Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

1 – “Do not obey in advance. Most of the power of authoritarianism is freely given. In times like these, individuals think ahead about what a more repressive government will want, and then offer themselves without being asked. A citizen who adapts in this way is teaching power what it can do.”

– Timothy Snyder

"The evils of tyranny are rarely seen but by him who resists it."

– John Hay

“What is to give light must endure burning.”

– Viktor Frankl

1. USSOCOM Fact Book 2024

2. New World War 2 film's true story of resistance against Nazis is a Netflix hit

3. Pentagon Labels More Chinese Companies as Military in Nature

4. Green Beret who blew up truck at Trump hotel in Las Vegas took part in Army mental health program

5. The Strange Triumph of a Broken America

6. Stress Test – Can a Troubled Order Survive a Disruptive Leader?

7. Ukraine's Kursk Offensive 2025 by Mick Ryan

8.Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 6, 2025

9. Iran Update, January 6, 2025

10. How a Tractor Became an 'America First' Hybrid Tank Ahead of its Time

11. Bill would make it easier for veterans who signed secrecy oaths for covert ops to obtain back benefits

12. Afghans arrive in the Philippines to complete visa processing for resettlement in US

13. From the bookshelf: ‘The Taiwan Story: how a small island will dictate the global future’

14. Is Trump a Navalist? President-elect Trump tells Hugh Hewitt

15. The first Americans to earn the Distinguished Service Cross were two Army nurses

16. Empowering Change: The Role of Non-Commissioned Officers in Implementing Transformation in Contact

17. Taiwan Says It Suspects a Chinese-Linked Ship Damaged an Undersea Internet Cable

18. Tehran’s proxies are on the back foot. An Iran-Russia defense pact could revive them.

19. The Mayhem of Russia’s “Research” Fleet

20. Leverage Afghan Special Forces to Strengthen US Defense

21. A Clearer Mirror: The Promise of Combat Training Center Data

22. The Internet Is Worse Than a Brainwashing Machine

23. Trump Can Keep America’s AI Advantage

24. The Gorgeous, Unglamorous Work of Freedom

25. Taiwan seeks S Korean help investigating Chinese ship suspected of cutting undersea cable

26. Drone discovery in Philippines spurs call for US military expansion

27. Does the US Defense Establishment Need a ‘Paradigm Shift’?

28. 'Make Korea great again' (US and China)

1. USSOCOM Fact Book 2025

Download the 40 page Fact Book at the link below.

USSOCOM Fact Book 2025

https://www.socom.mil/FactBook/2025%20Fact%20Book.pdf

Table of Contents

4 ... Medal of Honor Recipients

... Headquarters
... Leadership
... Mission

10 ... USSOCOM and Component Map

12 ... U.S. Army Special Operations Command

14 ... Naval Special Warfare Command

16 ... Air Force Special Operations Command

18 ... Marine Forces Special Operations Command

... Joint Special Operations Command
... Special Operations Command - Africa
... Special Operations Command - Central
... Special Operations Command - Europe
... Special Operations Command - Korea
... Special Operations Command - North
... Special Operations Command - Pacific
... Special Operations Command - South
... Theater Special Operations Commands Map

30 ... Aircraft

34 ... Maritime

36 ... Ground

38 ... SOF Truths

39 ... Glossary

2. New World War 2 film's true story of resistance against Nazis is a Netflix hit

I watched this film. I thought it was excellent. A lot to unpack. It is useful for those interested in the ethical aspect of resistance as well as the effects of war, the decisions made in war, and their after effects. Gunner's "5 drawers" in his head is an interesting concept and I think those who have experienced extreme trauma probably use some variation of this concept. Most important in the film are his discussions of freedom.

Not so much is available about Gunnar Sønsteby. I could not find a single English language book about him.

Here is his wikipedia page which does have a good bit of history.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gunnar_S%C3%B8nsteby

The Nazis withdrew from Norway on 8 May, and on 13 May Sønsteby led the cortége when Crown Prince Olav, the first member of the royal family to return from exile in London, arrived in Oslo. On 7 June, Sønsteby served as bodyguard for the Crown Prince and his family at the homecoming of the rest of the royal family, including King Haakon.^[10]

After the liberation of Norway, he refused job offers from both the British and Norwegian intelligence services. "I didn't want any more war," he explained. "I had had enough. I'd lost five years of my life." Instead, in the autumn of 1945, Sønsteby moved to Boston, where he worked at a government purchasing center in New York and took part in an executive study program at Harvard Business School. He worked for Standard Oil (Esso). In 1949 he returned home to Norway, where he held several major positions in private business. Later, he also worked at the Norwegian Home Front Museum.^[10]

Throughout the post war years and particularly after his retirement, Sønsteby gave many lectures in an effort to pass on the lessons of the Second World War to future generations.^[3]^[8] His credo, he said, was as follows: "As long as I live, I will tell the important facts. The historians can analyze, but I was there." Harald Stanghelle wrote in 2018 that Sønsteby was for many years a "living war encyclopedia" who helped serve as "an effective political vaccine against all forms of fascism" and who, while "factually oriented and sober," could get angry in debates at persons who tried to equate democracies with autocracies and had little patience for "historyless historians and ignorant journalists." At the same time, he minimised his own personal contributions to the war effort, saying that the merchant marines had played a more significant role in Norway's fight against the Nazi occupiers.^[14]

Two days before Sønsteby's death, Norwegian Financial Minister Sigbjørn Johnsen unveiled a statue of Sønsteby at Rjukan torg and stated, "Gunnar Sønstebye is a great hero who risked his life so that we could win our freedom and our democracy".^[10]

Here is an academic article about the history of Norwegian resistance.

https://crosssection.gns.wisc.edu/2019/11/11/norwegian-civil-resistance-of-the-nazi-occupation-1940-1945/

New World War 2 film's true story of resistance against Nazis is a Netflix hit

Express · by George Simpson · January 6, 2025

Number 24 official Netflix trailer

Now and then, a new and small World War 2 film comes out of the woodwork and enters the Netflix UK Top 10.

This newly released film, currently at No 4 in the British chart, tells the amazing true story of Gunnar Sønsteby.

A member of the Norwegian resistance during the German occupation of his country, he risked his life against the Nazis.

Known as Agent No 24, the brave young man became Norway’s most decorated war hero and was the only person awarded the War Cross with three swords, the nation’s highest military honour.

During the Second World War, he was involved in numerous sabotage operations, intelligence gatherings and informant assassinations.

Pentagon Labels More Chinese Companies as Military in Nature

Defense Department adds Tencent, Cosco, CATL and Comac to its list

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-labels-more-chinese-companies-as-military-in-nature-bac351b5?mod=latest_headlines

By James T. Areddy

Jan. 6, 2025 6:45 pm ET

A Cosco ship in China. Photo: Cfoto/DDP/Zuma Press

The Pentagon on Monday added a number of well-known Chinese businesses to a list of companies it identifies as military in nature, including some of the country’s largest internet, battery, science and shipping firms.

The additions to the Defense Department’s list of “Chinese military companies” reflects its assessment that China fuses commercial and military technology. Beijing aims “to strengthen all [China’s] instruments of national power by melding aspects of its economic, military, and social governance,” as the Pentagon put it in a threat assessment published last month. The report cited efforts to harness advanced artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology and integrated circuits for military means.

Among the new names on the list of more than 50 business groups plus subsidiaries are shipping and port industry giants China Overseas Shipping—or Cosco—Sinotrans & CSC Holdings, and China International Marine Containers; airplane producer Commercial Aircraft Corp. of China, or Comac; battery behemoth Contemporary Amperex Technology, or CATL; telecommunications modular maker Quectel Wireless Solutions; facial-recognition business SenseTime Group; and WeChat owner Tencent Holdings.

In a sign of investors’ attention to the list, Tencent’s U.S.-listed shares dropped almost 8% in Monday trading after the Pentagon published it.

A spokesman for Tencent said its inclusion “is clearly a mistake. We are not a military company or supplier. Unlike sanctions or export controls, this listing has no impact on our business. We will nonetheless work with the Department of Defense to address any misunderstanding.”

The other companies didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment.

To land on the Defense Department’s list, a company based in China must have some operations in the U.S. The latest additions join telecommunications-equipment maker Huawei Technologies, plane maker Aviation Industry Corp. of China, life-sciences group BGI Genomics and cellular business China Mobile.

The practical implications of landing on the list are “more about signaling and reputational damage than immediate legal restrictions,” said Craig Singleton, senior director of the China program at the Washington think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

“The designation highlights a company’s ties to China’s military and alerts U.S. entities to heightened national-security risks, potentially discouraging investment and collaboration while paving the way for future regulatory actions,” Singleton said.

A spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington criticized the Pentagon’s “concept of national security,” including what it termed as discriminatory lists and “unreasonable suppression of Chinese companies.” The spokesman called the U.S. practices violations of normal principles of market competition and said China would safeguard the legitimate rights of its companies.

Lawmakers have heaped pressure on the Pentagon to expand the list as they look for ways to slow China’s military advances.

“We can expect to see the Trump administration use the growing list as the legal basis for a more determined decoupling strategy, including limiting investments in many of these companies and even potential sanctions,” said Eric Sayers, a nonresident fellow at Washington think tank American Enterprise Institute.

Write to James T. Areddy at James.Areddy@wsj.com

4. Green Beret who blew up truck at Trump hotel in Las Vegas took part in Army mental health program

Green Beret who blew up truck at Trump hotel in Las Vegas took part in Army mental health program

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2025/jan/5/matthew-livelsberger-green-beret-blew-truck-trump-/

By Mike Glenn - The Washington Times - Sunday, January 5, 2025

A decorated Green Beret who took his life on New Year’s Day and triggered an explosion in a Tesla Cybertruck in Las Vegas was involved in a counseling program designed for special operations troops involved in high-risk operations.

Army Master Sgt. Matthew Livelsberger, 37, signed up for the Preservation of the Force and Family program, a resiliency initiative established in 2010 by the U.S. Special Operations Command, Brig. Gen. Amanda Azubuike, chief of Army public affairs, said Saturday.

“He did not display any concerning behaviors at the time, and was granted personal leave,” Gen. Azubuike said. “All relevant records were provided to the FBI as the lead investigative agency.”

Law enforcement officials in Las Vegas said the evidence indicates that Sgt. Livelsberger, a veteran of multiple combat tours, had post-traumatic stress disorder when he pulled up to the Trump International Hotel on New Year’s Day and set off the explosives.

Investigators recovered a cellphone that offered clues as to a possible motive. Sgt. Livelsberger used a note-taking app to document his thoughts about political and personal grievances. Assistant Sheriff Dori Koren of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department read part of the journal aloud during a press conference.

“We are the United States of America, the best country [and] people to ever exist, but right now, we are terminally ill and headed towards collapse. This was not a terrorist attack. It was a wake-up call,” Sheriff Koren read. “Americans only pay attention to spectacles and violence. What better way to get my point across than a stunt with fireworks and explosives?”

The Green Beret wrote that the U.S. was led by “feckless” government officials concerned only with accumulating wealth and power.

Sgt. Livelsberger was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group in Germany when he signed off on leave and returned to Colorado Springs, Colorado, where the rest of the unit is located. Authorities said he rented the Tesla Cybertruck in Denver.

He had served multiple combat tours and received several decorations, including the Bronze Star Medal for Valor, the Army Commendation Medal for Valor and the Meritorious Service Medal.

But one of the notes left on the cellphone indicates that Sgt. Livelsberger also was troubled by his combat experiences in Afghanistan.

“I need to cleanse my mind of the brothers I’ve lost and relieve myself of the burden of the lives I took,” he wrote.

FBI agents interviewed friends and family members, along with fellow soldiers he served with, for information about him. Sgt. Livelsberger held no animosity toward President-elect Donald Trump, although the truck detonated in front of his hotel in Las Vegas.

“He likely suffered from PTSD, and we are also aware that there were potentially other family issues or personal grievances in his own life that may have been contributing factors,” said Spencer Evans, special agent-in-charge of the Las Vegas FBI office.

The Veterans Administration said 10% to 18% of U.S. troops who served in Afghanistan or Iraq are likely to have PTSD when they return home. They are also at risk for other mental health problems. Estimates of depression in returning troops range from as low as 3% to as high as 25%, VA officials said.

Gen. Azubuike said the Army is “fully committed” to assisting soldiers and employs many behavioral health specialists to help them.

“We encourage our soldiers if they need help — mental health treatment — or need to speak with someone, to seek proactive behavioral health treatment either on base or online,” she said. “They also have the option of talking to an Army chaplain. We are committed to supporting our soldiers in every possible way.”

• Mike Glenn can be reached at mglenn@washingtontimes.com.

5. The Strange Triumph of a Broken America

Excerpts:

This is the paradox of American power: the United States is a divided country, perpetually perceived as in decline, yet it consistently remains the wealthiest and most powerful state in the world—leaving competitors behind.

How can such dominance emerge from disorder? The answer is that the United States’ main assets—its vast land, dynamic demographics, and decentralized political institutions—also create severe liabilities. On the one hand, the country is an economic citadel, packed with resources and blessed by ocean borders that shield it from invasion while connecting it to global trade. Unlike its rivals, whose populations are shrinking, the United States enjoys a growing workforce, buoyed by high levels of immigration. And despite political gridlock in Washington, the country’s decentralized system empowers a dynamic private sector that adopts innovations faster than its competitors. These structural advantages keep the United States ahead—even as its politicians squabble

...

The most immediate danger is that the United States will convince itself—and its adversaries—that it lacks the will or the capacity to counter large-scale aggression. To avoid asserting its interests without backing them up (thereby provoking aggressors without deterring them) or prematurely withdrawing from regions (forcing a rushed and costly reentry), the United States must rigorously reassess its core interests and determine where containing aggression is essential. The U.S. national security establishment believes this means preventing China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia from destroying their neighbors. This conviction—that powerful revisionist tyrannies should be contained—is as straightforward as it is hard learned. After World War I, the United States withdrew from Eurasia, a decision that contributed to the outbreak of World War II. In contrast, after World War II, the United States maintained peacetime alliances in Eurasia, ultimately defeating Soviet communism without triggering World War III, and providing the security foundation for an unprecedented surge in global prosperity and democracy. The key to success, then as now, is blending strength with diplomacy: building a credible military presence to deter aggression while offering revisionist powers a path to reintegration with the West if they renounce military conquest.

During the Cold War, the United States contained the Soviet Union until internal weaknesses forced Moscow to retreat. A similar strategy could work today. China’s economy is stagnating, and its population is shrinking. Russia is bogged down in Ukraine, and Iran has been battered by Israel. Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei are aging heads of state whose reigns will likely end within the next decade or two. The United States doesn’t need to contain their regimes indefinitely—perhaps just long enough for current trends to play out. As their power declines, their imperial dreams may seem increasingly unattainable, potentially prompting successors to chart a new course. In the meantime, Washington should sap their strength by welcoming their brightest people to the United States through immigration and by strengthening connections with their societies through student visas, diplomatic exchanges, and nonstrategic trade.

China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, however, are unlikely to mellow overnight. The United States’ struggle against these countries may not last forever, but Washington must prepare for a contest that could last years. In this competition, domestic unity will be essential. Investing in jobs, infrastructure, housing, and education in neglected areas—and rekindling a spirit of civic duty—will be crucial not only to mend national fissures but also to fortify the United States against foreign threats. Calling on Americans to stand up to autocratic aggression doesn’t mean rushing into war; it means creating a future in which peace is secured through sustained investments in military strength and diplomatic outreach. It means rallying a nation to recognize its immense power and accept the responsibility to wield it, not in frenzied reaction but before the storm—with purpose and prudence.

The Strange Triumph of a Broken America

Foreign Affairs · by More by Michael Beckley · January 7, 2025

Why Power Abroad Comes With Dysfunction at Home

Michael Beckley

January/February 2025 Published on January 7, 2025

Illustration by Zoë van Dijk

Michael Beckley is Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University, a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, Director of the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and Moynihan Public Scholar at the City College of New York.

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By all appearances, the United States is a mess. Two-thirds of Americans believe the country is on the wrong track, and nearly 70 percent rate the economy as “not good” or “poor.” Public trust in government has fallen by half, from 40 percent in 2000 to just 20 percent today. Love of country is fading, too, with only 38 percent of Americans now saying patriotism is “very important” to them, down from 70 percent in 2000. Congressional polarization has reached its highest point since Reconstruction, and threats of violence against politicians have surged. Former U.S. President Donald Trump faced two assassination attempts en route to reclaiming the White House, winning the popular vote even though many Americans believe he’s a fascist. Some scholars draw parallels between the United States and Weimar Germany. Others liken the United States to the Soviet Union in its final years—a brittle gerontocracy rotting from within. Still others argue that the country is on the brink of civil war.

Yet such undeniable American dysfunction has had remarkably little effect on American power, which remains resilient and, in some respects, has even grown. The country’s share of global wealth is about as large as it was in the 1990s, and its grip on global arteries—energy, finance, markets, and technology—has strengthened. Internationally, the United States is gaining allies, whereas its main adversaries, China and Russia, are increasingly embattled. Inflation, massive debt, and sluggish productivity remain serious concerns, but they pale in comparison to the economic and demographic headwinds facing other great powers.

This is the paradox of American power: the United States is a divided country, perpetually perceived as in decline, yet it consistently remains the wealthiest and most powerful state in the world—leaving competitors behind.

How can such dominance emerge from disorder? The answer is that the United States’ main assets—its vast land, dynamic demographics, and decentralized political institutions—also create severe liabilities. On the one hand, the country is an economic citadel, packed with resources and blessed by ocean borders that shield it from invasion while connecting it to global trade. Unlike its rivals, whose populations are shrinking, the United States enjoys a growing workforce, buoyed by high levels of immigration. And despite political gridlock in Washington, the country’s decentralized system empowers a dynamic private sector that adopts innovations faster than its competitors. These structural advantages keep the United States ahead—even as its politicians squabble.

Yet these same strengths also create two major vulnerabilities. First, they deepen the divide between prospering urban hubs and struggling rural communities, intensifying economic disparities and fueling political polarization. Although cities have largely benefited from an increasingly globalized, knowledge-based economy powered by immigration, many rural areas have been left behind as manufacturing and public-sector jobs have dwindled, breeding resentment and fraying national unity. Second, geographic insulation and wealth foster a sense of detachment from global affairs by shielding the country from external threats, leading to chronic underinvestment in military and diplomatic capabilities. At the same time, its vast power, diverse population, and democratic institutions drive the United States to pursue an array of ambitious interests abroad. This tension between detachment and global engagement results in a hollow internationalism in which the United States seeks to lead on the world stage but often lacks the resources to fully achieve its goals, inadvertently fueling costly conflicts.

Together, these vulnerabilities—domestic fragmentation and strategic insolvency—threaten the United States’ stability and security, creating dualities that define its power. An economic boom coexists with a civic bust. Unmatched material strength is often squandered by a feckless foreign policy. Trade and immigration enrich the country yet strain its social fabric and devastate working-class communities. The challenge for American leaders is to navigate these contradictions. If the United States can balance its ambitions with its resources and bridge its internal divides, it could not only preserve its power but also contribute to a more stable world order. Otherwise, the paradox of American power may one day bring it all crashing down.

STILL THE ONE

The United States remains an economic powerhouse, accounting for 26 percent of global GDP, the same as during the “unipolar moment” of the early 1990s. In 2008, the economies of the United States and the eurozone were nearly equal in size, but today, the American economy is twice as large. It is also roughly 30 percent larger than the combined economies of the so-called global South: Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. A decade ago, it was just ten percent larger. Even the Chinese economy is shrinking relative to that of the United States in current dollar terms—the clearest gauge of a country’s purchasing power in international markets—and that measure flatters China, since Beijing inflates its numbers. In reality, China’s economy is smaller than the Communist Party claims, and it is barely growing. That dismal performance is backed up by the behavior of China’s citizens, who increasingly vote with their money and their feet. From 2021 to 2024, Chinese citizens illicitly moved hundreds of billions of dollars out of China and became the fastest-growing migrant group crossing the U.S. southern border, with their numbers surging 50-fold over this period.

The United States is also widening its lead in per capita wealth. In 1995, Japanese citizens were, on average, 50 percent wealthier than Americans, measured in current dollars; today, Americans are 140 percent richer. If Japan were a U.S. state, it would rank as the poorest in average wages, behind Mississippi—as would France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. From 1990 to 2019, U.S. median household income rose 55 percent after taxes, transfers, and adjusting for inflation, with income in the bottom fifth seeing a 74 percent gain. Although most major economies have suffered declining wages since the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. real wages have kept rising, showing a modest gain of 0.9 percent from 2020 to 2024. Many Americans, especially renters and citizens without stock holdings, feel they are losing ground because of persistently high housing and food prices, but the majority are wealthier than before the pandemic, with low-income workers seeing particularly strong gains. Since 2019, wages for the lowest-paid decile have grown nearly four times as fast as for middle earners and over ten times as fast as for top earners, helping reverse about a third of the wage inequality accumulated over the past 40 years. Today, American millennials earn roughly $10,000 more on average than previous generations did at the same age (adjusting for inflation) and are similarly likely to own homes. Many U.S. middle-class households rank within the richest one to two percent of global income earners.

This combination of individual wealth and sheer economic size sets the United States apart. Unlike China and India (which are populous but poor) or Japan and western European countries (which are small but wealthy), the United States combines scale with efficiency, generating unrivaled material power. Size alone can yield vast output, but without high per-person productivity, much of that output will be wasted or consumed domestically, leaving little for global influence. History has proved this: in the nineteenth century, China had the largest population and economy in the world, and Russia had the largest in Europe, yet both were bested by more efficient powers such as Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

Although the United States has economic weaknesses, they are generally less severe than those of other major economies. For example, U.S. total factor productivity growth (which measures how efficiently a country translates all its resources—labor, capital, and technology—into economic output) has been sluggish over the past decade, but it remains positive, unlike the negative rates plaguing China and European countries, according to data from the Conference Board, an economic research organization. Total U.S. debt, including government, household, and business debt, is massive, at 255 percent of GDP in 2024, with interest payments on the federal debt climbing to 14 percent, approaching the 18 percent spent on the country’s defense budget. But it still falls below the average for advanced economies, remains well under China’s ballooning debt of over 300 percent of GDP, and has declined by nearly 12 percent from its peak in 2021. Meanwhile, other major economies are seeing their debt burdens continue to mount.

American dysfunction has had remarkably little effect on American power.

The United States has also expanded its military alliances and its control over financial systems, energy markets, consumer bases, and technological development, increasing its ability to shape the system in which other countries operate. Consider the dollar. The currency now accounts for nearly 60 percent of global central bank reserves—down from 68 percent in 2004 but equivalent to its 1995 share. It is used in roughly 70 percent of both cross-border banking liabilities and foreign currency debt issuance—up from 2004—and almost 90 percent of global foreign exchange transactions. The dollar’s dominant role allows Washington to impose sanctions, secure lower borrowing costs, and bind other countries’ fates to its own. Foreign governments holding large dollar reserves are effectively vested in a system in which the economic health of the United States underpins their prosperity, making them hesitant to take actions—such as currency devaluations or sanctions—that could ultimately harm their own interests.

The U.S. energy transformation has further bolstered Washington’s global influence. Once the world’s largest energy importer, the United States is now the leading producer of oil and natural gas, surpassing Russia and Saudi Arabia. Simultaneously, it has adopted energy efficiency and renewable technologies, bringing per capita carbon emissions down to levels not seen since the 1910s. This energy boom has kept U.S. oil and gas prices low, even during international conflicts. European companies, for example, currently pay two to three times as much for electricity and four to five times as much for natural gas, prompting some foreign manufacturers to relocate to the United States. Energy production has also helped Washington insulate itself and its allies from foreign coercion. After Russia invaded Ukraine, for instance, the United States was able to help Europe, heavily reliant on Russian energy, make up its shortfall by sending it oil and gas. Meanwhile, the huge American consumer market, equivalent to China’s and the eurozone’s combined, pressures foreign companies and governments to align with U.S. trade policies to maintain access to the world’s most lucrative revenue source.

The United States’ lead in global innovation further strengthens its structural power. U.S. firms generate over 50 percent of the world’s high-tech profits, whereas China captures only six percent. This innovation edge positions U.S. companies at critical points in supply chains, enabling Washington to twist production networks, as demonstrated by its coordination of multinational semiconductor restrictions on China. Additionally, the United States has expanded its military alliances, strengthening its ability to encircle rivals and project power across Eurasia. NATO has welcomed Finland and Sweden, while in the Indo-Pacific, initiatives such as AUKUS and the Quad, or Quadrilateral Dialogue, have deepened ties among Australia, India, and Japan. Previously strained relationships—such as those between Japan and South Korea or between the United States and the Philippines—are improving, paving the way for greater defense cooperation and U.S. military base access.

BUILT TO LAST

Critics contend that the United States is a house of cards, its towering strength masking a faltering foundation. They point to government gridlock, eroding public trust, and deepening societal divides as cracks spreading through the civic bedrock—fractures they claim will inevitably undermine the pillars of U.S. wealth and power.

Yet U.S. history shows no straightforward link between internal turmoil and geopolitical decline. In fact, the United States has often emerged stronger from political crises. The Civil War was followed by Reconstruction and an industrial boom. After the financial panics of the 1890s, Washington became a world power. The Great Depression spurred the New Deal; World War II marked the beginning of the “American century,” an era of unprecedented U.S. primacy. The malaise of the 1970s, marked by stagflation, social unrest, and defeats in Vietnam and Iran, eventually gave way to a resurgence in economic and military strength, a Cold War victory, and the tech boom of the 1990s. In the early years of this century, disastrous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, combined with the Great Recession, fueled predictions of U.S. decline. Yet nearly 20 years later, the American century rolls on.

The uncanny resilience of U.S. power lies in its structural strengths. Geographically, the United States is both an economic hub and a military fortress. It boasts abundant resources, with plentiful natural navigable rivers and deep-water ports. These features keep production costs low and stitch together a vast national market, linked to the wealthiest parts of Asia and Europe via ocean highways that also serve as protective moats. This geographic insulation shields the United States from foreign threats, allowing its military to roam abroad while enhancing the country’s appeal as a safe haven. Consequently, capital tends to flow into the country during global crises—even when those crises were made in America, as was the 2008 financial crash.

The United States also attracts human capital, drawing thousands of scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs from around the world each year. Although the immigration of low-skilled workers has depressed wages in some sectors, it has also helped staff essential industries such as retail, food services, agriculture, and health care, ensuring that these sectors continue to operate during supply chain disruptions and public health crises. Coupled with higher birthrates, the average annual influx of over a million immigrants makes the United States the only great power whose prime working-age population is projected to grow throughout this century. In contrast, other leading powers face steep declines: by the end of the century, China’s population of workers between the ages of 25 and 49 is projected to drop by 74 percent, Germany’s by 23 percent, India’s by 23 percent, Japan’s by 44 percent, and Russia’s by 27 percent.

Although the U.S. political system often seems gridlocked, its decentralized structure—distributing authority across federal, state, and local levels—empowers a workforce that is more educated than those of China, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Unlike most liberal democracies, which developed strong states before democratizing, the United States was born a democracy and only began building a modern bureaucracy in the 1880s. The American constitutional system, designed to maximize liberty and limit government, constrains state capacity but facilitates commerce. The mainstream media focus on presidential horseraces but often overlook the dynamism of local economies and the private sector. The United States consistently ranks at or near the top globally in innovation and in the ease of doing business, requiring roughly half the steps and time needed to register property or enforce contracts compared with European countries. Consequently, Americans start businesses at two to three times the rate of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia and one and a half times the rates of China and the United Kingdom. They also work 25 percent longer than German workers, produce 40 percent more output per hour than Japanese workers, and hire and fire more frequently and productively than any other major labor force. This industrious, adaptable labor market helps the United States recover from crises: for instance, the U.S. unemployment rate bounced back to pre-pandemic levels in 2022 and has remained at around four percent—the longest sustained period of low unemployment since the 1960s—while the G-20 average lingers near seven percent.

Anti-Trump protesters demonstrating in Palm Beach, Florida, March 2023 Ricardo Arduengo / Reuters

The decentralized U.S. system also excels at adopting and scaling innovations across industries, a capability more crucial for long-term growth than invention alone. Compared with their counterparts in other developed countries, American localities—like American businesses—face fewer constraints from central government red tape. Federal agencies set broad guidelines, allowing states to tailor regulations to local needs, experiment with different approaches, and compete for investment. As a result, successful ideas tend to spread quickly. This diffusion advantage is reinforced by the United States’ deep venture capital markets, which account for about half the global total. Close partnerships between businesses and universities enhance this ecosystem, with the United States hosting seven of the top ten universities worldwide and about a quarter of the top 200.

As the political scientist Jeffrey Ding has shown, the dynamic U.S. system has consistently gained more from new technologies than even the countries that invented them. During the First Industrial Revolution, the United Kingdom developed the steam engine, but Americans applied it more extensively in factories, railroads, and agriculture, creating what became widely known as the “American system” of mass production—a model that propelled the United States’ economy past the United Kingdom’s in the 1870s. In the Second Industrial Revolution, Germany led in chemical research, but the United States excelled in chemical engineering, applying advancements across industries such as petroleum, metallurgy, and food processing. Overall, the United States’ economy grew 60 percent faster than Germany’s from 1870 to 1913 and was 2.6 times as large as Germany’s on the eve of World War I. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union invested a larger share of its GDP in research and development and employed nearly twice as many scientists and engineers as the United States. Yet the hulking communist system drained resources and stifled innovation. By the 1980s, the Soviet Union was still stuck in the analog age, producing only a few thousand computers annually, while American firms were manufacturing millions and spearheading the digital revolution. Likewise, Japan led in semiconductors and consumer electronics, but the United States integrated these innovations more broadly across its economy, boosting productivity while Japan stagnated in the 1990s.

Today, the United States continues to set itself apart when it comes to innovation. Although the U.S. government sometimes engages in industrial policy—for example, through recent investments in semiconductor manufacturing and renewable energy—it generally relies on incentives and public-private partnerships rather than direct control, allowing new discoveries and technologies to spread organically across sectors. By contrast, China’s subsidy-driven, authoritarian model creates isolated pockets of innovation without enhancing productivity across the economy. China prioritizes what it thinks of as internationally important sectors, such as the electric vehicle and renewable energy industries. But these two industries make up only 3.5 percent of the Chinese economy, too little to offset declines in the bloated property and construction sectors, which account for roughly 30 percent of GDP and have erased $18 trillion in household wealth since 2021. China’s tech industries have also failed to create sufficient jobs for millions of recent college graduates, leaving nearly one in five young adults unemployed.

The costs of China’s subsidy-heavy model are enormous. The electric vehicle sector alone has received $231 billion in subsidies since 2009, with government support composing a significant portion of its revenue. This spending has propped up politically connected firms, but it, too, has drained household wealth, as well as stifled consumption and fueled overcapacity, debt, and corruption—all at the expense of investments in China’s citizens, particularly in education and health care. In rural areas, where a little less than half the population lives, this neglect has left around 300 million people without the education or skills needed to work in a modern economy, as the economist Scott Rozelle has shown. Heavy regulations and political crackdowns have further limited innovation, with new tech startups dropping from over 50,000 in 2018 to just 1,200 by 2023. As a result, China’s high-tech revenues remain a fraction of those in the United States, highlighting the limitations of its centralized model.

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS

Despite its exceptional prosperity, the United States has significant socioeconomic disparities. Although the U.S. poverty rate fell from 26 percent in 1967 to ten percent in 2023, it remains higher than in western Europe, and violent crime is four to five times as common. Social Security and Medicare help seniors, but working-age Americans receive far less support, with the United States spending only one-fourth of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development average on job training and just over one-third on childcare and early education. This disparity creates a stark contrast: the wealthiest Americans are the richest people in the free world, yet the poorest Americans are among the most likely to go hungry. Even with the recent narrowing of economic and racial inequality (the wages of Black and Latino workers are rising faster than those of white workers), the disparities remain pronounced and have engendered bitter political divisions.

The most contentious of these divides is the urban-rural split, which is, ironically, driven by the same factors that have created U.S. prosperity overall: continental scale, decentralized institutions, and immigration-fueled growth. Urban centers have largely reaped the benefits of globalization, immigration, and the shift to knowledge- and service-based industries. In contrast, most rural areas have been left behind. Many still rely on shrinking sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and public-sector jobs. Yet despite this declining economic base, rural regions still wield political power disproportionate to their population and economic output through the Senate and the Electoral College. The U.S. system has thus impoverished rural areas and empowered them politically, threatening the stability of American democracy.

This urban-rural rift, the widest among rich democracies, has roots that reach deep into the United States’ past. In the nineteenth century, a schism between the industrial North and the agrarian, slaveholding South culminated in the Civil War. The New Deal and World War II temporarily lessened these divisions by spreading manufacturing across town and country. But in the late twentieth century, globalization and technological change sparked a divergence in fortunes. The North American Free Trade Agreement of the 1990s and what academics call the “China shock” in the subsequent decade, which both sent jobs overseas, hollowed out American manufacturing towns. From 2000 to 2007, the United States lost 3.6 million manufacturing jobs, followed by another 2.3 million during the 2008 financial crisis and the recession that followed. Rural towns, often reliant on a single factory for commerce and tax revenue, were hit hardest. As jobs disappeared, blue-collar workers were forced into lower-paying fields, such as construction, agriculture, warehousing, and retail. In these industries, immigration reduced the earnings of the least-skilled native-born workers by 0.5 to 1.2 percent for each one percent rise in immigrant labor supply, according to an exhaustive review by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

Making matters worse, rural areas depended heavily on local government jobs, which accounted for around 20 percent of employment, compared with ten percent in urban areas, and more than 30 percent of rural Americans’ earnings. As tax revenues fell, local governments eliminated many of these public-sector positions, such as those at schools and police departments, to balance the books. Whereas urban areas with diversified private-sector economies were able to recover within a few years of the financial crisis, nearly half of the country’s rural counties still hadn’t regained pre-recession employment levels by 2019: from 2000 to 2019, 94 percent of new U.S. jobs were created in urban areas. Rural Americans have also suffered in other ways. Because rural Americans must drive longer distances to reach even limited options for food and health care and are thus more exposed to high fuel prices and local monopolies, costs for such goods and services rose nine percent faster in rural areas than in urban ones from 2020 to 2022.

An economic boom coexists with a civic bust.

The toll of these hardships is highly visible. All across rural America, there are empty main streets, closed schools, and shuttered hospitals. Rural counties have fewer births and more funerals. In 1999, urban and rural regions had similar mortality rates. By 2019, however, prime-age adults (aged 25–54) in rural areas were 43 percent more likely to die from natural causes such as chronic diseases. By 2018, rural Americans were 44 percent more likely to die from suicide, and by 2020, they were 24 percent more likely to die from alcohol-related causes. Today, life expectancy in rural areas lags two years behind that of urban areas, and 41 percent of rural regions are depopulating as young, educated workers relocate to cities in search of better opportunities.

These economic shifts are visible on the electoral map. During most of the Cold War and into the early 1990s, the partisan gap between rural and urban areas was relatively small; in the 1992 presidential election, for example, rural voters leaned Republican by just two percentage points over urban voters. In the decades that followed, however, that gap widened dramatically. By 2020, rural voters favored Republicans by a margin of 21 percentage points over urban voters—a tenfold increase. The 2022 midterms underscored this trend: 68 percent of urban voters supported Democrats, while 69 percent of rural voters backed Republicans. In the 2024 presidential election, exit polls suggest that Trump doubled his 2020 margin of victory among rural voters from 15 to 30 percentage points.

Sectional partisanship overlaps with race, age, education, and religion, transforming a political divide into a cultural clash. Rural areas are still largely home to white, older, less educated, Christian voters, a demographic strongly aligned with the Republican Party. Working-class men without college degrees now constitute a pillar of the Republican base, which remains primarily white but increasingly includes Latino men, a majority of whom voted for Trump in 2024. Working-class men have been hardest hit by reductions in decent-paying blue-collar jobs and wages over the past two decades. As the economist Nicholas Eberstadt has shown, prime-age men currently suffer unemployment levels comparable to those of the Great Depression, with even higher rates among the least educated men. Meanwhile, Democrats primarily draw on a base of urban support from highly educated whites, racial minorities, women, younger voters, and secular individuals.

The cultural fissure between the parties increasingly threatens the United States’ democratic stability. Sensing demographic and economic shifts working against them, some Republicans introduced restrictive voting measures after the 2020 election, citing concerns over election integrity. Some Democrats, frustrated by what they viewed as an unfair countermajoritarian system, pushed for sweeping reforms—such as abolishing the Electoral College, reforming the filibuster, and expanding the Supreme Court. Instead of seeking compromise, each party adopted strategies to sideline the other, undermining national unity and democratic norms.

Trump’s 2024 victory, propelled by the emergence of a multiethnic working-class coalition, could realign party priorities. Republicans may now attempt to increase voter turnout, as Democrats might find themselves defending countermajoritarian institutions. More important, this shift could pave the way for Republicans to pursue policies aimed at helping working-class communities and bridging the urban-rural divide, such as expanding high-speed Internet in rural areas to enable remote work, building roads and clinics to boost commerce and health-care access, offering tax incentives to attract businesses, and establishing job-training centers tailored to local industries. But the urban-rural divide itself remains a powerful obstacle to reform, because it fuels political polarization and gridlock. This fault line is likely to define American society for years to come, threatening national cohesion in a dangerous world.

LOUD VOICE, BRITTLE STICK

The United States’ geographic, demographic, and political advantages create another vulnerability: a tendency to pursue global interests without committing sufficient resources to prevent conflict. President Theodore Roosevelt advised leaders to “speak softly and carry a big stick,” but Washington today often does the reverse: it talks tough but then underprepares, falling back on blunt tools such as sanctions or missile strikes when challenged. This “chicken hawk” approach demoralizes allies, provokes adversaries, and escalates conflicts that might have been contained with stronger engagement or avoided with better judgment. Worse, after being too passive in peace, the United States sometimes overreacts in war, plunging into quagmires, as it did in Afghanistan and Iraq after the 9/11 attacks.

These tendencies stem from the same qualities that make the United States strong. Americans often overlook global affairs because oceans shield their country from foreign threats and because the U.S. economy is largely self-sufficient. Exports account for just 11 percent of GDP, compared with a global average of about 30 percent. Most trade is discretionary for the United States because it leads the world in the production of vital goods such as food, energy, and technology. In addition, the country’s decentralized institutions give rise to a diverse array of priorities, making national mobilization rare unless a clear and present danger compels unity. As a result, foreign policy frequently becomes a partisan football, with issues tossed around to score political points—and serious threats ignored until they erupt.

Yet the same security, wealth, and freedoms that allow the United States to deprioritize foreign policy also drive it to assert global interests. With unrivaled power, the United States feels compelled to have a policy on everything. This impulse is amplified by the decentralized American system—especially its free media and raucous Congress—which empowers voices, including those of diaspora populations, businesses, human rights organizations, and the national security bureaucracy, to advocate for various actions overseas. Meanwhile, weaker countries lobby the United States for protection from stronger autocratic neighbors that in turn view the United States—and the example it sets as a prosperous democracy—as a threat to their rule and spheres of influence. In response, autocracies such as China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia militarize against the United States and try to divide its alliances and subvert its democracy. Even when Americans want to stay out of foreign conflicts, these forces often pull them in.

People watching an assault ship in New York City, May 2024 Eduardo Munoz / Reuters

The structure of American power thus creates competing pressures for detachment and engagement. The result is a hollow form of internationalism that has sometimes resulted in disastrous failures of deterrence. In the 1920s, for instance, the United States opposed German and Japanese expansion but outsourced enforcement to treaties such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which outlawed war, and the League of Nations, which Washington then refused to join. The United States withdrew its forces from Europe while demanding debt payments from allies, who passed the costs on to Germany, worsening its financial turmoil and hastening its slide into Nazism. At the same time, in Asia, the United States abandoned plans for naval modernization and regional fortification but imposed increasingly severe sanctions on Japan, intensifying Tokyo’s perception of Washington as both hostile and vulnerable—thereby paving the road to the attack on Pearl Harbor. A similar pattern played out in the 1990s and the early years of this century. While nearly doubling NATO’s membership to include 12 new countries, the United States halved its troop presence in Europe and shifted NATO’s focus to counterterrorism operations in the Middle East. In 2008, the United States suggested that Georgia and Ukraine might eventually join the alliance but offered no concrete path to membership, thus provoking Russia without effectively deterring it.

In other cases, hollow internationalism led the United States to neglect deterrence entirely. On several occasions, it convinced itself and its adversaries that it had little interest in a region, only to respond massively to aggression there, with catastrophic consequences. In 1949, for instance, the United States excluded the Korean Peninsula from its defense perimeter and withdrew its troops. Yet when North Korea invaded South Korea, the United States intervened forcefully, pushing up to the Chinese border and provoking a ferocious Chinese counterattack. This shock heightened Cold War fears of communist expansion and solidified the domino theory: the idea that if one state falls to communism, its neighbors will, too. This notion in turn propelled Washington’s disastrous involvement in Vietnam. Similarly, in 1990, the United States made no serious effort to deter Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait but then took up arms to repel the attack after the fact. The result was the Gulf War and a prolonged U.S. military presence in the Middle East, which in turn mobilized jihadi groups such as al Qaeda—an outcome that culminated in the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

The world now faces converging threats: China is carrying out the largest peacetime military buildup since Nazi Germany’s, producing warships, combat aircraft, and missiles five to six times as fast as the United States can. Russia is waging Europe’s biggest war since World War II. Iran is trading blows with Israel, and North Korea is sending thousands of troops to fight for Russia in Ukraine while preparing for war with South Korea and developing nuclear missiles that can reach the U.S. mainland. Despite treating these regimes as enemies, the United States spends only 2.7 percent of GDP on defense, a level comparable to that of the post–Cold War 1990s and the isolationist 1930s and well below the Cold War range of six to ten percent. A military recruitment crisis compounds the shortfall, with 77 percent of young Americans ineligible for service because of obesity, drug use, or health issues and just nine percent expressing an interest in enlisting. In a potential conflict with China, U.S. forces would blow through their munitions inventory in a matter of weeks, and it would take years for the U.S. defense industrial base to produce replacements. Rising personnel costs, along with an endless array of peacetime missions, are stretching U.S. forces thin.

By pairing diplomatic hostility with military unreadiness, the United States is once again sending the world a mixed signal, a yellow traffic light. Yellow lights, of course, often prompt aggressive drivers to speed up. American ambiguity won’t matter—until it does, when China, Iran, North Korea, or Russia decides it’s time to take what it has long claimed by force.

THE DANGERS OF DECLINISM

Since the Soviet Union’s collapse, experts have urged policymakers to prepare for multipolarity, expecting the United States to be challenged or overtaken by rising powers. But reality has taken a different course. The United States remains economically dominant while other contenders—both adversaries and allies—are slipping into long-term decline. Shrinking populations and stagnant productivity are eroding the strength of once dominant Eurasian powers. Meanwhile, populous countries such as India and Nigeria struggle to ascend global value chains because of poor infrastructure, corruption, and weak education systems. Automation and the commodification of manufacturing are shutting off traditional growth paths, leaving many developing countries mired in debt, youth unemployment, and political instability. Rather than triggering a rise of the rest, current trends are solidifying a unipolar world with the United States as the sole superpower, surrounded by declining great powers and a periphery of middle powers, developing countries, and failing states.

In the long run, a world without rising powers could foster stability by reducing the risk of hegemonic wars. Over the past 250 years, the Industrial Revolution caused economies, populations, and militaries to double or more in size within a generation, sparking intense competition for resources and territory. But that era is winding down. Shrinking populations, stagnant economies, and the concentration of wealth in the United States make the rise of new great powers unlikely. Some analysts characterize China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia as an “axis,” but the world is unlikely to see a repeat of 1942, when Germany, Japan, and Italy seized half of the world’s productive capacity. Today’s fading challengers lack the strength to overrun Eurasia quickly, and once a great power falters, it no longer has the population growth to rebound, as Germany did between the world wars and the Soviet Union did after World War II. It’s hard to imagine Russia, for example, rising from the ashes of Ukraine to conquer large swaths of Europe. As rising powers fade, the world may become more stable.

But right now, several threats loom. Declining powers may resort to desperate wars of irredentism to reclaim what they believe are “lost” territories and avoid slipping permanently into second-tier status. Russia has already done this in Ukraine, and China might take similar actions in Taiwan or against the Philippines in the South China Sea. Although these conflicts may not match World War II’s scale, they could still be ghastly, involving nuclear threats and attacks on critical infrastructure. China, North Korea, and Russia face economic and demographic decline, but so do their most likely targets—South Korea, Taiwan, and the Baltic states—ensuring that Eurasia’s military balances will remain hotly contested. Even without sparking massive wars, China and Russia could gradually transform into gigantic North Koreas, relying increasingly on totalitarianism and military extortion to undermine an international order they can no longer hope to dominate.

Hollow internationalism has sometimes led the United States to neglect deterrence.

Another threat is rampant state failure, particularly in debt-ridden countries with rapidly growing populations. Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, is expected to add one billion people by 2050, yet most of its economies are already in fiscal crisis. Manufacturing no longer provides mass employment, and governments are slashing social spending to pay foreign loan interest. According to the United Nations, an estimated 3.3 billion people live in countries where interest payments exceed investments in either education or health care. The stagnation of major economies is worsening the situation. A slowing China, for instance, has halted most of its foreign lending while reducing its imports from poor countries and flooding their markets with subsidized exports, delivering a triple blow to their economies.

A spiral of state failure could magnify a third threat: the continued rise of antiliberalism in democratic countries. Many democracies are already struggling with demographic decline, sluggish economic growth, soaring debt, and ascendant extremist parties. A surge of refugees from failing states could further strengthen these antidemocratic movements. After the Syrian civil war sent more than a million refugees to Europe, for example, authoritarian parties made substantial gains across the continent. Liberal democracy has flourished in times of economic expansion, population growth, and social cohesion, but it’s uncertain whether it can survive an era of stagnation and mass migration.

The United States must contain these threats while continuing to harness its geographic, demographic, and institutional advantages. A crucial first step is rejecting the misperception that the country is doomed to decline. Nearly four decades ago, the political scientist Samuel Huntington argued in these pages that Americans must fear decline to avoid it. But fear risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. An exaggerated sense of decay is already starting to destabilize democracy, as some Americans lose faith in the system and turn to antiliberal solutions. Some are rallying behind white nationalism, propelled by fears of demographic shifts and “great replacement” conspiracy theories, which falsely claim that political elites encourage mass immigration to replace white Americans with minorities. Others are stoking minority grievances to mobilize voters along ethnic lines. Such cynical strategies have fostered harmful policies, such as defunding the police or mass deportations, eroding trust in democracy and potentially enabling demagogues to dismantle the republic’s checks and balances.

Fearing decline, the United States might lean toward protectionism and xenophobia, walling itself off rather than competing internationally, which would undermine its core strengths. The country has thrived on the free flow of goods, people, and ideas, soaking up foreign talent and capital like a sponge and building a global commercial order that attracts allies. But if the United States embraces a false narrative of decline, it risks becoming a rogue superpower, a mercantilist behemoth determined to squeeze every ounce of wealth and power from the rest of the world. Tariffs, sanctions, and military threats could replace diplomacy and trade, alliances might become protection rackets, and immigration could be sharply restricted. This nativist turn might yield short-term gains for Americans, but it would ultimately hurt them by making the world they inhabit poorer and less secure. Trade and security networks could collapse, sparking resource-driven conflicts and killing off any possibility for cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation, climate change, pandemics, and other global challenges—accelerating a descent into anarchy.

The U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., November 2024 Hannah McKay / Reuters

The most immediate danger is that the United States will convince itself—and its adversaries—that it lacks the will or the capacity to counter large-scale aggression. To avoid asserting its interests without backing them up (thereby provoking aggressors without deterring them) or prematurely withdrawing from regions (forcing a rushed and costly reentry), the United States must rigorously reassess its core interests and determine where containing aggression is essential. The U.S. national security establishment believes this means preventing China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia from destroying their neighbors. This conviction—that powerful revisionist tyrannies should be contained—is as straightforward as it is hard learned. After World War I, the United States withdrew from Eurasia, a decision that contributed to the outbreak of World War II. In contrast, after World War II, the United States maintained peacetime alliances in Eurasia, ultimately defeating Soviet communism without triggering World War III, and providing the security foundation for an unprecedented surge in global prosperity and democracy. The key to success, then as now, is blending strength with diplomacy: building a credible military presence to deter aggression while offering revisionist powers a path to reintegration with the West if they renounce military conquest.

During the Cold War, the United States contained the Soviet Union until internal weaknesses forced Moscow to retreat. A similar strategy could work today. China’s economy is stagnating, and its population is shrinking. Russia is bogged down in Ukraine, and Iran has been battered by Israel. Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei are aging heads of state whose reigns will likely end within the next decade or two. The United States doesn’t need to contain their regimes indefinitely—perhaps just long enough for current trends to play out. As their power declines, their imperial dreams may seem increasingly unattainable, potentially prompting successors to chart a new course. In the meantime, Washington should sap their strength by welcoming their brightest people to the United States through immigration and by strengthening connections with their societies through student visas, diplomatic exchanges, and nonstrategic trade.

China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, however, are unlikely to mellow overnight. The United States’ struggle against these countries may not last forever, but Washington must prepare for a contest that could last years. In this competition, domestic unity will be essential. Investing in jobs, infrastructure, housing, and education in neglected areas—and rekindling a spirit of civic duty—will be crucial not only to mend national fissures but also to fortify the United States against foreign threats. Calling on Americans to stand up to autocratic aggression doesn’t mean rushing into war; it means creating a future in which peace is secured through sustained investments in military strength and diplomatic outreach. It means rallying a nation to recognize its immense power and accept the responsibility to wield it, not in frenzied reaction but before the storm—with purpose and prudence.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Michael Beckley · January 7, 2025

6. Stress Test – Can a Troubled Order Survive a Disruptive Leader?

Excerpts:

Much of that order disappeared with the end of the Cold War, but parts of it have lived on, from institutions such as the United Nations to the treaties that govern everything from civil aviation to international trade. Crucially, a post-1945 unspoken agreement that the seizure of territory by force anywhere in the world was not the basis for sovereignty lasted until the early twenty-first century. But that understanding has now been breached, with the seizure by Russia of parts of Ukraine and the recognition by the U.S. government of Israel’s claims to sovereignty over the Golan Heights taken from Syria. As in domestic politics, leaders who break the rules and pay no price for doing so can cause others to attempt the same. Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s illiberal democracy in Hungary has inspired many Trump supporters in the United States, including the political strategist Steve Bannon and the tech entrepreneur Elon Musk. Putin’s unprovoked attacks on a sovereign neighbor have provided a precedent—especially if they succeed in winning him territory—for other leaders such as Xi, who has long expressed the goal of bringing Taiwan back under China’s rule. Norms that have held for decades can sometimes, in this way, crumble.

Americans are said to be tired of being the world’s policeman, and who can blame them. But the prospect of an isolationist policy under Trump, even the possibility of a U.S. withdrawal from NATO and the further weakening of the Western alliance, confrontation with China, and a tariff war with much of the world, is unlikely to make the United States, or other countries, safer. Moreover, the continued rise of right-wing nationalist movements in Europe may well lead to the further erosion of support for an international order that the United States has often benefited from.

It is also unclear whether the world knows how to deal with a leader who is likely to prove still more erratic and more inclined to ignore the rules than he was in his first term. In international relations, the danger that mistakes and misunderstandings can lead to confrontations, as they did in 1914, is always present, but today that risk appears to be growing. Even as the U.S. election was unfolding, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un tested a long-range intercontinental ballistic missile and drew closer to Putin, internationalizing the conflict in Ukraine by providing Russia with North Korean troops. For his part, Putin has announced a lower threshold for using nuclear weapons and has used a new kind of hypersonic missile against Kyiv. As Trump assumes office, it is difficult to guess whether his actions will lower the international temperature or raise it. In Asimov’s trilogy, the Mule is eventually brought under control, stripped of his powers, and sent back to his own minor planet with the galactic order restored. But that is science fiction.

Stress Test

Foreign Affairs · by More by Margaret MacMillan · January 7, 2025

Can a Troubled Order Survive a Disruptive Leader?

Margaret MacMillan

January/February 2025 Published on January 7, 2025

Illustration by Tyler Comrie; Photo source: Getty Images

Margaret MacMillan is Professor Emeritus of International History at Oxford University and the author of War: How Conflict Shaped Us and The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914.

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Historians are skittish about predicting the future, and not only because there are too many variables and possibilities. It is also not always easy to grasp the significance of events when you are in the middle of them. When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, people grasped at once that a new era had started. But few Europeans foresaw that the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in June 1914 would precipitate a terrifying, continent-spanning war in which more than 16 million people would be killed, and even tech experts did not understand the significance of the iPhone when Apple’s CEO, Steve Jobs, unveiled it in 2007.

Since Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election last November, it has been hard not to think of Isaac Asimov’s classic science fiction trilogy, The Foundation, published just at the end of World War II. In it, humanity’s future has been largely tamed by a brilliant mathematician who uses statistical laws to control human behavior and protect against catastrophic events, ensuring what is supposed to be benevolent and stable rule for centuries. But these assumptions are shattered by the appearance of the Mule, a mutant with extraordinary powers and millions of devoted followers, who threatens to overturn the order and bring back unpredictability.

Is Trump the Mule of our times? He, too, likes to see himself as the destroyer of conventions and rules and the breaker of institutions. And he, too, rose to power on the back of a personal mass following, raising the question of whether he has the potential to change the course of events and create a different United States in a different world. The presidential contest went off calmly, much to the relief of many, but if Trump and his supporters mean what they say, Republican control of the presidency and Congress, along with a pliant Supreme Court, will bring major changes to the way the United States is governed—including to the rule of law. The president-elect has threatened to do away with independent government agencies he doesn’t like, turn others into his own fiefdoms, politicize the military, and bypass Congress with term appointments if it refuses to approve his nominations. He has criticized American allies publicly and, worse, to their adversaries. And he sees no value or benefit to the United States in international law, rules, or institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, or the World Health Organization, and he denigrates even bedrock U.S. alliances such as NATO.

Asimov was a scientist, but he was dealing with one of the central questions about individuals’ capacity to change the course of history—specifically those who have the power and the drive to shatter an existing order. And he was also raising a related question: Was the old order doomed anyway, and if so, are such individuals merely agents of the external forces that shaped them? The answer may lie somewhere in the middle. It is unlikely that the young Napoleon Bonaparte, from a modest background, would have been able to rise to power without the upheavals of the French Revolution of 1789. Russian President Vladimir Putin might not have been able to seize the levers of power had the nascent political system of post-Soviet Russia been more established. Like Chinese President Xi Jinping, he has built a highly personal rule, reshaping his powerful country around himself and bringing about major shifts in the global order.

As observers try to gauge what the second Trump presidency will mean for the United States and the world, a more important question may be how well American democracy, and the international order, can withstand the stress. In the face of the Great Depression, the democratic systems of the United Kingdom and the United States proved resilient, but those of Germany and Japan collapsed, and the world descended into the worst military conflict of the modern era. In the United States today, the roots of its democracy run deep, and the dispersal of power between the federal government and the states limits what any one administration can do.

But the experience of the past is a reminder that the strength of institutions can be very hard to assess before they are directly challenged. That holds true for the international order, as well. Although today’s order appears to be stronger and more resilient than its 1930s counterpart, in recent years, norms that were long considered inviolable have been flouted. As of now, it is unclear whether Trump will be able to achieve his often stated goal of massive change to usher in a new age or will find himself constrained—by existing laws and structures of government, by the political opposition at home, or by others abroad. What ultimately happens is likely to depend as much on the balance of forces around him as on his own use of power.

DELUSIONS OF RUPTURE

Scholars have long been divided on the question of whether leaders shape or are shaped by larger forces. Political scientists are generally wary of studying individual actors, preferring to focus on what can be counted and aggregated. Their literature on leaders and leadership is sparse—surprisingly so perhaps, given how much attention and public debate there is over the motivations and probable actions of those in power today. Historians, by contrast, have found it easier to write about key figures, as, for example, Ian Kershaw did in his masterful biography of Adolf Hitler and Stephen Kotkin in his of Joseph Stalin. Yet historians are constantly aware of the challenge of finding the right balance between individuals and the social and political forces around them. Of course, all leaders are products of their times, whether in their ideas and values or in their assumptions about how the world works. Yet those who possess exceptional power—whether political, ideological, or financial—can use it to take their societies and sometimes larger parts of humanity down one road rather than another.

The experiences leaders bring with them will affect the ways in which they look at the world and the decisions they make. Putin was humiliated at the end of the Cold War when, as a young intelligence officer in East Germany, he went from being a representative of the Soviet empire to someone who barely had enough to live on. He witnessed firsthand the collapse of the Soviet Union, as its subject states such as Ukraine seized the opportunity for independence—traumatic events that doubtless fed his obsession with gaining back what he sees as lost Russian territory and making Russia great again. Personality counts, too. With Putin, one cannot ignore his determination and ruthlessness and his belief that he is a direct heir to past Russian and Soviet leaders such as Peter the Great and Stalin, who built and maintained a huge empire and made Russia respected and feared by its neighbors.

That conviction—that they have been chosen, whether by destiny, fate, or the gods—has motivated and sustained political leaders, great thinkers, generals, and revolutionaries, but it has often made them unwilling or unable to take advice or admit they are wrong. And this has sometimes led to mad policies that have resulted in disaster for their peoples. Hitler destroyed Germany in his quest for Aryan dominance, and Mao Zedong killed tens of millions of his own people in pursuit of his utopian fantasies.

Subtract certain people from the violent history of the twentieth century, and it is not possible to fully explain what happened. If Hitler had been killed in the trenches in World War I, it is unlikely that another German nationalist, with the same combination of ideology and a conviction that he was right, would have had a similar impact. If Winston Churchill had been killed when a car knocked him down in New York City in 1931, it is doubtful that anyone else who might have been in power in London in 1940 would have had the determination to fight on after the fall of France; certainly, it is hard to imagine Neville Chamberlain, who was succeeded by Churchill as prime minister in May of that year, or Chamberlain’s otherwise likely successor, Lord Halifax, doing so. Whereas Stalin and Mao were indifferent to the hideous losses they inflicted on their peoples in their attempts to change the very nature of their societies, their colleagues, who were also ideologues, nevertheless had qualms about the costs. As Kotkin observed of the collective farms in the Soviet Union, “If Stalin had died, the likelihood of forced wholesale collectivization—the only kind—would have been near zero.”

In the case of Trump, he has announced plans to deport 11 million unauthorized immigrants, emasculate the civil service, and impose sky-high tariffs while alienating or abandoning American allies. But it is unclear how much of what he has promised he will actually carry out. Are his threats more provocations and taunts to his enemies than parts of a coherent vision to create a transformed United States in a world divided into transactional power blocks? If many of those close to him have their way, it will be the latter. What is clear is that his attack on the status quo resonates with a large number of Americans and his many supporters elsewhere. Whether or not Trump intends it, his legacy may well be a lasting change in the way the world works.

TRUST BUST

To accept that certain kinds of leaders can divert the course of history does not mean that they do so on their own; they ride the changing currents in societies. Great political and social changes often come as institutions are losing authority because people simply stop believing in their legitimacy. At the start of the sixteenth century, for example, the Catholic Church was a rich and powerful institution that seemed set to dominate Christianity for centuries to come. In practice, however, it was losing its monopoly on learning, thanks to the printing press and the spread of literacy, along with its moral authority, as a result of growing and visible corruption within its hierarchy. When Martin Luther wrote his famous theses in 1517 to condemn the Church’s lucrative practice of selling indulgences, he set in motion the movement that, over the next few decades, transformed the political structures of Europe.

The leaders of the French Revolution faced a failing regime that was burdened by debt and increasingly unpopular—and not just with those who suffered from its inequalities but also among the aristocrats who had benefited from it. In a similar way, even most of those who worked for the Soviet regime had stopped believing in Marxism by the 1980s. Predicting the timing of the end, however, was another matter.

In the United States, Trump’s appeal suggests that this is not just politics as usual but a result of a widespread disillusionment with existing institutions. Under President Joe Biden, the economy was doing well, unemployment was down, and the government was making progress on controlling the southern border, but the perceptions of many voters were different. More important, in much of the country, the federal government was seen as ineffective and corrupt, or even tyrannical. Democracies depend on trust, and that was eroding. Trump was adept at giving voice to Americans’ concerns and resentments.

Trump at the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 2024 Callaghan O’Hare / Reuters

Building on discontent in troubled times to gain power takes a certain sort of genius and a willingness to ignore conventional wisdom and customs. As the founder of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Lenin was lucky in his times, but he also made his own luck. With his simple but brilliant slogan of “Peace, Bread, Land” and his single-minded fixation on gaining power, his Bolshevik Party was able to win support in key areas of the country. In November 1917, it seized power, with long-lasting consequences for what became the Soviet Union and for the world. Hitler managed to persuade enough influential Germans—including businesspeople, top generals, and those close to the German president and war hero Paul von Hindenburg—that he should be made chancellor in January 1933. A month later, after the Reichstag fire, Hitler was given emergency powers. He rapidly finished off what was left of the Weimar Republic and, as did Napoleon, Lenin, and Lenin’s successor, Stalin, created a new regime with new institutions, new values, and new winners and losers.

Such forceful agents of change are often welcomed. In Germany in the early 1930s, many people were tired of violence, uncertainty, and a failing economy and hoped that a strong leader would heed their concerns and come up with new and effective solutions to bring better and calmer days. Western countries such as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which might otherwise have supported the democratic forces in Germany or tried to contain the Nazis once they were in power, were struggling with the impact of the Great Depression on their own societies and fearful of the spread of communism and the rise of Japanese militarism. As with Benito Mussolini’s fascist regime in Italy, the new Nazi government, reviving the German economy and boldly pushing its interests internationally, was viewed with envy by many. Even leading Western democracies produced their own fascists and would-be autocrats, such as Sir Oswald Mosley in Britain or Huey Long or Father Coughlin in the United States.

A pressing question today is whether Trump will observe certain boundaries at home and abroad or, confident in his own power, disregard them. As wartime prime minister, Churchill had exceptional powers, but he always respected Parliament. As soon as the war ended in Europe, he agreed to dissolve the House of Commons so that a general election could be held. After years of the Supreme Court ruling against his New Deal legislation, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt contemplated a measure to enlarge the court with his own supporters, but when there was an outcry against what was seen as an unconstitutional act, he backed off. He did not attempt to challenge the democratic system again. Still, other leaders, in their pursuit of power and glory, have paid little attention to the costs of their chosen paths or the wishes of their people. Russians are paying a heavy price for Putin’s ill-judged decision to invade Ukraine, with casualties now estimated to number more than 700,000, but so far he shows little sign of changing course.

ALL IS PERMITTED

How Trump chooses to deal with unwritten rules and unspoken assumptions may be crucial in determining the future of the international order. In 1804, Napoleon ignored accepted norms when he had a leading Royalist, the Duc d’Enghien, kidnapped from the German state of Baden and executed in France after a hasty court-martial. Much of Europe was shocked, but the deed helped consolidate Napoleon’s control over France. Under Lenin, the new Soviet Union promoted world revolution and rejected normal diplomacy. Hitler famously denounced Germany’s endorsement of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I, and one by one broke what he called its “chains”—for example, by remilitarizing the Rhineland and unveiling a German air force. That he got away with these moves encouraged others, including Japan’s military leaders, who continued their unprovoked aggression in China, and Mussolini, who seized Ethiopia.

The international order today appears stronger and more resilient. After World War II, the victorious allies set up new institutions—including the United Nations and the international monetary system created at Bretton Woods—to prevent what the UN Charter called the “scourge of war” and address the forces, such as poverty, that make nations resort to armed conflict. Although the Cold War prevented the full establishment of the new order, over time the two competing alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact found ways to deal with each other and avoid all-out nuclear war. They signed formal treaties to limit arms, for example, and worked out informal rules and agreements to minimize the risk of misunderstandings that could lead to war. And in spite of the rhetoric, neither side tried to roll back the forces of the other on the ground.

Much of that order disappeared with the end of the Cold War, but parts of it have lived on, from institutions such as the United Nations to the treaties that govern everything from civil aviation to international trade. Crucially, a post-1945 unspoken agreement that the seizure of territory by force anywhere in the world was not the basis for sovereignty lasted until the early twenty-first century. But that understanding has now been breached, with the seizure by Russia of parts of Ukraine and the recognition by the U.S. government of Israel’s claims to sovereignty over the Golan Heights taken from Syria. As in domestic politics, leaders who break the rules and pay no price for doing so can cause others to attempt the same. Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s illiberal democracy in Hungary has inspired many Trump supporters in the United States, including the political strategist Steve Bannon and the tech entrepreneur Elon Musk. Putin’s unprovoked attacks on a sovereign neighbor have provided a precedent—especially if they succeed in winning him territory—for other leaders such as Xi, who has long expressed the goal of bringing Taiwan back under China’s rule. Norms that have held for decades can sometimes, in this way, crumble.

Americans are said to be tired of being the world’s policeman, and who can blame them. But the prospect of an isolationist policy under Trump, even the possibility of a U.S. withdrawal from NATO and the further weakening of the Western alliance, confrontation with China, and a tariff war with much of the world, is unlikely to make the United States, or other countries, safer. Moreover, the continued rise of right-wing nationalist movements in Europe may well lead to the further erosion of support for an international order that the United States has often benefited from.

It is also unclear whether the world knows how to deal with a leader who is likely to prove still more erratic and more inclined to ignore the rules than he was in his first term. In international relations, the danger that mistakes and misunderstandings can lead to confrontations, as they did in 1914, is always present, but today that risk appears to be growing. Even as the U.S. election was unfolding, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un tested a long-range intercontinental ballistic missile and drew closer to Putin, internationalizing the conflict in Ukraine by providing Russia with North Korean troops. For his part, Putin has announced a lower threshold for using nuclear weapons and has used a new kind of hypersonic missile against Kyiv. As Trump assumes office, it is difficult to guess whether his actions will lower the international temperature or raise it. In Asimov’s trilogy, the Mule is eventually brought under control, stripped of his powers, and sent back to his own minor planet with the galactic order restored. But that is science fiction.

Margaret MacMillan is Professor Emeritus of International History at Oxford University and the author of War: How Conflict Shaped Us and The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Margaret MacMillan · January 7, 2025

7. Ukraine's Kursk Offensive 2025 by Mick Ryan

Excerpts:

There is a possibility that Ukraine will seize more of Kursk in this offensive, but it is unlikely to recover all that it seized in August last year. And we don’t know whether this is the sum of Ukrainian offensive capacity, or it has something else up its sleeve before the Trump administration is inaugurated.

While assessing the impact of the 2025 Ukrainian operations in Kursk, we must also review the impact on Ukraine’s defensive operations against the Russian campaigns in eastern Ukraine. With the news today of the potential fall of Kurakhove (south of Pokrovsk), and as Ukrainian defenders in eastern Ukraine are being pushed back on multiple axes, the use of highly capable Ukrainian combat forces in Kursk will continue to be debated, as it has since the original Kursk campaign began in August 2024.

While success or failure in this latest Ukrainian offensive is unlikely to determine the ultimate outcome of the war, it could have a bearing on Ukrainian morale, its negotiating stance, as well as western attention and support for the war.

Politically, the Ukrainian attacks in the past few days are unlikely to change the calculus of the Russian president. In America, while the Biden administration may announce another military aid package for Ukraine in the coming days, there is essentially nothing else the Biden administration can do now for Ukraine. Crucially, the members of the incoming Trump administration will be watching these recent events and drawing their own conclusions about the correlation of Ukrainian and Russian forces in the war, and the prospects for securing a ceasefire in 2025.

Ukraine's Kursk Offensive 2025

An initial assessment of Ukraine's break out from its Kursk salient, Russia's response and what Ukraine's objectives for the new offensive might be.

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/ukraines-kursk-offensive-2025?utm

Mick Ryan

Jan 06, 2025

∙ Paid

Image: Ukrainian 21st Mechanized Brigade

Today marks exactly five months since the start of our actions in the Kursk region, and we continue to maintain a buffer zone on Russian territory, actively destroying Russian military potential there. President Zelenskyy address, 5 January 2025

Over the weekend, it emerged that Ukraine has undertaken what appears to be a limited offensive in the northern reaches of its salient in the Russian province of Kursk. While the size of the attacks is yet to be definitively confirmed, the nature of these combined arms activities – armour, fires, EW, infantry, mine clearance, drones, etc – means that this would have probably involved at least one, and perhaps more, Ukrainian brigades.

Ukrainian forces currently control around 800 square kilometres of the Kursk region, down from previous claims of nearly 1,400 square kilometres in the wake of the August 2024 offensive.

Like all military operations of this kind, it will probably be a couple more days yet before we have more clarity about this operation. However, given what we know about Ukrainian and Russian operations in the area since August last year, and the likely Ukrainian and Russian strategic objectives for 2025, I wanted to offer some initial insights in this special assessment into this latest Ukrainian offensive operation.

What We Know

Ukraine Has Advanced. Imagery and geospatial assessments indicate that Ukraine has already taken some Russian territory and done so with axes of advance in the Berdin-Novosotnitsky, Leonidovo and Pushkarnoye directions. It also appears to have also secured at least three Russian villages since beginning its new offensive operations in Kursk. These advances however remain small, with around 20-25 square kilometres of ground taken so far. The Centre for Defence Strategies update for 6 January describes the situation as follows:

The "Siversk" Operational Tactical Group (OTG) conducted a series of attacks in the Berdinsko-Novosotnitskoe direction in three waves using armoured vehicles, intensified their offensive toward Leonidovo, launched an assault near Pushkarnoe, advanced southwest and south of Berdino, and entered the southern part of the village. They are consolidating positions in Cherkasskoe Porechie, Martynovka, and Mikhailovka, entered Novosotnitskoe, advanced west of Yamskaya Step, west of Novaya Sorochina, and attacked near Nikolskiy, Alexandria, Russkaya Konopelka, and in the direction of Pushkarnoe.

Kursk situation 5 and 6 January. Source: ISW

Ukraine Has Continued Learning. Much as they did during their initial push into Kursk in August 2024, it appears the Ukrainians have continued to learn and adapt since arriving in Kursk. They have applied these lessons in their latest assault. Key lessons include the use of EW, counter-drone operations, effective use of engineers for mobility support to ground forces, tank-infantry integration, and the integration of EW and long-range fires.

Russia Was Surprised – Again. Well, no surprise that Russia was surprised here. However, this is more of a tactical than a strategic surprise. Unlike the original thrust into Kursk in August 2024, the Russians appear to have taken this in their stride so far. But it demonstrates again the fallacy of the ‘transparent battlefield’ dogma. As I wrote when Ukraine conducted its original thrust into Kursk last year:

Ukraine has achieved surprise. This is an important theme to note given the obsession of some with describing this war as a ‘transparent battlefield’. This, again, shows that the modern battlefield is far from transparent, and that deception activities, good intelligence, and surprise are crucial elements of modern war.

Russian Responses. We know that the Russians have already executed attacks on the Kursk salient in the past 48 hours, part of their larger campaign which has secured around 35-40% of ground seized by Ukraine last year. As the Centre for Defence Strategies update today notes:

Russian forces advanced in the western and southern parts of Makhnovka, pushing Ukrainian forces back from Makhnovka and Dmitriukov. In the battles near Makhnovka, Russian and North Korean troops suffered losses amounting to an infantry battalion.

Additionally, Putin has dispatched Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov to Kursk. This indicates that he wants to be seen as swiftly responding to the Ukrainian attack and that things are under control. But it also shows that Putin might be just a little worried by the Ukrainian operation.

Pokrovsk and Kursk – Russia’s Two Priorities. The Russian military has been directed to secure Pokrovsk (which it is in the processes of enveloping) and clear the Ukrainians from Russian soil. As Putin noted in his December 2024, news conference “We will definitely drive them out…I cannot answer the question about a specific date right now.” Ukrainian offensive actions in the last few days will not change these Russian priorities.

Why Now? As I explore below, the timing of this latest Ukrainian operation is driven by tactical and operational opportunities, but also by political necessity. Ukraine will want to shape the perceptions of the incoming Trump administration, and going on the offensive is a good way to message the new adminstration that despite the Russian strengths in manpower, Putin is not fully in control of the war and can be challenged - and beaten.

What We Don’t Know

Other Elements of the Russian Response. The Russians are responding more quickly to this attack than they have to previous surprise attacks by the Ukrainians. However, while they will aim to stem any significant Ukrainian response, they will also be doing a bit of ‘waiting and seeing’ over the next couple of days before making any major response that requires forces from outside the immediate area of operations.

As we saw in 2024, Putin is unlikely to redeploy troops away from his main effort in eastern Ukraine, the capture of Pokrovsk and securing as much of the Donbas as possible. Other areas, however, may see troops pulled away to assist in containing the Ukrainian breakout, if the situation further deteriorates for the Russians in Kursk, given the priority Putin has also placed on clearing Ukrainian forces from that region.

North Korea’s Response to its Kursk Losses. Part of understanding the Kursk campaign is appreciating the role of the North Korean forces deployed there, and whether they will provide a continuous stream of troops for Kursk operations. While it has been briefed to the press that the North Koreans have already lost about one third of their deployed forces in Kursk so far, it is not yet known whether this will be a one-off deployment or part of a continuous, rolling deployment of North Korean troops to the Ukraine War. In his recent interview with Lex Friedman, President Zelenskyy noted that it was possible that the North Koreans could deploy up to 30 or 40 thousand troops.

The Whole Thing – or Part of Something Bigger? Whenever these kinds of offensive operations begin, it is always worth asking the question “is this it, or is this part of something bigger?” The Ukrainian break out in Kursk might just be the response to a tactical or operational opportunity and not related to other battlefield operations in Ukraine. However, it could also be part of a larger Ukrainian activity in Kursk or elsewhere.

Given Ukraine’s manpower challenges at present, my sense is it is the former situation rather than the latter. However, the Ukrainians have continuously surprised us in this war, and we could have more ahead in the coming days.

Ukraine’s Possible Objectives

Much of the commentary in the media about the recent Ukrainian attacks has been about snatching land for forthcoming negotiations. While this is partially true, no military operation at this level is ever conduct with just one objective. They mostly have several aims (although sometimes these can work at cross purposes), and the objectives apply at different levels of war.

Tactical Objectives. At the tactical level, this operation will be about seizing ground and destroying Russian ground and aerial forces that can’t be used elsewhere.

Most likely, a key determinant in conducting these attacks was the loss of ground in the northeastern part of the Ukrainian salient, which created a small Russian salient in the Ukrainian salient! The destruction of a significant force of North Koreans late last week probably also presented a tactical opportunity which the Ukrainians were quick to realise and exploit.

Operational Objectives. There are a couple of possible operational objectives for this Ukrainian attack. First, Ukraine may be seeking to draw Russian forces away from its attacks in eastern Ukraine, particularly around Pokrovsk. President Zelenskyy referred to this objective in his most recent online address:

Since the beginning of the Kursk operation, the enemy has already lost over 38,000 troops in this area alone, including approximately 15,000 irrecoverable losses. The Russians have deployed their strong units to the Kursk region. Soldiers from North Korea are involved there. What’s important is that the occupier cannot currently redirect all this force to other directions.

However, given the significant disparity in available manpower between Russia and Ukraine, it is likely Russia can cover its two highest priorities – Pokrovsk and Kursk – with currently deployed forces and reserves.

A related operational objective, which is more likely to be realised, is to force the Russians to reconsider their force dispositions elsewhere on the front line. The Russians will have to respond. Ukrainian surveillance systems will be watching for Russian responses and standing by to exploit the opportunities they produce. This goes to my question above of “is this it, or is there something else to come?” The ‘something else’ might not be ground operations. It could consist of strikes on key Russian headquarters, logistics hubs and reserve forces which are unmasked by any redeployment.

Strategic and Political Objectives. There are at least four strategic objectives of these Ukrainian attacks in Kursk.

First, the 2025 Ukrainian offensive operations could be an attempt to slow or kill Russian momentum in its offensives which have lasted for the duration of 2024. Even Russia can’t remain on the offensive forever. However, they have demonstrated the ability to attack and advance on multiple fronts continuously for over a year now. The Ukrainian attacks in Kursk are unlikely to have a significant impact on this because the primary driver for this long-running Russian offensive is political.

Given the political nature of Russia’s ongoing offensives, a second strategic objective will be to shift the narrative about the war to one more positive for Ukraine and counter Russian misinformation about their ‘inevitable victory’ in Ukraine. These Kursk attacks generate more media interest, and draw attention back to the war generally, and Ukraine’s war efforts specifically. This is important given the changes in government in the U.S. that are about to occur.

Another strategic aim of Ukraine’s attacks over the weekend will be to boost morale in the Ukrainian armed forces and the population of Ukraine more broadly. Given the past year of defensive operations, constant aerial attacks on infrastructure and ongoing power shortages, the will of the people will be at the forefront of the Ukrainian government’s considerations about the trajectory of the war. Conducting a successful offensive into Russia might be seen by the government as worth the risk.

A fourth strategic objective for Ukraine will be to do what the Russians are doing in eastern Ukraine currently – grab as much territory as possible in case Ukraine is forced into some kind of negotiated settlement in 2025. Negotiating while in possession of some of your enemy’s territory is much better than negotiating without it. That said, Russia has 18% of Ukraine at the moment; Ukraine’s percentage of Russian territory is much, much smaller.

Assessment

This offensive, which appears to have employed company or battalion sized combined arms teams, is unlikely to shift the current trajectory of the war. It is, at present, limited in scale and geography, and Ukraine’s manpower challenges will have an impact on the sustainability of this offensive and its ability to conduct other similar advances at present. This is not to say it won’t, however.

There is a possibility that Ukraine will seize more of Kursk in this offensive, but it is unlikely to recover all that it seized in August last year. And we don’t know whether this is the sum of Ukrainian offensive capacity, or it has something else up its sleeve before the Trump administration is inaugurated.

While assessing the impact of the 2025 Ukrainian operations in Kursk, we must also review the impact on Ukraine’s defensive operations against the Russian campaigns in eastern Ukraine. With the news today of the potential fall of Kurakhove (south of Pokrovsk), and as Ukrainian defenders in eastern Ukraine are being pushed back on multiple axes, the use of highly capable Ukrainian combat forces in Kursk will continue to be debated, as it has since the original Kursk campaign began in August 2024.

While success or failure in this latest Ukrainian offensive is unlikely to determine the ultimate outcome of the war, it could have a bearing on Ukrainian morale, its negotiating stance, as well as western attention and support for the war.

Politically, the Ukrainian attacks in the past few days are unlikely to change the calculus of the Russian president. In America, while the Biden administration may announce another military aid package for Ukraine in the coming days, there is essentially nothing else the Biden administration can do now for Ukraine. Crucially, the members of the incoming Trump administration will be watching these recent events and drawing their own conclusions about the correlation of Ukrainian and Russian forces in the war, and the prospects for securing a ceasefire in 2025.

*****

You can read my previous articles on Ukraine’s Kursk campaign below:

The Battle of Kursk 2024, 8 August 2024. Read it here.

Surprise Attack in Kursk, 10 August 2024. Read it here.

Kursk’s Next Operational Phase, 12 August 2024. Read it here.

Kursk and the Battle of Wills, 15 August 2024. Read it here.

The Kursk Offensive Dilemma, 19 August 2024. Read it here.

The Kursk Campaign and Strategic Adaptation, 26 August 2024. Read it here.

Ukraine in Kursk: A Lesson in Strategic Audacity, 27 August 2024. Read it here.

Assessing the Kursk Campaign, 7 October 2024. Read it here.

8. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 6, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 6, 2025

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2025

Ukrainian forces recently made tactical advances amid continued intensified offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 6. Geolocated footage published on January 5 and 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Berdin, central Russkoye Porechnoye, and central Novosotnitsky (all northeast of Sudzha). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed on January 6 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian roughly reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Berdin and that Russian forces, including elements of Rosgvardia's "Talib" Group, repelled Ukrainian attacks near Novosotnitsky. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, and Akhmat Spetsnaz units cleared areas near Berdin and Novosotnitsky. One Russian milblogger characterized recent Ukrainian attacks in Kursk Oblast as enhanced reconnaissance in force operations that could be a diversionary effort for unspecified future operations. Increased Ukrainian offensive operations in Kursk Oblast may be the beginning stages of a concerted Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast or elsewhere in the theater, though ISW is unprepared to offer any specific forecast.

Russian forces attempted to leverage Ukrainian attacks northeast of Sudzha to attack elsewhere in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 6. Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Malaya Loknya (northwest of Sudzha). Russian milbloggers claimed on January 6 that Russian forces, including elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), seized Leonidovo (northwest of Sudzha) and that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Russkoye Porechnoye (northeast of Sudzha). Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced near Makhnovka and Dmitryukov (both southeast of Sudzha). ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), attacked toward Malaya Loknya and near Novoivanovka, Viktorovka, and Nikolskiy (all northwest of Sudzha). The Russian MoD claimed that "Caspian naval infantry" drone units, likely referring to drone units of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), are operating in Kursk Oblast, indicating that the Russian military command likely redeployed elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment from western Zaporizhia Oblast to Kursk Oblast.

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces recently made tactical advances amid continued intensified offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 6.

Russian forces attempted to leverage Ukrainian attacks northeast of Sudzha to attack elsewhere in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 6.

Ukrainian forces may be continuing to conduct long-range strikes against Russian rear areas in Kursk Oblast as part of efforts to use integrated strike capabilities to support ground operations.

Russian forces reportedly executed more Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on January 3.

Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets announced that Ukraine and Russia have reached a preliminary agreement to conduct regular POW exchanges in 2025.

The leaders of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz forces and the far-right paramilitary unit "Rusich" Russian Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group met on January 6 and promoted a message about Russia's ethnic diversity and harmony.

Russian forces advanced in the Lyman, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk directions, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Kurakhove.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview published on January 5 that 3,800 North Korean personnel have been killed and wounded in Kursk Oblast.

9. Iran Update, January 6, 2025

Iran Update, January 6, 2025

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-6-2025

The Syrian Resistance Movement, which announced its existence in December 2024, is likely a pro-Assad armed group and has begun to frame its operations in Assadist language. The Syrian Resistance Movement acknowledged that Sunni fighters conducted an attack on January 5 (see below for details), and added that it is a multi-sectarian movement. It also framed itself as a protector of the "Syrian people" against "terrorist gangs" and "foreign mercenaries," which is similar to the language employed by Assadist propaganda outlets before the fall of the regime. The group also uses the flag of the Assad regime. The group has employed sectarian narratives in an attempt to undermine the HTS-led coalition, but this is also consistent with the Assad regime’s propaganda strategy, which sought to portray the HTS and other majority Sunni opposition forces as inherently sectarian. CTP-ISW previously noted that growing conflict between HTS and minority and opposition groups would fuel sectarian tensions, drive an escalation cycle, and risk destabilizing Syria further.

The Syrian Resistance Movement also claimed its first attack targeting HTS-led interim government forces in coastal Syria on January 5, marking the first time that an organized group has claimed an attack against the HTS-led government. The Syria Resistance Movement claimed that it ambushed interim government forces conducting security patrols in al Awaina, Latakia City. This is the first attack claimed by the Syrian Resistance Movement since the group announced its armed opposition to the interim government on December 29. Interim government forces have clashed with pro-Assad remnants in other parts of the country, but this is the first attack claimed by an organized opposition group. Local sources reported that former pro-regime militias recruited and armed by the Assad regime (also known as Shabiha) targeted the forces with an improvised explosive device. The attack killed two interim government forces, including a Jaysh al Izza battalion commander. Jaysh al Izza is subordinated to HTS as part of the Fateh Mubin operations room that overthrew the Assad regime. The Syrian Resistance Movement said its attack was a response to the interim government’s clearing operations in Homs City, which have gone on for four days. The interim government announced that the Homs operations had ended after achieving their goals on January 6. The Syrian Resistance Movement had accused HTS-led forces of sectarian targeting during the operations in Homs and in other cities.

Key Takeaways:

Armed Pro-Assad Opposition to the HTS-led Government: The Syrian Resistance Movement, which announced its existence in December 2024, is likely a pro-Assad armed group and has begun to frame its operations in Assadist language. The group also claimed its first attack targeting HTS-led interim government forces in coastal Syria on January 5, marking the first time that an organized group has claimed an attack against the HTS-led government.

Iranian Regional Policy: Iran appears to be feeling more vulnerable after the fall of the Assad regime, Israeli military action against Iranian air defenses and missile production, and the defeats suffered by Hamas and Hezbollah. An IRGC spokesperson said that Iran doubled the number of military drills this year “in response to the evolving threat landscape” and they have “expanded participation of brigades engaged in realistic operations.”

Northern Syria: The SNA and Turkey continued offensive operations against the SDF in northern Syria on January 6. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reiterated that the “eradication” of the ”Kurdish YPG militia” is “imminent” amid increasing Turkish interdiction strikes against the SDF.

10. How a Tractor Became an 'America First' Hybrid Tank Ahead of its Time

Hybrid makes sense from a sound aspect. But when 14 X 70 ton tanks near the objective the enemy will be able to "feel" that tank company rolling up on them. They will still make the earth move under their feet.

How a Tractor Became an 'America First' Hybrid Tank Ahead of its Time

military.com · by Scott Murdock · January 6, 2025

As you read this, people at the Pentagon and several civilian partner organizations are putting their heads together to make America’s combat vehicles more effective and efficient through electrification. By combining diesel engines and electric motors, engineers hope to create a way for service members to move in silence and keep mission-critical electronics up and running longer.

The previous generation of military leaders didn’t get it done; neither did the one before that. This isn’t uncharted territory, though. America’s first tank was actually a gas-electric hybrid. It didn’t get past the prototype phase, but it influenced tank development overseas and laid the groundwork for American tankers.

‘America First’ Was Just Plain Silly

The longer you look at this concept vehicle, the more problems you’ll see. (Tank Encyclopedia)

During the first months of World War I, it became clear that draft animals would not keep the massive armies supplied with key logistics for long. The battlefield was too dangerous and too difficult to traverse -- with feet or hooves.

According to an archived Landships article, the British military turned from Clydesdales and steam-engine tractors to a gas-powered, 15-ton tractor from the Holt Manufacturing Company in the United States. The 75-horsepower Holt Caterpillar tractor (yep, that Caterpillar) could only manage about 5 mph with no weight in tow, but since it had tracks instead of wheels, it could tow heavy artillery pieces through muddy fields better than anything else available.

The Holt tractor was popular among Allied forces for its ability to outperform draft horses on the battlefields of World War I. (Wikimedia Commons)

The tractor also served as the foundation for Britain’s secret weapon: the tank. Holt had minimal involvement other than supplying the tractors for this project, but that didn’t stop the company from cashing in on a perfectly good marketing opportunity.

Tank Encyclopedia notes that the company hastily built a tank of its own for use in local parades in 1916. The beetle-shaped creation roamed the streets of Peoria, Illinois, rather than the battlefield, but it still made a splash in the national news. Fortunately for the designers, photos of the actual tanks hadn’t reached the American public so nobody was any wiser when they saw a glorified grain silo with “America First” painted on the side.

‘America First’ was a lousy concept, but it was the first glimpse of tank warfare that the American people got. (Library of Congress)

If you look closely at Holt’s “America First” tank, you might have a few questions. How does the crew see where they’re going? For that matter, how did they even get into the tank in the first place? Isn’t that stationary turret a little small for three machine guns? Fair questions, all. Maybe that’s why this prototype ended up being a one-off for local parades.

Behold the Holt Hybrid-Electric Tank

The hybrid Holt tank showed promise, but the U.S. military never deployed it during World War I.

The in-house “America First” prototype was a case of good initiative and bad judgment. Somebody in the U.S. military must have seen promise in the concept, though, because Holt ended up building another prototype for the Army.

An archived Landships article reports that the four-cylinder gasoline engine supplied power not to the tracks, but to a pair of General Electric motors that drove each track independently. This gave the vehicle improved mobility and left enough room at the front of the armored compartment for a Vickers mountain cannon in the nose and a .30 caliber machine gun on either side.

It was a clever idea, but the extra weight of the weapons, armor and powertrain made the tank far too slow and heavy -- roughly 25 tons as Landships estimates. That’s a lot for a vehicle with an estimated 90 horsepower.

A fictional tank based on the Holt Caterpillar tractor appeared in the 1917 miniseries ‘Patria.’ (Tank Encyclopedia)

The U.S. military wasn’t interested in Holt’s hybrid tank, but according to Tank Encyclopedia, Hollywood was. William Randolph Hearst’s International Film Service used a similar design based on the Holt Caterpillar tractor for the weirdly anti-Japanese 1917 miniseries “Patria” (remember, this was more than a decade before hostilities with Japan and right in the middle of a war with Germany, so that’s kind of an odd choice for an on-screen foe). Much of the series’ film has been destroyed or lost, including footage of the tank.

World War I: Proving Grounds for Bizarre Tanks

World War I saw old and new technology collide; here, we see a tank crew communicating by carrier pigeon. (Wikimedia Commons)

World War I began with cavalry that traveled on horseback rather than in helicopters, uniforms that looked like formal evening attire, and marching formations that hadn’t changed significantly since the days of flintlock muskets. It ended with chemical weapons, aerial dogfights and tank battles.

As with any new technology, the first tanks to see combat used pretty wild designs.

The British military led the way in early tank development. (Wikimedia Commons)

The most famous examples have to be the instantly recognizable British Mark I through Mark V tanks. These bear a resemblance to (and likely inspired) the fictional Hatay Heavy Tank in the first Indiana Jones movie, “Raiders of the Lost Ark.” The final-form Mark V featured an innovative steering system and a powerful engine, but it had a nasty habit of poisoning the crew with exhaust fumes due to poor circulation.

The French FT was tiny, but its rotating turret gave way to the modern tank concept. (Wikimedia Commons)

When Britain began its tank development, France followed suit. According to the Imperial War Museums, the Renault FT was the first tank to feature a rotating gun turret. Other designs of the time relied on multiple gun positions to cover all fields of fire.

When German tanks weren’t available, German soldiers had to capture British tanks. (Wikimedia Commons)

Allied advancements caught the German army off-guard. German designers resorted to reverse-engineering destroyed enemy tanks or using capturing ones. As the Tank Museum reports, Germany’s only original tank of World War I was the A7V. It was perhaps a superior design, but the long development phase resulted in only 20 being produced, and they didn’t see combat until 1918.

Schizer, this A7V tipped over! (Wikimedia Commons)

“Timeline” has a great documentary on the tanks of World War I if you want to really nerd out.

Everything that’s Old Is New Again

More than a century after the failed Holt hybrid tank, the U.S. military is revisiting the concept -- this time with much better technology. Oshkosh Defense is already building diesel-electric hybrid versions of the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) and Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR).

Clemson University’s Deep Orange program is giving hybrid-tracked vehicles a second chance. (Clemson University)

The Pentagon is also partnering with Clemson University to develop all kinds of new technology to support tracked vehicles with hybrid powertrains. They’re ostensibly going to be used for disaster relief, but come on. Autonomous tanks are a bit overkill for a pallet of MREs or a pair of stretchers, don’t you think?

Then there’s the possibility of ditching internal combustion altogether. GM Defense is advocating for an all-electric version of the nimble Infantry Squad Vehicle. If fielded, the prototype would give soldiers the speed of a Humvee or JLTV, with the ability to run surveillance systems and charge batteries from the vehicle without a big diesel engine idling in the background. When in motion, the vehicle would produce no more sound than a hushed whir of electric motors and tires rolling across the ground.

It looks like Holt was onto something with its armored tractor hybrid contraption. It just got to the party about 110 years early.

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military.com · by Scott Murdock · January 6, 2025

11. Bill would make it easier for veterans who signed secrecy oaths for covert ops to obtain back benefits

Of course covert ops caught my eye but this is really about military personnel who were part of secret medical and other tests and trials who were sworn to secrecy. I don't think they were conducting covert operations under the Title 50 scope. But the bottom line is these veterans should be properly cared for especially due to the nature of their service.

Bill would make it easier for veterans who signed secrecy oaths for covert ops to obtain back benefits

Stars and Stripes · by Linda F. Hersey · January 6, 2025

Troops in an undated photo enter a chamber where they were exposed to chemical agents as part of military experiments at Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland. (U.S. Army photo)

WASHINGTON — Veterans who signed secrecy oaths that kept them from disclosing to doctors or anyone else the nature of injuries connected to covert operations could seek benefits retroactive to their discharge date under a bill before Congress.

The Obligations to Aberdeen’s Trusted Heroes Act, or OATH Act, would lift a mandate that requires veterans to apply for benefits within one year of leaving military service to receive compensation dating back to their discharge.

The restriction would be waived for former service members who participated in secrecy oath programs that prevented them from disclosing a mission or seeking benefits for service-connected illnesses or injuries.

Sponsored by Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn., the legislation specifically identifies Vietnam-era service members who were human test subjects from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s in Army experiments using chemical warfare agents and hallucinogenic drugs.

“Government-employed scientists including former Nazi Germany scientists, tested mustard agents, psychedelics, nerve agents and other dangerous chemicals,” according to the legislation.

Service members in experiments at the former Edgewood Arsenal Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland were sworn to secrecy and threatened with court-martial or criminal charges if they violated it.

“Upon leaving service in the Army, veterans of the program could not seek benefits provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs for disabilities relating to the program without violating their secrecy oaths,” according to the legislation.

By secrecy oath, the military was referring to any non-disclosure agreement that prevented service members from disclosing or discussing covert missions. After leaving the military, the veterans could not seek compensation for injuries connected to the experiments until the secrecy oath was lifted in 2006, according to the legislation.

The bill was introduced in November and referred to the Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committee. Blumenthal is a committee member.

As the incoming top Democrat of the committee, Blumenthal plans to reintroduce the legislation in the new Congress and will continue fighting to ensure Edgewood veterans receive full benefits, his office said.

“I was experiencing health problems before the oath was lifted but was not able to file a claim for compensation,” said Army veteran Frank Rochelle, 71, of North Carolina.

“Compensation should not be timed to when the secrecy oath ended because injuries were incurred prior to that,” said Rochelle, a former corporal whose service from 1968-1970 included a tour in Vietnam.

Vietnam-era service members were considered volunteers in the classified studies by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps. They signed consent agreements prior to participating.

But veterans later said they were not fully informed about the nature of the tests or the risks to their health.

“We have boxes and boxes of papers we’ve collected over the years about the testing, but we got nothing when we filed claims for compensation,” said Michelle Josephs, wife and full-time caretaker of 76-year-old Army veteran Tim Josephs, another Edgewood participant. “We were told it was ‘informed consent.’ Tim and the others had volunteered. But these were a bunch of 18- and 19-year-old guys who had no idea the government would give them things harmful to them.”

“We fought for years for benefits and then finally gave up,” she said.

Because the statute governing veterans benefits requires veterans to apply within one year of discharge to receive retroactive benefits, veterans of the program were only eligible for benefits beginning from the date of their disability application, according to the legislation.

Rochelle took part in the military studies in 1968 at the former Edgewood Arsenal, where he received drugs orally and by injection.

“I never knew what they were giving me,” he said. “I pretty much lost consciousness after 10 minutes. I was delirious for about two days. All I remember is breathing in this one inhalation.”

The chronic medical problems that Rochelle developed after the experiments made him unemployable, according to VA records.

Rochelle obtained his military medical records in 2001 and found he was administered a chemical known by the code name, CAR-302,668. The drug was described as a “deliriant drug” developed in the 1960s and tested at Edgewood.

He also learned from medical records that he received a drug called EA-2233, a high-potency, synthetic form of THC, a psychoactive ingredient found in cannabis. Rochelle said he developed significant problems with his concentration and memory after receiving the drug.

“In my VA files, my medical problems are documented as due to the Edgewood experiments,” said Rochelle, who is 100% disabled.

He is now seeking disability compensation dating back to his discharge in 1970 and he continues to have respiratory problems that doctors determined were related to aerosol sprays that he and other service members inhaled through a mask.

Rochelle also has a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder connected to his service at Edgewood.

His case is on appeal before the U.S. Veterans Court of Appeals, which ordered retroactive compensation in 2024 in three other cases involving Edgewood veterans.

“By complying with their secrecy oaths, the veterans of the program lost the ability to receive the full veterans’ benefits they earned,” the legislation said.

The legislation would require no later than three months after a secrecy oath is lifted, the military must identify and notify the affected veterans about their ability to apply for full benefits retroactive to their date of discharge.

“Veterans of other secrecy oath programs may face the same hurdles to obtaining benefits. While some veterans of secrecy oath programs received limited relief in the courts, there is uncertainty about the scope of benefits available to those veterans,” according to the legislation.

A 2023 ruling in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Washington enabled service members who volunteered at Edgewood to obtain VA disability compensation retroactive to their date of discharge, potentially affecting 3,000 to 5,000 veterans believed to be alive.

If signed into law, the OATH Act would codify this decision for Edgewood veterans — “allowing them to avoid litigation and inconsistent outcomes between cases” — and enable veterans who served in other secrecy oath programs to backdate their benefits, Blumenthal’s office said.

Mark Jones, an attorney who represents several Edgewood veterans in cases seeking compensation, said the VA states publicly it has a process in place to handle claims for earlier effective dates. But the Edgewood veterans’ requests continue to be denied, he said.

“They are telling the veterans in decision letters that they do not have such a process in place,” Jones said. “I have the paperwork to support the fact that the VA is lying.”

Tim Josephs, a former Army sergeant, was given a cocktail of drugs that caused him to hallucinate and experience tremors when he served as a human test subject at Edgewood for three months in 1968.

Neurological problems, including depression, nightmares, and extreme anxiety, persisted in the decades following military service, said Michelle Josephs, speaking for her husband, who was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease 20 years ago. The medical condition limits his ability to have conversations.

Michelle Josephs said she did not learn about the experiments from her husband until the couple received a phone call several years after his discharge in 1969 from the military. The person identified himself as a federal government employee with questions about his participation in the studies, she said.

“We had just gotten married, and I was a nursing student. Someone from the government called. Tim did not ever call them back because he was so disgusted and didn’t trust them. I said, ‘What is this about?’ ” she recalled. “That’s when he told me about the experiments.”

The couple later obtained his military health records that included information about participation in the Edgewood studies. Michelle Josephs said her husband was administered nerve agents and antidotes to them. Tim Josephs pursued disability claims with the VA but was denied.

“We’ve had a lot of expenses over the years. At one point his medications were $3,000 a month,” she said. “He gets so worked up over this, and then nothing happens. We’re demoralized.”

Stars and Stripes · by Linda F. Hersey · January 6, 2025

12. Afghans arrive in the Philippines to complete visa processing for resettlement in US

Afghans arrive in the Philippines to complete visa processing for resettlement in US

apnews.com

Afghans arrive in the Philippines to complete visa processing for resettlement in US | AP News

World News

1 of 2 | This photo provided by U.S. Embassy, Philippines, shows the arrival of Afghan U.S. Special Immigrant Visa Applicants in the Philippines Monday, Jan. 6, 2025. (U.S. Embassy, Philippines via AP)

By AARON FAVILA and EILEEN NG

Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year]

MANILA, Philippines (AP) — A group of Afghan nationals arrived in the Philippines ⁠on Monday to process special immigrant visas for their resettlement in the United States, as part of an agreement between Manila and Washington.

The Philippines agreed last July to temporarily host a U.S. immigrant visa processing center for a limited number of Afghan nationals aspiring to resettle in America.

Department of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Teresita Daza said the Afghan nationals who landed in the Philippines on Monday were provided entry visas. She said they had completed extensive security vetting and undergone full medical screenings prior to their arrival.

The U.S. government will cover the costs for the Afghan nationals’ stay in the Philippines, including their food, housing, security, medical and transportation expenses, she said.

She didn’t specify how many Afghans arrived or how long the visa processing will take. Under the Philippines’ rules, visa applicants can stay for no longer than 59 days.

A senior Philippine official told The Associated Press last year that only 150 to 300 applicants would be accommodated in the Philippines under the “one-time” deal. The official who had knowledge of the negotiations agreed to speak on condition of anonymity because of a lack of authority to speak publicly.

The Afghan nationals seeking resettlement primarily worked for the U.S. government in Afghanistan or were deemed eligible for U.S. special immigrant visas but were left behind when Washington withdrew from the country and Taliban militants took back power in a chaotic period in 2021.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken first relayed the request to his Philippines counterpart in 2022, and President Joe Biden discussed the request with Philippines leader Ferdinand Marcos Jr. when he visited the U.S. last year, Philippine officials said.

Marcos has rekindled relations with the U.S. since winning the presidency by a landslide margin two years ago. In February last year, he allowed an expansion of the American military presence under a 2014 defense agreement in a decision that upset China.

___

Ng contributed from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

apnews.com

13. From the bookshelf: ‘The Taiwan Story: how a small island will dictate the global future’

From the bookshelf: ‘The Taiwan Story: how a small island will dictate the global future’ | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by John West · January 5, 2025

Among the most complex foreign policy challenges facing President Donald Trump following his inauguration on 20 January will be relations with China and the US’s position relative to Taiwan.

Perhaps no better book informs political debate and public opinion than Kerry Brown’s The Taiwan Story: How a small island will dictate the global future (Viking, 2024). Brown is a prolific author of books on Chinese politics, currently based at King’s College, London, following a stint at the University of Sydney.

The Taiwan Story begins with the Chinese Civil War (1945–49), in which Mao Zedong’s communists ousted Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalists from the mainland and establish the People’s Republic of China. Chiang’s forces retreated to the island of Taiwan as the Republic of China. The US government sided with the Republic of China, with which it maintained diplomatic relations, not recognising Beijing.

The story evolves when the US switches recognition from Taipei to Beijing, following the 1972 visit to China by US President Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger. Thus began the US ‘acknowledgement’ of the one-China policy. According to the Shanghai Communique of 1972, ‘the United States acknowledges that Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.’

Beijing’s insistence that Taiwan be united with the mainland has made the island Asia’s political flash point. A plethora of books have been published on Taiwan issues. What is most interesting about Brown’s is that he goes into the lives of the Taiwanese people and how Taiwanese politics, society and cultural identity have evolved quite differently to the mainland’s.

Chiang Kai-shek’s government on Taiwan was just as authoritarian as that of Mao Zedong on the Chinese mainland. But Taiwan democratised, holding its first presidential elections in 1996. Democracy is now firmly entrenched in Taiwan, as the presidency has alternated between the two leading political parties, the Kuomintang (the nationalists) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

The Economist Intelligence Unit ranks Taiwan as the most democratic place in Asia and 10th in the world. Democratisation means that Taiwan has aligned its values with the West and distinguishes itself from China, which has become ever more authoritarian. Taiwan also has a rich, open and free civil society, something that is very much lacking on the mainland.

Taiwan has also established itself among Asia’s technology leaders. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company produces more than 90 percent of the world’s most advanced semiconductors. Under US pressure, the company will not supply them to Chinese customers.

While Taiwan may be diplomatically isolated, with only 12 countries recognising it as the Republic of China, much of the world economy is depends on its technological prowess. And over the generations, a distinct Taiwanese cultural identity has developed, with the vast majority of Taiwanese people identifying as Taiwanese, rather than Chinese or both Chinese and Taiwanese.

Meanwhile, there is a growing risk of military conflict involving China and Taiwan. Chinese leader Xi Jinping is increasingly impatient for Taiwan to be unified with the mainland. As China–US relations have deteriorated, high-level US support for Taiwan has grown, even though Washington maintains its policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ concerning its willingness to defend Taiwan. Most Taiwanese prefer the political status quo of de facto independence, as do the current president and his predecessor (both from the Democratic Progressive Party). In response, Beijing has cut off all official contact with Taipei.

What future for relations across the Taiwan Straits?

Brown explores issues and risks of a military conflict over Taiwan. It would be massively risky and costly, not only for the countries directly involved but for the whole world economy. Brown sees no possibility of reconciliation between China and Taiwan. But he does argue that peace across the Taiwan Straits has been ensured for seven decades by accepting the status quo and that sticking with it is the only realistic option. This would involve all sides dialling down the tensions, however.

Brown notes that both China and Taiwan have undergone radical change over the past half a century or more. Looking further ahead, he argues that it is highly possible that continued radical change will throw up new ideas which could offer a longer term solution to the Taiwan problem.

aspistrategist.org.au · by John West · January 5, 2025

14. Is Trump a Navalist? President-elect Trump tells Hugh Hewitt

Is Trump a Navalist?

President-elect Trump tells Hugh Hewitt

https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/is-trump-a-navalist?utm

CDR Salamander

Jan 07, 2025

What does the next administration have in mind for the US Navy? What actions can we expect to see?

We don’t have to wait for the President’s pick for SECNAV, John Phelen, to get to confirmation hearings.

On Hugh Hewitt’s show Monday, President Trump put it on the record. Very Salamanderesque, hitting the high points we’ve been discussing for a very long time.

The bold faced items:

More Ships. Perhaps Built Overseas:

We don’t build ships anymore. We want to get that started. And maybe we’ll use allies, also, in terms of building ships. We might have to. We need ships. China’s building, from what I’m hearing, every four days, they’re knocking out a ship. And we’re sitting back watching. And we’ve suffered tremendously.

Program Management Reform:

…they started playing around with the design. I heard about that a year later. They took what I had. It was perfect. And what it is, is you build it. No changes, no change orders, no extra money, no nothing. You build it. They were doing a great job. But the generals or the admirals went in and they said oh, why don’t we make it a little bit wider? Why don’t we do this? Why don’t we do that? And it was designed specifically for speed and other things. When you start making it wider, you start making it slower. And it was also designed on a ship that was unbelievably successful in that same class, you know, design-wise.

Of course, he is referring to the Constellation Class FFG that started with the proven Franco-Italian FREMM. Was supposed to have 80% commonality, not it is 15%. Heartbreaking what we’ve done.

More Maintenance Capability:

We need ships. We have to get ships. And you know, everybody said oh, we’ll build them. We may have to go to others, bid them out, and it’s okay to do that. We’ll bid them out until we get ourselves ready. We’re not prepared for ships. We don’t have docks.

This is a bit unclear, but “We’re not prepared for ships. We don’t have docks.” to me sounds like more facilities, more maintenance.

I would expect to hear more from the new administration on the Navy. What we need to support that are the right players in the House and Senate to make sure the money flows that way as well.

15. The first Americans to earn the Distinguished Service Cross were two Army nurses

The first Americans to earn the Distinguished Service Cross were two Army nurses

The Distinguished Service Cross was established as the nation’s second-highest valor award, but its 20,000 recipients are often forgotten in history.

Joshua Skovlund

Posted 22 Hours Ago

taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund

The first Americans to earn the Distinguished Service Cross were not combat soldiers but two women serving as nurses with the British Army before the U.S. entered World War I.

On Aug. 17, 1917, Nurses Beatrice MacDonald and Helen McClelland of the Army Nurse Corps Reserve were assigned to a surgical team at the British Casualty Clearing Station Number 61 near Lillers, France.

During a German night air raid, MacDonald and McClelland continued caring for their patients despite bombs raining down all around them. When explosion wounded MacDonald, causing her to lose sight in one eye, McClelland treated her fellow nurse along with the other wounded service members.

Their actions under fire were the combat actions first deemed worthy of the Army’s then-new Distinguished Service Cross, which had been officially created by Congress on Jan. 2, 1917. The two were awarded the Cross on July 9, 1918.

Since the award was officially authorized by Congress as the nation’s second highest award for valor, over 20,000 service members have been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross or its sister awards, the Navy Cross or Air Force Cross, which are often collectively referred to as the ‘service crosses’ (the Distinguished Flying Cross, given for acts of bravery in flight, falls farther down the hierarchy, in line with a Bronze Star).

Though MacDonald and McClelland were the first to earn the DSC after its introduction, they were not the first to actually receive it. Three 1st Infantry Division soldiers were the first to be awarded the Distinguished Service Cross during WW I. Army 2nd Lt. John Newport Greene of the 6th Field Artillery, and Sgt. William Norton and Pvt. Patrick Walsh, both of Company I, 18th Infantry, went above and beyond the call of duty on March 1, 1918, earning the Distinguished Service Cross and awarded on March 18, 1918.

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Historian Doug Sterner believes that the Distinguished Service Cross and its many recipients tend to be overlooked in military history. A two-time Bronze Star recipient in Vietnam, Sterner has researched valor awards for decades and published dozens of books on the three highest tiers of U.S. valor awards: the Medal of Honor, the service crosses, and the Silver Star.

He maintains that combat actions rewarded with a Medal of Honor versus those that get service crosses are often indistinguishable in their bravery and danger but get split apart later in the awards process.

“What stands out to me is that as a nation, we’re myopically focused on the Medal of Honor. Now, civilians generally can’t tell the difference between a Medal of Honor and a Good Conduct Medal, which is great because anybody can say, ‘Hey, my dad got a medal,’ even if it’s a Good Conduct Medal,” Sterner said. “But among veterans, we can distinguish that difference, and I am concerned that we do not realize what the Service Cross is supposed to distinguish what the Service Cross, Navy Cross, and subsequently, the Air Force Cross represents. They represent an act of valor, that to somebody who got the second-highest combat decoration, in many cases, simply because the clerk wasn’t as good at writing up the after-action reports.”

President Woodrow Wilson ordered the establishment of the Distinguished Service Cross on Jan. 2, 1918. The U.S. Mint at Philadelphia minted the first 100 in 1918. The Navy Cross was introduced in 1919, and the Air Force Cross in 1960. Of note, the Coast Guard Service Cross was established in 2010 but has not yet been awarded.

Sterner said it’s time to understand that valor awards are based on the criteria set for each, and the actions performed to earn the award are nothing short of incredible, and they are not less than each other.

“There have been approximately 20,000 service crosses awarded in history, as compared to, say, for instance, a Silver Star, which is nothing to sneeze at, which has been awarded about 130,000 to 240,000 times,” Sterner said. “So the DSC, Navy Cross, and the Air Force Cross are quite major awards. At a time when our number of Medal of Honor recipients living is down to 60, there are hundreds of Service Cross recipients, and we should also focus on them as some of our most highly decorated heroes.”

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taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund

16. Empowering Change: The Role of Non-Commissioned Officers in Implementing Transformation in Contact

Excerpts:

Conclusion

Army Continuous Transformation represents a bold vision for the future, one that relies heavily on the leadership and expertise of non-commissioned officers. By embracing their immediate role in the change process, they can drive successful implementation and ensure the Army remains ready and capable in an ever-evolving operational landscape.

Non-commissioned officers play a critical role in all horizons, but Transformation in Contact is happening right now. Immediately, Army leaders must understand and communicate the changes Soldiers are going to see and the purpose of them. Non-commissioned officers must facilitate the integration of new equipment and procedures based on organizational change orders. Everyone plays a part in the creation and refining of unit documentation, but non-commissioned officers carry a significant portion of that development. Due to their unique position, they are the most qualified to do so.

The successes experienced in Army Futures Command experiments and the 25th ID, 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Prototype) Combat Training rotation are positive proof that Transformation in Contact is possible and flourishes when placed into the hands of our extraordinary non-commissioned officer corps.

Non-commissioned officers will remain at the forefront of positive change, guiding their units through the challenges and opportunities of continuous transformation, and ensuring the Army remains the world’s premier land force.

Empowering Change: The Role of Non-Commissioned Officers in Implementing Transformation in Contact

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/01/07/empowering-change/

by Katie Smith, by Brian Hester, by Garrett O'Keefe

01.07.2025 at 06:00am

The Army’s recent reframing of the transformation strategy into three distinct time horizons, being driven by Army Futures Command, marks a change in the language used to inform the Army of transformation efforts which ensure the Army remains agile, efficient, and ready to meet the demands of modern warfare. Army Futures Command is aggressively pursuing transformation opportunities and priorities across these three-time horizons: Transformation in Contact (18-24 months), Deliberate Transformation (2-7 years) and Concept-Driven Transformation, while protecting key capabilities from strategic competitors.

Continuous Transformation’s first time period, Transformation in Contact, encompasses a broad range of initiatives designed to enhance operational effectiveness, from advanced weapon systems to cutting-edge communication and technological integration. During this time period, the Army will deliberately and systematically order select units to begin incremental changes in organization or equipment. We rely on Transformation in Contact units to gather lessons learned to implement during each iteration so we can transform faster and make immediate tactical adjustments to maintain land dominance.

At the heart of Transformation in Contact lies the pivotal role of non-commissioned officers, whose leadership and expertise are crucial for the successful implementation of these changes. We, the Command Sergeants Major of both Army Futures Command and the 25th ID, 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Prototype), have unique perspectives from our foxholes. While Army Futures Command is the enterprise answer to Army transformation, the tactical solutions manifest within Transformation in Contact units, like the 25th ID, 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Prototype). Their hands-on experience reveals potential doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) implications which accompany Army transformation objectives. The unique positions we hold in these organizations enable us to highlight the critical role non-commissioned officers play across all three time horizons, with a particular focus on the execution of Transformation in Contact.

Understanding Transformation in Contact:

Transformation in Contact is being pursued through multiple integrated and mutually supporting lines of effort. One of the primary Army efforts is ‘organizational change,’ which aims to empower commanders and ensure the readiness of formations to support combatant commander requirements. Additional efforts include the development and upgrade of command-and-control systems, unmanned aerial systems, electronic warfare, acceleration of the next-generation squad weapons rifle and automatic rifle, counter-small unmanned aerial systems tactics, human machine integrated-formations, increased lethality, and more.

As the Army Future Command’s Command Sgt. Maj., I can attest that feedback from units executing the first steps of Transformation in Contact aligns with “Soldier-Centered Design” experimentation. Soldiers are placed into development and iterative improvement efforts to capitalize on the collective scientist, engineer, and unit Soldier, non-commissioned officer, and officer expertise. This development design delivers the best recommendations to improve Transformation in Contact change implementation, enhancing lethality and protection in the 18 to 24 months’ time frame from the practical guidance of those on the ground.

Non-commissioned officers often serve in leadership roles within their formations for extended periods, providing stability, mentorship, and continuity. Their experience and longevity in these positions, in garrison or deployed, afford them a unique vantage point to see gaps and opportunities in capabilities as they execute Transformation in Contact. Indeed, solutions to our tactical challenges often come from the non-commissioned officers that lead squads, sections, and teams. They are at the tactical edge, rendering their feedback as essential, some might say lifesaving, with regard to fighting in high-intensity conflict.

In the context of Transformation in Contact, non-commissioned officers play a crucial role in ensuring that their units adapt to new technologies and operational procedures. They are responsible for training and mentoring Soldiers, fostering a culture of innovation, and maintaining high-level standards of readiness and Soldier task performance.

The concept of operations for Transformation in Contact emphasizes the synchronization of efforts through the ‘organizational change’ line of effort via separate execution orders. For instance, the order for executing disposition of the RQ-7 Shadow Drone systems and associated equipment involves coordination with various Army Commands, demonstrating the comprehensive and multifaceted nature of even these first execution stages of Transformation in Contact. Every change ripples across the entire enterprise effecting doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. Every aspect must be considered for each incremental change made through transformation.

For example, the 25th ID, 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Prototype) execution in divesting the RQ-7 Shadow Drone systems had effects on those Soldiers assigned as drone operators and maintainers. The leadership recognized an opportunity however, to harness their talents and develop subject matter experts in building, repairing, and operating any small unmanned aerial system or first-person-view drones. The unit acquired commercially available systems and gave these techcraft savvy Soldiers the freedom to experiment and solve unit problems.

One focus has been to overcome distance disadvantage in the Pacific environment. For example, we have looked at employing drones to expand resupply options at the company level. Commercial digital trackers on the aerial resupply drops offer a capability to assist end users locate their items in various terrain. Critically, these novel and creative applications are captured, under the Soldier-Center Design methodology, and routed back to Army Futures Command for further system and tactic refinement in development and integration.

Transformation in Contact efforts have fielded the 25th ID, 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Prototype) numerous new technologies, equipment, weapons, and vehicles with no formal doctrine on how to use or employ in conflict. It is left up to the non-commissioned officers within the formation to develop these critical standards, through the concept we on the team call: ‘Try, fail, then try again.’

First into the Deep End: 25th ID 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Prototype) begins Transformation in Contact:

In February 2024, the 25th ID, 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Prototype) was notified they were selected as one of the first overseas units to undergo organizational and technological updates encapsulated within the Transformation in Contact stage of Continuous Transformation. They were first directed to convert from two infantry battalions and one cavalry squadron, into three infantry maneuver battalions. The brigade’s trajectory had to critically shift in preparation for the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center rotation scheduled for October 2024. The Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center is the overseas Combat Training Center. Exercises are conducted in a complex and realistic environment to help build readiness and proficiency in the tasks the unit is expected to execute in combat. The new organizational structure would need to be solid, cohesive, and prepared if they were to be successful in one of the most difficult exercises the Army offers.

After the initial notification, 25th ID, 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Prototype) leaders immediately began the deliberate, iterative, and systematic process the Army uses to make decisions, called the Military Decision-Making Process. A pathway was set for the way ahead between February and March 2024. Then, on 2 April 2024, marking the first step of change, the unit held its last formation as an Infantry Brigade Combat Team and ceremonially transitioned to its first formation as a new Light Brigade Combat Team (Prototype) construct. Between April and May, the non-commissioned officers and Soldiers rapidly progressed through the stages of team development, re-establishing cohesion and expected performance levels.

Due to the organizational changes, the brigade now had to re-execute squad, platoon, and company live fire exercises. For the new organization to be effective with the added technologies and capabilities ordered within Transformation in Contact, the development of standard operating procedures and tactics, techniques, and procedures was critical. Non-commissioned officers shouldered the bulk of this development burden, particularly in testing, refining, and training. To date, with the amount of newly integrated technology, equipment, and vehicles, over twenty programs of instruction, standard operating procedures, and tactics, techniques, and procedures documents have been published by 25th ID, 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Prototype) non-commissioned officers. Perhaps even more importantly, these on the ground lessons learned are now informing Army-wide DOTMLPF-P development and are increasing in utilization within the U.S. Army Infantry School, and across National Guard and Reserve units.

25th ID, 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Prototype) work stood up to the test. Between May and June, the brigade executed a series of live-fire exercises certifying nine maneuver companies and three Cross Domain Effects companies. The complex levels of integration were exceptional in the culminating exercise which included fires, maneuver, breach, short range reconnections drones, silent tactical energy enhanced dismount military carts, electronic warfare environmental complications, and counter-small unmanned aerial systems assets.

July was spent refining documents and implementation, informed by the lessons learned from each exercise. Non-commissioned officers continued to provide the most critical and practical experiences, optimizing the ‘how to fight’ with the new brigade formations. In August, the brigade executed a competitive field training exercise against their sister brigade. Now up against a free-thinking enemy at peer capability, the 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Prototype) procedures and tactics were put through their most strenuous trials yet, emerging from the exercise postured to succeed at the imminent rotation at the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center.

In just under eight months of preparation, the newly organized, trained and equipped brigade validated the entire formation during the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center rotation in October 2024.

Strategies for Transformation Success:

#1: Discard the Obsolete, Adopt the Innovative

To effectively implement Transformation in Contact, non-commissioned officers can employ several strategies and tactics. Foremost, efficient management of resources, including personnel, equipment, and time, is vital for successful implementation. Obsolete equipment collecting dust needs to be divested of properly, and immediately.

Transformation in Contact takes all four Army Commands, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA-ALT), and the Army Service Component Commands to execute. Army Futures Command must get the requirements right, ASA-ALT acquires the materials, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command develops leaders and doctrine, U.S. Army Forces Command and the Army Service Component Commands build readiness with the new material and organizational changes, and Army Materiel Command delivers and sustains this effort.

All these organizations must work in concert to divest legacy capabilities and invest in transformation. For example, the delivery of the Next Generation Squad Weapons will trigger the M4 Carbine rifle divestment. Delivery of Infantry Squad Vehicles means the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, or HMMWV, must find a new home. Our units can’t maintain multiple sets of equipment, nor maintain training proficiencies on multiple systems. Non-commissioned officers will be pivotal in the execution of disposing of legacy equipment, allowing the unit to be free to innovate with their new capabilities.

While staying current with new technologies and operational procedures is critical, the non-commissioned officers charged to lead and train Soldiers will always be successful if they stay brilliant at the basics. Non-commissioned officers should continuously leverage available training resources to keep their team skilled at their warrior tasks and drills, while also seeking opportunities for deliberate and incremental introduction of new and experimental tactics and equipment.

As changes are introduced to the unit, non-commissioned officers should ensure that their Soldiers are adequately equipped and that resources, like ranges, are allocated to support rapid and fluid adaptation. 25th ID, 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Prototype) has established accommodations for rapid integration. A dedicated ‘Ready Range’ has been allocated to the unit, complete with permanent restricted airspace for testing unmanned aerial system tactics and simulating denied environments. This allows non-commissioned officers, down to the squad level, to drill on the basics and also creatively test new systems or tactics with a focus on warfighting readiness. This asset continues to develop Soldier fieldcraft and techcraft but has also had positive impact on unit cohesion. These field training’s have generated valuable insights regarding lethality and survivability in a technologically saturated combat environment.

#2: Communication is the Language of Transformation Leaders

Non-commissioned officers serve as the rational, Soldier-wellbeing-focused, conscience of the Army; uniquely capable of supplying the necessary context for raw data or tactical information. Non-commissioned officers must maintain open lines of communication with their superiors and subordinates, ensuring that everyone understands the goals of Transformation in Contact, and their roles in achieving them. Non-commissioned officers that clearly outline the impact of the change to their Soldiers, will be successful in motivating them and preparing them to frame directives into a larger strategic context. Relaying key feedback of the results of integration effort to superiors, can inform the Army’s larger efforts in fielding during this horizon of transformation.

The profound effect of a non-commissioned officer that understands the ground tactical plan, the capabilities and limits of new technologies or resources, and the desired end state of the commander has been tested and proven within the 25th ID, 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Prototype). They are exposed to a singular pragmatic and utilitarian viewpoint on the ground and are postured to recommend and implement the most impactful ideas driving change. Today’s non-commissioned officers are writing our future and changing the way the Army will fight in future conflicts through realistic rigorous training, doctrine development, and realistic feedback drawn from experience and relayed to senior leaders.

Non-commissioned officers contribute to Transformation in Contact by developing and sharing their lessons learned. By writing and publishing articles, refining procedure and manuals, submitting feedback to the Center for Army Lessons Learned, and sharing developed documents with other units, non-commissioned officers ensure that the Army is prepared to meet the challenges of modern warfare. Non-commissioned officers are the backbone of the Army, responsible for translating high-level directives into actionable plans on the ground. Their unique position allows them to bridge the gap between strategic vision and tactical execution.

#3: What Gets Measured, Gets Done

At the outset of the 25th ID, 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Prototype) rotation at the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center, Gen. Randy A. George, Chief of Staff of the Army challenged the team to answer three Transformation in Contact questions: ‘Are you more mobile,’ ‘are you more lethal,’ and ‘how do you know.’

The long-term impact of Continuous Transformation will be significant, reshaping the Army’s operational capabilities and strategic posture. As we incorporate known technologies such as the semi-autonomous robotic platform, low-altitude stalking and strike ordnance program, and orbital drop drones, non-commissioned officers will set the conditions to assess both measures of performance and effectiveness. Indeed, non-commissioned officers will continue to play a vital role in this ongoing transformation process, leveraging their expertise to navigate the complexities of modern warfare and dexterously adapting to the increasing levels of technology on the battlefield.

Army Futures Command capitalizes on the knowledge of the non-commissioned officer in the near-term through its persistent Soldier-centered experimentation. Non-commissioned officers bring their wealth of experience, practical knowledge, and an intimate understanding of their Soldiers’ capabilities and needs, making them indispensable in the change implementation process.

Conclusion

Army Continuous Transformation represents a bold vision for the future, one that relies heavily on the leadership and expertise of non-commissioned officers. By embracing their immediate role in the change process, they can drive successful implementation and ensure the Army remains ready and capable in an ever-evolving operational landscape.

Non-commissioned officers play a critical role in all horizons, but Transformation in Contact is happening right now. Immediately, Army leaders must understand and communicate the changes Soldiers are going to see and the purpose of them. Non-commissioned officers must facilitate the integration of new equipment and procedures based on organizational change orders. Everyone plays a part in the creation and refining of unit documentation, but non-commissioned officers carry a significant portion of that development. Due to their unique position, they are the most qualified to do so.

The successes experienced in Army Futures Command experiments and the 25th ID, 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Prototype) Combat Training rotation are positive proof that Transformation in Contact is possible and flourishes when placed into the hands of our extraordinary non-commissioned officer corps.

Non-commissioned officers will remain at the forefront of positive change, guiding their units through the challenges and opportunities of continuous transformation, and ensuring the Army remains the world’s premier land force.

Tags: change management, innovation, leadership, military innovation

About The Authors

Katie Smith
Master Sgt. Katie Smith has experience as a signal and public affairs Soldier over her 19 years of service, and is a Licensed Master of Social Work. She currently supports the Army’s transformation mission under Army Futures Command, Communication Directorate.
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Brian Hester
Command Sgt. Maj. Brian A. Hester has over 34 years of Army service as an Infantry Soldier; serving in every enlisted leadership position and multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. He is currently the Command Sergeant Major of Army Futures Command, the Army’s newest major command, responsible for transforming the Army to ensure war winning future readiness. Connect on X @ArmyFuturesCSM.
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Garrett O'Keefe
Command Sgt. Major Garrett S. O’Keefe enlisted as an infantryman and has served in every infantry position of leadership over 24 years of service. He served two tours in Iraq and two tours in Afghanistan. Now, as the Senior Enlisted Advisor for 2nd LBCT-P, 25th ID, he provides critical enlisted perspectives and advice pivotal to Continuous Transformation and the development of Army tactics, techniques, and procedures supporting new emerging technologies. Command Sgt. Maj. O’Keefe was selected to be the next XVIII Airborne Corps Operations Sgt. Maj.

17. Taiwan Says It Suspects a Chinese-Linked Ship Damaged an Undersea Internet Cable

Taiwan Says It Suspects a Chinese-Linked Ship Damaged an Undersea Internet Cable

The Taiwanese Coast Guard said seven Chinese nationals were aboard a ship suspected of causing the damage.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/07/world/asia/taiwan-internet-cable-china.html

Taiwanese authorities are investigating a Chinese-owned cargo ship suspected of damaging an undersea internet cable northeast of the island, Taiwan’s coast guard said on Monday.Credit...Taiwan Coast Guard, via Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By Meaghan Tobin Muyi Xiao and Amy Chang Chien

Meaghan Tobin and Amy Chang Chien reported from Taipei, Taiwan. Muyi Xiao reported from New York.

Jan. 7, 2025, 1:11 a.m. ET

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Taiwan is investigating whether a ship linked to China is responsible for damaging one of the undersea cables that connects Taiwan to the internet, the latest reminder of how vulnerable Taiwan’s critical infrastructure is to damage from China.

The incident comes as anxiety in Europe has risen over apparent acts of sabotage, including ones aimed at such undersea communication cables. Two fiber-optic cables under the Baltic Sea were severed in November, prompting officials from Sweden, Finland and Lithuania to halt a Chinese-flagged commercial ship in the area for weeks over its possible involvement.

In Taiwan, communications were quickly rerouted after the damage was detected, and there was no major outage. The island’s main telecommunications provider, Chunghwa Telecom, received a notification on Friday morning that the cable, known as the Trans-Pacific Express Cable, had been damaged. That cable also connects to South Korea, Japan, China and the United States.

That afternoon, Taiwan’s Coast Guard intercepted a cargo vessel off the northern city of Keelung, in an area near where half a dozen cables make landfall. The vessel was owned by a Hong Kong company and crewed by seven Chinese nationals, the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration said.

The damaged cable is one of more than a dozen that help keep Taiwan online. These fragile cables are susceptible to breakage by anchors dragged along the sea floor by the many ships in the busy waters around Taiwan.

Analysts and officials say that while it is difficult to prove whether damage to these cables is intentional, such an act would fit a pattern of intimidation and psychological warfare by China directed at weakening Taiwan’s defenses.

Taiwan said the cargo vessel it intercepted had registered under the flags of both Cameroon and Tanzania. “The possibility of a Chinese flag-of-convenience ship engaging in gray zone harassment cannot be ruled out,” the Coast Guard Administration said on Monday in a statement.

Such harassment, which inconveniences Taiwanese forces but stops short of overt confrontation, has a desensitizing effect over time, according to Yisuo Tzeng, a researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a think tank funded by Taiwan’s defense ministry. That puts Taiwan at risk of being caught off guard in the event of a real conflict, Mr. Tzeng said.

Taiwan experiences near-daily incursions into its waters and airspace by the People’s Liberation Army. Last month, China sent nearly 90 naval and coast guard vessels into waters in the area, its largest such operation in almost three decades.

China has also deployed militarized fishing boats and its coast guard fleet in disputes around the South China Sea region, and stepped up patrols just a few miles off the shore of Taiwan’s outer islands, increasing the risk of dangerous confrontations.

Such harassment has been a “defining marker of Chinese coercion against Taiwan for decades, but over the last couple years has really stepped up,” said Gregory Poling, the director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

And in situations like this one and the recent damage to the cables under the Baltic Sea, it is difficult for the authorities to calibrate their response when a ship’s true identity is uncertain.

Image

An oil tanker in the Gulf of Finland that Finnish authorities said in January they planned to inspect for playing a role in the sabotage of a cable under the Baltic Sea.Credit...Jussi Nukari/Lehtikuva, via Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

“Do you deploy a Coast Guard vessel every time there is an illegal sand dredger or, in this case, a ship that is registered to a flag of convenience and has Chinese ties damages a submarine cable?” Mr. Poling asked.

Ship tracking data and vessel records analyzed by The Times show that the ship may have been broadcasting its positions under a fake name.

Taiwan said the ship appeared to use two sets of Automatic Identification System equipment, which is used to broadcast a ship’s position. On Jan. 3, at the moment that Taiwan said the cable was damaged, a ship named Shun Xing 39 was reporting its AIS positions in the waters off Taiwan’s northeastern coast.

About nine hours later, at around 4:51 p.m. local time, Shun Xing 39 stopped transmitting location data. That was shortly after the time that the Taiwan Coast Guard said it had located the ship and requested that it return to waters outside of Keelung port for an investigation.

One minute later, and 50 feet away, a ship called Xing Shun 39, which had not reported a position since late December, began broadcasting a signal, according to William Conroy, a maritime analyst in Wildwood, Mo., with Semaphore Maritime Solutions, who analyzed AIS data on the ship-tracking platform Starboard.

In the ship-tracking database, both Xing Shun 39 and Shun Xing 39 identify themselves as cargo ships with a class A AIS transponder. Typically, a cargo ship equipped with this class of transponder would be large enough to require registration with the International Maritime Organization and obtain a unique identification number known as an IMO number. Xing Shun 39 has an IMO number, but Shun Xing 39 does not appear in the IMO database. This suggests “Xing Shun 39” is the ship’s real identity and “Shun Xing 39” is fake, according to Mr. Conroy.

The Taiwan Coast Guard has publicly identified the vessel as Shun Xing 39, and said the ship used two AIS systems.

Vessel and corporate records show that Jie Yang Trading Ltd, a Hong Kong-based company, took over as the owner of Xing Shun 39 in April 2024.

The waves were too large to board the cargo vessel to investigate further, the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration said. Taiwan is seeking help from South Korea because the crew of the cargo vessel said it was headed to that country, the administration said.

In 2023, the outlying Matsu Islands, within view of the Chinese coast, endured patchy internet for months after two undersea internet cables broke. These fiber optic cables that connect Taiwan to the internet suffered about 30 such breaks between 2017 and 2023.

Image

Taiwan set up microwave towers to help thousands of residents of the outlying Matsu Islands stay connected in 2023 after their undersea cables broke.Credit...Huizhong Wu/Associated Press

The frequent breakages are a reminder that Taiwan’s communication infrastructure must be able to withstand a crisis.

To help ensure that Taiwan can stay online if cables fail, the government has been pursuing a backup, including building a network of low-Earth orbit satellites capable of beaming the internet to Earth from space. Crucially, officials in Taiwan are racing to build their system without the involvement of Elon Musk, whose rocket company, SpaceX, dominates the satellite internet industry, but whose deep business links in China have left them wary.

Meaghan Tobin covers business and tech stories in Asia with a focus on China and is based in Taipei. More about Meaghan Tobin

Muyi Xiao is a Times reporter on the Visual Investigations team covering China. More about Muyi Xiao

Amy Chang Chien is a reporter and researcher for The Times in Taipei, covering Taiwan and China. More about Amy Chang Chien

18. Tehran’s proxies are on the back foot. An Iran-Russia defense pact could revive them.

Tehran’s proxies are on the back foot. An Iran-Russia defense pact could revive them. - Breaking Defense

In this op-ed, Delaney Soliday and Shivane Anand of the Middle East Security Program at CNAS lay out what an Iran-Russia defense agreement could mean for Iran's proxies.

breakingdefense.com · by Delaney Soliday, Shivane Anand · January 6, 2025

Russian and Iranian flags on a desk. (Getty Images)

The sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in December 2024 has led many to focus on Russia, and its inability or unwillingness to prioritize Syria due to the conflict in Ukraine. But focusing too much on Russia understates the role that Iran, and more specifically Tehran’s proxies, played in propping up Assad. After all, Russia has been at war for almost three years, but it was only when Hezbollah was preoccupied with its war against Israel and Iran was no longer willing to spare resources to prop up the failing dictator that Assad’s regime finally crumbled.

Under the proposed “comprehensive strategic partnership” between Moscow and Tehran, we are likely to see the Iran-Russia relationship strengthen over time, not just on a conventional level but in terms of Moscow’s support for Iran’s proxy forces. A renegotiated defense treaty is likely to result in Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias playing a more outsized role in the Iran-Russia relationship.

With a renewed “all-encompassing” Iran-Russia defense agreement, Iran is likely to budget more funds for its overseas proxies and increase weapons shipments, creating new opportunities for Russia to tap sources of black-market weapons and skirt sanctions. Russia has started doing this already on a small scale; in March and April 2022, Iran-backed Hashd al-Sha’bi militants shipped Iranian rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), anti-tank missiles, and Brazilian Astros II rocket launchers to Russia by sea, which were later used in Ukraine.

The reverse flow of weapons also exists. Less than a month after Hamas’s horrific Oct. 7, 2023, assault on Israel, CNN and The Wall Street Journal reported that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad agreed to send Hezbollah the SA-22 missile system — an advanced Russian anti-aircraft weapon — via Russia’s state-sponsored mercenary Wagner Group. While officials never confirmed whether Wagner completed the delivery, the IDF later released photo evidence of other “state-of-the-art” Russian missiles stored in Hezbollah weapons caches, smuggled over-land into Lebanon via Syria. According to an unnamed Israeli major cited by The Wall Street Journal, Russian weapons alone constituted an estimated 60 percent to 70 percent of the Hezbollah weapons confiscated by the IDF in the first few days of the 2024 Israeli ground operation in southern Lebanon, prompting major concerns about Russian-Iranian weapons proliferation to proxy militias.

As the benefits of a stronger military and diplomatic relationship between Iran and Russia trickle down to Tehran’s proxies across the Middle East, more frequent exchanges of technical military-industrial knowledge and personnel could equip all parties involved with an arsenal of lethal technical expertise, allowing them to use one another’s weapons more effectively on the battlefield.

As with the flow of arms, this type of communication is already taking place. On Feb. 12, 2024, Ukrainian intelligence reported that Lebanese Hezbollah and the IRGC were training Russian troops to operate Iranian Shahed-136s, Ababil-3 UAVs, and the Raad remote-controlled air defense system prior to their deployment to the Ukrainian front line. The Wall Street Journal reported that Russia provided Iran-backed Houthi rebels with targeting data earlier this year for their attacks on global shipping in the Red Sea, in addition to prior shipments of small arms. Just one month after its illegal invasion of Ukraine, Moscow began recruiting Syrian mercenaries for its own military, and later reports confirmed that Iranian proxies were training the new recruits alongside Russian soldiers at an IRGC base in Syria. As Russian troops continue to suffer heavy losses on the Ukrainian front lines, Moscow has recently turned to other Iranian proxies for fresh draftees; according to The Financial Times, Houthi militants are promised “high salaries” and Russian citizenship in exchange for military service in Ukraine. FT also reported that ordinary Yemeni men were tricked into travelling to Moscow and then forced to sign enlistment contracts.

This mutually beneficial exchange of technical know-how and personnel not only encourages continued aggression against the West but allows Russia, Iran, and Tehran’s web of proxies to develop independent production, maintenance, and operational capabilities.

Beyond the direct military cooperation already taking place, a “comprehensive” defense treaty could accelerate Russia and Iran’s abilities to manufacture each other’s weapons systems. Russia has already built a drone factory in Tatarstan’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone capable of churning out 6,000 Iranian-spec Shahed UAVs per year for its war in Ukraine. One tangible deliverable of a Russian-Iranian agreement could be a Tatarstan-style production plant on Iranian soil, with the capacity to transform the logistics and smuggling networks that funnel Russian weapons from Tehran to Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza.

With the capacity to domestically produce more of the Russian weapons it sends to Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and various Iraqi militias, Tehran could significantly reduce the risk involved and time required to carry out successful smuggling operations. A domestic Russian arms industry would also afford Iran with the resources needed to resupply its own air defenses and rearm its proxies as Tehran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis continue to engage in direct conflict with Israel.

Trading amongst themselves allows both Russia and Iran — two of the most heavily sanctioned countries in the world — to self-sustain their own shadow economy, fueled by fleets of ghost ships and complex gold and oil smuggling schemes. Russia and Iran’s proposed agreement would see them cooperate on “all the spheres of bilateral cooperation,” including trade, indicating that a renewed treaty could result in a greater reliance on backchannel networks to raise funds and transport illicit goods — which already sees millions of dollars flowing through the network. Although the United States continues to take decisive action against the Iranian-Russian illicit trade networks, a defense treaty could inspire more creative sanctions evasion schemes and prompt an uptick in weapons and oil sales between Moscow, Tehran, and Iran’s proxy network.

The Russian-Iranian relationship has transformed over time from a marriage of convenience to a structured alliance between rogue states with shared economic and security interests. With this formalized agreement, Iran could secure both a steady supply of sophisticated weapons and also a P5 ally to safeguard its malign activities in the Middle East, potentially resulting in a more aggressive military strategy when carrying out direct attacks on Israel. This blanket protection afforded by Russian backing may in turn embolden Iranian proxies, prompting them to select riskier targets when attacking international shipping or American military assets.

Russia also benefits from closer defense ties with Iran; it gains millions of dollars in weapons sales, Iran-backed forces to replenish its battered military still fighting in Ukraine, expert training on Iranian weapons technology from Hezbollah and the IRGC, and logistical support from a regional ally after losing its military positions in Syria.

A renewed defense treaty between these two powers will render Iran’s web of proxies all the more dangerous by arming already destabilizing agents with more advanced weapons technology and the capacity to manufacture and ship arms to new battlefields.

Delaney Soliday is a research assistant with the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. Prior to joining CNAS, she was a research assistant for the Jeanette and Eli Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. She holds a BA in Global Affairs from George Mason University.

Shivane Anand was the Joseph S. Nye Research Intern for the Middle East Security program at the Center for a New American Security from July to December 2024. He holds a BA from George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

19. The Mayhem of Russia’s “Research” Fleet

Excerpts:

Conclusion

Since the Soviet era, Russia has maintained a research vessel fleet that serves civilian, research, and military purposes. While the Soviet Union once boasted one of the largest research fleets in the world, its collapse left Russia struggling to maintain and modernize its aging fleet. Today, this fleet, though diminished, remains a key element of Russian naval strategy, particularly in the realm of deep-sea intelligence and sabotage.

The Russian navy retains significant expertise and specialized capabilities for underwater operations, supported by a dedicated directorate for deep-sea sabotage and intelligence. Facing economic pressures from its invasion of Ukraine and its overall strategic inferiority in competition with NATO, Moscow is likely to prioritize strengthening these capabilities. Russia’s growing focus on deep-sea operations could also extend to targeting Europe’s renewable energy infrastructure, such as offshore wind farms and seabed projects, further escalating tensions in the region. Most recently, a Russia-linked dark fleet tanker, seized by Finland for damaging several undersea cables, reportedly had also intelligence devices.

One of the most immediate security challenges for Russia in the Baltic Sea is the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO. This expansion has not only extended Russia’s land border with the alliance but also transformed the Baltic Sea into what Russian analysts describe as a “NATO lake.” The Gulf of Finland, a critical maritime route for access to and from Kaliningrad, could be easily blockaded by the Finnish and Estonian navies, leaving the Russian Baltic Fleet in isolation. Such a scenario underscores the strategic vulnerability of Russia’s position in the region.

Russia is also deepening its naval cooperation with China, potentially as a means to bolster its capabilities. Recent joint exercises in the Gulf of Finland included scenarios simulating mine-laying operations by an enemy force. Russian and Chinese vessels practiced detecting and destroying these minefields, along with search-and-rescue operations and combat support. Around the same time, a Russian navy research vessel was accused of violating Finland’s territorial waters, highlighting Moscow’s persistent provocations.

These actions have prompted NATO to enhance its own maritime capabilities to counter Russian aggression, particularly in key regions such as the Baltic, Barents, and North Seas, as well as the Arctic. While the Russian navy continues to demonstrate significant expertise in deep-sea operations, its research fleet is aging rapidly, with many vessels nearing the end of their operational lives. Modernizing this fleet will be critical if Russia intends to sustain its ambitions beneath the waves.

The Mayhem of Russia’s “Research” Fleet - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Nurlan Aliyev · January 7, 2025

Russia wields a formidable capability to target NATO’s undersea infrastructure in critical regions such as the Baltic, Barents, and North Seas, as well as across the world’s oceans: its “research” vessels. These are ostensibly civilian ships used for scientific exploration that double as intelligence-gathering platforms. Equipped with advanced surveillance technology, these ships often operate near critical undersea infrastructure, raising concerns about covert espionage and sabotage capabilities under the guise of academic study.

Though this threat is making headlines in Europe today, it is far from new.

A recent incident in the Irish Sea brought this danger into sharp focus. The Russian research vessel Yantar, infamous for its deep-sea operations, was intercepted by the Irish navy while reportedly deploying drones near vital subsea energy and internet cables. This is just the latest chapter in a series of provocative activities by Russian “research” vessels, fueling mounting concerns over the security of NATO’s undersea lifelines.

These vessels are more than they seem. Armed with cutting-edge surveillance tools, they have the potential to sever undersea cables and cripple energy and communication networks. Yet, even as Russia flexes its maritime muscles, its research fleet faces pressing modernization challenges.

Worse still, Russia’s ambitions extend beyond research ships. Reports suggest that tankers like the Eagle S, part of the so-called “dark fleet,” are being outfitted for espionage. If true, this marks a chilling escalation — transforming ordinary commercial vessels into covert tools of sabotage.

The implications for NATO are stark. As Russia ramps up its deep-sea activities, the alliance should act decisively to safeguard critical infrastructure in the Baltic, Barents, and Arctic regions. This is not just a matter of defending cables and pipelines — it’s about countering a calculated strategy to destabilize NATO countries by exploiting their vulnerabilities beneath the waves.

Russia’s “research” fleet campaign is a wake-up call for NATO militaries and coast guards, demanding enhanced vigilance, stronger capabilities, and a proactive approach to securing the lifelines that connect and power modern society. To inform better strategy, I explore the dual-use nature of Russia’s research fleet, examining its potential as both a scientific tool and a weapon of geopolitical disruption.

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The Basics of Russian Research Vessels

The history of Russian research vessels stretches back to the early 20th century, reaching its height during the Soviet era between the 1940s and 1991. At its peak, the Soviet Union’s research fleet consisted of hundreds of vessels operated by academia, civilian ministries, and the navy, with estimates placing the total number at no fewer than 727 between 1946 and 1991. However, much about these ships remains shrouded in mystery. Records from certain years were never published. The fleet is similarly opaque today.

The classification of “research vessel” in Russia is broad and fluid. Officially, these ships are tasked with conducting scientific measurements and research at sea, but the definition often includes vessels that perform secondary scientific tasks, such as measuring air, water, or seabed parameters. This flexible categorization dates back to the 1950s, when the term “scientific research vessel” (Nauchno-Issledovatel’skoye Sudno) came into use. Over time, older ships or those repurposed from other duties were also labeled as research vessels, creating a category that spans everything from purpose-built expeditionary ships to aging transportation vessels adapted for scientific work.

This broad definition reflects the dual-use nature of many Russian research vessels, which often serve both civilian and military purposes. During the Soviet era, vessels operating in the Atlantic from 1959 onward were nominally part of civilian shipping companies but were, in reality, controlled by the Ministry of Defense. These ships were ostensibly assigned to the Department of Marine Expeditionary Work under the Soviet Academy of Sciences, yet their operations aligned closely with military objectives, including intelligence gathering and surveillance.

Hydrographic vessels have been particularly significant within the Russian research fleet. These ships are vital for gathering data to update navigation charts, identifying hazards, and equipping fairways. They often double as supply vessels and have been linked to suspicious Russian activities in international waters in recent years. Originally introduced in 1915, hydrographic vessels evolved during the Soviet era, with distinctions made between “hydrographic research” and “expeditionary oceanographic” vessels. By 1977, the latter were reclassified as “oceanographic research” ships, reflecting their more complex and often military-oriented missions.

Another important subtype is space communication support vessels, which fulfill a range of roles, from telemetry to equipment transport. These ships, like the famous cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, are nominally associated with civilian institutions such as the Academy of Sciences but are often repurposed for military or intelligence use. While some are strictly logistical, others are equipped for specialized missions, further highlighting the blurred line between civilian and military functions within the Russian research fleet.

Ultimately, the Russian research fleet exemplifies a longstanding strategy of leveraging ostensibly civilian assets for strategic and military purposes. This dual-use approach has allowed Russia to obscure the true nature of its operations, presenting a persistent challenge for NATO and its allies in countering these undersea activities.

Who Runs the Research Fleet?

Russia’s maritime research vessels operate under two key organizations, each with distinct but often overlapping roles. The Hydrographic Service of the Soviet Navy, once known as the Safety of Navigation Directorate, was renamed the Main Directorate of Navigation and Oceanography in 1972 and later became the Navigation and Oceanography Directorate in 2006. This organization is responsible for providing navigational, hydrographic, hydrometeorological, and topographic-geodetic support for Russia’s navy and armed forces in oceanic and maritime zones. A key element of its mission is organizing hydrographic, oceanographic, and marine geophysical work to support national defense and maritime activities. Officially, all navy research vessels are coordinated by this directorate.

However, the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research, a highly secretive unit within the Russian Defense Ministry, also plays a pivotal role. Often regarded as one of the most elite and classified branches of the Russian military, it is reportedly under the direct control of the minister of defense. Its known tasks include deep-sea exploration of the seabed, studying human physiology under extreme underwater conditions, recovering equipment from sunken vessels or aircraft, and conducting rescue operations. This directorate is widely believed to oversee deep-sea sabotage and intelligence missions, adding a shadowy dimension to Russia’s maritime operations.

The vehicles and ships associated with the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research are based in Gadzhiyevo, a strategic location in the Kola Bay of the Barents Sea. These assets include special-purpose nuclear submarines like the BS-64 Podmoskovie and BS-136 Orenburg, deep-sea nuclear stations, and research vessels such as Yantar and Almaz (Project 22010), with the latter still under construction. Additional assets include the Evgeniy Gorigledzha (Project 02670). Meanwhile, other navy research vessels are distributed among Russia’s various fleets, ostensibly under the purview of the Navigation and Oceanography Directorate.

The exact relationship and division of responsibilities between the two directorates remain unclear. While both officially coordinate maritime research, no publicly available information explains why their tasks overlap or how their roles differ. The Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research, in particular, is shrouded in secrecy, with limited insights gleaned from media and unofficial sources suggesting it handles specialized and highly classified missions.

Beyond the navy, other organizations also operate research vessels in Russia. The National Research Fleet Operator, under the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, alongside Roshydromet, Rosnedra, and RosGeo, deploy ships for scientific purposes. While ostensibly civilian, some of these vessels are capable of conducting seabed topographic surveys and could potentially serve military objectives. This dual-use capability underscores the blurred lines between civilian research and military applications in Russia’s approach to maritime operations.

What Do These Vessels Do?

Among the navy’s research vessels, mainly hydrographic vessels can be used for intelligence and sabotage against NATO and E.U. members’ undersea infrastructure, especially in the Baltic, Barents, and North Seas and the Arctic Ocean. They have deep-sea surveillance capabilities and can be used for sabotage operations against undersea cables, subsea energy, and internet infrastructure. They can conduct deep-sea research of the seabed for topographic survey, search for various equipment from sunken ships or aircraft lost at sea, and carry out rescue operations. Such capabilities can also be used for intelligence and sabotage, for instance on adversaries’ undersea cables or pipelines.

Reportedly, in 2020 the Russian navy had hydrographic vessels designed to perform marine, river, and lake surveying and pilot work and (one Project 860 vessel, four Project 861 vessels, one Project 852 vessel, eight Project 862 vessels and two Project 865 vessels); small hydrographic vessels designed for hydrological research in the near sea and base zones, survey and work in areas dangerous to shipping, equipping roadsteads, and surveying the seafloor relief in coastal areas (five Project 870 vessels, five Project 871 vessels, 15 Project 872 vessels, two Project REF-100 vessels, three Project 16611 vessels); and three Project 19910 vessels, two Project 16609 vessels, one Project 90600 vessel, nine Project 19920 boats, two Project 23040G boats, and 20 boats of various Soviet-built projects (a total of 52 vessels and 31 large hydrographic vessels.)

According to a 2023 publication, the Russian navy also has large hydrographic boats of projects 22370G, 1896, G-1415, and others, as well as small hydrographic boats of projects 21961, 21960M, 16831, 1403A, and 727M — more than 120 units in total. Of these, only 15 are capable of operating in the distant sea zone and oceans, with the rest being intended to perform tasks in the near sea zone.

Based on open sources, the main research vessels used by the Russian navy include: large hydrographic boats of Project 23040G (in service since 2018-2021): Georgy Zima, Alexander Evlanov, Vladimir Kozitsky, Boris Slobodnik, Nikolay Ivashintsov, and Leonid Senchura; experimental research vessel Ladoga of project 11982; Leonid Molchanov and Valeriy Rozhdestvensky of Project 23370; Evgeny Gorigledzhan of Project 02670; Academician Aleksandrov (20180); Zvezdochka (20180);Academician Kovalev(20181) and Academician Makeev (20181, not yet in service). There are also smaller vessels, such as boats and catamarans. For instance, the Mikhail Kazansky catamaran is a multifunctional modular hydrographic boat and the lead vessel in a series of three under Project 23370G.

The Yantar and Admiral Vladimirsky are Russian navy ships that often appear in media outlets. Yantar has been in service since March 2015 and serves as the flagship of Project 22010 Kruys. If necessary, it can carry the deep-sea manned bathyscaphes Rus, Consul, and Mir. Reportedly, it carries devices that are designed for deep-sea surveillance, as well as equipment for connecting to top-secret communication cables. Yantar is also widely known as a Russian spy ship, with its activities noted in several parts of the high seas in recent years. The construction of another vessel of that project, Almaz, is expected to be completed in 2024. Another research vessel is Admiral Vladimirsky (Project 852, in service since 1975).

The Challenges

At first glance, Russia appears to have an impressive fleet of research vessels, but most were built in the 1970s and 1980s and they will soon be decommissioned. Since the 2010s, both Russian civilian and navy research vessel fleets have faced the same significant challenge: the need for modernization. Although Russia has been building new vessels since the 2010s, sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine, the cut-off of cooperation with foreign shipbuilding companies, and the heavy workload on local shipbuilders have hindered progress in updating the fleet. Even before 2022, only small and large hydrographic vessels had been renewed, and in quantities far smaller than the number being decommissioned. In 2017, the Ministry of Defense’s report on the state of Russia’s national security in maritime activities stressed the dire condition of research vessels operated by the Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations, Roshydromet, and Rosnedra. The report described these fleets as being in a “catastrophic and critical state.” It noted that the average depreciation of the fleet exceeded 80 percent, the average vessel age was 34 years, and the technical condition of most vessels was assessed as unsatisfactory. The report warned that the remaining research vessels “may completely cease operations in the coming years,” potentially halting all expeditions monitoring Russia’s internal sea waters and territorial sea.

At the same time, there is no publicly available replacement plan for the vessels of projects 852, 862, and 865, capable of long voyages and operating in almost any point of the world ocean. Moreover, Russian experts stress that given the length of the Russian coastline and the diverse climatic and hydrological conditions of its coastal waters, the vessels currently being put into operation are insufficient to reliably provide hydrographic support to the navy even in Russian territorial waters. However, hydrographic support in distant sea zones can be provided by oceanographic vessels built for the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research.

Before the start of the invasion of Ukraine, the Nizhegorodsky Teplokhod Plant launched the construction of a series of large hydrographic boats of Project 23040G. The first two boats of this project were planned to join the hydrographic service of the Baltic Fleet of Russia. Also, the construction of small hydrographic boats of Project 21961 was launched for surveying the seabed in shallow waters.

Reportedly, it is planned to build four research vessels with unlimited seaworthiness, a displacement of about 5,000 tons, great autonomy, and long cruising range. Designs of the planned hydrographic vessels and boats stressed a high level of automation, equipping them with modern technical means for performing oceanographic, hydrographic, and hydrometeorological work, lifting equipment for working with floating warning signs, and outboard devices. It is also planned to reducing the total number of vessels and boats, as well as the nomenclature of different projects and creating universal vessels capable of partially replacing each other.

Conclusion

Since the Soviet era, Russia has maintained a research vessel fleet that serves civilian, research, and military purposes. While the Soviet Union once boasted one of the largest research fleets in the world, its collapse left Russia struggling to maintain and modernize its aging fleet. Today, this fleet, though diminished, remains a key element of Russian naval strategy, particularly in the realm of deep-sea intelligence and sabotage.

The Russian navy retains significant expertise and specialized capabilities for underwater operations, supported by a dedicated directorate for deep-sea sabotage and intelligence. Facing economic pressures from its invasion of Ukraine and its overall strategic inferiority in competition with NATO, Moscow is likely to prioritize strengthening these capabilities. Russia’s growing focus on deep-sea operations could also extend to targeting Europe’s renewable energy infrastructure, such as offshore wind farms and seabed projects, further escalating tensions in the region. Most recently, a Russia-linked dark fleet tanker, seized by Finland for damaging several undersea cables, reportedly had also intelligence devices.

One of the most immediate security challenges for Russia in the Baltic Sea is the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO. This expansion has not only extended Russia’s land border with the alliance but also transformed the Baltic Sea into what Russian analysts describe as a “NATO lake.” The Gulf of Finland, a critical maritime route for access to and from Kaliningrad, could be easily blockaded by the Finnish and Estonian navies, leaving the Russian Baltic Fleet in isolation. Such a scenario underscores the strategic vulnerability of Russia’s position in the region.

Russia is also deepening its naval cooperation with China, potentially as a means to bolster its capabilities. Recent joint exercises in the Gulf of Finland included scenarios simulating mine-laying operations by an enemy force. Russian and Chinese vessels practiced detecting and destroying these minefields, along with search-and-rescue operations and combat support. Around the same time, a Russian navy research vessel was accused of violating Finland’s territorial waters, highlighting Moscow’s persistent provocations.

These actions have prompted NATO to enhance its own maritime capabilities to counter Russian aggression, particularly in key regions such as the Baltic, Barents, and North Seas, as well as the Arctic. While the Russian navy continues to demonstrate significant expertise in deep-sea operations, its research fleet is aging rapidly, with many vessels nearing the end of their operational lives. Modernizing this fleet will be critical if Russia intends to sustain its ambitions beneath the waves.

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Nurlan Aliyev holds a Ph.D. in philosophy and security studies. His research area is primarily focused on Russia’s foreign and security policy, strategic studies, the Arctic, and the geopolitics and geoeconomics of Eurasia. He is the author of Reassessing Russia’s Security Policy. Follow him on X @anurlan.

Image: Andrey Luzik (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation) via Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Nurlan Aliyev · January 7, 2025

20. Leverage Afghan Special Forces to Strengthen US Defense

Excerpt:

At a time when military recruitment and retention face growing challenges, ANASOC veterans offer a rare solution: human capital already tested in the crucible of war. Their expertise is not just a resource for addressing global threats, but also a means of addressing the broader talent crisis within US forces. By embracing their potential, the US can rebuild critical capacities, reinvigorate its ranks, and show the world that it values the dedication of those who stand with her in battle. Integrating these veterans into American defense is an operational necessity and a testament to the enduring promise of partnership and shared sacrifice.

Leverage Afghan Special Forces to Strengthen US Defense - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Connor T. Christensen · January 7, 2025

When a new American president takes office on January 20th, they will confront a dangerous national security environment shaped by Irregular Warfare (IW) challenges. From cyber warfare and gray zone conflicts to terrorism and insurgency, these challenges demand immediate, actionable solutions. In September, the Irregular Warfare Initiative invited readers to contribute fresh, pragmatic, and non-partisan policy recommendations to help shape the next administration’s approach to these threats. In our first article, Connor T. Christensen calls for the U.S. military to incorporate ANASOC veterans into its special operations ranks.

The United States faces growing challenges in military recruitment and talent retention across both traditional and Special Operations Forces (SOF). In 2022, the Army missed its recruitment quota by 15,000 soldiers, and in 2023 the shortfall was 10,000 soldiers.

2024 was the year the Army bandaged the problem by slashing the quota by 10,000, but a proactive partial remedy is all but begging policymakers to take action in the coming years of the new presidential administration.

The 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan, now long-faded from media headlines, offers more than a series of past and present obstacles—it presents an opportunity to expand the military ranks and increase US defense capabilities. While much attention has been given to the equipment abandoned in the chaos of the Taliban’s takeover, a critical resource was successfully brought to American soil: human capital.

Among the 122,000 Afghans airlifted during the Kabul evacuation were at least 250 highly skilled Afghan special forces soldiers, trained to the highest standards by the United States. Belonging to the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC), these elite soldiers trained extensively at Camp Commando in counterinsurgency, reconnaissance, advanced medical care, land navigation, and close air attack coordination.

They frequently operated alongside US Army Green Berets and Navy SEALs in some of Afghanistan’s most dangerous provinces. Their direct combat experience and specialized skills—developed under the guidance of US SOF—made them invaluable assets during the war.

The US faces mounting irregular warfare challenges from China, Russia, and Iran as a critical military resource remains untapped: hundreds of elite Afghan special operations veterans whose battle-tested regional and martial expertise could fill critical gaps in military readiness and strengthen America’s strategic posture.

All that stands in these operators’ way of entering the ranks of the nation that trained them is a small investment in an expedited processing of residency status and the creation of a structured integration program. Extending veterans’ benefits to them would also send a powerful message to future foreign allies, reaffirming America’s commitment to its partners even after the conflict ends.

The Untapped Resource of Afghan Veterans

Many of these veterans resettled in the US, but others were not so fortunate. By 2022, Russia had already recognized the potential of these troops and began recruiting them for operations in Ukraine. While some allies, such as the UK, hinted at integrating Afghan special forces into their own ranks, they have yet to follow through. In stark contrast to Russia, the US has allowed the American-trained Afghans to languish in kitchens, taxi cabs, and warehouses inside its own borders.

There is a moral argument to be made about what the American people owe these Afghan veterans. Beyond this, however, lies a critical untapped resource at the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) fingertips—one that could enhance mission capability in pursuit of US strategic interests. So many of these men and women are eager to trade their box cutters for rifles once again. They possess skills and knowledge that remain critically underutilized in the face of growing global challenges. Their integration into US forces could dramatically reduce the training time and costs typically required for irregular warfare units, and their linguistic compatibility and cultural familiarity are precisely the assets needed to address critical capability gaps.

Military Readiness and Regional Threats

Even if ANASOC veterans do not initially qualify for SOF roles, their extensive combat experience could benefit conventional Army and Marine Corps combat and combat-support units. Their specialized expertise in asymmetric warfare tactics can bridge gaps in cultural understanding and improve operational readiness. By bolstering irregular warfare missions and providing a solution to the military’s recruitment challenges, their inclusion addresses urgent needs within the ranks of America’s armed forces. The US must act decisively to integrate ANASOC veterans and leverage their skills to strengthen national security and prevent adversaries from exploiting their potential. Their extensive combat experience and cultural fluency in Dari, Pashto, and Central and South Asian dynamics make them indispensable assets in the context of great power competition. ANASOC veterans, trained and tested alongside US SOF, bring advanced skills that can directly address threats posed by Iran, China, Russia, and the Taliban.

Iran, China, Russia, and Pakistan

Iran’s use of proxy militias and influence operations across Afghanistan and the broader Middle East undermines regional stability from a different angle. The Quds Force, in particular, has long leveraged Afghanistan’s borders to smuggle arms and support insurgent networks. ANASOC veterans have firsthand experience in countering Iran-backed elements, making them valuable assets for US intelligence and operational efforts. They could play a critical role in mapping and disrupting smuggling networks that span Afghanistan’s porous borders. Their operational history in intercepting arms shipments and dismantling militia supply chains would enhance US interdiction efforts beyond current capabilities.

Moreover, their insights into Iran’s tactics—such as the use of cultural and religious ties to build proxy networks—could inform US strategies to counter Tehran’s influence. By embedding these veterans within advisory teams or intelligence units, the US could strengthen local resistance to Iranian meddling, empowering communities to reject Tehran’s overtures. Additionally, their psychological operations experience could be leveraged to undermine Iranian propaganda, promoting narratives that highlight the risks of aligning with Tehran while emphasizing the benefits of US partnerships.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has solidified Beijing’s economic and strategic foothold across Asia and the Middle East, using infrastructure projects to expand its influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Xi’s strategy hinges on establishing economic dependencies and leveraging infrastructure investments for geopolitical influence. For instance, infrastructure projects such as roads, railways, and energy pipelines now link Central Asia to Chinese markets, increasing Beijing’s economic leverage over these regions. ANASOC veterans, with their operational experience in these areas, can provide critical insights into how these projects affect local power dynamics, including tribal rivalries and governance structures. Their ability to engage with regional actors familiar with Chinese economic entanglements could help identify vulnerabilities in Beijing’s strategy, enabling targeted US efforts to offer counter-incentives and foster alliances that resist Chinese influence.

Given Russia’s reliance on hybrid warfare and proxy strategies in the Middle East and Central Asia, addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive approach—one where ANASOC veterans are uniquely positioned to identify and counter these proxy networks. In regions like Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, where Moscow seeks to extend its influence, these veterans can amplify the effectiveness of US efforts by cultivating local alliances and countering Russian attempts to co-opt tribal leaders or insurgent factions. Acting as a force multiplier, they enhance the operational effectiveness of US forces by leveraging their deep regional expertise, enabling smaller teams to achieve disproportionate outcomes in complex and contested environments.

Their technical expertise, especially in air-ground coordination, is invaluable in contested areas where Russian advanced air-defense systems and electronic warfare capabilities are deployed. By integrating into US advisory teams, ANASOC veterans can provide actionable intelligence on these systems’ operational patterns, enabling more effective countermeasures. Additionally, their ability to gather human intelligence through established rapport with local populations enhances US situational awareness in regions where traditional intelligence collection methods face limitations.

When it comes to the future of the US’ relationship with the Taliban, Pakistan’s relationship with the now-ruling party of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s historical support for extremist groups present a persistent threat to regional stability and US security interests. For years, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency has been accused of providing covert support to the Taliban, facilitating safe havens, and enabling cross-border operations that have undermined Afghan sovereignty and contributed to ongoing violence in the region. Reports indicate that Pakistan allowed groups targeting Afghanistan, including the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network, to operate from its territory. The ISI has also supplied the Taliban with funding, training, and weapons since their emergence in the 1990s, as part of a broader strategy to maintain influence over Afghanistan while countering Indian interests in the region.

These safe havens have consistently allowed the Taliban and Haqqani Network to regroup, plan, and launch attacks on Afghan and coalition forces, further destabilizing the region. This nexus of state and non-state actors continues to serve as a platform for terrorist activity, including threats to US allies and interests. The symbiotic relationship between the Taliban and ISI has also fueled violence within Pakistan itself, as militant groups frequently cross borders to carry out attacks. For instance, the Pakistani Taliban, a close ally of the Afghan Taliban, remains active in the region and has intensified operations within Pakistan, leading to significant casualties among security personnel.

ANASOC veterans are uniquely positioned to monitor and counter such activities. Their deep understanding of Taliban operational methods, combined with their linguistic fluency and cultural familiarity, enables them to identify patterns of movement and resource flows across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. By integrating ANASOC veterans into US intelligence and advisory teams, the US could enhance its ability to detect and disrupt these networks. They can contribute to mapping out financial and logistical support mechanisms that sustain terrorist operations and provide actionable intelligence to mitigate these threats.

Moreover, ANASOC veterans’ experience in counterinsurgency operations equips them to advise on strategies for neutralizing Taliban influence in rural and urban areas. Their ability to build relationships with local communities could be leveraged to counter extremist recruitment efforts and disrupt the propaganda that often accompanies Taliban operations. Embedded within US and allied operations, these veterans can help foster greater regional cooperation to address Pakistan’s role in sustaining terrorism and push for accountability in its dealings with extremist groups.

Blueprint for Integrating ANASOC Veterans

To fully capitalize on the expertise of ANASOC veterans, the new administration must implement targeted policies that not only integrate these individuals into US military frameworks but also reaffirm America’s commitment to its allies. Policies such as expedited green card pathways and structured enlistment programs would allow these veterans to contribute effectively while ensuring rigorous vetting standards are upheld.

Maximizing the contributions of ANASOC veterans requires coordinated efforts from stakeholders across the US SOF community and beyond. Partnering with advocacy organizations such as Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America (IAVA), No One Left Behind (NOLB), and Honor the Promise could help build bipartisan support for the ANASOC initiatives. These groups, with their established success in championing veterans’ issues, are uniquely positioned to communicate the strategic and moral imperative of integrating ANASOC veterans. While the specific details of legislation should reflect input from the broader veteran and defense communities, a strong foundation for policy reforms could include the following:

Expedite Immigration Pathways: The first step in this effort requires action from both the executive and legislative branches. The President could issue an executive order directing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to prioritize Afghan SOF veterans within existing immigration frameworks, ensuring an expedited process for those with verified combat service.

At the same time, Congress should pass legislation formalizing this pathway, drawing inspiration from the Military Accessions Vital to National Interest (MAVNI) program (a program authorized by the US Department of Defense that allowed certain non-citizens with critical skills—such as medical expertise or foreign language proficiency—to enlist in the U.S. military in exchange for an expedited pathway to US citizenship) to establish clear eligibility criteria and funding for processing. Rigorous vetting measures, led by USCIS and supported by the DoD, would ensure security while prioritizing veterans with critical skills, reinforcing the immediate value they bring to national defense. Coordinated action from these entities is essential to ensure timely and effective implementation.

Create a Structured Integration Program: The DoD, in collaboration with the US Army and Marine Corps, should lead the development and implementation of a specialized ANASOC Veterans Pathway Program to integrate Afghan veterans into US military frameworks. This initiative would mirror the intensive training models used by US Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) (specialized US Army units trained to conduct security cooperation activities, such as advising and assisting partner nations in building and maintaining effective defense capabilities) and focus on providing targeted education in US military protocols, tactical communication systems, and irregular-warfare-specific skills.

To initiate this program, the DoD would need to allocate resources and establish training facilities within existing military education centers, such as the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Additionally, service branches must coordinate recruitment and selection processes, ensuring that ANASOC veterans with verified combat experience are prioritized. Congress could play a supporting role by authorizing funding for this program and mandating its inclusion within broader military readiness initiatives. By spearheading this effort, the DoD would ensure these veterans are mission-ready and positioned to contribute effectively to current and future operations.

Enhance Intelligence Collaboration: Deploying ANASOC veterans in intelligence and advisory roles would allow the US to capitalize on their regional expertise. By coordinating efforts with agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and regional commands, these veterans could provide actionable insights into adversary operations, regional power dynamics, and cultural nuances that are otherwise difficult to access.

Expand Veterans Benefits: Revising eligibility criteria for Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) benefits to include ANASOC veterans would require action from Congress to amend existing legislation. This revision would establish a precedent similar to benefits extended to certain Vietnamese allies after the Vietnam War, such as the Amerasian Homecoming Act. Congress would need to pass legislation explicitly authorizing Afghan SOF veterans to access VA benefits, including housing assistance, mental health services, and employment support. The VA, in coordination with the DoD, would implement these changes by verifying service records and combat roles of ANASOC veterans to ensure eligibility. The President could also direct the VA and DoD to develop an interim support framework, while Congress finalizes legislative actions. These resources are essential for ensuring the long-term readiness and stability of ANASOC veterans, enabling them to reintegrate effectively and contribute to US defense objectives through advisory roles, intelligence collaboration, or other critical capacities.

Conclusion

Integrating ANASOC veterans into US military and strategic roles is a strategic opportunity to strengthen the DoD’s irregular warfare capabilities in critical regions such as Central and South Asia, and the Middle East. Their unmatched combat experience, cultural fluency, and specialized training make ANASOC veterans vital assets for addressing challenges posed by Iran, China, Russia, and Pakistan. By adopting thoughtful policies to support their integration—expedited immigration pathways, a structured integration program, and expanded veteran benefits—the new administration can fortify American irregular warfare capacity, honor alliances forged in conflict, and strengthen America’s global leadership. This initiative is not just a strategic imperative but a reaffirmation of America’s commitment to those who stood beside it in its most challenging missions.

At a time when military recruitment and retention face growing challenges, ANASOC veterans offer a rare solution: human capital already tested in the crucible of war. Their expertise is not just a resource for addressing global threats, but also a means of addressing the broader talent crisis within US forces. By embracing their potential, the US can rebuild critical capacities, reinvigorate its ranks, and show the world that it values the dedication of those who stand with her in battle. Integrating these veterans into American defense is an operational necessity and a testament to the enduring promise of partnership and shared sacrifice.

Connor T. Christensen is a research consultant with the Corioli Institute, specializing in global security and policy analysis. A former US Navy servicemember with over a decade of professional experience, he has worked extensively on research initiatives spanning Colombia, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Ecuador, and Turkey, where he was a Fulbright Scholar. Connor holds a Master of Public Policy and a Master of Arts in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Chicago, combining expertise in international conflict resolution and regional studies.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

Main Image: 10th Special Operation Kandak Commandos conduct small arms barrier firing drills during a series of weapons proficiency ranges at Camp Pamir, Kunduz province, Afghanistan, Jan. 13, 2018. (US Air Force photo by Senior Airman Sean Carnes via DVIDS)

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21. A Clearer Mirror: The Promise of Combat Training Center Data

Charts/data at the link: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/a-clearer-mirror-the-promise-of-combat-training-center-data/

Excerpts:

The above [below] risks are important to mitigate but are not so great they outweigh the great unrealized benefit of systematically capturing structured rotational data. The decisive action rotations at our combat training centers are too valuable and too expensive to neglect. As Gorman knew nearly fifty years ago, the data represents not the only input but an incredibly important one for any interwar Army attempting to see itself and discern a path forward.

There is good news. The combat training centers’ operations groups have begun collecting more quantified data on their own initiative. The Combined Arms Center’s Data and Artificial Intelligence Office is considering adding data as a pillar of the combat training center management philosophy. The Army Research Lab, part of US Army Combat Capabilities and Development Command, is gathering instrumented and take-home packets in its SUNet enclave for researchers with government sponsorship.

The next step is for the Army to codify this progress by amending its Army Regulation 350-50 to mandate the collection of certain credible anonymized performance measures across all combat training centers. Stipulating in that regulation that the Combined Arms Center control and consolidate this longitudinal data so that it lives close to doctrinal innovation would be the next step. These are easy wins that ensure the Army makes best use of what is, in addition to a magnificent training opportunity, its costliest and clearest mirror.

A Clearer Mirror: The Promise of Combat Training Center Data - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Jon Bate, Theo Lipsky · January 7, 2025

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How can the Army know itself? In November 1976 this question was on the mind of Major General Paul Gorman, the deputy chief of staff for training at US Army Training and Doctrine Command. That month he told a gathered audience at Fort Monmouth that the Army struggled to know itself because it did “not have a lot of data being turned in by ordinary units trying to do their job in a well simulated operational environment.” So Gorman proposed a radical solution that he and his influential boss, General William DePuy, had been developing: the construction of a giant combat simulation in the wilderness to train soldiers and collect that data. With such data, the Army could learn the ground truth about the state of its operational force, as if gazing in a costly but unprecedentedly clear mirror. In doing so, it could learn what worked best in simulated war, and so ready itself for the next real one.

Though the Army has built the combat training centers that Gorman proposed and so gained its clear mirrors, it does not currently look at them. That is because the Army does not systematically collect data from those training centers owing to ambiguities in regulation. To meet the current interwar moment, to transform in contact now, the Army must capture rotational training unit performance in a structured, quantified, and regular way. The task is urgent because regular training center rotations reveal the true state of operational force as no report or inspection can. In doing so these rotations point the way to needed reform, but only if studied in the aggregate. Qualitative observations of the sort one finds in reports from the Center for Army Lessons Learned alone are insufficient. Longitudinal, structured data is also needed.

What Gets Collected at The Training Centers?

The Army’s combat training center rotations are something of a professional and logistical miracle. Rotation costs can run in the tens of millions of dollars. The resultant training is magnificent. Historically, however, the quality of data collection at combat training centers has lagged behind the quality of the training itself. A 1986 Government Accountability Office report found data collection at the National Training Center unsatisfactory. Thirteen years later, another report found the situation had not much improved, observing that for lack of centralized data the Army “does not know the extent to which center exercises are improving the proficiency of its units and leaders.”

Today the problem abides. Army Regulation 350-50, Combat Training Center Program, which governs combat training center operations, remains ambiguous as to what rotational training unit data must be collected. Beyond the terabytes of raw instrumented data produced by the Combat Training Center–Instrumentation System, most rotation data lives in unstructured take-home packets, consisting of after-action review slide decks intended for trained units. For lack of a regulatory standard, collection practices and take-home packets vary with different observer coach-trainer (OC/T) authors, creating gaps that make longitudinal analysis difficult. In this sense the Army leaves money on the table at the Training Centers each month.

With support from the National Training Center Operations Group and Headquarters, Department of the Army, we reviewed over five hundred rotational documents to manually build an exploratory dataset. The dataset treats as the unit of analysis the battalion-level force-on-force battle (a single phase of force-on-force training at the National Training Center), and it comprises over fifty of these battles. It includes a wealth of unit characteristic data captured by OC/Ts in “roll-out cards” as well as unit performance during the battle, ranging from OC/T-observed daily vehicle operational readiness rates to kill-loss ratios to subjective OC/T assessments such as “Decisive Action Big 12” scores. The National Training Center cavalry squadron OC/T team, “Cobra,” on its own initiative collected the same quantitative data about unit performance for long enough to build a large enough dataset for multivariate regressions. For this reason the battles discussed below are cavalry battles.

Use Case One: Testing Readiness Reports

Combat training center data can help the Army check whether unit readiness reports mean in fact what they mean in theory. For example, do armored units that report a larger percentage of working tanks in their monthly reports than other units see fewer maintenance issues in battles at the National Training Center? Do units that report the highest percentage of deployable personnel in their monthly reports reliably deploy a larger portion of their formations to the Joint Readiness Training Center than other units? Do commanders that assess their units at higher levels of training proficiency in their mission-essential tasks achieve the best battlefield results?

There are many plausible reasons why reported readiness might differ from readiness as measured at a combat training center. The two measurements may not be intended to capture the same phenomenon. But even if there are good reasons why a unit’s readiness as told in its Unit Status Report and as observed in the Mojave Desert systematically differ, the Army should at the very least know about the difference. We paired our National Training Center rotational performance dataset with the same battalions’ unclassified monthly readiness report inputs from the six months preceding each battle. These inputs were each battalion’s reported personnel deployability rate, its lowest monthly pacing equipment operational readiness rate, its overall equipment operational readiness rate, and its assessed mission-essential task proficiency.

We examined whether these readiness report components were correlated with their theoretical counterparts during combat training center rotations: the percentage of the unit’s assigned personnel deployed to the National Training Center, the average pacing equipment operational readiness rate over the course of a battle, and unit performance as measured by the OC/T provided “Decision Action Big 12” scores. We also looked at, among other potential independent variables, unit leader experience as captured on National Training Center “roll-out cards.” We examined the data first using simple pairwise correlations and then with “rapid data modeling,” primarily ordinary least squares (OLS) multivariate regressions.

We found that simple pairwise correlations suggest, at best, uneven correlation between unit readiness reports and unit performance. A unit’s equipment readiness as reported in monthly reports preceding a rotation weakly and positively correlated with that unit’s overall equipment operational readiness rates during force-on-force battles but did not for pacing equipment performance during battles. A unit’s reported training proficiency before a rotation and its “Decisive Action Big 12” scores were nearly perfectly noncorrelated (a coefficient of -.009). Personnel deployability was moderately negatively correlated (a coefficient of -.488), meaning the more a unit reported its personnel ready before a rotation, the lower its personnel deployment rate was for the rotation. This sort of initial finding—that personnel readiness reporting represents the inverse of what it is supposed to represent—is exactly the sort of insight that only structured data can credibly test. Though our dataset is too small to state it conclusively, the finding invites further study.

The linear regression results (both bivariate and multivariate) found limited statistically significant correlations between readiness report components and their counterpart measures at combat training centers. They suggest at least two key insights that warrant further investigation: leader experience and equipment health appear to matter more for battlefield performance than any other unit characteristic. Command sergeant major experience, squadron commander experience and overall equipment operational readiness rates depicted on Unit Status Reports are positively correlated with better performance at the National Training Center.

Figure 1: The relationship between battalion leadership self-reported combat experience and force-on-force performance.

Figure 2: The relationship between prerotation reported fleet health and force-on-force performance.

These findings, if replicable with more data, suggest important relationships (and lack thereof) between how ready a unit says it is and what the Army can expect of that unit. It may be that the best readiness report is not a Unit Status Report but the experience of its leadership. As noted above, the findings reported here are tentative and their validity is limited by the small sample size of fifty-six nonindependent battles. There are also certainly confounding factors not captured for lack of available data—most importantly the intensity of the opposing force, which chiefs of operations groups at combat training centers often alter in response to a unit’s proficiency. The findings nonetheless suggest possible relationships that more systematically collected data could credibly test.

Use Case Two: Forecasting Peak Lethality

What if combat training center data could help the Army forecast which units are approaching peak readiness, to inform either wargames or actual deployments? To explore this possibility we move from diagnostic analytics (“why did something happen”) to predictive analytics (“what will happen”) and apply machine learning techniques. We test two common types of machine learning models, random forest and gradient booster, which account for nonlinear relationships. The machine fits the model without human involvement—a rudimentary form of artificial intelligence.

To our surprise, both types of models were strongly predictive when applied to the data, with the random forest model performing slightly better. It significantly increased the explanatory power of the previous linear regression model. The plot below illustrates the model’s predictions compared to the actual test data.

Figure 3: The performance of machine learning models fed combat training center data.

The dotted line is the “perfect prediction” line, with the model’s predictions as black diamonds. The model accounts for approximately 50 percent of the variation, which is notable given how few measurements exist about unit factors. Due to the small size of the dataset, its generalizability is limited, but the accuracy of the model is surprising with such a small dataset.

These results demonstrate the potential of machine learning techniques to forecast combat readiness. They suggest a method by which a wargame designer can validate assumptions about readiness levels, a joint planner can determine which available units are best suited for a real-world mission, or an OC/T can anticipate issues an upcoming training audience may encounter.

Use Case Three: Reducing Training Accidents

Why do some units suffer training accidents more than others? A common answer is culture. Systematic measures of unit culture, climate, and cohesion are difficult to come by, but can be captured through soldier surveys. 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division has begun conducting a bimonthly, anonymous, cell phone survey measuring seven indicators of effective unit culture and climate. Broadly, this is a measure of unit cohesion. The “Ivy Raider Culture Survey” collected over 1,700 soldier responses across thirty-one companies and batteries from September to October 2024. It recorded responses across seven numerical culture measurables and unit morale (1–10 Likert scale). Do these reports mean anything?

Data from Fort Johnson’s Joint Readiness Training Center help us discern whether such surveys capture anything meaningful. At Fort Johnson the operations group measures combat discipline through what it categorizes as mishaps. These include negative incidents such as vehicle accidents, negligent discharges, missing equipment, and violations of exercise rules of engagement. How can we explain variations across companies and batteries?

Using linear regression analysis, we discovered a correlation between stronger unit culture at the company and battery level and fewer negative incidents during the brigade’s recent Joint Readiness Training Center rotation. Statistically significant relationships exist between various measures of company and battery culture prior to the rotation and negative incidents during the rotation (across twenty-one companies and batteries with complete data). The soldier “Development” score is the strongest correlation, followed by the “Efficient Time Use” score. A “Culture Index,” which adds up all culture measurable scores, is also negatively correlated with mishaps. We controlled for unit type, such as combat, support, and headquarters.

Figure 4: Relationship between units’ Joint Readiness Training Center incident count (violations of exercise rules of engagement) and Ivy Raider Culture Survey scores.

Interpreting the regressions suggests that each additional percentage point of soldier “Development” is associated with 3 percent fewer negative incidents. Similarly, as the “Efficient Time Use” and “Culture Index” scores increase by 1 percent, mishaps during rotations drop by almost 2 percent. These results suggest that stronger unit culture is correlated with fewer incidents of indiscipline in a simulated combat environment. The key insight is that investing in unit culture may be a focused method of improving soldier discipline, helping address the Army’s discipline gap.

Key Considerations and Next Steps

Narcissus reminds us that mirror gazing is not without risks. Nor is performance measurement. Measurement may cost scarce OC/T bandwidth and so reduce training value. It may fix the Army’s attention on junk measures and so lead the Army to wrong conclusions. And it may warp unit behavior by nudging commanders to seek good scores rather than good training. However, these risks are either smaller than imagined or can be mitigated to an acceptable level.

Concerns about OC/T bandwidth overstate the cost of systematic data collection at training centers because OC/Ts already collect almost all the data worth collecting. Anyone who has received a take-home packet from an OC/T after a rotation or worked in an operations group knows that operations groups are constantly collecting data. The question is not whether to collect data but whether to save what is collected in a systematic way by ensuring at least some measures are collected by every team across every rotation in a structured dataset rather than diffuse, inaccessible slide decks. Doing so represents a much smaller lift.

But even if the cost is low, is the data high quality? A skeptic might say lethality at a combat training center means little because instrumented gunnery is different from live gunnery. But instrumentation issues in lethality data is what data scientists call noise. The fact is a lot of useful data has noise. Noise is okay if random, and much noise is. To avoid junk measures, the Army must choose them carefully, but noise alone is not reason to avoid collection.

Even if OC/Ts have the bandwidth and the performance measures selected are good ones, does collection not, as Goodhart’s Law suggests, corrupt the measure by warping unit behavior? To preempt Goodhart’s Law, the Army must decouple measurement from incentive—communicating clearly to rotational units that what is collected does not bear on their evaluations. One way to make this guarantee credible is to immediately anonymize collected data. Another way is to measure performance evenly across different warfighting functions, so that the countervailing pressures cancel each other out. A third is to pick measures that are as close to the underlying phenomenon the Army aims to capture as possible—such as OC/T-observed vehicle operational readiness rates. If units responded to the collection of on-the-ground operational readiness rates rather than digitally reported ones by keeping their trucks running, that would be a good thing.

The above risks are important to mitigate but are not so great they outweigh the great unrealized benefit of systematically capturing structured rotational data. The decisive action rotations at our combat training centers are too valuable and too expensive to neglect. As Gorman knew nearly fifty years ago, the data represents not the only input but an incredibly important one for any interwar Army attempting to see itself and discern a path forward.

There is good news. The combat training centers’ operations groups have begun collecting more quantified data on their own initiative. The Combined Arms Center’s Data and Artificial Intelligence Office is considering adding data as a pillar of the combat training center management philosophy. The Army Research Lab, part of US Army Combat Capabilities and Development Command, is gathering instrumented and take-home packets in its SUNet enclave for researchers with government sponsorship.

The next step is for the Army to codify this progress by amending its Army Regulation 350-50 to mandate the collection of certain credible anonymized performance measures across all combat training centers. Stipulating in that regulation that the Combined Arms Center control and consolidate this longitudinal data so that it lives close to doctrinal innovation would be the next step. These are easy wins that ensure the Army makes best use of what is, in addition to a magnificent training opportunity, its costliest and clearest mirror.

Lieutenant Colonel Jon Bate is a US Army infantry officer currently serving as commander of 2-23 IN, 1/4 SBCT at Fort Carson, Colorado. He previously served in the 101st Airborne Division, in the 1st Armored Division, and as assistant professor of economics in the US Military Academy Department of Social Sciences. A Goodpaster Scholar in the Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program (ASP3), he holds an MPP from the Harvard Kennedy School and PhD in Political Science from Stanford University.

Captain Theo Lipsky is an armor officer currently studying public policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. He will next teach in the Department of Social Sciences at the US Military Academy.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. Ryan Gosselin, National Training Center

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Jon Bate, Theo Lipsky · January 7, 2025

22. The Internet Is Worse Than a Brainwashing Machine

Excerpts:

Spend time on social media and it’s easy to see the demand for this type of content. The early hours of a catastrophic news event were once for sense-making: What happened, exactly? Who was behind it? What was the scale? Now every event is immediately grist for the machine. After a mass shooting, partisans scramble for evidence to suggest that the killer is MAGA, or a radical leftist, or a disaffected trans youth. Last week, in the hours after a mass murderer ran a car into civilians on Bourbon Street in New Orleans, Trump began tossing out lies and speculation about the suspect, suggesting that he was a migrant (information later arrived indicating that the driver was a U.S. citizen and Army veteran). The tragedy and the chaos of its immediate aftermath became an opportunity to attack Democrats about the border.

This reflex contributes to a cultural and political rot. A culture where every event—every human success or tragedy—becomes little more than evidence to score political points is a nihilistic one. It is a culture where you never have to change your mind or even confront uncomfortable information. News cycles are shorter, and the biggest stories in the world—such as the near assassination of Trump last summer in Pennsylvania—burn bright in the public consciousness and then disappear. The justification machine thrives on the breakneck pace of our information environment; the machine is powered by the constant arrival of more news, more evidence. There’s no need to reorganize, reassess. The result is a stuckness, a feeling of being trapped in an eternal present tense.

...

The hum of the justification machine is comforting. It makes the world seem less unpredictable, more knowable. Underneath the noise, you can make out the words “You’ve been right all along.”

The Internet Is Worse Than a Brainwashing Machine

A rationale is always just a scroll or a click away.

By Charlie Warzel and Mike Caulfield

The Atlantic · by Charlie Warzel, Mike Caulfield · January 6, 2025

Try to remember for a moment how you felt on January 6, 2021. Recall the makeshift gallows erected on the Capitol grounds, the tear gas, and the sound of the riot shields colliding with hurled flagpoles. If you rewatch the video footage, you might remember the man in the Camp Auschwitz sweatshirt idling among the intruders, or the image of the Confederate flag flying in the Capitol Rotunda. The events of that day are so documented, so memed, so firmly enmeshed in our recent political history that accessing the shock and rage so many felt while the footage streamed in can be difficult. But all of it happened: men and women smashing windows, charging Capitol police, climbing the marbled edifice of one of America’s most recognizable national monuments in an attempt to overturn the results of the 2020 election.

It is also hard to remember that—for at least a moment—it seemed that reason might prevail, that those in power would reach a consensus against Donald Trump, whose baseless claims of voter fraud incited the attack. Senator Lindsey Graham, a longtime Trump ally, was unequivocal as he voted to certify President Joe Biden’s victory that night: “All I can say is count me out. Enough is enough.” The New York Post, usually a pro-Trump paper, described the mob as “rightists who went berserk in Washington.” Tech platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, which had generally allowed Trump to post whatever he wanted throughout his presidency, temporarily suspended his accounts from their service. “We believe the risks of allowing the President to continue to use our service during this period are simply too great,” Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg wrote then.

Yet the alignment would not last. On January 7, The Atlantic’s David A. Graham offered a warning that proved prescient: “Remember what yesterday’s attempted coup at the U.S. Capitol was like,” he wrote. “Very soon, someone might try to convince you that it was different.” Because even before the rioters were out of the building, a fringe movement was building a world of purported evidence online—a network of lies and dense theories to justify the attack and rewrite what really happened that day. By spring, the narrative among lawmakers began to change. The violent insurrection became, in the words of Republican Representative Andrew Clyde of Georgia, a “normal tourist visit.”

David A. Graham: Don’t let them pretend this didn’t happen

The revision of January 6 among many Republicans is alarming. It is also a powerful example of how the internet has warped our political reality. In recent years, this phenomenon has been attributed to the crisis of “misinformation.” But that term doesn’t begin to describe what’s really happening.

Think back to the original “fake news” panic, surrounding the 2016 election and its aftermath, when a mixture of partisans and enterprising Macedonian teenagers served up classics such as “FBI Agent, Who Exposed Hillary Clinton’s Cover-up, Found Dead.” Academics and pundits endlessly debated the effect of these articles and whether they might cause “belief change.” Was anyone actually persuaded by these stories such that their worldviews or voting behavior might transform? Or were they really just junk for mindless partisans? Depending on one’s perspective, either misinformation posed an existential threat for its potential to brainwash masses of people, or it was effectively harmless.

But there is another, more disturbing possibility, one that we have come to understand through our respective professional work over the past decade. One of us, Mike, has been studying the effects of our broken information environment as a research scientist and information literacy expert, while the other, Charlie, is a journalist who has extensively written and reported on the social web. Lately, our independent work has coalesced around a particular shared idea: that misinformation is powerful, not because it changes minds, but because it allows people to maintain their beliefs in light of growing evidence to the contrary. The internet may function not so much as a brainwashing engine but as a justification machine. A rationale is always just a scroll or a click away, and the incentives of the modern attention economy—people are rewarded with engagement and greater influence the more their audience responds to what they’re saying—means that there will always be a rush to provide one. This dynamic plays into a natural tendency that humans have to be evidence foragers, to seek information that supports one’s beliefs or undermines the arguments against them. Finding such information (or large groups of people who eagerly propagate it) has not always been so easy. Evidence foraging might historically have meant digging into a subject, testing arguments, or relying on genuine expertise. That was the foundation on which most of our politics, culture, and arguing was built.

The current internet—a mature ecosystem with widespread access and ease of self-publishing—undoes that. As the mob stormed the Capitol on January 6, the justification machine spun up, providing denial-as-a-service to whomever was in need of it, in real time. Jake Angeli, the “QAnon Shaman,” was an early focus. Right-wing accounts posting about the insurrection as it unfolded argued that these were not genuine “Stop the Steal”–ers, because Angeli didn’t look the part. “This is NOT a Trump supporter…This is a staged #Antifa attack,” the pastor Mark Burns wrote in a tweet that showed Angeli in the Senate chamber—which was then liked by Eric Trump. Other “evidence” followed. People shared a picture of Angeli at a Black Lives Matter protest that conveniently cropped out the QAnon sign he had been holding. People speculated that he was an actor; others interpreted his tattoos as a sign that he was part of an elite pedophile ring and therefore, in their logic, a Democrat.

The use of Angeli as proof that these people were not MAGA was just one of many such scrambles. Within a few hours, MAGA influencers speculated that one protester’s tattoo was a hammer and sickle—proof of leftist agitation. On TV, a Fox News host argued that Trump supporters don’t wear dark helmets, or use black backpacks, so the mob couldn’t be Trumpist. Fairly quickly, the narrative emerged that the attack was a false flag, and the media were in on it. Conspiracists pointed to the time stamp of an NPR live blog that seemed to announce the riot before it happened as evidence it was all preplanned by the “deep state” (and neglected to note that the story, like many, had been updated and re-headlined throughout the day, while retaining the time stamp of the original post). The famous footage of a Capitol Police officer heroically leading the mob away from the door to the Senate was “proof” in MAGA world that Trump supporters were being coaxed into the Capitol by the cops. Similarly, images of officers overwhelmed by rioters and allowing them past the barricades were further proof that the insurrection had been staged. The real organizer, they argued, was the deep state, abetted by far-left groups.

For a while, the rush to gather evidence produced a confusing double narrative from the right. In one telling, the riot was peaceful—the Trump supporters in the Capitol were practically tourists. The other highlighted the violence, suggesting that anti-fascists were causing destruction. Eventually, the dueling stories coalesced into a more complete one: Peaceful Trump supporters had been lured into the Capitol by violent antifa members abetted by law-enforcement instigators working for the deep state.

The function of this bad information was not to persuade non-Trump supporters to feel differently about the insurrection. Instead, it was to dispel any cognitive dissonance that viewers of this attempted coup may have experienced, and to reinforce the beliefs that the MAGA faithful already held. And that is the staggering legacy of January 6. With the justification machine whirring, the riot became just more proof of the radical left’s shocking violence or the deep state’s never-ending crusade against Trump. By January 7, Google searches for antifa and BLM (which had not played a role in the event) surpassed those for Proud Boys (which had). In the months and years after the attempted coup, the justification machine worked to keep millions of Americans from having to reckon with the reality of the day. December 2023 polling by The Washington Post found that 25 percent of respondents believed that it was “definitely” or “probably” true that FBI operatives had organized and encouraged the attack on the Capitol. Twenty-six percent were not sure.

Conspiracy theorizing is a deeply ingrained human phenomenon, and January 6 is just one of many crucial moments in American history to get swept up in the paranoid style. But there is a marked difference between this insurrection (where people were presented with mountains of evidence about an event that played out on social media in real time) and, say, the assassination of John F. Kennedy (where the internet did not yet exist and people speculated about the event with relatively little information to go on). Or consider the 9/11 attacks: Some did embrace conspiracy theories similar to those that animated false-flag narratives of January 6. But the adoption of these conspiracy theories was aided not by the hyperspeed of social media but by the slower distribution of early online streaming sites, message boards, email, and torrenting; there were no centralized feeds for people to create and pull narratives from.

Read: I’m running out of ways to explain how bad this is

The justification machine, in other words, didn’t create this instinct, but it has made the process of erasing cognitive dissonance far more efficient. Our current, fractured media ecosystem works far faster and with less friction than past iterations, providing on-demand evidence for consumers that is more tailored than even the most frenzied cable news broadcasts can offer. And its effects extend beyond conspiracists. During this past election season, for example, anti-Trump influencers and liberal-leaning cable news stations frequently highlighted the stream of Trump supporters leaving his rallies early—implying that support for Trump was waning. This wasn’t true, but such videos helped Democratic audiences stay cocooned in a world where Trump was unpopular and destined to lose.

Spend time on social media and it’s easy to see the demand for this type of content. The early hours of a catastrophic news event were once for sense-making: What happened, exactly? Who was behind it? What was the scale? Now every event is immediately grist for the machine. After a mass shooting, partisans scramble for evidence to suggest that the killer is MAGA, or a radical leftist, or a disaffected trans youth. Last week, in the hours after a mass murderer ran a car into civilians on Bourbon Street in New Orleans, Trump began tossing out lies and speculation about the suspect, suggesting that he was a migrant (information later arrived indicating that the driver was a U.S. citizen and Army veteran). The tragedy and the chaos of its immediate aftermath became an opportunity to attack Democrats about the border.

This reflex contributes to a cultural and political rot. A culture where every event—every human success or tragedy—becomes little more than evidence to score political points is a nihilistic one. It is a culture where you never have to change your mind or even confront uncomfortable information. News cycles are shorter, and the biggest stories in the world—such as the near assassination of Trump last summer in Pennsylvania—burn bright in the public consciousness and then disappear. The justification machine thrives on the breakneck pace of our information environment; the machine is powered by the constant arrival of more news, more evidence. There’s no need to reorganize, reassess. The result is a stuckness, a feeling of being trapped in an eternal present tense.

This stagnation now defines the legacy of January 6. Once Republicans rewrote their side’s understanding of the insurrection (as a nonevent at best and an example of deep-state interference at worst), they dismissed all attempts for accountability as “Trump derangement syndrome.” Senate Republicans blocked initial attempts at a bipartisan January 6 commission; then–Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell called it a “purely political exercise” that would not “uncover crucial new facts or promote healing.” During the congressional hearings on the attempted coup, Fox News largely ignored the proceedings. Trump, now president-elect, is pushing for an FBI probe of former Representative Liz Cheney for her involvement in the commission. Its findings, released in a detailed report, were immediately discredited by Republicans, who called it dishonest, politically motivated, and part of a witch hunt. By Republicans’ cynical logic, the events of January 6 were overblown, but are also ancient history. Only hysterical Democrats, obsessed with taking down Trump, could not move on.

Democrats—and the two Republicans on the committee—were right to seek accountability for January 6, but it proved exceedingly difficult to do so in an information environment that is constantly stuck in the now and the new. Trump and the MAGA media complex used the insurrection to portray Democrats as a party of scolds, obsessed with the past, droning on about democracy. The commission’s work was the sort of precise and methodical case-building that is the opposite of the frenetic and immediate justification engine. In an anti-institutional moment, the congressional truth-gathering process read to some as academic, slow, even elitist. Many simply didn’t pay attention to the process. Meanwhile, the right-wing ecosystem’s work to refute the commission likely felt more improvised, authentic, and ultimately convincing to its followers.

When the Democratic Party chose to make the 2024 election about Trump, his threat to the rule of law, and the “battle for the soul of this nation,” as President Biden once put it, it was under the assumption that the indelible images of January 6 would be able to maintain their resonance nearly four years later. That assumption, broadly speaking, was wrong. Confronted with information that could shake their worldviews, people can now search for confirming evidence and mainline conspiracist feeds or decontextualized videos. They can ask AI and their favorite influencers to tell them why they are right. They can build tailored feeds and watch as algorithms deliver what they’re looking for. And they will be overwhelmed with data.

The hum of the justification machine is comforting. It makes the world seem less unpredictable, more knowable. Underneath the noise, you can make out the words “You’ve been right all along.”

The Atlantic · by Charlie Warzel, Mike Caulfield · January 6, 2025

23. Trump Can Keep America’s AI Advantage

Conclusion:

Mr. Trump has likened AI to a “superpower” and has underscored the importance of the U.S. staying “right at the forefront” of its race against China. His administration’s actions will help determine whether democracies or autocracies lead the next technological era. Our shared security, prosperity and freedoms hang in the balance.

Trump Can Keep America’s AI Advantage

China is trying to catch up. The U.S. needs proactive development efforts and strong export controls.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/trump-can-keep-americas-ai-advantage-china-chips-data-eccdce91

By Dario Amodei and Matt Pottinger

Jan. 6, 2025 1:09 pm ET

Illustration: David Gothard

Legislators on both sides of the aisle recognize that the U.S. must lead the world in artificial intelligence to preserve national security. This gives the incoming Trump administration a chance to establish a historic advantage for the U.S. and the free world.

AI will likely become the most powerful and strategic technology in history. By 2027, AI developed by frontier labs will likely be smarter than Nobel Prize winners across most fields of science and engineering. It will be able to use all the senses and interfaces of a human working virtually—text, audio, video, mouse, keyboard control and internet access—to complete complex tasks that would take people months or years, such as designing new weapons or curing diseases. Imagine a country of geniuses contained in a data center.

The nations that are first to build powerful AI systems will gain a strategic advantage over its development. Incoming Trump administration officials can take steps to ensure the U.S. and its allies lead in developing this technology. If they succeed, it could deliver breakthroughs in medicine, energy and economic development. It could also extend American military pre-eminence. If they fail, another nation—most likely China—could surpass us economically and militarily. It’s imperative that free societies with democratic oversight and the rule of law set the norms by which AI is employed. They won’t be able to do so if totalitarian governments pioneer these technologies.

Export controls, which ban shipments to China of the high-end chips needed to train advanced AI models, have been a valuable tool in slowing China’s AI development. These controls began during the first Trump term and expanded under the Biden administration to cover a wider range of chips and chip-manufacturing equipment. The controls appear to have been effective: The CEO of one of China’s leading AI firms recently said the main obstacle he faces is the embargo on high-end chips.

China is trying to work around U.S. controls, including by using shell companies to set up data centers in countries that can still import advanced U.S. chips. This enables China to train its AI models on state-of-the-art chips and catch up with U.S. competitors.

The Trump administration should shut down this avenue of circumvention. One solution is to ensure that data centers in countries that China might use to skirt export controls are allowed to access U.S.-designed AI chips only if they adhere to verifiable security standards and commit not to help China’s AI efforts. AI hardware exports should be tracked. We should also ensure that frontier AI remains under our security umbrella by keeping the largest and most critical AI data centers within the U.S. and its closest partners.

Skeptics of these restrictions argue that the countries and companies to which the rules apply will simply switch to Chinese AI chips. This argument overlooks that U.S. chips are superior, giving countries an incentive to follow U.S. rules. China’s best AI chips, the Huawei Ascend series, are substantially less capable than the leading chip made by U.S.-based Nvidia. China also may not have the production capacity to keep pace with growing demand. There’s not a single noteworthy cluster of Huawei Ascend chips outside China today, suggesting that China is struggling to meet its domestic needs and is in no position to export chips at a meaningful scale.

Because of America’s current restrictions on chip-manufacturing equipment, it will likely take China years if not decades to catch up in chip quality and quantity. The CEO of ASML, the world’s largest maker of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, has said that these restrictions will cause China to “lag 10 to 15 years behind the West” in high-end chip manufacturing. That could give the U.S. a head start during a critical window. Whoever advances most during the next four years will be in a much stronger position in the decades that follow, given that AI gains will likely compound on one another.

The export and security terms that the U.S. sets will define the chip market for producing powerful AI systems. Countries that want to reap the massive economic benefits will have an incentive to follow the U.S. model rather than use China’s inferior chips.

Along with implementing export controls, the U.S. will need to adopt other strategies to promote its AI innovation. President-elect Trump campaigned on accelerating AI data-center construction by improving energy infrastructure and slashing burdensome regulations. These would be welcome steps. Additionally, the administration should assess the national-security threats of AI systems and how they might be used against Americans. It should deploy AI within the federal government, both to increase government efficiency and to enhance national defense.

Mr. Trump has likened AI to a “superpower” and has underscored the importance of the U.S. staying “right at the forefront” of its race against China. His administration’s actions will help determine whether democracies or autocracies lead the next technological era. Our shared security, prosperity and freedoms hang in the balance.

Mr. Amodei is CEO and a co-founder of Anthropic, which makes the AI system Claude. Mr. Pottinger is chairman of the China program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He served as U.S. deputy national security adviser, 2019-21.

The Gorgeous, Unglamorous Work of Freedom

Notes from an “actualist” on what liberation requires

By Bono

The Atlantic · by Bono · January 4, 2025

“Freedom” is a word that turns up with embarrassing frequency in rock and roll songs. How we love to free-associate about freedom. On occasion we’re good for a “Chimes of Freedom,” (at least Bob Dylan is) but if we’re honest, the freedom musicians are most interested in is our own.

The reason I am climbing on this slippery soapbox called “freedom” today is because I’m being given a presidential medal by that name—an honor I’m receiving mainly for the work of others, among them my bandmates and our fellow activists—and it’s got me thinking again about the subject. When we rock stars talk about freedom, we more often mean libertinism than liberation, but growing up in the Ireland of the 1960s, that had its place, too. We were mad for freedoms we didn’t have: political freedom, religious freedom, and (most definitely) sexual freedom.

Rock and roll promised a freedom that could not be contained or silenced, an international language of liberation. The freedom songs of the folk singers went electric, the coded messages of gospel music burst into the full flower of funk and soul. Even disco promised emancipation, from Chaka Khan’s “I’m Every Woman” to Diana Ross’s “I’m Coming Out.” In U2 we wanted our song “Pride (In the Name of Love)” to sound like the freedom we were campaigning for in our work with Amnesty International. That’s how insufferable we were.

Outside the studio, it felt like freedom was unstoppable. In Europe, the generation before us had paid for our freedom in blood. We promised we would never forget. Yes, freedom was stalled here, suppressed there, but not forever, we thought. Walls were made to tumble. I think my generation believed that consciousness itself was evolving, that humankind was moving inevitably toward being freer and more equal—despite five or six millennia of evidence to the contrary. I believed it, anyway.

At age 18, we in U2 had our first proper go at activism at an anti-apartheid concert at Trinity College in Dublin. Later we answered the call of Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu to take up the cause of freedom again, in this case freedom from economic slavery, and help cancel the old Cold War debts of the least developed countries. Statistics don’t rhyme very well, so I couldn’t sing my way through this campaign. I needed what one of our friends, Bill Gates, would later refer to as a software update, which is to say, a bigger brain.

Rather than go back to school, I went to Africa for my education. Africa, a continent confronting yet another colonizing force... a virus. And what was the death sentence of HIV/AIDS if not a negation of freedom, namely the freedom to go on living? Bobby Shriver, Jamie Drummond, Lucy Matthew and I launched ONE and (RED) to help lift that death sentence. Our M.O. was to enlist a wide variety of politicians across the political spectrum and to do the same with the forces of commerce to make sure that life-saving medicine would reach the people whose lives depended on it, whether or not they could pay for a single pill. We were following the African activists who were leading the resistance to this nasty little virus in the form of groups like TASO in Uganda, TAC in South Africa, unsung heroes like Zackie Achmat who refused to take his own ARVs until they were available for all. And took the South African government to court to prove that he and HIV/AIDS existed.

Most of my life, freedom could really hold its head up. Freedom had attitude, freedom was an attitude. Walls really did tumble, not just the one in Berlin; the Iron Curtains of the Soviet Union were drawn back to reveal democracies struggling to be born, gasping for free air; and extreme poverty—a trap as confining and debilitating as any prison—released millions of people from its grip. Thanks to PEPFAR, that brilliant cross-party achievement of President George W. Bush, 26 million people have been freed to go on living despite an HIV diagnosis. And Jubilee USA reports that in the years since Drop the Debt—another bipartisan triumph, this one led in the U.S. by President Bill Clinton—an extra 54 million children have been able to go to school. That’s freedom right there.

So if freedom swaggered—or even sometimes staggered, carrying a drink and smoking a cheroot—we kind of forgave freedom, because it got results.

But where are we now, as my hero David Bowie sang? Is the Medal of Freedom a nostalgia act? Is freedom itself a nostalgia act? Maybe the idea of freedom as a guarantee. But not freedom as a mighty, worthy struggle.

In America, the land of the free, we saw in the last election that freedom is universally valued but not universally defined. For some it means the freedom to things like access to reproductive care, for others it means freedom from various forms of perceived government intrusion. It’s an old family argument—older than America itself.

While America wrestles with the meaning of freedom—not just what it is, but who gets it—in other parts of the world, people are literally dying for it. In Ukraine, freedom is a brutally direct, existential question, framed by Vladimir Putin’s guns and bombs: are your lives worth this fight, this struggle? In Sudan, a civil war whose parties are supported by great powers poses the question of what freedom means when famine is not even considered a new tool of war and hardly makes the news.

Across the Middle East, freedom has always been at the beneficence of the great powers passing through rather than the great peoples born of the Levant. In Syria now we see the first, tentative shoots of freedom after Assad and Putin squeezed and choked the life out of this most mythological ground. But caution is the word. Seeds of democracy can be scattered or trampled. Even in the Queen of Sheba’s Yemen we see Iran trample on more treasured peoples and impose its brand of fundamentalism not just on its neighbors but its own people, mostly Persian but also Kurdish, like Mahsa Amina. Women and men yearning to breathe free—free of the vice and virtue police. Yes, that’s really their formal title.

And then there’s Gaza. Israel’s Prime Minister for almost 20 years, Benjamin Netanyahu, has often used the defense of Israel’s freedom and its people as an excuse to systematically deny the same freedom and security to the Palestinians—a self-defeating and deadly contradiction, which has led to an obscene leveling of civilian life that the world can visualize daily on their cellphones. Freedom must come for the Israeli hostages, whose kidnapping by Hamas ignited this latest cataclysm. Freedom must come for the Palestinian people. It does not take a prophet to predict Israel will never be free until Palestine is free.

Freedom is complex and demanding. It might even be a little dull, the work of freedom. Certainly the work of peacemakers. Which I’ve witnessed and of course don’t have the stamina for. The fluorescent lights, the conference tables with plates of stale sandwiches, the late nights of hard work and of missing your families back home. In Ireland during the late 1990s, I wasn’t in those rooms, but we all held our breath as almost everyone gave up something they believed in for the cause of peace.

This stuff is complicated. I used to love a good rant about it. Shooting your mouth off before you knew anything was part of the attraction of rock and roll. I used to think that being heard was the most useful thing I could do, maybe because it was the only thing I really knew how to do.

But at some point it reached diminishing returns. I remember Paul McGuinness, U2’s manager, with raised eyebrow, asking with exasperation, “What is it this time, Bono? Rock Against Bad Things?”

I still have a fondness for symbolic or poetic acts—a fist in the air, a shout, an indelible image. I still think they’re important. But for over two decades I’ve opted for more activism and less symbolism. A petition for something utterly worthy arrives once a month at our house. But I’m not much of a signer. These days I’m more inclined to be specific than dramatic, to organize than agonize.

On the barricades this word might sound like a yawn, but now all I want to be is an actualist (I thought I’d made the word up until I found it in the dictionary). I suppose being an actualist means being an idealist crossed with a pragmatist. I want to know what actually works. If I throw a punch, I want it to actually land. I enjoyed the wild swings of my youth. But now I’m excited by the strategy and tactics that might put injustice on the back foot.

And actually, in the end, it’s not personalities—as dull or luminous as singers can be—that change things. It’s movements like Jubilee 2000 or the ONE Campaign, which takes to the streets but also to the corridors of Capitol Hill and parliaments and G8 meetings, working with people who disagree on everything but the one thing (see what I did there?), cutting deals where they can to fight the injustice of extreme poverty. It’s also the animating idea of (RED), a gateway drug for AIDS activism, a way to bring the capitalists on board (and that was before I realized I was one).

Yes, it was twenty-five years ago almost to the month that the developing-world debt cancellation campaign brought me to the office of then-Senator Joe Biden. He was friendly—dropping references to County Mayo, even then reciting Seamus Heaney poems. But he was fearsome, too—ready to take a punch as well as throw them. That’s the kind of fighter you want on your side.

I left those meetings with a sense that the very ordinariness of the people who wrote the bills, who built the coalitions, whose day job was the grinding unglamorous work of serving freedom, was in fact their extraordinariness.

It’s what the fight for freedom needs today: faithful, stubborn, unselfish effort. For many years I quoted that line of Martin Luther King, Jr.: “The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” I now know it does not. It has to be bent. And that’s how the walls will finally come down: in Ukraine, in Sudan, in Gaza, across the Middle East, in every part of the world where health and humanity are at risk. Lincoln spoke of a “new birth of freedom.” I think he meant that freedom must be re-won by each generation. That is a fine call to action for a new year.

The Atlantic · by Bono · January 4, 2025

25. Taiwan seeks S Korean help investigating Chinese ship suspected of cutting undersea cable

South Korea: will it retain its position as a global pivotal state? Will it continue to contribute to a free and open INDOPACIFIC even if it means feeling the wrath of the PRC?

Taiwan seeks S Korean help investigating Chinese ship suspected of cutting undersea cable

Official says navigation patterns suggest cable damage was not an accident

https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/6007578

Jan. 6, 2025 10:39

TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — Taiwan is seeking assistance from South Korean authorities in investigating a Chinese freighter suspected of damaging an undersea cable in the waters off the northeast coast.

According to Taiwan’s telecom provider Chunghwa Telecom and the Coast Guard Administration, the cable was reportedly damaged on Friday by the Cameroonian-flagged freighter, “Shunxing39,” northeast of New Taipei's Yehliu. Although the ship is registered in Cameroon, Taiwanese officials identified it as belonging to Jie Yang Trading Limited, a Hong Kong-registered company headed by Chinese national Guo Wenjie (郭文傑), per the Financial Times.

Chunghwa Telecom said that emergency backup mechanisms were activated immediately after the incident, rerouting traffic through other international submarine communications cables. The company said all customer services were quickly restored.

Chunghwa Telecom and Taiwanese government officials informed the Financial Times that the damaged cable is part of the Trans-Pacific Express Cable System, which links Taiwan to the US West Coast. The system is jointly owned by several telecom operators, including Chunghwa Telecom, AT&T, Japan’s NTT, Korea Telecom, China Telecom, and China Unicom.

A Taiwanese Coast Guard official told FT, “Since it was not possible for us to question the captain, we have asked the South Korean authorities to help with the investigation at the ship’s next port of destination.” A Taiwanese national security official said the vessel is expected to reach Busan in the coming days.

Government and Coast Guard officials revealed to FT that tracking data from the ship’s automatic identification system and satellite data indicate that Shunxing39 had been dragging its anchor at the cable's rupture site.

Although Coast Guard vessels conducted an external inspection of the ship and established radio contact with the captain, adverse weather conditions prevented boarding, said an official told FT. Furthermore, under international law, Taiwan could not detain the vessel for investigation because too much time had passed since the incident.

A senior Taiwanese national security official told FT, “This is another case of a very worrying global trend of sabotage against subsea cables.” The official said ships involved in such incidents are often poorly maintained and rarely engage in legitimate commercial activities.

The official said this vessel is in similarly poor repair and is comparable to those in Russia's “shadow fleet.”

According to ship-tracking data reviewed by the newspaper, Shunxing39 had been maneuvering erratically in waters near Taiwan’s northern coast since at least Dec. 8. The national security official pointed out that such navigation patterns suggest the cable damage was not an “innocent accident.”

Chinese merchant and fishing vessels frequently participate in large-scale military exercises around Taiwan organized by Beijing. Taipei is concerned that such "gray zone" operations, which fall short of open warfare, may complicate Taiwan's ability to counter an eventual escalation into a full-scale attack, per the Financial Times.

Taiwan prosecutors will investigate the ship's culpability for the incident and potential compensation for damage.

26. Drone discovery in Philippines spurs call for US military expansion

In years past instead of expansion there might have been calls for expulsion. My how times have changed. (But I am sure there are some who still want expulsion).

The Philippines

This Week in Asia Politics

Drone discovery in Philippines spurs call for US military expansion

Filipino congressman Robert Ace Barbers’ call comes after a drone was recovered off Masbate, which he says could be a spying device

https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3293570/drone-discovery-philippines-spurs-call-us-military-expansion

Jeoffrey Maitem

Published: 2:54pm, 6 Jan 2025

A Philippine lawmaker’s call for an additional US military site to help counter foreign intrusions and potential resource exploitation following the recovery of a submarine drone allegedly from China has drawn mixed reactions from analysts and politicians.

Filipino congressman Robert Ace Barbers of Surigao del Norte said that having a naval base under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in the south, particularly in his province, was crucial for protecting the country’s eastern seaboard, which is rich in deuterium deposits.

Deuterium, a type of hydrogen, is used in fusion reactors and has various military, industrial, and scientific uses.

Barbers warned in a statement last Thursday that foreign actors might be conducting intelligence operations targeting deuterium and other mineral resources in Philippine waters.

He was referring to the yellow drone, marked “HY-119”, retrieved by Filipino fishermen from the waters off the province of Masbate in the central Philippines.

“It is not far-fetched that China has long been conducting in-depth intel gathering inside Philippine waters, possibly including data about deuterium,” Barbers said.

Brigadier General Andre Dizon, the province’s police commander, earlier said the drone – suspected of being of Chinese origin – was used to communicate with satellites and other surface units. He said it was capable of sending and receiving data and voice messages.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines said the navy was investigating the origin and purpose of the drone.

Lal-lo Airport in Cagayan, Philippines, is one of the sites under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the US. Photo: Reuters

Defence analyst Jose Antonio Custodio told This Week in Asia that Barbers’ proposal was feasible given that US troops had been stationed on Mindanao in the southern Philippines for 20 years for the war on terrorism.

Custodio, a fellow at the Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers, said having another EDCA site would be beneficial to Manila as the Americans could help monitor certain areas, such as the Surigao Strait’s exit into the Pacific Ocean.

“You can shut it off from the Chinese or to any hostile presence by establishing the capability to monitor and protect that particular strait,” Custodio said.

Barbers’ brother, Surigao del Norte Governor Lyndon Barbers, has been advocating for an EDCA site to be built on the country’s southeastern side due to the potential for intrusions such as the drone incident.

Separately, Robert Ace Barbers also responded to the proposal by the Department of National Defence and the navy to develop a naval facility within the 3,000-hectare Phividec Industrial Authority complex in Misamis Oriental to support the nearby Lumbia airbase located in Cagayan de Oro City in Mindanao.

“While I do not question the logic and wisdom behind the plan to put up an EDCA naval site inside the Phividec facility, I think it would be prudent for us not to intermix the business complex with a military complex,” Barbers said.

Violence at sea: how armed attacks on the high seas affect mariners

In 2023, Manila gave the US access to four new military sites, on top of an existing five under EDCA, which allows Washington to rotate troops and preposition defence material, equipment and supplies in specific locations in the country.

The four new bases include one on Palawan island facing the South China Sea, and three in northern Luzon, some 400km from Taiwan.

The hosting of US troops in the country is covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement, which was signed in 1999 and sets the terms under which American military personnel can operate on Philippine soil.

Custodio said another EDCA site could help the Philippines bolster its strategic position in the region.

“The role of the Philippines is like a cork plugging a bottle. So, we are basically the barrier against China expanding into the Pacific. You shut it off from the Chinese to contain them to operate only in the South China Sea,” he added.

Vincent Kyle Parada, a former defence analyst for the Philippine Navy, said when Manila adopted the new Comprehensive Archipelagic Defence Concept (CADC), it was intended to cover beyond the West Philippine Sea to include vital areas in the eastern seaboard such as Benham Rise and the rest of the Philippine Sea.

US soldiers gather after a live-fire drill of HIMARs inside a Philippine Army training facility in Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija last August. Photo: Jeoffrey Maitem

The CADC is Manila’s new strategy designed to protect the country’s exclusive economic zone, which is located in what it calls the West Philippine Sea.

“Strategic basing is a key component of CADC, so in that sense, a naval facility in Surigao del Norte would be aligned with the defence establishment’s ongoing efforts,” Parada said.

“I think the ball is really in Washington’s court if they want to further expand EDCA moving forward. If we take a look at the current sites, most are located in areas facing Taiwan and the South China Sea. Those are the key strategic interests for the US as far as its relationship with the Philippines is concerned.”

While a new facility might benefit the Philippines, Parada said that convincing the US could be a challenge.

Defence expert Joshua Espeña said adding another defence point on the eastern seaboard was crucial for Manila’s Active Archipelagic Defence Concept, especially to deal with purported foreign threats such as the drone incident.

Given widespread political support for President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr’s government to deepen the alliance with the US, Espeña described Barbers’ proposal as feasible.

US and Filipino soldiers fire howitzers during a live firing exercise in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, Philippines, last May. Photo: Jeoffrey Maitem

“An EDCA site will make the area more proactive in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities,” Espeña, who is also a lecturer at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, told This Week in Asia.

Citing the eastern Dinagat Islands as a potential EDCA site, Espeña said: “It is possible that US foreign military financing efforts can transform the area for berthing of vessels or even airstrips for air assets.”

The move towards closer military ties with the US, however, has drawn opposition from some quarters, including former president Rodrigo Duterte and his daughter Vice-President Sara Duterte-Carpio.

Carlos Isagani Zarate, a former member of the House of Representatives and the Bayan Muna party who is an opponent of EDCA sites, has dismissed Barbers’ proposal.

“The EDCA sites undermine our country’s sovereignty. The presence of foreign troops and facilities could escalate regional tensions and drag the Philippines into conflicts that are not our own,” he warned.

27. Does the US Defense Establishment Need a ‘Paradigm Shift’?

Excerpts:

Kelly: What about that sense of urgency that you talked about? It’s difficult for people to see the threat from China, for example, in the same way that they saw the smoke from the ships in Pearl Harbor. Do you feel it’s equally urgent today?

Louie: I think it is. If you look up where we are today and you go back to 1940 and early months of 1941, they were worried about the German threat. They were worried about the Japanese threat. They were worried about the Axis of Evil. Now you look out and you see Iran, North Korea, China and the Russians and you see the underlying nations all reorganizing around different structures that are going to be competitive with the U.S.

Now that doesn’t mean that everything always has to end in a kinetic fight. Today’s warfare includes things like economic warfare, information warfare, cyber warfare. There are many more dimensions than we had back in the 1940s. Nevertheless, everybody sees it, but we all like to admire the problem.

This is where leadership matters. Will we have the leaders who are bold enough to make the changes necessary to prepare us for the next several decades ahead? And can we move with the speed and urgency to prevent the temptations of another nation state from imposing their will on the U.S.? I think there’s enough good people in the defense industry and in technology and in intelligence to do it, but it does require leadership. It does require permission to change. We’re going to have to break some things in order to build the next new thing. But if we don’t do it, it’s going to get thrust upon us. And there may not be time for us to have those months to actually take the corrective steps.

Kelly: How confident are you that politics isn’t going to get in the way and that the true experts are going to be able to come together to break what needs breaking and then build it in a non-political, expert-based American way? Is that even in the cards?

Louie: I believe it’s in the cards. When you close the door and you’re trying to solve a real problem within the Department of Defense, or within the intelligence community, we don’t check what party cards people carry. When you have somebody’s life that depends upon what you build, if your ability to execute is going to protect the citizens of the United States, or men and women who are going off in battle, or allies and partners, that’s a different kind of serious stuff. And while people may disagree on the political views of where things are going, national security and economic security is not a partisan topic.

Does the US Defense Establishment Need a ‘Paradigm Shift’?

A long-time intelligence and technology expert worries that bureaucracy and a lack of imagination are national security risks

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/does-the-us-defense-establishment-need-a-paradigm-shift?utm

EXPERT INTERVIEW

An employee handles 155 mm caliber shells after the manufacturing process at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant (SCAAP) in Scranton, Pennsylvania on April 16, 2024. (Photo by CHARLY TRIBALLEAU/AFP via Getty Images)

Posted: January 7th, 2025

By The Cipher Brief

EXPERT INTERVIEW — The U.S. starts the new year with a daunting set of challenges in the national security space – from global conflicts to terrorism threats, cyber warfare to the collaborative, anti-West efforts of the so-called “Axis of Authoritarians.” And while policymakers tackle those issues – or try to – some experts fear that there’s a systemic problem in play, and that the current structure and approach of the U.S. defense establishment makes it harder for the country to meet the myriad challenges.

That’s a view held by Gilman Louie, who has had a three-decade career in national security and investment, which included service as the first CEO of In-Q-Tel, the CIA-funded technology investment firm, and time spent with the Defense Innovation Board. Louie is currently co-founder, CEO, and Managing Partner at America’s Frontier Fund, a self-described “deep-tech fund” dedicated to advancing U.S. national security interests.

In a wide-ranging conversation with The Cipher Brief, Louie offers both a warning and call to action to the U.S. defense sector, which he believes needs a paradigm shift in its race to develop and deploy the capabilities required for modern warfare. “The current trajectory that we’re on is not a winning trajectory,” Louie warns. While the U.S. still leads the world in these areas, Louie says adversaries may soon catch up in terms of scale and speed.

The solution, he says, involves leveraging both the mindset and capabilities of industry – and that, Louie believes, will require a wholesale change to inside-the-beltway workings, along with leadership bold enough to make the pivot. “We’re going to have to break some things in order to build the next new thing,” he told us.

Louie spoke with Cipher Brief CEO Suzanne Kelly for an episode of The State Secrets Podcast, available on Apple Podcasts or Spotify.

Gilman Louie

Gilman Louie is the co-founder, CEO, and Managing Partner at America’s Frontier Fund and a member of the board of directors at Maxar Corporation. Gilman is a member of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board and the Foreign Affairs Policy Board at the U.S. Department of State. Previously, Gilman served as a Commissioner on the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence and was an early CEO of In-Q-Tel, the pioneering technology investment firm funded by the CIA.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Kelly: You have more than 30 years of national security experience, and investment experience. Why do you have this fascination with national security and particularly with investing and the private sector world.

Louie: Pre 9-11, I think the concern expressed was the fear that there was going to be another Pearl Harbor around the corner. [There were] the conditions that led us up to Pearl Harbor — the inability to put the pieces together, to understand what was happening. Even though we were gathering all the intelligence from around the world, we were not organizing a way to get that information across to decision makers to take action. I think there was a sense in late 1999 that we were going to find ourselves in a very similar position. It was prescient that they were worried about this set of problems as you were running up to 9-11. The need was clearly articulated by the director of central intelligence at that time, George Tenet, who convinced me that in spite of the fact that I had the world’s greatest job, which was the Chief Creative Officer of Hasbro Interactive, the national calling was more important.

The job was to lead up a new way of interfacing with the technology community. The CIA has built its technical foundation off of great American companies – the defense contracting community, the tried-and-true technology companies of the day like IBM and Honeywell, Motorola – and didn’t know quite how to interface with this growing technology transition that was taking place in Silicon Valley. One of the ideas that I laid out was to do what the Valley companies do: start a strategic venture capital fund, no different than Intel, Oracle, or any of the big technical companies of the day, and start engaging with the technology centers of excellence and create your own vehicle to do it.

Kelly: How are you looking at the ability of the Department of Defense today to remain as competitive as it needs to be?

Louie: There have been specific eras that transitioned how we thought about modern warfare. The tank in World War I. The battleships that transitioned to aircraft carriers and aviation in World War II. We then moved into modern technology warfare with things like stealth- and precision-guided weapons. And as we are learning right now, particularly in places like the Ukraine, the concepts of warfare, particularly long warfare, not short bursts, require us to rethink how we fight, how we deter, and how we man and team up our military to be able to confront any of the challenges that are facing it.

We might find ourselves in a very difficult position today as a technology leader in the world. Everybody looks at the U.S. military and says, amazing technology. You think about the B-21, the F-35, the Aegis ships and the next generation of underwater warfare submarines like the Seawolf. All those are unbelievable platforms. But as we’re learning in Ukraine, small, simple systems in the thousands can overcome very sophisticated systems. Some of us on the defense side worry, Are we becoming like Germany of World War II? We have the most sophisticated weapons, but lack the factors of production to be able to meet the need and demand of the warfare of the day. So while the Germans had Messerschmitts and jets and Tiger tanks, Americans won the war by our ability to produce B-17s and Sherman tanks, all which may be inferior, but we could out-produce them, they were more reliable, and they delivered impact when they needed to deliver impact in mass and in quantity.

Kelly: It’s almost unbelievable the technological development that we’ve seen on the front in Ukraine. What are the lessons back here?

Louie: Clearly the Ukrainians have done a great job of using dual-use technologies. A lot of consumer tech is being redeployed with a lot of imagination, and taking advantage of the indigenous capabilities of what they have. If you take a look at their drones, they’re being built by furniture manufacturers. Turns out wood is pretty stealthy. That ability to innovate and take advantage of what your country has to offer really shows how agility wins fights.

In the U.S., if we look at our challenges on our supply chains and how long it takes us to build a system, it takes decades now to get to initial operating conditions for our most sophisticated weapons. We cannot manufacture them to meet the demand that’s in front of us. And it’s a real shame. You look at U.S. manufacturing now, as a percentage of GDP, three decades ago 70% of the manufactured goods were manufactured here in the U.S. Today it’s barely 10%. Our inability to build ships, simple things like munitions, artillery shells, Stinger missiles, much less our ability to go off and build next-generation stealth aircraft at scale and at speed is not going to allow us to keep up.

The U.S. military is very good in short-term warfare. But conflicts drag on, as we’re seeing in Ukraine and in Gaza. Is the U.S. really prepared for that? And are we really leveraging the best science and technology that’s in front of us? Are we taking advantage of the capacity and imagination of the technology and scientific sectors to help us fight or prepare to fight or even prevent a fight downstream?

Kelly: The Pentagon has different boards that offer advice on innovation. You’ve seen all these efforts develop over the years. Are they not where they need to be? And if so, where do we need to be to be competitive?

Louie: The Department of Defense is about ready to spend a trillion dollars to equip and provide personnel with capabilities to support the military going forward. But as innovative as those programs are, the reality is as a percentage of that budget, we’re not seeing the dollars being put aside with the intent. If we were a corporation, we would be spending 10 to 20 percent of our budget on innovation. Even if we moved the budget of DIU to a billion dollars, that’s two percent. That does not move the needle.

It’s not at the level of scale that meets what we’re going to need, which means as a department, we probably have to pivot. That doesn’t mean that we give up the high-end systems, because that is a U.S. advantage. But all that stuff in the middle needs to be redeployed and rethought. How do we extend our ability to innovate in quantity and at scale with the speed and agility that will prepare us, or prevent somebody from attacking interests of the United States?

The bureaucracy, how we purchase, the FAR, Federal Acquisition Regulations, the DFARs, how we build our industrial base is not tuned to be able to produce the systems we need for the future. And we haven’t really engaged industry outside of a few notable exceptions like Palantir and Anduril or a few others – far too few to meet the needs of what the department is going to have to have for the next part of this decade.

Kelly: Talk to me about America’s Frontier Fund, where you’re the co-founder. What are you trying to do with the fund, in creating something external to the government that is focused on investing in national security?

Louie: The good news is we’re already partnering with the government through the Office of Strategic Capital for the Department of Defense and the Small Business Administration, which is one of our lead funders in America’s Frontier Fund, with the goal of working with the department to imagine what we need to unlock the resources that are available throughout the United States.

Pair it with capital coming in from the capital markets – some $45 trillion that goes into our capital markets. It’s the biggest resource the United States has access to, to build out this new future and do it at the speed of the Valley. There is a mismatch right now between how the department moves at what they consider “at speed” and how Silicon Valley moves at speed. It needs that interface to make sure we don’t grind our gears and we actually produce the kinds of things that we need. I can’t take credit for that because that work came from the department. The good news about the Department of Defense is that there are thought leaders in places like DIU, in places like OSC. And by putting those pieces together, what we hope to do is to serve as a catalyst of change.

Kelly: We’ve heard this term public-private partnership for so many years. As you’re looking now to a future where technology plays such a critical role in any future war, how is that changing?

Louie: In the old days, partnership was really government-led, private sector-supported. [There are many who say] that we actually need to be industry-led and government-supported. And that is a massive change. Nobody writes the strategic plan for Silicon Valley. American innovation does not work that way. We don’t operate on five and 10-year plans. We out-innovate the rest of the world because we tap into the power of the individuals, the entrepreneurs, the scientists, the academics, the businesses to imagine what is possible, to do what everybody says can’t be done. That’s the power of American innovation, and that is not something you script out in terms of requirements and long RFIs and RFPs.

The Skunk Works, the F-104, the U-2, Corona SR-71 — those were led by industry who said we can do something that the DoD can only dream of, and they delivered. The U-2 program was done for under 20 million dollars, ahead of schedule. Lockheed even gave money back to the Department of Defense. We need to get back to that. We know it can be done. We know how to do it. We have the talent to get it done. There’s some gaps that we need to fill like manufacturing and production. It isn’t that we can’t do it. We just have to choose to do it.

Kelly: How is the private sector going to be able to lead in this area?

Louie: If you think about how regulations get developed, each regulation was created to prevent something bad that had happened in the past. You make a rule so you don’t do that again. And then over the years, you end up with 1,600 pages of these rules. And what happens in that mindset is fear of failure rather than desire to succeed.

We need to return to the pioneering spirit that built the department. Do it with foresight, not hindsight. And that means for us is to go through that pivot, to re-examine how we buy things, how we build things, how we partner with industry, to let loose the power of American industry to really keep us ahead.

The current trajectory that we’re on is not a winning trajectory. We have to change that rate of speed and rate of change for us to make sure our adversaries don’t catch us. The U.S. is still ahead, but the window is shrinking very rapidly. Our ability to build the exquisite, nobody can match that. Our ability to build at quantity and at scale, we’re behind. As we’re learning what’s happening in Ukraine right now, that is the template of warfare going forward. The U.S. is in the precarious position that [we must] go back to our roots – our superiority in manufacturing, about our ability to out logistics our competitors. We’ve fallen in love with the shiny objects and we outsourced everything else.

We have to go back to basics. Remove the barriers that prevent us from building things. Train up the workforce to have the trade skills necessary to construct. Use automation and AI not just for the military systems themselves, but how we actually build things.

We’re also going to have to change the way we buy things. We need to say, Look, here’s my problem. You tell us the best way to solve this problem, industry. And if you solve our problems, we’ll guarantee the buy. Without that long-term guarantee, you’re not going to get the financial community investing in these areas. Nobody’s going to invest billions of dollars in R&D to build out a system simply to have it re-competed to the lowest bid after you invent it. That is not an economic model that makes any sense at all.

Kelly: How do you see that relationship between the public and private sector changing?

Louie: You go back to World War II, you think about how from December 7th, 1941, to about May of 1942, industry swung into action. We didn’t create new factories of the future back then. We took the factories we already had, the Ford lines, the Chrysler lines, the GM lines — instead of pumping out cars, we were making tanks. We took aircraft manufacturers doing commercial aviation and transformed them to be unrivaled in our ability to produce aircraft. We were building a ship a day in our shipyards.

Today’s a little different because we lost that industrial base. But American technology companies have been thinking about how to manufacture at scale using automation, robotics, using AI. We can build those factories here. Again, it requires us to have the will. I would love to have “Under Secretary of Manufacturing” be an official position of the United States Department of Defense. Put one person in charge whose job it is to make sure our industrial base can deliver the goods at the quantity and scale we need.

It’s really scary to let go of the past. I equate it to the Navy letting go of its battleships and replacing them with these little fragile things called airplanes as a principle form of warfare. We’re going to need to do the same thing here.

Kelly: What do you propose as a better way?

Louie: I think we really need to rethink how we organize our intelligence services. We’ve got 18 of these agencies and every one is organized around certain problems. So we’ve got 18 different shots to deal with China. Maybe we should have China as an organizing principle. Maybe we should organize around threats rather than things, because things don’t kill us — threats do. If you organize around the objective rather than the things, you’re far more likely to achieve your goal.

Post 9-11, we created the counterterrorist centers and the different sharing units throughout the United States with law enforcement, because we were fighting terrorism. We weren’t organized around things.

Does that require a huge rethink? Yes. Is it going to take us time to do it? Yes. But if we don’t start today, we can’t wait until after the next crisis to go do another commission and study and then run around with our heads chopped off trying to fix it on the fly.

Kelly: What about that sense of urgency that you talked about? It’s difficult for people to see the threat from China, for example, in the same way that they saw the smoke from the ships in Pearl Harbor. Do you feel it’s equally urgent today?

Louie: I think it is. If you look up where we are today and you go back to 1940 and early months of 1941, they were worried about the German threat. They were worried about the Japanese threat. They were worried about the Axis of Evil. Now you look out and you see Iran, North Korea, China and the Russians and you see the underlying nations all reorganizing around different structures that are going to be competitive with the U.S.

Now that doesn’t mean that everything always has to end in a kinetic fight. Today’s warfare includes things like economic warfare, information warfare, cyber warfare. There are many more dimensions than we had back in the 1940s. Nevertheless, everybody sees it, but we all like to admire the problem.

This is where leadership matters. Will we have the leaders who are bold enough to make the changes necessary to prepare us for the next several decades ahead? And can we move with the speed and urgency to prevent the temptations of another nation state from imposing their will on the U.S.? I think there’s enough good people in the defense industry and in technology and in intelligence to do it, but it does require leadership. It does require permission to change. We’re going to have to break some things in order to build the next new thing. But if we don’t do it, it’s going to get thrust upon us. And there may not be time for us to have those months to actually take the corrective steps.

Kelly: How confident are you that politics isn’t going to get in the way and that the true experts are going to be able to come together to break what needs breaking and then build it in a non-political, expert-based American way? Is that even in the cards?

Louie: I believe it’s in the cards. When you close the door and you’re trying to solve a real problem within the Department of Defense, or within the intelligence community, we don’t check what party cards people carry. When you have somebody’s life that depends upon what you build, if your ability to execute is going to protect the citizens of the United States, or men and women who are going off in battle, or allies and partners, that’s a different kind of serious stuff. And while people may disagree on the political views of where things are going, national security and economic security is not a partisan topic.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief.

28. 'Make Korea great again' (US and China)

Two important points in this essay highlighted in these excerpts.

Excerpts:

Trump is not as skeptical of the United States’ commitment to allies as Yan claims. Trump and his cabinet members, as well as Republican backers, recognize the strategic importance of alliances. Trump may appear dissatisfied with the sacrifices his fellow Americans must make to preserve and defend allies. He simply wants his partners to be more fiscally responsible. He wants to use coercion to extract more money from the allies, requiring them to bear a higher percentage of the expense. No more, no less. He may pressure the allies by renouncing U.S. commitments or withdrawing some U.S. forces, as South Korea has. However, he understands, like his predecessors, that the implications of the withdrawal of the military are far more harmful to U.S. strategic objectives.

The Trump 2.0 administration will be tough on China. Nonetheless, his leadership style will exacerbate America's already polarized society, exposing the country's vulnerability to Chinese unrestricted warfare. This American vulnerability will boost bipartisan support concerning China in American domestic politics. One of the most significant effects will not come directly from Trump, but via the Republican-controlled U.S. Congress. Yan was inaccurate in suggesting that Trump intends to “levy further tariffs on Chinese goods, impose more restrictions on U.S. investment in China and Chinese capital in the U.S. stock market, place more constraints on technology cooperation.” This has been an ongoing issue in the U.S. Congress since Trump's first term, only progressing during the Biden administration. We should expect many more executive orders from the White House, in addition to judicial acts by the U.S. Congress.

'Make Korea great again'

The Korea Times · January 7, 2025

By Choo Jae-woo

Professor Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University in China, who is known for being outspoken and controversial, did not disappoint us with his piece “Why China isn’t scared of Trump,” which was published in Foreign Affairs in December 2024. Yan contends that Chinese leaders are not dreading Trump’s return because of his uncertain loyalty to allies, political isolationism, economic protectionism and less ideological policies. Yan fails to see or explain why anti-China sentiment in the United States is strong and nonpartisan. Simultaneously, he does not appear to understand Trump’s political stance on Taiwan, or the South China Sea for that matter. Instead, he openly asserts Trump’s unwillingness to “shape China’s political system to conform to its Western counterparts, and he is therefore unlikely to be keen to intervene in China’s domestic affairs.” For one thing, Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act in 2018, paving the path for high-level conversations and visits between U.S. and Taiwanese officials. He is a typical Republican politician who sympathizes deeply with Taiwan's situation.

Yan argues that Trump’s second-term agenda may differ from his first. But not that much. It is for one simple reason: his term is insufficient to achieve “MAGA,” as it is stated. His constituents have given him a mandate to lead the country and achieve MAGA in four years. Trump does not have adequate time. As a result, he appointed his cabinet members as soon as he was elected, saving time on the transition committee. It is also for this reason that he wishes to stop the war in Ukraine within 24 hours of his inauguration. In November, Trump spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin by phone, and in December, he met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Paris. In December, in Arizona, he hinted at a possible meeting with Putin following the inauguration. At the same time, he believes that the Middle East situation is a pretty simple issue to settle. Reimposing economic restrictions on Iran will reduce financial assistance for Hamas and Hezbollah. Trump wants to resolve all of these issues at once for one reason: to focus on limiting China.

Bipartisan anti-China sentiment will persist in U.S. politics and society. Not for economic or geostrategic competition considerations. It will prevail as Beijing prepares for more effective influence operations, often known as unrestricted warfare. The results have been highly successful and widely known. China has advocated for the use of the warfare approach anytime a schism in American society emerges. Trump's harsh immigration policies, for example, will cause societal upheaval in America. It will naturally increase the authority of law enforcement.

Abuse of power and accidents are unavoidable, as proven by George Floyd’s death and the subsequent societal demonstrations such as the Black Lives Matter movement. And Beijing will not ignore concerns that could cause division. In his recently published book "Blood Money: Why the Powerful Turn a Blind Eye While China Kills Americans," Peter Schweizer used a case study to show how Beijing provided financial support to some protest organizations in order to prolong the demonstrations. He also cited LGBTQ+ festivals and other human rights challenges in America. As a result, Trump’s reelection may be making Chinese President Xi Jinping happy right now. He may be devising more complex cognitive warfare methods.

Trump is not as skeptical of the United States’ commitment to allies as Yan claims. Trump and his cabinet members, as well as Republican backers, recognize the strategic importance of alliances. Trump may appear dissatisfied with the sacrifices his fellow Americans must make to preserve and defend allies. He simply wants his partners to be more fiscally responsible. He wants to use coercion to extract more money from the allies, requiring them to bear a higher percentage of the expense. No more, no less. He may pressure the allies by renouncing U.S. commitments or withdrawing some U.S. forces, as South Korea has. However, he understands, like his predecessors, that the implications of the withdrawal of the military are far more harmful to U.S. strategic objectives.

The Trump 2.0 administration will be tough on China. Nonetheless, his leadership style will exacerbate America's already polarized society, exposing the country's vulnerability to Chinese unrestricted warfare. This American vulnerability will boost bipartisan support concerning China in American domestic politics. One of the most significant effects will not come directly from Trump, but via the Republican-controlled U.S. Congress. Yan was inaccurate in suggesting that Trump intends to “levy further tariffs on Chinese goods, impose more restrictions on U.S. investment in China and Chinese capital in the U.S. stock market, place more constraints on technology cooperation.” This has been an ongoing issue in the U.S. Congress since Trump's first term, only progressing during the Biden administration. We should expect many more executive orders from the White House, in addition to judicial acts by the U.S. Congress.

Korea will lack leadership until the impeachment decision is made. Since U.S.-China competition will rise, it may not be lost. Instead, we should reflect on our diplomacy during this power transfer. We were caught up in internal politics and couldn't do so. Our strategic value with the U.S. must be properly considered. We showed a lack of knowledge of what we need from the U.S. during the Nov. 7 phone call between President-elect Donald Trump and President Yoon Suk Yeol. Trump’s interest in working with our shipbuilding industry sparked a nationwide focus on improving relations.

This reaction was expected as most analysts had already identified shipbuilding as a key industry in their economic estimates earlier this year. As the government failed to proactively offer areas of cooperation to the Trump administration, the fact that this attention was driven entirely by a remark from the U.S. president-elect, highlights our lack of strategic thinking. The story is both telling and scary. It is time for Korea to consider its own “make Korea great again” strategy rather than waiting for apples to fall.

Choo Jae-woo is a professor at Kyung Hee University.

The Korea Times · January 7, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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