Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Your position never gives you the right to command. It only imposes on you the duty of so living your life that others may receive your orders without being humiliated."

– Dag Hammarskjold

"The real index of civilization is when people are kinder than they need to be."

– Louis de Bernieres

"Respect your efforts, respect yourself. Self-respect leads to self-discipline. When you have both firmly under your belt, that's real power."

– Clint Eastwood

1. A Close Call for U.S. Commandos and an Emboldened Trump

2. Trump proposes massive increase in 2027 defense spending to $1.5T, citing 'dangerous times'

3. US will exit 66 international organizations as it further retreats from global cooperation

4. Withdrawing the United States from International Organizations, Conventions, and Treaties that Are Contrary to the Interests of the United States

5. The U.S. Pumps More Crude Than Anyone Else. Here’s Why It Wants Venezuela’s Too.

6. US has right to take over any country for its resources: Miller

7. What We Know About U.S. Seizures of Oil Tankers

8. Opinion | The Pentagon’s Patriot-Missile Realism

9. A Serious Report for Adversaries; Shrugs for Partners and Allies

10. Opinion | The Iranian Protests Escalate

11. Intelligence, power, moral clarity: Trump's Venezuela masterstroke

12. Marco Rubio says he will meet Danish officials to discuss Greenland next week

13. Adapting the Combat Training Centers for the Drone Battlefield

14. The New Global (dis)order and the Limits of China’s Power

15. Who Stress-Tests U.S. War Plans?

16. Overcoming the Principal-Agent Problem in “Running” Venezuela

17. Q & A: Karl Marlantes on Vietnam, Leadership, and the Lessons America Still Hasn’t Learned

18. China eyes risks, gains as Trump pushes for ‘spheres of influence’

19. Maduro's downfall deals China new cards in US rivalry

20. Maduro’s capture is an embarrassing defeat for China, Russia and Iran

21. What Silicon Valley Gets Wrong About National Security

22. To Support an America First State Department, Establish a Deputy Secretary of State for Military Affairs

1. A Close Call for U.S. Commandos and an Emboldened Trump

Summary:

The raid to capture Venezuela’s Maduro succeeded but nearly failed when a lead MH-47 Chinook was hit near the target and the mission commander pilot took three rounds to the leg. The operation, “Absolute Resolve,” blended cyber effects that blacked out Caracas, strikes by radar-evading fighters against Russian-built air defenses, and a helicopter assault that inserted more than 80 Delta Force commandos. After a firefight with Maduro’s Cuban security, the force seized Maduro and his wife and exfiltrated to the USS Iwo Jima. POTUS is using the outcome to validate a high-risk, force-forward style and is threatening repeat raids if Caracas resists.

A Close Call for U.S. Commandos and an Emboldened Trump

As a damaged U.S. helicopter struggled to stay aloft over Venezuela’s capital, the success of the entire operation hung in the balance.

By Eric Schmitt and Greg Jaffe

Reporting from Washington

Jan. 7, 2026
Updated 6:24 p.m. ET

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/07/us/politics/trump-venezuela-helicopter.html

By Eric Schmitt and Greg Jaffe

Reporting from Washington

Jan. 7, 2026
Updated 6:24 p.m. ET

President Trump described the operation to capture President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela as a “perfectly executed” display of American military power.

But Mr. Trump’s account of the audacious raid left out key details that underscored the risks U.S. troops faced as they approached Mr. Maduro’s fortified compound and how close the high-stakes operation came to taking a turn for the worse.

In the early hours of Saturday morning, U.S. Army helicopters skimmed 100 feet above the sea and then over Caracas, Venezuela’s capital, racing toward their target. Their stealthy pathway had been cleared by an American cyberattack that darkened the city, and by radar-evading U.S. fighter jets that pounded Venezuela’s Russian-built air defenses.

Initially, the helicopters, carrying dozens of Army Delta Force commandos, flew undetected.

But as they approached Mr. Maduro’s lair, the aircraft came under fire and shot back. The first helicopter in the assault, a giant twin-rotor MH-47 Chinook, was hit but remained flyable. The flight leader, who also planned the mission and was piloting the Chinook, was struck three times in the leg, said current and former U.S. officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters.

As the damaged helicopter struggled to stay aloft and deliver its troops to their target, the success of the entire operation, called Absolute Resolve, involving more than 150 aircraft launched from 20 different land and sea bases in the region, hung in the balance.

In his second term, Mr. Trump has grown more confident in sending the military on high-stakes missions to achieve complex foreign policy objectives. Asked what he would do if Delcy Rodríguez, Venezuela’s interim leader, resists his administration’s directives, Mr. Trump threatened another raid.

“She will face a situation probably worse than Maduro,” Mr. Trump told reporters on Air Force One this week.

But Mr. Trump’s string of military successes in places like Iran, Syria and now Venezuela, coupled with his tendency to take big risks, dating back to the earliest days of his real estate career and multiple bankruptcies, have obscured the downsides of using force in the manner that has increasingly defined his foreign policy.

“You’re operating on a very delicate wire and the risks of failing are huge,” said Seth G. Jones, a senior national security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Sometimes there are factors beyond your control.”

Image

A residential building damaged during the U.S. military’s airstrikes in Caracas, Venezuela, on Saturday.Credit...The New York Times

Those risks of a potentially catastrophic outcome were especially evident in Venezuela as the pilots of the damaged Chinook — one of them seriously wounded — fought to complete their mission.

Would these operators from the Army’s elite 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment adjust and prevail, as members of the SEAL Team 6 raid to capture Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011 did after one of their helicopters clipped a wall and crashed?

Or would the Chinook plummet into a hostile city and become a deadly echo of the Black Hawk helicopter that was shot down in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993 and ignited a fierce battle in which 18 U.S. troops died and 73 were wounded, at the time the deadliest single engagement for American troops since the Vietnam War?

“Failure of one component of this well-oiled machine would have endangered the entire mission,” Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said only hours after the mission was complete.

The Chinook did not crash. The flight leader, with the help of a co-pilot, stuck the landing, disgorged the commandos inside and guided the aircraft back to the warship Iwo Jima off the Venezuelan coast, as search-and-rescue teams and quick-reaction forces outside the country stood ready to zoom in, if needed.

By 2:01 a.m. in Caracas, more than 80 Army commandos had piled out of the helicopters, including the damaged Chinook. After an intense firefight with Mr. Maduro’s Cuban security detail, the soldiers blew open a door leading to Mr. Maduro’s bedroom, where they seized him and his wife as they were trying to escape into a steel-reinforced room.

A fresh wave of helicopters whisked the commandos and their prisoners from the compound, fighting through hostile fire on the way out. By 4:29 a.m., the aircraft were back over water, and later delivered Mr. Maduro and his wife to authorities on the Iwo Jima.

The flight leader, whom the Pentagon has not identified for security reasons, suffered serious injuries, but is recovering at a hospital in Texas along with one other soldier, the military said on Tuesday. Five other service members were treated for injuries and released. Military officials described the flight leader’s actions that night as “heroic.”

The mission also resulted in the deaths of about 40 Venezuelans, in addition to 32 Cubans who were helping to guard Mr. Maduro, according to Venezuelan and Cuban officials.

“This was one of the most stunning, effective and powerful displays of American military might and competence in American history,” Mr. Trump proclaimed after all the troops had returned home.

On Wednesday, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth alluded to the dangers that the U.S. commandos faced. “It was a contested raid, even with the sophistication that went into it,” he told “The Charlie Kirk Show.” “It wasn’t until we saw those birds floating out that any of us could really exhale.”

Image

President Trump speaking at a news conference on Saturday after the capture of President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela.Credit...Tierney L. Cross/The New York Times

“Not one piece of military equipment was lost,” he noted. “Not one service member was, more importantly, killed.”

In his news conference announcing Mr. Maduro’s capture, Mr. Trump took something of a victory lap, ticking off his recent military successes. He cited the killing of the Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi by Delta Force commandos in 2019; the death of Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, Iran’s top security and intelligence commander, in 2020 from a U.S. drone strike; and the targeting of Iran’s nuclear program by B-2 bombers in 2025.

“All perfectly executed and done,” Mr. Trump said.

To Mr. Trump, the military’s past failures were the product of lesser presidential leadership. In his news conference, he alluded to the botched U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 and President Jimmy Carter’s failed attempt in 1980 to rescue the U.S. hostages being held in Iran, which resulted in eight dead U.S. troops.

“You’ve seen some raids in this country that didn’t go so well,” he said. “They were an embarrassment.”

Notably absent from Mr. Trump’s list was the death of William Ryan Owens, a Navy SEAL, on a raid against an Al Qaeda offshoot operating in southern Yemen in 2017. In the aftermath of the mission, some questioned whether it was necessary.

At the time, Mr. Trump seemed to shift blame to his senior military leaders.

This was “something they wanted to do,” he said. “They came to see me, they explained what they wanted to do, the generals — who are very respected, my generals are the most respected that we’ve had in many decades, I believe. And they lost Ryan.”

Mr. Trump quickly soured on many of the military leaders from his first term. “I’ve worked with a lot of generals,” he said after the Venezuela raid. “I worked with some I didn’t like. I worked with some I didn’t respect.”

By contrast, he has described General Caine in glowing terms. “This guy is fantastic,” Mr. Trump said.

Image

“This guy is fantastic,” Mr. Trump said of Gen. Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.Credit...Eric Lee for The New York Times

In comparison with diplomacy, which has produced slow and unsatisfying results for Mr. Trump in places like Ukraine, military action often produces quick outcomes.

A big question for the military is how an increasingly confident Mr. Trump will react if it loses troops in battle.

Elliot Ackerman, a Marine veteran who served with the C.I.A.’s special activities division, reiterated that the U.S. military’s elite units have capabilities that no other nation can match.

“They train meticulously and execute incredibly precise operations,” he said.

But even the best planned and executed military operations hinge on uncertainties and can end badly, with long-lasting consequences.

“The second you have a U.S. soldier killed or captured, it changes the political calculus,” Mr. Ackerman said. “So it’s extremely risky to base a foreign policy around these types of operations. You can’t keep stepping up to the craps table and never expect to throw a losing roll.”

Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times. He has reported on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism for more than three decades.

Greg Jaffe covers the Pentagon and the U.S. military for The Times.

2. Trump proposes massive increase in 2027 defense spending to $1.5T, citing 'dangerous times'

Summary:

POTUS proposed raising U.S. defense spending to $1.5 trillion in 2027, framing it as necessary in “troubled and dangerous times.” The request follows the Maduro capture operation and continued U.S. force posture in the Caribbean. The 2026 defense budget is $901 billion, and Congress recently added about $175 billion via last year’s GOP tax and spending bill. POTUS argues tariff revenue can help fund the increase, though reported tariff and excise receipts remain far below the scale of his promises. He also threatened to restrict Pentagon business with Raytheon unless it curbs stock buybacks and invests more in production capacity, backed by an executive order targeting contractor underperformance.

Comment: If defense spending nearly doubles in nominal terms, what specific strategic problems does the additional $600 billion solve that current force structure, posture, and authorities cannot, and how will success be measured beyond inputs?

Can tariff-driven revenue realistically sustain long-term defense growth without crowding out readiness, modernization, or alliance commitments, and what happens when tariff income declines or triggers retaliation?

Does using procurement leverage to reshape defense industry behavior strengthen wartime production resilience, or does it risk slowing innovation and narrowing the supplier base at a moment of sustained global competition?

Trump proposes massive increase in 2027 defense spending to $1.5T, citing 'dangerous times'

AP · AAMER MADHANI · January 7, 2026

By AAMER MADHANI and KONSTANTIN TOROPIN

Updated 7:44 PM EST, January 7, 2026

Leer en español

https://apnews.com/article/trump-defense-spending-3bbea1ccc679ee8a388386d60e651fd7

WASHINGTON (AP) — President Donald Trump on Wednesday proposed setting U.S. military spending at $1.5 trillion in 2027, citing “troubled and dangerous times.”

Trump called for the massive surge in spending days after he ordered a U.S. military operation to capture Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and spirit him out of the country to face drug trafficking charges in the United States. U.S. forces continue to mass in the Caribbean Sea.

The 2026 military budget is set at $901 billion.

Trump in recent days has also called for taking over the Danish territory of Greenland for national security reasons and has suggested he’s open to carrying out military operations in Colombia. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has ominously warned that longtime adversary Cuba “is in trouble.”

“This will allow us to build the ‘Dream Military’ that we have long been entitled to and, more importantly, that will keep us SAFE and SECURE, regardless of foe,” Trump said in a posting on Truth Social announcing his proposal.

The military just received a large boost of some $175 billion in the GOP’s “big, beautiful bill” of tax breaks and spending reductions that Trump signed into law last year.

Insisting on more funding for the Pentagon is almost certain to run into resistance from Democrats who work to maintain parity between changes in defense and non-defense spending. But it’s also sure to draw objections from the GOP’s deficit hawks who have pushed back against larger military spending.

But Trump said he feels comfortable surging spending on the military because of increased revenue created by his administration through tariffs imposed on friends and foes around the globe since his return to office.

The U.S. government collected gross revenues of $288.5 billion last year from tariffs and other excise taxes, up from $98.3 billion in 2024, according to the Bipartisan Policy Center. That’s a meaningful increase in revenues from taxing imports. But it’s not enough to cover the various promises made by Trump, who has said the tariffs can also cover dividends to taxpayers, pay down the national debt and, now, cover increased spending on the military.

Meanwhile, Trump on Wednesday also threatened to cut off Pentagon purchases from Raytheon, one of the biggest U.S. defense contractors, if the company did not end the practice of stock buybacks and invest more profits into building out its weapons manufacturing capacity.

“Either Raytheon steps up, and starts investing in more upfront Investment like Plants and Equipment, or they will no longer be doing business with Department of War,” Trump said on social media. “Also, if Raytheon wants further business with the United States Government, under no circumstances will they be allowed to do any additional Stock Buybacks, where they have spent Tens of Billions of Dollars, until they are able to get their act together.”

The threat came as the president issued an executive order calling on the Pentagon to begin a review to spot defense contractors who are underperforming on fulfilling contracts and insufficiently investing in building manufacturing but are still engaging in stock buybacks or distributing dividends to shareholders.

The order also calls for the Pentagon to take steps to ensure future contracts with any new or existing defense contractor contain a provision prohibiting stock buybacks during a period of underperformance on U.S. government contracts. The order also calls for the Pentagon to stipulate in future contracts that executive incentive compensation is not tied to short-term financial metrics.

Trump in recent months has repeatedly complained broadly that defense companies have been woefully behind on deliveries of critical weaponry, yet continue to mete out dividends and stock buybacks to investors and offering eye-popping salaries to top executives.

The criticism of Raytheon, however, was the most pointed to date of a particular contractor.

The company is responsible for making some of the military’s most widely used and notable missiles, including the Tomahawk cruise missile, the shoulder-launched Javelin and Stinger missiles, and the Sidewinder air-to-air missile.

Raytheon also owns Pratt and Whitney, a company that is responsible for manufacturing a host of jet engines that power aircraft for all the military branches, including the newest F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

On Wall Street, shares of defense contractors fell, with Northrop Grumman dropping 5.5%, Lockheed Martin declining 4.8% and RTX Corp., the parent company of Raytheon, slipping 2.5%.

Raytheon did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

—

AP writers Josh Boak, Stephen Groves, Paul Harloff and Lisa Mascaro contributed reporting.

AP · AAMER MADHANI · January 7, 2026

3. US will exit 66 international organizations as it further retreats from global cooperation

Summary:

The administration announced the U.S. will exit or suspend support for 66 international organizations, most tied to the United Nations, citing redundancy, mismanagement, ideological bias, and threats to sovereignty. POTUS formalized the move by executive order after a government-wide review, extending earlier withdrawals from WHO, UNRWA, UNESCO, and the Human Rights Council. The pullback includes the UN climate framework and population agency, signaling a shift toward selective, transactional multilateralism. Officials argue resources will be redirected to forums where U.S. China competition shapes global standards. Critics warn the move weakens U.S. influence, disrupts humanitarian and climate cooperation, and accelerates a broader retreat from postwar multilateral leadership.

Comment: This may be the major inflection point in US history.

Does selective disengagement increase U.S. leverage, or does it create vacuums that competitors can fill at lower cost and higher legitimacy? Rhetorical question - I think we know the answer.

Can the United States shape global rules from the outside, or does influence ultimately require sustained presence inside imperfect institutions? - I think we are ceding influence that will ultimately harm the U.S.

US will exit 66 international organizations as it further retreats from global cooperation

AP · MATTHEW LEE · January 7, 2026

By MATTHEW LEE and FARNOUSH AMIRI

Updated 8:06 PM EST, January 7, 2026

Leer en español

https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-trump-international-organizations-withdrawal-d704fb9b444dc9cf569865d391b544a6

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Trump administration will withdraw from dozens of international organizations, including the U.N.'s population agency and the U.N. treaty that establishes international climate negotiations, as the U.S. further retreats from global cooperation.

President Donald Trump on Wednesday signed an executive order suspending U.S. support for 66 organizations, agencies, and commissions, following his administration’s review of participation in and funding for all international organizations, including those affiliated with the United Nations, according to a White House release.

Most of the targets are U.N.-related agencies, commissions and advisory panels that focus on climate, labor, migration and other issues the Trump administration has categorized as catering to diversity and “woke” initiatives. Other non-U.N. organizations on the list include the Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and Global Counterterrorism Forum.

“The Trump Administration has found these institutions to be redundant in their scope, mismanaged, unnecessary, wasteful, poorly run, captured by the interests of actors advancing their own agendas contrary to our own, or a threat to our nation’s sovereignty, freedoms, and general prosperity,” the State Department said in a statement.

Trump’s decision to withdraw from organizations that foster cooperation among nations to address global challenges comes as his administration has launched military efforts or issued threats that have rattled allies and adversaries alike, including capturing autocratic Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and indicating an intention to take over Greenland.

This is the latest U.S. withdrawal from global agencies

The administration previously suspended support from agencies like the World Health Organization, the U.N. for Palestinian refugees known as UNRWA, the U.N. Human Rights Council and the U.N. cultural agency UNESCO as it has taken a larger, a-la-carte approach to paying its dues to the world body, picking which operations and agencies they believe align with Trump’s agenda and those which no longer serve U.S. interests.

“I think what we’re seeing is the crystallization of the U.S. approach to multilateralism, which is ‘my way or the highway,’” said Daniel Forti, head of U.N. affairs at the International Crisis Group. “It’s a very clear vision of wanting international cooperation on Washington’s own terms.”

It has marked a major shift from how previous administrations — both Republican and Democratic — have dealt with the U.N., and it has forced the world body, already undergoing its own internal reckoning, to respond with a series of staffing and program cuts.

Many independent nongovernmental agencies — some that work with the United Nations — have cited many project closures because of the U.S. administration’s decision last year to slash foreign assistance through the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID.

Despite the massive shift, the U.S. officials, including Trump himself, say they have seen the potential of the U.N. and want to instead focus taxpayer money on expanding American influence in many of the standard-setting U.N. initiatives where there is competition with China, like the International Telecommunications Union, the International Maritime Organization and the International Labor Organization.

The global organizations from which the US is departing

The withdrawal from the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, or UNFCCC, is the latest effort by Trump and his allies to distance the U.S. from international organizations focused on climate and addressing climate change.

UNFCC, the 1992 agreement between 198 countries to financially support climate change activities in developing countries, is the underlying treaty for the landmark Paris climate agreement. Trump — who calls climate change a hoax — withdrew from that agreement soon after reclaiming the White House.

Gina McCarthy, former White House National Climate Adviser, called the move “shortsighted, embarrassing, and a foolish decision.”

“As the only country in the world not a part of the UNFCCC treaty, the Trump administration is throwing away decades of U.S. climate change leadership and global collaboration,” McCarthy, who co-chairs America Is All In, a coalition of climate-concerned U.S. states and cities, said in a statement. “This Administration is forfeiting our country’s ability to influence trillions of dollars in investments, policies, and decisions that would have advanced our economy and protected us from costly disasters wreaking havoc on our country.”

Mainstream scientists say climate change is behind increasing instances of deadly and costly extreme weather, including flooding, droughts, wildfires, intense rainfall events and dangerous heat.

The U.S. withdrawal could hinder global efforts to curb greenhouse gases because it “gives other nations the excuse to delay their own actions and commitments,” said Stanford University climate scientist Rob Jackson, who chairs the Global Carbon Project, a group of scientists that tracks countries’ carbon dioxide emissions.

It will also be difficult to achieve meaningful progress on climate change without cooperation from the U.S., one of the world’s largest emitters and economies, experts said.

The U.N.'s population agency, which provides sexual and reproductive health across the world, has long been a lightning rod for Republican opposition and Trump himself cut funding for the agency during his first term in office. He and other GOP officials have accused the agency of participating in “coercive abortion practices” in countries like China.

When President Joe Biden took office in January 2021, he restored funding for the agency. A State Department review conducted the following year found no evidence to support GOP claims.

Other organizations and agencies that the U.S. will quit include the Carbon Free Energy Compact, the United Nations University, the International Cotton Advisory Committee, the International Tropical Timber Organization, the Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation, the Pan-American Institute for Geography and History, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies and the International Lead and Zinc Study Group.

The State Department said additional reviews are ongoing.

___

Amiri reported from the United Nations. Associated Press writer Tammy Webber reported from Fenton, Michigan.

___

This story has been updated to correct Daniel Forti’s title at the International Crisis Group; It is head of U.N. affairs, not senior U.N. analyst.

AP · MATTHEW LEE · January 7, 2026

4. Withdrawing the United States from International Organizations, Conventions, and Treaties that Are Contrary to the Interests of the United States

Comment: Is the next move for the US to evict the UN from New York?

Presidential Actions

Withdrawing the United States from International Organizations, Conventions, and Treaties that Are Contrary to the Interests of the United States

Presidential Memoranda

January 7, 2026

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/01/withdrawing-the-united-states-from-international-organizations-conventions-and-treaties-that-are-contrary-to-the-interests-of-the-united-states/

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby direct:

Section 1. Purpose. (a) On February 4, 2025, I issued Executive Order 14199 (Withdrawing the United States from and Ending Funding to Certain United Nations Organizations and Reviewing United States Support to All International Organizations). That Executive Order directed the Secretary of State, in consultation with the United States Representative to the United Nations, to conduct a review of all international intergovernmental organizations of which the United States is a member and provides any type of funding or other support, and all conventions and treaties to which the United States is a party, to determine which organizations, conventions, and treaties are contrary to the interests of the United States. The Secretary of State has reported his findings as required by Executive Order 14199.

(b) I have considered the Secretary of State’s report and, after deliberating with my Cabinet, have determined that it is contrary to the interests of the United States to remain a member of, participate in, or otherwise provide support to the organizations listed in section 2 of this memorandum.

(c) Consistent with Executive Order 14199 and pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby direct all executive departments and agencies (agencies) to take immediate steps to effectuate the withdrawal of the United States from the organizations listed in section 2 of this memorandum as soon as possible. For United Nations entities, withdrawal means ceasing participation in or funding to those entities to the extent permitted by law.

(d) My review of further findings of the Secretary of State remains ongoing.

Sec. 2. Organizations from Which the United States Shall Withdraw. (a) Non-United Nations Organizations:

(i) 24/7 Carbon-Free Energy Compact;

(ii) Colombo Plan Council;

(iii) Commission for Environmental Cooperation;

(iv) Education Cannot Wait;

(v) European Centre of Excellence for Countering

Hybrid Threats;

(vi) Forum of European National Highway Research Laboratories;

(vii) Freedom Online Coalition;

(viii) Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund;

(ix) Global Counterterrorism Forum;

(x) Global Forum on Cyber Expertise;

(xi) Global Forum on Migration and Development;

(xii) Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research;

(xiii) Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals, and Sustainable Development;

(xiv) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change;

(xv) Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services;

(xvi) International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property;

(xvii) International Cotton Advisory Committee;

(xviii) International Development Law Organization;

(xix) International Energy Forum;

(xx) International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies;

(xxi) International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance;

(xxii) International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law;

(xxiii) International Lead and Zinc Study Group;

(xxiv) International Renewable Energy Agency;

(xxv) International Solar Alliance;

(xxvi) International Tropical Timber Organization;

(xxvii) International Union for Conservation of Nature;

(xxviii) Pan American Institute of Geography and History;

(xxix) Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation;

(xxx) Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia;

(xxxi) Regional Cooperation Council;

(xxxii) Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century;

(xxxiii) Science and Technology Center in Ukraine;

(xxxiv) Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme; and

(xxxv) Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.

(b) United Nations (UN) Organizations:

(i) Department of Economic and Social Affairs;

(ii) UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) — Economic Commission for Africa;

(iii) ECOSOC — Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean;

(iv) ECOSOC — Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific;

(v) ECOSOC — Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia;

(vi) International Law Commission;

(vii) International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals;

(viii) International Trade Centre;

(ix) Office of the Special Adviser on Africa;

(x) Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children in Armed Conflict;

(xi) Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict;

(xii) Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence Against Children;

(xiii) Peacebuilding Commission;

(xiv) Peacebuilding Fund;

(xv) Permanent Forum on People of African Descent;

(xvi) UN Alliance of Civilizations;

(xvii) UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries;

(xviii) UN Conference on Trade and Development;

(xix) UN Democracy Fund;

(xx) UN Energy;

(xxi) UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women;

(xxii) UN Framework Convention on Climate Change;

(xxiii) UN Human Settlements Programme;

(xxiv) UN Institute for Training and Research;

(xxv) UN Oceans;

(xxvi) UN Population Fund;

(xxvii) UN Register of Conventional Arms;

(xxviii) UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination;

(xxix) UN System Staff College;

(xxx) UN Water; and

(xxxi) UN University.

Sec. 3. Implementation Guidance. The Secretary of State shall provide additional guidance as needed to agencies when implementing this memorandum.

Sec. 4. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

(d) The Secretary of State is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

DONALD J. TRUMP

5. The U.S. Pumps More Crude Than Anyone Else. Here’s Why It Wants Venezuela’s Too.

Summary:

The U.S. leads the world in oil production but its refineries were built for heavier, sour crudes like Venezuela’s, not today’s lighter shale. About 70% of U.S. refining capacity runs best on heavy imports, so America still buys roughly 40% of its feedstock abroad while exporting surplus light crude.

Comment: Please go to the links to view the charts and graphics.

The U.S. Pumps More Crude Than Anyone Else. Here’s Why It Wants Venezuela’s Too.

WSJ

Ryan Dezember

and

Drew An-Pham

Jan. 7, 2026 8:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/business/energy-oil/us-venezuela-crude-oil-refining-df3854d1?st=P8PyXG&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

The U.S. pumps more oil than any other country, so why do President Trump and officials including Secretary of State Marco Rubio think American refineries need Venezuelan crude?

While the shale drilling boom has unleashed a flood of oil from places like West Texas and North Dakota, it is often not the right kind of crude for American refiners.

Refineries from Puget Sound to the Texas coast were designed decades ago to run the types of heavier and more sour grades of crude that the U.S. imports from countries including Canada, Mexico and Venezuela.

“Our refineries on the Gulf Coast are the best in the world in terms of refining this heavy crude and there’s been a shortage of heavy crude around the world so I think there will be tremendous demand and interest from private industry if given the space to do it,” Rubio said Sunday on ABC’s “This Week.”

About 70% of U.S. refining capacity runs most efficiently with heavier crude, according to the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, a trade group. Those plants are concentrated on the Gulf Coast, where nine of the country’s 10 largest refineries are located. In recent years, Venezuela’s oil output has plunged and what little it produces has mostly been redirected to countries such as Cuba and China.

As shipments from Mexico and Venezuela into the U.S. declined, refiners turned to Canada, which has ramped up heavy crude production from its oil sands. Canada now ships more oil to U.S. refineries than all other international suppliers combined.

In all, about 40% of the oil that runs through American refineries is imported to get the right mix of crudes to create different products, from gasoline and diesel to jet fuel and asphalt. Excess oil pumped in the U.S. gets shipped overseas since a ban on exporting crude was lifted a decade ago. America has since become one of the world’s largest oil exporters, sending tankers of crude to India, China, South Korea and all over Europe.

This explanatory article may be updated.

Write to Ryan Dezember at ryan.dezember@wsj.com

WSJ

6. US has right to take over any country for its resources: Miller

Summary:

White House adviser Stephen Miller told CNN the U.S. has the right to seize control of countries like Venezuela, and potentially Greenland, when resources and “our interests” are at stake, calling it the conduct of a superpower. He framed military intervention and resource control as core to Trump’s foreign policy, dismissing concerns about elections or sovereignty. Critics, including Senator Bernie Sanders, called this a textbook definition of imperialism that revives 19th and 20th century resource exploitation. Danish leaders warned any U.S. move on Greenland, a NATO partner, would threaten the alliance itself and undermine the international order Washington once built.

Excerpts:

Miller offered one of the most explicit explanations of the White House’s view yet: that “sovereign countries don’t get sovereignty if the US wants their resources,” as Representative Seth Moulton (D-Mass.) translated in a social media post.

...

Miller’s description of the White House’s current view on foreign policy followed threats from Trump against countries including Colombia, Mexico and Greenland, and further comments suggested that the administration could soon move to take control of the latter country – even though it is part of the kingdom of Denmark, which along with the US is a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

“Greenland should be part of the United States,” said Miller. “The president has been very clear about that. That is the formal position of the US government.”

He dismissed the idea that the takeover of Greenland, home to about 56,000 people, would involve a military operation – although Trump has said he would not rule out using force – and said that “nobody’s going to fight the United States militarily over the future of Greenland.”

Comment: I am just having a hard time figuring this out. I thought I had a decent public school education in international relations and national security but for the life of me I cannot follow Miller's rationale.

Does a doctrine that “sovereign countries do not get sovereignty if we want their resources” produce lasting security, or does it guarantee encirclement, resistance, and eventual overreach?

If the U.S. normalizes open resource imperialism, what happens to NATO, international law, and the legitimacy of American demands that adversaries respect borders and rules?

I wish we would put more emphasis on understanding Thucydides' "fear, honor, and interest" but I only think we are following his famous words about might makes right: "The strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must."

US has right to take over any country for its resources: Miller - Asia Times

asiatimes.com · Julia Conley · January 7, 2026

‘We’re a superpower and, under President Trump, we are going to conduct ourselves as a superpower’

by Julia Conley

January 7, 2026

https://asiatimes.com/2026/01/us-has-right-to-take-over-any-country-for-its-resources-miller/

“Belligerent” was how one Democratic lawmaker described a diatribe given by top White House adviser Stephen Miller on CNN Monday evening regarding the Trump administration’s right to take over Venezuela – or any other country – if doing so is in the interest of the US.

To Senator Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), however, Miller was simply providing viewers with “a very good definition of imperialism” as he described the worldview the administration is operating under as it takes control of Venezuela and eyes other countries, including Greenland, that it believes it can and should invade.

“This is what imperialism is all about,” Sanders told CNN‘s Jake Tapper. “And I suspect that people all over the world are saying, ‘Wow, we’re going back to where we were 100 years ago, or 50 years ago, where the big, powerful countries were exploiting poorer countries for their natural resources.’”

The senator spoke to Tapper shortly after Miller’s interview, in which the news anchor asked whether President Donald Trump would support holding an election in Venezuela days after the US military bombed the country and abducted President Nicolás Maduro and his wife.

Miller refused to directly engage with the question, saying only that it would be “absurd and preposterous” for the US to install Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado as the leader of the country, before asking Tapper to give him “the floor” and allow him to explain the White House’s view on foreign policy.

“The United States is using its military to secure our interests unapologetically in our hemisphere,” said Miller. “We’re a superpower and under President Trump we are going to conduct ourselves as a superpower. It is absurd that we would allow a nation in our backyard to become the supplier of resources to our adversaries but not to us.”

Instead of “demanding that elections be held” in Venezuela, he added, “the future of the free world depends on America to be able to assert ourselves and our interests without an apology.”

The Trump administration has repeatedly claimed that Venezuela “stole” oil from the United States. The country is believed to have the largest oil reserves in the world, and the government nationalized its petroleum industry in 1976, including projects that had been run by US-based ExxonMobil. The last privately run oil operations were nationalized in 2007 by then-President Hugo Chavez.

Miller offered one of the most explicit explanations of the White House’s view yet: that “sovereign countries don’t get sovereignty if the US wants their resources,” as Representative Seth Moulton (D-Mass.) translated in a social media post.

Moulton called Miller’s tirade “genuinely unhinged” and “a disturbing window into how this administration thinks about the world.”

Miller’s remarks followed a similarly blunt statement at a UN Security Council emergency meeting by US Ambassador Michael Waltz.

“You cannot continue to have the largest energy reserves in the world under the control of adversaries of the United States,” said Waltz.

Miller’s description of the White House’s current view on foreign policy followed threats from Trump against countries including Colombia, Mexico and Greenland, and further comments suggested that the administration could soon move to take control of the latter country – even though it is part of the kingdom of Denmark, which along with the US is a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

“Greenland should be part of the United States,” said Miller. “The president has been very clear about that. That is the formal position of the US government.”

He dismissed the idea that the takeover of Greenland, home to about 56,000 people, would involve a military operation – although Trump has said he would not rule out using force – and said that “nobody’s going to fight the United States militarily over the future of Greenland.”

The vast island is strategically located in the Arctic Circle and has largely untapped reserves of rare-earth minerals.

Danish and Greenlandic officials have condemned Trump’s latest threats this week, with Denmark’s prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, warning that, in accordance with the NATO treaty, “everything would come to an end” if the US attacks another NATO country.

“The international community as we know it, democratic rules of the game, NATO, the world’s strongest defensive alliance – all of that would collapse if one NATO country chose to attack another,” she told Danish news channel Live News on Monday.

The Danish government called an emergency meeting of its Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday to discuss “the kingdom’s relationship with the United States.”

On CNN, Sanders noted that as Trump sets his sights on controlling oil reserves in Venezuela and resources in Greenland, people across the president’s own country are struggling under rising costs and financial insecurity.

“Maybe instead of trying to run Venezuela,” said Sanders, “the president might try to do a better job running the United States of America.

This article, originally published by Common Dreams, is republished under a Creative Commons license.

asiatimes.com · Julia Conley · January 7, 2026

7. What We Know About U.S. Seizures of Oil Tankers

Summary:

U.S. forces intercepted two tankers, including the Russian-flagged Marinera, after a two-week pursuit in which the vessel spoofed its transponder, re-flagged to Russia, and briefly sailed with a Russian naval escort before boarding occurred without incident. This operation, along with recent seizures of the Centuries and Skipper, signals POTUS’s intent to exert de facto control over Venezuelan oil flows, seize and sell 30–50 million barrels, and redirect revenues under U.S. management. Washington is targeting a large “shadow fleet” that moves sanctioned oil via deceptive practices, aiming for a coercive quasi-blockade that stops short of a formal act of war.

Comment: At what point does a pattern of “law enforcement” seizures in international waters become, in practice, a naval blockade and thus an act of war?

Who ultimately gains strategic leverage if the United States assumes fiduciary control over Venezuela’s oil while Moscow and Beijing frame the seizures as piracy?

How resilient is the global shadow fleet; are we degrading an illicit system or merely forcing adversaries and private actors to innovate around U.S. maritime power?

What We Know About U.S. Seizures of Oil Tankers

U.S. forces seized two tankers, including one under a Russian flag, on Wednesday, as officials try to choke off most exports of Venezuelan crude oil.

By Jenny Gross and Genevieve Glatsky

Jan. 8, 2026, 4:36 a.m. ET

https://www.nytimes.com/article/trump-oil-tankers-venezuela.html?smtyp=cur&utm

Listen to this article · 4:53 min Learn more

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A frame grab from a video posted on social media by Kristi Noem, the homeland security secretary, showed a helicopter flying over Centuries, another oil tanker, which was intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard on Saturday.Credit...Agence France-Presse, via U.S. Homeland Security Secretary

The seizure by U.S. forces of a Russian-flagged oil tanker on Wednesday, part of an effort to choke off most Venezuelan exports of crude, ended a two-week pursuit on the high seas and escalated a confrontation with Moscow.

U.S. authorities led by the Coast Guard intercepted the vessel, the Marinera, in the waters between Scotland and Iceland, the U.S. military said. The operation was part of the Trump administration’s blockade of some tankers transporting oil from Venezuela.

Also on Wednesday, the military said that it had “apprehended a stateless, sanctioned dark fleet motor tanker,” the M Sophia, in international waters in the Caribbean, where it was “conducting illicit activities,” and that the ship was being escorted to the United States.

Here’s what we know.

A pursuit lasted two weeks.

The Marinera, which was previously known as the Bella 1 and began its journey in Iran, was first intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard on Dec. 20, while en route to pick up crude oil in Venezuela. Refusing to be boarded, the vessel instead rerouted away from the Caribbean, and the military began a pursuit.

To evade detection, the ship spoofed its transponder signals to make it appear as though it were off the coast of West Africa when it was in fact operating near Venezuela. The tactic is used by vessels in shadow fleets that transport oil for Russia, Iran and Venezuela in violation of sanctions imposed by the United States and other countries.

As the chase continued, the ship was renamed and registered under a Russian flag, with a home port of Sochi, on the Black Sea. Britain said the ship had been “initially flying a false flag.” On Jan. 2, the tanker broadcast its location after more than two weeks of sailing dark.

Russia sent at least one naval vessel to escort the Marinera, The New York Times reported, before it was seized. There were no Russian vessels in the area when the Coast Guard boarded the ship on Wednesday morning, averting the possibility of an armed standoff between the two countries, according to two U.S. officials briefed on the operation who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter.

500 mi.1000 km.

Source: Yaddnet.org Note: Shows first and last distress signals on Dec. 21. Times are Eastern.By Samuel Granados

The U.S. has previously intercepted tankers.

Last month, U.S. forces seized two other tankers. The Coast Guard boarded the Centuries, a tanker that had loaded Venezuelan oil, reportedly for a Chinese trader. Another tanker, the Skipper, that was transporting Venezuelan oil but had earlier carried Iranian oil, has been escorted to Galveston, Texas.

Tankers confronted by the United States

Locations of vessels around the time each was targeted by U.S. forces

500 mi.1000 km.

Sources: Yaddnet.org (Bella 1); MarineTraffic and Copernicus (Skipper); TankerTrackers.com (Centuries)By Samuel Granados and Riley Mellen

Image

A U.S. military helicopter flying over the Panama-flagged Centuries, which was intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard in the Caribbean in December.Credit...Department of Homeland Security, via Reuters

Trump is targeting Venezuela’s oil.

The Trump administration has said that it will maintain significant control over Venezuela’s oil industry for the foreseeable future, including overseeing the sale of oil. Mr. Trump said that Venezuela will begin sending oil to the United States, which will sell it “to benefit the people of Venezuela and the United States.”

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Wednesday that the first step in Venezuela is to stabilize the country, including by seizing and selling 30 million to 50 million barrels of oil. He added that the U.S. would control how the money would be disbursed.

Currently, much of Venezuela’s oil is sold to China. It also reaches the global market on tankers engaged in illicit trade and via Chevron, which pumps oil in the country and is allowed to export it under a license from the U.S. government.

The targeted ships are part of a shadow fleet.

Shipping and energy experts estimate that up to 20 percent of global tankers move oil from Iran, Venezuela and Russia in violation of U.S. sanctions. These ships often disguise their locations and file false paperwork. The Marinera, for instance, faked its location signal on a previous voyage.

U.S. officials say they have identified other tankers carrying Venezuelan oil that were previously involved in the Iranian oil trade, making them subject to U.S. sanctions. Mr. Trump has said that more seizures could follow, announcing a “complete blockade” of sanctioned oil tankers traveling to and from Venezuela. At least one vessel boarded by U.S. forces, the Centuries, does not appear on the Treasury Department’s public sanctions list.

Allowing most ships to continue operating would fall short of a true blockade — an act of war — and instead resemble a series of law enforcement operations.

Venezuela has condemned the boarding of the Centuries as theft and hijacking, accusing the United States of forcibly disappearing the crew.

The threat of additional seizures has apparently caused some tankers to reroute.

Some vessels that appeared to be heading to Venezuela have turned around, according to global shipping monitors.

Jenny Gross is a reporter for The Times covering breaking news and other topics.

Genevieve Glatsky is a reporter for The Times, based in Bogotá, Colombia.

8. Opinion | The Pentagon’s Patriot-Missile Realism

Summary:

The Pentagon will triple annual Patriot missile output to 2,000 under a seven-year Lockheed contract, signaling long-term demand and rebuilding munitions capacity for Ukraine, the Middle East, and a future Pacific war. The editorial praises Hegseth’s acquisition reforms and argues greater defense spending proves U.S. industry can still meet global security demands.

Comment: I suppose these are useful planning figures for our adversaries so they know how missiles they need to produce and shoot to deplete our stocks. My snarky comment aside, this is a very good step forward. We certainly need this capability.

Opinion | The Pentagon’s Patriot-Missile Realism

WSJ · The Pentagon’s Patriot-Missile Realism

It is ramping up production to 2,000 a year from 600 with a new seven-year contract.

By The Editorial Board

Jan. 7, 2026 5:46 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/pentagon-patriot-missile-trump-administration-pete-hegseth-lockheed-martin-271223c0

The Patriot weapons system were fired at the NATO Missile Firing Installation, Chania, Greece, Nov. 8, 2017. Sebastian Apel/Associated Press

It’s a wild world out there, so we’re pleased to bring you some unalloyed good news for the security of the United States. The Trump Administration is tripling production of a crucial air defense missile, a dose of realism about the world’s threats.

The Defense Department this week said it will work with Lockheed Martin to expand annual production of advanced Patriot air-defense missiles to 2,000 a year, from about 600 now. Many Americans have heard of the Patriot, which has been taking down Vladimir Putin’s cruise and ballistic missiles tormenting Ukraine.

Opinion: Potomac Watch

Trump Still Wants Greenland / RFK Jr.'s New Vaccine Schedule

The White House renews its pressure campaign to take control of Greenland, even suggesting the U.S. could do it by force. But what military access to the island can't already be negotiated? Plus, the CDC drops several shots from its childhood vaccine recommendations, which the trial bar could use as an opening for lawsuits.Read Transcript

But America needs more cover all over the world. U.S. troops defending America’s base in Qatar from Iranian attack last summer fired what the Pentagon called “the largest single Patriot engagement in U.S. military history.”

That would be a July 4 fireworks display compared with what U.S. forces would expend in a Pacific confrontation. Expanding the production line can help deter that conflict, and it gives America more strategic margin to help U.S. friends such as Ukraine, which can’t get enough Patriot missiles.

Especially notable is the Pentagon’s seven-year contract, part of Secretary Pete Hegseth’s promise to shake up the way the Defense Department purchases equipment. Pentagon official Michael Duffey says the arrangement will offer “an unwavering, long-term demand signal” from government, which gives companies the certainty they need to invest capital.

That predictability is also important for hundreds of suppliers that produce one doodad or another for missiles. The Pentagon acknowledges it’ll need assent from Congress—and that means the Administration will have to seek more money for defense in its budget. GOP defense appropriator Sen. Mitch McConnell underscored that point this week: “There’s no way around that fact.”

But with enough resources, the Patriot target is achievable, despite much defeatism about U.S. industrial capacity. Lockheed Martin has ramped up the Patriot line 60% over the past two years and is aiming to hit the 2,000 target by the end of 2030. That’s soon in the life of defense planning, and every missile helps.

Lockheed CEO Jim Taiclet also says the company is working with the Pentagon on similar frameworks for other weapons, such as the long-range antiship missile. War games for Taiwan show America running out of those indispensable fires within a week of fighting.

This news is also relevant to the broader world moment, notably America’s display of military sophistication in Caracas. Venezuela isn’t China or Russia, but the world’s bad actors have to take into account effective demonstrations of U.S. military power. Every recent time U.S. military technology has come into contact with the competition, the verdict has favored the free world.

The sprint for more munitions is a welcome development and a timely reminder that the U.S. can still choose to defend itself and its global interests.

Review & Outlook: European leaders including NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and the U.K.’s Chief of Defense Staff Richard Knighton are urging voters to make sacrifices to guarantee national security. Photo: Lucy North/PA Wire via Zuma Press/Kacper Pempel/Reuters/POU

WSJ · The Pentagon’s Patriot-Missile Realism

9. A Serious Report for Adversaries; Shrugs for Partners and Allies

Summary:

Platz argues Congress should require the Pentagon to produce an annual “will-to-fight” assessment for key U.S. partners and allies, comparable in rigor to the yearly public report on China’s military posture. He says recent failures in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Sahel show the United States still lacks a systematic way to judge whether partners will endure violence, mobilize society, sustain casualties, resist corruption, and keep critical systems running under attack. He proposes a whole-of-society framework that examines political resolve, public commitment, security force cohesion, infrastructure resilience, the effects of U.S. assistance, and institutional integrity, delivered in both classified and unclassified forms to guide policy and inform taxpayers.

Comment: An interesting and innovative idea. Assessing and reporting on our allies could be problematic on a number of levels. Will our allies consider this as collecting intelligence on them? And then if this information was made public I can see how our adversaries would use it to create narratives to drive wedges in our alliances: i.e., cognitive warfare.

I agree with the principle and intent of this proposal. This is critical information that we need to understand about our alliance relationships. I do think along similar lines as the author. But I think we have to be cautious about this type of information and not cause negative second and third order effects and of course the almost inevitable blowback.

My similar (though less comprehensive as the author's) thoughts here:

4. Assessment - must conduct continuous assessment to gain understanding - tactical, operational, and strategic. Assessments are key to developing strategy and campaign plans and anticipating potential conflict. Assessments allow you to challenge assumptions and determine if a rebalance of ways and means with the acceptable, durable, political arrangement is required. Understand the indigenous way of war and adapt to it. Do not force the US way of war upon indigenous forces if it is counter to their history, customs, traditions, and abilities.

5. Ensure US and indigenous interests are sufficiently aligned. If indigenous and US interests are not sufficiently aligned the mission will fail. If the US has stronger interest than the indigenous force we can create an “assistance paradox” - if indigenous forces believe the US mission is "no fail” and the US forces will not allow them to fail and therefore they do not need to try too hard. They may very well benefit from long term US aid and support which may be their objective for accepting support in the first place.

https://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2018/07/eight-points-of-special-warfare.html

A Serious Report for Adversaries; Shrugs for Partners and Allies

Why Congress Needs a Will-to-Fight Assessment for U.S. Partners

Ian Platz

Jan 06, 2026

https://governingsecurity.substack.com/p/a-serious-report-for-adversaries

Why do American taxpayers know more about our adversaries’ capacity to fight and win wars than our allies’?

Every year, the Pentagon delivers a detailed public report to Congress on China’s military and security posture, pages of analysis on force structure, doctrine, and trajectory, all focused on the overarching question: “What is China doing to prepare for a fight, and if they do get into one, how will they do it?”

Yet for countries the United States arms, trains, and expects to fight alongside us in a possible future conflict with China or Russia, the question “Will they actually fight?” is still too often left to guesswork.

Congress has the power to ensure and must ensure the next National Defense Authorization Act directs the Department of Defense to research, draft, and produce an annual assessment of our partners’ whole-of-society security, or commonly called “will-to-fight,” accounting for each country’s disposition and capacity to resist violence from another state in conflict.

How Do We Know If They Are Doing Their Part?

American failures in Afghanistan, the Sahel, and Iraq were not a series of flukes; they were a flashing red light on major deficiencies in the U.S. military’s capacity to understand, engage, and ensure our partners can do the most important task we ask of them. Despite a belated reckoning after those collapses and an increasing demand that partners do “their part on defense,” the United States still lacks a systematic way to assess whether they can actually do that and to publicly communicate whether partners will endure and persevere under violence or invasion from another state.

For decades, Congress has required the Department of Defense to produce a rigorous annual assessment of the People’s Republic of China’s economy, society, politics, and military forces. It is essentially a yearly check-in on China’s capacity to fight and win. There is no parallel mandate for partners such as Ukraine, Taiwan, the Philippines, Poland, and the Baltic states, despite the tremendous level of U.S. funding and equipment going to these nations.

Security Is More Than Soldiers: Answering Seven Questions That Matter

In the last several years, Congress has rightly pushed the Department of Defense to expand its understanding and assessment of the combat forces of partner nations’ will to fight. Still, those efforts stop short of a whole-of-society security approach.

There’s a better way. Based on my hands-on experience and research on U.S. security sector assistance in Africa, Europe, and Asia, interviews with practitioners and scholars, and lessons from two decades of failure and a few successes, these are seven strategic questions that consistently separate countries that hold from those that fold:

Together, these seven questions form the foundation of a whole-of-society security assessment that is closer to true civil-military preparedness than counting tanks, missiles, or widgets. They ask whether leaders will mobilize across parties; whether citizens will accept rationing, blackouts, mobilization, and casualties; whether the armed forces, territorial defense, police, and interior ministry can fight jointly; whether the grid, ports, pipelines, and networks can keep energy, food, and data moving; whether hospitals, medevac, and mortuary affairs can absorb losses; whether industry and the private sector can repair, replace, and surge to meet the needs of the people. It also gauges information and cyber resilience, as well as the ability to govern under attack or threat of attack.

Done annually, this would ensure U.S. support is directed at what is critical as a country attempts to resist an invasion, rather than the narrow, staged optics of assessments that remain overwhelmingly military-focused.

Congress should require the DoD to answer these questions and others each year for priority partners, in two forms. The classified report would support informing resourcing, posture, plans, and cooperation—what or whether to fund, where to base, and who gets which kit. The unclassified report gives taxpayers and allies a candid baseline: where things stand, what is improving, and what still needs work.

Modeled on the seriousness and in-depth approach of the China report, these two forms of assessments would be a new avenue of research that would fill a critical gap in the information needed by Congress, the broader U.S. interagency, and the public on what our partners can actually accomplish, where they need support, and if the U.S. is adequately supporting them.

Military-Only Assessments Miss the Real Fight

The world is firmly in an era of hybrid threats, in which America and its allies and partners face threats from that crosscut security forces, industry, and culture, with no single element able to respond to them. In the event of large-scale combat operations in Europe or Asia, American soldiers are highly likely to be supporting and fighting alongside military personnel, police, border guards, irregular forces, private-sector actors, and others in critical industries. As Russia’s war on Ukraine has demonstrated and Ukraine’s actions to preserve its freedom, Total War has returned, and whole-of-society security has come along with it in response. Yet our security cooperation assessment models are still heavily rooted in a 1990s era of stability operations, peacekeeping, and counterterrorism.

If the American People Are Paying the Bill, They Are Owed an Honest Assessment

This isn’t a panacea for poor political decision-making towards arming and equipping partners and allies, but increased transparency will force discipline in how partners are assessed and supported if everyone is seeing the same information. It could also deter adversaries by signaling that our partner’s weak points are being addressed, not papered over. It would also serve as a corrective to one of the U.S. military’s worst habits: mistaking money and training hours for a partner’s resolve in a fight.

After two long wars and many failed counterterrorism “partner capacity” initiatives, Americans are growing more fatigued about supporting our partners and allies. If the government is going to spend taxpayers’ money and possibly ask them risk their lives in response to threats to our partners and allies, it owes them the truth about who they believe will actually fight when necessary. Congress already demands an honest assessment about our most capable adversary and the pacing challenge of our time; it is time to demand it of our friends.

10. Opinion | The Iranian Protests Escalate

Summary:

Iran’s protests have entered a twelfth day as inflation, currency collapse, and a token $7-per-month subsidy expose the regime’s economic failure and its diversion of resources to Hezbollah. Crowds increasingly blame Khamenei directly. Security forces have killed at least 36 people and are raiding hospitals, while officials signal a harsher crackdown. A new subsidy reform will likely spike prices again, risking a repeat of past unrest. The rial’s historic slide underlines regime vulnerability. The editorial urges a U.S. policy of “maximum support” to help protesters, use cyber and intelligence tools, and exploit Tehran’s weakness without reviving an Obama-style nuclear deal.

Comment: What comes next? What happens when you catch the tail of the tiger? What do you do now Lieutenant?

Opinion | The Iranian Protests Escalate

WSJ · The Iranian Protests Escalate

Iran’s regime kills more protesters as crowds grow and prices rise.

By The Editorial Board

Updated Jan. 7, 2026 7:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/iran-protests-ayatollah-ali-khamenei-hezbollah-5503df3d

A shop owner counts Iranian banknotes at a store in Tehran on Wednesday. Atta Kenare/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Seven dollars a month. That’s the Iranian regime’s offer to its people as the currency plummets, inflation rises, and demonstrations enter their 12th day. Protests continue to grow, spreading to new cities and identifying in chants the source of Iran’s economic failures: the regime.

While Ayatollah Ali Khamenei scrounges $7 for the Iranian citizen, he smuggled a billion dollars to Hezbollah in the first 10 months of 2025, according to the U.S. Treasury’s top sanctions official. That’s enough to pay each Lebanese terrorist a monthly salary of more than $1,000. No wonder a popular protest chant is: “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, my life for Iran.”

Opinion: Potomac Watch

Trump Still Wants Greenland / RFK Jr.'s New Vaccine Schedule

President Trump warned Iran’s regime on Friday on Truth Social that “If Iran shots [sic] and violently kills peaceful protesters, which is their custom, the United States of America will come to their rescue. We are locked and loaded and ready to go.” By then Iran had killed at least eight protesters. Now the death toll is at least 36, according to the Human Rights Activists in Iran group. Regime thugs are raiding hospitals to arrest the wounded.

Statements from Mr. Khamenei, his judicial chief and the Governor of Tehran suggest the regime is preparing a new crackdown. The latter gave a green light to shoot “rioters,” which is how Iran’s authorities have long painted protesters who challenge the regime.

Mr. Khamenei is testing Mr. Trump and even more so his own people. Despite food inflation over 60% in 2025, Iran said Monday that a new policy will cause prices of essential goods to increase, perhaps by between 20% and 30% in the coming weeks. The idea is to end some importers’ preferential dollar-exchange rate—which had fed arbitrage and corruption and undermined the rial—and replace it with direct consumer subsidies.

Whatever the benefit of this new policy, this is a strange time to provoke price spikes. In 2019 a price shock caused by a fuel-subsidy reduction sparked a bloody protest wave. Economics is a political mover, as the downward class trajectory of Iranians unites them against their rulers.

The regime must feel it has no choice but to get its currency under control. The rial hit a new low Tuesday, trading at 1.47 million to the dollar. That’s down from 824,000 to the dollar in June, 165,000 in May 2020, 34,000 in July 2016 and 70 before the 1979 revolution.

Today’s protests aren’t yet large enough to topple the regime, but the combination of now-undeniable failures and new American pressure raises the chances. This isn’t 2009, when Barack Obama stayed mute to appease the Ayatollah.

Mr. Trump can help Iranians through a policy of what longtime Iran-watcher Mark Dubowitz calls “maximum support.” This means providing strike funds and secure communications for protesters, while severing communications of regime thugs and encouraging defections. U.S. cyber and intelligence can help with “leveling the battlefield for unarmed civilians facing an armed regime,” he writes.

Mr. Khamenei could tease more nuclear negotiations to win relief from markets, but he still isn’t budging on the key issues. By floating another Obama-style nuclear deal, his Foreign Minister insults Mr. Trump. The Khamenei regime is vulnerable, which makes it a moment for the U.S. to do what it can to help the Iranian people who want a government that looks out for them, not Hezbollah.

The White House renews its pressure campaign to take Greenland. But what military access to the island can't already be negotiated? Plus, the CDC drops several shots from its childhood vaccine recommendations.

Appeared in the January 8, 2026, print edition as 'The Iranian Protests Escalate'.

WSJ · The Iranian Protests Escalate

11. Intelligence, power, moral clarity: Trump's Venezuela masterstroke

Summary:

The editorial hails Trump’s removal of Maduro as a morally justified and strategically shrewd use of force. Maduro is cast as a brutal narco-tyrant whose rigged rule wrecked Venezuela and fueled U.S. drug crime, so his capture is “good” and deserved. Operation Absolute Resolve is portrayed as restoring U.S. deterrence, showcasing extraordinary military competence, humiliating Russia’s S-300 defenses, and evicting China and Russia from a key oil stronghold. Reviving Venezuela’s energy sector could depress global oil prices and strain Putin’s war machine while easing U.S. migration pressures and, if democracy takes root, restoring America’s moral credibility after Iraq.

Comment: History will of course be the judge. But we have no choice but to make it work.

Intelligence, power, moral clarity: Trump's Venezuela masterstroke

Washington Examiner · January 7, 2026

By Peter Laffin

Much could still go wrong for the United States following last week’s stunningly successful removal of illegitimate Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro.

For one, loyalists of the Chavista regime might dig in for the long haul, forcing President Donald Trump to make good on his threat of a second strike more devastating than the first. China, Russia, and Iran, already seething over lost footholds, will surely funnel arms, cash, and propaganda to any holdouts.

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/beltway-confidential/4409233/intelligence-power-moral-clarity-trump-venezuela-masterstroke/

To be sure, the American public did not sign up for a prolonged war and will not abide by one. Trump’s America First base would sharpen its knives against him. The same precision and resolve that defined the initial raid must be maintained for the remainder of the larger mission.

Yet, despite the precariousness of the situation, the calculation behind the move remains sound. The strategic benefits outweigh the risks. And the moral basis for intervention is powerful.

First, the moral case. Despite telling a New York judge that he is a “decent man,” Maduro is a full-fledged monster, even for an authoritarian despot. He ordered beatings and killings of political opponents and tortured protesters. His corrupt mismanagement of the Venezuelan economy sparked hyperinflation, food shortages, and mass migration from the country. His ties to drug cartels turned Venezuela into a dangerous narco-state that flooded America’s streets with drugs, empowering some of the most evil and vicious organizations the world over. And in 2024, he rigged the national election to retain power, with evidence revealing that he lost in a landslide.

Maduro is an evil man to his core. He belongs in prison. It is good he is there.

The practical case is even easier to make. For one, the spectacularly efficient operation restored a good deal of American deterrence lost in recent decades. The U.S. performed this mission independently, without aid from allies, and it was a masterclass. It reinforced that America’s military is the greatest in the world, and it is to be respected and feared.

For decades, the world witnessed an American military terribly mismanaged and unable to finish the job, from the Vietnam War to the long slog in Iraq to the shameful Afghanistan withdrawal under Biden. But for the second time in Trump’s second term, the military executed a complex, history-altering mission.

If America’s enemies didn’t understand our capacity to exert our will through force before, they do now. Our fighters turned Venezuela’s $2 billion Russian S-300VM air defense system, thought to be the industry standard, into an expensive paperweight in under 20 minutes.

When the world’s most advanced non-NATO air defense system can be neutralized in the time it takes to watch a Seinfeld rerun, adversaries recalculate. The U.S. is in a stronger global position than it was a week ago. That is beyond doubt.

Speaking of our adversaries, the move evicts them from a critical energy stronghold. With Maduro gone and the U.S. now in charge, China loses its access to the world’s largest proven oil reserves. PetroSinovensa, a partnership between the national oil companies of China, CNPC, and Venezuela, PDVSA, forged during the Chavez regime, develops extra-heavy crude that ships to China to service Venezuela’s sovereign debt. A new pro-U.S. regime will now likely be forced to rethink this arrangement as a matter of survival.

Operation Absolute Resolve knocked Russia down a peg, too. For one, it demonstrated, yet again, that Trump is willing and capable of attacking a Kremlin ally with impunity. That Russia’s missile defense system sputtered only furthers the embarrassment. Russia’s condemnation of the raid as “armed aggression” at the U.N. Security Council, made with a straight face, apparently, reeked of panic.

The move also stands to worsen Russia’s economic woes. Putin relies on oil sales to prosecute his war in Ukraine, and Russia’s economy is sensitive to global oil prices. The United States’s goal to revitalize Venezuela’s oil sector could flood the market and drive down oil prices globally. Diminished oil revenues would significantly hamper Putin’s capacity to continue a war that distracts America, draining its resources.

Other possible benefits could abound. Should Venezuela stabilize and become prosperous, many, if not most, of the migrants who flooded into the U.S. during Biden’s presidency might voluntarily return home. Future outflows will halt, thus resolving the “root causes” of illegal immigration that Kamala Harris never managed to figure out.

THE MILITARY’S STAGGERING COMPETENCE UNDER TRUMP

Finally, a stable and prosperous democratic Venezuela would help rebuild the moral credibility lost during the Iraq War. It would demonstrate that American power can be used not just to dismantle a dictatorship, but also to help foster a self-sustaining democracy in its own hemisphere in a country with a democratic DNA and a desire for self-determination. Linking arms with the most recent Nobel Prize winner, María Corina Machado, will send a strong message to the world about how America really regards dictators.

There is still much to be done. And plenty can, and probably will, go wrong. But Trump’s bold choice is both logical and morally defensible. America should rally around the effort, not only because of what it means for Venezuelans, but also because of what it means for us.

Washington Examiner · January 7, 2026

12. Marco Rubio says he will meet Danish officials to discuss Greenland next week

Summary:

Secretary Rubio will meet Danish and Greenlandic officials next week amid a NATO crisis triggered by POTUS’s threats to “take over” Greenland, including possible purchase or undefined military options. The White House frames control of Greenland as vital to deterring Russia and China in the Arctic, insisting “all options are on the table” while claiming diplomacy comes first. Denmark and European leaders warn any seizure could end NATO and assert Greenland’s future belongs to its people. Danish officials reject U.S. claims of inadequate defense and exaggerated Russian/Chinese presence, calling Washington’s narrative a misreading that must be replaced by sober dialogue.

Comment: Can we get all we need to secure access to the Arctic and effectively compete with Russia and China and win, without having to "own" Greenland? Haven't we long been pushing on an open door? Greenland is absolutely strategically critical to the US and the free world. Can't we get everything we need without causing such friction and dysfunction in our most important alliance?

Asked another way:

How does threatening force against a NATO ally’s territory affect U.S. credibility as the alliance’s security guarantor, especially vis-à-vis Russia and China?

Can Washington pursue greater Arctic leverage without normalizing great-power “real estate grabs” that others might imitate in their own regions?

Marco Rubio says he will meet Danish officials to discuss Greenland next week

The Guardian · January 7, 2026

Miranda Bryant and David Smith

Wed 7 Jan 2026 14.28 EST

Remarks by US secretary of state come after Greenland and Denmark request urgent meeting over Trump threats

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/07/france-and-allies-discuss-possible-response-to-donald-trump-us-invasion-of-greenland?utm

The US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, says he plans to meet Danish officials next week to discuss Greenland as a crisis escalates within Nato over Donald Trump’s threats to take over the Arctic territory.

An urgent meeting had been requested by the foreign ministers of Greenland and Denmark, which has said that any invasion or seizure of the territory by its Nato ally would mark the end of the western military alliance and “post-second world war security”.

Speaking to reporters in Washington, Rubio did not directly answer a question about whether the Trump administration was willing to risk the alliance by potentially moving ahead with a military option to gain control of Greenland.

“I’m not here to talk about Denmark or military intervention, I’ll be meeting with them next week,” he said. “We’ll have those conversations with them then, but I don’t have anything further to add to that.” Every US president retains the option of addressing national security threats through military means, he said.

France said on Tuesday that it was working with allies on how to react if the US were to invade Greenland. “We want to take action, but we want to do so together with our European partners,” the French foreign minister, Jean-Noël Barrot, told France Inter radio.

Rubio said Trump had been talking about acquiring Greenland since his first term. “That’s always been the president’s intent from the very beginning,” he said. “He’s not the first US president that has examined or looked at how we could acquire Greenland.”

The White House said Trump preferred diplomacy but would not rule out military action. “That’s something that’s currently being actively discussed by the president and his national security team,” the press secretary, Karoline Leavitt, said when asked about a possible US offer to buy the territory from Denmark. “The president has been very open and clear … that he views it in the best interest of the United States to deter Russian and Chinese aggression in the Arctic region, and so that’s why his team is currently talking about what a potential purchase would look like,” she said.

Asked why the US had refused to rule out military action, she replied: “I know that past presidents and past leaders have often ruled things out. They’ve often been very open about ruling things in and basically broadcasting their foreign policy strategy to the rest of the world – not just to our allies, but most egregiously to our adversaries. That’s not something this president does.

“All options are always on the table … But I will just say that the president’s first option always has been diplomacy.”

Leavitt was also pressed on what the US would gain by controling Greenland that it did not have already in its access to military bases there. “More control over the Arctic region and ensuring that China and Russia and our adversaries cannot continue their aggression in this very important and strategic region,” she said.

The UK’s prime minister, Keir Starmer, “set out his position on Greenland” in a phone conversation with Trump on Wednesday evening, Downing Street said without giving further details of the call.

Starmer has repeatedly said the territory’s future must be a matter for Greenland and Denmark alone, including in the Commons earlier on Wednesday.

Trump said on Wednesday that the US would not desert Nato in a backhanded social media post that also criticised the alliance.

“We will always be there for Nato, even if they won’t be there for us,” he wrote on Truth Social. Russia and China would “have zero fear” of Nato without the US, he said. Addressing “all of those big Nato fans”, he added: “They were at 2% GDP, and most weren’t paying their bills, UNTIL I CAME ALONG.”

After one of Trump’s leading aides said on Tuesday that the US may be willing to seize control of the Arctic territory by force, European leaders rallied around Denmark and Greenland with a rare rebuke to the White House, declaring that Greenland “belongs to its people”.

Barrot said that in a phone call on Tuesday Rubio had told him that he had “ruled out the possibility of an invasion” of Greenland. “I myself was on the phone yesterday with Marco Rubio … who confirmed that this was not the approach taken,” he said.

Trump has long expressed an interest in acquiring Greenland. But in recent days, after the US military operation in Venezuela on Saturday in which troops removed the country’s president, Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration’s rhetoric – and, subsequently, international tensions – have ramped up to new heights, putting the survival of Nato into question.

On Tuesday night, the Danish parliament held an extraordinary meeting to discuss the unprecedented situation.

Lars Løkke Rasmussen, the Danish foreign minister, and his Greenlandic counterpart, Vivian Motzfeldt, said they were seeking an urgent meeting with Rubio to discuss Greenland. “We would like to add some nuance to the conversation,” Rasmussen said on social media. “The shouting match must be replaced by a more sensible dialogue. Now.”

Trump has claimed that Greenland is “full of Chinese and Russian ships” and that Denmark is incapable of defending Greenland, which the president has said is vital for US national security.

But Rasmussen said after the extraordinary meeting that the US was giving a false representation of what was happening in Greenland. “The image that is being painted of Russian and Chinese ships right inside the Nuuk fjord and massive Chinese investments being made is not correct,” he said.

The situation, Rasmussen said, was “based on a misreading of what is up and what is down”, adding: “We are looking after the kingdom.”

Denmark’s defence minister, Troels Lund Poulsen, disputed US claims that the country was not doing enough to protect Greenland. “We have invested close to 100bn [Danish kroner] (£11.6bn) in security capabilities,” he said.

The Guardian · Miranda Bryant · January 7, 2026

13. Adapting the Combat Training Centers for the Drone Battlefield

Summary:

The article argues that U.S. Army Combat Training Centers must rapidly adapt to a drone-saturated battlefield by making sUAS and C-UAS core to every rotation. Drawing on Ukraine, Gaza, and U.S. border lessons, it urges realistic integration of drones into base defense, fires, and maneuver, updating adjudication rules for precision, not massed artillery. A five-pillar approach – strategy, education, technology, physical hardening, and plans and operations – should guide change. The authors call for immediate doctrinal updates, COTS tech, and mandatory offensive drone injects, warning that resistance to change, not safety, is the main obstacle to preserving U.S. battlefield advantage.

Comment: Graphics at the link. I think we should keep in mind that our Combat Training Centers have arguably been the most important contribution to readiness of the force. We should never forget what we did in the 1980s with the Big 5 weapon systems, AirLand Battle doctrine, and our Combat Training Centers (and do not forget education - SAMS): – Panama in 1989, Iraq in 1990-1991, and Iraq in 2003 were all successful operations due to our innovations in the 1980s. What we do at the Combat Training Centers will have long term effects on our Army.

Adapting the Combat Training Centers for the Drone Battlefield

by Bill Edwards, by Greg Hoyt

01.08.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/01/08/adapting-the-combat-training-centers-for-the-drone-battlefield/

U.S. Army Sgt. Jason Thompson and Staff Sgt. Michael Lezama, military police officers assigned to the 615th Military Police Company, 709th Military Police Battalion, 18th Military Police Brigade, take down an unmanned aircraft system with a DroneGun Mk4 at training at the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Demolition Range, U.S. Army Garrison Bavaria, July 8, 2025 (DVIDS).

“It felt like you were being hunted versus hunting,” said Col. Scott Wence…I didn’t have any experience talking through how you defeat this,” (CSM) Donaldson said. “None of us did.”

Is the U.S. Army paying attention to the lessons learned in conflict zones around the world? sUAS (small unmanned aerial systems, i.e., drones) have transformed modern warfare, and it is time our training reflects that reality. The Combat Training Centers (CTCs) are uniquely positioned and should lead this evolution by integrating drones into base defense (defense) and call-for-fire / indirect fire training (offense) as a core skill for every leader and soldier in a direct combat specialty and across the entire force.

This technology has been proven, the benefits are clear, and our adversaries are already operating this way. Incorporating drones at the CTCs is not about catching up; it is about staying ahead and ensuring our soldiers are fully prepared for the modern battlefield. To be fair, there is a significant amount of effort taking place in this space, but are we truly leaning into it?

Training at the CTCs focuses heavily on staff processes, but the modern-day battlefield is more dynamic. Our troops will fight in drone-saturated environments like Ukraine, Gaza, or the Pacific; they must train to confront these threats. While CTCs have made strides in threat replication and limited C-UAS exposure, they still fall short of making drones a core element of tactical training.

Current adjudication standards need to be updated. Training rules that require six guns and 100+ rounds to destroy an armored vehicle ignore the capabilities that precision drone observation brings to combat operations. When a drone can see round impacts in real time and adjust immediately, the notion of firing a full battery becomes wasteful. One shot, one kill is not just a slogan for snipers anymore—it is the reality of modern precision-enabled fires.

The CTCs have not yet fully adapted to the modern fight and must adapt quickly. They need to train for the asymmetric realities of today rather than the battlefield of yesterday. To prepare soldiers for the conflicts they will face, CTCs must embed UAS and C-UAS employment into every rotation, every scenario, and every training lane.

The Global Situation of UAS and C-UAS Employment

Across the world, drone warfare is reshaping the fight. From Ukraine to Gaza to the U.S. southern border, unmanned systems are redefining tactics, logistics, and even command decisions.

In Ukraine, small drones have become the primary forward observer for all fires. Ukrainian units routinely locate Russian positions and adjust artillery in real time, striking with precision using a fraction of the ammunition once required. Facing ammunition shortages, they have refined their fire support to deliver decisive effects with far fewer rounds. The Ukrainian integration of commercial drones into traditional artillery missions has completely reshaped the execution of fire missions.

Ukrainian artillerymen say drones make their aim 250% better. — Business Insider, Feb 2024.

What Ukraine has proven is that when soldiers at the lowest levels are empowered to use drones for spotting and adjustment, they become more lethal, more efficient, and far less vulnerable. In one Ukrainian artillery battalion, drone-enabled spotting improved accuracy by over 200 percent. Every successful mission becomes intelligence for the next one, a live feedback loop between sensor and shooter. This kind of adaptation is exactly what our CTCs should be teaching.

Small drones have been spotted tracking U.S. troop movements along the southwest border and mapping out our sensor and observation coverage. That is a homeland example that mirrors what we are seeing in Ukraine and a warning that we are lagging.

The fight in Gaza reinforced what we have now recognized: drones shape every aspect of modern warfare. Israel’s Defense Forces (IDF) used hundreds of small drones for reconnaissance and precision strikes, giving squad leaders the ability to clear buildings and tunnels without exposing their soldiers. Hamas used the same technology to blind Israeli sensors and open lanes for attack. Both sides proved the same point: drones are now integral to combined arms operations. If we expect our soldiers to succeed in that environment, our training must reflect it.

Drones are rewriting the geometry of the battlefield. — War on the Rocks, 2024.

Our adversaries have already accepted that drones are part of every fight. Russia, China, Iran, and even cartel networks along the U.S. southwest border are using drones to surveil, harass, and attack. Small drones have been spotted tracking U.S. troop movements along the southwest border and mapping out our sensor and observation coverage. That is a homeland example that mirrors what we are seeing in Ukraine and a warning that we are lagging.

The good news is that the U.S. Army is beginning to capture these lessons learned. The National Training Center (NTC) in California replicates threat UAS systems using platforms like the TSM 800, capable of swarming up to 150 drones from a single control station. They are also using commercial systems such as the Parrot Anafi and DJI Mavic for ISR and simulated munitions drops. These steps, while limited, demonstrate that the Army recognizes the shift.

We are using drones to locate targets, call for artillery fire, and observe fall of shot—safely and effectively. — SFC Richard Hutnik, 166th RTI, Nov 2024.

Momentum is already building across the force. There are pockets of excellence and leaders taking the initiative. The 82nd Airborne Division stood up Gainey Company to drive drone innovation and training. They have learned directly from Ukraine’s lessons and pushed those insights back into their training pipeline. That kind of thinking needs to reach the CTC system.

Gainey Company isn’t just testing drones—it’s redefining how units fight with them. — DefenseScoop, 2023.

Gainey Company’s work has shown what’s possible when leadership commits. The company’s operators test, fail, and improve weekly. Additional Army efforts like Project Shrike and experiments at the Pennsylvania National Guard’s Regional Training Institute (RTI) prove that drones can be safely used to adjust live artillery fire. Instructors used small quadcopters to observe impacts, make corrections, and assess damage under controlled conditions. That is exactly the kind of pilot program we need at the national level.

How the U.S. Army Should Adjust Its CTCs – Defense

There is an approach gaining momentum in the private sector that is similar to the U.S. Army’s understanding of “base defense” that has proven valuable in the protection of critical infrastructure, mass gathering venues, and sensitive sites in the United States. The author has created a methodology and framework using their own experience and a thought process that starts with an understanding of the sUAS ecosystem. Failure to appreciate this basic understanding is the single biggest reason there is much confusion on how to approach sUAS technology as a potential threat tool.

When planning for an operation, especially with a fixed site for base operations, it is important to set the defense planning and infrastructure improvements in motion as a top-priority and task; in military terms, it is the priority of work. Offensive and defensive postures work synergistically in this type of environment, a trademark of over two decades of conflict in the Middle East. Today, however, the geometry has changed, and leaders must now consider the air domain more deliberately when it comes to physical security. Physical security thought and legacy approaches are outdated. Commanders own this inside their units and must come to the table with a vision. This approach is based on a five-step methodology depicted in the graphic below:

In each of these pillars, there is an associated training course that supports the planning and operational processes. To understand this better, each of the supporting training events is detailed here:

Strategy: The unit Commander and subordinate leaders own this task in coordination with the organization’s senior leadership and leadership two levels up in the chain of command. These steps require that the Commander and leaders understand the different compartments of the sUAS ecosystem. Those include drone manufacturers, component providers, detection sensors, mitigation and defeat tools, and training resources. The importance of this knowledge is to competently support the tactical formations when challenges arise at the lowest levels and require resourcing, a higher headquarters’ primary task.

Education: Holistic and comprehensive organizational training that considers internal and external stakeholders. This is the next step in creating a common operating picture (COP) for all levels of the organization, as sUAS will have impacts across the unit. ENSCO provides C-UAS training courses that fulfill this intent. This education program provides foundations in the following:

C-UAS technologies, legal considerations inside the United States, status of forces agreements outside the United States, and rules of engagement in conflict zones.
Drone Vulnerability and Risk Assessments (DVRA) for base defense considerations.
Drone Emergency Response Planning (DERP) for policy, procedure, and standard operating procedure (SOP) development.
Left-of-Drone-Launch (LoDL) (i.e., shaping drone launches before they happen) operations and development of operational concepts (CONOP)

Technology: sUAS technological evolution is often intimidating, but simply put, it should not be that way. Technology is the capital investment in this ecosystem and provides tools for drone flight, detection, defeat, and training. Airframes are the foundation of this entire methodology. In the U.S., this technology is developing rapidly but remains far behind the Chinese manufacturing base. As the Ukrainian conflict continues, more countries are moving fast to produce all categories of drones to add to their arsenals. There are four types of C-UAS sensors to consider: radio frequency, radar, optical (camera), and acoustic (microphones). Mitigation is more nuanced, but remains simple to understand: kinetic-projectile and drone-on-drone Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs), high-powered microwave, high-powered lasers, electronic warfare (jamming), Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) disruption, and lastly a takeover of the Command-and-Control signal.

Physical Hardening: This consideration is all about basic defensive fortifications: bunkers, barriers, netting, taking lessons learned from Ukraine to harden vehicles, façade reinforcements, as well as ballistic glass and films, or even ground-based versions of naval chaff launchers. Tactically, tools like Kevlar blankets and cloaking camouflage are important to the individual Soldier. Limiting heat emission is a key learning point from Ukraine. Spectrum analysis tools on bases and in frontline positions give awareness of the signal emissions from your position, an essential step to remain undetected in an environment where electromagnetic emissions are easily detectable.

A U.S.-made Bradley armored vehicle fitted with a metal addition (ABC).

Plans and Operations: This consideration requires building operational concepts to support an offensive posture. Concept of Operations (CONOP) development takes shape as the next step in this framework. This is a collaboration between information and intelligence that drives directed operations to formally gain a left-of-drone-launch posture. Based on the author’s experience in the private sector and as an observer of contemporary conflict zones, drone pilots and operators have proven to be high-value targets in current operations in Ukraine.

Historical precedents do exist: live-fire training successfully integrated artillery, electronic warfare, and drones through white cell control, established safe grids, and coordinated observer checks to ensure safety. It can be done; no valid safety or doctrinal barrier prevents us from doing it; it just takes planning and leadership.

Planning the defense is a way to posture the organization for offensive operations. Once the Commander’s approach memorializes a concerted effort on defensive preparations and actions, it is prudent to focus on offensive operations by using the tools in the sUAS tool kit to support ground maneuver.

Every soldier on tomorrow’s battlefield will have access to a drone, just as every soldier today carries a radio. — Gen. Randy George, Chief of Staff of the Army (May 2024).

At the CTCs, risk can be mitigated. Historical precedents do exist: live-fire training successfully integrated artillery, electronic warfare, and drones through white cell control, established safe grids, and coordinated observer checks to ensure safety. It can be done; no valid safety or doctrinal barrier prevents us from doing it; it just takes planning and leadership.

There is a perception that sUAS cannot generate reliable grid locations. Forward observers have long generated coordinates with a greater margin of error than what most drones now achieve. This is no longer a safety issue – it is a resistance-to-change problem. Meanwhile, our adversaries have integrated drones as a routine and essential part of their operations.

Data from Ukraine and other conflicts proves the point. A quadcopter can generate coordinates with less than five meters of error, even less if properly calibrated. Meanwhile, traditional observers using a compass and rangefinder often miss by more. Our doctrine simply has not caught up.

CTCs must update their adjudication rules to reflect accuracy and incorporate multi-domain coordination between artillery, intelligence, and aviation trainers. We already have the processes in place with Restricted Operations Zones (ROZs), white cell control, and safety grids to safely manage drone operations. The only missing piece is the will to institutionalize it.

Train as you fight – or you’ll fight as you trained. — U.S. Army Training Doctrine Command.

How the U.S. Army Should Adjust Its CTCs – Offense

To operationalize offense, we must adopt a structured methodology that builds on defensive foundations, emphasizing sUAS as offensive enablers. The approach builds upon this through a Perception Shift, Training Integration, Technology Calibration, Doctrinal Update, and Operational Coordination.

Perception Shift

Reframe sUAS from primarily defensive reconnaissance tools to proactive offensive assets.
Train leaders to view drones as force multipliers for tempo, deception, and precision targeting.
Encourage units to integrate drones into maneuver planning, treating them as “organic fires” rather than adjunct ISR.

Training Integration

Embed offensive drone employment into CTC rotations, including red-team adversary use to stress friendly forces.
Develop scenarios where sUAS enable penetration of enemy defenses, rapid exploitation, and pursuit operations.
Train soldiers to synchronize drone feeds with fires, maneuver, and electronic warfare in real time.

Technology Calibration

Standardize offensive drone loadouts (munitions, EW payloads, decoys) to match mission profiles.
Test and refine drone swarm tactics under contested conditions, including GPS denial and EW interference.
Ensure interoperability between sUAS platforms and mission command systems for rapid targeting cycles.

Doctrinal Update

Codify offensive drone employment in FM 3-90 (Offense and Defense) and related doctrine.
Define offensive drone roles: suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), precision strike, deception, and tempo acceleration.
Establish offensive drone TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures) for company (and below)- and battalion-level operations.

Operational Coordination

Integrate sUAS into combined arms rehearsals at CTCs, ensuring synchronization with artillery, aviation, and maneuver.
Develop joint and coalition offensive drone playbooks to ensure interoperability in multinational exercises.
Use CTCs as laboratories for offensive drone innovation, capturing lessons learned and feeding them back into doctrine and acquisition.

This framing makes offensive sUAS employment not just a technical add-on, but a paradigm shift in maneuver warfare—where drones extend reach, accelerate tempo, and impose dilemmas on the adversary.

Here is an accelerated timeline for offensive sUAS integration at CTCs:

Immediate (0–12 Months)

Perception Shift

Mandate offensive drone injects in every CTC rotation, not just experimental lanes.
Push leader education modules into PME (Professional Military Education) now.

Training Integration

Use OPFOR drones offensively in all rotations to force adaptation.
Train company-level units to employ drones as “organic fires” immediately.

Technology Calibration

Rapidly field standardized offensive payload kits (munitions, EW, decoys) from existing commercial systems.
Conduct live-fire offensive drone trials during current rotations.

Doctrinal Update

Issue interim doctrine annexes and TTPs within one year.

Operational Coordination

Require drone integration in combined arms rehearsals at brigade-level exercises.

Near-Term (1–3 Years)

Perception Shift

Institutionalize drones as maneuver enablers in all PME and leader development.

Training Integration

Build dedicated offensive drone lanes at CTCs within 24 months.
Train battalion staffs to integrate drone-enabled tempo acceleration.

Technology Calibration

Field modular offensive kits Army-wide.
Begin swarm experimentation under contested EW conditions.

Doctrinal Update

Formalize offensive drone doctrine in FM 3-90 within 3 years.

Operational Coordination

Develop joint/coalition offensive drone playbooks and integrate into multinational exercises.

Mid-Term (3–5 Years)

Training Integration

Full-spectrum offensive drone rotations at CTCs (company through brigade).

Technology Calibration

Field semi-autonomous swarm systems capable of SEAD, deception, and precision strike.

Doctrinal Update

Codify offensive drone doctrine across Army and Joint publications.

Operational Coordination

Institutionalize offensive drone innovation cells at each CTC.

Acceleration Levers

Doctrine Fast-Track: Issue interim annexes and TTPs now, rather than waiting for full doctrinal cycles.
Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS): Leverage existing drone tech and payloads instead of waiting for bespoke Army programs
CTC Mandates: Require offensive drone injects in every rotation immediately
Leader Education: Push PME updates now, not in future cycle
Joint Integration: Use existing multinational exercises to accelerate coalition playbook development.

Conclusion

Get back to the basics, blocking and tackling. The CTCs are the right place to build these skills. Commanders are evaluated on their ability to fight and win in realistic conditions, and integrating drones into that training strengthens every formation. The bottom line is simple: drones are here to stay. They pose a risk to soldiers but are also offensive tools; therefore, practice on shortening the kill chain, and fundamentally reshape how we execute fires. The battlefield is changing, and CTCs can lead that change—ensuring our soldiers are ready, our tactics are current, and our advantage endures.

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Tags: C-UAS, combat training center, counter uas, drones, UAS

About The Authors

Bill Edwards
Bill Edwards is the Director of Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) Operations and Training at ENSCO, after retiring from the military in 2018. Edwards has more than 35 years of expertise in operational and technical security, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, surveillance, and counter-surveillance.
Before coming to ENSCO, he founded and operated Phoenix 6 Consulting, a customized security services firm. He also led Thornton Tomasetti’s security consulting group as a principal from 2018 to 2022. Recently, he led Building Intelligence’s directorate as President of the Federal and Public Safety to promote federal awareness of the firm’s trusted access management software. Edwards served as the Director of Intelligence for Theater Special Operations Command-North (USSOCOM), a position requiring extensive collaboration across the U.S. government security enterprise. He designed a cohesive counter-terrorism network with the U.S. Department of Defense, law enforcement, and inter-agency partners known as the“Blue Network,” while simultaneously building connections and networks abroad to support U.S. Homeland Security needs. Edwards has extensive experience in homeland security, homeland defense, and C-UAS security, safety, and emergency preparedness.
Find all his work at: William “Bill” Edwards CPP, PSP, PCI, CPD | LinkedIn.
View all posts
Greg Hoyt
Greg Hoyt is a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel, a veteran of the Afghanistan and Iraq War, and Director of Intelligence Operations at ENSCO.
Find out more at: Gregory B. Hoyt, MSSI | LinkedIn

14. The New Global (dis)order and the Limits of China’s Power

Summary:

The article argues that Trump’s unilateral Venezuela raid signals a new global disorder, where Washington reshapes rules through open, unapologetic force to secure strategic assets like oil and even eyes Greenland despite NATO norms. Multilateralism and legal cover give way to raw power, with sovereignty eroding under “national security” claims. This exposes the limits of China’s and Russia’s influence. They can trade, lend, and condemn, but cannot protect partners such as Venezuela or Iran from U.S. strikes. Beijing and Moscow must choose between slow asymmetric pushback, risky militarization, or accepting a subordinate role while U.S. military primacy remains decisive.

Comment: A view from Pakistan.

The New Global (dis)order and the Limits of China’s Power

Goodbye multilateralism

Jan 08, 2026

∙ Paid

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/new-global-disorder-limits-china-power?utm

By: Salman Rafi Sheikh

How things are now. Photo from XNY/Star Max/GC Images

The capture of a sitting president, the open discussion of “running” another country, and the unapologetic use of military force to secure strategic resources were once key features of colonialism in the 19th and 20th century. We are, however, back to the future. They are becoming features of a new global reality, a new normal with Washington’s recent military action against Venezuela, culminating in the removal of President Nicolás Maduro and direct US involvement in the country’s political and economic future.

This is much more than a mere regional shock. If it is not a signal of a demented president surrounded by sycophantic and incapable senior aides, which it could well be, it is still a signal that the US is no longer merely defending a fading liberal order. It is an out-of-control administration actively reshaping global rules through raw power. For China, a rising superpower whose influence is vast but largely economic, this moment exposes a fundamental vulnerability. Wealth builds influence, but it does not stop bombs. And in this new world order, the ability to protect allies may matter more than the ability to trade with them.

America’s New Global (Dis)Order

For decades after the Cold War, US power was exercised through institutions, alliances, and norms that—at least rhetorically—emphasized sovereignty, international law, and multilateralism. Even when Washington violated those norms, as in Iraq in 2003 or Libya in 2011, it sought legal cover, coalition partners, or humanitarian justifications. That era has ended. Now, all control appears to be gone in the hands of an unrestrained 80-year-old chief executive with no guardrails from Congress or the Supreme Court to deter him.

The US intervention in Venezuela reflects a different logic. The operation was not authorized by the United Nations Security Council. It was not conducted as part of a NATO campaign. It was not authorized by the US Congress too. Instead, it was framed as a unilateral act justified by national security, law enforcement and strategic necessity. International reaction from the UN human rights office to major Global South states has been sharply critical, emphasizing the erosion of sovereignty and the dangerous precedent such actions set. But Trump is undeterred. In fact, he is threatening military action against other countries including Iran and Cuba.

What distinguishes this moment is not simply American power, but American candor. Senior US officials openly discussed taking control of Venezuela’s oil infrastructure, the largest proven reserves in the world according to OPEC data. They are also already disputing control of Greenland by Denmark, a fellow NATO member. If Washington brings Greenland under US control through force or coercion, it will be the end NATO. With a NATO member attacking another NATO member, the alliance will simply collapse.

The NATO alliance

This pattern is not confined to Latin America. In the Middle East, US support for Israeli military operations against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure in 2025 demonstrated Washington’s willingness to absorb global criticism in pursuit of strategic objectives. Despite extensive Chinese and Russian ties with Tehran, neither power was able to deter or meaningfully constrain the attack.

Taking together, these cases suggest a new global disorder defined by three traits: unilateralism over multilateralism, coercion over consent, and military primacy over economic interdependence. In this system, norms matter only insofar as they are backed by the force of those who possess it and are willing to use it indiscriminately.

The Challenge to China’s Superpower Ambitions

China’s rise has been one of the defining stories of the 21st century. It is the world’s largest trading nation, a dominant manufacturing hub and the primary creditor for dozens of developing countries. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has embedded itself deeply in the infrastructure of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and parts of Europe.

Yet Venezuela and Iran expose the hard limits of this model. China does not possess – and has shown little appetite to develop – a global military footprint comparable to that of the US. Washington maintains hundreds of overseas bases and access agreements. China, by contrast, has one acknowledged overseas base in Djibouti and limited expeditionary capability beyond its immediate region.

This matters because influence without protection is fragile. Beijing can sell weapons, invest in ports, and finance highways, but it cannot provide what the US routinely offers its allies: a security umbrella. When Venezuelan sovereignty was breached, Chinese condemnation was swift but symbolic. When Iranian nuclear facilities were struck, Beijing called for restraint, but could not prevent escalation.

Russia faces a similar dilemma. Despite its formidable military, Moscow’s power projection is constrained by geography, sanctions, and the demands of its own conflicts. Like China, Russia can disrupt, but it cannot globally deter. The result is a credibility gap. For states in the Global South, alignment with China or Russia has often been seen as a hedge against US pressure. Recent events suggest that hedge may be weaker than advertised.

This credibility problem cuts to the heart of China’s superpower ambitions. Great powers are judged not only by GDP or trade volume, but by their ability to defend partners in moments of crisis. By that standard, Beijing remains a partial power—formidable economically, limited strategically.

Can China and Russia Adapt?

The question now facing Beijing and Moscow is whether adaptation is possible, or whether they must accept a subordinate role in a US-dominated security (dis)order.

One option is gradual militarization of foreign policy. China has increased defense spending for decades and expanded naval operations in the South China Sea and beyond. Joint exercises with Russia, arms sales, and intelligence cooperation are becoming more frequent. There are fears that China and Russia might follow Trump’s ‘Venezuela’ model’ to settle the Taiwan and Ukraine questions. Yet, this action would hardly make both China and Russia dominant military powers beyond their regions. Building a global deterrent comparable to the US would require decades, enormous political risk, and a fundamental shift in China’s long-standing doctrine of non-intervention.

Another option is asymmetric response. Rather than matching US power base for base, China and Russia can raise the costs of unilateralism through economic retaliation, technological decoupling, cyber capabilities, and diplomatic obstruction. This strategy is already visible in BRICS expansion, efforts to de-dollarize trade, and the creation of alternative financial institutions. But these tools work slowly. And they do not stop missiles when Washington decides to send them to Beijing’s and Moscow’s allies. What arrangements can do is, however, raise the ultimate cost of unilateral actions. But if Washington’s calculations indicate that the benefits of sending bombs outweigh the cost, China and Russia will continue to find their space squeezing overtime.

A third path is strategic patience combined with selective hardening. China may double down on protecting its core interests—Taiwan, its immediate periphery—while accepting vulnerability elsewhere. In this model, partners in Latin America or the Middle East are economic stakeholders, not security clients. That approach preserves stability at home but limits global leadership.

The Future of The Global Order

The US has sent a message the world cannot ignore. It is prepared to use military power, openly and unilaterally, to secure strategic interests. This new global disorder favors those who can project force, not just capital. For China and Russia, the lesson is sobering. Ambition without enforcement breeds dependency, not leadership.

The future international system is unlikely to return to multipolarity unless rising powers can close the gap between influence and protection. Until then, Washington will remain the ultimate arbiter—not because it is loved, but because it is feared. The real question is whether this order will produce stability or accelerate resistance and fragmentation. History suggests that power unrestrained by rules rarely goes unchallenged forever.

Dr Salman Rafi Sheikh is an Assistant Professor of Politics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) in Pakistan. He is a long-time contributor on diplomatic affairs to Asia Sentinel.

15. Who Stress-Tests U.S. War Plans?

Summary:

The article argues the United States has allowed red teaming to atrophy, leaving war plans insufficiently stress-tested for bias, blind spots, and unexamined assumptions. After Iraq and Afghanistan, structured contrarian analysis briefly strengthened planning, but institutional support evaporated, training fragmented, and “red teams” became branding rather than method. As adversaries get more capable and AI enters planning cycles, assumption audits and forecasting triggers are needed to reveal failure pathways early. The author proposes Red Team 2.0: train all planners in assumption-testing, tailor red team models to command needs, embed mandatory assumption audits into planning rhythms, and integrate forecasting to cue review.

Conclusion:

Red teaming didn’t fail — it became inconvenient. But plans built on convenient assumptions don’t survive contact with reality. As adversaries grow more capable and planning integrates AI, the cost of unexamined biases and blind spots will only increase. The U.S. military built red teaming capabilities for good reason, and those reasons are more valid than ever. Red teams were never meant to make planning comfortable. Irritation was the point. Better that friction arise in the planning room than on the battlefield.

Comment: Sometimes it all comes down to assumptions. But I am not sure of the criticism that Red Teaming is discounted or avoided because it makes planning (or planners) uncomfortable. But I agree we need Red Team capabilities. Some questions:

In an era of fast decision cycles and AI-enabled planning, who inside the U.S. system has the authority and incentives to say “slow down” and challenge foundational assumptions before combat?

If the United States avoids self-critique while adversaries stress-test against us, how long can planning asymmetry persist before it becomes a battlefield liability?

My obvious response to the above is that strong leadership is required. We can have all the advanced technology and advanced processes but they will never be effective without strong leadership. There is no AI replacement for leadership and the judgments made by leaders and the ability to discipline the force in the planning process (which means their demand that effective red teaming be part of the process). We need Clausewitz' coup d'oiel more than ever at all levels to make all of this work in the modern era..

Who Stress-Tests U.S. War Plans?

warontherocks.com · January 8, 2026

Alexandra Gerber

January 8, 2026

https://warontherocks.com/2026/01/who-stress-tests-u-s-war-plans/

The U.S. military spends billions trying to predict what its adversaries will do — and almost nothing testing whether its own plans make sense. In part, this asymmetry reflects the decline of red teaming, the practice of systematically challenging plans to expose biases, blind spots, and weak assumptions before they become operational liabilities. As U.S. adversaries become more sophisticated and the Department of Defense integrates AI into planning, restoring systematic self-critique isn’t optional — it’s urgent.

Restoring red teaming will require updating how it was practiced in the past. There are four possible ways to make this happen: train all planners — not just specialists — in assumption-testing, focus on building red team capabilities rather than red teams, strengthen mechanisms for including red teaming in ongoing planning cycles, and use forecasting methods and platforms to trigger assumption reviews.

Targeting Failure Pathways

Red team methodology primarily targets three failure pathways in defense and military planning. Biases like optimism bias or mirror-imaging creep in when planners unconsciously assume the adversary will behave as they would, or that their preferred outcomes are more likely than they are. Blind spots emerge from organizational or institutional silos. Planners may simply not see how logistics, allies, civilians, or political dynamics could shape the battlefield in ways they haven’t anticipated. The most dangerous failure pathway is unevaluated assumptions — uncertain claims upon which entire plans depend, but which rest on weak arguments, weak evidence, or both.

Integrating AI into planning amplifies these risks, as it can encode biases in its training data, create blind spots when algorithms function as black boxes, and generate confident outputs based on unvalidated assumptions. As these systems become embedded in planning, systematic assumption-checking becomes more, not less, critical. For a time, the U.S. military invested in mitigating these risks, but then it stopped.

I served on the U.S. Central Command Red Team in 2012–2013, when many combatant commands maintained in-house red teams. Our mission goal was simple but uncomfortable: expose flawed logic before it hardened into the command’s war plans. Red teaming was never just “thinking like the enemy.” Instead, it was an internal audit of thought that mapped assumptions, surfaced blind spots, and forced planners to confront what might go wrong.

BECOME A MEMBER

Red Teaming’s Rise and Fall

After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, commanders took stock of planning failures, such as overestimating Iraqi security force capacity, failing to anticipate how de-Baathification could fuel insurgency, and underestimating the rise of sectarian violence. To avoid repeating those mistakes, they began embedding structured contrarian analysis into planning through red teaming. Building on older “devil’s advocate” and wargaming traditions, the Army spearheaded formalizing the practice, founding the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies in 2004 to teach planners how to recognize cognitive bias and challenge assumptions. Within a decade, many combatant commands had adopted similar methods, making red teaming a routine feature of the joint planning process.

Doctrine eventually caught up. Joint Doctrine Note 1‑16 and later Joint Publication 5‑0, both in the main text and an appendix, encouraged commanders to use red teams for independent review. Yet, even as the concept gained legitimacy on paper, institutional support waned. The Army’s red team school closed in 2021 without a designated successor, leaving red team education fragmented across service schools and online modules. Many commands retained “red cells” focused on adversary emulation, but discontinued standing red teams that probed their own reasoning.

Over time, the phrase “red team” became more branding than practice. Cyber units still use it to test network defenses, and private industry borrows it for security audits. But the broader application of challenging operational and strategic assumptions has withered. A 2024 Data & Society study observed that organizations often “enroll red teaming for optics,” as a ritual of accountability rather than a mechanism of learning.

The result is predictable. With fewer institutional challenges, planners focus intensely on an adversary’s actions but neglect their own assumptions. This produces a pattern that analysts keep identifying: plans built on shaky assumptions that haven’t been stress-tested before operations begin.

Why Red Teaming Met Resistance

Red teaming declined for understandable reasons: time constraints, resource limits, and resistance to being challenged. Organizational behavior theory helps us understand how organizations can be resistant to change. Planners under tight deadlines tend gravitate to what seems most plausible, most digestible, and the least contentious. A red team was in the room to slow that reflex, to ask the questions others could or would not, and to provide deliberate pushback. During my time at Central Command, I watched commanders and planners struggle with uncomfortable analysis even when they recognized its validity.

Two key examples from my time on the red team illustrate the challenge. In 2013, command plans for Afghanistan and Syria rested on two core assumptions: Afghan security forces would be able to secure the government and prevent the Taliban from retaking control following the end of the International Security Assistance Force mission and President Bashar al-Assad’s regime would soon collapse due to the Syrian civil war that began in 2011. Our team challenged both assumptions, arguing that Afghan forces might not be capable and that Assad’s hold on power could prove more durable than expected. Planners acknowledged these alternative scenarios but struggled to incorporate them into formal plans. There was no clear process for developing formal contingency plans without an explicit order directing that work, no incentive to complicate an already complex planning effort, and no requirement to present the alternatives to the decision-makers.

Planners, and the commanders they work for, often operate under compressed timelines and ask legitimate questions such as: Can we afford to slow down planning to question our assumptions? Won’t constant challenge undermine cooperation in the planning team? If red teams identify problems but the system can’t accommodate alternative plans, what’s the point of the exercise?

These objections deserve answers. First, the concern that red teaming creates delay rests on a flawed premise. Checking your work as you go isn’t waste: it’s prudent planning and the only way to make best guesses as to whether plans can withstand implementation. Consider the costs of discovering during execution that partner forces can’t sustain operations, logistics assumptions don’t hold, or political constraints were miscalculated. Those kinds of failures lead to months or years of costly adjustment. Red teams exist to shift those discoveries left on the timeline — from the battlefield to the briefing room — where course corrections are possible without casualties or crippling expense.

Second, the concern about undermining the collaborative planning environment misreads legitimate challenge for sabotage. Red teams don’t exist to second-guess planners or commanders. Rather, they exist to stress-test logic before it hardens into operational plans — to ensure confidence is based on examined assumptions rather than untested optimism. That’s not undermining leadership. It’s supporting it.

Finally, the complaint that “red teams identify problems, but nothing changes” points to a system problem rather than a red team problem. When a red team’s findings reach commanders only as optional briefings rather than mandatory decision points, and when planners face no requirement to document why they accept or reject alternative planning scenarios, warnings become noise. The U.S. Intelligence Community has faced similar challenges with handling alternative analysis. The 2015 revision of Intelligence Community Directive 203 addressed this problem by requiring intelligence products to identify core assumptions, present credible alternatives, and document why those alternatives were set aside. That model could readily be applied to planning: require red team findings to be presented to commanders and require planners to document their rationale for setting aside red team findings.

Another common objection to red teaming is something along the lines of “we already do extensive wargaming — isn’t that enough?” It’s not. Wargaming tests plans against an adversary’s courses of action, revealing vulnerabilities in execution. Red teaming challenges the logical foundations and assumptions underlying those plans, revealing flaws in conception. A plan can perform well in a wargame while resting on faulty assumptions about partner force capacity, logistics, or political constraints. Both forms of challenge are necessary, but neither is a replacement for the other.

Dissenting views rarely die from bad evidence — they die from lack of process. Without institutional mechanisms to channel alternative analysis into decision cycles, uncomfortable insights get swept aside. If speed is consistently prioritized over ensuring validity, the ability to anticipate failure atrophies. But that can be fixed.

Why Red Team 2.0 is Needed

To avoid the next failure of imagination, several practical reforms could re-anchor red teaming in the planning process to better reflect the current realities of joint operational planning and warfighting.

Make Red Teaming Everybody’s Business

Existing requirements in joint doctrine could be strengthened so that joint planners are trained in how to include assumption-testing in their planning process. Planners, like everyone else, are already pressed for time, but they should have at least some understanding of the main failure pathways — biases, blind spots, and unevaluated assumptions — especially as AI-assisted planning tools that can encode hidden biases or rest on unverified data become commonplace. Senior planners should have even more robust training so they can lead planning efforts that address these issues. Initial red team training could be as little as a two hour module in basic planner training, whereas more advanced planners attending senior Army or joint planner training would need greater exposure.

Study and Resource What Works

While every command needs red team capabilities, not every command needs a permanent red team. The right red team model depends on command-specific planning characteristics. Commands doing continuous, high stakes contingency planning for complex operational environments — typically geographic combatant commands like European Command or Indo-Pacific Command — would benefit from a permanent, in-house red team capability to review plans as they evolve. By contrast, commands with more episodic planning cycles or narrower technical focus, such as Africa Command or Space Command, may only require external reviews during major exercises or plan updates. Service component commands might rely on planners with some red team training rather than building a dedicated red team. Matching requirements to solutions requires empirical assessment — each combatant command, or the Department of Defense as a whole, should study which approaches work best under what conditions to guide appropriate investments.

Link Red Teaming to Ongoing Planning Cycles

Planning isn’t a single event — it’s a continuous process. Operational planning teams often revisit and update plans as conditions change. Every review should include a mandatory assumption audit, with core assumptions tracked and updated each cycle. Building periodic assumption checks into the planning rhythm would make challenge the norm rather than the exception. Red teaming complements wargaming: While wargames test plans against adversary actions, assumption audits stress-test the logical foundations of the plans themselves.

Integrate Forecasting Methodologies

Forecasting can serve as a trigger for red teaming by signaling when assumptions should be reconsidered, such as by identifying shifts in partner capacity, changes in logistics delivery timelines, or regime stability. While forecasting may not deliver the precision that planners are looking for, it can be a useful tool for identifying when assumptions no longer align with reality. Tools such as the RAND Forecasting Initiative could be woven into planning cycles to provide early warning when key assumptions begin to diverge from observed trends.

Red teaming didn’t fail — it became inconvenient. But plans built on convenient assumptions don’t survive contact with reality. As adversaries grow more capable and planning integrates AI, the cost of unexamined biases and blind spots will only increase. The U.S. military built red teaming capabilities for good reason, and those reasons are more valid than ever. Red teams were never meant to make planning comfortable. Irritation was the point. Better that friction arise in the planning room than on the battlefield.

BECOME A MEMBER

Alexandra Gerber is a researcher at RAND and a graduate of the U.S. Army’s Red Team Short Course.

**Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

Image: Sgt. Jose Escamilla via DVIDS

warontherocks.com · January 8, 2026

16. Overcoming the Principal-Agent Problem in “Running” Venezuela

Summary:

Patrick Sullivan argues that any U.S. effort to “run” Venezuela short of full occupation will be plagued by a principal-agent problem. A compliant Caracas government will juggle Washington’s demands with its own survival, patronage networks, nationalist backlash, and powerful criminal actors. U.S. compellence must outmatch internal threats through credible demands, threats, and promises, yet U.S. will and resources are finite and visible to rivals. Intelligence is central to aligning incentives and information, including penetrating Venezuelan elites and selectively recruiting from the diaspora, to track competing pressures and adjust policy in near real time.

Excerpts:

Recall that managing the principal-agent problem involves bringing incentives and information back into alignment. Fortunately, the same means that the United States can employ to overcome the information and contextual advantage enjoyed by its Venezuelan government agent are also useful toward resolving the above credibility challenges: information’s strategic correlate (i.e., intelligence gathering).

...

Principal-agent problems are not new; they have existed as long as policymaking has, and the United States has encountered them well before Venezuela or Afghanistan. Like with Afghanistan, however, the historical record on how well the United States has managed them is spotty, to include in Latin America going all the way back to the earliest days of the Monroe Doctrine.

Operation Absolute Resolve was a bold gesture that the United States confidently undertook in defiance of international norms and expectations. To achieve its long-term interests in Venezuela, the United States must now defy the intractability of principal-agent problems in the historical record.

Comment: A $64K question: How can Washington design a compellence strategy for Caracas that is more credible than internal actors’ threats without drifting toward de facto occupation?

Overcoming the Principal-Agent Problem in “Running” Venezuela - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · Patrick Sullivan · January 7, 2026

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/overcoming-the-principal-agent-problem-in-running-venezuela/

One of the primary questions in the wake of Operation Absolute Resolve—the unilateral American raid to capture now former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores—is what the United States’ “running” of Venezuela will actually entail. The associated policy and implementation options exist on a spectrum. On one end, running Venezuela could mean occupation of the country by American armed forces and installation of an American civil administrator, adopting the model most recently seen with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq after the 2003 invasion. On the other end of the spectrum, running Venezuela could be more akin to a guardianship, wherein the United States advances its interests through a compliant Venezuelan government, with compliance assured through the threat of additional military action. Statements by the US secretary of state since the raid suggest that the United States will seek this latter option, at least initially.

Every option short of full occupation and direct US administration (like Iraq in 2003) contains a potential principal-agent problem. Such problems occur when a principal delegates tasks to an agent but there is a misalignment of interests, incentives, and information between the principal and agent. As a consequence of these misalignments, the agent’s task performance can be suboptimal, to the extent that the agent pursues goals that diverge from the principal’s intention. Given the agent’s informational and contextual advantage (by virtue of proximity to the task setting), these divergent goals can be achieved before the principal can do anything about it, thereby leading to strategic failure.

The United States’ ultimately futile partner capacity-building efforts in Afghanistan are a clear illustration of this dynamic. The Afghan government was the United States’ agent to achieve the strategic goal of defeating al-Qaeda and the Taliban by proxy. As the principal, the United States did not particularly care who was leading the Afghan government in service of this goal. The two Afghan presidents over the course of the American intervention in Afghanistan—Hamid Karzai, and subsequently Ashraf Ghani—cared very much about staying in position, however, and their political security became an agent-specific goal that they pursued independently. The goal divergence emerged when the material resources that the United States pushed into Afghanistan to improve security and governmental programs vis-à-vis the Taliban insurgency were managed by the Karzai and Ghani governments not toward program-optimal outcomes, but rather toward maintaining the corruption and patronage essential for their staying in power. Over time, the corresponding suboptimal program outcomes built up to provide a window of opportunity for the Taliban to resurge, and they exploited this window on the security and political legitimacy fronts to ultimately displace the US-backed Afghan government.

It is easy to project parallels between the US experience in Afghanistan and what is emerging in Venezuela. A compliant government (agent) will probably seek to thread the proverbial needle of satisfying American (principal) demands while simultaneously securing its leaders’ positions against the inevitable internal politicking (if not outright civil conflict) that will follow Maduro’s removal. This threading action is complicated by postcolonial resentment, nationalist sentiment that tends to get provoked by violations of state sovereignty irrespective of context and location, and the powerful array of illicit drug actors and other antigovernment criminal groups that may now see their own opportunity space to exploit in Venezuela. In light of these factors, even the most compliant Venezuelan government that acts in concert with the United States in a good-faith manner could still possibly only minimally satisfy American demands.

The United States does not have to accept this condition, of course, as there are ways to manage the principal-agent problem. Specifically, if the principal can bring the agent’s incentives and information back into alignment with its own, then better alignment of interests will follow and there will be less potential for goal divergence.

In the case of the Venezuelan government, officials could be incentivized to satisfy American demands to the degree that those demands are more compelling than the competing demands they face internally. In political parlance, compelling points to behavior, so the competing demands in question really reflect a competition between how the American principal wants the Venezuelan government agent to behave versus how the internal entities want the government to behave. Thus, the American strategy of compellence targeting the Venezuelan government needs to be stronger than those of its competitors.

Strategies of compellence are composed of demands, threats, and promises. In the context of the United States running Venezuela through a compliant government, the demand would be Do what I tell you to do, when I tell you to do it. The threat would be I will undertake more military action and get rid of you if you do not comply. And the promise would be I will let you remain in office and perhaps even protect you against internal threats if you do comply. The perceived strength of the American strategy is relative, and it pivots on whose threats and promises the Venezuelan government sees as more credible. If the ones being levied by the internal entities (i.e., those with competing demands) are seemingly more credible, then the Venezuelan government will be less compliant with American demands, thus reinforcing the conditions for goal divergence and strategic failure. As such, American policymakers need to be highly attuned to the underlying credibility of any threats and promises in the same relativistic fashion: They must know who their strategic competitors are, understand what threats and promises they are making, and objectively assess the credibility comparison. Nearly two decades of experience in Afghanistan shows that this is easier said than done.

The large US armada off the coast of Venezuela and President Donald Trump’s statements about not fearing boots on the ground certainly lend credibility to American threats. But it is important to recognize the limitations here. First, while the armada is significant, it is not enough to transition to the maximalist option of occupying a country that is twice the size of Iraq with geography characterized by dense tropical forests and numerous mountainous regions. Additionally, while the United States has significant strategic interests in Venezuela, the intensity of these interests is expectedly less than the existential ones carried by its strategic competitors that are internal to Venezuela. Thus, there is only so much blood and treasure the United States is willing to spend in Venezuela before American domestic audiences start exercising their own strategies of compellence on American policymakers. Furthermore, US policymakers must expect that strategic competitors in Venezuela will recognize this factor and seek to exploit it narratively, which can ultimately degrade the credibility of American threats and promises.

Recall that managing the principal-agent problem involves bringing incentives and information back into alignment. Fortunately, the same means that the United States can employ to overcome the information and contextual advantage enjoyed by its Venezuelan government agent are also useful toward resolving the above credibility challenges: information’s strategic correlate (i.e., intelligence gathering).

Unlike with Afghanistan, the United States has a long history of engagement in Venezuela and Latin America more broadly (and has gained significant cultural awareness in turn) and a large stable of native Spanish speakers that span all regional dialects. The advantages borne of this history have already paid dividends in Venezuela, given that Operation Absolute Resolve was almost assuredly assisted by American intelligence assets that had penetrated Maduro’s inner circle. The exploitation of well-placed sources on the ground must continue if the United States hopes to stay aligned informationally with its Venezuelan government agent. Extant collection capability across the various US intelligence agencies is not the only way to achieve this. Some of the Venezuelan diaspora in the United States will want to return to their home country, especially those that fled economic or political persecution under the Maduro regime. This is a potentially valuable recruitment pool for additional intelligence gatherers (but one with its own potential credibility and principal-agent problems that would have to be managed) that the US should consider employing. Regardless of which intelligence assets the United States chooses and where they come from, their placement will help American policymakers to see the strategic environment as their Venezuelan government agent sees it, thereby allowing the American strategy of compellence to be calibrated in near-real time to stay perceptually strong—to know who the strategic competitors are and understanding what threats and promises they are making. With this knowledge and understanding, the United States could nullify the strategic competitors through a variety of targeting strategies, thus ensuring that the credibility of American threats and promises stay at pace (at least) with those of the strategic competitors.

Principal-agent problems are not new; they have existed as long as policymaking has, and the United States has encountered them well before Venezuela or Afghanistan. Like with Afghanistan, however, the historical record on how well the United States has managed them is spotty, to include in Latin America going all the way back to the earliest days of the Monroe Doctrine.

Operation Absolute Resolve was a bold gesture that the United States confidently undertook in defiance of international norms and expectations. To achieve its long-term interests in Venezuela, the United States must now defy the intractability of principal-agent problems in the historical record.

Colonel Patrick Sullivan, PhD, is the director of the Modern War Institute at West Point.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Vicepresidencia de Venezuela

mwi.westpoint.edu · Patrick Sullivan · January 7, 2026

17. Q & A: Karl Marlantes on Vietnam, Leadership, and the Lessons America Still Hasn’t Learned

Summary:

Karl Marlantes argues Vietnam still haunts America because it was a lost, unnecessary war that shattered trust in leaders, exposed cultural ignorance, and never found closure. He insists the United States keeps repeating the mistake of intervening in other people’s civil wars and trying to export democracy it barely understands at home. Matterhorn resonates because human nature, careerism, and small-unit leadership problems do not change. He calls for national service, better reintegration for veterans, honest conversations about killing and atrocity, and far greater support to Ukraine, whose drone-driven, rapidly adapting fight exposes U.S. strategic delay and bureaucratic rigidity.

Comment: Leadership – the key to all problems.

Q & A: Karl Marlantes on Vietnam, Leadership, and the Lessons America Still Hasn’t Learned

irregularwarfare.org · Christopher Booth, Walker Mills · January 8, 2026

Editor’s Note: This article is presented in a question-and-answer format, with the Irregular Warfare Initiative interviewing Karl Marlantes. This piece has been edited for clarity and readability, as spoken language differs from how text is read on the page. Marlantes served as a Marine Infantry officer in Vietnam where he was awarded the Navy Cross, a Bronze Star, two Purple Hearts, and 10 Air Medals. He is a graduate of Yale University, was a Rhodes Scholar, and has a master’s degree from Oxford University. He is the author of four books including Matterhorn: A Novel of the Vietnam War, What It Is Like to Go to War, Deep River, and Cold Victory. Marlantes was also a contributor to the 10-part The Vietnam War documentary produced by Ken Burns and Lynn Novick.

IWI: We think one of the best reviews of your novel Matterhorn was by NPR book critic Michael Schaub, who wrote,

“There’s never been a Vietnam war novel as stark, powerful, and brutal as Matterhorn, and it’s the rare kind of masterpiece that enriches not just American literature but American history as well.”

April 2025 marked the fifty-year anniversary of the end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. That war has been a reference point for the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, an analogy that is brought up every time the U.S. military is potentially deployed overseas. Why do you think that Vietnam still seems to loom so large in America’s collective psyche?

Marlantes:

“There’s a host of reasons, and one of them is that we got involved [in the war even though we shouldn’t have]. We’ve learned nothing. Our war in Afghanistan was so similar to Vietnam. We know nothing about the culture. We don’t speak the language. We stand out like sore thumbs. They blend into their environment. Iraq was virtually the same.

Another thing that resonates, and, I hate to say it, [is the fact that] we lost. It was the first time America lost, and I think we’re still trying to swallow that. The images of Marines hauling people off the roof [of the American Embassy] by helicopter still resonate with people, and then we repeated it in Afghanistan.

It was also the first time that we lost our naiveté as a nation. I was a junior at Yale when the Gulf of Tonkin Incident happened. I was from this little logging town in Oregon, and I was a little bit naive. We’re talking about it, and a couple of my friends said, “well the President’s just lying.” And I remember just sputtering… “that’s impossible that the President would ever lie to the American people,” and they broke out laughing. That was the first time that it hit me, and I think it was the first time it hit America that these people can lie. That was a big change. It changed our culture and made us distrust institutions. That still resonates.

And another thing: there’s no closure to it. [In] World War II, we won, and, then we did the Marshall Plan, and we got everybody back on their feet. [With] Vietnam, we just left and it’s still hanging there. I’m involved with a group called Peace Trees Vietnam, and we’re cleaning up unexploded ordnance in Quang Tri Province. There’s a [lot] of it, and I was personally responsible for a lot of it. We found one field, and it was about an acre. There were 103 pieces of unexploded ordnance in it, and this farmer was trying to farm there. I mean, it was a war, and I hit them with everything I had. But I still feel like America hasn’t quite come to terms with it like it did with the Europeans, and the Japanese [after World War II].”

IWI: Your book Matterhorn has appeared on numerous reading lists, including the Commandant of the Marine Corps Professional Reading List, and the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program. Why do you think the book resonates with military leaders?

Marlantes:

“I’m chuckling because every one of those guys has been a junior officer. And I think [the book helps them] relate back to when they were new and trying to get their feet on the ground as junior officers, particularly Marine and Army infantry. The other thing is that the military is still dealing with [some of the same problems] like careerism.

I also get emails and letters from people in the Dutch army and the British army, and they always say that nothing changes. The military is run by people, and people don’t change. Or if they do, it’s really slow. I mean, you can read the Odyssey or the Iliad, and they still resonate [because they were dealing with the same things].”

IWI: Are there other books either about Vietnam about military culture or the military experience in general that you would recommend to military leaders, academics, or policymakers?

Marlantes:

“The first one that comes to mind is Tim O’Brien’s The Things They Carried, but I actually think his Going after Cacciato is the better book. I know Tim and he’s a great writer.

I remember once bitching to him and I said: “Tim, every eighth grader in America buys The Things They Carried. No one buys my book.” He looked at me and said, “Karl, there’s not an English teacher in the world that would assign a book that thick.”

James Jones wrote a trilogy with From Here to Eternity, The Thin Red Line, and Whistle.

I think that I was [also] influenced a lot by the First World War poets: Siegfried Sassoon, Wilfred Owen, Robert Graves, [and] Isaac Rosenberg. They’re important because they were the first writers that broke through this “war is glory” sort of stuff, and, “Dulce et decorum est pro patria more.” [Latin for ‘It is sweet and fitting to die for one’s country.’]

No. It’s not. It just isn’t.

Another writer that people don’t think about is J.D. Salinger. He wrote a couple of short stories that are really, really good war stories. One is about a veteran that comes back, A Perfect Day for Banana Fish.

The other one is For Esme With Love and Squalor. In this short story, the protagonist carries a watch that this little girl gave him, and it’s a perfect little watch. Her father was killed earlier in the war. This guy was in England met Esme [the little girl who gave him the watch] before his unit invaded France. And as the story goes on, that watch gets increasingly damaged. By the end of the war, it’s really damaged. [It is a metaphor for] Salinger’s own journey. He saw a lot of combat.

I think a lot of people overlook these two short stories [by J.D. Salinger].

[Another one is] the Sword of Honor series by Evelyn Waugh. It’s hilarious—it pokes fun at stuff, but it also really gets to the nitty gritty.

[Then there’s]War and Peace by Leo Tolstoy. Tolstoy was a soldier, and he can write about it really well. There’s a whole lot of other stuff in that novel, of course.

All Quiet on the Western Front by Erich Maria Remarque is another classic that should be read.

Norman Mailer wrote a great novel, The Naked and the Dead. It’s well constructed and good.

[There’s also] The Good Soldier Svejk by a Czech author named Jaroslav Hasek.

Then you have the great historians: AJP Taylor, Liddell Hart, John Keegan, Hew Strachan, Max Hastings, Anthony Beevor. These guys are great writers.

I think that it’s really important that our military leaders, noncommissioned officers, and [commissioned] officers read those histories because it gives an overview and some insight into how we get into these wars. I think we also have to pull back and ask how do we get into these messes? The great historians [are the ones] who have really good insight on it.”

IWI: What are some of the relevant lessons of Vietnam, and what are some of the things that people misunderstand about the war and the generation that fought it?

Marlantes:

“I think a relevant lesson that we have never learned is that if there’s something going on inside a country, don’t poke your nose into the hornets’ nest. There are many ways to solve problems [without going to war].

We end up getting involved in civil wars, and that’s just not something that we should do. We should get involved if we have serious national interests at stake …if it seriously threatens us or if there’s a clear violation of international laws.

[For example], what the Russians are doing in Ukraine is an absolutely clear violation of international law. I don’t think we should send troops to Ukraine, but we should be supporting them way more than we are now. The Russians certainly believe they are at war with us. We should have just flooded Ukraine with weapons and just given them everything we had from the start. Then the war would be over. But we delayed.

We can’t export democracy. I think that’s a lesson that we should learn from Vietnam and we haven’t. I love and admire Colin Powell, but I believe that when he was Secretary of State and they had to write the constitution for the new Iraqi government, and Powell said something like, “Well, why is that a problem? It’d take a week.” …Yeah. Okay, Colin. We spent two hundred and fifty years [building our democracy], and we’re still fighting about constitutional stuff today. So, who are we to be talking about other people’s democracies? We need to focus on our own.

In South Africa, we didn’t like apartheid. But we didn’t send the Marines to South Africa. Instead, we boycotted South Africa; we didn’t play rugby with them. We put the pressure on them morally. There are many ways you can put pressure on people without sending our kids to war. We reach for the military button all the time, and it’s ineffective, especially in those situations.

I believe in the Powell Doctrine, you need to have a clear military objective. Then, you go in with overwhelming force. Something has to be really at stake for the United States. And you need to have an exit plan.”

IWI: Before this interview, we talked some about Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and the lack of reintegration plans for Vietnam veterans. In your second book, What It Is Like to Go to War, you have a chapter about homecoming, which reminded us of Sebastian Junger’s book Tribe: On Homecoming and Belonging, and the lack of community focus on the individual in modern society. What are your thoughts about how we could improve kind of mutual understanding between the military and American society at large?

Marlantes:

“For starters, I think we should have national service. And I don’t think everybody should go into the military. I’ve got five kids and three of them I wouldn’t want anywhere near the Marine Corps. But two of them would be okay. They could teach people how to read in the urban schools, or they could help clear trails in the Forest Service. They could help screen people at airports for Homeland Security. There are all kinds of things.

I lost my first marriage mostly because I went crazy with post-traumatic stress, and we didn’t know. We’d never heard of it, and we didn’t know what hit us.

Veterans have to get back into the community, and it’s hard for two reasons. One is that Americans don’t know how to talk to veterans. They say “I don’t wanna talk to him about that. I mean, it might upset him. It might set him off, and this would be terrible.”

We need to tell people how to talk to a veteran about his war experience. Don’t start off with, “Have you killed anybody?” Start off with, “Was it hot?” or “What did you eat for breakfast?” Questions like that. And believe me, the veterans will start to spill their stories real fast. They want to talk about their experiences, but they don’t get the opportunity.

But veterans also have a part in this …namely [they have] a big chip on their shoulders. [In their heads, they are thinking:] “You have no idea what I went through.” It’s a way of saying “I’m superior to you because of my difficult, even horrid experience.” That’s no way to get back into community. Imagine if all the women felt the same way when talking to men about childbirth.”

IWI: You wrote the forward to Storm of Steel by Ernst Jünger, which is considered one of the classics of World War I literature. In your preface, you put the author’s experiences into context, especially the idea of him as a natural warrior. And you talk at length about what it means to be a warrior in What It Is Like to Go to War. Do you think modern war has changed what it means to be a warrior?

Marlantes:

“No. But, I have to tell you why. What’s changed is technology, and it’s a lot easier to be a warrior today. I mean, I’m so happy I didn’t have to kill somebody with a sword or be hacked up with a sword.

What does a warrior do? What is a warrior personality? A warrior must be willing to risk their life to defend their side, and they do have to choose a side. It’s like “I’m an American, and these are my people, and I will fight anybody who’s not one of this group.” That’s a warrior attitude, and they’re willing to inflict violence.

The police get this all mixed up all the time. I mean, you see these guys running around in combat gear, and its childish cosplay. Police are willing to inflict violence, and they certainly take some risks. They’re not nearly the same risks as an infantry soldier, but they are taking risks. But they cannot choose sides. They have to be on the side of the law. So even though they do something similar, they’re not warriors because they’re not choosing a side and defending that side with everything they’ve got.

And now you have modern warfare. Let’s take some woman on a cruiser firing a tomahawk. Well, she certainly puts her life at risk—not as much as an infantry soldier—but she does. She certainly is willing to inflict violence on the enemy. And she’s on the side of America. I would say that she’s a warrior just the same as somebody in the Odyssey, but modern technology makes it easier.

And I think that people need to understand that when they say “I’m a warrior.” No. What they really mean to say is “I’m tough” or “I’ve gone through hard stuff.” And that’s confusing because a lot of people go through hard stuff. But they’re not warriors because they’re not choosing sides and not willing to inflict violence.”

IWI: A lot of Matterhorn could be read as studies in small unit leadership, both positive and negative. In What it is like to Go to War, you wrote a section on atrocity and what happens when small-unit leadership breaks down. How can good leadership provide a bulwark against this?

Marlantes:

“What we have to understand about getting 18 or 19-year-old Americans to kill people is that you have to get them to believe that [their enemies are] not human. [People say] “You’re dehumanizing people.” Absolutely. Because those young soldiers or Marines won’t pull the trigger if it’s a human. But if it’s a “Gook” or a “Haji” or a “Towel-head,” then you can pull the trigger because you’re actually just killing an animal. I use the word pseudo-speciation to describe this dehumanization of the enemy. In other words, we make up a fake species. The famous line from the My Lai the massacre is “We were just shooting vermin.” Well, that’s classic pseudo-speciation.

Small unit leaders need to understand that this is because of how they’ve been trained in boot camp. The small unit leader and the brass have to understand that it’s a system that allows you in combat to pull the trigger. As soon as the firefight’s over, you’ve got to step in right away and say, “We just killed people. These are people.”

As soon as the fight is over, if you lose people, you have to have a ceremony. You can’t just not think about what you’ve done. You have to stop the pseudo-speciation.

[Once in Vietnam] we’d been in five or six days of continuous fighting. And one morning, I was checking the lines, and I saw a couple of kids with ears in their helmets. And I went up to them. I said, “Look. I know that they killed your friends. You’ve got to understand that this is an atrocity, and you can’t do this. So, you’re gonna go down and find those bodies you cut the ears off of,”—because they were still laying down below us in on the hillside—“and then you’re gonna bury them.”

Now this wasn’t a trivial task because we were still taking some sniper fire, but I didn’t care. I went down with them. And they started digging the holes to bury the people that they had mutilated, and they both broke down crying because suddenly it hit them, that they actually did this to a human being.

And there’s no way that those atrocities would’ve continued after that moment. So, I think doing things like that—burying the enemy, is very important. Small unit leaders can do this kind of stuff. In fact, they’re the only ones who can because they’re the ones that are actually in the fight at the time.

[After the fighting is over] the small unit leader has to step in immediately and say, “Okay. We’re over. It’s no longer a “Towel head.” It’s a kid. It’s bad luck that he ran into us, but he’s a kid.” And I think that’ll stop it. Junior officers can push back against that kind of stuff. As soon as the fighting’s over, you pull them out of pseudo speciation. It’s a protective mechanism that allows us to kill other people. So it’s good. We want it, but we don’t want it all the time.

Senior officers also have a part in this. They set the tone. If you ask your soldiers to prove body count by collecting ears, or make it permissible to torture and humiliate prisoners, as we did at Abu Ghraib, or put out memos from the Justice Department saying torture is okay, you’re going to get atrocities.

And if you get a[n unlawful] sort of order like that, you’ve gotta get the gang together and walk into the office or whatever and just say “We’re not gonna do this. This is an illegal order.” The main thing is [to address it] right there on the spot.”

IWI: Changing gears for our last question. You recently visited Ukraine. What lessons or impressions did you take away from the conflict there that you can share with IWI’s readership?

Marlantes:

“I was around the front at Kharkiv with a drone unit called the Achilles Regiment. It is unbelievable how war has changed. I read things about the war, but until you go there, [you don’t realize how much has changed in warfare].

For starters: the battalion headquarters. This battalion headquarters was probably spread out over two kilometers, and it was in movable trailers because if they had put it in one place, the Russians would have hit them, and that’d be the end of them.

Another thing that’s different is I was talking to a woman who was a medic. And she said that the most dangerous part of her job was after they picked the guy up, trying to get him back to a hospital because there’s at least ten miles where you’re under the surveillance of drones. So, the front line is just the end of the surveillance zone. You’re probably better off in your hole [on the front line], than some medic trying to get in a car and drive a wounded person back through the surveillance zone.

And, you can’t organize for a breakthrough or even a tactical operation like we used to because we can’t group people together. Until we can figure out some way of regaining air superiority, and that means we have to come up with some way of putting a tent over our infantry operations, [drones are going to be a problem].

The Ukrainians are really good at swift adaptation, and we’re horrible at it. So what’s the difference?

[I met] this battalion commander, a lieutenant colonel. I think he had almost a million dollars allocated to him, so that if he needed something changed on a drone, he could contact an entrepreneur, tell him what the problem was, give him the money, and get it solved. They’re turning around problems like that in a week. The improved drone is combat tested the next day and if it’s found lacking, that gets fixed immediately.

Unfortunately, the Russians are adapting fast too. But if we have to make a change in a weapon in the U.S. military, you have to write it up, and then you have to let it out for bid, and then you have to give it to the colonel that gives it to the general, and then the assistant undersecretary of [so on and so forth].

We’re hopeless at quick innovation, and, the Ukrainians have figured out how to do it fast. If we give a lieutenant responsibility for the lives of 42 infantrymen, we could certainly give him a million dollars. He doesn’t need to go to Raytheon. He can go to some guy who’s got a garage. Can you imagine that happening in America? I don’t think so because we’re just mired in our own bureaucracy.

The Ukrainians were cynical about American help. One guy said, “I learned a whole new American expression.” Oh, I said, “what’s that?” “We’re working on it,” he replied. And I went, “Yeah. I understand.” Because they need things like artillery shells and we tell them, “We’re working on it.”

They’re exhausted. I mean, they’ve been fighting for nearly four years now, and they’re tired. Their force is also older; they don’t have young kids. The young kids can volunteer, but they don’t draft them. I think they’re drafting at age 25 and above. [This is true. In April 2024 it was lowered from 27.] Our best frontline combat soldiers are 19-year-olds. People ask, “Why is that?” I said, “Well, they can go without water. They can go without food.” But, most importantly, they don’t have any frontal cortices developed yet. So, if you tell them to take the hill, they don’t think to ask you, they just go for it.

You never want 19-year-olds in special operations, and you certainly never want them to be police. You need to be in your mid-thirties before you develop that kind of judgment. But can you imagine a platoon of 35-year-olds? “Okay. We gotta take the hill.” “Oh, wait, lieutenant. Why don’t we call the Air Force? Why can’t we just bomb them for a couple of days?”

I think the Ukrainians are missing a big piece there, but they’ve got their reasons. You know, they want the future in the hands of these kids.

I think that they’re going to win. They’re incredible fighters. They’re exhausted, but they’re not gonna quit. I have no doubt Ukraine is going to win if it takes them ten years or if the Russians take over, then there’ll be an insurgency in Ukraine for twenty years. They are going to win this war. And I think with what they’re doing now, finally hitting their oil infrastructure, which we should have done two years ago.

And you’re never going to convince them to give up their land because, if you ask them to give up land, you’re asking them to give up Ukrainians, and they are not going to do it. It’s estimated, but impossible to verify, that there are around 100,000 children [estimates vary] in Russia that they have to get back. I mean, what are you thinking asking them to give up land? You’re going to get them to make a bargain? No. They got to whup the Russians, and I think we got to help them.”

The views expressed in this interview do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

Main Image: U.S. Marines near Mutter’s Ridge during fighting in northern South Vietnam, February 1969. Photo courtesy of Karl Marlantes’s personal collection.

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irregularwarfare.org · Christopher Booth, Walker Mills · January 8, 2026

18. China eyes risks, gains as Trump pushes for ‘spheres of influence’

Summary:

Trump’s revival of a hard-edged Monroe Doctrine, capped by Maduro’s abduction and demands that Caracas cut ties with China, exposes the vulnerability of Beijing’s Latin American investments while normalizing great-power “spheres of influence.” Chinese analysts see U.S. “raw power” unconstrained by rules, and some nationalists draw explicit parallels to Taiwan and the South and East China Seas. Yet Venezuela is not a Chinese core interest. Beijing is likely to stay pragmatic, preserve its detente and trade agenda with Washington, and quietly hedge political risk in the region rather than confront the United States directly.

Excerpt:

“Trump’s raid on Venezuela suggests that Chinese investments in Latin America now face greater political risks from US meddling in the region,” Gildau said. “Still, Beijing will likely respond by seeking ways to mitigate those risks rather than turning away from the region.”

Comment: I do not think the US is "meddling" in the region. It is now fully engaged.

But if Washington asserts an exclusive Western Hemisphere sphere, how does it credibly oppose Beijing’s future claims to its own sphere in Taiwan and the wider Asia-Indo-Pacific?

China eyes risks, gains as Trump pushes for ‘spheres of influence’

Al Jazeera English · Erin Hale,John Power

Erin Hale

and

John Power

Published On 8 Jan 2026

8 Jan 2026

China will need to reassess its investment in Venezuela and its understanding of US foreign policy under Trump.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/8/china-finds-risks-opportunities-as-trump-pushes-for-spheres-of-influence

Hours before United States special forces abducted Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro last Saturday, Maduro met with China’s special envoy to the Latin American country to reaffirm their nations’ “strategic relationship”.

Now the decades-long relationship is in question, as is the future of billions of dollars of Chinese investment in the country. At the same time, the US has handed China a new opportunity to assert its dominance in its own back yard, including on its claim to self-governing Taiwan, say analysts.

Maduro's downfall deals China new cards in US rivalry – DW – 01/07/2026

DW · Yuchen Li

Yuchen Li in Taipei

4 hours ago4 hours ago

Beijing is "deeply shocked" by the Trump administration's attack on Venezuela, one of China's key partners in Latin America. At the same time, China could find ways to use the kidnapping of Maduro for its own agenda.

https://www.dw.com/en/maduros-downfall-deals-china-new-cards-in-us-rivalry/a-75422605

Hours after the US controversial seizure of Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro this weekend, China's Foreign Ministry stated Beijing was "deeply shocked" by the "blatant use of force against a sovereign state."

The Asian nation also appealed to Latin American and Caribbean countries, calling them "good friends and good partners" and assuring them Beijing was willing to work with them and "navigate the changing international landscape with solidarity and coordination."

While criticizing the United States for attacking Venezuela, Chinese diplomats have also sought to portray their own country as a responsible global power.

Those remarks are likely to resonate strongly across Latin America. With US President Donald Trump reviving the Monroe Doctrine — a foreign policy stance first articulated over 200 years ago about Washington's supremacy in the Western Hemisphere — the kidnapping of Maduro is seen as a grim warning and a demonstration of US power in the region.

Maduro's fall stirs fears for Venezuelan, regional stability

William Yang, a senior Northeast Asia analyst at the International Crisis Group think tank, said Beijing is likely to tap into such concerns to challenge US international standing and to "further deepen its influence among countries across the Global South."

China will also "closely monitor how the US handles the situation in Venezuela in the coming weeks and months," Yang added.

Broken ties with Caracas

Trump's swift seizure of Maduro, the leader of a key Chinese ally in Latin America, could significantly impact the world's second-largest economy.

Under Maduro, China formed an "all‑weather strategic partnership" with Venezuela and became the country's largest oil buyer after the US sanctions escalated in 2019.

China has also sold weapons to Venezuela — with deliveries worth $615 million (€526 million) just between 2009 and 2019, according to a US estimate. Perhaps most significantly for China, its officials have provided billions in credit to Venezuela, and Caracas is nowhere near paying off its debt.

US-based think tank AidData puts the total Chinese lending to Venezuela at $105.5 billion, which includes $17 billion to $19 billion in outstanding principal from China Development Bank's oil-for-loans program.

Trump invokes Monroe Doctrine in Maduro capture

Hours before his capture on Saturday, Maduro welcomed a Chinese delegation in what he described as a "pleasant meeting" to reaffirm their political and economic partnership.

But US media has since reported that the Trump administration is insisting that the interim government in Venezuela must sever economic ties with China, Russia, Iran and Cuba. On social media, Trump has stated that Venezuela would deliver between 30 million and 50 million barrels of its oil to the US.

China decried the move as a violation of international law.

"The United States' brazen use of force against Venezuela and its demand for 'America First' when Venezuela disposes of its own oil resources are typical acts of bullying," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning told a press conference.

China's outrage remains symbolic

However, analysts caution that China's rhetoric should be taken with a grain of salt.

"China didn't give a hoot about international law," said Elizabeth Freund Larus, adjunct senior fellow at the Pacific Forum, pointing to China's military assertiveness in the South China Sea and its reluctance to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

"We can translate China's warning to Washington… as 'Beijing needs its money back!' and 'We demand that the US continue Venezuelan oil flows to China!'" Larus added.

What could be Donald Trump's next target after Venezuela?

Also, despite Beijing's strong language, China has yet to take any action in retaliation for the US attack on Venezuela.

"Beijing is unlikely to go beyond symbolic expressions of disapproval," said Ryan Hass, director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution.

Hass also said he did not expect the incident would significantly alter the trajectory of US-China relations.

"America's actions in Venezuela will only play into the US-China relationship if they cause the United States to get distracted and bogged down in a quagmire in Venezuela," he said.

Will China use Venezuela as template for Taiwan?

Over the weekend, Chinese social media closely followed Trump's capture of the Venezuelan leader, with nationalist users saying the operation offered a way for China to handle tensions with Taiwan.

Beijing claims Taiwan, a self-governing democracy, as its own territory and has vowed to take over the island by force if necessary.

Chinese troops carry out live-firing exercises near Taiwan

When asked to comment on the speculation regarding Taiwan on Monday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian reiterated Beijing's standard line that the Taiwan controversy was "an internal affair" and "no external forces are in the position of making any interference."

But analysts say that the situations in Venezuela and Taiwan are hardly comparable and that Beijing's calculus is unlikely to change due to the US seizing Maduro.

"Venezuela is a shattered state that was run by a strongman ruler. Taiwan is a vibrant democracy," Hass said. "China could not achieve its aims on Taiwan simply by capturing Taiwan's elected leader."

Beijing "has intended to grab Taiwan long before this and will long after," he told DW. "China hasn't done it yet because China isn't guaranteed success yet. That day is getting closer, regardless of Trump."

Edited by: Darko Janjevic

DW · Yuchen Li

20. Maduro’s capture is an embarrassing defeat for China, Russia and Iran

Summary:

Operation Absolute Resolve is framed as a decisive military and geopolitical victory for the United States and a humiliating setback for China, Russia, and Iran. U.S. cyber, space, and air power overwhelmed Venezuelan defenses built on their systems, showcasing Western technological superiority and joint-force integration across 150 aircraft. Beijing’s, Moscow’s, and Tehran’s recent pledges of “strategic partnership” could not protect Maduro, undercutting their credibility as security patrons. The operation is cast as the sharp edge of a revived Monroe Doctrine and Trump’s new National Security Strategy, signaling renewed U.S. resolve in the Western Hemisphere while opening a long, uncertain path to rebuild Venezuela.

Comment: Sometimes the best narratives in support of the US come from non-Americans (though Ambassador McFields was educated at our NDU and Harvard).

Maduro’s capture is an embarrassing defeat for China, Russia and Iran

by Arturo McFields, opinion contributor - 01/07/26 8:30 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5674224-venezuela-us-military-victory/

The mission to capture Nicolas Maduro — Operation Absolute Resolve — was precise, purposeful and powerful.

It was a military blow, and not only to Venezuela’s narco-dictatorship. The U.S. also demonstrated with this action its technological and operational superiority against the Chinese, Russian and Iranian aircraft defense systems used by the Venezuelan armed forces. The radars, drones and air-defense missile systems were overwhelmed by U.S. air power.

Gen. Dan “Razin” Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that as they approached Venezuelan shores, the U.S. Space Command and U.S. Cyber Command began layering different effects to suppress Venezuelan defenses and create a pathway to reach its objective. More than 150 aircraft from 20 different Western Hemisphere bases worked in perfect harmony in this extraordinary mission.

Operation Absolute Resolve also yielded a geopolitical victory. In December, Maduro had strengthened his alliance with Russia and China at the highest level — a desperate effort that did not weaken President Trump’s decision.

The day before his capture, Maduro met in Caracas with Beijing’s top envoy for Latin America, Qiu Xiaoqi. The high-ranking official carried a message of solidarity and political support against U.S. seizure of Venezuelan oil tankers and the destruction of suspected drug trafficking boats in the Caribbean Sea.

The meeting was in vain. Just hours later, Maduro would be escorted out in his pajamas by U.S. special forces.

The strategic partnership with Russia also failed. On Dec. 11, Maduro held a telephone conversation with Vladimir Putin, who reportedly reaffirmed his categorical support, strategic partnership and backing for the execution of new mutually beneficial projects. That promise did not do much for Maduro, either.

Iran’s alliance with Venezuela was also defeated. Just a few days ago, the U.S. took a key decision sanctioning 10 entities and individuals based in Iran and Venezuela. Those entities included a Venezuelan company that has contributed to the sale of millions of dollars’ worth of Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicles, and those linked to procurement networks that have supported Iran’s drone and ballistic missile programs.

During the U.S. special operation, the supposedly powerful Persian drones failed to stop or cause any harm to the powerful U.S. military deployment.

Operation Absolute Resolve was not just another operation. It was the realization of the new National Security Strategy, which makes it clear that the Western Hemisphere is a priority for the Trump administration.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio underscored Trump’s commitment to the region: “The U.S. will deploy every tool to eradicate these threats from our backyard.” he said in a statement. “This is where we live and we’re not going to allow the Western Hemisphere to be a base of operation for adversaries, competitors, and rivals of the United States.”

This new Monroe Doctrine represents a return to strong and unconventional leadership. Trump did what several administrations had promised but none had been able to deliver, removing Maduro from his palace and giving democracy, security and prosperity a chance.

The U.S. is recovering its position, power and presence in the international arena. The new approach is developing and deploying unprecedented results aimed at specific goals. Not to start never-ending wars but to prevent them.

Operation Midnight Hammer focused its efforts on the nuclear power of Iran. Operation Southern Spear aimed at addressing drug trafficking and Operation Absolute Resolve led to the capture of Maduro. Surgical and lethal military actions.

The U.S. has achieved a historic victory in Venezuela gaining respect among friends and foes. Restoring its global and regional leadership. Putting into action and giving life to its new National Security Strategy.

The challenges ahead are many. Maduro was captured and now is facing justice, but his criminal architecture remains intact. Venezuela has a long way to go to restore democracy and rebuild the rule of law. It is a monumental task, but Operation Absolute Resolve has provided the credentials and credibility to fulfill the task.

Arturo McFields is an exiled journalist, former Nicaraguan ambassador to the Organization of American States, and a former member of the Norwegian Peace Corps. He is an alumnus of the National Defense University’s Security and Defense Seminar and the Harvard Leadership course.

21. What Silicon Valley Gets Wrong About National Security

Summary:

The article argues that Silicon Valley’s diagnosis of U.S. defense acquisition is wrong. The system’s fragility stems less from overregulation and more from decades of globalization, financialization, deregulation, and hollowing out public arsenals, shipyards, and in-house expertise. “First Breakfast” ideas like more deregulation, fixed-price contracts, and leaning on venture capital repeat past mistakes, risk profiteering, and deepen dependence on a distorted monopsony market. True resilience requires rebuilding state capacity: larger, better trained acquisition and technical cadres, renewed public production options, and contracts that pay for surge capacity and long-term readiness, not just speed and “dynamism.”

Excerpts:

Defense tech leaders often speak about “unleashing” the power of the market by cutting regulations. But the defense sector is an inherently distorted and flawed marketplace. It is defined by a single dominant buyer, significant barriers to access, and large capital requirements; no amount of deregulation or deference to Silicon Valley can correct for that. Rather than cede yet more ground to the private sector or design policy around an unachievable vision of self-administering contracts available to flashy but untested firms, Washington must grab the regulatory and institutional reins to create and manage competition within the limits of a monopsony market. It must negotiate and oversee contracts that extract the best performance from the private sector, encouraging the competition that Silicon Valley rightly claims is currently lacking. And it must decide when public in-house research, development, or production is the better investment for the future.

Further weakening government institutions on the basis of misconstrued history will have devastating long-term costs. The first and second questions in any acquisition decision must always be: Does this choice strengthen the force today and in 50 years? and, Does it respect the taxpayer? Defense tech leaders and the government will not always agree on the answers. But the government’s role is to advance the public interest, not to please its contractors. A capable and competent state is not the enemy of innovation and resilience but a precondition for them.

Comment: This certainly goes against the current conventional wisdom (or is that unconventional wisdom?).

Where should the United States deliberately rebuild public, in-house defense production and design capacity instead of relying on private suppliers.

How can the Pentagon expand and professionalize its acquisition and technical workforce fast enough to manage a more muscular, state-led industrial strategy without losing control of costs and oversight.

Can we find the proper balance or the sweet spot in the public-private partnership?

What Silicon Valley Gets Wrong About National Security

Foreign Affairs · More by Margaret Mullins · January 8, 2026

Defense Tech Innovation Requires Government Intervention

Margaret Mullins

MARGARET MULLINS is Director of Public Options and Governance at the Vanderbilt Policy Accelerator. She served as Senior Adviser to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Biden administration from 2023 to 2025.

January 8, 2026

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/what-silicon-valley-gets-wrong-about-national-security

A soldier holding a drone at a military parade in Washington, D.C., June 2025 Jonathan Ernst / Reuters

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In the summer of 1993, U.S. President Bill Clinton’s secretary of defense, Les Aspin, and William Perry, then the deputy secretary of defense, hosted a dinner at the Pentagon for defense industry leaders. The Cold War was over, they informed the gathering, and the federal budget would not support them all. With no looming Soviet threat justifying ever-rising defense budgets, consolidation would be necessary.

Just after it happened, this meeting was dubbed the “Last Supper” by the CEO of the Martin Marietta Corporation, a major aerospace and defense firm that went on to merge with the Lockheed Corporation in 1995. Other similar mergers would follow. The gathering has since become a convenient origin story for why the U.S. defense industrial base lost the ability to meet the military’s needs and the defense acquisition process became so onerous. According to this narrative, the Defense Department simultaneously meddled with and neglected the industry, creating the inflexible behemoths that dominate the sector today while cutting off pathways for emerging technology companies to compete.

Defense acquisition is, indeed, broken. The United States cannot produce critical materiel at speed and at scale in a moment of crisis. Despite spending more on defense than the next nine countries combined, the U.S. faces a crisis of both modernization and production. Recently, an emergent group of Silicon Valley defense tech leaders and their funders, including Alex Karp, the CEO of Palantir; Palmer Luckey, the founder of Anduril; and Katherine Boyle, a co-founder of the Andreessen Horowitz venture capital firm American Dynamism, have blamed excessive government regulation and interventionism for this unhappy state of affairs. Too much funding, they say, flows to large legacy programs and prime contractors. Some have put a spotlight on the Last Supper, arguing that it marked a turning point after which procurement became too slow, requirements too numerous, and risk-averse contract structures too stifling to innovation.

Their declinist narrative is convenient, but it is inaccurate. The Last Supper did not usher in the industry’s dark era. By the time Aspin and Perry held the dinner, the defense industry, like nearly all U.S. manufacturing sectors, had already been weakened by globalization and the financialization of the U.S. economy, drawdowns in the defense budget since 1986, and a broader effort to remake the government in the image of private business. Indeed, after the Last Supper, policymakers repeatedly did exactly what Silicon Valley’s tech leaders suggest today as a solution for the department’s ills: they deregulated the industry and outsourced production capacity to the private sector. In fact, such strategies helped create the very problems that now plague the industry.

Defense tech leaders’ alternative vision for procurement is likely to fail, just as previous deregulatory efforts did. Washington should not rush to accept Silicon Valley’s critique as gospel. Instead, it should accept that national defense is not a normal competitive market and never will be and invest in the government’s own capacity to oversee military production, incorporate new technology, and manage competition.

A FRAGILE JUGGERNAUT

The modern U.S. defense industrial base took shape following World War II, benefiting from the enormous investments made by the government and the decimation of foreign production capacity wreaked by the war. Before the war, the government had researched, developed, and produced most weapons in-house, at public arsenals, shipyards, and laboratories. During World War II, the government had enlisted the help of blue-chip companies such as Chrysler and IBM to manufacture a variety of defense-related products, from tanks to engines to rifles. This generally fruitful partnership between the military and industry endured after the war ended, undergirding the early Cold War effort to beat the Soviet Union in a technological competition and sparking innovation in national security with positive spillover benefits to the broader U.S. economy. Government investment and direction, paired with industry expertise, led to the creation and commercialization of inventions such as GPS, the Internet, and semiconductors.

By the 1970s, however, overseas manufacturing and technology markets began to reemerge. Foreign governments subsidized the domestic production of electronics, ships, aircraft parts, and more, and U.S. defense companies were forced to find ways to remain competitive. Taking advantage of lower labor costs overseas, U.S. producers moved parts of their supply chains to Asia and Europe. Then, the 1980s brought “financial engineering” to defense. Threats of hostile takeovers, defensive restructuring, and ruthlessly profit-maximizing executives saddled companies such as Lockheed and Martin Marietta with debt, leaving them weak and increasingly dependent on the Defense Department’s largess to stay afloat.

As a result, long before the Last Supper, the U.S. defense industry began to constrict. A defense spending boom at the heart of President Ronald Reagan’s hawkish Cold War strategy in the early 1980s masked the damaging effects that globalization and financialization had on the industry, but only temporarily. When Reagan began to draw down defense spending in 1986, the move only hastened the hollowing out of the bloated sector. A 1989 Center for Strategic and International Studies report found that between 1982 and 1987, the number of suppliers in defense subsectors fell by 67 percent.

The United States cannot produce critical materiel at speed and at scale.

In several key subsectors, the situation was particularly dire. The top four firms in the submarine business and the space booster business had 99 percent and 97 percent of the market share in their respective subsectors. The top four manufacturers of surveillance and detection satellites had 100 percent of their subsector’s market share. Meanwhile, the blue-chip conglomerates, including Chrysler, Ford, and IBM, were getting out of the defense industry. By 1990, all three had largely left the sector, judging that fewer contracts and declining budgets would make defense production less profitable than making automobiles and personal computers.

Instead of compensating for U.S. defense firms’ offshoring, consolidation, and constriction by bolstering domestic capacity, the government mimicked the private sector’s trends. For the Defense Department, this meant shedding its organic production capacity. Shifting the production of several core military capabilities to the private sector resulted not in a cost-efficient transfer of production but in the outright disappearance of some production capability. Take shipbuilding. Before World War II, public shipyards managed almost half the research, design, construction, and maintenance of the U.S. Navy’s ships. From 1953 to 1960, private shipyards’ share in new ship construction and repair contracts rose from 55 to 85 percent. But by the 1970s, some large private builders had stopped bidding on navy work. Instead of reinvesting in a public option, the Reagan administration further limited the government’s role, eliminating the construction subsidy program that had underpinned the commercial shipbuilding business since the 1930s. Domestic shipbuilding, for the navy or the commercial sector, never recovered.

Washington also privatized services and reduced personnel. Between 1981 and 1987, the Defense Department outsourced almost 40,000 service positions on military installations to private contractors, citing cost-saving concerns. But the contracts tended to be poorly structured and too narrowly defined, and the firms that took over the work often found that the actual cost of implementation was higher than anticipated. Because the contracts held the government responsible for additional costs, Washington frequently ended up paying more to these private firms than it would have paid its own civilian personnel. And by the time the contracts ended, the government, having shed in-house talent, could not revert to in-house provisioning.

SLASH AND BURN

In 1989, Jacques Gansler, a defense acquisition scholar and future Defense Department undersecretary, wrote that defense firms and the defense divisions of diversified companies suffered from “heavy debt, difficulty of borrowing, considerable excess capacity, low cash generation, high (and growing) risks, old production equipment, too little capital investment, relatively low productivity, mixed quality, and rapidly rising prices.” During George H. W. Bush’s presidency, the Defense Department warned that industrywide restructuring was inevitable.

At the same time, by the early 1990s, it was clear that emerging technologies increasingly developed in the private sector should play an important role in national security. The Defense Department would need a new approach to acquiring and incorporating this technology into the military. But rather than build up the Pentagon’s capabilities and invest in in-house talent and research and production capacity, the Clinton administration adopted a policy of “civil-military integration,” to be achieved by deregulating the industry, developing and encouraging the production of dual-use technologies applicable to both military and civilian purposes to create private markets for defense products, and procuring, whenever possible, commercial products rather than items created specifically for the military. With bipartisan congressional support, Clinton signed into law the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act in 1994 and the Clinger-Cohen Act in 1996, which cut military-specific requirements and regulations, established a default preference for commercial technology, and simplified the acquisition of information technology.

Many of these reforms, however, did not have the hoped-for effect. Privatization, force reduction, and deregulation meant that ever-more complicated contracts had to be administered by fewer people and with less guidance. The outsourcing of information technology and data processing positions, cornerstones of the emerging private sector revolution, left the department less capable of understanding and adopting new technology. Reductions in force, which continued under a congressional directive in 1996, hit acquisition personnel especially hard. All told, between 1989 and 1999, the government’s defense acquisition workforce shrank by 50 percent.

Subsequent administrations failed to arrest the relative decline of government capacity. Between 2001 and 2015, the defense acquisition workforce increased by 21 percent while defense contract spending commitments increased by 43 percent. Between 2015 and 2020, the workforce grew by just 18 percent, as obligations grew by 41 percent. And although the Obama administration stood up the Defense Innovation Unit, the first Trump administration expanded use of other transaction agreements, and the Biden administration developed programs such as the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve and Competitive Advantage Pathfinders to improve the integration of emerging technology, none made any major reforms to state capacity.

CALL TO ARMS

Today, prominent voices in the new defense tech ecosystem and their funders argue that the Clinton-era deregulation simply did not go far enough. They see the government as fundamentally risk averse, beholden to taxpayers, and hostile to new industry entrants. Palantir’s chief technology officer, Shyam Sankar, for example, holds the Last Supper responsible for “the decoupling of commercial innovation from defense.” From the vantage point of these relative newcomers to the industry, the Defense Department’s byzantine processes, contract structures, and data requirements are shutting the door on a new generation of innovators. They argue that the Defense Department should limit military specification requirements for new technology, reduce compliance requirements for new entrants, and even increase competition within the department by having program offices compete with each other.

On the surface, their diagnosis is compelling. But these leaders ignore that their suite of preferred policies, which some winkingly refer to as a “First Breakfast,” have been tried already—and have failed. Many of the barrier-reducing measures would expose the Defense Department and American taxpayers to increased risk without an outweighing benefit. By easing regulatory and reporting burdens for new and commercial companies, the Defense Department would lose access to key data to determine whether a company’s pitch matches its product, whether that company can scale and deliver the product, and whether it is unfairly overcharging for the product. By using more flexible contracting structures for production, the Defense Department would be forced to rely on acquisition officers’ general understanding of companies, technology, and the market when they negotiate fair prices and terms, as opposed to direct insight into specific companies. And expanding the definition of nontraditional defense contractors may incentivize some more established legacy and nonlegacy companies to restructure superficially to get access to the department’s more flexible processes, meant to ease the entry of industry upstarts.

Defense tech leaders also argue that expanding the use of fixed-price contracts, which transfer cost risk (and upside) to the contractor, would allow firms to innovate faster. Unlike cost-plus contracts, which offer lower profit potential but allow the government to absorb the risk for systems requiring major technological advances or facing significant uncertainty, fixed-price contracts are typically used in deals for well-established and commercial technology with clear requirements. Historically, however, when the department has attempted to rely more on fixed-price contracts to save money and shift innovation risk to the private sector, costs have ballooned, development timelines have slipped, and the government has remained responsible for the risk.

Defense tech leaders have no reservations about pursuing consolidation.

Defense tech companies seem to consider themselves immune to the uncertainty that often compels the government to offer firms cost-plus contracts for emerging technology development because, they claim, their venture backers will absorb the risk, allowing them to achieve innovative leaps under fixed-price contracts. But over the long run, these firms and their funders are more likely to limit their own risk by shifting from defense-specific innovation (which invariably requires high, sustained R & D investment with uncertain outcomes that venture funds are unlikely to provide) to technology with clear commercial potential. Palantir, for example, evolved from an intelligence platform to support analysis for national security agencies to a data company that licenses access to its commercial software to government agencies and private companies. The growth of firms that offer competitive products to both the Defense Department and the commercial sector is, on the whole, positive. But such companies must ultimately answer to their profit-seeking investors and thus are unlikely to meet all of the department’s needs.

Furthermore, Silicon Valley’s proposed reforms would not guarantee increased competition. In fact, they could help large technology firms gain a foothold in emerging defense areas and then acquire new, smaller entrants. For all the invective against the industry consolidation that took place after the Last Supper, defense tech leaders have no reservations about pursuing consolidation themselves. Anduril, for example, has acquired nine companies since its founding in 2017. Palantir has acquired seven companies since 2013. AeroVironment, which manufactures small drones, has acquired six firms since 2019. Shield AI, which develops autonomous defense systems, has acquired three companies since 2021. Silicon Valley defense leaders argue that these moves are necessary to expand their offerings. In doing so, however, they echo the exact line that their more traditional corporate predecessors used in the 1980s and 1990s.

Finally, the solutions now being championed in Silicon Valley would not necessarily make the defense industrial base any more resilient in the face of a crisis. Often presented as a panacea for procurement modernization and production inefficiency, they would address only a narrow segment of the Defense Department’s needs. The capacity to produce less glamorous but strategically essential systems such as ships and munitions will not be solved with software alone, and they will require public investment in the government’s own expertise, production, and maintenance infrastructure—much of which has been deliberately dismantled over the past 40 years.

BACK IN BUSINESS

Defense tech leaders are correct that the U.S. military needs a faster procurement process and more agile development. But many of their proposed fixes would create a system that prioritizes speed and flexibility at the expense of fit, need, or cost discipline. Although few would object to a quicker acquisition process, the national defense requires viable, scalable, and surge-ready production, well-managed military-specific technology, and core capabilities resilient to market shifts in addition to speed. By advocating for “dynamism” as a cure-all, advocates distract from the more fundamental requirement to address the modernization and production crises: improving the structural capacity and expertise of the state.

To be sure, defense tech leaders do not totally ignore the need for state capacity entirely, but most treat it as one component among many, substitutable for private sector expertise, research, and production rather than the keystone of the entire system. To truly reform, Washington must defend itself against the false narrative that a lean government is an effective one.

If the Department of Defense wants to build a combined industrial base that can respond to the eruption of a conflict, it will have to pay for it. Washington should be willing to accept the higher costs that come with contracts that include provisions mandating that suppliers are capable of surging production if required. It should also ensure that the arsenals, shipyards, and depots that make up the Defense Department’s organic industrial base receive adequate funding. Critics may argue that expanding a near-trillion-dollar defense budget would be irresponsible, but it will cost less to maintain capacity in and outside government than to rapidly build or buy that capacity in a time of urgent need. Rather than relying on episodic crisis spending, Congress and the Defense Department should steadily invest in both the government’s and industry’s facilities, capital equipment, and manufacturing technology.

The government’s role is to advance the public interest, not to please its contractors.

The Pentagon also needs a process to assess when certain capabilities would be better developed in-house and when they would be better purchased from the private sector. Acquisition officers and others who must weigh these “build versus buy” decisions and negotiate increasingly complex contracts need more people, resources, and training to support them. To protect against waste and to encourage the responsible development and integration of new technologies in the private sector, the Defense Department should hire more acquisition officers tasked with conducting comprehensive market research and overseeing the adoption of technologies it does acquire, more systems engineers and product managers to help bring acquisition projects to fruition, and more technologists and designers who can smartly build, buy, and integrate cutting-edge technology.

Defense tech leaders often speak about “unleashing” the power of the market by cutting regulations. But the defense sector is an inherently distorted and flawed marketplace. It is defined by a single dominant buyer, significant barriers to access, and large capital requirements; no amount of deregulation or deference to Silicon Valley can correct for that. Rather than cede yet more ground to the private sector or design policy around an unachievable vision of self-administering contracts available to flashy but untested firms, Washington must grab the regulatory and institutional reins to create and manage competition within the limits of a monopsony market. It must negotiate and oversee contracts that extract the best performance from the private sector, encouraging the competition that Silicon Valley rightly claims is currently lacking. And it must decide when public in-house research, development, or production is the better investment for the future.

Further weakening government institutions on the basis of misconstrued history will have devastating long-term costs. The first and second questions in any acquisition decision must always be: Does this choice strengthen the force today and in 50 years? and, Does it respect the taxpayer? Defense tech leaders and the government will not always agree on the answers. But the government’s role is to advance the public interest, not to please its contractors. A capable and competent state is not the enemy of innovation and resilience but a precondition for them.

Foreign Affairs · More by Margaret Mullins · January 8, 2026

22. To Support an America First State Department, Establish a Deputy Secretary of State for Military Affairs

To Support an America First State Department, Establish a Deputy Secretary of State for Military Affairs

by David Maxwell

01.08.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/01/08/deputy-secretary-state-military-affairs-dsma/

Proposal for Establishing the Office of the Deputy Secretary for Military Affairs (DSMA) to Integrate U.S. Special Operations with Department of State Political Warfare and Statecraft Activities.

Introduction

The raid that removed Nicolás Maduro and the sudden designation of Marco Rubio as the de facto steward of Venezuela did more than end a regime. It exposed a truth Washington prefers to avoid. Modern statecraft now lives in the gray space between war and peace, where legitimacy, narrative, and perception decide outcomes faster than divisions or carrier strike groups. When the Secretary of State is asked to stabilize a nation, divide oil assets, manage sanctions, and shape elections at once, the problem is not bandwidth alone. It is architecture.

If the United States intends to practice America First statecraft with discipline and effect, the Department of State requires a standing, senior military capability embedded at the policy level. Modeled on the historical role of the Associate Director for Military Affairs within the CIA, this office will provide strategic oversight, operational planning, and interagency coordination to ensure USSOCOM’s irregular warfare capabilities support and enhance national objectives short of war (while continuing to prepare to support the geographic Combatant Commanders should deterrence fail). The DSMA will serve as SECSTATE’s principal military advisor for special operations and irregular warfare with a major focus on integrating Title 10 and Title 22 activities to support execution of campaign plans in the gray of strategic competition and support Chiefs of Mission in critical regions around the world.

The Strategic Moment

The Venezuela episode was not an anomaly. It was a preview. Strategic competition with China, Russia, Iran, and north Korea rarely crosses the threshold of declared war. It unfolds through influence, coercion, proxy forces, and stories that travel faster than facts. In this environment, political warfare is not a metaphor. It is the main effort.

Special Operations Forces were built for this terrain. They train to work by, with, and through partners. They shape before they strike. They influence human networks and decision making under pressure. Yet their employment remains structurally anchored to Title 10 processes, while the decisive terrain is political and diplomatic under Title 22. The result is friction, delay, and lost opportunity.

A Deputy Secretary of State for Military Affairs would close that gap.

The Office and Its Purpose

The proposed office would be led by a three star general officer serving as the Secretary of State’s principal military advisor for special operations and irregular warfare. The model is not new. During the early Cold War, the United States placed senior military leaders inside civilian intelligence and policy institutions to ensure unity of effort. The purpose was simple. Align action with strategy.

The DSMA would do the same today. The office would integrate special operations capabilities into diplomatic campaigns short of war, while preserving the chain of command to geographic combatant commanders should deterrence fail. It would advise Chiefs of Mission, synchronize interagency planning, and translate policy intent into feasible options in contested environments.

This is not about militarizing diplomacy. It is about making diplomacy effective where power is contested and time is short.

The State Department has already begun reorganization. It can include a DSMA.

Why Venezuela Matters

Venezuela illustrates the problem in sharp relief. The removal of Maduro created a vacuum. Vacuums attract narratives. Who liberated the country. Who controls the oil. Who speaks for the people. These questions are answered first in information space, not conference rooms.

Without a standing mechanism to integrate special operations, influence capabilities, and diplomatic messaging, the United States risks tactical success followed by strategic drift. The Secretary of State becomes a crisis manager instead of a campaign commander.

A DSMA provides continuity. It allows the Secretary to run long campaigns, not just respond to events.

Cognitive Warfare and Narrative Intelligence

No modern political warfare effort can succeed without mastery of cognition and narrative. Adversaries understand this well. They target identity, grievance, and legitimacy. They seed doubt and offer belonging. They rarely need to fire a shot.

The Department of State lacks an institutionalized cognitive warfare and narrative intelligence capability. That gap must be closed, and it should be done in direct support of the Secretary. The DSMA office is the right home.

Narrative intelligence does not mean propaganda. It means understanding how stories move societies, how symbols mobilize or fracture communities, and how adversaries frame reality. Cognitive warfare integrates this understanding with operations, diplomacy, and development. It ensures that actions reinforce words and that words anticipate reactions.

In Venezuela, as in many future cases, the decisive question is not who holds the palace. It is who owns the story the morning after.

Benefits to the Secretary and the Nation

A Deputy Secretary of State for Military Affairs gives the Secretary unified access to senior military expertise tailored to political campaigns. Decisions become faster and grounded in reality. Options expand beyond sanctions and statements.

Special operations capabilities such as civil affairs, influence activities, and irregular warfare are integrated into foreign policy from the start, not bolted on during crisis. This strengthens allies, counters adversary influence, and provides leverage without escalation.

Interagency synchronization improves. The chronic disconnect between diplomatic intent and military activity narrows. Planning becomes campaign driven rather than episodic, especially in gray zone theaters across the Asia-Indo-Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Western Hemisphere.

Crisis response sharpens. When instability breaks, the Secretary has immediate insight into feasible options, risks, and narratives. Diplomatic and military messaging align when it matters most.

Counterarguments and Risks

Critics will warn of blurred lines between civilian and military authority. That concern deserves respect. The answer is not avoidance but design. The DSMA advises. The Secretary decides. Civilian control remains absolute.

Others will argue that existing structures suffice. The Venezuela case suggests otherwise. When ad hoc arrangements become routine, institutions must adapt.

The final question is cost. The cost of inaction is higher. Strategic drift, narrative defeat, and reactive policy are expensive in blood, treasure, and credibility.

Conclusion

The designation of a Secretary of State as steward of a post regime Venezuela is a signal. American statecraft has entered an era where diplomacy, influence, and special operations converge at the center of policy.

11If America First is to mean effective first, the Department of State needs a Deputy Secretary of State for Military Affairs and a standing cognitive warfare and narrative intelligence capability. This is not innovation for its own sake. It is adaptation to reality.

The question is not whether the United States will practice political warfare. It already does, often clumsily. The question is whether it will do so deliberately, coherently, and under civilian leadership. If not now, after Venezuela, when.

Check out all of Small Wars Journal’s great content.

Tags: America First, Cognitive Warfare, Department of State, Statecraft, Venezuela

About The Author

David Maxwell
David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region (primarily Korea, Japan, and the Philippines) as a practitioner, specializing in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy. He commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines during the war on terrorism and is the former J5 and Chief of Staff of the Special Operations Command Korea, and G3 of the US Army Special Operations Command. Following retirement, he was the Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is a member of the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society, on the board of advisers of Spirit of America, and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

https://apstrategy.org/

Executive Director, Korea Regional Review

https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/

Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal

https://smallwarsjournal.com/

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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