Quotes of the Day:

3 – “Beware the one-party state. The parties that remade states and suppressed rivals were not omnipotent from the start. They exploited a historic moment to make political life impossible for their opponents. So support the multi-party system and defend the rules of democratic elections. Vote in local and state elections while you can. Consider running for office.”

– Timothy Snyder

"The care of human life and happiness, and not their destruction, is the first and only object of good government."

– Thomas Jefferson

"We are fast approaching the stage of the ultimate inversion: the stage where the government is free to do anything it pleases, while the citizens may act only by permission; which is the stage of the darkest periods of human history, the stage of rule by brute force."

– Ayn Rand

1. The Sullivan-Waltz channel

2. Breaking: Trump Transition at Spy Agencies Actually Going Smoothly

3. Elbridge Colby and the Return of Republican Realism

4. Welcome to the Gray Zone and the Future of Great Power Competition

5. The Undersea Cable War Hits Taiwan

6. Closing the Border to Terrorists: Cooperation between Mexican Cartels and International Terrorist Organizations

7. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 8, 2025

8. Iran Update, January 8, 2025

9. Trump Administration’s Counterterrorism Policy Should Begin at Golan Heights

10. Trump’s team convenes with Pentagon personnel in 100-plus transition meetings, so far

11. Biden administration announces its final military aid package for Ukraine before leaving office

12. Trump’s NATO Vision Spells Trouble for the Alliance

13. Trump Is Facing a Catastrophic Defeat in Ukraine

14. Why Greenland Matters: Natural Resources – and ‘Location, Location, Location’

15. Yes, US generals should be fired

16. The Constitution and War in the 21st Century

17. Storied Marine infantry battalion to be transformed into Littoral Combat Team

18. The Great M1 Abrams Tank Redesign Has Arrived

19. Does Donald Trump Want to Take Over North America?

20. Ukraine is determined, but tired

21. Ukraine Has Launched A New Offensive Into Russia. Why And Why Now?

22. U.S. Free Association with Greenland: A Bad Deal

23. How to Win the New Cold War

24. Special ops forces seek to manage digital footprints, achieve ‘security through obscurity’

25. Japanese Yakuza Leader Pleads Guilty To Nuclear Materials Trafficking, Narcotics, And Weapons Charges

26. US-backed army chief elected Lebanon’s president, ending years-long stalemate

27. Evaluating US Strategy for Ukraine: A Pre-Postmortem

28. Ethics, Integrity, and the Toll of Modern Irregular Warfare: A Conversation with Pulitzer Prize-Winning Journalist Dave Philipps

29. To the budding author, (The Harding Project)

1. The Sullivan-Waltz channel

Note to all national security professionals in both parties. Be like Sullvan and Waltz. Check the hubris. Check the political animosity and political attacks. Put the national security of our nation first. Our nation needs you to act the way they are acting.

The Sullivan-Waltz channel

By ROBBIE GRAMER  01/08/2025 04:05 PM EST Updated 01/08/2025 04:11 PM ESThttps://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2025/01/08/the-sullivan-waltz-channel-00197146

Incoming national security adviser Mike Waltz in a Jan. 2 interview with Fox News acknowledged that transition periods can represent a precarious moment for U.S. national security. | Ted Shaffrey/AP

With help from Nahal Toosi, Phelim Kine, John Sakellariadis and Daniel Lippman

Subscribe here | Email Robbie | Email Eric

Shortly before the Biden administration clinched a 60-day ceasefire deal in Lebanon in late November, national security adviser JAKE SULLIVAN called Rep. MIKE WALTZ (R-Fla.) to update him on the plans — and give the incoming Trump administration time to process and react to the developments before they were made public.

It was the start of a formidable working relationship between JOE BIDEN’s national security adviser and DONALD TRUMP’s incoming one — one of the most significant channels of communication between the two camps during the fast-moving transition period.

There’s no love lost between their two bosses, but Sullivan and Waltz have developed a cordial working relationship — and kept their conversations hermetically sealed off from politics — according to three administration officials and two Trump transition officials. All officials were granted anonymity to discuss internal transition matters.

That’s no small feat given the hyper-partisan cloud of acrimony descending on Washington as Trump prepares to take office.

The two check in regularly and have done multiple in-person deep dives on national security issues for an hour or more with one another, according to one administration official and one Trump transition official.

The Sullivan-Waltz channel of communication has also been spurred by an unusual spate of major national security news ahead of Trump’s inauguration. That includes a botched coup in close U.S. ally South Korea, the downfall of BASHAR AL-ASSAD’s regime in Syria, and the ongoing conflicts elsewhere in the Middle East and in Ukraine. The two also spoke at length after the New Year’s Day truck attack in New Orleans and the Tesla Cybertruck explosion outside of a Trump hotel in Las Vegas, the administration and transition officials said.

Both camps aim for Waltz and his team to hit the ground running when Trump takes office on Jan. 20 — even as Trump and his political allies continue to bash the Biden administration over its foreign policy record and Biden’s allies rebuke Trump over his provocative comments on “acquiring” Greenland, pushing peace talks in Ukraine with Russia and more.

Waltz in a Jan. 2 interview with Fox News acknowledged that transition periods can represent a precarious moment for U.S. national security. Trump backers have been making a public push to get his Cabinet in place as soon as possible. “That has to be in place day one, because this is a moment in transition, of vulnerability and President Trump is going to project because he is a leader of strength,” he said.

2. Breaking: Trump Transition at Spy Agencies Actually Going Smoothly

Some more apparent good transition news.  

Breaking: Trump Transition at Spy Agencies Actually Going Smoothly

National security nominees facing Hill problems, but teams meshing at CIA, ODNI

https://www.spytalk.co/p/breaking-trump-transition-at-spy?utm

Mark Hosenball

Jan 08, 2025

∙ Paid

ALTHOUGH THERE COULD STILL BE SERIOUS OBSTACLES AHEAD, preparations to transfer control of key U.S. spy agencies from Biden administration appointees to the intended nominees of President-elect Donald Trump are moving forward smoothly, according to sources directly familiar with the transition process. Coming amid reports of hiccups in FBI background checks and the president-elect’s sensational foreign policy pronouncements at Mar-a-Lago on Tuesday, news of relative calm at the CIA and Office of the Director of National Intelligence seems noteworthy.

In the wake of Trump's electoral victory—solid, although not the overwhelming mandate he proclaimed—some intelligence officials, congressional skeptics and longtime spy world monitors expressed serious concerns that Trump and his appointees would set out to twist intelligence collection and reporting to serve their political beliefs and objectives, the latest which include assertions by Trump that he would like the U.S. to annex strategic but independent and/or certainly non-American countries and territories such as Greenland and the Panama Canal. Trump also refuses to rule out the US. taking over Canada and turning it into a 51st state.

Regardless of such proclaimed ambitions and inclinations of the incoming president—which also include sympathy for Vladimir Putin regarding Russia's objectives in its continuing war in Ukraine—the word from the intelligence-related frontlines of the Biden-Trump transition enterprise is that the process is proceeding appropriately, and, so far, relatively smoothly, with feathers inside key agencies not being seriously ruffled, whatever Trump and his entourage have been saying publicly.

What hitches do exist seem centered on Capitol Hill and Trump’s intent to appoint loyalist and former Hawaii congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard as director of National Intelligence, the agency which is supposed to oversee and coordinate (and deconflict) the activities of all intelligence agencies. Republicans hoped for a fast confirmation for the controversial nominee, but her hearing has been delayed amid reports that she had failed to provide the Senate Intelligence Committee with responses to ”pre-hearing questions for an ethics disclosure” and that the panel “hasn’t gotten a copy of her FBI background check.”

Similar procedural issues have bedeviled Trump’s defense secretary nominee Pete Hegseth, whose FBI background check had yet to be completed by the close of business Tuesday, according to The Washington Post.   

At the Virginia headquarters of the ODNI itself, however, a spokesperson told SpyTalk that his office was "supporting the executive branch transition." A source familiar with the process said the activities of the Trump transition team—whose membership identities were not readily available—said Trump team members were very active but their inquiries were "standard stuff." 

Public controversy surrounds the credentials and history of Gabbard, a military veteran and former Democrat-turned Independent who embraced Trump’s 2024 presidential run. Gabbard's foreign policy views have attracted considerable attention and criticism from 

Never-Trump Republicans and Democrats. She once expressed apparent admiration for Vladimir Putin, tweeting "Al-Qaeda attacked us on 9/11 and must be defeated. Obama won't bomb them in Syria. Putin did." During a 2017 meeting in Damascus with erstwhile Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, Gabbard adopted the regime’s false line that U.S.-backed rebels were responsible for attacks on civilians, not itself or its Russian backers. 

According to a Dec. 5, 2024 ABC News account, “Three former aides said Gabbard, who left the Democratic Party in 2022, regularly read and shared articles from the Russian news site RT—formerly known as Russia Today—which the U.S. intelligence community characterized in 2017 as ‘the Kremlin's principal international propaganda outlet.’” In 2022, a commentator on Russia’s Channel One called Gabbard "our girlfriend Tulsi."

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But the Gabbard controversy is not impeding transition efforts directly so far, sources familiar with the activities of relevant agencies said. At one of ODNI's key spinoff agencies—the National Counterterrorism Center, the unit which is supposed to have the most intense U.S. government expertise in monitoring and countering terrorism activity— only the director of the Center is a political appointee and so far Trump hasn't named one.

As for the Central Intelligence Agency, a source familiar with transition activities said that William Burns, the former career diplomat who has been serving as Biden's CIA chief, has already met with John Ratcliffe, the former Texas Congressman who served as Trump's DNI from 2020 to 2021, and whom Trump has now named to head CIA.

Former GOP Rep. John Ratcliffe, R-Texas (Congressional Office)

A leading member of Trump's CIA transition team is Cliff Sims, a one time Trump administration aide who wrote a book about Trump's entourage entitled A Team of Vipers but is now evidently back in the Trump fold. While not yet installed full-time in the CIA's Langley, Va., headquarters, a source familiar with the transition said Trump team members were in the CIA building "as much as they want to be" and that CIA officials are "working closely with them."

A source familiar with congressional intelligence oversight activity (not affiliated with Trump) said that one blip in the transition process was that Trump's team was slow in engaging with agencies in the sometimes complicated process of making personal disclosures to enable agencies to conduct security background checks on Trump nominees. But while the clearance procedure "got a late start," it is now moving ahead appropriately, the source said, 

That is still no guarantee that the Senate ultimately will confirm key Trump nominees such as Gabbard—or Kash Patel, Trump's ultra-controversial nominee to become FBI director. The FBI declined to discuss transition issues, including about Patel, a former Trump administration official and Republican congressional investigator who has promised to turn FBI headquarters into a “Museum of the Deep State” and scatter its 7,000 officials and agents around the states to “ to chase down rapists, to chase down murderers, to chase down drug traffickers and let the cops be cops on the streets across America.” 

"We cannot comment on individual background checks," a spokesperson said, and referred other transition questions to Trump's transition team.

Editor’s Note: With this story, the award-winning veteran investigative reporter Mark Hosenball joins SpyTalk as a contributing editor. He most recently covered the intelligence agencies for Reuters. Previously he was a longtime investigative correspondent for Newsweek, and before that, Dateline NBC and other news organizations in Britain and the U.S.

3. Elbridge Colby and the Return of Republican Realism

No mention of Korea. But not a surprise. Despite his words he is not a supporter of the ROK/US alliance. He reminds me of Douglas Feith and Paul Wolfowtiz whoboth said in 2004 that US forces in Korea were a waste. Of course they were talking about the fact they were committed forces to a war plan and thus unavailable to support GWOT operations. Bridge's view is that we must focus on the defense of Taiwan and we should not waste forces in Korea. Korea should defend itself even if that means developing indigenous nuclear weapons and if the alliance does remain ROK forces should be used for the defense of Taiwan as well.

Excerpts:

The day after the Jewish Insider hit-piece, Neal Urwitz, a friend of Colby, pushed back in a response essay for the National Interest titled “In Defense of Elbridge Colby.” In the piece, Urwitz called the criticisms unfair and urged detractors to read Colby’s book as well as “his voluminous tweets.” But the rearguard action by Urwitz and others had a resigned quality to it. For Rapture-ready evangelicals and Iran hawks worried about a realist turn in Republican foreign policy, no amount of careful re-readings of Colby’s tweets will bring them around. The battle against his influence will now be waged within the administration, where the stage has been set for a consequential contest over the limits, uses, and purpose of American power.

It will be woeful if Colby, who has worked on nuclear strategy and arms control, finds his views overwhelmed in this contest, and not just because of the stakes of a disastrous war with Iran. In a time of alarming nuclear tensions, the world would be well served by Colby’s appreciation for the unpredictable logic of nuclear escalation and the terrible power of nuclear weapons.

In Colby’s conversation with Carlson, he lamented the disappearance of the “salutary fear” of nuclear war that once informed U.S. policy. “A lot of the people who are calling for no-fly zones over Ukraine and intervening against the Russians and escalating and allowing U.S. weapons to be overtly used to attack Moscow and Russian strategic forces … that is obviously crazy,” Colby said, describing this as “one of the ‘touch grass’ kind of things.”

Referring to Bob Woodward’s reporting that the Biden administration almost found itself in a nuclear exchange with Russia in 2022, he added: “People who are blithe and insouciant about it, that is incredibly irresponsible. And they should not be near serious decisions.” Wistfully, Colby reminded Carlson that “the biggest thing” Ronald Reagan did was to meet with his Soviet counterparts about nuclear weapons. ”We should be afraid of these things—you know, salutary fear,” he said.

In “Strategy of Denial,” Colby put an even finer point on it. “Peace does not come from some unfocused readiness to be unpeaceful,” he wrote, “but only from a willingness to imagine and consider what a war would actually be like.”

Elbridge Colby and the Return of Republican Realism

The leading theorist of America First foreign policy has his work cut out for him

dropsitenews.com · by Drop Site News

by Alexander Zaitchik

This story is co-published with Drop Site News and Truthdig

Elbridge Colby speaks at the National Conservative Conference in Washington D.C., Tuesday, July 9, 2024 / Dominic Gwinn / Middle East Images / AFP via Getty Images

On November 13, Elbridge Colby appeared on CNN to discuss and defend Donald Trump’s selection of Peter Hegseth to run the Pentagon. The role of explaining the president-elect’s foreign policy ideas had by then become a familiar one for Colby, who served as a deputy assistant secretary of defense in the first Trump administration. Throughout the summer and fall, he was a go-to guest for cable news segments on what an “America First” foreign policy would mean for the world. As he described it to CNBC in July, it did not signify a turn inward, toward isolationism, but backward, toward an older “practical, common-sense approach” to statecraft that included “sparing” use of the military and an Eisenhowerian attunement to the economic costs of security competition. It became a ritual in these appearances for Colby to coyly deflect speculation over his own possible role, fueled by his presence on shortlists for national security advisor and secretary of defense.

Following Trump’s victory, this speculation became aggressive advocacy on the part of Colby’s supporters. On November 10, Tucker Carlson began an in-person interview with the 45-year-old veteran of the Pentagon and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence by describing him as “one of the very few people with deep experience in national security who shares the president's priorities on national security,” and expressed his desire for Colby to play a “big role” in the administration. The Washington Examiner’s Tom Rogan urged the president-elect “to appoint Colby to a senior national security position, perhaps as Secretary of Defense or CIA director.” Sharing the Carlson interview on X, New York Times columnist Ross Douthat wrote: “More than most of the FP appointments, what happens with [Colby] will be a sign of whether the Trump WH is aiming for strategic coherence and an explicit ‘realist’ commitment this time around, as opposed to a more ad hoc team of ideological rivals.”

Within the week, the defense and CIA posts were off the table, as was national security advisor, each handed to figures with less experience and more hawkish records. As the weeks stretched on without the anticipated call from Mar-a-Lago, it seemed possible that a campaign by Iran hardliners to block Colby’s appointment —waged publicly and behind the scenes—was working. All the while, Colby dutifully continued to field booking requests from Christine Amanpour and Piers Morgan, and took to his social media battlements to defend the integrity of Hegseth’s Jerusalem Cross chest tattoo.

Finally, on December 26, Trump brought Colby in from the cold, announcing on Truth Social his appointment as under secretary of defense for policy. The appointment, a plum one straddling strategy and policy, certifies Colby as the GOP’s ideas man; among its duties is overseeing the production of the National Defense Strategy. Colby will be tasked with coalescing a realist foreign policy framework fit for a post-Blob era. To do that, Colby will harken back to older iterations of Republican foreign policy that preceded what he describes as a post-Cold War “primacist alliance” of interventionist liberals and neoconservatives. Primacists “have led us to a situation in which we're overextended, we're on the brink of war in multiple theaters,” Colby told Carlson. “You need peace through strength. But that that term has become cheapened and distorted to become basically an excuse for an aggressive, expansionist approach to foreign policy.”

So What Is Colby’s Worldview?

Rejecting the “absurd hubris” of the primacists, Colby has spent the last eight years attempting to systematize the anti-interventionist themes Trump has espoused. The result is a China-focused, national-interest realism that accepts the need for tradeoffs and limits in the exercise of U.S. power, and rejects adventurism and “democracy promotion” through regime change. Its principles have broad public support and helped Trump defeat a Democratic party that embraced the Cheney family in November.

The question is whether these principles will be allowed to guide the next administration. Not everybody on Trump’s national security council shares Colby’s views, and Trump himself remains a wild card. These ideological fault lines are most visible when it comes to the Middle East, a region that Colby sees through a realist lens as a secondary theater, but that others in Trump World, including his possible boss at the Pentagon, understand as a theater for realizing New Testament prophecy.

In the first Trump administration, Colby devoted a two-year stint as deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development to pushing a doctrinal shift away from terrorism and toward China. As the lead writer of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, he also scrapped the longstanding goal of preparing the U.S. military to fight two major wars simultaneously, again placing the focus on China.

Colby expanded on that document’s recommendations for Asia in his 2021 book, “The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict,” which presents a case for “blocking” China’s rise as regional hegemon and argues for a U.S.-led alliance that accepts and prioritizes members based largely on the defensibility of their territory. Although in many ways a traditional academic international relations treatise, “Strategy of Denial” is streaked through with a signature concern of America First realism: reviving the U.S. industrial economy. “If China could establish hegemony over Asia,” he writes:

it could then set up a commercial and trading bloc anchored in the world’s largest market that would privilege its own and subordinates’ economies while disfavoring America’s. The resulting drain on American businesses, large and small, would be most keenly felt by the workers, families, and communities who rely on those businesses for jobs, goods, services, and the other benefits that come with a vibrant economy. The steady erosion of America’s economic power would ultimately weaken the nation’s social vitality and stability.

This concern over the domestic economic impacts of Chinese dominance echo the warnings made 30 years ago by John Mearsheimer, the prominent realist whose criticisms of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy anticipated and influenced those of Colby. In the 1990s, Mearsheimer warned that the U.S. should not accelerate China’s rise with policies that encouraged the outsourcing of its industrial base to a potential rival. Now that the rivalry is real, Colby believes that only a long-term commitment to a policy of “denial” can give peace a chance. The belief that war can still be avoided puts Colby on the sunnier side of the street from Mearsheimer, for whom the tragic logic of security competition condemns the U.S. and China to fight a hegemonic war. (Despite their differences, Colby has expressed admiration for Mearsheimer, who likewise has been described as a “Colby fan”.)

Although Colby’s version of containment is not as aggressive as some, it’s not a policy of détente, either. One could argue that the belief that the U.S. should be ready to fight a major war to block China from dominating its backyard is its own kind of primacism, one with a soft underbelly of debatable assumptions about the nature of Chinese aggression, ambitions, and the threats they pose to the U.S. A war fought under a realist flag of global stability and national interest comes with the same cost as one fought under a neoconservative flag of freedom and democracy.

“At what point does ‘denial’ become escalatory?” wonders Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, senior advisor to the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. “We have to be careful. Building up U.S. military assets in the South China sea and aggressively pursuing bloc formations in China’s sphere of influence may provoke the very confrontation that Colby insists he doesn’t want.” She adds that observers calling for a less interventionist foreign policy are “cautiously optimistic” that Colby is not an ideologue and appears open to debate, including on the subject of how hard to push China. This is a welcome contrast, she says, to American primacists of the left and right who, in recent decades, have treated foreign policy discussions like a “members-only club that shut everyone else out.”

Colby’s tolerance for risk drops precipitously after China’s first island chain. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he has ruffled feathers in what he calls the Imperial Capital by using his frequent media appearances to criticize Washington’s blank-check support for Kiev as an unwise use of U.S. resources and a strategic folly that runs an unacceptable risk of nuclear escalation and a direct NATO-Russia war. In a Politico profile published a year into the Russia-Ukraine war, a GOP senate aide described Colby as “far and away leading the charge” in changing the party’s thinking on NATO and Ukraine, including “historically hawkish senators such as Sen. Marco Rubio.”

Colby versus the hawks

Colby has had less impact on Trump World’s approach to Iran. Although he has publicly praised each of his fellow appointees to national security posts, his realpolitik view of the Middle East contrasts sharply with the Biblical politics of people like Hegseth and Mike Huckabee, as well as the neoconservative records of Michael Waltz and Marco Rubio, Trump’s picks for national security advisor and secretary of state, respectively.

Mearsheimer, who is not constrained by political considerations, is able to deliver the realist’s assessment of Trump’s picks that Colby cannot. “The group of people he has appointed to almost all the most important national security positions are all super hawks on Iran,” Mearsheimer said in late 2024. “John Bolton is ecstatic about the appointments of Waltz, Hegseth, Rubio, because they’re neoconservatives like him.” Some Trump officials are already salivating at the prospect of bombing Iran.

As this team of Iran hawks was being formed, Colby’s enemies did their best to make sure he didn’t ruin the party. On November 13, Jewish Insider reported that a number of “conservative pro-Israel activists” and anonymous “foreign policy experts” were “raising concerns that one potential candidate for a senior national security job could create ideological friction in the incoming administration, particularly on Iran and the broader Middle East.” The article, titled “Rumored for a Trump posting, Elbridge Colby’s dovish views on Iran stand out,” highlighted a 2012 article Colby co-wrote for the National Interest titled “Why Not to Attack Iran.” In the piece, Colby argued “a perpetual-strike campaign” would fail to stop Iran’s nuclear program, as well as fail to provide

a reasonable and plausible answer to the ultimate question Americans want answered before the United States goes to war: How does this end? Stealthy air strikes and massive earth-penetrating bombs are only tools, not answers. The United States cannot responsibly attack Iran and leave it at that, simply hoping for the best. A firm and resolute containment may be costly and risky, but it is a lot better than that. It’s probably best not to start down a road that has no end in sight.

Days before the election, Colby reiterated these points. “The U.S. has every interest in avoiding yet another major war in the Middle East,” he said on X. “How do you propose the U.S. can launch major strikes on Iran and avoid exactly that, especially if Iran retaliates against U.S. forces and other allies and partners, including Israel?” Elsewhere he has criticized U.S. missile attacks on the Houthis, members of the Iran-aligned “Axis of Resistance,” as wasting resources on “a tertiary target in a tertiary region.”

The day after the Jewish Insider hit-piece, Neal Urwitz, a friend of Colby, pushed back in a response essay for the National Interest titled “In Defense of Elbridge Colby.” In the piece, Urwitz called the criticisms unfair and urged detractors to read Colby’s book as well as “his voluminous tweets.” But the rearguard action by Urwitz and others had a resigned quality to it. For Rapture-ready evangelicals and Iran hawks worried about a realist turn in Republican foreign policy, no amount of careful re-readings of Colby’s tweets will bring them around. The battle against his influence will now be waged within the administration, where the stage has been set for a consequential contest over the limits, uses, and purpose of American power.

It will be woeful if Colby, who has worked on nuclear strategy and arms control, finds his views overwhelmed in this contest, and not just because of the stakes of a disastrous war with Iran. In a time of alarming nuclear tensions, the world would be well served by Colby’s appreciation for the unpredictable logic of nuclear escalation and the terrible power of nuclear weapons.

In Colby’s conversation with Carlson, he lamented the disappearance of the “salutary fear” of nuclear war that once informed U.S. policy. “A lot of the people who are calling for no-fly zones over Ukraine and intervening against the Russians and escalating and allowing U.S. weapons to be overtly used to attack Moscow and Russian strategic forces … that is obviously crazy,” Colby said, describing this as “one of the ‘touch grass’ kind of things.”

Referring to Bob Woodward’s reporting that the Biden administration almost found itself in a nuclear exchange with Russia in 2022, he added: “People who are blithe and insouciant about it, that is incredibly irresponsible. And they should not be near serious decisions.” Wistfully, Colby reminded Carlson that “the biggest thing” Ronald Reagan did was to meet with his Soviet counterparts about nuclear weapons. ”We should be afraid of these things—you know, salutary fear,” he said.

In “Strategy of Denial,” Colby put an even finer point on it. “Peace does not come from some unfocused readiness to be unpeaceful,” he wrote, “but only from a willingness to imagine and consider what a war would actually be like.”

dropsitenews.com · by Drop Site News

4. Welcome to the Gray Zone and the Future of Great Power Competition

Excerpts:

What is the Gray Zone?

The gray zone is the geopolitical space between peace and war where nations conduct activities to advance their national interests and weaken their adversaries without triggering a military response. Gray zone activities may also set the conditions for a future war but remain below a threshold that would provoke an immediate military response.

As the U.S. and its allies seek to maintain the world order that has been in place since WWII, Russia and China, often working together (and supported by nefarious actors such as Iran and North Korea) have sought to diminish the influence and standing of the U.S. in favor of their own ascent and their authoritarian views.

The gray zone isn’t just one aspect of great power competition—it’s quickly becoming the dominant space where that competition plays out. Gray zone activity is increasing because great power competition is intensifying.

A few random thoughts on the gray zone developed through many conversations with my mentors and colleagues over the years, from my experience and education, and inspired by this essay.

During the Post Cold War World the conventional wisdom was that there was no country that could compete with the US from a traditional conventional and nuclear military perspective. This assumption led to the development of China's Unrestricted Warfare and later Gerasimov's New Generation or Non-linear Warfare in Russia. They recognized that asymmetric approaches were necessary to successfully compete with the U.S. by keeping conflict below the threshold of large scale combat operations in what we today call the gray zone..

While the U.S. has correctly sought to maintain its conventional and nuclear military superiority, it has taken a defensive and reactive approach to the asymmetric approaches taking place in the gray zone between peace and war. The U.S. has viewed operations in this space as a lesser included case in national security planning and operations. The military has made the assumption that since conventional and nuclear war are the most dangerous threats the military can more easily "scale down" for asymmetric threats and what is now described as irregular warfare from its superior conventional and nuclear capabilities. On the other hand it is acknowledged that forces optimized for irregular warfare cannot be "scaled up" to conduct conventional war.

In short, U.S. adversaries are competing offensively in the gray zone while the U.S. is competing defensively. U.S. adversaries are creating dilemmas and attempting to disrupt and bypass U.S. national security strengths. The U.S. has failed to develop an agile, flexible, and offensive capability for national security operations in the gray zone to seize the initiative in creating dilemmas for our adversaries. It has not developed a capability to achieve strategic disruption of our adversaries which are collectively described as the axis of upheaval, chaos, or tyranny or the Dark Quad of China, Russia, Iran, and north Korea.

The U.S. must work to maintain its conventional and nuclear military superiority because this offers the best chance of avoiding war. By doing so it neutralizes these threats which then can allow the U.S. to make very modest investments in its national security apparatus to be able to offensively and proactively compete in the gray zone. 

This was the vision of President John F. Kennedy when he established the US Agency for International Development, the Peace Corps, gave the Green Beret to U.S. Army Special Forces, and established the U.S. Navy SEALs. He significantly expanded the scope and capabilities of the U.S. Information Agency that President Eisenhower established. He sought to develop national security tools and concepts that would allow the US to proactively and offensively compete below the threshold of large scale combat operations. Sadly he was not able to fully implement his vision and his successors never fully embraced his concepts because they did not have his strategic vision. But he might be described as the father of the idea of harnessing the power of 3D - diplomacy, development, and defense.

It was not until 1986 and the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act's Nunn Cohen Amendment was there an attempt to create a capability to effectively compete in the gray zone or what was called at the time "low intensity conflict." However, the vision of creating an organization responsible for all US national security operations in the gray zone of low intensity conflict was never realized.

Perhaps we need to return to U.S. roots and our traditional war fighting and winning philosophy and strategies that were embodied in the U.S. War Department with an absolute focus on large scale combat operations and nuclear war fighting to ensure U.S. dominance so as to deter war. To effectively compete in the gray zone perhaps we need a new "office" to harness the elements of the interagency/whole of government and orchestrate offensive and proactive operations against our adversaries below the threshold of large scale combat operations. This might be an Office of Strategic Disruption (OSD). e.g., A War Department to be able fight and win the nation's wars (and thereby deter them) while providing select military capabilities to support an Office of Strategic Disruption which is built to give the nation the offensive tools (3D - diplomacy, development, and defense, plus information and intelligence operations) to compete in the gray zone.

Welcome to the Gray Zone and the Future of Great Power Competition

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/welcome-to-the-gray-zone-and-the-future-of-great-power-competition?utm

SPECIAL SERIESThe Chinese ship, the bulk carrier Yi Peng 3 (R) is anchored and being monitored by a Danish naval patrol vessels in the sea of Kattegat, near the City og Granaa in Jutland, Denmark, on November 20, 2024. Denmark’s navy said on November 20, 2024 it was shadowing a Chinese cargo vessel in the Baltic Sea, a day after Finland and Sweden opened investigations into suspected sabotage of two severed undersea telecoms cables. “The Danish Defence can confirm that we are present in the area near the Chinese ship Yi Peng 3,” the military wrote in an email to AFP, adding that it would make no further comment for the time-being. (Photo by Mikkel Berg Pedersen / Ritzau Scanpix / AFP) / Denmark OUT (Photo by MIKKEL BERG PEDERSEN/Ritzau Scanpix/AFP via Getty Images)

Posted: January 8th, 2025

By Dave Pitts

Pitts is a senior national security executive with over four decades of experience ranging from counterterrorism and special operations to regional and global affairs. Pitts served as the Assistant Director of CIA for South and Central Asia and was responsible for all CIA activities and engagement across South and Central Asia and for policy coordination in Washington.

This is part one of a 3-part series by Cipher Brief Expert and former Assistant Director of CIA for South and Central Asia Dave Pitts, who also serves as a member of The Cipher Brief’s new Gray Zone Group.

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Ten thousand North Korean soldiers arrive in Russia to attempt to drive the Ukrainians from Russian soil, although North Korea isn’t at war with Ukraine. 

China conducts persistent and aggressive Coast Guard incursions into Taiwan’s territorial waters to attempt to extend and normalize control over the Taiwan Strait, while also trying to intimidate the Philippines to give up its presence in the Second Thomas Shoal.

Russia, China, and Iran use cyber and disinformation operations to attempt to interfere in U.S. elections, a clear violation of U.S. sovereignty and political independence. 

Russia is conducting sabotage operations across Europe targeting critical infrastructure to destabilize NATO allies and disrupt their support for Ukraine. 

Pyongyang conducted 97 cyberattacks between 2017 and 2024 with total damage of around $3.6 billion.

Welcome to the Gray Zone.

The consequences of the military escalation of great power competition can be severe, and great powers will go to great lengths to avoid direct conflict, given the potential for devastating losses. The reality is that this shadowy gray zone has become a space of increasing activity by U.S. adversaries.

What is the Gray Zone?

The gray zone is the geopolitical space between peace and war where nations conduct activities to advance their national interests and weaken their adversaries without triggering a military response. Gray zone activities may also set the conditions for a future war but remain below a threshold that would provoke an immediate military response.

As the U.S. and its allies seek to maintain the world order that has been in place since WWII, Russia and China, often working together (and supported by nefarious actors such as Iran and North Korea) have sought to diminish the influence and standing of the U.S. in favor of their own ascent and their authoritarian views.

The gray zone isn’t just one aspect of great power competition—it’s quickly becoming the dominant space where that competition plays out. Gray zone activity is increasing because great power competition is intensifying.

The Gray Zone Offers Unique Opportunities

Countries often need deniability in order for gray zone activities to be successful, even if only a fig-leaf of deniability in some cases. Gray zone activities can span the spectrum of attribution from attributable (overt) to unattributable (covert), or misattributable (false flag).

Advances in technology, particularly in AI, and evolving warfare tactics like the ones we are observing in real time in Ukraine, (advances in drone technology, for example) are providing new capabilities to nations that have the ability to ‘level the playing field’ in some ways.

AI is also bolstering both the reach and impact of cognitive warfare tactics, providing new methods of persuasion, coercion, and manipulation. And because countries want to avoid a costly war, there is a high threshold, as well as general uncertainty, on how to respond to gray zone activities.

Using these advantages, smaller countries, like Iran and North Korea, can today attempt to make strategic gains against the U.S. and the West, either alone or in alliance with Russia or China, that would be unachievable in a conventional war. The gray zone provides options to nations that otherwise may have none.

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There are a few additional considerations for truly understanding gray zone operations.

First, determining what is gray zone activity versus normal statecraft can be difficult and confusing given the often-tense relations between nations. Some of what we consider as operations in the gray zone may simply be harsh diplomacy. There’s room for debate there, but we should avoid the urge to label every aggressive action our adversaries take as being ‘in the gray zone’.

There is also some thought that adversary activities have to be covert or ambiguous to be considered gray zone activities. That probably aligned well during the Cold War, but maybe less so today.

Some gray zone activities require varying levels of ambiguity or covertness, but not all. Some gray zone activity is meant to have an audience, such as China’s aggressive gray zone actions in the South China Sea.

What common strategies or tactics do our adversaries employ?

There are several tactics used by our adversaries that make deterrence and effectively responding to gray zone activities more challenging. 

The first, “salami tactics”, speaks to the use of small, incremental encroachments or actions that don’t merit a response, but that are often followed by similar small encroachments or actions that in sum, change the status quo over time. It’s hard for nations to know how to respond to this approach.

The second, “fait accompli” refers to bolder actions that are taken quickly with the calculation that a military response would be too escalatory or risky.

Russia likely calculated that its plan in 2022 to quickly decapitate Ukrainian leadership and take the country in a matter of days—along with some saber rattling and threats—would have made the takeover of Ukraine a fait accompli that was too risky for U.S. and NATO intervention.

Unlike in 2014 in Crimea, that strategy by Moscow failed in 2022.

One key attribute of gray zone activities is that the fear of the consequences of 21st century conflict, and particularly conflict that can draw in countries with powerful militaries, restrains responses to gray zone activity.

Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea watch U.S. responses closely, and a lack of response or inconsistent responses, encourages additional gray zone action. 

Are we already in a ‘Gray War’ with China and Russia?

Given the growing intensity and systematic use of gray zone activities by U.S. adversaries, it is worth considering whether we are now in a “Gray War” with China and Russia. And is that Gray War being supported by help from Iran and North Korea?

Consider that a Gray War would take place entirely in the gray zone and would be well beyond the periodic use of gray zone activities by our adversaries to gradually erode U.S power and influence.

A gray war could be defined as the systematic and coordinated use of gray zone activities by our adversaries to achieve the same strategic results as a conventional war, without the risks of direct conflict.

The question now is whether China believes that it can strategically defeat the U.S. – using Russia as a primary surrogate – so that it can take Taiwan and establish itself as the dominant global superpower without direct superpower conflict. 

Instead of China using the gray zone to gradually weaken the U.S. and to help set the conditions for a future war, the new reality is that the gray zone may now be the place where the next war is already being fought.

This is part one of a 3-part series by Cipher Brief Expert and former Assistant Director of CIA for South and Central Asia Dave Pitts, who also serves as a member of The Cipher Brief’s new Gray Zone Group.

Read the next installment of Pitts’ Gray Zone series next Wednesday exclusively in The Cipher Brief. And join Pitts and other Cipher Brief Experts in a series of live conversations happening in 2025 led by former Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Dr. Michael Vickers. 

5. The Undersea Cable War Hits Taiwan

The Undersea Cable War Hits Taiwan

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/the-undersea-cable-war-hits-taiwan

Posted: January 8th, 2025

By Nick Thompson

Nick Thompson is a former CIA Paramilitary Case Officer and Naval Special Warfare Development Group operator. With over 20 years of experience in the national security space, Nick has conducted countless clandestine operations and combat deployments with a primary focus in the Middle East and Asia. He has regularly navigated and led foreign intelligence collection and covert action initiatives by building networks with a diverse range of stakeholders. He now works in Washington D.C. at Anduril Industries, a leading defense technology company, seeking to bring cutting edge capability to intelligence and defense professionals alike.

EXPERT INTERVIEW — Undersea cables have been dominating the headlines in recent months – specifically, repeated episodes in which damage has been done to this unseen yet critical element of global infrastructure. Hundreds of thousands of miles of cables run along the sea floor, key pieces in networks of global communications and the world’s financial system, and in the Baltic Sea and most recently in the waters off Taiwan, undersea cables have been cut. It isn’t always clear whether the damage is accidental or intentional, but Chinese and Russian vessels have been accused in the latest incidents of damaging cables in apparent acts of sabotage.

The Cipher Brief turned to Nick Thompson, a former CIA paramilitary officer and expert on the subject, to assess the threat to undersea cables and what can be done to protect them. Thompson warned that as bad actors around the world increasingly turn to subterfuge and gray zone activity, the risks to undersea infrastructure will be heightened. “I think it’s widening from what we’ve seen traditionally, [with] Russia and China,” he said. “It’s probably going to take place in other areas around the globe.”

Thompson spoke with Cipher Brief Managing Editor Tom Nagorski. This conversation has been edited for length and clarity. Watch the full discussion on The Cipher Brief YouTube channel.

Nagorski: Authorities in Taiwan are investigating a Hong Kong-owned vessel that has apparently damaged one of these undersea fiber optic cables not far from Taiwan. Can you tell us what you know about this particular incident?

Thompson: It’s been a busy 90 days in the undersea cable world. In this latest incident on January 3rd in Northwest Taiwan, we have a Chinese-named vessel that is registered to Cameroon. We’ve got reports of this vessel using its AIS – its automatic identification system – at times, and then turning it off. Long story short, we had another cable severed. The Taiwanese Coast Guard launched a team [in response]; this happened in territorial waters of Taiwan. Unfortunately, they were not able to put somebody on the vessel, in a board, search and seizure scenario. The vessel denied requests to stay in the area for an inspection and it sailed on its way towards South Korea. Now the Taiwanese have reached out to the South Koreans. They’ve requested assistance.

Nagorski: How does an investigator know whether something like this is an accident or sabotage?

Thompson: It depends, but the narrative of, “We accidentally dropped an anchor and then we dragged it for 10, 20, 100 nautical miles before we accidentally cut the cable” is very, frankly, silly. If I’m on a 20-foot sailboat by myself, setting the anchor is a little bit of an art. So when you’re talking about vessels that are 700 feet long, 100 feet wide, that is a big piece of machinery going to the sea floor. The whole anchor theory of, “We accidentally did this,” is frankly just absolutely ridiculous.

Nagorski: Talk a bit if you would about what we’ve seen in this same vein in the Baltic Sea.

Thompson: The Baltic incidents are very interesting, one in November and then we had a December event, around Christmas. Starting with the November event, that was a Chinese vessel. There’s some indication that maybe the Chinese state was not behind that, and that maybe Russian intelligence bribed a crew member. There was at least one Russian crew member on that vessel. So maybe that was just a pay for play – do this damage, kind of a quick down and dirty operation. That was two cables — one was Sweden to Lithuania and the other was Finland to Germany.

As for the December event, that’s a suspected Russian shadow vessel, the Eagle S. Finland actually seized the vessel. I think a lot of people applauded that. That hasn’t really happened, another country seizing the vessel in question. And they’ve actually raised the anchor, they’ve actually inspected it. It’s kind of TBD what happens with the crew members. Are they going to face some kind of charges? That’ll be really interesting to see how it plays out.

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Nagorski: What do these undersea cables do and what happens if they are cut?

Thompson: It’s probably underestimated, the importance that they play in our everyday lives, but there’s really three major pillars that they hit: it’s economic, comms, and just regular internet. But on the economic side, trillions of dollars in transactions. Undersea cables tend to be cheaper, more reliable than satellite service.

But they’ve been traditionally vulnerable. Sometimes they’re just laid on the sea floor. Maybe they’re buried, but they’re not buried very deep. It’s usually public, unclassified information of where they are. So we have an idea of where they are.

They’ve frankly been flying under the radar a little bit. The Taiwanese, I think, probably understand this better than most — the resiliency and the redundant comms piece. This most recent attack, January 3rd, I think it’s a good-news story that the data was rerouted to another undersea cable. But I also think we need to be looking at LEO (Low Earth Orbit) constellations to where you could even reroute resilient communication data flow from subsea into space. I think that’s gradually gaining momentum.

But to speak to your original question, how important is it? We’re talking military communication, and then think about how much we depend on our lives just for regular internet. Some of those military communications are encrypted. Some of them probably aren’t. Some countries are more susceptible to other undersea types of sabotage to include espionage, bending fiber and stealing data that way.

Nagorski: Are there other things that the United States or other countries should be doing to mitigate against this? How protected are we?

Thompson: I mentioned the resiliency of looking at rerouting information. I think enhanced monitoring, subsurface and air, especially in the realm of autonomous systems, that’s going to free up other manned assets that have other really important missions. AUVs (autonomous underwater vehicles), you have hydrophones that could be listening, you have unmanned surface vessels maybe as deterrents. And then you could also even have unmanned rotary and fixed wing surveilling the area, especially places that are probably vulnerable.

I really like the seizure that happened. Stop and searching, having rapid response teams that feed into repair. People don’t usually understand how expensive ships are on a day-to-day cost. But if you talk about smaller ships, lean crews that can get places very, very quick, use an AUV to maybe find the area, AUV into an ROV (remotely operated vehicle) operation maybe for the repair. Maybe you’ve already done some rerouting, intelligent routing, as I say, on the data. You could be up and running very, very quickly potentially.

Nagorski: You told us when we last spoke about this that “the geopolitical landscape was throwing gasoline on the fire” of the undersea cable issue. Can you explain what you meant by that?

Thompson: I was thinking about where is this headed? I think it’s going to be increased covert ops targeting strategic locations and conflict zones. What we’ve really seen is the Russian model, the Chinese model. But let’s not forget, what are the Iranians doing? You have [the Iranian port] Bandar Abbas, they have a huge coastline there. You have the Straits of Hormuz. You have the North Koreans now. They’re pushing troops obviously to help the Russians. What are they doing with their nuclear aspirations? I think it’s widening from what we’ve seen traditionally, [with] Russia and China. It’s probably going to take place in other areas around the globe.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

6. Closing the Border to Terrorists: Cooperation between Mexican Cartels and International Terrorist Organizations

Excerpts:

The problem of individuals with potential ties to international terrorist organizations entering the United States via the Southwest border is a significant and growing threat. Cooperation between Mexican cartels and terrorist groups has grave implications for U.S. national security. The numerous cases of potential terrorists using the border as a point of entry highlight critical vulnerabilities within current border security protocols. Although the number of such incidents remains uncertain, the problem is exacerbated by the sheer volume of “gotaways” and the difficulties in identifying these individuals before they can carry out dangerous activities.

Addressing this issue requires a comprehensive, multi-faceted approach. Pressuring Mexican cartels to curtail their involvement in human trafficking operations, particularly those facilitating terrorist infiltration, should be a primary focus. Enhancing cooperation with Mexican authorities through better intelligence-sharing, training, and support can help reduce the flow of dangerous individuals. Furthermore, the United States must reevaluate its current enforcement strategies, avoiding ineffective and destabilizing measures like the kingpin strategy, which only exacerbates violence without addressing the deeper causes. Instead, a more targeted approach that combines law enforcement efforts with meaningful policy changes, such as revising the handling of detainees with derogatory data from terrorist watchlists, is necessary.

The United States should also work with the Mexican government to incentivize effective cooperation and take a strong stance against the cartels, ensuring that the border is more secure, and terrorists have fewer opportunities to exploit its vulnerabilities. The ultimate goal must be to raise the cost of illegal entry sufficiently to deter terror organizations from attempting to infiltrate the United States via the Southwest border. This will require both the political will to enact significant policy shifts and the dedication of resources to implement these changes effectively. By taking these steps, the United States can better defend its borders and reduce the likelihood of terrorist attacks facilitated by current security gaps.

Closing the Border to Terrorists: Cooperation between Mexican Cartels and International Terrorist Organizations

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/01/09/closing-the-border-to-terrorists/

by Kelsey Warner, by Andrew Byers

|

01.09.2025 at 06:00am

Recently constructed panels at the new border wall system project east of Douglas, Arizona on December 14, 2020. The border wall system includes a combination of infrastructure including new all-weather access roads. (U.S. Customs and Border Protection photo by Jerry Glaser)

In July 2024, three Palestinians and a Turk, all with possible connections to terrorist organizations, were detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents while attempting to illegally cross the Southwest border from Mexico into the San Diego area. One of the two Jordanians who attempted to breach the USMC Marine Corps Base at Quantico in May 2024 was confirmed to have crossed the Southwest border illegally before being detained and then released into the United States. Eight Tajiks with ties to the Islamic State-Khorasan Branch (ISIS-K) were found to have crossed illegally into the United States via the Southwest border at various points in 2023 before being released into the United States. These are just a handful of the most recent incidents involving potential international terrorism-affiliated individuals entering the United States via the Southwest border in the past several years, all facilitated by the Mexican cartels that control the flow of human trafficking across the border.

A growing number of potential terrorists have entered the United States illegally via the Southwest border in recent years. While we can document several important recent cases, we do not yet understand the full scope of the problem because of the large number of “gotaways,” illegal aliens who are known to have entered the United States, typically between ports of entry, but who do not have encounters with U.S. law enforcement officials, so their identities remain unknown, and they are never vetted. The vast majority of such gotaways are, of course, economic migrants unaffiliated with international terror organizations. The number of bad actors blending into this large pool of gotaways, however, remains both unknown and unknowable.

If the United States wants to address the problem of individuals with international terrorism ties entering the United States via the Southwest border, it will have to target the Mexican cartels. These cartels control the flow of illegal entries into the United States through its border with Mexico. While these organizations are run by businessmen driven by profit motives, well-financed terror organizations have the resources to secure entry to the United States from the cartels. The application of additional pressure on the cartels to cut off the flow of terror-affiliated illegal aliens will change the cartels’ incentives and should have a positive effect on the problem.

The Scope of the Problem

In December 2023, FBI Director Christopher Wray testified before Congress that the number of warning signs of possible terror attacks inside the United States has increased dramatically since the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. Wray stated:

“What I would say that is unique about the environment that we’re in right now in my career is that while there may have been times over the years where individual threats could have been higher here or there than where they may be right now, I’ve never seen a time where all the threats or so many of the threats are all elevated, all at exactly the same time.”

This is troubling, to say the least, and suggests that much more must be done to head off the possibility of one or more major terrorist attacks inside the homeland.

Furthermore, the recent re-arrest of eight Tajiks with possible ties to ISIS-K inside the United States is a case study of both the potential problem—terrorists entering the United States via the Southwest border—and how current U.S. government policies exacerbate or fail to correct the problem. While most of ISIS-K’s attacks have taken place inside Afghanistan and Pakistan (including the 2021 Kabul airport attack that killed thirteen U.S. servicemembers), ISIS-K has also staged attacks inside Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Iran. Most recently, in March 2024, four ISIS-K operatives, all ethnic Tajiks, attacked a Russian concert hall killing close to 150 civilians. This recent out-of-area attack is highly worrisome because it suggests larger aspirations for ISIS-K, providing the context for why the recent arrests of eight ethnic Tajiks said to have connections to ISIS-K inside the United States are so concerning. The eight entered the United States illegally, coming across the Southwest border at various times in 2023. Of the eight Tajik nationals, three used the CBP One phone application to schedule an appointment at a port of entry, four were initially encountered by CBP while crossing the border between ports of entry, and one arrived at a port of entry without scheduling a CBP One app appointment. After they were taken into custody by CBP, they were nominally “vetted” and subsequently released inside the United States with notices to appear before a U.S. immigration court at a later date. Only later were they re-arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in Los Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia after the individuals in question had scattered. This group of Tajiks is said to have ties with a larger ISIS-K cell operating in Central Europe, but it remains unclear if this was an ISIS-K operational cell being sent to conduct one or more attacks within the United States.

The Tajik case is not isolated. It comes on the heels of an April 2024 arrest of an Uzbek national with ISIS-K ties who had been living illegally inside the United States for two years in Baltimore. In February 2024, a Columbian man who was a positive match for membership in a terrorist organization (name of organization has not been publicly released) was detained by the Texas Department of Public Safety and turned over to CBP when he crossed into the United States via Eagle Pass area just a few days before a visit to the area by President-Elect Donald Trump. In August 2023, more than a dozen Uzbeks were detained on the Southwest border, having been infiltrated into the United States by a human smuggler with ties to ISIS. Astonishingly, this case did not result in any detentions, since no derogatory information on the Uzbeks was immediately found. The Uzbeks all requested asylum and were then released into the United States and provided with court dates for their asylum hearings. It was only after the Uzbeks were released into the United States that the FBI learned that their travel had been facilitated in part by an individual with ties to ISIS. Even though there was no known immediate attack plot involving the Uzbeks and the ISIS-linked smuggler was not believed to be a formal member of ISIS but rather had “personal sympathies” with ISIS, according to U.S., government officials, this was an alarming case of potentially very dangerous human trafficking. Over 400 Central Asians are believed to have entered the United States via this ISIS-connected human trafficking operation. While some 150 of the Central Asians who entered the United States via this smuggling network have now been arrested, at least fifty of them have not been located and remain at large.

The number of individuals attempting to illegally enter the United States who are present in the Terrorist Screening Data Set (TSDS) has increased dramatically in the last few years. CBP reports that in FY2023, there were 80 such encounters on the Southwest border and 484 such encounters on the Northern border at land ports of entry. In FY2024, there were 52 such encounters on the Southwest border and 358 on the Northern border. There were many more such encounters between ports of entry. In FY2023, there were 169 such encounters on the Southwest border and 3 on the Northern border. In FY2024, there were103 on the Southwest border and 3 on the Northern border. This is not to suggest that in each case the individual in question is a known terrorist, but in each case, there is enough potentially derogatory information about the individual to further screen them. The total number of potential terrorists attempting to enter the United States is unknown, because since 2021 there have been at least 1.7 million gotaways at the Southwest border (illegal entrants detected but not detained). Then-U.S. Border Patrol Chief Raul Ortiz testified in March 2023 that the total number of gotaways was likely 10-20 percent higher than the publicly reported numbers. We simply cannot know how many of these two million gotaways were also present in the TSDS.

Congressional oversight recently forced CBP to admit that at least 99 individuals from the TSDS encounters on the Southwest border from FY2021-23 were released into the U.S. homeland and at least 34 additional TSDS individuals remain in DHS custody and have not yet been deported. These individuals represent nationals from 36 countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. Of these 99, immigration judges granted bond to at least 27; four more were granted asylum inside the United States, and at least two more had their cases terminated by immigration judges. In at least one case, a potential terrorist was granted bond after the immigration judge was never told by CBP that the individual was a potential national security threat. The Chief Immigration Judge admitted to a Congressional committee that only 5% of immigration judges have a Top Secret clearance, and that because of this, she “imagine[d] there may be” gaps in the information that DHS shares with immigration judges about the potential national security risks posed by such individuals.

While we see news of isolated cases of watchlist-associated individuals crossing the border, Mexican cartels have a hand in everything that moves through the areas under their control, drugs, contraband, and people alike. In 2021 alone, the most recent year for which data are available, the Mexican cartels are estimated to have made $13 billion from human trafficking across the Southwest border. CBP chief of the Tucson Sector recently testified before Congress that, “…if someone’s being smuggled, they’re using a criminal organization….that has changed significantly, when I started…in ’95, people could just get to the border and cross on their own….now nobody crosses without paying the cartels. …the cartels…determine when people cross…how many people cross at a time, all of that.” Other senior CBP officials have likewise testified that anyone attempting to cross the Southwest border without the cooperation of the cartels—and, most importantly, paying the cartels—is beaten or killed by the cartels. Yuma County Sheriff Leon Wilmot recently noted that, “The cartels don’t have to invest a penny in any of the human smuggling. Their product is walking up to them and paying them to cross, so the cartels control every bit of what’s going on. Same with over in Baja. So, it’s more of a human product and it’s cheap and easy for them. They just tell ‘em when to cross.”

Policy Recommendations

Several obvious and immediate policy recommendations naturally flow from the above analysis. All require significant political will to implement and require acknowledgement that there is a major problem underway. The good news is that there are some remedies that can begin to help cut off the flow of individuals with links to international terrorist organizations. If terrorists want to enter the United States, some will find ways to get inside the United States no matter what policy changes are implemented. The key is to raise the costs for illegal entry and deter at least some terror organizations from dispatching operatives because of the increased likelihood of getting caught.

One common refrain is that Mexican cartels and other transnational criminal organizations should be designated as terrorist organizations. This would not necessarily increase U.S. legal authority to deal with the problem, however. As Brian Jenkins noted, “Ironically, the USA Patriot Act, passed in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks, allowed investigators dealing with terrorism ‘to use the tools that were already available to investigate organized crime and drug trafficking.’” While potentially satisfying, doing so would not change much. More specific policy solutions are needed.

First, the United States must apply additional pressure on the Mexican cartels to cut off the flow of terror-affiliated illegal entrants. This pressure should take the form of additional use of law enforcement resources, as well as military and intelligence community support for CBP and state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies on the border. In part, this could take the form of cooperative training exercises between U.S. and Mexican forces that would give Mexican law enforcement organizations additional resources while simultaneously allowing the United States deeper and more frequent access to vet their Mexican partners. The United States could also create a formalized, identity-protected channel of communication for Mexican law enforcement personnel to report terrorism concerns. This channel could be supported by additional counterterrorism training.

Second, the United States should cease using a kingpin strategy and head-hunting tactics, which target cartel leaders, which only serve to further destabilize the local cartel presence and spur further violence. As one study found, such an approach failed to “tackl[e] underlying issues like corruption, collusion, impunity, and a lack of economic opportunities,” and ended up doubling the local homicide rates where such a strategy was employed. Another study found that homicide rates increase by 80% in a municipality in which a cartel leader is captured, and these effects persist for at least one year; neighboring municipalities suffer a 30% increase in homicides, with effects lasting at least six months. The case study of the Sinaloa Cartel’s Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman is one such cautionary tale. El Chapo was arrested in 2014, re-arrested in 2016, and extradited to the United States in 2017. This resulted in the creation of a power vacuum within the Sinaloa Cartel, which immediately resulted in massively increased violence as various Sinaloa factions jockeyed for influence. Cartel violence peaked in 2018, with 33,341 homicides that year, though Mexico’s murder rate has only diminished slightly since then. While the removal of El Chapo from power initially seemed to be a success, it soon became clear that this was a Pyrrhic victory at best. New approaches that address underlying sources of violence, poor governance, and poverty while simultaneously depriving cartels of resources are needed.

Third, the United States should employ a combination of carrots and sticks against the Mexican government to pressure it to assist in combating the cartels. This would be a combination of punitive measures against Mexican law enforcement when they fail to stop crossings as well as providing additional resources and training to help them perform their jobs better. Note that giving the Mexican government increased access to U.S. vetting procedures may make them better at assisting the cartels in evading our security efforts but is probably necessary.

Lastly, in response to the recent reporting of at least 99 detained watchlisters being allowed into the United States, the U.S. federal government should make detention and automatic deportation the rule for all detained illegal aliens with derogatory data on the TSDS watchlist, rather than allowing immigration judges to grant bonds or asylum status, both of which permit release of these individuals into the United States with minimal to no oversight. This change may require congressional support but should be a nonpartisan issue. If such a new blanket policy is not politically feasible, all immigration judges should go through the process of receiving Top Secret security clearances so that they can be given information about the national security risks posed by detained watchlisters by CBP and other intelligence community officials. CBP should create a formalized process for its personnel with first-hand interactions with those on the list to refer them for further questioning by U.S. intelligence agencies before the detainees receive further processing. Illegal aliens with derogatory information on the TSDS watchlist should have their cases reviewed by immigration judges with the proper security clearances to review all information pertaining to the individuals.

Conclusion

The problem of individuals with potential ties to international terrorist organizations entering the United States via the Southwest border is a significant and growing threat. Cooperation between Mexican cartels and terrorist groups has grave implications for U.S. national security. The numerous cases of potential terrorists using the border as a point of entry highlight critical vulnerabilities within current border security protocols. Although the number of such incidents remains uncertain, the problem is exacerbated by the sheer volume of “gotaways” and the difficulties in identifying these individuals before they can carry out dangerous activities.

Addressing this issue requires a comprehensive, multi-faceted approach. Pressuring Mexican cartels to curtail their involvement in human trafficking operations, particularly those facilitating terrorist infiltration, should be a primary focus. Enhancing cooperation with Mexican authorities through better intelligence-sharing, training, and support can help reduce the flow of dangerous individuals. Furthermore, the United States must reevaluate its current enforcement strategies, avoiding ineffective and destabilizing measures like the kingpin strategy, which only exacerbates violence without addressing the deeper causes. Instead, a more targeted approach that combines law enforcement efforts with meaningful policy changes, such as revising the handling of detainees with derogatory data from terrorist watchlists, is necessary.

The United States should also work with the Mexican government to incentivize effective cooperation and take a strong stance against the cartels, ensuring that the border is more secure, and terrorists have fewer opportunities to exploit its vulnerabilities. The ultimate goal must be to raise the cost of illegal entry sufficiently to deter terror organizations from attempting to infiltrate the United States via the Southwest border. This will require both the political will to enact significant policy shifts and the dedication of resources to implement these changes effectively. By taking these steps, the United States can better defend its borders and reduce the likelihood of terrorist attacks facilitated by current security gaps.

Tags: border security, gang violence, national security

About The Authors

• 
  
• Kelsey Warner
• Kelsey Warner is a former intelligence operations specialist for the Department of Homeland Security who focused on transnational organized crime and cybersecurity threats.
• View all posts 
• 
  
• Andrew Byers
• Andrew Byers is a non-resident fellow at the Texas A&M University’s Albritton Center for Grand Strategy and a former history professor at Duke University.

7. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 8, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 8, 2025

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-8-2025

Ukrainian forces struck Russia's state-owned Kombinat Kristal oil storage facility near Engels, Saratov Oblast on the night of January 7 to 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and the Unmanned Systems Forces struck the oil storage facility and caused a large fire. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the facility provides fuel for the Russian military's Engels-2 Air Base and noted that strike will create logistical issues for Russia's strategic aircraft based at the airfield. Geolocated footage published on January 8 shows a large fire at the storage facility, and Russian sources noted that the fire continued to burn into the morning of January 8. Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that debris from a falling drone struck an unspecified industrial facility near Engels but later acknowledged that the strike caused a fire in the area.

Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) on January 8 in occupied Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the 8th CAA used this command post to coordinate operations in Kurakhove. Russian sources amplified reports on January 8 that a Ukrainian purported Storm Shadow strike against Lgov, Kursk Oblast on December 30 killed at least one serviceman in the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) and three servicemen in the 76th VDV Division.

Key Takeaways:



• Ukrainian forces struck Russia's state-owned Kombinat Kristal oil storage facility near Engels, Saratov Oblast on the night of January 7 to 8.

• Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) on January 8 in occupied Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast.

• Russian forces advanced in Kursk Oblast, in Toretsk, and near Kurakhove.

• Russian forces are increasingly using drones attached to fiber optic cables in Ukraine. 

8. Iran Update, January 8, 2025

Iran Update, January 8, 2025

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-8-2025

Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) are preparing for a possible offensive into US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory in Syria. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on January 7 that Turkey would conduct a “military operation” against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria if the YPG does not disband and integrate into the new Syrian Defense Ministry. Turkey frequently conflates the YPG with the SDF and uses the YPG to refer to the entire SDF. Fidan’s comment is one of the most explicit statements by a senior Turkish official threatening military action against the SDF. The SDF is currently negotiating the terms of its potential integration into the future Syrian armed forces with the HTS-led interim government in Damascus, but it remains unclear if Turkey would wait for these negotiations to conclude before launching an operation.

SNA forces have reportedly deployed and mobilized along SDF-SNA frontlines, which suggests that the SNA is preparing to launch a potential offensive against the SDF from the SNA-controlled Peace Spring area. The Peace Spring area is an SNA-controlled enclave between Ain Issa and Tal Tamr and north of the M4 Highway. Turkish state-run media reported on January 8 that the SNA sent “heavy weapons” to SDF frontlines in the Peace Spring area. A commander in the Joint Force, an SNA formation that includes the Hamza Division and Suleiman Shah Brigade, said that the SNA sent fighters, tanks, and other vehicles to the frontlines overlooking the SDF-controlled towns of Kobani in Aleppo Province, Ain Issa in Raqqa Province, and Tal Tamr in Hasakah Province. The US Treasury Department has sanctioned the commanders of the Suleiman Shah Brigade and Hamza Division for human rights abuses against Kurds. Syrian media circulated footage on January 7 of a small convoy of T-series tanks and vehicles moving through Ras al Ain, a city in northern SNA-controlled territory along the Syria-Turkey border. CTP-ISW can neither confirm local reports about SNA deployments nor comment on their size and scale. The reports of SNA mobilization are consistent with recent Turkish and Turkish-backed airstrikes and artillery shelling targeting SDF positions and assets along the Peace Spring line of control. A Kurdish journalist separately reported that the SNA sent “significant” reinforcements to Jarabulus, which is north of the Qara Qozak Bridge on the western bank of the Euphrates River.

The reported SNA deployments and the current SNA axes of advance toward SDF-controlled territory on the western bank of the Euphrates River provide contours of a potential future SNA offensive. Deployments to the “frontlines” of Kobani, Ain Issa, and Tal Tamr suggest that the SNA could launch a three-pronged assault to collapse SDF defenses along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River. One objective of this advance may be to capture Kobani or fix SDF forces around Kobani while a second prong advances west and southwards from the Ain Issa area towards the rear of the Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge positions. Some interim objectives could include cutting the M4 Highway to block any SDF reinforcements to the Qara Qozak Bridge from areas to the east. The reinforcements that the SNA reportedly sent to the Tal Tamr frontlines suggest that the SNA could advance east toward al Hasakah and attempt to isolate the northernmost Kurdish-controlled territory. The reinforcements that the SNA reportedly sent to Jarabulus could advance southwards toward the SDF bridgeheads on the western bank of the Euphrates River. The timeline of a potential SNA operation from Peace Spring territory is unclear, however.



Key Takeaways:



• Northern Syria: Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) are preparing for a possible offensive into US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory in Syria. An SNA commander said that the SNA deployed forces to the line of control between the SNA and SDF in northern Syria. The reported SNA deployments and the current SNA axes of advance toward SDF-controlled territory on the western bank of the Euphrates River suggest the SNA may launch a three-pronged offensive designed to collapse SDF units along the eastern bank of the Euphrates.

• Tishreen Dam Airstrike: Turkish or Turkish-backed SNA air assets struck a Kurdish government-organized civilian convoy traveling to Tishreen Dam on January 8. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) which is the governing authority in northeast Syria and is affiliated with the SDF, called on January 7 for civilians to travel to the Tishreen Dam and protest Turkish-backed military operations there.

• Iraqi Prime Minister in Iran: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani traveled to Iran on January 8, likely to try to urge the Iranian regime to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appears to have rejected Sudani’s request for Iran to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.

• Iran-Azerbaijan Ties: Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, Azerbaijan, on January 8 to discuss strengthening political and security ties.

• Hamas-Held Hostages in the Gaza Strip: The IDF recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from a tunnel in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip, on January 7. 

9. Trump Administration’s Counterterrorism Policy Should Begin at Golan Heights

Trump Administration’s Counterterrorism Policy Should Begin at Golan Heights

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/trump-administrations-counterterrorism-policy-should-begin-at-golan-heights

Posted: January 8th, 2025

By Christopher Costa

Christopher P. Costa is the Executive Director, International Spy Museum, and an adjunct associate professor with Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, Walsh School of Foreign Service.  He was special assistant to the president and senior director for counterterrorism at the National Security Council from 2017 to 2018.   

By Colin Clarke

Colin P. Clarke, Ph.D., is the Director of Policy and Research at The Soufan Group. Clarke’s research focuses on domestic and transnational terrorism, international security, and geopolitics. He is also a senior research fellow at The Soufan Center.

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE / OPINION — We’ve seen all this before, the U.S. mission in Syria is not mission complete – it was not in 2018 – and it’s not done today. Syria remains an unfinished mosaic.

But a small U.S. presence in northeast Syria remains a strategic hedge against a resurgent ISIS and the center of gravity for maintaining much-needed pressure on a temporarily weakened Iran. 

The Golan Heights is an apt metaphor for the transformation of the terrorism threat over the course of the last 8 years. U.S. policymakers will benefit from reconsidering Syria from atop the Golan plateau in the southwest corner of Syria to the plains below, as far as the eyes can see. From those heights looking downward – and considering Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, Lebanon, and against Iran throughout the broader region – Syria should remain a U.S. counterterrorism priority against jihadists and a field of rival competition among powers, great and emerging. 

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – a former Al Qaeda affiliate – Turkey, ISIS, competing Islamists, Syrian opposition groups, and Kurds, are all scrambling for greater influence in Syria. Until Assad fled Damascus, Russia sought greater influence there, while Iran dreamed of regional hegemony that now seems to be slipping away quicker than the mullahs in Tehran can react. 

On the other hand, the United States and its Kurdish partners – the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – work together in Syria to keep the pressure on ISIS. In this competition – only now coming into sharper focus – the unintentional consequence of Hamas terrorism on October 7, is that Iran and its proxies are among the losers. But the biggest losers in this competition are Russia and Moscow’s erstwhile Syrian allies: they both lost the first Great Power campaign in the Middle East. Assad’s regime is now gone, and as a result, the Kremlin will struggle to project power from the region, moving military assets from coastal Syria to Haftar’s Libyan redoubt. 

Because of Israel’s muscular response to Hamas and Hezbollah, the ‘axis of resistance’ threat is significantly degraded and won’t recover easily. But the Middle East contest is far from settled because variegated extremist actors will inevitably compete to fill a power vacuum in Syria. So, Islamist terrorists will remain a potent threat if the equilibrium is thrown off balance in Damascus. 

It’s too soon to be overly optimistic. 

Just a few weeks into 2025, problems from Gaza to Iran, and much of the future of the Middle East will rest in the hands of a second Trump administration. Counterterrorism work during the first Trump administration turned shrinking the ISIS ‘physical caliphate’ and killing Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, into a signature policy achievement. 

This time around, however, a new administration will face an even more complex threat landscape. As the horrific New Year’s Day terrorist attack in New Orleans demonstrates, ISIS still retains the ability to inspire attacks through its propaganda, pushing its supporters and followers to wreak havoc, including in Western countries. The attacker pledged allegiance to ISIS in a video, but according to his brother, “he was upset about what’s happening in Palestine.”

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As terrorism expert Brian Jenkins rightly observed in 2024, “the Israel-Hamas war has upended the terrorist threat matrix.” Now with the overnight collapse of Assad’s brutal regime, and with Islamists overrunning Damascus, the complexities of counterterrorism policy, coupled with broader Middle East policy objectives, will be immensely more complicated in Syria — and across the region. The terrorist threat landscape looks much different for 2025 than it did back in 2017, when Trump first took office.

It’s worth providing some sense of the scope of the counterterrorism problems that the Trump Administration faced in 2017, in order to contextualize where we are today in terms of the terrorism threats.  Counterterrorism priorities defined the early days and months of a new Trump administration in 2017 — not by choice, but by circumstance.

The Trump Administration had four terrorist-related problems on Inauguration Day 2017 that it was dealing with: a palpable threat stream directed at commercial aviation. Secondly, a pressing counterterrorism operation directed at al-Qa’ida’s affiliate in Yemen, AQAP. Thirdly, it was an imperative to accelerate and get the “Defeat ISIS” campaign right. Fourth, and not least, there were American hostages held by terrorists from the Middle East to South Asia.

From a counterterrorism standpoint, then, what will be different for a new administration in 2025? 

So far, there’s no publicly known threats to commercial aviation from terrorists. But Western security officials believe that incendiary devices, shipped via an air transport company were part of a stepped-up Russian sabotage plot that aimed to start fires aboard cargo or passenger aircraft flying to the U.S. To be sure, then, that’s a terrorism problem that could escalate catastrophically. Secondly, there are still U.S. hostages being held by Hamas in Gaza, and finding Austin Tice in Syria must remain a focus of U.S. intelligence and diplomatic outreach. In short, Syria must be the highest U.S. counterterrorism priority: jihadists cannot fill any power vacuums in an already volatile Middle East.   

We’ve both been to Israel and across the Arab world to see and study counterterrorism challenges. So, we can also agree that time spent at the Golan Heights can help contextualize the current Israel–Hamas, and post-Assad Syria developments through a much broader geo-strategic lens. From those heights, Syria represents competition and conflict that goes well beyond U.S.-led counterterrorism campaigning against the Islamic State. It’s part of a low-level war — and competition — that’s been underway for decades. Now, it’s a field of competition that harkens back to the First Word War. 

Let’s consider that history and its relevance today. 

First, the ISIS campaign of violence played out in a disrupted Middle East landscape reminiscent of the political geography during the First World War. Then, fragmented tribes united under the banner of Abd-al Wahhab, when the Ikhwan movement—a violent formation of tribesmen fanatically committed to Wahhabism, an austere version of fundamentalist Islam—arrived on the scene to fill a vacuum left after the Ottoman caliphate collapsed, and a civil war erupted in the Arabian Peninsula that lasted until the 1930s. Seeing that historical backdrop, some observers labeled ISIS a “neo-Ikhwan vanguard.” 

Second, there is, yet again, a serious governance and legitimacy vacuum in Syria that serves as the Middle East’s setting for HTS and other variegated Islamists to compete and consider their next moves in post-Assad Damascus.

Third, as a result of an aggressive 10-year counterterrorism campaign waged against ISIS across three U.S. administrations, aspiring jihadists may still be biding their time underground. What’s more, even though ISIS can no longer credibly point to the group’s territorial control of a self-declared caliphate, the New Orleans attack showed once again the group’s capacity for destruction far beyond the borders of the Middle East.

And yet, there are even more immediate questions to consider, for example, can jihadists recast their past ideological underpinnings for a more nationalist approach to governance? And perhaps most urgently, what does all this mean long-term for U.S. policymakers in terms of Iran and counterterrorism? Will Ahmed al-Sharaa, who heads Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham, honor his pledge to American diplomats that he would not allow terrorist groups there to threaten the West? If he has the political will, does he also have the capability? These questions are unanswerable for the time being. 

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Still, conventional policy wisdom suggests that in chaos, there is opportunity. That may be good for the United States and Israel, but worryingly, it may also be good for jihadists, too.  

The region’s volatility does provide real opportunity for ISIS to again cause Syria and its neighbors to erupt into further violence. After all, ISIS has directed its past violence against rival Sunni Islamist fighters, Iraqi Shi’ite militias and Hezbollah, and, of course, American-trained Kurdish fighters—who are avowed enemies of Turkey. More threateningly, there are already rumblings that Turkey is poised to conduct a military offensive against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. And no one can be sure what assorted militia groups and the unwilling conscripts who formed the remnants of the once-menacing Syrian Army will do going forward.

Meanwhile, Israel is still contending with Hamas, a restive Palestinian population in the West Bank, a tenuous ceasefire with Hezbollah, and Iranian proxies like the Houthis are testing the limits of Israeli patience. 

Israeli military operations in Syria went from a publicly acknowledged low-level “campaign between the war” against Iranian targets to overtly and aggressively destroying remnants of Syria’s military equipment – and chemical weapons – that could potentially fall into jihadi hands. Israel also moved into the Syrian side of a 50-year-old demilitarized buffer zone to increase its security, realizing that its forces would face little to no resistance. 

Though weakened, ISIS remains a movement that views the world in apocalyptic terms. The last holdouts commanding the group are confident in ultimate victory, either by defeating forces arrayed against them or—far more likely—as ISIS’s members rally to become martyrs in a chaotic and violent Syria. ISIS will regard any setbacks as merely temporary—affiliates, branches and cells will carry on the fight. That means the challenge posed by ISIS will persist, given the group’s own view of its continuing struggle and given its lingering foothold in a region replete with governance and legitimacy challenges. There are growing concerns that ISIS could set its sights on detention centers and prisons in northeastern Syria—as the group did during its initial ‘Breaking the Walls’ campaign and again three years ago this very month, in al-Hasakah.

Ironically, policy critics in 2018 from outside the Trump administration opined that 9/11 had disproportionally “warped U.S. foreign policy,” concluding that it would take years to correct. 

In some ways, October 7 validates how strategically risky pivoting away from the Middle East and undoing steady counterterrorism investments can be. Significant investments of blood and treasure can be swept away like the region’s shifting sands.  

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To be fair, both the Trump and Biden administrations wanted to focus more on great-power competition. As a consequence, in the last few years the U.S. overcorrected its counterterrorism policy attention in the Middle East, while the pendulum swung from a laser-like focus on non-state actors to a fixation on nation-states, chief among them Russia and China. And while the U.S. was realigning its foreign policy focus to counter Moscow and Beijing’s influence, respectively, the Iranians seized plenty of political space to fill the vacuum but instead waged a failed and highly counterproductive war with their proxies, losing Syria along the way. 

Although much remains to be seen, since Hamas terrorism has triggered a dramatic and far-reaching rebalancing of power in the Middle East, the Trump administration should endeavor to see the region through a strategic competition lens that begins at the Heights of Golan – across Syria — and ranges eastward to Iran, and to the Ukraine, where Russia is challenging the Western rules-based order. This is what great power competition looks like. And like it or not, terrorism — and counterterrorism policy — will be central to the yet-to-be written narrative for the next four years. 

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

10. Trump’s team convenes with Pentagon personnel in 100-plus transition meetings, so far

Seems like good things are happening during this transition.

Excerpt:

“As of 7:30 a.m. today,” Gough said on Wednesday morning, officials on Trump’s ART have held 106 meetings with current DOD personnel. The department’s Transition Task Force had also responded to 81 requests for information by that time, according to the spokesperson. 

Trump’s team convenes with Pentagon personnel in 100-plus transition meetings, so far

Heads of the Defense Innovation Unit and Chief Digital and AI Office have met with the transition team, among others.\

https://defensescoop.com/2025/01/08/trump-dod-agency-review-team-convenes-pentagon-transition-meetings-100-plus/?utm_

By

Brandi Vincent

January 8, 2025Listen to this article

3:36

Learn more.

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump speaks to members of the media during a press conference at the Mar-a-Lago Club on January 07, 2025 in Palm Beach, Florida. Trump will be sworn in as the 47th president of the United States on January 20. (Photo by Scott Olson/Getty Images)

Defense leaders overseeing technology development, procurement and other critical areas under the outgoing Biden administration are actively engaging with senior members on President-elect Donald Trump’s team preparing to take over at the Pentagon after the inauguration later this month, three officials involved said this week.

Pentagon spokesperson Sue Gough confirmed on Wednesday that more than 100 meetings were conducted so far to set the Defense Department on its path ahead for the next presidential term — and more are planned between now and the switchover on Jan. 20. 

“The department is committed to conducting a smooth and professional transition with the incoming administration,” Gough told DefenseScoop. 

Led by transition director Jennifer Walsh, representatives from the current office of the General Counsel, Washington Headquarters, Services Security Office and the DOD Transition Task Force first met with Trump’s DOD Agency Review Team — or ART — in the Pentagon on Dec. 16 to sign non-disclosure agreements and officially kick-off transition efforts. 

“As of 7:30 a.m. today,” Gough said on Wednesday morning, officials on Trump’s ART have held 106 meetings with current DOD personnel. The department’s Transition Task Force had also responded to 81 requests for information by that time, according to the spokesperson. 

Gough did not reveal any of those RFI topics addressed to date.

She also confirmed that the ART has met with the undersecretaries for acquisition and sustainment and research and engineering, as well as the heads of both the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) and Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO).

At this point, however, members of the Pentagon’s All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO), which investigates reports of “unidentified anomalous phenomena” (UAP), have not connected directly with ART representatives. 

Gough referred questions regarding any future plans for AARO-involved meetings to the president-elect’s transition team. Trump spokespersons did not respond to DefenseScoop’s requests for further information ahead of publication.

Briefing reporters Wednesday afternoon, Pentagon Deputy Press Secretary Sabrina Singh reiterated the same transition stats shared earlier by Gough. When asked whether Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has spoken with Pete Hegseth — Trump’s nominee to serve as SecDef — Singh said: “I don’t have anything to announce. If I have something to announce about a meeting or a call, I’ll certainly keep you updated.”

On Tuesday morning, Gough previously told DefenseScoop that 97 meetings had been held between the administrations’ transition teams by then — and that 77 requests for information had been answered.

“Interactions with the ART are occurring daily,” she said Wednesday.

In response to further questions, Gough said the Pentagon does “not comment on the details of those meetings.”

An official who participated in transition meetings with past administrations told DefenseScoop on the condition of anonymity late last year that such engagements typically cover a wide range of topics including how to use department phone lines, access federal information technology systems, conduct contemporary operations and securely communicate with U.S. military allies.

Written by Brandi Vincent

Brandi Vincent is DefenseScoop’s Pentagon correspondent. She reports on emerging and disruptive technologies, and associated policies, impacting the Defense Department and its personnel. Prior to joining Scoop News Group, Brandi produced a long-form documentary and worked as a journalist at Nextgov, Snapchat and NBC Network. She grew up in Louisiana and received a master’s degree in journalism from the University of Maryland.

11. Biden administration announces its final military aid package for Ukraine before leaving office

Biden administration announces its final military aid package for Ukraine before leaving office | CNN Politics

CNN · by Alex Marquardt · January 9, 2025

US President Joe Biden and Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky meet in the Oval Office in Washington, DC, on September 26, 2024.

Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images/File

CNN —

The Biden administration has announced the final tranche of military aid it will send to Ukraine, amounting to about $500 million.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin was expected to detail the figure at the last meeting of the US-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany.

The last package comes as the White House prepares to announce another round of sanctions on Russia, expected at the end of this week. US officials have argued they are trying to give Ukraine the greatest leverage possible ahead of possible negotiations to end the war this year. There had been an expectation the White House could impose more sanctions on Russia before the looming inauguration and amid persistent Ukrainian pressure.

The security aid announced Thursday under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) has an estimated value of $500 million and includes missiles for air defense, air-to-ground munitions and equipment for Ukraine’s use of F-16 fighter jets.

Stocks of weaponry and ammunition in Ukraine are stable for now, US officials say, while the US believes there are severe Ukrainian manpower issues. All of the remaining money that has been appropriated by Congress for Ukraine is expected to be provided. That does not mean, however, that all of the Presidential Drawdown Authority for Ukraine will be used by the time President Joe Biden leaves office.

Biden had been set to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on Friday in Rome for what was likely to be their final meeting, but the White House announced late Wednesday night that it was canceling the trip to focus on the wildfires raging in California.

The Biden-Zelensky meeting would’ve been just over a month before the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the administration is keen to highlight US support for Ukraine in Biden’s remaining time in office. Administration officials argue that both the US and Ukrainian administrations anticipated that there could be negotiations with Moscow in the first part of 2025 – regardless of who won the US elections – and their goal was to further empower Ukraine ahead of potential talks.

Earlier Wednesday, President-elect Donald Trump’s incoming envoy for Ukraine and Russia, Keith Kellogg, told Fox News that he hopes to have a “solvable solution” between the two sides within 100 days of Trump taking office.

US officials say the sanctions the US has imposed on Russia have contributed to a significant weakening of the Russian economy – with current soaring inflation and interest rates and Russia’s diminishing ability to compete economically in the long term. The latest sanctions that are expected to be announced, whose targets are unclear, are being discussed – but not coordinated – with incoming Trump officials even though the next administration would be charged with enforcing them.

The Biden administration has given Ukraine more than $65 billion in aid since the war began in late February 2022.

CNN · by Alex Marquardt · January 9, 2025

12. Trump’s NATO Vision Spells Trouble for the Alliance

Excerpts:

NATO’s Rutte said last month that any increase in spending must be paired with greater efficiency, focusing on innovation and joint purchasing. He said NATO must “get rid of that idiotic system” where each member sets national requirements, which “makes it almost impossible to buy together, to have joint procurement.” If NATO doesn’t boost efficiency, he said, “even with 4% you can’t defend yourselves.”

Daalder, who served under former President Barack Obama, said he fears “the real purpose of setting this high a bar is to give Trump an excuse either to withdraw from NATO or not to have to fulfill America’s treaty obligation to come to NATO’s defense in case it is attacked.”

Trump on Tuesday, citing an exchange he had with European NATO leaders in 2018, said the idea that “we’ll protect you even if you don’t pay…that’s not the way life works.”

Early last year Trump said while campaigning that if a low-spending NATO ally were attacked by Russia, “No, I would not protect you. In fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want. You got to pay. You got to pay your bills.”

If Trump were to withdraw U.S. support, European allies would need to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to replace low spending over recent decades. Germany has missed NATO’s 2% for so long that it now faces a shortfall of more than $230 billion since 1990, according to recent analysis by Germany’s IFO Institute. Italy’s gap is more than $130 billion and Spain’s is more than $80 billion.

Trump’s NATO Vision Spells Trouble for the Alliance

Call for much higher arms spending and threat of grabbing allies’ land dial up pressure on members

https://www.wsj.com/world/trumps-nato-vision-spells-trouble-for-the-alliance-dd1d96fc?mod=hp_lead_pos2

By Daniel Michaels

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Jan. 8, 2025 9:00 pm ET

President-elect Donald Trump raised the prospect of forcibly taking over Canada and Greenland. Photo: Scott Olson/Getty Images

President-elect Donald Trump’s latest demands of America’s NATO partners—that they cede territory to the U.S. and spend more on defense than Washington itself does—risk undermining allies’ confidence and potentially emboldening adversaries.  

In a press conference Tuesday, Trump raised the prospect of forcibly taking over Canada and Greenland, which is part of Denmark. Canada and Denmark are founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the U.S. is treaty-bound to protect them. 

The president-elect also said NATO allies should raise their military-spending target to around 5% of gross domestic product from the current target of at least 2%. The U.S. last year spent roughly 3.4% of GDP on its military, in line with recent years, according to NATO. 

Trump’s comments Tuesday can be seen as opening bids in hard-nosed negotiations more than policy statements, some analysts and Trump advisers argued. Still, they are unprecedented. Never before has someone elected as U.S. president publicly discussed using military force or other coercive measures to take over either parts or all of closely allied countries or demanded such high levels of military spending. 

Low defense spending by Canada and European members of NATO has long angered Trump, who during his first term threatened to withdraw from the alliance if outlays didn’t increase. He has said European countries should reimburse the U.S. for decades of protection and has called them freeloaders for not adequately funding their own security.

The new pressure from Trump comes amid deep uncertainty over his approach to the war in Ukraine. Under President Biden, NATO members have largely been unified on the need to support Kyiv in its fight to eject Russian forces. 

Trump has remained cagey on his approach to the conflict. He has pledged to end Europe’s biggest conflict since World War II but given no details on how he plans to do that. Many European leaders fear Trump will reduce or end U.S. support for Ukraine.

Boosting NATO spending and acquiring Greenland are both objectives Trump raised during his first term. Denmark said then, and again recently, that Greenland isn’t for sale.

Critics said Trump’s comments run counter to fundamental tenets of the modern world order and risk endorsing authoritarians’ use of force, such as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s efforts to intimidate Taiwan. 

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said European leaders he spoke to Wednesday reacted with “incomprehension” to Trump’s remarks. “The principle of inviolability of borders applies to every country, whether it is to our east or west, and every state must keep to it,” regardless of its size and power, he said.

Trump’s threats to pull the U.S. from NATO unilaterally prompted Congress in 2023 to pass legislation preventing a president from withdrawing from the alliance without approval of the Senate or an act of Congress. NATO was created by a treaty signed in 1949 and ratified by the Senate.

His increasingly confrontational approach with allies holds the prospect of gutting NATO and its capacity for deterrence without the U.S. formally withdrawing.

Dramatically increasing military outlays is difficult because European countries are under extreme spending pressure due to generally weak economies and because arms producers are already struggling to deliver equipment that has been ordered. NATO military officials have complained that the combination of slow increases in supply and quickly rising demand are bidding up the cost of arms more than expanding arsenals.

Most European countries have significantly increased military spending since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine almost three years ago, though many remain below the 2% target. Some that have reached the target appear likely to fall back in coming years due to weak government finances. Almost all face painful trade-offs with social or environmental spending to meet NATO obligations.

Spending increases began following Russia’s seizure of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 and accelerated during Trump’s first term, which began in 2017. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, who recently visited Trump, and his predecessor, Jens Stoltenberg, both credited Trump with helping prompt Europeans to increase their spending.

NATO allies “weren’t paying their bills,” Trump said Tuesday. “I said we’re not going to protect you if you’re not paying the bills. So, in a true sense, I saved NATO, but NATO has taken advantage of us.”

Leaders of most European NATO members say they need to increase security spending due to threats from Russia, and to spend more efficiently. A new spending target above 2% has been hotly debated since NATO’s annual summit in Washington in July.

Rutte, in his first big speech since taking office in October, said last month that the new target should be “considerably more than 2%” but a specific figure remains under discussion. 

Trump said Tuesday that spending “should be 5%, not 2%.” Only one NATO member comes close to 5%: Poland, which last year spent roughly 4.1% of GDP on defense. No other member was above 4%.

The last time the U.S. spent 5% of GDP on defense was in the 1980s, at the height of the Cold War, according to the Defense Department.

Trump’s new 5% target “is a made-up number with no basis in reality,” said former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder. He said European NATO members now spend three times as much as Russia does on defense, and at 5% Europe would outspend Russia by $750 billion annually, spending roughly 10 times what Russia spends. 

NATO’s Rutte said last month that any increase in spending must be paired with greater efficiency, focusing on innovation and joint purchasing. He said NATO must “get rid of that idiotic system” where each member sets national requirements, which “makes it almost impossible to buy together, to have joint procurement.” If NATO doesn’t boost efficiency, he said, “even with 4% you can’t defend yourselves.”

Daalder, who served under former President Barack Obama, said he fears “the real purpose of setting this high a bar is to give Trump an excuse either to withdraw from NATO or not to have to fulfill America’s treaty obligation to come to NATO’s defense in case it is attacked.”

Trump on Tuesday, citing an exchange he had with European NATO leaders in 2018, said the idea that “we’ll protect you even if you don’t pay…that’s not the way life works.”

Early last year Trump said while campaigning that if a low-spending NATO ally were attacked by Russia, “No, I would not protect you. In fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want. You got to pay. You got to pay your bills.”

If Trump were to withdraw U.S. support, European allies would need to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to replace low spending over recent decades. Germany has missed NATO’s 2% for so long that it now faces a shortfall of more than $230 billion since 1990, according to recent analysis by Germany’s IFO Institute. Italy’s gap is more than $130 billion and Spain’s is more than $80 billion.

Write to Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com

13. Trump Is Facing a Catastrophic Defeat in Ukraine

Excerpts:

Trump’s problem, however, is that unlike his fellow travelers in anti-liberalism, he will shortly be the president of the United States. The liberal world order is inseparable from American power, and not just because it depends on American power. America itself would not be so powerful without the alliances and the open international economic and political system that it built after World War II to protect its long-term interests. Trump can’t stop defending the liberal world order without ceding significantly greater influence to Russia and China. Like Putin, Xi Jinping, Kim Jong Un, and Ali Khamenei see the weakening of America as essential to their own ambitions. Trump may share their hostility to the liberal order, but does he also share their desire to weaken America and, by extension, himself?

Unfortunately for Trump, Ukraine is where this titanic struggle is being waged. Today, not only Putin but Xi, Kim, Khamenei, and others whom the American people generally regard as adversaries believe that a Russian victory in Ukraine will do grave damage to American strength everywhere. That is why they are pouring money, weaponry, and, in the case of North Korea, even their own soldiers into the battle. Whatever short-term benefits they may be deriving from assisting Russia, the big payoff they seek is a deadly blow to the American power and influence that has constrained them for decades.

What’s more, America’s allies around the world agree. They, too, believe that a Russian victory in Ukraine, in addition to threatening the immediate security of European states, will undo the American-led security system they depend on. That is why even Asian allies far from the scene of the war have been making their own contributions to the fight.

If Trump fails to support Ukraine, he faces the unpalatable prospect of presiding over a major strategic defeat. Historically, that has never been good for a leader’s political standing. Jimmy Carter looked weak when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, which was of far less strategic significance than Ukraine. Henry Kissinger, despite his Nobel Prize, was drummed out of the Republican Party in the mid-1970s in no small part because of America’s failure in Vietnam and the perception that the Soviet Union was on the march during his time in office. Joe Biden ended an unpopular war in Afghanistan, only to pay a political price for doing so. Barack Obama, who moved to increase American forces in Afghanistan, never paid a political price for extending the war. Biden paid that price in part because the exit from Afghanistan was, to say the least, messy. The fall of Ukraine will be far messier—and better televised. Trump has created and cherished an aura of power and toughness, but that can quickly vanish. When the fall of Ukraine comes, it will be hard to spin as anything but a defeat for the United States, and for its president.

This was not what Trump had in mind when he said he could get a peace deal in Ukraine. He no doubt envisioned being lauded as the statesman who persuaded Putin to make a deal, saving the world from the horrors of another endless war. His power and prestige would be enhanced. He would be a winner. His plans do not include being rebuffed, rolled over, and by most of the world’s judgment, defeated.

Whether Trump can figure out where the path he is presently following will lead him is a test of his instincts. He is not on the path to glory. And unless he switches quickly, his choice will determine much more than the future of Ukraine.

Trump Is Facing a Catastrophic Defeat in Ukraine

If Ukraine falls, it will be hard to spin as anything but a debacle for the United States, and for its president.

By Robert Kagan

January 7, 2025Share as Gift

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The Atlantic · by Robert Kagan · January 7, 2025

Vice-president Elect J. D. Vance once said that he doesn’t care what happens to Ukraine. We will soon find out whether the American people share his indifference, because if there is not soon a large new infusion of aid from the United States, Ukraine will likely lose the war within the next 12 to 18 months. Ukraine will not lose in a nice, negotiated way, with vital territories sacrificed but an independent Ukraine kept alive, sovereign, and protected by Western security guarantees. It faces instead a complete defeat, a loss of sovereignty, and full Russian control.

This poses an immediate problem for Donald Trump. He promised to settle the war quickly upon taking office, but now faces the hard reality that Vladimir Putin has no interest in a negotiated settlement that leaves Ukraine intact as a sovereign nation. Putin also sees an opportunity to strike a damaging blow at American global power. Trump must now choose between accepting a humiliating strategic defeat on the global stage and immediately redoubling American support for Ukraine while there’s still time. The choice he makes in the next few weeks will determine not only the fate of Ukraine but also the success of his presidency.

The end of an independent Ukraine is and always has been Putin’s goal. While foreign-policy commentators spin theories about what kind of deal Putin might accept, how much territory he might demand, and what kind of security guarantees, demilitarized zones, and foreign assistance he might permit, Putin himself has never shown interest in anything short of Ukraine’s complete capitulation. Before Russia’s invasion, many people couldn’t believe that Putin really wanted all of Ukraine. His original aim was to decapitate the government in Kyiv, replace it with a government subservient to Moscow, and through that government control the entire country. Shortly after the invasion was launched, as Russian forces were still driving on Ukraine, Putin could have agreed to a Ukrainian offer to cede territory to Russia, but even then he rejected any guarantees for Ukrainian security. Today, after almost three years of fighting, Putin’s goals have not changed: He wants it all.

Read: The abandonment of Ukraine

Putin’s stated terms for a settlement have been consistent throughout the war: a change of government in Kyiv in favor of a pro-Russian regime; “de-Nazification,” his favored euphemism for extinguishing Ukrainian nationalism; demilitarization, or leaving Ukraine without combat power sufficient to defend against another Russian attack; and “neutrality,” meaning no ties with Western organizations such as NATO or the EU, and no Western aid programs aimed at shoring up Ukrainian independence. Western experts filling the op-ed pages and journals with ideas for securing a post-settlement Ukraine have been negotiating with themselves. Putin has never agreed to the establishment of a demilitarized zone, foreign troops on Ukrainian soil, a continuing Ukrainian military relationship with the West of any kind, or the survival of Volodymyr Zelensky’s government or any pro-Western government in Kyiv.

Some hopeful souls argue that Putin will be more flexible once talks begin. But this is based on the mistaken assumption that Putin believes he needs a respite from the fighting. He doesn’t. Yes, the Russian economy is suffering. Yes, Russian losses at the front remain staggeringly high. Yes, Putin lacks the manpower both to fight and to produce vital weaponry and is reluctant to risk political upheaval by instituting a full-scale draft. If the war were going to drag on for another two years or more, these problems might eventually force Putin to seek some kind of truce, perhaps even the kind of agreement Americans muse about. But Putin thinks he’s going to win sooner than that, and he believes that Russians can sustain their present hardships long enough to achieve victory.

The frontline city Bakhmut faces shelling day and night.(Chien-Chi Chang / Magnum)

Are we so sure he’s wrong? Have American predictions about Russia’s inability to withstand “crippling” sanctions proved correct so far? Western sanctions have forced Russians to adapt and adjust, to find work-arounds on trade, oil, and financing, but although those adjustments have been painful, they have been largely successful. Russia’s GDP grew by more than 3 percent in 2023 and is expected to have grown by more than 3 percent again in 2024, driven by heavy military spending. The IMF’s projections for 2025 are lower, but still anticipate positive growth. Putin has been re-Sovietizing the economy: imposing market and price controls, expropriating private assets, and turning the focus toward military production and away from consumers’ needs. This may not be a successful long-term economic strategy, but in the long term, we are all dead. Putin believes Russia can hold on long enough to win this war.

It is not at all clear that Putin even seeks the return to normalcy that peace in Ukraine would bring. In December, he increased defense spending to a record $126 billion, 32.5 percent of all government spending, to meet the needs of the Ukraine war. Next year, defense spending is projected to reach 40 percent of the Russian budget. (By comparison, the world’s strongest military power, the U.S., spends 16 percent of its total budget on defense.) Putin has revamped the Russian education system to instill military values from grade school to university. He has appointed military veterans to high-profile positions in government as part of an effort to forge a new Russian elite, made up, as Putin says, exclusively of “those who serve Russia, hard workers and [the] military.” He has resurrected Stalin as a hero. Today, Russia looks outwardly like the Russia of the Great Patriotic War, with exuberant nationalism stimulated and the smallest dissent brutally repressed.

Read: What makes Russia’s economy so sanctions-resistant?

Is all of this just a temporary response to the war, or is it also the direction Putin wants to steer Russian society? He talks about preparing Russia for the global struggles ahead. Continuing conflict justifies continuing sacrifice and continuing repression. Turning such transformations of society on and off and on again like a light switch—as would be necessary if Putin agreed to a truce and then, a couple of years later, resumed his attack—is not so easy. Could he demand the same level of sacrifice during the long, peaceful interlude? For Putin, making Russians press ahead through the pain to seek victory on the battlefield may be the easier path. The Russian people have historically shown remarkable capacity for sacrifice under the twin stimuli of patriotism and terror. To assume that Russia can’t sustain this war economy long enough to outlast the Ukrainians would be foolish. One more year may be all it takes. Russia faces problems, even serious problems, but Putin believes that without substantial new aid Ukraine’s problems are going to bring it down sooner than Russia.

That is the key point: Putin sees the timelines working in his favor. Russian forces may begin to run low on military equipment in the fall of 2025, but by that time Ukraine may already be close to collapse. Ukraine can’t sustain the war another year without a new aid package from the United States. Ukrainian forces are already suffering from shortages of soldiers, national exhaustion, and collapsing morale. Russia’s casualty rate is higher than Ukraine’s, but there are more Russians than Ukrainians, and Putin has found a way to keep filling the ranks, including with foreign fighters. As one of Ukraine’s top generals recently observed, “the number of Russian troops is constantly increasing.” This year, he estimates, has brought 100,000 additional Russian troops to Ukrainian soil. Meanwhile, lack of equipment prevents Ukraine from outfitting reserve units.

Ukrainian morale is already sagging under Russian missile and drone attacks and the prolonged uncertainty about whether the United States’ vital and irreplaceable support will continue. What happens if that uncertainty becomes certainty, if the next couple of months make clear that the United States is not going to provide a new aid package? That alone could be enough to cause a complete collapse of Ukrainian morale on the military and the home front. But Ukraine has another problem, too. Its defensive lines are now so shallow that if Russian troops break through, they may be able to race west toward Kyiv.

Putin believes he is winning. “The situation is changing dramatically,” he observed in a recent press conference. “We’re moving along the entire front line every day.” His foreign-intelligence chief, Sergei Naryshkin, recently declared, “We are close to achieving our goals, while the armed forces of Ukraine are on the verge of collapse.” That may be an exaggeration for now, but what matters is that Putin believes it. As Naryshkin’s comments affirm, Putin today sees victory within his grasp, more than at any other time since the invasion began.

Read: The only way the Ukraine war can end

Things may be tough for Putin now, but Russia has come a long way since the war’s first year. The disastrous failure of his initial invasion left his troops trapped and immobilized, their supply lines exposed and vulnerable, as the West acted in unison to oppose him and provide aid to a stunningly effective Ukrainian counterattack. That first year of the war marked a peak moment of American leadership and alliance solidarity and a low point for Putin. For many months, he effectively fought the entire world with little help from anyone else. There must have been moments when he thought he was going to lose, although even then he would not give up on his maximalist goals.

But he clawed his way back, and circumstances today are far more favorable for Russia, both in Ukraine and internationally. His forces on the ground are making steady progress—at horrific cost, but Putin is willing to pay it so long as Russians tolerate it and he believes that victory is in sight.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s lifeline to the U.S. and the West has never been more imperiled. After three years of dealing with an American administration trying to help Ukraine defend itself, Putin will soon have an American president and a foreign-policy team who have consistently opposed further aid to Ukraine. The transatlantic alliance, once so unified, is in disarray, with America’s European allies in a panic that Trump will pull out of NATO or weaken their economies with tariffs, or both. Europe itself is at a low point; political turmoil in Germany and France has left a leadership vacuum that will not be filled for months, at best. If Trump cuts off or reduces aid to Ukraine, as he has recently suggested he would, then not only will Ukraine collapse but the divisions between the U.S. and its allies, and among the Europeans themselves, will deepen and multiply. Putin is closer to his aim of splintering the West than at any other time in the quarter century since he took power.

Read: Helping Ukraine is Europe’s job now

Is this a moment at which to expect Putin to negotiate a peace deal? A truce would give Ukrainians time to breathe and restore their damaged infrastructure as well as their damaged psyches. It would allow them to re-arm without expending the weapons they already have. It would reduce the divisions between the Trump administration and its European allies. It would spare Trump the need to decide whether to seek an aid package for Ukraine and allow him to focus on parts of the world where Russia is more vulnerable, such as the post-Assad Middle East. Today Putin has momentum on his side in what he regards, correctly, as the decisive main theater. If he wins in Ukraine, his loss in Syria will look trivial by comparison. If he hasn’t blinked after almost three years of misery, hardship, and near defeat, why would he blink now when he believes, with reason, that he is on the precipice of such a massive victory?

Avdiivka, Donetsk. 2023. Avdiivka was the site of an extended battle, falling to Russian forces in February, 2024. (Chien-Chi Chang / Magnum)

A Russian victory means the end of Ukraine. Putin’s aim is not an independent albeit smaller Ukraine, a neutral Ukraine, or even an autonomous Ukraine within a Russian sphere of influence. His goal is no Ukraine. “Modern Ukraine,” he has said, “is entirely the product of the Soviet era.” Putin does not just want to sever Ukraine’s relationships with the West. He aims to stamp out the very idea of Ukraine, to erase it as a political and cultural entity.

This is not a new Russian goal. Like his pre-Soviet predecessors, Putin regards Ukrainian nationalism itself as a historic threat that predates the “color revolutions” of the early 2000s and NATO enlargement in the 1990s—that even predates the American Revolution. In Putin’s mind, the threat posed by Ukrainian nationalism goes back to the exploitation of Ukrainians by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 15th and 16th centuries, to the machinations of the Austrian empire in the 18th and 19th centuries, and to the leveraging of Ukrainian nationalist hatred of Russia during World War II by the Germans. So Putin’s call for “de-Nazification” is not just about removing the Zelensky government, but an effort to stamp out all traces of an independent Ukrainian political and cultural identity.

Read: Putin isn’t fighting for land in Ukraine

The vigorous Russification that Putin’s forces have been imposing in Crimea and the Donbas and other conquered Ukrainian territories is evidence of the deadly seriousness of his intent. International human-rights organizations and journalists, writing in The New York Times, have documented the creation in occupied Ukraine of “a highly institutionalized, bureaucratic and frequently brutal system of repression run by Moscow” comprising “a gulag of more than 100 prisons, detention facilities, informal camps and basements” across an area roughly the size of Ohio. According to a June 2023 report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, nearly all Ukrainians released from this gulag reported being subjected to systematic torture and abuse by Russian authorities. Tortures ranged from “punching and cutting detainees, putting sharp objects under fingernails, hitting with batons and rifle butts, strangling, waterboarding, electrocution, stress positions for long periods, exposure to cold temperatures or to a hot box, deprivation of water and food, and mock executions or threats.” Much of the abuse has been sexual, with women and men raped or threatened with rape. Hundreds of summary executions have been documented, and more are likely—many of the civilians detained by Russia have yet to be seen again. Escapees from Russian-occupied Ukraine speak of a “prison society” in which anyone with pro-Ukrainian views risks being sent “to the basement,” where torture and possible death await.

This oppression has gone well beyond the military rationale of identifying potential threats to Russian occupying forces. “The majority of victims,” according to the State Department, have been “active or former local public officials, human rights defenders, civil society activists, journalists, and media workers.” According to the OHCHR, “Russia’s military and their proxies often detained civilians over suspicions regarding their political views, particularly related to pro-Ukrainian sentiments.”

Putin has decreed that all people in the occupied territories must renounce their Ukrainian citizenship and become Russian citizens or face deportation. Russian citizenship is required to send children to school, to register a vehicle, to get medical treatment, and to receive pensions. People without Russian passports cannot own farmland, vote, run for office, or register a religious congregation. In schools throughout the Russian-occupied territories, students learn a Russian curriculum and complete a Russian “patriotic education program” and early military training, all taught by teachers sent from the Russian Federation. Parents who object to this Russification risk having their children taken away and sent to boarding schools in Russia or occupied Crimea, where, Putin has decreed, they can be adopted by Russian citizens. By the end of 2023, Ukrainian officials had verified the names of 19,000 children relocated to schools and camps in Russia or to Russian-occupied territory. As former British Foreign Secretary James Cleverly put it in 2023, “Russia’s forcible deportation of innocent Ukrainian children is a systematic attempt to erase Ukraine’s future.”

Read: The children Russia kidnapped

So is the Russian effort to do away with any distinctively Ukrainian religion. In Crimea, Russian authorities have systematically attacked the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, harassed its members, and forced the Church to give up its lands. The largest Ukrainian Orthodox congregation in Crimea closed in 2019, following a decree by occupation authorities that its cathedral in Simferopol be “returned to the state.”

These horrors await the rest of Ukraine if Putin wins. Imagine what that will look like. More than 1 million Ukrainians have taken up arms against Russia since February 2022. What happens to them if, when the fighting stops, Russia has gained control of the entire country? What happens to the politicians, journalists, NGO workers, and human-rights activists who helped in innumerable ways to fight the Russian invaders? What happens to the millions of Ukrainians who, in response to Russia’s attack, have embraced their Ukrainian identity, adopted the Ukrainian language, revived Ukrainian (and invariably anti-Russian) historical narratives, and produced a nascent revival of Ukrainian culture? Russian-occupation authorities will seek to stamp out this resurgence of Ukrainian nationalism across the whole country. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians will flee, putting enormous strain on Ukraine’s neighbors to the west. But thousands more will wind up in prison, facing torture or murder. Some commentators argue that it would be better to let Ukraine lose quickly because that, at least, would end the suffering. Yet for many millions of Ukrainians, defeat would be just the beginning of their suffering.

This is where Ukraine is headed unless something changes, and soon. Putin at this moment has no incentive to make any deal that leaves even part of Ukraine intact and independent. Only the prospect of a dramatic, near-term change in his military fortunes could force Putin to take a more accommodating course. He would have to believe that time is not on his side, that Ukraine will not fall within 12 months: that it will instead be supplied and equipped to fight as long as necessary, and that it can count on steady support from the United States and its allies. It’s hard to see why anything short of that would force Putin to veer from his determined drive toward victory.

April 2022. An Orthodox priest presides over a burial for a woman whose husband disappeared in early March in Bucha, which was occupied by Russian troops. His body was not discovered until a month later. (Chien-Chi Chang / Magnum)

Which brings us to President-Elect Donald Trump, who now finds himself in a trap only partly of his own devising. When Trump said during his campaign that he could end the war in 24 hours, he presumably believed what most observers believed: that Putin needed a respite, that he was prepared to offer peace in exchange for territory, and that a deal would include some kind of security guarantee for whatever remained of Ukraine. Because Trump’s peace proposal at the time was regarded as such a bad deal for Kyiv, most assumed Putin would welcome it. Little did they know that the deal was not remotely bad enough for Putin to accept. So now Trump is in the position of having promised a peace deal that he cannot possibly get without forcing Putin to recalculate.

Compounding Trump’s basic miscalculation is the mythology of Trump as strongman. It has been no small part of Trump’s aura and political success that many expect other world leaders to do his bidding. When he recently summoned the beleaguered Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to Mar-a-Lago and proceeded to humiliate him as “governor” of America’s “51st state,” Trump boosters in the media rejoiced at his ability to “project strength as the leader of the U.S. while making Trudeau look weak.” Many people, and not just Trump’s supporters, similarly assumed that the mere election of Trump would be enough to force Putin to agree to a peace deal. Trump’s tough-guy image and dealmaking prowess supposedly gave him, in the view of one former Defense official, “the power and the credibility with Putin to tell him he must make a just, lasting peace.”

Read: The real reason Trump loves Putin

It’s dangerous to believe your own shtick. Trump himself seemed to think that his election alone would be enough to convince Putin that it was time to cut a deal. In his debate with Kamala Harris, Trump said he would have the war “settled” before he even became president, that as president-elect he would get Putin and Zelensky together to make an agreement. He could do this because “they respect me; they don’t respect Biden.” Trump’s first moves following November 5 exuded confidence that Putin would accommodate the new sheriff in town. Two days after the election, in a phone call with Putin that Trump’s staff leaked to the press, Trump reportedly “advised the Russian president not to escalate the war in Ukraine and reminded him of Washington’s sizable military presence in Europe.” Beyond these veiled threats, Trump seems to think that something like friendship, high regard, or loyalty will facilitate dealmaking.

That Trump, the most transactional of men, could really believe that Putin would be moved by such sentiments is hard to credit. Days after the phone call in which Trump “advised” him not to escalate, Putin fired a hypersonic, nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile at Ukraine, and he’s been escalating ever since. He also had his spokesmen deny that any phone call had taken place. Even today, Putin insists that he and Trump have not spoken since the election.

Putin has also made clear that he is not interested in peace. As he observed in the days before the missile launch, “Throughout centuries of history, humanity has grown accustomed to resolving disputes by force. Yes, that happens too. Might makes right, and this principle also works.” In a message clearly aimed at Trump’s pretensions of power, Putin suggested that the West make a “rational assessment of events and its own capabilities.” His spokesmen have stated repeatedly that Putin has no interest in “freezing the conflict,” and that anyone who believes Moscow is ready to make concessions at all has either “a short memory or not enough knowledge of the subject.” They have also warned that U.S.-Russian relations are “teetering on the verge of rupture,” with the clear implication that it is up to Trump to repair the damage. Putin is particularly furious at President Joe Biden for finally lifting some of the restrictions on the Ukrainian use of the American long-range ATACMS missiles against Russian targets, threatening to fire intermediate-range ballistic missiles at U.S. and allied targets in response.

Trump has since backed off. When asked about the phone call, Trump these days won’t confirm that it ever happened—“I don’t want to say anything about that, because I don’t want to do anything that could impede the negotiation.” More significantly, he has begun making preemptive concessions in the hope of getting Putin to begin talks. He has declared that Ukraine will not be allowed to join NATO. He has suggested that Ukraine will receive less aid than it has been getting from the United States. And he has criticized Biden’s decision to allow Ukraine to use American-made ATACMS to strike Russian territory. Putin has simply pocketed all these concessions and offered nothing in return except a willingness to talk “without preconditions.” Now begin the negotiations about beginning the negotiations, while the clock ticks on Kyiv’s ability to endure.

Read: Trump to Russia’s rescue

So much for the idea that Putin would simply fold and accept a peace deal once he saw Donald Trump in charge. But what can Trump do now?

Quite a bit, actually. Putin can be forced to accept less than his maximal goals, especially by an American president willing to play genuine hardball. Trump’s reference in his phone call to the superiority of American power and its many troops and facilities in Europe was obviously designed to get Putin’s attention, and it might have if Putin thought Trump was actually prepared to bring all that power into the equation. The thing that Putin has most feared, and has bent over backwards to avoid provoking, is the United States and NATO’s direct involvement in the conflict. He must have been in a panic when his troops were bogged down and losing in Ukraine, vulnerable to NATO air and missile strikes. But the Biden administration refused to even threaten direct involvement, both when it knew Putin’s war plans months in advance, and after the initial invasion, when Putin’s troops were vulnerable. Trump’s supporters like to boast that one of his strengths in dealing with adversaries is his dangerous unpredictability. Hinting at U.S. forces becoming directly involved, as Trump reportedly did in his call with Putin, would certainly have confirmed that reputation. But Putin, one suspects, is not inclined to take such threats seriously without seeing real action to back them. After all, he knows all about bluffs—he paralyzed the Biden administration with them for the better part of three years.

Trump has a credibility problem, partly due to the Biden administration’s failures, but partly of his own making. Putin knows what we all know: that Trump wants out of Ukraine. He does not want to own the war, does not want to spend his first months in a confrontation with Russia, does not want the close cooperation with NATO and other allies that continuing support for Ukraine will require, and, above all, does not want to spend the first months of his new term pushing a Ukraine aid package through Congress after running against that aid. Putin also knows that even if Trump eventually changes his mind, perhaps out of frustration with Putin’s stalling, it will be too late. Months would pass before an aid bill made it through both houses and weaponry began arriving on the battlefield. Putin watched that process grind on last year, and he used the time well. He can afford to wait. After all, if eight months from now Putin feels the tide about to turn against him in the war, he can make the same deal then that Trump would like him to make now. In the meantime, he can continue pummeling the demoralized Ukrainians, taking down what remains of their energy grid, and shrinking the territory under Kyiv’s control.

Read: How Biden made a mess of Ukraine

No, in order to change Putin’s calculations, Trump would have to do exactly what he has not wanted to do so far: He would have to renew aid to the Ukrainians immediately, and in sufficient quantity and quality to change the trajectory on the battlefield. He would also have to indicate convincingly that he was prepared to continue providing aid until Putin either acquiesced to a reasonable deal or faced the collapse of his army. Such actions by Trump would change the timelines sufficiently to give Putin cause for concern. Short of that, the Russian president has no reason to talk about peace terms. He need only wait for Ukraine’s collapse.

Putin doesn’t care who the president of the United States is. His goal for more than two decades has been to weaken the U.S. and break its global hegemony and its leadership of the “liberal world order” so that Russia may resume what he sees as its rightful place as a European great power and an empire with global influence. Putin has many immediate reasons to want to subjugate Ukraine, but he also believes that victory will begin the unraveling of eight decades of American global primacy and the oppressive, American-led liberal world order. Think of what he can accomplish by proving through the conquest of Ukraine that even America’s No. 1 tough guy, the man who would “make America great again,” who garnered the support of the majority of American male voters, is helpless to stop him and to prevent a significant blow to American power and influence. In other words, think of what it will mean for Donald Trump’s America to lose. Far from wanting to help Trump, Putin benefits by humiliating him. It wouldn’t be personal. It would be strictly business in this “harsh” and “cynical” world.

Kurakhove, Donetsk. 2023. A 59th Brigade artillery unit fires a rocket. (Chien-Chi Chang / Magnum)

Trump faces a paradox. He and many of his most articulate advisers and supporters share Putin’s hostility to the American order, of which NATO is a central pillar. Some even share his view that the American role in upholding that order is a form of imperialism, as well as a sucker’s bet for the average American. The old America First movement of the early 1940s tried to prevent the United States from becoming a global power with global responsibilities. The thrust of the new America First is to get the United States out of the global-responsibilities business. This is where the Trumpian right and some parts of the American left converge and why some on the left prefer Trump to his “neoliberal” and “neoconservative” opponents. Trump himself is no ideologist, but his sympathies clearly lie with those around the world who share a hatred of what they perceive to be the oppressive and bullying liberal world order, people such as Viktor Orbán, Nigel Farage, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Vladimir Putin.

Trump’s problem, however, is that unlike his fellow travelers in anti-liberalism, he will shortly be the president of the United States. The liberal world order is inseparable from American power, and not just because it depends on American power. America itself would not be so powerful without the alliances and the open international economic and political system that it built after World War II to protect its long-term interests. Trump can’t stop defending the liberal world order without ceding significantly greater influence to Russia and China. Like Putin, Xi Jinping, Kim Jong Un, and Ali Khamenei see the weakening of America as essential to their own ambitions. Trump may share their hostility to the liberal order, but does he also share their desire to weaken America and, by extension, himself?

Unfortunately for Trump, Ukraine is where this titanic struggle is being waged. Today, not only Putin but Xi, Kim, Khamenei, and others whom the American people generally regard as adversaries believe that a Russian victory in Ukraine will do grave damage to American strength everywhere. That is why they are pouring money, weaponry, and, in the case of North Korea, even their own soldiers into the battle. Whatever short-term benefits they may be deriving from assisting Russia, the big payoff they seek is a deadly blow to the American power and influence that has constrained them for decades.

Read: How Trump can win the peace in Ukraine

What’s more, America’s allies around the world agree. They, too, believe that a Russian victory in Ukraine, in addition to threatening the immediate security of European states, will undo the American-led security system they depend on. That is why even Asian allies far from the scene of the war have been making their own contributions to the fight.

If Trump fails to support Ukraine, he faces the unpalatable prospect of presiding over a major strategic defeat. Historically, that has never been good for a leader’s political standing. Jimmy Carter looked weak when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, which was of far less strategic significance than Ukraine. Henry Kissinger, despite his Nobel Prize, was drummed out of the Republican Party in the mid-1970s in no small part because of America’s failure in Vietnam and the perception that the Soviet Union was on the march during his time in office. Joe Biden ended an unpopular war in Afghanistan, only to pay a political price for doing so. Barack Obama, who moved to increase American forces in Afghanistan, never paid a political price for extending the war. Biden paid that price in part because the exit from Afghanistan was, to say the least, messy. The fall of Ukraine will be far messier—and better televised. Trump has created and cherished an aura of power and toughness, but that can quickly vanish. When the fall of Ukraine comes, it will be hard to spin as anything but a defeat for the United States, and for its president.

This was not what Trump had in mind when he said he could get a peace deal in Ukraine. He no doubt envisioned being lauded as the statesman who persuaded Putin to make a deal, saving the world from the horrors of another endless war. His power and prestige would be enhanced. He would be a winner. His plans do not include being rebuffed, rolled over, and by most of the world’s judgment, defeated.

Whether Trump can figure out where the path he is presently following will lead him is a test of his instincts. He is not on the path to glory. And unless he switches quickly, his choice will determine much more than the future of Ukraine.

About the Author

Robert Kagan

Robert Kagan is a contributing writer for The Atlantic, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and the author, most recently, of Rebellion: How Antiliberalism Is Tearing America Apart—Again.

The Atlantic · by Robert Kagan · January 7, 2025

14. Why Greenland Matters: Natural Resources – and ‘Location, Location, Location’

It is afterall real estate. 

Why Greenland Matters: Natural Resources – and ‘Location, Location, Location’

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/why-greenland-matters-natural-resources-and-location-location-location

A former top US commander explains the island’s geopolitical value – and the need for a “quiet conversation” about its future

EXPERT INTERVIEWThe Pituffik Space Base in northern Greenland, on October 4, 2023. (Photo by Thomas Traasdahl / Ritzau Scanpix / AFP via Getty Images)

Posted: January 9th, 2025

By The Cipher Brief

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — When The Cipher Brief looked at the global security landscape for 2025, Greenland didn’t rate a mention. That was probably true of new year’s forecasts made by many organizations, but in the past couple of weeks, President-elect Donald Trump has put the world‘s largest island squarely into the national security conversation. 

“For purposes of national security and freedom throughout the World, the United States of America feels that the ownership and control of Greenland is an absolute necessity,” Trump wrote in a late-December post. This week he spoke of a “deal” to take over Greenland, and then said he wouldn’t rule out the use of force to make it happen. While his son Donald Trump, Jr., paid a visit to Greenland Tuesday, the President-elect said that “Greenland is an incredible place, and the people will benefit tremendously if, and when, it becomes part of our Nation.” 

Why the sudden attention? Greenland is mineral-rich and strategically located in the North Atlantic edge of the Arctic. For more than six centuries, Greenland has been part of Denmark, though it was granted substantial autonomy in 2009. Greenland’s Prime Minister Mute Egede has said repeatedly that the island is not for sale, Denmark has rejected Trump’s offer to buy it, and while many in Greenland have pushed for independence from Denmark, Greenland’s Finance Minister said this week that “our ambition is not to go from being governed by one country to another.”

Meanwhile, in his farewell tour as America’s top diplomat, Secretary of State Blinken told a Paris news conference that “the idea expressed about Greenland is obviously not a good one, but maybe more important, it’s obviously one that’s not going to happen.”

To better understand these latest developments, as well the national security importance of Greenland to the United States, we turned to General Philip Breedlove, a Cipher Brief expert and former NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Europe. During his long military career, Gen. Breedlove visited Greenland often, in large part because the U.S. has maintained military facilities there since the 1950s, at the invitation of the governments of Greenland and Denmark. 

General Breedlove likened Greenland to Turkey – “It’s location, location, location,” he said, referring to their geopolitical importance in economic and military terms. As for Trump’s latest statements, he said, “I would have preferred that we would be having these kinds of conversations with the people of Greenland and Denmark in a more reserved way, out of the public eye, but it’s in the public eye now.”

General Breedlove spoke Wednesday with Cipher Brief Managing Editor Tom Nagorski. Their conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

General Philip M. Breedlove

Gen. Breedlove retired as the Commander, Supreme Allied Command, Europe, SHAPE, Belgium and Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany. He also served as Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force; and Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff.

Nagorski: General Breedlove, looking at the year ahead, I didn’t think one of our first conversations would be about Greenland, but here we are. I wonder if you could just start – as a baseline – I’m not sure everybody knows why Greenland matters so much from a national security perspective. What do we need to know on that front?

Gen. Breedlove: Well, it’s sort of like when you’re talking to a real estate person these days, what is the first thing that come out of their mouth? It’s location, location, location. And much like Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greenland in the Northern Atlantic is the prime land when it comes to location, location, location. 

This has to do with several military factors. The first is this growing thing we call the Northern or Northwest Passage, where – whether you believe in climate change or not, the ice is receding. And as the ice recedes in the north, the passage opens up for longer and longer every year, whereby commercial as well as military craft can go through there. And from the ports of Europe to Asia is 14 days on that Northern Passage – which is way faster than going through the Mediterranean and around through the [Panama] Canal.

And secondarily, from most northern U.S. ports, it’s about a 20-day transit. So when you save time like that, it is money. It means you can turn your capital ships around faster. This is a big commercial deal. And that’s why we see China so interested in buying land in the Arctic Circle. They want to be on the Arctic Council. They want to be able to dictate terms to everyone else in the Arctic about how it will be used. 

Of course, Russia is looking to Greenland for a much different set of issues, primarily military control, extracting tax money, duty for the use of the Northern Passage, et cetera. Many in the world have never heard of what we call the GIUK Gap, which is essentially that body of water to the east of Greenland – “GIUK,” as in Greenland, Iceland, UK – into the northern waters on the north side of Russia. And this is where all of their strategic Navy is, all of their big capital ships, all of this passes in and out of the GIUK Gap as it’s going into the Atlantic Ocean. So Russia is extremely keen to be able to use that gap to their advantage, and certainly not have somebody like America sitting on top of that. And then one more quick thing: Just think about Russia and the United States. In between them in the North is Greenland. So for whatever missile defense shield we might need in the future, this is prime territory.

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Nagorski: Can you talk a little bit about what the United States has now, and has had for a long time, in terms of military assets on Greenland?

Gen. Breedlove: So our one base, we used to call it Thule, and it now has an Inuit name, an indigenous name:  Pituffik [Space Base] now is the name of that base. And this is a big modern base. We’ve invested a lot of money in it in the past. We don’t have a lot of forces on it, but we maintain hangar facilities, runway facilities, we’ve maintained taxiways, all of the things to give us access to that base. There have been times when we’ve had NATO missions on that base and we’re doing air defense and air definition and describing the context of the Northern airspaces from that base, with radars, et cetera. So this base is strategically very important to the United States. And derivatively, it is strategically important to NATO.

Nagorski: And as I understand it, it serves among other things as a kind of early warning system.

Gen. Breedlove: Yes. It’s a part of our radar system, and does sensing for air traffic and missile sensing in the north.

Nagorski: President-elect Trump said, quote, that “for purposes of national security and freedom throughout the world, the United States of America feels that the ownership and control of Greenland is an absolute necessity.” You’ve just made clear why a presence there is important. What difference if any would, to use his words, ownership and control over Greenland make?

Gen. Breedlove: I really don’t like to do politics, so I’ll try to cast this answer in a non-political way. I think it is important that Greenland has been an integral part of the West, and the Danes and others who have influence there, have been an integral part of the West. 

Now it is also clear that China has been pushing very hard to get land so that they get somewhere in the Arctic Circle, so that they can become an Arctic nation and sit on the Arctic Council. And so guaranteeing a Western-leaning Greenland is extremely important. I don’t believe that that has to be through sovereign ownership.

But the fact of the matter is we need to have the ability to work with the people of Greenland in a way that assures that they will remain on side, if you want to use a soccer term. And the problem here is like so many other places in the world, China and Russia will throw money at this problem. And when you have a nation like Greenland, they need money for investment. 

The United States has more than once tried to buy Greenland. At the end of World War II, we offered $100 million for Greenland. And so this is not the first time that there has been these conversations. I would have preferred that we would be having these kinds of conversations with the people of Greenland and Denmark in a more reserved way, out of the public eye, but it’s in the public eye now.

Nagorski: Greenland was once a colony of Denmark, right? It is now a part of Denmark and Denmark, of course, is a NATO ally. As I understand it, U.S. relations with Greenland and Denmark have been quite good, right? 

Gen. Breedlove: They have, and that’s why it’s a little hard to see that we’re having this sort of rough public conversation with people who are friends. I believe that we can do this, and maybe accomplish what we need to do via several options, in a quiet conversation with the people of Greenland and Denmark. 

My own association [with Greenland] here began when I was the third Air Force commander in Europe. And then when I was the U.S. Air Force’s commander in Europe, and we had airplanes and air defense detachments and all these things that would rotate in and out of then-Thule Air Base. So we have been working with this country and these people for a long time. They are wonderful people, hospitable people, and they’ve always been very welcoming of how we help to maintain the Air Base.

Nagorski: To use your phrase, this isn’t now a “quiet conversation,” and the President-elect has now said he’s not ruling out use of the military to take Greenland if necessary. And officials in Greenland and Denmark have said it’s not going to happen. So what now? Is a “quiet conversation” still possible?

Gen. Breedlove: I think it needs to become a quiet conversation. And yes, if we all decided to do that, we could do that. The idea that one NATO country would impose its will on another NATO country is quite interesting. So I think that we have rational people who can sit down and work this out as we move forward. It is incredibly important that we do not allow Russian and Chinese influence to grow in this great country, on this island. And it is important that we continue to have a relationship with an ally, no matter how the conversation plays out. That’s incredibly important.

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15. Yes, US generals should be fired

From the Quincy Institute.

Excerpts:

Because history is also ruthless in its pursuit of truth, it teaches how the choice of military leadership often determines the progress or failure of democracy itself.

Around the same time that General Marshall was preparing America for war by choosing more agile leadership, a historian and French army officer named Captain Marc Bloch lambasted a lack of virtue and capability amongst his seniors in his remarkable book Strange Defeat, written mere months before his own cold-blooded execution by the Gestapo.

Summarizing the facts he witnessed firsthand without access to archives in the battlefield, Bloch noted of the serial mistakes that led to the fall of France that, “One glaring characteristic, is however, common to all of them. Our leaders, or those who acted for them, were incapable of thinking in terms of a new war. In other words, the German triumph was, essentially, a triumph of intellect – and that is which makes it so peculiarly serious.”

As General Marshall well knew, America is no more inoculated from a triumph of intellect than the French or any other nation in defending itself. Senior selection systems also require both the freedom of introspection that many died to defend – and the trust of all who would serve in the future. There is nothing more strategic or existential than this.

Yes, US generals should be fired

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Steve Deal · January 8, 2025

quincyinst.org

We need a 'Marshall moment' to reform the military’s leadership selection system — before it's too late

Jan 08, 2025

In October 1939, just one month after he took over as Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall famously winnowed the ranks of hidebound senior officers to prepare for war. “Most of them have their minds set in outmoded patterns,” Marshall told his leadership team, “and can’t change to meet the new conditions they may face if we become involved in the war that started in Europe.”

Every democracy since a defeated Athens has pruned its senior leaders proven inadequate to the demands of their respective era – often more painful than mere public shame. Ours may be the only era when an entire general and admiralty class — more than 80% of which gain employment in the defense sector after retirement — has been consistently rewarded with lucre and prestige for losing.

With two failed wars and scores of weapons acquisition fiascoes now secured in history’s dustbin, many may fear that virtue itself has been swept from the floor. Mainstream deference to “self-serving delusion” has sustained an unearned and stunting faith in a senior leadership selection system made hollow by long-past assumptions.

Therefore, Secretary of Defense-designate Pete Hegseth’s impassioned plea to focus upon the people who serve and his condemnation of a self-perpetuating, class-creating leadership system may, if we can look past the vitriol of our day, herald our very own Marshall moment to deter war rather than to fight one.

First, most Americans do not realize that the competitive promotion board system for our military, as defined by law, ends after two-star selection. All three and four-star officers are thus political appointees — in every sense. No selection board convenes to nominate them to the Secretary, President, or Congress. So who culls the anointed from the herd? It falls to each uniformed service chief to manage an ever-shrinking, hermetically-sealed talent pool, presenting a goldilocks-like offering of options to the civilian Secretary who will then forward recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. The products of those selections, when confirmed by the Senate, will often outlast their civilian masters in duration of service. The long-term stakes of national security couldn't be higher.

The Senate rarely applies intense scrutiny to the lists of future three-star officers before them for confirmation. A clear signal of systemic dysfunction was the outcry across senior military and mainstream media leaders for the holds exercised by Senator Tommy Tuberville of Alabama. Even after a storied history of senior officer failures, most valued in the end was the replication of and deference to an established hierarchy, and certainly not the effectiveness of the hierarchy selection system itself.

Hegseth is also not wrong when he accuses a senior officer class of self-serving political machinations which often disregard warfighting realities. Yes, senior rank structure past and present is required for the legal execution of the necessary battle captaincy of war. But it is the very nature of political competition for promotion at the highest levels where leaders often first stray from their virtuous origins. The philosophical descent from the battlefield to the polis can be morally treacherous for all who tread there, and especially for the battlefield’s gods who soon enough prove all too human.

Officers protected from prosecution even when found guilty of embezzlement are often the same ones who are the most ready to end much more youthful careers, rather than to stand and support them.

Reinforcing the above debilitating dynamic are the press and leaders who believe that an effective uniformed meritocracy still exists. Often the first time many of today’s elite civilian socioeconomic class mixes with the military occurs at the most senior levels. And the latter feel if they had left service earlier or earlier enjoyed their counterparts’ privileges, they too naturally would have risen as leaders of the corporate world. Pursuit of positions in the same industries that supported them in uniform is merely considered their just due.

This mutual reinforcement reaches its apogee when our most senior military leaders believe they are speaking publicly for the good of the nation, in concert with their newly joined class. They may even attempt to lead-turn the electorate by using their institutionally supported platform to trumpet policies that resonate with their own experiences while also pleasing their political masters’ desires, further ensuring their rise and importance.

A picture book of “firsts” thus replaces victories on the battlefield in the minds of power brokers who measure such selections, however fairly won, as an accretion to even greater power themselves.

Yet often lost in this unvirtuous cycle are the newest volunteers from civilian society, who have little ability to predict the political game ahead.

Indeed, our most vulnerable leaders in the junior ranks sustain the greatest damage from such replication of hierarchy and class creation. Here stands Major Hegseth’s greatest potential and longest-reaching contribution. For as he well knows, most of our youthful best just aren’t willing to go through the inane career paths, obsequious mental tortures, and real damage to family required to participate in such replications of hierarchy, while the less talented do so much more willingly.

Yes, the market of talent is working, but with active flows decidedly leaving an open faucet of promise at every career decision point. Seldom is current leadership held accountable for recruiting and retention woes, or for that matter, anything else.

Some argue this is too complicated to unravel, yet there are ready remedies available. Because the Secretary of Defense must approve each permanent retirement at three or four-star rank, he or she has the capability to use this approval as a lever for national-level accomplishment, not just a rubber stamp for uneventful custodianship. Following the example of the reserve components, we must increase permeability of experts and executives flowing in and out of uniform at the highest levels, and make the reserve-civilian model a feature of the selection system, not a bug.

Moreover, we should enforce and extend “cooling off” periods without which senior officers are enticed to profit from the same military requirements they wrote while on active duty. Bring former three- and four-star officers back to testify when the weapons requirements they championed go wrong so we can learn as an institution. Audit the selection process, emphasize learning leaders, and achieve a modern talent management system that can earn the trust of all ranks.

And since they are political appointees in truth, create a repeatable mechanism to ensure potential three and four-star officers are held accountable to clearly stated strategic intent, rather than wandering aimlessly and often selfishly between the Constitution and the President.

Because history is also ruthless in its pursuit of truth, it teaches how the choice of military leadership often determines the progress or failure of democracy itself.

Around the same time that General Marshall was preparing America for war by choosing more agile leadership, a historian and French army officer named Captain Marc Bloch lambasted a lack of virtue and capability amongst his seniors in his remarkable book Strange Defeat, written mere months before his own cold-blooded execution by the Gestapo.

Summarizing the facts he witnessed firsthand without access to archives in the battlefield, Bloch noted of the serial mistakes that led to the fall of France that, “One glaring characteristic, is however, common to all of them. Our leaders, or those who acted for them, were incapable of thinking in terms of a new war. In other words, the German triumph was, essentially, a triumph of intellect – and that is which makes it so peculiarly serious.”

As General Marshall well knew, America is no more inoculated from a triumph of intellect than the French or any other nation in defending itself. Senior selection systems also require both the freedom of introspection that many died to defend – and the trust of all who would serve in the future. There is nothing more strategic or existential than this.

Steve Deal

Steve Deal, Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.) served as deputy chief of staff to the Secretary of the Navy and deputy chief learning officer for the Department of the Navy. During his twenty-seven years on active duty, he commanded Patrol Squadron Forty-Seven, in Ali Air Base, Iraq; Joint Provincial Reconstruction Team Khost, Afghanistan; and Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing Ten in Whidbey Island, Washington.

Top Photo Credit: US Military General David Petraeus in 2007 (Reuters)

16. The Constitution and War in the 21st Century

The Constitution and War in the 21st Century

By Anthony Cowden

January 09, 2025

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/01/09/the_constitution_and_war_in_the_21st_century_1083421.html?mc_cid=ee788a9722

President-elect Donald Trump has again doubled down on the idea of taking military action against Panama and Greenland (Denmark), to achieve foreign policy aims:

“Asked at a press conference at his Florida resort whether he could assure the world he would not use military or economic coercion as he tries to gain control of the Panama Canal and Greenland, Trump said, "No, I can't assure you on either of those two. But I can say this, we need them for economic security." “[i]

Within a couple of weeks Donald Trump will be President of the United States, and his word will be the official policy of the United States government, so it is probably a good idea to pay attention to what he has to say now.

In addition, if I were still teaching National Security Decision Making (NSDM) as a member of the National Security Affairs (NSA) department of the Naval War College (NWC – boy, that’s a lot of acronyms!), it would be tempting to use the idea of using military force against Panama and Denmark to achieve foreign policy goals as a case study in national security decision making. Here’s how that conversation might go:

Instructor: OK, so far, the President-elect has not backed away from the idea of using military force to take the Panama Canal away from Panama or gain territorial control – I think that is the idea – of Greenland. So, starting with the Panama Canal, how might this work? Anyone?

Student A: Sir?

Instructor: “Tony”

Student A: Sir?

Instructor: Don't call me "sir," call me "Tony."

Student A: Oh, OK - Tony, Sir, ...

Instructor: 

Other Students: Student Z: You’re always preaching to us about using “to pay for, to kill for, and to die for” as a rubric for determining what level of military force is appropriate for a given national security interest; shouldn’t we start there?

Instructor: Thank you for reminding me, although I’m not sure I would use the word “preach”![ii] Yes, we certainly could start there, but I think if one is considering attacking a sovereign nation with the stated aim of seizing their territory, one has already decided it’s an interest worth dying for, because sovereign nations tend to object to such actions. In any event, let’s set that aside for a minute – I’d like to get at what the Constitution might have to say about this.

Student Z: Well, I guess as Commander in Chief the President can take whatever military action he wants to protect U.S. interests, right?

Instructor: Class, what do you think? And two things I would like you to address: does the interest matter? And what power does the President have in committing the nation to war on his own authority?

Students: Yes! No way, the Constitution... To defend the US against attack, sure... It depends...? Not to seize territory! Well, some have... The War Powers Resolution!

Instructor: Hang on, one at a time! D, we haven’t heard from you recently - what are your thoughts?

Student D: Well, the Constitution says Congress declares wars, but it also makes the President the Commander in Chief...

Instructor: Is that a contradiction?

Student A: No, I think the idea was that Congress would decide when we would go to war, and once that decision was made, the President would lead the military forces in prosecuting the war.

Instructor: It would have been nice if the Founding Fathers had spelled that out, wouldn't it?!? OK, let's say that was the intent - but even in the 18th century, and certainly today, threats to our national security can develop very quickly, too fast to convene Congress to debate a war resolution - shouldn't the President be able to respond to "obvious" threats to our national security?

Students: Yes! No! Maybe!

Instructor: OK, OK! I'm glad you all agree! Well, if you look at our history, Presidents have insisted, from the earliest days of the Republic, and often acted on, the premise that it is within their authority as the Commander in Chief of the armed forces to be able to respond as necessary to protect our national interests. Does the Panama Canal case seem to fall into this category?

Student C: Well, I don’t think so – apparently the issue is the rates US flagged ships are paying to transit the Canal, and China’s operation of a couple of Panama’s ports. I don’t think that raises to the level of using military force, but it’s not my personal opinion that matters, it’s Congress’s.

Instructor: How so?

Student C: Well, the Constitution gives Congress the sole power to declare war; if the US is going to go to war with another country, I would think the President should at least try to convince Congress to declare war.[iii]

Instructor: OK, good. But what happens if the President goes to Congress, and Congress declines to declare war – what then? Does he have to live with that decision?

Student D: Well, Sir…

Instructor: Tony!

Student D: Uh, right – Tony – well, Tony, he could, but he might, as Commander in Chief, decide to just go ahead and take military action anyway…

Instructor: I don’t doubt you’re right, but it seems to me that would be a pretty bold act, especially since both chambers of Congress will be controlled by his party when he takes office. So, two things I would like you to address, starting with the military’s response: what is the operational chain of command, and how might uniformed members respond to an order to invade Panama given that Congress declined to declare war against Panama?

Student E: Sir, the…

Instructor: 

Student E: …operational chain of command flows from the President or the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commander – in this case, to Admiral Alvin Holsey, Commander, U.S. Southern Command.

Instructor: OK – A, back to you: how might Admiral Holsey respond.

Student A: Well, Tony, …

Instructor: Yay!

Student A: …that’s hard to say. Admiral Holsey has taken an oath to “support and defend the Constitution,” but we identified before the contradiction of declaring war and commanding the troops – he could probably justify supporting the Constitution in a number of different ways! In this case, with Congress having specifically declined to declare war against Panama, it would seem to me that Admiral Holsey would be on firm ground to at least ask the President about using military force given that Congress is against the idea. But then again, he might decide, as the President clearly had, that as Commander in Chief the President had the authority to authorize the use of military force. Of course, if Admiral Holsey invades Panama, Congress might invoke the War Powers Resolution.[iv]

Instructor: Ah, the War Powers Resolution again! OK, how does that apply?

Student X: Well, “Tony,” given this scenario, it seems to me that the President already met the requirement to “consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities…” when he asked for a declaration of war…

Instructor: Good point! Go on…

Student X: The next requirement is for the President to report to Congress about the employment of the military, and I don’t see any reason why that and subsequent required reports wouldn’t happen…

Instructor: OK. So that’s it, the US is at war?

Student Y: Well, not exactly – the meat of the Resolution is in Section 5, subsections b) and c), which if you don’t mind, I’ll read:

(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.

(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

Student Y: To summarize, Congress’s real power lies in the purse: Congress could direct the President to remove the military forces and/or remove the operational funds required to pursue military operations…

Student Z: But, Sir, do you think Congress would really take such a drastic step? And even if they did, they already told the President “no” once, do you think he would actually listen to them?

Instructor: It’s “Tony!” And I said I was unpromotable, I didn’t say I couldn’t be court-martialed - save it for your Policy instructor! Ok, that’s the bell, we are (thankfully!) out of time! But I’d like you to think about the Greenland/Denmark case – specifically, how might NATO react if one NATO member attacks another…? Isn’t “an attack on one an attack on all” …?

Anthony Cowden is the Managing Director of Stari Consulting Services and co-author of Fighting the Fleet: Operational Art and Modern Fleet Combat, all royalties from which go to the Navy/Marine Corps Relief Society.

Notes:

[i] https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-wont-rule-out-military-economic-action-he-seeks-control-panama-canal-2025-01-07/

[ii] Readers of this space would certainly agree with the “preach” characterization!

[iii] I choose to ignore the problematic and silly euphemism of “authorizing the use of military force”.

[iv] https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/warpower.asp

17. Storied Marine infantry battalion to be transformed into Littoral Combat Team

We are literally a littoral combat team. If its new motto does not include the use of "literally" it will not be a modern force. I am sure some young Marines will come up with something pithy. (I could not resist my snarky comment).

Storied Marine infantry battalion to be transformed into Littoral Combat Team

1st Battalion, 4th Marines will hold a ceremony on Jan. 10 to mark the unit’s redesignation as the 12th Littoral Combat Team.

Jeff Schogol

Updated 18 Hours Ago

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol

A historic Marine infantry battalion, whose regimental colors were burned prior to their capture during World War II and was then reforged from one of the Corps’ first Marine Raider units, will be remade again as part of the Marine Corps’ force structure changes that focus on China and the Pacific.

On Friday, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines will hold a redesignation ceremony at Camp Pendleton, California, so that the unit can become part of the 12th Littoral Combat Team, said Capt. Kristine Doan, a spokesperson with the 1st Marine Division.

The term “redesignating” means that the battalion is becoming a new unit, not deactivating, Doan told Task & Purpose. The littoral combat team will eventually move to Okinawa, Japan.

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“The battalion’s colors will be ceremoniously rolled up and delivered to the United States Marine Corps History Division,” Doan said. “[Twelfth] Littoral Combat Team will hold its own ceremony at a later time to formally acknowledge their relocation.”

The new littoral combat team will have its own colors and be incorporated into the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment, which will fall under the 3rd Marine Division, III Marine Expeditionary Force, Doan said.

“The [Littoral Combat Team] is organized, trained, and equipped to support sea control and sea denial operations within actively contested maritime spaces as part of a modernized force integrated with the U.S. Navy, other elements of the Joint Force, and allied and partnered forces,” Doan said.

Burning the colors

The battalion initially stood up in 1911 as 1st Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, and the unit’s first combat deployment was to the Dominican Republic in November 1916, according to the unit’s official history. First Lieutenant Ernest C. Williams became the battalion’s first Medal of Honor recipient for leading a charge that captured a fort at San Francisco de Macoris.

From 1927 to 1941, the 4th Marine Regiment was stationed in Shanghai, China, during which the battalion earned the title “China Marines.” For the first two years of its tour there, the regiment fell under the 3rd Marine Brigade, which was led by legendary Marine Brig. Gen. Smedley D. Butler, who returned to the United States in 1929.

The battalion left China for the Philippines along with the rest of the 4th Regiment in late November 1941, just before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. For five months, the Marines fought against Japanese troops in the Bataan Peninsula and finally on the island of Corregidor in Manila Bay.

This exhibit in the National Museum of the Marine Corps tells the story of the Marines from the 4th Regiment, who fought in the Philippines and were later captured by the Japanese in May 1942. Photo courtesy of the National Museum of the Marine Corps.

Around 800 Marines with the regiment fought tenaciously on Corregidor along with thousands of U.S. soldiers, sailors, and Philippine Scouts, but they had little food and water, no heavy guns, and were near the end of their supplies of ammunition. U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Jonathan Wainwright, who also feared the Japanese would massacre 1,000 sick and wounded personnel, surrendered U.S. and Filipino forces to the Japanese on May 6, 1942.

After the surrender, the Marines at Corregidor were ordered to burn all national and regiment colors, according to “From Shanghai to Corregidor: Marines in the Defense of the Philippines,” by J. Michael Miller.

Upon hearing that the colors had been burned, Miller wrote, Marine Col. Samuel L. Howard, who led the 4th Regiment at the time, put his face into his hand and wept, saying, “My God, and I had to be the first Marine officer ever to surrender a regiment!”

The regiment had lost 250 Marines in the fighting, but hundreds more died while in Japanese captivity, according to the National Museum of the Marine Corps.

The battalion is reborn

With the surrender of all U.S. troops in the Philippines, the battalion temporarily ceased to exist. Then, in February 1944, the 1st Marine Raider Battalion was redesignated as 1st Battalion, 4th Marines. The Raiders had fought in the Guadalcanal Campaign two years earlier and took part in the Battle of Edson’s Ridge in September 1942, during which Marines fended off waves of Japanese troops over two days. Col. Merritt Edson and Maj. Kenneth Bailey were both awarded the Medal of Honor for their leadership during the battle. Bailey’s award was posthumous.

The reborn battalion adopted the motto “Hold the High Torch” to honor the 4th Regiment Marines who were captured at Corregidor, and it went on to fight at Guam and Okinawa. Cpl. Richard Bush was awarded the Medal of Honor for leading an assault on Okinawa, during which he was seriously wounded, and used his body to shield other Marines from a grenade.

The battalion deployed to Vietnam from 1965 to 1969 and fought in places such as the Rockpile, Camp Carroll, Con Thien and Vandergrift Combat Base. Cpl. Larry Maxam and Pfc. Douglas Dickey were both posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for giving their lives to save their fellow Marines.

After the war, the battalion participated in the May 1975 operation to rescue the container ship SS Mayaguez from the Khmer Rouge, during which 41 U.S. service members were killed.

The battalion took part in the first Persian Gulf War in 1990 and 1991 and then in March 2002 the unit served as a reserve force for combat operations in Afghanistan.

Starting in March 2003, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines was part of the invasion of Iraq, fighting at Nasiriyah, Al Kut and Bagdad. The unit returned to Iraq in May 2004 and fought insurgents at Najaf. The battalion deployed to Iraq twice more from 2006 to 2009, serving in Al Qaim Fallujah. In February 2009, 1st Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment was the last Marine infantry battalion to leave Iraq.

When the battalion is designated as the 12th Littoral Combat Team, it will continue to train and evolve to be ready to fight, Doan said.

“This redesignation reflects the Corps’ continued effort to ensure that Marines will remain capable of fighting and winning on the battlefields of the future, should the need arise,” Doan said.

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taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol

18. The Great M1 Abrams Tank Redesign Has Arrived

The Great M1 Abrams Tank Redesign Has Arrived

19fortyfive.com · by Caleb Larson · January 8, 2025

Key Points and Summary: The U.S. Army’s AbramsX tank demonstrator represents a revolutionary leap in armored warfare, addressing deficiencies in the M1A2 SEPv4 upgrade program.

-Unlike its predecessors, the AbramsX features a hybrid-electric powertrain for reduced fuel consumption and stealthy operation. Its modular design includes an unmanned turret, lowering the tank’s profile and increasing survivability. Active protection systems offer enhanced defense against threats like loitering drones and anti-tank missiles, key lessons from the Ukraine war.

-While still in development, the AbramsX promises extended range, improved digital situational awareness, and reduced logistical burdens, marking a new chapter in the evolution of the M1 Abrams platform.

The M1 Abrams Keeps Getting Lots of Upgrades

The M1 Abrams main battle tank has been the backbone of the United States Army’s armored forces for over four decades. Introduced in 1980, it has been continuously upgraded to offer tankers incrementally better capabilities: better firepower, more robust armored protection, and better situational awareness.

The most recent upgraded variant is the M1A2 System Enhancement Package Version 3, better known by its SEPv3 abbreviation. While the SEPv3 offers the Abrams significant improvements in onboard electronics, armor protection, and lethality, the pace of threats facing the tank has necessitated the development of an entirely new main battle tank concept: the AbramsX tank demonstrator.

Built by General Dynamics Land Systems, the AbramsX tank concept vehicle addresses deficiencies in the SEPv4 program — deficiencies that have come to light partly thanks to the ongoing war in Ukraine — which was ultimately canceled in favor of pursuing more advanced, next-generation capabilities.

AbramsX: an Entirely New Main Battle Tank

The AbramsX is genuinely a new kind of main battle tank. Although it is still a prototype, its planned enhancements to survivability, lethality, and mobility are nothing short of radical. Thanks to an active protection system, a new powertrain, and lighter weight, the platform holds real promise.

Powertrain and Digital Architecture

Another significant difference from the traditional Abrams design is the AbramsX’s hybrid-electric powertrain. This system combines a conventional internal combustion engine with electric motors, which reduces fuel consumption significantly. It also would allow the AbramsX to operate almost noiselessly in all-electric mode, offering not only a much reduced acoustic signature. Still, it would also eliminate a strong heat signature from the tank’s exhaust and engine compartment.

AbramsX. Image Credit: Screenshot.

By contrast, the SEPv3 and the planned SEPv4 variants would rely on the Abrams’ Honeywell AGT1500 turbine engine, which, though a powerful engine, is well known for its high fuel consumption and logistical requirements, and is infamous for its high fuel consumption and logistical demands.

The AbramsX also incorporates a raft of new digital technologies that would significantly augment the tank’s situational awareness and networking with other nodes on the modern battlefield, addressing shortcomings of the SEPv4 design, which may have had difficulty integrating newer, emerging technologies. A reduced crew workload and better on-the-fly decision-making in high-stress environments is anticipated.

Armored Protection Package

Although the M1 Abrams is one of the most capable main battle tanks in the world today, it is also among the heaviest main battle tanks in existence. Not only does this negatively affect the tank’s operational range, but it also makes the tank’s logistical footprint much larger. One criticism the Abrams has sustained has been its ability to navigate civilian infrastructure like bridges, which are designed for much, much lighter vehicles. The turret design of the AbramsX partially addresses this shortcoming.

Unlike the SEPv3 and SEPv4, which retained the traditional manned turret configuration, the AbramsX features an unmanned turret. This design change not only reduces crew exposure to incoming fire but also gives the tank an overall lower profile, making it more difficult to detect and target. It also reduces the weight of the tank somewhat, though until the AbramsX is finalized, it is not known by how much.

AbramsX Tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

M1 Abrams Tank: Lessons from the War in Ukraine

The ongoing war in Ukraine has made the evolving nature of modern armored warfare very stark — and provided lessons for future tank design, including the AbramsX. First and foremost among those lessons is the vulnerability of armored vehicles to precision-guided munitions like anti-tank missiles, and in particular to loitering drones.

In Ukraine, tanks and other armored vehicles have frequently been targeted and destroyed or disabled by these aerial threats, underscoring the need for enhanced active protection systems. The AbramsX tackles this challenge head-on via an APS capability that is designed to intercept projectiles before they strike the vehicle, reducing the risk of a knock-out strike. APS could also afford the AbramsX with a significantly lighter armor package as well, affording the tank a lighter footprint and lighter logistical requirement, as well as extending range by reducing fuel consumption.

“We appreciate that future battlefields pose new challenges to the tank as we study recent and ongoing conflicts,” said Brigadier General Geoffrey Norman, director of the Next-Generation Combat Vehicle Cross Functional Team, in a U.S. Army statement. “We must optimize the Abrams’ mobility and survivability to allow the tank to continue to close with and destroy the enemy as the apex predator on future battlefields.”

Oregon Army National Guard M1A2 Abrams battle tank with Alpha Troop, 3rd Squadron, 116th Cavalry Regiment, engages a target at a firing range during annual training at the Orchard Combat Tranining Center near Boise, ID, June 19, 2021. Soldiers trained in their military occupational specialties during annual training. (National Guard photo by Spc. Dominic Trujillo, 115th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

“The Abrams Tank can no longer grow its capabilities without adding weight, and we need to reduce its logistical footprint,” said Major General Glenn Dean, Program Executive Officer for Ground Combat Systems. “The war in Ukraine has highlighted a critical need for integrated protections for Soldiers, built from within instead of adding on.”

SEPv4 Cancellation

The Army’s decision to cancel the SEPv4 program is a reflection that incremental upgrades to a forty-plus, Cold War-era main battle tank would not be sufficient to address today’s challenges on the battlefield.

The SEPv4 was envisioned as a comprehensive upgrade that would build upon the SEPv3 with improved sensors, a more powerful engine, and enhanced firepower, including the integration of the XM1147 Advanced Multi-Purpose (AMP) round. This munition would have combined several kinds of tank rounds into a single package, a potential logistical boon.

However, the SEPv4 program faced significant challenges. First and foremost was weight and power output. Balancing upgrades to the platform and integrating upgrades onto the aged Abrams chassis proved to be a challenge and made clear the diminishing returns of continuous, incremental Abrams upgrades.

M1E3

Until the AbramsX comes online, however, the Army will rely on the newest Abrams variant, the M1E3. “The M1E3 Abrams nomenclature is a return to the Army’s standard use of its type classification and nomenclature system for our combat vehicle fleet,” said a United States Army spokesman.

U.S. Army M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank variation fires at a target at Bucierz Range at Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area, Poland, August 11, 2020. DEFENDER-Europe 20 was designed as a deployment exercise to build strategic readiness in support of the U.S. National Defense Strategy and NATO deterrence objectives. In response to COVID-19, DEFENDER-Europe 20 was modified in size and scope. Phase I of the modified DEFENDER-Europe 20 was linked to exercise Allied Spirit, which took place at Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area, Poland, June 5-19 with approximately 6,000 U.S. and Polish Soldiers. In phase II of the modified DEFENDER-Europe 20, a U.S.-based combined arms battalion will conduct an emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise to Europe July 14-Aug. 22.

“The ‘E’ designation represents an engineering change to an existing platform that is more significant than a minor modification and serves to designate the prototype and development configuration until the vehicle is formally type classified and receives an ‘A’ designation. This is distinct from the ‘XM’ designation used for new prototype systems.”

Into the Future for M1 Abrams

The AbramsX tank demonstrator represents a significant step forward in the evolution of the Abrams main battle tank and addresses substantial deficiencies in the SEPv4 upgrade program. The AbramsX’s emphasis on extended range, thanks to hybrid-electric propulsion, modularity, and planned sensor integration, marks a stark departure from more traditional main battle tank design philosophies. Though the tank has not entered serial production and, therefore, may change significantly before the design is ultimately finalized, it is clear that whatever form the ArbramsX ultimately takes, it will be radically different than its predecessors — and, indeed, anything else on the battlefield.

About the Author: Caleb Larson

Caleb Larson is an American multiformat journalist based in Berlin, Germany. His work covers the intersection of conflict and society, focusing on American foreign policy and European security. He has reported from Germany, Russia, and the United States. Most recently, he covered the war in Ukraine, reporting extensively on the war’s shifting battle lines from Donbas and writing on the war’s civilian and humanitarian toll. Previously, he worked as a Defense Reporter for POLITICO Europe. You can follow his latest work on X.

19fortyfive.com · by Caleb Larson · January 8, 2025

19. Does Donald Trump Want to Take Over North America?

I think President-elect Trump may be going about this the wrong way. He should be approaching this from the model of the Louisiana Purchase and the Alaska Purchase (or Treaty of Cession) (Or "Seward's Folly" and "Seward's Icebox"). I do not see any mention of these possible historical precedents.

He also needs to put his eyes on another prize: The Philippines. When I was in Mindanao the students at Mindanao State University reminded tour US Ambassador that in 1946 when we returned sovereignty to the Philippines, the people of Mindanao wanted to remain a colony of the US.

On a more serious note, I notice the officials in Denmark and Greenland are saying they need serious talks with the Trump Administration about a way ahead. Despite many comments in the media they seem to be talking this seriously though I think they want to find a way to help sustain the status quo while helping President Trump release his ambitions (words of the Danish FM I think). I think that US allies seek cooperation with the incoming Administration even on issues that might seem far fetched (and I think the Greenland issue is no longer farfetched. it is being mainstreamed.)

Another point that would make sense for Greenland (and perhaps Northern Canada) has to do with exploiting the cold weather and natural low temperatures to support AI. A friend mentioned this to me: 

Greenland's natural cooling would make it the ideal AI-data center mecca. And, we MUST win the AI race.

Although that might become target reference point (TRP) 1 in any future conflict.

Does Donald Trump Want to Take Over North America?

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · January 8, 2025

Incoming US President Donald Trump suggested once again this week that the United States expand into Canada and Greenland. Trump has talked this up before – both recently and during his first presidential term.

At first glance, this sounds like another one of Trump’s exotic diversions. For example, Trump has claimed that injecting bleach could help fight COVID-19, and he is obsessed with windmills.

These sorts of digressions are often dismissed as weird non-starters by observers, and then Trump’s attention drifts off someplace else.

But Trump has referred to Greenland repeatedly this year, and he also threatened Canada in his wild press conference this week. Trump is more focused on this than usual, provoking an extensive discussion of whether Trump seeks to absorb North America into the United States.

Trump has also threatened Mexico with military action over drug cartels operating in its territory and Panama over the Panama Canal Zone.

Three possible explanations stand out:

Trump Actually Seeks to Expand the United States

Trump may believe the United States should control all or most of North America.

Trump has distinctly illiberal foreign policy instincts. As Stephen Walt has noted, Trump basic approach to other countries, especially smaller ones, is to bully them.

That is how nineteenth-century imperial politics unfolded, complete with land grabs of the sort Trump is proposing.

In his first term, Trump notably hung pictures of President Andrew Jackson in the White House.

Jackson, like Trump, was prone to a populist, blustery foreign policy style and believed in manifest destiny.

Trump also genuinely does not care for US alliances. Rather than as supplements to US power, Trump sees them as hangers-on and free-riders. Trump just does not care that he is alienating US NATO allies with his threats against them.

He has been far more willing to antagonize allies than any other US president. So nervous are US allies about Trump’s North American threats that Germany and France felt compelled to warn Trump not to attack or otherwise try to take Greenland.

Trump Enjoys Attention and Purposefully Stirs It Up

Another obvious explanation is Trump’s clear psychic need to be as much as possible at the center of attention, especially media attention.

Trump is thrilled by the chaos and movement around him. In his first term, he notoriously fed the factional conflict within the White House, which most presidents struggle to tamp down.

Intrigue, drama, and conflict excite Trump. He regularly generated unnecessary commotion in his first term over topics he did not know or care much about – such as his suggestion to drop a nuclear weapon on a hurricane, build a wall along the border with Mexico, or receive a Nobel Peace Prize because he meet the leader of North Korea three times.

Nothing much came of these outlandish proposals – even Congressional Republicans balked at building the wall – but they kept the spotlight on Trump for weeks and months.

Trump is Diverting Attention from His Contentious Domestic Policies

Many have noted that Trump’s foreign policy bluster changes the subject nicely from the issues on which Trump ran for president.

Like most candidates, Trump emphasized domestic issues. Voters do not vote much based on foreign policy. Domestic economic perceptions particularly tend to drive the vote. And Trump ran on precisely that. He spoke regularly of inflation, immigration, and tariffs. Fixing these would ‘make America great again.’

President of the United States Donald Trump speaking at the 2017 Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in National Harbor, Maryland. By Gage Skidmore.

However, as economists noted, Trump’s policy proposals would hurt US growth and raise inflation. Tariffs would hike prices across the board – especially the enormous import taxes Trump occasionally proposed.

An immigration crack-down would shrink the US labor supply, driving up wages. Both measures would lift inflation. Trump is close to Wall Street. Many of his cabinet appointees are extremely wealthy. They likely signaled to Trump that his proposals would be economically destructive.

That leaves Trump in an awkward bind, which foreign policy crises and diversions nicely alleviate—his coalition thrills to his image of no-nonsense toughness.

Picking on Greenland and Canada is an easy way to rally the base with substantial perceived gains: Canada and Greenland are both big. Trump is changing the subject.

In the end, Trump is unlikely to move on either target. Neither will capitulate to US pressure. US military coercion against NATO allies would end the alliance immediately and isolate the US from its long-time friends.

Trump may want that, but the economic consequences of lost trade relationships and the diplomatic costs of radical US isolation would be enormous.

About the Author: Dr. Robert Farley

Dr. Robert Kelly is a professor of political science at Pusan National University. Kelly is a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · January 8, 2025

20. Ukraine is determined, but tired

Ukraine is determined, but tired

militarytimes.com · by William Courtney · January 8, 2025

In late-December conversations in Kyiv, I found Ukrainians determined to resist Russian aggression but tired of war. No one, however, spoke of ending the fight, exhaustion, or permanent cessation of land to Russia. A negotiated peace was thought to be beyond reach, but even a ceasefire might be difficult to achieve. Left unsaid was that the West could risk resentment if it pressed Ukraine into a negotiation likely to fail.

I talked with two former prime ministers, a top national security adviser, a deputy defense minister, and others familiar with politics and national security. In this independent visit, I sought Ukrainian perspectives on the politics of the war and any efforts to end it.

Ukrainians were cautiously optimistic that President-elect Donald Trump was becoming more supportive. In early December in Paris, one leader said Trump had told President Volodymyr Zelensky that he would not abandon Ukraine. But Trump appeared to have no clear-cut plan to end the war. Trump, the leader added, also said NATO would not be available, but Zelensky said he would keep pressing for it.

Ukrainians saw other positive signs. One leader recalled that Trump was the first to provide lethal weapons (Javelin anti-armor missiles), and he opposed the Russian Nord Stream II gas pipeline. Trump would not want to preside over a failed negotiation, the leader surmised. If Friedrich Merz became Germany’s next Chancellor, another leader said, he and French President Emmanuel Macron would strengthen European leadership with more forceful support forUkraine.

Views differed on Ukraine’s military situation. One leader observed that in the failed 2023 counter-offensive, Ukraine lacked airpower, electronic warfare and air defense. A lot of capable people died. On the other hand, another leader said, Russia had failed to win the war at the outset, and it had lost a half-million personnel and half of its good officers. One leader assessed that to win the war, Ukraine would need a decisive advantage in drones.

Leaders said Ukraine could sustain its fight for perhaps another year or two. But, one leader stipulated, Ukraine would require a defensive strategy, with more fortifications and an end to offensives such as Kursk. Russians, with a large war economy and more people, might sustain a longer fight. They had a high tolerance for pain and could accept lower living standards.

Ukrainians voiced gratitude for Western support but also frustration. According to one leader, the West had provided only 30% of the weapons Ukraine needed. Ukraine could not mobilize more troops unless it could arm them properly. According to another leader, Ukraine could maintain morale if it sent new troops into battle in Bradley and Stryker armored vehicles, but not into the trenches poorly armed. The goal this year would be to stabilize the front and increase the scale of deep-strike bombing, a leader said.

Ukrainians did not expect NATO membership anytime soon, one leader commented. With its large, combat-tested forces and expanded defense industry, Ukraine would be potent asset for the alliance.

Prospects for a negotiated solution to the war were seen to be poor. Ukraine was not ready, one leader lamented, it needed to become stronger. Another said, all Ukrainians wanted the war to end and regretted giving up nuclear weapons to Russia, but Ukrainians did not want to give up an inch of their territory. If the West forced it, this would be like Munich in 1938. It would be the end of international law – force would have prevailed.

Potential negotiating positions were seen to be far apart. According to one leader, Putin would insist that Ukraine accept Russian sovereignty over Crimea and the four partially occupied regions in the east. And Ukraine would have to slash its armed forces, become neutral, and foreswear joining NATO. No Ukrainian leader could agree to this.

In any peace accord, a leader said, there could be no compromise on Ukraine’s sovereignty or territorial integrity, on the size or capability of its armed forces, and or on its ability to join the European Union and NATO. Ukraine would agree only to a just peace, one that deterred further aggression.

A negotiated peace or even just a ceasefire, leaders agreed, would require that Ukraine maintain its armed forces and be allowed to host European peacekeepers. They would have to be militarily credible, to help deter aggression. On Dec. 26, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov disparaged prospects for a ceasefire, calling it a “path to nowhere.”

Ukrainians emphasized good governance. Democracy and civil society remained vibrant even though martial law imposed some media limits, a leader said. Corruption persisted, but Ukraine had strong potential to attack it, aided by U.S.-backed anti-corruption institutions.

Ukrainians agreed that during the war unity was most important. Elections could take place afterward. Zelensky was said to be planning to run again. He or General Valerii Zaluzhny could lead a coalition government. Now ambassador to the U.K., Zaluzhny was Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. But one leader cautioned, “War is not an excuse to limit the role of the parliament.”

William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at RAND. He was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia, and a Department of State senior adviser at the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission).

21. Ukraine Has Launched A New Offensive Into Russia. Why And Why Now?

Ukraine Has Launched A New Offensive Into Russia. Why And Why Now?

rferl.org · by Todd Prince · January 9, 2025

Since August, Ukrainian forces have been struggling to hold onto territory they seized in Russia's Kursk region, part of a cross-border incursion that, despite having unclear tactical aims, surprised Kyiv's Western allies and the Kremlin.

Now Kyiv has launched a new offensive in Kursk, pushing against Russian forces supported by North Korean soldiers who have clawed back more than half of the territory Ukraine captured.

It's not clear why Ukraine is waging a new assault in Kursk, and why now. Ukraine is struggling in multiple locations along the front line. It's outgunned by Russia. It has major problems recruiting and mobilizing enough men to replenish its depleted ranks.

So why expend scarce resources on a new, possibly futile offensive? The goal, experts say, could be to change the narrative of the nearly three-year war.

"Ukraine's center of gravity is U.S. support. Any gains it makes inside Russia will make it harder for the new administration to call the war a lost cause," said John Nagl, a professor at the U.S. Army War College.

Ukraine Advances In Kursk Region (January 5, 2024)

Boosting Morale

Ukrainian forces have made limited gains since launching their new assault on January 5. And it remains unclear if it is a feint operation -- designed to draw Russian forces in from elsewhere on the front -- or part of a larger counteroffensive.

Ukraine's incursion into Kursk in August was seen as an attempt to draw Russian forces from eastern Ukraine and slow down their advance.But Kyiv's strategy largely failed as Russia prioritized advances in eastern Ukraine. Moscow also received help from North Korea, which sent some 11,000 troops to Kursk to support Russian forces.

Russian troops have continued to push forward in eastern Ukraine, seizing the town of Vuhledar in October. They are now close to capturing Pokrovsk, an important logistics hub in the Donetsk region.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has defended the incursion into Kursk. But military experts have questioned the move.

"Russian gains in the vicinity of Pokrovsk are militarily significant and have political weight; Kursk is of less military importance," said Nagl, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel.

SEE ALSO:

Tanks, Drones, And Troops Fight For Russian Village In Kursk Offensive

Nonetheless, gains in Kursk could boost Ukrainian morale and change the battlefield narrative at a critical time in the war. Pessimism has grown over Ukraine's chances with each new town captured by Russia.

It would also be a blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin's image as a "strong man defending Russia," said David Silbey, a professor of military studies at Cornell University.

During the highly choreographed annual call-in with the public in December, Putin promised to drive out Ukrainian forces from the Kursk region, though he did not give a time frame.

Silbey said Ukraine's chances of success in Kursk are higher than in the heavily fortified eastern front. Russia not only has most of its forces deployed in eastern Ukraine but also extensive defensive lines.

SEE ALSO:

Russia Advances, Ukraine Struggles, The War Turns Grimmer For Kyiv

"An offensive [in eastern Ukraine] would be a slow grind likely with limited success and heavy casualties, and it would weaken Ukrainian defenses in the area. The Ukrainian units are already wearing down really badly in eastern Ukraine and I don't think Zelenskiy wants to hasten that," added Silbey.

Ukraine is struggling to recruit soldiers, leading to a shortage of manpower along the 1,000-kilometer front line. A shortage of fighters, not weapons, is now the biggest problem for Ukraine's armed forces, experts say.

Silbey said he did not expect Ukraine's offensive in Kursk to last long considering the manpower constraints.

Bargaining Positions

Experts say the aim of Ukraine's new Kursk offensive could also be to boost Kyiv's leverage in any future peace negotiations.

Ukraine Invasion: News & Analysis

RFE/RL's Ukraine Live Briefing gives you the latest developments on Russia's invasion, Western military aid, the plight of civilians, and territorial control maps. For all of RFE/RL's coverage of the war, click here.

The fresh Kursk operation comes just two weeks before U.S. President-elect Donald Trump takes office. Trump has pledged to quickly end the war and previously threatened to cut billions in U.S. military aid to Ukraine.

At a news conference on January 7, Trump said he hoped to end the war within six months. He said it will be "tough" to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine but added he is determined to get things "straightened out."

Trump is reportedly seeking to freeze the conflict along the current front line, meaning any gains by either side in the meantime would strengthen their respective bargaining positions.

"In some ways, I see this as the opening salvo in the peace negotiations, getting Ukraine into as strong a position as it can be, and giving more to trade back to Russia at the negotiating table," Silbey said.

RFE/RL correspondent Mike Eckel contributed to this story.

rferl.org · by Todd Prince · January 9, 2025

22. U.S. Free Association with Greenland: A Bad Deal

A view from Denmark.

Excerpts:

The United States would gain nothing but additional expenses and unnecessary tensions with one of its close allies by pursuing free association with Greenland. In fact, free association would spoil what is a near-perfect arrangement for the United States, as Washington is already achieving its geostrategic objectives, while letting Denmark foot the bill for running Greenlandic society. Abandoning the cheap and successful engagement strategy would be an unforced error that would only benefit America’s adversaries.

Instead, the United States should maintain its current efforts and strive to find cheap ways to further strengthen its ties with Greenland. The United States could invest in additional support packages aimed at cooperation with Greenland in areas such as tourism and education. To make it easier for U.S. mining companies seeking to work in Greenland, Washington could incentivize new ventures by creating favorable loan schemes or a special investment fund for Arctic mining. This would not only secure important mineral supplies, but it would also weave the Greenlandic and U.S. economies closer together. Finally, Greenland has suggested the establishment of an Arctic North American political forum. Washington should support this initiative. Such a forum could be a place where the Arctic countries and local governments in North America (such as Alaska and Nunavut), as well as organizations representing local and indigenous communities, could strengthen dialogue and cooperation.

There is still cheap low-hanging fruit that can be picked to strengthen cooperation between Greenland, the United States, and Denmark — and thus secure American interests in Greenland. Washington should stick to these cost-effective efforts rather than pursuing complicated schemes like free association that will only make the United States worse off.

U.S. Free Association with Greenland: A Bad Deal - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen · January 9, 2025

In a press conference on Jan. 7, President-elect Donald Trump declined to rule out using military force to acquire Greenland. Previously, he proclaimed that American “ownership and control” of the semi-autonomous island, which is part of the Kingdom of Denmark, was “an absolute necessity.” The incoming president has also reposted a recent article arguing the virtues of a U.S. takeover of the island and even extended a Christmas greeting to “the People of Greenland, which is needed by the United States for National Security purposes” a few days later. All this has reinvigorated speculation that President-elect Trump will once again try to acquire Greenland. The previous Trump administration initially tried to buy the island in 2019.

This speculation should be taken seriously. It taps into an ongoing debate among former Trump officials who have focused on designing more realistic plans for acquiring the island. Kaush Arha, Alexander B. Gray, and Tom Dans have offered the most sophisticated proposal, suggesting that the United States should pursue a Compact of Free Association with an independent Greenland, like the current arrangement between Washington and a handful of Pacific micro-nations such as Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands. Under this arrangement, Greenland would gain independence from Denmark but offer the United States access to its territory in return for a security guarantee and promises of economic and administrative support, such as large annual direct economic transfers, judicial and diplomatic services, and a coast guard. Free association, the authors argue, would be beneficial for the United States as it would allow “the stationing of U.S. military personnel,” give the United States “an essential source of critical minerals,” and counteract a Chinese presence on the world’s largest island.

However, pursuing free association with Greenland would be a costly mistake. As I have previously argued in these pages, the United States is already achieving its geostrategic objectives in Greenland, while passing on the hefty bill for running the island to Denmark. While the proponents of free association accurately identify the three most important American goals in Greenland — maintaining military access to the island’s territory, getting access to critical minerals (such as rare earth elements), and avoiding Chinese influence over the island — free association would not enable Washington to reach those objectives. While it may be more realistic than trying to buy the island outright, free association would yield no geostrategic benefits, while ensuring the United States would incur new costs. It would also alienate Denmark, a NATO ally, which opposes the move. In short, pursuing free association would be a bad deal.

Become a Member

Free Association is Expensive

The Trump administration’s attempt to buy Greenland in 2019 was a strategic cul-de-sac that led to nothing but unnecessary tensions with Denmark. When the dust had settled, the United States quickly abandoned this approach and instead began pursuing a cost-effective engagement strategy in Greenland.

The current U.S. engagement strategy builds on existing agreements and combines an effective public diplomacy effort, anchored at the American consulate in Nuuk, the capital of Greenland, with minor economic and political incentives to Greenland and Denmark in return for local acceptance of American geostrategic ambitions. Such incentives include ensuring that installation support services at the American Pittufik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) are provided by a local company at lucrative rates, as well as small support packages for the minerals, tourism, and education sectors. Washington has not disclosed the total sum of these efforts, but based on publicly available data it is estimated to cost less than $50 million per year.

The U.S. strategy also tacitly acknowledges that interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Denmark, including American probing into the question of Greenlandic independence, is the third rail of Danish–American relations. Most Greenlandic elites as well as the broader public want independence from Denmark, and most Danish elites share the view that the island’s future is up to its inhabitants. While Denmark is unlikely to prevent Greenlandic independence if Nuuk wants to strike out on its own, Copenhagen views external meddling in what it considers its internal affairs to be out of bounds. As part of its engagement strategy, the United States has therefore stayed out of debates about the future status of Greenland and has strived to only engage with Greenland in ways that are seen as acceptable under the existing laws and norms governing Danish–Greenlandic relations.

Free association, by contrast, would involve touching that third rail by actively supporting Greenlandic independence and offering Greenland a better deal than the one Nuuk is currently getting from Denmark. It would lead to unnecessary tensions between the United States and one of its most stalwart allies in Europe.

Free association would not only cause consternation in Copenhagen, it would also entail taking on a substantial economic burden. Polls show that Nuuk would therefore only accept independence and free association with the United States if Washington at a minimum offers to replace Denmark as Greenland’s main source of administrative support and direct economic transfers worth at least $700 million per year. Free association would thus increase the price of U.S. involvement in Greenland by more than 1,000 percent.

The United States Is Already Getting What It Wants

At the same time, free association would not help the United States achieve any of its three geostrategic goals.

First, the United States has had a military presence in Greenland for several decades. The island plays an important role in U.S. deterrence of both global and regional threats. The radar and satellite installations at Pittufik Space Base, the Defense Department’s northernmost installation, support missile warning, missile defense, and space surveillance missions. While Greenland currently only plays a limited role in supporting maritime and airspace capacities and operations in the wider Arctic and North Atlantic regions — such as anti-submarine operations against Russian forces — the island’s strategic location could warrant more U.S. military attention in the future. If the United States wants more access than existing agreements allow, Greenland and Denmark have shown themselves to be amenable to Washington’s preferences, especially if given more political or economic incentives, the cost of which would be a tiny fraction of current Danish support to Greenland. It is therefore difficult to imagine that the United States would encounter significant pushback to expanding its current military presence should the need arise.

Second, American firms do not currently require free association to mine the critical minerals — including rare earth elements — found in Greenland. In 2019, the United States and Greenland agreed to strengthen existing cooperation in the development of mineral resources. Greenland’s 2024 foreign policy strategy emphasized a strong interest in attracting direct investment and trade from like-minded partners such as the United States, particularly individual states such as Alaska and those in the northeastern United States. At present, the Greenlandic mining industry largely remains dormant due to a number of factors, including low world market prices, high costs associated with mining under the harsh Arctic conditions, cumbersome regulations, and occasional local resistance by civil society groups. Free association would not remedy those challenges.

Third, the United States aims to prevent a significant Chinese presence on the island and maintain Greenland’s place within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. This has already been achieved through the current set-up, and free association would add no tangible benefits. While Russian entities have shown little interest in gaining a foothold in Greenland through investments or other types of cooperation, Chinese companies and research institutions made several unsuccessful attempts to establish a presence between 2014 and 2018. The lack of success was largely due to Danish and American efforts to deny China. Beijing has since moved on from its Arctic ambitions in Greenland — there have been no major attempts by Chinese actors to garner influence on the island since 2019.

Stick to the Current Engagement Strategy

The United States would gain nothing but additional expenses and unnecessary tensions with one of its close allies by pursuing free association with Greenland. In fact, free association would spoil what is a near-perfect arrangement for the United States, as Washington is already achieving its geostrategic objectives, while letting Denmark foot the bill for running Greenlandic society. Abandoning the cheap and successful engagement strategy would be an unforced error that would only benefit America’s adversaries.

Instead, the United States should maintain its current efforts and strive to find cheap ways to further strengthen its ties with Greenland. The United States could invest in additional support packages aimed at cooperation with Greenland in areas such as tourism and education. To make it easier for U.S. mining companies seeking to work in Greenland, Washington could incentivize new ventures by creating favorable loan schemes or a special investment fund for Arctic mining. This would not only secure important mineral supplies, but it would also weave the Greenlandic and U.S. economies closer together. Finally, Greenland has suggested the establishment of an Arctic North American political forum. Washington should support this initiative. Such a forum could be a place where the Arctic countries and local governments in North America (such as Alaska and Nunavut), as well as organizations representing local and indigenous communities, could strengthen dialogue and cooperation.

There is still cheap low-hanging fruit that can be picked to strengthen cooperation between Greenland, the United States, and Denmark — and thus secure American interests in Greenland. Washington should stick to these cost-effective efforts rather than pursuing complicated schemes like free association that will only make the United States worse off.

Become a Member

Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen is an associate professor at the Royal Danish Defence College, where he is the head of research at the Center for Arctic Security Studies. The views presented here are the author’s own and do not represent the views of the Royal Danish Defence College or any other Danish government entity.

Image: Oliver Schauf via Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen · January 9, 2025

23. How to Win the New Cold War

Excerpts:

Trump’s foreign policy looks superficially more dangerous than Biden’s. But it was the Biden administration’s incomprehension of deterrence that set in motion a series of disasters, first in Afghanistan, then in Ukraine, and then in Israel, and created the conditions for what would be a much larger disaster: a Chinese blockade of Taiwan. In a similar way, Reagan’s critics at home and abroad accused him of risky brinkmanship, whereas in fact it was during the term of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, that the Soviets invaded Afghanistan—one of the most perilous moments in the Cold War.

In 1980, many would have scoffed at any prediction that Reagan would end the Cold War—that he really would deliver peace through strength. Today, the argument that Trump might pull off a similar feat will strike many as absurd. But historical wisdom consists partly of remembering how unlikely epochal events seemed, even just a few years before they happened. Success in foreign policy can remake a presidential reputation beyond recognition. So it was with Reagan. So it may yet prove with Trump.

How to Win the New Cold War

Foreign Affairs · by More by Niall Ferguson · January 7, 2025

To Compete With China, Trump Should Learn From Reagan

Niall Ferguson

January/February 2025 Published on January 7, 2025

Illustration by Tyler Comrie; Photo source: Reuters

Niall Ferguson is Milbank Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the author of Kissinger: 1923–1968; The Idealist.

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Donald Trump’s 2024 presidential campaign very deliberately echoed the one that Ronald Reagan ran in 1980. “Peace through strength” and “Are you better off today than you were four years ago?” are the two Reagan slogans that are best remembered today. Less well known is that in 1980, Reagan used the slogan “Make America great again,” including in his convention acceptance speech.

Few commentators have paid much attention to these parallels, partly because the two presidents’ personalities are so different, partly because paying tribute to Reagan has long been a vacuous ritual for Republican candidates. But the analogy is instructive—and Trump should use it to his political and strategic advantage, remembering (as others have forgotten) what exactly “peace through strength” turned out to mean in the 1980s. Although it has become fashionable to credit the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev with ending the Cold War, in truth it was the Reagan administration that forced Moscow down a path of reform that ultimately led to drastic disarmament and the end of the Soviet empire in eastern Europe.

Reagan opened with strength. He boldly reasserted the American rejection of communism as an ideology and Soviet expansionism as a strategy. At the same time, he initiated a major increase in defense spending that sought to exploit U.S. technological superiority. When the right time came, however, he pivoted to a series of summit meetings with Gorbachev that ultimately produced stunning breakthroughs in both disarmament and European security.

As he makes clear in his book The Art of the Deal, Trump lives to bargain. “There are times when you have to be aggressive,” he writes of one real estate coup, “but there are also times when your best strategy is to lie back.” Trump firmly believes that, in a negotiation with a strong adversary, one must open aggressively—but then seek the crucial moment to settle. Today, the United States finds itself in at least the sixth year of a second cold war, this time with China, a confrontation that has become even more dangerous under the Biden administration. In his first term, Trump recognized the American need to contain China’s rise and convinced Washington policy elites, despite their initial skepticism, that this required both a trade war and a tech war. In his second term, he should once again begin by piling on the pressure with a fresh show of American strength. But this should not be an end in itself. His ultimate goal ought to be like Reagan’s: to get to a deal with Washington’s principal adversary that reduces the nightmarish risk of World War III—a risk inherent in a cold war between two nuclear-armed superpowers.

SAME DIFFERENCE

There are, of course, major differences between Trump and Reagan. Trump is a protectionist; Reagan was a free trader. Trump is as hostile to illegal immigration as Reagan was relaxed about it. Trump is as sympathetic to authoritarian strongmen as Reagan was keen to promote democracy. Trump’s public personality is as abrasive as Reagan’s was genial, as vindictive as Reagan’s was magnanimous.

Also important to note is that the economic context when Reagan was elected was quite different from today: it was far worse. Inflation, as measured by the consumer price index, was at 12.6 percent in November 1980. The unemployment rate was 7.5 percent and climbing; it would peak at 10.8 percent in December 1982. Interest rates were sky-high: the effective federal funds rate was 15.85 percent. The economy had emerged from recession in August 1980 and would return to recession a year later. By contrast, at the time of the 2024 election, inflation was 2.6 percent, unemployment 4.1 percent, and the federal funds rate 4.83 percent.

Nevertheless, the resemblances between Trump and Reagan—and their times—are numerous and significant. It is easy to forget, for example, how widely Reagan was feared at that time by liberals at home and abroad, as well as by Washington’s adversaries. As Max Boot shows in his new, revisionist biography of Reagan, he was seen at the time of his first election victory as “an amiable dunce,” in the words of the Democratic Party grandee Clark Clifford. The liberal journalist Nicholas von Hoffman wrote in Harper’s that it was “humiliating to think of this unlettered, self-assured bumpkin being our President.” It was routine for cartoonists to depict a crazed Reagan astride a falling atomic bomb, like the character T. J. “King” Kong in the movie Dr. Strangelove. Trump is depicted the same way today. Reagan was mocked, belittled, and condescended to more than any other major politician of his era—and so, today, is Trump.

Consider also the strength of their political positions. On the one hand, Reagan won in 1980 by a much larger margin than Trump did in 2024. Carrying 44 states, Reagan was elected president with 489 votes in the Electoral College and a popular vote margin of 9.7 percent. Trump’s win was no landslide: 31 states, 312 Electoral College votes, a popular vote margin of around 1.6 percent. On the other hand, the Republican Party, under Trump, will control both chambers of Congress, whereas under Reagan it had only the Senate. Moreover, Trump moved the Supreme Court decidedly to the right with his three first-term appointments, whereas the court during Reagan’s term was distinctly more liberal.

The resemblances between Trump and Reagan are numerous and significant.

Like Reagan—who was shot by John Hinckley, Jr., barely two months after his inauguration—Trump has survived a brush with death at the hands of an assassin. In each case, survival was accompanied by a sense of divine oversight, although neither man was especially devout. Like Reagan, too, Trump has vowed to reduce the size of the federal government. Both men were committed to supply-side reforms (in particular, deregulation), as well as spending cuts. And, like Reagan, one of Trump’s first-year priorities will be to extend the tax cuts of his first term. Also like Reagan, Trump is very unlikely to balance the budget.

It is true that some of Trump’s nominees are more outlandish than anyone Reagan ever considered for a cabinet-level job: consider, for example, Kash Patel, a midlevel official during Trump’s first term whom Trump has tapped to lead the FBI and who has vowed to purge “the deep state” of Trump’s enemies and critics, and Tulsi Gabbard, an idiosyncratic former Democrat whom Trump has tapped as director of national intelligence despite her lack of experience and her puzzling sympathetic views of Vladimir Putin’s regime in Russia and Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Many remember nostalgically the stars of the early Reagan years: James Baker as chief of staff, Caspar Weinberger as secretary of defense, and the wunderkind David Stockman as director of the Office of Management and Budget. But few have any memory of James Edwards, who had served as governor of South Carolina but whose training as an oral surgeon scarcely qualified him to be secretary of energy, the post for which Reagan nominated him in 1980.

What about Trump’s very un-­­Reaganite fondness for tariffs? On the campaign trail, Trump talked about a “universal” tariff of up to 20 percent on all goods coming into the United States and a 60 percent tariff on all imports from China. Twenty-three Nobel laureate economists have warned that Trump’s economic policies, “including high tariffs even on goods from our friends and allies and regressive tax cuts for corporations and individuals, will lead to higher prices, larger deficits, and greater inequality.” But Trump seems more likely to deliver disinflation, as did Reagan, partly through lower oil prices and an already cooling labor market. And although Reagan was certainly in favor of free trade, it would be a mistake to caricature him as doctrinaire on the issue. He was not above pressuring Japan into imposing “voluntary” quotas on its automobile exports, which were then undercutting cars manufactured in Detroit.

Economists also worry that Trump may undermine the independence of the Federal Reserve. They might not know, however, that Reagan startled Fed chair Paul Volcker at their first meeting by saying, according to Boot’s biography: “I’ve had several letters from people who raise the question of why we need the Federal Reserve at all. They seem to feel that it is the Fed that causes much of our monetary problems and that we would be better off if we abolished it. Why do we need the Federal Reserve?” Initially dumbstruck, Volcker recovered and explained that the Fed had been “very important to the stability of the economy.” However much Trump dislikes today’s Fed chair, Jay Powell, he knows—as does his nominee for Treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, a Wall Street veteran—the importance of market confidence in the independence of monetary policy.

HAWKS AND DOVES

Historians tend to judge modern presidents more by their foreign policy successes and failures than by their domestic achievements. Like Reagan, Trump will inherit several foreign policy crises from his predecessor. Back in 1980, Iran and Iraq were at war and the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan. Today, Iran is at war with Israel, rather than with Iraq, and it is Ukraine, not Afghanistan, that is in the Kremlin’s cross hairs. Back then, Nicaragua had just succumbed to the communist Sandinista revolution. Today, Venezuela is a failed state after 25 years of the Chavistas. All in all, the world seems more perilous than at any time since the end of the Cold War. China has supplanted the Soviet Union as the United States’ principal rival—a superpower that is both economically and technologically more formidable than the Soviets ever were. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are now cooperating openly both economically and militarily. It is not hyperbole to refer to them as an axis akin to the one Washington and its allies faced during World War II.

Perhaps Trump will share Reagan’s early luck. Within minutes of Reagan’s first inaugural address, Iran released the 53 American hostages it was holding in Tehran. Trump may get good news even sooner, depending on the steps Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu decides to take against the Islamic Republic’s nuclear facilities. Compared with a year ago, the strategic situation of Israel has been greatly strengthened. Iran’s various proxies—Hamas and Hezbollah, in particular—have suffered major losses, and the Islamic Republic’s capabilities in both air attack and air defense have been exposed as feeble. Few other states in the region seem very sorry at the reverses inflicted on the moribund regime of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

By contrast, the news from Ukraine is unlikely to be good. Trump has repeatedly pledged that he will end the war there but without specifying how—and wars are notoriously difficult to end. More than three years passed between President Richard Nixon’s opening peace initiative in 1969 and the agreement for which Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese General Le Duc Tho received the Nobel Peace Prize. The negotiations that eventually produced peace between Egypt and Israel in 1979 lasted more than five years.

In Ukraine, negotiations will be extremely difficult, partly because only one side desperately needs a cease-fire, and that is Kyiv, whose army is dangerously close to its breaking point. Outmanned and outgunned, Ukraine’s military is also overstretched, thanks in part to its bold but perhaps foolhardy incursion into Russian territory. It is not obvious why Putin would enter peace negotiations when his forces seem close to a breakthrough in several areas along the frontline. The Biden administration’s lifting of restrictions on what Ukraine can do with U.S.-supplied weapons has come too late to turn the tide. In terms of weapons deliveries, Russia continues to receive more support from allies than does Ukraine, and Moscow has also received additional troops from North Korea.

A pro-Trump shirt at a rally in Reading, Pennsylvania, October 2024 Jeenah Moon / Reuters

In facing this set of challenges, Trump should look to Reagan’s example. At first, Reagan escalated the arms race with the Soviets; U.S. defense spending rose 54 percent between 1981 and 1985. He deployed intermediate-range nuclear missiles to Western Europe, launched the Strategic Defense Initiative missile defense system in 1983, and armed the mujahideen in Afghanistan, who inflicted heavy casualties on the Soviet forces that had invaded in 1979. More generally, Reagan did not hesitate to use U.S. military force when he saw American interests threatened. In 1983, he ordered U.S. forces to invade the Caribbean island nation of Grenada, after its Marxist-Leninist regime had descended into internecine violence. He also ordered the bombing of Libya in April 1986, in retaliation for the bombing of a discotheque in West Berlin, which had killed an American soldier.

But Reagan was not always a hawk. He did little in response to the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981. He agreed to reduce arms sales to Taiwan in 1982. And he did not retaliate when Iranian-backed Shiite militants bombed a U.S. barracks in Beirut in 1983, killing 241 members of the U.S. armed forces engaged in a doomed peacekeeping mission.

Nothing captured this flexibility more than Reagan’s about-face from brinkmanship to détente with Gorbachev. In talks in Reykjavik in 1986, the two came close to agreeing to abolish all their nuclear weapons. In the end, they pledged to drastically reduce intermediate-range nuclear missiles on both sides of the Iron Curtain. So radical were the steps Reagan took in his second term that he was criticized for going too far by the original architects of détente, Nixon and Kissinger. Indeed, Kissinger privately called the Reagan-Gorbachev agreement the “worst thing since World War II.”

The most impressive thing about Reagan’s apparent turn from brinkmanship to deep disarmament is how little resonance these criticisms found outside the pages of conservative journals such as the National Review. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was ratified in the Senate, 93 votes to 5. The peace that ended the Cold War enjoyed widespread legitimacy more than a year before the fall of the Berlin Wall provided Reagan with symbolic vindication.

LET’S MAKE A DEAL

At the beginning of his first term, Trump’s most important foreign policy priority was competing with China. But competition quickly evolved into containment and ultimately confrontation. Trump did not intend to start a second cold war. But his strategy revealed that one had already begun, owing in no small part to the logic of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s strategy of achieving parity with and then superseding the United States.

Today, the new cold war is being waged unremittingly in multiple domains, from Ukraine to the Middle East, from space to cyberspace. But the biggest risk to world peace is surely in East Asia, where Chinese military exercises suggest that Beijing is preparing for a blockade—or a more ambiguous “quarantine”—of Taiwan at some point in the coming years. At present, the United States has few good options for such a contingency. In an interview last June, Admiral Sam Paparo, the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, spoke of his intention, in the event of a Chinese blockade, “to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape using a number of classified capabilities . . . so that I can make their lives utterly miserable for a month, which buys me the time for the rest of everything.” But the United States does not yet have the maritime drones and other weapons Paparo has in mind. Even if it did, using them against Chinese naval forces would risk a fearful escalation into full-blown war, with the potential to culminate in a nuclear exchange. Whatever “the rest of everything” means, it does not offer the least clarity about how such a showdown would end.

Trump’s commitment is to avoid entangling the United States in more “forever wars” and, above all, to prevent a third world war. In his memoir, John Bolton, who served as Trump’s third national security adviser, describes how the president repeatedly deviated from planned talking points when meeting with Xi because of Trump’s desire to strike “the big deal” with Beijing—“the most exciting, largest deal ever,” as Trump described it. To that end, he was willing to cut China slack in the U.S.-Chinese tech war by relaxing measures against Chinese firms such as ZTE and Huawei. And for the same reason, as Bolton relates, Trump was unwilling to press China on issues such as its crackdown on Hong Kong pro-democracy protests (“I don’t want to get involved. We have human-rights problems too.”) and China’s repression and large-scale imprisonment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang (which Trump explicitly approved of during a conversation with Xi).

The new cold war is being waged unremittingly in multiple domains.

In Trump’s view, a “big deal” might be the only way to avoid having to start a war that the United States might not win. “One of Trump’s favorite comparisons,” Bolton recalls, “was to point to the tip of one of his Sharpies and say, ‘This is Taiwan,’ then point to the Resolute desk [in the Oval Office] and say, ‘This is China.’” It was not just the discrepancy in size that bothered him. “Taiwan is like two feet from China,” Trump told one Republican senator. “We are 8,000 miles away. If they invade, there isn’t a fucking thing we can do about it.”

Whatever members of his national security team may imagine, a deal with Xi should remain Trump’s ultimate objective in his second term. The close involvement of the high-tech entrepreneur Elon Musk in the Trump transition also points in the direction of détente with China, as a strategy of confrontation is not in the interests of Musk’s electric vehicle company, Tesla.

Such a deal could not be a giveaway, in which Beijing enjoyed tariff reductions without having to dismantle its extensive system of industrial subsidies. Nor could it allow China to resume exploiting high-tech supply chains for the purposes of espionage and possibly sabotage. But it would make sense, as it did in the 1980s, for the two superpowers to pursue disarmament. The current nuclear arms race is a lopsided one in which Washington’s foes expand their arsenals while nonproliferation applies only to U.S. allies.

A crucial element of any U.S.-Chinese agreement would have to be a return to the 1970s consensus on Taiwan, whereby the United States accepts that there is “one China” but also reserves the option to resist any forcible change to Taiwan’s de facto autonomy. The erosion of this “strategic ambiguity” would not enhance American deterrence but merely increase the risk of a “Taiwan semiconductor crisis” akin to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

A Trump-Xi deal, however, can come only after the United States has reestablished a position of strength. After ratcheting up frictions over trade in 2025 and 2026—which will hurt the Chinese economy more than it hurts the U.S. economy, as in 2018–19—Trump should adopt a more conciliatory stance toward China, just as Reagan dramatically softened his attitude toward the Soviet Union in his second term.

SURPRISES IN STORE?

Trump’s foreign policy looks superficially more dangerous than Biden’s. But it was the Biden administration’s incomprehension of deterrence that set in motion a series of disasters, first in Afghanistan, then in Ukraine, and then in Israel, and created the conditions for what would be a much larger disaster: a Chinese blockade of Taiwan. In a similar way, Reagan’s critics at home and abroad accused him of risky brinkmanship, whereas in fact it was during the term of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, that the Soviets invaded Afghanistan—one of the most perilous moments in the Cold War.

In 1980, many would have scoffed at any prediction that Reagan would end the Cold War—that he really would deliver peace through strength. Today, the argument that Trump might pull off a similar feat will strike many as absurd. But historical wisdom consists partly of remembering how unlikely epochal events seemed, even just a few years before they happened. Success in foreign policy can remake a presidential reputation beyond recognition. So it was with Reagan. So it may yet prove with Trump.

Niall Ferguson is Milbank Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the author of Kissinger: 1923–1968; The Idealist.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Niall Ferguson · January 7, 2025

24. Special ops forces seek to manage digital footprints, achieve ‘security through obscurity’

Special ops forces seek to manage digital footprints, achieve ‘security through obscurity’

With focus now turned toward competition with China and Russia, special operations forces need to hone their ability to achieve “security through obscurity.”

https://defensescoop.com/2025/01/08/socom-sof-special-operations-forces-renaissance-digital-security-through-obscurity/

By

Jon Harper

January 8, 2025Listen to this article

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A Special Tactics Airman, assigned to the 24th Special Operations Wing, signals a plane to land at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico on March 1, 2024. Supported by U.S. Special Operations Command, Emerald Warrior is a joint special operations exercise that prepares U.S. Special Operations Command forces, Conventional Enablers, Partner Forces, and Interagency Elements to respond to various threats across the spectrum of conflict. (U.S. Air Force Photo by Senior Airman Natalie Vandergriff)

Advanced adversaries are acquiring intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and other tools that will make it easier to locate American troops. To counter that, U.S. special operations forces need to hone their ability to achieve “security through obscurity” on “hyper-transparent battlefields,” officials say.

During the post-9/11 Global War on Terror, U.S. commandos squared off against relatively low-tech adversaries. However, with the Pentagon’s focus now turned toward competition with nations like China and Russia and the proliferation of advanced technology, the SOF community faces new challenges.

Officials are pointing to the ongoing Ukraine-Russia conflict as an example of how warfare is evolving. In that clash, both sides have been using drones, electronic warfare, cyber, counter-drone tools, deception techniques, social media and other means to find enemy forces and obscure their own locations.

“I think we’ve seen this in sort of a microcosm of the Ukraine fight, it’s going to be more about dealing with being seen and what that means in terms of your signature, as opposed to maybe a previous way of thinking of being not seen at all. And so … in the multi-domains we’re going to have to operate it means having the right, if you will, footprint in the digital environment. It means knowing that if an adversary can see you, that you’re not something that necessarily generates any more interest,” Christopher Maier, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, said Tuesday at an event hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Maier continued: “The fascinating thing looking at some of our less sophisticated adversaries … is they almost all have social media presence, right, things that we wouldn’t have thought about 15, 20 years ago, maybe even five years ago. And that means there’s a lot of chaff out there. And I think finding ways to use that noise, you know, sort of security through obscurity, is going to be how we have to think about this. [There’s a] lot of effort to really build, in many cases, the technology, but oftentimes, it’s the different thinking, the different tactics, techniques and procedures that we’re going to have to use against adversaries that — let’s face it, China, Russia, Iran are much more sophisticated in identifying our activity than ISIS and Al Qaeda were, and so we’ve known that for a long time. There’s a lot of emphasis and a lot of investment in that space.”

The Defense Department is trying to work through those challenges via experiments, he noted.

“What I can talk about here is really thinking about it in a different way than just assuming we’re always going to have the advantage and that some of these capabilities that are so ubiquitous now … and so easy to access, aren’t going to be threats to us. They are. And it’s less of the perfect widget or the perfect way of doing things, and more of, I think, a series of layering approaches we’re going to have to take. And we’ve seen some good success in our internal departmental experimentation that if we really put a lot of emphasis on it, we can achieve degrees of obscurity that I think we’re going to need, not only in … sort of steady state of campaigning, but certainly in cases where we’re going to need a period of uncontested space in a crisis or conflict to do the things we need to do,” he said.

Last month, U.S. Special Operations Command released a new strategy document, dubbed “SOF Renaissance,” which noted the need to be prepared for “hyper-transparent battlefields.”

The strategy’s development came as commandos are preparing for and conducting a variety of missions, not just raids against terrorists. That includes assisting foreign partners — U.S. SOF are present in more than 80 countries — with honing irregular warfare concepts, and countering adversaries’ strategies and activities below the threshold of armed conflict.

Key focus areas for the command include assured access, shaping operating environments prior to conflict, all-domain deep sensing and supporting the Joint Force with SOF capabilities, among others.

“I think SOF has started to come into the fore again, still doing counterterrorism [and] crisis response — those have been the persistent missions — but increasingly where we can support other elements, largely in a support role for those strategic competition elements. And here campaigning is the bread and butter of SOF. So when we talk about the integration of technology in a way that advances not only our ability to operate, but often provides many of the fixes that we’re struggling with as an overall force, we talk about that as solving the challenges of the Joint Force. SOF plays a big role in that. That could be in some of the more, you know, in vogue elements like AI or … machine learning. We’re doing that at a level that brings operators and technologists together quite effectively. But it could be in some of the old traditional ways of being that sensor out there and providing the necessary input to decision makers to better understand the situation,” Maier said.

Special Tactics Airmen assigned to the 24th Special Operations Wing secure an airfield during exercise Emerald Warrior 2024 at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, March 1, 2024. Special Tactics Airmen are continuously adapting and training in order to ensure mission success for the joint force. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Stephen Pulter)

The “silent warrior” concept fits with that vision, he noted.

“Going forward, in many instances, sure, there’ll be opportunities and probably we’ll be called on to do more of the direct action that have been more the calling card … of SOF in the CT fights, [but] I don’t think that’s going to be the future bulk of our effort. And I think we will be enabling lots of other aspects of the government and hopefully partners and allies, to be that more visible face,” he said.

The special ops community will need resourcing for transformation, the new strategy noted.

“As we look to the future, we can see a changing world where SOF is required to conduct full spectrum Special Operations that illuminate challenges and offer new options to the Joint Force in campaigning, crisis, and conflict,” officials wrote. “Ensuring this transformation in the face of today’s strategic landscape requires innovative force designs regarding how SOF will fight in the future. This demands a joint, all-domain, SOF formation that utilizes time-tested SOF concepts, approaches, and techniques, with modern-day technology and SOF-Space-Cyber convergence… all while adapting to the complexities of a converging threat and changing character of war. Finally, SOF experimentation and wargaming aim to introduce futuristic concepts in evolving operational environments, with a particular focus on capabilities tied to how SOF fights.”

Special ops forces must be early adopters at the Defense Department of innovations in areas such as AI, autonomous systems and cyber to enhance irregular warfare capabilities in complex operating environments, the document emphasized.

“AI and uncrewed systems are changing warfare through increased automation and autonomy. This leads to more precise targeting and reduced risk to human personnel. The distinction between optimizing and generative AI is crucial and will be a game changer. Swarms of low-cost drones and remote explosive devices, using AI and autonomy, blur traditional human-machine boundaries on the battlefield. SOF must also use these systems to improve decisionmaking and situational awareness,” officials wrote, noting that SOCOM “views the relationship of data, analytics, and AI not just as a tool, but as a strategic imperative to create advantages for the Joint Force.”

In future conflicts, commandos are expected to serve as a so-called “inside force” to support other U.S. military elements and operate within sophisticated adversaries’ weapons engagement zones.

Defense Department officials are promoting a concept known as the SOF-space-cyber “triad.” Traditionally, in U.S. military parlance, the term “triad” referred to strategic forces consisting of nuclear-armed missiles, submarines and bombers. The new or modern triad is focused on supporting conventional and irregular forces.

“The SOF-Space-Cyber triad represents a powerful convergence and synergy in modern warfare, combining the unique capabilities of special operations forces, space assets, and cyber operations. This integration enables on-the-ground intelligence, access, global communication, surveillance, information warfare and network disruption. Together, these elements create a force multiplier factor that enable the Joint Force to conduct operations with reduced risk of escalation,” officials wrote in the strategy.

Officials in the special ops community want SOCOM to remain a pathfinder for new capabilities that other elements of the Joint Force can adopt.

The new strategy noted that SOF had a pioneering role in bringing the Maven Smart System artificial intelligence capability into the U.S. military.

Last year, Palantir was awarded a $480 million deal for the system to be used broadly across the Defense Department. The Pentagon’s Chief Digital and AI Office (CDAO) plans to proliferate the technology to warfighters. Work under the new contract will initially cover five U.S. combatant commands: Central Command, European Command, Indo-Pacific Command, Northern Command/NORAD, and Transportation Command.

Meanwhile, SOCOM aims to bring new innovations and vendors into its acquisition fold.

(U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Barry Loo)

The SOFWERX hub, located in Tampa, Florida, near where Special Operations Command is headquartered, helps connect technology providers with acquisition officials and special operators.

Last month, the Defense Department announced that SOCOM’s acquisition, technology and logistics directorate is launching a commercial solutions opening to support the program executive office for SOF digital applications.

Maier said he talked to SOCOM commander Gen. Bryan Fenton earlier this week about challenges associated with onboarding new tech, including solutions from the commercial sector.

“We’re continuing to try to stress the system that is still fundamentally built on a previous model — you might call it the hardware model. We’ve moved to the software space,” Maier said.

SOCOM has seen successes in linking operators with officials in the acquisition world, he noted, but it faces some of the same constraints as other DOD components when it comes to procurement and working with commercial vendors.

“We’re endeavoring to continue to reinforce the idea that this is operator led, as opposed to spending a lot of time developing a requirement, then it goes out for bid and we’re shooting a couple ducks behind the duck we’re trying to hit. I do worry, though, that some of the structures are built on a previous model and you can only evolve them so much, and we’re going to have to find ways to do things differently,” Maier said.

“We’ve got to do it with the necessary safeguards, but we want our operators who are seeing the problem upfront or talking closely to their allies and partners who might be dealing with the problem to be sitting side-by-side with industry or the right parts of the commercial sector to build solutions. We always pride ourselves from the special operations world of being those pathfinders. We’re going to have to make sure that we’re not believing our own sort of … hype and showing that we’re actually providing capabilities that then the Joint Force can take, maybe make a program of record, maybe scale up and use otherwise. If we’re only doing it for SOF, that’s not going to be effective. And if we’re doing it too slowly to even help the Joint Force, that’s also not going to be effective.”

That principle should apply to how the special ops community develops capabilities for operating in environments that are contested from a surveillance perspective, he suggested.

“A lot of this is going to have to be SOF working closely with the intelligence community to come up with those solutions. It’s not only about the next widget per se or the next, you know, first-person viewer drone,” Maier said. “It’s going to have to be some of these tools that enable us to have that security wrapper around the things that are necessary for us to operate in semi or totally contested environments.”

Written by Jon Harper

Jon Harper is Managing Editor of DefenseScoop, the Scoop News Group’s online publication focused on the Pentagon and its pursuit of new capabilities. He leads an award-winning team of journalists in providing breaking news and in-depth analysis on military technology and the ways in which it is shaping how the Defense Department operates and modernizes. You can also follow him on X (the social media platform formerly known as Twitter) @Jon_Harper_

25. Japanese Yakuza Leader Pleads Guilty To Nuclear Materials Trafficking, Narcotics, And Weapons Charges

Japanese Yakuza Leader Pleads Guilty To Nuclear Materials Trafficking, Narcotics, And Weapons Charges

justice.gov · January 8, 2025

Edward Y. Kim, the Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York; Matthew G. Olsen, the Assistant Attorney General for National Security; and Anne Milgram, the Administrator of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), announced today that TAKESHI EBISAWA pled guilty in Manhattan federal court to conspiring to traffic nuclear materials, including uranium and weapons-grade plutonium, from Burma to other countries, as well as to international narcotics trafficking and weapons charges. EBISAWA pled guilty today before U.S. District Judge Colleen McMahon.

Acting U.S. Attorney Edward Y. Kim said: “As he admitted in federal court today, Takeshi Ebisawa brazenly trafficked nuclear material, including weapons-grade plutonium, out of Burma. At the same time, he worked to send massive quantities of heroin and methamphetamine to the United States in exchange for heavy-duty weaponry such as surface-to-air missiles to be used on battlefields in Burma and laundered what he believed to be drug money. It is thanks to the extraordinary efforts of the DEA’s Special Operations Division, the career national security prosecutors of this Office, and the cooperation of our law enforcement partners in Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand, that Ebisawa’s plot was detected and stopped.”

Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen said: “Today’s plea should serve as a stark reminder to those who imperil our national security by trafficking weapons-grade plutonium and other dangerous materials on behalf of organized criminal syndicates that the Department of Justice will hold you accountable to the fullest extent of the law.”

DEA Administrator Anne Milgram said: “This case demonstrates DEA’s unparalleled ability to dismantle the world’s most dangerous criminal networks. Our investigation into Takeshi Ebisawa and his associates exposed the shocking depths of international organized crime from trafficking nuclear materials to fueling the narcotics trade and arming violent insurgents. DEA remains positioned to relentlessly pursue anyone who threatens our national security, regardless of where they operate. Protecting the American people from such evil will always remain DEA’s top priority.”

According to the allegations contained in the Complaint, the Superseding Indictment, and other information in the public record:

Since at least in or about 2019, the DEA investigated EBISAWA in connection with large-scale narcotics and weapons trafficking. During the investigation, EBISAWA unwittingly introduced an undercover DEA agent (“UC-1”), posing as a narcotics and weapons trafficker, to EBISAWA’s international network of criminal associates, which spanned Japan, Thailand, Burma, Sri Lanka, and the U.S., among other places, for the purpose of arranging large-scale narcotics and weapons transactions. EBISAWA and his network, including his co-defendants, negotiated multiple narcotics and weapons transactions with UC-1.

EBISAWA conspired to broker the purchase, from UC-1, of U.S.-made surface-to-air missiles, as well as other heavy-duty weaponry, intended for multiple ethnic armed groups in Burma (including the leader of an ethnic insurgent group in Burma (“CC-1”)), and to accept large quantities of heroin and methamphetamine for distribution as partial payment for the weapons. EBISAWA understood the weapons to have been manufactured in the U.S. and taken from U.S. military bases in Afghanistan. EBISAWA planned for the heroin and methamphetamine to be distributed in the New York market.

In addition, EBISAWA conspired to sell, in a separate transaction, 500 kilograms of methamphetamine and 500 kilograms of heroin to UC-1 for distribution in New York. In furtherance of that transaction, on or about June 16, 2021, and on or about September 27, 2021, one of EBISAWA’s co-defendants provided samples of approximately one kilogram of methamphetamine and approximately 1.4 kilograms of heroin. EBISAWA also worked to launder $100,000 in purported narcotics proceeds from the U.S. to Japan.

Finally, beginning in early 2020, EBISAWA informed UC-1 and a DEA confidential source (“CS-1”) that EBISAWA had access to a large quantity of nuclear materials that he wanted to sell. Later that year, EBISAWA sent UC-1 a series of photographs depicting rocky substances with Geiger counters measuring radiation, as well as pages of what EBISAWA represented to be lab analyses indicating the presence of thorium and uranium in the depicted substances. In response to EBISAWA’s repeated inquiries, UC-1 agreed, as part of the DEA’s investigation, to help EBISAWA broker the sale of his nuclear materials to UC-1’s associate, who was posing as an Iranian general (the “General”), for use in a nuclear weapons program. EBISAWA then offered to supply the General with “plutonium” that would be even “better” and more “powerful” than uranium for this purpose. EBISAWA further proposed, together with two other co-conspirators (“CC-2” and “CC-3”), to UC-1 that CC-1 sell uranium to the General, through EBISAWA, to fund CC-1’s weapons purchase.

Thereafter, on a February 4, 2022, videoconference, CC-2 told UC-1 that CC-1 had available more than 2,000 kilograms of Thorium-232 and more than 100 kilograms of uranium in the compound U3O8 — referring to a compound of uranium commonly found in the uranium concentrate powder known as “yellowcake” — and that CC-1 could produce as much as five tons of nuclear materials in Burma. CC-2 also advised that CC-1 had provided samples of the uranium and thorium, which CC-2 was prepared to show to UC-1’s purported buyers. CC-2 noted that the samples should be packed “to contain . . . the radiation.” Approximately one week later, EBISAWA, CC-2, and CC-3 participated in a series of meetings with UC-1 and CS-1 in Southeast Asia, to discuss their ongoing weapons, narcotics, and nuclear materials transactions. During one of these meetings, CC-2 asked UC-1 to meet in CC-2’s hotel room. Inside the room, CC-2 showed UC-1 two plastic containers each holding a powdery yellow substance (the “Nuclear Samples”), which CC-2 described as “yellowcake.” CC-2 advised that one container held a sample of uranium in the compound U3O8, and the other container held Thorium-232.

With the assistance of Thai authorities, the Nuclear Samples were seized and subsequently transferred to the custody of U.S. law enforcement. A nuclear forensic laboratory in the U.S. examined the Nuclear Samples and determined that both samples contain detectable quantities of uranium, thorium, and plutonium. In particular, the laboratory determined that the isotope composition of the plutonium found in the Nuclear Samples is weapons-grade, meaning that the plutonium, if produced in sufficient quantities, would be suitable for use in a nuclear weapon.

* * *

EBISAWA, 60, of Japan, pled guilty to six counts contained in the Superseding Indictment. A table containing the charges and minimum and maximum penalties is set forth below.

COUNT

MIN. AND MAX. PRISON TERM

Count One: Conspiracy to commit international trafficking of nuclear materialsMaximum of 10 years in prisonCount Two: International trafficking of nuclear materialsMaximum of 20 years in prisonCount Three: Narcotics importation conspiracyMandatory minimum of 10 years in prison; maximum of life in prisonCount Six: Narcotics importation conspiracyMandatory minimum of 10 years in prison; maximum of life in prisonCount Seven: Conspiracy to possess firearms, including machineguns and destructive devicesMaximum of life in prisonCount Eight: Money launderingMaximum of 20 years in prison

The minimum and maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing will be determined by the judge.

Mr. Kim praised the outstanding efforts of the DEA’s Special Operations Division Bilateral Investigations Unit. Mr. Kim also thanked the DEA Tokyo Country Office, DEA Bangkok Country Office, DEA Chiang Mai Resident Office, DEA Jakarta Country Office, DEA Copenhagen Country Office, DEA New York Field Office, DEA New Delhi Country Office, the Counterterrorism Section of the Department of Justice’s National Security Division, the Office of International Affairs of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division, and our law enforcement partners in Indonesia, Japan, and the Kingdom of Thailand for their assistance.

This prosecution is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (“OCDETF”) operation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the U.S. using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF.

The case is being handled by the Office’s National Security and International Narcotics Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Kaylan E. Lasky, Alexander Li, and Kevin T. Sullivan are in charge of the prosecution, with assistance from Trial Attorney Dmitriy Slavin of the Counterterrorism Section.

justice.gov · January 8, 2025

26. US-backed army chief elected Lebanon’s president, ending years-long stalemate

US-backed army chief elected Lebanon’s president, ending years-long stalemate | CNN

CNN · by Tamara Qiblawi · January 9, 2025

Lebanese army chief Joseph Aoun in December 2024.

Anwar Amro/AFP/Getty Images

Beirut, Lebanon CNN —

Lebanon’s parliament has elected the US-backed army chief to be the country’s new president, ending a years-long political stalemate and presidential vacuum.

Army chief Joseph Aoun was voted president after two rounds of voting. This came after a robust efforts by Saudi Arabia and the United States to rally support for Aoun, who is close to Washington and Riyadh.

After he was declared president, Aoun effectively stepped from his military role. He arrived in parliament to be sworn in as president dressed in civilian clothing.

Lebanon has been without a president since the end of the tenure of former President Michel Aoun – who is not related to Joseph Aoun – in October 2022. The former president was backed by Iran-supported Hezbollah. Negotiations over his successor were unsuccessful, reinvigorating tensions between the country’s pro-Western and pro-Iranian camps.

Prior to Thursday’s parliamentary sessions, there were 12 failed attempts to elect a president over the last two years.

A US-brokered ceasefire agreement that ended a war between Hezbollah and Israel last November appears to have also expedited the long-awaited presidential election. Hezbollah was dealt heavy blows by Israel’s assault, which was shortly followed by the downfall of Iran-backed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who had opened his territory to the passage of Hezbollah’s weapons from Iran via neighboring Iraq.

Hezbollah and its main Shia ally Amal are widely believed to have cast their ballots for Aoun in the second round after withholding their votes in the first round. Aoun won by 99 parliamentary votes out of 128 in the second round of votes.

Lebanese lawmakers in the country's parliament on January 9, the day they voted in Joseph Aoun as president.

Mohamed Azakir/Reuters

The Lebanese army did not participate in the all-out war with Israel but is a key player in the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. This stipulates that the army must deploy to areas dominated by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, which borders Israel. It also requires Israeli forces to withdraw from Lebanese territory.

As part of the tiny eastern Mediterranean country’s confessional power-sharing system, Lebanon’s president is typically a Maronite Christian.

CNN · by Tamara Qiblawi · January 9, 2025

27. Evaluating US Strategy for Ukraine: A Pre-Postmortem

Excerpts:

The war in Ukraine underscores a fundamental truth about strategy: it is as much about navigating uncertainty and managing risks as it is about achieving goals. Three key lessons stand out from this case.

First, a good strategy requires the alignment of ends, ways, and means informed by consideration of risk. The current approach illustrates the importance of setting realistic goals and calibrating resources and actions to achieve those goals.

Second, strategy is a dynamic process, not a static plan. Effective strategy requires continuous adaptation. Strategists must cultivate intellectual flexibility to avoid becoming anchored to initial goals or assumptions and adjust their strategy based on the evolving environment. Ultimately, strategy is not about creating a rigid plan to achieve one’s goals but maintaining the agility to navigate complex and unpredictable environments.

Finally, risk management is at the core of strategic thinking. Strategy is a competitive activity and, as such, always involves risk. The art of strategy lies in calibrating actions to achieve outcomes while mitigating the potential negative consequences of action. Successful strategists must have the capacity to make difficult trade-offs and understand that every strategic decision involves inherent uncertainties.

As Lawrence Freedman notes, there is a difference between having a strategy and acting strategically—in other words, between strategy as a thing and strategy as an action. The Ukraine conflict is a profound reminder that strategy is less a destination and more a continuous process of adaption, learning, and careful navigation of goals, resources, and risks. Ultimately, strategists or policymakers must constantly evaluate their strategies and adjust the ends, ways, or means as necessary based on their risk tolerance.

Evaluating US Strategy for Ukraine: A Pre-Postmortem - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Chase Metcalf · January 9, 2025

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Beginning in February 2022, the world watched as the largest land war in Europe since World War II consumed men and material at a prodigious rate. Since the beginning of the war, the administration of President Joe Biden clearly stated that Russia’s unprovoked aggression would not stand and that the United States would support Ukraine “as long as it takes.” As the war approaches the end of its third year and with speculation about a possible negotiated settlement, it is appropriate to assess the US strategy. Since much depends on the conflict’s final outcome, consider this a pre-postmortem.

Joint doctrine defines strategy as “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.” The US Army War College defines it as “the alignment of ends (aims, objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources)—informed by risk—to attain goals.” Regardless of which definition we use, there is a fundamental truth: ultimately, strategy serves policy, and thus, the most obvious way to assess strategy is by asking whether it achieves the policy outcomes at acceptable cost and levels of risk.

The Strategy: Ends

At the Army War College, we teach students that strategy begins with an understanding of national interests. The US National Security Strategy identifies a number of interests directly tied to the Russian war in Ukraine. These include the defense of democracy and countering of autocracies globally, upholding and promoting a rules-based international order that respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, and the maintenance of a strong and unified NATO as part of a global network of alliances and partnerships. Of course, the war and its outcome also have real implications for strategic competition and the balance of power—not only regionally, but globally, as well. One of the most frequently cited concerns is what lessons President Xi Jinping and the People’s Republic of China are learning from this conflict and how that might impact Beijing’s decisions about invading Taiwan.

Since 2022, these national interests have informed US policy objectives for Ukraine. These policy objectives can be summarized as: Ukraine able to defend itself and Russia denied strategic success, further Russian aggression deterred, and direct conflict between Russia and the United States or NATO avoided. In a 2022 op-ed in the New York Times, President Biden stated clearly: “America’s goal is straightforward: We want to see a democratic, independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine with the means to deter and defend itself against further aggression.”

In 2022, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Mark Milley, described the US strategic objectives (or ends) as:

No. 1: “Don’t have a kinetic conflict between the U.S. military and NATO with Russia.”

No. 2: “Contain war inside the geographical boundaries of Ukraine.”

No. 3: “Strengthen and maintain NATO unity.”

No. 4: “Empower Ukraine and give them the means to fight.”

These strategic objectives align with the desired policy outcomes and further clarify the priorities. Before the failed 2023 Ukrainian offensive, the United States appeared supportive of Ukraine’s desire to drive Russia from the occupied territories. However, since the failed offensive, it appears increasingly focused on better posturing Ukraine for a negotiated settlement.

The above policy and strategic objectives are laudable and have remained relatively static throughout the conflict—certainly since the 2023 failed Ukrainian offensive. Thus, implementation has appeared to prioritize avoidance of a direct conflict with Russia and preventing Russian success. This prioritization is almost certainly due to concerns with the risk of escalation—something that will become more evident as we look at the ways and means in the next section. Notably, this prioritization has led critics to argue the strategy lacks a clear vision or end-state, setting conditions for a prolonged war.

The Strategy: Ways and Means

The United States has employed multiple elements of national power—diplomatic, information, economic, and military—to pursue these ends. Summarizing work by retired Major General Mick Ryan and Dr. Kori Schake, the main elements of the US approach (ways) are:

1. providing military and economic assistance to Ukraine;

2. rallying international military and economic support for Ukraine;

3. imposing economic sanctions and isolating Russia diplomatically; and

4. deploying forces to assure allies and deter further Russian aggression.

The Biden administration has marshaled significant resources (means) to support the strategy. This includes the deployment of additional forces to Europe, the use of the presidential drawdown authority and working with Congress to pass the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, and the use of diplomatic capital to isolate Russia economically and diplomatically. Let’s now examine strategy implementation and assess its success.

Direct Military and Economic Assistance for Ukraine

As of September 2024, the United States Congress had authorized $175 billion in aid to Ukraine, and Europe another $253 billion. This aid has been instrumental to Ukraine’s ability to sustain the war effort, something acknowledged by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy when he noted that Ukraine would lose the war without US aid, and prevented Russia from achieving a rapid victory. Additionally, the military support for Ukraine is revitalizing the defense industrial base and enhancing the US capacity for waging great power conflict. As of October 2024, for example, the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative and the Biden administration’s use of presidential drawdown authority have resulted in at least $46.3 billion in obligations to defense industry partners and around $5 billion in direct investment to improve defense industry capacity across the United States. Finally, this aid has directly contributed to the imposition of 600,000–700,000 Russian casualties and the destruction of large portions of Russia’s strategic material reserves.

However, this aid has proven insufficient for Ukraine to push Russian forces back, and Russian forces continue to make slow, if costly, gains. Critics of the strategy highlight its incremental approach and restrictions on aid due to fear of escalation as being responsible for missed opportunities, increased casualties, and a prolonging of the conflict. Additionally, critics note concerns with resource allocation, asserting that resources used to support Ukraine put the United States’ ability to deal with China as the “pacing threat” at risk. Amplifying this argument, Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, recently highlighted concerns that aid to Ukraine may impact his force’s readiness and ability to respond to China. Overall, economic and military aid has proven, at best, only partially successful.

Rally Others to Support Ukraine

Even before the war began, the United States sought to rally international backing to deter Russia and generate support for Ukraine through the sharing of declassified intelligence and overt messaging of Russia’s plans and intentions. These efforts enabled Ukraine to endure Russia’s initial invasion and contributed to the willingness of international partners to aid Ukraine. The establishment of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, involving over forty countries, and the authorization of hundreds of billions in aid to Ukraine illustrate these efforts. Despite this success, critics note that the United States is bearing a disproportionate share of the burden given the inability of European defense forces and infrastructure to meet Ukraine’s requirements. Overall, America’s ability to rally others to support Ukraine’s cause is one of the more successful elements of the strategy, yet it has only been partially successful, given the failure of those countries to fully mobilize their resources in support of Ukraine.

Impose Sanctions and Isolate Russia

Diplomatic and information efforts to isolate Russia were effective at the outset. Symbolizing these early efforts, 141 countries (out of 193) voted to condemn Russia’s invasion in the UN General Assembly, and countries expelled or suspended Moscow from a variety of international institutions. Economically, the United States and its partners have imposed thousands of sanctions on Russian entities, constraining the Russian defense industry and driving interest rates to 21 percent, with the potential to go higher.

However, over time, these efforts have proven less decisive than hoped. Today, only forty-five countries directly sanction Russia, and Russia has proven quite capable of mitigating the worst effects of these sanctions. Moscow is increasingly strengthening its relationship and cooperation with the axis of upheaval (Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea) out of necessity and shared interest. For these reasons, this element of the strategy has proven least successful. More importantly, if it leads to the long-term strengthening of the axis of upheaval, it could be seen as counterproductive for the US position in the world.

Deploying Forces to Assure Allies and Deter Russia

In the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States announced the deployment of an additional seven thousand troops to Europe and supported NATO’s activation of its Rapid Response Force. In addition, Congress appropriated another $45 billion to support US military operations in Europe and other government responses to the war. Today, the United States maintains approximately eighty thousand personnel in Europe and is a key contributor to the enhanced NATO force posture along the alliance’s eastern flank. Perhaps most importantly, thirteen member nations are providing a larger percentage of their GDP in aid to Ukraine than the United States—certainly in part because they are confident in the United States’ commitment to NATO. Despite this, it is necessary to acknowledge Russia is waging a campaign of subversion against the West that could inadvertently escalate. Thus, this element is clearly the most successful of the strategy.

Overall Assessment

So, has the US strategy been successful? Given the aspirational goals, the short answer is no, but the full answer is slightly more nuanced and partly dependent on the war’s final outcome.

Throughout the war, the United States’ principal concern has been the risk of escalation or direct conflict with Russia. From the beginning, the Biden administration has been very clear about its desire to avoid World War III and has acted deliberately as a result. The conflict has remained largely contained to Ukraine and certainly imposed significant costs on the Russians—including the addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO. Supporters of the strategy will argue that US leadership, along with fear of a more aggressive Russia, has strengthened NATO unity and mutual commitment, with twenty-three member nations (up from just three in 2014) spending more than 2 percent of GDP on defense, ensuring a stronger and more unified NATO as part of a global network of alliances. In these terms, the strategy has been quite successful, although the Ukrainians would certainly argue that it is at far too high of a cost.

However, critics claim pursuing a “Goldilocks strategy” that seeks to support Ukraine without provoking Russia has enabled Ukraine to survive but not to win, allowing Russia to adapt over time and regain the strategic initiative. Thus, despite short-term success, the strategy’s long-term prospects appear increasingly uncertain. More importantly, concerns about escalation must be balanced against the implications of Russian success in Ukraine. General Christopher Cavoli, commander of US European Command, testified to Congress in April that failure to support Ukraine would embolden Russia and threaten the global security environment, while administration officials have frequently cited the threat to a rules-based international order if Russia succeeds in Ukraine.

When assessed against the overall policy outcome of an independent and prosperous Ukraine with the means to deter and defend against further aggression, the strategy clearly fails. Since the unsuccessful 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, both sides have struggled to make operational-level gains on the battlefield. However, in 2024, Russia’s superiority in resources, its willingness to expend men and materiel, and uncertainty about continued United States support led many to see the conflict as trending toward a settlement that will allow Russia to retain control over occupied areas of Ukraine. While Ukraine survives, the Ukrainian economy is currently at 78 percent of its prewar size. Further, it is running a $38 billion annual budget deficit and was estimated to require $486 billion in reconstruction spending as of December 2023. Given this, it is hard to imagine an economically prosperous Ukraine with the resources to defend itself in the near term.

Without an end in sight more than half of Ukrainians polled now believe Ukraine should seek a negotiated end to the conflict, and over half of those are willing to make territorial concessions to make this a reality. This likely reflects a growing exhaustion on the part of the Ukrainian people with the costs of the war. While a future settlement could lead to the type of Ukraine desired by current policy, it is hard to argue that the US strategy is on a trajectory to accomplish that today.

While the US strategy has avoided direct conflict and prevented near-term Russian success, it has failed to achieve the overall policy objective of a free Ukraine capable of defending itself or deterring future Russian aggression. What happens next will go a long way toward how historians see the strategy—did it buy time for Ukraine while effectively managing the risk of escalation and conflict or did it squander resources in an adventure that could not succeed given an acceptable level of risk?

Lessons for Aspiring Strategists and Policymakers

The war in Ukraine underscores a fundamental truth about strategy: it is as much about navigating uncertainty and managing risks as it is about achieving goals. Three key lessons stand out from this case.

First, a good strategy requires the alignment of ends, ways, and means informed by consideration of risk. The current approach illustrates the importance of setting realistic goals and calibrating resources and actions to achieve those goals.

Second, strategy is a dynamic process, not a static plan. Effective strategy requires continuous adaptation. Strategists must cultivate intellectual flexibility to avoid becoming anchored to initial goals or assumptions and adjust their strategy based on the evolving environment. Ultimately, strategy is not about creating a rigid plan to achieve one’s goals but maintaining the agility to navigate complex and unpredictable environments.

Finally, risk management is at the core of strategic thinking. Strategy is a competitive activity and, as such, always involves risk. The art of strategy lies in calibrating actions to achieve outcomes while mitigating the potential negative consequences of action. Successful strategists must have the capacity to make difficult trade-offs and understand that every strategic decision involves inherent uncertainties.

As Lawrence Freedman notes, there is a difference between having a strategy and acting strategically—in other words, between strategy as a thing and strategy as an action. The Ukraine conflict is a profound reminder that strategy is less a destination and more a continuous process of adaption, learning, and careful navigation of goals, resources, and risks. Ultimately, strategists or policymakers must constantly evaluate their strategies and adjust the ends, ways, or means as necessary based on their risk tolerance.

Colonel Chase Metcalf is an assistant professor in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the Army War College and deputy director for the Ukraine War Integrated Research Project.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Army War College, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Chad J. McNeeley, DoD

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Chase Metcalf · January 9, 2025

28. Ethics, Integrity, and the Toll of Modern Irregular Warfare: A Conversation with Pulitzer Prize-Winning Journalist Dave Philipps

Excerpts:

Let me give you an example. We have heavy artillery that in 2024 we fire by pulling a six-foot string. There is no reason for eight guys to stand around a giant cannon that’s going to go off. We can do it off somebody’s phone. Obviously, in a combat environment, you need that to be much more secure. But again, we don’t need to do it like we did in the 1890s. In the 1600s did holding up a blunderbuss full of black powder to shoot it make sense? Yeah, it probably did. But in 2024 does holding a Carl Gustaf rocket launcher right next to your head so you can aim and fire? Probably not, and not only from the point of view of the safety of the operator’s brain, but from the situational awareness and effectiveness of that small unit that’s using that rocket launcher, because that guy, now he’s probably not thinking clearly for the next 20-30, minutes.

Q: Thinking of your story of the guys that were firing the 10,000 rounds in a few months at all coming back injured (From 2016-2017 the Pentagon deployed a small number of artillerymen to pound the Islamic State around Mosul – the medical records of one Marine artillery battery demonstrated that fifty-percent were diagnosed with brain injuries). Of course there is the issue between causation and correlation, but it’s hard to say that you have a small unit that fires a high volume of artillery in a short period of time, and they all are exhibiting pretty severe symptoms of something when they come home. So, what was going on?

The problem is that everybody in the military is just doing their job. It’s not the job of the captain in charge of that unit to really understand that stuff. He’s never been briefed on it. He doesn’t know that maybe repeated safe operation of the weapon system could cause psychosis.

Many of these people can’t sleep. So, they go to the sleep doctor. They’re going to give you all these ideas about how to sleep, but they’re not going to look at you for brain damage. Say you’re depressed. You go to the psychologist and they’re not seeing it as a brain injury either. And so there were a couple people within Naval medicine who said, “We think this is a bigger deal.” They wrote about it, but it sort of disappeared into the ether. There was nobody within the organization to telegraph it back down to the units. And so today, I don’t think many of these units are doing things any differently.

Ethics, Integrity, and the Toll of Modern Irregular Warfare: A Conversation with Pulitzer Prize-Winning Journalist Dave Philipps - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Christopher Booth, Walker Mills · January 9, 2025

Navy SEALs Joint Force Conclude Training

Editor’s note: This article is part of Project Maritime, which explores modern challenges and opportunities in the maritime dimension at the intersection of irregular warfare and strategic competition. We warmly invite your participation and engagement as we embark on this project. Please send submissions with the subject line “Project Maritime Submission” and follow us on X (formerly Twitter) @proj_maritime.

Project Maritime had the pleasure of interviewing New York Times military reporter, and two-time Pulitzer Prize winner, Dave Philipps. Philipps’ writing has special resonance to those focused on irregular warfare in the littorals and those soldiers, sailors, marines, and operators, who have been serving in expeditionary operations in a variety of conflict zones.

Mr. Philipps may be best known for his searing and gripping book, “Alpha: Eddie Gallagher and the War for the Soul of the Navy SEALs.” Philipps has focused his writing on small units, and the soldiers, marines, and special operators who have fought the Global War on Terror.

Additionally, he has had a series of pieces over the past year focusing on the brain damage apparently caused by cumulative shock-waves to troops exposed to repeated blasts from weapons in combat or high intensity training. He has exposed injury clusters around Army and Marine artillerymen who fired up to 10,000 rounds in just several months in small units deployed against the Islamic State in Mosul. He has documented similar problems with mortars, M1 tanks, Carl Gustaf recoilless rifle, and most recently brain trauma among elite Navy Special Boat teams made up of U.S. Navy Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewmen who deliver SEALs to the fight in high-powered craft that may expose their crews to 64Gs (64 times the force of gravity).

We hope that his unique perspective furthers the discussion among those interested in maritime irregular warfare.

Q: Your book “Alpha: Eddie Gallagher and the War for the Soul the Navy SEALs” chronicles an apparent war crime – if not multiple crimes – in urban fighting against ISIS and Mosul; a cover up; failures in the NCIS investigation and prosecution; as well as the firing of the Navy Secretary. In many cases, the whistleblowers who tried to do the right thing appear to have been shunned or suffered more than the alleged war criminal. What would you tell someone who has not read the book about why they should read it?

I think this is a really old story in in more modern clothing; the story of the experienced enlisted ground-pounder who thinks he knows better – not only better than the young officer who’s in charge – but also the folks back home who make the rules. It is a story that has happened for generations, and in fact, what happened with this Navy SEAL platoon basically played out 20 years before in the movie Platoon. It is so similar to the movie that one of the SEALs told me that he started watching Platoon on that deployment and had to turn it off because it was so disturbing.

And one of the things that I found fascinating about Eddie Gallagher (the chief who was accused of these crimes), was that he had really grown up in the Global War on Terror; very much surrounded by guys whose whole adult lives had been dedicated to that effort. Going after ISIS and to going after the Taliban; and none of the strategic goals had really been met. And so, these guys had created their own culture where wars are not going to be won and lost. You’re never going to get a ticker tape parade. And they built sort of a warrior culture based on, like, “How many people did you kill, and how did you kill them?” “Did you kill them in a pure warrior way or not?” I think that’s what was driving Edward Gallagher when he took his platoon to Mosul. What he was trying to achieve was not something strategic. He wanted to – what the SEALs would say – is that he “Wanted to get after it and drop bodies.” To him and to a lot of people around him, his superiors and his peers, that had value in itself; which is pretty warped, but he had lived in a pretty warped situation of constant deployments since he was a teen.

The story is sort of a microcosm of the unintended problem that having these long, amorphous wars can cause when you have this type of professional war fighter who, for them, essentially, the war is never over.

Q: Since writing the book, what kind of feedback have you gotten from SEALs, and others in the Special Operations community- who are currently serving, or veterans?

It’s really mixed, because veterans are a diverse group of people. Eddie Gallagher wasn’t very happy about it. He tried to sue me and gave up. There are people that are good friends of his or who embrace the same ethos that he did, and probably think that I’m naive and I’m telling a story that’s pointless.

There are other people in the SEALs that really saw this as someone finally turning on the light and sending some of the cockroaches scurrying, because there are some dark parts of their subculture that are vying for more influence. I get a lot of young SEALs and other young officers who pick up this book and it’s very helpful to them. I think that there are a lot of older SEALs who are now out, and who read this book and said, “Thank God there’s finally a book about the SEALs that isn’t some sort of American Sniper glorification.”

Q: In the book, you define this preexisting pirate culture that was in conflict with the rules-based culture. Do you have an opinion as to what is more ascendant, or is it just kind of a cyclical?

Naval Special Warfare does not let me walk around its bases and talk to its operators. So the best I can do is sort of echolocation. You know, I can’t actually even see it. It’s like water behind a dam, you know, the potential to get frustrated with the realities of warfare and overstep the rules of engagement will always be there and will always be pressing against regulations. If it is held back, it has to be through constant education and discussion about morals and ethics.

Q: One of the themes that struck us in your book was the small unit leadership and its absence. Was that a major theme of the story for you? How did you see the leadership or lack of playing out?

One real frustration for me is I did not get to talk to the officer in charge of that platoon. He never said anything to NCIS. He never said anything to me. The Navy SEALs that I talked to, who served in the unit with him just sort of shook their heads and said, “You know he was a good guy. We liked him.” But I think he didn’t understand that someone like Eddie Gallagher could exist and could be misleading him or leading him down a bad road, and he wasn’t prepared to resist it. And the other thing is we don’t know how much he did resist it. How much was he talking to the officers above him, saying, “Hey, I got a problem with my chief,” and how much was the organization saying, “Don’t worry about it”?

It would have been a short and totally different story if the leadership had worked out as it was supposed to on paper. Essentially, what would have happened is Eddie Gallagher would have been relieved pretty early on in the middle of his deployment; someone else would have come in. He probably would have been put at a desk in Coronado, California until he retired. No one would have ever heard about this whole incident. The dead body that they’d taken pictures with would have never become the center of a court martial; and I think it would have worked. And I also think that the guys in the platoon would have been okay with dealing with it quietly within the family, so “We can actually do our job.” And it was only after repeatedly trying to get the system to work, that they kind of broke the glass and pulled the emergency handle by going outside of the SEAL family to NCIS, that things got really out of control, and I think that they tried, probably at three or four different levels of the organization to not have that happen and to deal with things quietly within the organization.

So it’s both understandable but also problematic, because how many other Eddie Gallaghers were there where the system was smart enough and responsive enough to, deal with it quietly? I have a feeling there were quite a few, although we’ll never know.

Q: Are there other books or stories that helped you tell this one?

When I was writing this, I really wanted to write like almost a mystery drama, because all the pieces were there. And one of the things that you learn as a newspaper writer is the easiest thing for a reader to do with your writing is stop reading. If you’re going to make a larger point about ethics within the military, or concerns about elite troops, you better get people to turn the page, or you’re not going to be able to do it.

What’s funny is, when I finished writing the book, I realized what I’d actually written was a noir story. In the classic formula of the noir there’s going to be a crime at the beginning, and the detective is going to try and solve it, and maybe it’s going to get solved, and maybe it isn’t, but it doesn’t matter, because the crux of the noir is that in trying to solve that crime, the detective will reveal an even bigger and more disturbing crime that cannot be solved.

And that’s kind of what happened with the Gallagher story. There was a body. It was probably killed by Eddie Gallagher. People stood around it and took pictures. But then the larger crime is sort of Mosul itself – why had we sent these guys in to Mosul to try and take pot shots at ISIS, while at the same time, that city was leveled by a coalition effort – leveled thousands of buildings and thousands of civilians were killed? And then we had a trial over the case of one combatant who was killed by a chief, but we never discussed the larger thing that was happening. So, I realized I told a detailed story about this one small part of Mosul, but I don’t know if it really settles anything.

Q: You’ve written some powerful stories about soldiers, Marines and SEALs who have committed suicide or have had their physical and mental health damaged by blast waves. In particular, there were some artillery gun crews who fired more than 10,000 rounds in a few months in the fight against ISIS, and many of those soldiers were demonstrating symptoms consistent with concussion at the time. Some came home basically incapable of functioning with an inability to read, follow instructions, exhibiting mood swings, etc. If you were the Secretary of Defense for one day, what are the changes you would seek to implement on this issue?

I actually think that this is not a different subject [from my writing about Eddie Gallagher], and I didn’t realize this until I started doing this reporting. I think that there are a lot of people in the Navy SEALs, especially if they stay in for many years, like Eddie Gallagher (who joined when he was at 17), who are walking around with brain injuries that make it hard to function; that can make them emotional, uninhibited, and make their judgment seriously suspect. Those injuries result from repeated exposure in training to routine and proper operation of weapons, and it gets worse over time.

You have people that – as they progress in their career and rise in rank and are given more responsibility – are at the same time potentially having compromised brain function. And if you take that dynamic and you expand it to Naval Special Warfare writ large, the young SEALS dealing with Eddie Gallagher are saying, “What the hell is going on?” They are trying to report it to older SEALs who say, “Don’t worry about it.” It’s impossible for us to understand how much brain injury is mixed in there, but it is quite possible that brain injury is a significant factor in some of the dysfunction in that organization.

As I started to learn how pervasive these injuries are and how debilitating they can be (and also how hidden they are within the senior ranks, especially senior enlisted), it really has started to make me look at all of these things in a totally different light. I think in that context, Eddie Gallagher looks much more like a victim than he does like a perpetrator, right?

Let me answer the question about what we should do about this. I’m a novice and not qualified to do that, but I can tell you that the Department of Defense has been sort of spinning its wheels on this for more than 10 years because it tries to hold two truths in hand at once: One, we don’t know if this is harmful or not. Two, since we have no evidence that this is harmful, there’s no reason for us to study it.

It’s like putting the tobacco companies in charge of whether cigarettes are bad for you. This is so central to operations that looking at it would be severely disruptive, and so nobody wants to do it. Washington needs to mandate real research, so that we can understand what’s harmful and what’s not. We all want an effective military, and these folks to be taken care of, and we certainly don’t want people who are rising up in the enlisted ranks who can’t make good decisions. That’s really bad and dangerous.

It’s got to start there, and then basic tracking should start immediately. We need to do this so that if we do learn five years down the road, that have been exposed to something potentially harmful, folks can get help. Right now the dynamic is, you go to the VA and say, “I’ve got all these symptoms of brain injury,” and they look back at your record and say, “But there was no event that ever caused it. How can you have a brain injury when all you ever did is routinely and safely fire your weapon?” Right now I think the best-informed people don’t know what to do.

Q: It seems like there is a basket of injuries, whether physical, moral or emotional, from Global War on Terror. Has your reporting led you to anything else that would fit into that basket?

When I started my journalism career and was writing about Iraq and Afghanistan wars pretty early on, it was new and kind of mysterious to write about Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. This was really the first conflict where we were standing up an infrastructure to detect and treat that stuff within the active-duty military. It didn’t always work perfectly, but they were trying to take care of folks. What I’ve realized within the last 12 months is that they’ve missed the boat or repeated the exact same mistake that happened in Vietnam, in World War II, and in World War I, of missing what this injury is. I kept running into people who had been diagnosed with PTSD, and it didn’t make sense. They weren’t particularly traumatized by the things they had experienced in war, and yet they had all this list of symptoms that made them qualify as suffering from PTSD, and they were being treated for it, but the treatment was not working.

And many of these people, a huge percentage of combat veterans who come back and get the standard treatments for PTSD wash out of it. First, I thought we needed better treatment. But now I’m now convinced that, more than anything, the anxiety, the sleeplessness, and all that stuff is caused by repetitive blast injury. And when you have a repetitive blast injury, and it creates an anxiety disorder in your in your brain that can lead to very real things like what we call PTSD, anxiety, and rumination on past traumatic events. I’m not saying that PTSD isn’t real. I think it is, and I think it can be really serious, but I think too often things are labeled as PTSD, when they are much, much more complex.

I’ve now talked to a lot of people who were never deployed, but worked around heavy weapons for years, and their symptoms are the exact same as the guys who went to war. It makes me wonder, what is driving it? How much of it is the way we’ve designed weapons? Maybe it has very little to do with combat.

Q: The Lewiston shooter, right? The Army has denied that his years on the grenade range had anything to do with his brain injury, which is counter indicated by what the brain researchers, who’ve actually seen the brain have said. The Army said his brain injury came from falling off a roof.

It makes me think of the NFL. Because what we’re looking at is so central to their operations, whether you’re talking about the army or the NFL. And so, they cannot talk about it. The NFL does something that the Army is on its way to doing. It says, “We know this is serious. We’re going to have a new concussion protocol, because we take concussions very seriously.”

The research says concussion is independent of this problem. You can have all of these small, non-concussive hits that lead to these really debilitating CTE injuries. The NFL is like, “We’re on it, we’re taking care of it,” but at the same time, they can’t really take care of it, or there wouldn’t be an NFL. I actually think that the military isn’t in quite such a pickle. I think that probably there are ways to do this safely and spread-out risk. Whether we’re designing different weapons, or limiting a lot of the unneeded training that’s going on.

Let me give you an example. We have heavy artillery that in 2024 we fire by pulling a six-foot string. There is no reason for eight guys to stand around a giant cannon that’s going to go off. We can do it off somebody’s phone. Obviously, in a combat environment, you need that to be much more secure. But again, we don’t need to do it like we did in the 1890s. In the 1600s did holding up a blunderbuss full of black powder to shoot it make sense? Yeah, it probably did. But in 2024 does holding a Carl Gustaf rocket launcher right next to your head so you can aim and fire? Probably not, and not only from the point of view of the safety of the operator’s brain, but from the situational awareness and effectiveness of that small unit that’s using that rocket launcher, because that guy, now he’s probably not thinking clearly for the next 20-30, minutes.

Q: Thinking of your story of the guys that were firing the 10,000 rounds in a few months at all coming back injured (From 2016-2017 the Pentagon deployed a small number of artillerymen to pound the Islamic State around Mosul – the medical records of one Marine artillery battery demonstrated that fifty-percent were diagnosed with brain injuries). Of course there is the issue between causation and correlation, but it’s hard to say that you have a small unit that fires a high volume of artillery in a short period of time, and they all are exhibiting pretty severe symptoms of something when they come home. So, what was going on?

The problem is that everybody in the military is just doing their job. It’s not the job of the captain in charge of that unit to really understand that stuff. He’s never been briefed on it. He doesn’t know that maybe repeated safe operation of the weapon system could cause psychosis.

Many of these people can’t sleep. So, they go to the sleep doctor. They’re going to give you all these ideas about how to sleep, but they’re not going to look at you for brain damage. Say you’re depressed. You go to the psychologist and they’re not seeing it as a brain injury either. And so there were a couple people within Naval medicine who said, “We think this is a bigger deal.” They wrote about it, but it sort of disappeared into the ether. There was nobody within the organization to telegraph it back down to the units. And so today, I don’t think many of these units are doing things any differently.

The views expressed in this interview do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

29. To the budding author, (The Harding Project)

Harding Project Substack

To the budding author,

Meet the Weekly Interceptor

https://www.hardingproject.com/p/to-the-budding-author?utm

Joshua Urness and Josh Urness

Jan 09, 2025

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— Harding Announcement: Our Deputy Director, SFC Marcel Blood, will be coming to an installation near you! Next Tuesday, January 14, SFC Blood will be hosting a mixer from 1700-1800 at the Sasquatch Saloon on JBLM. We hope to see you there! —

As the Army continues to build out Line of Departure as a professional forum, we may need to ask where the “water cooler” is? Where can less developed writers go to have conversations that contribute to the professional dialogue in a less formal way? One answer could be the informal (or less formal) branch newsletters scattered across the Army.

Visit Line of Departure

Created in 2017 as an Air Defense Early Bird, the Weekly Interceptor publishes a tailored buffet of air and missile defense-focused news articles, leadership development, and commentary on open-source threat events. This plain text email with PDF attachment increases ease of viewing, regardless of device, e.g., government phone in the airport or laptop. In 2022, the Weekly Interceptor pivoted to include professional writing. The pivot partially focused on addressing gaps the Harding Project fills today.

Below, we share our experience helping authors bridge the idea to article gap.

Photo courtesy of Josh Urness

Three-foot walls

We frequently faced challenges converting writing interest to Interceptor submissions, generally due to some mixture of the following concerns:

• Impact skepticism. Authors questioned whether the piece would be read and whether their idea would make an impact.
• Perceived inexperience. The potential writer’s self-imposed belief that they were “too inexperienced” or lacked credibility, especially due to rank.
• Retribution concerns. The potential writer’s concern about challenging narratives or stepping “outside the lines” on a topic.
• Embarrassment concerns. The potential writer’s concern about looking “stupid” or writing something that could result in professional embarrassment.
• Perfectionism. Too often, writers fought their introduction, constantly rewriting and rewickering toward the perfect opening, without getting into the meat.

While each of these concerns have some merit, we found a solution that could build confidence in our authors.

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Solution: the dirty-nasty-draft

The “dirty-nasty-draft” gets authors moving—and converted more ideas into articles. Critically, this approach challenges authors to put something (anything!) on paper, with promises to assist in refinement and no judgment. This drafting process has three stages: the pitch, the dirty-nasty-draft, and the article.

First, we asked potential authors for a pitch: a couple sentences on their ideas or concepts. The initial submission essentially soft-launched the writing process, but also helped commit the author to finishing. This non-binding pitch helps the author get more comfortable with their idea—and provides us an opportunity to help the author assess any career “risk” before they publish. As good teammates, we’d never let an author walk blind into a minefield.

Following these pitches, we found potential writers could tell you exactly what they wanted to say in their article with their words, but got wrapped around the axle when they had to put it on paper. As a result, the request for a dirty draft neutralized the preoccupation with structure and pomp. We frequently cap our word count requests to reduce complexity for writers because it seems more achievable to “put together a few hundred words” than write an “article.” (We also now direct authors towards the special issue’s tools for writing).

Finally, we work with the authors to convert their drafts into articles; we’ve seen success here with an increase in converting interest to submissions from previously about 20% to 75%. Most recently, we hosted a Summer 2024 op-ed writing contest and finished with twice as many submissions as expected. Writers ranged in rank from Sergeant First Class to Major. While many of these articles may not be ready for prime time on the big blogs or journals, we published eight writers over the course of ten weeks in the fall. The increased frequency of writer publications to our audience seems to increase social proof because we see increased writing interest.

More articles

Through this transformation, we continue learning the significance of reducing barriers to contribution to professional dialogue. “Water cooler” forums complement official and more formal mediums in a way that was not described in Fractured Branch Publications: by serving as developmental steppingstones for writers. The return on investment is there: one of our articles (also published in the Air Defense Artillery Journal) was featured as one of the Chief of the Army’s three recommended articles in December 2024. That article was written by Second Lieutenant Ian Murren, who, since the publication of the article in 2023, joined the Weekly Interceptor staff.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com