Quotes of the Day:
"One must be sane to think clearly, but one can think deeply and be quite insane."
- Nikola Tesla
“[Democracy] is the line that forms on the right. It is the don’t in don’t shove. It is the hole in the stuffed shirt through which the sawdust slowly trickles; it is the dent in the high hat. Democracy is the recurrent suspicion that more than half of the people are right more than half of the time. It is the feeling of privacy in the voting booths, the feeling of communion in the libraries, the feeling of vitality everywhere. Democracy is a letter to the editor. Democracy is the score at the beginning of the ninth. It is an idea which hasn’t been disproved yet, a song the words of which have not gone bad. It’s the mustard on the hot dog and the cream in the rationed coffee. Democracy is a request from a War Board, in the middle of a morning in the middle of a war, wanting to know what democracy is.”
― E.B. White
“Unpopular ideas can be silenced, and inconvenient facts kept dark, without the need for any official ban... Anyone who challenges the prevailing orthodoxy finds himself silenced with surprising effectiveness. A genuinely unfashionable opinion is almost never given a fair hearing, either in the popular press or in the highbrow periodicals.”
― George Orwell, Animal Farm
1. Another North Korean “Hypersonic” Missile?
2. [Washington Talk] "North Korea launches 'ballistic missile'... U.S. 'Security Council meeting' convened
3. How North Korea graduated from Russian Scud-B to hypersonic missiles
4. ONN Brief: Analysis on the 5 January 2022 Hypersonic Missile Test of the DPRK
5. A South Korean village is protesting U.S. plans for THAAD missile defense upgrades
6. What do we know about North Korea's missiles?
7. Thousands of North Koreans gather for huge pro-military rally
8. Sinpo-class Submarine Damaged During October 19 Test Launch
9. Beijing Winter Olympics: China ‘fully understands’ why North Korea will stay away
10. North Korea’s Strict COVID-19 Policies Undermine Kim Jong Un’s Goal of Ending Hunger
11. Why we keep getting North Korea wrong
12. Hair loss emerges as new election issue in South Korea
1. Another North Korean “Hypersonic” Missile?
Useful analysis. I tried to make this point on VOA's Washington Talk today.
As with the Hwasong-8, the new missile would only make a niche contribution to the North’s existing large ballistic missile force, primarily in providing another option to evade missile defenses.[7] It is unclear why the North might be pursuing two types of “hypersonic” missiles or two types of “hypersonic” payloads for essentially the same missile. The two types might be competitors for the same role, fulfill two different targeting needs, or be intended to provide extra bang for North Korea’s political and propaganda buck. Regardless, if the North intends to deploy either system as a credible weapon, it will need at least a few more successful and longer-range tests, probably taking at least a few years.
Another North Korean “Hypersonic” Missile?
Information to Date
(Source: Rodong Sinmun)
On January 5, the South Korean and Japanese governments reported that North Korea had launched a ballistic missile. The missile reportedly flew about 500 km into the East Sea/Sea of Japan. (No source has thus far reported the altitude reached by the flight.)
The next day, North Korea announced the test launch of an unnamed “hypersonic missile” that “precisely hit a set target 700 km away.”[1] The missile’s “detached hypersonic gliding warhead… made a 120 km lateral movement… from the initial launch azimuth to the target azimuth,” combining “multi-stage gliding jump flight” and this “strong lateral movement,” which was termed a “new” technique. The test also was said to have verified “the reliability of fuel ampoule system under the winter weather conditions.”[2]
“The successive successes in the test launches in the hypersonic missile sector have strategic significance in that they hasten a task for modernizing strategic armed force of the state…and help fulfill the most important core task out of the five top priority tasks for the strategic arms sector in the five-year plan,” the North Koreans announced. They also published a single photograph of a non-canisterized, liquid-propellant missile with a conical, finned payload just alighting from a road-mobile launcher.
Analysis
A number of important points emerge from the recent test:
MaRV or Boost-Glide Vehicle?
The missile in the photograph appears to be one of those displayed by North Korea in October 2021 at the “The Defence Development Exhibition Self-Defense 2021,” nearby the “hypersonic missile Hwasong-8” launched on September 28, 2021.[3] Both missiles appear to use the same or a similar booster (resembling a shortened version of the Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile [IRBM]), but have different payloads. The September 2021 Hwasong-8’s arrow-shaped payload strongly resembles the boost-glide vehicle (BGV) used with the Chinese DF-17 missile, while the January 2022 missile’s payload resembles a traditional maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) akin to that on the North Korean KN-18 variant of the Scud short-range ballistic missile and the 1980s US Pershing-II medium-range ballistic missile.
However, it is not clear from the available data whether the payload of the January 2022 missile is a traditional MaRV or a conical boost-glide vehicle (BGV) like the US Common-Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB).[4] Either one, as well as a standard ballistic reentry vehicle, would technically be “hypersonic” (i.e., travel at speeds better than Mach 5) when launched from a booster of the size shown by North Korea. State media’s reference to the January test combining “multi-stage gliding jump flight” (which sounds like a BGV) and “strong lateral movement” (which sounds like a MaRV) does not help resolve this question. A BGV would be capable of greater speed and maneuverability, and would be more technically demanding than a MaRV, but either type of payload would be useful in evading US and allied missile defenses.
More Clarity on the September 2021 Hwasong-8 Launch
The information released by North Korea on January 6 clarified two aspects of the September 2021 launch:
-
The depiction of a road-mobile launcher for the January 2022 test, and Japanese reporting that this test was conducted from the same general location as the September 2021 launch, lends further credence to the original assessment that the September test was conducted from a mobile launcher. (North Korea did not announce the launcher type in September and only showed photos of the missile in flight, not the launcher.)
-
The January announcement may also have resolved some of the confusion the North Koreans created in their September 2021 attribution of “missile fuel ampoules” to the Hwasong-8. Some analysts took this to mean that the missile was transported in and launched from a canister, which they assessed would permit the missile to be maintained “pre-fueled” and “launch-ready for years.” But the January 2022 photo shows that the new missile (and thus presumably the Hwasong-8, which uses the same or similar booster and probably also was launched from a mobile launcher) is not canisterized, and the North announced that the new missile also uses the “fuel ampoule system.”
-
This seems to confirm that “ampoulization” is not canisterization but akin to the Soviet/Russian practice of preloading submarine-launched ballistic missiles with propellants at the factory and maintaining the fueled missile as a sealed unit for loading into the launcher. As noted previously, it is in fact not “ampoulization” or canisterization but the use of storable liquid propellants in missiles like the Hwasong-8 and the new system that permit such missiles to remain fueled on a day-to-day basis.[5]
Possible Implications for Long-Range Missile Reliability
The rocket engines used in the September and January tests probably are the same type used (in different configurations) in the North’s Hwasong-12 IRBM and Hwasong-14 and –15 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), none of which have been flight tested since 2017. (The same engine probably also is used in the large ICBM North Korea paraded in October 2020 and has not yet been flight tested.) The fact that both of the “hypersonic” systems apparently functioned successfully through the boost phase will probably give the North a bit of comfort that these larger systems have some degree of launch reliability.
Implications
The North clearly enjoys the sense of military threat and technological prowess conveyed by having “hypersonic missiles.” Interestingly, the January 6 announcement called hypersonic missiles “the most important core task out of the five top priority tasks for the strategic arms sector in the five-year plan,” while the announcement of the September 28 test called them just “one of 5 top-priority tasks of the five-year plan.”[6]
As with the Hwasong-8, the new missile would only make a niche contribution to the North’s existing large ballistic missile force, primarily in providing another option to evade missile defenses.[7] It is unclear why the North might be pursuing two types of “hypersonic” missiles or two types of “hypersonic” payloads for essentially the same missile. The two types might be competitors for the same role, fulfill two different targeting needs, or be intended to provide extra bang for North Korea’s political and propaganda buck. Regardless, if the North intends to deploy either system as a credible weapon, it will need at least a few more successful and longer-range tests, probably taking at least a few years.
- [1]
The difference between the 500-km range reported by Japan and the 700-km range reported by North Korea probably is due to the final leg of the missile’s flight occurring below Japanese radar coverage. This is often the case with North Korean missiles that maneuver in the final phase, and this time, Japan recognized that possibility by noting the 500-km figure applied “if it is a normal suborbital orbit.” See also: Joseph Dempsey, Twitter post, January 5, 2022, 6:07 p.m., https://twitter.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1478865668510474242.
- [2]
See: Ankit Panda, Twitter post, January 5, 2022, 4:09 p.m., https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1478835947584241668?s=20; “Defence Development Exhibition Self-Defence 2021 Opens in Splendour Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Commemorative Speech at Opening Ceremony,” Foundation of the Korean Friendship Association, October 14, 2021; and “Hypersonic Missile Newly Developed by Academy of Defence Science Test-Fired,” Rodong Sinmun, January 6, 2022.
- [3]
Ibid.
- [4]
See: Brad Lendon and Yoonjung Seo, “North Korea claims to be testing the world’s most advanced weapon. Experts are doubtful,” CNN, January 6, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/06/asia/north-korea-missile-test-explained-intl-hnk-ml/index.html; Ankit Panda, Twitter post, January 5, 2022, 4:09 p.m., https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1478835947584241668?s=20; and Kyle Mizokami, “Trump’s ‘Super Duper Missile’ Is Actually Super Duper Real,” Popular Mechanics, July 20, 2020, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/research/a33369447/trump-super-duper-missile-facts.
- [5]
- [6]
“Hypersonic Missile Newly Developed by Academy of Defence Science Test-Fired,” KCNA, September 29, 2021.
- [7]
See: Vann H. Van Diepen, “Six Takeaways From North Korea’s “Hypersonic Missile” Announcement,” 38 North, October 13, 2021; and Joseph Dempsey, Twitter post, January 5, 2022, 6:07 p.m.
2. [Washington Talk] "North Korea launches 'ballistic missile'... U.S. 'Security Council meeting' convened
VOA journalist Kim Young-gyo hosted Ken Gause and me to discuss north Korea this morning. Note that the primary target audience is the elite in north Korea so consider that when you listen to our remarks.
The video is in English with Korean subtitles.
[Washington Talk] "North Korea launches 'ballistic missile'... U.S. 'Security Council meeting' convened
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North Korea has launched a ballistic missile for the first time in five days since the new year. It is an armed demonstration that took place only a few days after a plenary meeting at the end of last year, after the declaration of military reinforcement. The United States expressed its condemnation and requested the convening of an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council along with five other countries, including Britain and France. We will analyze the intention of the North Korean authorities to launch the first ballistic missile test in 2022 and the future US response with experts. Moderator: Kim Young-kyo / Conversation: David Maxwell (Senior Research Fellow, Democracy Defense Foundation), Ken Gause (Head of the Naval Analysis Center, Naval Analysis Center)
3. How North Korea graduated from Russian Scud-B to hypersonic missiles
Some background to bring us up to date with this year's first test.
Excerpts:
In its first major weapons test of 2022, North Korea said it has carried out a second hypersonic missile test, with a warhead capable of gliding as well as lateral movement during flight.
The test on Wednesday "reconfirmed the flight control and stability of the missile in the active-flight stage and assessed the performance of the new lateral movement technique applied to the detached hypersonic gliding warhead", KCNA said.
The launch also verified the "fuel ampoule system under winter weather conditions", it added.
Seoul and Tokyo had detected the launch of a suspected ballistic missile from North Korea that fell in the sea east of the Korean peninsula.
The United States condemned the launch and urged Pyongyang to sit down for talks.
How North Korea graduated from Russian Scud-B to hypersonic missiles
North Korea said it has conducted a second hypersonic missile test, a sophisticated technology it is pursuing as a top priority for its arsenal.
North Korea's Scud-B missile
North Korea said Thursday it has conducted a second hypersonic missile test, a sophisticated technology it is pursuing as a top priority for its arsenal.
North Korea started working in the late 1970s on a version of the Soviet Scud-B missile with a range of around 300 kilometres carrying out its first test in 1984.
Between 1987 and 1992, it developed longer-range missiles, including the Taepodong-1 (2,500 km) and Taepodong-2 (6,700 km).
(Photograph:AFP)
Taepodong-1 missile test-fired over Japan
The Taepodong-1 missile was test-fired over Japan in 1998 but the following year, Pyongyang declared a moratorium on such tests as ties with the United States improved.
However, in 2005 the moratorium ended as North Korea blamed the "hostile" policy of US President George W. Bush's administration and carried out its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006.
In May 2009 the North Korean regime conducted a second underground nuclear test, several times more powerful than the first.
(Photograph:AFP)
Kim conducts North Korea's third nuclear test
Kim Jong-Un succeeded his father Kim Jong Il who died in December 2011 and oversaw a third nuclear test in 2013.
North Korea then conducted a fourth underground nuclear test in January 2016 which Pyongyang claimed was hydrogen bomb.
In March, Kim claimed North Korea had successfully miniaturised a thermonuclear warhead. In April, it test-fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile.
On August 3, it launched, for the first time, a ballistic missile directly into Japanese-controlled waters. Later that month, it successfully test-fired another SLBM.
(Photograph:AFP)
North Korea targets US bases
Between February and May 2017, Pyongyang launched a series of ballistic missiles that fell into the Sea of Japan also known as the East Sea in Korea. North Korea claimed it was meant to hit US bases in Japan.
In May, Pyongyang said it had tested the "newly developed mid/long-range strategic ballistic rocket, Hwasong-12". It flies 700 kilometres before landing in the Sea of Japan.
Two months later, North Korea announced it had successfully tested on July 4 an inter-continental ballistic missile capable of reaching Alaska - a gift for the "American bastards" announced on US Independence Day. Kim's regime also conducted a second successful ICBM test on in July.
(Photograph:AFP)
16 times the size of the US bomb that destroyed Hiroshima
Former president Donald Trump threatened Pyongyang with "fire and fury" over its missile programme.
However, North Korea conducted its sixth and largest nuclear test on September 3, 2017. Monitoring groups estimated a yield of 250 kilotons, which is 16 times the size of the 15-kiloton US bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945.
Within days, the United Nations adopted an eighth series of sanctions as North Korea fired an intermediate-range missile over Japan.
Just over a month later, Washington declared North Korea a "state sponsor of terrorism", a day before adding to pressure on the isolated state with fresh sanctions.
(Photograph:AFP)
Hwasong-15 ICBM targets US
Pyongyang launched a new Hwasong-15 ICBM which it claimed could deliver a "super-large heavy warhead" anywhere on the US mainland.
Analysts agree the rocket is capable of reaching the United States but voice scepticism that Pyongyang has mastered the advanced technology needed to allow the rocket to survive re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere.
In his New Year speech in 2018, Kim said the development of North Korea's nuclear force has been completed but catalysed by the Winter Olympics in South Korea, a rapid diplomatic thaw begins in February.
(Photograph:AFP)
ICBM launches
In 2018, Pyongyang said nuclear blasts and ICBM launches will cease immediately and the atomic test site at Punggye-ri will be dismantled to "transparently guarantee" the end of testing.
However, After the Hanoi summit in February 2019, negotiations between the United States and North Korea were deadlocked.
There was fresh tensions in 2021 with North Korea carrying out a number of high-profile weapons tests, including a claimed submarine-launched ballistic missile, a long-range cruise missile, a train-launched weapon, and what it says is a hypersonic gliding missile.
(Photograph:AFP)
North Korea starts 2022 with hypersonic missile launch
In its first major weapons test of 2022, North Korea said it has carried out a second hypersonic missile test, with a warhead capable of gliding as well as lateral movement during flight.
The test on Wednesday "reconfirmed the flight control and stability of the missile in the active-flight stage and assessed the performance of the new lateral movement technique applied to the detached hypersonic gliding warhead", KCNA said.
The launch also verified the "fuel ampoule system under winter weather conditions", it added.
Seoul and Tokyo had detected the launch of a suspected ballistic missile from North Korea that fell in the sea east of the Korean peninsula.
The United States condemned the launch and urged Pyongyang to sit down for talks.
(Photograph:AFP)
Topics
4. ONN Brief: Analysis on the 5 January 2022 Hypersonic Missile Test of the DPRK
More useful and timely analysis.
ONN Brief: Analysis on the 5 January 2022 Hypersonic Missile Test of the DPRK
Overview:
State media of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) reported on 6 January 2022 that the Academy of Defence Science had tested a hypersonic missile on 5 January 2022 (Figure 1).1 Below is an initial analysis based on available information.
Figure 1. Hypersonic missile launched on 5 January 2022.
Image: KCNA
Given the similarities in the shape of the warhead and the length of the rocket stage, the recently tested missile may have been first revealed during the “Self-Defence-2021” weapon exhibition held in October 2021 (marked as Missile B in Figure 2).2 The missile seems to be shorter than the Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile (also identified in Figure 2).
Figure 2. Ballistic missiles showcased at the October 2021 exhibition.
Image: KCNA
As is the Hwasong-12, the hypersonic missile is carried by a MAZ-547 transport-erector-launcher (TEL). As shown in Figure 3, the difference in length between the recently tested missile and the Hwasong-12 is also evidenced by the clips on the erection arms (which have been moved back to hold the shorter rocket stage) and the fact that the number of steps in the same section of the erection arm appears to have been reduced from 15 to 13 (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Hwasong-12 (left), hypersonic missile tested on 5 January 2022 (right). White boxes show the different lengths from the clips to the tips of the erection arms.
Images: KCNA
However, the hypersonic missile tested on 5 January 2022 seems similar in length to that of the Hwasong-8 hypersonic missile tested in September 2021.3 While all three missiles are powered by the same type of engine, a rough comparison shows that the rocket stages of the two hypersonic missiles are shorter than that of the Hwasong-12 (Figure 4). It is not clear whether the two hypersonic vehicle designs are meant to compete with or complement each other.
Figure 4. Length comparison of Hwasong-12, Hwasong-8 and hypersonic missile tested on 5 January 2022.
Images: KCNA
The warhead of the hypersonic missile tested on 5 January appears to be an evolution of the warhead of a precision strike variant of the SCUD-C/Hwasong-6 tested in May 2017.4 During the May 2017 test, the warhead fine-tuned its trajectory while flying a normal ballistic arc (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Warhead of a precision strike variant of the SCUD-C/Hwasong-6 (left) and its normal ballistic trajectory (right) shown during the test launch in May 2017.
Images: KCNA, KCTV
On 5 January 2022, the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the flight distance of the missile was about 500 km if the missile flew a normal trajectory.5 DPRK State media claimed on 6 January that the missile hit a target 700 km away from the firing position after maneuvering “120 km from the initial launch azimuth to the target azimuth” (horizontal maneuvers) and carrying out multiple pull-up (vertical) maneuvers.6 Based on the DPRK’s announcement and using the Japanese MoD map, the approximate splash zone of the hypersonic glide vehicle is shown in Figure 6. The DPRK’s short-range submarine-launched ballistic missile tested on 19 October 2021 also reportedly performed horizontal maneuvers.7 In comparison, State media emphasized that the horizontal maneuvers during the 5 January 2022 test were “strong.”8
Figure 6. Red dot: splash zone of warhead if the missile followed a normal ballistic trajectory (per Japanese MoD).
Green dot: approximate splash zone with 700 km flight (per DPRK statement) but without a change in azimuth. Yellow dot: approximate splash zone after 120 km of horizontal movement.
Base image: Japanese MoD
The initial announcement by the Japanese MoD and the report by DPRK State media suggest that the maneuvering capabilities of the hypersonic glide vehicle, especially the ability to stay below the radar’s line of sight, could potentially make detection and tracking by adversaries more difficult, thus posing greater challenges to missile defence. However, the MoD of the Republic of Korea (ROK) stated that the claim of the DPRK9 regarding the missile’s capabilities “appears to be exaggerated” and reiterated that the ROK military and its allies believed their combined assets were "capable of detecting and intercepting" the missiles of the DPRK. The MoD of the ROK further added that the missile tested on 5 January flew less than 700 km at a top speed of Mach 6 and at an altitude of below 50 km.10
As a shortened Hwasong-12 rocket stage is still relatively large, and considering that the DPRK already has single-stage, solid propellant hypersonic missiles that cover the range demonstrated in the recent test,11 both the Hwasong-8 tested in September 2021 and the hypersonic missile tested on 5 January 2022 may have not demonstrated their maximum ranges. It is unclear what the intended targets for these two hypersonic missiles are. It is possible that the medium-to-long term goal is to place hypersonic glide vehicles on standard Hwasong-12 stages. Such a missile concept was already displayed during the “Self-Defence-2021” weapon exhibition in Pyongyang.12
In its 6 January report, KCNA stated that “the reliability of fuel ampoule system under the winter weather conditions was also verified.”13 As mentioned in a previous ONN brief,14 in the Soviet Union “ampoulization” was normally associated with a transport-launch canister that was able to hold a fully fuelled missile in a combat-ready state for years. However, the DPRK’s hypersonic missile was not launched from a canister during the 5 January 2022 test. Thus, it is possible that the “ampoilization” in the DPRK context is only associated with the sealing and protection of the propellant tanks. Judging by the KCNA text, one may also expect another launch aimed to verify the operation of an ampoulized liquid-propellant ballistic missile on a hot summer day.
The same types of relatively high performance liquid-propellant engines used in the recent hypersonic missile tests are also used to power the strategically more valuable assets, such as the Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Hwasong-14 and the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missiles. The fact that the DPRK used such high performance engines on the testing of short range flights could mean that the DPRK may have achieved the capability to produce as many high performance engines as it wishes.
- KCNA text from 6 January 2022
Hypersonic Missile Newly Developed by Academy of Defence Science Test-Fired
Pyongyang, January 6 (KCNA) -- The Academy of Defence Science of the DPRK test-fired a hypersonic missile on Wednesday.
Leading officials concerned of the Department of the Munitions Industry of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and the sector of national defence science watched it.
The successive successes in the test launches in the hypersonic missile sector have strategic significance in that they hasten a task for modernizing strategic armed force of the state put forward at the 8th Party Congress and help fulfill the most important core task out of the five top priority tasks for the strategic arms sector in the five-year plan.
The Party Central Committee expressed great satisfaction at the result of the test-firing and extended warm congratulations to the relevant sector of the national defence science research.
In the test launch the academy reconfirmed the flight control and stability of the missile in the active-flight stage and assessed the performance of the new lateral movement technique applied to the detached hypersonic gliding warhead.
Having been detached after its launch, the missile made a 120 km lateral movement in the flight distance of the hypersonic gliding warhead from the initial launch azimuth to the target azimuth and precisely hit a set target 700 km away.
The reliability of fuel ampoule system under the winter weather conditions was also verified.
The test launch clearly demonstrated the control and stability of the hypersonic gliding warhead which combined the multi-stage gliding jump flight and the strong lateral movement.
[1] Hypersonic missile newly developed by Academy of Defence Science test-fired, KCNA, 6 January; National Defense Science Academy hypersonic missile test launch, Rodong Sinmun, 6 January 2022
[4] Kim Jong Un guides ballistic missile test-fire through precision control guidance system, KCNA, 30 May 2017
[6] National Defense Science Academy hypersonic missile test launch, Rodong Sinmun, 6 January 2022
[7] “It clarified that the new type SLBM, into which lots of advanced control guidance technologies including flank mobility and gliding skip mobility are introduced, will greatly contribute to putting the defence technology of the country on a high level…”. Academy of Defence Science Succeeds in Test-Launch of New Type SLBM, KCNA, 20 October 2021
[8] National Defense Science Academy hypersonic missile test launch, Rodong Sinmun, 6 January 2022
[10] Ibid
[13] Hypersonic missile newly developed by Academy of Defence Science test-fired, KCNA, 6 January
5. A South Korean village is protesting U.S. plans for THAAD missile defense upgrades
It is worth emphasizing something my korean friends often remind me. The local population has been heavily influenced by professional agitators and because of this the ROK government is challenged in how to deal with these protests.
But should consider these protests and the THAAD issue now in the context of strategic competition in Asia and of course the ROK/US alliance.
A South Korean village is protesting U.S. plans for THAAD missile defense upgrades
NPR · by Anthony Kuhn · January 8, 2022
Activists demonstrate against a U.S. missile defense system installed in Seongju county, South Korea, since 2017. Protesters stand near the entrance of the base, the site of a former golf course. Anthony Kuhn/NPR
SOSEONG-RI, South Korea — A short hike in Seongju county, some 135 miles southeast of Seoul, brings you to the top of a small mountain. To the north, you can see the high-rises of Gumi city. Just in front of you lies a former golf course, with an old clubhouse, some shipping containers on the grass and six mobile missile launchers with their tubes pointing north, toward North Korea.
The launchers are part of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense or THAAD system that the United States installed in 2017.
The base is a symptom of a growing arms race in Asia. The system is to defend against potential North Korean missiles, which have only in recent years been able to reach any part of the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea claims to have successfully test-launched its second hypersonic missile on Wednesday, intended to defeat missile defense systems including THAAD.
But opponents of the defense system argue it was installed without due democratic process and in disregard of their opinion on the matter.
"We activists and residents think that the THAAD deployment here is illegal," says activist Kim Young-jae. "So we try to stay alert and notice any changes happening inside the base."
A THAAD missile defense battery (at left) sits facing north, on a former golf course in Seongju county, South Korea. U.S. and South Korean soldiers have reportedly been living in an old clubhouse (to the right of the batteries) and shipping containers. Anthony Kuhn/NPR
In particular, they're looking for signs that the missile battery and living quarters for U.S. and South Korean troops are being upgraded.
After five years of operation, the place still looks a lot more like a golf course than a military base.
During a visit in March, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin discussed with South Korean defense officials how the countries' soldiers were living in a golf clubhouse, with others in shipping containers, according to South Korean news reports.
Activists have blockaded the base to try to keep construction materials from getting in. The activist Kim says U.S. and South Korean authorities have not been straightforward about the base.
"Publicly, they say this is a temporary deployment, in order to deflect residents' opposition," he says. "But in fact, they've been taking every possible step to make it a permanent deployment."
THAAD is a symbol of South Korea's strategic predicament
On a geopolitical level, THAAD has become synonymous in South Korea with the country's delicate balancing act between its chief ally, the U.S., and its main trading partner and biggest neighbor, China. Beijing vehemently opposes the defense system, fearing that it could be used to defeat Chinese missiles or that its radar could spy on China.
For many South Koreans, THAAD brings to mind a cautionary tale of the economic punishment that China meted out on their country, when Seoul allowed the U.S. to deploy THAAD over Beijing's objections.
Park Soo Gyu, a resident of Soseong-ri, a rural village near the THAAD base in Seongju county, South Korea, stands in the town library. "This quiet village is now being ravaged," he says of the conflict between residents and authorities over the THAAD issue. "Some call it a jail without bars." Anthony Kuhn/NPR
For the mostly elderly residents of Soseong-ri, a remote village of some 70 households close to the base, the prospect of upgrades to THAAD has been worrisome.
"This quiet village is now being ravaged," says resident Park Soo Gyu. "Some call it a jail without bars."
He notes that a dozen or so activists have faced prosecution, after clashing with police.
The residents also fear being caught in the crossfire between the U.S. and its potential foes.
"In case of a conflict between the U.S. and North Korea, or between the U.S. and China, this place will be the one of the first targets of attack," he says. "This village could become the front line overnight."
Protesters often gather near the base to chant slogans and call for the missile battery to be removed. A poster hanging near the entrance criticizes the administration of South Korean President Moon Jae-in, proclaiming: "We condemn the Moon Jae-in government for serving the U.S.' containment of China."
Is Seoul bound by its THAAD pledges to Beijing?
After the launchers were deployed to the golf course in 2017, Beijing used undeclared economic sanctions to punish South Korea, until Seoul made several promises. One was that it would not install any more THAAD batteries. Another was that the existing batteries in South Korea would not be integrated into the larger U.S. missile defense system.
Protesters march toward the entrance of a U.S. and South Korean base where a missile defense battery is deployed. Behind them, a poster made by a local labor union reads: "We condemn the Moon Jae-in government for serving the U.S.' containment of China." Anthony Kuhn/NPR
But that's exactly what the Pentagon has in mind. Its Missile Defense Agency began testing in 2020 to link THAAD to its Patriot, or PAC-3, missile systems.
"I think the upgrades will involve, first and foremost, integrating the [THAAD] systems with other existing U.S. assets, obviously the PAC-3s," says Clint Work, a fellow with the Stimson Center, a think tank in Washington, D.C.
South Korea's Defense Ministry says personnel at the THAAD base should have adequate living quarters. As for the possible THAAD upgrade, the ministry has deferred to the U.S. on the issue.
"[The U.S.] has publicized a long-term plan [for upgrading THAAD], but it will take time to implement it," a ministry spokesman told reporters in 2020. "We are aware that the system in Seongju is scheduled to be updated, but we can't know in detail what's next."
Work believes that the idea is to give the U.S. and its bases multiple layers of defenses. "North Korea's own missile advancements clearly are intended to exploit gaps in the current coverage," he says.
Work says that the THAAD system here could also be integrated with other THAAD batteries in Japan and Guam, and a central missile defense control center in Alaska.
Could the system be redirected at China?
In future, the analyst says, it's possible that THAAD could be repurposed to counter a threat from China.
"At least as the U.S. currently states it, the way that the radar are oriented really doesn't allow too much peering into Chinese territory," Work notes. But, "they could easily be shifted to do so. And I wouldn't be surprised if they were."
Yoon Sukjoon, a retired Korean navy captain, argues that since THAAD is being integrated into U.S. missile defenses, Seoul is no longer constrained by its previous pledges to Beijing, and Washington doesn't need to beat around the bush about what THAAD is here for.
"Under the framework of competition with China, the U.S. no longer needs to make the excuse that that the system needs to be deployed on the peninsula solely for defense against North Korea," Yoon tells NPR.
He also argues that THAAD could mean the end of Seoul's strategic ambiguity about its relations with Beijing and Washington.
"THAAD is a part of the U.S.' global anti-China united front," Yoon says. "It's become a strategic tool for containing China from one of the closest countries and one of the most trustworthy allies of the U.S."
That's not the language of the outgoing President Moon's administration, which has avoided using any rhetoric about confronting Beijing.
The future of South Korea's approach to the THAAD issue could depend on the outcome of its presidential elections in March, with conservative and liberal candidates staking out opposing views on the topic.
NPR's Se Eun Gong contributed to this report.
NPR · by Anthony Kuhn · January 8, 2022
6. What do we know about North Korea's missiles?
In terms of what north Korea "can get away with" we need to consider that Presidents Trump and Moon established a de facto "red line" of nuclear weapons testing and ICBM tests. Therefore, Kim likely thinks he can get away with almost anything less that either of those actions.
Excerpts:
Nevertheless, the Kim Jong Un-led regime in Pyongyang has pushed ahead with weapons tests, arguing that it has a right to self-defense, and that diplomacy with its adversaries can only be conducted from a position of military strength.
The United States and its allies, Japan and South Korea, condemn North Korea's missile tests as a threat to regional stability. Negotations between the US and North Korea on curbing weapons development in exchange for sanctions relief fell flat in 2019.
"Given the hardships North Korea is facing at the moment, there are likely calculations about what kinds of weapons testing can be done without galvanizing the international community against it," said 38 North's Town.
Town added that, unlike in 2017, the North is more likely to tread lightly with its weapons testing.
"Pyongyang seemed to be willing to sacrifice its foreign relations at that time to achieve a certain level of success, but these days, with a real focus on economic development as part of its national strategy and an urgent need to forge a path to economic recovery in the near term, some level of foreign relations and support is necessary," she added.
What do we know about North Korea's missiles? | DW | 07.01.2022
North Korea is continuing to test high-tech weapons, but analysts say Pyongyang is being careful in considering the weapons it can get away with testing without drawing more international pressure.
As the reclusive East Asian nation continues developing high-tech weapons systems, some tests over the past months show potentially big steps, while other tests look like adaptations of previously available technology.
North Korea's hypersonic ambitions
A cause for concern has been the North's development of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), an advanced weapons system being developed by major militaries around the world.
HGVs involve a projectile launched on a rocket booster with a velocity at least five times the speed of sound, featuring increased maneuverability that can evade detection and interception.
While most ballistic missiles can already fly at hypersonic speeds, analysts say it is the HGV's ability to fly at low altitudes and maneuver in-flight that make them a greater threat.
According to Jeffery Lewis, an arms expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, the type of HGV launched this week looks to be a type of conical hypersonic glider, also known as a "maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV)."
The weapons system tested this week flew a total 700 kilometers (435 miles), including a lateral maneuver that flew for 120 kilometers.
However, MaRV is not a novel type of weapon, and North Korea has tested similar vehicles before on less-powerful boosters, such as the 2017 launch of a MaRV on a short-range scud missile.
The missile fired this week appears to have first been shown off at the "Self-Defense-2021" expo in Pyongyang in October 2021, according to Ankit Panda, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Nuclear Policy Program.
In late September, North Korea surprised the world by announcing for the first time that it had tested an HGV. North Korean state media said the missile system was called "Hwasong-8," Hwasong, being the name North Korea gives to a series of missiles that translates to "Mars" in English.
According to a photograph of the September launch analyzed by 38 North, a think tank, an "arrowhead-shaped vehicle with stubby wings resembling an HGV" was atop an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), a booster resembling a shortened version of a Hwasong-12 ballistic missile.
The shape of the hypersonic glider launched in September appeared wedge-shaped, different than the conical-shaped glider launched this week.
The missile boosters used in the launches reportedly used more mobile type of pre-loaded storable liquid propellant called a missile fuel ampoule.
"Hypersonic glide vehicle technology requires very advanced materials science and industrial techniques, to the extent that in my opinion North Korea likely received foreign assistance in the endeavor," Ian Williams, deputy director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS), told DW.
However, according to 38 North, an HGV would only make a niche contribution to the North's existing large ballistic missile force, "primarily in providing another option to evade missile defense."
It is also difficult to verify North Korea's claims of successful launches, without direct data on where projectiles may have flown or if they reached their intended targets.
Submarine-launched missiles
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are another adavanced weapons system the North is pursuing.
Following North Korea's first hypersonic test, it claimed to have test-fired an SLBM in October.
"The missile itself is something we haven't seen before. It is smaller than the sub-launched missiles that Pyongyang displayed in recent military parades and appears to more closely resemble the land-based KN-23 missile," Williams said.
A short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), the KN-23 has a range of 450 kilometers, which means a submarine would theoretically need to move relatively close to targets in order to be effective. This would make the subs more vulnerable to advanced detection systems.
The last time North Korea claimed it had launched an SLBM, it was a larger "Pukguksong" (Polaris) missile with nearly three times the range of the KN-23.
According to 38 North, the "new type" of SLBM fired in October had more to do with political messaging to South Korea, than a display of increased strategic capability. Seoul had launched a very similar SLBM in September.
And analysts point out the effectiveness of SLBMs would still depend on the effectiveness of North Korea's aging submarines.
"North Korea's recent missile tests have been of new technologies, although add only incrementally to its already formidable missile capabilities," Jenny Town, director of 38 North, told DW.
What other types of missiles does North Korea use?
Some of these capabilities include, the Hwasong-14, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which was tested in 2017 and has a range of over 10,000 kilometers, which could potentially threaten targets anywhere in the United States.
However, to strike targets in South Korea or Japan, which are home to the largest overseas contingent of US military personnel, smaller missiles with a shorter range are enough to present a major threat.
"Other developments included launches of missiles we had seen before 2021, but fired from new kinds of platforms. Most notably, the launch of a KN-23 ballistic missile from a rail car," Williams said.
In September, the North also fired a long-range cruise missile, claimed to be a "strategic weapon of great significance"
North Korea has also tested a satellite launch vehicle called "Taepodong-2," which can carry a 1,000 kilogram payload up to 10,000 kilometers, including vehicles capable of reentering the atmosphere.
Pyongyang has also developed nuclear weapons, and analysts carefully watch satellite images of its Yongbyon nuclear research center for signs that the program could be advancing. The North has carried out six tests of nuclear weapons, but the last one was in 2017.
"Much of the work of developing missile systems doesn’t involve flight testing. North Korean engineers require time to design, and build, which takes time. Just because we don't see flight tests, doesn't mean North Korea isn't continuing to develop its missile capabilities," said Williams.
Why test now?
North Korea is banned by international sanctions from testing ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, the Kim Jong Un-led regime in Pyongyang has pushed ahead with weapons tests, arguing that it has a right to self-defense, and that diplomacy with its adversaries can only be conducted from a position of military strength.
The United States and its allies, Japan and South Korea, condemn North Korea's missile tests as a threat to regional stability. Negotations between the US and North Korea on curbing weapons development in exchange for sanctions relief fell flat in 2019.
"Given the hardships North Korea is facing at the moment, there are likely calculations about what kinds of weapons testing can be done without galvanizing the international community against it," said 38 North's Town.
Town added that, unlike in 2017, the North is more likely to tread lightly with its weapons testing.
"Pyongyang seemed to be willing to sacrifice its foreign relations at that time to achieve a certain level of success, but these days, with a real focus on economic development as part of its national strategy and an urgent need to forge a path to economic recovery in the near term, some level of foreign relations and support is necessary," she added.
Watch video 06:10
Are we seeing a new arms race on the Korean Peninsula?
Edited by: Srinivas Mazumdaru
7. Thousands of North Koreans gather for huge pro-military rally
Can anyone be anti-military in north Korea? (note sarcasm).What would the New year be without some kind of event?
Thousands of North Koreans gather for huge pro-military rally
- Citizens held banners and wore face masks as they assembled in Pyongyang's Kim Il-sung square
- Follows ruling party's first Workers' Party Congress in five years, where Kim Jong Un underlined need for new five-year plan to develop economy
- In decade since Kim took power, North Korea has seen rapid progress in its military technology at the cost of international sanctions
PUBLISHED: 14:11 EST, 7 January 2022 | UPDATED: 17:13 EST, 7 January 2022
Daily Mail · by Nick Enoch for MailOnline · January 7, 2022
Thousands of North Koreans gathered at a rally to pledge their support for Kim Jong Un's plans to expand the nation's military.
Citizens of the pariah state - said to include factory and office workers, farmers and students - held banners and wore face masks as they assembled in Pyongyang's Kim Il-sung square on Wednesday.
Their show of apparent 'unity' for the regime, where non-compliance can have severe consequences, came in the wake of the ruling party's first Workers' Party Congress in five years, during which Kim underlined the need for a new five-year plan to develop the economy.
In the decade since he took power, North Korea has seen rapid progress in its military technology at the cost of international sanctions.
Despite severe economic difficulties during the coronavirus pandemic, Kim said last week the country would continue to build up its military capabilities.
During the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the ruling Workers' Party, Kim repeated his vows to boost his country's military capacity and ordered the production of more powerful, sophisticated weapons systems.
Thousands of North Koreans gathered at a rally to pledge their support for Kim Jong Un's plans to expand the nation's military
Citizens of the pariah state - said to include factory and office workers, farmers and students - held banners and wore face masks as they assembled in Pyongyang's Kim Il-sung square on Wednesday
The show of apparent 'unity' - where non-compliance can lead to incarceration - came in the wake of the ruling party's first Workers' Party Congress in five years, during which Kim underlined the need for a new five-year plan to develop the economy
In the decade since Kim took power, North Korea has seen rapid progress in its military technology at the cost of international sanctions
Above, Kim's supporters gather en masse. Despite severe economic difficulties during the coronavirus pandemic, Kim said last week the country would continue to build up its military capabilities
Citizens of the famine-hit state march through Pyongyang City earlier this week in matching pink outfits
During the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the ruling Workers' Party, Kim repeated his vows to boost his country's military capacity and ordered the production of more powerful, sophisticated weapons systems
It comes as North Korea fired what it claims was its second 'hypersonic missile' after joining the global race to develop the 'new generation' of weapons - which are designed to dodge anti-missile defence systems.
According to state media KCNA, the missile, launched on Wednesday, managed to hit its target some 430 miles away.
However, on Friday, South Korea dismissed North Korea's claim as an exaggeration, saying it was a normal ballistic missile that could be intercepted. The assessment is certain to anger North Korea.
South Korea has previously avoided publicly disputing North Korea's weapons tests, apparently so as not to aggravate relations.
South Korea's Defence Ministry said it believes North Korea has not acquired the technologies needed to launch a hypersonic weapon.
Kim Jong Un is pictured at the first of day of the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party. During a key meeting, he spoke about building up defences but did not mention the United States at all
North Korea recently fired what it claims was its second 'hypersonic missile' (above). According to state media KCNA, the missile, launched on Wednesday, managed to hit its target some 430 miles away. However, on Friday, South Korea dismissed North Korea's claim as an exaggeration, saying it was a normal ballistic missile that could be intercepted
North Korea is under multiple sets of international sanctions over its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, which have progressed rapidly under Kim
The worsening economic situation during the pandemic has not blunted North Korea's military programmes, and it has continued to pursue weapons development, a UN report said in October
Workers gather in a show of support in Pyongyang. The United States has repeatedly declared its willingness to meet North Korean representatives, while saying it will seek denuclearisation
It said in a report that what North Korea fired on Wednesday was a type of ballistic missile that was displayed in October during a weapons exhibition in Pyongyang, its capital.
It said South Korean and US forces could shoot it down.
The ministry said North Korea's claim that the weapon flew 700 kilometres (435 miles) and manoeuvred laterally appeared to be an exaggeration.
Ministry officials said the claim was likely to have been aimed at a domestic audience to boost public confidence in its missile programme.
In 2021, nuclear-armed North Korea said it successfully tested a new type of submarine-launched ballistic missile, a long-range cruise missile, a train-launched weapon, and what it described as a hypersonic warhead.
The dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang remains stalled, following the collapse of talks between Kim and then-president Donald Trump in 2019.
Under Trump's successor Joe Biden, the United States has repeatedly declared its willingness to meet North Korean representatives, while saying it will seek denuclearisation.
But Pyongyang has so far dismissed the offer, accusing Washington of pursuing 'hostile' policies.
At the end of a key meeting of the ruling Workers' Party last week, where Kim spoke about building up defences, he did not mention the United States at all.
Instead of the policy positions on diplomacy for which Kim's New Year statements have been closely watched in recent years, he focused on food security and development in an extensive speech.
Last month, Kim marked ten years in power. Since assuming control after his father and longtime ruler Kim Jong Il's death in December 2011, Kim Jong Un has established absolute power at home. (Above, the latest Workers' Party Congress in Pyongyang)
But he said Pyongyang would continue to boost its capabilities keeping in mind 'the military environment of the Korean peninsula' and the changing international situation.
North Korea is under multiple sets of international sanctions over its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, which have progressed rapidly under Kim.
The impoverished nation has also been under a rigid self-imposed coronavirus blockade that has hammered its economy.
The worsening economic situation during the pandemic, however, has not blunted those programmes, and North Korea has continued to pursue weapons development, a UN report said in October.
Concerns have grown about a full-blown food crisis in North Korea, and a United Nations human rights expert warned in October that the most vulnerable were 'at risk of starvation'.
Last month, Kim marked ten years in power. Since assuming control after his father and longtime ruler Kim Jong Il's death in December 2011, Kim Jong Un has established absolute power at home and bolstered his nuclear and missile arsenals.
Daily Mail · by Nick Enoch for MailOnline · January 7, 2022
8. Sinpo-class Submarine Damaged During October 19 Test Launch
New reporting on last year's SLBM test launch.
Sinpo-class Submarine Damaged During October 19 Test Launch - Beyond Parallel
Sinpo-class Submarine Damaged During October 19 Test Launch
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Key Findings
- North Korea’s SINPO-class experimental ballistic missile submarine suffered a malfunction likely resulting in damage during the October 19, 2021, SLBM test launch.
- The submarine underwent repair work within the secure boat basin to its sail, which contains the submarine’s sole missile launch tube, during October-November.
- During early December, it moved to the graving dock at the Sinpo Shipyard for further repairs and maintenance—including work around its engine compartment.
- The submarine returned to the secure boat basin during mid-December and appears operational.
- The submarine plays a critical role in the under-way development of SLBMs, ballistic missile submarine technology, and operational procedures. It is also an indispensable tool for hands-on training to new submariners.
Examination of approximately 76 Maxar, Planet, and Airbus satellite images between October 3, 2021, and December 29, 2021, provides insight into recent activity and status of the 8.24 Yongung from its preparations for the October 19 test launch until present. While it remains to be publicly confirmed, this imagery and informed sources indicate that North Korea’s SINPO-class experimental ballistic missile submarine (SSBA)—recently named the 8.24 Yongung (August 24th Hero)—suffered a malfunction likely resulting in damage during the October 19, 2021 test launch of a “new type” submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). This same satellite imagery also indicates that there was noteworthy activity centered on the stern of the boat during December.
October 19, 2021, test launch of North Korea’s new SLBM (Rodong Sinmun)
Image of the Pukguksong 5 (l), Pukguksong 1 (c), and new SLBM (r) on display at the recent Self-Defense 2021 exposition (KCTV)
Between October and December of 2021, the 8.24 Yongung prepared for and conducted an SLBM test of a “new type” SLBM, underwent apparent repair work on its sail, which contains the submarine’s sole missile launch tube, and was subsequently moved into and out of the graving dock at the Sinpo Shipyard for the first time since being launched in 2014.
The Sinpo South Shipyard’s secure boat basin showing the presence of the 8.24 Yongung SSBA on November 12, 2021, prior to the commencement of repairs. Click to enlarge. (Copyright © 2022 by Planet)
During these three months, a wheel-mounted telescoping crane was observed working directly alongside or with its boom extended directly over the sail of the 8.24 Yongung on 18 separate occasions. The first of these occasions was on October 14 and the last on November 29. The crane’s presence during October 14-15 was clearly associated with the missile loading and pre-test checkout preparations for the October 19 SLBM test launch. Such activity has been observed prior to other SLBM test launches and an image published by North Korea’s KCTV during 2016 shows the telescoping crane loading a Pukguksong-1 (KN-11) SLBM into the submarine in the background.
Kim Jung-un at the loading of a Pukguksong-1 (KN-11) SLBM into what will become known as the 8.24 Yongung submarine, Note the telescoping crane in the background lowering the missile into the submarine. August 24, 2016 (KCTV)
The secure boat basin on November 25, 2021, showing the telescoping crane working on the sail/missile launch tube of the 8.24 Yongung through the opening in the removable canopy. Click to enlarge. (Copyright © 2022 by Planet)
The crane reappeared afterward on October 21 and 25, which was less typical of previously observed post-test activities. What isn’t typical, however, is that the crane again returned to working alongside or above the submarine’s sail during November 4-6. Then, most unusually, it was again present from November 18 through 29 before departing. One week later, on about December 6, the 8.24 Yongung was moved from its berth in the secure boat basin to the graving dock at the Sinpo Shipyard 3.7 kilometers (2 nautical miles) to the northeast. The submarine remained here until about December 15 when it returned to its normal berth within the secure boat basin.
The secure boat basin on December 13, 2021 showing the absence of the 8.24 Yongung SSBA which has been moved to the Sinpo Shipyard’s graving dock. The telescoping crane is just visible dockside outside the entrance to the secure boat basin. Click to enlarge. (Copyright © 2022 by Maxar Technologies)
Only one clear publicly available high-resolution satellite image, acquired by Maxar Technologies on December 13, shows the submarine located in the graving dock. In this image, the top of the submarine’s sail (with missile launch tube) is obscured—either due to resolution or by a tarp—preventing any detailed examination of any potential damage or repairs to the sail or launch tube. Significant activity, however, is observed on and around the stern of the submarine above the area of the engine room. This activity suggests either a repair of the propulsion system or the upper hull in this area. This work was apparently complete, and the submarine moved back to the secure boat basin on about November 16.
Overview of the Sinpo Shipyard’s graving dock on December 13, 2021, showing the presence of the 8.24 Yongung SSBA. Click to enlarge. (Copyright © 2022 by Maxar Technologies)
Close-up view of the 8.24 Yongung SSBA showing the work being undertaken on the bow and stern, above the engine compartment. Components and equipment are visible both dockside and inside the graving dock. The top of the sail, including the hatch to the missile launch tune, is obscured by a tarp. Click to enlarge. (Copyright © 2022 by Maxar Technologies)
Overview of the Sinpo Shipyard’s graving dock on December 29, 2021, showing the absence of the 8.24 Yongung SSBA, which has been moved back to the secure boat basin. Click to enlarge. (Copyright © 2022 CNES 2022, Distribution AIRBUS DS)
The secure boat basin on December 29, 2021 showing that the 8.24 Yongung SSBA has returned and that the telescoping crane is no longer present. Click to enlarge. (Copyright © 2022 CNES 2022, Distribution AIRBUS DS)
Assessment
Taken as a whole, this level of activity is unprecedented, never having been observed in publicly available satellite imagery. The observed activity appears to support informed sources’ reports that a malfunction, likely resulting in damage, occurred to the submarine’s launch tube or conning tower during the October 19 SLBM test. This assessment may also be supported by an image released by North Korea purportedly showing the 8.24 Yongung surfacing immediately after the October 19 test launch with its launch tube hatch in the open position—not common practice during submarine ballistic missile test launches.
The 8.24 Yongung (August 24th Hero) experimental ballistic missile submarine (SSBA) with its newly applied pennant number of “824’ and launch tube hatch cover open (Rodong Sinmun).
The close timing among the test launch, repairs in the secure boat basin, and activity in the graving dock suggest a direct correlation. However, the precise nature of this has yet to be determined.
The continued operation and maintenance of the 8.24 Yongung provides ample evidence of the critical role it plays in the under-way development of SLBMs, ballistic missile submarine technology, and operational procedures. It also provides an indispensable tool for hands-on training to new submariners in operating a ballistic missile submarine. The latter is of the utmost importance to the commissioning and manning of future true ballistic missile submarines.
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an internationally recognized analyst, award-winning author, and lecturer on North Korean defense and intelligence affairs and ballistic missile development in developing countries. He is concurrently senior fellow for Imagery Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Security (CSIS); senior adviser and imagery analyst for the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK); author for IHS Markit (formerly the Jane’s Information Group); and publisher and editor of KPA Journal. Formerly, he has served as founder and CEO of KPA Associates, LLC, senior imagery analyst for 38 North at Johns Hopkins SAIS, chief analytics officer and co-founder of AllSource Analysis, Inc., and senior all-source analyst for DigitalGlobe’s Analysis Center.
Victor Cha is senior vice president and the inaugural holder of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Jennifer Jun is a program coordinator and research assistant with the iDeas Lab and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Headline image credit: Copyright © 2022 by Maxar Technologies
References
- Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. Prior to the October 19 test launch the 8.24 Yongung (August 24th Hero) was publicly unnamed and carried no pennant number. It was most often simply identified as the SINPO-class experimental ballistic missile submarine (SSBA). From the images of the test released by North Korea this “new type” SLBM bears a strong resemblance to the new, smaller, SLBM displayed at the October 12, 2021 Defense Development Exhibition, Self-Defense 2021. “Academy of Defence Science Succeeds in Test-Launch of New Type SLBM,” Rodong Sinmun. October 20, 2021.
- The available imagery does not cover every day during the period under study, not all the imagery covers both the secure boat basin and the graving dock, and clouds frequently obscured the secure boat basin and/or graving dock for dates when imagery was available.
- It is unknown whether the submarine moved to and from the graving dock on its own power or was assisted by a yard tug.
9. Beijing Winter Olympics: China ‘fully understands’ why North Korea will stay away
I may have to dig up an old article but if my memory serves me correctly north Korea announced that it would not participate inthe games due to COVID even before the IOC suspended it. Now they are putting quite a spin on things.
Beijing Winter Olympics: China ‘fully understands’ why North Korea will stay away
- Beijing aware of ‘special reasons’ behind neighbour’s absence, foreign ministry spokesman says
- North Korea, officially barred from the Games by the IOC, accuses the US and its allies of trying to sabotage the event
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Published: 9:10pm, 7 Jan, 2022
China said it “fully understands” North Korea’s decision to miss next month’s Beijing Winter Olympics, after Pyongyang blamed its inability to attend on the Covid-19 pandemic and “hostile forces” led by the US intent on preventing the “successful opening” of the Games.
North Korea was already barred from the Beijing Games, as the International Olympic Committee in September suspended the country until the end of 2022 for failing to send a team to the Tokyo Olympics, citing the pandemic.
On Friday, North Korea’s state news agency said its Olympic committee and sports ministry sent a letter to their counterparts in China to formally notify them of their absence from the Games opening on February 4.
North Korea suspended from Beijing Winter Olympics after Tokyo Games no-show
“We could not take part in the Olympics due to the hostile forces’ moves and the worldwide pandemic,” the letter said, according to the official Korean Central News Agency.
The IOC has indicated that it remains open to individual North Korean athletes competing in Beijing.
Pyongyang also promised to work with China towards the success of the Beijing Games, while criticising “the US and its vassal forces” for their “moves against China aimed at preventing the successful opening of the Olympics”, an apparent reference to the US-led diplomatic boycott of the event in protest against China’s human rights record.
Chinese President Xi Jinping with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in June 2019. Photo: KCNA/dpa
The Chinese foreign ministry said North Korea and China were close neighbours with “traditionally friendly ties” and Beijing would continue to work with Pyongyang.
“The Chinese side fully understands the special reasons that have prevented the North Korean side from taking part in the Games,” ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said in Beijing.
“The Chinese side is willing to continue strengthening cooperation with the North Korean side in various fields, including sport.”
The 2018 Winter Olympics in South Korea gave the North with an opportunity to improve ties, with its leader Kim Jong-un sending his younger sister and close aide, Kim Yo-jong, to Pyeongchang as part of a high-ranking delegation.
10. North Korea’s Strict COVID-19 Policies Undermine Kim Jong Un’s Goal of Ending Hunger
As I have said and will continue to say, the Korean people living in the north are suffering due to Kim Jong-un's deliberate policy decisions to prioritize the nuclear weapons and missile programs over the welfare of the Korean people.
Kim Jong-un alos faces a deadly paradox of reform - north Korea must open its economy and reform it but by doing so it will undermine the legiamcticy of the regime and bring into north Korea not only economic investment but also information which in and of itself is a deadly threat to the regime.
Conclusion:
When Kim Jong Un first came to power a decade ago, he promised that the North Korean people should not have to tighten their belts again. It is a pledge that he has failed to fulfill. If Kim is to succeed this time he will likely have to make policy choices regarding markets, domestic investments in agriculture, and imports that he has been unwilling to make during his first decade in power. However, as long as the regime maintains a zero COVID-19 policy, North Korea will continue to face a domestic food crisis.
North Korea’s Strict COVID-19 Policies Undermine Kim Jong Un’s Goal of Ending Hunger
Dismal trade figures for 2021 attest to the toll the North’s border closures are taking on its food supply.
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At a recent party meeting, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un set aside a discussion of nuclear talks with the United States and South Korea to focus on ending hunger in North Korea over the next decade and the need to maintain tight COVID-19 protocols. In the short term, however, these two goals are incompatible.
North Korea has taken some steps to address the crisis. In August, it released military wartime grain reserves, and it is reported to have struck a deal with China to exchange smuggled coal for food, but these have been insufficient.
Meanwhile, North Korea’s zero COVID-19 policy has hindered Pyongyang’s ability to import the food and agricultural supplies needed to address the domestic food crisis. To keep COVID-19 out of the country, North Korea has severely restricted trade across its borders and recently tightened domestic travel restrictions as well.
The result has been a dramatic decline in trade with China, which accounts for roughly 90 percent of North Korea’s trade. As the pandemic began in 2020, North Korean exports to China declined by 77.7 percent, while imports fell by 80.9 percent.
Despite global trade growing by 10.8 percent in 2021, the situation remains bleak in North Korea. While trade briefly improved during the summer months, North Korea’s imports from China declined by 53.6 percent through November to $226 million for the year-to-date. At the same point in 2019, pre-pandemic, North Korea’s total imports from China were $2.3 billion.
North Korean exports to China for the year were down a more modest 9 percent through November 2021 to $42.1 million. In 2019, they were worth $192.6 million for first 11 months of the year.
While North Korea briefly attempted to open its border to cargo train service in November of last year, it quickly reversed course due to COVID-19 outbreaks in China. With Kim’s commitment to COVID-19 restrictions, trade is unlikely to improve in the near future.
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This impacts access to food in North Korea in at least two ways. First, it limits North Korea’s ability to produce food domestically by reducing imports of inputs such as fertilizer. Second, and more directly, it reduces Pyongyang’s ability to import food to cover shortages in domestic production.
The news on domestic production and imports of fertilizer is nominally good. Despite the continued deep decline in overall imports, North Korea increased its imports of fertilizer by 202.5 percent in 2020. Along with improved weather, increased fertilizer imports helped to support improved agricultural outputs over 2020, but total imports of fertilizer remain more than 50 percent below 2019 levels. North Korea is dependent on China for the majority of its fertilizer and inputs for domestic fertilizer production, underlining the importance of trade to food production domestically.
The difficulty has been imports of food, specifically cereals. According to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, 68 percent of the average North Korean’s diet consists of cereals, roots, and tubers. Last year, in the year to November, North Korea had imported no cereals, roots, or tubers from China. The decline in imports from China also saw imports of meat, edible fruits and nuts, vegetables, fish and aquatic invertebrates fall to zero.
Without imports North Korea is unable to make up for the shortfall in domestic food production, estimated to be the equivalent of 860,000 tons of cereals in 2021. While China is reported to have shipped 300 tons of corn as aid to North Korea in April, in addition to what it may have provided as part of its aid-for-coal trade with North Korea and any other unreported aid, significant shortages remain.
Historical data suggests that the full deficit would not be made up with imports. Over the last decade, imports of cereals from China have ranged from a low of just under 30,000 tons in 2015 to slightly over 200,000 tons in 2019. However, if North Korea dedicated more resources to importing cereals on par with the 2019 totals, they could make a significant difference in easing the food shortage.
Addressing this gap would require loosening border restrictions to allow in additional purchases of cereals, fertilizer, and food aid, but North Korea’s zero COVID-19 policy means that a permanent reopening is unlikely. Instead, the regime will likely loosen restrictions during the summer as it has the last two years when the risk of infections lessens.
Even then, openings will still be subject to potential disruptions as long as China and North Korea follow a zero COVID-19 policy. The Omicron variant is more transmissible than other variants and there are likely to be additional variants of concern before the pandemic ends. As a result, future efforts to restore cargo train service will continue to see disruptions as new outbreaks occur. Even North Korea’s construction of decontamination centers is likely to have minimal impact as at their optimum they will limit trade to a function of their capacity divided by the time required for decontamination. Until North Korea is able to transition to a policy of living with COVID-19 – something that will be difficult as long as Pyongyang continues to reject offers of vaccines from abroad – there will be constraints on trade.
When Kim Jong Un first came to power a decade ago, he promised that the North Korean people should not have to tighten their belts again. It is a pledge that he has failed to fulfill. If Kim is to succeed this time he will likely have to make policy choices regarding markets, domestic investments in agriculture, and imports that he has been unwilling to make during his first decade in power. However, as long as the regime maintains a zero COVID-19 policy, North Korea will continue to face a domestic food crisis.
11. Why we keep getting North Korea wrong
I am sorry Mr. Deptris but you get it wrong as well and demonstrate the typical lack of understanding the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. And most Korean watchers and specialists in and out of government do not view Kim jong-un as crazy or suicidal but as you recommend, a rational actor from the perspective of the nature of the Kim family regime.. But like some pundits you do not go far enough in understanding Kim's desire for regime survival. The "rest of the story" is that Kim believes for the regime to survive it must dominate the Korean peninsula. We can assess this from his words, the words in party documents and their constitution, and seven decades of action. I believe the administration would very much welcome Kim acting as as responsible member of the international community and is willing to give him the opportunity to do so, but again, for seven decades the regime has chosen not to act responsibly and in accordance with international norms.
Conclusion:
This analysis goes against the grain of the conventional Washington, DC boilerplate, which tends to depict North Korea and its leadership as borderline crazy, capable of doing anything, anywhere, at a moment’s notice.
But just as this kind of threat-inflation whips us into an unproductive, emotional frenzy, so does hyperventilating about North Korea’s military hardware without accounting for the reason behind the new, flashy objects. And the reason is more about deterring a foreign invasion than acquiring the means to launch an offensive attack against the US or its allies in the region — one bound to cut short the Kim family’s seven-decade rule over the North.
Policymakers need to stop viewing North Korea as suicidal and start viewing it as a rational actor whose ultimate objective is self-preservation. Only through a realistic analysis can Washington begin to form a North Korea policy that actually works.
Why we keep getting North Korea wrong - The Spectator World
As bizarre as Kim can sound sometimes, he appears to know where Washington’s red-lines are
January 7, 2022 | 6:34 am
Kim Jong-un in 2019 (Getty)
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Kim Jong-un is focused first and foremost on managing his country’s lingering food crisis. But that doesn’t mean the thirty-seven-year-old dictator has any intention of siphoning off resources from North Korea’s weapons programs. He made that abundantly obvious this week, when Pyongyang conducted its second ballistic missile test using hypersonic technology in four months. According to North Korean media, the missile traveled 435 miles to the east, hitting the designated target.
The response to the latest test was predictable. South Korea called an emergency meeting to discuss the launch. The US State Department quickly issued a statement to reporters reminding them that the tests are a violation of multiple UN Security Council Resolutions (as if North Korea cared). Secretary of state Antony Blinken called his Japanese counterpart, foreign minister Hayashi Yoshimasa, to assure him the US-Japan alliance was “ironclad.” And the experts who make a living on analyzing the technical aspects of North Korea’s missile program got to work, describing the most recent testing event as an indication of Pyongyang’s seriousness in acquiring the ability to evade US ballistic missile defenses.
The media coverage thus far has focused primarily on the North Korean missiles themselves. Weapons analysts inside out and outside of the US government continue to pore over data to decipher every minute detail of the latest projectile: the length of the missile itself, its distance, the diameter of the nose-cone, the fuel used and the type of hypersonic glider employed. The most important question, however, is getting lost in the ether: what is motivating Kim to enhance his country’s missile program?
Admittedly, this strikes as a fairly obvious, if not simplistic, question. But it also strikes at the core of how the US should be approaching North Korea as it crafts its strategy toward the country. When seeking to analyze the threat North Korea’s missile (and nuclear) program represents to the US, we must determine not only the capability of the program but the intent that drives it.
This is not some theoretical or academic exercise. A so-called threat to national security is not merely about capability, but also about the purpose of that capability. Many countries have top-tier militaries with sophisticated bomber aircraft, naval destroyers and cyber weapons. Some even have nuclear weapons. But if those countries don’t intend to use those weapons against the US, then the overall threat assessment is low. France, for instance, has one of the most formidable militaries in Europe, can project force to other continents rapidly when it needs to, and possesses nearly 300 nuclear warheads. But nobody in the US worries about France’s military capabilities because the French aren’t about to order an invasion of the US mainland.
Of course, North Korea isn’t France. It’s a lot easier for US officials to brush capability aside when assessing a US ally or partner. North Korea is neither. The concept, however, still stands. We may be disturbed about Pyongyang’s decision to repeatedly break UN Resolutions, rollout new ballistic missiles during military parades and make the resumption of diplomacy more difficult by engaging in periodic missile testing, but none of this adds up to a truly direct and imminent threat to Americans. Why? Because as bizarre as Kim can sound sometimes, he appears to know where Washington’s red-lines are and has demonstrated a knack for avoiding things that will jeopardize his own personal survival.
Technically, Kim already has the capability to do significant damage to the roughly 80,000 US forces stationed in Japan and South Korea. Technically, he could wake up one morning and decide to use this capability. But realistically, Kim isn’t stupid or reckless enough to order a decision like this because doing so would unleash a torrent of US, South Korean and Japanese retaliation that would make Kim’s original decision look wholly idiotic. At the end of the day, Kim Jong-un wants what all dictators want: to rule unchallenged for decades until, at age 100, quietly and comfortably slipping into the afterlife. Needless to say, instigating a war with the most powerful country on the face of the earth would be a perplexing way to accomplish this. Taking steps that lead you to a quick, painful death is not exactly great for longevity.
This analysis goes against the grain of the conventional Washington, DC boilerplate, which tends to depict North Korea and its leadership as borderline crazy, capable of doing anything, anywhere, at a moment’s notice.
But just as this kind of threat-inflation whips us into an unproductive, emotional frenzy, so does hyperventilating about North Korea’s military hardware without accounting for the reason behind the new, flashy objects. And the reason is more about deterring a foreign invasion than acquiring the means to launch an offensive attack against the US or its allies in the region — one bound to cut short the Kim family’s seven-decade rule over the North.
Policymakers need to stop viewing North Korea as suicidal and start viewing it as a rational actor whose ultimate objective is self-preservation. Only through a realistic analysis can Washington begin to form a North Korea policy that actually works.
12. Hair loss emerges as new election issue in South Korea
Who would have thought this would be an issue?
Hair loss emerges as new election issue in South Korea
SEOUL, South Korea — South Korean presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung isn’t bald. But he is enjoying the support of many bald voters over his push for government payments for hair loss treatments.
Since his proposal was disclosed earlier this week, hair loss has emerged as a hot-button topic ahead of March’s presidential vote in South Korea, where previous elections have focused on North Korea’s nuclear program, relations with the U.S., scandals and economic problems.
Online communities for bald people are flooded with messages supporting his proposal. There is also strong criticism that it’s just a populism-driven campaign pledge by Lee, the governing party candidate, to win votes.
Messages on social media include, “Jae-myung bro. I love you. I’ll implant you in the Blue House” and “Your Excellency, Mr. President! You’re giving new hope to bald people for the fist time in Korea.”
Lee told reporters Wednesday that he thinks hair regrowth treatments should be covered by the national health insurance program.
April 3, 201302:04
“Please, let us know what has been inconvenient for you over hair-loss treatments and what must be reflected in policies,” Lee wrote on Facebook. “I’ll present a perfect policy on hair-loss treatment.”
Lee, an outspoken liberal, is leading public opinion surveys. Some critics have called him a dangerous populist.
“(Lee’s idea) may appear to be a necessary step for many people worrying about their hair loss but it’s nothing but serious populism, given that it would worsen the financial stability of the state insurance program,” the conservative Munhwa Ilbo newspaper said in an editorial Thursday.
Currently, hair loss related to aging and hereditary factors is not covered by the government-run insurance program. Hair loss treatments are only supported if the loss is caused by certain diseases.
Reports say one in every five South Koreans suffers from hair loss.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
