Quotes of the Day:
“It is depressing to have to point out, yet again, that there is a distinction between having the legal right to say something & having the moral right not to be held accountable for what you say. Being asked to apologise for saying something unconscionable is not the same as being stripped of the legal right to say it. It’s really not very f-cking complicated. Cry “free speech” in such contexts, you are demanding the right to speak any bilge you wish without apology or fear of comeback. You are demanding not legal rights but an end to debate about and criticism of what you say. When did bigotry get so needy?”
- China Miéville
"It is not ignorance but knowledge which is the mother of wonder."
- Joseph Wood Krutch
“We must not overlook the role that extremists play. They are the gadflies that keep society from being too complacent or self-satisfied; they are, if sound, the spearhead of progress. If they are fundamentally wrong, free discussion will in time put an end to them.”
- Abraham Flexner
1. 'Favorable environment set for end-of-war declaration'
2. UN Security Council expected to meet Monday on NK’s missile launch
3. In highly vaccinated Korea, mandates are fueling a backlash
4. No first use for all
5. USFK imposes tougher social distancing amid virus resurgence
6. S. Korea's kimchi exports hit new high in 2021
7. U.S., Japan to vow joint response to ultra-supersonic missiles
8. Some escapees pay bribes, cross rivers, risk lives to return to Kim Jong Un's North Korea
9. U.S. court seizes $2.4M in North Korea case
10. The bald facts (South Korea election issue)
11. Leading U.S. and Multinational Forces in South Korea and the Management of Competing Interests
12. Considering Human Rights in Aid to North Korea: A Rights-based Approach for the United Nations
1. 'Favorable environment set for end-of-war declaration'
Obviously Minister Lee has a very different world view and view of the Korean peninsula than many other Korea watchers. I am reminded of conversations with Korean friends who emphasize that as a political appointee Minister Lee is always advancing his political agenda which may not be in total lockstep with the administration and certainly not in step with the security requirements of the ROK.
As I have written many times, most all Korea watchers and all US government officials I know support peace on the Korean peninsula. We want the war to be over. We want peace, security, and prosperity on the Korean peninsula.
However, this excerpt belies Minister Lee's agenda and following such a course of action will not lead to the effects we all desire but instead will be assessed by Kim Jong-un as continued success of his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies. It will not. bring him to the negotiating table in good faith to negotiate as a responsible member of the international community. We will see him double on his strategies.
Giving concessions to get Kim Jong-un to agree to an end of war definition is a very bad course of action.
Excerpts:
"The issue had been mentioned separately by those countries over the years, but since the President's proposal in September, all the relevant parties have concurred on the declaration in principle and in theory," he added.
"In that respect, it is the best time to pursue the end-of-war declaration."
In response to Moon's proposal, Kim Yo-jong described the end-of-war declaration as an "admirable idea," followed by Kim Jong-un who said he did not oppose the declaration itself, although both have urged South Korea and the U.S. to drop their "double-dealing" attitude and hostile policy toward their country first. However, the reclusive state has since remained unresponsive to the matter.
The lasting silence is fueling speculation that Seoul and Washington should offer something to entice North Korea into responding to the end-of-war issue, and the suspension of combined military drills and partial sanctions relief are being mentioned as possible incentives among others.
'Favorable environment set for end-of-war declaration'
Unification Minister Lee In-young speaks during an interview with The Korea Times at his office in Seoul, Thursday. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul
Unification minister urges North Korea not to miss out on 'golden time'
By Kang Seung-woo
It is the right time to declare an end to the Korean War, as an unprecedentedly favorable environment for the implementation of the declaration has been set up among relevant countries, according to Unification Minister Lee In-young.
In this regard, he also believes the first half of the year could be a "golden time" to make strides in frayed inter-Korean ties and stalled nuclear negotiations between North Korea and the United States, citing a heap of political events in the second half of the year that could disrupt efforts toward Pyongyang-related issues.
Strongly believing such an agreement could serve as a catalyst for negotiations on the denuclearization of North Korea, President Moon Jae-in resurrected his proposal of declaring a formal end to the 1950-53 conflict in a speech at the United Nations last September.
Since then, South Korean and U.S. diplomats have been meeting frequently with each other to discuss the proposal, while National Security Director Suh Hoon also drew support from China following a meeting with top Chinese diplomat Yang Jiechi in December.
Additionally, accompanied by positive responses from North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and his powerful sister Kim Yo-jong, President Moon said the four relevant parties have agreed, in principle, to an end-of-war declaration.
The Korean War ended in an armistice between North Korean and Chinese forces and the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC), leaving the war technically still ongoing.
"It has been some 20 years since the idea of an end-of-war declaration was first floated, but now is the first time that all four related countries ― South and North Korea, the U.S. and China ― have agreed 'in principle' and shown positive responses to an end-of-war declaration," Lee said in an interview with The Korea Times at his office in Seoul, Thursday.
"The issue had been mentioned separately by those countries over the years, but since the President's proposal in September, all the relevant parties have concurred on the declaration in principle and in theory," he added.
"In that respect, it is the best time to pursue the end-of-war declaration."
In response to Moon's proposal, Kim Yo-jong described the end-of-war declaration as an "admirable idea," followed by Kim Jong-un who said he did not oppose the declaration itself, although both have urged South Korea and the U.S. to drop their "double-dealing" attitude and hostile policy toward their country first. However, the reclusive state has since remained unresponsive to the matter.
The lasting silence is fueling speculation that Seoul and Washington should offer something to entice North Korea into responding to the end-of-war issue, and the suspension of combined military drills and partial sanctions relief are being mentioned as possible incentives among others.
However, the minister said the end-of-war declaration itself is one of the options available to resolve hostility between South and North Korea and between the U.S. and North Korea.
"The precondition that North Korea has consistently wanted before returning to talks is for South Korea and the U.S. to withdraw their hostile policy," Lee said.
"In that respect, the end-of-war declaration could be a step in the direction toward ending hostile relations between them, and that is why the South Korean government is pursuing the declaration, which could be a gateway to the denuclearization of North Korea."
Some who are critical of South Korea's drive for the end-of-war declaration say it would undermine and destabilize the security situation on the Korean Peninsula by paving the way for the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and the dismantlement of the UNC.
Describing these concerns as a "distorted perception," Lee said even if the end-of-war declaration is signed, the future of the USFK and the U.S.-led UNC along with the alliance between South Korea and the U.S. will not be legally affected.
"I have repeatedly explained that the end-of-war declaration is a significant measure to build confidence between South and North Korea and the U.S., which means that any military changes linked to the USFK or the UNC are not under consideration in our goal and pursuit of the declaration," the minister said.
"Rather, even if the peace treaty is signed and, furthermore, North Korea and the U.S. establish diplomatic ties, the upkeep of American troops here is an issue between South Korea and the U.S. and it has nothing to do with the end-of-war declaration."
He added: "Such concerns are a misunderstanding."
Unification Minister Lee In-young poses during an interview with The Korea Times at his office in Seoul, Thursday. The left picture behind him represents Chonji, the crater lake of Mount Paektu in North Korea, and the right one describes Baengnokdam, the crater lake of Mount Halla on Jeju Island in South Korea. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul
Cross-border relations saw their heyday in 2018 as evidenced by three inter-Korean summits, but soured after the Hanoi summit between North Korea and the U.S. failed to reach a nuclear deal in February 2019. Despite repeated calls from Seoul and Washington for dialogue, Pyongyang has remained silent on the overtures.
While saying that inter-Korean ties are at a crossroads over whether to once again take the road of reconciliation and cooperation or tension and confrontation, the minister said the first six months of 2022 would be the best time to improve bilateral relations and furthermore get the deadlocked nuclear negotiations back on track.
"Entering the second half, the geopolitical situation surrounding the peninsula could see increased uncertainties, which could leave the North Korea issue low on the agenda. The U.S. will hold its midterm elections, while Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to seek a third term in power," Lee said.
The minister also said the U.S. and North Korea will not be able to sit back and maintain the status quo, so they may seek to take action, which may also fuel uncertainty.
"In particular, following the South's presidential election in March, the uncertainties could further loom large. So I believe that it will be highly desirable that some changes should be made in the first half," he added.
On Wednesday, North Korea test-launched what it called a hypersonic missile. During its fourth Plenary Meeting of the eighth Central Committee of the ruling Workers' Party at the end of last year, its leader made few references to foreign policy and relations with South Korea in his de facto New Year speech.
Consequently, the events are sparking conjecture that Pyongyang is apathetic about mending ties with Seoul.
"I am worried that North Korea test-fired a missile at a critical moment for peace on the peninsula. This is when the North needs to consider resuming talks rather than firing missiles," he said.
When it comes to the North Korean leader's de facto New Year speech at the plenary meeting, the minister added that it was neither positive nor negative.
"He refrained from using belligerent rhetoric, which was not bad, but his failure to deliver a message indicative of resuming talks is something that we cannot assess positively," Lee said.
The minister expressed regret that momentum for inter-Korean cooperation has been lost due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
"Besides the no-deal summit in Hanoi, the coronavirus has significantly restricted chances of talks and negotiations among the two Koreas and the U.S.," he said. "Without the virus situation, we may have had more channels to try to resume talks and more chances for it."
2. UN Security Council expected to meet Monday on NK’s missile launch
Excerpts:
There are largely three measures the UNSC could take, including adopting a resolution that is binding, a non-binding presidential statement if the members cannot reach consensus on a resolution and a press statement.
In the past, the UNSC has adopted a resolution on North Korea in response to its intercontinental ballistic missile test and nuclear test.
Meanwhile, countries, including the US, Japan, Canada and France have condemned North Korea’s missile tests as a threat to regional stability.
[Newsmaker] UN Security Council expected to meet Monday on NK’s missile launch
Published : Jan 9, 2022 - 16:01 Updated : Jan 9, 2022 - 16:32
Debates at the UN Security Council Summit in 2017 (123rf)
The UN Security Council is expected to meet behind closed doors on Monday to discuss North Korea’s missile launch, but a joint statement after the session appears to be less likely.
Diplomatic sources say the US, France and the UK -– three of the five permanent members on the council –- as well as Ireland and Albania, requested an emergency meeting to be held on Monday in the US to discuss the launch of what Pyongyang claims to be a hypersonic missile.
“We can confirm that the US, Albania, France, Ireland and the UK called for consultations on Monday on North Korea’s latest ballistic missile launch,” a State Department spokesperson told the Voice of America.
On Wednesday, the North launched what it claims to be a hypersonic missile into the East Sea, marking its first major weapons test this year, and the second reported test of a such a weapon by the Kim Jong-un regime. Last week’s launch follows a flurry of weapons tests last September and October, indicating the reclusive regime will continue to expand and modernize its aresenal amid the stalled denuclearization talks with Washington.
Following the fall launches last year, the UNSC held two emergency meetings to follow up on the North’s Sep. 28 launch of what it claimed to be a hypersonic missile, called Hwasong-8, and a submarine-launched ballistic missile on Oct. 19.
No resolution nor a joint statement were issued after the meetings. During an Oct. 1 meeting, France proposed the adoption of a joint statement condemning the launch, but Russia and China refused the measure. The Oct. 20 meeting on the SLBM test also failed to issue a joint text.
Observers say no joint statement or action is expected after the upcoming meeting, considering the precedent.
There are largely three measures the UNSC could take, including adopting a resolution that is binding, a non-binding presidential statement if the members cannot reach consensus on a resolution and a press statement.
In the past, the UNSC has adopted a resolution on North Korea in response to its intercontinental ballistic missile test and nuclear test.
Meanwhile, countries, including the US, Japan, Canada and France have condemned North Korea’s missile tests as a threat to regional stability.
France on Friday condemned the firing as violation of UNSC resolution, and called on Pyongyang to end its “program of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, which threaten regional and international peace and security, and to comply with UN Security Council obligations.”
The US and Japan also expressed strong concerns over the regime’s advancing nuclear and missile development activities, in a joint statement issued after their “two-plus-two” meeting of foreign and defense ministers on Friday. The ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and urged the North to abide by its obligations under UNSC resolutions.
3. In highly vaccinated Korea, mandates are fueling a backlash
In highly vaccinated Korea, mandates are fueling a backlash
Published : Jan 9, 2022 - 18:10 Updated : Jan 9, 2022 - 18:20
QR code scanners are set up at the entrance of a mall in Seoul. Visitors must scan their personal QR code generated through a smartphone app before entering. (Yonhap)
Korea’s new policy requiring people to be completely vaccinated or cleared in tests to enter public places is firing up a wave of protests and court challenges.
On Saturday civic groups and local community organizations marched from Seoul Station to Gwanghwamun Square demanding that the compulsory vaccine-or-testing policy at public places be scrapped. The Saturday rally, among the firsts of many that is being planned, follows a series of legal battles facing the government over the mandate, with one reaching the Constitutional Court last month.
Last week, a Seoul court temporarily blocked the use of vaccine passes at educational facilities, citing potential infringements of constitutional rights to education and other freedoms, marking the first time that the judiciary has put a brake on the government’s COVID-19 rules.
In other places, including cafes, restaurants and libraries, the mandate remains in full force while they await a verdict from the court, expected to be given in two to three weeks.
Starting Monday, large malls and grocery stores will require people to provide proof of being fully vaccinated within the last six months or a negative PCR test result that is less than 48 hours old. For the first “trial” week no penalties will be imposed on those that fail to comply. After that, first-time offenders can face a fine of up to 1.5 million won ($1,263) and other administrative penalties.
During the first court showdown on Friday in a Seoul administrative court, the judges questioned the validity of extending the pass system to low-risk, essential places while health officials maintained it was necessary to control the pandemic.
Asked what public good the passes achieved, Son Young-rae, the Ministry of Health and Welfare spokesperson, appearing as a defendant, told the judges that vaccine passes would provide relief to struggling intensive care rooms at hospitals.
“The spirit of the COVID-19 pass is to shield the unvaccinated and keep hospitals from breaking,” he said. He said unvaccinated adults -- just 6 percent of the entire adult population -- were making up about a third of all cases, and more than half of all hospital admissions and deaths.
Saying that large proportions of critical care resources were going into treating unvaccinated patients, he argued that “the fewer unvaccinated patients there are, the less burdened our hospitals are going to be.”
Son said vaccine passes were “more efficient at controlling COVID-19 than social distancing.” Since the passes were introduced in early December, cases have started to fall, he said.
“If the controversy stops the passes from being used in more places, it will take us longer to contain the surge, which means that we will have to keep restrictive measures in place for that much longer,” he said.
Health experts both within or working with the government say they have qualms about courts having the ultimate say in COVID-19 response measures.
Dr. Lee Jacob, infectious disease specialist who is on the advisory panel providing advice to the government on its return to normal strategy, said, “The court now has the final authority on COVID-19 policies. Any policy met by similar public protests will be subject to review by the court.”
Dr. Jung Jae-hun, a COVID-19 adviser to the prime minister, said although the court’s decision should be respected, some of its reasoning “lacked scientific, medical understanding.”
For one thing, the court was “evidently wrong to say that the unvaccinated are ‘not at a significantly higher risk of spreading COVID-19’ than the vaccinated,” he said.
Other health experts say the expansive mandates are doing more harm than good.
Infectious disease professor Dr. Kim Woo-joo of Korea University worried that the enforcement of mandates producing a “rise of more vocal vaccine naysayers.” He said the controversy surrounding the mandates was “emboldening vaccine skeptics into discrediting the vaccination campaign.”
To counter hesitancy, the government should engage in a transparent and responsible risk communication, he said.
On Son’s claims that the surge has stabilized since the implementation of the pass policy, Kim said, “It’s not accurate to attribute the slowdown in infections in the last few weeks to vaccine passes. Over the period, booster vaccination rates in older adults have gone up and more intensive social distancing was reinstituted.”
Dr. Paik Soon-young, an emeritus professor of microbiology at Catholic University of Korea’s College of Medicine, agreed that, “Koreans have responded with an incredible enthusiasm to the vaccine campaign. Blaming the unvaccinated for crowding hospitals will only end up dividing the country.”
He said, “Mandates of similar nature have been adopted elsewhere in the world with the aim of encouraging people to get the shot. On the other hand, as far as adult vaccinations go, Korea is as vaccinated as it can be. So why fix something that isn’t broken?”
Barring unvaccinated people from visiting grocery stores, shopping centers and other common places where face masks can be worn is “minimally helpful” in stemming the spread, he said. “Most dangerous places are where people take masks off and dine together.”
He went on, “In the early days, Korea used to pride itself on getting the pandemic under control without sacrificing personal freedoms. But with the latest mandate, I’m afraid we’re straying farther from that direction.”
4. No first use for all
A view from South Korea. (its current ruling party).
[Contribution] No first use for all
Recent joint statement by nuclear-armed states should be followed by multilateral “No First Use” policy on nuclear weapons
Published : Jan 9, 2022 - 18:26 Updated : Jan 9, 2022 - 18:26
Song Young-gil(Chairman of the Democratic Party of Korea)
Nuclear weapons are one of today’s most critical international issues. We face rising tension between nuclear-armed states such as the United States, the Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China. From the border between Russia and Ukraine to the Taiwan Strait, growing military activity in those regions concerns the global community. Hence the recent joint statement by the five nuclear-armed states -- China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States -- gave us, the NPT-abiding non-nuclear-armed states, a credible assurance that the current military build-up would not end in total annihilation. I commend the decision of these five countries. However, the world needs a more robust security guarantee that ensures fundamental certainty about the usage of nuclear weapons: A No First Use policy by all nuclear-armed states.
Undoubtedly, using nuclear weapons against a nuclear-armed state will result in a chain reaction of atomic missile exchange. That is why the beginning of the NPT starts with acknowledging the dire outcome of nuclear war and why the states need to make every effort to prevent far-reaching consequences. Yet, we are still witnessing the modernization of nuclear weapons by nuclear-armed states, which gives off the impression that they are planning to utilize the weapons when they deem it necessary. This Post-Cold War trend comes from a strategic discourse, which argues nuclear weapons from the Cold War paradigm are not fit for use in modern warfare. How did the world end up with this nuclear hypocrisy where we support the ideas of the NPT and turn a blind eye to the modernization of nuclear weapons? I believe this is caused by the lack of a No First Use policy.
Except for China and India, all nuclear-armed states reserve the option to use their nuclear weapons first to provide solid security guarantees to their nations and partners. In the case of the US, its nuclear umbrella covers much wider partners around the globe than the Chinese or Russian nuclear umbrella. Thus, it could be argued that the adoption of a No First Use policy by the US is likely to undermine the credibility of its security guarantees to its partners. However, I would say that this argument only increases the likelihood of mistrust between the nuclear-armed states, which has already resulted in the modernization of nuclear weapons. The only way to break this vicious circle is to implement a No First Use policy as a multilateral agreement by all nuclear-armed states. Even though a No First Use policy is highly symbolic, it will truly usher in an open discussion for the world without threats of nuclear wars, where nuclear weapons would only serve the purpose of deterrence.
The world must openly discuss implementing a No First Use policy and develop a coherent diplomatic strategy to encourage nuclear-armed states to pause the modernization of their nuclear weapons. It will also be a gesture of goodwill that levels the playing field for North Korea to pursue denuclearization proactively, ultimately paving a road for achieving lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and diplomacy. I hope the recent joint statement will motivate the five nations and other nuclear-armed states to declare a No First Use policy formally.
This article was contributed by Democratic Party Chairman Song Young-gil. Views expressed here are his own. -- Ed.
By Song Young-gil
Chairman of the Democratic Party of Korea
5. USFK imposes tougher social distancing amid virus resurgence
USFK imposes tougher social distancing amid virus resurgence | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Jan. 8 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) said Saturday it has decided to toughen social distancing rules for its service members amid the growing number of infections among its troops.
The USFK had confirmed a weekly record high of 682 additional COVID-19 cases among its personnel from Dec. 28 to Tuesday. It did not offer more details, including the number of breakthrough cases or locations of the infected members.
"Due to the continued presence of COVID-19 within United States Forces Korea and South Korea, USFK has increased its health protection condition to 'Bravo Plus' peninsula-wide effective today at 12 p.m. until further notice," the USFK said in a statement.
Under the scheme, the U.S. military will prohibit all personnel from visiting off-base facilities, such as indoor malls and gyms.
Access to bars and saunas will also be banned, though the USFK had previously banned such activities for non-vaccinated personnel only.
Seated dining at restaurants outside the base will also be restricted.
The USFK added it will prohibit its personnel from traveling to Seoul except for official duties or those who live there.
The total number of COVID-19 cases reported among the USFK-affiliated population totaled 3,027 as of Tuesday. The USFK said nearly 90 percent of its affiliated community is vaccinated.
South Korea hosts some 28,500 U.S. troops to deter North Korean aggression, a legacy of the 1950-53 Korean War that ended in an armistice, not a peace treaty.
colin@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. S. Korea's kimchi exports hit new high in 2021
S. Korea's kimchi exports hit new high in 2021 | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Jan. 9 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's exports of kimchi hit an all-time high last year thanks to its growing popularity, data showed Sunday.
Outbound shipments of the spicy Korean traditional side dish came to a record US$159.9 million in 2021, resulting in a trade surplus of $19.2 million in the sector, according to the data from the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs.
It is the first time in 12 years that South Korea registered a surplus in the kimchi trade.
Kimchi is a traditional Korean side dish normally made of fermented cabbage, salt and hot peppers and is eaten with almost all meals.
Exports of kimchi grew 18 percent on average per year in the past five years, and the number of import countries increased to 89 in 2021 from 61 countries in 2011.
The agriculture ministry attributed the increase in kimchi exports to growing awareness of the fermented dish amid the growing popularity of "hallyu," the Korean wave of pop culture.
K-pop and the broader Korean Wave have resonated with young people around the world, burnishing South Korea's image as a cool country, home to K-pop phenomenon BTS and "Gangnam Style," South Korean rapper Psy's 2012 megahit song.
Experts said the Korean Wave generated by K-pop and TV dramas could turn fans in foreign countries into active consumers of South Korean products.
jwc@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. U.S., Japan to vow joint response to ultra-supersonic missiles
U.S., Japan to vow joint response to ultra-supersonic missiles
Posted January. 08, 2022 08:00,
Updated January. 08, 2022 08:00
U.S., Japan to vow joint response to ultra-supersonic missiles. January. 08, 2022 08:00. lovesong@donga.com,jarrett@donga.com.
The U.S. and Japan agreed on Thursday that they would conduct a joint study to respond to ultra-supersonic missiles from North Korea, China, and Russia at their meeting of foreign affairs and defense ministers (2+2). The two allies decided to jointly respond to threats posed by China and Russia, which are capable of deploying ultra-supersonic missiles to combat operation, as well as North Korea two days after Pyongyang test-fired an ultra-supersonic missile. Watchers say that collaboration and cohesion has been further strengthened between Washington and Tokyo.
The U.N. Security Council will hold a meeting on Monday to discuss the North’s missile filing at the requests of the U.S., the U.K., and France. In contrast, South Korea has yet to announce any official position despite the North’s claim that it succeeded in test-firing an ultra-supersonic missile, causing critics to suspect that Seoul and Washington may have differing views on how to respond to the North’s nuclear weapons.
In their joint statement after their meeting, U.S. and Japanese ministers expressed concern about the massive development of new weapons systems including nuclear weapons, ballistic and cruise missiles, and ultra-supersonic missile by North Korea, China and Russia. “We have reached agreement to conduct a joint study focused on future cooperation to cope with ultra-supersonic technology,” the ministers said. In attendance at the meeting were U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinken, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi, and Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi.
In their joint statement, Washington and Tokyo also said, “Japan expressed resolution that it would consider diverse options required for its national defense, including capabilities to cope with missile threats through a process to revise strategies, while the U.S. and Japan stressed the need for close solidarity through this process.” The Japanese daily Asahi Shimbun interpreted the message as indicating Tokyo’s intention to consider possessing the capability to target the enemy’s military bases.
8. Some escapees pay bribes, cross rivers, risk lives to return to Kim Jong Un's North Korea
Excerpts:
The New Year’s jumper, who was about 30 and reportedly told investigators he’d been a gymnast in North Korea, worked as a janitor and struggled to make ends meet, according to local media reports.
The economic plight North Korean refugees can face was highlighted in 2019 when Han Sung-ok, a single mother, and her 6-year-old son were found dead in their Seoul apartment, possibly of starvation. The mother and son’s deaths became a rallying cry for fellow refugees. South Korea provides initial resettlement funds and housing for the first five years, but many are left with nothing once they’ve paid broker’s fees, and struggle to find stable jobs.
Jeon Su-mi, an attorney who works as an advocate for North Korean refugees, said many feel disillusioned by the individualism and capitalism of the South. The choice of refugees to voluntarily return should be an opportunity for reflection in South Korea, she said.
“How ready was South Korea to genuinely welcome and accept these refugees in our midst?” Jeon said. “They risked their lives to get here and then risk their lives once again to leave. That should be a sign.”
Some escapees pay bribes, cross rivers, risk lives to return to Kim Jong Un's North Korea
SEOUL —
Not long after nightfall on New Year’s Day, a short, slight man picked a spot along one of the most heavily fortified borders in the world, a quarter-mile from the nearest platoon of soldiers, and scaled a 10-foot-tall wire fence.
Warning lights flashed and an alarm blared. The man hurried over rough terrain dusted with snow, navigating the threat of untold land mines left over from a last-century war, his movements slipping in and out of view of thermal cameras.
Hours later, South Korean soldiers, who discounted the evening’s disturbance as a false alarm, would realize they’d missed the man’s footprints and the wisps of down feathers from his winter jacket clinging to the concertina wire atop the border fence.
More than 33,000 North Koreans have risked their lives to flee their oppressive homeland in recent decades, leaving behind an impoverished economy, fear bred by political gulags and a third-generation cult of personality that demands unquestioning reverence of leader Kim Jong Un and his forebears. The New Year’s fence-jumper, who has not been publicly identified, became one of a much smaller number to make their way back to the isolated communist state after a taste of the outside world.
Officially, about 30 North Koreans are known to have returned after settling in the South, according to South Korean intelligence. Researchers and advocates estimate that the real number is likely much higher, possibly in the hundreds. Some of those who return become propaganda tools for the North Korean state, appearing in videos or news conferences making tearful statements about how much they regretted leaving. A handful change their minds yet again, escaping once more.
Wire fences line the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea, one of the most heavily fortified borders in the world.
(Ahn Young-joon / Associated Press)
“It’s hard to approximate, but it’s probably many more,” said Baek Nam-seol, a professor at the Korean National Police University who has worked with and researched North Korean refugees. “There are surely ones who aren’t picked up by North Korean authorities. We only get confirmation when North Korea chooses to publicize it.”
The man’s crossing spurred a frenzy in South Korea over the breaches in border security, particularly after the revelation that the man had crossed into South Korea in November 2020 along the same route, twice evading detection by South Korean military. Among those working with or researching North Koreans’ resettlement in the South, though, his decision to return after barely a year marked the latest testament to the challenges North Korean refugees face adjusting to their new home, their isolation and economic difficulties furthered by the pandemic.
Nearly 1 in 5 North Korean refugees in South Korea said they have thought about going back, according to a 2021 survey by the nonprofit Database Center for North Korean Human Rights. The reason most often given is missing one’s hometown or family. Some said they experienced discrimination in South Korea or found the capitalist society too competitive, according to the survey.
Joo Seong-ha, who left North Korea in 2002 and works as a prominent journalist at a South Korean newspaper, said he still finds himself thinking of home.
“I’ve thought about it. If you have family there how can you not?” he said. Even so, most refugees put down roots after a few years and make their way in an adopted land. “Every community has its outliers, and the North Korean refugee community is the same. It’s just that this outlier’s way of acting out happened to be crossing the DMZ.”
Observers look toward North Korea from an observation deck on the border in Paju, South Korea.
(Ahn Young-joon / Associated Press)
Park Young-ja, a research fellow at the South Korean government-funded think tank Korea Institute for National Unification, said those who don’t have family members in the South have a harder time adjusting. Their continuing challenges — even as tens of thousands of North Koreans have been living in South Korea for decades, appearing on television, running for office and starting businesses — suggest how much further South Korean society has to go toward embracing them, she said.
“It does show the limits to the potential for integration between North and South Koreans,” Park said. “At the end of the day, what’s needed is integration of the heart.”
Even though the Koreas share a common language, food and culture, in the seven decades since the Korean War, lives on either side of the border have increasingly diverged as the South grew wealthier and North Korea more isolated. On top of international economic sanctions for Kim’s nuclear and military ambitions, North Korea has imposed severe COVID-19 restrictions, furthering control of people and information in and out of the country.
After a brief thaw in relations in 2018, during which Kim met South Korea’s president and both sides dismantled some guard posts in the demilitarized zone as a sign of goodwill, Kim has rejected entreaties and offers of help from the South Korean government.
Kim’s father, Kim Jong Il, who ruled for 17 years, had little regard for refugees, seeing them as traitors. But not long after his son took over in 2011, North Korea began a concerted effort to lure escapees to return, offering them amnesty and a comfortable life in exchange for information about other North Korean refugees in South Korea, according to researchers.
“Under Kim Jong Un, they saw the refugees in South Korea as a threat to his hereditary rule,” said Kim Yun-young, an adjunct professor at Cheongju University and former researcher at the Police Science Institute. “There was much more of an effort for conciliation and enticement, sometimes using their remaining families as hostages.”
In one 2016 video posted by a North Korean government-affiliated website, a 40-year-old man who returned out of concern for the wife he left behind said he faced discrimination and economic strife trying to make it in South Korea.
“I spent only a year and six months in South Korea, but every moment there felt like a decade, and every day was like hell,” Kang Chul-woo, dressed in a dark Mao suit with a pin of Kim Jong Un’s father and grandfather’s face affixed near his heart, said in the video. “I was treated with contempt and disdain wherever I went because I was a North Korean refugee.”
That man again escaped North Korea eight months later, according to South Korean court records. He was sentenced to three years and six months in prison for providing North Korean authorities with information about fellow refugees.
Other court cases involving North Koreans’ attempts to return reveal a desperation that pushes escapees to go back. One man who worked in construction as a day laborer was defrauded of about $50,000 and was chased by debt collectors. Another had the deposit to his home seized when he couldn’t pay back about $800 he owed the broker who had facilitated his initial escape. Another in his 60s had suffered a stroke and wanted to see his wife and son once more before his death, and begrudged being treated like a migrant worker in South Korea, according to court records.
Across the heavily guarded border, North Korea’s Kaepoong town is seen from the observatory of the Aegibong Peace Ecopark in Gimpo, South Korea.
(Lee Jin-man / Associated Press)
Some prepared lump sums of cash to pay “loyalty fees” to North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party to be absolved of having escaped the country, which is normally punished as a criminal offense with time in a prison camp or forced labor, according to the records.
The New Year’s jumper, who was about 30 and reportedly told investigators he’d been a gymnast in North Korea, worked as a janitor and struggled to make ends meet, according to local media reports.
The economic plight North Korean refugees can face was highlighted in 2019 when Han Sung-ok, a single mother, and her 6-year-old son were found dead in their Seoul apartment, possibly of starvation. The mother and son’s deaths became a rallying cry for fellow refugees. South Korea provides initial resettlement funds and housing for the first five years, but many are left with nothing once they’ve paid broker’s fees, and struggle to find stable jobs.
Jeon Su-mi, an attorney who works as an advocate for North Korean refugees, said many feel disillusioned by the individualism and capitalism of the South. The choice of refugees to voluntarily return should be an opportunity for reflection in South Korea, she said.
“How ready was South Korea to genuinely welcome and accept these refugees in our midst?” Jeon said. “They risked their lives to get here and then risk their lives once again to leave. That should be a sign.”
9. U.S. court seizes $2.4M in North Korea case
The RGB is the north's SOCOM/CIA/CYBERCOM.
As an aside I wonder if any of the $2.4million will go toward the civil court ruling fines against Kim Jong-un in the case of Otto Warmbiers's murder.
Excerpts:
Citing a “confidential reliable source,” the U.S. government also argued that both Company 1 and 2 follow orders from the North’s Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), which conducts the regime’s cyber warfare and other clandestine operations.
Sunday
January 9, 2022
U.S. court seizes $2.4M in North Korea case
A U.S. district court on Thursday ordered the seizure of $2.4 million in funds from companies involved in money laundering for North Korea in violation of U.S. and international sanctions.
The court’s ruling follows a probe by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) into a series of wire transfers by four companies acting on behalf of North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (Ieepa).
The state-run bank is subject to both U.S. and United Nations Security Council sanctions.
Judge Rudolph Contreras of the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia granted the U.S. government’s request for a default judgement allowing it to confiscate the funds, as the companies failed to respond to official complaints about their activities.
In its court filing, the U.S. government alleged that the North Korean bank laundered over $2.5 billion via such front companies through the U.S. financial system. The $2.4 million funds seized by U.S. authorities in Thursday’s ruling are just the transfers detected and intercepted by U.S. law enforcement.
The four companies – whose names were withheld and identified in court documents as only Company 1, 2, 3 and 4 – have not yet been sanctioned by the United States, but their funds were seized after their transactions with known North Korean front companies operating abroad came to light.
$1.8 million of the funds seized came from Company 1, which according to the U.S. government complaint not only made several wire transfers to the Foreign Trade Bank’s front companies based in Russia, Thailand and Kuwait, but also received transfers from other known North Korean front companies.
The U.S. government said that Company 2, which was incorporated in Singapore just two months after Company 1’s funds were seized by U.S. authorities, was a new front company established by North Korean agents to continue money laundering on behalf of the regime.
Citing a “confidential reliable source,” the U.S. government also argued that both Company 1 and 2 follow orders from the North’s Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), which conducts the regime’s cyber warfare and other clandestine operations.
According to the U.S. government, Company 3 and 4 were also involved in a series of wire transfers with organizations closely linked with the regime, including the Chi Yupeng network, which encompasses a number of North Korean front companies.
One company in the Chi Yupeng network, Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Materials Co. Ltd., used foreign currency raised by sales of North Korean coal to purchase nuclear and missile components for Pyongyang.
10. The bald facts (South Korea election issue)
Sunday
January 9, 2022
The bald facts
Ruling Democratic Party (DP) presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung has vowed medical insurance coverage for hair-loss treatment. The DP got excited about the response to the campaign pledge from the online community of bald people. The party has launched a video campaign called, “Lee Jae-myung can implant!” As many as 10 million Koreans worry about loss of hair, and many in the younger generation — who will have the deciding vote in the March 9 election — are also fretting over their hairlines.
There are two prescribed medications for hair loss, Minoxidil and Finasteride. The latter is also used to treat men with benign prostatic hyperplasia. Men get a prescription for insurance-covered prostatic hyperplasia to treat hair loss. It would be great if the state can help ease the concerns over loss of hair. But national medical insurance cannot be a panacea for every problem. It should have priorities as restricted as its resources.
Due to a large deficit in the national medical insurance system, even cancer patients must shoulder huge costs for treatment. Under revised terms, newly diagnosed cancer patients must pay even more to get a second level of anticancer drugs. Third-generation immunotherapy taken once every three weeks costs 5 million won ($4,152) per session. Doctors rage at the idea of the government paying for hair loss treatment when people are dying of cancer because they can’t afford the treatemtn.
According to the National Health Insurance Corp., its debt ratio will hit 132 percent by 2023 due to a surge in coverage under the liberal Moon Jae-in administration. Medical costs per each senior citizen are expected to average 7.6 million won in 2030, double the level in 2015. Yet the DP is proposing increased coverage for dental implants.
Politicians promise anything they can to buy votes. But DP candidate Lee is setting a new standard for both promises and flip-flops. He withdrew the idea of universal disaster relief due to the public’s negative response. He also has been blurry about his previous idea of imposing tax on land ownership.
A leader must take responsibility for his words. None of the candidates explain how they will fund their extravagant campaign promises. Tax hikes will be inevitable amid a thinning working population and increasing welfare demands. But who wants to talk about that? Candidates should beware: fooling voters isn’t as easy as it looks.
11. Leading U.S. and Multinational Forces in South Korea and the Management of Competing Interests
Important essay from one of the foremost experts on the command relationships in Korea.
Conclusion:
In closing, the U.S. four-star general officer in South Korea should continue to compartmentalize the position of CFC commander, clearly separating it from the other three hats conceptually. This includes the necessity for the CFC commander to suppress the role of serving as a U.S. service member beholden exclusively to the U.S. government. For when acting in an alliance capacity, this officer should exercise commander authorities and make decisions in the best interests of both nations’ forces. Coalitions fracture in crisis and war when unilateral imperatives come to dominate the military command established to execute the allied campaign. Regional and transnational security concerns require bilateral and multilateral solutions, not domination by one set of interests.
In order to maintain the sanctity of the CFC as an allied institution, all members, including the commander, must stand above national prerogatives when performing their duties. This last point is pivotal. Nations supporting a coalition count on their forces being utilized for alliance purposes and not one member’s own national prerogatives. This expectation differs little from the professional military ethic we demand of our service members to be duty-bound to their military oaths, avoiding partisan national politics.
Leading U.S. and Multinational Forces in South Korea and the Management of Competing Interests
by Shawn P. Creamer
January 8, 2022
Shawn Creamer examines the different roles that the U.S. four-star general officer in South Korea must perform and argues that the unique responsibilities concentrated in this position require the officer to compartmentalize the alliance “hat” from other unilateral national responsibilities.
The U.S. government maintains a four-star general officer to represent its many military and security interests in the Republic of Korea (ROK). This senior U.S. general officer is simultaneously appointed on behalf of the U.S. government to four legally distinct military capacities on the Korean Peninsula, colloquially referred to in military circles as “hats.” Deep intersectionality and tensions arise from a single individual executing such a diverse expanse of responsibilities for large portions of the friendly force. Pressures builds between the four capacities due to their competing imperatives, authorities, and communication channels, which can be compounded by the fact that this senior U.S. general officer relies on staff from three highly diverse headquarters for support in executing command responsibilities.
This essay identifies gaps in current understanding of the theater-level command and alliance decision-making architecture through a deeper examination of the hats worn by the U.S. four-star general officer in South Korea. It argues that the wide range of unique responsibilities concentrated in this position requires the officer to compartmentalize the alliance hat from other unilateral national responsibilities.
THE FOUR HATS
Of the four hats the general officer wears in the ROK, three are command responsibilities with the United States Forces Korea (USFK), the United Nations Command (UNC), and the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC). The fourth hat is serving as the representative of the U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where the general officer represents U.S. national interests in the Military Committee’s Permanent Session (as described below). When wearing this fourth hat, the general officer is known as the senior U.S. military officer assigned to Korea (SUSMOAK). However, the scope of the SUSMOAK is narrowly defined by the Military Committee and the CFC Terms of Reference, meaning that the officer is not acting as a representative of the other three hats as SUSMOAK.
While U.S. military commands headquartered in South Korea have existed since 1957, these four legally distinct military capacities have only coexisted together since 1978. From 1978 to 1992, the CFC and UNC headquarters were joined together, while the USFK headquarters were separate. From 1992 to 2018, the CFC, UNC, and USFK headquarters were conjoined, referred to by U.S. service members as the tri-command. The tri-command relationship involved U.S. joint service members operating from a single headquarter workspace. Most of these U.S. staff members operated in a highly complex, interconnected web of multi-hatted capacities not just across the three commands but also in support of the SUSMOAK on the Military Committee. During this period, the cross-command responsibilities of the U.S. service members induced certain tensions with and bewilderment by the ROK service members who only supported the CFC. The tri-command structure made it difficult for the ROK service members to understand which command the U.S. service members represented at any given time. In 2018 a change was made to disentwine the roles of U.S. service members supporting the three headquarters. Thereafter, these headquarters were operated by separate staffs, except for some multi-hatted U.S. general officers and low-density specialists who still supported more than one command.
Today, the USFK headquarters staff consists of U.S. joint force service members and civilian employees, while the UNC headquarters staff consists of joint force service members from the U.S. and the UN Sending States. The USFK also maintains three foreign exchange officers on its staff, one from Australia and two from the United Kingdom. The headquarters staff for the CFC consists of ROK joint force service members, U.S. joint force service members, and U.S. civilian employees. The USFK, UNC, and CFC are also supported by Korean national civilian employees working as employees of the U.S. government. Many of the key supporting leaders on whom the U.S. four-star general officer relies across the four hats are also multi-hatted general officers who remain interconnected, as they were in the former tri-command-era paradigm of cross-command, cross-service responsibilities. This phenomenon at times requires the U.S. four-star general officer to sort out command authorities, responsibilities, and communication channels, while at the same time synchronizing and prioritizing the command’s common purposes and goals.
“Further complicating the senior U.S. general officer’s extensive command responsibilities is the added obligation to the contributing nations and the forces they would provide to the UNC and CFC in wartime.”
While all three of these commands are in support of one common goal—peace and security on the Korean Peninsula—all have competing strategic imperatives. The USFK and UNC are unilateral U.S. commands reporting to U.S. national authorities, including the president, while the CFC is the military embodiment of the ROK-U.S. alliance, operating under the bilateral strategic guidance and direction of the ROK-U.S. Military Committee. Further complicating the senior U.S. general officer’s extensive command responsibilities is the added obligation to the contributing nations and the forces they would provide to the UNC and CFC in wartime. To help mitigate the cross-purpose challenges of these three commands, the three staffs supporting the senior U.S. general officer must first comprehend the distinct authorities and responsibilities that reside within their specific command. Second, each must have a clear understanding of communication channels to it higher headquarters. Third, each staff must have a clear understanding of decision authorities that reside in its higher headquarters. Each command must then exercise the requisite staff discipline to keep to its correct command lines and communication channels and avoid stepping on another command’s toes.
NAVIGATING CFC AND SUSMOAK ROLES
Among the more nuanced arrangements for the senior U.S. general officer to navigate are the roles of the CFC commander and the SUSMOAK. As the CFC commander, the general officer is focused on the operational military domain and the attainment of the alliance’s military objectives. However, the SUSMOAK must operate at the higher strategic level on behalf of the U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to represent U.S. national interests at the Military Committee’s Permanent Session. At Permanent Session forums, the SUSMOAK and the ROK chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff counterpart provide mutually developed strategic guidance and direction for the CFC. When required, the members of the Military Committee’s Permanent Session engage their respective national authorities for political guidance and direction. As the SUSMOAK, the U.S. four-star general officer in South Korea is supported by the USFK assistant chief of staff J5, a U.S. Marine Corps two-star general officer, as secretary.
“While the CFC commander should of course remain informed on strategy and policy in the execution of the command duty assigned by the Military Committee, these influences must include both the ROK and U.S. perspectives together.”
It is important to remember that the CFC was purposely designed and built to focus exclusively on the operational military domain, reserving the strategic and political domains, respectively, to the Military Committee and the national authorities. As the CFC commander, the U.S. four-star general officer must compartmentalize the CFC duty from the other assigned responsibilities, effectively screening out U.S. strategic and national policy positions. This is done to prioritize the alliance’s military operations over the general officer’s own national imperatives in order to retain both outward and inward credibility as the alliance’s appointed commander.
While the CFC commander should of course remain informed on strategy and policy in the execution of the command duty assigned by the Military Committee, these influences must include both the ROK and U.S. perspectives together. When strategy and policy divergences arise, the CFC commander is to default to existing standing orders and execute military operations to their fullest. The role of this position within the alliance is to focus on the operational military domain, while it is the Military Committee and national authorities’ role to reach bilateral concurrence on strategic and political matters. This demarcation of roles and responsibilities is essential so that the CFC and its assigned military forces can focus on prosecuting the military campaign and delivering battlefield success for the attainment of agreed-on alliance strategic and political objectives.
The commander of the CFC has received substantial bilaterally developed strategic guidance and direction from the Military Committee to perform the alliance mission. Since 1978, such guidance has taken multiple forms, including the Terms of Reference for the Military Committee and the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, the Strategic Directive, and other Military Committee and national authority decisions, including most importantly the bilaterally approved Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) and the CFC operational plan produced from the SPG. However, despite the existing guidance and decisions, the CFC commander will face circumstances that require updated guidance from the Military Committee or decisions by the national authorities. Examples include defense condition changes or operational plan phased transitions. In those scenarios, as CFC commander the four-star general officer makes a recommendation to the Military Committee concerning operational requirements aligned with the CFC mission. Simultaneously, in the role of SUSMOAK, the general officer will consider the strategic implications of that CFC recommendation through a unilateral U.S. strategic lens. However, if the strategic conditions determine that it is not in the U.S. national interest to support the CFC commander’s recommendation, the general officer has the responsibility to represent that U.S. strategic position as the U.S. chairman’s representative, the SUSMOAK, further underscoring the challenges of navigating between the CFC commander and SUSMOAK roles.
COMPARTMENTALIZED VS. COMINGLED RESPONSIBILITIES
Some U.S. alliance managers do not subscribe to the above compartmentalized approach to the simultaneous exercising of multiple hats, arguing that it is too cumbersome and complex for the common staff officer to understand. Additional arguments against compartmentalization include that multi-hatted leaders should comingle all their responsibilities, so that all the responsibilities are synchronized and not cross-purposed. Under such an approach, the CFC commander would not recommend or seek guidance on a military course of action if it conflicted with one of the command’s other strategic or operational imperatives, or if the commander knew through a unilateral role that the U.S. government’s strategic or political position was not aligned with a certain military pathway.
However, if compartmentalization is regarded as the wrong approach, then what does this say about the CFC’s relationship with the alliance command structure and all the international military agreements governing it? If we were to condone an approach in which the U.S. national authority and policy dictate how the U.S. four-star general officer commands the CFC, then the Military Committee’s influence is diminished and the delicate balance of U.S. and ROK national interests within the alliance command is disrupted. In this case, the United States should then be willing to accept that in the future the ROK national authority and government policy would influence the actions of a future ROK-appointed commander of the CFC.
Consequently, the comingling approach is not in the United States’ national interest now, nor will it be in the future, just as such an approach is not in the ROK’s national interest today. In practical terms, should one nation’s service members display an unhealthy nationalist orientation to their CFC duties, this would necessitate the partner’s service members to do the same in order to balance their nation’s interests within the command. An increasingly downward spiral in staff efficiency and mission effectiveness would be generated as a result of a bifurcated staff operating along nationalist lines.
General Dwight Eisenhower serves as a positive role model for today’s military leaders operating in multinational command settings, particularly in how he approached working with allies, compartmentalized his coalition duties, and stood above the fray of competing national interests as the commander of coalition forces. While the individual agency provided by a commander has always been a decisive factor in any command arrangement, General Eisenhower was able to flourish in multinational settings because the coalitions he led possessed a unifying purpose, with common views of political objectives. Moreover, he was resourced by his coalitions with a staff both appropriately sized to the mission requirements and empowered with the authority and trust to make the necessary decisions for the alliance. While no two multinational commands are the same, there are striking similarities to the command arrangements led by General Eisenhower and those in South Korea today.
“Coalitions fracture in crisis and war when unilateral imperatives come to dominate the military command established to execute the allied campaign. Regional and transnational security concerns require bilateral and multilateral solutions, not domination by one set of interests.”
In closing, the U.S. four-star general officer in South Korea should continue to compartmentalize the position of CFC commander, clearly separating it from the other three hats conceptually. This includes the necessity for the CFC commander to suppress the role of serving as a U.S. service member beholden exclusively to the U.S. government. For when acting in an alliance capacity, this officer should exercise commander authorities and make decisions in the best interests of both nations’ forces. Coalitions fracture in crisis and war when unilateral imperatives come to dominate the military command established to execute the allied campaign. Regional and transnational security concerns require bilateral and multilateral solutions, not domination by one set of interests.
In order to maintain the sanctity of the CFC as an allied institution, all members, including the commander, must stand above national prerogatives when performing their duties. This last point is pivotal. Nations supporting a coalition count on their forces being utilized for alliance purposes and not one member’s own national prerogatives. This expectation differs little from the professional military ethic we demand of our service members to be duty-bound to their military oaths, avoiding partisan national politics.
Shawn P. Creamer is an active duty U.S. Army colonel, currently serving as the Deputy Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy at United States Forces Korea. He was commissioned through the ROTC as an infantry officer in 1995 when he graduated from the Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina. He has served in a wide variety of command and staff assignments over the course of his 26-year career, which includes 11 years assigned to the ROK or working on Korean Peninsula security issues. He was a U.S. Army War College Fellow in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Security Studies Program and is a fellow with the Institute for Corean-American Studies.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Endnotes
[1] This essay expands on previous work by the author on joint and multinational theater-level command and the ROK-U.S. alliance’s decision-making construct, representing the fourth in a series of essays and research projects. See Shawn P. Creamer, “Theater-Level Command and Alliance Decision-Making Architecture in South Korea,” International Journal of Korean Studies, no. 20 (2016); Shawn P. Creamer, “Joint and Multinational Theater Headquarters in Korea: History, Organization and Manpower Activities,” Institute for Corean-American Studies, January 6, 2020; and Shawn P. Creamer, “Setting the Record Straight on OPCON Transition in the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” National Bureau of Asian Research, July 16, 2021, https://www.nbr.org/publication/setting-the-record-straight-on-opcon-transition-in-the-u-s-rok-alliance.
[2] Some USFK field-grade staff members also have formally assigned duties with the CFC, such as the provost martial, the command surgeon, public affairs officer, and staff judge advocate.
[3] UN Sending State military personnel serving on the UNC headquarters staff is a relatively recent phenomenon. While such personnel have been historically affiliated with the UNC’s Liaison Group, the Military Armistice Commission, and the Honor Guard, they did not formally operate inside the UNC’s headquarters as designated staff members until 2015, except for a brief period during 1952–56.
[4] The key U.S. staff directors assigned to USFK all have corresponding duty assignments with the CFC as either the primary staff director or as a deputy director. The USFK J3 and J5 also have staff director assignments with the UNC.
[5] The ROK-U.S. Military Committee is a bilateral body of senior military officers from both nations that provides strategic guidance, direction, and oversight over the ROK-U.S. CFC. The body consists of two sessions: a plenary consisting of all members, which typically meets in person annually; and a permanent session consisting of the ROK chairman and the SUSMOAK (representing the U.S. chairman), which meets routinely in person to issue day-to-day guidance to the command. For further discussion, see Creamer, “Theater-Level Command and Alliance Decision-Making Architecture in Korea,” 49–51.
[6] Former CFC-UNC-USFK chief of staff and Eighth Army commander, Lieutenant General Dan Petrosky, promoted three secrets to success during his tenure in South Korea for the staffs supporting him: know your lane, stay in your lane, and keep people out of your lane.
[7] The reference to the USFK assistant chief of staff J5 supporting the SUSMOAK in a secretariat capacity is significant for the reader to understand as it highlights the complexity of the entire enterprise. This two-star general officer has other multiple duty appointments, as the assistant chief of staff C5 for CFC and as the assistant chief of staff U5 for the UNC. The USFK J5 position supports the SUSMOAK at the Permanent Session because the SUSMOAK is representing U.S. national interests in an alliance forum. The complexity arises in that the members of the three staffs (USFK, CFC, and UNC), in addition to other commands such as the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the U.S. Joint Staff, see this U.S. Marine Corps two-star general officer as a single all-encompassing individual rather than through a compartmentalized lens as separate entities. Additionally, some alliance managers mistakenly assume that this two-star general officer is acting in a CFC C5 capacity when supporting the SUSMOAK due to the CFC subject matter being conducted. This comingling of responsibilities and authorities manifests itself improperly through staff actions being subsumed and executed by the wrong command, through actions being reported often to the wrong higher headquarters, and through the wrong higher headquarters at times communicating improperly to the wrong command.
[8] The problems associated with not compartmentalizing the commands have been identified as undermining efficient and effective military operations as far back as the spring of 1951. Creamer, “Theater-Level Command and Alliance Decision-Making Architecture in Korea,” 55–56.
[9] During World War II, General Eisenhower served as the commander-in-chief of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. After the war, he helped form its successor as commander-in-chief of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe for NATO.
[10] Both NATO and the CFC are categorized by the U.S. Defense Department as International Military Headquarters. In addition, both commands are governed at the strategic level by a military committee and at the political level by the national authorities of contributing nations. That said, the NATO model is more complex and cumbersome than the CFC model due to the large number of nations belonging to the coalition.
[11] Should a U.S. four-star general officer not compartmentalize the four hats, particularly the CFC hat from the others, it may reinforce Korean perceptions of this officer as a “U.S. representative” regardless of which hat (SUSMOAK, CFC, USFK, or UNC) is being worn.
12. Considering Human Rights in Aid to North Korea: A Rights-based Approach for the United Nations
The below is the text of an essay published on a Korean website in both Korean and English. The english text is provided by the author for ease of reading.
Considering Human Rights in Aid to North Korea: A Rights-based Approach for the United Nations
by Amanda Motwart Oh
In 2013, then United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon introduced the concept of the “human rights up front” (or HRuF) approach. The Secretary-General called for a UN system-wide strategy when serious violations of human rights are found in a country, through this HRuF approach. All UN agencies and offices were expected to become involved to advance human rights on the ground, provide candid information, and develop a common UN system for information.[1] The following year, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (UN COI) recommended the immediate application of the HRuF strategy for North Korea “to help prevent the recurrence or continuation of crimes against humanity” in North Korea.[2] As such, the UN should keep human rights up front when considering and conducting its important operations in North Korea, which include the provision of food aid, medical supplies, and hygiene and sanitations projects, to name only a few.
The UN, by way of Member States, has long recognized that human rights are vital to international peace and security. In the aftermath of two world wars, nation states decidedly and determinatively came together in 1945 to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,” as the Preamble of the UN Charter declares.[3] While these statements do not reflect all the important issues covered in the UN Charter, the significance of human rights was a central focus of this document intended to combine efforts across the world to promote international peace and security. Nations better understood the meaning of collectively valuing human rights after experiencing the devastating consequences of World War I and World War II when such rights were egregiously violated.
In the case of North Korea, a place with critical and urgent humanitarian needs, the UN has five partner agencies–(1) World Food Programme (WFP), (2) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), (3) Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), (4) United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and (5) United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA)–that are coordinated by the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) of its DPR Korea Office.[4] In its most current 2020 Needs and Priorities Plan, the UN DPR Korea Office stated its number one strategic objective is to “[r]educe morbidity and mortality from malnutrition of the most vulnerable people with an integrated, community-based approach and improve equitable access to quality essential health services” (emphasis added).[5] “The most vulnerable people” implies a concern for those people who are in particular suffering or more likely to suffer because of their precarious status. Arguably, it also conveys an interest in the marginalized and targeted (the vulnerable) inside the country so that more resources may be effectively leveraged to provide these populations with the resources needed to survive.
In North Korea, “the most vulnerable people” are often those heavily discriminated against by Kim Jong-un’s regime, meaning those with low songbun (socio-political classification), those judged to be political criminals, or those seen as disloyal or traitors to the country for other reasons. According to the UN COI’s findings from February 2014, prisoners, for example, are held in a grossly unjust and inhumane detention system where there are reasonable grounds to conclude crimes against humanity have occurred and are occurring against them. The Kim family considers certain persons, who it sends to political and sometimes other prison camps, to “pose a threat to the political system and leadership” of the State.[6] For example, a political prisoner (and her family) in North Korea is one of the most vulnerable, as she is tortured, disappeared, and inhumanely treated in deplorable prison conditions because of her perceived lack of loyalty to the Kim family. This means she has an insufficient supply of food and medicine, with no hope of having family members visit the political prison camp (kwan-li-so), and almost certainly suffers from malnutrition and disease in detention as well as beatings or sexual-related assaults. This political prisoner is highly likely to die early and in detention because of being viewed by the North Korean regime as disloyal.
Because political prisoners, by way of example, are viewed as political offenders of the North Korean State, UN agencies may be reluctant to mention this group of highly vulnerable people. Even organizations with the best intentions and with the most experience may prefer to “keep politics out of aid” in an effort to accomplish their mission and work within the confines of the State. It is in this way that characterizations of basic human rights issues framed as political ones may jeopardize vulnerable people’s opportunities to receive humanitarian aid from the UN and others. It is this divergence between human rights and humanitarian aid that also undermines the determination set forth early in the UN Charter’s Preamble to affirm faith in human rights. This also fails to effectively implement the HRuF approach in North Korea called on by then Secretary-General Ban.
In February 2020, UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated in his remarks and Call to Action to the UN Human Rights Council that “[h]uman rights permeate the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” and a human-rights based approach “delivers development that is more lasting and inclusive.”[7] Calling HRuF an important initiative, Mr. Guterres remarked that his Call to Action would “enhance[e] human rights analysis and expand[] the presence of Human Rights Advisors within UN Country Teams.”[8]
In implementing HRuF, the UN will help ensure the most vulnerable people receive necessary aid and relief that they so need. Through donors, it is the UN’s (and civil society organizations’) dedication and resources that can improve people’s lives on the ground in immediate and direct ways. Without question these issues are complex and challenging, yet it is essential that the UN implement the HRuF approach.
As of now, it remains to be seen whether HRuF is being considered or implemented in North Korea. Due to COVID-19 and the North Korean regime’s restrictive measures to prevent the coronavirus, UN agencies have been impacted in country and are operating at a much-reduced capacity. When COVID is no longer a major hurdle, though, a plan of action and an impact assessment should commence to adequately consider human rights in the delivery of UN humanitarian aid.
Member States contemplated the importance of human rights seventy-five years ago as they sought to maintain international peace and security and, therefore, prevent another world war. As such, the UN must address the ongoing commission of crimes against humanity in North Korea by effectively implementing an HRuF approach. Not only will the UN HCT in the DPRK Korea Office be able to actively support the most vulnerable in North Korea with this approach, but it may be able to help prevent the erosion of peace and security.
Amanda Motwart Oh, US Attorney, graduated from Tufts University's Fletcher School of International Law with a master's degree in international law.
[7] António Guterres, “Remarks to the UN Human Rights Council: ‘The Highest Aspiration: A Call to Action for Human Rights,’” February 24, 2020, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2020-02-24/human-rights-council-remarks-the-highest-aspiration. See United Nations, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, para. 8, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf: “A just, equitable, tolerant, open and socially inclusive world in which the needs of the most vulnerable are met;” also para. 10: “The new Agenda is guided by the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including full respect for international law. It is grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international human rights treaties, the Millennium Declaration and the 2005 World Summit Outcome. It is informed by other instruments such as the Declaration on the Right to Development.”
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
