Quotes of the Day:
“The reward for all virtues is the virtue itself. The wage for a good deed is to have done it.”
– Seneca
"Devices are not dangerous for literature. People can be dangerous for literature. People, for example, who do not read."
– László Krasznahorkai
"History is a vast early warning system."
– Norman Cousins
1. Expert calls for greater efforts to better deter N. Korea in 'gray zone' shy of full-scale war
2. Vice FMs of S. Korea, U.S. to discuss alliance modernization ahead of APEC summit
3. North Korea's 10/10 Military Parade: What To Watch For
4. N. Korea's Kim pledges to build 'affluent paradise' on 80th anniv. of party founding
5. Kim, China's Li discuss elevating cooperation, strategic communication: KCNA
6. N. Korea's Kim, Vietnamese leader discuss expanding bilateral cooperation: KCNA
7. Kim Jong Un touts totalitarianism to foreign guests at first mass games in years
8. Kim Jong Un holds talks with Chinese, Vietnamese dignitaries ahead of mass games
9. Where Next on the Peninsula?
10. Korea: Fading hopes for families split by North-South divide
11. Suffering Behind Closed Doors:North Korean Women as Victims of Chinese Sexual Slavery
12. Seoul spending too much on North Korean defector resettlement, lawmaker suggests
13. Rehearsal under way for imminent N. Korean military parade: JCS
14. N. Korea's Kim accelerates multilateral diplomacy on key party anniversary
15. N. Korea, China reopen cross-border land route for postal service exchanges
1. Expert calls for greater efforts to better deter N. Korea in 'gray zone' shy of full-scale war
It is good to see this. So few people recognize that north Korea has been one of the most effective masters of the gray zone among the Dark Quad for seven decades.
Below the article is a syllabus for a seminar I put together in 2023: "DPRK and the Gray Zone"
Expert calls for greater efforts to better deter N. Korea in 'gray zone' shy of full-scale war | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · October 10, 2025
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Oct. 9 (Yonhap) -- An expert noted the need Thursday to better deter North Korea's potential "gray-zone" activities short of a full-blown war, saying that its leader Kim Jong-un could still resort to military force against Seoul even if Pyongyang does not have the ability to "overrun" South Korea militarily.
Markus Garlauskas, director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, made the remarks during an online forum hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
"We have to think in a much more aggressive and risk-acceptant way of how do we better deter North Korea in that gray zone short of a full-scale war," he said.
The gray zone refers to an unclear realm between full-scale conflict and peace. Activities in the zone -- shy of a major attack -- create security concerns and confusion, but make it difficult for a country to respond effectively due to the often vague nature of the activity.
Markus Garlauskas (R), director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council; former Ambassador to South Korea Mark Lippert (L); and Sydney Seiler, senior advisor at the Korea Chair of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) engage in an online forum hosted by CSIS on Oct. 9, 2025, in this photo captured from a YouTube account of CSIS. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Garlauskas noted that the Hamas militant group pressed ahead with its attack on Israel in 2023, although it did not have the military power to destroy Israel, as he raised the possibility that the North Korean leader could also turn to military force against South Korea.
"Hamas did not have the ability to destroy Israel, but they attacked anyway ... Just because North Korea doesn't have the ability to overrun South Korea and wipe the ROK off the map with military force ... (that) doesn't mean there aren't scenarios where military force is rational for Kim Jong-un. It helps him achieve his goals," he said. ROK is short for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.
"That is a real possibility whether it's in the waters off the west of Korea, along the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) ... could be somewhere in eastern waters, in the sky ... so many different places where North Korea has viable military options to achieve a tactical advantage."
Gray-zone activities put South Korea in a position where it is challenging "politically, operationally, strategically" to respond effectively and have confidence that Seoul can control escalation, he noted.
"That's what North Korea banks on," he said.
Seoul and Washington have paid growing attention to the possibility of North Korean provocations in the gray zone while focusing primarily on deterring a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula. Gray-zone provocations include Pyongyang's psychological warfare, cyber attacks and GPS signal disruptions to name a few.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · October 10, 2025
Lesson Name: DPRK and the Gray Zone (1 day)
Overview
The U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula dates back to 1945, when the United States and Soviet Union partitioned the country along the 38th parallel, with a loose agreement for Korean self-determination. Competing ideologies of the occupying forces led to the communist-supported attack in 1950. New international institutions, still establishing after WWII, suddenly had to react to a crisis. The United Nations (UN) committed to resist this act of aggression and the United States committed its military to a “police action” with the sanction of the still fledgling UN Security Council (UNSC). The USSR, and other UNSC members, learned an important lesson from the USSR boycott of that UNSC vote. The U.S. Congress and president are still wrestling with the impact of this first post-WWII “war.” The Korean War followed, and continues to this day with a decades-long armistice holding the peace.
Today the mafia like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime is executing a seven decades old three pronged effort to achieve its objectives to complete its revolution, rid Korea of foreign influence, and bring the Korean peninsula under the domination of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. The regime employs political warfare, blackmail diplomacy, and warfighting strategies. These are mutually supporting and reinforcing. Kim will not give up his nuclear weapons because they are key to survival and support the three pronged effort. Furthermore, he must deny the human rights of the Korean people in the north and isolate them from all outside information because the population armed with information is an existential threat to the regime.
The ROK and US administrations as well as civil society in both the ROK and U.S. and countries around the world have an opportunity for a new approach to the Korean security challenge. The ROK/U.S. Alliance way ahead should be an integrated deterrence strategy as part of the broader strategic competition that is taking place in the region. There is a need for a Korean “Plan B” strategy that rests on the foundation of combined ROK/U.S. defensive capabilities. It includes political warfare, aggressive diplomacy, sanctions, cyber operations, and information and influence activities, with a goal of denuclearization. However; ultimately the objective must be to solve the “Korea question” (e.g., the unnatural division of the peninsula as described in para. 60 of the Armistice) with the understanding that denuclearization of the north and an end to the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity will only happen when the “Korea question” is resolved. Such resolution will lead to a free and unified Korea, otherwise known as a United Republic of Korea (UROK).
Lesson Learning Outcomes – LLOs – Upon completion of the lesson, students will…
Assess historical, current, and emergent approaches to Grey Zone Warfare as practiced by North Korea and consider US and Alliance strategies to respond and seize the initiative.
Understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
Understand the full range of threats from north Korea and how it exploits Grey Zone Warfare.
Identify potential US and ROK/US alliance political warfare and influence operations.
Total Hours (8)
Reading 5 Hours
Class 3 Hours
Required readings:
1. LTG Chun, In Bum, “How North Korea Wages Political Warfare at Home and Abroad...and How to Respond” ORBIS, Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 6, 2020, page 1-18
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OM-lnGiZHhuUUrI9xsnbR72MN20teWkz/view?usp=sharing
2. Jihyun (Amanda) Won, “The Theory and Practice of North Korean Espionage,” The Intelligencer: The Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies, Winter/Spring 2020, page 9-17.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Pegm2W2KOnt_WYkqyqT6gN7DRLvEa7h0/view?usp=sharing
3. Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., “North Korea’s Illegal Weapons Trade: The Proliferation Threat From Pyongyang,” Foreign Affairs, June 6, 2018.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-06-06/north-koreas-illegal-weapons-trade
4. Robert Collins, “Marked for Life: Songbun, North Korea's Social Classification System,” Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, June 6, 2012, pages 1-27.
https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_Songbun_Web.pdf
5. Commander Frederick Vincenzo, “An Information Based Strategy to Reduce North Korea’s Increasing Threat - Recommendations for ROK & U.S. Policy Makers,” Center for New American Security, October 3, 2016, pages 1-15.
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/an-information-based-strategy-to-reduce-north-koreas-increasing-threat
6. George Hutchinson, “Army of the Indoctrinated: The Suryong, the Soldier, and Information in the KPA, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea,” April 26, 2022, Read Chapter 5 & 6 pages 57-88.
https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Hutchinson_KPA_web_0426.pdf
7. Jieun Baek, “A Policy of Public Diplomacy with North Korea: A Principled and Pragmatic Approach to Promote Human Rights and Pursue Denuclearization,” Harvard Belfer Center, August 2021, pages 20-28.
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/policy-public-diplomacy-north-korea
8. David Maxwell, “The Nature of The Kim Family Regime: The Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State,” Red Diamond, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, February 19, 2020
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/02/19/the-nature-of-the-kim-family-regime-the-guerrilla-dynasty-and-gulag-state/
and https://drive.google.com/file/d/12DLljRWQtQNje4hqrpwfGuEMvlpyk5Gt/view?usp=sharing
9. Bradley Bowman and David Maxwell, “Maximum Pressure 2.0 A Plan for North Korea,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, December 5, 2020, “A Plan B for North Korea,” pages 8-13 and “Information and Influence Activities” pages 46-51)
https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/fdd-report-maximum-pressure-2-a-plan-for-north-korea.pdf
10. David Maxwell, “Resilience and Resistance in Asia-Political Warfare of Revisionist and Rogue Powers”, Small Wars Journal, 2020. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/resistance-and-resilience-asia-political-warfare-revisionist-and-rogue-powers
11. David Maxwell, “Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting A Resistance”, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies Vol. 24, No. 2, 2015, 127–152,
https://www.kinu.or.kr/pyxis-api/1/digital-files/d3f8fb63-4f8c-49c9-a4fa-901d3120bd5a
12. Suki Kim, “The Underground Movement Trying to Topple the North Korean Regime,” The New Yorker Magazine, November 16, 2020
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/11/23/the-underground-movement-trying-to-topple-the-north-korean-regime
13. Anthony H. Cordesman and Charles Ayers, Korean Special, Asymmetric, and Paramilitary Forces, CSIS Special Report, https://www.csis.org/analysis/korean-special-asymmetric-and-paramilitary-forces
14. David Maxwell, “Kim Jong Nam Assassination Showcases North Korea’s Special Operations Capabilities,” FDD Policy Brief, August 22, 2018,
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2018/08/22/kim-jong-nam-assassination-showcases-north-koreas-special-operations-capabilities/
15. David Maxwell, “Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula Thoughts on Irregular Threats for north Korea Post-Conflict and Post-Collapse: Understanding Them to Counter Them” The Small Wars Journal, November 30, 2010
https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/609-maxwell.pdf
Recommended readings/References:
1. David Maxwell “What sites to use to watch North Korea,” Foreign Policy, December 12, 2014
https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/12/what-sites-to-use-to-watch-north-korea/
2. Gian Gentile et. al., “Four Problems on the Korean Peninsula: North Korea’s expanding nuclear capabilities drive a complex set of problems,” RAND Corporation
https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL271.html
2. “North Korea Military Power, A Growing Regional and Global Threat,” Defense Intelligence Agency, 2021.
https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/NKMP.pdf
3. Joseph S. Nye, “Understanding the North Korea Threat,” article Australian Strategic-Policy-Institute, 7 Dec 2017, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/understanding_the-north-korea-threat (accessed 3 Jan 2020).
4. Eleanor Albert, “North Korea’s Military Capabilities,” 20 Dec 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-military-capabilities (accessed 10 Jan 2020). Blackboard.
5. 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement
https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31006.htm
6. Korean-US Mutual Defense Treaty 1953
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp
7. Video: “Conversation with COL (Ret) Dave Maxwell, Potential for North Korea Influence & Information Campaign,” July 14, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0E9032OEOo
8. Video: David Maxwell, “Beyond Nuclear Crisis: New and Long-Term Strategy for the Korean Peninsula,” Institute of World Politics, July 11, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I6XPOWvQGpw&t=49s
9. Video: David Maxwell, “Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula, “ Institute of World Politics, September 28, 2021 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bgiZGWPIKuc&list=FL3fu5rXx0ma6f9Ze3C1i-MA&index=46&t=2s
Additional Readings:
Readings from 1945 (https://www.19fortyfive.com/author/david-maxwell-and-matthew-ha/)
Hermit Kingdom
Unification Must Be Korea’s Future
Editor’s Note: These remarks were provided to freedom-loving people who gathered on the National Mall on November 5, 2022, for the K-Peace Festival organized...
November 7, 2022
Hermit Kingdom
North Korea’s Provocations: Time for an Asymmetric Approach
Do not fear North Korea’s provocations. They are a standard expression of leader Kim Jong Un’s three-pronged strategy, which is built on political warfare,...
David MaxwellOctober 11, 2022
Hermit Kingdom
North Korea’s Missile Tests Are Part of a Political Warfare and Blackmail Strategy
North Korea has done it again, which is no surprise. While the ROK/U.S. alliance and the international community has been waiting for a seventh...
David MaxwellSeptember 25, 2022
The Embassy
A Three Part Plan to Enhance President Yoon’s North Korea Strategy: Toward a Free and Unified Korea
On August 15th, in his Liberation Day speech, President Yoon described his “audacious initiative” for North Korea. In summary, it is an economic engagement...
David MaxwellSeptember 2, 2022
Hermit Kingdom
We Must Bring About a Free and Unified Korea
This article is adapted from remarks presented by the author at International Forum on One Korea 2022 in Seoul, Korea on August 13, 2022....
David MaxwellAugust 14, 2022
Hermit Kingdom
The Forgotten South Korean Prisoners of War Who Sacrificed and Suffered for Seven Decades for Korean Freedom
Editor’s Note: This essay is adapted from the prepared remarks of the author for the “International Forum on Urging the Repatriation of Korean Prisoners...
David MaxwellJuly 21, 2022
Hermit Kingdom
Recommendations for Yoon-Biden Summit – Must Build on the Strong Alliance Foundation
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol began his five-year term on May 10 with a midnight security briefing from the ROK Joint Chiefs of...
David MaxwellMay 16, 2022
Hermit Kingdom
How Will President-Elect Yoon Manage the South Korea – U.S. Alliance and North Korea?
What to Expect from the Yoon Administration on the ROK/U.S. Alliance and National Security – President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol will have a positive impact on...
David MaxwellApril 20, 2022
Hermit Kingdom
How to Respond to North Korea’s ICBM Test
North Korea’s ICBM Launch: A Response to Kim’s Miscalculation – On March 24, North Korea possibly tested its new Hwasong-17 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)....
David MaxwellMarch 28, 2022
Hermit Kingdom
How to Prepare: North Korea Could Soon Test an ICBM or Nuclear Weapon
On March 10, 2022, the U.S. released a South Korea and Japan coordinated assessment of the last two North Korean missiles launches in February...
David MaxwellMarch 14, 2022
19fortyfive.com · by David Maxwell
Hermit Kingdom
How to Get North Korea to Negotiate over Its Nuclear Weapons and Missiles
On 30 January Kim Jong-un conducted another test launch of what is suspected to be an intermediate-range ballistic missile. This is the seventh event...
January 31, 2022
Hermit Kingdom
How Joe Biden Can Push Back Against North Korea’s Political Warfare Strategy
North Korea conducted a spate of missile launches testing various systems five times in 2022, so far. Kim Jong-un knows how to stir up...
David Maxwel lJanuary 25, 2022
Hermit Kingdom
North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Test: A 6 Step Strategy to Respond
North Korea’s New Ballistic Missile Test: How Should the Alliance Respond? At the end of the Worker’s Party of Korea 4th Plenary Meeting of the...
David MaxwellJanuary 5, 2022
Hermit Kingdom
End of Korean War Declaration: Why Just Words on Paper Won’t Matter
Let me state up front that I want peace on the Korean peninsula, and I think all Koreans and Americans want peace. The question...
David MaxwellNovember 22, 2021
Hermit Kingdom
What Kim Jong-un May Learn from Biden’s Chaotic Afghanistan Exit
As the dust is settling from the fallout of the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, Americans and allies will be conducting after-action reviews to determine...
David MaxwellSeptember 7, 2021
Hermit Kingdom
The North Korea Threat Is Growing. U.S.-South Korea Military Training Must Press Forward.
Following the successful Joe Biden-Moon Jae-in summit on May 21, 2021, the Moon administration began backsliding on alliance commitments to military readiness. Specifically, President...
David MaxwellJune 3, 2021
Smart Bombs: Military, Defense and National Security
The U.S. Military and South Korea Must Train to Deter North Korea
ROK/U.S. combined training – routine but necessary defensive exercises – is described in the media in various ways that causes confusion among the public....
David MaxwellMarch 10, 2021
Hermit Kingdom
Joe Biden Can’t Fall for North Korea’s Latest Trap
After he labelled America as North Korea’s “foremost principal enemy” and announced plans to strengthen his regime’s nuclear and missile arsenal, Kim Jong-un last...
David MaxwellJanuary 12, 2021
19fortyfive.com · by David Maxwell
2. Vice FMs of S. Korea, U.S. to discuss alliance modernization ahead of APEC summit
How do we optimize our combined military forces to deter war, and if north Korea attacks, to defeat the nKPA or respond to instability and regime collapse, while conducting counter-nuclear operations, and addressing third party influence and intervention, while simultaneously developing the capabilities required by the Mutual Defense Treaty to to defend each country against threats in the "Pacific Area?" How do we develop the strategic agility to respond to multiple contingencies in the Asia-Indo-Pacific that could be sequential or simultaneous?
My recommendations are here:
Strategic Concept: Establishing a Combined Northeast Asia Combatant Command (NEACOM) in Seoul
https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/strategic-concept-establishing-a-combined-northeast-asia-combatant-command-neacom-in-seoul/
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1deTjTO-q6b1g6d0WMRvhiSUx6oz109MI/view?usp=sharing
Why America and South Korea Need a Combined Multi-Domain Task Force
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/why-america-and-south-korea-need-a-combined-multi-domain-task-force
‘Back to the Line’: Why American Soldiers Should Be on the Korean DMZ
https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/back-to-the-line-why-american-soldiers-should-be-on-the-korean-dmz/
Optimizing U.S. and Allied Forces for Deterrence and Defense Throughout Indo-Pacom: From Korea to Australia and Everywhere in Between
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/24/us-allies-deterrence-indo-pacific/
Developing an Irregular Warfare Campaign for North Korea
https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/developing-an-irregular-warfare-campaign-for-north-korea/
A Psychological Operations Strategy for the Korean Peninsula from Lessons Learned in Ukraine
https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/a-psychological-operations-strategy-for-the-korean-peninsula-from-lessons-learned-in-ukraine/
America Must Stop Treating Taiwan and Korea as Separate Security Issues
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/04/america-must-stop-treating-taiwan-and-korea-as-separate-security-issues/
Silk Web of Alliances: Trump’s Legacy and the Indo-Pacific’s Future
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/01/silk-web-of-alliances-trumps-legacy-and-the-indo-pacifics-future/
Vice FMs of S. Korea, U.S. to discuss alliance modernization ahead of APEC summit | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · October 10, 2025
SEOUL, Oct. 10 (Yonhap) -- Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-Joo was set to meet with his U.S. counterpart, Allison Hooker, on Friday and discuss the bilateral alliance and coordination over North Korea's nuclear issues.
Park will hold a "strategic dialogue" with Hooker, U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs, to discuss pending issues ahead of the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, according to the foreign ministry.
It will mark the first such vice foreign ministerial talks between the two nations since July 2021.
The two sides are expected to discuss ways to "modernize" the Seoul-Washington alliance and coordinate their policy on North Korea as the leaders of the two nations are likely to hold talks on the sidelines of the APEC summit set for Oct. 31-Nov. 1 in the South Korean southern city of Gyeongju.
The United States has been pushing to modernize the decades-old alliance in a bid to expand Seoul's defense posture beyond the Korean Peninsula to deter China's threats. It includes readjusting the role and size of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea under a concept known as "strategic flexibility."
Speculation is growing that U.S. President Donald Trump may make a one-day visit to South Korea on Nov. 29 for his talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping and leave Gyeongju without attending the APEC summit.
This file photo shows the Korean flag and the United States flag waving at the memorial for U.S. war veterans who fought in the Korean War at Imjingak in Paju, north of Seoul. (Yonhap)
sookim@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · October 10, 2025
3. North Korea's 10/10 Military Parade: What To Watch For
North Korea's 10/10 Military Parade: What To Watch For
nationalsecurityjournal.org · Robert E. Kelly · October 9, 2025
Key Points and Summary – As North Korea holds a military parade this week, analysis suggests observers should look beyond the expected ICBMs and focus on two more critical developments.
-The first is any evidence of tactical, low-yield nuclear weapons, which would signal a dangerous doctrinal shift from deterrence to battlefield nuclear use.
M2020 Tank from North Korea. Image Credit: KCNA/North Korea State Media.
-The second is the display of advanced combat drones.
-Having gained experience in Ukraine, North Korea could use drones to offset its conventional army’s technological disadvantage against South Korea.
-These two capabilities represent a more immediate and destabilizing evolution in Pyongyang’s military strategy.
North Korea: What Will They Show the World During Their Military Parade?
North Korea will display its latest military hardware in a parade this week. Such parades are a regular occurrence. As a Stalinist state persisting past the Cold War-era, the North likes to show its deterrence against enemies — internal and external — with extravagant displays of hardware.
Much of this year’s focus is on a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Hwasong-20. The Hwasong series has given North Korea the range it would need to hit the U.S. mainland since 2017. But it is widely suspected that North Korea struggles with guidance and re-entry: We do not know how well its ICBMs can reach a specific location on a map when launched from a great distance, nor do we know if its warheads can survive re-entry into the atmosphere from space.
There is suspicion that Russian President Vladimir Putin may have given the North Koreans help in solving these doubts in exchange for their assistance in the Ukraine war. In the meantime, there are two other kinds of weapon systems North Korea observers are also watching for — tactical nuclear weapons and drone systems.
Will North Korea Build Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons?
North Korea has announced in the past that it would construct tactical, or low-yield, nuclear weapons. A nuclear weapon’s “yield” is the amount of energy it releases, and a “low” yield is generally considered anything less than 5 kilotons. The weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had yields of about 20 kilotons.
All nuclear-armed states have large, high-yield nukes. These are intended for use only as a last defense. Launched at an attacker’s cities, they would do devastating damage. They therefore deter other countries from attack. This manner of nuclear deterrence goes back decades, and it appears that North Korea has achieved it with its ICBMs and six nuclear tests.
But the use of small nuclear weapons to supplement conventional forces on the battlefield has long been a temptation for nuclear states. In theory, a small nuclear weapon could function like very powerful conventional artillery. Just one warhead could do tremendous damage to enemy forces. For small and vulnerable states, the appeal is obvious. Mini-nukes could correct punishing conventional imbalances. This is particularly attractive to North Korea, given how far behind it is compared to its American, South Korean, and Japanese opponents.
In an inter-Korean conflict, North Korean mini-nukes could halt any northward advance by South Korean formations. Thus any sign during North Korea’s parades that it has attained tactical nuclearization is crucial. The development of such weapons would imply that North Korea not only seeks an arsenal for traditional deterrence, but for battlefield use too.
What Has North Korea Learned from Drone Warfare in Ukraine?
Wars quickly bring successful technologies to the fore. They harshly demonstrate how prized, prestigious legacy systems may no longer be useful.
Conversely, underdeveloped, overlooked platforms may suddenly shape the battlefield. In Ukraine, the decline of the tank and armored vehicle when faced with the ubiquity of the drone has been just such a story.
Every military in the world is noting just how much traditional land warfare has been taken over by small, cheap, flying killing machines.
As a land power with a massive army, this lesson is especially pertinent for North Korea. Pyongyang may go nuclear in a war, but that would come with huge risks.
It would prefer to fight conventionally, at least for a while, until a peace deal could be struck and nuclear escalation avoided.
The traditional North Korean strategy has been to militarize the entire country. Everyone serves in the military for long conscription terms, and the North’s standing army is three times larger than the South’s. But South Korea is so technologically far ahead that there is much skepticism that North Korean mass could succeed against South Korean quality.
Drones offer a potential exit from this dilemma. North Korean troops serving in Ukraine have much greater experience with drone combat than the South Korean or U.S. armies.
This gives North Korea, uncharacteristically, a conventional edge. If it can deploy drones across multiple army functions and formations, perhaps it can somewhat equalize the conventional imbalance and avoid early nuclear escalation.
North Korea has proven to be a surprisingly persistent opponent, and it has adopted technologies that give it a fighting chance.
Expect to see those new technologies on display.
About the Author: Dr. Robert Kelly, Pusan National University
Dr. Robert E. Kelly is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University in South Korea. His research interests focus on Security in Northeast Asia, U.S. foreign policy, and international financial institutions. He has written for outlets including Foreign Affairs, the European Journal of International Relations, and the Economist, and he has spoken on television news services including BBC and CCTV. His personal website/blog is here; his Twitter page is here.
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nationalsecurityjournal.org · Robert E. Kelly · October 9, 2025
4. N. Korea's Kim pledges to build 'affluent paradise' on 80th anniv. of party founding
Perhaps for the elite but certainly not for the 26 million Koreans in the north.
(LEAD) N. Korea's Kim pledges to build 'affluent paradise' on 80th anniv. of party founding | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · October 10, 2025
(ATTN: UPDATES with more info in last 3 paras, photos)
By Park Boram
SEOUL, Oct. 10 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has pledged to turn the country into an "affluent" socialist "paradise" during an event celebrating the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea, state media reported Friday.
Kim issued the pledge in a speech at the event at Pyongyang's May Day Stadium the previous day, which was attended by foreign guests and members of various groups, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.
The North Korean leader recalled the party's past course, saying it had to pursue a policy of simultaneously pursuing economic construction and nuclear buildup to cope with the growing nuclear war threats by the U.S. imperialists amid worldwide political upheaval in the 1990s.
"Historically, there has been no such country in the world as ours, which had to carry out so many tasks ... for national defense and construction, even as it was facing constant and tenacious pressure, interference and threats of aggression by outside forces," Kim claimed.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un waves from the podium during a ceremony marking the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea held at Pyongyang's May Day Stadium on Oct. 9, 2025, in this photo from the Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
The country is still facing "adversaries' ferocious political and military" pressure, but its "international prestige" as a faithful member of the socialist forces is further increasing each year, he said.
If the country strives for some more years in the same spirit, it can transform its life remarkably and achieve its goals, Kim appealed.
"I will surely turn this country into a more affluent and beautiful land and into the best socialist paradise in the world," the KCNA quoted Kim as saying.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un delivers a speech during a ceremony marking the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea held at Pyongyang's May Day Stadium on Oct. 9, 2025, in this photo from the Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Thursday's celebrations, held on the eve of the anniversary, kicked off with fireworks, mass games and an art performance. Key foreign guests included Chinese Premier Li Qiang; Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council; and Vietnam's Communist Party chief To Lam.
The North was also expected to hold a large-scale military parade around midnight, but it appears to have been rescheduled, possibly to Friday night, due to rain.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R) greets Russian artists during their performance at Pyongyang's Mansudae Art Theatre on Oct. 9, 2025, in this photo from the Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Also on Thursday, Kim attended a celebratory concert by a delegation of Russian artists, including singer-songwriter Shaman, held at Pyongyang's Mansudae Art Theatre.
Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui and Kim Yo-jong, vice department director of the North Korean party's Central Committee and the powerful sister of the leader, accompanied him to the performance, along with government officials and members from the Russian Embassy in North Korea.
Kim hailed the performance as a "unique contribution" to strengthening the brotherly friendship between North Korea and Russia, the KCNA said.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) attends a performance by Russian artists at Pyongyang's Mansudae Art Theatre on Oct. 9, 2025, in this photo from the Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · October 10, 2025
5. Kim, China's Li discuss elevating cooperation, strategic communication: KCNA
Kim must be feeling pretty good about how he has elevated his stature in the past year or so.
Kim, China's Li discuss elevating cooperation, strategic communication: KCNA | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · October 10, 2025
By Park Boram
SEOUL, Oct. 10 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has held a meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang and discussed ways to broaden bilateral cooperation, including high-level exchanges and strategic communications, the North's state media reported Friday.
The meeting took place Thursday in Pyongyang as Li visited North Korea to attend celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of the founding of the North's Workers' Party of Korea, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported. It was the first visit by China's No. 2 leader to Pyongyang in 16 years.
Kim and Li discussed "issues arising in mutually expanding high-level visits, strategic communication, multi-faceted exchange and cooperation to develop the friendly and cooperative relations ... in a wider and comprehensive way," the KCNA said.
Li noted that the two countries are opening a new chapter in bilateral relations under the strategic guidance of their state leaders, the KCNA said, quoting him as saying that it is China's "consistent and steadfast strategic policy to successfully defend, consolidate and develop the China-DPRK relations."
DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name.
Kim echoed the pledge, saying North Korea plans to work toward more vigorous relations through joint struggles to accomplish socialist causes with Chinese comrades.
Kim also wished China "greater success" in its journey to build a modern socialist state."
The trip comes only about a month after Kim traveled to Beijing to attend a military parade and hold talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, as the two countries scrambled to restore bilateral ties strained by Pyongyang's military alignment with Russia.
The KCNA separately said that Xi sent a congratulatory message to Kim on the occasion of the party's founding anniversary, reaffirming China's policy of steadfastly strengthening relations with North Korea regardless of changes in the international security situation.
Xi said his "deep" talks with Kim last month "indicated the way for further developing" the bilateral friendship.
"No matter how the international situation may change, it is the consistent policy of the Chinese party and government to successfully defend, consolidate and develop China-DPRK relations," Xi also said.
China "is ready to contribute ... to make positive contributions to peace, stability, development and prosperity of the region and the rest of the world by promoting the steady development of China-DPRK relations," he added.
Chinese Premier Li Qiang (L) attends the East Asia Summit in Vientiane, Laos, on Oct. 11, 2025. (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · October 10, 2025
6. N. Korea's Kim, Vietnamese leader discuss expanding bilateral cooperation: KCNA
Could there be a Vietnam communications channel established for the US and north Korea?
N. Korea's Kim, Vietnamese leader discuss expanding bilateral cooperation: KCNA | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · October 10, 2025
SEOUL, Oct. 10 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has held talks with Vietnamese head of state To Lam and exchanged views on expanding the long-standing cooperative relations between their countries, state media reported Friday.
The meeting took place in Pyongyang the previous day, as To Lam, chief of Vietnam's Communist Party, visited North Korea to attend celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of the founding of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
Kim noted that the Vietnamese leader's visit "boosts the friendly ties between the two parties and the two peoples and adds significance to the 80th founding anniversary."
Lam expressed his country's willingness to "further consolidate the traditional relations of friendship" with North Korea and develop them to a new level, according to the KCNA.
"There was an open-minded exchange of views on the issues arising in positively promoting the cause of building socialism in the DPRK and Vietnam and expanding the long-standing cooperative relations ... as required by the times and other issues of mutual concern," the KCNA said. DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the official name of North Korea.
Also on Thursday, Kim hosted a reception welcoming Lam's visit, the North said.
The Vietnamese leader arrived in Pyongyang the previous day for a three-day trip through Saturday, marking the first trip by a top Vietnamese leader to North Korea since then Communist Party General Secretary Nong Duc Manh's trip in 2007.
The two countries are celebrating 2025 as the year of friendship, marking the 75th anniversary of their formal diplomatic relations.
This image from the Korean Central News Agency on Oct. 10, 2025, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R) toasting with To Lam, chief of Vietnam's Communist Party, during their talks in Pyongyang on Oct. 9. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
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(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · October 10, 2025
7. Kim Jong Un touts totalitarianism to foreign guests at first mass games in years
"Eliminating political enemies:" the fundamental "skill" of every dictator or authoritarian/totalitarian leader. Perhaps, no one does it better than KJU. It is key to his survival.
Kim Jong Un touts totalitarianism to foreign guests at first mass games in years
North Korean leader promotes benefits of eliminating political enemies in speech at 80th party anniversary celebration
https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/kim-jong-un-touts-totalitarianism-to-foreign-guests-at-first-mass-games-in-years/
Colin Zwirko October 10, 2025
The “Grand Mass Gymnastics and Artistic Performance” titled "Long Live the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK)" took place at May Day Stadium on Oct. 9 | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Oct. 10, 2025)
North Korea held its first mass games propaganda performance in five years on Thursday, where leader Kim Jong Un delivered a speech to promote the benefits of totalitarianism for hundreds of foreign visitors, including China’s premier and the leaders of Vietnam and Russia’s ruling parties.
According to state media on Friday, Kim told foreign guests that North Korea has established the “best socialist paradise in the world” over the 80 years since gaining independence from Japan, namely by enforcing “oneness in ideology and leadership” and eliminating “any slightest tendency” toward political opposition.
He also defended his priority on nuclear weapons development, saying North Korea is the biggest victim of “interference and threats of aggression by outside forces” in the world, specifically of “growing nuclear war threats by the U.S. imperialists.”
The “Grand Mass Gymnastics and Artistic Performance” titled “Long Live the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK)” took place at May Day Stadium. The performances have unofficially been dubbed the “mass games.”
The “Grand Mass Gymnastics and Artistic Performance” titled “Long Live the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK)” took place at May Day Stadium on Oct. 9 | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Oct. 10, 2025)
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The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that the event largely focused on the North Korean leader, with “songs praising the great era of Kim Jong Un” and claiming people have “nothing to envy” in other countries while living “under the warm care of the fatherly Marshal.”
Joining Kim on the viewing stand for the speech and mass games Thursday night were Chinese Premier Li Qiang, Vietnam’s ruling party chief To Lam, and Russian chairman of the National Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, who also leads the ruling United Russia party.
Political delegations from Iran, Nicaragua, Mexico and other countries, as well as supporters from small DPRK ideological support groups around the world, were also invited to attend events in Pyongyang this week, expected to culminate in a large-scale military parade on Friday.
A large portion of Kim’s speech at the mass games focused on promoting his ruling system as stable and successful, addressing outside observers while saying the DPRK stands “in front of the world as powerful beings.”
Kim explicitly defended his political system as based on disallowing challenges to national leadership and enforcing “ideological uniformity” and “purity” in society, following the tradition of executing an “acute class struggle and elimination of factions in the Party” in the 1950s.
Kim Jong Un delivers a speech at a national meeting and mass games at May Day Stadium on Oct. 9 | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Oct. 10, 2025)
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China’s Li Qiang appears on the viewing stand on Kim Jong Un’s right, and Vietnam’s To Lam and Russia’s Dmitry Medvedev to his left | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Oct. 10, 2025)
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But he also claimed citizens don’t consider the system authoritarian because they in fact support it as beneficiaries of party policies on improving living conditions and defending state sovereignty.
“Always aware of and guarding against the possible budding of authoritarianism and a number of other problems which are likely to separate the Party from the masses as its ruling years get longer and one generation is replaced by another, we have made sure that an absolute spirit of serving the people prevails across the Party,” Kim said.
The DPRK leader delivered a similar speech in front of top party cadres on Wednesday, calling for intensifying a “militant” fight against any opposition to his rule and North Korea’s one-party system in the party ranks and society at large.
Taken together with a third speech earlier this week on the importance of continuing to develop nuclear and conventional arsenals, Kim has overall used the occasion of the party anniversary to present an image of a nation ready to fight external threats and almost completely unified behind the dictator against internal threats.
He has claimed in these speeches that “the people” support his position on enforcing his “unitary” rule and socialist system, sending a message of conformity and unity after recently criticizing both high-level cadres and ordinary people who pursue personal or “anti-socialist” actions.
At the end of his speech at May Day Stadium on Thursday, Kim promised to “always cherish love for the people and not neglect my obligation of requital,” and that he “will surely turn this country into a more affluent and beautiful land and into the best socialist paradise in the world.”
North Korea has used the mass games for decades as the highest form of live storytelling about state lore, involving tens of thousands of performers on the stadium floor as well thousands more acting as “human pixels” forming the large colorful backdrop while flipping books of colored paper.
The shows have featured sections on the country’s history, the mythical origins of the Kim family and war experiences, while also focusing on the state’s current economic policies. Citizens are also taught a “strong sense of organization, discipline and oneness” through the show, KCNA said.
Though KCNA did not describe the entire program, it reported that Thursday’s show “depicted in a grand epic style the great history of the genuine people’s Party” since it “took the responsibility of the destiny of the people” 80 years ago. It is possible that state TV will air the show in full in the coming days.
Preparations for this year’s event began almost four months ago in mid-June, with young children as well as adults taking part in frequent practices over that period.
In the past, Pyongyang has held shows almost nightly for extended periods of time, but the last performance — celebrating the Oct. 10 holiday in 2020 and titled “Great Guidance” — may have only taken place on one night, possibly due to concerns over the spread of COVID-19.
It is not yet clear how long this year’s show will run, but it may go on for a number of days or weeks to boost patriotism for North Korean audiences usually bussed in by local social or work-based organizations.
Edited by Bryan Betts
8. Kim Jong Un holds talks with Chinese, Vietnamese dignitaries ahead of mass games
China, Russia, and Vietnam.
Kim Jong Un holds talks with Chinese, Vietnamese dignitaries ahead of mass games
North Korean leader also greets Russia’s Medvedev at cultural performance after one-on-ones with Li Qiang and To Lam
Shreyas Reddy October 10, 2025
Kim Jong Un at the mass games event, flanked by Chinese Premier Li Qiang (left), Vietnamese party chief To Lam (second from right) and former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (right) | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Oct. 10, 2025)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met China’s premier and the heads of Russia’s and Vietnam’s ruling parties on Thursday, amid large-scale celebrations for the Workers Party of Korea’s 80th anniversary in Pyongyang.
At a mass games performance kicking off festivities, Kim enthusiastically greeted Chinese Premier Li Qiang, United Russia Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev and Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) General Secretary To Lam, photos published by state media on Friday show.
Reflecting their seniority, the Chinese head of government and the CPV chief sat to the right and left of the North Korean leader, respectively, at the large-scale gymnastics and arts event at Pyongyang’s May Day Stadium, while Medvedev sat to the left of To.
Kim also held one-on-one talks with both Li and To ahead of the cultural event, with the meetings underscoring Pyongyang’s focus on strengthening relations with its closest partners amid shifting tides in global geopolitics. State media has not reported on a separate meeting with Medvedev.
Dignitaries from across the world have descended on Pyongyang for anniversary events, including an expected military parade showing off North Korea’s arsenal of nuclear-capable missiles and other new weapons.
REJUVENATING TIES WITH CHINA
Kim held talks with the Chinese premier before the mass games, building on the two sides’ recent efforts to strengthen ties despite speculation of growing distance over diverging geopolitical priorities.
The North Korean leader welcomed the Chinese delegation’s participation in the event as an important act demonstrating Beijing’s “unchanging support and special friendship” and intent to strengthen the bilateral relationship, the ruling party newspaper Rodong Sinmun reported on Friday.
He also conveyed his thanks to Chinese President Xi Jinping for sending an art troupe for the Party Founding Day celebrations, and expressed hope that China would achieve great success in “comprehensively building a modern socialist country” under Xi’s leadership.
“Further strengthening and developing the DPRK-China friendship and cooperation in keeping with the requirements of the times is the unchanging position of the Workers’ Party of Korea and the DPRK government,” Rodong Sinmun cited Kim as saying.
Li conveyed Xi’s greetings to Kim and congratulations for the party anniversary, and highlighted the importance of the two leaders’ summit in China last month, with the Chinese president pledging Beijing’s readiness to work with the DPRK to strengthen “the cause of socialist construction” in both countries.
“No matter how the international situation may change, it is the consistent policy of the Chinese party and government to successfully defend, consolidate and develop China-DPRK relations,” Xi’s message said.
Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Kim Jong Un held talks in Pyongyang. | Image: KCNA (Oct. 10, 2025)
Praising Xi and Kim’s creation of a “blueprint” for further strengthening the bilateral relationship, Li expressed China’s readiness to boost high-level exchanges and strategic communication with the DPRK, China’s state-owned Xinhua News Agency reported on Friday.
The premier’s remarks reinforce the Chinese and North Korean leaders’ emphasis on bilateral exchanges and cooperation during last month’s summit, after which DPRK foreign minister Choe Son Hui traveled to Beijing in late September for talks with her counterpart and Li.
Emphasizing Beijing’s prioritization of long-term ties with Pyongyang, Li called on the two sides to “strengthen multilateral collaboration, firmly safeguard and practice multilateralism and promote the development of the international order in a more just and equitable direction,” Xinhua reported.
One key difference between the two countries’ readouts was Chinese state media’s claim that Kim firmly rejected “separatist acts of ‘Taiwanese independence’ and any external interference” and backed Beijing’s claims over Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet.
The DPRK has previously expressed support for China’s claims over Taiwan, but this marks the second time this month that Chinese media has differed from North Korean media in its claims about Pyongyang’s support in territorial disputes.
VIETNAM RECEPTION AND RUSSIAN REMARKS
Kim also held talks on Thursday with To and organized a reception in the Vietnamese party chief’s honor.
Highlighting the “comradely friendship” between the two socialist states, Kim expressed appreciation for To’s visit and praised the CPV’s “successes in the struggle for building a prosperous state,” Rodong Sinmun reported on Friday.
In response, To lauded North Korea’s “eye-opening successes” in developing the country “by dint of self-reliance” under the leadership of Kim and the ruling party, and affirmed Vietnam’s will to further strengthen the bilateral relationship.
At the reception attended by top officials from both countries, Kim welcomed the CPV general secretary with a 21-gun salute and a guard of honor.
Vietnamese party leader To Lam received a guard of honor at a reception hosted by Kim Jong Un. | Image: KCNA (Oct. 10, 2025)
Meanwhile, Russia’s ruling party chief Medvedev — who also serves as deputy chairman of the national Security Council — delivered a speech thanking Kim for North Korea’s support in Russia’s “liberation” of the Kursk region from Ukrainian forces.
In a speech posted on social media after the mass games event, the Russian ex-president praised the “heroism” of North Korean soldiers who fought alongside Russian forces in the Ukraine war, highlighting the two countries’ burgeoning military alliance.
Neither Russian nor North Korean sources have reported on Medvedev holding talks with Kim beyond their brief greetings at the mass games performance, indicating his remarks about the Kursk campaign were delivered at a separate event.
The United Russia chairperson also held talks on Thursday with Workers’ Party officials led by party secretary Jo Yong Won and paid tribute to former leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.
United Russia Party Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev held talks in Pyongyang with senior North Korean official Jo Yong Won. | Image: KCNA (Oct. 10, 2025)
While Medvedev does not appear to have held talks with the North Korean leader yet, his remarks serve as a reminder of the growing closeness between the two nations under an alliance formalized last year.
This message of friendship was reinforced at a performance by Russian pop stars, orchestral and choral music troupes and a ballet company on Thursday afternoon, with Kim Jong Un and senior North Korean officials in attendance.
Edited by Bryan Betts
9. Where Next on the Peninsula?
More of the same? - Conventional diplomacy and the application of conventional international relations theory?
From a forthcoming paper I am working on:
For more than seven decades, diplomats, strategists, and scholars have sought to resolve “the Korea question” which is the unnatural division of the peninsula that paragraph 60 of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement declared must one day be settled peacefully. Yet despite countless rounds of talks, communiqués, and summits, the peninsula remains divided, the armistice unreplaced, the North possess nuclear weapons, and twenty-six million Koreans remain captive under the most despotic regime of the modern era. The failure is not one of effort or sincerity, but of paradigm. Traditional international relations theory and conventional negotiation strategies have repeatedly misdiagnosed the problem, treating North Korea as a normal state rather than what it is: a revolutionary, criminal, and hereditary cult whose survival depends on perpetual hostility. Because every conceivable traditional technique such as deterrence only containment, inducement, arms control, summit diplomacy, sanctions relief, and even maximum regime engagement, has been tried and failed, the time has come for a new approach: the “Two Plus Three Strategy.” This strategy recognizes that the key to solving the Korea question lies not in negotiating with the Kim family regime but in helping the Korean people in the North create the conditions for change themselves.
The Structural Failure of Traditional International-Relations Theory
Classical realism views states as rational actors pursuing survival within an anarchic system. Liberal institutionalism presumes that engagement, commerce, and dialogue can socialize regimes toward cooperation. Constructivism argues that shared norms and identity can reshape behavior. All three lenses assume a basic rationality and self-preservation instinct tied to the welfare of a population. North Korea violates each assumption.
The Kim regime’s legitimacy derives not from performance or consent but from absolute control through surveillance, repression, and ideological isolation. It does not behave as a rational state maximizing national interest; it acts as a family-run mafia enterprise whose overriding imperative is regime survival at all costs. The welfare of the population is irrelevant except insofar as it sustains the regime’s security apparatus. Attempts to apply realist balance-of-power logic (e.g., deterrence and containment) ignore the regime’s need to fabricate external threats to justify internal control. Liberal hopes that trade and aid might induce moderation fail because any influx of information or prosperity threatens the regime’s monopoly on truth. Constructivist efforts to foster mutual understanding collapse because the North’s ideological foundation of juche, songun, and hereditary deification rejects coexistence as ideological heresy.
In short, the Kim family regime does not seek peaceful coexistence; it seeks permanent confrontation to sustain its domestic control. The problem is not miscommunication between rational states but the irreconcilable nature of a totalitarian system whose very identity depends on the division of Korea – until it can achieve domination.
Where Next on the Peninsula?
https://www.38north.org/2025/10/where-next-on-the-peninsula/
There is an open opportunity for President Trump in negotiations with Kim Jong Un to confound enemies—and friends—in a deal that will make America Safe Again, although at what cost?
Since the collapse of the Soviet Empire a third of a century ago, three generations of the Kim family have searched for an American president willing to seriously engage. Kim Jong Un thought he had found that in Donald Trump. In the run-up to the 2019 Hanoi Summit they followed the path laid down by Steve Biegun in his Stanford University speech with a plan for a carefully choreographed step by step denuclearization process over a decade or more, front loaded with North Korea’s surrender of the Yongbyon nuclear complex for disablement and dismantlement in exchange for some UN sanctions relief. They were driven like lambs to the slaughter, with South Korea’s intelligence services assuring them it was a done deal.
It’s unclear whether Trump’s real estate dealing muscle memory or his hunt for the biggest headlines to drown out his domestic woes were the problem in Hanoi. But Trump walked and Pyongyang concluded he was willing though unable to deal. The result was pro-engagement groups among North Korea’s political elite abruptly and effectively neutralized. Watching the US retreat from Afghanistan and Washington’s weakness over Ukraine and Gaza, Kim Jong Un chose, at that point, to pivot away from Washington and align with Moscow, Beijing and Tehran in a Second Cold War. Pyongyang knew it could not win a conventional war with the South, let alone with US intervention on Seoul’s side, while the very nature of nuclear weapons left no room to pry the South’s misguided masses from their malign leadership. The economic reality of unification in the absence of assimilation meant the two systems could not sustainably coexist in any feasible time scale. Thus, all had to be cast into the outer darkness.
Kim has, given all these factors, chosen an alternate future for North Korea: one where sovereignty is key, and firmly underpinned by its nuclear deterrent. While Trump may see an opportunity within that space that could serve US interests, the de facto recognition of North Korea as a nuclear power could potentially catalyze a new nuclear arms race in East Asia and the effective demise of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Once Bitten, Twice Shy
At a pragmatic level, there is no reason for Kim to court a second Hanoi humiliation. On the UN Security Council, he has Moscow and Beijing’s twin vetoes to counter US maneuvers to increase pressure upon his regime. Even the current sanctions are more honored in breach than observance by Moscow and Beijing’s neighboring provinces, if not the center.
While North Korea has rejected the American administration’s early overtures to resume talks, even refusing Trump’s missive at their New York Embassy, Kim Jong Un’s recent speech has created an opening for Trump-Kim talks in the future. However, one condition is clear: abandon any dreams of denuclearization. While the Chinese leadership is concerned about South Korea going nuclear—because of the potential knock-on to Japan and Taiwan—it may well have to settle for the better rather than the best with effectively an arms control regime.
While the US is regularly castigated by the North, Trump himself largely remains immune. Therefore, in the light of the speech, there’s a real possibility that Kim might be seduced by the theatre of being global center-stage with Trump once again.
If, and when, the two do meet, it is unclear what the full agenda will be, and Kim may be on a hair-trigger to walk first this time around, leaving a narrow path to success. It is just possible that Pyongyang might—with some delicacy and some difficulty regarding Seoul and Tokyo—end up signing off on a multilateral deal effectively offering some form of arms control in exchange for massive industrial funding over a decade or more. Trump’s obsession with the Nobel Peace Prize may well lead him to concessions and a deal he might not otherwise make.
A Cautionary Scenario
Constructing a deal where both Pyongyang and Washington can credibly claim a win is challenging but far from impossible—yet will come with considerable collateral damage to both friends and neighbors. One plausible scenario, for instance, could include a North Korean commitment to certain arms limitations in exchange for significant sanctions relief and, if the US approach to Ukraine is any example, potential investment in rare earth mining. Kim could announce that the North has completed all necessary nuclear and ICBM testing and satellite launches, and commit to halting further long-range missile development, with the unspoken notion for his domestic audience that henceforth the North is moving from development to production. Trump could claim, with some justification, he has made America “safe again” by ending the North’s ICBM testing and halting further progress to both a hydrogen bomb and warhead miniaturization. Yet, such a scenario, while alleviating the direct threat to the United States, leaves an augmented real and present danger to Seoul and Tokyo.
In sum, Kim would get the de facto recognition of the North as a nuclear power, a partial lifting of UN sanctions, normalization of relations with Washington, and potential massive Western investment. Such a deal would protect the United States while leaving its Japanese and South Korean allies exposed to the North’s continued development and deployment of medium and short-range ballistic missiles. This could serve Trump’s foreign and domestic interests. The nuclear umbrella over Northeast Asia could be furled with little threat to the US, while Seoul—and Tokyo—would be over a barrel in future negotiations to extend their Special Measures Agreements. Seoul, Tokyo, and Taipei may subsequently choose to go nuclear, but too late to make a difference.
Beijing too would be on its back foot. A US-DPRK relationship, potentially coupled with renewed US-Russia relations—when the war in Ukraine ends—would create new see-saw dynamics amid Moscow, Washington and Beijing, plus the possibility of North Korea acting out a ‘reverse Nixon’. The prospect of Taiwan going nuclear would be an anathema and nightmare for Beijing and threaten to destabilize the whole region, while the undermining of China’s quasi-monopoly on rare earths would weaken its global trade leverage with the West.
Conclusion
The stakes for any future Trump-Kim negotiation are high for Seoul and Tokyo. If they want to head off this ‘nightmare’ scenario, then Tokyo and its new Prime Minister in particular will need to adopt a more conciliatory approach to engagement with Pyongyang and the Trump administration as regards the North, while Seoul will need to find some novel ways of indirectly engaging with the process. If this doesn’t happen, it may well be the perfect case of “Be careful what you wish for, lest it come true.” In retrospect, the current predicament may seem preferable to those that follow such a resolution.
10. Korea: Fading hopes for families split by North-South divide
One of the many human rights atrocities of the Kim family regime: forced family separation. The cruelty of the regime is beyond imagination.
Korea: Fading hopes for families split by North-South divide – DW – 10/09/2025
Julian Ryall
22 hours ago22 hours ago
With North Korea building up ties with China and Russia while growing ever more distant from Seoul, the chances of reunions for families torn apart by the 1950s Korean War look slim.
DW
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has called on North Korea to permit brief reunions of families that have been separated by the Korean War decades ago, although analysts say his pleas will almost certainly fall on deaf ears in Pyongyang.
"Unfortunately, inter-Korean relations are currently mired in deep distrust, but the issue of separated families remains the top priority that South and North Korea must work together to resolve," Lee said this Saturday, in a speech marking the third annual memorial day for separated families.
Lee urged "dialogue and cooperation" to resolve the issue.
Over 70 years after the armistice, time is running out for divided familiesImage: Lee Su-Kil-Korea Pool/Getty Images
The large-scale fighting between the two Koreas and their allies ended with the 1953 armistice which divided the peninsula. With no permanent peace treaty in place, however, North and South Korea are technically still at war.
In this speech, Lee pledged that his administration would do its "utmost to ensure peace takes root on the Korean Peninsula" and make sure that "the grief of the separated families is not passed down to future generations."
North Korea 'has all the cards'
Lee's comments came shortly before the celebration of Chuseok, the annual harvest festival when families gather and pay respects to their ancestors.
North Korea has yet to respond to Lee's remarks regarding family reunions. Such meetings have been organized in the past — the last one in 2018 when 83 North Koreans were able to meet 89 relatives from the South after many decades. The oldest South Korean who was selected by lottery to travel to the North for the reunion was 101 years old.
There is now a growing recognition that time is running out for the dwindling number of divided families on each side of the Demilitarized Zone. Pyongyang's stance on the issue seems to have only grown more hostile, with North Korea demolishing the traditional meeting place for families earlier this year.
"I do not think the North has any intention of even replying," said Kim Sang-woo, a former politician with the left-leaning South Korean Congress for New Politics who now serves on the board of the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation.
"Right now, North Korea has all the cards and can agree to reunions, but since it developed its alliances with China and Russia it has no need to do anything that the South wants," he told DW.
While North Korea is still largely politically isolated and dependent on China, it has now also forged a strong partnership with Russia which saw North Korean troops being shipped out to Russia to fight in the Ukraine war.
North Korea continues to back Russia's war against Ukraine
"Obviously (South Korean President) Lee has good intentions, but this will be torture for families who are going to be given false hope that they might get to see their relatives in the North, only to be disappointed," Kim said.
A lifetime without news of family
Dan Pinkston, a professor of international relations at the Seoul campus of Troy University, has met a number of Koreans who have been separated from relatives since the 1950s war and do not even know if their loved ones are still alive.
"It is a completely tragic situation," he said. "I know a man who works at the Unification Ministry in Seoul and who has worked on efforts to arrange reunions in the past. His father had a sister who was training to be a nurse when the North Koreans invaded in 1950 and was seized when Seoul fell."
Korea families reunited
"She was taken to the North but there was no word of her after that," he said. "Decades later, whenever the North provided the ministry with lists of names of people who wanted to take part in reunions, he would always go through the names to see if he could find his aunt."
"He never did and that is heartbreaking — but that is only one of thousands of people who have been affected," he said.
Pinkston agrees that there is little likelihood of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un heeding Lee's request.
"Why would Kim do a political favor to the South?" Pinkston asked, pointing out that Seoul no longer had leverage that it used to have with offers of economic and other assistance.
North's propaganda 'spell' threatened by reunited families
Another factor the North may be taking into account is that if the reunions did go ahead, it could lead to a surge in fraternal feelings for the South.
"There is the very real risk of reunions provoking nationalist sentiment and the emotional desire for reunification, which goes against the policy that Pyongyang has adopted in the last year that says the North and South are 'two hostile states,'" Pinkston said.
Kim Sang-woo also points out a propaganda pitfall for the North should the reunions go ahead.
"The regime tightly controls its people under a sort of spell that they have created," he said. "For generations they have told their people that the South is corrupt, that we are slaves of the United States, that we are not independent, that there is widespread disorder and that the South is on the brink of collapse," he added.
"To keep that image alive, they cannot allow any contact between their people and relatives in the South," Kim underlined. "It is terribly sad, of course, but I do not see the North changing its position on this any time soon."
Edited by: Darko Janjevic
DW
11. Suffering Behind Closed Doors:North Korean Women as Victims of Chinese Sexual Slavery
China and north Korea: two of the world's worst human rights abusers.
Suffering Behind Closed Doors:North Korean Women as Victims of Chinese Sexual Slavery
9/18/2025
0 Comments
By Sloane Thor
Edited by Diletta De Luca
https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/suffering-behind-closed-doorsnorth-korean-women-as-victims-of-chinese-sexual-slavery
Introduction
In recent years, dozens and hundreds of North Koreans have escaped their homeland and made the perilous passage across the Tumen River into China[1]. Many North Korean escapees flee from conditions defined by a chronic lack of food and rights due to the songbun system that leaves them disadvantaged and at risk of political persecution. Others leave to seek an income to maintain and support their families in North Korea (often to pay for medical treatment for a relative),[2] or to reunite with family that already left the country. Since the DMZ is full of landmines, the only way to reach freedom for these escapees is to go through China in order to eventually reach resettlement in South Korea.
North Korean escapees are also vulnerable due to their status as illegal immigrants in China. The Chinese government does not grant refugee status or asylum to North Korean escapees, as it instead considers them illegal economic migrants.[3] This causes many North Koreans who cross the border into China to be subjected to exploitation due their undocumented status and the Chinese government’s refusal to implement the non-refoulement principle (outlined in the U.N.’s 1951 Refugee Convention), meaning that escapees who are caught will be forcibly repatriated back to North Korea where they will be heavily punished. They are often tortured and sent to prison camps for their defection, as it is seen as “treachery against the nation” by the North Korean Ministry of People’s Security.[4] North Korean escapees are not able to obtain working permits, or residency permits due to their “illegal”status in China.[5] This makes them dependent on Chinese citizens in order to obtain housing or work. Coupled with the lack of Chinese language skills, this leaves them extremely exploitable.
North Korean female escapees are particularly easy targets for traffickers and brokers. They are easily manipulated due to age, status, risk of refoulment, and gender. The most prominent human rights abuses that befall North Korean women escapees are forced marriage, prostitution, and sexual slavery in the cyber realm.
The Vulnerability of North Korean Women
The vulnerability of North Korean women makes them particularly easy targets for traffickers and brokers. Korean NGOs estimate that up to 80% of the female escapees become victims of human trafficking.[6] Victims are usually between the ages of 12 and 29 but some research reports victims as young as 9 years old.[7] Being undocumented and at the risk of refoulement makes it easy for traffickers to control them through threats of exposure to officials if they do not comply with their demands. The risk of refoulement means that victims of human trafficking are unable to ask for help or report to officials as they risk being sent back to North Korea and thus being treated worse than prior to escaping.
The undocumented status of North Korean women in China provides an environment where physical, sexual, mental, and emotional abuse are used to control the women to mold them into complaisant sex slaves. In a recent report published by Korea Future it is noted that North Korean women are subjected to “supplementary violence designed to induce compliance and delivered in the forms of starvation, physical beatings, and verbal threats of repatriation”.[8] This makes them easier to control and less likely to try to escape.
Arranged Marriages and the One-Child Policy
30% of North Korean women who are trafficked in China are sold into forced marriages with Chinese men, often in rural areas.[9] This is because in China there is a high demand for young, sexually exploitable, and “marriage material” women as an effect of the “One-Child Policy”. This measure was enacted in 1979 and abolished in 2016, and it existed in a law that limited couples to only having one child as an attempt to curb a rapidly rising population. However, the policy resulted in a surplus of over 40 million boys[10] due to the male-dominated culture. The families tended to favor boys over girls as it was preferred to “have a male child to carry on the family’s name and inheritance.”[11] Thus, many Chinese women during this time were born in cities while few to none were born in rural areas as farm work was often carried out by men. This resulted in a high demand for brides in rural areas since the cities were far away and the Chinese women there were becoming educated and setting their sights on wealthier marriage partners This created a lucrative industry of “black-market brides” (trafficking victims from other countries) to remedy the vast gender imbalance, especially in rural areas of China.
Once a price is agreed upon by a broker and the soon-to-be Chinese husband, North Korean wives are relocated to the Chinese families who, fearing their escape, heavily restrict their freedom of movement for weeks or months by withholding access to a mobile phone, the internet, or the ability to travel outside the property without a family member.[12] While in the village, North Korean women nevertheless are unlikely to be reported to the police or to other local authorities. Additionally, even if they are reported to local authorities, it remains highly unlikely that their presence is revealed to higher level officials. This can be due to bribes or the Chinese concept of guanxi, a system of social networks and relationships that facilitate deals and influence transactions. Guanxi, while an important part of Chinese culture, facilitates the trafficking industry by causing citizens to protect the illegal acts of others to gain favor or receive an advantage or benefit in return.
Prostitution and Brothels
While forced marriage has long been the predominant fate for trafficked North Korean women, it has quickly been overtaken by prostitution. Korea Future estimates that prostitution in general accounts for about 6% of China’s GDP.[13] Currently, it is estimated that 50% of North Korean women who are trafficked in China are sold into brothels, karaoke bars, or other forms of forced prostitution.[14] Prostitution in China seems to be managed by criminal organizations who remain reliant upon the guanxi system and rarely operate nationwide as they prefer to opt for small regions or cities.[15] Many of these North Korean escapees work “in brothels masqueraded as entertainment or service venues, namely: bathhouses, saunas, karaoke bars, cafes, massage parlors, beauty parlors, barbershops, hair salons, small hotels, and restaurants”.[16] It is estimated that North Korean women engage with 2 to 4 men a night and are subjected to multiple forms of rape.[17] They are confined to the establishment and work under the instruction of a pimp or madam. In Shanghai, to avoid abduction by rival organizations and to signify ownership, some North Korean women are branded with tattoos, such as lions and butterflies.”[18] Criminal organizations work closely with corrupt or bribed officials to prevent the escape by the abducted North Korean escapees.[19]
The Chinese Cybersex Industry
With the emergence of the internet, North Korean women who become trafficking victims have been increasingly sold into the cybersex industry. These women are trapped in small apartments with a handful of other women and are sexually assaulted or forced to perform graphic sexual acts via webcam online for paying male clientele.[20] “Unlike bars or brothels with a permanent address, cybersex trafficking victims can be moved to and abused in any location with an internet connection and a webcam, or just a mobile phone”.[21] The cybersex exploitation of North Korean victims takes place on platforms that can be “rudimentary, deliberately inconspicuous, or simply well-known and widely available video-chat services”.[22] The majority of clients utilizing these platforms, particularly chatrooms, tend to be from South Korea, where pornography and prostitution are illegal.[23]
Off-camera, victims face “coercion, starvation, intimidation, and brutalization”.[24] They are forced to cover up bruises sustained from the acts performed or from abuse by their handler with makeup and cover up hair loss with wigs.[25] Many are often subjected to drug abuse in order to force them to work longer hours and “dull their shame”. [26] Their handlers often dangle the chance of freedom in front of them, telling them that they can go free once they have paid off their debt or the money it took to buy them. However, the women will never see a cent from their work and will not obtain freedom as they remain trapped in a vicious cycle of abuse.[27]
Concluding Remarks
“Urgent and immediate action, which will run contrary to the prevailing politics of inter-Korean dialogue, is needed to save the lives of countless female North Korean refugees in China”.[28] China has been complicit when it comes to perpetrating and helping cover up human rights abuses against North Korean escapees within its own borders. It has notably become a hub and a destination country for human trafficking.[29] The usage of human trafficking, predominantly of vulnerable populations such as North Korean women, has been an unethical but easy remedy to the surplus of unmarried men left in the wake of the One-Child policy. China is notably a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 2003 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons put forth by the United Nations. Refusing to implement the non-refoulment principle violates the North Korean escapees’ fundamental human rights, from the right to a fair trial to protection from torture. By denying North Korean escapees the right to asylum and refusing to grant them the status of refugees, the Chinese government is directly responsible for the vulnerability and exploitation of North Korean people, particularly when it comes to women and children in their own country.
As a signatory of multiple U.N. conventions to protect human rights and as a member of the U.N. Human Rights Council, it is of the utmost importance that China adhere to the bylaws it agreed to as it sets a precedent for other nations. The Chinese government should grant North Korean escapees the right to asylum in China as well as refugee status. Banning the practice of forced repatriation is imperative to implementing the non-refoulement principle.
Sloane Thor is a first-year graduate student in the Masters of Asian Studies Program at the Elliott School of International Affairs. As a recipient of the GWIKS Academy of Korean Studies Fellowship, she is excited to pursue her interest in North Korean human rights and inter-peninsular politics. Sloane Thor graduated cum laude from Wittenberg University with a major in East Asian Studies and minors in Mandarin Chinese language and Literature, Political Science, and International Studies. Her passion for North Korean human rights began after studying abroad in South Korea for a semester at Yonsei University in Seoul. During her time there she took a class on North Korean human rights and the U.N. taught by HRNK CEO Greg Scarlatoiu, which prompted her to write a thesis style paper on North Korean humanrights for her senior capstone project when she returned to the United States. She currently speaks,reads, and writes Korean at an intermediate level and has advanced proficiency in Chinese and French. As a second-year intern at HRNK she is excited to pursue the topic of North Koreans in China further along with studying North Korean propaganda. She hopes to bring her language skills into use whether it is through translating or cultural literacy when it comes to resources.
[1] King, Robert R. “Number of North Korean Defectors Drops to Lowest Level in Two Decades.” CSIS, January 27, 2021. https://www.csis.org/analysis/number-north-korean-defectors-drops-lowest-level-two-decades.
[2] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China. Washington, D.C.: U.S. (2009). https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Lives_for_Sale.pdf.
[3] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China. Washington, D.C.: U.S. (2009). https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Lives_for_Sale.pdf.
[4] “World Report 2020: Rights Trends in North Korea.” Human Rights Watch, January 22, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/north-korea.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Zaugg, Julie. “These North Korean Defectors Were Sold into China as Cybersex Slaves. Then They Escaped.” CNN, June 10, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/09/asia/north-korea-defectors-intl-hnk/index.html.
[7] Ochab, Dr. Ewelina U. “Trafficking of North Korean Women in China.” Forbes, July 1, 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2019/07/01/trafficking-of-north-korean-women-in-china/?sh=1777b7187af0.
[8] Yoon, Hee-soon. “Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’.” (2019). Korea Future Initiative. http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf
[9] Ochab, Dr. Ewelina U. “Trafficking of North Korean Women in China.”
[10] Lisa Cameron, Dan-dan Zhang, and Xin Meng, “China’s One-Child Policy: Effects on the Sex Ratio and Crime.” Institute for Family Studies, December 19, 2018.
[11] Kathleen Davis, “Brides, Bruises and the Border: The Trafficking of North Korean Women into China.” SAIS Review of International Affairs 26, no. 1 (2006): 131-141, 133.
[12] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). “Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’.”
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ochab, Dr. Ewelina U. “Trafficking of North Korean Women in China.”
[15] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). “Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’.”
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative. http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf
[21] “Cybersex Trafficking - International Justice Mission.” IJM, September 2016. https://www.ijm.org/sites/default/files/IJM_2016_Casework_FactSheets_CybersexTrafficking.pdf.
[22] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative . http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf
[23] Ji-an, Son Hyeon-yoo & Seo. “Attention for Digital Sex Crimes: A Push for Reform in South Korea.” 한양저널, June 1, 2020. https://www.hanyangian.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=992.
[24] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative . http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf
[25] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative . http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf
[26] Sang-hun, Choe. “After Fleeing North Korea, Women Get Trapped as Cybersex Slaves in China.” The New York Times, September 13, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/world/asia/north-korea-cybersex-china.html#:~:text=With nowhere to turn for,in a report in May.
[27] Zaugg, Julie. “These North Korean Defectors Were Sold into China as Cybersex Slaves. Then They Escaped.” CNN, June 10, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/09/asia/north-korea-defectors-intl-hnk/index.html.
[28] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative . http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf
[29] Micallef, Etienne. “China, EU Work to Combat Human Trafficking.” International Organization for Migration, November 15, 2016. https://www.iom.int/news/china-eu-work-combat-human-trafficking.
12. Seoul spending too much on North Korean defector resettlement, lawmaker suggests
Oh where to start with this disappointing report? Just disappointing.
Seoul spending too much on North Korean defector resettlement, lawmaker suggests
Kim Sang-wook calls for adjusting budget amid decline in arrivals, while criticizing lack of support for escapees abroad
https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/seoul-spending-too-much-on-north-korean-defector-resettlement-lawmaker-suggests/
Jooheon Kim October 10, 2025
Democratic Party lawmaker Kim Sang-wook (left) | Image: Screenshot from Kim's Facebook
ROK government funding for a center that helps North Korean defectors resettle in the South has held steady despite a significant decrease in new arrivals, according to a ruling party lawmaker, raising concerns about inefficient operations.
At the same time, lawmaker Kim Sang-wook of the Democratic Party criticized a lack of sufficient support for children of North Korean defectors born in third countries, while stressing the need to protect defectors overseas.
In a report released on Monday, Kim cited unification data showing that the annual number of defectors arriving in South Korea has declined from around 1,500 throughout the 2010s to a record low of 63 in 2021. Arrivals have only partially recovered to 236 as of last year.
The number of people completing resettlement training at the Hanawon support center, south of Seoul, has also declined from 1,444 in 2016 to just 242 last year, according to the lawmaker.
But the lawmaker noted that around 180 staff members continue to work at Hanawon’s main and secondary centers. All new arrivals are required to spend three months at the center learning basic skills like how to use a bank, find a job and vote, along with undergoing vocational training.
“While the unique nature of inter-Korean relations means we can’t rule out the possibility of a sudden increase in defector arrivals, maintaining the same level of staff and budget despite the significant decrease in numbers is not rational,” said Kim, a member of the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee.
The budget execution rate remains low, according to the release. The ROK government allocates tens of billions of won each year for North Korean defector settlement support, but the execution rate reached just 44% in 2021, 49% in 2022, 62% in 2023 and 69% in 2024.
The unification ministry emphasized the difficulty of making precise projections about defector arrivals, stating that the government has set the 2026 budget based on arrival trends.
“Although the numbers have been on the rise since 2023 following the end of the pandemic, they remain lower than pre-COVID levels,” a ministry official told NK News.
Regarding Hanawon staff, the official said essential personnel must work regardless of trainee count, making flexible adjustments difficult. Despite this, some staff have been reassigned to other departments, with 74 out of 90 positions currently filled.
North Korean defectors in a baking class at the Hanawon resettlement center | Image: Ministry of Unification (July 10, 2023)
Bada Nam, secretary-general of the North Korea-focused human rights nonprofit PSCORE, told NK News that there is a need to flexibly manage resources and staff at the resettlement center, while also preparing for potential increases in the number of defectors.
“Such problems have been ongoing. The key issue is how to use the budget effectively,” he said, stressing that inter-Korean relations remain unpredictable.
96 escapees entered South Korea in the first half of 2025, most after spending a significant period in China or other third countries before arriving. The figure represents a slight decline from last year.
SUPPORT FOR DEFECTORS’ CHILDREN
In a separate press release on Wednesday, Kim took issue with what he described as a lack of government support for North Korean defectors living abroad, stressing that this leads to serious adaptation challenges for their children born in third countries when they resettle in the South.
The lawmaker singled out foreign ministry restructuring last year that dissolved a division previously in charge of protecting defectors abroad and facilitating their return to South Korea, citing it as evidence of mismanagement.
The responsibility now lies with just three officials, according to the press release, while the related budget has dropped off from $29.5 million (41.9 billion won) in 2017 to $11.3 million in 2024
“The policy on North Korean defectors is an issue that the state must handle responsibly from a human rights and humanitarian perspective,” Kim said.
The lawmaker argued that there is an urgent need to strengthen support for defectors from the time they are overseas through to domestic resettlement.
The foreign ministry had not responded to NK News questions about defector support as of the time of publication.
Citing education ministry data, Kim said the number of children born in third countries to defectors stood at 1,242 as of 2024, nearly three times the number of those born in North Korea.
But those children are not legally recognized as beneficiaries under the North Korean Defectors Protection and Settlement Support Act, excluding them from some institutional support such as resettlement subsidies, housing assistance and employment incentives.
Sons of defectors born in third countries are also required to serve in the ROK military, while those born in North Korea are exempt.
But earlier this year, the ROK government expanded educational support to include defectors’ children.
“Many children of defectors have spent time living not just in China, but also in countries like Russia before coming to South Korea,” the activist Nam said. “Because many of their parents have no schooling experience here or were educated under a very different system in North Korea, these children need more support.”
Edited by Bryan Betts
13. Rehearsal under way for imminent N. Korean military parade: JCS
Rehearsal under way for imminent N. Korean military parade: JCS | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · October 10, 2025
SEOUL, Oct. 10 (Yonhap) -- North Korea is conducting a rehearsal for a military parade marking a key party anniversary, which is likely expected to take place Friday night, South Korea's military said.
The North marks the founding anniversary of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea on Oct. 10 each year, with mass celebrations usually taking place in years ending in zero or five. This year marks the party's 80th founding anniversary.
"(North Korea) is conducting a rehearsal involving equipment and missile," an official at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) told reporters, saying the event is likely to take place at nighttime.
Since 2020, North Korea has staged all seven of its most recent military parades at night.
The JCS official said the North is likely to hold the military parade regardless of showers forecast for Pyongyang later in the day, but said the weather conditions may affect the mobilization of air assets.
The South's military earlier said North Korea is preparing for a large-scale military parade involving tens of thousands of people.
Analysts have raised the view that Pyongyang may showcase the next-generation Hwasong-20 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) under development during the military parade or test-launch it around the anniversary.
The JCS official did not elaborate on the possibility of North Korea disclosing the new ICBM during the military parade. The North usually discloses photos and information on its military parade the following day through state media reports.
This file photo, released by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency, shows a Hwasong-18 solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on display during a military parade, attended by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, at Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang on the night of July 27, 2023, to mark the 70th anniversary of the signing of the armistice that halted the 1950-53 Korean War. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · October 10, 2025
14. N. Korea's Kim accelerates multilateral diplomacy on key party anniversary
Kim feels like the big man on cmapus these days.
(News Focus) N. Korea's Kim accelerates multilateral diplomacy on key party anniversary | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · October 10, 2025
By Park Boram
SEOUL, Oct. 10 (Yonhap) -- Following his high-profile debut in multilateral diplomacy in Beijing last month, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is using the 80th anniversary of the country's ruling party to accelerate efforts to broaden his diplomatic outreach, experts said Friday.
Observers assessed that Kim appears to be making all-out efforts to break out of his diplomatic isolation, building on the confidence gained when he debuted on the multilateral diplomatic stage by standing next to the Chinese and Russian presidents during a Beijing military parade on Sept. 3.
This week, Kim held a flurry of talks with foreign leaders, including China's premier and Vietnam's top leader, and senior officials invited to Pyongyang for celebrations marking the Oct. 10 anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea.
On Thursday, Kim held talks with Vietnamese head of state To Lam and exchanged views on expanding the long-standing cooperative relations between their countries.
Lam's visit to North Korea marks the first trip by a top Vietnamese leader to North Korea since then Communist Party General Secretary Nong Duc Manh's trip in 2007.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (2nd from L) stands with Chinese Premier Li Qiang (L); To Lam, chief of Vietnam's Communist Party (2nd from R); and Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, during a ceremony marking the 80th anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea on Oct. 9, 2025, in this photo from the Korean Central News Agency the next day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Kim and Lam had "an open-minded exchange of views on the issues arising in ... expanding the long-standing cooperative relations ... as required by the times and other issues of mutual concern," North Korea's state media said.
Also on Thursday, Kim held separate talks with Li Qiang, China's premier considered the No. 2 in power.
The two discussed "issues arising in mutually expanding high-level visits, strategic communication, multi-faceted exchange and cooperation to develop the friendly and cooperative relations ... in a wider and comprehensive way," the Korean Central News Agency said.
The North Korean leader pledged to turn his country into a more affluent land and the "best socialist paradise" in the world during a ceremony in Pyongyang on the eve of the party anniversary, which was attended by Li, To Lam and Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council and Russia's No. 2, as top foreign guests.
On Tuesday, Kim met with Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith and agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation, as the Lao leader was visiting North Korea for two days on the occasion of the party anniversary.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R) speaks to Chinese Premier Li Qiang during their talks in Pyongyang on Oct. 9, 2025, in this photo from the Korean Central News Agency the next day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R) toasts with To Lam, chief of Vietnam's Communist Party, during their talks in Pyongyang on Oct. 9, 2025, in this photo from the Korean Central News Agency the next day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
The whirlwind of rare bilateral talks by Kim appears aimed at shedding the reclusive image Kim had long been associated with and at broadening his diplomatic outreach amid the shifting global security landscape, observers pointed out.
"After debuting on the multilateral diplomatic stage at China's military parade, Kim Jong-un is deftly utilizing the opportunity for multilateral diplomacy, afforded by the party's 80th anniversary," said Hong Min, a senior researcher at South Korea's Korea Institute for National Unification.
"He may go on to expand his scope for activities, possibly by joining multilateral organizations, including an economic security cooperation body," Hong predicted.
Kim's rare talks with the Vietnamese and Lao leaders may also signal North Korea's potential bid to deepen diplomatic engagement with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), according to experts.
During their talks, the Vietnamese leader was reported to have expressed his intent to enhance economic cooperation with North Korea and share his country's experience in the economic sector. The two sides also agreed to support each other in international organizations, including the United Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum.
Lam was accompanied, in particular, by Defense Minister Phan Van Giang on his visit to North Korea, in a sign of potential bilateral cooperation in the defense sector.
Observers warned that Kim's diplomatic outreach could come at the expense of international sanctions on the country, which prohibit defense and military cooperation with North Korea.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R) speaks with Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith in Pyongyang on Oct. 7, 2025, as the Lao official visited the North to attend celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea, in this photo from the Korean Central News Agency on Oct. 8. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · October 10, 2025
15. N. Korea, China reopen cross-border land route for postal service exchanges
Let's send a letter to KJU. I wonder if he is acepting new penpals.
N. Korea, China reopen cross-border land route for postal service exchanges | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · October 10, 2025
SEOUL, Oct. 10 (Yonhap) -- North Korea and China reopened a land route for postal services late last month that connects the North's border city of Sinuiju to China's Dandong, China's state postal service said Friday.
The Sinuiju-Dandong land postal route has been "officially resumed" on Sept. 25 with cooperation from relevant government agencies, China's state post bureau said in a message on its social media.
"The reopening of the China-North Korea land postal route is expected to provide greater convenience for postal exchanges between the peoples of the two countries," it said.
The two border cities had undergone vibrant exchanges of personnel and transport before the North closed down its border in early 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The resumption of the land route for postal exchanges came after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged to increase cooperation and bilateral exchanges during their talks on the sidelines of the military parade in Beijing last month.
Some speculate that economic exchanges between Pyongyang and Beijing, which have been stalled for years, may gain traction as the two nations seek to normalize relations and resume senior-level exchanges.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping (R) following their summit in Beijing on Sept. 6, 2025, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sookim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · October 10, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
|