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Quotes of the Day:


"Your position never gives you the right to command. It only imposes on you the duty of so living your life that others may receive your orders without being humiliated." 
– Dag Hammarskjold

"The real index of civilization is when people are kinder than they need to be." 
– Louis de Bernieres

"Respect your efforts, respect yourself. Self-respect leads to self-discipline. When you have both firmly under your belt, that's real power." 
– Clint Eastwood




1. N. Korea stresses importance of designating leader's successor in party magazine

2. N. Korea urges heightened discipline, loyalty among officials ahead of party congress

3. Defense Counterintelligence Command involved in martial law bid to be dismantled

4. Pyongyang's state media silent on birthday of N. Korea's Kim

5. What North Korea’s 2026 calendar reveals about its plans for the year ahead

6. South Koreans can now read North Korea's Rodong Sinmun at public sites

7. Civic audit monitors give Lee government's first audit an 'F'

8. From ramyeon to haenyeo, eight Korean words enter Oxford English Dictionary

9. Kim Jong-un's relationship with daughter under scrutiny after New Year's cheek kiss

10. Lee downplays Xi remarks at South Korea-China summit

11. Kim Jong-un, Ju-ae Stress 'Socialist Big Family' at Memorial Hall

12. North Korea’s utility collection drive pits neighborhood watch heads against broke people

13. North Korean markets buzz with fresh food as winter vegetable supply surges

14. Why did President Lee refer to Xi's remark as 'the words of Confucius'?



1. N. Korea stresses importance of designating leader's successor in party magazine


​Summary:


North Korea’s internal party magazine “Geunroja” argued in March 2025 that designating a successor while the leader is alive is a central task of regime management, emphasizing the need to build loyalty, institutionalize the successor’s authority, and crush dissent to monolithic leadership. It cited Kim Jong Il’s early grooming of Kim Jong Un as the model, and called for full party cooperation in succession. The article appeared shortly before Kim Ju ae’s return to public view and her expanding ceremonial role, including her first visit to Kumsusan with Kim. Pyongyang still avoids naming a successor publicly, but is clearly preparing the ideological and organizational terrain for a third hereditary transfer.



Comment: Maybe I will have to re-evaluate my skepticism on succession. Maybe Kim is not just playing with us. Perhaps they are really going to lay the foundation for succession now. This leads to a few important questions:


If Kim is now operationalizing a Ju ae succession, how does that change our long term assessment of regime durability and elite cohesion, including the prospects for internal fractures during or after a transition?


How should outside strategy adjust if the key political contest inside north Korea is no longer over “who succeeds Kim” but over how thoroughly the system can socialize the next generation to accept a third hereditary ruler?


What levers, if any, do the ROK, the United States, and like minded partners have to influence elite and popular perceptions of hereditary succession in north Korea, and are we prepared with information and pressure tools if succession planning accelerates or falters? (I think we all know the answer to this is not a positive one).


N. Korea stresses importance of designating leader's successor in party magazine | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · January 8, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260108004300315?section=nk/nk

SEOUL, Jan. 8 (Yonhap) -- A North Korean party magazine stressed the importance of designating the state leader's successor in a publication in March last year, shortly before leader Kim Jong-un's daughter, Ju-ae, resumed public appearances following a brief hiatus.

Amid speculation that Ju-ae is being groomed as Kim's potential successor, the publication has gained attention as it may have been aimed at setting the stage for the ruling family's third hereditary transfer of power.

"Geunroja," which means "workers" in Korean, a magazine published for party officials, raised the "issue of designating a successor to inherit the status and role of the political head and establishing (the designee's) leadership," in the March publication obtained by Yonhap News Agency on Thursday.

The magazine, a key party publication intended for ideological indoctrination and policy promotion among officials, described the issue as central to handling the country's leadership succession, although it made no mention of Ju-ae.

Designating a successor in line with the people's respect and trust, and the collective will of the party as well as establishing the successor's leadership while the state head is alive were listed as central to addressing the succession issue.

The magazine also noted the importance of nurturing party and workers' loyalty to the successor, and combating any dissent against the successor's monolithic leadership, referring to the power transition from late leader Kim Jong-il to the current leader and his son, Kim Jong-un.


North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (5th from L), alongside his daughter, Ju-ae (4th from L), and his wife, Ri Sol-ju (3rd from L), visits the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun on Jan. 1, 2026, in this photo released by the North's Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Kim Jong-il paid attention early on to grooming Kim Jong-un as his successor and made "enormous" efforts to that end, it said, also calling for cooperation from the party and its officials in succession issues.

The March publication came a month before the teenage Ju-ae was seen in North Korean media accompanying her father at an official inspection of a construction site in Pyongyang, resuming her public appearances after remaining out of the public eye for about three months.

On New Year's Day, Ju-ae paid tribute to the late North Korean leaders and her ancestors at the family mausoleum, the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, for the first time alongside her father. Her presence at the mausoleum has rekindled speculation she may be the heir apparent to Kim.

North Korea has yet to publicly designate Kim's successor, instead introducing her as Kim's beloved daughter whenever she has been mentioned in state media.


North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) and his daughter, Ju-ae (3rd from L), pose for a photo with soldiers during an inspection of the construction site for the Memorial Museum of Combat Feats at the Overseas Military Operations in Pyongyang on Jan. 5, 2026, in this image captured from the Korean Central Television the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · January 8, 2026



2. N. Korea urges heightened discipline, loyalty among officials ahead of party congress


​Summary:


north Korea’s Rodong Sinmun orders officials to tighten discipline and prove loyalty ahead of the ninth party congress, warning that their “revolutionary inclination” and qualifications will be strictly scrutinized. Positions are defined as burdens assigned by the party; true “service to the people” means faithfully executing Kim’s and the party’s intent, not responding to grassroots needs. The editorial attacks risk aversion and fake compliance, urging officials to deliver tangible achievements before the congress, where long term diplomatic and economic lines will be set and regime propaganda is already highlighting progress under regional development and other flagship projects.




Comment: Loyalty, ideology, and discipline - keys to survival of the regime and survival of individual Koreans in the north. I hate to keep harping on these issues but I have to keep asking these questions:

Is this tightening of discipline a precursor to targeted purges, broader reshuffles, or simply ideological mobilization before a new long term line, and how should outside analysts distinguish among those paths in real time.

If the regime equates “serving the people” with obeying the party’s intent, how does that constrain policy experimentation at local levels and what does it imply for the credibility of north Korean reporting on economic progress.

How should the ROK, the United States, and partners prepare information and contingency plans if the congress becomes a venue for announcing harsher internal controls, risky external policies, or both. (Again we know our ROK and US information capabilities have been neutered by self inflicted shots to our feet)

And lastly, are we effectively planning AND preparing for what might come next in north Korea?



N. Korea urges heightened discipline, loyalty among officials ahead of party congress | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · January 8, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260108002600315?section=nk/nk

SEOUL, Jan. 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Thursday urged officials to strengthen work discipline and loyalty to the regime ahead of an upcoming key party congress, calling it a "highly responsible" occasion in which their qualifications will be scrutinized.

"Officials need to honorably face the party congress with proud achievements from their devoted service to the people," read the headline of an article carried by the Rodong Sinmun, North Korea's most widely read newspaper, on Thursday.

Their official positions are those "the party has assigned to them to carry a heavier burden for the people and to take on more tasks," the newspaper said, adding that good service for the people means "correctly capturing the wishes and intentions of the party and becoming a genuine loyalist."

The call for heightened devotion and work discipline came as North Korea is expected to convene the ninth party congress in January or February, the first such convention since 2021, to formulate a long-term policy line reportedly covering diplomacy, the economy and other areas.

The newspaper said the period leading up to the party congress is a "highly important time" in which party loyalty and revolutionary inclination of officials will be sternly scrutinized.

"They should wage a strong struggle against the tendency to avoid undertaking projects out of fear ... or to cling to their posts by pretending to work," it pointed out.

As part of preparations for the party congress, North Korea is also scurrying to publicize the results from the party's economic and other projects, including leader Kim Jong-un's signature regional development policy aimed at narrowing the gap between urban and rural areas.

The state-run Korean Central News Agency reported Thursday a national planning committee and a separate committee for the regional development policy were thoroughly preparing the implementation of projects assigned for this year.


This photo from the Korean Central News Agency on Dec. 11, 2025, shows a plenary gathering of the Workers' Party of Korea, held from Dec. 9-11, 2025. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · January 8, 2026



3. Defense Counterintelligence Command involved in martial law bid to be dismantled


​Summary:


The ROK defense ministry will dismantle the 49 year old Defense Counterintelligence Command, which played a central role in former President Yoon’s failed martial law attempt in December 2024, including alleged deployment of troops to the National Assembly and plans to detain key politicians. Its broad powers in intelligence and investigations are judged “excessive.” A new Defense Security Intelligence Agency focused on counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and arms industry intelligence is proposed, with functions dispersed across multiple bodies and a cooperative mechanism to prevent gaps. Legal and organizational reforms are to be phased in, with completion targeted before year end.


Comment:  A checkered past. for this Command This is not surprising to see. Some tough issues for for the military and ROKG:


How can Seoul balance the urgent need to prevent future politicized martial law attempts with the operational requirement for agile, effective military counterintelligence​?


Does dispersing authorities across multiple organizations reduce the real risk of abuse, or simply make accountability harder to trace if another crisis arises? Will this create blind spots that will undermine counterintelligence operations?


How can or will north Korea exploit this?



(2nd LD) Defense Counterintelligence Command involved in martial law bid to be dismantled | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · January 8, 2026

(ATTN: CHANGES photo; ADDS details; RECASTS headline; TRIMS)

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, Jan. 8 (Yonhap) -- The defense ministry will seek to disband the Defense Counterintelligence Command embroiled in former President Yoon Suk Yeol's 2024 botched martial law bid, officials said Thursday, in what would mark the command's dissolution after 49 years upon completion.

The command is suspected of having played a key role in Yoon's short-lived martial law imposition in December 2024, with its former commander standing trial for allegedly deploying troops to the National Assembly and the National Election Commission on the night of the martial law attempt.

It is also suspected of organizing troops to detain around 10 key politicians, including the then leaders of the ruling and main opposition parties as well as the National Assembly speaker.

While the command tasked with counterintelligence activities has been renamed several times under different governments amid criticism over its influential role, it marks the first time the command will be dismantled since its establishment in 1977.

"We have advised the constructive dismantling of the Defense Counterintelligence Command and transferring or removing its existing functions, such as security investigation, counterintelligence and security audit," Hong Hyun-ik, the chief of a special committee tasked with reforming the command, said in a briefing.


This Nov. 14, 2022, file photo, provided by the defense ministry, shows the entrance of the Defense Counterintelligence Command. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

The committee, comprising military, government and civilian officials, advised the military to establish a new organization tentatively named the Defense Security Intelligence Agency, specialized in securing counterintelligence, counterterrorism and arms industry intelligence, Hong said.

The plan comes as the defense ministry has been seeking to rebuild the military following the martial law bid that has led to the removal of senior military leaders from office, including the former chiefs of the counterintelligence command as well as the defense intelligence command and capital defense command.

In a report submitted to lawmakers last year, the ministry said the counterintelligence command holds "excessive" rights ranging from securing intelligence to investigation, saying its functions should be adjusted so that it only specializes in counterintelligence activities.

"The focus of the reform was to optimally disperse rights and functions ... so that one specific institution would not excessively exercise its rights," a ministry official said.

Addressing concerns over possible lapses that could occur in the process of dispersing the functions across different units, the committee called for the establishment of a cooperative body to share relevant information.

The defense ministry said it plans to draw up detailed measures to carry out suggestions made by the special committee and take necessary legal and organizational steps in phases to complete the reform before the end of the year.


This Sept. 30, 2025, file photo, provided by the defense ministry, shows Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back (3rd from L) posing with members of a special advisory committee in Seoul on reforming the military in the aftermath of the failed martial law bid in December 2024. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · January 8, 2026


4. Pyongyang's state media silent on birthday of N. Korea's Kim


​Summary:


north Korea’s state media ignored Kim Jong Un’s presumed birthday on 8 January, concentrating instead on preparations for the upcoming ninth party congress. Pyongyang has never made his birthday an official holiday, in contrast to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Yet the regime is quietly elevating Kim’s personal cult, downplaying “Day of the Sun,” adopting pins with his portrait, and reportedly shifting oaths of allegiance to his birthday. The silence may reflect lingering sensitivity about his mother Ko Yong hui’s status as an unmarried partner and Japan-born Korean, even as authorities recalibrate the ideology around Kim as sole leader.



Comment: This could only be by KJU's direction. What effect is he trying to achieve? Can we exploit the sensitivity about his mother's heritage? (if we had an information capability to employ)



Pyongyang's state media silent on birthday of N. Korea's Kim | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · January 8, 2026

SEOUL, Jan. 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's state media has remained silent on the birthday of leader Kim Jong-un, believed to fall on Thursday, instead focusing on reporting the nation's preparations for the upcoming key party congress.

North Korea has not officially announced Kim's birthday, known to be Jan. 8, for special celebrations, though the birthdays of late state founder Kim Il-sung and former leader Kim Jong-il have been marked as national holidays.

On the front page of the Thursday edition, the Rodong Sinmun, the North's main newspaper for the domestic audience, called for senior officials to thoroughly prepare for the ninth party congress set for early this year but did not carry any report on Kim's birthday.

The Korean Central News Agency, the North's state-run news agency for external readers, also did not make any mention of it.


North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un visits the construction site of a greenhouse farm in the northwestern city of Sinuiju on Jan. 2, 2026, in this image captured from footage of North Korea's state-run TV station. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Kim's birthday was first revealed in 2014, when the North's state media reported former American professional basketball player Dennis Rodman had visited North Korea on the occasion of Kim Jong-un's birthday.

Attention has been drawn to the possibility that North Korea may formalize Kim's birthday as he has been accelerating efforts to bolster his status as a stand-alone leader while reducing his reliance on the predecessor for authority.

Since 2024, North Korea has rarely used the term the Day of the Sun to refer to the birthday of Kim Il-sung, which falls on April 15. The North has also begun using a pin exclusively featuring Kim Jong-un's portrait.

In January 2024, North Korea is believed to have ordered its people to take an oath of allegiance on Kim Jong-un's birthday, not on the first day of the new year or his predecessors' birthdays.

Some observers said North Korea's reluctance to make public Kim's birthday may be related to the background of his mother, Ko Yong-hui, who gave birth to him without officially marrying Kim Jong-il. She was also a Korean resident in Japan, which North Korea views as having a low societal status in the North.

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · January 8, 2026


5. What North Korea’s 2026 calendar reveals about its plans for the year ahead


​Summary:


north Korea’s 2026 calendars suggest regime priorities will be front-loaded around the Ninth Party Congress, likely in January, with a military parade and high-profile groundbreaking ceremonies for Kim Jong Un’s rural development projects. The rest of the year features routine ideological and historical commemorations, with only a few round-number anniversaries likely to generate larger events, notably the 80th anniversary of the Korean Children’s Union in June and the 15th anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s death in December. Kim Jong Un’s birthday on Jan. 8 again does not appear, even as his personal cult grows, signaling an ongoing, calibrated recalibration of the leadership’s symbolism and holiday hierarchy.


Comment: The calendar is perhaps a quiet map of intent. Does it reveal what the regime wants to emphasize and what it prefers to blur?


Does the front loading of political spectacle into the party congress period suggest that Kim seeks to lock in a new policy line before external shocks can shape it, or that the system requires early ideological mobilization to sustain discipline through the year​?


If Kim’s personal​ity cult is rising while his birthday stays unofficial, what does this calibrated ambiguity signal about elite sensitivities, succession politics, and the broader effort to reorder the regime’s symbolic hierarchy​?


If 2026 lacks major external oriented anniversaries, should we expect more space for operational initiatives abroad, or does the regime intend to focus inward on economic projects and ideological consolidation, and how would we know the difference soon enough to act​? Should the ROK and US governments be planning proposals for talks in the "white space?"



​Who would have thought we could glean so much potential intelligence from a calendar or am I reading too much into it?



What North Korea’s 2026 calendar reveals about its plans for the year ahead

Lack of major anniversaries suggests events, including military parade, will be front-loaded around Ninth Party Congress

Seung-Yeon Chung January 6, 2026

https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/what-north-koreas-2026-calendar-reveals-about-its-plans-for-the-year-ahead/


North Korean soldiers put up a calendar | Image: KCTV (Jan. 1, 2026)

North Korean calendars released for 2026 have offered a glimpse into the regime’s official schedule for the year, suggesting that major celebrations will be front-loaded around the Ninth Party Congress.

The calendars that have surfaced on social media do not specify when the congress will take place, but the precedent from the Eighth Congress in 2021 suggests it could start as early as this month, with ongoing training pointing to a military parade.

But the DPRK’s official schedule shows few other major anniversaries during the rest of the year. The most significant dates are the 80th anniversary of the Korean Children’s Union in June and the 15th anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s death in December, though neither date is likely to see a large-scale parade.

Meanwhile, this year’s calendar makes no mention of Kim Jong Un’s birthday on Jan. 8, while continuing to use standard propaganda terms for the birth anniversaries of former leaders, even as Kim has elevated his personality cult at the expense of his predecessors in recent years.


2026 North Korean calendar | Images: Sally Yin via X (Dec. 19, 2025), edited by NK News

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North Korean soldiers dispatched to Kursk hanging a banner reading “2025.1.8” and “With the deepest reverence, warm wishes are extended for the good health of the respected Supreme Commander” | Image: KCTV (Aug. 24, 2025)

JANUARY

The 2026 North Korean calendar begins with New Year’s Day, when state media published Kim Jong Un’s message to troops fighting Ukraine and visited the mausoleum where his predecessors are buried.

Jan. 8 marks Kim Jong Un’s reported birthday. Pyongyang has never officially confirmed or publicly announced the leader’s date of birth, which only became known to the public through former NBA player Dennis Rodman. The date received indirect confirmation last year when Korean Central Television (KCTV) aired a scene of North Korean dispatched soldiers to Kursk celebrating Kim’s birth anniversary. 

However, the date is still missing from the 2026 official calendar, suggesting that state propaganda is not yet ready to promote the birthday as part of the leader’s growing cult of personality. 

As Kim Jong Un’s rural development project enters its third year, a series of groundbreaking ceremonies will likely take place across the country in January and February. 

The biggest expected event of the year will be the Ninth Party Congress, which could take place in January like the congress in 2021. North Korea is expected to hold a military parade to commemorate the event, but state media has not yet announced the date of the meeting.

North Koreans in front of the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun to commemorate Kim Jong Il’s birth anniversary | Image: KCNA (Feb. 17, 2025)

FEBRUARY

Kim will likely make a military-related appearance to commemorate the 78th founding anniversary of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) on Feb. 8. In 2025, the leader visited the defense ministry and blamed the U.S. for escalating regional tensions, while reaffirming the country’s nuclear policy and solidarity with Russia. 

Feb. 16 marks the 84th birthday of the late leader Kim Jong Il. A North Korean calendar posted on social media still labeled the date as the Day of the Shining Star, despite signs that official propaganda has been toning down the former leader’s personality cult. As has long been the case, this date and Kim Il Sung’s April 15 birthday are the only two rendered in a distinct font, setting them apart from all other days. 

Lunar New Year’s Day falls on the day after Kim Jong Il’s birth anniversary, which could give North Koreans a chance to rest after commemorative events for the former leader’s birthday.

North Koreans shop for cards and flowers for International Women’s Day | Image: KCNA (March 9, 2025)

MARCH

March 3 is Jongwoldaeborum, a traditional folk holiday marking the 15th day of the first lunar month. North Koreans are known to spend the day by visiting tourist spots, playing folk games and eating traditional foods, as well as wishing Kim Jong Un “good health” and hoping “for national prosperity and the happiness of families.” 

Pyongyang also celebrates International Women’s Day on March 8. State media typically use the occasion to argue that the country upholds women’s rights at the highest level, unlike capitalist countries.

Kim Il Sung at a New Year’s celebration of schoolchildren in Dec. 1986 | Image: DPR Korea (April 2025)

APRIL

The Day of the Sun on April 15 marks the DPRK’s founder Kim Il Sung’s birthday and is one of the most important holidays in North Korea, along with the Day of the Shining Star. Citizens celebrate by visiting statues of former leaders and attending various concerts and events, but while the regime has held military parades on the holiday in the past, this appears unlikely for the 114th birth anniversary since Pyongyang emphasizes those ending in 0 or 5.

North Korea is likely to wrap up construction for a 10,000-apartment project in the Hwasong district around the holiday. Kim Jong Un is expected to attend a grand ceremony to mark the occasion, since it is the final project under a five-year plan.

The 94th founding anniversary of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army (KPRA) falls on April 25. Last year, Kim Jng Un attended the launching ceremony of the country’s 5,000-ton destroyer on the day. In the past, the DPRK has also used the holiday for military parades, though that is unlikely since this year does not mark a major anniversary.

High-ranking officer Choe Ryong Hae visiting workers to offer encouragement | Image: KCNA (May 2, 2025)

MAY

May Day is the sole holiday on the North Korean calendar this month, with state media using the day to hype how workers are “proud masters of the state and society.”

Children pledge their oath upon joining the Korean Children’s Union | Image: KCNA (Feb. 17, 2025)

JUNE

June 6 marks the 80th founding anniversary of the Korean Children’s Union (KCU), which every North Korean child must join. Due to the anniversary’s round number, a large-scale ceremony is likely with Kim Jong Un in attendance.

While absent from the official calendar, June 29 marks a decade since Kim Jong Un was elevated to the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, and some commemorative events may take place.

Soldiers march with portraits of famous military figures from previous generations at a victory day event | Image: KCNA (July 28, 2025)

JULY

Though not a public holiday, July 8 marks the 32nd anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s death. Kim Jong Un or senior officials will visit the mausoleum, while citizens pay tribute with flowers at statues of former leaders. 

July 27 is the most significant day of the month: North Korea celebrates victory in the Korean War, even though it’s when the Armistice Agreement was signed.

Last year, Kim Jong Un visited the Sinchon anti-U.S. museum, the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum, the martyrs’ cemetery and China-DPRK Friendship Tower in the days leading up to July 27, while skipping events on the holiday itself for the first time since 2019. 

Meanwhile, July 30 marks the 80th anniversary of the promulgation of the Law on Sex Equality — an occasion Pyongyang will likely use to boast that it has fully achieved gender equality.

Kim Jong Un at the Liberation Tower | Image: KCNA (Aug. 15, 2025)

AUGUST

Aug. 15 is the 81st anniversary of Liberation Day, commemorating Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule. Unlike last year’s 80th anniversary, which saw grand celebrations, this year’s events are expected to be more subdued. The leader will exchange greetings with his counterparts and may visit the Liberation Tower.

The Day of Songun, a military-first policy enacted by Kim Jong Il, falls on Aug. 25. After a relatively muted 65th anniversary last year, this year’s observance is likely to be similarly modest.

Aug. 28 marks Navy Day. While not a public holiday, the 80th anniversary this year could prompt a larger-than-usual event. In 2023, Kim visited the navy headquarters with his family, denouncing the U.S. ROK and Japan in a speech.

Kim Jong Un at an oath-taking ceremony | Image: KCNA (Sept. 10, 2025)

SEPTEMBER

North Korea will commemorate its 78th national founding anniversary on Sept. 9. Kim Jong Un attended an oath-taking ceremony with high-ranking officials last year, declaring the DPRK “the strongest” country.

Chuseok, another traditional folk holiday, falls on Sept. 25. North Koreans visit ancestral graves and enjoy traditional meals with family, though celebrations are typically more limited than in the South.

Hwasong-20 ICBM at the military commemorating the 80th founding anniversary of North Korea’s ruling party | Image: KCNA (Oct. 11, 2025)

OCTOBER

Kim Jong Un will commemorate the 81st founding anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) on Oct. 10. Last year’s celebration featured a major military parade with high-level foreign guests, but the country is likely to hold smaller-scale events on the holiday this year.

Kim Jong Un at the 80th Aviation Day event | Image: KCTV (Nov. 30, 2025)

NOVEMBER

Nov. 16 is Mother’s Day, which serves as a day to express gratitude to women who sacrifice themselves in service of the country. 

Although not marked as a public holiday, Nov. 29 is Aviation Day. Kim attended the 80th anniversary event last year with his daughter, observing a flight demonstration and calling for enhanced aerial capabilities against enemies.

Kim Jong Un at a memorial service for Kim Jong Il | Image: KCNA (Dec. 17, 2021)

DECEMBER

Dec. 17 marks 15 years since Kim Jong Il’s death. The 10th anniversary in 2021 featured a noon siren and large memorial service in front of the mausoleum, where Kim Jong Un wept. Another large-scale commemorative event is anticipated this year.

While 2026 marks 15 years since Kim Jong Un succeeded his father, the regime will see celebrating the leader’s rise alongside his father’s death as inappropriate. Any celebrations of his tenure will likely take place in 2027 and be tied to anniversaries for his acquisition of leadership titles.

The only public holiday in December falls on the 27th. Originally called Socialist Constitution Day, state media dropped “Socialist” from the name last year, and how it will be observed this year remains to be seen.

Edited by Bryan Betts


6. South Koreans can now read North Korea's Rodong Sinmun at public sites


​Summary:


Koreans in the South can now read north Korea’s Rodong Sinmun at 181 public sites, including the National Library and university libraries, without special procedures. Photography is restricted, but physical copies are accessible alongside other DPRK publications. Scholars describe the paper as an organ for Kim Jong Un and the party line, with front pages devoted to leader messages, resolutions, and images, saturated with honorifics and evaluative language. The style emphasizes propaganda over information, with predictable phrasing and limited data. Experts welcome greater transparency for research but caution that younger readers may need context to avoid misunderstanding or prejudice.



Comment: This is still far from free access. Young people are smarter than we think and they will soon be smarter about north Korea with this exposure. Or do we think this will turn them into communists and that South Korea will collapse (apologies for the sarcasm).

World News Jan. 7, 2026 / 9:27 PM / Updated Jan. 7, 2026 at 9:27 PM

South Koreans can now read North Korea's Rodong Sinmun at public sites

By Asia Today and translated by UPI

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/07/nkorea-official-newspaper-can-read-designated-public-location/4151767838955/

   


A copy of North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun is seen in the North Korean materials room at the National Library of Korea in Seoul. Photo by Asia Today


Jan. 7 (Asia Today) -- South Koreans have been able to view North Korea's official newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, at designated public locations without special procedures since Dec. 30, a move researchers have welcomed while some scholars urge guidelines for younger readers.

The paper is available at 181 sites including the Ministry of Unification's North Korea Information Center, the National Library of Korea and university libraries, the report said. Visitors can read the physical copies on site, though photography is restricted.


A reporter who visited the National Library of Korea in Seoul on Tuesday said staff directed him to a North Korea materials room where issues of Rodong Sinmun were organized by date and could be turned page by page. Other North Korean publications, including The Pyongyang Times and Minju Joson, were shelved nearby, the report said.

The story described the newspaper's content as broadly covering politics, society and the economy but centered on leader Kim Jong Un's activities and the Workers' Party's policy line, with little of the incident, accident or critical reporting common in South Korean newspapers.

Related

The report said the front page typically begins with messages from Kim and party resolutions supporting them, then frames subsequent coverage around people "responding" to those directives. It cited repeated honorific phrases praising the party and leader, and noted that the paper often uses laudatory modifiers and verbs such as "proclaimed" instead of neutral attributions like "said."

The newspaper also gives heavy space to photographs, with some pages filled with multiple images, the report said. Even when figures are presented, the story said they are commonly followed by evaluative language crediting party policy or leadership rather than sourcing data.

A 26-year-old reader at the library told the reporter the phrasing becomes predictable after a few headlines and sentences, adding that the writing style stands out more than the details.

Kim Seok-hyang, an emeritus professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University, said the paper functions as the Workers' Party's official organ and is aimed less at informing than at repeatedly emphasizing party direction. She called the opening for research purposes positive but said social discussion and guidelines are needed if children and adolescents encounter it, citing a risk of misunderstanding and prejudice if the paper is read without context.

Kim Yong-hyun, an emeritus professor at Dongguk University, said opening the paper is unlikely to lead to more public admiration for North Korean ideology and that excessive concern is unnecessary, describing the publication as a direct reflection of the North Korean regime's mindset.

-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI


7. Civic audit monitors give Lee government's first audit an 'F'


​Comment: But Lee retains relatively high public approval ratings.

World News Jan. 7, 2026 / 9:33 PM / Updated Jan. 7, 2026 at 9:33 PM

Civic audit monitors give Lee government's first audit an 'F'

By Asia Today and translated by UPI

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/07/civic-group-monitors-national-assembly-audit-process-gave-first-partliamentray-audit/5571767839273/

   


An empty seat is seen at a National Assembly committee hearing room in Seoul during a parliamentary audit session, as lawmakers, aides and reporters take their places around the chamber. Photo by Asia Today


Jan. 7 (Asia Today) -- A coalition of South Korean civic groups that monitors the National Assembly's annual audit process said Wednesday it gave the Lee Jae-myung administration's first parliamentary audit an "F," citing what it called a crisis in separation of powers and poor preparation.

The NGO Monitoring Group for National Audits, which said it has tracked the audit process for 27 years with participation from more than 1,000 experts and civic activists, said in a position paper that the audit "began" with controversy over Supreme Court Chief Justice Cho Hee-dae and "ended" with allegations of abuse of power involving Kim Hyeon-ji, the first deputy chief of staff at the presidential office.


The group listed reasons for the failing grade that included what it described as the worst crisis in separation of powers, inadequate preparation, extreme confrontation and an audit of Cho that it said only provoked backlash.

It also cited what it called structural problems during the audit, including committee chairs it said acted without restraint, a shortened audit period and the presence of seven senior ruling party lawmakers serving as ministers leading agencies subject to scrutiny.

The group said some committee chairs restricted lawmakers' opportunities to question witnesses and, rather than acting as lawmakers, behaved like investigators, turning the audit into a confrontation-style interrogation.

- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI



8. From ramyeon to haenyeo, eight Korean words enter Oxford English Dictionary


​Comment: We can all speak Korean. We just did not know it.


World News Jan. 8, 2026 / 1:34 AM

From ramyeon to haenyeo, eight Korean words enter Oxford English Dictionary

By Thomas Maresca

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/08/korea-Oxford-Englsh-Dictionary-Korean-words-ramyeon-haenyeo-ajumma-officetel/9921767852472/

   


The Oxford English Dictionary added eight Korean-origin words, including ramyeon, in its latest quarterly update. This November 2025 photo shows a visitor eating instant noodles at a ramyeon festival in Gumi, South Korea. File Photo by Thomas Maresca/UPI | License Photo


SEOUL, Jan. 8 (UPI) -- The Oxford English Dictionary has added eight words drawn from South Korean culture in its latest quarterly update, reflecting the continued influence of Korean food, customs and everyday life on global English usage.

In a press release issued Wednesday, Oxford Languages unveiled the newly added words, highlighting how Korean-language terms have entered English alongside the worldwide popularity of K-culture.


Among the additions are ajumma, a term commonly used to refer to a middle-aged or older woman; sunbae, meaning a senior colleague or mentor; jjimjilbang, a large communal bathhouse offering saunas, lounges and sleeping areas; and officetel, a blend of "office" and "hotel" describing mixed-use residential buildings common in South Korean cities.

Food-related entries include ramyeon, Korea's version of instant noodles, and bingsu, a shaved-ice dessert topped with ingredients such as red beans, fruit or condensed milk.

Related

The English phrase Korean barbecue was also added for the first time. While specific terms for grilled meat dishes such as samgyeopsal and galbi were already included in the dictionary, this year's update marks the first formal appearance of the broader English term. Its earliest citation dates to a 1938 article in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

Another new entry, haenyeo, refers to the traditional female free divers associated with Jeju Island, whose seafood-harvesting practices have drawn international attention for their cultural significance.

The update continues a recent pattern of Korean-origin words entering the dictionary. Seven Korean words were also added in 2025, following a larger group of 26 terms introduced in September 2021 amid a period of heightened global interest in Korean popular culture.

In an analysis cited by Oxford Languages, scholar Simon Barnes-Sadler examined how Korean-origin words have entered the dictionary in relation to the rise of hallyu, or the Korean Wave.

"While words of Korean origin have been attested in English texts stretching back to the nineteenth century, a large number of such words have been added since 1997, the year to which the beginning of the Korean Wave is conventionally attributed," Barnes-Sadler wrote.

He added that many Korean-origin words still occur relatively infrequently in the English-language sources tracked by the OED, raising questions about how quickly their emergence will translate into sustained everyday usage.

First published in 1884, the Oxford English Dictionary is widely regarded as the authoritative record of the English language. It contains more than 500,000 words and phrases from past and present English usage and traces their development through millions of quotations drawn from books, academic sources, news reports and social media.




9. Kim Jong-un's relationship with daughter under scrutiny after New Year's cheek kiss


​Summary:


Japan based outlet Daily NK Japan highlighted what it called “unusual” intimacy between Kim Jong Un and his daughter Kim Ju ae during the 2026 New Year performance in Pyongyang. Footage showed her seated between Kim and Ri Sol ju, holding his hand, whispering, and at midnight standing, cupping his face, and kissing his cheek as he smiled broadly. The outlet and cited Sand Times noted earlier scenes, such as a hotel ceremony, where their closeness drew internal reactions as “disgusting” and beyond a normal father daughter relationship. Daily NK Japan argues this behavior reflects deeper distortions and anxieties in north Korea’s system, not just a staged succession narrative.



Comment: Unusual photos at the link. Disturbing? Certainly questionable. If the regime is willing to broadcast behavior that even some internal audiences find unsettling, what does that reveal about the insularity, risk perception, and possible psychological fragility of Kim’s inner circle, and how should analysts factor that into assessments of succession management and crisis decision making?


I will be interested in the assessments from my Korean friends who have escaped from the north.

Kim Jong-un's relationship with daughter under scrutiny after New Year's cheek kiss

Published: 06 Jan. 2026, 20:36

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2026-01-06/national/northKorea/Kim-Jonguns-relationship-with-daughter-under-scrutiny-after-New-Years-cheek-kiss/2494266


Kim Ju-ae, the daughter of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, kisses her father on the cheek after the New Year’s countdown ends during the 2026 New Year’s celebration performance at the May Day Stadium in Pyongyang on Jan. 1. [KOREAN CENTRAL TELEVISION]

 

A Japan-based media outlet called a moment in which Kim Ju-ae, the daughter of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, kissed her father on the cheek at a New Year’s performance in Pyongyang “unusual.” 

 

Daily NK Japan, a Tokyo-based outlet focused on North Korean affairs, published on Monday an online article, the title of which translates to “Is this a normal father-daughter relationship? The strange behavior of Kim Jong-un and his daughter that is stirring controversy.” The report cited footage of a New Year’s celebration broadcast by Korean Central Television last Thursday.

 

Related Article

North Korean leader attends factory opening ceremony with daughter Kim Ju-ae beside him

Kim Ju-ae not North Korea's next leader, DP lawmaker asserts

Kim Ju-ae being groomed to lead a brutal regime

 

The outlet said the pair “engaged in what could be described as excessive physical contact throughout the event,” adding that “nearby officials were occasionally seen averting their gaze or appearing visibly uncomfortable.”

 

At the event, Kim Ju-ae sat between Kim Jong-un and his wife, Ri Sol-ju, and watched the performance while holding her father’s hand and whispering to him, openly displaying their closeness.

 

In particular, as the countdown to 2026 began midway through the event, Kim Ju-ae stood up, placed one hand on Kim Jong-un’s face and kissed him on the cheek. He responded with a broad smile.

 


North Korean leader Kim Jong-un whispers to his daughter, Kim Ju-ae, while attending the 2026 New Year’s celebration performance at the May Day Stadium in Pyongyang on Jan. 1. [KOREAN CENTRAL TELEVISION]

 

“This is not the first time that Kim Jong-un and his daughter have drawn attention for their unusual behavior,” the outlet said, citing a report by the South Korean independent media outlet Sand Times.

 

The outlet noted that at a hotel completion ceremony in December last year, the two were seen standing unusually close “like a couple,” allegedly prompting reactions within North Korea that described the scene as “disgusting” and “beyond a normal father-daughter relationship.”

 

Daily NK Japan concluded that “the strange behavior that Kim Jong-un and Ju-ae openly display appears to go beyond a rational attempt to stage a succession narrative, instead reflecting distortions and anxieties inherent in the North Korean system itself, seemingly without self-awareness.”

 


Kim Ju-ae kisses her father North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on the cheek as the new year begins in footage from a New Year’s celebration broadcast by Korean Central Television on Jan. 1. [KOREAN CENTRAL TELEVISION]



This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.


BY HAN YOUNG-HYE [kim.minyoung5@joongang.co.kr]




10. Lee downplays Xi remarks at South Korea-China summit


​Summary:


President Lee Jae-myung downplayed speculation that Xi Jinping’s call for South Korea to “stand on the right side of history” carried specific political pressure, portraying it instead as a broad, Confucian-inflected remark. Speaking in Shanghai, Lee said there was no need to respond even if Xi had a particular issue in mind. He framed South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine program as a core national interest, reiterating it is defensive and will not carry nuclear weapons, and that Xi had “taken note.” National Security Office Director Wi Sung-lac said both sides fully exchanged views, with no major problems reported in the talks.


Comment: Xi comments are problematic. We should understand how he is shaping the narrative by reframing history from the PRC/CCP perspective. AgainSee Ms Jihyun Park's important essay: 


The Republic of Korea-China summit and Xi Jinping's politics of history

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2026/01/07/The-Republic-of-Korea-China-summit-and-Xi-Jinpings-politics-of-history/6781767748150/


Lee downplays Xi remarks at South Korea-China summit

Posted January. 08, 2026 09:37,   

Updated January. 08, 2026 09:37



https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20260108/6048217/1


President Lee Jae-myung said Jan. 7 that he viewed Chinese President Xi Jinping’s remark at the South Korea-China summit about standing on the right side of history and making the correct strategic choice as a broad, general statement rather than one with specific political intent.


Speaking at a luncheon with reporters at the Shanghai Press Center, Lee said he understood the comment as reflecting Confucian values. He said he was unsure whether Xi intended a particular message but added that it is appropriate for countries to seek to stand on the right side of history. Xi’s remark led to speculation that China was pressuring South Korea to move closer to Beijing amid tensions between the United States and China and between China and Japan. Lee said he saw no need to respond if Xi had a specific issue in mind.


Lee said countries should naturally respect one another’s core interests and major concerns, adding that South Korea’s plan to introduce nuclear-powered submarines falls into that category. By framing the submarine project as a core national interest, Lee again sought to persuade China. At their first summit in November last year, Lee emphasized that the submarines would not carry nuclear weapons and would be used solely for defensive purposes. Xi reportedly responded briefly that he had taken note. The plan to introduce nuclear-powered submarines was formally confirmed at the South Korea-U.S. summit in October last year.


Earlier, National Security Office Director Wi Sung-lac said Jan. 5 that the two sides had discussed a wide range of issues related to the situation on the Korean Peninsula and that South Korea had fully explained its position. He said there were no major problems, indicating that the two sides had exchanged views on the construction of nuclear-powered submarines.


Lee also said he told Xi directly that national leaders are obligated to act in their respective countries’ interests. He said Xi works to advance China’s national interests, while Lee does the same for South Korea, adding that relations between countries require compromise and coordination when necessary.



상하이=박훈상 igermask@donga.com


11. Kim Jong-un, Ju-ae Stress 'Socialist Big Family' at Memorial Hall


Summary:


north Korean media showed Kim Jong Un visiting the construction site of an “Overseas Military Operations Combat Merit Memorial Hall” honoring troops dispatched to Russia, accompanied by daughter Ju-ae, wife Ri Sol-ju, and sister Kim Yo-jong. Kim drove a forklift carrying Ju-ae and officials and planted a tree with her, projecting a hands-on, humble leader working with his “socialist big family.” Ju-ae’s central, color coordinated appearance again fueled speculation about succession. Seoul’s unification ministry, however, assesses her recent visibility as aimed more at stressing the “socialist big family” concept than formal succession, while acknowledging a basic succession framework.


Comment: So much propaganda. Certainly prep for the party congress but i wonder if the regime is also hoping the Koreans in the South are able to see this propaganda push as well.


Kim Jong-un, Ju-ae Stress 'Socialist Big Family' at Memorial Hall

North Korean leader and daughter work at memorial for Russian-dispatched troops, emphasizing familial unity concept


By Choi Hye-seung

Published 2026.01.06. 16:58

Updated 2026.01.06. 17:19https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2026/01/06/JIEQXBBXMFDGBDRD25STV43WMY/





Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of North Korea's Workers' Party, reported on the 6th that 'General Secretary Kim Jong-un visited the construction site of the Overseas Military Operations Combat Merit Memorial Hall with party and government officials on the 5th.' His daughter Kim Ju-ae accompanied the on-site guidance that day. /News1·Rodong Sinmun

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited the construction site of a memorial hall commemorating North Korean troops dispatched to Russia, personally driving a forklift and staging a scene of shoveling soil with his daughter Ju-ae. The Ministry of Unification stated that North Korea’s recent emphasis on highlighting Ju-ae appears to reflect an intention to stress the concept of a “socialist big family.”

The Rodong Sinmun reported on the 6th that Kim Jong-un visited the construction site of the “Overseas Military Operations Combat Merit Memorial Hall” on the 5th with high-ranking party, government, and military officials. During the on-site guidance, he was accompanied by his daughter Ju-ae, wife Ri Sol-ju, and sister Kim Yo-jong, a vice department director of the Workers’ Party.


North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visits the construction site of the Overseas Military Operations Combat Merit Memorial Hall with Ri Sol-ju and Kim Ju-ae. /Newsis


Korean Central Television reported on the 6th that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited the construction site of the Overseas Military Operations Combat Merit Memorial Hall with party and government officials on the 5th. His wife Ri Sol-ju and daughter Kim Ju-ae accompanied him. /Newsis·Korean Central Television

Photos released by the newspaper showed Kim Jong-un holding a shovel with Ju-ae to plant a tree. Another image captured Kim driving a forklift carrying Ju-ae and other officials, drawing attention. This appears aimed at emphasizing the unassuming image of the supreme leader working alongside officials.

On that day, Ju-ae wore a black padded jacket and a scarf combining red, blue, and white—the colors of North Korea’s national flag. Ri Sol-ju was positioned at a relatively distant location, receiving less attention compared to her daughter.


Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of North Korea's Workers' Party, reported on the 6th that 'General Secretary Kim Jong-un visited the construction site of the Overseas Military Operations Combat Merit Memorial Hall with party and government officials on the 5th.' His daughter Kim Ju-ae accompanied the on-site guidance that day. /News1·Rodong Sinmun


Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of North Korea's Workers' Party, reported on the 6th that 'Comrade Kim Jong-un visited the construction site of the Overseas Military Operations Combat Merit Memorial Hall with party and government officials on the 5th.' /News1·Rodong Sinmun

Kim Jong-un described the memorial hall as “a monumental symbol of the era representing the heroism of the excellent sons of the Korean people.” He added, “Alongside the construction of this memorial hall, our people will celebrate major holidays, including the anniversary of the war victory, together with the heroes, powerfully demonstrating to the world the immortality of our great fatherland, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and the invincibility of the Korean People’s Army.”


Korean Central Television reported on the 6th that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un plants a tree at the construction site of the 'Overseas Military Operations Combat Merit Memorial Hall' with party and government officials on the 5th and takes commemorative photos with officers and soldiers mobilized for the construction. /Yonhap


Korean Central News Agency reported on the 6th that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un plants a commemorative tree with senior party, government, and military officials at the construction site of the Russian Expeditionary Forces Memorial Hall in Pyongyang on the 5th. /Korean Central News Agency·Yonhap

Kim Jong-un has recently been accompanied by Ju-ae on major schedules. During this year’s New Year, they publicly paid respects at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, where the preserved remains of Chairman Kim Il-sung and former Defense Commissioner Kim Jong-il are enshrined. Notably, in a front-facing photo, Ju-ae appeared to be standing at the center of the front row, reigniting speculation about her being a potential successor.

Regarding North Korean reports highlighting Ju-ae, the Ministry of Unification said, “While the succession framework is fundamentally considered, recent appearances seem to emphasize the ‘socialist big family’ concept more than succession aspects.” This assessment is based on Ju-ae’s appearances alongside her father and Ri Sol-ju’s public presence. The government reportedly judges that if North Korea were to emphasize succession, positioning Ju-ae behind Kim Jong-un would be more natural than placing her at the center.


North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visits the construction site of the Overseas Military Operations Combat Merit Memorial Hall with daughter Kim Ju-ae. /Newsis



12. North Korea’s utility collection drive pits neighborhood watch heads against broke people


Summary: 


north Korea is pushing a nationwide campaign to collect unpaid electricity and housing fees, creating friction between neighborhood watch unit heads and cash strapped residents. In one Ryanggang County case, a head argued for over an hour with a mother and daughter who had not paid for six months and complained they barely receive water or power. Authorities pressure unit heads to collect quickly, so they in turn press households, sometimes visiting in person when mobile transfers are missed. Though monthly bills are only about 5,000–8,000 won, accumulated arrears are hard to pay, fueling recurring, highly visible neighborhood confrontations.


Comment: How is this the Socialist Workers Paradise? Can we see a tipping point as all these injustices accumulate?


North Korea’s utility collection drive pits neighborhood watch heads against broke people

dailynk.com

North Korea’s utility collection drive pits neighborhood watch heads against broke people | Daily NK English


By Eun Seol - January 8, 2026


https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-utility-collection-drive-pits-neighborhood-watch-heads-broke-people/

FILE PHOTO: An electricity pole in Sunchon, South Pyongan province, in October 2018. (Daily NK)

North Korea has been collecting unpaid electricity bills and housing fees across the country, sparking friction between neighborhood watch unit heads and ordinary people.

“In one neighborhood watch unit in Kimjongsuk County, an argument erupted between the unit head pressing a family to pay their electricity bills and housing fees, and the family pushing back, saying they would pay when they could,” a Daily NK source in Ryanggang province said recently. “The argument lasted over an hour, with voices growing louder. Eventually, everyone in the neighborhood watch unit came outside to watch.”

According to the source, the unit head informed the household that it hadn’t paid utilities in six months and demanded immediate payment.

The family responded: “You need money to pay, and it’s nonsense that you simply take our money when we don’t properly receive water or power.”

Household size determines utility bills, and this household—a mother and daughter—had a relatively small bill.

Still, after months of non-payment, the neighborhood watch unit head personally urged them to settle their debt, triggering the confrontation.

In North Korea, people can pay utilities like electricity bills and housing fees through mobile transfers. Those with phones can transfer money to designated accounts, but those without phones or who miss deadlines get visits from neighborhood watch unit heads collecting in person.

Pressure from above creates tension below

Arguments erupt when unit heads come demanding money. As authorities pressure them to collect unpaid bills quickly, unit heads have no choice but to pressure people.

“The neighborhood watch unit heads are getting pressed from above, so they have to push families to pay quickly, and people respond that they don’t have the money right away,” the source said.

Witnesses to such confrontations are divided. Some side with the unit heads, arguing “it’s not like they want to pressure families,” and that it would “simply be better for families to pay what they owe quickly without starting a fight.”

Most people, however, say unit heads should avoid confrontations “because families would pay if they had money,” and should be more understanding of those who cannot afford their bills.

“Electricity bills or housing fees aren’t high—maybe between 5,000 and 8,000 North Korean won (roughly $3-$5)—but they’re hard to pay all at once if you’ve been missing payments,” the source said. “These fights between neighborhood watch unit heads and ordinary people will keep happening.”

Read in Korean

Eun Seol

Eun Seol completed her doctoral coursework at the University of North Korean Studies and focuses on education and cultural issues in North Korea. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynkenglish(at)uni-media.net.


dailynk.com


13. North Korean markets buzz with fresh food as winter vegetable supply surges


Summary:


Markets across north Korea are unusually lively this winter, with stalls stocked with fresh vegetables, seafood, pork, sandfish, and injogogi for New Year demand. Greenhouse produce such as cucumbers, lettuce, mushrooms, and tomatoes, once rare in rural areas, is now widely available, supplemented by imports from China. Increased supply has pushed prices down somewhat, bringing winter vegetables within reach of more households, though they remain costly for some. State propaganda about year round greenhouse vegetables is, for now, matched by market reality. Improved seafood storage and distribution also support brisk trade, and merchants express cautious optimism that this momentum will continue.


Comment: Part of the propaganda push in preparation for the party congress?


North Korean markets buzz with fresh food as winter vegetable supply surges

dailynk.com

Once-scarce winter vegetables are now plentiful and more affordable, fulfilling state propaganda promises while creating optimism among merchants and consumers

By Seon Hwa - January 8, 2026

https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korean-markets-buzz-with-fresh-food-as-winter-vegetable-supply-surges/

North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun reported in its July 12, 2025, issue that trucks loaded with the year’s first peach crops from Kwail county and Onchon Orchard had arrived in the cities of Pyongyang and Nampo on July 11. (Rodong Sinmun, News 1)

Major markets throughout North Korea have bustled with activity since New Year’s Day. Even in struggling agricultural villages, more consumers are visiting markets stocked with fresh vegetables and seafood.

According to a Daily NK source in North Pyongan province, markets in agricultural regions like Unsan county have been receiving plenty of sandfish, pork, injogogi (artificial meat made from soybeans), and other holiday foods at the start of the new year.

Demand for these items grows every January around the New Year holiday, and this year was no different—merchants recorded strong sales, the source said.

“Sandfish, pork, and injogogi were quite popular as the holiday approached,” the source said. “People firmly believe you need these foods for the holiday, so they sell well even if you raise prices a bit.”

Particularly striking is how market stalls overflow with fresh vegetables despite the dead of winter. With more merchants selling greenhouse produce like cucumbers, lettuce, mushrooms, and tomatoes, sales of these items are climbing too.

Fresh vegetables now sold in North Korean markets include produce from local greenhouse farms, but many have been imported from China and distributed to provincial markets, the source said.

“As recently as last year, people in rural regions couldn’t even imagine eating vegetables like cucumbers or lettuce,” the source said. “Even if you found them, they were just for show. But nowadays, with plenty of supply, prices have dropped somewhat, and more people buy them, even if they’re still a bit expensive.”

State propaganda meets market reality

The authorities have repeatedly claimed they would build large-scale greenhouse farms so people could eat fresh vegetables year-round, and public consumption of vegetables has risen as a result.

“People began believing you could eat vegetables even in winter because the state keeps promoting it,” the source said. “In fact, more vegetables appear in markets, and people no longer think winter vegetables are either expensive or poor quality.”

Market stalls selling seafood have also done brisk business recently. “There are plenty of customers at seafood stalls as more people look for fresh or frozen fish,” the source said. “This is because seafood storage and distribution are better than in the past.”

With so much produce reaching markets and so many people buying compared to previous years, merchants are hoping the momentum continues.

One merchant told the source: “I think I’ll make money if there are plenty of goods and plenty of people in the markets, just like now. I hope this atmosphere continues.”

Read in Korean


dailynk.com




14. Why did President Lee refer to Xi's remark as 'the words of Confucius'?


Summary:


President Lee interpreted Xi Jinping’s call for South Korea to “stand on the right side of history” as “the words of Confucius” to neutralize its political edge and recast it as a universal moral platitude rather than a veiled demand to align with China. By framing the remark as generic ethical guidance, Lee avoided accepting any China centered strategic framing while still showing cultural respect and avoiding public friction. This approach reflects Seoul’s broader line: engage Beijing politely, deny that Chinese rhetoric dictates Korean choices, and preserve freedom of action to pursue its own interests and U.S. aligned cooperation.


Comment: Korea must not nomarlize Xi's refrmaing of history.


Why did President Lee refer to Xi's remark as 'the words of Confucius'?

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By Shim Jae-yun

  • Published Jan 8, 2026 4:23 pm KST


https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/20260108/why-did-president-lee-refer-to-xis-remark-as-the-words-of-confucius

President Lee Jae Myung and Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, shake hands during a Korea-China memorandum of understanding signing ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Jan. 5. (Yonhap)

When President Lee Jae Myung said that he understood Chinese President Xi Jinping’s remark about “standing on the right side of history” as “the words of Confucius,” he was making a carefully calibrated diplomatic statement rather than a philosophical observation. His comment reveals how South Korea seeks to manage sensitive relations with China without compromising its own national interests or international positioning.

President Xi’s phrasing has been interpreted widely as carrying political weight. In recent years, China has used moral and historical language to frame global issues, sometimes implying that other countries should align with China’s vision of world order, particularly in contrast to U.S.-led alliances. Against this backdrop, Xi’s remark raised speculation that China was subtly urging South Korea to distance itself from U.S.-centered cooperation.

Lee’s response deliberately defused that interpretation. By describing the remark as “the words of Confucius,” he reframed it as a universal moral teaching rather than a geopolitical directive. Confucius is widely associated with ideas such as ethical conduct, harmony and living a righteous life. In this sense, Lee suggested that Xi’s words should be understood as a general call to act justly, not as a demand for political alignment.

This framing served multiple purposes. It allowed Lee to show respect for Chinese culture and tradition, reducing the risk of diplomatic friction. At the same time, it avoided endorsing any specific Chinese strategic position. By emphasizing that public remarks should be taken at face value, Lee signaled that South Korea would not read hidden instructions into such statements.

Ultimately, Lee’s comment underscored a core principle of South Korean diplomacy: engagement without submission. By treating Xi’s remark as a moral aphorism rather than a strategic ultimatum, Lee reaffirmed that South Korea will pursue its own national interests while maintaining constructive relations with all major powers.

Shim Jae-yun is chief editorial writer of The Korea Times.





Shim Jae-yun

I am now the chief editorial writer of The Korea Times. I also worked as the managing editor of the newspaper for 26 months from April 2018. Before that my stints included Politics Desk editor, Business Desk editor, City Desk editor and Culture Desk editor. As a journalist of The Korea Times, the most influential English newspaper of Korea, I have been committed to promoting 'international justice' beyond the social justice pursued by vernacular papers. My career includes working as a visiting scholar in Britain's Cambridge University from 2006-07.

jayshim@koreatimes.co.kr






De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

https://apstrategy.org/

Executive Director, Korea Regional Review

https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/

Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal

https://smallwarsjournal.com/

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Executive Director, Korean Regional Review

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com



If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:


"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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