Those who join are drawn by martial ambitions, which terror groups can also provide an outlet for.”

According to Start, 42.1% of veterans who commit violent crimes do so 15 years or more after serving. The group’s analysis of U.S. extremists with military backgrounds who committed criminal acts from 1990 to 2024 found that more than 80% were inspired by white nationalist or antigovernment extremism. Just under 7% were motivated by jihadist ideologies.

Pushback from Congress

The U.S. military has spent much of its modern history trying to battle extremism within the ranks, including when there was a march by Ku Klux Klan members in 1968 on a base in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, celebrating the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.

In 1986, then-Defense Secretary Casper W. Weinberger issued a directive that banned leading or organizing white supremacist groups, although troops could still be members. Membership in such groups wasn’t banned until a decade later.

The U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, which drove a new generation to fight the so-called “forever wars,” led to new warnings within the military about a growing radicalization threat. In 2009, Army Maj. Nidal Hasan’s shooting rampage that killed 12 people on Fort Hood cemented those fears. Three years later, troops were found to be part of a plot to kill then-President Obama and in 2019, prosecutors charged a Coast Guard officer and self-described white nationalist of plotting to kill U.S. politicians.

Air Force personnel watched then-Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin address the issue of extremist ideology within the military during a base-wide pause in training in 2021. Photo: Tech. Sgt. Jeffrey Grossi/U.S. Air Force

Coming into office in the aftermath of Jan. 6, 2021, President Biden vowed that his administration would tackle domestic extremism. His defense secretary, Lloyd Austin, announced initiatives to counter domestic extremist groups that tend to recruit among U.S. military service members and veterans.

But the Biden administration’s efforts to screen service members for ties to extremist groups or potential indications of radicalization to violent action encountered strong pushback from Republican lawmakers, who lambasted them as politically motivated.

Punishing someone for espousing potentially extremist ideologies is like “threading a very fine needle when we’re engaging in prohibiting conduct that may be protected by the First Amendment,” a Pentagon official told reporters in 2021 when briefing the task force findings.

In recent years, Republican lawmakers have deleted language that would have made violent extremism a crime in the military code of justice from the Defense Department’s annual policy bill. They also introduced a bill to “prohibit the use of appropriated funds to investigate extremism in the military” and eliminated funding for the Pentagon’s Countering Extremism Working Group.

Trump’s nominee to head the Pentagon, Fox News personality and U.S. Army veteran Pete Hegseth, partly rose to prominence by waging a crusade against efforts to weed out extremism in the military, which he called politically motivated. He also has said the role of U.S. service members in the Jan. 6, 2021 attacks on the Capitol have been overstated.

The Jan. 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol. Photo: Shannon Stapleton/Reuters

3. Cold comfort: The latest attacks on America follow a familiar playbook

Excerpts:

Having made it through election day without major incidents of violence, the country is again on edge. What will happen next?

Uncertainty prevails. Security will be increased for the upcoming events in Washington D.C. — the Jan. 6 congressional count of the electoral votes, former President Carter’s funeral and the inaugural ceremonies. Security will also be heavy at major sporting events –– the Bowl games, the ongoing college football playoffs and the upcoming NFL playoffs.

Meanwhile, social media will no doubt fuel rumors, accusations and conspiracy theories. That we have been here before and persevered is a source of cold comfort to those fearful today

Cold comfort: The latest attacks on America follow a familiar playbook

by Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce R. Butterworth, opinion contributors - 01/03/25 9:30 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/5063956-vehicle-ramming-attacks-terrorism/

The tragic pickup truck ramming in New Orleans and the subsequent explosion of a Tesla Cybertruck in Las Vegas remind us that terrorist threats remain a deadly reality in the U.S.

There are no indications yet that the two attacks were coordinated. More likely, they are coincidental, although that will not prevent linking them to advance political agendas or conspiracy theories. The coincidence contributes to greater public apprehension.

In the coming days, we will learn more about the perpetrators — motivation, collaborators, funding. For now, it is clear that the New Orleans attack was intended to cause high casualties. It did.

The attack in Las Vegas resulted in the death of the driver and injuries to bystanders, but the vehicle used (manufactured by Tesla) and the venue chosen (a Trump Hotel) suggest a political message.

Both attacks were premeditated, indicated by advanced preparations. The attacker in New Orleans rented a vehicle, acquired firearms and built explosive devices. The FBI believes they worked alone.

The Las Vegas attack also involved the rental of a vehicle, reportedly through the same peer-to-peer app, packing it with some form of explosive or incendiary material, and detonating it at a symbolic location. This could also be accomplished by a single individual, but we shall see if others were involved.

Vehicle ramming attacks are not a new phenomenon.

According to research on vehicle ramming attacks we carried out at the Mineta Transportation Institute, the first one occurred in 1964 when an angry bus driver drove his vehicle, running down people in Taipei, but there may well have been vehicle attacks before then.

In 1973, a mentally unstable woman living in Czechoslovakia decided to take revenge for the hatred she felt from society and her family. She rammed a truck into people waiting for a tram in Prague, killing eight and injuring 12.

These were and remain rare events. None of the myriad of terrorist groups that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s employed the tactic.

Vehicle ramming became a terrorist tactic in the 1990s when Palestinian drivers began targeting off-duty Israeli soldiers waiting at bus stops. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad called for vehicle ramming attacks, which began to increase in the 2000s, climbing sharply after 2014. By 2016, they had become the second most common and second deadliest form of attack in Israel.

Historically, both al Qaeda and ISIS also exhorted their followers to carry out vehicle ramming attacks. In 2010, an online magazine published by al Qaeda suggested using a vehicle as a “mowing machine” to mow down the enemies of Allah.

The author of the article advised attackers to choose a pick-up truck, preferably with four-wheel drive, select a pedestrian-only location, aim for the crowd and accelerate. The article also described modifying the vehicle by attaching steel blades to the grill to slice through its victims. None of the ramming attacks have seen such a modification.

ISIS published a similar article in 2016, with equally grisly language. The “crusaders” would be demoralized by “vehicles that unexpectedly mount their busy sidewalks, smashing into crowds, crushing bones, and severing limbs.”

The ISIS article appeared four months after the deadliest jihadist vehicle ramming attack in Nice, France when a driver plowed a heavy cargo truck through a crowd watching Bastille Day fireworks, killing 86 and injuring hundreds on July 14, 2016.

The attack in Nice, more than jihadist exhortations, inspired others, reflecting a contagion effect. Vehicle ramming attacks come in clusters. The planning for the New Orleans attack, however, is likely to have preceded the Dec. 21 vehicle ramming attack in Magdeburg, Germany, which killed five.

German authorities say that the driver in that case shows signs of mental illness. If we exclude attacks in Israel and the Palestinian territories, official statements and media accounts suggest that confirmed or possibly mentally disturbed individuals account for more than 40 percent of the attackers. They also account for nearly half of the total fatalities.

According to our data, right-wing extremists appear in 20 percent of the cases but have caused less than 5 percent of the fatalities. Individuals inspired by jihadist ideologies account for just eight percent of the attacks, but more than a quarter of the fatalities. The lines between the categories, however, are blurry with attackers often displaying a mix of personal problems and ideological fervor.

Unlike other forms of terrorist attack, most of which occur in conflict zones in the developing world, most vehicle ramming attacks occur in developed countries — Europe and the United States account for nearly three-quarters of the attacks and almost half of the fatalities.

Roughly half of all vehicle ramming attacks have occurred in the United States alone, but these account for only nine percent of the fatalities, owing to the many ramming attacks that occurred during the Black Lives Matter protests. Fifteen deaths (including the driver) in the New Orleans attack surpass the eight killed in the 2017 Bike Path attack in New York, which was also ISIS-inspired.

China accounts for 11 percent of the attacks and 40 percent of the fatalities. France, Germany and the United Kingdom together account for about 15 percent of the attacks and 43 percent of the fatalities.

More than half of the attackers use their own or a family vehicle; in other cases, the vehicle is stolen. In 5 percent of the cases, the vehicle is rented. Attacks involving rental vehicles, however, are the most lethal, accounting for more than a quarter of the total fatalities. Rental vehicles reflect prior planning, and that renters are able to acquire larger vehicles.

Just about all of the elements of the New Orleans attack have been seen before: the use of a rental vehicle, an attack on pedestrians gathered for a public event, the additional use of firearms and explosives, the driver killed in a final confrontation with police.

The vehicle explosion in Las Vegas also has ample precedents. In 2007, police found two vehicles that had been parked outside of nightclubs in London to be loaded with explosives. The next day, two of the perpetrators crashed a Jeep filled with propane canisters into the Glasgow airport terminal.

In 2010, a jihadist parked an SUV packed with incendiaries in New York’s Times Square. In 2020, a massive bomb contained in an RV parked in downtown Nashville, Tenn., detonated, killing the bomb-maker and injuring eight people. The motives for the attack were not clear, but as in many such cases, it may have included a combination of factors.

Having made it through election day without major incidents of violence, the country is again on edge. What will happen next?

Uncertainty prevails. Security will be increased for the upcoming events in Washington D.C. — the Jan. 6 congressional count of the electoral votes, former President Carter’s funeral and the inaugural ceremonies. Security will also be heavy at major sporting events –– the Bowl games, the ongoing college football playoffs and the upcoming NFL playoffs.

Meanwhile, social media will no doubt fuel rumors, accusations and conspiracy theories. That we have been here before and persevered is a source of cold comfort to those fearful today

Brian Michael Jenkins is the director and Bruce R. Butterworth is a senior researcher at the National Transportation Security Center of the Mineta Transportation Institute.

Tags Al Qaeda Donald Trump FBI ISIS Las Vegas Las Vegas explosion Magdeburg, Germany New Orleans New Orleans attack Politics of the United States terrorist attacks Tesla CybertruckCopyright 2024 Nexstar Media Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.

4. U.S. to Ease Aid Restrictions for Syria in Limited Show of Support for New Government

U.S. to Ease Aid Restrictions for Syria in Limited Show of Support for New Government

The move reflects Washington’s wariness about U.S.-designated terror organization that leads the country

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-to-ease-aid-restrictions-for-syria-in-limited-show-of-support-for-new-government-26835e9c?mod=latest_headlines

By Alexander Ward

Jan. 5, 2025 10:12 pm ET

The U.S. is seeking assurances Syria won’t renege on promises to protect the rights of women and religious and ethnic minorities. Photo: zohra bensemra/Reuters

WASHINGTON—The Biden administration plans to announce Monday it is easing restrictions on humanitarian aid for Syria, a move to speed delivery of basic supplies without lifting sanctions that block other assistance to the new government in Damascus.

The decision underscores the White House’s wariness about removing the broad sanctions on Syria until the direction taken by its new leaders, led by a group the U.S. labels a terror organization, becomes clearer.

The limited step approved by the administration over the weekend authorizes the Treasury Department to issue waivers to aid groups and companies providing essential services, such as water, electricity and other humanitarian supplies, officials said.

Available initially for six months, the waiver would free aid suppliers from having to seek case-by-case authorization but it comes with conditions to ensure Syria doesn’t misuse the supplies, the officials said.

The U.S. has already dropped a $10 million bounty on Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani, the Islamist leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, the Sunni Islamist group that began as an offshoot of al Qaeda and led the assault that toppled the Assad regime.

The U.S. is withholding a decision on lifting crippling sanctions imposed during Syria’s brutal 13-year civil war, seeking assurances Damascus won’t renege on promises to protect the rights of women and the country’s many religious and ethnic minorities.

The limited step authorizes the Treasury Department to issue waivers to aid groups and companies providing essential services. Photo: yamam al shaar/Reuters

“Make no mistake, some of the rebel groups that took down Assad have their own grim record of terrorism and human right abuses,” President Biden said in December after Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad fled the country. “They are saying the right things now, but as they take on greater responsibility, we will assess not just their words, but their actions.”

The Jawlani-led government is seeking recognition from world powers to legitimize his rule. The group publicly cut ties with al Qaeda years ago and has sought to cast itself as more moderate.

But with only weeks left of the Biden administration, decisions about sanctions and whether to recognize the rebel-led government likely will be left to President-elect Donald Trump.

Midlevel U.S. officials have met in Damascus with HTS leaders, and French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot and German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock were in Damascus Friday. After meeting with Jawlani, Baerbock said women and Kurds must be involved in the country’s transition, further warning that European funds shouldn’t be used for “new Islamist structures.”

The German diplomat also signaled that it was too early for European nations to lift sanctions on Syria, but said that “the past few weeks have shown how much hope there is here in Syria that the future will be one of freedom.”

Oil tanker boss says UN maritime body ‘sleeping’ over dark fleet threat

https://www.ft.com/content/4cd90c84-9fd2-47e8-a035-9b7bf1a21445

Lars Barstad of Frontline insists it is ‘only a question of time’ before a significant maritime disaster takes place

Robert Wright in London

Financial Times · by Robert Wright · January 5, 2025

The boss of the world’s largest publicly listed oil tanker operator has accused the UN maritime rule-setting body of “sleeping behind the wheel” over the growing dark fleet of unregulated vessels, saying it is “only a question of time” before a significant disaster takes place.

Lars Barstad, chief executive of Frontline, also criticised European governments for failing to enforce rules meant to curtail trading in Russian oil, saying they were worried about forcing up energy prices.

The number of dark fleet vessels has grown to about a fifth of the world fleet after Russian-linked owners bought up hundreds of ageing ships to circumvent western countries’ curbs on the country’s oil trade.

The potential for disaster was illustrated in July when the Hafnia Nile, a tanker operated by Singapore-based Hafnia, collided with the Ceres I, a dark fleet vessel carrying Iranian oil, in waters off Malaysia.

According to a subsequent US Treasury sanctions notice against the Ceres I’s owners, at the time of the collision the vessel’s radar system was broadcasting an inaccurate location — a common tactic for dark fleet ships trying to conceal their activities.

Dark fleet vessels, which carry oil from Iran and Venezuela as well as Russia, are generally the property of offshore companies whose ownership is unclear and often lack adequate insurance. They are frequently registered under the flags of countries that do little to enforce rules about regular safety inspections.

Lars Barstad said he was ‘very, very concerned’ about the growth of the dark fleet © Mats Finnerud

Barstad said he was “very, very concerned” about the growth of the dark fleet, which he said had incentivised a number of “lawbreaking operators” to make an “insane amount of money”.

He added that the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the UN body, was doing too little to ensure enforcement of its safety and environmental rules.

“All these vessels . . . are trading outside the IMO framework,” Barstad said. “They have been sleeping behind the wheel now for quite some time in respect of tankers.”

There had been reports of other, unconfirmed incidents besides the Ceres I collision, Barstad added. “I’m very surprised we’ve not had more incidents like this,” he said. “I think it’s only a question of time until we get a big one.”

A vessel such as the Ceres I — which was carrying 2mn barrels of crude oil — could be split in two in a future incident, he said.

“That would be in the environment a bigger problem,” Barstad said. “It can happen any day — and then the biggest problem is that, if that happens, nobody will know who actually owns the ship or the cargo.”

Shipowners that complied with the regulations, such as Frontline, were facing disadvantages because so many others were operating with lower costs in unregulated dark fleets, Barstad added. He said that reflected politicians’ lack of willingness to enforce the sanctions.

“Politicians have decided not to take the political risks,” Barstad said, adding that he thought many feared higher energy prices if oil from Russia, Iran and Venezuela were truly excluded from international markets.

There have been persistent suggestions that countries such as Denmark — which controls the entrance to the Baltic — and countries by the English Channel should inspect and take into custody tankers sailing past their coasts without proper insurance.

Barstad declined to single out particular states but said: “It seems extremely halfhearted the way enforcement has been done. A tough position should be taken if one is serious about this.”

The IMO said in response to Barstad’s criticism that its general assembly passed a resolution in late 2023 calling on member states to take tougher action over fraudulent registration of ships and to step up inspections of vessels in port.

It also said member states had the responsibility to ensure that vessels flying their flag followed the required rules and to ensure ships visiting their ports did so.

Financial Times · by Robert Wright · January 5, 2025

6. Shaping the Narrative: America’s Struggle for Strategic Coherence

A useful assessment of the problem that hopefully will provoke some discussion.

Excerpts:

Much of the recent efforts to remedy these failures manifest in the attempt to create whole-of-government approaches. Proponents of this method argue that aligning messaging across departments, agencies, and official bodies—through coordinated talking points and unified narratives—could address communication challenges. However, organizations within the U.S. government generally collaborate and share unified messages when and where it makes sense. For example, the Departments of Justice, Commerce, and Treasury work together on sanctions and export controls, the Departments of Defense and State work together on Foreign Military Sales, and multiple departments, including Homeland Security, Energy, and Justice, are represented on the National Security Council. Underneath this collaboration exists an often-observed issue: bureaucratic competition; government departments are inherently competitive, frequently jockeying for personnel, resources, and authorities. This bureaucratic competition can lead agencies to prioritize actions that enhance their individual positions rather than advancing the broader U.S. government’s strategic objectives. These challenges, however, represent symptoms rather than the root cause of the problem: a national purpose.

This point was expressed in the October 2007 issue of Joint Forces Quarterly by retired Colonel William Darley: “Therefore, national-level failure to agree on what the United States stands for (that is, what national values strategic communications should reflect) is the principal impediment to developing a synchronized and effective program of strategic communications. Moreover, of perhaps greater concern, the root cause of the bureaucratic impasse on strategic communications reflects a deeper lack of consensus on what our national values in fact are.” It remains unclear whether the United States has since addressed this underlying issue or fundamentally altered its outlook on national values and strategic communications in the years following Colonel Darley’s statement.

Shaping the Narrative: America’s Struggle for Strategic Coherence

By Ian Whitfield

January 06, 2025

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/01/06/shaping_the_narrative_americas_struggle_for_strategic_coherence_1082598.html?mc_cid=f7f45bf8f6

Throughout history, information has been integral in shaping the outcomes of competition and conflict. From Alexander the Great's calculated propaganda campaigns to the Phoenix Program in the Vietnam War, these examples underscore the timeless power of information as a tool of strategy. Such operations are designed to exploit the “fog", the uncertainty and confusion that clouds decision-making, and " friction", the unpredictable and disruptive elements that impede even the best-laid plans, inherent in competition and conflict.

The United States has wielded information throughout history to achieve strategic objectives. During World War II, the Office of War Information (OWI) played a pivotal role in shaping public opinion and controlling the flow of information. Utilizing radio broadcasts, films, posters, and print media, OWI rallied domestic support and crafted and managed narratives that emphasized the United States’ role in defending democratic values and highlighted the moral struggle against fascism. By coordinating informational activities across government agencies, OWI ensured a consistent and accurate flow of information on the Homefront, avoiding war fatigue and turning the U.S. into the Arsenal of Democracy. During the Cold War, the United States Information Agency (USIA) expanded the scope of information operations overseas. Through academic exchanges, international broadcasting, English language programs, and curated policy messaging, USIA sought to break through the informational iron curtain authoritarianism used to insulate itself from democratic values. In both cases, these agencies demonstrated the power of strategic communication campaigns, contextually relevant messages tailored to their target audiences, which aligned with the national interest at the time, and the spread of democratic values.

These historical examples of using information to shape perceptions highlight an area the United States is severely lacking: strategic communications. This is the deliberate curation (the action of collecting and presenting information in a truthful manner like white propaganda, versus the creation of manipulated or false narratives, like black propaganda) of actions, messages, signals, and engagements to harmonize the disparate efforts of government by utilizing all levers of national power to inform, influence, or persuade target audiences in support of the nation’s strategy. Unlike ad hoc or isolated information campaigns, strategic communications require a unified voice that integrates policy objectives with targeted messaging to ensure consistency and credibility.

The United States government’s messaging and narratives surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic and the Afghanistan withdrawal underscore significant failures in strategic communication. Inconsistent and often conflicting messages from federal, state, and local agencies during the pandemic created widespread confusion and provided fertile ground for disinformation campaigns. Similarly, the messaging surrounding the Afghanistan withdrawal conveyed that the U.S. was no longer willing to engage in “forever wars,” even as it sought to position itself for long-term strategic competition with the Chinese Communist Party. The issues raised here are not a critique of the policy decisions made by both Republican and Democratic administrations, but rather an examination of the inherent contradictions and lack of coherence in how the United States government frames those decisions.

Much of the recent efforts to remedy these failures manifest in the attempt to create whole-of-government approaches. Proponents of this method argue that aligning messaging across departments, agencies, and official bodies—through coordinated talking points and unified narratives—could address communication challenges. However, organizations within the U.S. government generally collaborate and share unified messages when and where it makes sense. For example, the Departments of Justice, Commerce, and Treasury work together on sanctions and export controls, the Departments of Defense and State work together on Foreign Military Sales, and multiple departments, including Homeland Security, Energy, and Justice, are represented on the National Security Council. Underneath this collaboration exists an often-observed issue: bureaucratic competition; government departments are inherently competitive, frequently jockeying for personnel, resources, and authorities. This bureaucratic competition can lead agencies to prioritize actions that enhance their individual positions rather than advancing the broader U.S. government’s strategic objectives. These challenges, however, represent symptoms rather than the root cause of the problem: a national purpose.

This point was expressed in the October 2007 issue of Joint Forces Quarterly by retired Colonel William Darley: “Therefore, national-level failure to agree on what the United States stands for (that is, what national values strategic communications should reflect) is the principal impediment to developing a synchronized and effective program of strategic communications. Moreover, of perhaps greater concern, the root cause of the bureaucratic impasse on strategic communications reflects a deeper lack of consensus on what our national values in fact are.” It remains unclear whether the United States has since addressed this underlying issue or fundamentally altered its outlook on national values and strategic communications in the years following Colonel Darley’s statement.

Historically, U.S. strategy has relied upon a clearly defined external threat—an existential challenge to the United States and the American way of life—to shape its strategic purpose and focus. During World War II, the U.S. united around the need to defeat the rise of fascism and respond to the abhorrent violence perpetrated by the Axis powers, framing the conflict as a moral struggle for the future of humanity. As the nation transitioned into the Cold War, the existential threat of communism gave rise to a strategy of containment manifesting in economic competition, extensive foreign influence campaigns, and a series of proxy conflicts spanning multiple continents. Following the Cold War, the United States demonstrated its military dominance and strategic resolve in the Gulf War. The U.S. effectively leveraged its stockpile of materiel and acted under the legitimacy of a U.N. resolution and Kuwaiti permission to repel Iraq’s aggression.

In the post-Gulf War period, the United States continued to rely on a strategy centered around championing democratic values. The newly established hegemon relied on a framework originally devised to counter hostile forces during the 20^th Century. This approach failed to account for the lack of a cohesive adversarial narrative in the immediate post-Cold War era. The United States missed a critical opportunity to reimagine and redefine its strategic purpose, as the absence of a singular existential threat left the nation without a clear, unifying focus. As the new millennium dawned, the United States became mired in the fight against global terrorism. The terrorism threats posed following the attacks of September 11^th were sporadic and episodic. Although a significant threat, the U.S. became hyper-focused in its allocated resources and attention on terrorist activities. This fixation on extremely diffuse threats left rising geopolitical challenges largely unchecked and insufficiently addressed. The United States applied tenets of its Cold War strategy in an attempt to contain terrorism with a specific focus on containing the violent actions of religious extremists. This continuation of 20^th century containment policy is exhibited in the American approach to the Chinese Communist Party. Author David Sanger explores this concept in his book, New Cold Wars, “Then, the ideal of ‘containment’ meant preventing other countries from becoming communist: now it meant starving American competitors of key technologies in order to maintain an edge in AI and nuclear weapons, in space and in cyberspace,”. Failure to adapt its approach to an evolving global landscape has contributed to the fragmented and reactive posture that characterizes the United States strategy and national security efforts. This strategy has since evolved into a defensive framework, a negative-aim approach that centers on preserving the global status quo. The United States has neglected opportunities to enhance its strategic posture. The ramifications of American inaction are amplified by significant events, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the Afghanistan withdrawal, and the ongoing wars in Ukraine and Israel, which exacerbate the underlying tension and strain rooted in a reliance on a strategic approach intended for an adversary that has long since been defeated.

This vacuum of American strategy flows downstream from a broader identity crisis: a nation lacking consensus on what it fundamentally stands for as it continues repackaging and repeating narratives from the 20th century that no longer resonate in the contemporary strategic environment. The answer here is not in the legislative decision to increase defense spending or decrease labor regulations. The policies argued on Capitol Hill and in the White House are the tactics which best address a strategy with tangible ends. A strategy that should be driven by not just national interests, but the nation’s values. A strategy that provides direction and guidance and considers the potential points of fog and friction as it navigates new challenges and opportunities. A strategy that amplifies the strengths of the incredibly unique American ethos of ambition, courage, and innovation.

Should the United States adopt a strategy of restraint, prioritizing economic prosperity and domestic development as the foundation of its strength? Or should it focus on expanding American influence abroad, positioning itself for strategic competition in an increasingly contested international order? These perspectives are not necessarily diametrically opposed nor mutually exclusive; however, these questions illustrate a much more basic observation. For American leaders and strategists to accurately answer these macro-level questions, the United States must first understand itself.

2025 presents a pivotal opportunity for the presidential administration and congressional leaders to redefine the United States' strategic purpose in an increasingly complex and competitive global environment. A new administration brings the chance to set a fresh direction that carefully considers the strategic vision required to navigate today’s challenges and opportunities. This vision must clearly and confidently articulate what the United States stands for in the contemporary strategic environment: a framework rooted in stated American values while acknowledging and understanding the nuances of potential threats in the modern era. From this overarching vision, leaders within the Executive and Legislative branches can establish a cohesive communications framework that bridges policies and messaging. This framework would enable departments and agencies to align their subordinate strategies and corresponding communications efforts, ensuring unity of purpose, clarity of message, and strategic coherence. By harmonizing the tools of national power under a unified strategy, the United States can project its values and resolve while countering adversarial narratives and reclaiming information to achieve its strategic ends. The United States doesn’t need new organizations or more bureaucratic synergy. What it needs is clarity of purpose: to define its values, craft a coherent strategy, and communicate it with conviction.

Ian Whitfield is an Army Reserve officer and a graduate of Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or beliefs of Georgetown University, the Department of Defense, or any other organization the author is associated with.

7. New Orleans attacker visited city twice in recent months, wore Meta glasses to record the scene in advance

A key piece of new information here:

Finally, investigators are looking into Jabbar’s trips to Egypt and Canada and other visits to Atlanta and Tampa, according to Myrthil. He traveled to Cairo from June 22 to July 3, 2023, and visited Ontario from July 10 to July 13, 2023, he said. FBI agents are digging into what he did on those trips and whether they tie into the attack.

New Orleans attacker visited city twice in recent months, wore Meta glasses to record the scene in advance

https://www.cnn.com/2025/01/05/us/new-orleans-attack/index.html

By Eric Levenson, CNN

6 minute read

Updated 6:41 AM EST, Mon January 6, 2025

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Syrian hazmat team shows CNN inside of what appears to be a former chemical lab