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Quotes of the Day:
“It does not require many words to speak the truth.”
- Chief Joseph
“A harmless man is not a good man. A good man is a very dangerous man who that under voluntary control.”
- Jordan Peterson
“It's not what we eat but what we digest that makes us strong; Not what we gain but what we save that makes us rich; Not what we read but what we remember that makes us learn it; And not what we profess but what we practice that gives us integrity.”
- Francis Bacon
1. Yoon says N. Korea has nothing to gain from nuclear weapons
2. How to Stop North Korea's Missile Tests: One Million USB Drives Loaded with K-Pop?
3. ‘North Korea has already won’: US urged to abandon denuclearisation ‘farce’
4. North Korea Unleashes Flurry of Missiles as US War Games End
5. Kim Jong-un's Wife Resurfaces at Missile Launches
6. Yoon's office defends naval drills with Japan
7. South Korea To Supply Ukraine With Chiron MANPADS & US Is Paying For Them - Czech Media Reports
8. S. Korea urges Pyongyang to halt provocations, respond to economic aid offer
9. Presidential office sees possibility of localized provocation by N. Korea
10. North Korea Says It Has Underwater Missile Silos, but Experts Aren’t So Sure
11. When Will Biden Put Pressure on North Korea?
12. Commentary: South Korea is reconsidering nuclearisation in response to North Korea
13. US policy on North Korea the least bad option
1. Yoon says N. Korea has nothing to gain from nuclear weapons
Kim Jong Un of course disagrees.
(LEAD) Yoon says N. Korea has nothing to gain from nuclear weapons | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · October 11, 2022
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with more comments by Yoon, background; ADDS photo)
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, Oct. 11 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk-yeol said Tuesday that North Korea has nothing to gain from nuclear weapons, a day after the North said it carried out exercises on mobilizing "tactical nukes" and rejected any chances of negotiations.
North Korea has ratcheted up tensions with a series of provocative missile launches in recent weeks, including one that flew over Japan in a demonstration of its ability to strike targets in the U.S. territory of Guam.
On Monday, the North also said that leader Kim Jong-un gave guidance during the recent series of tests, including exercises on loading missiles with tactical nuclear weapons and firing a nuclear-capable ballistic missile from under a reservoir.
"North Korea is steadily developing and advancing its nuclear weapons and threatening not only the Republic of Korea but the world, but I believe it has nothing to gain from nuclear weapons," Yoon told reporters as he arrived for work.
Yoon said that as the nuclear threat is "growing serious by the day," South Korea will ready itself and respond based on a firm alliance with the United States and trilateral security cooperation with the U.S. and Japan.
He reassured the people not to worry and to focus on their economic activities and livelihoods.
When asked if he thinks his administration's policy on North Korea remains effective in pushing the North toward the ultimate goal of complete denuclearization, Yoon said he does.
"North Korea's denuclearization has been sought over the last 30 years since the early 90s under the aim of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which saw us having our tactical nukes withdrawn," he said.
The U.S. introduced tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea in the late 1950s but withdrew them in the early 1990s following a disarmament deal with the then Soviet Union and amid the then South Korean government's efforts to promote reconciliation with the North.
Asked to address calls for the redeployment of tactical nukes to South Korea, Yoon declined to comment publicly but said he is listening carefully to opinions in both South Korea and the U.S.
Yoon also dismissed concerns raised especially among opposition politicians that strengthening military cooperation with Japan, as seen in recent trilateral naval exercises with the U.S., could set the stage for the stationing of Japanese troops on the Korean Peninsula.
"What concern can be justified before the threat of nuclear weapons? That's what I think," he said.
South Koreans have reacted sensitively to the issue of military cooperation with Japan due to haunting memories of Tokyo's 1910-45 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · October 11, 2022
2. How to Stop North Korea's Missile Tests: One Million USB Drives Loaded with K-Pop?
Information is an existential threat to the Kim family regime. We must understand that the regime fears the korean people in the north armed with information more than it fears the ROK/US combined military. It is one of the least used levers of pressure from the ROK/US alliance.
Dr. Bennett outlines a very basic influence campaign. But we need to develop one with far more depth. K-pop alone will not pressure the regime. We need to focus on human rights. We need to focus on separate the 2d tier leaders from the elite, we need to focus on giving the 2d tier leaders options when faced with decisions (or lack of decisions) from the regime, we need to focus on driving cracks in the elite, we need to begin the long education process of preparing the population for unification. I am afraid people laugh off K-pop and all the derogatory anti-Kim propaganda that is sent into the north. We really need to develop a sophisticated and comprehensive information and influence activities campaign. K-pop is useful as an initial door opener but it is not sufficient for a real influence campaign.
Ultimately our influence campaign must seek three broad possible effects (though there are many other effects we need to achieve as well) within the north - (1) pressure on Kim to change his behavior (least likely to occur); (2) pressure from the elite and the military to change Kim's behavior (possible); (3) pressure and actions among the people to change the regime (possible at some point in the future).
How to Stop North Korea's Missile Tests: One Million USB Drives Loaded with K-Pop?
19fortyfive.com · by Bruce Bennett · October 10, 2022
Last week’s North Korean Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) launch, part of a renewed pattern of violations of UN resolutions, was a major concern for Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States. It could be time to get creative in seeking to deter North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un from future provocative acts. Could K-Pop, the global musical sensation, be part of the strategy?
Just over a year ago, Kim called K-Pop a “vicious cancer” corrupting young North Koreans’ “attire, hairstyles, speeches, behaviors.” His state media has warned that if left unchecked, it would make North Korea “crumble like a damp wall.” Given that regime survival is Kim’s number one objective, Kim clearly views ROK influences like K-Pop and K-dramas and other outside information as very serious threats.
Such outside information is toxic to Kim because it demonstrates to the North Korean people how the democracy and market economy of the ROK have given Koreans a superior existence to Kim’s dictatorship and human rights violations. It is no surprise, then, that Kim has used COVID to justify closing the North’s border with China, which was the route by which most outside information had been entering North Korea.
What if the U.S. and ROK were to deliver to Pyongyang one million USB drives loaded with K-Pop, K-dramas, and other cultural information from the ROK, Japan, the U.S. and other places? The mere threat of such an offensive, delivered by drones or balloons or some other method, could cause Kim to think twice before launching missiles, conducting nuclear weapon tests, or taking other provocative actions.
North Korea is banned by a series of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) from performing ballistic missile launches. Nevertheless, on Oct. 4 North Korea launched an apparent IRBM that flew over Japan, flying a total of about 4,500 kilometers. This was the North’s 8th missile launch in just over a week.
The IRBM launch caused immediate concerns in Japan, in particular, because if the missile somehow failed, it could have hit Japan, and thereby potentially been interpreted as an act of war by North Korea. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida called it a “violent act.”
By ordering the launch, Kim apparently sought to demonstrate his ability to disrupt the peace and cause damage to the three allies. Kim apparently has absolute power in deciding to execute such provocations. He likely does so in order to demonstrate to his people and the world that he is a powerful leader, in contrast to his vast array of failures to provide the North Korean people the food and other goods that they need. The U.S. and many other countries expressed their concerns about this launch and his other provocations.
Yet neither the United States nor its two regional allies appear to have taken the kind of actions that might deter North Korea from launching this missile or subsequent missiles. For almost 70 years the U.S. and its allies have done an excellent job of convincing the Kim family not to invade the ROK again. But they have failed to deter many North Korean provocations, including some North Korean limited attacks, such as the sinking of the ROK warship Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, both in 2010, and some 40 ballistic missile launches in 2022.
The United States does not have a track record of imposing sufficiently objectionable costs on Kim to deter his provocations. Yes, the U.S. has responded by claiming that it has an “ironclad alliance” with the ROK and Japan, but such statements have not deterred previous North Korean provocations. The U.S. has also said that this launch did “not pose a threat to U.S. personnel, or territory, or to our allies.” This was narrowly true because the missile did not hit such areas. But it was actually not true because of the threat felt by both U.S. and allied personnel in the ROK and Japan, the people in Japan having been told by the government to evacuate and shelter because of the risks posed by this missile.
It could be time for the U.S. and ROK to consider whether or not to abandon the strategic ambiguity they have used in trying to deter North Korean provocations. Their threats to use “a strong and resolute whole-of-government response” to a North Korean nuclear weapon test or other provocations were obviously not enough to stop North Korea from launching six ICBMs or ICBM components earlier this year. And the failure to impose significant costs on Kim himself for those launches has apparently convinced Kim that he can continue to launch ballistic missiles and likely carry out other provocations without suffering serious costs.
Instead, the U.S. and ROK could take steps to show the people of North Korea some of the cultural output of their neighbors to the south. At the same time, the U.S. could threaten to enhance the budgets for Voice of America and Radio Free Asia if Kim launches more missiles, amplifying information sent to North Korea. The U.S. and the ROK could also threaten to enhance specific strategic military training in response to North Korean missile tests—more serious training responding to more serious missile tests.
The U.S. and ROK could be more specific and creative in seeking to deter Kim and the global popularity of K-pop could be part of the strategy.
Bruce W. Bennett is an adjunct international/defense researcher at the RAND Corporation and a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. He works primarily on research topics such as strategy, force planning, and counterproliferation within the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center.
19fortyfive.com · by Bruce Bennett · October 10, 2022
3. ‘North Korea has already won’: US urged to abandon denuclearisation ‘farce’
Kim Jong Un's political warfare, blackmail diplomacy, and advanced war fighting strategies have not yet won though Kim assesses some success.
Yes, CVID is dead (as many have long known), but no political leader in the ROK and US can admit that because to do so (and begin arms control negotiations which many of the pundits advocate) is both politically untenable but also because it will then give Kim Jong Un his political warfare victory. This is the real danger. If we shift to arms control negotiations, Kimwil double down on his three strategic lines of effort. While we could see some cosmetic caps or minor reductions on nuclear capabilities the regime will not agree to anything that reduces either its deterrent capability or its offensive capabilities.
Of course headlines and articles such as this one reinforce KIm's belief that his strategies are working and gives him the incentive to continue to execute them. Our response can only be to continue the strongest possible deterrence and defense (the foundation for all diplomacy and actions) and execution of a superior political warfare strategy that focuses on a human rights upfront approach, an information and influence campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea. We must show Kim that his strategies will fail and only a superior political warfare strategy can do that.
‘North Korea has already won’: US urged to abandon denuclearisation ‘farce’
Financial Times · by Christian Davies · October 9, 2022
The US should admit defeat in its campaign to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and focus on risk reduction and arms control measures instead, experts have urged.
On Tuesday, North Korea fired a ballistic missile over Japan for the first time since 2017, sparking renewed condemnation from Washington and its allies.
The US and South Korea responded by conducting joint military drills and firing missiles into the Sea of Japan, while the USS Ronald Reagan, an American nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, conducted a rare U-turn to return to waters east of the Korean peninsula after a recent visit.
But analysts said the military gestures and combative words emanating from Washington, Seoul and Tokyo belied the reality that they have run out of ideas and options for containing North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme.
Experts argued that the US and its allies should focus on agreeing with Pyongyang steps to reduce the risk of a conflict on the Korean peninsula, even if doing so amounted to a tacit acceptance that North Korea would continue to possess nuclear weapons.
“Insistence on denuclearisation is not just a failure, it has turned into a farce,” said Ankit Panda, a nuclear weapons expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.
“They test, we respond, we move on with our lives,” Panda added. “North Korea has already won. It’s a bitter pill, but at some point we’re going to have to swallow it.”
South Korea and the US conducted joint military drills in response to North Korea’s latest weapons test. Analysts said an arms race in Asia made it unlikely Pyongyang would agree to denuclearise © South Korean Defence Ministry/AFP/Getty Images
US and Korean officials insisted that even a tacit acceptance of North Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state would have dangerous consequences for global non-proliferation efforts.
Last month, Kim Jong Un amended North Korea’s nuclear doctrine to allow for pre-emptive strikes. The previous policy only permitted the use of nuclear weapons in a second-strike scenario.
“There will never be any declaration of ‘giving up our nukes’ or ‘denuclearisation’, nor any kind of negotiations or bargaining to meet the other side’s conditions,” the North Korean leader declared. “As long as nuclear weapons exist on earth and imperialism remains . . . our road towards strengthening nuclear power won’t stop.”
Jenny Town, director of the 38 North programme at the Stimson Center think-tank in Washington, said “the window for a denuclearisation-led process has closed”.
Town pointed to the intensifying arms race in east Asia and increasing tensions between the US and China. “It’s unrealistic to think in the middle of all this, North Korea will contemplate denuclearisation when everyone else, including South Korea, is arming up,” she said.
“Once the relationship is better and the geopolitical trends shift in a more positive direction, maybe we can talk about the nuclear programme again. But that seems way far down the line.”
Andrei Lankov, professor of history at Kookmin University in Seoul and a pre-eminent North Korea expert, said “Kim’s message is as follows: ‘We have nukes, we will have them forever and we will use them as we see fit.’”
Lankov argued that Pyongyang would not countenance talks as long as Washington maintains North Korea’s denuclearisation even as a distant policy goal, while Congress and the US public will not accept anything less than a North Korean capitulation on the issue.
“The US public wants its government to pursue an unobtainable and dangerous dream, but the North Koreans have made clear they are not going to play this game,” said Lankov. “The only way to persuade them to consider restrictions on their nuclear weapons will be to pay them obscenely well for it.”
North Korea has eschewed diplomacy since 2019, when the last of a series of summits between Kim and then-US president Donald Trump collapsed in Hanoi.
In January 2021, Kim outlined the capabilities he intended to obtain within five years, including tactical nuclear weapons, manoeuvrable missiles, solid fuel ICBMs and nuclear submarines.
Weapons experts said the North Korean regime has made considerable progress on multiple fronts, despite tough international sanctions and Kim sealing the country’s borders in 2020 in response to the coronavirus pandemic.
Co-operation between the permanent members of the UN Security Council on North Korea has also broken down in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, further alleviating pressure on Pyongyang.
North Korea has also seized on Russia’s international isolation to foster closer ties with Moscow. On Wednesday, the Security Council failed to condemn Pyongyang’s missile launch after Russia and China blamed Washington for ignoring North Korean security concerns.
“Most senior US officials working on North Korea policy now privately recognise that denuclearisation isn’t going to happen, but can’t or won’t say it publicly,” said Chad O’Carroll, founder of the Korea Risk Group consultancy.
Panda noted that policymakers should be especially worried by North Korea’s development of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons that could be deployed against South Korea.
“A nuclear war might end with an ICBM, but it is more likely to begin with a tactical nuke — they are incredibly dangerous and concerning,” said Panda. “This could be the capability that Kim is waiting for before turning to nuclear coercion or territorial revisionism against the South.”
He said the longer Washington waited before acknowledging the reality that North Korean nuclear weapons were here to stay, the larger and more sophisticated Pyongyang’s arsenal would become, and the higher the cost that Kim would be able to extract in an inevitable future negotiation.
“It is not in the US national interest to let this fester,” Panda said.
Financial Times · by Christian Davies · October 9, 2022
4. North Korea Unleashes Flurry of Missiles as US War Games End
Excerpts:
The US Navy shrugged off North Korea’s missile launches, which landed nowhere near where the aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan and its escorts Chancellorsville and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer Benfold sailed.
“Facing challenges together with our allies is an important part of our role as a forward-deployed unit,” Capt. Edward Angelinas, Chancellorsville’s commanding officer, said in a prepared statement. “The Chancellorsville crew is proud to contribute to our mutual defense agreements and increase our interoperability and partnership with the maritime forces of Republic of Korea and Japan.”
North Korea Unleashes Flurry of Missiles as US War Games End
coffeeordie.com · by Carl Prine · October 10, 2022
North Korea has unleashed a flurry of tactical nuke test strikes, strongman Kim Jong Un’s bon voyage to an American, South Korean, and Japanese flotilla wrapping up two weeks of war games near the divided peninsula.
A barrage on Sunday, Oct. 9, marked a final salvo in an escalating series of North Korean launches that began 14 days earlier while trilateral exercises involving the US Navy’s Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group and guided-missile destroyers from both Japan and South Korea played out offshore.
“The military drills were carried out amid the ongoing dangerous military drills staged by large-scale combined naval forces, including U.S. carrier, Aegis destroyer and nuclear-powered submarine in the waters off the Korean Peninsula,” stated Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of North Korea’s ruling Communist Party, on Monday.
The publication claimed Kim personally “guided the military drills on the spot” to “check and improve the reliability and combat power” of North Korea’s nuclear forces and to “send a strong military reaction warning to the enemies.”
Lt. j.g. Sylvester Williams signals an F/A-18E Super Hornet from the “Eagles” of Strike Fighter Squadron 115 after it lands on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan in the Sea of Japan, Thursday, Oct. 6, 2022. US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Michael B. Jarmiolowski.
US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Michael B. Jarmiolowski.
On Thursday, the US Navy’s guided-missile cruiser Chancellorsville joined Japan’s destroyers Chokai and Ashigara and the South Korean destroyer Sejong the Great to conduct their own ballistic missile defense exercise, simulating how they would swat down incoming North Korean missiles.
The carrier strike group’s maritime maneuvers also included a counter-special-operations exercise with South Korea; blasting apart targets with Japanese destroyers; and anti-submarine warfare maneuvers involving all three navies.
“Our commitment to regional security and the defense of our allies and partners is demonstrated by our flexibility and adaptability to move this strike group to where it is needed,” said US Navy Rear Adm. Michael Donnelly, the commander of the carrier strike group, in a prepared statement released Saturday. “We have an inherent capability to respond to any challenge, and we will continue to train and operate alongside our allies and partners and uphold the rules-based international order wherever we fly, sail, and operate.”
According to Pyongyang, the initial North Korean test occurred at dawn on Sept. 25 and involved a ballistic missile launched from a silo under an undisclosed water reservoir in the northwestern part of the country. The conventional warhead exploded over an unoccupied portion of the Sea of Japan, officials claimed.
A volley of missiles on Sept. 28 mirrored a tactical nuclear attack on South Korean airports, with similar simulated attacks repeated on Sept. 29 and Oct. 1 that included air bursts and “direct precision and dispersion strikes, proving the accuracy and might of our weapon systems,” according to Rodong Sinmun.
Sideboys and officers render honors to Capt. Fred Goldhammer on the flight deck of the US Navy’s aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan in the Sea of Japan, Friday, Oct. 7, 2022. Goldhammer departed the ship after a change of command ceremony in which he was relieved by Capt. Daryle Cardone as commanding officer. US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Michael B. Jarmiolowski.
US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Michael B. Jarmiolowski.
On Tuesday, North Korea launched what it claimed was a new ground-to-ground intermediate-range ballistic missile that flew roughly 2,430 nautical miles and slammed into the Pacific Ocean east of the Japanese islands.
Two days later, North Korea unleashed “super-large multiple rocket launchers” that volleyed tactical ballistic missiles on flight paths designed to simulate attacks on South Korean military command and control centers, Rodong Sinmun reported.
The final test, on Sunday, mirrored how North Korea would attack South Korean ports, the newspaper added.
The US Navy shrugged off North Korea’s missile launches, which landed nowhere near where the aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan and its escorts Chancellorsville and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer Benfold sailed.
“Facing challenges together with our allies is an important part of our role as a forward-deployed unit,” Capt. Edward Angelinas, Chancellorsville’s commanding officer, said in a prepared statement. “The Chancellorsville crew is proud to contribute to our mutual defense agreements and increase our interoperability and partnership with the maritime forces of Republic of Korea and Japan.”
coffeeordie.com · by Carl Prine · October 10, 2022
5. Kim Jong-un's Wife Resurfaces at Missile Launches
Is it a family affair? The Kim family is all in on nuclear weapons and missiles.
CNN has a report on Kim's "wardrobe" which is assessed as trying to show Kim in control. I wonder also if he is trying to take some cues from President Zelensky and his First Lady in dress, words, and actions. Kim is not stupid and he pays close attention to what is happening around the world.
CNN video report here: https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2022/10/10/kim-jong-un-missile-tests-bold-wardrobe-north-korea-todd-pkg-intl-tsr-vpx.cnn/video/playlists/around-the-world/
Kim Jong-un's Wife Resurfaces at Missile Launches
english.chosun.com
October 11, 2022 13:33
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's wife Ri Sol-ju made her first public appearance for some time during an inspection of missile drills targeting South Korea and the U.S.
It is the first time that Ri, whose activities are normally limited to more ladylike pursuits such as musical performances, has made an appearance at military drills.
On Monday, the 77th founding anniversary of the Workers Party, the Rodong Sinmun and other state media outlets illustrated reports of Kim's inspection of the drills from Sept. 25 to Oct. 9 with photos that showed Ri by his side.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (left) and his wife Ri Sol-ju watch a missile launch in an undisclosed location, in this photo from the [North] Korean Central News Agency on Monday.
Though they did not mention her by name, she can be seen alongside her husband watching missile tests.
Pundits speculate that the regime is keen to demonstrate family unity in the ruling dynasty.
Kim Jong-un's Wife Makes 1st Public Appearance in over a Year
Public Absence of Kim Jong-un's Wife Fuels Pregnancy Speculation
Kim Jong-un's Wife Gets New Honorific Title
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
english.chosun.com
6. Yoon's office defends naval drills with Japan
Recall that in the US INDOPACOM strategy one of the 10 actions items is improved trilateral cooperation.
A lot of hyperbole from the political opposition in South Korea which will have a negative effect on national security.
(3rd LD) Yoon's office defends naval drills with Japan | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · October 11, 2022
(ATTN: UPDATES with DP spokesperson's remarks in last 2 paras)
By Lee Haye-ah and Lee Minji
SEOUL, Oct. 11 (Yonhap) -- Nothing is wrong with holding joint military exercises with Japan to cope with the common threat of North Korea, a presidential spokesperson said Tuesday, rejecting opposition criticism that such drills could lead to the stationing of Japanese troops in South Korea.
Rep. Lee Jae-myung, chairman of the main opposition Democratic Party, has been voicing such concerns while denouncing trilateral naval exercises, which South Korea held with the United States and Japan in the East Sea last week, as a move legitimizing Japan's Self-Defense Forces as a regular military.
His point was that such exercises would help advance Japan's ambitions to become a normal country capable of waging war and South Korea could fall victim to Japan's renewed militarism and face a fate similar to the 1910-45 colonial rule.
"We cannot imagine the day when the Japanese military invades the Korean Peninsula and the Rising Sun Flag again hangs over the peninsula but it could come true," Lee said, claiming that a military alliance between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan could make the Korean Peninsula a flashpoint.
On Tuesday, the office of President Yoon Suk-yeol rejected the claims.
"The threat of North Korea's nuclear and missile program is biggest for Northeast Asia," deputy presidential spokesperson Lee Jae-myoung said in a radio interview with CBS on Tuesday. "When there is a fire, it's so natural that neighbors should combine their strengths to put it out."
Lee went on to argue that it is the president's job as commander-in-chief to ensure a seamless defense posture through military exercises and with the help of the Japanese if possible, noting that Japan has the second-largest number of antisubmarine aircraft after the United States.
The spokesperson added that the previous administration of President Moon Jae-in had also recognized the need for trilateral military exercises and agreed to conduct them.
Earlier in the day, ruling People Power Party (PPP) leader Chung Jin-suk said no one would buy the opposition leader's claim at a time when exchanges between South Korea and Japan are set to increase further. Chung also said Lee's claim is one of two most absurd remarks, along with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's promise to give up his nuclear programs.
"I hope he won't blind the people with a frivolous take on history," he said. "I promise the people. Unless the Republic of the Korea is in a situation where it has renounced its sovereign power, the Japanese military will not be allowed to station in South Korea."
Senior PPP members joined Chung in denouncing Lee.
Rep. Sung Il-jong, the PPP's chief policymaker, accused Lee of using the issue to divert public attention from a number of corruption allegations raised against him.
"He remarked that the Rising Sun Flag could be hoisted up. Then does he mean that it's OK for the North Korean flag to be hung?" Sung said. "Don't deceive the people by disguising an attempt to get rid of legal risks with a pro-Japanese rhetoric that would have only worked decades ago."
Lee doubled down on his claim, calling such exercises a "defense disaster" and a "self-inflicting" act.
"It could send a signal that the Republic of Korea recognizes the Japanese Self-Defense Forces as an official military and it could act as a stepping stone moving toward the military alliance between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan," he said. "This is an act that goes against our national interests."
He said the ruling party should heed his concerns rather than trying to portray him as pro-North Korea.
Lee also condemned North Korea's recent provocations.
"The Democratic Party opposes and strongly condemns all North Korean acts that escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula," he said. "North Korea should halt all provocations and return to the dialogue table."
Meanwhile, the DP accused the PPP leader of having pro-Japanese views and called for his resignation.
"No excuses can hide the pro-Japanese tendencies of Chung, who still supports Japan and denies our history," Lim O-kyeong, the DP's spokesperson, said in a briefing at the National Assembly. "Chung should apologize for his thoughtless remarks, and we want him to resign from his interim chief post."
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · October 11, 2022
7. South Korea To Supply Ukraine With Chiron MANPADS & US Is Paying For Them - Czech Media Reports
I have not seen any other reporting on this.
I do hope that South Korea (and Japan) is studying the air and missile defense lessons from Putin's War in Ukraine. A key lesson should be realization of the necessity for an integrated missile defense capability.
South Korea To Supply Ukraine With Chiron MANPADS & US Is Paying For Them - Czech Media Reports
eurasiantimes.com · by Tanmay Kadam · October 4, 2022
The Ukrainian military is set to lay its hands on South Korea’s Chiron man-portable air defense system (MANPADS), as per a recent report by a Czech daily newspaper, iDnes.
South Korea will indirectly supply approximately $2.9 billion worth of arms to Ukraine through the Czech Republic. The US will reportedly finance the arms supply.
“The Americans will pay for the weapons – rocket launchers and cannon ammunition worth billions of dollars (sources of the editorial office speak of approximately three billion dollars, i.e., about seventy-five billion crowns in conversion),” reported iDnes on September 29.
The weapons will primarily include the South Korean Chiron (KP-SAM Shingung) MANPADS, according to iDnes.
Chiron (KP-SAM Shingung)
Produced by the South Korean aerospace and defense company, LIG Nex1, the Chiron MANPADS is intended to protect troops in the forward area from low-flying threats. Known in South Korea as ‘Shingung,’ it is marketed internationally as Chiron.
The development of the system began in 1995, and it entered service in South Korea in 2005. Apart from that, the Chiron is also used by the armed forces of Indonesia and Peru.
File Image: Chiron MANPADS
The MANPADS can be used to destroy fixed-wing aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft, helicopters, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and cruise missiles from around seven kilometers. Its probability of hitting non-maneuvering targets is said to be 90%.
The Chiron’s surface-to-air missile (SAM) features an integrated friend or foe (IFF) system. It is equipped with a two-color (IR/UV) seeker, which enables the missile to negate the impact of infrared countermeasures (IRCM) employed by low-flying aircraft.
According to South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development, the missile is superior to the American FIM-92 Stinger and the French Mistral in hit probability, price, and portability, making it invaluable in the field.
The Chiron will be the latest addition to Ukraine’s ever-growing arsenal of MANPADS that has played a significant role in the ongoing Ukraine war. Russia and Ukraine have employed MANPADS to a great extent in their air-denial strategy against each other.
For example, Russia’s Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Oleg Salyukov, said in an interview on September 30 that one-third of Ukrainian fighter jets were shot down using Igla-S and Verba MANPADS.
Also, a retired-Russian fighter pilot admitted the effectiveness of Ukrainian MANPADS in a recent interview with EurAsian Times.
“Most of our Su-35s, Su-24s, and Su-34s have been hit while flying at low altitudes,” a retired Russian pilot told EurAsian Times, who requested anonymity.
Sukhoi Su-34 – Wikiwand
Therefore, since the onset of the war in February, thousands of MANPADS of different types from several countries have been supplied to the Ukrainian forces across the country, with more on their way. For example, the US government has committed to providing Ukraine with over 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems.
Likewise, the South Korean Chiron MANPADS was also sought after by Ukraine for a long time. However, Seoul was unwilling to supply the system because of South Korea’s “principled stance” on not providing lethal military equipment to the war-torn country.
South Korea Had Turned Down Ukraine’s Request For Chiron MANPADS
In April, South Korea reportedly turned down a Ukrainian request for the anti-aircraft system. The request was made by the Ukrainian defense minister Oleksiy Reznikov in a call with his South Korean counterpart Suh Wook.
However, “Minister Suh politely repeated the South Korean government’s principled stance that its aid is confined to non-lethal materials,” a South Korean defense ministry official told This Week in Asia.
Shortly after that, President Zelensky also appealed to the South Korean lawmakers for arms, citing the country’s national history by recalling how the international community helped South Korea during the 1950-53 Korean War.
“South Korea has various weapons that are required to protect us from Russian tanks, ships, and missiles,” Zelensky said through an interpreter. “Please help us to stand up against invaders,” he said in his appeal.
It appears that Seoul has finally decided to accommodate Ukraine’s request, albeit through indirect means.
However, Ukraine’s request was not confined to the Chiron MANPADS, according to Kim Jong-dae, a military expert and former lawmaker of the pro-labor Justice Party, who said that Ukraine wanted South Korea’s Cheongung II midrange surface-to-air missiles (M-SAM) system.
The Cheongung II SAMs are based on the technology from the 9M96 missile used on Russian S-350E and S-400 missile systems. The missile can engage incoming enemy aircraft and ballistic missiles at an altitude below 40 kilometers.
Midrange surface-to-air Cheongung II. (Hanwha Defense)
Furthermore, the missiles are said to have anti-electronic warfare capabilities to keep functioning, despite jamming.
This would be a very advanced high-tier air defense system for Ukraine, and Kyiv’s interest in the system is understandable.
As EurAsian Times has discussed at great length, the forward-deployed medium and long-range air defenses force the enemy fighter jets to fly at altitudes below 4500 meters, right into the range of the man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). Without these, the MANPADS will be rendered useless.
eurasiantimes.com · by Tanmay Kadam · October 4, 2022
8. S. Korea urges Pyongyang to halt provocations, respond to economic aid offer
In recent talks with government officials I still detect the hope and belief that the South will be able to someday soon negotiate with north Korea and conduct economic engagement. Some officials want to ensure that not bridges are burned with north Korea.
I think that is naive and dangerous. We should not make the assumption that Kim is going to change because we are nice to him or that we do not do things that will upset him. He will negotiate in the future when he believes he has shaped the conditions for successful negotiations and he will come to the negotiating table for that reason and not because the South has somehow been "nice" to him..
S. Korea urges Pyongyang to halt provocations, respond to economic aid offer | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · October 11, 2022
SEOUL, Oct. 11 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean government on Tuesday called for North Korea to immediately cease tension-escalating activities, a day after Pyongyang said it conducted "tactical nuclear" drills and vowed to strengthen its nuclear force.
On Monday, the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said its leader Kim Jong-un inspected an exercise of tactical nuclear operation units to assess the "war deterrent and nuclear counterattack capability" in response to recent joint military trainings by South Korea and the United States.
"The government urges North Korea once again to immediately cease any additional provocations and to respond to our 'audacious initiative' offer," a unification ministry official told reporters, referring to President Yoon Suk-yeol's proposal to help rebuild the North's economy in return for denuclearization steps.
The official also stressed the South's government considers it "very serious" that the North pushed ahead with a nuclear exercise targeting Seoul after it recently adopted a new law that hints at the possibility of preemptive nuclear strikes, saying the North's "illegal" military provocation cannot be justified in any way.
"The government has kept close eyes on North Korea, and has strongly condemned its back-to-back test-firing of short and intermediate ballistic missiles as a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions and a grave provocation that escalates tensions on the Korean Peninsula, as well as urging the North to immediately cease its (provocative actions) numerous times," he said.
North Korea has ratcheted up tensions on the peninsula with a barrage of provocative missile launches in recent weeks, including an intermediate-range ballistic missile that flew over Japan last Tuesday.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · October 11, 2022
9. Presidential office sees possibility of localized provocation by N. Korea
Yes, I think it is wise to remain alert for this type of provocation.
The proper response to this type of provocation is a decisive action by the ROK military at the time and place of the provocation to defend South Korea.
Presidential office sees possibility of localized provocation by N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · October 11, 2022
SEOUL, Oct. 11 (Yonhap) -- The presidential office believes North Korea could carry out a localized provocation similar to the 2010 shelling of a border island and is taking steps to prepare, officials said Tuesday.
A senior presidential official told Yonhap News Agency the North has a track record of staging surprise attacks, such as when it shelled Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 and killed four South Koreans, including two civilians.
"We're seriously taking into consideration surprise provocations other than an intercontinental ballistic missile launch or a nuclear test," the senior official said. "We have to check our readiness posture in that regard and are establishing that posture in practice."
Another official also said the possibility of a conventional provocation cannot be ruled out.
Last week, the presidential National Security Council also mentioned the possibility of a localized provocation when it issued a statement after an emergency meeting convened to discuss a North Korean missile launch.
In the statement, the council said council members agreed to "make thorough preparations against the possibility of any form of additional provocation by North Korea, including a localized provocation."
Meanwhile, President Yoon Suk-yeol has warned that North Korea will be met with a "resolute" and "overwhelming" response in the event it attempts to use nuclear weapons.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · October 11, 2022
10. North Korea Says It Has Underwater Missile Silos, but Experts Aren’t So Sure
Bruce Bennett and I offer our perspectives.
If Kim wants us to know about "underwater missile silos" what does he not want us to know about? All warfare is based on deception.
North Korea Says It Has Underwater Missile Silos, but Experts Aren’t So Sure
Kim Jong Un regime says soldiers practiced loading tactical nuclear warheads under a reservoir in the country’s northwest
https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-says-it-has-underwater-missile-silos-but-experts-arent-so-sure-11665490618
By Timothy W. MartinFollow
and Dasl YoonFollow
Updated Oct. 11, 2022 8:17 am ET
SEOUL—The latest North Korean weapons claim seemed like something out of a James Bond movie: nuclear missile silos hidden underwater.
Weapons experts doubt the Kim Jong Un regime has serious plans for such a stealthy missile-launch system. But they see a strategic purpose for Pyongyang in trying to suggest that any of the country’s reservoirs, lakes and surrounding seas could be a potential threat.
On Monday, North Korean state media noted the use of an underwater missile silo—the first mention of such a facility. It was used Sept. 25 as soldiers practiced the loading of tactical nuclear warheads under a reservoir in the country’s northwest, the state-media report said.
State-media photographs showed a missile roaring out of the water, the rocket’s glow barely visible behind the cascading waves and plumes of smoke. The launchpad wasn’t visible. North Korea didn’t release video footage.
The launch was likely conducted from a submersible barge that is mobile, rather than a cavernous structure with a fixed location that is built beneath the water, weapons experts say.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un speaking at an undisclosed location in North Korea in a photo released Sunday.
PHOTO: KCNA/VIA REUTERS
Constructing an underwater missile silo poses a series of logistical hurdles, said Bruce Bennett, a North Korean weapons expert at Rand Corp., a policy think tank. Building it, he added, would likely require digging under the reservoir itself.
The missile silo could be filled with air or water, though sealing off the space would still run the risk of leaks that could lead to corrosion, Mr. Bennett said. Keeping the missile—and a nuclear warhead—inside the silo would probably require a continuous security presence nearby, which could arouse suspicion from the U.S. and its allies who monitor the North with sophisticated satellite imagery. Not storing the missile there means having to move it to the launch site in a time-consuming process that is difficult to cloak, he said.
“Building a true underwater silo would be far more difficult and costly, and the effort would have a significant footprint,” Mr. Bennett said.
The purported underwater-silo launch was one of seven North Korean missile tests in recent weeks that state media chronicled on Monday, a holiday celebrating the founding of the country’s ruling Workers’ Party. The tests were part of drills simulating tactical nuclear strikes against the U.S. and South Korea and guided by Kim Jong Un, state media said.
North Korean state-media photos released Oct. 10 showed a missile launching from the water at an undisclosed location.
PHOTO: KCNA/VIA REUTERS
By publicly discussing underwater silos, the U.S. and South Korea are now put in a position to assess whether the Kim regime’s claims are feasible, and if so, committing further resources to search for the missile facilities, said David Maxwell, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington think tank.
“Something else the regime may be doing is trying to make us think they have silos when in actuality they are talking about the submerged barge” used for other launches in recent years, said Mr. Maxwell, a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel, with extensive experience in Asia.
The potential for North Korean underwater silos adds another layer of mystery to the Kim regime’s weapons program. Pyongyang has around 20 undeclared missile bases, according to an assessment by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington. That includes a secret missile base in its Chagang province bordering China, where North Korea last week launched the intermediate-range missile that flew over Japan in a major provocation.
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This year, North Korea has test fired missiles from different locations, including trains, in an effort to make it more difficult for Washington and Seoul to detect and destroy potential launches. But it is rare for countries to launch missiles from an inland body of water, military experts say.
Still, it is likely that Washington and Seoul’s current missile defense systems aren’t able to fully detect and strike every type of North Korean missile, especially ones that travel at low altitudes or come from unexpected places, said Cho Dong-youn, a former South Korean army major and a military-studies professor at Seo Kyeong University in Seoul.
The initial assessments for the Sept. 25 test from Seoul’s military didn’t specify that the missile had been fired from an underwater launch site, instead believing it had come from a land-based transporter erector launcher.
“North Korea is not only expanding its arsenal but also changing its military strategy, to find holes in the allies’ defense systems,” Ms. Cho said.
On Tuesday, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, a conservative who took office in May, said North Korea’s advances threaten the world and that there is nothing to be gained by the rogue country from nuclear weapons.
Under Mr. Yoon, South Korea has emphasized a so-called Kill Chain system to counter North Korean threats. Developed a decade ago, the Kill Chain calls for pre-emptive strikes against North Korea’s missiles and even its leadership if an attack is detected. The Yoon administration announced a Strategic Command will be created by 2024 to oversee pre-emptive-strike strategies.
Mr. Yoon has also called for bolstering counterforces by expanding South Korea’s weaponry including ballistic missiles, stealth fighters and submarines. Seoul is also seeking to develop its own satellites to detect North Korean targets independent from the U.S.
The Kim regime’s underwater silos represent a “last resort method” against South Korea’s Kill Chain system, a spokesman for Seoul’s defense ministry said Tuesday.
Write to Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com and Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com
11. When Will Biden Put Pressure on North Korea?
Yes, we need to do much better on sanctions. However, to really pressure Kim we need to focus on human rights influence activities and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea. We need to do things we have never done before.
But the most important thing we must never do is make concessions in the form of sanctions relief (whether they are working or not) because to do so will mean that Kim can assess his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies as successful which will cause him to double down.
When Will Biden Put Pressure on North Korea?
A once-robust sanctions program has atrophied since Trump embraced summit-level diplomacy with Kim in 2018.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-will-biden-put-pressure-on-north-korea-kim-jong-un-missiles-japan-11665410852?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d
Oct. 10, 2022 2:57 pm ET
Your editorial “The Missiles of North Korea” (Oct. 5) argues that the Biden administration should respond to North Korea’s intermediate-range ballistic-missile launch over Japan by strengthening “the credibility of the conventional and military deterrent in Northeast Asia.” That is correct, but Washington must also launch a sanctions offensive against the Kim Jong Un regime’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs.
President Biden should return to the once-robust sanctions program that has atrophied since former President Trump embraced summit-level diplomacy with Mr. Kim in 2018. The administration hinted it may move in that direction by pledging to limit Pyongyang’s “ability to advance its prohibited ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs, including with allies and U.N. partners.” The Biden team needs to match its words with actions.
Unfortunately, Mr. Biden has continued his predecessor’s post-2018 policy of imposing few sanctions and enforcing them indifferently. Last year the administration issued only a single set of sanctions on Pyongyang. While it has issued more this year, its actions remain infrequent and inadequate, even though there are plenty of targets available. Mr. Biden should concentrate his initial efforts on reducing the regime’s sources of revenue, and then address the Russian and Chinese companies, individuals and banks that aid North Korea’s sanctions evasion.
Mr. Kim continues his provocations because he knows the Biden administration won’t increase the pressure. Now is the time to make Mr. Kim uncomfortable and force him to choose between his weapons and the financial viability of his regime.
Anthony Ruggiero
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Washington
Mr. Ruggiero was director for North Korea (2018-19) and senior director for counterproliferation (2019-21) on the National Security Council.
12. Commentary: South Korea is reconsidering nuclearisation in response to North Korea
While the public and pundits seem to desire nuclear weapons, most government officials at various levels say there is currently no intention to obtain nuclear weapons.
We must keep in mind that whether north Korea has nuclear weapons or not, the number one mission of the ROK/US alliance's combined military force is to deter war/resumption of hostilities and if war does resume, to defeat the nKPA. Will the development of South Korean nuclear weapons make a significant contribution to deterrence? Will Kim be any more deterred from war than he already is if South Korea possesses nuclear weapons?
Excerpts;
South Korea and Japan’s response options are poor. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol floated the idea earlier this year of preemptively striking North Korean missile sites in a crisis. That is extremely risky and could ignite the very war it seeks to prevent.
Missile defence would be an excellent option because it is defensive-only. But it does not work very well. In fact, performance anxiety – that missile defence might miss its target – is the reason the US, Japan and South Korea have never tried to shoot down a North Korean missile test, such as last week’s.
Negotiation, of course, would be the ideal outcome, but North Korea has made it clear that it will not seriously negotiate denuclearisation, or even controls.
If Japan and South Korean could nuclearly deter North Korea themselves, there would be less anxiety about US commitments. Seoul and Tokyo would not proliferate these weapons, sell them to terrorists, lose them, store them improperly, or use them in a first strike.
Their nuclearisations would be strictly defensive, a choice made long after North Korea ignored the international community and moved first into these weapons.
Commentary: South Korea is reconsidering nuclearisation in response to North Korea
Russian President Vladimir Putin has threatened nuclear strikes on Ukraine. It is easy to see North Korea trying the same thing against South Korea in future, says international relations expert Robert Kelly.
Robert E Kelly
@Robert_E_Kelly
11 Oct 2022 06:06AM
(Updated: 11 Oct 2022 09:14AM)
channelnewsasia.com
BUSAN: In 2022, the debate over the possible nuclearisation of South Korea has widened considerably. Where this was previously a fringe idea, relegated to an occasional op-ed in conservative newspapers, it is now a topic of national security discussion.
Op-eds on the topic and high-profile debates, at outlets such as the Asian Leadership Conference and Seoul Defense Dialogue this summer, are now common. In the 15 years I have taught international relations in South Korea, there has never been this level of ferment.
PUBLIC OPINION IS SUPPORTIVE
These unofficial discussions, also known as “Track II” diplomacy, in South Korean think-tanks and academia is complemented by shifting public opinion.
A February 2022 poll from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 71 per cent of South Koreans wanted their country to have nuclear weapons. Another in May 2022 from the Asan Institute for Policy Studies found 70 per cent supported indigenous nuclearisation, with 64 per cent in support even if that violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
It seems likely that “Track I” actors – South Korean decision-makers and their US alliance counterparts – will eventually be pressed to address this issue.
South Korean public support for indigenous nuclearisation has been steady, and growing, for more than a decade. This has opened policy space for nuclearisation advocates to make the case for nukes at the elite level.
A persistent Track II discourse among nongovernmental national security analysts will, in turn, pressure a formal, Track I response. Already in 2017, the then-leader of the main opposition party publicly suggested South Korea needed nuclear weapons.
CHINESE AND NORTH KOREAN PRESSURE FORCING MORE RADICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Polling regularly returns support for this option for the reasons one would expect – China and North Korea.
China is a large, powerful state on Seoul’s doorstep. It has increasingly tried to bully South Korea, regarding, for example, missile defence or Chinese travellers during the pandemic.
And North Korea, obviously, is an ongoing, arguably existential threat. It is an opaque nuclear weapons state that routinely threatens South Korea and rejects even the most basic arms control regarding its warheads and missiles.
It has fired a flurry of seven missile launches in just over two weeks, with one that flew over Japan in blatant disregard for Japanese sovereignty.
On Monday (Oct 10), North Korean state media said that the exercises involved ballistic missiles with mock nuclear warheads, and were meant to deliver a strong message of war deterrence.
"Even though the enemy continues to talk about dialogue and negotiations, we do not have anything to talk about nor do we feel the need to do so," KCNA quoted North Korean President Kim Jong Un as saying.
Traditionally, the US-South Korea alliance has been Seoul’s backstop against such threats. And on the conventional challenge from North Korea (or even China), it remains so.
But nuclear weapons are a unique class of weapons. As Russian President Vladimir Putinhas demonstrated in Ukraine, they can be used to block assistance by outside partners.
In March, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) rejected Ukrainian pleas for a no-fly zone over Ukraine for fear of nuclear escalation with Russia. North Korea will almost certainly try the same bluff in a conventional war with South Korea.
But even short of open conflict, nuclear weapons are a constant temptation, to weak or autocratic leaders especially. They open up possibilities of blackmail and coercion. They tempt leaders to overreach in the belief that nukes can be leveraged to support risky courses of action.
Putin too has illustrated this in Ukraine, where he has obliquely threatened nuclear strikes to prevent Ukraine from winning the war, to deter the West from sending heavy weapons, and to defend Russian territory, including newly annexed territories in Ukraine.
It is easy to see North Korea trying the same thing against South Korea in a few years when its programme is more mature.
OTHER OPTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE POOR
North Korean nuclear weapons raise concerns about American defence guarantees to both South Korea and Japan. While the debate is more advanced in the former than the latter, it is likely that Japan would consider nuclear weapons if South Korea were subject to aggressive North Korean nuclear coercion.
Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe floated this idea earlier this year, although Article 9 of Japan’s constitution – a renunciation of war – would make this move especially controversial.
Japan’s constitutional commitment to peace however does not change the structural pressures it faces, which are identical to South Korea’s.
North Korea is not going to stop building nuclear weapons and missiles. It is not going to denuclearise no matter how many times we demand it. Indeed, it is not going to permit anything like inspectors or cameras or oversight of its nuclear industry.
South Korea and Japan’s response options are poor. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol floated the idea earlier this year of preemptively striking North Korean missile sites in a crisis. That is extremely risky and could ignite the very war it seeks to prevent.
Missile defence would be an excellent option because it is defensive-only. But it does not work very well. In fact, performance anxiety – that missile defence might miss its target – is the reason the US, Japan and South Korea have never tried to shoot down a North Korean missile test, such as last week’s.
Negotiation, of course, would be the ideal outcome, but North Korea has made it clear that it will not seriously negotiate denuclearisation, or even controls.
If Japan and South Korean could nuclearly deter North Korea themselves, there would be less anxiety about US commitments. Seoul and Tokyo would not proliferate these weapons, sell them to terrorists, lose them, store them improperly, or use them in a first strike.
Their nuclearisations would be strictly defensive, a choice made long after North Korea ignored the international community and moved first into these weapons.
Robert Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly) is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University.
channelnewsasia.com
13. US policy on North Korea the least bad option
I oppose this because it will mean success for Kim Jong Un's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy and will allow him to conitute to develop advanced warfighting capabilities all with the goal of dominating the peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State,
But for those who support arms control agreements, even with "trust but verify," what makes us think Kim is going to negotiate as a responsible member of the international community and live up to any agreements made to cap or reduced his weapons After the last four decades of agreements, broker agreements, and non agreements, what makes us think the leopard will change his spots?
I will place my trust in deterrence and defense, human rights upfront, influence operations, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.
US policy on North Korea the least bad option
It’s possible tensions on the Peninsula would be no lower with an arms-control agreement than they are now
asiatimes.com · by Denny Roy · October 11, 2022
As it has regularly done for decades, during the last few weeks the North Korean government reminded Washington, Seoul and Tokyo that it has unredressed grievances. Pyongyang signaled through several gestures that the long-running crisis on the Korean Peninsula will continue.
First, paramount leader Kim Jong Un reiterated in a September 9 speech that “there can be no bargaining over our nuclear weapons” even if the United States maintains economic sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
Second, on the same occasion, Kim announced a standing order that DPRK commanders would launch nuclear weapons “automatically” if they lost communication with Kim. This was an answer to the South Korean government’s interest in developing a “decapitation” capability – preempting a DPRK missile launch by killing Kim to prevent him from giving the order.
Pyongyang is now saying that Kim’s assassination will cause the outcome Seoul hopes to avoid.
Third, Pyongyang said it would employ nuclear weapons if it expected an attack against an important DPRK strategic target or against the DPRK leadership, in effect announcing a nuclear first-use policy.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un speaking on September 2 last year at the third enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in Pyongyang. Photo: KCNA / KNS
Fourth, North Korea fired off another barrage of ballistic missiles in what had already been its busiest year for missile tests. Pyongyang said the launches tested the “actual war capabilities” of “tactical nuclear operation units.”
An interest in building up a tactical nuclear weapons capability is frightening because it indicates Pyongyang sees nukes as a warfighting weapon rather than simply an insurance policy to deter an enemy invasion.
Fifth, the latest barrage included a ballistic missile that overflew Japan, an intentionally provocative act.
This new spate of ominous DPRK signals has brought a resurgence of calls for the United States to change its stagnant North Korea policy.
“North Korea has already won” and “The US should admit defeat,” says one representative article in the Financial Times published October 8.
The argument is as follows:
The core of US policy is pressuring Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Washington is willing to make a deal that would include economic and perhaps political benefits (such as diplomatic recognition) in exchange for the North Koreans trading away their nukes and missiles.
In the meantime, the United States refuses to officially recognize the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state and maintains a collection of punitive restrictions on economic engagement with North Korea.
Current US policy, however, is a proven failure, the argument continues. Not only is Pyongyang keeping its nuclear weapons, but it is also improving, expanding and diversifying its delivery systems. The situation gets steadily more dangerous as Washington waits in vain for the Kim regime to relent.
The argument leads to the recommendation that Washington should drop the insistence on Kim getting rid of his nukes and missiles, accept the DPRK as a permanent nuclear weapons state and negotiate an arms control agreement with Pyongyang to lower the risk of conflict on the Peninsula.
This, by the way, is exactly the outcome Kim wants. For months he has broadcast that he aspires to international acceptance of the DPRK as a “responsible nuclear weapons state.” North Korean officials are reportedly encouraged by the experiences of India and Pakistan, which at first incurred US displeasure when they acquired nuclear weapons but later became US security partners.
Obviously, the US approach of offering economic and political rewards for de-nuclearization has not worked. It seems increasingly unlikely to work in the future as well.
The notion of seeking success through an arms control agreement with Pyongyang, however, has weaknesses that deserve serious consideration.
It is easy to uncritically assume that abandoning a bad policy will lead to success. Logically, this is not necessarily true. The new policy might prove just as bad or worse, even if in different ways.
Washington’s official stance of not recognizing the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state is a joint policy followed also by Seoul and Tokyo. These allies would see a US abrogation of this position as a minor betrayal, another reason to question US reliability, and the apparent end of the US commitment to eventual DPRK denuclearization.
Acquiescing to North Korea’s permanent possession of nuclear weapons not only would be a blow to nuclear non-proliferation; it would arguably be the worst instance of nuclear proliferation in human history, given the profound criminality of the Pyongyang regime.
Offering arms control talks would elevate Kim to a position of strength. Instead of an outlaw state seeking international respectability, North Korea would be a fellow member of the nuclear weapons club with the United States, buoyed by the victory of forcing Washington to back down from its previous refusal to reward Pyongyang’s violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions.
Deciding to try for an arms control agreement is one thing; getting there is another.
Negotiations on a US-DPRK arms control agreement would likely be as difficult as were negotiations over de-nuclearization in 2018–2019. In 2018, Kim expressed willingness in principle to denuclearize.
By the time of the Hanoi Summit in 2019, however, it became clear that Kim was negotiating in bad faith, demanding sweeping sanctions relief while offering only the closure of obsolete nuclear research facilities in return.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and US President Donald Trump failed to reach agreement on a nuclear deal in which Kim proposed to dismantle part of the Yongbyon reactor complex. Photo: KCNA VIA KNS
Kim would still be pushing for an agreement in which he gains much of what he wants while giving the Americans little of what they want. Unquestionably, Kim would demand sanctions relief as a condition of any arms control agreement, immediately doing away with Washington’s strongest point of leverage.
Had denuclearization negotiations proceeded far enough, Pyongyang’s willingness to allow sufficient transparency and verification would have been gigantic hurdles. The same problems would arise in negotiations over an arms control agreement.
There is little reason to believe the DPRK would honor an arms control agreement. The Pyongyang government is notorious for cheating on and unilaterally repudiating its commitments.
It would be folly to assume that being officially recognized as a nuclear weapons state would somehow pacify the Kim regime and fundamentally transform its foreign policy.
Even with an arms control agreement, Pyongyang would still regularly accuse the United States of a “hostile” policy toward North Korea, using this as a justification for activities prohibited by the agreement. The accusation of aggressive intent and war-mongering by the USA would continue to be a useful domestic political tactic for a Kim regime that persistently fails to deliver prosperity at home.
In sum, it is very possible that tensions on the Peninsula would be no lower with an arms control agreement than they are now.
The idea that North Korea has “won” is dubious. Pyongyang has elected to build extraordinarily expensive weapons programs to counter a phantom threat (South Koreans are not hankering to absorb their impoverished cousins), diverting funds from economic development and isolating the country from trade and investment opportunities.
More accurately, no one is winning. The best that America’s current policy can promise is to maintain deterrence while the DPRK bolsters its arsenal, periodically tries to intimidate its adversaries and falls farther behind South Korea in economic and human development.
Alas, that might be the least bad option available.
Denny Roy (RoyD@EastWestCenter.org) is a senior fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu. He specializes in strategic and international security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. Follow him on Twitter: @Denny_Roy808.
asiatimes.com · by Denny Roy · October 11, 2022
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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