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Quotes of the Day:
"It takes two years to learn to speak and sixty seconds to learn to be quiet."
– Ernest Hemingway
"If my doctor told me I had only six minutes to live, I wouldn't brood. I'd type a little faster."
– Isaac Asimov
"Three passions, simple but overwhelmingly strong, have governed my life: the longing for love, the search for knowledge and unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind."
– Bertrand Russell
1. Acting U.S. ambassador leaves post in S. Korea: foreign ministry
2. The Republic of Korea-China summit and Xi Jinping's politics of history
3. After US raid on Venezuela, analysts weigh lessons about Russian air defenses
4. Defense chief reaffirms continued S. Korea-U.S. combined drills despite calls for adjustment
5. Colby seeks visits to S. Korea, Japan in late Jan.: sources
6. Lee returns home from China trip focused on improving ties
7. Lee urges efforts to ease negative public sentiment between S. Korea, China
8. Editorial: Denuclearization, Unification Absent: Lee Government's Principle?
9. Lee says he asked China's Xi to play mediator role on Korean Peninsula
10. S. Korea to import over 2 mln eggs from U.S. amid fast spread of bird flu
11. N. Korea touts achievements in 'rural revolution' ahead of key party congress
12. Hwasong-20 ICBM: North Korea’s “doomsday missile” that can hit every US city
13. President Lee Invokes Penguin Metaphor for Inter-Korean Dialogue
14. Why China Stopped Publicly Urging for North Korean Denuclearization
15. N. Korea limits Pyongyang residency for fallen soldiers’ families amid loyalty checks
16. North Korea’s car wash boom: fines drive demand, donju seize opportunity
1. Acting U.S. ambassador leaves post in S. Korea: foreign ministry
Summary:
Acting U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Kevin Kim has departed Seoul and returned to the United States, South Korea’s foreign ministry said, after serving about two months as chargé d’affaires since October. He replaced Joseph Yun, as the embassy’s top role has remained vacant since Ambassador Philip Goldberg left early last year. Deputy Chief of Mission Jim Heller is expected to serve as chargé d’affaires until a new ambassador is appointed. Seoul sources speculate Kim may be reassigned to a Korea-related role in the Trump administration, potentially as a senior adviser to Under Secretary of State Allison Hooke
Comment: Curious. Still no nominee for US Ambassador to the ROK. As noted we have had long vacancies. I am not in the loop but I have not heard any recent speculation (since former Rep. Michele Steele's name) on who might be nominated. We were fortunate to have both Joseph Yun and Kevin Kim serve as acting Ambassadors.
World News Jan. 7, 2026 / 1:21 AM
Acting U.S. ambassador leaves post in S. Korea: foreign ministry
By Kim Seung-yeon, Yonhap News Agency
Acting U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Kevin Kim, seen here at the National Assembly in Seoul in December, has left his post and returned to the United States, the foreign ministry said Wednesday, File Photo by Yonhap
Acting U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Kevin Kim has left his post in Seoul and returned to the United States, the foreign ministry said Wednesday, amid speculation he may be assigned a new role in the Trump administration related to Korea issues.
Kim's departure came just about two months after he took up the post as charge d'affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul in October last year.
Kim succeeded then acting U.S. Ambassador Joseph Yun after the position had remained vacant since former U.S. Ambassador to Seoul Philip Goldberg left the post early last year following the launch of the second Trump administration.
Kim recently informed Seoul officials he returned to the U.S., according to the foreign ministry.
Related
Jim Heller, deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, is expected to serve as charge d'affaires until a new ambassador is appointed.
Sources say that Kim could be tapped for a new role handling Korea-related issues, possibly a position tasked with implementing the summit agreements reached between the allies on security and other matters, or dealing with North Korea issues.
Kim has likely been named a senior adviser to Allison Hooker, U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs, a diplomatic source said. Both Hooker and Kim were deeply involved in nuclear negotiations with North Korea during Trump's first term, when denuclearization talks were in full swing.
Prior to his posting in Seoul, Kim served as U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for China, Japan, Korea, Mongolia and Taiwan at the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
Kim's departure leaves the ambassadorial post in Seoul vacant once again. Goldberg assumed the position more than a year after the Biden administration took office. It took about 18 months for Ambassador Harry Harris to take up the post under Trump's first term.
2. The Republic of Korea-China summit and Xi Jinping's politics of history
Comment: This is an important and timely analysis by my good friend and CAPS colleague from north Korea, Ms. Jihyun Park. This is a very important analysis of Chinese cognitive warfare.
Voices Jan. 7, 2026 / 5:00 AM
The Republic of Korea-China summit and Xi Jinping's politics of history
By Jihyun Park
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung (L) takes a selfie with Chinese President Xi Jinping after a state dinner for the South Korean leader in Beijing on Sunday. Xi gave the phone to Lee during their first summit talks in Gyeongju, South Korea, in November. Photo by Yonhap
Jan. 7 (UPI) -- A note from the executive director: This article describes China's cognitive warfare and shaping the narrative for strategic purposes.
"History is history and truth is truth. No one can change history or truth." -- Xi Jinping
In spring 2013, a confidential internal document -- later known as Document No. 9 -- was circulated among senior Chinese officials.
The document warned that the Chinese Communist Party was facing a "complex and intense struggle" in the ideological sphere and identified a series of "erroneous ideological trends" that must be resolutely opposed.
These included "Western-style constitutional democracy," "universal values," "civil society" and attempts to promote what it termed "historical nihilism" -- interpretations of history that challenge the party's official narrative.
According to the document, the ultimate aim of such historical nihilism was to undermine the party's legitimacy and weaken its "long-term governing capacity."
The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences concluded that historical discourse itself had become one of the primary tools used by "hostile international forces" to weaken China's ideological security and sow division.
The following year, a small group of historians convened a special meeting at a government-affiliated research institute in Beijing. They called for a more systematic approach to historical research in order to "defend ideological security" and "construct a positive image of China."
Just as research on past "national humiliations" surged after the Tiananmen Square crackdown, "historical nihilism" now became a major focus of scholarly and political attention.
New directives and policy plans followed in quick succession. Qiushi (Seeking Truth), the party's leading ideological journal, created a dedicated section on its website devoted to the struggle against historical nihilism, prominently displaying one of Xi Jinping's quotations as a banner: "History is history, and truth is truth. No one can change history or truth."
The statement is categorical. Yet, when viewed alongside the CCP's actual conduct, it reads less like a declaration and more like a warning. Since Xi came to power, China has elevated the fight against "historical nihilism" to a matter of political survival.
Any historical interpretation perceived as threatening the party's legitimacy has become a target of control.
The Great Famine during the Great Leap Forward, the violence of the Cultural Revolution and the tragedy of Tiananmen have all been minimized, distorted or erased. History and truth are permitted to exist only within the boundaries approved by power.
This approach to history does not stop at domestic governance. At the Korea-China summit held Monday, Xi Jinping remarked that "more than 80 years ago, China and Korea endured enormous national sacrifices together in resisting Japanese militarism and ultimately achieved victory."
The statement was emblematic of how China's politics of history are now being projected onto the diplomatic stage.
The trap of the "shared victory against Japan"
There is no doubt that both Korea and China suffered deeply under Japanese imperialism. Yet, their historical positions are not the same. Korea was a colonized victim; China was a belligerent state that later became a direct participant in the invasion of Korea during the Korean War.
On July 31, 2015, Xi convened a Politburo meeting at the Academy of Military Sciences to review progress in academic research on the history of World War II. He argued that although the Chinese people had made a "great contribution" to the Allied victory and to world peace, existing scholarship was still "far from sufficient" and required "deeper and more systematic" development.
For decades, Chinese historians had referred to World War II as the "Eight-Year War of Resistance Against Japan," dating its beginning to July 1937, when Japanese forces attacked near Beijing. Yet, Japan had invaded Manchuria six years earlier, in 1931. Until then, that conflict had been treated as a related but separate regional incident. Xi called for a redefinition of the war as a "Fourteen-Year War of Resistance," beginning in 1931.
While this shift had a plausible historical basis, it was also unmistakably political. Xi instructed scholars to emphasize the war's "profound significance," China's "important position" in the global struggle against fascism, and, above all, the Communist Party's "central role" in achieving victory. This, he made clear, was the direction that research on the anti-Japanese war -- and the party's Japan-focused patriotic education -- should take.
Yet, Xi goes further, weaving China's and Korea's fundamentally different historical experiences into a single narrative of "shared victory against Japan." In doing so, Korea's suffering is absorbed into a China-centered victor's narrative, while China positions itself as the morally superior protagonist.
On the diplomatic stage of a summit meeting, such framing is anything but neutral. Rather than facilitating future cooperation, it functions as political language designed to place Korea within a particular camp of historical memory. In truth, the primary audience for this statement was not Korea, but Japan -- and the international community at large.
The U.N. Charter and the substitution of "China"
At the core of this politics of history lies a deliberate conflation of what "China" means. At the 2015 victory parade -- the first of its kind -- Xi repeatedly described China as "the first country to sign the United Nations Charter." Yet, the "China" that signed the Charter in 1945 was not the People's Republic of China, but the Republic of China. At that time, the Chinese Communist Party was neither a state nor a government nor a subject of international law.
The People's Republic of China was founded on Oct. 1, 1949. The U.N. Charter, by contrast, was signed on June 26, 1945, in San Francisco, by 50 of the 51 founding member states. Nevertheless, the Xi administration has absorbed -- without explanation -- the Republic of China's role in the war against Japan, its status as a victorious power and its position as a U.N. founding member into the historical narrative of the PRC.
This is not a matter of interpretation. It is a substitution of historical subjects -- a mechanism designed to erase Taiwan's existence and retroactively extend the CCP's legitimacy into a past it did not inhabit.
Wars not spoken of and wars repeatedly invoked
China's historical diplomacy is marked by a clear selectivity: wars that are not spoken of and wars that are endlessly repeated. In the Korean War, China invaded Korea alongside North Korea and the Soviet Union. It was a full-scale international conflict involving direct combat with U.N. forces, and China was unmistakably an aggressor. Yet, this war is almost entirely absent from China's official historical narrative and diplomatic language.
Instead, China continually resurrects the war against Japan from 80 years ago -- a war that grants it the moral status of both victim and victor. Unfavorable history is silenced; favorable history is amplified and reproduced. This is the basic structure of China's politics of history.
The 2015 victory parade -- and the present
This pattern became unmistakable in 2015. Under Xi's leadership, China held its first-ever massive military parade explicitly celebrating its status as a victor in World War II. This was not a mere commemorative event. It fixed the Chinese Communist Party a the center of the anti-Japanese war and redefined China as both a founder and guardian of the postwar international order.
The victory narrative has been repeated ever since.
The parade held in 2025 was not about honoring the past, but about legitimizing present strategic realities -- rivalry with the United States and Japan and rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Past wars have become political assets deployed to support current diplomatic and security objectives.
If 2015 marked the moment China first converted the past into its own political achievement, 2025 marked its use of that past to legitimize a present-day confrontation between a North Korea-China-Russia bloc and the United States and its allies.
A repeated miscalculation: "Things will change when Xi comes"
One striking feature of recent history is the recurring misjudgment that accompanied Xi's rise to power. Early in his tenure, some in the West openly speculated that Xi would remove Mao's body from Tiananmen Square, release Liu Xiaobo and steer China toward reform and openness. A similar logic was applied to North Korea, where Kim Jong Un's emergence sparked hopes of reform and liberalization.
Reality proved the opposite. The Xi era brought not reform, but concentration of power; not openness, but control; not de-ideologization, but the rearmament of ideology. At the center of this shift stood history itself.
The essence of Chinese-style patriotic education
The patriotic education strengthened under Xi is not designed to encourage reflection on the past. It is designed to justify power in the present. The war against Japan is reconstructed as the exclusive achievement of the Chinese Communist Party, while Japan is portrayed as a perpetual potential enemy. Under the banner of combating "historical nihilism," critical historical research has been brought under tight control, and history and truth are reshaped according to political necessity.
This approach closely resembles the indoctrination long practiced by North Korea, an aggressive form of patriotic education that sustains regime legitimacy by cultivating hostility toward Japan.
The historical consciousness produced in this way inevitably spills over into diplomacy. Xi's remarks at Monday's recent Republic of Korea-China summit are a direct extension of this logic.
The real nature of this summit
The core of this summit was not the expansion of cooperation. It was the positioning of Republic of Korea through the medium of historical memory.
Rather than addressing present challenges, North Korea's nuclear program, the Taiwan Strait or fractures in the international order, Xi chose to summon a war from 80 years ago.
This was less a summit about the future than a political question about where Korea stands in the landscape of memory.
History matters. But when history is deployed as a diplomatic language, its purpose must be scrutinized. A diplomacy that speaks of peace while presupposing enemies, that speaks of cooperation while mobilizing memory, cannot illuminate the future.
This Republic of Korea-China summit was not about what we will do together.
It was about where you will stand.
And answering that question requires not emotion, but clarity -- clarity about history, and a decision about whether Republic of Korea will stand on the side of truth.
Jihyun Park, a British Korean Conservative politician, is a North Korean escapee who fled twice from the country -- in 1998, which resulted in a forced repatriation, and in 2008, which was successful.
3. After US raid on Venezuela, analysts weigh lessons about Russian air defenses
Summary:
Analysts caution that Venezuela’s failure to down a single U.S. aircraft says less about “Russian systems don’t work” and more about how the United States fights when it chooses to dominate the air. Venezuela fields Russian-made Igla-S MANPADS, S-300VM long-range SAMs, and Buk-M2E medium-range systems, plus Su-30s, yet the United States reportedly layered cyber, electronic attack, anti-radiation strikes, and massed airpower to clear corridors for the raid force. The takeaway is deterrence fragility: advanced gear cannot compensate for exposed emitters, static launchers, thin training, and an adversary that can close the kill chain at scale.
Comment: Again this was not LSCO, but it is useful to note that most north Korean air defense systems are based on Russian technology. We should not get cocky but we should exploit this from an information warfare perspective, for example:
If the United States can routinely suppress Russian-derived IADS at distance, what new deterrent signal can Moscow credibly offer allies and clients that does not collapse the moment U.S. air and cyber effects arrive?
After US raid on Venezuela, analysts weigh lessons about Russian air defenses - Breaking Defense
Venezuela's air defenses failed to down a single American aircraft, though experts said that could be more credit to US proficiency than the systems' own failures.
By Lee Ferran on January 06, 2026 11:57 am
breakingdefense.com · Lee Ferran
https://breakingdefense.com/2026/01/after-us-raid-on-venezuela-analysts-weigh-lessons-about-russian-air-defenses/
WASHINGTON — Ostensibly speaking about the US industrial base, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth took a short detour on Monday to take a victory lap regarding the surprise US military operation to snatch Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro in a daring nighttime raid over the weekend.
“And then we saw three nights ago in downtown Caracas in Venezuela, as nearly 200 of our greatest Americans went downtown in Caracas. Seems those Russian air defenses didn’t quite work so well, did they?” Hegseth said to some applause during a visit to shipbuilders at Newport News.
That Venezuela was guarded by Russian-provided tech was well known; Maduro himself boasted in October that he had 5,000 Russian-made anti-aircraft missiles at “key air defense positions.”
Maduro was referring specifically to Russian Igla-S man-portable (MANPAD) systems in that quote, but Venezuela was known to also employ at least two S-300VM long-range surface-to-air missile systems, an older version of Russia’s current S-400, and an “unknown number” of Buk-M2E SA-17 Grizzly medium-range surface-to-air missile systems, according to Ralph Savelsberg, a missile defense specialist at the Netherlands Defence Academy. (A US Army database of foreign weapon systems lists other systems and variations as well, though that database appears dated to around 2018.) And then there’s the Venezuelan air force, which flies some older American-made F-16s and more modern Russian-made Su-30 fighter jets.
“Tactical operating system” for warfighters has evolved to provide more situational awareness of the battlefield.
In the wake of the US successful operation — in which President Donald Trump said one helicopter was struck by fire but not a single American aircraft was shot down and no Americans were killed — the question has been raised: How good are Russian-supplied air defenses, especially after similar systems used in Iran were ineffective against US and Israeli strikes last year?
While many details have yet to emerge, Savelsberg and other analysts cautioned that in this case it could be less of a matter of the air defenses’ failings, and more the overwhelming nature of the American multi-layered electronic and kinetic assault. After all, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine said the US employed 150 aerial assets in the operation to “layer effects for a single purpose, to get an interdiction force into downtown Caracas while maintaining the element of tactical surprise.”
As Savelsberg put it, “The success of this raid is not solely a reflection of the quality, or lack thereof, of the equipment. Quantity has a quality all its own: The aircraft involved in this mission vastly outnumbered the defenses.”
Center for Strategic and International Studies analyst Mark Cancian said that “of course” going up against the US is the “most demanding scenario that these systems would face.”
“Now, to be fair to the Russians, in the Ukraine war they’ve been reasonably effective because they aren’t facing a[n] adversary as sophisticated as the United States,” Cancian said in a CSIS webinar on Monday.
Speaking on The Break Out video series by Breaking Defense, Cancian told Editor-in-Chief Aaron Mehta, “The United States probably took [Venezuelan air defenses] out several ways. Cyber might’ve been one piece of it. The United States of course has anti-radiation missiles to take out the radars themselves. We certainly used some missiles to take out the air defense facilities. Flares, chaff, self-defense systems also probably played a role.
“But the bottom line was that these systems could not face a high level air attack such as the United States can mount, and the Israelis can mount,” he said.
Savelsberg, a frequent Breaking Defense contributor, theorized that lessons from the war in Ukraine may have tipped the American advantage even further.
“Furthermore, while the Venezuelan surface-to-air missile systems are reasonably advanced, they are also used by Russia in the Ukraine war, so it is possible that the US gained considerable intelligence on their operation and, consequently, on effective electronic countermeasures,” he said in an email.
“Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war may offer another hint,” he continued. “In its 2022 attack on Ukraine, Russia succeeded in destroying a significant fraction of Ukraine’s surface-based air defenses but failed to destroy the systems that Ukraine had moved just prior to the attack. In the subsequent war, Ukraine’s air defenses never stay in the same location for very long, to prevent their destruction on the ground. Unless Venezuela frequently moved its surface-to-air missile launchers prior to the attack, the US would have known exactly which locations to strike.”
Carlton Haelig, a fellow with the Center for a New American Security, echoed the point, saying the “optimum capability” of any air defense system is going to be limited by how well it’s employed and how well-trained its operators are.
“If they hadn’t been moved, that makes them relatively easy to find and fix. You just have to close the kill-chain and destroy them,” he said.
“Ultimately,” Haelig said, “the ability to draw too much in terms of, ‘Well does that mean Russian air defenses are not that good?’ from this, or even the Iranian operations … is, to me in my mind, a little bit limited.”
Still, Cancian said the back-to-back failures in Iran and Venezuela could cause other nations, many of whom are desperate for air defenses, to think twice about purchasing from Moscow.
“I think prospective buyers have to wonder whether these systems are really capable of standing up the highest level of attack,” Cancian said on the CSIS webinar. “[If] I were a purchaser, I’d be scratching my head about just how good these systems are.”
breakingdefense.com · Lee Ferran
4. Defense chief reaffirms continued S. Korea-U.S. combined drills despite calls for adjustment
Summary:
South Korea’s defense minister, Ahn Gyu-back, said preparations for the annual U.S.-ROK combined exercises are proceeding as planned and called them a lifeline for readiness. He noted the two major drills remain Freedom Shield in spring and Ulchi Freedom Shield in summer, while leaving room to adjust if U.S.-north Korea talks gain traction. Ahn also said Seoul expects progress on conditions-based wartime operational control transfer within President Lee Jae Myung’s term, with Full Operational Capability verification likely completed by year’s end smoothly. On nuclear-powered submarines, he said an envisioned boat could deploy in the mid-2030s, pending fuel talks with Washington.
Comment: Good news. We need to prevent a reduction in readiness in return for false hopes of Kim negotiating.
Defense chief reaffirms continued S. Korea-U.S. combined drills despite calls for adjustment | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · January 7, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260107010100315
By Lee Minji
SEOUL, Jan. 7 (Yonhap) -- Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back said Wednesday that preparations for annual combined drills between South Korea and the United States are under way as planned, calling such exercises a "lifeline" for the military.
Ahn made the remarks during a television appearance amid calls for a need to readjust the military drills to help revive dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea, as both Seoul and Washington are seeking to reengage with Pyongyang.
"Drills are a lifeline for soldiers," Ahn said in a televised interview with Yonhap News TV. "Both South Korea and the U.S. are thoroughly preparing for the exercises under a roadmap, without any significant change so far."
The South Korean and U.S. militaries conduct large-scale drills twice a year -- the springtime Freedom Shield and the summertime Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises. Both militaries stress the drills are defensive in nature, but the North has denounced them as a rehearsal for invasion.
Ahn still left open the possibility of readjusting the drills, saying that the political situation could be taken into account if talks between North Korea and the U.S. materialize.
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back speaks in a parliamentary committee meeting at the National Assembly in Seoul on Jan. 7, 2026. (Yonhap)
Addressing South Korea's push to build a nuclear-powered submarine, Ahn said the envisioned vessel may be deployed as early as the mid-2030s if plans proceed smoothly.
The defense ministry has said it will seek to hold negotiations with Washington to gain access to fuel to build nuclear-powered submarines, with the aim of completing the envisioned talks within two years.
Meanwhile, Ahn said the government is expected to achieve the transfer of conditions-based wartime operational control from Washington to Seoul within President Lee Jae Myung's term ending in 2030.
"Both sides assess that significant progress has been made," Ahn said. "The verification of the Full Operational Capability (FOC) is likely to be completed without much difficulty by year-end."
FOC refers to the second part of a three-stage program to assess Seoul's capabilities to lead the allies' combined forces for the retaking of wartime control, with the South Korean military seeking to complete the phase by the next annual defense chiefs' meeting between the two countries scheduled for November.
Ahn, however, noted that the final stage depends on the decision of the leaders of the two countries and vowed utmost efforts for the envisioned plan.
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · January 7, 2026
5. Colby seeks visits to S. Korea, Japan in late Jan.: sources
Summary:
Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby is considering late-January visits to South Korea and Japan for talks with key allies, Yonhap reports. Officials are coordinating the schedule and agenda. Likely topics include South Korea’s defense-spending increase, conditions-based wartime OPCON transition, and Seoul’s nuclear-powered submarine push. Seoul did not confirm the trip.
Comment: I wonder if he is going to pre-brief the Global Force posture review before it is released? Does this telegraph potential changes to US forces structure in Korea and Japan. I would be happy to give him a brief ahead of his trip, especially on the need for a Northeast Asia Command.
Colby seeks visits to S. Korea, Japan in late Jan.: sources | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · January 7, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260107010200315
SEOUL, Jan. 7 (Yonhap) -- A senior Pentagon official is mulling back-to-back visits to South Korea and Japan later this month to discuss security issues with Asian allies, sources said Wednesday.
Officials are in the process of coordinating a schedule and agenda for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby's possible trip to the region, according to the government sources.
Alliance issues, such as South Korea's defense spending increase, the envisioned transition of wartime operational control from Washington to Seoul and Seoul's push to build a nuclear-powered submarine, are likely to be discussed should Colby visit the country.
In a social media post last month, the U.S. official called for Asian allies to "do more" for their own defense and cited South Korea as the most recent case of allied countries stepping up to meet a "new global standard" for defense spending.
Seoul's defense ministry did not verify the report, but said the South Korean and U.S. defense ministries are closely cooperating on key pending issues.
This Nov. 15, 2025, file photo shows Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby delivering a speech in Washington. (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · January 7, 2026
6. Lee returns home from China trip focused on improving ties
Summary:
POTUS Lee Jae Myung returned to Seoul after a four-day state visit to China aimed at stabilizing ties and expanding economic cooperation. In Beijing, he met Xi Jinping, pressed China to play a mediating role on the Korean Peninsula, and discussed cultural exchanges amid tension driven by north Korea’s recent missile tests and Beijing’s dispute with Japan over Taiwan. Lee also raised concerns about Chinese steel structures in overlapping Yellow Sea waters and said he expects partial removal. He met Premier Li Qiang and Zhao Leji, led a 400-member business delegation, and promoted cooperation in AI, startups, and cultural content.
Comment: I hope improving ties is not based on Korean acceptance of Chinese historical interpretation. Beware of the Chinese narrative.
(LEAD) Lee returns home from China trip focused on improving ties | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · January 7, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260107010451315?section=national/politics
(ATTN: CHANGES photos)
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Jan. 7 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung returned home Wednesday from a four-day state visit to China, where he held summit talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping to enhance economic ties and coordination on peace efforts regarding North Korea.
Lee met Xi in Beijing on Monday for the second time in two months, amid tension over North Korea's recent ballistic missile tests and China's diplomatic dispute with Japan over Taiwan.
President Lee Jae Myung (R) shakes hands with Kang Hoon-sik (2nd from L), the presidential chief of staff, upon arrival at Seoul Air Base in Seongnam, south of Seoul, on Jan. 7, 2026, from his trip to China. (Yonhap)
During the talks, Lee said he asked Xi to play a mediating role in handling issues on the Korean Peninsula, including on North Korea's nuclear program, and discussed ways to expand cultural exchanges between the two countries.
The two sides also addressed sensitive issues, including China's steel structures in overlapping waters of the Yellow Sea, which Seoul views as potential groundwork for territorial claims. Lee told reporters Wednesday that he expects Beijing to remove part of the structures, as he suggested during the talks.
President Lee Jae Myung (L), accompanied by his wife, Kim Hea Kyung, arrives at Seoul Air Base in Seongnam, south of Seoul, on Jan. 7, 2026, following his trip to China. (Yonhap)
On Tuesday, Lee held back-to-back talks with Chinese Premier Li Qiang and China's top legislator, Zhao Leji, to discuss ways to advance bilateral ties.
Accompanied by a 400-member business delegation, Lee attended a business forum in Beijing with top executives of major companies of South Korea and China to explore new areas of cooperation, including artificial intelligence and cultural content.
In Shanghai, he took part in a business event involving startup companies of the two countries, and visited a historical site that once served as the headquarters of the provisional government of the Republic of Korea during Japanese colonial rule in the early 20th century.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · January 7, 2026
7. Lee urges efforts to ease negative public sentiment between S. Korea, China
Summary:
President Lee Jae Myung urged South Korea and China to reduce mutual distrust and “unfounded” misunderstandings that have hardened negative public sentiment and slowed bilateral progress. Speaking at a Shanghai welcome dinner hosted by Party Secretary Chen Jining, Lee argued that better “good neighborly, friendly” relations are a prerequisite for expanding economic cooperation. He framed the task as practical statecraft: minimize conflict areas, maximize mutual benefit, and prioritize economic collaboration alongside culture, foreign affairs, military ties, and people-to-people exchanges. Lee also signaled interest in aligning with China’s 2026–30 development plan. In Shanghai, he tied diplomacy to history, highlighting independence-era sites and commemorations.
Comment: I am curious as to why we have never seen an effort to limit anti-American sentiment (But I think there should be no effort whatsoever to limit anti-China or anti-US sentiment but I am a free speech absolutist).
Lee urges efforts to ease negative public sentiment between S. Korea, China | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · January 6, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260106012100315
By Kim Eun-jung
SHANGHAI, Jan. 6 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung said Tuesday that South Korea and China should work to ease negative public sentiment toward each other and develop "good neighborly, friendly" relations to help expand economic cooperation.
Lee made the remarks at a welcome dinner hosted by Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Jining after arriving in Shanghai, the second and last stop of his state visit to China.
"I believe building good neighborly, friendly relations is essential when it comes to resolving economic issues," he told Chen.
President Lee Jae Myung (L) talks with Chen Jining, the Shanghai Municipal Party secretary, ahead of a dinner hosted by Chen in Shanghai on Jan. 6, 2026. (Yonhap)
He noted that "unfounded and unnecessary misunderstandings" have long hurt public sentiment in both countries and have become one of the factors hindering the development of bilateral relations.
"We need to minimize those misunderstandings and encourage more goodwill between our peoples," Lee said. "If there are areas of conflict or confrontation, we should minimize them and maximize the areas where we can benefit each other so that we can truly become good neighbors."
President Lee Jae Myung (L) shakes hands with Chen Jining, the Shanghai Municipal Party secretary, ahead of a dinner hosted by Chen in Shanghai on Jan. 6, 2026. (Yonhap)
Expressing hope that his visit would help take bilateral ties to a new level, Lee said improving economic cooperation should be a top priority among the many areas of potential collaboration, including culture, foreign affairs, military and people-to-people exchanges.
Lee also expressed hope to work together with China in its 2026-30 economic development plan to contribute and foster new growth drivers.
He said the visit to Shanghai was especially meaningful, noting that the city was a hub for the Korean independence movement during Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule and that he will visit historical sites to mark landmark anniversaries.
On Wednesday, Lee is scheduled to visit a historical site that served as the headquarters of Korea's provisional government to mark the centennial anniversary of its establishment this year. He also plans to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the birth of independence hero Kim Koo (1876-1949), who led the government in the city.
Thanking the Shanghai authorities for preserving the historical sites, Lee said, "Keeping alive the records of how we fought so fiercely to protect our national sovereignty will offer an important lesson for future generations."
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · January 6, 2026
8. Editorial: Denuclearization, Unification Absent: Lee Government's Principle?
Summary:
Chosun Ilbo faults Lee Jae-myung’s Beijing summit for omitting explicit mention of north Korea denuclearization and Korean unification. It argues Seoul promised to raise denuclearization, yet Xi said nothing and advisers offered only generic language about “peace and stability.” The editorial warns Beijing is drifting toward de facto acceptance of north Korea as nuclear, especially since Trump and the China Russia DPRK alignment. It insists denuclearization and unification remain core South Korean interests, regardless of feasibility, and that Seoul must press China publicly and consistently. Avoiding issues Kim Jong-un dislikes, it says, yields only hollow gains in the long run.
Comment: I have only fourteen words for President Lee: Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through information and human rights.
Editorial: Denuclearization, Unification Absent: Lee Government's Principle?
South Korea-China Summit Skips North Korea Discussions, Questioning Diplomatic Stance
By The Chosunilbo
Published 2026.01.07. 00:00
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/01/07/EA6SPJ3LWVD6VAZ7SUN2VIKLE4/
President Lee Jae-myung and Chinese President Xi Jinping inspect the honor guard during an official welcoming ceremony held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on the 5th. /News1
The summit talks between President Lee Jae-myung and Chinese President Xi Jinping made no mention of North Korea’s denuclearization or inter-Korean unification. The only relevant remark by President Lee was, “We will together explore feasible alternatives for peace on the Korean Peninsula.” Xi Jinping did not address the North Korean issue at all.
Prior to the visit to Beijing, the Lee Jae-myung administration stated it would discuss North Korea’s denuclearization with China. National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac remarked, “The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is an issue involving the interests of neighboring countries.” However, it appears the Chinese side did not respond positively to discussions on North Korea’s denuclearization during the talks. After the South Korea-China summit, Adviser Wi stated, “We confirmed China’s willingness to play a constructive role in achieving peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.” This was a principled statement.
Since the emergence of Trump, China has avoided mentioning North Korea’s denuclearization amid closer ties between North Korea, China, and Russia. The South Korea-China summit held in Gyeongju last November also made no reference to North Korea’s denuclearization. Chinese officials stated, “Much has changed, and conditions have shifted, so diverse approaches are needed.” This remark sounded like an acknowledgment of North Korea’s nuclear status.
From South Korea’s perspective, North Korea’s denuclearization remains an unavoidable task regardless of changes in the international landscape. The question is not whether it is immediately feasible. If South Korea, the country most directly affected, loses its resolve to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons, the international community will have no choice but to follow suit. A nightmare scenario could unfold where sanctions on North Korea are lifted while it retains its nuclear arsenal.
China’s cooperation is essential for North Korea’s denuclearization. Regardless of China’s stance or response, the South Korean president must consistently and proactively request Beijing’s cooperation on this issue. There is room for skepticism about whether President Lee did so. The current administration appears reluctant to mention anything North Korean leader Kim Jong-un dislikes, and denuclearization is what Kim dislikes the most.
The same applies to unification. In 2014, during a summit with former President Park Geun-hye, Xi Jinping stated, “We hope for the realization of independent and peaceful unification by both Koreas.” This outcome followed because the South Korean government had expressed its commitment to unification and requested China’s role. However, the Lee Jae-myung administration has made no remarks on unification. The Minister of Unification is moving toward solidifying the division. Why would China proactively mention unification first?
Diplomacy is about principles. If we avoid saying what must be said because it displeases those who threaten our security, we can achieve nothing. Even if we gain something in such a state, it will be nothing but a facade.
9. Lee says he asked China's Xi to play mediator role on Korean Peninsula
Summary:
President Lee Jae-myung said in Shanghai that he asked Xi Jinping to act as a mediator on Korean Peninsula issues, explicitly including north Korea’s nuclear weapons. Lee argued inter-Korean channels are frozen, trust is zero, and hostility is entrenched, so Seoul must understand Pyongyang’s perceptions to reopen dialogue. He said Xi urged patience and, by Lee’s account, signaled China would try to play that mediating role. Lee also claimed the summit produced more progress than expected, while reaffirming a “mutual respect, national interest” approach to South Korea China relations and seeking gradual relief on cultural restrictions.
Comment: Didn't China try to play a mediator role during the 6 Party Talks? But why would we think China would play this role? Assuming mediation could replace pressure, what concrete leverage would China actually use to change Pyongyang’s nuclear calculus rather than simply manage tensions?
(2nd LD) Lee says he asked China's Xi to play mediator role on Korean Peninsula | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Haye-ah · January 7, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260107005852315
(ATTN: UPDATES with more quotes, details; ADDS photo)
SHANGHAI, Jan. 7 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung said Wednesday that he asked Chinese President Xi Jinping to play the role of a mediator on the Korean Peninsula, including on the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons.
Lee made the remark in Shanghai after holding a summit with Xi in Beijing on Monday as part of his ongoing state visit to the country.
"There's something I asked for from the Chinese side," he said during a luncheon with reporters accompanying him on the trip. "I would like (China) to play the role of a mediator on Korean Peninsula issues, including on the North Korean nuclear issue."
Lee said he explained that all channels between the two Koreas have been blocked, with "zero trust" and only hostility remaining between the sides.
President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a press conference at a hotel in Shanghai on Jan. 7, 2026. (Yonhap)
"President Xi noted the efforts until now and said patience is needed," he said, expressing his agreement with the idea. "For quite a long time, we've effectively taken military offensive action against North Korea. North Korea was likely extremely nervous. In order to have dialogue with a counterpart, we have to understand the position of the other side."
Lee said that in response to his request, the Chinese side said it would work to play a mediator's role.
Beijing, Pyongyang's main ally and economic benefactor, has long been considered to have crucial leverage over the North's decision-making.
Lee's comments came as critics have raised questions about why the issue of North Korea's denuclearization was not explicitly mentioned in Cheong Wa Dae's briefing on the outcome of this week's summit.
"I think there was more progress than expected during this visit to China," Lee said, claiming the two sides shared an understanding on various issues and found ways to smoothly resolve other issues on which they could disagree.
"The government of the Republic of Korea plans to manage South Korea-China relations on the principle of mutual respect and placing one's national interest at the center so that they don't tilt to one side or get swayed by emotions," he said.
Reporters raise their hands to ask questions to President Lee Jae Myung during a luncheon at a hotel in Shanghai on Jan. 7, 2026. (Yonhap)
Lee fielded a wide range of questions, including on China's ban on Korean cultural content in the country and steel structures set up by Beijing in overlapping waters in the Yellow Sea.
He expressed optimism on the cultural content ban, which Beijing imposed in retaliation for Seoul's 2016 decision to host a U.S. THAAD antimissile battery on its soil. China has never formally acknowledged the existence of the restrictions.
"The Chinese government has until now said the ban doesn't exist, but this time there was something different in their expression," Lee said, quoting Xi as likening the situation to a large lump of ice that melts gradually or a fruit that falls from the tree when it ripens.
"I think that's an accurate expression," he said, adding that Xi instructed relevant government agencies to conduct detailed discussions. "It will be resolved gradually and in stages, in an orderly manner."
On the structures in the Yellow Sea, Lee sought to clarify that the two countries each have exclusive zones in the Yellow Sea and an overlapping area that they manage jointly.
The Chinese structures, he said, cross "slightly" into the overlapping waters but not into South Korea's exclusive zone.
"We decided to hold working-level talks to draw a line exactly through the middle," he said.
On tensions between China and Japan, which appeared to intensify this week with Beijing's decision to ban exports of dual-use items to the country, Lee struck a cautious tone.
"I think what we can do is very limited for now," he said, noting the export control issue is complex and deep-rooted. "When the time comes, and the situation allows for it, we will look for a role we can play."
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Haye-ah · January 7, 2026
10. S. Korea to import over 2 mln eggs from U.S. amid fast spread of bird flu
Comment: That's a lot of omelets.
S. Korea to import over 2 mln eggs from U.S. amid fast spread of bird flu | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Na-young · January 7, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260107007200320
SEOUL, Jan. 7 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will import 2.24 million fresh eggs from the United States this month to help stabilize domestic egg prices amid the recent spread of highly contagious avian influenza (AI), the agriculture ministry said Wednesday.
The eggs will be purchased by the Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corp., and distributed to supermarkets and food ingredient suppliers here, according to the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs.
It will mark the first time in two years for South Korea to purchase U.S.-produced eggs. Seoul last imported U.S. eggs in January 2024, a ministry official said.
The move is part of a preemptive measure against a potential egg supply shortage, as the country has been coping with the spread of highly contagious bird flu in recent months.
Since the start of the cold season, more than 4.32 million laying hens have been culled at farms affected by AI, according to the ministry.
The ministry said the country's egg supply currently remains stable, with the number of laying hens growing 1.2 percent from a year earlier as of end-2025, though its daily egg production dropped 1.1 percent to 49 million over the cited period.
South Korea has confirmed more than 30 cases of highly contagious AI at poultry farms this winter as of Monday.
Eggs at a supermarket in Seoul on Jan. 7, 2026 (Yonhap)
nyway@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Na-young · January 7, 2026
11. N. Korea touts achievements in 'rural revolution' ahead of key party congress
Summary:
Yonhap reports that north Korea’s Rodong Sinmun is touting a “new-era rural revolution” ahead of the expected ninth Workers’ Party congress in January or February. The paper praises farm-village construction, higher output, improved technology and rural conditions at home, but offers no figures, framing it as a major five-year achievement.
Comment: Are no figures offered because no one would believe them anyway?
N. Korea touts achievements in 'rural revolution' ahead of key party congress | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · January 7, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260107004800315
SEOUL, Jan. 7 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Wednesday hailed the country's endeavors in achieving a "rural revolution" as the regime is set to hold the ninth party congress early this year.
The Rodong Sinmun, North Korea's most widely read newspaper, carried the report, praising the construction of farm villages as an "immortal journey" that has stood out prominently over the past five years.
The paper cited rural achievements, such as increased agricultural output, advances in farming technologies and improvements in the rural environment, but did not provide any specific figures.
"The new-era rural revolution is an undertaking that is unprecedented in the country's socialist construction in terms of the range and depth of its transformation and the magnitude of its tasks," the newspaper said.
The North Korean party is expected to convene its ninth party congress in January or February, at which a new five-year development plan is expected to be formulated. It will mark the first party congress since the eighth in 2021, where a five-year economic development plan was adopted.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is depicted in a mosaic mural installed at a newly built rural housing complex in North Hamgyong Province, in this file photo carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Nov. 27, 2025. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sookim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · January 7, 2026
12. Hwasong-20 ICBM: North Korea’s “doomsday missile” that can hit every US city
Summary:
north Korea’s Hwasong-20, first displayed at the Workers’ Party 80th-anniversary parade in October 2025, is portrayed by Pyongyang as its most powerful nuclear strategic weapon. Analysts describe it as a solid-fuel ICBM that can be readied and launched faster than older liquid-fuel missiles and may be designed to carry multiple warheads, complicating missile defense planning. Public estimates place its potential reach in the intercontinental class, theoretically putting all U.S. cities within range, but open sources cannot confirm real accuracy, reliability, or payload until more flight testing is observed. Until telemetry and test history are clearer, treat performance claims cautiously today.
Comment: I will defer to our missile experts for assessment.
Hwasong-20 ICBM: North Korea’s “doomsday missile” that can hit every US city
wionews.com
Edited By Abhinav Yadav
Published: Jan 05, 2026, 21:18 IST | Updated: Jan 05, 2026, 21:18 IST
https://www.wionews.com/photos/hwasong-20-icbm-north-korea-s-doomsday-missile-that-can-hit-every-us-city-1767626779391
North Korea has unveiled the Hwasong-20, a solid-fuel ICBM with a 15,000 km range capable of striking anywhere in the US. Featuring a new engine and potential for multiple warheads, it is described by Pyongyang as its most powerful strategic weapon to date.
1 / 7
Hwasong-20
North Korea displayed the Hwasong-20 for the first time in October 2025 during the 80th-anniversary parade of the Workers’ Party. State media KCNA officially designated it as the nation’s ‘most powerful nuclear strategic weapon’ to date.
2 / 7
(Photograph: X)
Striking the US mainland Range exceeds 15,000 kilometres
Military experts estimate the Hwasong-20 has an operational range of over 15,000 kilometres. This capability ensures that every major city in the United States, including Washington D.C. and New York, is well within its striking distance.
3 / 7
(Photograph: X)
Faster launch capability Advanced solid-fuel engine
Unlike older liquid-fuel missiles, the Hwasong-20 uses a high-thrust solid-fuel engine made with carbon fibre composites. This allows the missile to be fuelled in advance and launched in minutes, making it much harder for satellite systems to detect and intercept.
4 / 7
(Photograph: AFP)
Multiple warhead potential Designed to overwhelm defences
The missile features a blunter, wider nose cone compared to previous models like the Hwasong-19. Analysts believe this design change allows it to carry Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), letting one missile strike several targets simultaneously.
5 / 7
(Photograph: X)
Massive mobile launcher Transported on 11-axle vehicle
The Hwasong-20 is carried on a massive 11-axle Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL), highlighting its sheer size and mobility. The launch vehicle features a central erection mechanism similar to Russian designs, improving stability during the firing sequence.
6 / 7
(Photograph: X)
40 per cent more power Major engine performance boost
According to North Korean defence reports, the new solid-fuel engine generates roughly 200 tonnes of thrust. This represents a 40 per cent increase in power over the Hwasong-18, enabling the missile to carry heavier nuclear payloads over greater distances.
7 / 7
(Photograph: AFP)
The ‘Doomsday’ deterrent Kim Jong Un’s ultimate weapon
Leader Kim Jong Un has framed the Hwasong-20 as the cornerstone of his war deterrent strategy. By combining rapid launch times with the ability to defeat US missile shields, Pyongyang views this weapon as its primary guarantee against foreign military intervention.
wionews.com
13. President Lee Invokes Penguin Metaphor for Inter-Korean Dialogue
Summary:
President Lee Jae-myung invoked a penguin metaphor to signal renewed interest in inter-Korean dialogue, referencing Pororo, a rare product of past South-North cooperation. Writing on X after returning from China, Lee framed coexistence as biological necessity, not sentiment. The post was widely read as an overture to Kim Jong-un, reinforced by Lee’s request that Xi Jinping act as mediator. Beijing urged patience, echoed by Li Qiang. Notably, denuclearization was downplayed, raising questions about whether symbolism is substituting for strategy.
Comment: I was unfamiliar with this analogy.
President Lee Invokes Penguin Metaphor for Inter-Korean Dialogue
References 'Pororo' animation to symbolize interdependence amid push for North Korea talks
By Kim Tae-jun
Published 2026.01.07. 21:52
Updated 2026.01.07. 22:30https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/01/07/WZYQB7RMVBAGNFZ52R62DXK2G4/
President Lee Jae-myung, who returned to South Korea on the 7th after a state visit to China, wrote on his X (formerly Twitter) account: “Someday, the Korean Peninsula will overcome chaos and hostility, and a day will come when we respect and coexist for mutual prosperity. I hope the North also receives much blessings in the new year.” He added, “Let’s meet, Bbo Jae-myeong and Bbo Jeong-eun.”
The penguin photo shared by President Lee was posted in early this month by *Hankyoreh21*. In the article, it was stated, “‘Pororo the Little Penguin’ is an animation born in 2003 through the combined wisdom and technology of the South and North. (Penguins) are animals that have the instinct to die if they do not live together. Can’t we engrave such genes in the South and North? Can’t Bbo Jae-myeong and Bbo Jeong-eun meet with Pororo in between?” President Lee appears to have quoted this passage.
His post, made immediately after returning from his trip to China, is interpreted as a strong will to actively pursue a meeting with Kim Jong-un. During this visit, President Lee directly requested Chinese President Xi Jinping to act as a mediator. At a press briefing in Shanghai on the same day, he said, “All communication channels with North Korea are currently blocked, and hostility has surpassed the level of zero trust. We requested that China play a mediating role for peace.”
Both President Xi and Chinese Premier Li Qiang responded in unison that “patience is necessary.” President Lee added, “China agreed that easing long-standing hostility requires time and the roles of surrounding countries.”
However, it is known that North Korea’s denuclearization was not deeply discussed during the summit. President Lee stated, “We had in-depth discussions for a long time on peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. However, only some details were announced, as disclosing all content could lead to unnecessary misunderstandings.”
Meanwhile, President Lee arrived at Seongnam Airport around 9:37 p.m. on the same day, three days after departing for Beijing on the 4th. Based on the timing, it is observed that he wrote the X post while on the presidential aircraft during his return trip.
· This article has been translated by Upstage Solar AI.
14. Why China Stopped Publicly Urging for North Korean Denuclearization
Summary:
China has stopped publicly urging north Korea to denuclearize and now frames peninsula issues as needing a “fair and impartial” approach, signaling reduced willingness to contest Pyongyang’s de facto nuclear status. Beijing sees more utility in keeping a nuclear-armed north Korea close as U.S. China tensions rise over Taiwan and as Pyongyang’s growing arsenal helps pin down U.S. military resources. China also wants to retain patron influence and prevent deeper north Korea drift into Moscow’s orbit. A China defense white paper omitted denuclearization, while POTUS’s December NSS likewise downplayed it. With China and Russia shielding Pyongyang from more sanctions, leverage is limited and talks remain unlikely.
Comment: Perhaps because the status quo is best for China until there is change inside north Korea ,
Why China Stopped Publicly Urging for North Korean Denuclearization
Beijing has fewer reasons to alienate Pyongyang, turning down chances to openly back disarmament such as at a state visit by South Korea’s president
By Dasl Yoon
Follow
Jan. 5, 2026 7:36 am ET
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/why-china-stopped-publicly-urging-for-north-korean-denuclearization-8872b47a?st=qHVh3H
Chinese leader Xi Jinping and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung in Beijing on Monday. Yonhap News Agency/Yonhap News Agency/Reuters
Quick Summary
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China has shifted its public stance on North Korea’s denuclearization, now advocating for a “fair and impartial” approach.View more
SEOUL—At a Monday meeting in Beijing, South Korea’s leader broached with Xi Jinping one of China’s most striking foreign-policy pivots in recent memory: North Korea’s denuclearization.
Xi and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung expressed a desire to maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia, according to footage aired by state broadcaster China Central Television. The left-leaning Lee vowed to work with China to explore viable measures to foster peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Beijing had long openly opposed North Korea’s push to obtain nuclear weapons, often mentioning denuclearization as a goal with the regime of its leader, Kim Jong Un. But more recently, China has stopped making such calls publicly, opting to instead push for a “fair and impartial” approach toward peace on the Korean Peninsula—suggesting Beijing won’t contest Pyongyang’s de facto nuclear status.
That doesn’t mean South Korea can—or will—stop asking China for help in slowing Pyongyang’s efforts to build out its nuclear arsenal, even if the answer, ultimately, is no. Xi likely now sees more utility in keeping a nuclear-armed North close as tensions rise with the U.S. over Taiwan, security experts say. China’s sway looks also more limited, given how Kim’s nuclear stockpile and resolve in keeping his atomic bombs have only grown with time.
The shifting rhetoric on Kim’s nuclear arsenal reflects a new reality where China, despite remaining North Korea’s economic lifeline, increasingly lacks the incentive to apply pressure on Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversaw a test-launch on Sunday of what Pyongyang’s state media claimed were hypersonic missiles. KCNA/Associated Press
In late November, China, for the first time in nearly two decades, omitted any mention of North Korean disarmament from a periodically released defense white paper that articulates its stance on global threats. Meanwhile, the Trump administration in December made no reference to North Korea or denuclearization in the U.S.’s National Security Strategy document, which outlines Washington’s defense strategies and, in years past, called for the country to give up such arms. White House officials have subsequently said Washington is still committed to the “complete denuclearization” of North Korea.
The Trump administration hasn’t made Pyongyang’s denuclearization a central condition to Washington-Beijing relations, said Patricia M. Kim, a China expert at the Brookings Institution, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank. “Absent such pressure, Beijing has little reason to recalibrate its hands-off approach,” she said.
Russia’s backing and China’s hesitation to openly call for denuclearization have emboldened North Korea to call its nuclear status “irreversible.” With those two powers providing a shield against additional United Nations sanctions, Pyongyang has vowed to expand its nuclear program, leaving Washington and its allies facing a nuclear-armed axis.
On Sunday, Kim oversaw a test-launch of what Pyongyang’s state media claimed were hypersonic missiles—capabilities that underscored a need for a “nuclear war deterrent,” the North Korean leader was quoted as saying.
China’s calculations have also likely shifted, now seeing North Korea as essential for pinning down American military resources that could otherwise be deployed to counter Chinese moves in the Taiwan Strait. Xi is also seeking to maintain its influence as North Korea’s primary patron and prevent Pyongyang from drifting further into Moscow’s orbit.
Ahead of Monday’s Xi-Lee summit, Seoul officials said the two leaders would discuss denuclearization, expressing South Korea’s concerns over Pyongyang’s evolving nuclear threats. Xi hosted Lee at a Chinese state guesthouse that once served as a venue for North Korean denuclearization talks. That round of diplomacy, starting in 2003, featured the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the U.S. in an arrangement known as the “Six-Party Talks.” The multilateral effort to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear program broke down as North Korea withdrew from the talks in 2009.
China, alongside Russia, backed tighter sanctions against the Kim regime as recently as 2017 during President Trump’s first term, when the U.N. passed sweeping restrictions after a spree of North Korean weapons tests. Since then, China has publicly supported North Korea’s denuclearization—at least until more recently, when it toned down its language to call for peace. Both China and Russia have shifted blame toward the U.S. for escalating military tensions.
Beijing’s influence on Pyongyang has diminished because of the Kim regime’s closer relations with Moscow, and Xi appears to have little power to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table to advance denuclearization, said Victor Cha, the Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank.
“The only one who could bring North Korea back to the table is probably Trump himself,” Cha said. “But for North Korea there would have to be no conditions for denuclearization.”
Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com
Copyright ©2026 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the January 6, 2026, print edition as 'Visit Highlights Shift By China on Pyongyang'.
15. N. Korea limits Pyongyang residency for fallen soldiers’ families amid loyalty checks
Summary:
north Korea is offering Pyongyang residency to families of soldiers killed fighting in Russia, but the privilege is tightly controlled. The regime is limiting eligibility to immediate relatives only, and it is verifying family ties through joint military and party lists. Grandparents and siblings do not qualify, even if they live together. Authorities are considering new housing in place for those excluded, and some eligible families may trade Pyongyang residency for homes where they already live. State security is running loyalty and reputation checks to screen out anyone deemed unreliable. The aim is to reward sacrifice, suppress discontent, and control information about the Russia deployment.
Comment: There is only one success and survival criteria for every individual Korean in the north: demonstrated personal loyalty to Kim Jong Un.
N. Korea limits Pyongyang residency for fallen soldiers’ families amid loyalty checks
State security is vetting families for party loyalty as authorities balance rewarding sacrifice with maintaining control over information about troops in Russia
By Seon Hwa - January 7, 2026
https://www.dailynk.com/english/n-korea-limits-pyongyang-residency-for-fallen-soldiers-families-amid-loyalty-checks/
Rodong Sinmun reported on July 27 , 2025, that "respected comrade Kim Jong-un visited the Korean War Veterans Cemetery on July 26 in commemoration of the 72nd anniversary of Victory Day." (Rodong Sinmun·News1)
North Korea plans to grant Pyongyang residency to families of soldiers killed fighting in Russia, but it’s strictly limiting the privilege to immediate relatives and conducting thorough background checks to prevent an influx of provincial residents into the capital.
Multiple sources in North Korea say the military and ruling party are jointly preparing eligibility lists and verifying family relationships.
Kim Jong Un announced the initiative during an August 2024 meeting with bereaved families. “The Workers’ Party and the state will work diligently so that you can begin happy lives in Pyongyang with the respect and admiration of the entire country,” Kim said.
Relocating bereaved families to Pyongyang is the first step toward fulfilling Kim’s pledge.
The regime has limited eligibility to immediate family members—parents, spouses, and children—to prevent too many people from gaining Pyongyang residency. Grandparents and siblings apparently don’t qualify, even if they currently live with eligible relatives.
The state is exploring giving ineligible family members new housing in their current locations instead.
While grandparents of deceased soldiers cannot move to Pyongyang, eligible family members may have the option of forfeiting their capital residency in exchange for new homes where they currently live.
“The reason the military and Workers’ Party are so thoroughly vetting immediate family members is to prevent the capital from being overrun by provincial residents,” a source explained.
North Koreans view Pyongyang residency as a privilege reserved for certain classes. The regime appears to be granting it to bereaved families both to dampen public discontent about the Russian deployment and to keep those families from leaking information about it.
Loyalty screenings and control measures
State security agencies are investigating bereaved family members’ attitudes in organizational activities, their loyalty to the ruling party, and their reputation among friends and relatives.
These background checks ensure that no one of questionable party loyalty receives Pyongyang residency.
“Bringing fallen soldiers’ family members to Pyongyang is preferential treatment, but it’s also designed to keep them under strict control,” said a military source familiar with the developments.
That suggests regime concerns about bereaved families potentially leaking information about the Russian troop deployment.
“The number of bereaved family members who actually get Pyongyang residency may be fewer than expected. Given how strictly they’re being vetted, even immediate family won’t be allowed to live in Pyongyang if there are any doubts about their loyalty,” the source said.
Read in Korean
16. North Korea’s car wash boom: fines drive demand, donju seize opportunity
Summary:
north Korea is seeing a boom in informal, for-profit car washes as vehicle ownership expands and drivers fear fines at city checkpoints for dirty exteriors. Traffic rules reportedly bar filthy cars from entering Pyongyang and major provincial cities, and violations can trigger onerous paperwork and steep penalties, so drivers clean up before entering urban areas. Donju are investing in car wash lots, often on city outskirts to reduce scrutiny for “non-socialist” activity and to manage wastewater runoff. The business model relies on low-cost day labor, paying vulnerable workers a small daily wage in Chinese yuan that can outperform market earnings. Fees per wash are higher, yielding steady profits, though participants expect potential police crackdowns as the sector grows.
Comment; There is discretionary money because of the markets.
North Korea’s car wash boom: fines drive demand, donju seize opportunity
Informal operations are springing up on city outskirts, creating day labor jobs while donju profit from drivers' fear of checkpoint fines
By Lee Chae Eun - January 7, 2026
https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-koreas-car-wash-boom-fines-drive-demand-donju-seize-opportunity/
A North Korean traffic police officer in blue uniform directs traffic on a main street in Pyongyang, standing next to a police patrol car with emergency lights. The scene shows typical urban traffic including public buses and private vehicles in North Korea's capital city. Photo taken in 2018 during the inter-Korean summit. (Korea Summit Press Pool)
As car culture spreads across North Korea, a new industry is booming: for-profit car washes. Drivers are desperate to keep their vehicles spotless, knowing that dirty cars can mean hefty fines at checkpoints.
“Some donju in Hamhung have recently been investing in car washes. Many are opening because more cars are on the road and dirty vehicles aren’t allowed in the city,” a source in South Hamgyong province told Daily NK recently, referring to North Korea’s wealthy entrepreneurs.
Traffic regulations prohibit vehicles with filthy exteriors from entering Pyongyang or major provincial cities. Even drivers returning from long trips must clean their cars before entering urban areas or face fines.
Those caught with unwashed vehicles must complete time-consuming paperwork, including written statements, and pay fines that can reach hundreds of thousands of North Korean won. To avoid the hassle, many drivers make car washes a priority before reaching checkpoints.
Despite the sharp increase in vehicles on North Korean roads, car washes remain scarce, leaving drivers frustrated. Enterprising individuals have filled the gap by opening informal operations, hiring day laborers to wash cars on rented or purchased lots.
In Hamhung, where traffic is growing heavier, many people have recently entered the car wash business. Most operate on the city’s outskirts—partly to avoid authorities, since running for-profit businesses without state permission can be punished as “non-socialist activity.”
The peripheral locations also solve a practical problem: wastewater disposal. Only the outskirts offer space to handle the runoff from washing vehicles, the source explained.
Day labor opportunity for the struggling
The car wash boom has created an income source for some of North Korea’s most financially vulnerable people.
“Donju in the car wash business pay workers between 7 and 10 Chinese yuan (roughly $1-$1.40) per day, regardless of how many vehicles they wash. That’s enough to buy over a kilogram of rice—actually better than daily earnings at the jangmadang. So people with tight finances want these jobs,” the source said, referring to North Korea’s markets.
In Hamhung, washing a vehicle costs at least 20 Chinese yuan (about $2.75). Prices can reach 60 yuan (roughly $8.25) depending on the vehicle’s size and condition.
“While some days bring no customers, there are typically two vehicles a day. That gives owners steady income and helps workers support themselves,” the source said.
North Korea has imported more vehicles through state-condoned smuggling and last year legalized individual vehicle ownership. The result is a growing number of unofficial automotive businesses that let donju accumulate capital while providing disadvantaged people with day labor opportunities.
But as privately operated car washes proliferate, some worry the regime will start making examples of these businesses.
“Since the car wash industry is currently expanding, police may crack down with unannounced raids. We’ll have to see how long these operations can keep turning a profit,” the source said.
17.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Executive Director, Korea Regional Review
Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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