Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

2 – “Defend institutions. It is institutions that help us to preserve decency. They need our help as well. Do not speak of “our institutions” unless you make them yours by acting on their behalf. Institutions do not protect themselves. They fall one after the other unless each is defended from the beginning. So choose an institution you care about—a court, a newspaper, a law, a labor union—and take its side.”

– Timothy Snyder

“Nietzsche said the newspaper had replaced the prayer in the life of the modern bourgeois, meaning that the busy, the cheap, the ephemeral, had usurped all that remained of the eternal in his daily life.”

– Allan Bloom

"The life of the nation is secure only while the nation is honest, truthful, and virtuous."

– Frederick Douglass

1. Trump Imagines New Sphere of U.S. Influence Stretching From Panama to Greenland

2. How ISIS May Respond to HTS’s Takeover: Rivalries, Strategy, and Future Challenges in Syria

3. How Ukraine’s New Push in Kursk Can Change the War

4. Trump, Greenland, and a History of Intrigue

5. Xi Jinping Muzzles Chinese Economist Who Dared to Doubt GDP Numbers

6. Takeaways from Trump's Mar-a-Lago press conference

7. Trump says he will change the name of the Gulf of Mexico. Can he do that?

8. Facebook’s Fact-Checkers Changed the Way I See Tech—and Speech—Forever

9. Office of the Director of National Intelligence Selects Arizona State University as one of the newest members of the Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence (IC CAE) Program

10. Taiwan holds military drills as concerns rise over possible defense budget cut

11. Mark Zuckerberg’s Political Evolution, From Apologies to No More Apologies

12. Banning TikTok Won’t Solve Your Data-Security Problem

13. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 7, 2025

14. Iran Update, January 7, 2025

15. Can Europe Fight for Taiwan?

16. Asia-Pacific nations boost amphibious naval fleets to repel China

17. The Axis of Upheaval Goes to Sea

18. US Army tests mid-range capability of Typhon weapon system

19. Permission Structures, a PSYOP Against the American People, & the Big Man Theory

20. U.S. Rep. Van Orden: Appointed to House Armed Services Committee for 119th Congress

21. Retired US Army colonel led joint task force that safely removed tons of uranium from Iraq

22. The Domestic Fentanyl Crisis in Strategic Context, Part II: China and the Fentanyl Supply Chain

23. Can America’s Allies Save America’s Alliances?

24. Trump’s Antiliberal Order

25. Know Your Rival, Know Yourself - Rightsizing the China Challenge

26. The Flawed U.S. Exit from Afghanistan in 2021: Lessons Not Learned

1. Trump Imagines New Sphere of U.S. Influence Stretching From Panama to Greenland

Excerpts:

With the Panama Canal and Greenland, he suggested he could use force to take them over. With Canada, he suggested he would hit the U.S.’s northern neighbor with extreme tariffs, leaving it no choice but to submit to annexation.

“Canada and the United States, that would really be something,” Trump said. “You get rid of that artificially drawn line and you take a look at what that looks like and it would also be much better for national security.”

Taking control of Greenland, Canada, and the Panama Canal through military or economic force would be a dramatic departure from decades of U.S. foreign policy as pursued by presidents of both parties. If Trump does even a portion of what he described—each of which is extremely unlikely—it could mean far-reaching changes in America’s global role, emboldening adversaries and forcing allies no longer assured of Washington’s backing to seek new security and economic arrangements, analysts said.

Trump Imagines New Sphere of U.S. Influence Stretching From Panama to Greenland

President-elect sees overseas territory as vital to U.S. interests and suggests he isn’t bluffing in threats to take over allies

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/trump-foreign-policy-expansion-canada-greenland-panama-canal-b1cbe478?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Vivian Salama

and Alexander Ward

Jan. 7, 2025 9:10 pm ET

Outside a hotel in Nuuk, Greenland. Photo: daniel l johnsen/Shutterstock

WASHINGTON—President-elect Donald Trump’s calls to take control of Greenland, Canada and the Panama Canal reflect his fascination with a 21st-century version of an old idea—that great powers should carve out spheres of influence and defend their economic and security interests by imposing their will on smaller neighbors.

In a press conference Tuesday, Trump outlined a second-term foreign policy agenda that rests not on global alliances and free trade but on economic coercion and unilateral military might, even against allies.

With the Panama Canal and Greenland, he suggested he could use force to take them over. With Canada, he suggested he would hit the U.S.’s northern neighbor with extreme tariffs, leaving it no choice but to submit to annexation.

“Canada and the United States, that would really be something,” Trump said. “You get rid of that artificially drawn line and you take a look at what that looks like and it would also be much better for national security.”

Taking control of Greenland, Canada, and the Panama Canal through military or economic force would be a dramatic departure from decades of U.S. foreign policy as pursued by presidents of both parties. If Trump does even a portion of what he described—each of which is extremely unlikely—it could mean far-reaching changes in America’s global role, emboldening adversaries and forcing allies no longer assured of Washington’s backing to seek new security and economic arrangements, analysts said.

For Trump, the case for a sweeping reorientation of foreign policy rests on a stew of long-espoused and even conflicting convictions—that even close allies are treating the U.S. unfairly, that America gave away the canal to Panama for nothing, and that China is moving into what should be the U.S.-dominated Western Hemisphere.

Asked by a reporter if he would commit to not using military force or economic pressure in his quest to acquire the territories, Trump replied “No, I can’t assure you on either of those two. But I can say this, we need them for economic security.”

Trump’s willingness to broach such ideas and his disregard for bipartisan doctrines left some aghast.

“We just haven’t seen anything like this, at least in my lifetime, from a president of the United States,” said Chuck Hagel, the former Republican senator and defense secretary during the Obama administration. “This is very, very autocratic, and that is why it is so concerning what Trump is saying and how he’s acting.”

How ISIS May Respond to HTS’s Takeover: Rivalries, Strategy, and Future Challenges in Syria

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/01/08/how-isis-may-respond-to-htss-takeover/

by Mahmut Cengiz

01.08.2025 at 06:00am

Abstract: This article explores the growing influence of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria and the potential responses of ISIS, a longstanding rival, to HTS’s expanding control. HTS is seeking legitimacy and has garnered tacit approval from Western governments and regional actors, including the European Union, which is engaged in pragmatic relationships with the group due to the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis. The United States also closely monitors the situation as dynamics shift in the region. According to the Global Terrorism and Trends Analysis Center (GTTAC) database, which recorded nearly 8,000 attacks in Syria by 88 different terrorist groups from January 2018 to October 2024, ISIS remains the most dominant actor in terms of attack frequency, group size, and global reach. Despite some speculation about whether ISIS might withdraw from the region, its increasing operational capabilities and well-established presence suggest it will continue to challenge HTS’s leadership. The historical rivalry between ISIS and HTS raises the likelihood of ongoing conflict. While temporary ceasefires may occur, ISIS is expected to exploit any weaknesses in HTS’s governance, posing a significant challenge to long-term regional stability. Ultimately, ISIS’s resilience and strategic adaptability may undermine HTS’s attempts to consolidate power, further destabilizing Syria’s future trajectory.

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) takeover of Syria has raised several key questions regarding its ability to function as a legitimate state. These concerns include whether HTS can form a government, create a constitution that ensures equal rights and representation, and uphold women’s rights, particularly given fears that women may face pressures similar to those under the Taliban. There are also questions about how Islam might be exploited under HTS’s leadership, and how Turkiye, a country that has distanced itself from democratic values, might effectively guide HTS. Additionally, there is the challenge of reshaping the radical ideologies of jihadist groups under HTS’s control and determining how other factions in Syria will respond to HTS’s leadership. According to the Global Terrorism and Trends Analysis Center (GTTAC) Records of Incidents Database (GRID), 88 non-state actors are involved in Syria from January 2018 to October 2024, including Salafi-jihadist terrorist groups, Turkish-backed rebel groups fighting Kurdish forces, Iran-backed groups, Russia-backed groups, pro-Assad forces, and Kurdish groups. Among these, ISIS remains the most established and capable, with a significant presence in size, number of attacks, and extensive global network. This article focuses on Turkiye’s potential role in guiding HTS and examines how ISIS might respond to HTS’s leadership, taking into account the long-standing rivalries and struggles for dominance in conflict zones like Syria.

Despite being confined to a relatively small region, such as Idlib, and relying primarily on conventional terrorist tactics, HTS’s successful consolidation of control in Syria has been both surprising and noteworthy. This shift in power appears to have been tacitly accepted by both Western and regional leaders. For European Union countries, this development may be seen as a preferable outcome, as Syria has become a major source of refugees flowing into Europe. Rather than managing the complex refugee crisis, it may appear more pragmatic to contain the refugee population within Syria’s borders.

Similarly, the United States has not actively opposed HTS’s governance, mainly due to the broader shift in U.S. foreign policy priorities. The Middle East, once a central focus, has become less significant in light of Russia’s expanding territorial ambitions and China’s growing regional and global influence. In response, the U.S. has reoriented its strategic focus toward countering these two powers. This strategic shift was exemplified by the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, which left the Taliban in control of the country. For the U.S., the primary concern remains preventing large-scale terrorist attacks akin to those of September 11, 2001, while safeguarding American interests abroad. Although both Al-Qaeda and ISIS continue to present substantial threats, U.S. security experts assess that their operational capabilities are primarily constrained to specific regions in which they remain active.

Abu Mohammad al-Julani, the leader of HTS, has demonstrated a calculated shift in his leadership approach, frequently engaging with international media to shape his image. He consciously refrains from presenting himself as an immediate threat to the United States, avoiding direct antagonism towards U.S. policies or Israel. Instead, al-Julani has emphasized the need for national unity, articulating plans to establish a constitution that encompasses the interests of all Syrians. This rhetoric contrasts sharply with his earlier tenure in Idlib, where authoritarian practices, including widespread repression and the torture of detainees, characterized HTS’s governance. In a marked departure from the past, al-Julani now seeks to project an image of moderation and clemency. This strategic evolution can be understood as part of al-Julani’s broader effort to secure political legitimacy and establish HTS as a recognized, lawful authority within Syria’s fragmented political landscape.

Despite al-Julani’s rhetoric of peace and inclusivity, it remains uncertain whether he possesses the necessary skills to govern a nation. His background is rooted in military conflict, having played a key role in the early years of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and later in the formation of Jabhat al-Nusra, with the support of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Syria. While al-Julani has demonstrated expertise in insurgency and terrorist tactics, his leadership appears ill-suited for the complexities of statecraft. As a result, the United States has designated HTS as a foreign terrorist organization and placed a $10 million bounty on his head.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkiye has emerged as a key actor in the Syrian conflict, notably through his support for various rebel factions seeking to topple the Assad regime. A significant moment in this context occurred when Erdoğan’s Chief of Intelligence visited Damascus and prayed at the Umayyad Mosque on December 12, 2024, a symbolic gesture that harkened back to Erdoğan’s 2012 statement, “We will go to the Umayyad Mosque shortly and pray there.” This remark underscored Turkiye’s assertion of military capability to intervene in Syria and to challenge the Syrian government’s forces. Despite this rhetoric, however, the effort to undermine the Assad regime took over twelve years, involving numerous rebel groups—many of which are documented in global terrorism databases, including the National Liberation Front, Syrian National Army, Syrian Liberation Front, and Jaysh al-Islam—before a tangible shift in power dynamics was achieved.

In addition to supporting opposition groups, Erdoğan has suggested that Turkiye could help Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) draft a new Syrian constitution. However, this proposal raises significant concerns about the legitimacy of Turkiye’s involvement, given Erdoğan’s own authoritarian policies. Under his leadership, Turkiye has experienced a decline in democratic values, including the erosion of secularism, the imprisonment of journalists, and the suppression of political dissent. Furthermore, Turkiye’s government has been accused of imprisoning hundreds of thousands of people without sufficient evidence, as reported in the U.S. Department of State’s 2023 Country Reports on Terrorism.

Erdoğan’s government has also been associated with corruption, including the misappropriation of public funds and the consolidation of power by his inner circle. These actions stand in stark contrast to the democratic ideals that would be necessary to guide Syria through a genuine process of political transition. Given Turkiye’s record of undermining democratic norms at home and its increasing authoritarianism, the role of Erdoğan’s government in Syria’s constitutional reform process remains highly problematic. The prospect of a successful, inclusive, and peaceful political resolution under an HTS-led government with Turkish backing seems highly unlikely.

In addition to HTS’s evolving image and Turkiye’s strategic interests in Syria, another critical question is how ISIS will respond to HTS’s consolidation of power. Although ISIS originally emerged as an offshoot of Al-Qaeda, it has since sought to surpass its predecessor in its ambition to establish itself as the preeminent “caliphate” of the Islamic world. This rivalry continues to play out in regions such as the Sahel and Afghanistan, where both groups compete for influence. Given their historical tensions and ideological differences, it remains uncertain how ISIS will interact with HTS in Syria. The potential for conflict between these two groups is high, as their divergent objectives and territorial aspirations may lead to further hostilities in the region.

ISIS is considered one of the deadliest terrorist organizations in modern history. At its peak in 2014 and 2015, the group controlled extensive territories across Iraq and Syria, ruling over six million people. During this period, ISIS also expanded its influence through a network of regional affiliates. These affiliates, located in countries such as Afghanistan, Nigeria, Somalia, Libya, the Sahel region, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, significantly broadened ISIS’s reach and impact. Despite its territorial losses in Syria, ISIS continues to pose a substantial threat, largely due to the ongoing activities of its global franchises, which maintain the group’s presence and operational capacity worldwide.

The global coalition against ISIS has made significant strides worldwide, with U.S. forces, in collaboration with Kurdish groups, successfully driving ISIS militants to the outskirts of Syrian territory. In response to these intensified operations, a notable portion of ISIS fighters relocated, with some joining ISIS’s affiliate in the Sahel (ISIS-Greater Sahara) and others moving to the group’s branch in Afghanistan (ISIS-Khorasan). U.S. military actions further disrupted ISIS’s organizational structure, leading to the elimination of several senior leaders in 2020 and 2021.

Recent international reports suggest that ISIS’s leadership has primarily re-established itself in Somalia. Despite this geographical shift, the group continues to pose a significant threat in Syria. From January 2018 to October 2024, ISIS conducted 2,036 attacks, accounting for approximately 25% of all incidents in Syria during this period. Notably, the frequency of ISIS attacks has steadily increased, rising from 187 in 2018 to 416 in the first ten months of 2024, reflecting both the group’s persistence and its adaptive strategies in response to external pressures.

Figure 1: The Number of ISIS Incidents in Syria, January 2018 to October 2024

ISIS remained the deadliest terrorist organization in Syria. While the group’s lethal impact decreased from its peak years in 2014 and 2015, it was still responsible for 2,312 fatalities in 2018 alone. Over the following years, the number of deaths fluctuated, but ISIS consistently caused at least 800 fatalities annually. Crucially, the number of deaths consistently exceeded the number of injuries from January 2018 to October 2024, underscoring ISIS’s focus on inflicting maximum harm through high-caliber weapons and coordinated attacks.

Figure 2: Number of People Killed and Wounded in ISIS Attacks, January 2018 to October 2024

An important indicator of ISIS’s operational activity is the geographic distribution of its attacks across Syria. In 2018, the group launched attacks in all 12 Syrian provinces, a pattern that persisted in subsequent years. As illustrated in Figure 3, Dayr ar Zawr emerged as the most active province, with ISIS conducting a total of 1,019 attacks from 2018 to October 2024. This province has thus served as the group’s primary base of operations. Other provinces with notable levels of activity include Homs (308 attacks), Ar Raqqah (195 attacks), and Al-Hasakah (192 attacks). As of October 2024, ISIS conducted 237 attacks in Dayr ar Zawr, 83 in Homs, and 51 in Ar Raqqah. Remarkably, ISIS was active in seven of Syria’s 12 provinces in 2024, further reinforcing the group’s sustained presence and operational capacity across the region.

Figure 3: Locations of ISIS Attacks, January 2018 to October 2024

In addition to its geographic spread, ISIS’s tactics also provide insights into its operational capacity. The group targeted military forces in 25% of its attacks and employed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in 21% of its incidents in the same period. These figures highlight ISIS’s reliance on asymmetric warfare methods, enabling the group to continue its operations against both military and civilian targets effectively.

The GTTAC data underscores the increasing capabilities of ISIS, while HTS’s stance toward Kurdish groups remains uncertain. The survival of Kurdish factions under HTS control largely hinges on U.S. support, especially in opposition to groups that Turkiye classifies as PKK-linked. If U.S. support diminishes, these Kurdish groups could face considerable difficulties under HTS leadership, potentially creating risks for HTS as well.

Turkiye’s alleged relationship with ISIS has raised significant concerns, particularly regarding its potential role as an intermediary between HTS and ISIS. Between 2014 and 2018, Turkiye is reported to have facilitated the movement of over 30,000 ISIS militants across its borders, while allegedly turning a blind eye to the group’s procurement of weapons and logistical support. Notably, in 2014, Turkish authorities intercepted a truck carrying explosives en route to Syria, reportedly intended for jihadist groups. However, the officers involved in this interception were subjected to severe judicial proceedings and remain in solitary confinement to this day. Since that incident, there have been no reports of similar investigations into weapons shipments. A particularly concerning development is the recent release of ISIS militants involved in the 2016 Istanbul airport bombing, which resulted in the deaths of 45 people. Despite being sentenced to multiple life terms, these individuals were unexpectedly freed, fueling further speculation about Turkey’s strategic relationship with ISIS and the possibility of a deal in its intermediary role.

The United States is closely monitoring the ongoing conflict in Syria and, while initially reluctant, may eventually tacitly support an HTS-led government, contingent upon HTS’s severance of ties with Al Qaeda. However, the reliability of HTS’s commitment to this condition remains uncertain. Given the precedent established by the Taliban’s provision of sanctuary to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, there are concerns that HTS may similarly offer refuge to Al Qaeda in Syria. Despite shifts in HTS’s public rhetoric, the group’s ideological alignment with Al Qaeda persists, posing significant challenges to the full severance of their relationship.

In conclusion, the consolidation of power by HTS in Syria raises several significant questions about the country’s future trajectory. Foremost among these are whether Turkiye can successfully manage Syria’s transition towards peace, facilitate the return of millions of Syrian refugees, and ensure long-term stability. Another key concern is how ISIS will respond to HTS’s leadership, given the historical rivalry between the two groups and ISIS’s established presence in the region. As the most capable and operationally effective terrorist group in Syria, ISIS continues to pose a significant challenge for HTS. This is evident in ISIS’s sustained military activity, which includes a high frequency of attacks across multiple Syrian provinces, the strategic deployment of explosives and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and its ability to employ complex and diversified terror tactics. While ongoing negotiations between HTS and ISIS could lead to a temporary détente, ISIS is likely to remain resilient and opportunistic. The group may seek to exploit any potential weaknesses or failures within HTS’s governance, thereby enabling it to regain influence and destabilize the region further. Consequently, despite any short-term agreements, ISIS is expected to remain a formidable force, capitalizing on the vulnerabilities inherent in the HTS-led governance model.

Tags: counterinsurgency, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, HTS, insurgency, Islamic State, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

About The Author

Mahmut Cengiz
Dr. Mahmut Cengiz is an Associate Professor and Research Faculty member at the Terrorism, Transnational Crime, and Corruption Center (TraCCC) and the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University (GMU). He has extensive international field experience, having provided capacity-building and training assistance to partners across the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. Dr. Cengiz has also contributed to research projects for the Brookings Institution, the European Union, and various U.S. agencies. Dr. Cengiz is a prolific author, with six books to his name, along with numerous articles and book chapters on topics such as terrorism, organized crime, smuggling, terrorist financing, and trafficking. His 2024 book, Murder By Mail: A Global History of the Letter Bomb, explores the individuals and groups who have used letter and package bombs to kill and maim their victims. Since 2018, Dr. Cengiz has been leading the development of the Global Terrorist Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC) and currently serves as Academic Director and Co-Principal Investigator for the GMU component. He is also a Fellow at Small Wars Journal El Centro, a columnist, and a member of the editorial board of Homeland Security Today. Dr. Cengiz teaches courses on Terrorism, American Security Policy, and Narco-Terrorism at George Mason University.

3. How Ukraine’s New Push in Kursk Can Change the War

How Ukraine’s New Push in Kursk Can Change the War

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/how-ukraines-new-push-in-kursk-can-change-the-war

Posted: January 7th, 2025

By Glenn Corn

Glenn Corn is a former Senior Executive in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who worked for 34 years in the U.S. Intelligence, Defense, and Foreign Affairs communities. He spent over 17 years serving overseas and served as the U.S. President’s Senior Representative on Intelligence and Security issues. He is an Adjunct Professor at the Institute of World Politics.

OPINION — Ukrainian forces launched a fresh offensive into Russia’s western Kursk region over the weekend, trying to surprise Russian forces – and the North Korean troops fighting alongside them – and carve out more territory. Five months ago, Ukrainian troops entered Kursk in a stunning move that marked the first time a foreign military had occupied Russian territory since World War II. Since then, Russian and North Korean have been slowly retaking territory in Kursk seized by the Ukrainian side. In this sense, the current Ukrainian operation is really a counter-counteroffensive, aimed at turning the tide once more. And it’s clearly aimed at doing so before Donald Trump returns to the White House, and to gain some territorial leverage before Trump begins his much-promised effort to negotiate an end to the war.

“We continue to maintain a buffer zone on Russian territory, actively destroying Russian military potential there,” President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Monday. “Since the beginning of the Kursk operation, the enemy has already lost over 38,000 troops in this area alone, including approximately 15,000 irrecoverable losses.”

The Cipher Brief spoke with former Senior CIA Officer Glenn Corn, a Cipher Brief expert, to discuss the state of the latest Ukrainian push in Kursk and the impact it may have on the wider war. “My own assessment is that the Ukrainians are trying to send a message again that they are in a position of strength,” Corn told us, noting the importance of the operation’s timing — just two weeks before Trump’s inauguration.

Corn spoke with Cipher Brief Managing Editor Tom Nagorski. Their conversation has been edited for length and clarity, and you can watch the full discussion on The Cipher Brief YouTube channel.

Nagorski: Ukraine’s counteroffensive in Kursk – it’s a counter to a counteroffensive that the Russians had started. What can you tell us about what you’re hearing in terms of what’s going on?

Corn: My understanding is that the Ukrainians once again caught the Russians off guard. They launched, as you mentioned, a counter-counter-offensive. The Ukrainian estimate I saw is maybe eight kilometers (captured). It looks like they’re moving in the direction of the Kurchatov Atomic Station. There’s a lot of speculation as to whether that’s their objective, (or) that this is actually a deceiving maneuver, that they have plans to launch other offensives along the front. But it appears that they have been successful so far.

Kyiv is being very careful on what they’re saying in terms of details. And of course, in the Russian media space and the blogger space, the Russians are putting out lot of disinformation about the number of Ukrainians they’ve killed, equipment they’ve destroyed, aircraft they’ve shot down, which I find highly suspicious.

Nagorski: It’s five months ago now that they first stormed in there. It was one of the more startling military episodes of the war and widely understood then, at least in part, to be about leverage and grabbing a bargaining chip for any potential negotiations. Is that still the game, do you think?

Corn: My own assessment is that the Ukrainians are trying to send a message again that they are in a position of strength. I think the timing is important, because Putin didn’t have a very good end of last year. His number one ally in the Middle East got crushed and is now living in an AirBnb in Moscow somewhere, a guest of the Russian Federation, the terrorist Bashar al-Assad, former leader of Syria. The Syrian regime collapsed very quickly. This has caused a lot of complications for Putin and his reputation.

My own assessment is that [Russia is] not happy with the U.S. elections. They had hoped there’d be a lot more drama and turmoil in the U.S. after the elections. Instead, it was a pretty clear victory on the side of the Republicans and there were no major protests, no violence.

I speculate that the Ukrainians wanted to continue that bad streak for Putin and to show the incoming [U.S.] administration that they are strong, that they’re not on their back foot, and that they are an ally that we should count on and invest in because they can succeed.

Nagorski: It’s impressive what the Ukrainians done, on the one hand, but it’s also a small piece of Russian territory in Kursk. What kind of a bargaining chip is that?

Corn: I guess in theory, when they go to the bargaining table with the Russians, they can say, OK, we’ll give you back this territory that we took, if you give us some of the territory [Russia has captured]. Maybe a kilometer to kilometer – with the Russians, they’re very reciprocal, like an eye for an eye.

But I also would say that the Ukrainians have been involved in a very long-term effort, for over a year, to destabilize Russia from within, show the Russian people that Putin is not as strong as he is – coming after the collapse of the Assad regime, coming after news about the Russian economy, the devaluation of the ruble, and the fact that the Ukrainians stopped the gas transit, which is going to cause a problem for the Russian economy.

At the same time, people in the Trump administration have said that we are going to pump the Russians into submission, [regarding] oil and gas. In other words, economically, we are going to break the Russians’ back because that’s the main tool they’ve been using to finance their war. We’re going to devalue their energy resources by making available more of our own alternatives, which I personally think is a smart strategy.

All these things are happening, and I think the Ukrainians are just continuing to show that they can hit the Russians, they can catch Putin off guard, and that Putin is not protecting Russia the way that he claimed he was going to do when he came to power in early 2000s.

Nagorski: I want to mention the North Koreans. Talk a bit about the impact of their presence there.

Corn: The fact that [Russia] had to bring in North Koreans to fight this war, basically as mercenaries, demonstrates that they also have a personnel shortage in the Russian military. They have a problem. The North Koreans have not demonstrated great prowess on the battlefield. I’m not surprised about that. I doubt that they have the level of training and motivation that the Ukrainians have to defend their own territory. Remember, the Ukrainians are fighting a defensive war. The North Koreans, maybe they’re making more money doing this, and the propaganda and the level of brainwashing of the North Koreans is probably pretty high. But I doubt that they’re as motivated to fight. My understanding is that the Russians themselves are treating the North Koreans poorly, that there’s a lot of conflict between the North Korean troops and the Russians.

I don’t think that the North Koreans have made a huge difference so far. We’ll have to see now whether Putin tries to bring in another tranche, whether the North Koreans continue to invest in this, and whether the PRC continues to allow it to happen, because early on I think that Beijing was very upset with what Putin’s doing for a number of reasons.

Nagorski: Everyone has talked about the potential of a Trump-led plan or a negotiated effort [to end the war]. I think that the general assessment, in global media anyway, is that the Ukrainians would come to such a negotiation right now in a weak state. That doesn’t seem to be your take.

Corn: The Russians want people to believe that, and that’s been the Russian propaganda effort, the covert influence effort for a long time at multiple levels. I’m glad that President Trump actually stated publicly after Assad fled that Iran and Russia were not in positions of strength. It demonstrated their weakness. That is good because the incoming administration should understand that the Ukrainians are not as weak as the Russians want people to believe, and the Russians are not as strong and Putin’s not in the power position that he wants everyone to believe he’s in. Again, I think this operation may have been also intended to send a public message to people in Europe and the United States that we can still hit, we can still take territory, we can still catch the Russians, and look how incompetent the Russians are. We caught them again off guard.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

4. Trump, Greenland, and a History of Intrigue

Excerpts:

The U.S. has been operating in Greenland under the 1951 agreement with Denmark, which was amended in 2004 to reflect Greenland’s new status as a part of Denmark, and no longer a colony. In addition, the 2004 change said, “The Government of the United States will consult with and inform the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, including the Home Rule Government of Greenland, prior to the implementation of any significant changes to United States military operations or facilities in Greenland.”

In the aftermath of Trump’s December statement that the U.S. needed to own Greenland, Prime Minister Egede, in his January New Year’s speech, talked of his desire to pursue independence from Denmark. “It is about time that we ourselves take a step and shape our future, also with regard to who we will cooperate closely with, and who our trading partners will be,” Egede said.

Under a 2009 agreement with Denmark, Greenland has the right to declare its independence through a referendum, which Egede hinted could be held as early as April in conjunction with the island’s planned parliamentary elections.

President-elect Trump may want to own Greenland when he once again becomes the leader of the world’s richest and most powerful country, and its 335 million citizens. But in the end, he may have to bow to the wishes of Egede, the prime minister of a much smaller, weaker, poorer, and currently icebound entity, but a property that for eight decades has been key to the defense of the U.S. homeland.

Trump, Greenland, and a History of Intrigue

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/trump-greenland-and-a-history-of-intrigue?utm_source=The+Cipher+Brief+Nightcap+Newsletter&utm_campaign=eb6aa73364-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2025_01_07_10_56&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_-eb6aa73364-122484577&mc_cid=eb6aa73364

Posted: January 7th, 2025

By Walter Pincus

Pulitzer Prize Winning Journalist Walter Pincus is a contributing senior national security columnist for The Cipher Brief. He spent forty years at The Washington Post, writing on topics that ranged from nuclear weapons to politics. He is the author of Blown to Hell: America's Deadly Betrayal of the Marshall Islanders. Pincus won an Emmy in 1981 and was the recipient of the Arthur Ross Award from the American Academy for Diplomacy in 2010. He was also a team member for a Pulitzer Prize in 2002 and the George Polk Award in 1978.

OPINION — “For purposes of National Security and Freedom throughout the World, the United States of America feels that the ownership and control of Greenland is an absolute necessity.”

That was President-elect Donald Trump in a statement on December 22, made while announcing that he plans to nominate Ken Howery to serve as the next U.S. ambassador to Denmark.

Greenland is the world’s largest island, covering 840,000 square miles, more than 80 percent of which is covered by an ice cap or smaller glaciers. With a population of near 60,000, Greenland was a colony of Denmark for some 300 years, but was granted home rule in 1979. Greenland’s people voted for self-government in 2008, which the government in Copenhagen approved, while retaining control of Greenland’s defense, foreign and monetary policies.

Danes and Greenlanders alike have heard statements like Trump’s before, and, no surprise, Greenland’s Prime Minister Mute Egede responded to Trump by saying, “Greenland is ours. We are not for sale and will never be for sale.”

The U.S. and Greenland – a history

Trump and the American people should recognize there is a long and complex 80-year history of U.S. military activities in Greenland involving air and naval bases, weather stations, nuclear weapons, and even a secretly built underground facility, put in place to protect the U.S. homeland. I review some of that history below.

But first it’s worth looking at the importance today of the varied military operations the U.S. is carrying on in Greenland at Pituffik Space Base (pronounced beee-doo-FEEK), formerly known as Thule Air Base.

It is America’s northernmost base, located in the middle of nowhere, 750 miles north of the Arctic Circle, and 947 miles south of the North Pole on Greenland’s northwest side. Pituffik is locked in ice for nine months of the year, but the airfield is open and operated year-round. The nearest town is 75 miles to the northwest.

From this base the U.S. Air Force and Space Force personnel carry out ballistic missile early warnings, missile defense, and space surveillance missions supported by what the Space Force described as an “Upgraded Early Warning Radar weapon system.” That system includes “a phased-array radar that detects and reports attack assessments of sea-launched and intercontinental ballistic missile threats in support of [a worldwide U.S.] strategic missile warning and missile defense [system],” according to a Space Force press release.

The same radar also supports what Space Force said is “Space Domain Awareness by tracking and characterizing objects in orbit around the earth.”

The phased-array radar is operated 24 hours a day, seven days a week by U.S. and Canadian military personnel and contractors. The system’s antennas do not move, but the radar’s thousands of beams are electronically steered to programmed locations covering two-thirds of the horizon.

Also operated out of Pituffik Space Base is one of seven worldwide Remote Tracking Stations in the Satellite Control Network (SCN). Run by Space Force, SCN provides support for the operation, control, and maintenance of a variety of Defense Department and some non-defense satellites. The Greenland automated tracking station, Space Force said, “allows contact with polar orbiting satellites 10-12 times per day…[and] provides telemetry, tracking and commanding for communication with surveillance satellites of the highest national priority; communications, navigation and weather satellites; and NASA missions. It also…conducts more than 15,000 satellite contacts per year with a 99.3 percent success rate, 24/7.”

The Pituffik Space Base population, which can total over 600, includes fewer than 200 active-duty U.S. Air Force and Space Force personnel. The majority includes representatives from other government agencies and private contractors working to support the Pituffik Space Base military mission, plus Danish Arctic Command personnel in the Danish Liaison Office; Danish Police; some Canadian military and researchers funded by international agencies.

As in the past, today’s U.S. military activities in Greenland have as their primary purpose defense of the American homeland. Given that situation, it’s been a bargain for Washington to have had the use of property in Greenland without paying rent, as the U.S. does, for example, for a similar, multi-use base in the South Pacific Marshall Islands.

Protection of the U.S. homeland was certainly the purpose more than 80 years ago, in the fall of 1941, when the first U.S. air base was built in Greenland near the end of Sondre Strom Fjord, 30 miles north of the Arctic Circle.

Circumstances were quite different then. Hitler’s troops had seized Denmark in April 1940. Greenland’s governors and the then-Danish Ambassador to the U.S. formed councils which, as an unofficial government-in-exile, signed an agreement on April 9, 1941 with then-Secretary of State Cordell Hull, which permitted the U.S. to operate military bases in Greenland “for as long as there is agreement” that the threat to North America existed.

A critical mine

At that time, there was another reason for U.S. interest in Greenland — the cryolite mine at Ivittuut, located near the tip of Greenland. Cryolite is necessary to the electrolytic process that produces aluminum, and this mine was the United States’ only commercial source of the mineral required for producing aircraft.

During World War II, some 500 U.S. soldiers guarded the mine, and big guns were placed in strategic points for protection. The U.S. Navy also built a naval base three miles away and the U.S. Coast Guard built a base across the fjord from Ivittuut, holding hundreds more soldiers. With America’s source of strategic cryolite secured, President Roosevelt requested military appropriations from Congress, including the industrial capacity to build at least 50,000 aluminum-skinned aircraft per year.

After a Nazi submarine sent a torpedo toward a U.S. Navy destroyer, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, during a September 11, 1941 Fireside Chat, declared, “The United States destroyer, when attacked, was proceeding on a legitimate mission…There will be no shooting unless Germany continues to seek it. That is my obvious duty in this crisis. That is the clear right of this sovereign Nation. This is the only step possible, if we would keep tight the wall of defense which we are pledged to maintain around this Western Hemisphere.”

In 1946, the post-war U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to secure military rights in Greenland from Denmark, which eventually led to a Truman administration offer, similar to Trump’s. It came during a December 1946 meeting in New York City between visiting Danish Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmussen and Secretary of State James Byrnes. After discussing other security arrangements for Greenland, Byrnes told Rasmussen that an outright sale to the United States would be more satisfactory. The U.S. would pay $100 million. Rasmussen took the proposal, but the Danes never acted on it.

Greenland and the Cold War

The 1949 founding of NATO led to an April 1951 United States-Denmark joint defense agreement for Greenland, which allowed the U.S. to operate bases in Greenland for NATO defense activities. The air base at Thule (now Pituffik) was built in 1951–52, and the indigenous population was relocated to other settlements. Other bases were built at Narssarsuaq, and Sondestrom. In the context of the Cold War, these bases provided refueling points and operation sites for intermediate-range B-47s and long-range B-52 strategic bombers.

Thule, according to a SAC press release, “is at the precise midpoint between Moscow and New York…Strategic Air Command bombers flying over the Arctic presented less risk of early warning [to Moscow]] than using bases in England. Defensively, Thule could serve as a base for intercepting [Soviet Union] bomber attacks along the northeastern approaches to Canada and the U.S.”

Additionally, the U.S. deployed radar stations in Greenland to maintain a Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) and a Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, which would give the United States advance warning of a Soviet nuclear attack.

In 1959, the U.S. also secretly began building a ballistic missile base beneath Greenland’s ice layer, 150 miles east of the Thule Base. Powered by a portable nuclear generator and called Camp Century, it was built to host up to 200 soldiers, provide year-round accommodation, and upon expansion would be capable of storing up to 600 ballistic missiles. The cover story was that it was a demonstration for constructing affordable ice-cap military outposts and a base for scientific research.

Called, Project Iceworm, the original Army plan called for deploying the 600 missiles, in trenches four miles apart, and build 60 Launch Control Centers. The “Iceman” missile was to be a modified version of the Minuteman ICBM, but with only two stages and a range of 3,300 miles, enough to hit targets in the Soviet Union.

In the end, the Army found the Greenland ice sheet was too unstable to support the project, whose tunnels could collapse at any moment. Project Iceworm was officially canceled in 1963, but not totally abandoned until 1967, when the nuclear reactor was removed. Today the remains of Camp Century survive under roughly 100 feet of snow and ice.

Beginning in 1961, SAC began flying a mission called the Thule Monitor. This was a single B-52, carrying four live thermonuclear bombs, that would orbit continuously near the Thule Air Base’s BMEWS system. The Thule Monitor B-52’s purpose, according to a SAC document, was to “be in a position to determine quickly the nature of any communications failure between the [BMEWS] site and warning centers in the United States,” and “race toward the Soviet Union in case of an attack on the station.”

On January 21, 1968, a Thule Monitor B-52, armed with four B28 thermonuclear bombs, developed a cockpit fire, forcing its crew of seven to bail out. The bomber crashed on the ice in a narrow fjord less than eight miles from the Thule Air Base runway. Six of the seven crew members were rescued within hours; one died from an accident exiting the airplane.

When the B-52 crashed, the conventional explosives in three of the four bombs exploded rupturing their nuclear payloads and thus dispersing radioactive material, including plutonium and uranium, over a wide one-mile-by-three-mile area. The nuclear payload of the fourth bomb, which probably went through the ice to the water below, was not found.

Cleanup operations under U.S. and Danish supervision, were undertaken under the code-name Project Crested Ice to remove blackened, contaminated, ice and wreckage from around the crash site. Some 147 freight cars of radioactive waste were shipped back to the U.S.

One result of the crash was that the U.S. halted the practice of having its in-flight strategic bombers carry live nuclear weapons. Instead, SAC nuclear-armed bombers were kept on 15-minute alert and on runways ready to take off.

The U.S. has been operating in Greenland under the 1951 agreement with Denmark, which was amended in 2004 to reflect Greenland’s new status as a part of Denmark, and no longer a colony. In addition, the 2004 change said, “The Government of the United States will consult with and inform the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, including the Home Rule Government of Greenland, prior to the implementation of any significant changes to United States military operations or facilities in Greenland.”

In the aftermath of Trump’s December statement that the U.S. needed to own Greenland, Prime Minister Egede, in his January New Year’s speech, talked of his desire to pursue independence from Denmark. “It is about time that we ourselves take a step and shape our future, also with regard to who we will cooperate closely with, and who our trading partners will be,” Egede said.

Under a 2009 agreement with Denmark, Greenland has the right to declare its independence through a referendum, which Egede hinted could be held as early as April in conjunction with the island’s planned parliamentary elections.

President-elect Trump may want to own Greenland when he once again becomes the leader of the world’s richest and most powerful country, and its 335 million citizens. But in the end, he may have to bow to the wishes of Egede, the prime minister of a much smaller, weaker, poorer, and currently icebound entity, but a property that for eight decades has been key to the defense of the U.S. homeland.

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5. Xi Jinping Muzzles Chinese Economist Who Dared to Doubt GDP Numbers

I guess this economist did not heed the adage that figures lie and liars figure which I think is what you must adopt to work for Xi (and survive).

Excerpts:

An early indication that Gao was in trouble came last month, when an event to be hosted by China’s Nankai University—where he was due to be the guest speaker—was canceled. According to a website advertising the program, and to a message sent to attendees and seen by the Journal, the Jan. 11 event was canceled because of “the personal schedule of the guest of honor, Mr. Gao Shanwen.”

In a New Year’s speech on Dec. 31, Xi tried to bolster confidence in the Chinese economy, saying it is “on an upward trajectory.” He appeared to acknowledge concerns over a trade war with the incoming Trump administration, but vowed that China would prevail over challenges from the “external environment.”

That did little to instill confidence in investors that Beijing has the resolve to address the country’s economic woes. Chinese stocks and bonds started the year with a selloff. The benchmark CSI 300 equity index dropped 2.9% on Jan. 2, its steepest decline on the year’s first day of trading in nearly a decade. China’s 10-year sovereign yield continued last year’s plunge to hit new lows.

Pro-growth measures launched since September, such as interest-rate cuts and debt swaps for municipalities, have had limited impact on reviving activities. The leadership then pledged bolder action at a December meeting, but many economists and analysts question whether those promises, such as one aimed at boosting consumption, will go far enough.

Gao’s remarks made in Washington were shared privately by many economists and analysts inside and outside China.

Xi Jinping Muzzles Chinese Economist Who Dared to Doubt GDP Numbers

Gao Shanwen questioned Beijing’s ability to boost its economy as threats loom from a property meltdown, burgeoning debt and other challenges

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/xi-jinping-muzzles-chinese-economist-who-dared-to-doubt-gdp-numbers-2a2468ef?mod=latest_headlines

By Lingling WeiFollow

Updated Jan. 8, 2025 12:22 am ET

At a Washington forum last month, a prominent Chinese economist raised doubts about Beijing’s economic management and said China’s economy might have grown at less than half the roughly 5% pace flaunted by authorities.

When Xi Jinping found out, he was furious.

According to people familiar with the matter, the Chinese leader ordered an investigation of Gao Shanwen, chief economist at state-owned SDIC Securities, who has frequently advised the government on economic and financial policies. Xi then ordered authorities to discipline him.

Two comments that Gao made at the forum, hosted jointly by the Peterson Institute for International Economics and a Chinese think tank, angered Xi, the people said.

One questioned the reliability of Chinese growth data. “We do not know the true number of China’s real growth figure,” Gao said at the Dec. 12 event, whose webcast is available on the Peterson Institute’s website and on YouTube. “My own speculation is that in the past two to three years, the real [gross domestic product growth] number on average might be around 2% even though the official number is close to 5%.”

Xi was further incensed to learn that Gao cast doubt regarding Beijing’s ability to take the steps needed to bolster growth.

Tap to unmute

Comments by Chinese economist Gao Shanwen at a Washington forum prompted a ban on him speaking publicly for an unspecified period. Peterson Institute for International Economics

“Their efforts to stimulate the economy will be very opportunistic,” Gao said at the forum. “In the end, I don’t think they can very confidently deliver what they have promised.”

Xi’s order led to a ban on Gao speaking publicly for an unspecified period, said the people familiar with the matter. For now, he has been allowed to keep his job, they said.

The leader’s reaction to Gao’s criticism highlights the deep sensitivities in Beijing over economic troubles that have mounted on Xi’s watch.

Beijing is trying to quell worries that China is plunging into a prolonged downturn. The country’s economy is being dragged down by a property meltdown that has wiped out $18 trillion in household wealth, a buildup of debt that is approaching 300% of GDP, and severe industrial overcapacity that risks a deflationary spiral.

The gathering gloom also hampers Beijing’s efforts to project strength and prepare to confront head-on tariffs and other threats from the incoming Trump administration.

In recent months, authorities have sought to stamp out any negative talk about the state of the economy.

An early morning in Shanghai’s financial district. Property-market troubles are weighing on the Chinese economy. Photo: Qilai Shen/Bloomberg News

Last year, Zhu Hengpeng, a senior economist at one of China’s top think tanks was placed under investigation, detained and removed from his post after he allegedly made remarks in a private chat group that were critical of Xi’s management of the economy, The Wall Street Journal reported in September. The remarks included veiled references to the leader’s mortality, according to the Journal report.

Other targets have ranged from business tycoons and bankers to academics, many of whom either questioned the leadership or otherwise are seen as not falling in line with what the top echelon of power wants.

The campaign has accelerated after Gao’s muzzling.

The Securities Association of China, the industry watchdog supervised by the country’s top securities regulator, late last month warned brokerages and fund managers to ensure that their economists and analysts “play a positive role” in interpreting government policies and boosting investor confidence. Offenders, according to the association, can be fired.

At a meeting this weekend, Cai Qi, Xi’s chief of staff, urged propaganda chiefs across the country to “strengthen economic publicity and expectation management”—a call to snuff out negative commentary about the economy.

The China Securities Regulatory Commission said the securities association’s directive mainly targets “chief economists who make unprofessional and irresponsible remarks.” It responded to other questions, including on Gao and Xi’s involvement, by saying, “The rest is untrue,” without elaborating.

SDIC Securities didn’t respond to questions.

A Chinese securities-industry watchdog wants brokerages and fund managers to ‘play a positive role’ in boosting investor confidence. Photo: Wang Zhao/AFP/Getty Images

An early indication that Gao was in trouble came last month, when an event to be hosted by China’s Nankai University—where he was due to be the guest speaker—was canceled. According to a website advertising the program, and to a message sent to attendees and seen by the Journal, the Jan. 11 event was canceled because of “the personal schedule of the guest of honor, Mr. Gao Shanwen.”

In a New Year’s speech on Dec. 31, Xi tried to bolster confidence in the Chinese economy, saying it is “on an upward trajectory.” He appeared to acknowledge concerns over a trade war with the incoming Trump administration, but vowed that China would prevail over challenges from the “external environment.”

That did little to instill confidence in investors that Beijing has the resolve to address the country’s economic woes. Chinese stocks and bonds started the year with a selloff. The benchmark CSI 300 equity index dropped 2.9% on Jan. 2, its steepest decline on the year’s first day of trading in nearly a decade. China’s 10-year sovereign yield continued last year’s plunge to hit new lows.

Pro-growth measures launched since September, such as interest-rate cuts and debt swaps for municipalities, have had limited impact on reviving activities. The leadership then pledged bolder action at a December meeting, but many economists and analysts question whether those promises, such as one aimed at boosting consumption, will go far enough.

Gao’s remarks made in Washington were shared privately by many economists and analysts inside and outside China.

The punishment of Gao and other outspoken economists are a blow for investors trying to assess the true state of China’s increasingly opaque market.

Gao as he spoke at the Washington forum, where he wondered about the reliability of Beijing’s growth data. Photo: Peterson Institute for International Economics

Beijing’s official GDP figures have long been viewed with skepticism even within China’s own policymaking circles. Li Keqiang, China’s late premier, preferred to use indicators showing electricity consumption, volumes of goods shipped and bank-loan disbursements to gauge the health of the economy, rather than relying on the GDP numbers.

Doubts over the reliability of Chinese statistics have grown in recent years as authorities have restricted access to certain data and stopped releasing others, such as on foreign investors’ interest in Chinese stocks. The government also paused disclosing widely watched youth jobless data in late 2023. It later restarted publication but excluded university students from its methodology.

Economists at Barclays wrote to clients in October that they noticed discrepancies between a sudden improvement in China’s third-quarter headline economic-activity data and the country’s weakening economic indicators, such as wage growth, exports and a purchasing-managers index. Economists at Nomura also noted the inconsistencies, saying that data from alternative sources for the country’s property and financial sectors appeared at odds with official data points.

Official data shows China’s economy grew 5.2% in 2023 and was on track for an expansion of about 5% last year. Growth of roughly 5% is critical to Xi’s ambitious plans, laid out in 2020, to expand China’s wealth and double the size of the nation’s economy by 2035. Such a target would require the economy to grow an average of nearly 5% annually over 15 years, according to estimates by officials involved in policymaking.

Gao said at the forum: “If my speculation is correct, I think it might be more reasonable to expect a growth rate between 3% and 4% in the years to come, the next three to five years.” He added, “But we know the official number will always be around 5%.”

In a statement, the Peterson Institute said it values candid exchanges with Chinese experts and believes “fact-based analytical expert discussions of public policy are essential to fostering mutual understanding and better public policy.” It said it would continue to collaborate with Chinese scholars “insofar as they are able to engage on that basis.”

Rebecca Feng contributed to this article.

Write to Lingling Wei at Lingling.Wei@wsj.com

6. Takeaways from Trump's Mar-a-Lago press conference

Initial strategic guidance from the president-elect?

Takeaways from Trump's Mar-a-Lago press conference

By JILL COLVIN, AAMER MADHANI and WILL WEISSERT

Updated 3:39 PM EST, January 7, 2025

AP · by JILL COLVIN · January 7, 2025

PALM BEACH, Florida (AP) — Less than two weeks before taking office, President-elect Donald Trump on Tuesday took some of his most audacious claims and promises of the transition period and amped them up to new levels.

Speaking to reporters at his Mar-a-Lago club in Florida, Trump would not rule out using military force to seize control of the Panama Canal and Greenland, citing national security interests. Greenland is an autonomous territory of Denmark, a longtime U.S. ally and a founding member of NATO. Washington relinquished control of the canal to Panama, another ally, in 1999.

Trump also criticized the late President Jimmy Carter just as his remains were being transported from the Carter Presidential Center in Georgia to Washington for three days of state funeral rites in the capital.

And he escalated his threats against Hamas, warning anew that, “All hell will break out in the Middle East” if the Israeli hostages still being held in Gaza are not returned before he takes office.

Some of the highlights from the press conference:

The new Trump imperialism

Trump ran on an isolationist “America First” agenda, promising to spend more time worrying about America’s problems than the world’s. But since his win, Trump has been increasingly preoccupied with a new imperialist agenda, threatening to seize control of the Panama Canal, Greenland and even Canada, a top U.S. ally and trading partner.

The billionaire Elon Musk, a frequent presence at Mar-a-Lago, even suggested in a survey posted on X that the U.S. “should liberate the people of Britain from their tyrannical government.”

Asked Tuesday whether he would rule out using the military in Panama and Greenland, Trump refused to do so.

“I’m not going to commit to that. It might be that you’ll have to do something,” he said. “The Panama Canal is vital to our country.”

Trump’s eldest son, Donald Trump Jr., is currently in Greenland, increasing speculation about his father’s intentions.

“We need Greenland for national security purposes,” the president-elect said. He also threatened to impose high tariffs on Denmark, while predicting the people of Greenland would welcome his plan.

“The people are going to probably vote for independence or to come into the United States,” he said.

Trump has also repeatedly talked about Canada joining the U.S. as its 51st state — rhetoric that at first sounded like trolling of outgoing Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, but that has become increasingly serious.

Trump told reporters he would not use military force to annex the country of more than 40 million people that is a founding NATO partner. Instead, he threatened “economic force,” as he cast the U.S. trade deficit with Canada — a nation rich in natural resources that provides the U.S. with crude oil, cars and petroleum — as a subsidy.

“Why are we supporting a country $200 billion plus a year,” he asked, insisting the U.S. doesn’t need Canadian cars, lumber or milk.

Trump also renewed talk of steep tariffs on both Canada and Mexico in response to their handling of the northern and southern borders.

And, adding something new to the mix, he said he’d move to rename the Gulf of Mexico as the Gulf of America.

Mixed transition messages

Trump repeatedly complained that President Joe Biden has been undermining his transition to power, even as other members of his team have offered praise for the current administration’s cooperation.

Trump railed against Biden’s move this week to ban offshore energy drilling on about 625 million acres of federal water, including along the East and West coasts, the eastern Gulf of Mexico and portions of Alaska’s Northern Bering Sea.

Biden’s actions on offshore drilling “will not stand,″ Trump said. ”I will reverse it immediately. And we will drill, baby, drill.” He pledged to take the dispute to the courts “if we need to.”

Trump cast Biden’s effort — one in a series of final actions before the Democrat leaves office — as part of an effort to undermine him.

“You know, they told me that, ‘We’re going to do everything possible to make this transition to the new administration very smooth,’” Trump said. “It’s not smooth.”

Other members of Trump’s team have repeatedly cast the outgoing and incoming administration as working closely together, particularly on foreign policy matters. The Biden administration has also provided access and courtesies to the incoming team that Trump initially denied Biden after the 2020 election.

Trump’s incoming chief of staff, Susie Wiles, told Axios in an interview published Monday that Biden chief of staff Jeff Zients had been “very helpful,” introducing her to former chiefs of staff and hosting her for a dinner at his home.

Trump believes he is now driving force in Gaza hostage talks

Trump set a clear expectation at his press conference: A deal to release the 100 hostages that remain captive in Gaza must be completed by the time he takes office in less than two weeks.

“If this deal’s not done for the people representing our nation by the time I get to office all hell is going to break out,” said Trump, hammering home a threat he’s been making since last month without detailing what those ramifications could mean.

Trump is dispatching his incoming special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, to Qatar this week for additional talks. Witkoff said real progress has been made on the talks, which are centered on a 42-day ceasefire deal in exchange for the release of hostages.

“The red lines he’s put out there — that’s driving this negotiation,” Witkoff told reporters standing next to Trump.

One sticking point in landing a deal has been Hamas’ call for a permanent cessation in fighting to be agreed to at the outset. Witkoff in an exchange with reporters following the press conference said that Hamas’ negotiating position has been weakened.

“I’m not sure they have the leverage to,” Witkoff said. “I mean, they can say what they want.”

Witkoff said he’s been having near daily conversations with Biden’s Middle East adviser, Brett McGurk, who has served as the outgoing administration’s chief interlocutor in the talks. McGurk has also been in Qatar this week for talks.

Witkoff offered praise for the “solid” Biden team’s coordination on the talks. But he also made clear that the specter of Trump’s return to office is changing the dynamic on the efforts to release the hostages that have languished for months. Israeli officials believe at least one-third of those still being held are dead.

“I just think that President Trump’s persona is such that he’s driving the narrative on this negotiation — that it is that relevant that he is coming in,” Witkoff said.

Trump criticizes Carter as the former president’s body lays in state

Carter’s body was transported to Washington from his native Georgia on Tuesday to lay in state at the U.S. Capitol –- but that didn’t stop Trump from making digs at the former president.

Trump said it’s “a disgrace what took place at the Panama Canal. Jimmy Carter gave it to them for one dollar.”

Trump has spent weeks decrying Carter for signing a 1977 treaty that transferred control of the Panama Canal back to its home country in 1999. He argues that Panama is overcharging U.S. ships to use the waterway and has allowed China to increase its influence there.

Trump has long been critical of Carter, making his administration a punchline on the campaign trail as part of a larger dig at Biden for today’s high inflation rates, although he offered some gracious statements upon his death, saying the country owed the former president “a debt of gratitude.”

Current presidents traditionally refrain from sharply criticizing former presidents, offering deference to fellow members of the informal president’s club. But, like so many Washington traditions, Trump hasn’t been afraid to flout that.

“I liked him as a man. I disagreed with his policies,” Trump said when pressed about whether it was appropriate to criticize Carter as his body was on its final trip to Washington.

“This was a question that was asked of me. I didn’t bring it up. I didn’t want to bring up the Panama Canal because of Jimmy Carter’s death,” Trump added. But he had mentioned the canal earlier unprompted.

Itchy heating

As he vowed to expand offshore drilling and energy exploration, Trump also pledged to roll back limits on gas heaters.

Biden, Trump claimed, “wants all gas heaters out of your homes and apartments.” It was an apparent reference to an Energy Department rule published last month that would require so-called tankless water heaters to improve their efficiency by about 13% by 2029.

The updated standards would require products to use condensing technology that wastes less heat, officials said. About 60% of new units now sold meet the new standards, and all major water heater manufacturers sell the more efficient models, according to the Appliance Standards Awareness Project, an advocacy group that promotes energy efficiency.

“I don’t know what it is with electric. This guy loves electric,″ Trump said, referring to Biden.

Gas heat is less expensive than electric heat, Trump said, adding that gas heat “is much better. It’s a much better heat. As the expression goes, you don’t itch. Does anybody have a heater where you go and you scratch an itch? That’s what they want you to have.”

___

Colvin reported from New York and Madhani from Washington.

AP · by JILL COLVIN · January 7, 2025

7. Trump says he will change the name of the Gulf of Mexico. Can he do that?

What problem or issue does this solve?

Who benefits? Map makers who have to reprint new maps and maps in various forms depending on the country where they are being published. (Of course digitalization makes name changes much easier).

Trump says he will change the name of the Gulf of Mexico. Can he do that?

AP · January 7, 2025

President-elect Donald Trump said Tuesday that he would move to try to rename the Gulf of Mexico to the “Gulf of America,” a name he said has a “beautiful ring to it.”

It’s his latest suggestion to redraw the map of the Western Hemisphere. Trump has repeatedly referred to Canada as the “51st State,” demanded that Denmark consider ceding Greenland, and called for Panama to return the Panama Canal.

Here’s a look at his comment and what goes into a name.

Why is Trump talking about renaming the Gulf of Mexico?

Since his first run for the White House in 2016, Trump has repeatedly clashed with Mexico over a number of issues, including border security and the imposition of tariffs on imported goods. He vowed then to build a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border and make Mexico pay for it. The U.S. ultimately constructed or refurbished about 450 miles of wall during his first term.

The Gulf of Mexico is often referred to as the United States’ “Third Coast” due to its coastline across five southeastern states. Mexicans use a Spanish version of the same name for the gulf: “El Golfo de México.”

Americans and Mexicans diverge on what to call another key body of water, the river that forms the border between Texas and the Mexican states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas. Americans call it the Rio Grande; Mexicans call it the Rio Bravo.

Can Trump change the name of the Gulf of Mexico?

Maybe, but it’s not a unilateral decision, and other countries don’t have to go along.

The International Hydrographic Organization — of which both the United States and Mexico are members — works to ensure all the world’s seas, oceans and navigable waters are surveyed and charted uniformly, and also names some of them. There are instances where countries refer to the same body of water or landmark by different names in their own documentation.

It can be easier when a landmark or body of water is within a country’s boundaries. In 2015, then-President Barack Obama approved an order from the Department of Interior to rename Mount McKinley — the highest peak in North America — to Denali, a move that Trump has also said he wants to reverse.

Just after Trump’s comments on Tuesday, Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene of Georgia said during an interview with podcaster Benny Johnson that she would direct her staff to draft legislation to change the name of the Gulf of Mexico, a move she said would take care of funding for new maps and administrative policy materials throughout the federal government.

How did the Gulf of Mexico get its name?

The body of water has been depicted with that name for more than four centuries, an original determination believed to have been taken from a Native American city of “Mexico.”

Has renaming the Gulf of Mexico come up before?

Yes. In 2012, a member of the Mississippi Legislature proposed a bill to rename portions of the gulf that touch that state’s beaches “Gulf of America,” a move the bill author later referred to as a “joke.” That bill, which was referred to a committee, did not pass.

Two years earlier, comedian Stephen Colbert had joked on his show that, following the massive Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, it should be renamed “Gulf of America” because, “We broke it, we bought it.”

Are there other international disputes over the names of places?

There’s a long-running dispute over the name of the Sea of Japan among Japan, North Korea, South Korea and Russia, with South Korea arguing that the current name wasn’t commonly used until Korea was under Japanese rule. At an International Hydrographic Organization meeting in 2020, member states agreed on a plan to replace names with numerical identifiers and develop a new digital standard for modern geographic information systems.

The Persian Gulf has been widely known by that name since the 16th century, although usage of “Gulf” and “Arabian Gulf” is dominant in many countries in the Middle East. The government of Iran threatened to sue Google in 2012 over the company’s decision not to label the body of water at all on its maps.

There have been other conversations about bodies of water, including from Trump’s 2016 opponent. According to materials revealed by WikiLeaks in a hack of her campaign chairman’s personal account, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2013 told an audience that, by China’s logic that it claimed nearly the entirety of the South China Sea, then the U.S. after World War II could have labeled the Pacific Ocean the “American Sea.”

___

Kinnard reported from Chapin, South Carolina, and can be reached at http://x.com/MegKinnardAP.

AP · January 7, 2025

8. Facebook’s Fact-Checkers Changed the Way I See Tech—and Speech—Forever

From the Free Press. Regardless of what you think about META and Facebook and Twitter, I think we have to err on the side of free expression, free speech, free press, etc. We cannot depend on the government of businesses or media organizations to police the ideas and information we have access to. The information genie is out of the bottle because of internet communications and we cannot stuff it back in. We are going to have to live with what we have created. And that means we all must take personal responsibility for what we read and what we believe.

That does not mean we do not need organizations that go after adversaries' disinformation, propaganda, and psychological warfare. We need organizations that recognize and understand our adversaries' strategies for the use of information to influence our behavior, decision making, and actions. We need organizations to expose those strategies to inoculate the American public from their malign influence activities. And then we need to attack the strategies of those adversaries and malign actors with a superior political warfare strategy.

I am again reminded of the 2017 National Security Strategy and these worlds from Nadia Schadlow and HR McMaster which we should all read and heed. We all have personal responsibility as we live in this modern information environment.

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Facebook’s Fact-Checkers Changed the Way I See Tech—and Speech—Forever

https://www.thefp.com/p/facebook-fact-checkers-shut-down-my-story-on-covid-lab-leak-theory?utm

Mark Zuckerberg at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing about social media in Washington, D.C., on January 31, 2024. (Matt McClain via Getty Images)

I thought I was sharing an important story on Covid’s origins. How naive I was.

By Margi Conklin

01.07.25 — Free Speech, Big Tech and Free Speech, and Tech

When I first heard that Mark Zuckerberg was shutting down Facebook’s fact-checking department, my first thought was: Too little, too late.

That’s because I’ve had my own experience with his team of fact-checkers.

Back in February 2020, when I was the Sunday editor of the New York Post, China expert Steven Mosher pitched me a theory about how the coronavirus started. Back then, it was believed it came from a wet market in Wuhan, but Steven was unconvinced. He said it was much more likely it had leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which had been doing experiments with the coronavirus for years.

This was before the lockdowns, and before Covid had spread across America and killed millions worldwide. Some experts had just started talking about the possibility of a global pandemic.

I was happy to publish Steven’s piece, because I figured the world would want to hear an alternative idea at an important moment from a social scientist who had lived in China and written books about the country.

I was right about the story. (In fact, the lab leak theory is now seen as the most likely explanation for Covid’s origins.) But I was wrong—and naive—to think anyone in power would want to hear it.

We published the piece on February 22, under the headline “Don’t Buy China’s Story: The Coronavirus May Have Leaked from a Lab.” It immediately went viral, its audience swelling for a few hours as readers liked and shared it over and over again.

I had a data tracker on my screen that showed our web traffic, and I could see the green line for my story surging up and up. Then suddenly, for no reason, the green line dropped like a stone. No one was reading or sharing the piece. It was as though it had never existed at all.

Seeing the story’s traffic plunge, I was stunned. I thought, How does that even happen? How does a story that thousands of people are reading and sharing suddenly just disappear?

Later, the Post’s digital editor gave me the answer: Facebook’s fact-checking team had flagged the piece as “false information.”

I was shocked—and embarrassed. Never in my life had a story I worked on been deemed “false information.” For a moment, I second-guessed myself. I was worried I’d done something wrong, and that I had caused reputational damage—and possible financial damage—to the Post. If your outlet gets dinged three times by Facebook, the digital editor told me, they pretty much censor all your stories from the platform. No media outlet could afford that.

In the meantime, I kept seeing stories by legacy media outlets parroting the wet market theory, turning the idea of a lab leak into a “conspiracy theory.” The message was clear: The Post was irresponsible for even suggesting such hogwash.

I feel ridiculous admitting it now, but even after more than 25 years as a journalist, even though I worked at a more irreverent newspaper, I strongly believed that our most prestigious outlets believed in seeking the truth. I trusted them. Now, I realized, they were pushing a singular narrative and squelching all other discussion. I was seeing Big Tech censorship of the American media in real time, and it chilled me to my bones.

What happened next was even more chilling. I found out that an “expert” who advised Facebook to censor the piece had a major conflict of interest. Professor Danielle E. Anderson had regularly worked with researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and even done her own experiments at the institute—and she told Facebook’s fact-checkers that the lab had “strict control and containment measures.”

Well, of course she did.

Facebook’s “fact-checkers” took her at her word. An “expert” had spoken, Wuhan’s lab was deemed secure, and the Post’s story was squashed in the interest of public safety. Zuckerberg’s team wasn’t going to challenge the party line on the pandemic—especially after, as was reported last year, President Biden started pressuring Facebook to censor certain stories about Covid. It was strange to think the suppression of other stories like mine could have come straight from the White House.

Thankfully, the Post won the battle to have Facebook’s “false information” flag removed after a few months. But other outlets didn’t seem to care. In the years that followed, I watched as the elite media happily continued to dismiss the Post as a purveyor of false information on stories like Hunter Biden’s laptop and Joe Biden’s fitness to run the free world. Outlets like Politico, The Washington Post, and The New York Times sneered at the Post as a “far-right” tabloid with a political axe to grind, trying to convince their readers that nothing the paper reports is true.

But these outlets have been grinding their own axe, aided and abetted by Zuckerberg and other tech overlords who wish to decide what we all believe. In 2021, in the wake of a lawsuit, Facebook admitted that its “fact checks” are just “opinion,” used by social media companies to police what we watch and read.

I applaud Zuckerberg for admitting he was wrong and eradicating his fact-checking department. It’s not easy to deliver such a public mea culpa. But still, I wonder how much it will help. Once you’ve shut down a toxic waste dump that’s been poisoning a landfill for years, the ground is never the same.

9. Office of the Director of National Intelligence Selects Arizona State University as one of the newest members of the Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence (IC CAE) Program

ASU is really becoming a university for national security issues. I have worked with a number of universities and academic organizations (and think tanks) and I have not found any to be as innovative, afile, flexible, and forward looking and forward thinking than ASU. It is really a remarkable university. We were so fortunate to find ASU as the new home for Small Wars Journal and this is one of the reasons why.

In addition to this announcement naming ASU as a member of the Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence in October ASU was chosen to lead a consortium of universities in support of Irregular Warfare.

Arizona State University has been selected to work closely with the U.S. Department of Defense to provide reputable academic research support to deepen the understanding of current and emerging global trends in nontraditional warfare. ASU will lead a national consortium supporting the DOD’s Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) in the National Capital Region.

https://news.asu.edu/20241024-local-national-and-global-affairs-asu-selected-support-dod-irregular-warfare-center

Office of the Director of National Intelligence Selects Arizona State University as one of the newest members of the Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence (IC CAE) Program

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/01/08/office-of-the-director-of-national-intelligence-selects-arizona-state-university-as-one-of-the-newest-members-of-the-intelligence-community-centers-for-academic-excellence-ic-cae-program/

by SWJ Staff

01.08.2025 at 06:50am

Full Office of the Director of National Intelligence press release: https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2024/4040-pr-30-24

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

ODNI News Release No. 30-24

December 27, 2024

ODNI Welcomes Six Consortia to IC Centers for Academic Excellence Program

WASHINGTON, D.C. – “The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) announced Arizona State University; Chicago State University, in partnership with Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana; Metropolitan State University; Spelman College; the Southern University System, in partnership with Grambling State University; and the University of New Mexico as this year’s grant recipients and newest members of the Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence (IC CAE) program, an initiative to prepare and hire the next generation of qualified intelligence professionals.”

Since its launch in 2007 with just four schools, the Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence (IC CAE) program has grown into a network of over 80 colleges and universities, with six new schools and their consortium partners joining this year. This expansion offers students unparalleled opportunities, from networking and research to specialized workshops and conferences.

Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Human Capital, Cynthia Snyder, highlighted the program’s evolution: “What began as a focus on national security curriculum has now expanded to include pathways in STEM, foreign language, and integrated approaches that combine these disciplines with national security.”

The IC CAE program equips future intelligence professionals with the skills needed to excel in the Intelligence Community (IC) through grants supporting curriculum development, research, and engagement with IC professionals. A key goal is to engage ethnically and geographically diverse student populations, broadening the talent pool for the IC workforce.

Schools receive funding for five years of program development, with an option for additional years of sustainment funding to ensure long-term success.

To learn more about how IC CAE is shaping the future of the IC workforce, read the full article linked here and at the top of this announcement.

To learn more about the Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence, visit here: https://www.dni.gov/index.php/iccae

Tags: Arizona State University, Intelligence Community, Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence

About The Author

SWJ Staff
SWJ Staff searches the internet daily for articles and posts that we think are of great interests to our readers.

10. Taiwan holds military drills as concerns rise over possible defense budget cut

We cannot want to defend Taiwan more than it wants to defend itself.

Perhaps counterintuitive but has all the hardline rhetoric resulted in the mindset in Taiwan that they do not need to worry about their own defense because Uncle Sam is there to defend them?

Something it seems most agree on on both sides of the Taiwan Strait - status quo (though with perhaps different descriptions of what the status quo means).

Conclusion:

Neither military intimidation, economic coercion nor appeals to their common Chinese ancestry seem to be working on Taiwan’s population, the vast majority of whom favor the current status of de-facto independence.

Taiwan holds military drills as concerns rise over possible defense budget cut

By TAIJING WU

Updated 1:02 AM EST, January 7, 2025

AP · January 7, 2025

HSINCHU, Taiwan (AP) — Taiwan began three days of military drills on Tuesday as concerns rose over potential cuts to the defense budget due to legislative wrangling between the island’s two major political parties.

The drills began in the north with tank maneuvering at a base in Hsinchu featuring outmoded CM-11 tanks, which are gradually being replaced by newly purchased Abrams M1A2T from the U.S. The replacement marks a huge upgrade despite some complaints over the weight of the new tanks and their likely effectiveness at preventing a possible Chinese landing.

Troops arrived on armored personnel carriers, while Apache and S-70 helicopters whirled overhead, providing reconnaissance and covering fire.

With the equipment Taiwan currently operates, the communication officer is on the ground to coordinate airborne attacks, said Army Captain Chuang Yuan-cheng of the 542 Armored Brigade in Hsinchu county just south of the capital of Taipei. That allows them to guide the helicopters so that “ground fire and airborne fire are synchronized,” Chuang said.

On Wednesday, the army will show off its Patriot III anti-missile system aimed at countering one of China’s most potent weapons against the island of 23 million. And on Thursday, anti-submarine exercises will be held off of Taiwan’s largest port of Kaohsiung, considered China’s best conduit for resupplying its troops should it establish a beachhead in the heavily defended region.

The annual drills are held in the run-up to the Lunar New Year holiday to reassure the population of Taiwan’s ability to meet China’s threats and to boost recruitment. Taiwan has a backlog of orders from the U.S. for about $20 billion in weapons systems, while it upgrades its M-16 fighters and develops its own submarines. It has also extended compulsory military service to one year.

However, the government has warned that new legal amendments being considered could force a 28% cut in the defense budget by altering the way funds are distributed between the central and local governments.

That in turn could reduce the willingness of the U.S. and its allies such as Japan and the Philippines to assist Taiwan in the event of an armed clash with China, National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu told legislators last month.

The legislation is being pushed by the main opposition Nationalist Party, which has joined with the tiny Taiwan People’s Party to oppose the ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s legislative agenda.

Taiwan currently spends about 2.4% of its GDP, or roughly $20 billion, on the military annually.

China has responded furiously to all U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, saying unification with the island is inevitable and warning that Washington is “playing with fire.” However, apart from regularly sending planes and warships into areas near the island, it has done little more than blacklist companies and executives involved in the production and sales of such equipment.

Neither military intimidation, economic coercion nor appeals to their common Chinese ancestry seem to be working on Taiwan’s population, the vast majority of whom favor the current status of de-facto independence.

AP · January 7, 2025

11. Mark Zuckerberg’s Political Evolution, From Apologies to No More Apologies

I will continue to beat the horse:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Mark Zuckerberg’s Political Evolution, From Apologies to No More Apologies

Meta’s chief executive has stepped away from his mea culpa approach to issues on his platforms and has told people that he wants to return to his original thinking on free speech.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/07/business/mark-zuckerberg-meta-free-speech.html

Mark Zuckerberg, the chief executive of Facebook, at a Senate hearing in 2018.Credit...Tom Brenner/The New York Times

By Sheera Frenkel and Mike Isaac

Reporting from San Francisco

Jan. 7, 2025

In November 2016, as Facebook was being blamed for a torrent of fake news and conspiracy theories swirling around the first election of Donald J. Trump, Mark Zuckerberg, the chief executive of the social network, wrote an apologetic post.

In his message, Mr. Zuckerberg announced a series of steps he planned to take to grapple with false and misleading information on Facebook, such as working with fact-checkers.

“The bottom line is: we take misinformation seriously,” he wrote in a personal Facebook post. “There are many respected fact checking organizations,” he added, “and, while we have reached out to some, we plan to learn from many more.”

Eight years later, Mr. Zuckerberg is no longer apologizing. On Tuesday, he announced that Meta, the parent company of Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Threads, was ending its fact-checking program and getting back to its roots around free expression. The fact-checking system had led to “too much censorship,” he said.

It was the latest step in a transformation of Mr. Zuckerberg. In recent years, the chief executive, now 40, has stepped away from his mea culpa approach to problems on his social platforms. Fed up with what has seemed at times to be unceasing criticism of his company, he has told executives close to him that he wants to return to his original thinking on free speech, which involves a lighter hand in content moderation.

Mr. Zuckerberg has remolded Meta as he has made the shift. Gone is the CrowdTangle transparency tool, which allowed researchers, academics and journalists to monitor conspiracy theories and misinformation on Facebook. The company’s election integrity team, once trumpeted as a group of experts focused solely on issues around the vote, has been folded into a general integrity team.

Instead, Mr. Zuckerberg has promoted technology efforts at Meta, including its investments in the immersive world of the so-called metaverse and its focus on artificial intelligence.

Image

The Meta Store in Burlingame, Calif. Mr. Zuckerberg has been promoting the company’s investments in the technology of the metaverse and artificial intelligence.Credit...Jason Henry for The New York Times

Mr. Zuckerberg’s change has been visible on his social media. Photos of him uncomfortably clad in a suit and tie and testifying before Congress have been replaced by videos of him with longer hair and in gold chains, competing in extreme sports and sometimes hunting for his own food. Long, heavily lawyered Facebook posts about Meta’s commitment to democracy no longer appear. Instead, he has posted quips on Threads responding to celebrity athletes and videos showing the company’s newest A.I. initiatives.

“This shows how Mark Zuckerberg is feeling that society is more accepting of those libertarian and right-leaning viewpoints that he’s always had,” said Katie Harbath, chief executive of Anchor Change, a tech consulting firm, who previously worked at Facebook. “This is an evolved return to his political origins.”

Mr. Zuckerberg has long been a pragmatist who has gone where the political winds have blown. He has flip-flopped on how much political content should be shown to Facebook and Instagram users, previously saying social networks should be about fun, relatable content from family and friends but then on Tuesday saying Meta would show more personalized political content.

Mr. Zuckerberg has told executives close to him that he is comfortable with the new direction of his company. He sees his most recent steps as a return to his original thinking on free speech and free expression, with Meta limiting its monitoring and controlling of content, said two Meta executives who spoke with Mr. Zuckerberg in the last week.

Mr. Zuckerberg was never comfortable with the involvement of outside fact-checkers, academics or researchers in his company, one of the executives said. He now sees many of the steps taken after the 2016 election as a mistake, the two executives said.

“Fact-checkers have just been too politically biased and have destroyed more trust than they’ve created,” Mr. Zuckerberg said in a video on Tuesday about the end of the fact-checking program, echoing statements made by top Republicans over the years.

Image

An advocacy group displayed cardboard cutouts of Mr. Zuckerberg outside the U.S. Capitol in 2018.Credit...Gabriella Demczuk for The New York Times

Meta declined to comment.

Those who have known Mr. Zuckerberg for decades describe him as a natural libertarian, who enjoyed reading books extolling free expression and the free market system after he dropped out of Harvard to start Facebook in 2004. As his company grew, so did pressure to become more responsive to complaints from world leaders and civil society groups that he was not doing enough to moderate content on his platform.

Crises including a genocide in Myanmar, in which Facebook was blamed for allowing hate speech to spread against the Muslim Rohingya people, forced Mr. Zuckerberg to expand moderation teams and define rules around speech on his social networks.

He was coached by people close to him, including Meta’s former chief operating officer, Sheryl Sandberg, to become more involved in politics. After the 2016 election, Mr. Zuckerberg embarked on a public campaign to clear his name and redeem his company. He held regular meetings with civic leaders and invited politicians to visit his company’s headquarters, rolled out transparency tools such as CrowdTangle and brought on fact-checkers.

In 2017, he announced that he was conducting a “listening tour” across the United States to “get a broader perspective” on how Americans used Facebook. The campaign-like photo opportunities with farmers and autoworkers led to speculation that he was running for political office.

Despite his efforts, Mr. Zuckerberg continued to be blamed for the misinformation and falsehoods that spread on Facebook and Instagram.

In October 2019, Mr. Zuckerberg began to push back. In an address at Georgetown University, he said Facebook had been founded to give people a voice.

“I’m here today because I believe we must continue to stand for free expression,” he said.

In 2021, when the Jan. 6 riot broke out at the U.S. Capitol after the presidential election, Meta was again held responsible for hosting speech that fomented the violence. Two weeks later, Mr. Zuckerberg told investors that the company was “considering steps” to reduce political content across Facebook.

Image

The headquarters of Meta, which Mr. Zuckerberg recently said could need a decade to get its brand back to where he wanted it. Credit...Jason Henry for The New York Times

His evolution since then has been steady. Executives who pushed Mr. Zuckerberg to involve himself directly in politics, including Ms. Sandberg, have left the company. Those closest to him now cheer his focus on his own interests, which include extreme sports and rapping for his wife, as well as promoting his company’s A.I. initiatives.

In a podcast interview in San Francisco that Mr. Zuckerberg recorded live in front of an audience of 6,000 in September, he spoke for nearly 90 minutes about his love of technology. He said he should have rejected accusations that his company was responsible for societal ills.

“I think that the political miscalculation was a 20-year mistake,” he said. He added that it could take another decade for him to move his company’s brand back to where he wanted it.

“We’ll get through it, and we’ll come out stronger,” Mr. Zuckerberg said.

Sheera Frenkel is a reporter based in the San Francisco Bay Area, covering the ways technology impacts everyday lives with a focus on social media companies, including Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, TikTok, YouTube, Telegram and WhatsApp. More about Sheera Frenkel

Mike Isaac is a technology correspondent for The Times based in San Francisco. He regularly covers Facebook and Silicon Valley. More about Mike Isaac

12. Banning TikTok Won’t Solve Your Data-Security Problem

Banning TikTok Won’t Solve Your Data-Security Problem

Beijing doesn’t need the app to get information, and Google and Meta collect much more.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/banning-tiktok-wont-solve-your-data-security-problem-supreme-court-case-869877cd?mod=latest_headlines

By Jason L. Riley

Jan. 7, 2025 5:09 pm ET

Photo: Cfoto/Zuma Press

During last year’s presidential campaign, Kamala Harris regularly posted on TikTok, encouraging voters to follow her on the platform, as did Joe Biden before he withdrew. Yet the Biden Justice Department is set to argue before the Supreme Court this week that the popular Chinese-owned social-media app, used monthly by around 170 million Americans, represents a grave threat to our national security. Huh?

When Donald Trump tried to ban the app during his first presidency, a federal court blocked his executive order on the grounds that singling out the company was “arbitrary and capricious.” Mr. Trump also cited the nation’s safety, but lately he has become a huge fan of the app. “Why would I want to ban TikTok?” he wrote on Truth Social last week, above a bar graph that showed his TikTok views outpacing not only Ms. Harris’s but also those of Tucker Carlson and Taylor Swift.

For much of the political class, however, TikTok has remained a target. In April, Mr. Biden signed the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act. The bipartisan legislation requires TikTok’s owner, Beijing-based ByteDance, to sell the app by Jan. 19 or face a ban in America. TikTok sued, arguing that the law violates free-speech protections under the First Amendment. In a December ruling, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected those claims. “The Government has offered persuasive evidence demonstrating that the Act is narrowly tailored to protect national security,” Judge Douglas Ginsburg wrote. TikTok appealed to the Supreme Court, which will hear oral arguments on Jan. 10.

Most court observers believe the divestment requirement is on solid legal ground and that TikTok is likely to lose. Presumably, the federal government has a compelling national-security interest in preventing a foreign adversary from harvesting the personal data of 170 million Americans. ByteDance has ties to the communist Chinese government, and in China even supposedly private companies can be forced to turn data over to government intelligence agencies. Moreover, the U.S. has a history of limiting foreign ownership of media platforms to prevent spying. The Radio Act of 1927 was passed in part to restrict foreign control of broadcast stations.

Still, the free-speech concerns of TikTok and its libertarian-leaning defenders shouldn’t be brushed aside. Yes, lawmakers are interested in protecting sensitive data for security purposes, and prohibiting the app on government-issued devices is logical and prudent. But Congress also aims to protect Americans from what a House committee report called “misinformation,” “propaganda,” and “divisive narratives,” which is worrisome. Such language is inherently subjective and suggests that Americans are easily manipulated and incapable of thinking for themselves.

When a New York Times reporter asked then-Rep. Mike Gallagher (R., Wis.), a co-sponsor of legislation against the app, what he feared most about TikTok, his reply was instructive. “There are two threats. One is what you could call the espionage threat. It’s data security—using the app to find Americans, exfiltrate data, track the location of journalists,” he said. “That’s a serious threat, but I actually think the greater concern is the propaganda threat.”

But TikTok is hardly the only social-media platform that offers heaping platefuls of misinformation and political propaganda. It isn’t even the only app owned by a Chinese company that gathers extensive data on American users. WeChat, the messaging app developed by the Chinese tech firm Tencent, is another. Although concerns about fake news and misleading conjecture are legitimate, the best way to fight propaganda is with counterspeech, not censorship.

Another problem with banning TikTok might be that it will do little if anything to address data-security concerns. Foreign and domestic tech companies capture mountains of user information, which enable them to target advertising. TikTok is far from the worst offender. A 2022 Consumer Reports study noted that Google and Meta collect much more data than TikTok. As Scientific American reported last year, “many foreign and domestic tech companies collect data on their users at staggering scale and depth. Many of those data are traded globally in legal markets through third-party data brokers.”

Calli Schroeder of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, which studies digital privacy issues, told the magazine that banning TikTok amounts to “security theater.” According to Ms. Schroeder, “you could get rid of TikTok today, and China would not lose any significant [amount] of personal information on Americans.”

The reality is that nothing TikTok does is unique to TikTok, and China doesn’t need the app to access our data. If Congress wants to do something about digital privacy, it will have to do better than this.

Can Europe Fight for Taiwan? - War on the Rocks

Luis Simón and Toshi Yoshihara

warontherocks.com · by Luis Simón · January 8, 2025

Should a war erupt with China over Taiwan, many observers seem to think that Europe would be largely irrelevant as far as the actual fighting is concerned. Those who share this opinion typically point to Europe’s reluctance to confront China or a lack of meaningful military capabilities to bring to the table. Or they prefer Europe simply mind its knitting and focus on the Russian threat, which is much closer to home, and would free up the United States to concentrate on China.

We have a different perspective.

A war over Taiwan that draws in the United States and its Asian allies would likely become a bloody, drawn-out fight that geographically expanded beyond the Western Pacific. The strategic repercussions of a local conflict that assumed global characteristics, including fighting on the world’s oceans, would likely compel European military involvement in one form or another.

To advance this debate, we set a high bar by focusing on high-end conventional combat. We lay out the conditions that could incline Europe to get involved militarily. We then test the various direct military contributions that Europe could make.

Far from being strategically sidelined in the event of war, Europe could prudently offer operationally relevant capabilities, possibly tipping the scales in favor of an allied campaign to defend Taiwan. Nuclear submarines would likely be the most valuable asset European countries could contribute.

Become a Member

The Debate

In recent years, there has been a flurry of wargames and table-top exercises trying to ascertain the likelihood and possible consequences of a potential People’s Republic of China attack on Taiwan. These exercises have focused primarily on unpacking alternative scenarios, including blockade, intensified hybrid attacks, seizure of offshore islands, full invasion, and so forth — and discussing what they may entail for the United States, Japan, Australia, and other relevant regional powers. Comparatively less attention has been paid to the implications of a war over Taiwan for Europe, or Europe’s potential role therein.

To be sure, some recent analyses have pondered on such factors as the legal basis for a possible NATO response to a war over Taiwan, the implications of a Taiwan war for U.S. capability requirements and NATO’s posture in Europe or how the European Union can help prevent an aggression through diplomatic engagement or sanctions. More recently, others have pointed to Europe’s potential contribution to a broader arsenal of democracy. As European defense spending continues to pick up, Europeans could indeed help supply munitions, drones, and other relevant systems to Taiwan, the United States, or Japan, and thus indirectly assist a broader allied effort in defense of Taiwan. They could also help with other critical non-military goods such as energy supplies and raw materials, even if the logistical challenges of supplying Taiwan are admittedly much more acute than in Ukraine.

Most discussions on Europe’s potential contribution to Taiwan’s security focus on peacetime and highlight the non-military and indirect nature of European assistance. This is understandable. First off, Europeans are divided and a bit wobbly on China. While China’s image in Europe may have taken a hit in recent years, going to war with Beijing over Taiwan might be a bridge too far for some. Second, European military capabilities are scarce. And, in the event of a war over Taiwan, such capabilities would likely be devoted to shoring up deterrence in Eastern Europe, especially as the United States turns its attention to the Indo-Pacific. In fact, both Washington and its Indo-Pacific allies may actually encourage Europeans to focus on plugging force gaps in Europe so as to free up as much U.S. strategic bandwidth as possible in the Indo-Pacific.

Undeniably, Europe could wield other coercive tools, such as the threat of sanctions, to influence Beijing’s cost-benefit calculation on whether to invade Taiwan. It is also true that Europeans are likely to prioritize threats closer to home, particularly given the salience of Russian revisionism. That said, there are good reasons to believe that the global spillover effects of a cross-strait war could radically shift Europe’s calculus. Therefore, it is sensible to examine the conditions that could overturn Europe’s prevailing preferences and to assess the kinds of direct military contributions that Europeans could offer in the event of conflict.

Under What Conditions Would Europe Fight for Taiwan?

Arguably, Europe’s response to a war over Taiwan would be significantly conditioned by at least five sets of interrelated factors: context, length, the nature of U.S. involvement, geographical scope, and timing.

The first condition relates to the broader strategic context. Does a war over Taiwan break out in isolation, or while there is an ongoing war — or credible threat of war — in Europe? Would Russia use the distraction of a Taiwan war to strike or double down on aggression in Europe? Relatedly, would Russia directly or indirectly assist a Chinese attack on Taiwan? A war in Europe would no doubt significantly constrain the ability of Europeans to engage in a war over Taiwan, at least militarily. Conversely, a multi-theater or global war could incentivize European military engagement in the Indo-Pacific.

The second condition is length. Would a war over Taiwan be short, or long and protracted? Indo-Pacific Command’s “hellscape” concept and Taiwan’s own total defense concept stress the importance of ensuring the war isn’t quickly lost by disrupting the Chinese military’s operational tempo to buy time for a more organized — and collective — response. The longer the war, the higher the chances that European countries will have an opportunity to contribute to Taiwan’s defense.

The third condition has to do with the nature of U.S. involvement. Would the United States provide significant but indirect assistance to Taiwan, or would U.S. forces engage the Chinese military directly? This is a critical question for Europeans, who have an alliance with Washington (though confined to the Euro-Atlantic area) and see the security of the United States and that of Europe as indivisible.

A fourth and critical factor, which is very much related to the nature of U.S. involvement, has to do with the geographic scope of the war. A contingency confined to Taiwan’s offshore islands or main island is not the same as a broader Sino-American war spreading across the first and second island chains, and into the Indian Ocean.

The fifth factor relates to when the war breaks out, i.e., whether in 2027 — a date often noted in intelligence and expert estimates — or a decade from now. If we assume that European military spending will continue on an upward trajectory, Europeans would be in a position to provide a more significant military contribution in 10 years than in two.

There is growing consensus that a great-power war between China and the United States would produce profound disruptions that span the globe. It is therefore likely that a cross-strait war that drew in the United States, that went long, and that expanded beyond Asia would compel European intervention, even if it took place in the next five years and even if Russia menaced on Europe’s eastern front. It is thus useful to sketch the attributes of such a war to map out where Europe’s contributions might be most efficacious.

What Are the Pathways?

There are various pathways to a widened conflict over Taiwan that draws in Europe. It is possible that Chinese attempts at coercion short of war either fail and compel Beijing to escalate further, or backfire and spur third-party intervention. It is also possible that a military assault confined exclusively to Taiwan nevertheless spirals into a wider regional war. Another possibility is that Beijing would start a war that targeted U.S. and allied military forces and bases at the outset to level the playing field and to seize the battlefield initiative. China may even threaten the American homeland with cyber and other kinetic weapons against critical infrastructure.

We do not render judgments about the likelihood of these pathways. The point is that China could find itself in an expanded conflict even if its initial strategy was precisely meant to avoid one. Moreover, our aim is to identify some constant features of an expanded war that would be most relevant to how Europe considers its military role should it choose to help resist Chinese aggression.

To fight and win a cross-strait war, Chinese military doctrine specifies three types of campaigns, namely an air and missile campaign, a blockade, and an amphibious invasion against Taiwan. These operations would not necessarily be mutually exclusive. For example, a bombardment and a blockade could precede an invasion. To maximize its chances of success, the Chinese military would seek to seize local command of the air, seas, and other domains and deny those same commons to the enemy. Its land-based missiles, airpower, and naval forces as well as a thicket of modern air and missile defense systems would support a range of operations against the island. The Chinese military’s anti-access/area denial network would be densest and most lethal to hostile forces around Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait, and the island’s surrounding air and sea spaces.

In a hypothesized regional war against the United States and its allies, the Chinese military would mount a forward defense by targeting regional bases along the first and second island chains and rendering the approaches to mainland China hazardous to the enemy. Chinese military doctrine and the large-scale deployment of long-range strike capabilities suggest that Chinese military commanders would conduct air and missile bombardment against major bases, such as Kadena airbase, Yokosuka naval base, and facilities located on Guam. Shore-based airpower, submarines, and land-based anti-ship missiles would contest access to and operations from the Philippine Sea. Defenders in southern China, on Hainan Island, and on the manmade Spratly Island bases would threaten passage through and movement in the South China Sea. There is strong evidence that Beijing would challenge allied undersea operations there.

Beyond the Western Pacific, the mostly likely theater of hostile contact would be the Indian Ocean, where the Chinese navy has kept a rotating naval flotilla since 2008, and where China maintains a permanent military base in Djibouti. The Chinese navy’s globalizing posture and its doctrinal intent to stage a global presence suggest that horizontal escalation that leads to a multi-theater conflict is a distinct possibility. Mike McDevitt suggests that if a cross-strait war involved the United States, the conflict would likely escalate rapidly into a global naval war, with the U.S. Navy and Chinese navy clashing wherever they met around the world. As Aaron Friedberg further observes, the Chinese navy’s relative weakness in the Indian Ocean might tempt it to “get in the first blow” to knock the United States off balance and thereby compel U.S. forces to divert resources from the central front in the Pacific to that secondary theater.

China’s military campaigns would be waged by the largest navy and the largest conventional missile force in the world, the largest air force in the region, and a massive industrial base located near the frontlines. China thus possesses the mass to inflict heavy damage at the outset, to “flood the zone” in certain areas close to the mainland, to sustain operations, and to absorb significant losses without these triggering strategic paralysis.

Implications for Europe

A widened conflict of the kind depicted above would shape European decisions about how they could make the best use of their scarce military resources. Consider, for illustrative purposes, how the war would intersect with high-end combat systems, such as fighters and warships, that Europe could contribute to the fight.

The immediate zone of conflict surrounding Taiwan and the Western Pacific area that covers U.S. and allied bases on the first and second island chains would be highly contested. China’s anti-access/area denial network would thus place an extraordinary premium on survivability. Generally, large-signature platforms, such as major surface combatants and non-stealthy airframes, would be vulnerable when operating within range of China’s reconnaissance-strike complex. This explains arguments for keeping high-value American assets, such as carrier strike groups, east of the second island chain.

Even stealthy F-35 fighters, although expected to be widely available in European air forces, might not be suitable for such a deadly environment. Owing to their limited range, the F-35s would rely excessively on regional airbases located well inside the Chinese military’s weapons engagement zone, and on vulnerable large-signature aerial refueling tankers to conduct operations. In the widened war hypothesized here, China will have attacked and possibly knocked out major airbases along the first island chain upon which F-35s would depend. Moreover, the fighters might be badly needed in Europe and are already in service among allies in the Indo-Pacific.

Extra-regional theaters like the Indian Ocean, by contrast, are largely beyond the reach of China’s land-based anti-access/area denial network, although the Chinese navy maintains a presence there and theater-range missiles, such as the DF-26, could in theory threaten shipping in the Bay of Bengal. As such, Europe’s carrier strike groups and surface action groups could be quite effective in performing escort missions and conducting interdiction and anti-submarine warfare operations across wide swathes of the Indian Ocean, a major thoroughfare for allied power projection, and a region where France and the United Kingdom have overseas territories and bases.

Beyond exquisite systems, Europe would likely be well positioned to offer lower-end capabilities tailored to the operational environment. For example, special operations forces, missile-armed fast attack craft, and other tactical units designed to better elide China’s sensors could be employed for the close-in fight along the straits and narrow seas of the first island chain. The bottom line is that the warfighting scene, both near and far from China, offers parameters for European leaders to make informed decisions about what platforms to rule out and what capabilities could be offered to join the fight.

Submarines as the Most Decisive European Contribution

Among the various exquisite systems that Europe could offer, its undersea capabilities, particularly nuclear-powered attack submarines and, to a lesser extent, diesel-electric attack submarines stand out. European navies boast a combined fleet of 66 submarines, among which are 7 British Astute- and 6 French Barracuda-class nuclear-powered attack submarines. The mobility, range, and endurance of nuclear-powered attack submarines would allow Britain and France to swing the attack boats from European waters to the Indo-Pacific, even if the persistence of the Russian threat in the North Atlantic may limit their availability. It is also worth noting that the weeks it would take for these submarines to reach their stations in Asia, if they began their transits in Europe, mean that the warring sides have likely settled into a protracted war.

A network of homeports and support facilities, especially those located outside the Chinese military’s weapons engagement zone, such as Hawaii and Diego Garcia, would be available to European nuclear-powered attack submarines. Although Guam and Yokosuka would almost certainly come under attack in a widened conflict, they may offer some degree of support in wartime. Moreover, starting in 2027, Australia’s HMAS Stirling will be home to Submarine Rotational Force-West, comprising forward-staged U.S. and U.K. nuclear-powered attack submarines. In other words, leaning more on submarines would build on existing infrastructure and ongoing initiatives, thereby reducing duplication of effort.

The submarines’ greatest strength is their survivability, which will be especially superior to their naval surface and air counterparts for the foreseeable future. Aside from the most contested areas, such as China’s coastal waters, they will likely be able to operate with near impunity inside the Chinese military’s weapons engagement zone. Short of some revolutionary breakthrough that rendered the seas transparent, competent undersea forces will be very hard to find.

European submarines would exploit China’s longstanding structural weakness in anti-submarine warfare — one that, admittedly, China has begun to address. Nevertheless, American and allied undersea forces will likely be unmatched for at least another generation. Indeed, the promise of enduring underwater superiority was one reason behind Australia’s big bet on a nuclear-powered submarine force under the AUKUS framework.

Perhaps most important, European nuclear-powered attack submarines would meet two urgent American needs. First, the U.S. military, including its submarine force, has descended into a capacity trough that will run through the remainder of the 2020s into the early 2030s. Owing to bad political decisions, fiscal constraints, and an atrophied industrial base, the U.S. Navy has been unable to maintain the production rate necessary to meet its force structure target. As such, the silent service will field an older and smaller force than it has ever done in decades. Tellingly, although the U.S. Navy estimates that it needs 66 submarines to fulfill its global missions, it currently has about 49. This fleet is expected to dip further to 47 nuclear-powered attack submarines in 2030 — the bottom of the trough — before clawing its way back to 50 boats in 2032 and rising slowly to 64 or 66 submarines three decades hence. Relatedly, and critically, U.S. allies in the region thus far lack this capability.

Yet, such an undersized fleet will be expected to shoulder a heavy burden in war. American submarines will be tasked to hunt down China’s aircraft carriers and surface combatants as well as the amphibious ships crossing the strait, conduct strikes ashore against various land targets, trail Chinese strategic ballistic missile submarines, and sink enemy submarines. Those that have exhausted their weapons would need to return to port to rearm, taking them temporarily out of action. Despite their tactical superiority, losses will likely be inevitable.

Given the enormous demand for submarines, allied contributions through nuclear-powered submarines would do much to offset the operational load. Although the Japanese military boasts a fleet of modern submarines and would play an important role in a cross-strait conflict, its diesel boats lack the kinds of qualities, such as endurance, that nuclear-powered submarines possess. European attack submarines would thus add flexibility and options — in addition to numbers — to the coalition campaign.

Second, as noted above, a war over Taiwan could quickly spread to the Indian Ocean. Given the decline in numbers, it is unclear the extent to which the U.S. military can adequately deal with a secondary front where China might be inclined to employ its expeditionary maritime forces as a diversion. Moreover, U.S. decision-makers have not had to think seriously about waging a multi-theater war since the height of the Cold War and it is doubtful that they have relearned the atrophied skills of fighting a globalized conflict against a peer adversary. In short, the United States will likely need all the help it can get in the undersea domain.

If European submarines were deployed to the Indo-Pacific in a major conventional conflict, they could be used to defend the wide perimeter along the exterior lines of the first island chain. They could keep open the main access routes into the theater of operations for U.S. and allied forces while bottling up the Chinese navy within the first island chain. Acting as gatekeepers, European submarines could intercept Chinese surface and submarine forces seeking to break out of the South China Sea through the Malacca Strait in the west, the Luzon Strait in the east, and everywhere in between.

The attack boats could also play offense. Armed with long-range land-attack cruise missiles, the European nuclear-powered submarines could launch strikes against Chinese targets, including its bases in the South China Sea, from standoff distances. To balk attempts by China to open a new diversionary front, the boats could sever the lines of communication connecting China’s expeditionary forces in the Indian Ocean from their home bases on the mainland, thereby isolating them from reinforcements and resupply. The submarines could also hold at risk China’s access to and use of the critical sea lanes so essential to fueling its economic engine. Indeed, such threats would exploit a deeply embedded Chinese psychological fear of being cut off from the seas.

Some of these potential missions, such as enemy interdiction across the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean, would be capital-intensive, requiring mass to fulfill. As such, Europe’s contribution should conform to the number of attack boats that it could realistically deploy to the Indo-Pacific. Assume that European navies follow a four-to-one availability ratio, meaning that the routine cycle of deployment, extended overhaul, and workups requires four submarines to keep one ready for action at any given time. Assume also that submarines going through exercises, training, and inspections can be surged in an emergency. If so, then a combined Anglo-French fleet could in theory dispatch three to four nuclear-powered attack submarines to Asian waters in wartime.

This may appear to be a limited contribution that would be inadequate to tilt the correlation of forces, but several choices would sustain the operational value of nuclear-powered European submarines. First, the attack boats could fight alongside surface fleets in clearing the seas of threats. Current and future European warships could also combine their firepower with undersea forces to launch cruise missile salvoes against land targets. There is precedent for this: HMS Triumph, a Trafalgar-class nuclear-powered submarine, together with the U.S. Navy’s two destroyers, two fast-attack submarines, and a cruise-missile-armed submarine, fired more than 120 missiles to take down Libya’s integrated air defenses during Operation Odyssey Dawn in 2011.

Second, British and French nuclear-powered submarines could be augmented by diesel-powered and air independent- powered hunter-killer submarines in service with other European navies. Although less versatile than their nuclear brethren, demand for such boats from other oceangoing navies suggests that they would be tactically relevant in places like the Indian Ocean. Indeed, the French Scorpene, the German Type 214, and the Spanish S80 submarines are being — or have been — considered by the Australian, Canadian, and Indian navies. To compensate for the long transit times necessary to reach the Asian theater of operations, these boats could be forward staged on a rotational basis at bases in Western Australia and Diego Garcia where facilities are equipped to support them. Thus, a core of Anglo-French nuclear-powered attack submarines combined with other European diesel-electric attack submarines could generate the numbers necessary to make a difference in wartime.

Third, insofar as numbers define the mission, the European nuclear-powered submarines could be dedicated to chokepoint defense around geographically confined bottlenecks like those along the Indonesian archipelago. A more sedentary gatekeeping role would ease the demand for more hulls in the water and might be better suited for a small fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, if it were to fight without the help of other assets. In this regard, even a few exquisite systems could have an outsized impact on the enemy’s calculations by dissuading them from assuming certain risks in the first place. Fears of being ambushed by lurking European submarines could convince China’s navy not to transit certain straits or to take time-consuming detours.

Whatever roles that British and French nuclear-powered submarines might play, from perimeter defense to strikes ashore, these submarines would likely help advance allied burden-sharing. They could mitigate or neutralize threats that, if unaddressed, could divert and tie up scarce American resources. Put another way, European boats would enable the United States to concentrate its efforts on the main fight near Taiwan and on other priority missions elsewhere. If the U.S. military were heavily committed in the central front around Taiwan, easing painful trade-offs between theaters and between sub-theaters may be one of the most salutary contributions that Europe could make to this hypothetical war effort.

Follow the Logic

Although there is a strategic and operational logic for Europe to make a meaningful military contribution to a war over Taiwan, the diversion of scarce resources, such as nuclear-powered submarines, will likely be a significant undertaking, requiring forethought and preparations. Defense planners would need to consider calculations of acceptable risk on the home front should submarines be surged to Asia. After all, Russia still boasts a formidable undersea force that Europe would need to contend with, especially if Moscow were to exploit the opportunities presented by an America engaged in large-scale fighting in Asia.

Access agreements and arrangements with allies and partners would need to be established in advance of a crisis or war. Indeed, routine peacetime submarine deployments to the Indo-Pacific might help to shore up deterrence. Europe would need to devote intellectual capital to develop concepts of operations, roles and missions, a proper division of labor, interoperability with allied undersea forces, water space management to avoid fratricide between allied submarines operating in close quarters, and so forth. Should Europe heed this logic, then it should get to work now.

Become a Member

Luis Simón, Ph.D., is director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy at Vrije Universiteit Brussel, and director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute.

Toshi Yoshihara, Ph.D., is senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, D.C.

This commentary was developed as part of the Bridging Allies initiative, led by the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel.

Image: U.K. Ministry of Defence via Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Luis Simón · January 8, 2025

16. Asia-Pacific nations boost amphibious naval fleets to repel China

Asia-Pacific nations boost amphibious naval fleets to repel China

Defense News · by Gordon Arthur · January 8, 2025

CHRISTCHURCH, New Zealand — Navies across the Asia-Pacific region are boosting amphibious capabilities in an effort to protect their complex coastlines, as China continues its flex its military muscle in the region.

The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF), for example, is set to receive 10 new landing craft by the end of Fiscal Year 2027. This includes two 3,500-ton Logistics Support Vessels (LSV), four 2,400-ton Landing Craft Utility (LCU) and four smaller Maneuver Support Vessels.

Japanese shipbuilder Naikai Zosen launched the first LSV on Nov. 28, and the first LCU on Oct. 29. All these vessels will join a joint Maritime Transport Group being established next March, and will help support the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, Japan’s equivalent of a marine corps.

Tokyo is alarmed at the vulnerability of its southwest archipelago to Chinese intrusion. The military said, “In light of the current severe security environment, the JGSDF will steadily build transport vessels to strengthen transport functions to islands.”

Australia is charting the same course as it rapidly overhauls its amphibious capacity with 18 new Landing Craft Medium (LCM) and eight Landing Craft Heavy (LCH). Last year’s Defence Strategic Review mandated greatly improved littoral capabilities.

The LCMs, designed by Birdon Group, carry 90 tons of cargo, while the larger LCHs displace 3,900 tons. On Nov. 22, Canberra announced the LST 100 design from Damen Shipyards had been selected for the LCH. Austal will build all LCMs and LCHs in Western Australia.

Australia’s chief of Army, Lt. Gen. Simon Stuart, said: “Our plan is to have the first medium in the water by the end of 2026, the first heavy by the end of 2028. That means we’ve got to work with industry and make sensible compromises to get the capability, which will be a step change above anything we’ve currently got.”

The Australian government said the craft “will support a strategy of denial, which includes deploying and sustaining modernized land forces with long-range land and maritime strike capabilities across our region.”

Elsewhere, the Philippines already has two Tarlac-class landing platform dock (LPD) vessels, and PT PAL in Indonesia is building another two following a 2022 contract.

To be delivered to the Philippine navy in 2026, these LPDs are useful for moving units around the Philippine archipelago, including its existing South China Sea bases. Manila is currently facing Chinese pressure in this maritime territory.

Taiwan commissioned the domestically built LPD Yushan in September 2022. This 10,000-ton vessel cannot help counter a full-scale Chinese invasion, but it can support mine countermeasures, resupply offshore islands and support amphibious landings.

India is dragging the chain in terms of improving its limited amphibious sealift. The Indian Navy issued a request for information for four LPDs in 2021, but little more has occurred since.

Navantia of Spain teamed up with Larsen & Toubro to offer the Juan Carlos I platform. However, amphibious vessels are competing for funding against submarines and other surface combatants. Plus, India’s land borders with China and Pakistan are mired in tensions.

About Gordon Arthur

Gordon Arthur is an Asia correspondent for Defense News. After a 20-year stint working in Hong Kong, he now resides in New Zealand. He has attended military exercises and defense exhibitions in about 20 countries around the Asia-Pacific region.

17. The Axis of Upheaval Goes to Sea

Excerpts:

Thus, these operations and probes display a joint desire to intimidate Indo-Pacific states and expand their area of joint operations, obviously to push back American and allied naval power. If this is not alliance behavior, it is hard to determine what it is. Finally, in the Red Sea the Houthis, another terrorist organization has conducted a long campaign against both Israel, against whom it has launched 220 missiles since October 7, 2023, and international trade in the Red Sea. As a result of these attacks international shipping costs have risen and Red Sea shipping has dramatically declined. Here again the incidence of support from Iran, who provides weapons and funds obtained from energy sales to China who is now offering them weapons, while Russia is now offering weapons and evidently has given the Houthis GPS and ship siting technology and may be angling for a base in Yemen is essential to their campaign. As Elisabeth Braw has written, these actions transgress every concept of maritime international law even though Russia and China are members of the UN Security Council.

But beyond that, as Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery (USN, ret.), a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, this three-sided Iran-Sino-Russian cooperation, observes, “These reports of intelligence sharing between the Houthis and Russians — and the potential transfer of more capable anti-ship cruise missiles to the Houthis — is the natural extension of the evolving axis of chaos. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and their surrogates, such as the Houthis, are conducting more and more exchanges of equipment, intelligence, and know-how.” Whether it be in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia the activities of the Axis of Upheaval or what Montgomery calls the axis of chaos are expanding, their cooperation is growing, their operational range and readiness to strike are expanding and this is now particularly noticeable throughout the world ocean. Thus, as Donald Trump takes office we and our allies are being attacked increasingly persistently and broadly, at land as in Ukraine and Israel, and at sea. And this is the overarching strategic threat that we must vanquish, starting in 2025.

The Axis of Upheaval Goes to Sea

By Stephen Blank

January 08, 2025

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/01/08/the_axis_of_upheaval_goes_to_sea_1083174.html?mc_cid=71d1f53ceb

Last year analysts discovered that an “Axis of Upheaval” comprising Russia, China, North Korea and Iran had come into being. Although some analysts dismissed the idea of an axis operating in some form of concerted action against the U.S. and its allies; as other experts analyzed this axis, they noted that its members usually acted bilaterally, e.g. Russia and North Korea exchanging troops and missiles for oil grain, and satellite technology. However, it has now become increasingly clear that not only do we find examples of concerted action we find that in some cases, we find members of this axis emulating each other’s attacks on American interests and collaborating in groups of two or three powers against Washington and its allies. In these cases, e.g., support for Iran and through Iran its proxies, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, is now concentrating on attacking Western maritime targets. We can trace these trends with regard to probes against NATO members in the Baltic, the Houthis targeting of both Israel and international maritime trade through the Red Sea, and in the Indo-Pacific, specifically Chinese probes against Taiwan, and joint Sino- Russian naval probes against the Philippines, and Japan.

Thus, the members of this “axis” are now showing signs of cooperation through emulation, or through synchronized collaboration involving two or three members and even proxies that are increasingly striking naval and maritime targets.

If we look first at emulation we see that China is now apparently cutting sea cables around Taiwan on top of all of its earlier air and naval probes. This activity clearly emulates the three instances attributed to Russia of cutting sea cables around and in the Baltic Sea to threaten the Baltic states, Finland, Sweden, and probably the other littoral states, Germany, Poland, and Denmark. Indeed, in the first . h case, in October 2023, a Chinese-flagged ship cut the Baltic Sea underwater internet and communication cables, demonstrating Chinese readiness to strike at European targets on behalf of its Russian ally. Another Chinese ship repeated this kind of operation in November 2024. And a third Chinese ship damaged the underwater Baltconnector pipeline and internet cables. In the Taiwanese case China has acted apparently alone. Nevertheless Russian ships have frequently been spotted in the waters near Taiwan, ostensibly on Pacific Ocean missions or to join in exercises with China.

Russian submarines and ships have also apparently regularly probed the waters around the Philippines. As President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. observed, "All of that is very concerning" ---Any intrusion into the West Philippine Sea, of our (Exclusive Economic Zone) EEZ, of our baselines is very worrisome. So, yes, it's just another one." Thus, this is a regular phenomenon that makes no strategic sense unless Russia is aligned with China regarding the South China Sea, a point that if true, should trigger action among littoral states, the U.S., and its Asian allies. Concurrently with these provocations we have a long-standing and ongoing record of Russo-Chinese air and naval probes against both South Korea and Japan. Naturally these probes arouse heightened threat perceptions in both countries and in South Korea those are added to existing fears of North Korea. Finally in 2024 we saw individual and joint Sino-Russian air and naval probes against Alaska. These flights took off from a Russian air base and reflected what both sides called operations in a “new area of joint operations.”

Thus, these operations and probes display a joint desire to intimidate Indo-Pacific states and expand their area of joint operations, obviously to push back American and allied naval power. If this is not alliance behavior, it is hard to determine what it is. Finally, in the Red Sea the Houthis, another terrorist organization has conducted a long campaign against both Israel, against whom it has launched 220 missiles since October 7, 2023, and international trade in the Red Sea. As a result of these attacks international shipping costs have risen and Red Sea shipping has dramatically declined. Here again the incidence of support from Iran, who provides weapons and funds obtained from energy sales to China who is now offering them weapons, while Russia is now offering weapons and evidently has given the Houthis GPS and ship siting technology and may be angling for a base in Yemen is essential to their campaign. As Elisabeth Braw has written, these actions transgress every concept of maritime international law even though Russia and China are members of the UN Security Council.

But beyond that, as Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery (USN, ret.), a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, this three-sided Iran-Sino-Russian cooperation, observes, “These reports of intelligence sharing between the Houthis and Russians — and the potential transfer of more capable anti-ship cruise missiles to the Houthis — is the natural extension of the evolving axis of chaos. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and their surrogates, such as the Houthis, are conducting more and more exchanges of equipment, intelligence, and know-how.” Whether it be in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia the activities of the Axis of Upheaval or what Montgomery calls the axis of chaos are expanding, their cooperation is growing, their operational range and readiness to strike are expanding and this is now particularly noticeable throughout the world ocean. Thus, as Donald Trump takes office we and our allies are being attacked increasingly persistently and broadly, at land as in Ukraine and Israel, and at sea. And this is the overarching strategic threat that we must vanquish, starting in 2025.

Dr. Stephen J. Blank is a Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is an internationally renowned expert on Russian and Chinese defense policy. He is the author of "Light from the East: Russia's Quest for Great Power Status in Asia" (Taylor & Francis, 2023). He was a Professor of National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College.

18. US Army tests mid-range capability of Typhon weapon system

US Army tests mid-range capability of Typhon weapon system

defence-blog.com · by Colton Jones · January 8, 2025

The U.S. Army’s 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment (Long Range Fires Battalion) has achieved two groundbreaking milestones in its mission to advance long-range precision fires.

These accomplishments, conducted under the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), highlight innovations in strategic capabilities and operational readiness.

In early November 2024, the battalion executed its first live-fire test using the Mid-Range Capability (MRC) system with fully organic Army sensors and shooters.

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The MRC, known as the Typhon Weapon System, is a ground-launched system designed to provide multi-domain fires against specific threats. The system leverages existing Raytheon-produced SM-6 missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles.

Conducted at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, the test validated the MRC’s ability to strike a moving surface target with precision. Soldiers trained intensively at the site in preparation, focusing on fire team coordination and reload drills.

“This test event not only expands the capability of MRC but also builds the competence and confidence of those who operate it,” said Capt. Michael Geissler, Delta Battery commander.

Sgt. W. Teloh of Delta Battery made history by becoming the first U.S. Army Soldier to fire both the Tomahawk cruise missile and the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6). His expertise, honed during specialized training, exemplifies the unit’s commitment to cultivating adaptable and highly skilled personnel.

Lt. Col. Ben Blane, the battalion commander, praised the team’s success, stating, “It’s not just about mastering the MRC; it’s about building a culture of continuous improvement. Our Soldiers are doing an outstanding job, and I couldn’t be prouder of their efforts.”

In a separate landmark event, the battalion successfully loaded the MRC system onto a chartered vessel at the Port of Tacoma. This exercise validated the use of maritime transport for the system, enhancing the Army’s ability to deploy land-based fires in coastal and amphibious environments.

“This battery didn’t even exist a year ago. Now you have qualified crews and systems demonstrating new methods to deliver fires and move in theater,” said Lt. Col. Blane. “We’re building capability faster and more efficiently while providing increasingly lethal options to support commanders in the Indo-Pacific.”

The exercise, conducted in partnership with Lockheed Martin engineers and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, reflects the Army’s focus on rapid mobility and strategic deployment.

The 1st MDTF, assigned to the Indo-Pacific, plays a critical role in neutralizing adversary anti-access and area denial networks. With five Multi-Domain Task Forces now directed globally, the Army’s layered precision fires are creating multiple dilemmas for adversaries while strengthening U.S. strategic positioning.

These milestones demonstrate the Army’s ability to adapt and innovate, underscoring its commitment to enhancing long-range precision fires and maritime mobility for modern conflict scenarios.

defence-blog.com · by Colton Jones · January 8, 2025

19. Permission Structures, a PSYOP Against the American People, & the Big Man Theory

CDR Salamander recommends reading this entire "PSYOP" article at the Tablet. He summarizes the key points of the very long and in-depth article below. This should ne studied objectively.

Rapid-Onset Political Enlightenment:

How Barack Obama Built an Omnipotent Thought Machine and How it was Destroyed

By David Samuels

https://www.tabletmag.com/feature/rapid-onset-political-enlightenment

Excerpts:

The below my second attempt in commenting on this exposé. I did not like the focus of my first draft, so I ditched it a couple of days ago, printed out a fresh copy, reread, and changed my focus to just two areas. Both revolve around his description of the operationalization of the core of the left’s drive: to control the mechanism of the distribution and use of power.

The left were way ahead of everyone else in seeing how suing social tools, networks both real and online, they could refine social manipulation and enforce compliance through direct and indirect control of institutions public and private—backed up by a pliable legal system. They stole a march on the libertarians and the right for over a decade and once everyone else figured out the game was afoot, it was almost too late to counter. It was a near run thing, as Samuels shows in an almost airtight diagnosis.

Permission Structures, a PSYOP Against the American People, & the Big Man Theory

...and the rebellion against it that wasn't supposed to happen

https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/permission-structures-a-psyop-against?utm

CDR Salamander

Jan 08, 2025

There is a space between and article and a report—perhaps exposé is the correct word—but if you print it out, David Samuels’s latest over at Tablet, Rapid Onset Alignment, is a force to be reckoned with.

If you print it out, it goes well over 30 pages or so depending on what font you use, and is densely packed with insights into what we have all seen going on in the last two decades but never quite stitched together.

Samuels has.

The below my second attempt in commenting on this exposé. I did not like the focus of my first draft, so I ditched it a couple of days ago, printed out a fresh copy, reread, and changed my focus to just two areas. Both revolve around his description of the operationalization of the core of the left’s drive: to control the mechanism of the distribution and use of power.

The left were way ahead of everyone else in seeing how suing social tools, networks both real and online, they could refine social manipulation and enforce compliance through direct and indirect control of institutions public and private—backed up by a pliable legal system. They stole a march on the libertarians and the right for over a decade and once everyone else figured out the game was afoot, it was almost too late to counter. It was a near run thing, as Samuels shows in an almost airtight diagnosis.

Samuels provides the details of the history and players, but toward the end two central meta points broke out from the rest. These are the two things I’ll focus on:

Using old school tactics with ideas from David Axelrod but perfected by former President Obama and his fellow travelers, a long-run PSYOP, leveraging institutional control over cultural, media, political, and ultimately legal centers of power, was run against the American people and anyone who stood in their way.
The final successful pushback of the last year validated the Big Man theory of history. Axelrod, Obama, Musk, Trump, and Netanyahu. Those four men made, and then broke a new model for political control that, just as it was consolidating complete power, had their grip taken away one finger at a time.

Anyone over 40 will nod their head to the below. Those younger then 40 don’t remember what being an adult was like before the big change at Y2K:

Something big changed sometime after the year 2000 in the way we communicated with each other, and the means by which we absorbed new information and formed a working picture of the world around us. ... This once-every-five-centuries revolution would have large effects, ones we have only just begun to assimilate, and which have largely rendered the assumptions and accompanying social forms of the past century obsolete, even as tens of millions of people, including many who imagine themselves to reside near the top of the country’s social and intellectual pyramids, continue to imagine themselves to be living in one version or another of the long 20th century that began with the advent of a different set of mass communications technologies, which included the telegraph, radio, and film.

This is under-appreciated. Today, anyone with access to an open internet can tap into most of human knowledge, references, and opinion. Audio, video, text—it is all there—in seconds. In the last year, easy access to AI can have anyone digest huge datasets. Easier than making an international phone call two decades ago, you can set up a video call with multiple participants on every continent as if they were all in the same neighborhood.

As with most technology, the early adopters get the edge.

The methodology on which our current universe of political persuasion is based was born before the internet or iPhones existed, in an attempt to do good and win elections while overcoming America’s historical legacy of slavery and racism. Its originator, David Axelrod, was born to be a great American advertising man—his father was a psychologist, and his mother was a top executive at the legendary Mad Men-era New York City ad agency of Young & Rubicam. Instead, following his father’s suicide, Axelrod left New York City for Chicago, where he attended the University of Chicago, and then became a political reporter for the Chicago Tribune. He then became a political consultant who specialized in electing Black mayoral candidates in white-majority cities. In 2008, Axelrod ran the successful insurgent campaigns that first got Barack Obama the Democratic Party nomination over Hillary Clinton, and then elevated him to the White House.

Axelrod first tested his unique understanding of the theory and practice of public opinion, which he called “permission structures,”…

You would think that someone like Axelrod would be the one trying to pull an up and coming talent like Obama into his orbit. No, that isn’t what happened.

Barack Obama—already imagining himself as a future president of the United States—would seek out the Chicago-based consulting wizard to run his campaigns. But Axelrod wasn’t interested. In fact, Obama would spend more than a decade chasing Axelrod—who was far better connected in Chicago than Obama was—in the hopes that he would provide the necessary magic for his political rise. The other Chicago kingmaker that Obama courted was Jesse Jackson Sr., whose Operation PUSH was the city’s most powerful Black political machine, and who liked Obama even less than Axelrod did. The reality was that Obama did best with rich whites, like the board members of the Joyce Foundation and the Pritzker family.

When Axelrod finally agreed to come onboard, he found that Obama was the perfect candidate to validate his theories of political salesmanship on a national scale. First, he engineered Obama’s successful 2004 Senate campaign—a victory made possible by the old-school maneuver of unsealing Republican candidate Jack Ryan’s divorce papers, on the request of Axelrod’s former colleagues at the Chicago Tribune—and then, very soon afterward, Obama’s campaigns for the presidency, which formally commenced in 2007.

Obama achieved his goal in 2008. In an interesting correlation, that is the same year I signed up for an account at this strange little “microblogging” place called “twitter”. I only signed up to make sure no one took the quirky name of my then four year old blog. Little did I know…

That is when Axelrod saw the shift.

Once in office, though, Axelrod and Obama found that the institutions of public opinion—namely the press, on which Axelrod’s permission structure framework depended—were decaying quickly in the face of the internet. Newspapers like the Cleveland Plain Dealer, as well as national television networks like CBS, which Axelrod relied on as validators, were now barely able to pay their bills, having lost their monopoly on viewers and advertisers to the internet and to newly emerging social media platforms.

With Obama’s reelection campaign on the horizon in 2012, the White House’s attention turned to selling Obamacare, which would become the signature initiative of the president’s first term in office. Without a healthy, well-functioning press corps that could command the attention and allegiance of voters, the White House would have to manufacture its own world of validators to sell the president’s plan on social media—which it successfully did.

Once Samuels outlines what happened, you will never look at the last decade of political discourse the same way again:

…social media—which was now the larger context in which former prestige “legacy” outlets like The New York Times and NBC News now operated—could now be understood and also made to function as a gigantic automated permission structure machine. Which is to say that, with enough money, operatives could create and operationalize mutually reinforcing networks of activists and experts to validate a messaging arc that would short-circuit traditional methods of validation and analysis, and lead unwary actors and audience members alike to believe that things that had never believed or even heard of before were in fact not only plausible, but already widely accepted within their specific peer groups.

The effect of the permission structure machine is to instill and maintain obedience to voices coming from outside yourself, regardless of the obvious gaps in logic and functioning that they create.

The Iran deal proved that, with the collapse of the reality-establishing function of professional media, which could no longer afford to field teams of independent, experienced reporters, a talented politician in the White House could indeed stand up his own reality, and use the mechanisms of peer-group pressure and aspirational ambition to get others to adopt it. In fact, the higher one climbed on the social and professional ladder, the more vulnerable to such techniques people turned out to be—making it easy to flip entire echelons of professionals within the country’s increasingly brittle and insecure elite, whose status was now being threatened by the pace and scope of technologically driven change that threatened to make both their expertise and also their professions obsolete. As a test of the use of social media as a permission structure machine, the Iran deal was therefore a necessary prelude to Russiagate, which marked the moment in which the “mainstream media” was folded into the social media machinery that the party controlled, as formerly respected names like “NBC News” or “Harvard professor Lawrence Tribe” were regularly advertised spouting absurdities backed by “top national security sources” and other validators—all of which could be activated or invented on the spot by clever aides with laptops, playing the world’s greatest video game.

Let’s pull the center of that and quote it again. First, I want you to remember how former CNO Gilday debased himself to defend that discredited race-grifter Kendi during his tenure, along with other unnecessary expenditures of personal and institutional capital on pure socio-political, cultural Marxist political plays. How quickly great professionals, leaders of Sailors and a Navy of unmatched power in all of human history, were bullied by academics and otherwise unemployable leftists into falling in line with a cultural Marxist secular religion;

…the higher one climbed on the social and professional ladder, the more vulnerable to such techniques people turned out to be—making it easy to flip entire echelons of professionals within the country’s increasingly brittle and insecure elite, whose status was now being threatened by the pace and scope of technologically driven change that threatened to make both their expertise and also their professions obsolete.

It worked. It worked exceptionally well.

In the wake of Obama’s reelection in 2012, the defection of large swaths of the Silicon Valley elite from the Republican to the Democratic Party led to a tremendous influx of cash into the coffers of the Democratic Party and its associated penumbra of billionaire-funded foundations and NGOs, along with a new willingness of Silicon Valley titans to work directly with the White House—which after all, retained the power, in theory, to regulate their quasi-monopolies out of existence. In field after field, from sex and gender, to church attitudes toward homosexuality, to formerly apolitical sources of public information, to voting practices, to the internal politics of religious groups, to race politics, to what films Americans would watch and how they would henceforth be entertained, the oligarchs would do their part, by helping buy up once independent social spaces and torque them to function as parts of the party’s permission structure machine. The FBI would then do its part, by adopting political categories like “white supremacy” as chief domestic targets, and puppet groups in the vertical, like the ADL and the ACLU, would pretend to be objective watchdogs who just happened to come to the same conclusion.

Peer pressure. Permission structures. Fear. Desire to be in the in group. Bullies and their victims. Again, constants in the human condition, but in overdrive by those who understood how to use new information mediums to accentuate it.

Then COVID and chaos...which then brought opportunity.

As COVID provided cover for increasingly extreme and rapid manifestations of rapid political enlightenment, numbers of formerly quiescent citizens began to rebel against the new order. Unable to locate where the instructions were coming from, they blamed elites, medical authorities, the deep state, Klaus Schwab, the leadership of Black Lives Matter, Bill Gates, and dozens of other more or less nefarious players, but without being able to identity the process that kept generating new thought-contagions and giving them the seeming force of law. The game was in fact new enough that Donald Trump didn’t get it before it was too late for his reelection chances, championing lockdowns and COVID vaccines while failing to pay attention to the Democratic lawyers who were changing election laws in key states. Once Joe Biden was safely installed in the White House, Obama’s Democratic Party could look forward to smooth sailing—protected by new election laws, the party’s control over major information platforms, the FBI, and the White House, and a government-led campaign of lawfare against Trump. It was hard to see how the party could lose for at least another generation, if ever again.

People knew that something was not right, but could not see the hidden hand. They could see the effects, but could not see the cause.

Old methods. New tools.

The permission structure machine that Barack Obama and David Axelrod built … is totalitarian in its essence, a device for getting people to act against their beliefs by substituting new and better beliefs through the top-down controlled and leveraged application of social pressure, which among other things eliminates the position of the spectator. The integrity of the individual is violated in order to further the superior interests of the superego of humanity, the party, which knows which beliefs are right and which are wrong. The party is the ghost in the machine, which appears to run on automatic pilot, using the human desire for companionship and social connection as fuel for an effort to detach individuals from their own desires and substitute the dictates of the party, which is granted the unlimited right to enforce its superior opinions on all of mankind.

This is why those who had experience as citizens of the former Soviet Union, captive nations of the Warsaw Pact, and communist horror shows like Cuba were some of the first to see what was going on.

This all looks familiar…though in a much diluted and less deadly form.

The effect of the permission structure machine is to instill and maintain obedience to voices coming from outside yourself, regardless of the obvious gaps in logic and functioning that they create. The clinical term for this state is schizophrenia…

How many times have you looked at people and institutions and wondered, “What happened? Have they lost their mind? I worked with them three years ago. I don’t recognize any of this?”

Well, this should help explain things. It wasn’t you. It was them.

What the permission structure machine seeks to do is to undo the millennia-long work of consciousness by once again locating consciousness outside of the self—but clothing it as an internal product via the mechanized propagation of what Marxists used to call “false consciousness.” But where the progenitors of “false consciousness” in the Marxist lexicon are villains, working on behalf of the capitalist order by preventing workers from being cognizant of their own interests, the mechanized permission structure machine offers the reverse: The “false consciousness” it seeks to propagate is a positive instrument of the party’s attempt to establish the reign of justice on earth. Which is why the natural outcome of the automation of permission structures is not humor, however cynical, but institutionalized schizophrenia, instantiated within the structure of the bicameral mind. No matter how the bots that animate the mechanism position themselves, for whatever low-end careerist purpose, the voices they listen to come from outside. They are incapable of being truth-tellers, because they have no truth to tell. They are creatures of the machine.

That is also where the model starts to fall apart, and what we are seeing play out now.

I was but a young junior officer plowing through PQS as the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact fell apart. They were staunch communists, until they weren’t. Change can happen fast.

The machine is still running, but it is breaking and its masters already scattering to safe harbors or trying to change out of their uniforms, but what is breaking the machine?

That brings us to the second half of the second part I mentioned at the start; the Big Man theory of history.

It took three powerful men, each of whom had the advantage of operating entirely in public, and with massive and obvious real-world consequences, to rupture the apparatus of false consciousness that Obama built. In doing so, they saved the world—for the moment, at least. While history will judge whether their achievements were lasting, it is clear that if they hadn’t acted as they did, we would still be living inside the machine.

The first of these men was Elon Musk…

And the critical part of that was the cute little micro-blogging site I first used 17 years ago as just a place to advertise my blog posts and now I have over 24,000 followers, X:

Twitter’s significance, as part of the party’s permission structure machinery, was key in part because, as the history of platforms and companies like Facebook, Google, Uber, Instagram. and TikTok shows, advantages of scale tend naturally toward localized monopolies. Twitter could play the signaling and coordinating function that it did in part because it was a monopoly, which is why Obama, Axelrod, Plouffe, etc. all had Twitter accounts. It’s why the FBI came on board Twitter, to ensure that the tilt of the platform was coordinated with the FBI’s role in the party’s “whole of society” censorship efforts—whether directed against “disinformation,” or COVID measures, or “white supremacy,” or Donald Trump, or “insurrectionists.”

…

It is certainly plausible that someone in Obama’s universe saw the danger in selling Twitter to Musk. That it happened anyway suggests—as in the case of the lawfare campaign against Trump—that they hubristically believed in their own propagandistic accounts of their adversary as venal, corrupt, and weak, and of their own practical and moral superiority. Unable to think outside their own box, they may have reasonably expected that Musk could be constrained by the need to keep his advertisers by retaining the existing tilt of the platform’s algorithms for as long as the platform itself continued to matter. To keep Musk in line, the party could cut the platform’s advertising revenues by half or more at will by having its adjuncts in the censorship business label it a sinkhole of racism and depravity, and getting it banned from Europe and other global markets. As the reputational cost spread, Musk would have no choice but to eat a loss of tens of billions of dollars and sell, or else face the destruction of his other businesses—which the party could speed up by canceling contracts with NASA and other government agencies and opening multiple SEC and Justice Department investigations that would further augment his reputational risk—until he agreed to kiss the ring.

They tried exactly that, but they misjudged the man—and themselves.

Obama’s operatives shared the same character flaw as their master, a kind of brittle, Ivy League know-it-all-ness that demanded that they always be the smartest person in the room.

…

Faced with the party’s regime of increasing direct censorship over social media, Musk was aware, in a way his adversaries were not, that the party’s ambitions to control content meant that he was coming perilously close to losing control over his own personal dream space, which provides a large share of the value of his companies. Once Donald Trump, a former president of the United States, was thrown off Twitter, the equation became quite obvious: Either the party would control Twitter, in which case Elon Musk was next up for shadow-banning, fact-checking, and eventual exile, at a cost of however many hundreds of billions of dollars to his personal brand, i.e., his companies, or else Musk could assert his own control over that space, by buying Twitter. When measured against the likely losses that would result from being silenced and thrown off the site, and his likely subsequent difficulties in raising public and private capital, $44 billion was therefore an entirely reasonable cost for Musk to pay. The hitch in Musk’s plan to buy Twitter was that it relied on the party being stupid enough to sell it to him. Luckily, unbelievably, they were that stupid—while crowing loudly that Musk was a sucker.

Oops.

It is clear by now that the Obama party were the suckers—not Musk. In fact, the party’s belated war on Twitter’s new owner only served to convince other Silicon Valley oligarchs that whatever reputational risks they might incur by backing Donald Trump would be outweighed by the direct risks that party weaponization of federal regulatory structures, which gave it effective control of markets and banks, would pose to their businesses. By letting Twitter go, and then making war on its new owner, in a belated attempt to get him to do their bidding, the Obama party showed both the scope of its ambition and also its hubris—a combination that split the country’s oligarchy on the eve of the key election that would have allowed the party to consolidate its power.

With Musk’s X now open to all comers, the party’s censorship apparatus was effectively dead. A new counter-permission structure machine was now erected, licensing all kinds of views, some of which were novel and welcome, and others of which were noxious. Which is how opinion in a free society is supposed to operate.

Elon Musk’s decision to buy Twitter was in turn a necessary precondition for the election of Donald Trump, which was in turn made possible by Trump’s own split-second decision on July 13, 2024, to turn his head fractionally to the right while delivering a speech in a field in Butler, Pennsylvania.

Trump’s head turn was a perfect example of an event that has no explanation outside the favor of the gods, or whatever modern equivalent involving wind factors and directional probabilities you might prefer to the word “God.” Trump was fated to win, just as Achilles was fated to overcome Hector, because the gods, or if you prefer the forces of cosmic randomness, were on his side, on that day, at that moment. That move not only saved his life by allowing him to escape an assassin’s bullet; it revitalized his chi and set in motion a series of subsequent events that generated a reordering of the entire world.

That is the best description for what we have seen that I have seen put in print.

“OK,” I can hear some of you, “I can get Musk and Trump, but how does Netanyahu get in this mix?”

Don’t forget, Israel has been in a proxy war with Iran for 15 months. I grew up being told that, “All Israel’s wars have to be short wars.” Yet, here we are, 15 months and running.

Then there was Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who gave the story a further epic dimension by returning to the original field of battle. Bibi, as you may recall, played the role of Obama’s piñata during the fight over the Iran deal, fated to go down to defeat by opposing the will of a sitting U.S. president on a foreign policy question that most Americans cared very little about. But this past summer, Netanyahu turned himself into the active party, with the means to reverse Obama’s achievement and unveil the origins of his power grab, by showing that the “peace deal” that he had sold to the American people—founded on the idea that Iran was itself a formidable adversary—was a mess of lies. Iran was not and never was a regional power, capable of “balancing” traditional American allies. It was a totalitarian shit hole regime that is deeply hated by its own people and throughout the region, entirely dependent on American backing in its efforts to gain a nuclear bomb.

Ever wonder why the pro-Iran American left hated Netanyahu?

Israel was not to invade Rafah, a prohibition that ensured that Hamas could regularly bring in supplies and cash through the tunnels beneath its border with Egypt while ensuring the survival of its command-and-control structure, allowing it to reassume control of Gaza once the war was over, thereby assuring the success of U.S. policy, which was that Israel’s military invasion of Gaza must serve as the prelude to establishing a Palestinian state—an effort in which Hamas was a necessary partner, representing the Iranian interest, and must therefore be preserved in some part, even after being cut down to size.

Netanyahu’s decision to override the U.S. and take Rafah would turn out to be the prelude to a further series of stunning strategic moves which would enable Israel to smash the Iranian regional position and take full control of her own destiny. After conquering Rafah, in a campaign that the U.S. had said would be impossible without large-scale civilian casualties, Netanyahu proceeded to run the table in a series of rapid-fire blows whose only real point of comparison is Israel’s historic victory in the Six-Day War. In fact, given the odds he faced, and the magnitude of the victories he has won, that comparison may be unfair to Netanyahu, who has provided history with one of the very few examples of an isolated local client redrawing the strategic map of the region against the will of a dominant global power.

Israel proved how wrong Obama, Biden, Blinken, and Sullivan—and as such their entire foreign policy world-view—were. With the election of Trump, it is hard to see how that world-view could claw its way back to credibility.

When their approach to the world and our nation’s threats is seen as a naked failure, it is only natural that eyes will turn home.

Parallel to the collapse of the new regional order that Obama decreed for the Middle East has been the collapse of the Obama-led domestic order at home. The coincidence marks the end of Obama’s pretensions to be a new kind of world leader, running a new world order of his own making from his iPhone, grounded in his own strange combination of nihilism and virtue-mongering.

In fact, it can be argued that there is no coincidence here at all, since the division between Obama’s program abroad and his role at home is largely artificial.

This is “one of those moments in history” we are at. A pivot point. I’m not sure where it is headed, but like in 1991, I am confident it won’t be a u-turn to what was.

I can’t see what can be, but I am quite confident that whatever it is, it won’t be unburdened by what was. Nothing is.

At the end of the day, Elon Musk may take ketamine all day long while wandering the halls of his own mind in a purple silk caftan. Donald Trump may be an agent of chaos who destroys more than he saves. Benjamin Netanyahu may or may not make peace with the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, who may or may not turn out to be a good guy. Regardless of their faults, all three men shared a common trait at a critical moment in history—they trusted their own stubbornness against the mirror world of digitally based conformity. The human future rests on individuals in all walks of life and representing all parties and all currents of opinion being brave and independent-minded enough to make that same choice.

As for Barack Obama, I will admit that I wasn’t sure I’d ever see him face the consequences of his own arrogance, obsession with personal power, and efforts at vanquishing the exceptionalism that makes this country different from every other one. But I guess, as a wise man once explained: “Life’s a bitch.”

If you have not already, do read the whole thing. I’ve only scratched the surface of superb autopsy of the last 20+ years.

20. U.S. Rep. Van Orden: Appointed to House Armed Services Committee for 119th Congress

Not many former senior NCOs from any service serve in Congress. He may be the keeper of the B**lSh*t meter in Congress and I expect he will speak his mind for the right reasons and not for political reasons.

I look forward to his questioning at HASC hearings. I doubt any member of Congress will ask harder and more probing questions than Rep. Van Orden. A lot of Congressional colleagues are going to learn a lot from him.

My initial criticism is that he failed to mention north Korea, But I will give him a pass.

Excerpt:

Prior to serving in Congress, Rep. Van Orden spent 26 years in the United States military, retiring as a Navy SEAL Senior Chief in 2014. He is a recognized expert in Unconventional Warfare, Advanced Special Operations, Special Reconnaissance and Land Warfare in the Special Operation Forces community.

U.S. Rep. Van Orden: Appointed to House Armed Services Committee for 119th Congress

January 7, 2025

Home » Press Releases » U.S. Rep. Van Orden: Appointed to House Armed Services Committee for 119th Congress

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, former Navy SEAL Congressman Derrick Van Orden (WI-03) announced his appointment to the House Armed Services Committee for the 119th Congress. Following his appointment, Congressman Van Orden stated:

“I am honored to be appointed to the House Armed Services Committee. As the longest serving enlisted military member to be elected to Congress, I have firsthand experience with the challenges faced by our servicemembers, what it takes to navigate modern threats, and how to prepare and equip our troops for future conflicts.

“Under the Biden administration, the Department of Defense has gone so far off mission, putting our servicemembers, the United States, and our allies at grave risk. Immediate course correction is necessary if we are going to deter China, Russia, and Iran, and protect freedom around the world. We must get our military back to a place of prioritizing lethality, recruitment and retention, and securing peace through strength. I am ready to work with my committee colleagues, Chairman Rogers, and our incoming Commander-in-Chief, President Trump, to restore our military and re-establish the United States as the leading global power.”

“I am thrilled to welcome Rep. Van Orden to the House Armed Services Committee,” Chairman Mike Rogers (R-AL) said. “As a Navy SEAL, Rep. Van Orden bravely served our nation. In Congress, Rep. Van Orden has been a vocal supporter for improving servicemember quality of life. I look forward to working with him to support our servicemembers and strengthen our military.”

Prior to serving in Congress, Rep. Van Orden spent 26 years in the United States military, retiring as a Navy SEAL Senior Chief in 2014. He is a recognized expert in Unconventional Warfare, Advanced Special Operations, Special Reconnaissance and Land Warfare in the Special Operation Forces community.

21. Retired US Army colonel led joint task force that safely removed tons of uranium from Iraq

An little told story about a great American. I was fortunate to serve with Barry in Korea and at Fort Bragg.

We used to joke that he was the only Airborne Ranger Nuclear Physicist that we knew.

Retired US Army colonel led joint task force that safely removed tons of uranium from Iraq

By Walter T. Ham IVJanuary 8, 2025

army.mil · January 8, 2025

Retired Col. Barrett “Barry” F. Lowe commanded Task Force McCall, a joint task force that helped to transfer 550 metric tons of yellowcake uranium from the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center near Baghdad. After Task Force McCall completed the mission, the Secretary of the Army awarded the 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives (CBRNE) Command Detachment the Meritorious Unit Commendation for its role in the operation. (Photo Credit: Courtesy photo) VIEW ORIGINAL

FORT LIBERTY, N.C. – A retired U.S. Army colonel led a task force that safely removed more than 550 metric tons of Iraqi uranium in 2008.

Retired Col. Barrett “Barry” F. Lowe was chosen to command Task Force McCall, a joint task force that helped to transfer yellowcake uranium from the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center near Baghdad.

After Task Force McCall completed the mission, the Secretary of the Army awarded the 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives (CBRNE) Command Detachment the Meritorious Unit Commendation for its role in the operation.

“The unit was responsible for the security, on-site management, and execution of the repackaging and transport of the remainder of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear program out of Iraq,” read the Meritorious Unit Commendation citation. “The command demonstrated the newly operational capabilities available to the Department of Defense, as well as a tremendous ability to work as an intra-agency and inter-agency liaison to accomplish the mission.”

Task Force McCall helped to transfer yellowcake uranium from the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center near Baghdad. After Task Force McCall completed the mission, the Secretary of the Army awarded the 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives (CBRNE) Command Detachment the Meritorious Unit Commendation for its role in the operation. Courtesy photo. (Photo Credit: Courtesy photo) VIEW ORIGINAL

The uranium was transported by Air Force C-17 Globemaster III aircraft to the Military Sealift Command ship SS Gopher State that delivered the materials to Canada, who bought the materials for use in nuclear energy facilities.

Lowe said the mission included the 20th CBRNE Command’s Nuclear Disablement Team, led by then Lt. Col. Rich Schueneman and Maj. Jerry Vavrina, and a Department of Energy team from Oak Ridge that moved four highly radioactive sources and 550 metric tons of yellowcake uranium out of Iraq.

Lowe played a key role in operationalizing the 20th CBRNE Command, the U.S. military’s multifunctional and deployable CBRNE formation. From July 2005 to March 2008, Lowe served as the chief of staff for the command before becoming the commander of Task Force McCall.

The 20th CBRNE Command marked its 20th anniversary in October 2024.

“I was the first U.S. Army Countering Nuclear and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) officer (FA 52) officer assigned as the chief of staff and had the great opportunity to serve in the unit in the early days of its formation,” said Lowe.

(From the left) retired Col. Ray Van Pelt, retired Col. Barrett "Barry" F. Lowe, retired Command Sgt. Maj. Marvin Womack and retired Col. Paul Plemmons stand together the 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives (CBRNE) Command change of command ceremony on Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, May 20, 2015. Van Pelt, Lowe, Womack and Plemmons served together at the 20th CBRNE Command during the Force Design Update based on guidance from the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Courtesy photo. (Photo Credit: Courtesy photo) VIEW ORIGINAL

“We had an absolutely great team of senior staff under Brig. Gen. Kevin Wendel,” said Lowe. “Col. Ray Van Pelt was the operations officer (G3), Col. Paul Plemmons was the deputy commander and Command Sgt. Maj. Marvin Womack was the command sergeant major when I was the chief of staff.”

Lowe came from a family with a tradition of service at sea. His father served in the U.S. Navy as an enlisted Navy Dental Technician (Corpsman) and later as a Dental Officer. His father was in the Navy from the Korean War through the Cold War and both his grandfathers served in the Navy during World War II. He was born in Alexandria, Virginia, and raised around the world.

A West Point Cadet presentation at his high school helped to bring the Lowe family tradition of service ashore.

Retired U.S. Army Col. Barrett "Barry" F. Lowe graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in the Class of 1981. Lowe commanded Task Force McCall, a joint task force that helped to transfer 550 metric tons of yellowcake uranium from the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center near Baghdad. (Photo Credit: Courtesy photo) VIEW ORIGINAL

“I grew up on Navy bases from Puerto Rico to Guam, and others on the East Coast,” said Lowe. However, I really hadn’t thought about joining any branch of the military until the Spring of my 10th grade year in high school when I attended a presentation from a West Point Cadet. This presentation really motivated me, and since I didn’t like the idea of being on a ship, I thought that the U.S. Military Academy looked like a great option.”

Lowe was especially drawn to the West Point motto of “Duty, Honor, Country.”

“My family was very understanding of me going to West Point vice Annapolis, especially as they knew I really enjoyed my time in the Boy Scouts and would rather serve on land than at sea,” said Lowe, who made Eagle Scout in 1975. “My grandfather’s personal motto – which became our family motto – was ‘Success without honor is failure.’ I subsequently went through the admissions process and was accepted to the Class of 1981.”

Retired Col. Barrett “Barry” F. Lowe served as the first commander for the Long-Range Surveillance Detachment in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) from 1986 – 1987. In 2008, Lowe commanded Task Force McCall, a joint task force that helped to transfer 550 metric tons of yellowcake uranium from the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center near Baghdad. (Photo Credit: Courtesy photo) VIEW ORIGINAL

Lowe was commissioned as an Infantry officer. He met his wife Betsy during his first assignment with the 1st Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment Airborne Battalion Combat Team in Vicenza, Italy.

He also served as the first commander for the Long-Range Surveillance Detachment in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) from 1986 – 1987.

“We stood the unit up from scratch with an outstanding group of noncommissioned officers as well as tremendous support from the division,” said Lowe.

He earned his master’s degree in engineering physics at the Air Force Institute of Technology on Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio.

Lowe then taught on the faculty at West Point in the Department of Physics.

After his West Point assignment, Lowe attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Lowe then served as the battalion operations officer (S-3) for the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, and the brigade S-3 for 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light), at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington.

After his promotion to lieutenant colonel, Lowe served in the plans section at U.S. Forces Korea before moving to the XVIII Airborne Corps and being selected to serve in the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) from 2000 - 2005.

“I can’t talk much about JSOC, but that assignment led to my promotion to colonel and next assignment to the 20th CBRNE Command,” said Lowe.

Retired Col. Barrett “Barry” F. Lowe commanded Task Force McCall, a joint task force that helped to transfer 550 metric tons of yellowcake uranium from the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center near Baghdad. At the 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives (CBRNE) Command, in addition to commanding Task Force McCall, Lowe led the staff through the Force Design Update (FDU) that was based on guidance from the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. (Photo Credit: Courtesy photo) VIEW ORIGINAL

At the 20th CBRNE Command, in addition to commanding Task Force McCall, Lowe led the staff through the Force Design Update (FDU) that was based on guidance from the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.

“With top cover from the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Richard A. Cody and total support from Brig. Gen. Wendel, our staff team developed the FDU and Organization and Operations Plan that led to the Army order approving the new Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) – which is very similar to the MTOE for the command headquarters today,” said Lowe.

“This one-of-a-kind organization brings together critical capabilities to support Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and combatting WMD operations in support of joint force commanders,” said Lowe.

Retired Col. Barrett “Barry” F. Lowe commanded Task Force McCall, a joint task force that helped to transfer 550 metric tons of yellowcake uranium from the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center near Baghdad. At the 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives (CBRNE) Command, in addition to commanding Task Force McCall, Lowe led the staff through the Force Design Update (FDU) that was based on guidance from the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. C (Photo Credit: Courtesy photo) VIEW ORIGINAL

Today, the 20th CBRNE Command is home to 75 percent of the active-duty U.S. Army CBRN specialists and EOD technicians, as well as the 1st Global Field Medical Laboratory, CBRNE Analytical and Remediation Activity, Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordination Teams and Nuclear Disablement Teams (Infrastructure).

The multifunctional and deployable 20th CBRNE Command is headquartered in Northeast Maryland’s science, technology and security corridor.

Soldiers and Army civilians from the 20th CBRNE Command deploy from 19 bases in 16 states to confront and defeat the world’s most dangerous hazards in support of joint, interagency and multinational operations.

Lowe said his enduring leadership philosophy has been shaped by his family, mentors, peers and fellow warfighters. It centers on “mission first – people always” and emphasizes setting the standard by example as well as empowering people and giving them room to innovate.

“Assume your people know how to do their jobs. Guide them as lightly as possible,” said Lowe. “Many of your people will surprise you with their creativity.”

He also puts integrity above all and believes in walking his talk.

“Set and enforce standards. Do not expect your people to do anything that you are not willing to do yourself – set the example,” said Lowe. “Strive to excel in what you do every day.”

After retiring from the U.S. Army in 2011, retired Col. Barrett “Barry” F. Lowe continued to work on Fort Liberty, North Carolina, in different roles. He is currently a defense contractor working in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command G3 Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Counter-Threat Integration Division. Courtesy photo. (Photo Credit: Courtesy photo) VIEW ORIGINAL

Lowe said serving together with the men and women who wear the nation’s uniform was what kept him in the U.S. Army for three decades.

“What motivated me to stay for a 30-year career was the comradeship with my fellow officers and noncommissioned officers, development opportunities, the commanders and senior NCOs who coached and mentored me, and the purpose of serving in the Army protecting our great nation,” said Lowe. “I looked forward to going to work every day leading American Soldiers.”

After retiring from the U.S. Army in 2011, Lowe continued to work on Fort Liberty, North Carolina, in different roles. He is currently a defense contractor working in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command G3 Combating WMD and Counter-Threat Integration Division.

Lowe said the lessons he learned in the U.S. Army and his commitment to defending the nation have stayed with him long after he retired from the service.

“Do these attributes change when you hang up the uniform?” said Lowe. “Not if you want to remain the person you were when you were a Soldier.”

army.mil · January 8, 2025

22. The Domestic Fentanyl Crisis in Strategic Context, Part II: China and the Fentanyl Supply Chain

The 28 page report can be accessed here: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Domestic-Fentanyl-Crisis-Strategic-Context_China-Fentanyl-Supply-Chain.pdf

The Domestic Fentanyl Crisis in Strategic Context, Part II: China and the Fentanyl Supply Chain - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Nicholas Dockery · January 8, 2025

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Editor’s note: This report is the second in a three-part series that examines the role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the ongoing fentanyl crisis in the United States. The first report, which you can read here, traced the origins of the fentanyl crisis and its consequences for national security. This report provides evidence of the PRC’s complicity in the fentanyl crisis by describing how its domestic policy and law enforcement efforts fail to adequately undermine fentanyl production and sometimes even facilitate it. The final report will draw parallels between the PRC’s actions and asymmetric warfare, arguing that the United States must take a more concerted, whole-of-government approach to addressing the crisis that recognizes the PRC’s role in perpetuating it.

Publicly and officially, the PRC has made significant gestures of cooperation with the United States in meeting the opioid crisis challenge. Unofficially and illicitly, considerable evidence suggests the PRC actively supports and facilitates the flow of fentanyl into the United States. PRC officials continue to claim a narrative of fentanyl addiction as a US problem. In an interview with China Global Television Network, an international English-language news channel based in Beijing, the deputy secretary-general of the China National Narcotics Control Commission (CNNCC) criticized the United States for its role in creating the fentanyl crisis, attributing it to “its own misuse of prescription drugs.” Despite criticism, CNNCC’s spokesman declared readiness to provide full support in material control, intelligence sharing, law enforcement, and combating transnational crimes. In the words of Liu Pengyu, spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington, “It is very clear that there is no fentanyl problem in China, and the fentanyl crisis in the United States is not caused by the Chinese side, and blindly blaming China cannot solve the U.S.’ own problem.” While there is some truth to Pengyu’s statement—the United States must do more to address the problem of addiction—currently, Chinese companies, possibly with the full support or willful blindness of the PRC government, are fanning the flames of this crisis.

Read the full report here.

Nicholas Dockery is a White House Fellow, Special Forces officer, United States Military Academy graduate, and Wayne Downing scholar. Dockery holds a master of public policy from Yale’s Jackson School of Global Affairs and previously served as a research fellow at the Modern War Institute.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Shealah Craighead, White House

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Nicholas Dockery · January 8, 2025

23. Can America’s Allies Save America’s Alliances?

Excerpts:

U.S. allies mostly interpreted Trump’s victory in 2016 as an aberration, and they viewed the strengthening of American alliances since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Beijing’s alignment with Moscow as a return to the strategic normal. But Trump’s reelection could have longer-lasting effects. Trump’s second term could fray the alliance network that the Biden administration painstakingly reinforced over the past four years, and the disruption it could cause may spill over into U.S. allies’ domestic political systems.

Whether the network stays in place will depend increasingly on the actions of U.S. allies themselves. On that front, at least, early indications give some cause for optimism. Spurred by Russia’s brutal war and China’s complicity in that aggression, governments in Australia, Japan, South Korea, and across Europe have finally started the long overdue process of taking greater responsibility for their countries’ defense. Yet as they spend and do more, they will also expect to have a greater say on issues that affect their security and prosperity. This means, in effect, renegotiating the formal and informal terms on which American alliances were built 80 years ago.

Such a recalibration could exacerbate tensions with Washington, as well as between European capitals, even if the Trump administration takes a more pragmatic approach to U.S. alliances than many fear. Nevertheless, U.S. partners must now do their part to ensure that the alliance network can survive whatever changes Trump implements. They must use the next four years to show Americans that, as allies become more capable and demanding, they can also be more attractive global partners.

Can America’s Allies Save America’s Alliances?

Foreign Affairs · by More by Robin Niblett · January 8, 2025

Washington’s Partners Must Create a New Allied Consensus

Robin Niblett

January 8, 2025

Soldiers during NATO exercises in Korzeniewo, Poland, March 2024 Kacper Pempel / Reuters

Robin Niblett is Distinguished Fellow at Chatham House and author of The New Cold War: How the Contest Between the US and China Will Shape Our Century.

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U.S. President Joe Biden’s two major foreign policy achievements have been to strengthen U.S. alliances across the Atlantic and Pacific and to develop a transoceanic latticework that binds them all together. The past few years have seen NATO enlargement; a trilateral pact between the United States, Japan, and Korea; the formation of AUKUS, the partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; sustained support for Ukraine; sanctions on Russia; and coordination in the G-7 on critical supply chains. Working together, the United States and its allies have improved their prospects of confronting successfully the emerging axis between an aggressive Russia and an increasingly assertive China.

Donald Trump’s return to the White House threatens to undo this work. During Trump’s first term, U.S. allies did their best to accommodate his demands, increasing their defense spending, adapting trade policies, and tightening technology restrictions against China. American alliances did not just survive—they emerged stronger, as the security burden became more equitably shared. But now, four years later, the security risks are far higher and the forces of fragmentation are far more powerful in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. Yet Trump appears bent on reviving his “America first” foreign policy and ramping up political and economic pressure on U.S. allies even further. Those policies could alienate partners from Washington and strain relations among countries within the alliance system, giving Beijing and Moscow new room for diplomatic maneuvering.

U.S. allies will have to decide whether to close ranks or to let the centrifugal forces Trump may unleash drive them apart. If they choose the latter, pursuing their narrow self-interest in the absence of U.S. leadership, they will struggle to cope with the enormous domestic and international challenges of the coming decades, and the United States will be severely weakened relative to its geopolitical rivals. But if U.S. allies hang together, the U.S.-led status quo will need to give way to a system in which the United States engages with its allies on far more equal terms.

AMERICA’S CRUMBLING CONSENSUS

At a minimum, U.S. allies expect that Trump’s return to the presidency will initiate a painful new period of transactionalism. Trump will do no favors for treaty allies merely because they are allies. Nor will he give them much credit for past action, such as increasing their defense spending or replacing imports of Russian pipeline gas with imports of U.S. liquefied natural gas.

Instead, Trump may leverage U.S. allies’ insecurity—much greater today than during his first term, given Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and China’s growing military might—for better deals on trade and defense, mixing and matching his demands as he pleases. He could threaten to draw down the U.S. military presence in Europe, Japan, and South Korea unless partner countries offer more favorable terms of trade. He could also threaten additional tariffs if U.S. allies fail to match the 3.4 percent of GDP that Washington currently spends on defense.

Beyond a mercantilist approach to alliances, Trump’s complaints about the costs of stationing U.S. forces abroad reflect a rejection of the post–World War II bipartisan consensus on the value of forward defense in Europe and Asia. This consensus has not yet fallen apart. According to a 2024 survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 64 percent of Americans said that U.S. security alliances were beneficial to both allies and the United States. And in an effort to block Trump from following through on his threats to withdraw from NATO, in December 2023, the U.S. Congress passed a bill that would prevent any U.S. president from leaving the alliance without Senate approval. But the return of an isolationist president at a moment of heightened global insecurity exposes the fragility of U.S. promises to Atlantic and Pacific allies.

Trump will do no favors for treaty allies merely because they are allies.

NATO’s Article V does not order all members to use military force if one member is attacked; it only requires that each one take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” Thus, although Trump may not be able to unilaterally withdraw from NATO, the nature of any U.S. response to Russian aggression against a NATO ally would be at his discretion as commander in chief. Trump could decide not to commit U.S. forces to defend one of the Baltic states against a Russian incursion, for example, or choose to back down in the face of nuclear threats from Russian President Vladimir Putin.

U.S. commitments to alliances in Asia are just as uncertain. Trump and many of his advisers are more hawkish on China than on Russia, but that does not mean Trump would risk direct conflict with China if Chinese forces blockaded Taiwan. He may not use military force to counter a concerted Chinese effort to claim Japanese-administered islands in the East China Sea, either. Article V of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty is as vague as NATO’s Article V, giving the president wide latitude to decide how to intervene in a conflict.

Trump also mused in his last term about withdrawing U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula—an action that would be even more dangerous in 2025 than it would have been a few years ago, now that North Korea has become far more nuclear capable and regards South Korea as a “hostile state.” In a June poll by the Korea Institute for National Unification, 66 percent of South Korean respondents said that it was necessary for their country to possess nuclear weapons to deter Pyongyang, reflecting widespread public concern about the U.S. nuclear guarantee.

HANGING APART

If the United States steps back under Trump, the common front against Chinese and Russian coercion and aggression that the Biden administration worked to strengthen could begin to fray. The relationship between Japan and South Korea is especially tenuous. Even before South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s failed attempt to impose martial law in December, South Korea’s reconciliation with Japan was built on weak domestic political foundations and was dragging down Yoon’s already low popularity. A poll by Gallup Korea in March 2023 indicated that a majority of Korean citizens rejected the deal he struck with Japan to resolve the long-standing dispute over the Japanese government’s labor abuses against Koreans during World War II as a part of the trilateral agreement with the United States. With Yoon now facing impeachment, Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung is likely to win a special presidential election. Lee, who described the deal with Japan as “the most shameful and crushing moment in the history of [South Korea’s] foreign relations,” has also been highly critical of Yoon’s tough line on China, asking publicly, “Why do we care what happens to the Taiwan Strait?”

In Japan, a long-running series of corruption scandals led to Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s resignation in September, and Kishida’s successor, Shigeru Ishiba, lost his parliamentary majority in the snap elections he called in October. Although Ishiba is a China hawk, he is also a nationalist, and he has advocated a more equal U.S.-Japanese security alliance. Ishiba believes that Japan’s commitment to spend two percent of its GDP on defense should be targeted toward strengthening its own national security, rather than toward becoming a more capable but passive U.S. ally.

Trump’s return to the White House comes at an even worse moment for Europe. France and Germany—the two largest and most influential countries in the EU—are in disarray as their political systems struggle to adapt to the growing popularity of nationalist, socially conservative parties. Although centrists still secured over 60 percent of votes in this year’s European Parliament elections, the largest parties in parliament in EU member states as diverse as Austria, France, Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Slovakia are now populist ones. Few of them advocate leaving NATO, but they reject the alliance’s newfound focus on confronting Putin’s expansionism. The cost of supporting Ukraine is at the top of their list of grievances.

Europe’s responsibility for securing Ukraine’s future is inescapable.

Trump’s reelection both legitimizes these parties and could make it harder for their centrist opponents to close Europe’s security gap. Even though European countries collectively spend over four times as much on defense as Russia, their defense budgets, military forces, and industrial capabilities are not sufficiently integrated to be able to respond to further Russian aggression without significant U.S. support—support that could be less than forthcoming under Trump. But nationalist parties are skeptical of the deeper EU integration that could strengthen Europe’s capacity to act autonomously.

Trump’s return could destabilize Europe in other ways, too. If he keeps his pledge to withdraw the United States again from the Paris climate agreement, which Biden rejoined in 2021, that move would give ammunition to climate skeptics in Europe, deepening the divisions between the countries committed to the EU’s goal to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and those that want to water them down. On the economic front, Trump’s tariff threats have galvanized EU members to prepare serious retaliatory measures, such as targeting specific U.S. exports with new levies or applying an across-the-board tariff hike, with exceptions only for critical imports. But activating those measures would lead to conflict between the EU governments most dependent on U.S. trade, which will want to delay and limit the extent of the retaliation, and those that are ready to retaliate immediately to strengthen the EU’s negotiating hand.

It is often said that Europeans, dependent on trade, cannot afford to sanction Russia and impose trade restrictions on China at the same time. They certainly cannot do both while engaging in a tariff war with the United States, too. Some European governments have already begun hedging their bets, breaking ranks with the EU to improve relations with China. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz took a large business delegation with him in April on his second visit to China in 18 months, having refused French President Emmanuel Macron’s offer to take a joint trip in November 2022. During Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s visit to China in September, he criticized the EU’s plans to levy tariffs on Chinese exports of electric vehicles to the EU, fearing Chinese retaliation against Spain’s lucrative pork exports to China.

Perhaps more worrying, if Trump goes ahead with his antiliberal agenda, this could dissolve the values-based consensus that holds the United States’ alliances together. Using the U.S. military to conduct mass deportations of immigrants, demanding that European allies contest the International Criminal Court’s prosecutions of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, or weaponizing U.S. domestic security services to seek retribution against those who investigated Trump for wrongdoing during his last presidency would all cause rifts between the United States and its allies.

HANGING TOGETHER

If they choose, U.S. allies could also respond to Trump’s return by accelerating positive changes that are already underway. For one, the prospect of a U.S. drawback makes it all the more urgent that European countries step up their defense efforts. Government investment is already surging into the continent’s defense industrial capacity, with ammunition production projected to rise from one million artillery shells annually in January 2024 to two million by the end of 2025. In October, the United Kingdom agreed to join France, Germany, and other European countries to build new long-range missiles. And the recent appointment of former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte as NATO secretary-general, alongside that of former Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius as the EU’s first defense and space commissioner, will mean more focus on overcoming the obstacles to building a “European pillar” within NATO’s integrated military command, which would enable European forces to use NATO assets more autonomously.

European countries are also strengthening their relationships independent of the United States. The United Kingdom and its EU neighbors have overcome their post-Brexit reservations and have started negotiating a new bilateral security treaty. In October, London and Berlin completed their first-ever bilateral defense agreement, and London and Paris have initiated discussions to upgrade the defense agreement they signed in 2010. Moreover, British and French policymakers, with German, Polish, and other European counterparts, are exploring how they could compensate for growing uncertainty about the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear guarantee. Creating a joint European nuclear deterrent faces seemingly insurmountable obstacles. But intermediate confidence-building steps are already under debate, including assigning officers from nonnuclear European states to participate in British and French nuclear exercises, and creating a European nuclear pillar in NATO.

France and other European countries are now considering a deployment of combat forces to Ukraine to help uphold a potential cease-fire. With the likelihood of a U.S. veto making Ukraine’s NATO membership an even more distant prospect under Trump, Europe’s responsibility for securing Ukraine’s future is inescapable. European countries’ embrace of that role could even help ensure that Washington stays involved. If they commit to long-term financial assistance to Ukraine, members of the U.S. Congress may be more inclined to reactivate the expired Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act, which would ensure a continued flow of U.S. weapons to Kyiv.

Finally, European countries are developing new avenues for cooperation with their Pacific partners to address the security threat from China—efforts that will acquire new urgency under Trump. The British, Italian, and Japanese governments have committed to develop a next-generation combat aircraft together, and the British government has confirmed a second carrier strike group visit to the Indo-Pacific and Japan in 2025. And should U.S. and Chinese forces ever enter into direct confrontation, European officials and their Pacific partners are considering how they would backfill U.S. capabilities in Europe and in connected theaters such as the Indian Ocean.

AWKWARD ALLIES

If the United States’ allies hang together in the coming years, strengthening their collective capabilities and mechanisms for joint action, they will change the political balance of power within what has been, since it formed, a U.S.-dominated alliance system. If an end to the conflict in Ukraine is upheld principally by European forces, for instance, then European governments will expect an equal if not bigger say in the terms of future deals with Moscow. They will assert their positions on which sanctions to sustain against Russia, the scale of Russian reparations, the role of war crime tribunals, and whether to give the nearly $300 billion of Russian reserves currently held by European financial institutions to Ukraine or back to Russia.

European allies may also try to reduce their reliance on the U.S. economy. If Trump sustains some version of the Biden administration’s “Buy America” approach to rebuilding U.S. manufacturing capacity, EU members will back their own European champions in critical sectors. The EU may also have fewer reservations about imposing additional controls on the operations of big U.S. technology and social media companies. If Trump imposes new tariffs on U.S. allies, too, they will be more tempted to cut their own deals with China.

U.S. allies will follow their own interests separately from Washington if necessary.

Already, European governments appear to be arriving at their own consensus—distinct from Washington’s—on how to lessen their growing dependence on Chinese inputs for their green energy transition. Alongside its tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, the EU plans to introduce a requirement for Chinese battery companies to invest in Europe and transfer relevant intellectual property to their European partners if they want to access EU green subsidies, mirroring Chinese requirements for foreign companies that sell to China.

When British Prime Minister Keir Starmer held a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sideline of the G-20 summit in November—the first meeting between a British prime minister and Xi in six years—Starmer emphasized the need for “consistent, durable” relations between the two countries. In a sign of intent, in mid-January, British Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves will travel to Beijing with a large banking and business delegation to discuss Chinese investments in the United Kingdom and the City of London’s role as the main hub outside Asia for renminbi financing and trade. The Labour government wants to project an approach to Chinese investment that is more open and business-friendly than that of its Conservative predecessors, or, perhaps, than that of the United States under Trump.

U.S. allies have also shown that they will follow their own interests on global issues separately from Washington if necessary. In the absence of U.S. leadership at the COP 29 meeting in Azerbaijan in November, for example, the EU delegation and the British government teamed up with the Azeri, Brazilian, and Chinese governments to take charge of the negotiations. They ensured that climate adaptation—a big priority for lower income countries—secured a bigger slice of developed economies’ direct financial grants than it has in the past. And in December, EU members finally signed a new free trade agreement with Mercosur, the free trade bloc comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, indicating that Europe does not share the Biden and Trump administrations’ reflexive skepticism of multilateral trade agreements.

The G-7 is the one forum that embodies a more equal relationship between the United States and its primary allies, addressing issues of common interest. The G-7’s immediate future is uncertain, however, given past standoffs between Trump and his G-7 counterparts over trade and climate policy. The fact that G-7 members (including the EU) currently run a larger goods trade surplus with the United States than China could put the grouping back in Trump’s crosshairs. But the G-7 carries more practical value now than it did a few years ago. The economic threat from China is more acute than it was during Trump’s first term, and if the new administration wants to sustain coordination with U.S. allies on technology controls and critical supply chains, then it will have to continue using G-7 channels. If Trump disengages, it will be up to the rest of the G-7 to keep the forum alive.

TAKING INITIATIVE

U.S. allies mostly interpreted Trump’s victory in 2016 as an aberration, and they viewed the strengthening of American alliances since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Beijing’s alignment with Moscow as a return to the strategic normal. But Trump’s reelection could have longer-lasting effects. Trump’s second term could fray the alliance network that the Biden administration painstakingly reinforced over the past four years, and the disruption it could cause may spill over into U.S. allies’ domestic political systems.

Whether the network stays in place will depend increasingly on the actions of U.S. allies themselves. On that front, at least, early indications give some cause for optimism. Spurred by Russia’s brutal war and China’s complicity in that aggression, governments in Australia, Japan, South Korea, and across Europe have finally started the long overdue process of taking greater responsibility for their countries’ defense. Yet as they spend and do more, they will also expect to have a greater say on issues that affect their security and prosperity. This means, in effect, renegotiating the formal and informal terms on which American alliances were built 80 years ago.

Such a recalibration could exacerbate tensions with Washington, as well as between European capitals, even if the Trump administration takes a more pragmatic approach to U.S. alliances than many fear. Nevertheless, U.S. partners must now do their part to ensure that the alliance network can survive whatever changes Trump implements. They must use the next four years to show Americans that, as allies become more capable and demanding, they can also be more attractive global partners.

Robin Niblett is Distinguished Fellow at Chatham House and author of The New Cold War: How the Contest Between the US and China Will Shape Our Century.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Robin Niblett · January 8, 2025

24. Trump’s Antiliberal Order

Excerpts:

There are other ways that the abandonment of liberal values—or values often coded as “liberal,” such as an opposition to corruption—could damage the United States’ security, impinge on its economic interests, and diminish its power, putting it at the mercy of competitors. The post–Cold War unipolar moment allowed the United States to build a huge toolbox of policy mechanisms by which it influences countries, companies, and individuals around the world. Like some of the kleptocratic regimes he mistakenly admires, Trump could easily repurpose these instruments to enrich himself and his friends. A politicized Justice Department and Treasury Department could deploy the anticorruption measures found in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Foreign Extortion Prevention Act, and the Magnitsky Sanctions Program to persecute foreign officials who offend Trump or target foreign leaders’ opponents with time-consuming corruption investigations in return for payments or favors. An illiberal American leader could selectively and arbitrarily use such tools to punish governments that refuse to transact with his cronies.

Such behavior would pose obvious dangers to U.S. national security. But it would also destroy important instruments of American power. Consider the United States’ ability to impose targeted sanctions, enforce broader sanctions regimes, investigate corruption in other countries, and target terrorist groups’ finances. It is able to do these things effectively in part because of the ways in which it dominates the global financial system, such as prohibiting sanctioned actors from transacting in U.S. dollars in the United States and across the international financial system. Many foreign governments tolerate their vulnerability because the United States uses these instruments in relatively predictable ways. But if an American president started deploying them for corrupt purposes, other countries would become much less willing to accept how vulnerable they are to U.S. financial pressure. And finding ways to limit the United States’ influence over the global financial system—by increasing nondollar reserve holdings, including digital assets and cryptocurrency, and their use in international transactions—would become much more appealing. Although a single credible alternative to the U.S. dollar, such as a BRICS currency, is still a long way off, sanctioned countries including Iran, North Korea, and Russia are making international de-dollarization a priority.

Trump and his acolytes are poised to commit a string of unforced foreign policy errors driven by ideological opposition to a system—the liberal order—whose nature and value they clearly do not understand. The nature of this order is already shifting because of forces well outside the United States’ control. To cope with urgent challenges such as interstate conflict and large-scale migration, U.S. policymakers will need a keen, nuanced sense of which powers and advantages their country possesses. Sweeping disruption is not the means to promote American power and stability. Yet to assert his vision of primacy, Trump would unilaterally destroy the very infrastructure that has helped the United States advance its core interests through previous eras of turbulent political change.

Internationalists must spotlight the real costs of such an ideologically driven project. If they cannot preserve the bureaucracies tasked with managing America’s global commitments and if pragmatists in Trump’s administration cannot moderate his “America first” foreign policy, the incoming president will voluntarily relinquish powerful tools that almost any interpretation of American interests would counsel him to preserve.

Trump’s Antiliberal Order

Foreign Affairs · by More by Alexander Cooley · January 7, 2025

How America First Undercuts America’s Advantage

Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon

January/February 2025 Published on January 7, 2025

Illustration by Tyler Comrie; Photo source: Reuters

Alexander Cooley is Claire Tow Professor of Political Science and Vice Provost for Research and Academic Centers at Barnard College.

Daniel Nexon is a Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

More by Daniel Nexon

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During his campaign for president, Donald Trump promised to deliver a nationalist “America first” foreign policy. He boasted about how, in his first term, he had threatened to abandon NATO allies and claimed that in his second, if European NATO members failed to increase their defense spending, he would let the Russians “do whatever they want.” His high-profile nominees and appointments have elevated MAGA loyalists who have long inveighed against “globalism” and the “liberal international order”; his administration will be staffed by a large number of contributors to the Heritage Foundation’s policy wish list, Project 2025, which calls for the United States to exit the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Days after Trump tapped the Fox News personality Pete Hegseth for defense secretary, Hegseth condemned the United Nations as “a fully globalist organization that aggressively advances an anti-American, anti-Israel, and anti-freedom agenda.”

It should come as no surprise, then, that Trump’s 2024 victory has generated headlines such as “America Chooses a New Role in the World” and “Trump Will Deliver the Final Blow to the Liberal Order.” Trump’s second term will, without a doubt, reorient both domestic and international politics. He fully intends to push both in illiberal directions. But his presidency will not end the so-called liberal international order, for the simple reason that it has already ended.

The liberal international order is shorthand for the international institutions and treaty arrangements that Washington took the lead in creating during the first decade after World War II, including the United Nations and NATO. These ostensibly, and sometimes actually did, promote human rights, freer trade, democracy, and multilateral cooperation. Washington—along with its most powerful allies—expanded and reworked that order after the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse left the United States the world’s sole superpower; that expansion saw a wave of democratization, the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and a worldwide push for unfettered global trade and financial flows. For more than a decade, however, China and Russia have been engaged in their own international ordering projects. They have done so directly, such as by contesting human rights norms at the UN, and indirectly, by offering economic and security deals that are, at best, indifferent toward defending democratic governance and combating corruption. Meanwhile, the relative economic decline of the G-7 countries has enhanced the bargaining leverage of weaker states. For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, such states now enjoy meaningful alternatives to Western markets, development assistance, and even military protection. And the rise of reactionary populism—not just in North America and Europe but also in India and in parts of Latin America—has shattered the ideological dominance that liberalism enjoyed for two decades after the end of the Cold War. U.S. President Joe Biden retained key aspects of Trump’s nationalist economic approach, including Trump’s tariffs, and pushed forward the first major U.S. industrial policy in decades via the CHIPS Act and the Inflation Reduction Act.

References to the “liberal international order” discount the growing strength of illiberalism in global politics. The broad-brush phrase also wrongly implies that many aspects of contemporary international order—principles and practices such as state sovereignty, the rule of law, and multilateralism—are inherently or necessarily liberal, when in fact they are perfectly compatible with some nonliberal and illiberal forms of politics. Consider the fact that China and Russia—hardly liberal countries—are not seeking to destroy multilateralism. On the contrary: they are racing to expand their influence in long-existing multinational institutions and to create their own counterparts.

This is in part because they understand the power that such institutions provide to the United States. Important elements of what is known as the liberal international order are, in fact, components of the infrastructure of American power: norms, institutions, and relationships that offer Washington a still unmatched ability to influence other states, coordinate responses to emerging threats, and secure cooperation on matters it considers crucial to its national interests. Even a foreign policy solely concerned with preserving American power would invest in sustaining key elements of this system. With Trump’s victory, however, self-proclaimed American nationalists now hope to wreck or upend an unrivaled network of American influence that took more than 50 years to build.

But internationalists who oppose these nationalists should also reconsider the way they talk and think about the stakes. Trump’s contempt for institutionalism is the mirror image of how the Biden administration, and liberal internationalists more broadly, have justified their own foreign policy preferences, including U.S. commitments to NATO and support for Ukraine. Each of those policies, they contend, is necessary to defend immutable principles: not just support for democracies but the preservation of a liberal order worldwide. Yet this argument is increasingly out of touch with the complex realities of contemporary international politics. The Biden administration’s framing of the Ukraine crisis failed to sway countries of the global South, which often associate rhetoric about a liberal or rules-based international order with Western efforts to dictate their economic policies, meddle in their politics, and disrespect their sovereign autonomy. It also exacerbated the backlash against the United States over its unwavering support of Israel’s invasion of Gaza.

It is well past time to retire the understanding of international politics encapsulated by the term “liberal international order.” It has become less lodestar than lodestone, saddling foreign policy debates with a surfeit of ideological, often Manichaean, baggage. It mires internationalists in nostalgia for an idealized past. And worst of all, it is now driving reactionary populists and postliberals to mistakenly support policies that weaken the United States.

MISTAKEN IDENTITY

NATO was indeed founded as a defense pact among liberal democracies, one rooted in the internationalist principles that U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill laid out in the 1941 Atlantic Charter. After the end of the Cold War, the organization rebranded itself as the anchor of a liberal democratic security community rather than a defensive alliance aimed more narrowly at deterring external threats. But the rationale for the United States to sustain its commitment to NATO—as well as to support Ukraine—cannot be reduced to a principled wish to protect liberalism worldwide. NATO also owes its existence to two fundamental tenets of postwar U.S. grand strategy: that the United States cannot afford to see a rival power establish dominance over Europe and that preventing such an outcome requires a standing U.S. military presence on the continent.

These strategic precepts first failed to prevent, and then prolonged, World War II. The United States and the rest of the world paid an unacceptable price in blood and treasure after Washington attempted to wash its hands of European power politics in the wake of World War I. NATO, by contrast, achieved key U.S. strategic goals not merely by deterring the Soviet Union but also, as its first secretary-general, Hastings Ismay, put it, by “keeping Germany down.” NATO did not merely end the threat of German aggression against its neighbors. It greatly reduced the risk that any of its member states would engage in significant and sustained military conflict. The arrangement proved so successful that a war among France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom now seems inconceivable. The American architects of NATO worried about a rival power achieving dominance in Europe; instead, the United States became the dominant player in European security.

Many “America first” foreign policy hands and self-described realists believe that the United States can drastically scale back its commitments to NATO without jeopardizing its long-standing strategic goals in western Eurasia. They point to post–Cold War developments such as the apparent ease of deterring Russia from invading Europe, the lack of military friction between European nations, and the existence of a functional European Union. The problem here is straightforward: the U.S. commitment to NATO made all of these developments possible in the first place. Advocates of a U.S. drawdown claim that current trends would persist in the absence of a strong American presence. Perhaps they are right. But if they are wrong, the costs will far outweigh any possible gains the United States could win by freeing up some forces for use in the Asia-Pacific.

The United States does not uphold its obligations to NATO out of some kind of misguided altruism. The alliance is a crucial instrument of U.S. power: NATO ensures that competition between the United States and Europe remains restricted to the economic sphere. And within that sphere, the alliance helps keep the European market—one of the world’s largest, accounting for 15 percent of global trade—especially friendly toward the United States and aligned with American economic interests. If the world is entering a new, more chaotic era of great-power competition, the existence of NATO dramatically reduces the number of serious geopolitical competitors that the United States faces. Policymakers who believe that the United States can simply “pivot to Asia” must understand that Washington will need the support of all its existing allies if it intends to compete with China. Already, NATO’s activities in support of Ukraine have boosted allied countries’ willingness to act in concert with Washington against Beijing.

DUAL USE

In their antipathy to all things “liberal,” many Trump advisers are playing into the hands of America’s rivals. The irony is that the United States’ authoritarian adversaries have no difficulty distinguishing between multilateralism and liberalism. Indeed, they are building out their own infrastructure of international institutions and multilateral forums. China has already made significant progress on this front, having founded or taken the lead in a large number of new institutions, including the BRICS, in which Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa were the first members; the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, with other Asian states, including Russia; the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation; the China-CELAC forum, a set of summits in which it meets with Latin American and Caribbean governments; and the newly established China–Central Asia mechanism. Beijing is leveraging these to promote its goals—many of them profoundly illiberal—and to explicitly counter the United States. The Astana Declaration, for example, which the Shanghai Cooperation Organization adopted in July 2024, opposed protectionist measures and “unilateral missile defense systems,” thinly veiled references to the United States.

Neither China nor Russia is focusing exclusively on building its own institutional capacity. Both also seek to undermine the United States’ existing influence in the international order. Rather than attacking incumbent institutions such as the UN, China and Russia have focused on expanding their sway over the organizations’ staffing and policy priorities. And capitalizing on the tendency of American leaders to look at world politics through the lens of ideological shibboleths, Beijing and Moscow are playing U.S. conservatives for suckers. Consider Russia: to some degree, the American right’s turn away from backing Ukraine reflects Trump’s own idiosyncratic obsessions. If Trump were less enamored of Russian President Vladimir Putin—or if his worldview were less informed by the burden-sharing debates of the late 1980s, when trade tensions between the United States and Germany and Japan were at their peak—more American conservatives would likely back aid to Kyiv. The Kremlin has also conducted a long-term effort to cultivate the U.S. right by using the same techniques that Russian intelligence used to build ties with European far-right parties, including junkets, financial support, and propaganda.

Moscow knows that its often superficial commitment to cultural conservatism gives it soft power with the American right. It uses that appeal to sell an anti-NATO, ostensibly antiglobalist vision of international order to American conservatives—a vision that just so happens to serve Russia’s interests. Moscow does not want to weaken NATO because the alliance is “liberal” or “globalist.” It wants to weaken NATO because doing so will enhance Russian power at the expense of the United States. And like China, it seeks to increase its influence in the kind of institutions that Trump’s camp dismisses. In July, when Russia hosted the 2024 BRICS summit, it was eager to present the organization as a counterweight to Western-led multinational financial institutions and touted the attendance of the UN secretary-general, António Guterres.

China and Russia are furiously seeking new forms of multilateral engagement because they believe that doing so will only become more important. Unlike during the Cold War, when many countries chose or were coerced to align with one of two patrons, today’s states want to hedge risk and maximize their leverage by establishing a diverse portfolio of security commitments, political support, and aid from rival powers. Even governments closely aligned with the United States are becoming more independent and entrepreneurial in their geopolitical allegiances. Any anxiety that India, for instance, might have initially felt about its neutrality on Ukraine quickly gave way to a confident defense of its right to strategic autonomy and to maintain dialogue with Moscow. Turkey remains part of NATO. But it has refused to join the anti-Russian sanctions regime, has applied to join the BRICS, and continues to promote its own interests in the Middle East. The United Arab Emirates’ position as a major U.S. security partner has not prevented it from establishing itself as a hub for Russians who want to evade U.S. sanctions.

POWER STRIP

In the short term, if Trump withdraws from alliances and multilateral institutions, his purely transactional foreign policy may succeed in extracting greater concessions from countries that depend on U.S. security guarantees or cannot afford to lose access to American markets. But great-power competition will give many of those countries exit options. They can shift toward other export markets, find alternative sources of development assistance, or seek military protection from a rival great power.

And if the United States abandons, explicitly or implicitly, even a minimal commitment to some of the foreign policy principles it has long espoused—such as human rights, democracy, and good governance—little will set it apart from its great-power competitors. To be sure, the country has never lived up to the loftiest articulation of its values in either its domestic politics or its international behavior. When it comes to naked power politics, the United States can give any great power a run for its money. But despite that history, the United States has also won allegiance from other countries because it has stood for ideals with widespread international appeal. It is vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy because its support for those principles is inconsistent, not nonexistent. If Trump’s most transactional impulses become U.S. policy, however, the United States will lose a tarnished but nontrivial asset in its power-politics toolkit. When other governments ask themselves why they should partner with the United States instead of, say, China, the only answer will be “better compensation.” That means the United States will have to spend more to get less.

There are other ways that the abandonment of liberal values—or values often coded as “liberal,” such as an opposition to corruption—could damage the United States’ security, impinge on its economic interests, and diminish its power, putting it at the mercy of competitors. The post–Cold War unipolar moment allowed the United States to build a huge toolbox of policy mechanisms by which it influences countries, companies, and individuals around the world. Like some of the kleptocratic regimes he mistakenly admires, Trump could easily repurpose these instruments to enrich himself and his friends. A politicized Justice Department and Treasury Department could deploy the anticorruption measures found in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Foreign Extortion Prevention Act, and the Magnitsky Sanctions Program to persecute foreign officials who offend Trump or target foreign leaders’ opponents with time-consuming corruption investigations in return for payments or favors. An illiberal American leader could selectively and arbitrarily use such tools to punish governments that refuse to transact with his cronies.

Trump at the G-20 leaders summit in Osaka, Japan, June 2019 Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Such behavior would pose obvious dangers to U.S. national security. But it would also destroy important instruments of American power. Consider the United States’ ability to impose targeted sanctions, enforce broader sanctions regimes, investigate corruption in other countries, and target terrorist groups’ finances. It is able to do these things effectively in part because of the ways in which it dominates the global financial system, such as prohibiting sanctioned actors from transacting in U.S. dollars in the United States and across the international financial system. Many foreign governments tolerate their vulnerability because the United States uses these instruments in relatively predictable ways. But if an American president started deploying them for corrupt purposes, other countries would become much less willing to accept how vulnerable they are to U.S. financial pressure. And finding ways to limit the United States’ influence over the global financial system—by increasing nondollar reserve holdings, including digital assets and cryptocurrency, and their use in international transactions—would become much more appealing. Although a single credible alternative to the U.S. dollar, such as a BRICS currency, is still a long way off, sanctioned countries including Iran, North Korea, and Russia are making international de-dollarization a priority.

Trump and his acolytes are poised to commit a string of unforced foreign policy errors driven by ideological opposition to a system—the liberal order—whose nature and value they clearly do not understand. The nature of this order is already shifting because of forces well outside the United States’ control. To cope with urgent challenges such as interstate conflict and large-scale migration, U.S. policymakers will need a keen, nuanced sense of which powers and advantages their country possesses. Sweeping disruption is not the means to promote American power and stability. Yet to assert his vision of primacy, Trump would unilaterally destroy the very infrastructure that has helped the United States advance its core interests through previous eras of turbulent political change.

Internationalists must spotlight the real costs of such an ideologically driven project. If they cannot preserve the bureaucracies tasked with managing America’s global commitments and if pragmatists in Trump’s administration cannot moderate his “America first” foreign policy, the incoming president will voluntarily relinquish powerful tools that almost any interpretation of American interests would counsel him to preserve.

Alexander Cooley is Claire Tow Professor of Political Science and Vice Provost for Research and Academic Centers at Barnard College.

Daniel Nexon is a Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.Foreign Affairs · by More by Alexander Cooley · January 7, 2025

25. Know Your Rival, Know Yourself - Rightsizing the China Challenge

Excerpts:

It is vital to remember that Beijing’s greatest wins have tended to occur not in spite of American efforts, but in their absence. Take 5G telecommunications: China developed and deployed next-generation wireless networks at breakneck speed, cornering markets in Africa, Asia, and parts of Europe. This did not happen because the United States lacked the capacity to compete, but because it was slow to invest in domestic alternatives and unwilling to mobilize resources to scale a national strategy at China’s pace.

China’s especially rapid advancements in quantum communications and satellite networks underscore the extent to which it has prioritized leadership in technologies that the United States has been slower to embrace or fund at scale. This success has been driven by government subsidies, aggressive industrial policies, and a singular focus on securing critical raw materials, often at a high geopolitical and environmental price. These gains come with other costs, too. The Chinese government’s laser focus on specific strategic domains has diverted its attention and resources from projects that would drive longer-term economic growth, such as reforming the social safety net and boosting domestic consumption.

As China struggles, the United States should press its advantages. To do so, U.S. policymakers must make significant investments in areas in which the United States appears strong, boosting funding for research and development and cutting-edge industries, attracting global talent through targeted immigration reform, fortifying alliances in Asia and Europe, and rebuilding the U.S. defense industrial base. If American leaders continue to wring their hands over China’s ascendancy instead of taking these crucial steps, Washington’s strategic advantage could quickly erode.

It is undeniable that the United States faces serious challenges. But it is equally undeniable that it retains extraordinary strengths—and that its democratic institutions, albeit stressed, possess a unique capacity for renewal. Competition between the United States and Beijing will be a defining feature of the coming decades. But although China’s centralized governance may deliver rapid advancements in key areas, its gains are fragile. The real peril for the United States may lie not in the unmatchable rise of a new rival but in its own unwillingness to acknowledge and build on its own unmatched potential.

Know Your Rival, Know Yourself

Foreign Affairs · by More by Jude Blanchette · January 7, 2025

Rightsizing the China Challenge

Jude Blanchette and Ryan Hass

January/February 2025 Published on January 7, 2025

Beppe Conti

Jude Blanchette is Director of the China Research Center and Distinguished Tang Chair in China Research at the RAND Corporation. He is the author of China’s New Red Guards: The Return of Radicalism and the Rebirth of Mao Zedong.

Ryan Hass is a Senior Fellow, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center, and Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies in the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution. From 2013 to 2017, he served as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the U.S. National Security Council.

More by Ryan Hass

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Ever since the United States ascended to global leadership at the end of World War II, American leaders have regularly been stricken by bouts of anxiety that the country is in decline and losing ground to a rival. The Soviet Union’s 1957 launch of the Sputnik satellite prompted such fears, as did Soviet expansionism in the 1960s. In the 1980s, Washington was seized by the worry that American industry was incapable of competing with Japan’s economic juggernaut. Even in 1992, just after the Soviet Union collapsed, an article in the Harvard Business Review asked, “Is America in Decline?”

Today, this perception of decline is wedded to fears about new vulnerabilities in the U.S. democratic system and the burgeoning strength of China. Both of these concerns have merit. Although U.S. voters disagree on the sources of the threats to American democracy, they broadly express an anxiety that their country’s democratic institutions can no longer deliver on the American dream’s promises. An October Gallup poll found that three-quarters of Americans were dissatisfied with their country’s trajectory.

Meanwhile, the story goes, China is powering ahead, pairing ambitious economic and diplomatic agendas with a massive military expansion while the United States staggers under the weight of inequality, stagnating wages, legislative gridlock, political polarization, and populism. Over the past three decades, China has indeed established itself as the factory of the world, dominating global manufacturing and taking the lead in some advanced technology sectors. In 2023, China produced close to 60 percent of the world’s electric vehicles, 80 percent of its batteries, and over 95 percent of the wafers used in solar energy technology. That same year, it added 300 gigawatts of wind and solar power to its energy grid—seven times more than the United States. The country also exerts control over much of the mining and refining of critical minerals essential to the global economy and boasts some of the world’s most advanced infrastructure, including the largest high-speed rail network and cutting-edge 5G systems.

As the U.S. defense industry struggles to meet demand, China is producing weapons at an unprecedented pace. In the past three years, it has built over 400 modern fighter jets, developed a new stealth bomber, demonstrated hypersonic missile capabilities, and doubled its missile stockpile. The military analyst Seth Jones has estimated that China is now amassing weapons five to six times faster than the United States.

To some observers, such advances suggest the Chinese system of government is better suited than the American one to the twenty-first century’s demands. Chinese leaders often proclaim that “the East is rising and the West is declining”; some U.S. leaders now also seem to accept this forecast as inevitable. Arriving at such a broad conclusion, however, would be a grave mistake. China’s progress and power are substantial. But it has liabilities on its balance sheet, too, and without looking at these alongside its assets, it is impossible to evaluate the United States’ real position. Even the most formidable geopolitical rivals have hidden vulnerabilities, making it crucial for leaders to more keenly perceive not only the strengths but also the weaknesses of their adversaries.

And although China will continue to be a powerful and influential global player, it is confronting a growing set of complex challenges that will significantly complicate its development. Following a decade of slowing growth, China’s economy now contends with mounting pressures from a turbulent real estate market, surging debt, constrained local government finances, waning productivity, and a rapidly aging population, all of which will require Beijing to grapple with difficult tradeoffs. Abroad, China faces regional military tensions and increasing scrutiny and pushback by advanced economies. Indeed, some of the foundational conditions that drove China’s remarkable growth over the past two decades are unraveling. But just as these new difficulties are emerging, demanding nimble policymaking, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power has stifled political debate and sidelined technocrats, yielding a policymaking process that is brittle, reactive, and prone to missteps. Chinese young people now lament the narrowing space they have to achieve their goals, a trend that won’t change unless their country’s leadership does. But that event appears distant.

The United States still has a vital edge over China.

Even with its many shortcomings and vulnerabilities, the United States continues to command a strategic depth that China fundamentally lacks: a unique combination of economic vitality, global military superiority, remarkable human capital, and a political system designed to promote the correction of errors. The resilient and adaptable U.S. economy has the world’s deepest and most liquid capital markets and unparalleled influence over the global financial system. The United States continues to attract top global talent, including many Chinese nationals now fleeing their country’s autocratic political environment.

Put plainly, the United States still has a vital edge over China in terms of economic dynamism, global influence, and technological innovation. To highlight this fact is neither triumphalism nor complacency. It is the root of good strategy, because Washington can easily squander its asymmetric advantages if excessive pessimism or panic depletes its will, muddies its focus, or leads it to overindulge nativist and protectionist impulses and close America’s doors to the rest of the world. For despite its problems, China is still making headway in specific domains that challenge U.S. national security and prosperity, such as quantum computing, renewable energy, and electric vehicle production. A political-economic system such as China’s can remain a fierce rival in key areas even as it groans under the weight of its pathologies.

China most often gains primacy in areas in which the United States is dramatically underinvested. China’s greatest assets in its competition with the United States are not its underlying fundamentals but its hyperfocus and willingness to expend enormous resources, and tolerate enormous waste, in the pursuit of key objectives. That means that Washington cannot afford to retreat from sectors vital for competing in the twenty-first century’s economy, as it did in the case of 5G technology in the previous decade.

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s campaign rhetoric relied particularly heavily on the specter of American decline. The United States does face its own daunting array of problems abroad and at home, but these pale in comparison to those China faces. And Washington’s tendency to stress its rivals’ power and underestimate its own strengths has often backfired, becoming a trap that leads to serious policy errors. Even Trump’s most pessimistic advisers should understand this history—and recognize that U.S. leaders risk making costly missteps by adopting a reactive posture toward China instead of capitalizing on the United States’ comparative advantages to push forward its interests at a moment when Beijing is struggling.

CONFIDENCE GAME

Throughout the last century, the United States has consistently overestimated the strength of its rivals and underestimated its own. This habit became particularly evident during the Cold War, when U.S. officials and analysts were consumed by fears that the Soviet Union had grown superior in military might, technological advancement, and global political influence. In the late 1950s, for instance, U.S. officials came to believe that the Soviets had a much larger and more sophisticated stockpile of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Intelligence gathered by U-2 spy planes and other sources, however, later revealed that the so-called missile gap had been mostly imaginary. As the Cold War drew to a close, it became clear that the Soviet economy was crumbling under the weight of military expenditures, and much of the feared Soviet superiority was exaggerated or based on misinterpretations.

The tendency to underappreciate the United States’ strength is driven by a difference in how democracies and autocracies perceive and present their weaknesses. Democratic systems are more transparent and foster more debate about their own flaws. This can lead to a heightened focus on domestic shortcomings, making weaknesses appear more significant than they are. A democracy’s vulnerabilities can seem even more alarming when compared with the apparent strength of authoritarian regimes, which, conversely, punish criticism and disseminate propaganda in order to present a brighter picture than the reality. The Soviet Union strove to maintain a veneer of invincibility by censoring its press and mounting military parades. Its efforts to mask its economic stagnation, political infighting, and failure to innovate often fooled U.S. policymakers; the United States’ tendency toward self-criticism, meanwhile, obscured its own advantages.

Sometimes, this dynamic redounds to the United States’ benefit. The prospect of a rival’s ascendancy can mobilize American resources and political will: for instance, although the claim that the United States lagged the Soviet Union in its production of ballistic missiles was largely erroneous, the warning served as a powerful motivator for the U.S. government to boost its defense spending and accelerate its technological research. To some extent, the misperception that the United States was losing its comparative advantage helped it maintain that advantage. Similarly, the Soviet Union’s early space-race victories—and the fear that the United States would fall behind in a crucial, symbolic contest—prompted the U.S. government to create NASA, renew its investments in science education in American schools, and increase funding for scientific research. In this case, the worry that the Soviet Union was outstripping the United States was valuable, catalyzing beneficial investments that undergirded a subsequent half century of American technological superiority.

Underestimating geopolitical threats also comes with costs, as it did in the case of Nazi Germany’s rise in the 1930s, al Qaeda’s growth in the 1990s, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The chaos that these underestimates unleashed can make it seem as if it is generally safer to overestimate the threat posed by a potential adversary. But in many cases, developing an outsize fear of a rival has led the United States to misallocate government resources, lose sight of the need to nurture its own sources of strength, become distracted by peripheral threats, or even become mired in unnecessary wars. The United States’ immense financial and human investments in the Vietnam War, for example, were inspired in part by the so-called domino theory, which held that if the United States allowed Soviet-backed communism to take hold in Southeast Asia, communism would inexorably come to dominate the globe. That belief led the United States to fixate on winning a costly, protracted war that ultimately drained its resources, hurt its reputation worldwide, and eroded Americans’ trust in their own government. Decades later, a similar mobilization against an exaggerated threat—Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq—led to a disastrous and drawn-out conflict, domestic turmoil, and the further decline of the United States’ international credibility.

The United States’ tendency to point to a rival’s strength to spur domestic action has thus been a double-edged sword. On the one hand, perceived threats can mobilize resources, drive innovation, and foster unity in the face of potential challenges, as seen with the space race and military advancements during the Cold War. A useful overestimate is one that galvanizes constructive action without leading to paranoia or unsustainable commitments. Overestimates become damaging when they dramatically skew government priorities and distract leaders’ finite attention from other pressing issues. Recognizing the difference requires both a nuanced understanding of a rival’s capabilities and the development of a well-calibrated and sustainable response to them.

ALL THAT GLITTERS

Today, many in the United States fear that China will eclipse its power. On the surface, evidence for this prediction is abundant. In a variety of key capabilities, from hypersonic missiles to shipbuilding, China is increasingly powerful, if not dominant, which appears to demonstrate that China’s state-driven political-economic model remains more than capable of “concentrating power to do big things,” as Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping put it.

Yet the foundations of China’s strength are strained by mounting challenges. The country’s growth rate has steadily declined from its 2007 peak; the past five years, in particular, have ushered in stark structural problems and economic volatility. The real estate market, a core driver of China’s growth and urban development, is experiencing a historic correction with far-reaching implications. In August 2024, the International Monetary Fund estimated that roughly 50 percent of Chinese property developers are on the brink of insolvency. Their woes are driven in part by a persistent decline in housing prices, which as of October 2024, were falling at their fastest pace since 2015. Because more than 70 percent of Chinese household wealth is tied up in the property market, steep drops in the value of housing hurt not only developers but nearly all Chinese citizens.

The real estate crisis is affecting the finances of China’s local governments, too. These municipalities were long reliant on land sales to fund investment in public services and infrastructure. As property values and land sales falter, these municipalities are becoming strapped for revenue, preventing them from servicing their debt and providing essential services. In an April 2024 analysis, Bloomberg estimated that China’s local governments had, that month, generated their lowest revenue from land sales in eight years. To compensate, they have resorted to collecting arbitrary fines from local companies, clawing back bonuses paid to local officials, and even seeking loans from private firms to cover payroll.

Touring Dunhuang Photovoltaic Industrial Park in Gansu province, China, October 2024 Tingshu Wang / Reuters

Even Chinese citizens’ faith in Beijing’s economic stewardship is eroding. According to The Wall Street Journal, as much as $254 billion may have quietly flowed out of the country between June 2023 and June 2024—a clear signal of domestic disillusionment. Young people are turning to a posture they call “lying flat,” a quiet rebellion against societal expectations that demand relentless effort in exchange for increasingly elusive rewards. With youth unemployment surging to record levels, young Chinese people face a bleak reality: advanced degrees and grueling work no longer guarantee stable employment or upward mobility.

The external environment that formerly supported China’s meteoric rise is also characterized by wariness. Foreign companies that once rushed to tap the potential of China’s vast market are now approaching it with caution, and some are even seeking the exits. Foreign direct investment into China plunged 80 percent between 2021 and 2023, reaching its lowest level in 30 years. Beijing’s 2021 crackdown on the tech sector wiped out billions of dollars in value, and the country’s unpredictable regulatory and political environment has forced multinational corporations to rethink their China strategies. In September, a survey by the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai revealed a grim outlook: fewer than half of foreign firms expressed optimism about China’s five-year business prospects—the lowest levels of confidence in the survey’s 25-year history.

In the years following its accession into the World Trade Organization, China was warmly welcomed into global markets, with countries eager to benefit from its manufacturing prowess and seemingly limitless appetite for foreign investment. China remains deeply reliant on access to the world’s markets, but many foreign governments are growing ever more concerned about the strategic implications of China’s economic reach and military might. Many developing countries that initially embraced its Belt and Road Initiative as a pathway to infrastructure development, for example, are scrutinizing the project’s impact, worried about its negative effects on the environment and on local labor practices. Advanced economies such as Australia and Canada have erected new investment screening mechanisms to better protect their economies from national security risks stemming from Chinese investment. In March 2019, in a “strategic outlook” report, the European Commission formally labeled China a “systemic rival,” marking a shift from the traditional view that the country offered a market opportunity with few downsides. The EU subsequently moved to impose stricter regulations on Chinese investments in Europe’s critical infrastructure, technology, and digital sectors and tariffs of up to 45 percent on Chinese-made electric vehicles.

Washington’s tendency to focus on its rivals’ strength has often backfired.

Xi, meanwhile, has ushered in a governance style characterized by reactive, opaque decision-making, which often exacerbates China’s domestic and international tensions. By consolidating his authority within a small circle of loyalists, Xi has weakened the internal checks and balances that might otherwise temper policy decisions. Beijing’s handling of the initial COVID-19 outbreak is a striking example: the suppression of critical information, along with the silencing of whistleblowers, caused delays in the global response to the virus, contributing to its rapid spread beyond China’s borders. What might have been a well-coordinated local response metastasized into a global health crisis, exposing China to international condemnation and illustrating the pitfalls of a system that punishes dissent and cuts off sources of feedback.

Xi’s attempts to reduce economic inequality and curb the excesses of China’s booming private sector have followed a similarly opaque and erratic course. Policy missteps by the central government—such as its reluctance to bail out local governments and rein in shadow banking and capital markets—have intensified the fiscal pressure on the Chinese economy, triggering liquidity crises for giant real estate developers. Sudden and aggressive regulatory crackdowns in sectors such as technology and private education have sent shock waves through China’s business community and unsettled international investors. With his push to institutionalize what he calls a “holistic national security concept”—in which Beijing’s economic and political decision-making is guided by concerns about regime security—Xi has begun to erode the very sources of dynamism that propelled China’s rapid ascent. Since Deng began to open China’s economy in the late 1970s, Chinese leaders have striven to offer the country pragmatic, pro-market policies and to afford local politicians the flexibility to address their areas’ specific challenges. But hamstrung, now, by rigid and top-down directives that prioritize ideological conformity over practical solutions, local politicians are ill equipped to tackle the mounting pressures of fiscal insolvency and unemployment.

Entrepreneurs, once key engines of China’s economic miracle, now operate in a climate of fear and uncertainty, unsure of what Beijing’s next policy shift might be. The lack of transparency or legal recourse in government decision-making reveals the deeper flaws of centralized governance: policies are developed and carried out with little consultation or explanation, leaving citizens and businesses to navigate the fallout. Xi’s consolidation of power may offer short-term control and a capacity to achieve certain strategic and technological outcomes through brute force. But it risks rendering China’s policymaking apparatus increasingly tone-deaf, out of touch with both domestic realities and global expectations.

GOOD BONES

The extreme attitudes of either fatalism or triumphalism can easily obscure a more nuanced perspective that recognizes China’s expanding global influence while appreciating the United States’ unique and enduring strategic advantages: its resilient economy, innovative capacity, robust alliances, and open society. In dollar-adjusted terms, the U.S. economy remains not only larger than China’s but also larger than the next three biggest economies combined, and it is on track to grow faster than any other G-7 economy in 2024 and 2025, according to International Monetary Fund estimates. During President Joe Biden’s tenure, the United States more than doubled its GDP lead over China, and its share of global GDP remains near the level it was in the 1990s. Analysts such as the Rhodium Group’s Logan Wright have predicted that China’s share of global GDP peaked in 2021 and will likely remain below that of the United States for the foreseeable future. Even observers who think the outlook for China’s economy is less dire agree that its growth is slowing and will be constrained by structural challenges and a clumsy policymaking process.

American companies dominate global markets: as of March 2024, nine of the world’s ten largest firms by market capitalization were American; China’s largest firm, Tencent, ranked twenty-sixth. And the United States continues to attract the most foreign capital of any economy, in stark contrast to China’s increasing capital outflows. The United States also has more high-skilled immigrants than any other country; China, meanwhile, struggles to attract any significant amount of foreign-born talent.

As the artificial intelligence revolution accelerates, the United States is particularly well positioned to become the global epicenter of AI innovation and diffusion. According to Stanford University’s Global AI Power Rankings, the United States leads the world in artificial intelligence, possessing a substantial lead over China in areas such as AI research, private-sector funding, and the development of cutting-edge AI technologies. Over the past decade, the United States’ tech sector has consistently outpaced China’s in AI, creating more than three times as many AI-focused companies. In 2023, U.S. companies developed 61 significant AI models compared with China’s 15, reflecting the strength of the United States’ AI ecosystem. That same year, U.S. investors poured nearly nine times more capital into AI than China did, funding the launch of 897 AI startups, far surpassing China’s 122. This success stems in no small part from a decentralized, market-driven approach that China, as it is currently governed, cannot emulate. The United States’ relatively flexible regulatory framework, the free collaboration it permits between private companies and academia, and its ability to attract talent give it an edge.

As the world’s largest oil importer, China relies on imports for over 70 percent of its oil needs, leaving it vulnerable to global disruptions. Geopolitical tensions, supply-chain bottlenecks, or regional conflicts could severely jeopardize China’s energy security. The United States, by contrast, has nearly achieved energy independence and has emerged as a leading global producer of oil and natural gas. Its energy dominance is driven in part by strong innovation in areas such as advanced fracking and horizontal drilling, and the United States uses its preeminence to shape global energy markets and strengthen its geopolitical leverage. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine disrupted Europe’s energy supply, for example, the United States quickly increased its exports of liquefied natural gas, reducing Europe’s dependence on Russian energy.

The dollar’s status as the world’s primary reserve and settlement currency gives the United States unparalleled financial leverage, although it also has downsides. In 2023, nearly 60 percent of global foreign exchange reserves were held in dollars, far outpacing the euro (around 20 percent) and the yuan (less than three percent). That gives the United States advantages such as lower borrowing costs, greater flexibility in managing its debt, and the ability to impose sanctions. At the same time, the dollar’s global status imposes costs on the U.S. economy, such as a persistent trade deficit and pressure on manufacturing when it makes American exports less competitive. But these are problems Beijing wishes it had: it is actively promoting alternatives to the dollar and has unveiled a digital currency to try to blunt the United States’ ability to weaponize its financial system.

China’s investments in aircraft carriers, stealth-capable submarines, and AI-driven systems are reshaping the Indo-Pacific’s military balance and creating an undeniably challenging operating environment for the U.S. force posture there. Beijing’s defense industrial base now produces fifth-generation fighter jets, hypersonic weapons, and sophisticated missile systems at scale. Its development of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities reflects a strategic focus on limiting the U.S. military’s freedom of action in the western Pacific. Despite these advancements, however, China’s military also faces serious obstacles. It is grappling with corruption, which could undermine its operational efficiency and readiness. Its lack of combat experience means that it is uncertain whether it could execute complex operations under the pressures of modern warfare. And any conflict within or near China’s territorial waters would likely have a disproportionate impact on the Chinese economy, which relies heavily on maritime trade and trade with its immediate region. The U.S. military’s ability to project power on a global scale, by contrast, remains unmatched, supported by extensive combat experience, a vast alliance network, and forward-deployed forces stationed across the world.

Perhaps most significantly, however, China cannot yet match the United States’ greatest force multiplier: its global alliance system. The United States’ partnerships with NATO and close treaty allies in the Pacific such as Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea allow it to form a united front in the face of natural disasters, technological competition, and adversarial ambitions. These alliances are more than symbolic. They enable real-time coordination that allows the United States to pre-position forces far from its shores, thus amplifying its military effectiveness and readiness. A superpower is a country capable of projecting force and exercising influence in every corner of the world. The United States meets this definition. China does not, at least not yet.

The decentralized nature of the United States’ democratic system, in which significant governance responsibilities remain vested with state and local authorities, remains an American advantage, too. Unlike in China, the United States’ regular electoral cycles and peaceful transfers of power enable citizens to insist on change when they become dissatisfied with the country’s trajectory. And although the United States must urgently address the many threats to its democratic norms from extreme polarization and institutional erosion, it still boasts serious checks on presidential power from a free media, an independent legislature, and a transparent legal system.

FALSE CEILING

It is vital to remember that Beijing’s greatest wins have tended to occur not in spite of American efforts, but in their absence. Take 5G telecommunications: China developed and deployed next-generation wireless networks at breakneck speed, cornering markets in Africa, Asia, and parts of Europe. This did not happen because the United States lacked the capacity to compete, but because it was slow to invest in domestic alternatives and unwilling to mobilize resources to scale a national strategy at China’s pace.

China’s especially rapid advancements in quantum communications and satellite networks underscore the extent to which it has prioritized leadership in technologies that the United States has been slower to embrace or fund at scale. This success has been driven by government subsidies, aggressive industrial policies, and a singular focus on securing critical raw materials, often at a high geopolitical and environmental price. These gains come with other costs, too. The Chinese government’s laser focus on specific strategic domains has diverted its attention and resources from projects that would drive longer-term economic growth, such as reforming the social safety net and boosting domestic consumption.

As China struggles, the United States should press its advantages. To do so, U.S. policymakers must make significant investments in areas in which the United States appears strong, boosting funding for research and development and cutting-edge industries, attracting global talent through targeted immigration reform, fortifying alliances in Asia and Europe, and rebuilding the U.S. defense industrial base. If American leaders continue to wring their hands over China’s ascendancy instead of taking these crucial steps, Washington’s strategic advantage could quickly erode.

It is undeniable that the United States faces serious challenges. But it is equally undeniable that it retains extraordinary strengths—and that its democratic institutions, albeit stressed, possess a unique capacity for renewal. Competition between the United States and Beijing will be a defining feature of the coming decades. But although China’s centralized governance may deliver rapid advancements in key areas, its gains are fragile. The real peril for the United States may lie not in the unmatchable rise of a new rival but in its own unwillingness to acknowledge and build on its own unmatched potential.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Jude Blanchette · January 7, 2025

26. The Flawed U.S. Exit from Afghanistan in 2021: Lessons Not Learned

Excerpts:

The flawed U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 serves as a stark reminder of the perils of strategic missteps, misaligned objectives, and inadequate preparation. These failures mirror the lessons that should have been learned from the disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975. Both conflicts exposed the dangers of mission creep, overreliance on fragile local forces, and insufficient planning for disengagement's humanitarian and operational complexities.

In Afghanistan, the failure to adapt to the realities of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and the speed of the Taliban's resurgence revealed a profound disconnect between strategic objectives and on-the-ground realities. This mirrors Vietnam, where the collapse of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) similarly highlighted the limitations of U.S. support for corrupt and unsustainable local regimes. Both cases reflect strategic ineptitude in crafting realistic, achievable objectives and a failure to develop resilient local partners.

The humanitarian crises that followed both withdrawals—abandoned allies in Vietnam and the chaos at Kabul airport in Afghanistan—underscore a recurring failure to protect those who supported U.S. efforts. The tragic scenes of desperation and loss of life tarnished America's global reputation and demonstrated a lack of proactive evacuation planning despite prior warnings in both conflicts.

Intelligence failures also played a critical role. In Vietnam, policymakers underestimated the ARVN's vulnerabilities, just as intelligence assessments in Afghanistan failed to predict the rapid collapse of the ANDSF. These repeated failures highlight systemic issues in intelligence coordination and the inability to anticipate adversaries' strategies.

Accountability remains elusive in both cases. Although Vietnam's lessons were thoroughly documented and widely studied, they were ignored in Afghanistan. This repeated disregard raises serious questions about whether the U.S. can learn from its mistakes or whether institutional inertia ensures these errors will persist in future engagements.

The chaotic withdrawals from both Afghanistan and Vietnam expose a troubling pattern of strategic ineptitude. As the U.S. considers future interventions, the lessons of these twin failures must be internalized. For the sake of military personnel, American taxpayers, and the citizens of nations where the U.S. intervenes, it is imperative to break this cycle of flawed decision-making—failing to do so risks repeating the same catastrophic outcomes, with dire consequences for U.S. credibility, global stability, and the moral responsibility owed to those who serve and depend on America’s leadership.

I worry that Kim Jong Un has learned lessons from our strategic failure.

What Kim Jong-un May Learn from Biden’s Chaotic Afghanistan Exit

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2021/09/what-kim-jong-un-may-learn-from-bidens-chaotic-afghanistan-exit/

The Flawed U.S. Exit from Afghanistan in 2021: Lessons Not Learned

Examining the Parallels Between the US Withdrawals from Afghanistan & Vietnam

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/the-flawed-u-s-exit-from-afghanistan-in-2021-lessons-not-learned

Strategy Central

By & For Practitioners

By Monte Erfourth – January 8, 2025

Introduction

The United States' withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 was marked by chaos, tragedy, and widespread criticism, both domestically and internationally. The 20-year war ended with harrowing scenes at Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport: desperate Afghans clinging to departing planes, the deadly bombing that killed 13 U.S. service members, and the abrupt Taliban takeover of the capital. Analyzing the factors leading to the disastrous withdrawal reveals a confluence of strategic missteps, intelligence failures, and political decisions. These decisions tragically often mirrored the strategic failure of Vietnam.

A Compressed Timeline

The 2021 withdrawal’s chaos stems from decisions made years earlier. In February 2020, the Trump administration signed the Doha Agreement with the Taliban, committing to a full U.S. troop withdrawal by May 2021 in exchange for Taliban promises to sever ties with al-Qaeda and negotiate with the Afghan government. Critics argued that the deal gave the Taliban significant leverage without ensuring enforceable guarantees. Despite these warnings, the agreement accelerated the momentum for withdrawal.

Following the November 2020 presidential election, President Donald Trump ordered a rapid troop drawdown, bypassing standard military and diplomatic protocols. The sudden directive, signed just days after the election, shocked senior officials, with then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley describing it as “potentially catastrophic” and “militarily unfeasible.” Ultimately, the order was not fully implemented, but it set the stage for instability by reducing U.S. forces to a skeleton presence.

When President Joe Biden took office in January 2021, he faced a dilemma: honor the Doha Agreement’s withdrawal deadline or risk renewed conflict with the Taliban. Biden extended the deadline to August 31, 2021, asserting that prolonging the war would not yield meaningful change. However, the administration’s timeline provided little room to adapt to the rapidly deteriorating situation on the ground.

The Final Days of Withdrawal

The withdrawal’s final phase was marked by chaos, violence, and tragedy. As the Taliban encircled Kabul in mid-August, thousands of Afghans rushed to Hamid Karzai International Airport, desperate to escape the impending regime. Images of people clinging to departing aircraft became a searing symbol of the withdrawal’s dysfunction.

In the chaos, U.S. forces scrambled to evacuate American citizens, Afghan allies, and other vulnerable groups. Operation Allies Refuge, one of the largest airlift operations in history, evacuated over 120,000 people. Yet, the operation was marred by tragic incidents, including the August 26 suicide bombing at Abbey Gate that killed 13 U.S. service members and over 170 Afghan civilians.

The evacuation’s disarray highlighted serious lapses in planning and execution. Military commanders were forced to negotiate directly with Taliban leaders to secure the airport perimeter, a stark illustration of the diminished U.S. leverage. Meanwhile, thousands of Afghan allies, including interpreters and their families, were left behind, sparking outrage and calls for accountability.

The Miscalculations

A significant miscalculation stemmed from overestimating the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Over two decades, the U.S. invested billions into training and equipping the Afghan military. Yet, the ANDSF suffered from systemic corruption, poor leadership, and reliance on U.S. support. When the U.S. withdrew its air support and contractors who maintained critical equipment, the ANDSF collapsed in a matter of weeks. General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, later described the speed of the collapse as unforeseen and a failure of intelligence assessments (The Washington Post).

The Trump administration's February 2020 agreement with the Taliban in Doha set the stage for the U.S. exit. The deal, which included a commitment to withdraw all U.S. troops, excluded the Afghan government from negotiations and emboldened the Taliban. Critics argue that this agreement undermined the Afghan government’s legitimacy and morale while signaling to the Taliban that they could wait out U.S. forces (Sandler, Foreign Affairs). The Biden administration inherited this framework and followed through, citing the risks of extending the war.

Despite U.S. intelligence warnings of a possible Taliban takeover, the speed at which the group captured provincial capitals and Kabul caught both the U.S. and Afghan governments off guard. A classified July 2021 U.S. intelligence report, later leaked, predicted that Kabul could fall within months after the U.S. withdrawal. Instead, it fell in mid-August, as President Ashraf Ghani fled the country (Rosenberg and Schmitt, The New York Times).

The evacuation effort was hindered by disorganized planning and reliance on an aging State Department bureaucracy. Tens of thousands of Afghans who had worked with U.S. forces, along with their families, were left behind, despite earlier promises of safe relocation. By the time the evacuation began in earnest, the Taliban controlled Kabul, complicating access to the airport. The attack by ISIS-K, which killed 170 Afghan civilians in addition to the U.S. troops, underscored the fragility of the situation (BBC News).

Lessons From Afghanistan

The chaotic withdrawal offers profound lessons for U.S. policymakers, military planners, and the broader international community. These lessons span strategy, execution, and the human cost of war.

Strategic Clarity and Realism

The withdrawal underscored the importance of aligning strategic objectives with on-the-ground realities. The U.S. entered Afghanistan in 2001 with the clear goal of dismantling al-Qaeda and ousting the Taliban. Over time, the mission expanded to include nation-building and democratization, ambitions that proved unsustainable. Future interventions must prioritize achievable objectives and maintain a clear exit strategy.

The Perils of Overreliance on Local Partners

The collapse of the ANDSF revealed the dangers of overdependence on fragile local institutions. While U.S. training programs focused on replicating Western military structures, they failed to account for Afghanistan’s unique social and political dynamics. Ensuring the long-term viability of local forces requires a tailored approach that addresses cultural, logistical, and operational challenges.

The Humanitarian Dimension

The withdrawal highlighted the moral imperative to protect civilians and allies in conflict zones. The failure to evacuate thousands of Afghan allies before the Taliban takeover damaged U.S. credibility and left vulnerable populations at risk. Moving forward, evacuation plans must be prioritized and implemented proactively, rather than as last-minute crises.

The Role of Intelligence

Intelligence failures contributed to the withdrawal’s chaos. Despite warnings about the Taliban’s capabilities, U.S. officials underestimated the speed of the ANDSF’s collapse. Enhancing intelligence coordination and integrating diverse perspectives can improve decision-making in complex environments.

Accountability and Oversight

The withdrawal exposed gaps in accountability at multiple levels, from senior policymakers to operational commanders. Transparent reviews and robust oversight mechanisms are essential to learning from past mistakes and preventing similar outcomes in future conflicts.

The Lessons Not Learned

The flawed U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 shares striking parallels with the botched withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975, underscoring recurring lessons in strategic planning, operational execution, and accountability. These lessons reflect critical areas where both operations faltered, with implications for future military and foreign policy engagements.

Strategic Clarity and Realism

Afghanistan and Vietnam reveal the dangers of mission creep and the failure to align strategic objectives with on-the-ground realities. In Vietnam, the initial goal of containing communism expanded into an unwinnable nation-building effort, just as in Afghanistan, the mission shifted from counterterrorism to ambitious democratization. In both cases, the U.S. failed to adapt its strategy to the shifting terrain of local politics and military feasibility. The lesson here is clear: future interventions must establish achievable objectives grounded in a realistic understanding of local contexts and maintain a clear exit strategy to prevent overextension.

The Perils of Overreliance on Local Partners

The collapse of U.S.-supported forces—South Vietnam’s ARVN in 1975 and Afghanistan’s ANDSF in 2021—underscores the risks of overdependence on fragile local institutions. Both instances reflect failures to build sustainable and resilient local forces, with U.S. training efforts overly focused on replicating Western military models rather than adapting to local conditions. Future training programs must prioritize cultural, logistical, and operational considerations to ensure the longevity and effectiveness of local partners, mitigating the risks of sudden collapse when external support wanes.

The Humanitarian Dimension

Humanitarian crises marred both withdrawals, with the abandonment of allies and vulnerable populations casting long shadows over U.S. credibility. In Vietnam, thousands of South Vietnamese who had supported U.S. operations were left behind as Saigon fell. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the failure to evacuate Afghan allies before the Taliban’s rapid advance left countless individuals at risk. Proactive evacuation planning must become a central component of future withdrawal operations, ensuring the timely protection of those who risk their lives in support of U.S. efforts.

The Role of Intelligence

Intelligence failures played a pivotal role in both chaotic withdrawals. In Vietnam, the collapse of ARVN forces caught many U.S. policymakers off guard despite clear indicators of their fragility. In Afghanistan, U.S. intelligence underestimated the Taliban’s capabilities and the ANDSF’s vulnerability. These missteps highlight the need for improved intelligence coordination, diverse analytic perspectives, and scenario planning to anticipate and mitigate worst-case outcomes in future operations.

Accountability and Oversight

Both withdrawals exposed significant gaps in accountability from senior policymakers to operational commanders. In Vietnam, debates over the conduct of the war lingered for decades, with no comprehensive review to assign responsibility for its failures. Similar calls for transparent reviews and oversight mechanisms have arisen in Afghanistan to prevent such outcomes in the future. Institutionalizing accountability through robust oversight and after-action assessments is essential to learning from past mistakes and fostering trust in U.S. military and foreign policy decision-making.

The withdrawals from Vietnam in 1975 and Afghanistan in 2021 underscore the need for strategic discipline, realistic objectives, sustainable partnerships, proactive humanitarian planning, and institutional accountability. As the U.S. prepares for future conflicts in an increasingly complex global environment, these lessons must inform a more adaptable, ethical, and effective approach to military engagement and withdrawal. Failing to heed them risks repeating the same mistakes, with dire consequences for U.S. credibility, allies, and broader strategic goals.

A Troubling Pattern of Strategic Disaster

The flawed U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 serves as a stark reminder of the perils of strategic missteps, misaligned objectives, and inadequate preparation. These failures mirror the lessons that should have been learned from the disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975. Both conflicts exposed the dangers of mission creep, overreliance on fragile local forces, and insufficient planning for disengagement's humanitarian and operational complexities.

In Afghanistan, the failure to adapt to the realities of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and the speed of the Taliban's resurgence revealed a profound disconnect between strategic objectives and on-the-ground realities. This mirrors Vietnam, where the collapse of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) similarly highlighted the limitations of U.S. support for corrupt and unsustainable local regimes. Both cases reflect strategic ineptitude in crafting realistic, achievable objectives and a failure to develop resilient local partners.

The humanitarian crises that followed both withdrawals—abandoned allies in Vietnam and the chaos at Kabul airport in Afghanistan—underscore a recurring failure to protect those who supported U.S. efforts. The tragic scenes of desperation and loss of life tarnished America's global reputation and demonstrated a lack of proactive evacuation planning despite prior warnings in both conflicts.

Intelligence failures also played a critical role. In Vietnam, policymakers underestimated the ARVN's vulnerabilities, just as intelligence assessments in Afghanistan failed to predict the rapid collapse of the ANDSF. These repeated failures highlight systemic issues in intelligence coordination and the inability to anticipate adversaries' strategies.

Accountability remains elusive in both cases. Although Vietnam's lessons were thoroughly documented and widely studied, they were ignored in Afghanistan. This repeated disregard raises serious questions about whether the U.S. can learn from its mistakes or whether institutional inertia ensures these errors will persist in future engagements.

The chaotic withdrawals from both Afghanistan and Vietnam expose a troubling pattern of strategic ineptitude. As the U.S. considers future interventions, the lessons of these twin failures must be internalized. For the sake of military personnel, American taxpayers, and the citizens of nations where the U.S. intervenes, it is imperative to break this cycle of flawed decision-making—failing to do so risks repeating the same catastrophic outcomes, with dire consequences for U.S. credibility, global stability, and the moral responsibility owed to those who serve and depend on America’s leadership.

Sources

Malkasian, Carter. "What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?" The Atlantic, September 2021.
Sandler, Ethan. "The Taliban’s Victory and America’s Defeat." Foreign Affairs, October 2021.
Rosenberg, Matthew, and Eric Schmitt. "The Afghanistan Papers: What Went Wrong?" The New York Times, September 2021.
"Afghanistan: Timeline of the U.S. Withdrawal." BBC News, August 2021.
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed: SIGAR-23-16-IP. 2023.
Shane, Leo III. "Trump Ordered Rapid Withdrawal from Afghanistan after Election Loss." Military Times, October 13, 2022.
Associated Press. "New GOP Report Blames Biden for Disastrous End to U.S. War in Afghanistan." AP News, 2023.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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