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Quotes of the Day:
Albert Camus, author of The Stranger, said “fiction is the lie through which we tell the truth.”
“One ought, every day at least, to hear a little song, read a good poem, see a fine picture, and, if it were possible, to speak a few reasonable words.”
- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
“We must be the great arsenal of democracy”
On the night of December 29, 1940, theaters and restaurants across the country emptied as Americans gathered around radios to hear President Franklin Delano Roosevelt deliver one of the most famous of his beloved fireside chats. His topic was a somber one for the holidays. “Never before since Jamestown and Plymouth Rock has our American civilization been in such danger as now,” the president said.
World War II was underway, though America had not yet entered the fight. Germany and its allies had overrun much of Europe and Asia. The British, Greeks, Chinese, and a few other nations struggled to hold back the Axis assault. If Great Britain fell, FDR predicted, Americans “would be living at the point of a gun.” (That very night, German bombs fell on London, engulfing many buildings in flames.)
“There can be no appeasement with ruthlessness,” Roosevelt warned. “There can be no reasoning with an incendiary bomb. We know now that a nation can have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender.”
The president explained that America had no choice but to use its industrial might to arm nations battling the Axis powers. “We must be the great arsenal of democracy,” he said. “We must apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and sacrifice as we would show were we at war.”
In the following months, American factories began pumping out planes, tanks, guns, and ships to aid the Allies. Between 1940 and 1943, the United States increased its war output by a stunning 25 times. As the British journalist Alistair Cooke wrote, “The Allies would not have won the war . . . without the way the American people, with amazing speed, created an arsenal no coalition of nations could come close to matching.”
This content is courtesy of The American Patriot's Almanac
1. [Washington Talk] The reality of North Korea's river strategy... US-Korea discussion on 'nuclear asset management'
2. Trilateral cooperation with S. Korea, Japan most important to U.S.: State Dept.
3. North Korea likely to take advantage of new 'Cold War' paradigm: experts
4. South Korea would play role in a Taiwan contingency
5. Korea to take drastic measures to tackle population decline
6. S. Korea could resume loudspeaker broadcasting to N. Korea
7. Is Kim Ju-ae North Korea's heir apparent?
8. [Editorial] Raise nuclear deterrence (ROK/US)
9. Surfing Through Korea’s War Games
10. Learning English saved my life
11. Intercultural communication key to sustainability of Hallyu
12. South Korea Embraces 'Tit for Tat' Approach to North's Provocations
13. North Korean Students EXPELLED From University & Forced To Work In Coal Mines After Sounding Like They 'Watched Too Much Foreign TV'
14. What Can Deter North Korea?
1. [Washington Talk] The reality of North Korea's river strategy... US-Korea discussion on 'nuclear asset management'
VOA's Eunjung Cho hosts Mark Tokola and me on the weekly VOA show, Washington Talk, for broadcast to the primary target audience in Pyongyang and secondarily, Seoul, and around the world.
I think we were able to provide a few messages to Kim Jong Un and the elite.
Below is a Google Translate of the Korean description of the show (Not sure what the "river strategy" is a translation of)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=on5yl0TgX7M
[Washington Talk] The reality of North Korea's river strategy... US-Korea discussion on 'nuclear asset management'
VOA Korean
265K subscribers
1,275 views Premiered 2 hours ago #Washington Talk #VOA #North Korea
North Korea announced that it would continue to take a hardline stance against the United States and South Korea by exponentially increasing its nuclear warheads this year as well. Let's take a look at the reality and problems of North Korea's strategy in response to the US-ROK combined defense posture. In addition, we will analyze how far the joint operation of nuclear assets between the United States and South Korea is possible. Moderator: Cho Eun-jung / Interviewer: Mark Tokola (Deputy Director, Korea Economic Research Institute, KEI), David Maxwell (Senior Research Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies)
#Washington Talk #VOA #North Korea #korea #USA #japan #china #US Korea #North, China, Russia #biden #yoon seok-yeol #Kim Jong-un #denuclearization #ballistic missile #nuclear #nuclear test #sanctions #drone #U.S.-ROK joint training #ICBM #MarkTokola #DavidMaxwell #WashingtonTalk #VoiceofAmerica
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2. Trilateral cooperation with S. Korea, Japan most important to U.S.: State Dept.
Trilateral cooperation benefits from the Nietzsche quote: "That which does not kill me makes me stronger." Every north Korean provocation drives the three nations closer together.
A trilateral ALLIANCE could be a game changer for Northeast Asia and the INDOPACIFIC and the international community. It could tip the balance in strategic competition and from a mutual national security perspective the three militaries operating as an alliance could be a force that would be the most powerful in the region.
If only we were not hamstrung by the historical issues.
Trilateral cooperation with S. Korea, Japan most important to U.S.: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · January 7, 2023
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Jan. 6 (Yonhap) -- Close cooperation between South Korea, Japan and the United States is crucial in dealing with a range of challenges facing the allies in the Indo-Pacific, including the security threat posed by North Korea, a state department spokesperson said Friday.
Ned Price said ways to enhance the trilateral cooperation will also be a major topic for U.S.-Japan discussions next week.
U.S. President Joe Biden is set to hold a bilateral summit with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at the White House, after their defense and foreign ministers hold the annual Security Consultative Committee meeting in Washington.
Department of State Press Secretary Ned Price is seen answering questions during a press briefing at the Foreign Press Center in Washington on Jan. 6, 2023 in this captured image. (Yonhap)
"We have an ironclad relationship with our Japanese allies. That will be on full display next week when we have a Two Plus Two format with our Japanese allies and when the president, prime minister convene at the White House on Friday," the department press secretary said during a press briefing at the Foreign Press Center in Washington.
"The bilateral relationship we have with Japan is indispensable to our shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. But there are certain challenges and the DPRK is at the top of that list, where it's especially important for us to have an effective trilateral relationship as well," he added.
DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name.
Price said the Biden administration has been working to "revitalize" the trilateral cooperation since its earliest days, "knowing that the challenges we confront in the Indo Pacific, as well as the opportunities but certainly the challenges, would benefit from a seamless and unified trilateral approach."
"It's a topic of conversation with our ROK allies, just as the threat that the region, Japan, the ROK, other allies and partners face from the DPRK (is) in the context of next week's discussions," he added, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.
The department spokesperson also highlighted U.S. efforts to help improve human rights conditions in North Korea, despite the post of U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights being vacant for more than five years.
"I don't have any personnel announcements," he said when asked, adding, "But I can tell you that when we look at our approach to the DPRK, we are taking into account the full array of challenges that we see from that regime and within that regime."
Price insisted that the human rights situation in the North is of "deep concern" to the U.S.
"So special envoy or not, this is a focus of ours. We, even in amidst of a robust sanctions regime that owes to North Korea's ballistic missile, its ballistic missiles its nuclear weapons program, we seek to do all that we can to support the people of the DPRK," he said.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · January 7, 2023
3. North Korea likely to take advantage of new 'Cold War' paradigm: experts
We should always keep in mind Kim Jong Un needs an external threat to justify the sacrifices and suffering he demands from and causes among the Korean people living in the north.
We can argue the merits of whether the global situation is a Cold War 2.0 but for Kim describing the world that way provides the ability to describe threats to the north. It allows Kim to portray itself like the former USSR (and supports the demand for arms control negotiations).
Kim also recognizes the world is lining up in a sort of bipolar way - authoritarian regimes versus freedom loving countries and this puts China, Russia, and Iran on the north's side
But the bottomline is the north calls the global situation a Cold War to create an external threat for the north.
North Korea likely to take advantage of new 'Cold War' paradigm: experts
The Korea Times · by 2023-01-07 09:56 | North Korea · January 7, 2023
gettyimagesbank
By Kang Seung-woo
With the global order shifting to a new "Cold War" paradigm, where North Korea partners with China and Russia against a U.S.-led trilateral alliance with South Korea and Japan, Pyongyang is expected to go its own way of advancing its nuclear program, according to diplomatic observers.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un noted that the structure of international relations has been apparently shifted to the new Cold War system, further expediting a push for multipolarization, and accused the United States of establishing a military bloc similar to NATO, in a plenary meeting of its ruling Workers' Party last week. In addition, he hinted that his country will focus heavily on the security situation and its defense plans.
"I think North Korea views Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington as aligned in their policy approach with the goal of denuclearization and sees little value in dialogue with either of them. Pyongyang is not interested in talks that continue to pursue denuclearization and holds out little hope for concessions that they seek. As a result, North Korea will continue to grow its military capabilities," U.S. Naval War College professor Terence Roehrig said.
China, North Korea's biggest ally, has been engaged in a strategic competition with the U.S., while Russia, another enabler of Pyongyang's provocations, is in conflict with the U.S. and other Western countries due to its invasion of Ukraine, raising concerns that the North Korean nuclear issue has been pushed to the back burner of the Joe Biden administration's foreign policy, giving it the opportunity to concentrate more on modernizing its nuclear arsenal.
However, Ramon Pacheco Pardo, a professor of international relations at King's College London, said differing views between the two have led to the lack of diplomatic attention toward North Korea.
"Traditionally, North Korea has not been the main issue on Washington's agenda. In the past, the Middle East and terrorism were more important, as well as managing China's rise. Today, competition with China and Russia's war on Ukraine are more important than North Korea for the Biden administration," Pacheco Pardo said.
"But past U.S. administrations found the time to deal with North Korea in spite of other, more pressing foreign policy priorities. So this could be the case with the Biden administration. However, the positions of the U.S. and North Korea are very far apart right now. In my view, this is the main reason why the Bided administration see little reason to focus on North Korea, rather than other foreign policy priorities."
Leif-Eric Easley, an associate professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University, said policies of various stakeholders on the North Korean nuclear issue interact with each other, but it is important to clarify whether factors operate more as causes or effects.
"The Biden administration may be more focused on China and Russia, but its lack of diplomatic attention toward North Korea is more a result of the Kim regime's recalcitrance rather than a reason for it," he said.
Trilateral cooperation with S. Korea, Japan most important to US: State Dept.
Roehrig said the U.S. has the bandwidth to engage in dialogue but North Korea has shown little interest in doing so.
"After the Biden administration announced the results of its policy review on North Korea at the start of its tenure that showed few differences from the Obama administration, Pyongyang has likely decided that there is little to be gained in talks," he said.
During the plenum, Kim highlighted the importance and necessity of mass-producing tactical nuclear weapons and called for an exponential increase of the country's nuclear arsenal.
"As long as there is no engagement between Washington and Pyongyang, the Kim regime will have no incentive to slow down development of its nuclear weapons program," Pacheco Pardo said.
"In any case, North Korea has made clear that it considers itself a nuclear power. So even if there were negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea, Pyongyang would continue to seek ways to improve its nuclear weapons capabilities."
Currently, the South Korean government has urged China to play a role in resolving the North Korean issue, saying that Pyongyang's return to dialogue is in the common interest of Beijing as well as Seoul and Washington ― although experts remain skeptical of a possible Chinese engagement.
"China may quietly encourage North Korea to resume dialogue but if Pyongyang is not interested, there is little Beijing can do to force it to the table. I am not optimistic that much will change for the time being," Roehrig said.
Easley added, "China's support of North Korea is related to geopolitical dynamics around the Korean Peninsula but is also a major enabler of Pyongyang's provocations."
The Korea Times · by 2023-01-07 09:56 | North Korea · January 7, 2023
4. South Korea would play role in a Taiwan contingency
If there is a conflict in Taiwan, job one for the ROK/US Combined Forces Command the the ROK/US alliance is to sustain readiness to defend Korea so that Kim will be deterred from attacking the South.
Excerpts:
But South Korea’s military involvement would surely trigger China’s retaliation. China has shown the pattern of “killing the chicken to scare the monkey” when confronted with multiple players, as seen in the South China Sea.
South Korea is the chicken in this case. Chinese media publicly refer to the country as “the weakest link” of the US alliance system in East Asia. China’s missiles can easily reach South Korea’s bases, and the People’s Liberation Army Navy will block or attack South Korean naval vessels in the Yellow Sea even before they sail to the Taiwan Strait.
North Korea is also likely to exploit the situation because the US focus would be distracted if conflict were to occur in the Taiwan Strait. Such an event would create an opportunity for North Korea to speed up its advancement in missile and nuclear capabilities.
North Korea’s concurrent military provocations may also help China divide the US military assets between the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula.
Map highlighting proximity of South Korea and Taiwan: Wikipedia
Pyongyang already has begun to comment on the Taiwan issue. For example, Kim Jong Un sent “a letter of solidarity” to Beijing after US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. This is North Korea’s strategic signaling of potential support for China in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
Perhaps for these reasons, the South Korean government has been cautious in clarifying its potential role in a Taiwan contingency.
South Korea would play role in a Taiwan contingency
Polls surprisingly show South Koreans are ready to support a contribution to the defense of Taiwan against a China invasion
asiatimes.com · by Sungmin Cho · January 5, 2023
As South Korea’s military has grown stronger, the United States now expects it to play a larger role in maintaining regional stability.
General Paul LaCamera, the commander of the US Forces Korea (USFK), stated that, “given the international reach of the South Korean military, opportunities are emerging for alliance cooperation beyond the Korean Peninsula.”
The former secretary of defense Mark Esper was more explicit. In the event of a contingency in the Taiwan Strait, he said, “certainly there would be a support role” for South Korea. “I would imagine coming off the Korean Peninsula to support any type of Taiwan scenario.”
Indeed, there are important precedents. South Korea provided military support for the US war efforts in Vietnam and Iraq, and its air force and navy could likewise be deployed to the Taiwan Strait to fight with the United States.
But South Korea’s military involvement would surely trigger China’s retaliation. China has shown the pattern of “killing the chicken to scare the monkey” when confronted with multiple players, as seen in the South China Sea.
South Korea is the chicken in this case. Chinese media publicly refer to the country as “the weakest link” of the US alliance system in East Asia. China’s missiles can easily reach South Korea’s bases, and the People’s Liberation Army Navy will block or attack South Korean naval vessels in the Yellow Sea even before they sail to the Taiwan Strait.
North Korea is also likely to exploit the situation because the US focus would be distracted if conflict were to occur in the Taiwan Strait. Such an event would create an opportunity for North Korea to speed up its advancement in missile and nuclear capabilities.
North Korea’s concurrent military provocations may also help China divide the US military assets between the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula.
Map highlighting proximity of South Korea and Taiwan: Wikipedia
Pyongyang already has begun to comment on the Taiwan issue. For example, Kim Jong Un sent “a letter of solidarity” to Beijing after US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. This is North Korea’s strategic signaling of potential support for China in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
Perhaps for these reasons, the South Korean government has been cautious in clarifying its potential role in a Taiwan contingency.
During the summit with President Joe Biden in May 2022, President Yoon Suk-yeol agreed to insert “the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” in the joint statement. But President Yoon did not meet with Speaker Pelosi when she visited South Korea after her trip to Taiwan.
Likewise, while South Korea’s minister of defense and the US secretary of defense reaffirmed the importance of peace in the Taiwan Strait in December 2021, South Korea’s vice defense minister revealed that there had been no discussion between the two governments about South Korea’s role in a Taiwan contingency.
Surprisingly, the South Korean people are ready to support South Korea’s positive contribution to the defense of Taiwan.
According to a survey conducted by the Seoul daily Joong-Ang Ilbo and the East Asia Institute in August, only 18% of respondents opposed any involvement of South Korea in a Taiwan contingency, while 22.5% said they would support its participation in the joint military operation with the US forces.
In the same survey, 42% responded that South Korea’s military role should be limited to providing rear-area support for US forces. Overall, 64.5% of South Korean respondents agreed that South Korea should provide direct or indirect support for US military operations in a Taiwan contingency.
In sum, South Korea is most likely to provide indirect support for the US forces in a Taiwan contingency. The USFK commander has hinted that the contingency planning for the forces’ involvement in the Taiwan Strait is under development.
Due to China’s potential retaliation and North Korea’s opportunistic provocations on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea’s direct involvement in combat operations would most likely create two fronts of crises.
Therefore, in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, South Korea’s primary focus should be to deter North Korea’s aggression while providing rear-area support for US operations – for example, through base access, provision of ammunitions, noncombatant evacuation and noncombat operations such as maintenance of weapon systems and augmentation of US reconnaissance capabilities.
Camp Humphreys, 50 miles south of Seoul, is the largest overseas US military base. Photo: US Army
Critics may argue that the diversification of the USFK’s role to the region beyond the Korean Peninsula is concerning, given North Korea’s military threats and improvement in missile and nuclear capabilities. But they need to acknowledge the new reality that the United States and South Korea must be prepared for multiple contingencies in different locations.
The need to discuss the division of labor between allies should not be misconstrued as a “decoupling” of the alliance. In this context, regardless of the real probability of China’s invasion of Taiwan, the issue is already a matter of alliance management between the United States and South Korea.
Sungmin Cho is a Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS). The views in this commentary are his own and do not represent those of the APCSS or the US Department of Defense.
This article was . Asia Times is republishing it with permission.
asiatimes.com · by Sungmin Cho · January 5, 2023
5. Korea to take drastic measures to tackle population decline
Korea to take drastic measures to tackle population decline
The Korea Times · January 5, 2023
Na Kyung-won, chief of the presidential committee on Aging Society and Population Policy, speaks during a press conference held at Korea Press Center in Seoul, Thursday. Courtesy of presidential committee on Aging Society and Population PolicyBy Lee Hyo-jin
The government will take drastic measures to tackle Korea's demographic crisis of its falling birthrate and rapidly aging society, said Na Kyung-won, head of the presidential committee on Aging Society and Population Policy, who floated the idea of writing off loans for married couples who give birth to children.
"Now is the absolute last chance to take action on the imminent demographic crisis. Responding and adapting to the demographic change is a matter of the nation's survival and sustainability," Na, a four-term lawmaker, said during a press conference held in Seoul, Thursday.
Korea is expected to become an ultra-aged society by 2025, in which 20 percent of the population is aged 65 and over. The country's fertility rate, which has been the lowest in the world for several years, is showing no signs of rebound with the latest figure standing at 0.79.
Na told reporters that her committee has recently come up with a set of measures to encourage marriage among the young generations, focusing on increasing financial and housing support.
"Recent surveys show that economic instability and housing issues are the main reasons why young people are reluctant to get married," she said. "The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport is offering low-interest loans and housing benefits for newlyweds, but that's not enough. So we are looking at whether we can provide bolder support such as writing off some amount of loans. We will continue discussions with the land ministry."
The presidential committee is closely looking at what is called the "baby expecting loan" carried out by the government of Victor Orban in Hungary, a preferential loan offered to heterosexual married couples. The government offers a 10-million-forint ($26,800) loan, and for couples that have one child in a five-year period, the interest on their loan is suspended forever and monthly repayments are halted for three years. The birth of a second child allows them a further three-year pause on repayments and the loan is written off upon the birth of a third child
Na also stressed that the government will ease regulations in regards to immigration policies so as to attract more foreign workers to the country. The Ministry of Justice will create a new visa under the E-7 category ― called the E-7-S visa ― to allow foreign nationals to apply for jobs that are not designated by the E-7 visa. The ministry will also offer more employment options for international students.
During Thursday's conference, Na declined to give a direct response as to whether she will run for the ruling People Power Party (PPP) leadership contest in March. The political heavyweight has been leading polls conducted among party supports.
Amid growing anticipation that she will make a decision by the end of this month as candidate registration begins in early February, Na said, "If I declare my bid, I would have to leave my current position. But I believe I will still be able to provide support in carrying out demographic policies."
The Korea Times · January 5, 2023
6. S. Korea could resume loudspeaker broadcasting to N. Korea
A psychological warfare response to north Korean provocations is good. Information is an existential threat to the regime. The 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry recognized the isolation of the Korean people and their lack of access to outside information due to deliberate regime policies is a human rights abuse. The UN COI called on the international community to provide information to the Korean people in the north. The ROK has the moral high ground doing so. I know the counter to this argument is the moral hazard that is created because Koreans who view outside information could be subject to severe punishment. and even execution. But in talking to escapees I have learned that the Korean people know the risks and are so hungry for outside information that they are well aware of the risks and willing to accept those risks.
We need more than loudspeakers.
Here is what we need to consider:
· Design an overt information warfare campaign targeting the North Korean people based on Information, Knowledge, Truth, and Understanding
o Information: massive quantities of information from entertainment to news;
o Knowledge: practical information on how to effect change, best practices for agriculture and market activity, educational lessons without Juche influence;
o Truth: the truth about the regime and the situation in North Korea and the outside world; and,
o Understanding: help the Korean people in the North to understand the inalienable and universal rights that belong to all human beings.
The only way to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, military threats, and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people in the North by the mafia-like crime cult known as the Kim family regime is through unification. A free and unified Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government would be a strong American ally in Asia. An information warfare campaign against North Korea will be the most important contribution to this outcome, a United Republic of Korea (UROK).
I previously provided my thoughts along with references here: https://conta.cc/3vDW2ST
S. Korea could resume loudspeaker broadcasting to N. Korea
donga.com
Posted January. 07, 2023 07:42,
Updated January. 07, 2023 07:42
S. Korea could resume loudspeaker broadcasting to N. Korea. January. 07, 2023 07:42. by Joo-Young Jeon aimhigh@donga.com.
The South Korean government started an earnest inspection of loudspeakers for broadcasting to North Korea at the inter-Korean border, it was confirmed Friday. If the North makes a grave provocation including violation of South Korean territory with its drones, Seoul is set to nullify the September 19, 2018 inter-Korean military agreement, and consider resumption of loudspeaker broadcasting to the North, and has started checking loudspeaker facilities in preparation for the move accordingly.
“In preparation for the resumption of broadcasting, the government is inspecting loudspeaker broadcasting equipment. It is a preparatory measure,” a source in the South Korean government told The Dong-A Ilbo over the phone. It is Seoul’s position that if the September 19 military agreement is suspended, a cause for punishing violators under the current Inter-Korean Relations Development Act (or the anti-leaflet act), which bans loudspeaker broadcasting, will be nullified. There will be no legal obstacles to the resumption of loudspeaker broadcasting.
Before others, South Korea is reportedly checking the sites of frontline military units where loudspeaker broadcasting facilities were placed in the past. However, the government has stopped short of purchasing new equipment just yet. “We are thinking to decide whether to resume loudspeaker broadcasting or not if Pyongyang commits a (grave) violation, including the firing of an inter-continental ballistic missile or testing of a nuclear weapon (apart of violation of the South Korean territory),” another Seoul source said.
“(In the event of North Korea’s provocation), steps will be taken for President Yoon Suk Yeol to decide to suspend the September 19 agreement, before the National Security Council will determine whether to resume loudspeaker broadcasting to the North,” an official at the South Korean presidential office said.
한국어
donga.com
7. Is Kim Ju-ae North Korea's heir apparent?
I doubt it. But is all this speculation helpful? Or is KIm playing us and laughing at us as we take overly serious his "take a daughter to a LAUNCH day?"
Saturday
January 7, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Is Kim Ju-ae North Korea's heir apparent?
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/01/07/national/northKorea/North-Korea-Kim-Juae-Kim-Jongun/20230107070008667.html
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, right, and his daughter Ju-ae inspect a missile facility at an unspecified location in North Korea, in a photo released by state media on Jan. 1, 2023. [YONHAP]
On New Year’s Day, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un made an appearance on state television viewing an array of weapons at a missile base in an undisclosed location.
What really caught the world’s attention was not the Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles or transporter erector launcher (TEL) at the site, but the fact that Kim was hand-in-hand with his second child.
This was the young girl’s third appearance. Her first was with her father at a test of Pyongyang’s new Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on Nov. 18, 2022.
That was the first time any of Kim’s offspring were shown to the public.
The daughter's latest appearance is fueling speculation on whether Kim is setting her up as his heir apparent.
Children of North Korea’s ruling dynasty have traditionally been kept from public view until they reached adulthood. Mystery is part of the personality cult of the Kim family, also known as the Mount Paektu bloodline.
In her second appearance at an event celebrating the ICBM launch later in November, high-ranking North Korean officials were photographed bowing to the daughter — as she stood straight — showing notable reverence to her.
North Korean state media described this daughter as Kim Jong-un’s “most beloved” child, though it never revealed her name or age. South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) said she is believed to be named Kim Ju-ae, and is around nine or 10 years old.
Ju-ae resembles both of her parents and is dressed with notable style.
Like her mother Ri Sol-ju, Ju-ae appears to be emerging as a new style icon and the leader of the younger generation of North Koreans.
Some analysts see Ju-ae’s public appearances as an attempt to solidify the regime's security.
Others tentatively suggest that Ju-ae may be cementing her role as heir apparent to carry on a fourth generation of the Kim dynasty and someday take control of the North’s nuclear weapons.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un holds hands with his daughter Ju-ae as they prepare to watch the launch of a new Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at Pyongyang International Airport on Nov. 18 in a photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on Nov. 19, 2022. [YONHAP]
Who is Kim Jong-un’s 'most beloved' child?
Kim Jong-un and his wife Ri Sol-ju are believed to have married in 2009 and have three children born around 2010, 2013 and 2017. The first is believed to be a son and the two others are daughters.
Ju-ae is the only one of Kim Jong-un’s three kids that we have a name for thanks to retired NBA star Dennis Rodman. Rodman revealed to the media in September 2013 he held Kim's baby girl in his arms after a visit to Pyongyang on the invitation of the North Korean leader earlier in the year, revealing her name for the first time.
The world got its first look at Ju-ae on Nov. 19, 2022, in a series of photos released by state media. She was observing the Hwasong-17 ICBM test the previous day.
The North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that Kim was "together with his beloved daughter and wife" to take part in "a crucial milestone” in the regime’s nuclear development. It did not specify the daughter’s name or age.
Her appearance overshadowed Pyongyang’s boast that it had launched a Hwasong-17 — an ICBM dubbed the "monster" missile with a range of around 15,000 kilometers, which would put the United States mainland within its range.
The South’s spy agency NIS later confirmed that the child in the photos was believed to be Kim Ju-ae, the North Korean leader’s second child.
On Nov. 27, the state-run Rodong Sinmun released 15 photos of Ju-ae on its front and second pages, this time with officials who worked on the launch of the Hwasong-17.
The father and daughter pair was affectionately holding hands. In two photographs, Ju-ae places her hand on her seated father’s shoulder, an act of intimacy expected only from closest family members.
In her latest appearance in images released by the North’s Korean Central Television on Jan. 1, she is visiting a missile base at an unspecified location with her father, viewing what appears to be over a dozen Hwasong-12 IRBMs and other missiles.
The images were shown in a report on the results of the North’s ruling Workers' Party plenary meeting held from Dec. 26 to 31.
Unification Ministry spokesman Cho Joong-hoon confirmed to reporters on Jan. 2 that Kim’s daughter has been featured in the North Korean media three times and that Seoul would continue to “monitor and evaluate related trends” of coverage of Kim Ju-ae.
Kim Ju-ae poses with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at a photo session with missile officials involved in the Hwasong-17 ICBM launch in a photo released by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on Nov. 27, 2022. [YONHAP]
Why reveal Ju-ae now?
In September 2022, a video clip of a young girl in a pink dress and short hair at the center of a children’s choir at an event celebrating North Korea’s 74th founding anniversary attended by Kim and Ri caught South Korean and western media’s attention.
The video showed Kim smiling widely and Ri wrapping her hand around the child's back after the performance, raising speculation that this could be Kim’s daughter.
The big reveal came two months later.
“Exposing a member of the Kim family is a strategic choice that has to be carefully planned or determined to be necessary; there is simply no accidental or spontaneous exposure,” said Hong Min, director of the North Korean Research Division at Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU).
“In the case of the ‘royal family,’ not only are there issues of personal safety, but once revealed, it’s not just an internal security issue, but various foreign intelligence agencies can mark them and monitor their every move.”
But despite the risks, Hong pointed out that publicizing the father-daughter relationship has a “considerable image-making effect” and also brings the leader closer to the North Korean people.
“Through showing stability in his family, he is also guaranteeing the safety and security of the future generations,” or the so-called “market generation,” those born after 2010.
“It shows they have a weapon that can secure the future of the country,” said Hong, “and presents an image of the head of a family and a leader who is guaranteeing the safety of all North Koreans and their children.”
Appearing with his daughter at the missile site also “softens the belligerent military image,” said Hong, and “provides a justification for developing missiles and having nuclear weapons.”
North Korea described the successful test of the Hwasong-17 last November as a “historic day,” and Kim Jong-un brought along his second child, pointed out Cheong Seong-chang, director of the Center for North Korean Studies at the Sejong Institute.
“Kim Jong-un wanted to show off the great achievement of the successful test of the Hwasong-17 ICBM, and I believe he naturally tried to link loyalty to himself with loyalty to his daughter,” said Cheong.
“It's not like he took his daughter out to an on-site inspection out of the blue,” said Cheong. “Kim Ju-ae was brought out on an historical day, and officials in the related fields pledged in a letter their loyalty from generation to generation to the Mount Paektu bloodline. So, naturally, Kim intended to instill an image that his daughter would succeed his achievements.”
Kim Ju-ae and her mother Ri Solju. [YONHAP]
How did Ju-ae become an overnight style icon?
In her Nov. 18 sighting, Ju-ae looked like a typical elementary school girl, sporting a padded jacket with a white fur collar over black pants. She had straight bangs, hair tied back with a blue scrunchie. For a fun pop of color, she had red patent leather shoes with bows.
The first thing many people noted was her remarkable resemblance to her father.
In her second appearance, she sported a more mature look, donning a black woolen coat with a black fur collar, similar to a style worn by her mother Ri Sol-ju, the reigning style icon for the Pyongyang elite.
Ju-ae’s bangs were swept to the side, and her hair styled in a half-up do, Ri’s signature look, drawing attention this time to the resemblance between mother and daughter. Kim Jong-un also sported an all-black look on that occasion, wearing a black leather double-breasted trench coat.
In her New Year’s Day appearance, Ju-ae again is dressed in a long black coat, black trousers and black leather shoes, with her half-up hairstyle, similar to her second appearance.
The white puffer jacket Ju-ae wore on her first appearance reportedly sparked a padded jacket boom in North Korea.
In early December, the Rodong Sinmun published pictures of North Korean women in white and pink padded jackets, indicating that Ju-ae was a trendsetter following in her mother's footsteps.
“Kim Jong-un daughter” was the most popular search term related to North Korea in Google search engines globally in the days after her public appearances, catapulting her to worldwide fame.
Experts point out that Kim’s styles varied according to the occasion, and that Ju-ae sported a more casual look for the missile test, and more formal attire for the commemorative photo.
“What's certain is that such outfits weren't mere personal preferences,” said Hong Min, director of the North Korean Research Division at Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU). “There must have been coordination, similar to how Ri Sol-ju's clothes are similarly coordinated depending on the event location and various other things.”
He pointed out that this publicity and image-making, down to Ju-ae’s outfits, was likely meticulously coordinated by Kim Yo-jong, the leader’s powerful younger sister in charge of propaganda.
“Once revealed, it is not a one-time exposure, but with the intention to fully utilize Kim Ju-ae for image politics for government activities.”
A compilation of North Korean first lady Ri Sol-ju’s outfits. [YONHAP]
Who is Ri Sol-ju, North Korea’s first lady?
Before she became North Korea’s first lady, Ri was best known as a cheerleader, a very competitive position, who traveled to South Korea for the 2005 Asian Athletics Championship in Incheon.
Ri is reported to have come from an upper-class family. Her exact age is unknown, though she is assumed to be in her early to mid-30s. She was a singer in the Unhasu Orchestra, an elite troupe of handpicked musicians, before she married Kim Jong-un around 2009.
As first lady, Ri also went through a style transformation and is credited with popularizing Western-style attire, miniskirts, luxury bags and high heels.
Ri was immediately noted for her exceptional beauty in South Korea, and compared to the North’s version of a K-pop star.
In her earliest appearances, Ri was often seen wearing modest black skirted suits, considered typical for the Pyongyang female elite. She wore a short haircut before adopting her signature long-haired, half-up do.
She began donning pastel colors, skirt suits reminiscent of Jackie Kennedy, brighter patterns, floral prints, statement accessories and luxury brand bags, including Dior.
Ri is often credited for a boom in fake luxury bags, and brighter colors and patterns also caught on with Pyongyang women, according to defectors, who said that bright fabrics similar to Ri’s outfits sold out quickly.
Ri’s fashion choices were also seen to be linked to Kim Jong-un’s focus on improving his country’s economy after coming into power.
A senior North Korean military official is seen bowing to Kim Ju-ae at the commemorative photo shoot in a screen capture from the North’s Korean Central Television on Nov. 27. [YONHAP]
What is the Mount Paektu bloodline?
The so-called Mount Paektu bloodline refers to the North Korean ruling family. The Kim dynasty dates to founding father Kim Il Sung, and after he died in 1994, North Korea was run by his son Kim Jong-il and then his grandson Kim Jong-un.
Mount Paektu, an active volcano straddling the North Korean-Chinese border, is considered the spiritual home of the Korean people. The Mount Paektu bloodline is a major part of the personality cult of Kim Il Sung and his successors, and three generations of Kims were officially born on the mountain, though historical accounts contradict that claim.
Kim's children are comparable to “princes or princesses in a dynastic system,” said Cheong.
Senior military brass are seen bowing low to Ju-ae at the Nov. 27 photo event, showing her status as Kim’s daughter surpasses that of four-star generals much older than her.
“What really surprised me is that four-star generals bowed 90 degrees to Kim Ju-ae,” People Power Party (PPP) Rep. Thae Yong-ho, a former senior North Korean diplomat who defected to the South, told SBS radio later that month. “North Korea is similar to the South, based on Confucian tradition, and this would not happen even for the children [of the Kim dynasty], at least not during Kim Il Sung’s time.”
He said Ju-ae’s appearance “seems to be an opportunity to firmly carve out the fourth generation of succession.”
Why the secrecy?
Kim Jong-il was named heir-apparent to North Korean founder Kim Il Sung in 1974 but was officially designated his father's successor at a ruling Workers' Party meeting six years later in 1980.
Kim Jong-il named Kim Jong-un his successor in 2008, but he made his first appearance in the media two years later.
His father told his closest aides that Kim Jong-un would be his successor since 1992, after his son’s eighth birthday, because he resembled him the most. Kim Jong-il passed over his first born son, Kim Jong-nam, and second, Kim Jong-chol, in favor of Kim Jong-un. Kim Jong-nam had a different mother than the other two sons, so he was their half-brother.
Kim Jong-chol and Kim Jong-un spent their adolescent years at an elite boarding school in Bern, Switzerland. They were left in the care of maternal aunt Ko Yong-suk, and her husband, Ri Gang. Ko, Ri and their three children later defected to the United States.
Kim Jong-nam fell out of favor with his father in the early 2000s after a visit to Tokyo Disneyland in 2001 that produced embarrassing headlines around the world. He was assassinated with a nerve agent at Kuala Lumpur International Airport in Malaysia in February 2017.
“It took a lot of time for Kim Jong-un to overcome the prejudices of the outside world and questions about regime stability when he took power,” said Cheong. “However, there will be no such talk if his successor is appointed early on.”
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, right, and daughter Ju-ae watch the launch of a new Hwasong-17 ICBM at Pyongyang International Airport on Nov. 18 in a photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency on Nov. 19, 2022. [YONHAP]
Who will succeed Kim?
Some analysts point out it that the hidden first child, or son, is likely to be Kim’s heir apparent and will be kept out of the public eye until he grows older, as Kim Jong-un was.
They point out that Kim himself is still young, not yet 40, leaving a lot of time to formally name a successor.
“Kim Jong-un is a young leader, who will likely rule the country for more than 20 years taking into consideration his age,” said Hong. “He needs to be reaching the current young generation, teenagers and those in their 20s, and 30s, the people that will become the central pillars of North Korean society in the future.”
Hong was skeptical that Ju-ae is the heir apparent, noting that North Korea “in general is patriarchal,” and that “despite society changing in many ways, it is still a country where the differences between men and women are very severe.”
He said that the first son is likely to be Kim’s successor.
However, it’s not unheard of for North Korea to have powerful female officials.
Other prominent female figures include Kim’s younger sister and closest aide Kim Yo-jong, the first vice director of its propaganda department, who often serves as a mouthpiece for her brother, and Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui, who was responsible for denuclearization negotiations.
Kim Kyong-hui, the once powerful aunt of Kim Jong-un, was the only legitimate daughter of North Korean founder Kim Il Sung and wielded immense influence during the Kim Jong-il era. Her husband, Jang Song-thaek, a former vice chairman of the National Defense Commission, was executed in late 2013 for allegedly plotting to overthrow the regime, which put Kim Kyong-hui out of the spotlight for some years before she made reappeared in 2020.
“Kim Ju-ae can have a role to assist her father's governing activities, and a role to assist her brother, who later becomes his successor,” said Hong, similar to the role Kim Yo-jong plays today. “She can serve as an icon of her generation.”
However, Cheong pointed out that there were only three previous people described as “precious” before Ju-ae, said Cheong. They were former leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il, and the current leader Kim Jong-un.
“This suggests that Kim Ju-ae will soon become the fourth-generational leader,” he said, and “it can be interpreted that she has been chosen to succeed her father.”
Ju-ae is described in North Korean state media as Kim’s “most beloved” child, literally meaning she is his favorite of his three offspring, he pointed.
“The reason Kim Jong-un was chosen as the successor to Kim Jong-il is because Kim Jong-il loved him the most amongst his sons,” said Cheong. “Even if Kim Jong-un’s first child is a son, if he doesn’t have the temperament, or is considered soft like the music-loving Kim Jong-chol, or weak [like Kim Jong-nam], it would be difficult for the North Korean leader to name such a son as his successor. However, even if Kim Ju-ae is a daughter, if she has strong fighting power, she could be the logical choice for him.”
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and his daughter Ju-ae inspect a missile facility at an unspecified location in North Korea, in a photo released by state media on Jan. 1, 2023. [YONHAP]
What next for Ju-ae?
Whether or not Ju-ae is indeed Kim’s successor, her every move will be scrutinized from now on.
“In light of his own experience, Kim may have decided on a successor and disclosed it early on to make it is less shocking to people and provide an opportunity for his successor to form a wider network of people around her,” said Cheong.
Ju-ae probably won't be able to study abroad, as Kim did, because she is now a public figure and there are stricter international sanctions in place.
“For the time being, she will still be in training,” said Cheong. “She likely wouldn’t be able to properly aid her father until she turns around 20 years old and will likely continue to watch and learn by his side. She is also expected to build up her own personal connections in the meantime.”
Kim may gradually share information with Ju-ae to “firmly command and control North Korea's most important strategic assets, nuclear weapons and missiles,” Cheong said.
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
8. [Editorial] Raise nuclear deterrence (ROK/US)
[Editorial] Raise nuclear deterrence
koreaherald.com · by Korea Herald · January 4, 2023
US President Joe Biden said “no” when asked by a reporter at the White House on Tuesday if he was currently discussing joint nuclear exercises with South Korea.
His reply briefly caused confusion as it could be interpreted as contradicting remarks by his South Korean counterpart.
President Yoon Suk-yeol said in an interview with the Chosun Ilbo, published Monday, “The nuclear weapons belong to the United States, but planning, information sharing, exercises and training should be jointly conducted by South Korea and the US. The US has a considerably positive position (on the idea).”
Yoon's top adviser for press affairs, Kim Eun-hye, said that probably Biden had no other choice but to answer “no” because a reporter asked him the question abruptly without context. She added that “joint nuclear exercises can only be held between nuclear weapons states.”
According to Reuters, a senior US administration official said that joint nuclear exercises with Seoul would be “extremely difficult” because South Korea is not a nuclear power, but that the allies are looking at enhanced information sharing, joint contingency planning and an eventual tabletop exercise.
Further explanations by Kim and the US official seem to be made to prevent Biden‘s reply from creating the impression that there are differences between the two allies.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un recently vowed to increase his country's nuclear weapons arsenal “exponentially” and singled out South Korea as an “undoubted enemy.” He also vowed to develop a new type of intercontinental ballistic missiles that would give the North a “quick counterstrike capability.” Last year it approved a new law authorizing the preemptive use of nuclear weapons.
Considering Pyongyang's escalating nuclear threat, Yoon may have wanted to show through the interview a solid alliance with Washington. However, Biden’s terse “no” effectively weakened any such impression, though that may not have been his intention. But given North Korea's rapid development of ICBMs and nuclear weapons, South Korea and the US have no other choice but to strengthen nuclear deterrence.
North Korea is on the brink of completing intercontinental ballistic missiles that can strike US cities. If it finishes the job, it would be difficult to expect Washington to use nuclear weapons to strike back against a North Korean attack on South Korea. Few US presidents would take the risk of sacrificing a large number of US citizens for the sake of defending South Korea. The US has defended non-nuclear allies through its nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence, but North Korea‘s ceaseless development of ICBM and nuclear weapon programs arouses concerns about the effectiveness of US nuclear umbrella.
South Korea and the international community have striven to denuclearize North Korea but the North has kept on increasing its missile and nuclear capabilities. Denuclearizing the North should remain an objective for Seoul and Washington, but attaining it has become practically impossible. South Korea needs to focus on a more realistic objective, and that is nuclear deterrence.
A sure way to prevent a nuclear attack would be to possess nuclear weapons. In this view, Seoul needs to consider defending itself with its own nuclear weapons. But in reality, it is difficult to put the idea into practice. Seoul has no other choice but to rely on US nuclear weapons to deter a North Korean nuclear attack.
When it comes to fending off North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile threats, as a matter of fact, Seoul and Washington pledged to further strengthen the alliance’s capabilities, information sharing, and consultation process, as well as joint planning and execution. The pledge was contained in the joint communique issued by South Korean National Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup and US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin following the 54th Security Consultative Meeting held in Washington in November last year.
The US has barred South Korea from accessing nuclear weapons and instead offers its nuclear umbrella. Given the North's nearly complete nuclear missile program, the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence must be raised. If the US puts the pledge into practice early, it will be a significant progress in that direction.
By Korea Herald (khnews@heraldcorp.com)
koreaherald.com · by Korea Herald · January 4, 2023
9. Surfing Through Korea’s War Games
Kind of a puff piece intermixed with some insights on the exercises. A fairly neutral story.
Surfing Through Korea’s War Games
Every fall, U.S. and South Korean forces conduct drills in waters shared by North Korea and China. This year, I saw the exercises up close.
By
The New Yorker · by E. Tammy Kim · January 6, 2023
For hours, I had watched the ominous, looping news broadcasts on my phone: the reporters cloaked in ponchos, some wearing hard hats, as tall waves crashed behind them on the beaches of Busan and Jeju Island. Typhoon Hinnamnor was predicted to be the most ferocious storm in Korean history and the second weather catastrophe of the season. An earlier storm had produced seventeen inches of rain in a single August day, flooding the southern half of Seoul. That water had been cinematically lethal: a family of three drowned in a basement apartment; two middle-aged siblings dropped to their deaths down a manhole, whose cover had floated away.
Typhoon Hinnamnor arrived from across the East Sea onto the southern end of the Korean Peninsula. But the storm wore itself out in Japan, and, by the time I took a train down to Busan from Seoul several days later, the only terrestrial evidence of high winds was a few peeled-up stone slabs on the sidewalk of touristic Haeundae Beach. Out at sea, though, the waves continued to form angry, kinetic white walls. At a quieter Busan beach called Songjeong, the typhoon had chased away the usual scrum of bodyboarders and surfers. Cafés and restaurants closed down and fortified their doors with sandbags. In the blackness of night, the cresting, crashing waves looked like demon clouds, racing for prey.
The roiling waters of Songjeong reminded me that early fall in Korea is a time of both storms and a decades-old martial tradition: when the U.S. and South Korea conduct weeks of joint military exercises in the East Sea. Indeed, the first of these war games, which took place in 1955, just after the Korean War, was called Chugi, meaning autumn.
Nearly thirty thousand U.S. troops are still stationed in South Korea, under national and international auspices, on large and small bases scattered around the country. In the event of an actual war, the U.S. military would take full command and exert operational control of all South Korean forces. South Korea has universal male conscription and a standing army of more than a half million people, an astounding one per cent of the population. These combined militaries perform “readiness” exercises on land, air, and ocean. Their stage is the East Sea; their front-row audience, North Korea and China.
Between 2017 and 2021, the fall war games were smaller than usual. The then President, Moon Jae-in, a liberal reformer who prioritized diplomacy with North Korea, persuaded Donald Trump to scale back the exercises to avoid antagonizing Kim Jong Un. Last spring, Yoon Suk-yeol, of the opposition conservative party, was narrowly elected to succeed Moon after promising to reverse his agenda. For the Biden Administration, the timing was fortuitous; rehearsing a potential Korean war would send a warning to Russia and China. The war in Ukraine had also made countries eager to show off their might. South Korean weapons manufacturers supplied Ukrainian troops with a hundred thousand artillery shells, and sold billions of dollars in tanks, howitzer batteries, rocket launchers, and fighter planes to Poland. In late August, the U.S. and South Korea began Ulchi Freedom Shield, two weeks of drills, both defensive and in the vein of a counterattack.
Over the past four years, I’ve made several trips to South Korea to report on the U.S. military presence abroad. My family has an intimate connection to that presence: my mother is a Korean immigrant who, in the nineteen-seventies, enlisted in the U.S. Army, where she met my father, also a Korean-immigrant enlistee. Through the strange workings of empire, Mom was later deployed to U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan, in her home town of Seoul, where she gave birth to me and my younger brother. During her long career as an Army paralegal—first full time, then as a reservist—she participated in several joint military exercises in South Korea. Her military occupational specialty, or M.O.S., put her not inside a tank but at a desk, responding to simulated requests for wartime legal advice.
This fall, I travelled through South Korea as the war games unfolded, and rented an apartment just outside U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys, in Pyeongtaek, America’s largest overseas base by area. There, the bugle calls of reveille, retreat, and taps structured my days; the buzz of helicopters kept me up late into the night. I also toured Camp Casey and Camp Hovey, older bases near the mountainous border with North Korea, and stayed in a lodge on Kunsan Air Base, along the Yellow Sea, as U.S. fighter jets wailed overhead. On my off days, I took beginner surfing lessons in Busan, paddling in the same East Sea where so many ships and planes, submarines and rockets, were deterring, or courting, hot war.
In late September, I attended a press conference on the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier longer than the Eiffel Tower is high. The Reagan is usually situated in Yokosuka, Japan, but had docked at a South Korean naval base in Busan for the first time in five years. Travelling with the Reagan was a strike group, comprising the Carrier Air Wing 5, Destroyer Squadron 15, the U.S.S. Chancellorsville guided-missile cruiser, and the U.S.S. Benfold guided-missile destroyer. Augmented by South Korean and Japanese navy ships, they would take part in extended war games in the East Sea, in a show of what one commander called “flexible combat power” and a “shared commitment to upholding the rules-based international order.”
Several dozen of us journalists were bused into the Busan naval base from the train station. Through the bus window, I saw a rolling vista of green-black mountains and sea. The presence of the South Korean Navy had protected this part of Busan from overdevelopment. Military terrain is at once pristine and abundantly polluted, a space where “the booming sounds of shelling or artillery . . . punctuate the ambient backdrop of trees rustling and bird calls,” Eleana J. Kim writes, in her ethnography of Korea’s Demilitarized Zone, “Making Peace with Nature.” We got off the bus and joined a noisy throng of V.I.P.s and some five thousand sailors being released into town for a weekend of R. and R. before the joint exercises began. Blue-and-white tents run by the U.S. Navy’s morale and welfare department offered swag and tourism tips. A Korean Navy band, dressed in blinding whites, played a generic martial tune, and members of a flag team held the stars and stripes in their left hands and the Korean Taegukgi flag in their right.
The press conference took place on the sun-drenched deck of the ship, amid a distinct smell of burning gas. Rear Admiral Michael “Buzz” Donnelly, the commander of the strike group, told us that the binational alliance reflected a “clear vision for a free and clear Indo-Pacific.” A reporter asked if the current exercises were in response to provocations by Pyongyang. Donnelly said no, but added that “readiness” required being able to operate out of the Philippines, Guam, and the Horn of Africa. President Biden had recently declared that the U.S. would defend Taiwan in case of an invasion by China—a remarkably casual abandonment of “strategic ambiguity,” America’s policy of not taking sides. I asked whether Biden’s new stance would affect the upcoming exercise in the East Sea. Donnelly and Kim Kyung-cheol, a rear admiral in the South Korean Navy, said no: the combined training was about “interoperability” and “common security interests,” just as it had always been.
We were given a tour of the ship’s innards, led up and down cramped port ladders, through passages that felt like a maze of human-diameter pipes. The “pilot house” navigation room, full of knobs and steering wheels and elaborate gauges, was up three ladder lengths, a hundred and ten feet off the ground. A sailor on duty, wearing a uniform bearing the U.S. and Japanese flags, told me that he was from West Palm Beach. Elsewhere was a gilded statue of President Reagan garlanded in lavender flowers. At the end of the afternoon, as the journalists were bused out of the base, we encountered a few Korean protesters outside the gate. “Stop! War Exercise Yankee, Go Home,” their banner read.
Earlier that week, I had stayed on Busan’s Songjeong Beach and taken beginner surfing lessons at a school styled like a beach shop in Malibu. Despite William Finnegan’s counsel, in “Barbarian Days,” that it’s impossible to become a proficient surfer “at an advanced age, meaning over fourteen,” I felt compelled to try. A more relevant memoir was Diane Cardwell’s “Rockaway,” about learning to surf in New York City during a midlife crisis. I wiggled into a warm-weather wetsuit and sat with a few other, much younger, newbies for a brief orientation on Day One. I had worried that pelagic jargon in Korean, my second language, would elude me, but surfing speak is all borrowed English: paddle, leash, nose, tail.
The teacher was a young, floppy-haired man shaped like an upside-down trapezoid. (I later learned that he was primarily a bodybuilder.) He showed us how to tie a leash and carry a giant foam board in the wind. We practiced the universal motions of pop-up and takeoff on the sand, knowing how much harder it would be on the water. We waded in past the impact zone, where waves crashed white. We lay stomach down on our boards as the instructor pushed us, one by one, onto the crests of incoming waves. I stood up a few times and felt an unnatural, physics-defying joy. I also learned to sit up on my board, straddling the tail and looking out at the sea. The waves appeared newly mysterious: Which ones would be good enough to ride? Where did they come from? What other bodies and vessels had they touched?
Most South Koreans don’t think about North Korea. It is officially an enemy state, but it is also a vexing sibling, one whose behavior rankles yet does not surprise. Then, every once in a while, comes a genuine shock. On a warm night in early October, residents of Gangneung, on South Korea’s east coast, heard a boom and saw a red-orange conflagration on the horizon. A photo of the explosion spread quickly online, as did rumors that it was the result of a North Korean rocket. In fact, South Korea had been shooting ballistic missiles over the East Sea, into waters shared with North Korea, as part of war games with the U.S. One of those missiles, a Hyunmoo-2C, had failed to properly detonate and crashed on the golf course of a South Korean military base, less than a kilometre away from a residential neighborhood. No one was hurt, but the accident reminded the general public of the peninsula’s twitchy status quo: something between war and peace. A similar South Korean missile had crashed into the sea in 2017.
A couple of weeks later, a friend offered to take me to the Odusan Unification Tower, an observatory directly across the Imjin River from North Korea. As the two Koreas exchanged practice fire, we peered over the border with fixed, high-powered binoculars. I was impressed by the level of voyeuristic detail: I could see individual North Koreans, working a field of rice, a bicycle, a tractor, a row of apartment buildings. I recalled that the Demilitarized Zone ends at the mouth of an estuary that’s technically neutral but used by neither North nor South. A young woman to my right reported to her boyfriend, “Wow, they live well over there,” before self-correcting and adding, “Or maybe they’ve put these people there, where we can see them, to make it seem like everything’s O.K.” To my left were several people who looked older than my parents, meaning that they’d been born in a unified Korea. When they gazed through the binoculars, did they think about friends and family members who’d gone North before the division, never to be seen again?
I returned to Busan—this time, to Dadaepo Beach—for a second round of surfing lessons. The teacher, a genial guy who’d come up in the area, indulged my interest in the science of waves. He explained their shape and how they crest and break. He also outlined the basics of a predictive chart that surfers use to judge where and when to enter the water. The variables on Windfinder, his preferred app, included wind speed and direction, weather forecast, air temperature, wave height and direction, and tidal status. The ideal condition in Busan, he said, is a wave that travels northeast. He used his left hand to represent the Korean Peninsula and a small, plastic wave figurine, tilted at a diagonal, to represent the Japanese islands. “Japan deflects the storms coming over the ocean from the southeast, so, by the time they hit Korea, the waves are chopped up,” he said. I pictured giant, oblong Japan as the lever of a pinball machine, tossing off storms like metal balls. “So you want a wave that comes from the other direction, perpendicular to Busan,” he said. I imagined storm-chasing surfers and storm-chasing admirals. At that very moment, many nautical miles away, sailors and pilots and soldiers were rehearsing for an unthinkable series of events.
Busan offers some of the best surfing in South Korea, which isn’t saying much. The waves are tiny by international standards, but welcoming for beginners like me. (North Korea reportedly has more rideable waves.) As I got to know the city’s surf spots, I began to index my days on the water to hostilities in the East Sea. Busan has always been shaped by its proximity to the ocean. It is a port city, a seafood city, a city of shipbuilding and conflict. Even a casual student of the Korean War will walk around Busan and be reminded of various battles and maneuvers that occurred there. One day, I crossed the Nakdong River on foot, over a bridge connecting the neighborhood of Hadan to Eulsuk Island. That area, where the river meets the ocean, had been the site of the Nakdong Bulge, part of a monthlong battle in 1950. It is now an estuary for migrating birds, and I thrilled at seeing a great egret preen on a glittering field of water.
A few weeks later, I visited a small American installation in the Port of Busan. Situated at Pier 8, it wasn’t a full base but, rather, a borrowed slip that quietly hosts at least one massive ship at a time. I had dinner at the United Seamen’s Service, a small restaurant, bar, and gift shop with the look of a decades-old expatriate club: brocaded tablecloths in need of a good wash, fake-leather menus, Oriental knickknacks, N.F.L. jackets, cheap wine, and a wall-mounted collection box for Korean orphans. The selection of food, served by an older Korean waitress, was best described as processed suburban latchkey. I ordered a plate of spaghetti, knowing full well that the tomato sauce would be sweet and poured straight out of a plastic bottle. The waitress also brought over a cannister of Kraft parmesan powder, which was badly expired. A lone sailor nursed a beer at the bar. He told me that he’d been docked there since the summer. He was bored and desperate to get downtown, but the taxi that the waitress had called for him never arrived.
During the exercises, North Korea flew warplanes and shot off rockets eerily close to the border with the South. China, meanwhile, continued to fly military jets into Taiwanese airspace and gave President Xi Jinping a historic third term at a party Congress in mid-October. President Biden intensified a blockade of semiconductors against Beijing and later warned Xi that the U.S. was ready to increase its military presence in East Asia.
In late October, U.S. and South Korean forces prepared for another drill, Vigilant Storm, which would involve some two hundred and forty warplanes. To see the preparations up close, I travelled to Gunsan, in the rural southwest, and got a room at the Wolf Pack Lodge, inside Kunsan Air Base, an unlikely parcel of American land. At 5:35 A.M., a loudspeaker blared a banshee siren that rose and fell by ghastly thirds, followed by a count and coded instructions. At breakfast in the dining hall, men and women wore olive uniforms, boots, and colored bands—red, yellow, green—that seemed to represent their assigned roles during the exercises. Outside the base, I switched sides, as it were, and spent time with anti-base activists. A man named Goo, who’d dedicated himself to the peace movement after seeing farmers lose their homes to a base-expansion project in 2006, gave me a tour of the natural areas just beyond Kunsan’s barbed wire. We foraged persimmons, dates, and honeysuckle on land owned by the Korean military. From a small plateau, overlooking the base, he pointed out rows of barracks, hangars, magazine lockers, and a radar dome.
Vigilant Storm was supposed to last for five days, but was extended after North Korea launched some two dozen missiles, including an intercontinental ballistic missile aimed at Japan. Another missile triggered an aerial-attack siren on South Korea’s easterly island of Ulleungdo. In 2022, Pyongyang shot off a record number of missiles. At Osan Air Base, a large U.S. military installation near Seoul, Boeing EA-18G Growlers were visible overhead. American forces also flew two B1-B supersonic bombers over the peninsula, a step meant to intimidate Kim Jong Un. I thought about a recent interview I’d done—with LeaDan Yee, a schoolteacher and mother whose Army husband was stationed at Camp Humphreys. Yee was from Hawaii, of Native Hawaiian and Filipina descent, and thus well versed in colonial histories. “Whenever I get asked where I live, I say Korea, not South Korea. They’re not two separate Koreas. They’re one Korea with a relationship issue,” she told me. “I’m not sure what the U.S. role should be here.”
We discussed my foray into surfing, which she had never attempted, and, more important, a campaign by Hawaiian activists against the U.S. Navy’s Red Hill Fuel Facility, in Pearl Harbor. Last year, after hundreds of thousands of litres of jet fuel had leaked out of Red Hill’s Second World War-era tanks and pipelines, contaminating the local water system, activists demanded that Red Hill be closed. Under pressure, the Navy agreed to empty out the vessels by 2027, but not to shutter the facility altogether. Yee told me about a different facility in Hawaii, owned by the Marine Corps, at Mokapu Beach on Kane’ohe Bay. The site holds ceremonial significance for Native Hawaiians, yet remains inaccessible to them. But Yee, as an Army spouse, could walk that very shore at any time. “What’s weird for me is, I have more access to my country because I can get on the bases,” she said. I felt the same way. As I toured South Korea’s many U.S. military bases and caught glimpses of the joint exercises, I was constantly crossing barbed wire. I could meet with Korean peace activists in the morning and sleep in a military hotel at night, paid for in U.S. dollars. The boundary was impervious on land, but murkier on water, way out in the sea.
The New Yorker · by E. Tammy Kim · January 6, 2023
10. Learning English saved my life
Learning English saved my life
The Korea Times · January 7, 2023
Han Song-mi, the co-author with Casey Lartigue of the book "Greenlight to Freedom," poses with the book. The paperback version of her memoir is scheduled to be released at a book talk, May 14, 2022. Courtesy of Casey Lartigue
By Han Song-mi
I escaped from North Korea in March 2011. The main reason is that I didn't see a future for myself there. Things have not always been easy in South Korea, however. In late 2019, I had hit a low point in my life. I was having many personal problems and I didn't see a future for myself.
I was looking for something to save myself. I had to find a reason to survive, I had to find a reason to live. I needed to find something meaningful in my life.
I did a lot of reading during that time as I tried to find a direction in my life. If I could find something meaningful despite my problems, then I would not commit suicide.
After thinking about my life and future, I decided that I wanted to learn English. The most delightful time in my life was when I studied English in Canada. I discovered a new world. If I studied English again perhaps I could find a reason to live.
I had heard from a friend about an organization named Freedom Speakers International (it was then Teach North Korean refugees). But she didn't give me any information about it, she suggested that I might want to study English there. She had studied there and she said she had a great experience. The organization gives a lot of support to North Korean refugees.
I searched for the organization on the internet, I found so many articles and videos about them. Was this organization for real? At the top of the search results I saw Casey Lartigue, the co-founder of FSI. I sent him a message right away. I told him, "I'm a North Korean refugee and I want to learn English." I kept messaging him, but he was about to board a plane to the USA. I kept messaging him because I felt so desperate. I felt so relieved when he answered after he arrived in the U.S. and talked me through the application process and encouraged me.
A few weeks later, I visited FSI. It was the beginning of my relationship with the organization. My problems weren't over, during the next year I also had psychological counseling that helped me get over my trauma. After learning English and going through counseling, I was a different person. I felt alive.
The next year, I wrote a book with Casey and FSI published it last year. I hoped in telling my story that others, especially North Korean refugees, who are struggling as I did could be comforted.
I have found meaning in life, I no longer have thoughts about suicide. I am too busy to kill myself! I am now a college student, an author, a public speaker, I have gotten over my psychological trauma from North Korea and I am constantly finding more things that are meaningful.
Such as, one thing that is meaningful to me is cooking North Korean food. I started catering North Korean food when people kept asking me to cook for them.
When I was growing up in North Korea, I often starved. Now I can cook and eat whatever I want. I remember the first time some North Korean friends asked me to cook for them. I didn't think about them paying me because I was happy that they ate the food that I cooked. Cooking is a hobby for me now and I am lucky that it is no longer about basic survival.
I now have many meaningful things in my life. It all started when I started studying English in FSI. Learning English saved my life and made many things possible for me.
Han Song-mi is co-author with Casey Lartigue Jr. of her memoir "Greenlight to Freedom: A North Korean Daughter's Search for Her Mother and Herself." (Freedom Speakers International, 2022).
The Korea Times · January 7, 2023
11. Intercultural communication key to sustainability of Hallyu
Excerpts:
Choi’s latest project is her YouTube channel, Choi JW Rendez-vous, in which she interviews foreign ambassadors, well-known artists, opinion leaders and celebrities.
“When COVID-19 hit, I couldn’t meet people to promote Korea. Really, necessity is the mother of success. I needed a way to promote Korea in a noncontact way and YouTube was the only solution,” said Choi. “It is great that I started it because I can introduce foreign culture to Koreans and Korean culture to foreigners.”
She has so far uploaded some 270 clips and plans to upload one clip a week. Most of the 70 or so interviews are with high-profile people many of whom shun media interviews, a testimony to her vast network and influence.
Where does her influence come from? Moving people, Choi said. “I realized early on that I act when I am moved emotionally and it then dawned on me that I may be able get people to act if I could move them emotionally. So I am always trying to touch people’s hearts,” Choi said. “It is only when I take genuine interest in the other person, that the other person begins to take interest in me,” she added.
Creating content, much to her delight, suits her just fine. “It never feels like work. It is what I enjoy doing. Just like I enjoy leading CICI, too,” said Choi.
“I try do what I want to do and I enjoy doing it. And that joy is infectious,” she added. “I am grateful that I continue to have seemingly endless ideas.”
[Eye interview] Intercultural communication key to sustainability of Hallyu
koreaherald.com · by Kim Hoo-ran · January 6, 2023
Choi Jung-wha, president of Corea Image Communication Institute, speaks during an interview with The Korea Herald on Dec. 21, 2022. (Lee Sang-sub/The Korea Herald)
In 2003, interpreter to statesmen and global leaders Choi Jung-wha launched the Corea Image Communication Institute with the goal of communicating Korea’s image to the world.
Both frustration and optimism motivated her.
“People ask why a private individual took on the task of promoting Korea’s image. Well, I traveled to many different countries as an interpreter. But, really, no one ever asked ‘Are you Korean?’ This really upset me,” said Choi in a recent interview with The Korea Herald. “So I was determined to promote Korea.”
Twenty years later, things could not be more different. From a country whose image was unfortunately enmeshed with "M.A.S.H.," an American TV show set in South Korea during the Korean War, Korea is a trendy place; a country that young people around the world want to visit. K-pop has taken the world by storm and Korean movies and dramas enjoy huge followings abroad. People who once frowned upon its garlicky smell now say they enjoy kimchi and boast about making it at home.
“I really, really love that Korea is now envied. I dare say that K-culture has become a trendsetter,” Choi said, her face beaming. “It’s such a great change in just 20 years, isn’t it?”
After the 2002 World Cup, held jointly by Korea and Japan, Choi instinctively felt that the spotlight was on Korea. “Of course, there was the North Korean nuclear issue too,” she added. The year 2002 saw North Korea launch a record number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, eight in total.
“The World Cup and the North Korean issue brought the world’s focus on Korea. And I thought of the proverb: ‘Strike while the iron is hot,’” Choi said.
Proud of her culture and heritage, Choi thought Korea was undervalued and underappreciated. So she set out to do what she could do best: Communicate Korea to the world.
The year 2003, incidentally, was the year that saw Hallyu really begin to burgeon. The "Winter Sonata" TV series became a hit in Japan that year and K-pop was beginning to take off internationally. But very few believed it would last and pundits opined it would be a passing fad.
Choi thought -- or knew -- otherwise. “I kept telling people that Hallyu was not a temporary phenomenon. I said it would continue to evolve and develop. And look where we are now,” Choi said.
Choi, then a professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, began the work of promoting Korea by establishing the Korea CQ Forum, a weekly meeting of foreign envoys, international businesspeople and Korea’s opinion leaders where all things Korean could be discussed.
In Choi’s opinion, it is the cultural exchanges that take place at these informal gatherings that explain the longevity of the forum. “I think if I had only communicated Hallyu, the CQ Forum would not be this long running. Everything needs to be give-and-take,” she said. "My focus is on cultural exchange."
For example, foreign ambassadors to Korea frequently host a CQ Forum session where they introduce their own country, culture and food. “Foreigners want Korea’s opinion leaders to know about their country, too,” Choi noted.
Choi Jung-wha (left) presents Korea Image Award to then UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in New York in 2007. On the right is Didier Beltoise, president of Cs and spouse of Choi. (CICI)
It can be easy to make people come once, but difficult to get them to return, Choi pointed out. So what explains the large number of repeat forum members? Over 500 people have participated in the CQ Forum over the past two decades.
“I always give people good information. Everybody wants information. But people can’t live on information alone, they need to have fun. So I try to give them fun, too” said Choi. CQ Forum programs typically include a weekend trip under expert guidance of local people who are eager to share their knowledge and experiences.
An essential element of the success of the CQ Forum is communication. “No matter how much you learn, how much fun you have, it is uncomfortable if communication is not easy. So we always provide simultaneous interpretation. That puts people at ease,” Choi said.
In 2010, Choi brought intercultural communication to another level by convening C-20.
“G-20 was taking place in Korea in 2010. I had heard about B-20 of business leaders, so I brought together leading cultural figures from the G-20 countries to Seoul,” Choi said.
The event was a huge success, and the Culture Communication Forum has been taking place every year since, even during the pandemic in virtual and hybrid formats. “CCF is at a crossroads. It has been going for 12 years and according to the (Chinese) zodiac system, every 12 years is a new beginning,” she said, adding that how to proceed with CCF remains to be decided, especially due to funding issues.
Asked which of the many projects over the past two decades she thinks proved the most meaningful, she said, “Perhaps the best known is the Korea Image Awards -- former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, maestro Chung Myung-whun are among past recipients, and skater Kim Yuna and actor Lee Jung-jae are this year’s recipients. However, CQ Forum is the most personally meaningful,” Choi said.
“When I hear from members who are returning to their home countries that joining CQ Forum was the best thing they had done in Korea, I feel it was all worthwhile,” Choi said.
Singaporean Ambassador to Korea Eric Teo is interviewed on Choi JW Rendez-vous Courtesy of CICI
Choi’s latest project is her YouTube channel, Choi JW Rendez-vous, in which she interviews foreign ambassadors, well-known artists, opinion leaders and celebrities.
“When COVID-19 hit, I couldn’t meet people to promote Korea. Really, necessity is the mother of success. I needed a way to promote Korea in a noncontact way and YouTube was the only solution,” said Choi. “It is great that I started it because I can introduce foreign culture to Koreans and Korean culture to foreigners.”
She has so far uploaded some 270 clips and plans to upload one clip a week. Most of the 70 or so interviews are with high-profile people many of whom shun media interviews, a testimony to her vast network and influence.
Where does her influence come from? Moving people, Choi said. “I realized early on that I act when I am moved emotionally and it then dawned on me that I may be able get people to act if I could move them emotionally. So I am always trying to touch people’s hearts,” Choi said. “It is only when I take genuine interest in the other person, that the other person begins to take interest in me,” she added.
Creating content, much to her delight, suits her just fine. “It never feels like work. It is what I enjoy doing. Just like I enjoy leading CICI, too,” said Choi.
“I try do what I want to do and I enjoy doing it. And that joy is infectious,” she added. “I am grateful that I continue to have seemingly endless ideas.”
Kim Hoo-ran is the Culture desk editor at The Korea Herald –Ed.
By Kim Hoo-ran (khooran@heraldcorp.com)
koreaherald.com · by Kim Hoo-ran · January 6, 2023
12. South Korea Embraces 'Tit for Tat' Approach to North's Provocations
Rather than "tit for tat" the ROK/US alliance needs to adopt a superior political warfare strategy.
First it needs to recognize, understand, EXPOSE, and attack the regime's strategy with information.
We should consider that these drone incursions are designed to drive the very response described in the article as well as to create divides in South Korean politics (or expanding the existing ones as well as drive a wedge in the RO US alliance). It is imperative that the alliance does not respond in the way the regime desires.
It is critical that we understanding the nature, objetics, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
Again, here is my summarized strategy:
A superior political warfare strategy:
1) Built on the foundation of a strong and ready ROK.US military alliance with the demonstrated (political and nation) will and military capability to conduct the full range of military operations to ensure the defense of South Korea, regional allies, US interests in the region, and the US homeland.
2) A human rights upfront approach
2/A sophisticated information and influence activities campaign
4. The pursuit of a free and unified Korea (with a recognition that the policy of denuclearization then unification must be reversed - e.g., unification first - then denuclearization) - support the ROK Ministry of Unification's new campaign for "Unification On" or "UniOn" ( pronounced either :"Uni-On" or "Union" - union obviously implying unification)
South Korea Embraces 'Tit for Tat' Approach to North's Provocations
January 06, 2023 9:43 AM
voanews.com
SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA —
In June, after North Korea fired eight short-range ballistic missiles into the ocean, South Korea and the United States responded by sending the exact same number of missiles into the sea.
Five months later, when a North Korean missile crossed the de facto inter-Korean sea border for the first time since the 1950s Korean War, South Korea hours later launched three of its own missiles north of the sensitive maritime boundary.
Last week, after North Korea sent five small reconnaissance drones across the land border, South Korea quickly retaliated by sending one of its own drones into the North for the first time and vowed to send two or three more for every future North Korean drone incursion.
Under President Yoon Suk Yeol, South Korea has adopted an explicit “tit for tat” policy when responding to North Korean aggression.
Supporters say such an approach helps keep the peace. By responding with quick, corresponding displays of force, South Korea and the United States can demonstrate their ability and willingness to respond using superior weapons, they argue.
But critics say the strategy also increases the likelihood of misunderstandings or mistakes, leading to a situation that could quickly escalate. In addition, it ensures North Korea is in the driver’s seat, they say, by allowing it to more easily start provocation cycles that could be exploited.
Approach not new
The South Korean military has long defended responding to North Korea’s threatening actions with at least proportional measures, and sometimes more.
During periods of military tensions, South Korea has often embraced a policy of retaliating with at least three times as much force as North Korea. The “three-to-one” policy stretches back at least to 2010, when South Korea responded to North Korea’s deadly shelling of the frontline island of Yeonpyeong.
The policy has again become more clear-cut over the last few years, as North Korea ramps up its weapons tests and threats after having mostly paused such actions during its 2018-19 outreach to Washington and Seoul.
The near-constant North Korean missile tests have prompted South Korea to not only push for bigger displays of military force on its own, but also in coordination with its ally, the United States.
Debate over how best to respond, and what role South Korea should play, has at times created friction between the two allies – such as earlier this week, when Washington publicly dismissed Yoon’s idea of holding joint nuclear exercises with Seoul.
SEE ALSO:
US Says It's Not Considering Joint Nuclear Exercises with South Korea
Many risks
Although South Korea needs to show resolve in the face of North Korean provocations, the country’s tit-for-tat reactions are worrisome, according to Chun In-bum, a retired lieutenant general in the South Korean army.
“A million things can go wrong – just think about it,” Chun said in an interview with VOA.
Among the possibilities, according to Chun, are that Yoon’s orders could be misinterpreted by an overeager South Korean military leader, North Korea could confuse South Korea’s retaliation with an attack and fire on the South, South Korean weapons could malfunction, as they did on multiple occasions during such responses last year, and advanced South Korean weapons, such as drones, could be captured by the North if sent across the border.
No 'payback' allowed
South Korea’s responses have also at times violated the Armistice Agreement, which is meant to prevent the resumption of hostilities following the 1950-53 Korean War.
Yoon’s “three-for-one” drone threat may be particularly problematic on that front, Chun said.
Under the terms of the armistice, cross-border military responses are only allowed if they are proportional and in self-defense, according to Chun.
On the one hand, South Korean authorities would be justified in shooting down North Korean drones on South Korean territory, he said, adding there are many instances where even an unarmed drone could be seen as life-threatening.
On the other hand, sending drones north of the border as a sort of “payback,” as proposed by Yoon, would violate armistice rules of engagement, Chun said.
South Korean military officials cited self-defense in sending the drone north of the border, calling it a justified response to North Korea’s blatant invasion of its airspace. However, broadly speaking, Yoon has referred to his approach as an attempt to “punish and retaliate” against the North.
United Nations Command, the multinational military force charged with upholding the armistice, has not commented other than to say it launched an investigation following the North Korean drone incursion.
When contacted by VOA, U.N. Command did not say whether it will also investigate South Korea’s actions. But following past border skirmishes, U.N. Command has faulted both sides.
Following a May 2020 exchange of gunfire at guard posts within the Demilitarized Zone, the U.N. Command found that both North and South Korea committed armistice violations.
The investigation found North Korea violated the armistice when it fired four rounds of ammunition at a South Korean guard post, possibly by accident. South Korean guards, who waited 32 minutes before responding with two volleys of gunfire, also committed violations, according to U.N. Command.
Deterrence considerations
Despite the escalatory risks, South Korea’s firm response strategy has many supporters.
Dan Pinkston, a Seoul-based international relations professor at Troy University, argues there would be a bigger risk in appearing intimidated by North Korea’s threats. Proportional retaliation, he says, ensures North Korea knows it will be defeated if it attacks the South.
Pinkston shrugs off the idea that such an approach may invite further North Korean weapons tests, which he says are often preplanned exercises meant to develop particular weapons systems.
“It’s part of an ongoing program … you can’t really ‘deter’ exercises,” Pinkston said.
As for the escalatory risks, Pinkston said the two Koreas are currently “a long way” from major hostilities and that off-ramps would be available if tensions should approach that point.
Alliance coordination
If North Korea keeps provoking the South – while continuing to build more and better weapons – South Korea may feel it must continue its high-stakes retaliation. Yoon, a former prosecutor with no prior political experience, may also keep responding in ways that risk escalating tensions.
Following nearly every North Korean provocation, U.S. and South Korean officials reiterate they are in close contact – a crucial factor moving forward, analysts say.
“It only reinforces the need for continued air-tight alliance coordination on provocation response … and public messaging,” said Robert Rapson, charge d'affaires and deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in Seoul until 2021.
“There’s no room for any perception in the North of cracks in bilateral unity of purpose and approach to Pyongyang’s challenges,” Rapson told VOA. “The consequences of miscalculation are too great.”
voanews.com
13. North Korean Students EXPELLED From University & Forced To Work In Coal Mines After Sounding Like They 'Watched Too Much Foreign TV'
Information and outside influence is an existential threat to the regime.
Next thing you know university students will grow their hair long, wear blue jeans, listen to rock and roll, and smoke marijuana.
North Korean Students EXPELLED From University & Forced To Work In Coal Mines After Sounding Like They 'Watched Too Much Foreign TV'
msn.com · by Radar Online 23 hrs ago
© Radar Online Mega
Four students in North Korea were recently expelled from their university and forced to work in coal mines because they were overheard speaking as if they “watched too much foreign television,” RadarOnline.com has learned.
The shocking incident reportedly took place earlier this week after the four unnamed students were overheard speaking on the phone with “softer accents” and using certain terms that are associated more closely with South Korea.
© Radar Online Mega
According to Daily Mail, songs, movies and TV shows – such as the popular Netflix series Squid Games – are outlawed in North Korea but are often smuggled into the isolated and authoritarian country via USB flash drives.
North Korean authorities have accused the four students of obtaining these illegal flash drives in an effort to watch outlawed content before mimicking the language in their own daily lives.
“The phenomenon of using a ‘puppet accent’ is defined by the Central Committee as an unforgivable act of sympathizing with the enemy's plot to infiltrate bourgeois ideology and culture,” explained one North Korean resident in the North Hamgyong region of the country.
Even more shocking are reports two North Korean teenagers were sentenced to execution in October 2022 for selling USB drives containing South Korean content to other citizens.
© Radar Online Mega
The two teenagers, aged between 16 and 17, were sentenced to death by firing squad under Kim Jong-un’s 2020 Rejection of Reactionary Thought and Culture Act – an act that punishes North Korean citizens with death or two years of hard labor for “speaking, writing or singing in a South Korean style.”
The four university students’ punishment comes as a dramatic change compared to the punishment individuals previously received when caught speaking “in a way deemed unacceptable.”
In the past, violators would reportedly be forced to write a “self-critical” public statement in which they would also promise never to use the “softer” South Korean accent ever again.
Meanwhile, other guilty parties have received hard labor sentences that last as long as 15 years for violating Jong-un’s 2020 Rejection of Reactionary Thought and Culture Act.
© Radar Online Mega
According to a December 2021 report, at least ten civilians had already been killed for watching South Korean content.
Parents of those caught watching South Korean content are also punished by being sent to a correctional camp for up to five years for “failing to discipline their children.”
msn.com · by Radar Online 23 hrs ago14.
14. What Can Deter North Korea?
I agree with Dr. Bennett that we need to invest in an information and influence activities strategy as part of a superior political warfare strategy. It must be a holistic, comprehensive, and sophisticated campaign. It cannot be based on simplistic insults that are often transmitted to the north by some groups.
But Kim will not change his behavior. That said, he is smart enough to know that he cannot successfully attack into strength. This is why he puts some effort into splitting the ROK/US alliance. A weak alliance is to Kim's advantage. We must understand that and then ensure that the ROK/US alliance remains rock solid in the face of any action taken by Kim.
But what will affect Kim's decision making is a greater threat from within from among his eite and military and in the most drastic way from the people. This is why he works so hard to impose draconian population and resources control measures and implements a system of ideological and social control unlike anywhere in the world. We must find the weaknesses and exploit them using information.
What Can Deter North Korea?
19fortyfive.com · by Bruce Bennett · January 6, 2023
At the end of 2022, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un made two dramatic announcements. He first claimed that because “South Korea has become ‘our undoubted enemy,’ it highlights the importance and necessity of a mass-producing of tactical nuclear weapons and calls for an exponential increase of the country’s nuclear arsenal.” Kim said that 30 KN-25 launchers, which carry six missiles each, would be armed with tactical nuclear weapons over time, or 180 total nuclear weapons. This is far more than most experts have projected. He then ordered that North Korea field a new ICBM that could be rapidly launched, which would be consistent with the solid-fuel large rocket engine tested in December.
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Threat from the Hermit Kingdom
These announcements are part of Kim’s “divide and conquer” strategy. To counter it, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) can take steps to keep their alliance strong, while using information as a weapon against the Kim regime. Exposing North Korean audiences to outside information and culture could be a means of shaking the people’s loyalty to the regime.
The North Korean KN-25 missiles have an apparent range of just under 400 kilometers, which means they are only a threat to the ROK or China, and not Japan or the United States. If North Korea doesn’t already pose an existential threat against the ROK, a force of 180 North Korean nuclear weapons would certainly pose such a threat.
Meanwhile, the North Korean threat of a new, solid-fuel ICBM is aimed at the United States. Just the threat of this development could fuel ROK concerns about the U.S. nuclear umbrella, under which the United States promised to use U.S. nuclear weapons in response to nuclear attacks on the ROK. The United States promises a nuclear umbrella over the ROK and other allies so that the allies don’t feel a need for their own nuclear weapons, the development of which could lead to significant global nuclear proliferation. But will a future U.S. president be willing to use nuclear weapons in response to North Korean nuclear attacks on the ROK if a brutal dictator like Kim Jong-un threatens to hit 20 or 30 or 40 U.S. cities with nuclear weapons carried by this new ICBM? These ICBMs won’t be available any time soon, but it may not take too many years either.
Dual Threats Against U.S. and ROK
Not surprisingly, the United States and the ROK face different direct threats from Kim’s nuclear weapons, and therefore have somewhat different interests. Kim is apparently seeking to exploit these differences. Kim was very successful in highlighting these differences during Donald Trump’s presidency. In 2018, then President Trump agreed to Kim’s request to significantly downsize U.S. military training (“war games”) with the ROK, exercises critical to keeping the ROK and U.S. ready to respond to North Korean military attacks. Trump went on to argue that North Korean short-range missile tests (like the KN-25) were not a threat to the United States and therefore acceptable, apparently forgetting that such missiles threaten tens of thousands of U.S. citizens living in Korea, and that in reality any military threat to the ROK is also a threat to the United States under the ROK and U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. The Biden administration has also discounted these short-range missile tests.
Ultimately, Kim Jong-un wants to dominate the Korean peninsula. If he can do this, he strengthens his role as the leader of North Korea. Kim is facing a diverse set of instabilities in North Korea. These issues range from his inability to feed his people adequately or to provide reliable electricity to the brutality he has imposed to maintain control, including executions and imprisonments of even the elite. He presumably hopes that if he can dominate the peninsula, he will gain access to at least some of the wealth of the ROK and with that solve many of his internal problems.
Can Kim Drive a Wedge?
But to dominate the peninsula, Kim must induce the ROK and U.S. to decouple their alliance. As long as the United States supports the ROK, Kim is unlikely to dominate. Even with U.S. support, a poll by the Korea Institute of National Unification in 2021 found that almost a plurality of South Korean citizens believed that the North Korean military was superior to the ROK military. If the alliance is broken, North Korean military strength (and especially its nuclear weapons) may provide it with the coercive power needed for peninsula dominance.
Neither the ROK nor the United States can afford to let North Korea dominate the peninsula, and thus could consider some more serious actions to deter the growing North Korean nuclear weapon threat. Deterrence of North Korean nuclear and missile threats may require that the ROK and United States organize themselves, threaten North Korea with punishment in response to its provocations, and then execute such responses if Kim’s provocations are not deterred. And the ROK and U.S. punishment could have the greatest impact if it directly affects Kim in some way—something that is hard to do. While the United States has sought to punish North Korea after some of its provocations, there has been less appearance of threats made to stop the North’s provocations before they happen. Deterrence may be especially needed when the North begins a sequence of provocations that threatens to undermine the U.S. nuclear umbrella, such as the North Korean ICBM tests that the Defense Department acknowledged began in February and March of 2022.
The UN Prohibits Such Build-Ups
The North Korean missile tests, all violations of UN Security Council Resolutions, threaten consequences like those suffered by other countries that have previously allowed prohibited military build-ups. For example, European countries were reluctant to enforce the Treaty of Versailles against the German military build-up in the 1930s, and ultimately paid a severe price for their inaction.
What options are available to achieve such deterrence? The United States refers to the term “DIME”—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—to characterize the options available for countering any adversary. North Korea has refused any form of diplomacy. The United States has exercised much of the leverage it can get from economic sanctions, and is unlikely to impose any serious enhancements of such sanctions, given Chinese and Russian opposition. The ROK and the United States have ramped-up their military training, which has apparently caused North Korea to increase its missile tests, as feared. And military attacks on North Korea would be far too escalatory. Nevertheless, ROK and U.S. efforts to keep their alliance strong and their forces working and training together are critical to countering Kim’s efforts. Indeed, it is ironic that Kim’s efforts to divide the ROK and the United States in 2022 actually pushed them closer together—a classical Kim failure.
Kim is Affected by Efforts from Outside
Fortunately, information is a potentially fertile field for ROK and U.S. action against North Korea, and could directly threaten Kim. Indeed, while Kim has claimed he closed his border with China to prevent the infiltration of COVID-19, he almost certainly wanted just as much to stop the infiltration of outside information. Since then, Kim has fought major battles to stop the proliferation of outside information. Kim apparently believes that even K-Pop is a “vicious cancer” that could cause his regime to fail.
Kim’s efforts to stop outside information from reaching his people make the ROK and U.S. use of information against North Korea somewhat difficult. But the ROK and the United States could threaten various information operations, such as sending massive numbers of USB drives into Pyongyang with K-Pop, K-Dramas, and messages to the North Korean elite in response to any North Korean missile or nuclear weapon test. Of course, Kim may react seriously to such ROK and U.S. actions. The ROK and the United States need to recognize that the North may take escalatory steps. The ROK and the United States can potentially avoid such escalation by thinking several moves ahead beforehand and posing deterrent threats to limit or stop potential North Korean escalation. By analogy, few chess players win a game if they only think about their next move.
The ROK and the United States could also increase the funding of organizations that send radio and television broadcasts into North Korea and surrounding areas. While the North attempts to jam incoming broadcasts, some penetration still occurs, and some North Koreans hearing such messages are likely to pass that information on to others. Another particularly useful audience could be North Korean workers, students, and diplomats serving outside of North Korea. While living outside of the North, those individuals pass some information on to family and friends in the North, and once they return to North Korea, they may pass on far more information.
Kim is frightened by even the current modest flow of information into the North. He may be prepared to reduce his provocations if those threats lead to the further spread of outside information in the North. At the very least, the ROK and the United States could try such efforts.
Dr. Bruce W. Bennett is an adjunct international/defense researcher at the RAND Corporation and a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. He works primarily on research topics such as strategy, force planning, and counterproliferation within the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center.
19fortyfive.com · by Bruce Bennett · January 6, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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