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Quotes of the Day:
“It does not require many words to speak the truth.”
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- Jordan Peterson
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- Francis Bacon
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 10 (Putin's War)
2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (10.10.22) CDS comments on key events
3. US airports' sites taken down in DDoS attacks by pro-Russian hackers
4. Russia’s Revenge
5. China’s Real Takeaway From the War in Ukraine: Grey Zone Conflict Is Best
6. The risks of escalation in the Ukraine war are rising fast
7. More Missile Defenses for Ukraine
8. Putin and the Shadow of Munich
9. The War in Ukraine Is Decimating Russia’s Asian Minorities
10. Opinion | Democracies must stand firm against Xi Jinping’s next assault on human rights
11. 'War crime:' Industrial-scale destruction of Ukraine culture
12. Ukraine leader to ask G7 for air defence weapons after Russian strikes
13. Executive Order On Enhancing Safeguards For United States Signals Intelligence Activities
14. Wormuth: US Army to invest in larger, high-tech formations
15. FDD | China wins human rights vote at UN, exposing flaws of Biden’s reform plan
16. Five reasons why the Crimean bridge explosion is significant
17. FDD | Ukraine’s NATO Bid is a Test of the “Open Door”
18. FDD | Growing Trade Signals Deeper Ties Between Iran and Turkey
19. US information attacks undermine global security, stability - China Military
20. Musk's proposal for China-Taiwan relations gets slammed: Our freedom is 'not for sale'
21. British Official Stresses Threat From China Even Amid Russian Aggression
22. The end of the brown beret: Air Force special ops squadron shuts down after 28 years advising allied aviators
23. The Army is struggling to stay out of the culture war
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 10 (Putin's War)
Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces conducted massive, coordinated missile strikes on over 20 Ukrainian cities.
- President Vladimir Putin claimed that the coordinated missile strikes were in retaliation for the explosion on the Kerch Strait Bridge, likely in part to curry favor with “pro-war” factions.
- Russian and Belarusian ground forces remain unlikely to attack Ukraine from Belarusian territory to the north.
- Ukrainian forces have likely liberated over 200 square kilometers of territory in western Luhansk Oblast as of October 10.
- Russian forces continued unsuccessful attempts to regain recently lost territory in northwest Kherson Oblast while reinforcing nearby positions with damaged and hastily mobilized units.
- Russian forces continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast.
- Russian and occupation administration officials are setting conditions to move up to 40,000 residents out of Kherson Oblast to Russian-occupied Crimea and the Russian Federation.
- Russian forces cannot supply mobilized forces, likely due to years of supply theft by contract soldiers and commanders.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 10
understandingwar.org
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 10
Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, Riley Bailey, Angela Howard, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 10, 9:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces conducted a massive missile strike attack against over 20 cities, including Kyiv, on October 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched over 84 cruise missiles and 24 drone attacks, 13 of which were carried out with Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones.[1] Ukrainian air defense shot down 43 cruise missiles, 10 Shahed-136 drones, and 3 unspecified drones. Russian forces launched missiles from 10 strategic bombers operating in the Caspian Sea and from Nizhny Novgorod, Iskander short-range ballistic missile systems, and 6 missile carriers in the Black Sea.[2] Russian forces launched the Shahed-136 drones from Crimea and Belarus.[3] Ukrainian media reported that Russian missile strikes hit 70 targets, including 29 critical infrastructure facilities, 4 high-rise buildings, 35 residential buildings, and a school.[4]
Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed to have ordered the missile strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure in retaliation for a “terrorist act” at the Kerch Strait Bridge, likely in part to curry favor with the Russian pro-war nationalist camp that has been demanding such retaliation.[5] Putin accused Ukraine during his meeting with the Russian Security Council of conducting terrorist acts against Russian civilian and critical infrastructure, namely against the Kerch Strait Bridge, the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), and segments of the Turkish Stream gas transmission system.[6] Ukrainian officials have not formally taken responsibility for the explosion at the Kerch Strait Bridge.[7] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) also reported that Putin has been planning this attack prior to the Kerch Strait Bridge explosion, and if true, could indicate that Putin planned this attack for the deflection of the Kharkiv-Izyum-Lyman failures.[8]
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu also attended the meeting despite speculations that Putin would force him to resign, which may suggest that Putin settled on responding to only one of the pro-war community’s demands at this time.
Putin emphasized that he would conduct proportional escalation in any future retaliatory actions. He stated that if Ukraine continues to carry out “terrorist attacks against [Russian] territory, then Russian responses will be harsh, and their scale will correspond to the level of the threat to the Russian Federation.” This declaration of proportionality suggests that Putin intends to continue climbing the escalation ladder rung by rung and cautiously rather than jumping to more dramatic measures such as the use of nuclear weapons. Putin may also mean to message the Russian pro-war camp that they should manage their expectations of an ongoing daily bombardment of Ukraine similar to the one conducted today.[9] Russian milbloggers, for their part, have overwhelmingly welcomed the strikes and amplified Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev’s statement that more attacks against Ukraine will follow soon.[10] Ukrainian and Western intelligence have previously reported that Russia has spent a significant portion of its high-precision missiles, and Putin likely knows better than Medvedev or the milbloggers that he cannot sustain attacks of this intensity for very long.[11]
The October 10 Russian attacks wasted some of Russia’s dwindling precision weapons against civilian targets, as opposed to militarily significant targets. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces successfully completed the mission of striking Ukrainian military command centers, signal infrastructure, and energy systems in Ukraine.[12] Social media shows that Russians instead hit a children’s playground, a park, a German consulate, and a business center among other non-military targets.[13] Ukrainian air defenses also shot down half of the Russian drones and cruise missiles. Russian attacks on the Ukrainian energy grid will not likely break Ukraine’s will to fight, but Russia’s use of its limited supply of precision weapons in this role may deprive Putin of options to disrupt ongoing Ukrainian counter-offensives in Kherson and Luhansk Oblasts.
Russian and Belarusian forces remain unlikely to attack Ukraine from the north despite Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko's October 10 announcement that Belarus and Russia agreed to deploy the Union State’s Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV) —a strategic formation of Russian and Belarusian units tasked with defending the Union State. Lukashenko stated that he and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed on October 7 on an unspecified “deployment” of the Russian-Belarusian RGV in “connection with the escalation on the western borders of the Union State” but did not clearly define the deployment’s parameters.[14] Lukashenko stated that over a thousand Russian personnel will deploy to Belarus and that a Russian-Belarusian group began forming on October 8.[15] The Russian component of any RGV formations in Belarus will likely be comprised of low-readiness mobilized men or conscripts who likely will not pose a significant conventional military threat to Ukraine.
The Russian component of the RGV is comprised of elements of the 1st Guard Tank Army, 20th Combined Arms Army, and airborne units– formations that have all sustained heavy combat losses in Ukraine and have a severely reduced combat capacity.[16] A Kyiv Post reporter claimed that Russian soldiers are deploying to Belarus en masse via cattle railcars without mechanized equipment on October 10—a characterization consistent with ISW's assessment.[17] ISW has previously assessed that Ukrainian reports from late September of Belarus preparing to accept 20,000 mobilized Russian men indicate that Russia hopes to use Belarusian military facilities and infrastructure to hold and potentially train newly mobilized Russian forces, but that it remains exceedingly unlikely that these are leading indicators of imminent Belarusian involvement in Ukraine on Russia’s behalf.[18] The Kremlin may seek to use additional Russian forces in Belarus to fix Ukrainian forces near Kyiv and prevent their redeployment elsewhere to participate in counter-offensives. ISW has previously assessed that Lukashenko cannot afford the domestic ramifications of Belarusian involvement in Ukraine.[19] ISW also assesses that Russia does not have the ability to form a ground strike force from scratch or from existing units in Belarus quickly. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that it has not observed indicators of Russian forces forming offensive groups in Belarus and explicitly stated “there is no threat of an attack from the territory of the Republic of Belarus as of October 10.”[20]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces conducted massive, coordinated missile strikes on over 20 Ukrainian cities.
- President Vladimir Putin claimed that the coordinated missile strikes were in retaliation for the explosion on the Kerch Strait Bridge, likely in part to curry favor with “pro-war” factions.
- Russian and Belarusian ground forces remain unlikely to attack Ukraine from Belarusian territory to the north.
- Ukrainian forces have likely liberated over 200 square kilometers of territory in western Luhansk Oblast as of October 10.
- Russian forces continued unsuccessful attempts to regain recently lost territory in northwest Kherson Oblast while reinforcing nearby positions with damaged and hastily mobilized units.
- Russian forces continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast.
- Russian and occupation administration officials are setting conditions to move up to 40,000 residents out of Kherson Oblast to Russian-occupied Crimea and the Russian Federation.
- Russian forces cannot supply mobilized forces, likely due to years of supply theft by contract soldiers and commanders.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Counter-offensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
- Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Ukrainian Counter-offensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Eastern Ukraine: (Oskil River-Kreminna Line)
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Luhansk Oblast east of the Oskil River in the direction of Svatove and Kreminna on October 9 and 10 and have likely liberated over 200 square kilometers of territory in western Luhansk Oblast as of October 10.[21] Ukrainian forces captured Stel'makhivka (17 kilometers west of Svatove) on October 9, and Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai confirmed that Ukrainian forces liberated several settlements on the Oskil River-Kreminna Line including Novolyubivka, Nevske, Hrekivka, Novoiehorivka, Nadiia, and Andriivka.[22] Geolocated combat footage posted on October 9 shows Ukrainian forces destroying a Russian tank in Novoselivske 15 km northwest of Svatove on the Svatove–Kupyansk highway.[23] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to ford the Zherebets River near Makiivka and Raihorodka (approximately 12 km southwest of Svatove) on October 10. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked and recaptured Terny on October 10, though ISW cannot verify this claim.[24] ISW’s assessment of Ukrainian forces’ front line places Ukrainian forces within 20 km of Svatove’s western side.
Russian forces are likely preparing defenses in Starobilsk and Svatove in response to Ukraine’s northern counter-offensive. A Russian milblogger reported that the Wagner Group deployed approximately 1,000 personnel to the Russian force grouping in Lysychansk to reinforce the Luhansk sector and establish a defensive line that will run from Lysychansk along the Seversky Donets River back to Russian’s internationally recognized borders on October 9.[25] Social media video reportedly shows Russian forces in Starobilsk forcing students to dig trenches on October 9.[26] Haidai reported that Russian forces blew up railway and bridge crossings near Svatove, are laying mines, and continued to prepare defenses in the area on October 10.[27]
Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)
Russian forces continued their unsuccessful attempts to regain lost positions in northern and northwestern Kherson Oblast on October 9 and October 10. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russian forces up to the size of a motorized rifle platoon unsuccessfully attempted to attack Ukrainian positions in the direction of Davydiv Brid on the eastern bank of the Inhulets River.[28] Ukrainian military officials noted that Russian forces focused most of their airstrikes on Davydiv Brid and struck Ukrainian positions with kamikaze drones in Dudchany (on the western bank of Dnipro River) and other liberated settlements.[29] Russian sources claimed that Davydiv Brid “is a grey zone” and stated that Russian forces are clearing the forest belt south of Davydiv Brid, however.[30] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed repelling Ukrainian counter-offensives on settlements in the vicinity of Davydiv Brid.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attempted to launch a counterattack on Ternovi Pody, approximately 33km northwest of Kherson City.[32]
Russian forces are maintaining their efforts to reinforce positions with hastily mobilized and damaged units in northern Kherson Oblast. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces transferred an additional 200 servicemen and up to 300 units of military equipment to reinforce areas of Ukrainian counter-offensives, but these forces are likely not sufficient for Russian forces to regain lost positions in northern Kherson Oblast.[33] Russian sources also reported that mobilized men from Volgograd Oblast and the Republic of Kalmykia arrived in Kherson Oblast.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff claimed that a battalion tactical group (BTG) of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division that operates in the Kherson direction had over 520 servicemen killed in action, which would be more than half of the nominal complement of personnel in a motorized rifle BTG.[35] The report noted that the BTG largely consists of mobilized men, which is likely considering that ISW has previously reported that 150th Motorized Rifle Division had suffered serious losses during the Battle of Mariupol.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Donetsk People’s Republic‘s (DNR) 127th Rifle Regiment of the 1st Army Corps has suffered critical losses after serving on the first line of combat in Kherson and Mykolaiv Oblasts, and that their families complained to Russian law enforcement about failures by the Russian military command to support them and about their poor living conditions.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that an unspecified commander of the Russian 49th Combined Arms Army formed the 127th Rifle Regiment without necessary preparation or proper equipment. ISW previously reported that this unit is composed of forcefully mobilized men and has previously refused to fight due to lack of such basic supplies as water in early September.[38]
Ukrainian forces continued to conduct an interdiction campaign in Kherson Oblast on October 9 and October 10. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed three ammunition warehouses in Kherson and Beryslav Raions, and one control point in Kakhovka Raion. Odesa Oblast Military Administration Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk also insinuated that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian warehouse with military equipment in Hola Prystan (about 14km southwest of Kherson City), and social media footage showed fire and smoke in the settlement on October 9.[39]
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued to conduct ground assaults in Donetsk Oblast on October 9 and 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut; north of Bakhmut near Bakhmutske and Soledar; and south of Bakhmut near Mayorsk, Ozaryanivka, Ivanhrad, and Niu York on October 9 and 10.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces fully occupied and cleared Zaitseve on October 9.[41] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces entered the southern outskirts of Opytne and Ivanhrad on October 10, although ISW cannot independently verify his claims.[42] Russian sources reported that fighting in and around Bakhmut is more intense than usual and that Ukrainian artillery attacks intensified to a level unseen since summer 2022.[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks north of Avdiivka near Kamianka, and south of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske, Nevelske, Pobieda, and Opytne on October 9 and 10.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces launched assaults near Pisky and Marinka on October 9 and 10.[45] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to attack Russian positions near Oktyabirske, Neskuchene, and Yehorivka on October 9.[46] Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic Denis Pushilin stated on October 10 that Russian forces in the Vuhledar and Marinka directions are making progress, but not as quickly as commanders had hoped.[47] Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk Oblast on October 9 and 10.[48]
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued routine artillery, air, and missile strikes west of Hulyaipole, and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts on October 9 and 10.[49] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Zaporizhia City, Mykolaiv City, Ochakiv, and Nikopol.[50] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces conducted cruise missile strikes on Zaporizhzhia City on October 9, killing at least 12 civilians.[51]
Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian positions and destroy Russian drones in southern Ukraine on October 9 and 10. Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian air defense systems shot down Russian UAVs, including Shahed-136s, in Mykolaiv and Odesa Oblasts on October 9 and 10.[52] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions near Tokmak on October 8, 9 and 10, reportedly destroying a Russian manpower concentration, a railway connection, and infrastructure facilities.[53] The Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov reported on October 10 that Russian forces are increasingly transporting military equipment through Zaporizhia Oblast following the October 8 explosion on the Kerch Strait Bridge.[54] Russian columns of military equipment reportedly move from Mariupol through Berdyansk to Melitopol, a route more vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes than the supply line across the Kerch Strait Bridge.[55]
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Mobilization in Russia continues to face bureaucratic and logistical challenges. Russian court records suggest that years of corruption and petty theft of military supplies among Russian military personnel has rendered the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) unable to provide mobilized troops basic necessities such as protective equipment, weapons, medical, and personal supplies.[56] The BBC reported on October 10 that Russian military garrisons have sentenced at least 558 men for clothing theft, and have made 12,000 fraud convictions and over 700 embezzlement convictions over the past eight years.[57] Stolen equipment includes millions of rubles worth of goods ranging from bullet-proof vests, boots, and diesel fuel to soap, toilet paper, and socks.[58] The data from these convictions likely represents a small subset of corruption in the Russian military. The governor of the Russian Mari El Republic acknowledged the Russian MoD’s supply problems impacting mobilized troops, promised to fix the problems, and attributed the challenges to ignorance of the mobilized men’s needs on October 9.[59]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to depend on proxy forces, mobilized, and contract soldiers finding ways to provide their own equipment. Russian authorities opened a mobilized-soldier support center collecting “humanitarian aid” at Novosibirsk State University on October 9.[60] One Russian milblogger posted a link to crowdfunding for equipment for the Russian proxy 208th Cossack Regiment.[61] A separate milblogger posted a crowdfunding link for Russian, Luhansk People’s Republic, and Donetsk People’s Republic forces on October 9.[62] Two other milbloggers posted photos and videos of thermal sights and drones purchased with crowdfunding from channel subscribers on October 9.[63]
Russian physical supply shortages extend beyond equipping Russian soldiers. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 9 that Russian leadership is negotiating with other countries for the procurement of further artillery shells, mortar shells, and components for rocket launcher systems. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Belarusian military warehouses and arsenals remain another source for resupply and that Belarusian authorities plan to send 13 trains with ammunition and other unspecified equipment from Belarus to Russia.[64]
Russian citizens continue resisting mobilization in Russia. An unknown individual conducted an arson attack against a military recruitment office in Arkhangelskoe, Bashkortostan on October 9.[65] One Russian milblogger posted on October 9 that North Ossetia has not fulfilled its quota for partial mobilization and has only mobilized 40% of the region’s target.[66] The milblogger stated that the mobilization delinquency situation is worst in Vladikavkaz, whose mayor vacations in Turkey.[67] A Russian source reported that occupation Crimean State Council Chairman Vladimir Konstantinov announced plans to formally propose a federal law banning men on the military registration list from fleeing Russia to avoid mobilization.[68] Konstantinov suggested that Russia label those who have already fled as “under foreign influence” and prevent those convicted of discrediting the Russian army or evading service from voting or holding office for up to 10 years after the conviction’s expungement.[69]
Russian-backed occupation authorities reportedly established sites in Severodonetsk to mobilize Ukrainians on October 9. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on October 9 that Russian forces are prioritizing mobilizing Ukrainians with experience but also seek to fill personnel shortages with untrained and improperly equipped conscripts.[70]
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian and occupation administration officials continued to conduct filtration activities in the Russian-occupied territories on October 9 and 10. The Head of the Kherson Oblast occupation administration Vladimir Saldo announced that governors in Russian-occupied Crimea, Kransodar Krai, Stavropol Krai, and Rostov Oblast have agreed to take up to 10,000 people from Kherson Oblast.[71] Saldo has framed the movement of Kherson Oblast residents as a “vacation” program for children and their parents.[72] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk claimed that Russian and occupation administration officials may not plan to return the children and their parents to Kherson Oblast.[73] The Mayor of Melitopol, Ivan Fedorov, reported that occupation administration officials in Melitopol are transporting families from the city to the Russian Federation as well.[74] Fedorov also reported that Russian and occupation administration officials continue to prevent residents from crossing the Vasylivka checkpoint into Ukrainian-held Zaporizhia Oblast and that the queue there is over 6,000 people long as of October 8.[75]
Russian and occupation administration officials have failed to restore heating infrastructure ahead of the heating season in Russian-occupied territories as of October 10. The Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration reported on October 10 that 269 settlements in Russian-occupied Zaporizhia and Donetsk Oblasts face gas supply disruptions.[76] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian and occupation administration officials in Zaporizhia Oblast have left Melitopol and Berdyansk completely without heat despite promises to repair damaged pipelines.[77] Haidai reported on October 9 that Russian and occupation administration officials are concerned about the winter in Lysychansk, Rubizhne, and Severodonetsk, where many residents still do not have access to heat.[78] Haidai and the head of the Kharkiv Oblast Military administration, Oleg Synehubov, have warned their respective residents to leave settlements in both occupied and recently de-occupied territories that lack heating as it will likely be months before Ukrainian or occupation authorities can restore heating.[79]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
understandingwar.org
2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (10.10.22) CDS comments on key events
CDS Daily brief (10.10.22) CDS comments on key events
On the morning of October 10, Russia launched a massive missile attack on Ukraine. The General Staff of the Armed Forces reported that the Russian Federation used 84 cruise missiles and 24 UAVs, 13 of them Iranian "Shahid-136". The Armed Forces destroyed 56 targets. Among them are 43 cruise missiles and 13 UAVs (10 of them of the "kamikaze" type).
The Russians have been planning missile attacks on the Ukrainian capital and infrastructure since the beginning of October, Ukrainian military intelligence reported. The occupying forces received a corresponding instruction on October 2 and 3. On October 8, seven Tu-160 strategic bombers were transferred from the Engels airfield to the "Olenya" airfield and equipped with Kh-101 cruise missiles. 6 cruise missile carriers with forty Caliber missiles were deployed on the outer raid of Sevastopol. The main goal is the destruction of the TPP, panic among Ukrainians and intimidation of the European public.
As of 17.00, the preliminary death toll is 11 people and almost 90 wounded. A total of 117 objects were damaged, of which 35 were residential buildings," the State Emergency Service said.
The Russians attacked critical infrastructure facilities (mainly energy infrastructure) in 12 Ukrainian Oblasts and the city of Kyiv; more than 30 fires broke out, Ukrainian Emergency Services said. Electricity supply was disrupted almost throughout the entire Ukraine (in 15 Oblasts).
15 enemy rockets attacked the Lviv Oblast. Part of them was shot down by anti-aircraft defense, reported Lviv Oblast Military Administration. An explosion at a critical infrastructure facility was recorded. Due to the lack of electricity, the operation of the city's thermal power plants has been temporarily suspended. About 90% of Lviv is without electricity, trams and trolleybuses do not run. More than 80% of traffic lights do not work. Traffic police regulated the major intersections. There is no hot water in the city. Cold water is supplied through the backup power supply, said Andriy Moskalenko, First Deputy Mayor of Lviv. Due to the lack of electricity, the air-raid alert work was interrupted. In case of alarm, cars with loudspeakers would drive through the city, said Mayor Sadovy.
As a result of today's rocket attacks on Kyiv, 50 people were injured and six died, including the head of the department of Cyber Police Department, Yuriy Zaskoka, who was driving along Shevchenko Boulevard to work, said the National Police. Forty-five residential buildings, 5 critical infrastructure facilities, 6 educational institutions, 5 medical facilities were damaged in the capital by Russian shelling. The damaged pedestrian bridge over the Volodymyrsky Uzviz in Kyiv will be temporarily closed. Cultural objects and educational institutions were damaged, including the scientific library, the National University of Ukraine, the headquarters of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, the Kyiv City Teacher's House, and the Khanenko Museum of Western Art. The blast wave damaged the windows of the central railway station in Kyiv, but the station is operational; boarding of trains is carried out through the western and eastern
underground passages, which simultaneously serve as a shelter. Ukrzaliznytsia railroad company reported 20 passenger trains delayed. As a result of the rocket attack on Kyiv, the visa department of the German consulate was damaged.
Additionally, almost every district of the Kyiv Oblast was subjected to Russian shelling. Still, due to the successful work of Ukrainian air defense, most of the Russian missiles were destroyed, Chief of Police of Kyiv Oblast Andriy Nebytov wrote in his Telegram. The authorities urged residents of the Kyiv Oblast to stock up on food, and water, charge phones, and take warm clothes.
Ukrenergo says that power outages are possible throughout Ukraine due to the shelling. To regulate the power grid, energy company DTEK warned that some enterprises and residential buildings would be disconnected from the grid for two hours. The schedule and geography of outages are unknown. Hospitals, the subway, rescue services, etc., are fully supplied with electricity. Ukrainians are strongly asked to limit their electricity consumption from 5:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. This will help pass the critical loads of our power grids.
In Zhytomyr, due to problems with the electricity supply, trams and trolleybuses will not be released on the line yet, announced Zhytomyr Mayor Serhiy Sukhomlyn. According to him, the main task now is to ensure electricity supply to high-rise buildings and the private sector.
Sukhomlyn noted that the water supply was restored almost everywhere in the city but still called on Zhytomyr residents to stock up on water.
In the morning, the enemy struck the Kremenchuk District of Poltava Oblast. Air defense forces shot down 2 rockets. Three people were injured due to the falling debris of one of them, reported Dmytro Lunin, the head of Poltava OMA.
In the Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, 4 Russian missiles hit the Burshtynsk TPP. The fire at TPP, which broke out after the attacks, has already been extinguished.
Due to rocket attacks, there is no electricity and no water in Khmelnytskyi, and the operation of electric transport has been suspended, according to the city mayor Oleksandr Simchyshyn.
4 killed and more than 16 injured are reported in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Civil and critical infrastructure objects, high-rise buildings, public transport, and private vehicles were damaged.
Two were killed, and 23 were wounded after the night shelling of Zaporizhzhia. One of the seven rockets hit a 5-story building, and the second rocket hit a kindergarten in the city's centre, causing significant destruction. The other - to the gymnasium of one of the districts. Fortunately, it did not break. Infrastructure facilities and high-voltage power grids were also damaged.
In Mykolaiv at night, Russian troops launched a missile attack on the National Shipbuilding University, announced the mayor Oleksandr Sienkovych, in his Telegram.
Until Friday, all Ukrainian schools will switch to distance learning, announced the Ministry of Education.
Operational situation
(please note that this part of the report is on the previous day's (Oct 9) developments)
It is the 228th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas"). The enemy tries to maintain control over the temporarily captured territories. It concentrates its efforts on disrupting the counteroffensive actions of the Ukrainian troops, and continues the offensive in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions.
The Russian military shelled the positions of the Ukrainian troops along the entire contact line, fortified defensive positions and frontiers in certain directions, and conducted aerial reconnaissance. In violation of the norms of international humanitarian law, the laws and customs of war, it striked critical infrastructure and residential quarters.
The threat of Russian air and missile strikes persists throughout the entire territory of Ukraine. Thus, the Russian forces launched 10 rocket and 19 air strikes during the past day and carried out more than 90 MLRS attacks. As a result, the infrastructure and civilians of more than 30 towns, cities and villages, including Zaporizhzhia, Sloviansk, Novobakhmutivka, Siversk, Bilohorivka, Nikopol and Blahodativka, were affected over the past day. In addition, the Russian military used seven anti-aircraft guided missiles to attack Zaporizhzhia. Once again, the city's critical infrastructure and peaceful civilians' homes were affected.
Near the state border, Popivka, Starykove, Vorozhba, Yanzhulivka, Myropillya, Chervona Zorya, Veterynarne, Strileche, Mali Prohody, Vovchansk, Kamianka, Dvorichna, and Hrynkivka of Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts were shelled.
The aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces made 24 strikes. Hits on 20 areas of enemy weapons and military equipment concentration and on 4 Russian anti-aircraft missile systems are confirmed. Ukrainian Air defense units shot down a Russian Su-25, 3 UAVs and 3 Kh-59 cruise missiles.
The Russian military command is creating a counterattack grouping in the northern part of Luhansk Oblast and on the territory of the Russian Belgorod Oblast. It may include up to 200-220 tanks, up to 340-350 self-propelled guns, up to 150 guns, 100-110 MLRS and up to 25,000 military personnel. The reserve can be up to 2,500-3,000 people. The technical readiness coefficient of the group's combat equipment is estimated at 0.5-0.75.
There are no signs that offensive groupings of enemy troops are being formed on the territory of the Republic of Belarus. Six BTGs of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus perform tasks related to protecting and defending the Ukraine section of the Belarusian state border: four BTGs from the 6th separate mechanized brigade (Grodno), one each from the 11th separate
mechanized brigade (Slonim) and 103rd separate airborne brigade (Vitebsk). In addition, a joint special-purpose unit made up of the 5th separate SOF brigade (Marina Horka), and the forward C2 point of this brigade has been deployed in the border area with Ukraine.
The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low. Kharkiv direction
• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the
RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;
• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.
Ukrainian forces continue their counteroffensive on the Kreminna-Svatove highway.
Kramatorsk direction
● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;
● 252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th, and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.
Shelling from tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery continued along the entire line of contact, particularly in the areas around Pershotravneve, Siversk, Makiivka, Novoyehorivka, Stelmakhivka, Terny, Torske and Zarichne. Also, in the area of Svatove, the Russian military blew up railway and road bridge crossings.
The commander of the Russian operational grouping of troops in the Svatove-Starobilsk direction decided to improve the tactical position of his troops in the Kreminna-Rubizhne area to create favorable conditions for continuing control of the region. For this purpose, the Russian military formed an assault tactical group northwest of Kreminna and attacked the positions of the advanced units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the direction of Kreminna - Terny, which advanced to Terny. This assault group consists of the 6th "assault detachment" of the Wagner PMC (numbering about 100 people from among former prisoners of the Leningrad Oblast (Russian Federation) correctional institutions. Subsequently, a reinforced company of the 752nd
motorized rifle regiment of the 3rd motorized rifle division, two platoons of the 13th "Kuban" BARS detachment and a company of the 119th rifle regiment of mobilization reserve of the 2nd Army Corps were brought into battle.
The attacks were carried out without the support of armored vehicles but were supported by mortar and artillery fire. The Russian forces suffered losses and were forced to withdraw to the starting positions. Units of the Russian Armed Forces regroup their forces in the Chervonpopivka- Zhytlivka area and prepare for new attempts to regain control over Terny and improve their tactical position in the areas of Yampolivka and Zarichne.
According to the available data, the Russian command formed two fairly powerful tactical groupings from the 2nd, 41st, 20th Armies and 1st Tank Army, units of the 18th motorized rifle division in the Svatove and Rubizhne-Sievierodonetsk directions (Kreminna district) 11th Army Corps and at least one SOF brigade. In addition to those mentioned above, up to two battalions of the 4th separated motorized rifle brigade of the 2nd Army Corps, four rifle battalions from the mobilization reserve regiments, six detachments of regional volunteers of the Russian Federation (according to the estimate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian MOD – 1-1.5 battalions in total), up to seven separate motorized rifle brigades of the Territorial Defense of the so-called LPR are also concentrated here.
In total, up to 10-11 BTGs switch to defense at the positions along the Svatove – Kreminna – Sieverodonetsk route, of which only half are manned to the "battalion" level; the rest are reinforced companies.
There are another 6-7 BTGs in reserve, a third of which are riflemen (there are no armored vehicles).
About 4-5 BTGs renew combat readiness near the area of future hostilities (manned with 40-60% of personnel and combat equipment).
Donetsk direction
● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.
The Russian military fired at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces from tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery in the areas of Rozdolivka, Serebryanka, Bilohorivka, Verkhnokamyanske,
Zaitseve, Krasna Hora, Soledar. In addition, the occupiers mined the areas of Berestove, Avdiyivka, Kamianka, Vodyane, Pervomaiske, Pisky, Krasnohorivka, and Maryinka.
Over the past day, units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces have repelled Russian attacks in the areas of Ozaryanivka, Kamianka, Pervomaiske and Nevelske.
Zaporizhzhia direction
● Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.
More than 20 towns and villages were affected by artillery fire. In particular, Vuhledar, Novopil, Shakhtarske, Mali Shcherbaky, Velyka Novosilka, Malynivka and Mala Tokmachka.
Tavriysk direction
- Vasylivka – Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 42, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7 km;
- Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd, and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 37th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 10th, 16th, 346th separate SOF brigades, 239th air assault regiment of the 76th Air assault division, 217th and 331st parachute airborne regiments of the 98th airborne division, 108 air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault battalion of the 7th Air assault division, 11th and 83rd separate airborne assault brigade, 4th military base of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 7 military base 49 Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 126th separate coastal defence brigades, 127th separate ranger brigade, 1st and 3rd Army Corps, PMCs.
Russian shelling was recorded in the areas of more than 25 towns and villages along the entire contact line. Near Dudchany, the Russian military used an attack UAV. In total, the occupiers made up to 30 UAV sorties in this direction for the purpose of aerial reconnaissance.
A critical situation is developing in the enemy 127th rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps. By the decision of the 49th Army commander, the hastily formed regiment was immediately transferred to the first line of battle in Kherson and Mykolaiv Oblasts. Relatives of mobilized servicemen prepared an appeal to the law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation about significant losses and inaction of the military command. There are lengthy interruptions in water and food supplies in the subdivisions. Military personnel is equipped with old-style protective gear, which leads to numerous casualties.
Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:
The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and to maintain control over the captured territories.
On October 10, ships of the Black Sea Fleet took part in a massive missile attack on the territory of Ukraine. About 20 Caliber missiles were fired from the sea area south of the cape of Fiolent (Crimea). For this purpose, on the morning of October 10, two more surface ships went to sea, bringing the number of missile carriers up to 8. After the volley, part of the ships returned to the base, and other ships went to sea.
Currently, 16 enemy warships and boats are on a mission in the Black Sea, conducting reconnaissance and controlling navigation. Six of them are Kalibr missile carriers with 48 missiles ready for a volley. Therefore, the rocket threat against Ukraine remains high. The next massive attack is expected on the night of October 11. The bombing of the Ukrainian territory was carried out in coordination with Tu-160 and Tu-95 strategic aircraft, which fired Kh-101 and Kh-555 missiles while flying over the Caspian Sea.
The Russian military continues shelling Ukrainian ports and coastal areas. On the night of October 10, the Russian forces attacked Odesa Seaport and Kyiv River port with "Shahid 136" kamikaze drones. Most of them were shot down by air defense.
"Grain initiative": Additional measures that can be taken to speed up the shipment of grain became the topic of conversation between Minister of Infrastructure of Ukraine Oleksandr Kubrakov and Minister of National Defense of Turkey Hulusi Akar. During the conversation, there was an exchange of views regarding the grain shipment; additional measures to speed up grain shipments were assessed. The ministers expressed their satisfaction with the work of the Joint Coordination Center. Minister Kubrakov noted on his Facebook page that Ukraine had increased agricultural product exports by land and waterways.
"Last month, Ukrainian farmers exported 6.9 million tons of food. This is a record figure since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion. Compared to August, we increased the volume of agricultural exports by 41%," Kubrakov wrote. He noted that the operation rate of the unblocked ports of Greater Odesa continues to increase. "In September, we increased the agricultural exports more than twice, to 3.8 million tons, and the number of ships for loading by 2.5 times, to
168 ships per month. Such indicators show that business trusts the "grain initiative" and is ready to intensify its participation in its implementation," the minister said.
Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 10.10
Personnel - almost 62,870 people (+370);
Tanks 2,495 (+9);
Armored combat vehicles – 5,149 (+16);
Artillery systems – 1,486 (+9);
Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 353 (+5); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 181 (+1); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 3,908 (+18); Aircraft - 267 (+1);
Helicopters – 235 (+1);
UAV operational and tactical level – 1,097 (+11); Intercepted cruise missiles - 249 (+2);
Boats / ships - 15 (0).
Ukraine, general news
The attack on the energy system of Ukraine, carried out by Russia in the morning of October 10, is the largest since the beginning of the war. The invaders struck the entire power supply chain, stated the Minister of Energy German Galushchenko "the entire supply chain was hit to make it difficult to reconnect and provide electricity from other sources," the minister said. He emphasized that the restoration of damaged objects is already underway, and power supply has already been restored in some areas. Galushchenko also urged Ukrainians to reduce electricity consumption during peak hours.
Since October 11, Ukraine has suspended the export of electricity to stabilize its energy system, the Ministry of Energy reported on Facebook. It is noted that Russia continues to carry out energy terror against Ukraine and also increases energy pressure on the European Union. Thus, the export of electricity from Ukraine helped Europe reduce Russian energy resource consumption.
Consumer prices rose by 1.9% in September, State Statistics Service reported. Inflation on the consumer market in September 2022 compared to August 2022 was 1.9%, since the beginning of the year - 21.8%, compared to September 2021 - 24.6%.
International diplomatic aspect
Russia unleashes the most significant missile attacks against Ukraine in months, firing as many as eighty-four cruise and ballistic missiles and twenty-four UAVs worth $400-700 million. The brutal Russian attacks were similar to the ones the Nazis committed in 1944-1945. There were 10,386 launches of the V1 cruise missile against the UK in general and the most densely populated areas of London in particular. The attacks cast the lives of as many as 6,000 Britons. The primary goal was to break the will to resist. But, as we know, the Nazis have failed.
Vladimir Putin justified the attack by accusing Ukraine of various "terrorist" activities, including blowing up the Kerch bridge. He threatened Ukraine with a proportional response should Ukraine repeat "terrorist" acts on "Russian" territory. However, the Russian missile attack can hardly be called proportioned and justified from the military point of view. Given that several missiles hit crowded areas, killing civilians, and the other ones hit energy and communication infrastructure, it's Russia that yet again committed a terrorist act.
There are three aims of the attack. First, Vladimir Putin had to please Russian fanatics and hawks in his surroundings. After failing to achieve significant progress in his military adventure and several humiliating defeats on the battleground, there was growing dissatisfaction with military and political leadership. In the heavily censored country, public figures were allowing themselves to criticize even their supreme chieftain. The hawks were calling on Putin to stop being "soft" and unleash the full power of the Russian military. But, given the lost ability to turn to an offensive on the battlefield, the only remaining option was to hit the "soft" targets – civilian infrastructure and civilian population.
Secondly, the Kremlin believes that it's still possible to break the Ukrainian will to resist. A disinformation campaign accompanied the strikes about the "outrage" of Ukrainians with their military and political leadership and false claims that the President of Ukraine fled the country. Meanwhile, Volodymyr Zelenskyy published a video address to compatriots, filmed in front of his office in Kyiv's center. In fact, he just captured the thoughts and feelings of all Ukrainians supporting the struggle against pure evil. The essence of the message is that the Nation will not give up.
"Hitler's blitzkrieg on the innocent Brits strengthened their resolve," twitted Senator Dick Durbin. "Putin's mass strike on innocent Ukrainians will do the same. The hottest ring in Hell has Putin's name on the door." He was right. Instead of fear and despair, Ukrainians launched a donation campaign to support the Armed Forces. As many as $6.1 million were gathered from dusk till dawn.
Thirdly, the terrorist attack aimed to deter Ukraine's partners from stepping up security assistance. "These attacks only further reinforce our commitment to stand with the people of Ukraine for as long as it takes. Alongside our allies and partners, we will continue to impose costs on Russia for its aggression, hold Putin and Russia accountable for its atrocities and war crimes, and provide the support necessary for Ukrainian forces to defend their country and their freedom," stated the President of the United States. "The indiscriminate targeting of civilians is a war crime… The EU remains firmly committed to supporting Ukraine in political, financial, military, and humanitarian terms as well as with reconstruction and covering winter preparedness needs," proclaimed the President of the European Council. Germany will deliver the first IRIS-T air defence system in the coming days.
It remains to be seen whether cruelty and brutality of the criminal act would change fear-of- escalation self-restrain strategy in Berlin and Washington DC. While the Americans aren't willing
to provide Ukraine with long-range capabilities (ATACMS), the Germans find various excuses to provide no modern battle tanks or infantry fighting vehicles.
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3. US airports' sites taken down in DDoS attacks by pro-Russian hackers
US airports' sites taken down in DDoS attacks by pro-Russian hackers
BleepingComputer · by Bill Toulas · October 10, 2022
Update: Title of story modified to indicate it was the sites taken down.
The pro-Russian hacktivist group 'KillNet' is claiming large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against websites of several major airports in the U.S., making them unaccessible.
The DDoS attacks have overwhelmed the servers hosting these sites with garbage requests, making it impossible for travelers to connect and get updates about their scheduled flights or book airport services.
Notable examples of airport websites that are currently unavailable include the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL), one of the country's larger air traffic hubs, and the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), which is intermittently offline or very slow to respond.
Atlanta airport website out of reach
Other airports returning database connection errors include Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD), Orlando International Airport (MCO), Denver International Airport (DIA), Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport (PHX), along with some in Kentucky, Mississippi, and Hawaii.
KillNet listed the domains yesterday on its Telegram channel, where members and volunteers of the hacktivist group gather to acquire new targets.
KillNet announcing list of targets
They are relying on custom software to generate fake requests and garbage traffic directed at the targets with the goal of depleting their resources and making them unavailable to legitimate users.
In this case, the DDoS attacks do not impact flights, but they still have an adverse effect on the function of a crucial economic sector, threatening to disrupt or delay associated services.
KillNet has previously targeted countries that sided with Ukraine, like Romania and Italy, while its "sub-group" Legion struck key Norwegian and Lithuanian entities for similar reasons.
As the war in Ukraine has entered a new phase, pro-Russian threat actors and hacktivists are trying to ramp up their retaliatory cyberattacks against neuralgic organizations in the western world.
The U.S., being the de-facto leader of NATO, which is Russia's main military rival, has supplied Ukraine with intelligence and equipment from early on in the war, but DDoS attacks so far seemed to be focused on EU targets, especially after the announcement of sanctions.
KillNet's targeting scope expanded to include the U.S. only last week when the DDoS group attacked government websites in Colorado, Kentucky, and Mississippi, with moderate success.
BleepingComputer · by Bill Toulas · October 10, 2022
4. Russia’s Revenge
Russia’s Revenge
After weeks of setbacks on the battlefield, Russia struck civilian targets in Ukraine. But Vladimir Putin’s missiles may not accomplish much.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/11/briefing/russia-ukraine-strikes.html
Kyiv yesterday.Credit...Finbarr O'Reilly for The New York Times
By German Lopez
Oct. 11, 2022, 6:07 a.m. ET
You're reading the The Morning newsletter. Make sense of the day’s news and ideas. David Leonhardt and Times journalists guide you through what’s happening — and why it matters. Get it sent to your inbox.
Ukrainian resilience
When Russia invaded Ukraine in February, many Ukrainians took shelter underground for days and even weeks from constant bombardments and fighting.
Yesterday, Russia hit at least 11 Ukrainian cities with missiles in its broadest aerial assault against civilians since the invasion’s early days. But even amid destruction, many people sheltered for only a few hours. Some quickly went back to their lives. As my colleague Megan Specia, a Times foreign correspondent, left a shelter in the capital of Kyiv, she saw residents walking dogs and riding electric scooters.
In the northeastern city of Kharkiv, which has seen more bombardments than Kyiv, residents shifted to war footing and stocked up on canned food, gas and drinking water. Yet they also entertained themselves at the Typsy Cherry, a local bar. “The mood was cheerful,” its owner, Vladyslav Pyvovar, told The Times. “People drank, had fun and wondered when the electricity will resume.” (Power came back hours later.)
Russia’s latest strikes inflicted significant damage: They killed at least 14 people and wounded 89 others, destroyed vital infrastructure and caused power failures. They also shattered a relative sense of calm that had allowed Ukrainians in parts of the country to go back to work, school and entertainment venues in recent weeks. (Here’s a snapshot of the destruction in different parts of the country.)
But if Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, wanted to crush Ukrainians’ morale, he failed, as their resilience after the strikes showed. The attacks may have even backfired, strengthening Ukrainians’ resolve to defeat and punish Russia. “People are really resolute here,” Megan said. “It has been really striking to me.”
Image
The missile assaults also seem unlikely to produce battlefield gains, experts said. “I don’t think they will have a strategic impact,” Konrad Muzyka, a military analyst for Rochan Consulting, told The Times, “unless we’re talking about increasing morale on the Ukrainian side and maybe speeding up some deliveries of military equipment from the West.”
Putin’s challenge
Putin said that the strikes were revenge for an explosion on Saturday that partially destroyed Russia’s only bridge to Crimea. The bridge attack was a strategic victory for Ukraine, straining one of Russia’s supply lines to the battlefield. It was also a symbolic one, demonstrating that Ukraine can strike deep in Russia-occupied territory and at a target that is of personal importance to Putin.
The bridge blast punctuated weeks of Russian losses on the battlefield: Ukrainian troops have taken back more than 1,200 square miles of territory in the east and south since late September. The recent Russian setbacks have prompted even some of Putin’s supporters to criticize him and the war effort. Yesterday’s missile strikes appeared to be a response to those critics, some analysts said.
Image
Debris after a missile strike yesterday in Zaporizhzhia.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times
As devastating as Russia’s attacks were — a playground was among the sites hit — they also exposed Putin’s weaknesses. He is not able to mount a counteroffensive to seize territory in Ukraine right now. The war has depleted Russian forces, with estimates of tens of thousands of troops killed. Western sanctions have damaged Russia’s ability to restock the military equipment it has used and lost on the battlefield, particularly high-end weapons. Ukraine’s recent advances have worsened these problems.
Putin has called a draft to rebuild Russian forces, but training and deploying the soldiers will take months, potentially until spring. So Putin has resorted to missile strikes — which do little to help Russia gain territory — to put Ukraine “in a state of constant unease in an effort to keep the Ukrainian economy from functioning,” said my colleague Michael Schwirtz, a Times correspondent reporting from Kyiv.
Putin’s broader gamble is that he can wait out Ukrainian and Western resolve. He seems to believe that Ukrainians will eventually falter under the constant pressure of war, and that Western support for Ukraine will collapse as energy prices rise this winter.
But Putin has consistently underestimated Ukraine’s and the West’s willpower. “Everyone I have spoken to — both in the U.S. and Ukraine — really doubt Putin can break morale,” said my colleague Julian Barnes, who covers national security for The Times. “That doesn’t mean he won’t try. But it is a wasted effort.”
More from Ukraine
5. China’s Real Takeaway From the War in Ukraine: Grey Zone Conflict Is Best
My thesis: our adversaries will continue to conduct political warfare in the gray zone between peace and war in strategic competition.
Conclusion:
The Russian invasion of Ukraine provided us an important lesson: attempting to escalate from grey zone tactics to conventional military operations is likely to reduce the odds of long-term political (and military) success. Furthermore, beyond the direct dimension of the conflict, the actor seeking the escalation is likely to face additional economic, diplomatic, and technological pressures, illustrating that the decision to escalate is more likely than not to have a negative impact on both the narrow and broader conflict.
Given that lesson from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and China’s successful history of using grey zone tactics, China is likely to pursue them further. But the nature of salami-slicing necessitates constant boundary-pushing. China may find it difficult to maintain its grey zone tactics without risking an escalation, whether intentional or unintentional, that would effectively reverse any gains made over the previous decades.
China’s likely next escalatory move – a possible aerial and naval blockade – presents itself as a realistic scenario that would lead to conflict and inter-state war, likely beyond the grey zone domain.
China’s Real Takeaway From the War in Ukraine: Grey Zone Conflict Is Best
The steep costs of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will bolster China’s continued use of its effective salami-slicing and grey zone tactics.
thediplomat.com · by Tobias Burgers · October 6, 2022
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How the Russian invasion of Ukraine can shed light on a hypothetical conflict in the Taiwan Strait has been the subject of much international discussion and debate. Numerous publications have compared the Russian invasion of Ukraine and a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, paying particular attention to the lessons learned regarding air-ground coordination, the necessity of training, the function of civil defense forces, the requirement for skilled military leadership, and finally the quality of armaments. However, many of these articles deal with the potential for a full-scale military invasion of Taiwan’s main island; as a result, most of the lessons are concentrated on the planning and execution of conventional military operations.
A comparative approach should consider the different kinds of conflicts that might occur in the Taiwan Strait rather than focusing exclusively on the lessons acquired from conventional military combat. With that in mind, the key lesson from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is that China will continue to use its effective salami-slicing and earlier grey zone tactics.
We anticipate a situation in which China will try to further encircle Taiwan’s international standing and endanger its economic and political existence through diplomatic, economic, and military measures, possibly using aerial and/or naval blockades. However, switching to an aerial and naval blockade could be a risky strategy for China. This results in a deadlock since China will need to expand its operations qualitatively and quantitatively in the grey zone, but at the same time it must make sure that these actions do not unintentionally or intentionally escalate the situation beyond the grey zone.
Moving From Grey to Black-and-White
One of the key lessons to be learned from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict – which did not begin with Russia’s full-scale invasion in February – is the economic, military, and political utility and effectiveness of grey zone operations and strategies versus the high costs of conventional war.
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The conflict in Ukraine has significant epistemological implications when treated as a complex grey zone conflict as opposed to a traditional military combat scenario. Putin had successfully employed his “little green men” and grey zone techniques in earlier acts, notably the successful annexation of Crimea as part of the Russo-Ukrainian War that started in 2014. Putin’s deft employment of unacknowledged Russian troops in terms of military and political control enabled him to successfully maintain political control over Crimea.
Meanwhile, (Western) nation-states and the public responded to these activities in the grey zone in a measured manner. There was virtually no inclination to take military action in opposition to these Russian grey zone maneuvers. In contrast, the Western response was primarily comprised of moderate economic pressure, limited political and diplomatic pressure against Russia, and military assistance to Ukraine. For example, even after Russia was kicked out of the G-8, foreign leaders continued to try to contact Russia and its authorities. For years after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, multiple U.S. presidents and EU leaders met with Putin and other prominent Russian authorities. In addition, there were no in-depth discussions about broad sanctions as (economic) weapons, with economic relations between the European Union and Russia remaining stable and cordial.
That all changed after Russia escalated to a full-fledged conventional war against Ukraine in February 2022.
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It is clear from the Russian invasion that the political and economic objectives of the protagonists are undermined by turning a political and constrained military battle, carried out through grey zone operations, into a full-fledged conventional war. This case is supported by three important lessons from the Russian invasion of Ukraine that are relevant to the current situation in the Taiwan Strait:
- Traditional military operations have innately higher failure rates, and, from a military standpoint, escalations frequently do not produce the desired outcome.
- The Russian invasion demonstrated that, even at the most brutal level of warfare, military intrusions affect political and economic endeavors and are further complicated by popular perceptions of and reactions to military aggression, particularly when it is explicitly targeted at civilians.
- Putin’s invasion of Ukraine shows many signs of a strategic failure and has little chance of being politically successful.
The ongoing struggle in Ukraine, the disputed status of the territory Russia’s occupies, and the absence of widespread support for Russian political rule mean that, despite Russia’s prior military successes, mostly in southern and eastern Ukraine, it is still far from having achieved even a moderate operational or strategic victory. Conversely, Russian military forces are actively embroiled in an escalating insurgency while their political power in these regions is also limited and disputed.
Second, from a non-military perspective, conflict escalation outside the grey zone has been shown to be unsuccessful when considering economic, political, and sociological factors. Military-intensive operations, particularly those that last for an extended period, demand significant resources, indicating the need to move away from a peace economy in the social, economic, and political spheres, which could lead to significant upheavals and political and economic instability. This is true in both democratic and non-democratic nations. However, authoritarian leaders have higher stakes: failure, societal upheaval, and discontent can create potential conflict that threatens regime stability and survival.
Third, from a diplomatic and political perspective, Putin’s escalation of the crisis and the conflict has been shown to be a bad bet and poor judgment, leading almost immediately to a sincere and robust response to Russia’s invasion, with the West significantly contributing political, economic, and military support to Ukraine. Regardless of whether their citizens supported them or not, many Western governments have demonstrated a substantial willingness to continue helping Ukraine as the crisis worsens, despite rising energy prices and inflation. At the same time, Russia’s economy has suffered severe effects and appears to be “imploding,” isolating it politically and turning it into a pariah on the global stage.
Putin’s decision to escalate the conflict into a full-fledged war has made the geopolitical situation on the globe even more unpredictable and dangerous. The considerable political costs (sanctions, isolation) that Russia has already experienced and will continue to incur appear to be persistent characteristics of the political and economic environment for the foreseeable future.
China’s Grey Remains Grey
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Considering the escalatory steps Russia has taken and its failure to achieve success, it is worth assessing what lessons China could take from this.
Observing Chinese behavior in the Taiwan Strait, or for that matter, in many of its geopolitical and security conflicts, illustrates a solid adherence to grey zone tactics and strategies. Indeed, when looking at the Taiwan Strait, the decisiveness with which China has employed grey zone tactics and salami-slicing techniques is evident. China has approached such tactics across a broad spectrum: an increasing number of air intrusions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone; the use of unmanned systems over the island of Kinmen; crossings of the median line in the Taiwan Strait (initially by aerial means, now by both aerial and naval means); efforts to restrict Taiwan’s international diplomatic recognition and political participation; and the ever-increasing use of economic pressure tools.
Given the ubiquity of such techniques in China’s playbook and the obvious failures of Russia’s escalation in Ukraine, it is likely that China will continue its current track. When China has undertaken a discernible movement in long-term tactics away from grey zone tactics and toward more conventional operations, it was only when the operational theater allowed for it. For example, in the South China Sea, we have seen a clear shift from salami-slicing and grey zone operations to regular military operations targeted at maximizing power and influence. Nevertheless, China only intended to do so in this area of operation after establishing de facto military and political authority over the area first with its grey zone techniques.
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However, in the context of the Taiwan Strait conflict, such a shift appears improbable. First, the Taiwan Strait’s military balance is different from the South China Sea’s. China is gaining military advantages, but control and supremacy have not yet been achieved. It is unclear whether China will succeed in establishing military control through the deployment of grey zone and salami-slicing methods after observing the current scenario and Taiwan’s responses.
Second, while other nations frequently respond passively to Chinese initiatives and methods in the South China Sea, this is obviously not the case in the Taiwan Strait. In the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan, the U.S., and even Japan are retaliating against Chinese grey zone actions by putting those retaliations into action.
What Would Grey Zone Escalation Look Like?
The logic of China’s salami-slicing tactics, however, implies that pressure accumulation is unavoidable. Simply maintaining the status quo is insufficient. As we have already established, the scope and difficulty of a successful escalation campaign in the conventional arena make this an unpalatable option. This begs the question: what other (escalatory) choices are available?
We might be able to glimpse a probable direction in the Chinese reaction to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in early August. In reaction to her visit, the People’s Liberation Army launched a series of aerial and naval activities reminiscent of an early effort to construct a potential blockade around Taiwan’s main island. It is therefore worthwhile analyzing China’s recent campaign to reduce Taiwan’s naval and aerial connectivity, which essentially sought to isolate the island and put pressure on Taiwan and its allies to break a Chinese embargo.
A gradually tightening chokehold of the Taiwanese islands, including the main island, would fit seamlessly into China’s decades-long grey zone tactics applied in the Taiwan Strait conflict. As a result, it may be the next logical move by the Chinese government to limit international collaboration, recognition, and financial support for Taiwan while also exerting additional political and economic pressure on the island nation.
Throughout history, states have efficiently applied aerial and naval blockades to pressure and coerce states to yield to their political demands. The difficulty in measuring the efficiency of such blockades, however, is eclipsed by the unforeseen consequences and outcomes of the action. For such a move to be successful, China would need to assess several conditions.
China would have to deal with the problem of establishing and maintaining control over the surrounding aerial and naval environment. This raises the question of whether China’s armed forces are powerful enough to establish a full-circle aerial and naval blockade of Taiwan. It not only needs to have sufficient forces to counter any Taiwanese armed forces attempting to break the blockade, but it also must plan for possible interdiction efforts by the U.S., other states, or even a coalition of other major powers (notably Japan, South Korea, and possibly European military forces) attempting to break the blockade.
Second, China is vulnerable to counterblockades; sanctions, trade barriers, and land and sea blockades may have an impact on China’s economy even if they do not occur immediately. A formal blockade is unlikely when considering the resources that China would need to maintain one effectively. Furthermore, there is a high risk of conflict escalation not only between China and Taiwan but also between other actors such as the United States and Japan. Finally, China would likely struggle to manage the consequences of such an embargo. A state’s direct control over the outcomes of a blockade is tenuous, and reputational costs could easily surpass acceptable levels.
Conclusion
The Russian invasion of Ukraine provided us an important lesson: attempting to escalate from grey zone tactics to conventional military operations is likely to reduce the odds of long-term political (and military) success. Furthermore, beyond the direct dimension of the conflict, the actor seeking the escalation is likely to face additional economic, diplomatic, and technological pressures, illustrating that the decision to escalate is more likely than not to have a negative impact on both the narrow and broader conflict.
Given that lesson from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and China’s successful history of using grey zone tactics, China is likely to pursue them further. But the nature of salami-slicing necessitates constant boundary-pushing. China may find it difficult to maintain its grey zone tactics without risking an escalation, whether intentional or unintentional, that would effectively reverse any gains made over the previous decades.
China’s likely next escalatory move – a possible aerial and naval blockade – presents itself as a realistic scenario that would lead to conflict and inter-state war, likely beyond the grey zone domain.
GUEST AUTHOR
Tobias Burgers
Tobias Burgers is assistant professor in the faculty of Social Studies, Fulbright University, Vietnam and a CCRC fellow at the Cyber Civilization Research Center, Keio University.
GUEST AUTHOR
Scott N. Romaniuk
Dr. Scott N. Romaniuk is a visiting fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales, U.K., and a non-resident expert at the Taiwan Center for Security Studies.
thediplomat.com · by Tobias Burgers · October 6, 2022
6. The risks of escalation in the Ukraine war are rising fast
Excerpts:
Given the high stakes and emotions, the window for diplomacy is likely to open at the most dramatic moment: for example, when Putin starts to unpack his nuclear toolkit, which will be visible to Nato and involve a lot of signalling by Moscow. Only then might the Ukrainian and western publics be convinced there is an urgent need to negotiate. Diplomacy will have to involve Biden, since the Kremlin considers him the only real head of the opposing coalition.
Close co-ordination with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Nato is essential. The sooner honest, closed-door conversations start, the higher the chance of climbing down the escalation ladder. Finally, given the irreconcilable differences between Moscow and Kyiv on core issues such as the status of Crimea and Donbas, as well as Ukraine’s and the west’s moral imperative not to trade territory for peace, only an armistice that will freeze the front lines can be agreed at this point, not a comprehensive solution to the war.
The risks of escalation in the Ukraine war are rising fast
No comprehensive settlement is possible for the moment, but the US must start laying the groundwork for crisis diplomacy
Financial Times · by Alexander Gabuev · October 10, 2022
The writer is a senior fellow of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Russia’s latest attacks on Ukrainian cities are a sad reminder that the most horrific pages of this ugly war are still ahead of us. But they also point to something more profound: Vladimir Putin’s appetite for escalation, and the emotional nature of his decision-making. With Ukraine increasingly victorious on the conventional battlefield, the Kremlin’s response is becoming ever more erratic, disproportionate and destructive.
The indiscriminate air strikes came in retaliation for blowing up the Kerch bridge to Crimea. For the Kremlin, the bridge is not only a lifeline connecting mainland Russia with the annexed peninsula (enabling military supplies, among other things), but also a symbol of Putin’s legacy as the ruler who returned Crimea to Mother Russia. Coming the day after Putin’s 70th birthday, the attack must have added insult to injury.
The Kremlin’s response contains two significant lessons. First, Russia still has a vast toolkit for escalation. The tragic events of October 10 are a reminder that no part of Ukraine is safe from Russian attacks, and so no full-scale return of refugees and no reconstruction are possible at this point. Suspected covert attacks against German critical infrastructure show that Nato territory is vulnerable too.
The second lesson is Putin’s reaction to humiliating setbacks. Far from backing down, he will double down with little regard for the strategic consequences of his actions. The air strikes, for example, will most likely result in more western support for Kyiv, including the swift delivery of much-needed air defence systems, and further boost Ukraine’s will to fight the aggressor. Yet Putin ordered the strikes. The same approach prompted his disastrous reaction to the Maidan protests in 2014, and his decision to invade Ukraine.
These lessons are increasingly important. Ukraine’s military gains and the Kremlin’s inability to counter them conventionally may bring the west to the very top of the escalation ladder with a nuclear superpower. Given Putin’s emotionality, this moment could arrive swiftly and unpredictably, leaving decision makers with little time to prepare for something like a Russian military garrison in Kherson being encircled and captured or killed.
President Joe Biden’s sobering remarks about the threat of the use of nuclear weapons show that the White House is clear-eyed about the risk of escalation. For understandable reasons, Washington wants to maintain strategic ambiguity in public while communicating its views to the Kremlin in private. However, attempts to use a combination of new sanctions, more diplomatic isolation and possibly conventional Nato strikes against Russian military targets in Ukraine to deter a desperate Putin from using weapons of mass destruction, should he feel cornered, are by no means guaranteed to succeed. To improve the chances of preventing a showdown, the quiet groundwork for crisis diplomacy should be laid now.
Given the high stakes and emotions, the window for diplomacy is likely to open at the most dramatic moment: for example, when Putin starts to unpack his nuclear toolkit, which will be visible to Nato and involve a lot of signalling by Moscow. Only then might the Ukrainian and western publics be convinced there is an urgent need to negotiate. Diplomacy will have to involve Biden, since the Kremlin considers him the only real head of the opposing coalition.
Close co-ordination with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Nato is essential. The sooner honest, closed-door conversations start, the higher the chance of climbing down the escalation ladder. Finally, given the irreconcilable differences between Moscow and Kyiv on core issues such as the status of Crimea and Donbas, as well as Ukraine’s and the west’s moral imperative not to trade territory for peace, only an armistice that will freeze the front lines can be agreed at this point, not a comprehensive solution to the war.
Financial Times · by Alexander Gabuev · October 10, 2022
7. More Missile Defenses for Ukraine
We are playing catch-up rather than anticipating. I do think we have intelligence analysts and operational planners who are correctly assessing the future and making recommendations based on anticipation, but the political constraints based on the belief that we can prevent escalation are hamstringing our support.
More Missile Defenses for Ukraine
Russia has a military setback, and Putin bombs cities in response.
By The Editorial BoardFollow
Oct. 10, 2022 6:46 pm ET
https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-missile-defenses-for-ukraine-11665441980?mod=hp_opin_pos_3#cxrecs_s
Russia’s missile assault on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities on Monday is a reminder that the Kremlin retains a considerable capacity to wreak havoc. The best response is to provide Ukraine with more weapons, including better air defenses.
The attacks follow the Russian pattern going back to the beginning of the invasion. Ukraine registers an apparent military success, as it (or someone) did in striking the Kerch bridge between Russia and Crimea. Russia responds with an attack on civilian targets or infrastructure that is important for civilians such as water or electricity plants.
Mr. Putin blamed Ukraine for the Kerch bridge attack, which blew up the main lifeline to supply Crimea, which Russia invaded and annexed from Ukraine in 2014. He called the bridge attack a “terrorist” act, which is what his entire Ukraine campaign has been.
Ukrainian officials said Russia fired 84 missiles and that 43 were intercepted. Most landed in cities across Ukraine as far west as Lviv that are far from the active battlefield, some hitting rush-hour commuters. Russia claims it is firing precision-guided munitions at military targets, but its missiles must not be very precise.
More likely, the Russian targeting is indiscriminate and intended to spread terror across the civilian population and break the country’s will to resist. Previous attacks have had the opposite effect, and Monday’s will probably have the same.
The attacks also seem to have rallied Ukraine’s Western supporters. President Biden spoke with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and pledged to “continue providing Ukraine with the support needed to defend itself, including advanced air defense systems.” That air defense point is crucial since Russia retains a considerable advantage in missiles.
Monday’s casualties reflect the delay in getting air defenses to the country. The U.S. agreed in July to supply the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System, or Nasams, but that won’t reach Ukraine for several months. The U.S. has been reluctant to supply Patriot missile batteries for reasons that seem related to risks of escalation with a NATO weapons system, but that line has already been crossed. Mr. Putin won’t end his war until it becomes clear the cost of continuing it is too high.
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WSJ Opinion: Putin’s Revenge For Crimean Bridge Bombing
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WSJ Opinion: Putin’s Revenge For Crimean Bridge Bombing
Play video: WSJ Opinion: Putin’s Revenge For Crimean Bridge Bombing
Following the Kerch Bridge bombing on Oct. 8, 2022, Vladimir Putin has retaliated with a barrage of missile strikes for what he called 'terrorist attacks' by Ukraine. Images: Sputnik/Kremlin/AP/AFP via Getty Images Composite: Mark Kelly
Appeared in the October 11, 2022, print edition as 'More Missile Defenses for Ukraine'.
8. Putin and the Shadow of Munich
Excerpts:
And with a spat of misinformation and distortion of the truth, Putin had this message for the Ukrainian government, declaring, “We call on the Kyiv regime to immediately cease fire and all hostilities; to end the war unleashed back in 2014 and return to the negotiating table.”
As Iuliia Mendel, the former press secretary for President Volodymyr Zelensky, commented on Sept. 30 in response to Putin’s speech, “So in effect he was saying: ‘I’ve invaded your country. I’ve killed tens of thousands of your people, created millions of refugees, caused many billions of dollars’ worth of damage, and now I am trying to steal your land. So let’s negotiate.”
That is why President Zelensky, in the shadow of Munich publicly warned the Western democracies not to negotiate on Ukraine’s behalf without its consent and presence, stated on Sept. 30 that he would negotiate as soon as Russia changes leadership and is ready “to agree on coexistence on equal, honest, dignified, and fair terms.”
Putin and the Shadow of Munich - Kyiv Post - Ukraine's Global Voice
By Joshua D. Zimmerman. Published Oct. 11 at 1:40 pm
kyivpost.com
It is a profound irony, but perhaps not coincidental, that President Putin chose Sept. 30, 2022, to deliver his speech announcing the annexation of the eastern Ukrainian regions of the Donbas, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. It was on that exact day 84 years ago – Sept. 30, 1938 – that Adolf Hitler announced the annexation of the Sudetenland in western Czechoslovakia at the infamous Munich Conference.
There is an eerie similarity between the two speeches by authoritarian dictators bent on destabilizing the rule-based international order. For Putin in 2022 and Hitler in 1938, the same arguments were used to justify the changing of borders by force, the open and egregious violation of international law and norms. In 1938, the ethnic Germans in western Czechoslovakia, Hitler claimed, had a right to be part of the German fatherland as well as to Germany’s protection from persecution (although none existed).
Hitler’s mission, he stressed, was to right the alleged wrongs of history: The honor and dignity of the German people – violated in the hated 1919 Treaty of Versailles that carved out borders for a new Czechoslovak state that cut off ethnic Germans from their fatherland – had to be corrected.
Nazi Germany’s aim, Hitler pronounced, was to reincorporate “German” territory into the German fatherland through any means necessary. On Sept. 26, 1938, just days before the Munich conference, Hitler publicly declared that “the Sudetenland is the last territorial demand I have to make in Europe, but it is a demand from which I never will recede.”
Having duped the leaders of Britian, France, Italy, and Belgium with the notion that the annexation of western Czechoslovakia would bring about lasting peace between Germany and its neighbors, the Great Powers agreed – without Czechoslovakia’s consent – to Hitler’s demand. The Czechoslovak government, under intense pressure from Britain and France, acquiesced.
As the Czechoslovak leaders instructed its armed forces to stand down, the German armed forces crossed into Czechoslovakia and declared the Sudetenland part of the Third Reich. The area of 3.6 million people was 77.6 percent German and 20 percent Czech. “Never again,” Hitler said in his speech, “shall the Sudetenland be torn from the Reich.” Now that Germany had liberated the Sudetenland, Hitler continued, it was the duty of its German inhabitants to give their lives to defend Germany: “For you the nation was prepared to draw swords. You will also be as ready in the same sprit to assist if ever our German land and German people are threated.” The Sudetenland, Hitler stressed, will be a permanently and forever part of the German fatherland.
Like Hitler, who claimed he was merely righting the wrongs the Treaty of Versailles, Putin claimed the original sin was the separation of Ukraine in 1991 from the Soviet Union. The annexation of eastern Ukraine, Putin said, constituted the moral act of liberating “Russian lands” from alleged oppressive “Nazi” Ukrainian rule. “I want the Kiev authorities and their true handlers in the West to hear me now,” Putin said on Sept. 30, “and I want everyone to remember this: The people living in Luhansk and Donetsk, in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia have become our citizens, forever!”
According to a population census of Ukraine before the Russian invasion, the four annexed regions had a population of 8.6 million people. Ethnic Russians comprised 14.1 percent in Kherson region, 24 percent in Zaporizhzhia region, 38.2 percent in the Donetsk region, and 39 percent in the Luhansk region. Despite Putin’s claim that he is merely granting the inhabitants of the annexed regions the right to self-determination, the fact is that these four regions all voted overwhelmingly to be part of Ukraine in the free and fair referendum that was held on December 1, 1991, including 84 percent in favor in the Donetsk region.
Putin began the invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, with the attempt not only to obliterate Ukraine as a state but he used and continues to use the threat of force against Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Moldova, as well as threats to Poland and Romania.
Although in 1938 Neville Chamberlain of Britain, Benito Mussolini of Italy, and Edouard Daladier of France soon realized they had been tragically fooled when Hitler took the whole of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and immediately demanded parts of Poland, Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling is much more dangerous to the world order than was Hitler’s actions in 1938-1939.
“And all we hear is that the West is insisting on a rules-based order. Where did that come from anyway? Who has ever seen these rules? Who agreed or approved them? Listen,” Putin said in his infamous speech, “this is just a lot of nonsense, utter deceit, double standards, or even triple standards!”
Like Hitler in 1938, who ranted and raved about the dignity and honor of ethnic Germans forced to live in neighboring states, Putin railed against the West for carving out borders that left swaths of ethnic Russians as new minorities in 1991: “It was the so-called West that trampled on the principle of the inviolability of borders, and now it is deciding, at its own discretion, who has the right to self-determination and who does not, who is unworthy of it.”
Putin continued: “In 1991 … without asking the will of common citizens, representatives of the then-party elites decided to destroy the Soviet Union, and people suddenly found themselves cut off from their motherland. This tore apart and dismembered our nation, becoming a national catastrophe… I want everyone to remember this: the people living in Luhansk and Donetsk, in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia have become our citizens, forever!”
And with a spat of misinformation and distortion of the truth, Putin had this message for the Ukrainian government, declaring, “We call on the Kyiv regime to immediately cease fire and all hostilities; to end the war unleashed back in 2014 and return to the negotiating table.”
As Iuliia Mendel, the former press secretary for President Volodymyr Zelensky, commented on Sept. 30 in response to Putin’s speech, “So in effect he was saying: ‘I’ve invaded your country. I’ve killed tens of thousands of your people, created millions of refugees, caused many billions of dollars’ worth of damage, and now I am trying to steal your land. So let’s negotiate.”
That is why President Zelensky, in the shadow of Munich publicly warned the Western democracies not to negotiate on Ukraine’s behalf without its consent and presence, stated on Sept. 30 that he would negotiate as soon as Russia changes leadership and is ready “to agree on coexistence on equal, honest, dignified, and fair terms.”
The views expressed in this article are the author’s and not necessarily those of the Kyiv Post.
kyivpost.com
9. The War in Ukraine Is Decimating Russia’s Asian Minorities
The War in Ukraine Is Decimating Russia’s Asian Minorities
Putin’s “partial mobilization” is continuing a brutal legacy of colonization – as well as resistance – among the country’s minority groups.
thediplomat.com · by David Saveliev · October 10, 2022
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On September 21, President Vladimir Putin announced a partial mobilization in Russia to revitalize the battered Russian army fighting in Ukraine.
While the Kremlin promised to mobilize only able-bodied reservists with military experience, it already looks like a total mobilization in many places. Dr. Samuel Ramani, an Oxford-based researcher and author of several books on Russia, believes that the mobilization might even “constitute ethnic cleansing.”
The ethnic cleansing concern is rooted in the fact that the draft appears to be uniquely merciless in the impoverished communities of Russian Asians and other ethnic minorities.
The Diplomat spoke to Aldar Erendjenov, a representative of the Free Kalmykia foundation – an activist group aiding the Kalmyks fleeing Russia. Kalmykia is Europe’s only majority-Buddhist region, located in southwest Russia. Erendjenov told us that “we see the disproportionality with a naked eye… from our [ethnic minority] regions we had three, four times more men taken [than from Slavic regions].” Erendjenov noted that some villages in Kalmykia had been depopulated by roughly 20 percent since the beginning of the mobilization.
Russian Asians are tremendously diverse; they include Turkic Tuvans, Tungusic Evenks, Mongolic Kalmyks, and many others. They are also spread geographically, from the Kalmyks near the north Caucasus to the Aleuts split by the Russian border with Alaska. But one of the key things that unite Russian Asians is that the expanding Russian state colonized them at one point in their history.
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The Russian metropole has long been plundering the vast resources of subjugated Asians. In peace, there was increased taxation; in war, they were called up to serve the empire that colonized them.
The Diplomat spoke to the Sakha Pacifist Association, a group attempting to fight mobilization in the Sakha Republic – a Russian region roughly the size of India situated in the taiga of northeast Siberia. They told us that “the mobilization… reflects the long-term colonial policy of the Russian state and is aimed at reducing the population of indigenous peoples. We believe the purpose is to further exploit our lands’ natural resources, in particular, oil and gas.”
The war drastically impacted Russian Asians even before the mobilization. As Ramani pointed out, “it is easier to recruit soldiers in the poorest regions, and many of those happen to be ethnic minority regions.” Indeed, the Republic of Buryatia, one of the poorest regions in Russia, has reliably supplied contract fighters to the frontlines in Ukraine and a steady flow of coffins back to Russia. “With the disproportionate targeting of minorities and resettlement of Ukrainians into Russia,” Ramani said, “one could argue that one of the Kremlin’s goals is to make Russia whiter.”
Russian Asians also have a long history of resisting colonial plunder. In fact, one of the longest-running anti-colonial movements in the Russian Empire and the USSR was the Basmachi. This Central Asian national liberation movement sprung up as a response to forced conscription during World War I. The country-wide anti-colonial resistance by ethnic minority activists never entirely stopped. Still, the Kremlin was effective in suppressing it.
“It is crazy how many activists are jailed,” said Leyla Latypova, a Bashkorkostani journalist and scholar. “The field is cleared to the point that there are very few free activists within Russia who can talk about decolonization.”
But now, Russian Asians once again find themselves the target of а forced draft – to fight a war in Europe, thousands of miles away from their homeland. This has already spurred dissent and prompted organizations, from spontaneous protests in Yakutsk, the capital of the Sakha Republic, to Asian organizations we spoke to that are organizing transit of Russian Asians out of the country.
The Diplomat spoke to Tuvan activist Vasily Matenov, a representative of the activist group Asians of Russia. Tuva is a region on Russia’s southwestern border with China. Matenov said that “since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, there has been a lot of resistance among the Asian peoples of Russia. People created anti-war movements, spoke at rallies, and spoke out against the war. It feels like the mobilization is Putin’s revenge on our peoples through ethnic cleansing.”
The fear of death, malnutrition, and injury drove many Russians into dissent, across the border, into hiding, or all of the above. Russian Asians are no exception. Evidence has already emerged that the Russian army often can’t house, feed and supply their newly mobilized soldiers. This, not to mention the staggering casualty numbers on the front, would make even die-hard Putin supporters think twice about enlisting.
Since the beginning of the draft, roughly 700,000 have left Russia – against the 300 000 scheduled to be mobilized. The refugees don’t have many escape routes. After the mobilization was announced, several EU politicians were quick to emphasize that their countries would not shelter draft dodgers.
On the contrary, Central Asian states – especially Kazakhstan and Mongolia – welcomed the refugees. Dr. Diana Kudaibergenova, a Kazakhstani sociologist based in Cambridge, told The Diplomat that while the situation is quickly developing and more data is needed, “The reception of the migrants has been diverse but mostly welcoming so far.”
Asian Russians are especially welcomed. Erendjenov, the Free Kalmykia representative, said that in Mongolia, “even on [the] state level, Asian minorities are invited in and welcomed. It warms my heart that our problems are noticed there.”
Latypova noted that the mobilization might reignite the “pan-Turkic sentiment that is experiencing a kind of a revival because of similar languages and shared values.”
It is possible that the push for mobilization could even reignite an anti-colonial discourse within Russia, threatening the very basis of the Russian state. Since the beginning of the full-scale war, the idea of decolonizing Russia has been picking up steam in the West and among exiled activists. Latypova pointed out that “the Ukrainian community pushed the narrative at the beginning of the war; they helped uplift the anti-colonial voices within and outside Russia.”
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Russian activists often lament the lack of political education in Russia, especially among the poorer population which is the main target of the Kremlin’s narrative. Adlia (name changed), an exiled Sakha activist and photographer whose entire friendship group of more than 20 people has now left Russia, sighed in exasperation: “It might be rude to say this, but a lot of Russian Asians love Putin. Many of them watch only state TV, especially in the impoverished villages.”
But this might change, as Latypova argued. “When people see half of a village being mobilized, then the ideas are backed up by facts on the ground, this gives a lot of credibility to the decolonization rhetoric.” Indeed, even the recently apolitical communities in Russia are getting directly hit by mobilization and are not too happy.
In any case, the change might come too late for many of Russia’s Asian minorities. As Adlia said, “Take Evenk and Chukchi languages and cultures. They’re already dying. And if a whole generation of their boys dies, the peoples will die even faster.”
GUEST AUTHOR
David Saveliev
David Saveliev, is an Oxford university researcher and journalist currently based in Ukraine. His writing focuses on post-Soviet Asia and conflicts.
thediplomat.com · by David Saveliev · October 10, 2022
10. Opinion | Democracies must stand firm against Xi Jinping’s next assault on human rights
Excerpts:
Last but far from least: No democratic government should ever forget that people across China — regardless of what self-interested authoritarians in Beijing claim — are entitled to human rights. Giving independent activists from China now living in democracies a visible seat at policy tables reflects real — not just rhetorical — support for their ideas and work. It will also help to generate new policy ideas and to challenge Xi’s claim that he and “China” are one and the same.
Xi has had a decade to show his true human rights colors. From crimes against humanity to the abusive “zero-covid” policies to an unwillingness to condemn Russia for war crimes in Ukraine, the outcome is far bleaker than most predicted. The costs of allowing these trends to go unchecked into the future should motivate action now. Democracies should move swiftly to defend human rights inside and outside China.
Opinion | Democracies must stand firm against Xi Jinping’s next assault on human rights
The Washington Post · by Sophie Richardson · October 10, 2022
Sophie Richardson is the China director at Human Rights Watch.
The Chinese Communist Party is set to open its 20th National Congress on Oct. 16. Xi Jinping will almost certainly secure a third term as party general secretary — and therefore continue his profound assault on human rights across the country and around the globe. Are the world’s democracies up to the task?
Over the past decade, Xi’s regime has conducted brutal assimilationist campaigns with especially grim consequences for Tibetans, Uyghurs, people in Hong Kong, and others. He has reengineered the party state, reversing previous decades of slow progress toward legal reform. From the 2016 counterterrorism law to the 2017 Foreign Nongovernmental Organization Activities in China law to the Orwellian 2020 “national security” law imposed on Hong Kong, Xi’s entourage has used the law to entrench party power.
Xi’s repression has not stopped at China’s borders. In relentless pursuit of global power, Chinese authorities have dramatically expanded their capacity to commit human rights violations around the world. State-owned enterprises and Belt and Road Initiative projects often violate labor, land and Indigenous people’s rights and harm the environment in other countries. Other governments are pressured to forcibly return refugees and asylum seekers.
Some members of diaspora communities — even those who have obtained citizenship in democracies — are under such close scrutiny or harassment that they don’t feel secure exercising their rights. Chinese authorities now seek to influence public education in democracies, neutralize key international human rights institutions and shape global technical standards to expand their vision of technology as an instrument of control and coercion.
Where are the democracies?
Few governments were until recently willing to impose any meaningful consequences in response to serious human rights violations, and fewer still to consider dialing back the economic relationships that have given Beijing such leverage. Most have been painfully slow to recognize that Beijing poses threats to human rights inside their own countries. For democracies, defending international human rights institutions and norms has been a relatively low priority.
This must change.
To challenge Xi and his allies’ sense of impunity, democracies should use all available domestic and international means to investigate and appropriately prosecute those responsible for crimes against humanity. Acting through United Nations mechanisms, particularly the Human Rights Council, requires coordination and commitment, but it has the additional advantage of building that whole system’s resilience to insulate it from Beijing’s pressure — and last week’s close vote on a debate about Uyghurs shows how critical that goal is. There are also avenues to justice available in democracies, particularly by way of opening national investigations.
Democracies can no longer ignore the reality that their economic interdependence with Xi’s government has helped sustain human rights abuses. Canada, the European Union, Britain and the United States have begun imposing some sanctions in response to Chinese government human rights violations. The U.S. Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act has made it harder for goods produced in China with forced labor to enter the United States, and has helped gain recognition for the idea that companies and consumers should not want to profit from repression.
But large swaths of economic activity — from finance to manufacturing — remain largely unexamined. Business ties to the Chinese companies and institutions that provide surveillance equipment and services, as well as to the Chinese military-industrial complex, deserve particular scrutiny. Some democracies already have tools to limit trade as a means of pressuring Beijing to improve its human rights record. But they should also urgently adopt laws requiring companies to conduct human rights due diligence to identify and address risks of complicity in China and elsewhere.
Democracies can also do a better job of trying to protect and preserve the distinct identities Beijing seeks to obliterate. This could take several forms, from expediting asylum claims for those Beijing has driven out, and ensuring that they can live with full protection of their rights in democracies, all the way through to underwriting curriculums in languages such as Cantonese, Mongolian, Tibetan and Uyghur.
Governments should also make clear they are firmly opposed both to Chinese government repression and to anti-Chinese racism, a horrific phenomenon amplified during the pandemic. Some have been hesitant to do the former, fearing it exacerbates the latter. The Chinese government decries anti-Chinese sentiment in democracies for self-serving purposes; democracies need to take strong steps to tackle both problems.
They should support Chinese-language media platforms not subject to Beijing’s censorship. Encouraging — and investing in — innovations that give people easy access to uncensored news and other information will most likely pay dividends. Governments should require Chinese social media companies to publicly disclose what content they have censored or suppressed at the behest of the Chinese government as well as the legal basis for doing so.
Last but far from least: No democratic government should ever forget that people across China — regardless of what self-interested authoritarians in Beijing claim — are entitled to human rights. Giving independent activists from China now living in democracies a visible seat at policy tables reflects real — not just rhetorical — support for their ideas and work. It will also help to generate new policy ideas and to challenge Xi’s claim that he and “China” are one and the same.
Xi has had a decade to show his true human rights colors. From crimes against humanity to the abusive “zero-covid” policies to an unwillingness to condemn Russia for war crimes in Ukraine, the outcome is far bleaker than most predicted. The costs of allowing these trends to go unchecked into the future should motivate action now. Democracies should move swiftly to defend human rights inside and outside China.
The Washington Post · by Sophie Richardson · October 10, 2022
11. 'War crime:' Industrial-scale destruction of Ukraine culture
More evidence of the evil nature of the Putin regime.
'War crime:' Industrial-scale destruction of Ukraine culture
AP · by HANNA ARHIROVA · October 9, 2022
KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — The exquisite golden tiara, inlaid with precious stones by master craftsmen some 1,500 years ago, was one of the world’s most valuable artifacts from the blood-letting rule of Attila the Hun, who rampaged with horseback warriors deep into Europe in the 5th century.
The Hun diadem is now vanished from the museum in Ukraine that housed it — perhaps, historians fear, forever. Russian troops carted away the priceless crown and a hoard of other treasures after capturing the Ukrainian city of Melitopol in February, museum authorities say.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine, now in its eighth month, is being accompanied by the destruction and pillaging of historical sites and treasures on an industrial scale, Ukrainian authorities say.
In an interview with The Associated Press, Ukraine’s culture minister alleged that Russian soldiers helped themselves to artifacts in almost 40 Ukrainian museums. The looting and destruction of cultural sites has caused losses estimated in the hundreds of millions of euros (dollars), the minister, Oleksandr Tkachenko, added.
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“The attitude of Russians toward Ukrainian culture heritage is a war crime,” he said.
For the moment, Ukraine’s government and its Western backers supplying weapons are mostly focused on defeating Russia on the battlefield. But if and when peace returns, the preservation of Ukrainian collections of art, history and culture also will be vital, so survivors of the war can begin the next fight: rebuilding their lives.
Live Updates: Russia-Ukraine War
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“These are museums, historical buildings, churches. Everything that was built and created by generations of Ukrainians,” Ukraine’s first lady, Olena Zelenska, said in September when she visited a Ukrainian museum in New York. “This is a war against our identity.”
Workers at the Museum of Local History in Melitopol first tried hiding the Hun diadem and hundreds of other treasures when Russian troops stormed the southern city. But after weeks of repeated searches, Russian soldiers finally discovered the building’s secret basement where staff had squirrelled away the museum’s most precious objects — including the Hun diadem, according to a museum worker.
The worker, who spoke to the AP on condition of anonymity, fearing Russian punishment for even discussing the events, said the Ukrainians don’t know where Russian troops took the haul, which included the tiara and some 1,700 other artifacts.
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Dug up from a burial chamber in 1948, the crown is one of just a few Hun crowns worldwide. The museum worker said other treasures that disappeared with Russian soldiers include 198 pieces of 2,400-year-old gold from the era of the Scythians, nomads who migrated from Central Asia to southern Russia and Ukraine and founded an empire in Crimea.
“These are ancient finds. These are works of art. They are priceless,” said Oleksandr Symonenko, chief researcher at Ukraine’s Institute of Archaeology. “If culture disappears, it is an irreparable disaster.”
Russia’s Culture Ministry did not respond to questions about the Melitopol collection.
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Russian forces also looted museums as they laid waste to the Black Sea port of Mariupol, according to Ukrainian officials who were driven from that the southern city, which was relentlessly pounded by Russian bombardment. It fell under Moscow’s complete control only in May when Ukrainian defenders who clung to the city’s steelworks finally surrendered.
Mariupol’s exiled city council said Russian forces pilfered more than 2,000 items from the city’s museums. Among the most precious items were ancient religious icons, a unique handwritten Torah scroll, a 200-year-old bible and more than 200 medals, the council said.
Also looted were art works by painters Arkhip Kuindzhi, who was born in Mariupol, and Crimea-born Ivan Aivazovsky, both famed for their seascapes, the exiled councillors said. They said Russian troops carted off their stolen bounty to the Russian-occupied Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine.
The invasion has also wrought extensive damage and destruction to Ukraine’s cultural patrimony. The U.N.’s cultural agency is keeping a tally of sites being struck by missiles, bombs and shelling. With the war now in its eighth month, the agency says it has verified damage to 199 sites in 12 regions.
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They include 84 churches and other religious sites, 37 buildings of historic importance, 37 buildings for cultural activities, 18 monuments, 13 museums and 10 libraries, UNESCO says.
Ukrainian government tallies are even higher, with authorities saying their count of destroyed and damaged religious buildings alone is up to at least 270.
While invasion forces hunted for treasures to steal, Ukrainian museum workers did what they could to keep them out of Russian hands. Tens of thousands of items have been evacuated away from the front lines and combat-struck regions.
In Kyiv, the director of the Museum of Historical Treasures of Ukraine lived in the building, guarding its artifacts, during the invasion’s first weeks when Russian forces sought, unsuccessfully, to encircle the capital.
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“We were afraid of the Russian occupiers, because they destroy everything that can be identified as Ukrainian,” recalled the director, Natalia Panchenko.
Fearing Russian troops would storm the city, she sought to confuse them by taking down the plaque on the museum’s entrance. She also dismantled exhibits, carefully packing away artifacts into boxes for evacuation.
One day, she hopes, they’ll go back into their rightful place. For now, the museum is just showing copies.
“These things were fragile, they survived hundreds of years,” she said. “We couldn’t stand the thought they could be lost.”
___
AP journalist John Leicester in Paris contributed. Efrem Lykatsky contributed from Kyiv.
___
Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine
AP · by HANNA ARHIROVA · October 9, 2022
12. Ukraine leader to ask G7 for air defence weapons after Russian strikes
Ukraine leader to ask G7 for air defence weapons after Russian strikes
Reuters · by Max Hunder
- Summary
- G7 leaders to discuss Ukraine later on Tuesday
- Expected to review Kyiv's request for air defence systems
- May also warn Belarus against closer involvement
- Russia says it will respond to greater Western aid
KYIV, Oct 11 (Reuters) - President Volodymyr Zelenskiy will ask the leaders of the G7 group of nations to urgently supply Ukraine with air defence weapons on Tuesday, after Russia rained down cruise missiles on cities across the country.
New missile strikes killed at least one person in the southeastern town of Zaporizhzhia and left part of the Western city of Lviv without power, officials said, after Ukraine woke up to the wailing of air raid sirens for a second day.
Other parts of the country remained blacked out after the cruise missile attacks on Monday which officials said killed 19 people in the biggest air raids since the start of the war.
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Russian President Vladimir Putin, under domestic pressure to ramp up the conflict as his forces have lost ground since the start of September, said he ordered the strikes as revenge for an explosion that damaged Russia's bridge to annexed Crimea.
Kyiv and its allies condemned Monday's attacks, which mainly hit civil infrastructure such as power stations. Missiles also landed in parks, tourist sites and busy rush hour streets.
U.S. President Joe Biden and other G7 leaders will convene virtually later on Tuesday to discuss what more they can do to support Ukraine and to listen to Zelenskiy, who has called air defence systems his "number 1 priority". Biden has already promised more air defences.
The broad avenues of the capital Kyiv were largely deserted after air raid sirens resounded as the morning rush hour was beginning – the same time that Russian missiles struck on Monday. Residents took cover again deep in the underground Metro, where trains were still running.
Viktoriya Moshkivski, 35, her husband and their two sons were among hundreds of people waiting for the all-clear in the Zoloti Vorota station, near a park where a missile ripped a crater next to a playground on Monday.
"(Putin) thinks that if he scares the population, he can ask for concessions, but he is not scaring us. He is pissing us off," she said as her sons, Timur, 5, and Rinat, 3, sat by her side on a sleeping bag, the younger playing with a King Kong action figure.
MORE STRIKES
Russia said it continued to launch long-range air strikes on Ukraine's energy and military infrastructure on Tuesday, although the attacks did not seem as intense as the day before.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said the main targets were energy facilities.
"They’ve hit many yesterday and they hit the same and new ones today. These are war crimes planned well in advance and aimed at creating unbearable conditions for civilians — Russia’s deliberate strategy since months," he wrote on Twitter.
The governor of the southern town of Mykolayiv said Russia seemed to have changed tactics.
"They launch rockets more than once so that our people can wait and our air defence can work, but at intervals they launch significantly fewer rockets and keep people in shelters. What is this if not terror?" he said on national television.
1/13
People shelter inside a subway station during a Russian missile attack in Kyiv, Ukraine October 11, 2022. REUTERS/Viacheslav Ratynskyi
In Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine's sixth-largest city, apartment blocks have been struck overnight at least three times in the past week, killing civilians while they slept. Moscow has denied intentionally targeting them.
The city remained under Ukrainian control after Russia occupied most of the surrounding province, among four partially occupied regions that Moscow claims to have annexed this month.
In an overnight video address from the scene of one of the attacks in Kyiv, Zelenskiy promised that Ukraine would keep fighting.
"We will do everything to strengthen our armed forces. We will make the battlefield more painful for the enemy."
As many as 301 settlements in the regions of Kyiv, Lviv, Sumy, Ternopil and Khmelnytsky remained without electricity on Tuesday.
Faced with blackouts, Ukraine has halted electricity exports to neighbouring Moldova and the European Union, at a time when the continent already faces surging power prices.
BELARUS FEARS
G7 leaders are also expected to issue a warning to Belarus, Moscow's closest ally, after Minsk said on Monday it was deploying soldiers with Russian forces near Ukraine in response to what it called a threat from Kyiv and its Western allies.
Belarus, whose troops have not yet crossed into Ukraine, could face more sanctions if it gets more involved in the Ukraine conflict, French Foreign Affairs Minister Catherine Colonna told French radio. Russia had violated the rules of war with Monday's attacks, she added.
Moscow has accused the West of escalating the conflict by supporting Ukraine.
"We warn and hope that they realise the danger of uncontrolled escalation in Washington and other Western capitals," Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov was quoted as saying by RIA news agency on Tuesday.
Since Ukrainian forces broke through Russia's front lines in September, Putin has not only announced the annexation of Ukrainian territory but also called up hundreds of thousands of reservists and repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons.
The director of Britain's GCHQ spy agency said it would expect to see signs if Russia was considering deploying nuclear arms but that its ground forces were running out of supplies.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Russia would not turn down a meeting between Putin and Biden at a forthcoming G20 meeting and would consider the proposal if it receives one.
Putin on Tuesday met the president of the United Arab Emirates, a member of the group of oil producers known as OPEC+ that rebuffed the United States last week by announcing steep production cuts.
State news agency WAM had said President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan would push for "military de-escalation".
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Reporting by Reuters bureaux; Writing by Stephen Coates, Andrew Osborn, Peter Graff; Editing by Philippa Fletcher and Nick Macfie
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Reuters · by Max Hunder
13. Executive Order On Enhancing Safeguards For United States Signals Intelligence Activities
Executive Order On Enhancing Safeguards For United States Signals Intelligence Activities | The White House
whitehouse.gov · by The White House · October 7, 2022
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Purpose. The United States collects signals intelligence so that its national security decisionmakers have access to the timely, accurate, and insightful information necessary to advance the national security interests of the United States and to protect its citizens and the citizens of its allies and partners from harm. Signals intelligence capabilities are a major reason we have been able to adapt to a dynamic and challenging security environment, and the United States must preserve and continue to develop robust and technologically advanced signals intelligence capabilities to protect our security and that of our allies and partners. At the same time, the United States recognizes that signals intelligence activities must take into account that all persons should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside, and that all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal information. Therefore, this order establishes safeguards for such signals intelligence activities.
Sec. 2. Signals Intelligence Activities.
(a) Principles. Signals intelligence activities shall be authorized and conducted consistent with the following principles:
(i) Signals intelligence activities shall be authorized by statute or by Executive Order, proclamation, or other Presidential directive and undertaken in accordance with the Constitution and with applicable statutes and Executive Orders, proclamations, and other Presidential directives.
(ii) Signals intelligence activities shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, which shall ensure that privacy and civil liberties are integral considerations in the planning and implementation of such activities so that:
(A) signals intelligence activities shall be conducted only following a determination, based on a reasonable assessment of all relevant factors, that the activities are necessary to advance a validated intelligence priority, although signals intelligence does not have to be the sole means available or used for advancing aspects of the validated intelligence priority; and
(B) signals intelligence activities shall be conducted only to the extent and in a manner that is proportionate to the validated intelligence priority for which they have been authorized, with the aim of achieving a proper balance between the importance of the validated intelligence priority being advanced and the impact on the privacy and civil liberties of all persons, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside.
(iii) Signals intelligence activities shall be subjected to rigorous oversight in order to ensure that they comport with the principles identified above.
(b) Objectives. Signals intelligence collection activities shall be conducted in pursuit of legitimate objectives.
(i) Legitimate objectives.
(A) Signals intelligence collection activities shall be conducted only in pursuit of one or more of the following objectives:
(1) understanding or assessing the capabilities, intentions, or activities of a foreign government, a foreign military, a faction of a foreign nation, a foreign-based political organization, or an entity acting on behalf of or controlled by any such foreign government, military, faction, or political organization, in order to protect the national security of the United States and of its allies and partners;
(2) understanding or assessing the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign organizations, including international terrorist organizations, that pose a current or potential threat to the national security of the United States or of its allies or partners;
(3) understanding or assessing transnational threats that impact global security, including climate and other ecological change, public health risks, humanitarian threats, political instability, and geographic rivalry;
(4) protecting against foreign military capabilities and activities;
(5) protecting against terrorism, the taking of hostages, and the holding of individuals captive (including the identification, location, and rescue of hostages and captives) conducted by or on behalf of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;
(6) protecting against espionage, sabotage, assassination, or other intelligence activities conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;
(7) protecting against threats from the development, possession, or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or related technologies and threats conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;
(8) protecting against cybersecurity threats created or exploited by, or malicious cyber activities conducted by or on behalf of, a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;
(9) protecting against threats to the personnel of the United States or of its allies or partners;
(10) protecting against transnational criminal threats, including illicit finance and sanctions evasion related to one or more of the other objectives identified in subsection (b)(i) of this section;
(11) protecting the integrity of elections and political processes, government property, and United States infrastructure (both physical and electronic) from activities conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person; and
(12) advancing collection or operational capabilities or activities in order to further a legitimate objective identified in subsection (b)(i) of this section.
(B) The President may authorize updates to the list of objectives in light of new national security imperatives, such as new or heightened threats to the national security of the United States, for which the President determines that signals intelligence collection activities may be used. The Director of National Intelligence (Director) shall publicly release any updates to the list of objectives authorized by the President, unless the President determines that doing so would pose a risk to the national security of the United States.
(ii) Prohibited objectives.
(A) Signals intelligence collection activities shall not be conducted for the purpose of:
(1) suppressing or burdening criticism, dissent, or the free expression of ideas or political opinions by individuals or the press;
(2) suppressing or restricting legitimate privacy interests;
(3) suppressing or restricting a right to legal counsel; or
(4) disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or religion.
(B) It is not a legitimate objective to collect foreign private commercial information or trade secrets to afford a competitive advantage to United States companies and United States business sectors commercially. The collection of such information is authorized only to protect the national security of the United States or of its allies or partners.
(iii) Validation of signals intelligence collection priorities.
(A) Under section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 3024), the Director must establish priorities for the Intelligence Community to ensure the timely and effective collection of national intelligence, including national intelligence collected through signals intelligence. The Director does this through the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which the Director maintains and presents to the President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, on a regular basis. In order to ensure that signals intelligence collection activities are undertaken to advance legitimate objectives, before presenting the NIPF or any successor framework that identifies intelligence priorities to the President, the Director shall obtain from the Civil Liberties Protection Officer of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (CLPO) an assessment as to whether, with regard to anticipated signals intelligence collection activities, each of the intelligence priorities identified in the NIPF or successor framework:
(1) advances one or more of the legitimate objectives set forth in subsection (b)(i) of this section;
(2) neither was designed nor is anticipated to result in signals intelligence collection in contravention of the prohibited objectives set forth in subsection (b)(ii) of this section; and
(3) was established after appropriate consideration for the privacy and civil liberties of all persons, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside.
(B) If the Director disagrees with any aspect of the CLPO’s assessment with respect to any of the intelligence priorities identified in the NIPF or successor framework, the Director shall include the CLPO’s assessment and the Director’s views when presenting the NIPF to the President.
(c) Privacy and civil liberties safeguards. The following safeguards shall fulfill the principles contained in subsections (a)(ii) and (a)(iii) of this section.
(i) Collection of signals intelligence.
(A) The United States shall conduct signals intelligence collection activities only following a determination that a specific signals intelligence collection activity, based on a reasonable assessment of all relevant factors, is necessary to advance a validated intelligence priority, although signals intelligence does not have to be the sole means available or used for advancing aspects of the validated intelligence priority; it could be used, for example, to ensure alternative pathways for validation or for maintaining reliable access to the same information. In determining whether to collect signals intelligence consistent with this principle, the United States — through an element of the Intelligence Community or through an interagency committee consisting in whole or in part of the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community, the heads of departments containing such elements, or their designees — shall consider the availability, feasibility, and appropriateness of other less intrusive sources and methods for collecting the information necessary to advance a validated intelligence priority, including from diplomatic and public sources, and shall prioritize such available, feasible, and appropriate alternatives to signals intelligence.
(B) Signals intelligence collection activities shall be as tailored as feasible to advance a validated intelligence priority and, taking due account of relevant factors, not disproportionately impact privacy and civil liberties. Such factors may include, depending on the circumstances, the nature of the pursued objective; the feasible steps taken to limit the scope of the collection to the authorized purpose; the intrusiveness of the collection activity, including its duration; the probable contribution of the collection to the objective pursued; the reasonably foreseeable consequences to individuals, including unintended third parties; the nature and sensitivity of the data to be collected; and the safeguards afforded to the information collected.
(C) For purposes of subsection (c)(i) of this section, the scope of a specific signals intelligence collection activity may include, for example, a specific line of effort or target, as appropriate.
(ii) Bulk collection of signals intelligence.
(A) Targeted collection shall be prioritized. The bulk collection of signals intelligence shall be authorized only based on a determination — by an element of the Intelligence Community or through an interagency committee consisting in whole or in part of the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community, the heads of departments containing such elements, or their designees — that the information necessary to advance a validated intelligence priority cannot reasonably be obtained by targeted collection. When it is determined to be necessary to engage in bulk collection in order to advance a validated intelligence priority, the element of the Intelligence Community shall apply reasonable methods and technical measures in order to limit the data collected to only what is necessary to advance a validated intelligence priority, while minimizing the collection of non-pertinent information.
(B) Each element of the Intelligence Community that collects signals intelligence through bulk collection shall use such information only in pursuit of one or more of the following objectives:
(1) protecting against terrorism, the taking of hostages, and the holding of individuals captive (including the identification, location, and rescue of hostages and captives) conducted by or on behalf of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;
(2) protecting against espionage, sabotage, assassination, or other intelligence activities conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;
(3) protecting against threats from the development, possession, or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or related technologies and threats conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;
(4) protecting against cybersecurity threats created or exploited by, or malicious cyber activities conducted by or on behalf of, a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;
(5) ; and
(6) protecting against transnational criminal threats, including illicit finance and sanctions evasion related to one or more of the other objectives identified in subsection (c)(ii) of this section.
(C) The President may authorize updates to the list of objectives in light of new national security imperatives, such as new or heightened threats to the national security of the United States, for which the President determines that bulk collection may be used. The Director shall publicly release any updates to the list of objectives authorized by the President, unless the President determines that doing so would pose a risk to the national security of the United States.
(D) In order to minimize any impact on privacy and civil liberties, a targeted signals intelligence collection activity that temporarily uses data acquired without discriminants (for example, without specific identifiers or selection terms) shall be subject to the safeguards described in this subsection, unless such data is:
(1) used only to support the initial technical phase of the targeted signals intelligence collection activity;
(2) retained for only the short period of time required to complete this phase; and
(3) thereafter deleted.
(iii) Handling of personal information collected through signals intelligence.
(A) Minimization. Each element of the Intelligence Community that handles personal information collected through signals intelligence shall establish and apply policies and procedures designed to minimize the dissemination and retention of personal information collected through signals intelligence.
(1) Dissemination. Each element of the Intelligence Community that handles personal information collected through signals intelligence:
(a) shall disseminate non-United States persons’ personal information collected through signals intelligence only if it involves one or more of the comparable types of information that section 2.3 , states may be disseminated in the case of information concerning United States persons;
(b) shall not disseminate personal information collected through signals intelligence solely because of a person’s nationality or country of residence;
(c) ;
(d) shall take due account of the purpose of the dissemination, the nature and extent of the personal information being disseminated, and the potential for harmful impact on the person or persons concerned before disseminating personal information collected through signals intelligence to recipients outside the United States Government, including to a foreign government or international organization; and
(e) shall not disseminate personal information collected through signals intelligence for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this order.
(a) shall retain non-United States persons’ personal information collected through signals intelligence only if the retention of comparable information concerning United States persons would be permitted under applicable law and shall subject such information to the same retention periods that would apply to comparable information concerning United States persons;
(b) shall subject non-United States persons’ personal information collected through signals intelligence for which no final retention determination has been made to the same temporary retention periods that would apply to comparable information concerning United States persons; and
(c) shall delete non-United States persons’ personal information collected through signals intelligence that may no longer be retained in the same manner that comparable information concerning United States persons would be deleted.
(B) Data security and access. Each element of the Intelligence Community that handles personal information collected through signals intelligence:
(1) shall process and store personal information collected through signals intelligence under conditions that provide appropriate protection and prevent access by unauthorized persons, consistent with the applicable safeguards for sensitive information contained in relevant Executive Orders, proclamations, other Presidential directives, Intelligence Community directives, and associated policies;
(2) shall limit access to such personal information to authorized personnel who have a need to know the information to perform their mission and have received appropriate training on the requirements of applicable United States law, as described in policies and procedures issued under subsection (c)(iv) of this section; and
(3) is accessed only in order to make or support such a determination or to conduct authorized administrative, testing, development, security, or oversight functions.
(C) Data quality. Each element of the Intelligence Community that handles personal information collected through signals intelligence shall include such personal information in intelligence products only as consistent with applicable Intelligence Community standards for accuracy and objectivity, with a focus on applying standards relating to the quality and reliability of the information, consideration of alternative sources of information and interpretations of data, and objectivity in performing analysis.
(D) Queries of bulk collection. Each element of the Intelligence Community that conducts queries of unminimized signals intelligence obtained by bulk collection shall do so consistent with the permissible uses of signals intelligence obtained by bulk collection identified in subsection (c)(ii)(B) of this section and according to policies and procedures issued under subsection (c)(iv) of this section, which shall appropriately take into account the impact on the privacy and civil liberties of all persons, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside.
(E) Documentation. In order to facilitate the oversight processes set forth in subsection (d) of this section and the redress mechanism set forth in section 3 of this order, each element of the Intelligence Community that engages in signals intelligence collection activities shall maintain documentation to the extent reasonable in light of the nature and type of collection at issue and the context in which it is collected. The content of any such documentation may vary based on the circumstances but shall, to the extent reasonable, provide the factual basis pursuant to which the element of the Intelligence Community, based on a reasonable assessment of all relevant factors, assesses that the signals intelligence collection activity is necessary to advance a validated intelligence priority.
(iv) Update and publication of policies and procedures.
(A) shall continue to use the policies and procedures issued pursuant to Presidential Policy Directive 28 of January 17, 2014 (Signals Intelligence Activities) (PPD-28), until they are updated pursuant to subsection (c)(iv)(B) of this section;
(B) shall, within 1 year of the date of this order, in consultation with the Attorney General, the CLPO, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), update those policies and procedures as necessary to implement the privacy and civil liberties safeguards in this order; and
(C) shall, within 1 year of the date of this order, release these policies and procedures publicly to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, in order to enhance the public’s understanding of, and to promote public trust in, the safeguards pursuant to which the United States conducts signals intelligence activities.
(v) Review by the PCLOB.
(A) Nature of review.
(B) Consideration of review. Within 180 days of completion of any review by the PCLOB described in subsection (c)(v)(A) of this section, the head of each element of the Intelligence Community shall carefully consider and shall implement or otherwise address all recommendations contained in such review, consistent with applicable law.
(d) Subjecting signals intelligence activities to rigorous oversight. The actions directed in this subsection are designed to build on the oversight mechanisms that elements of the Intelligence Community already have in place, in order to further ensure that signals intelligence activities are subjected to rigorous oversight.
(i) Legal, oversight, and compliance officials. Each element of the Intelligence Community that collects signals intelligence:
(A) shall have in place senior-level legal, oversight, and compliance officials who conduct periodic oversight of signals intelligence activities, including an Inspector General, a Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer, and an officer or officers in a designated compliance role with the authority to conduct oversight of and ensure compliance with applicable United States law;
(B) shall provide such legal, oversight, and compliance officials access to all information pertinent to carrying out their oversight responsibilities under this subsection, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources or methods, including their oversight responsibilities to ensure that any appropriate actions are taken to remediate an incident of non-compliance with applicable United States law; and
(C) shall not take any actions designed to impede or improperly influence such legal, oversight, and compliance officials in carrying out their oversight responsibilities under this subsection.
(ii) Training. Each element of the Intelligence Community shall maintain appropriate training requirements to ensure that all employees with access to signals intelligence know and understand the requirements of this order and the policies and procedures for reporting and remediating incidents of non-compliance with applicable United States law.
(iii) Significant incidents of non-compliance.
(A) Each element of the Intelligence Community shall ensure that, if a legal, oversight, or compliance official, as described in subsection (d)(i) of this section, or any other employee, identifies a significant incident of non-compliance with applicable United States law, the incident is reported promptly to the head of the element of the Intelligence Community, the head of the executive department or agency (agency) containing the element of the Intelligence Community (to the extent relevant), and the Director.
(B) Upon receipt of such report, the head of the element of the Intelligence Community, the head of the agency (to the extent relevant), and the Director shall ensure that any necessary actions are taken to remediate and prevent the recurrence of the significant incident of non-compliance.
(e) Savings clause. Provided the signals intelligence collection is conducted consistent with and in the manner prescribed by this section of this order, this order does not limit any signals intelligence collection technique authorized under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) (FISA), Executive Order 12333, or other applicable law or Presidential directive.
Sec. 3. Signals Intelligence Redress Mechanism.
(a) Purpose. This section establishes a redress mechanism to review qualifying complaints transmitted by the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state concerning United States signals intelligence activities for any covered violation of United States law and, if necessary, appropriate remediation.
(b) Process for submission of qualifying complaints. Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Director, in consultation with the Attorney General and the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community that collect or handle personal information collected through signals intelligence, shall establish a process for the submission of qualifying complaints transmitted by the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state.
(c) Initial investigation of qualifying complaints by the CLPO.
(i) Establishment. The Director, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall establish a process that authorizes the CLPO to investigate, review, and, as necessary, order appropriate remediation for qualifying complaints. This process shall govern how the CLPO will review qualifying complaints in a manner that protects classified or otherwise privileged or protected information and shall ensure, at a minimum, that for each qualifying complaint the CLPO shall:
(A) review information necessary to investigate the qualifying complaint;
(B) exercise its statutory and delegated authority to determine whether there was a covered violation by:
(i) taking into account both relevant national security interests and applicable privacy protections;
(ii) giving appropriate deference to any relevant determinations made by national security officials; and
(iii) applying the law impartially;
(C) determine the appropriate remediation for any covered violation;
(D) provide a classified report on information indicating a violation of any authority subject to the oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to the Assistant Attorney General for National Security, who shall report violations to the FISC in accordance with its rules of procedure;
(E) after the review is completed, inform the complainant, through the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state and without confirming or denying that the complainant was subject to United States signals intelligence activities, that:
(1) “the review either did not identify any covered violations or the Civil Liberties Protection Officer of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a determination requiring appropriate remediation”;
(2) the complainant or an element of the Intelligence Community may, as prescribed in the regulations issued by the Attorney General pursuant to section 3(d)(i) of this order, apply for review of the CLPO’s determinations by the Data Protection Review Court described in subsection (d) of this section; and
(3) if either the complainant or an element of the Intelligence Community applies for review by the Data Protection Review Court, a special advocate will be selected by the Data Protection Review Court to advocate regarding the complainant’s interest in the matter;
(F) maintain appropriate documentation of its review of the qualifying complaint and produce a classified decision explaining the basis for its factual findings, determination with respect to whether a covered violation occurred, and determination of the appropriate remediation in the event there was such a violation, consistent with its statutory and delegated authority;
(G) prepare a classified ex parte record of review, which shall consist of the appropriate documentation of its review of the qualifying complaint and the classified decision described in subsection (c)(i)(F) of this section; and
(H) provide any necessary support to the Data Protection Review Court.
(ii) Binding effect. Each element of the Intelligence Community, and each agency containing an element of the Intelligence Community, shall comply with any determination by the CLPO to undertake appropriate remediation pursuant to subsection (c)(i)(C) of this section, subject to any contrary determination by the Data Protection Review Court.
(iii) Assistance. Each element of the Intelligence Community shall provide the CLPO with access to information necessary to conduct the reviews described in subsection (c)(i) of this section, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, and shall not take any actions designed to impede or improperly influence the CLPO’s reviews. Privacy and civil liberties officials within elements of the Intelligence Community shall also support the CLPO as it performs the reviews described in subsection (c)(i) of this section.
(iv) Independence. The Director shall not interfere with a review by the CLPO of a qualifying complaint under subsection (c)(i) of this section; nor shall the Director remove the CLPO for any actions taken pursuant to this order, except for instances of misconduct, malfeasance, breach of security, neglect of duty, or incapacity.
(d) Data Protection Review Court.
(i) Establishment. The Attorney General is authorized to and shall establish a process to review determinations made by the CLPO under subsection (c)(i) of this section. In exercising that authority, the Attorney General shall, within 60 days of the date of this order, promulgate regulations establishing a Data Protection Review Court to exercise the Attorney General’s authority to review such determinations. These regulations shall, at a minimum, provide that:
(A) The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Director, and the PCLOB, shall appoint individuals to serve as judges on the Data Protection Review Court, who shall be legal practitioners with appropriate experience in the fields of data privacy and national security law, giving weight to individuals with prior judicial experience, and who shall not be, at the time of their initial appointment, employees of the United States Government. During their term of appointment on the Data Protection Review Court, such judges shall not have any official duties or employment within the United States Government other than their official duties and employment as judges on the Data Protection Review Court.
(B) Upon receipt of an application for review filed by the complainant or an element of the Intelligence Community of a determination made by the CLPO under subsection (c) of this section, a three-judge panel of the Data Protection Review Court shall be convened to review the application. Service on the Data Protection Review Court panel shall require that the judge hold the requisite security clearances to access classified national security information.
(C) Upon being convened, the Data Protection Review Court panel shall select a special advocate through procedures prescribed in the Attorney General’s regulations. The special advocate shall assist the panel in its consideration of the application for review, including by advocating regarding the complainant’s interest in the matter and ensuring that the Data Protection Review Court panel is well informed of the issues and the law with respect to the matter. Service as a special advocate shall require that the special advocate hold the requisite security clearances to access classified national security information and to adhere to restrictions prescribed in the Attorney General’s regulations on communications with the complainant to ensure the protection of classified or otherwise privileged or protected information.
(D) The Data Protection Review Court panel shall impartially review the determinations made by the CLPO with respect to whether a covered violation occurred and the appropriate remediation in the event there was such a violation. The review shall be based at a minimum on the classified ex parte record of review described in subsection (c)(i)(F) of this section and information or submissions provided by the complainant, the special advocate, or an element of the Intelligence Community. In reviewing determinations made by the CLPO, the Data Protection Review Court panel shall be guided by relevant decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the same way as are courts established under Article III of the United States Constitution, including those decisions regarding appropriate deference to relevant determinations of national security officials.
(E) In the event that the Data Protection Review Court panel disagrees with any of the CLPO’s determinations with respect to whether a covered violation occurred or the appropriate remediation in the event there was such a violation, the panel shall issue its own determinations.
(F) The Data Protection Review Court panel shall provide a classified report on information indicating a violation of any authority subject to the oversight of the FISC to the Assistant Attorney General for National Security, who shall report violations to the FISC in accordance with its rules of procedure.
(G) After the review is completed, the CLPO shall be informed of the Data Protection Review Court panel’s determinations through procedures prescribed by the Attorney General’s regulations.
(H) After a review is completed in response to a complainant’s application for review, the Data Protection Review Court, through procedures prescribed by the Attorney General’s regulations, shall inform the complainant, through the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state and without confirming or denying that the complainant was subject to United States signals intelligence activities, that “the review either did not identify any covered violations or the Data Protection Review Court issued a determination requiring appropriate remediation.”
(ii) Binding effect. Each element of the Intelligence Community, and each agency containing an element of the Intelligence Community, shall comply with any determination by a Data Protection Review Court panel to undertake appropriate remediation.
(iii) Assistance. Each element of the Intelligence Community shall provide the CLPO with access to information necessary to conduct the review described in subsection (d)(i) of this section, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, that a Data Protection Review Court panel requests from the CLPO and shall not take any actions for the purpose of impeding or improperly influencing a panel’s review.
(iv) Independence. The Attorney General shall not interfere with a review by a Data Protection Review Court panel of a determination the CLPO made regarding a qualifying complaint under subsection (c)(i) of this section; nor shall the Attorney General remove any judges appointed as provided in subsection (d)(i)(A) of this section, or remove any judge from service on a Data Protection Review Court panel, except for instances of misconduct, malfeasance, breach of security, neglect of duty, or incapacity, after taking due account of the standards in the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the United States pursuant to the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act (28 U.S.C. 351 et seq.).
(v) Record of determinations. For each qualifying complaint transmitted by the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state, the Secretary of Commerce shall:
(A) maintain a record of the complainant who submitted such complaint;
(B) not later than 5 years after the date of this order and no less than every 5 years thereafter, contact the relevant element or elements of the Intelligence Community regarding whether information pertaining to the review of such complaint by the CLPO has been declassified and whether information pertaining to the review of any application for review submitted to the Data Protection Review Court has been declassified, including whether an element of the Intelligence Community filed an application for review with the Data Protection Review Court; and
(C) if informed that such information has been declassified, notify the complainant, through the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state, that information pertaining to the review of their complaint by the CLPO or to the review of any application for review submitted to the Data Protection Review Court may be available under applicable law.
(e) Annual review by PCLOB of redress process.
(i) Nature of review. Consistent with applicable law, the PCLOB is encouraged to conduct an annual review of the processing of qualifying complaints by the redress mechanism established by section 3 of this order, including whether the CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court processed qualifying complaints in a timely manner; whether the CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court are obtaining full access to necessary information; whether the CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court are operating consistent with this order; whether the safeguards established by section 2 of this order are properly considered in the processes of the CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court; and whether the elements of the Intelligence Community have fully complied with determinations made by the CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court.
(ii) Assistance. The Attorney General, the CLPO, and the elements of the Intelligence Community shall provide the PCLOB with access to information necessary to conduct the review described in subsection (e)(i) of this section, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
(iii) Report and certification. Within 30 days of completing any review described in subsection (e)(i) of this section, the PCLOB is encouraged to:
(A) provide the President, the Attorney General, the Director, the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community, the CLPO, and the congressional intelligence committees with a classified report detailing the results of its review;
(B) release to the public an unclassified version of the report; and
(C) make an annual public certification as to whether the redress mechanism established pursuant to section 3 of this order is processing complaints consistent with this order.
(iv) Consideration of review. Within 180 days of receipt of any report by the PCLOB described in subsection (e)(iii)(A) of this section, the Attorney General, the Director, the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community, and the CLPO shall carefully consider and shall implement or otherwise address all recommendations contained in such report, consistent with applicable law.
(f) Designation of qualifying state.
(i) To implement the redress mechanism established by section 3 of this order, the Attorney General is authorized to designate a country or regional economic integration organization as a qualifying state for purposes of the redress mechanism established pursuant to section 3 of this order, effective immediately or on a date specified by the Attorney General, if the Attorney General determines, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director, that:
(A) the laws of the country, the regional economic integration organization, or the regional economic integration organization’s member countries require appropriate safeguards in the conduct of signals intelligence activities for United States persons’ personal information that is transferred from the United States to the territory of the country or a member country of the regional economic integration organization;
(B) the country, the regional economic integration organization, or the regional economic integration organization’s member countries of the regional economic integration organization permit, or are anticipated to permit, the transfer of personal information for commercial purposes between the territory of that country or those member countries and the territory of the United States; and
(C) such designation would advance the national interests of the United States.
(ii) The Attorney General may revoke or amend such a designation, effective immediately or on a date specified by the Attorney General, if the Attorney General determines, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director, that:
(A) the country, the regional economic integration organization, or the regional economic integration organization’s member countries do not provide appropriate safeguards in the conduct of signals intelligence activities for United States persons’ personal information that is transferred from the United States to the territory of the country or to a member country of the regional economic integration organization;
(B) the country, the regional economic integration organization, or the regional economic integration organization’s member countries do not permit the transfer of personal information for commercial purposes between the territory of that country or those member countries and the territory of the United States; or
(C) such designation is not in the national interests of the United States.
Sec. 4. Definitions. For purposes of this order:
(a) “Appropriate remediation” means lawful measures designed to fully redress an identified covered violation regarding a specific complainant and limited to measures designed to address that specific complainant’s complaint, taking into account the ways that a violation of the kind identified have customarily been addressed. Such measures may include, depending on the specific covered violation at issue, curing through administrative measures violations found to have been procedural or technical errors relating to otherwise lawful access to or handling of data, terminating acquisition of data where collection is not lawfully authorized, deleting data that had been acquired without lawful authorization, deleting the results of inappropriately conducted queries of otherwise lawfully collected data, restricting access to lawfully collected data to those appropriately trained, or recalling intelligence reports containing data acquired without lawful authorization or that were otherwise disseminated in a manner inconsistent with United States law. Appropriate remediation shall be narrowly tailored to redress the covered violation and to minimize adverse impacts on the operations of the Intelligence Community and the national security of the United States.
(b) “Bulk collection” means the authorized collection of large quantities of signals intelligence data that, due to technical or operational considerations, is acquired without the use of discriminants (for example, without the use of specific identifiers or selection terms).
(c) “Counterintelligence” shall have the same meaning as it has in Executive Order 12333.
(d) “Covered violation” means a violation that:
(i) arises from signals intelligence activities conducted after the date of this order regarding data transferred to the United States from a qualifying state after the effective date of the Attorney General’s designation for such state, as provided in section 3(f)(i) of this order;
(ii) adversely affects the complainant’s individual privacy and civil liberties interests; and
(iii) violates one or more of the following:
(A) the United States Constitution;
(B) the applicable sections of FISA or any applicable FISC-approved procedures;
(C) Executive Order 12333 or any applicable agency procedures pursuant to Executive Order 12333;
(D) this order or any applicable agency policies and procedures issued or updated pursuant to this order (or the policies and procedures identified in section 2(c)(iv)(A) of this order before they are updated pursuant to section 2(c)(iv)(B) of this order);
(E) any successor statute, order, policies, or procedures to those identified in section 4(d)(iii)(B)-(D) of this order; or
(F) any other statute, order, policies, or procedures adopted after the date of this order that provides privacy and civil liberties safeguards with respect to United States signals intelligence activities within the scope of this order, as identified in a list published and updated by the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence.
(e) “Foreign intelligence” shall have the same meaning as it has in Executive Order 12333.
(f) “Intelligence” shall have the same meaning as it has in Executive Order 12333.
(g) “Intelligence Community” and “elements of the Intelligence Community” shall have the same meaning as they have in Executive Order 12333.
(h) “National security” shall have the same meaning as it has in Executive Order 13526 of December 29, 2009 (Classified National Security Information).
(i) “Non-United States person” means a person who is not a United States person.
(j) “Personnel of the United States or of its allies or partners” means any current or former member of the Armed Forces of the United States, any current or former official of the United States Government, and any other person currently or formerly employed by or working on behalf of the United States Government, as well as any current or former member of the military, current or former official, or other person currently or formerly employed by or working on behalf of an ally or partner.
(k) “Qualifying complaint” means a complaint, submitted in writing, that:
(i) alleges a covered violation has occurred that pertains to personal information of or about the complainant, a natural person, reasonably believed to have been transferred to the United States from a qualifying state after the effective date of the Attorney General’s designation for such state, as provided in section 3(f)(i) of this order;
(ii) includes the following basic information to enable a review: information that forms the basis for alleging that a covered violation has occurred, which need not demonstrate that the complainant’s data has in fact been subject to United States signals intelligence activities; the nature of the relief sought; the specific means by which personal information of or about the complainant was believed to have been transmitted to the United States; the identities of the United States Government entities believed to be involved in the alleged violation (if known); and any other measures the complainant pursued to obtain the relief requested and the response received through those other measures;
(iii) is not frivolous, vexatious, or made in bad faith;
(iv) is brought on behalf of the complainant, acting on that person’s own behalf, and not as a representative of a governmental, nongovernmental, or intergovernmental organization; and
(v) is transmitted by the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state, after it has verified the identity of the complainant and that the complaint satisfies the conditions of section 5(k)(i)-(iv) of this order.
(l) “Significant incident of non-compliance” shall mean a systemic or intentional failure to comply with a principle, policy, or procedure of applicable United States law that could impugn the reputation or integrity of an element of the Intelligence Community or otherwise call into question the propriety of an Intelligence Community activity, including in light of any significant impact on the privacy and civil liberties interests of the person or persons concerned.
(m) “United States person” shall have the same meaning as it has in Executive Order 12333.
(n) “Validated intelligence priority” shall mean, for most United States signals intelligence collection activities, a priority validated under the process described in section 2(b)(iii) of this order; or, in narrow circumstances (for example, when such process cannot be carried out because of a need to address a new or evolving intelligence requirement), shall mean a priority set by the President or the head of an element of the Intelligence Community in accordance with the criteria described in section 2(b)(iii)(A)(1)-(3) of this order to the extent feasible.
(o) “Weapons of mass destruction” shall have the same meaning as it has in Executive Order 13526.
Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law, including orders of and procedures approved by the FISC, and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) Nothing in this order precludes the application of more privacy-protective safeguards for United States signals intelligence activities that would apply in the absence of this order. In the case of any conflict between this order and other applicable law, the more privacy-protective safeguards shall govern the conduct of signals intelligence activities, to the maximum extent allowed by law.
(d) Nothing in this order prohibits elements of the Intelligence Community from disseminating information relating to a crime for law enforcement purposes; disseminating warnings of threats of killing, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping; disseminating cyber threat, incident, or intrusion response information; notifying victims or warning potential victims of crime; or complying with dissemination obligations required by statute, treaty, or court order, including orders of and procedures approved by the FISC or other court orders.
(e) The collection, retention, and dissemination of information concerning United States persons is governed by multiple legal and policy requirements, such as those required by FISA and Executive Order 12333. This order is not intended to alter the rules applicable to United States persons adopted pursuant to FISA, Executive Order 12333, or other applicable law.
(f) This order shall apply to signals intelligence activities consistent with the scope of PPD-28’s application to such activities prior to PPD-28’s partial revocation by the national security memorandum issued concurrently with this order. To implement this subsection, the head of each agency containing an element of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director, is hereby delegated the authority to issue guidance, which may be classified, as appropriate, as to the scope of application of this order with respect to the element or elements of the Intelligence Community within their agency. The CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court, in carrying out the functions assigned to it under this order, shall treat such guidance as authoritative and binding.
(g) Nothing in this order confers authority to declassify or disclose classified national security information except as authorized pursuant to or any successor order. Consistent with the requirements of Executive Order 13526, the CLPO, the Data Protection Review Court, and the special advocates shall not have authority to declassify classified national security information, nor shall they disclose any classified or otherwise privileged or protected information except to authorized and appropriately cleared individuals who have a need to know the information.
(h) This order creates an entitlement to submit qualifying complaints to the CLPO and to obtain review of the CLPO’s decisions by the Data Protection Review Court in accordance with the redress mechanism established in section 3 of this order. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any other entitlement, right, or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. This order is not intended to, and does not, modify the availability or scope of any judicial review of the decisions rendered through the redress mechanism, which is governed by existing law.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 7, 2022.
whitehouse.gov · by The White House · October 7, 2022
14. Wormuth: US Army to invest in larger, high-tech formations
Wormuth: US Army to invest in larger, high-tech formations
Defense News · by Jen Judson · October 10, 2022
WASHINGTON — The U.S. Army will build larger formations outfitted with high-tech capabilities geared toward near-peer adversaries, Secretary Christine Wormuth told an audience Oct. 10 at the Association of the U.S. Army annual conference in Washington, D.C.
“After two decades of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, focused on brigade and below operations, the Army is shifting its organizational focus to larger formations more capable of integrating with our sister services and our allies and partners around the globe,” Wormuth said.
The Army has learned through extensive study and analysis of recent conflicts, exercises, simulations and training, she said, that brigade commanders give their attention to the close fight. To facilitate that, “division and corps commanders will have the responsibility and the capability to visualize the larger picture,” Wormuth said.
The service will build up personnel, organizations and equipment within theater armies, corps and divisions needed “to disrupt and defeat peer adversaries on the future battlefield,” she added.
“These force structure redesigns go well beyond building [security force assistance brigades] and the additional multidomain task forces,” she explained.
The Army created those brigades in 2017 to deploy around the globe for training, advising and assisting foreign militaries. There are six of them: Five are in an active duty status and assigned to each combatant command; the sixth is a National Guard unit.
The Multi-Domain Task Force originally began as an experimental unit deployed to Indo-Pacific Command to test out the multidomain operations warfighting concept as the Army worked to transform it into doctrine. The service is debuting that doctrine at AUSA.
Now, the service plans to stand up five MDTFs. It has one in the Indo-Pacific Command’s area of responsibility and another in the European theater; it activated a third in the Pacific last month.
The task forces combine precision effects and fires across domains to disrupt or destroy adversaries’ networks and weapon systems in a bid to deny access.
“By consolidating fires, engineer and military intelligence at the division level, we will maximize the division’s ability to shape the fight and enable brigades to close with and defeat peer enemy threats,” Wormuth said.
“At the corps level, we will provide the additional personnel and organizations necessary to fully converge effects across all domains,” she added. “Our corps will be capable of commanding and controlling joint and multinational formations.”
And critical to enabling these organizations, the Army will use “advances in commercial data analytics to improve the speed and accuracy of our leader decision-making,” Wormuth said.
The Army is unveiling at AUSA a digital transformation strategy that, in part, seeks to ensure troops have the right data at the right time to quickly make decisions.
The secretary said these new larger formations are important to the Army of 2030, which is geared at being able to defeat advanced adversaries, like Russia and China, and fighting across all domains including space and cyberspace.
The Army is driving to field 35 signature systems across six priority areas by 2030; it wants to deliver 24 of those systems into soldiers’ hands by the end of fiscal 2023.
The service’s efforts are taking place amid the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The U.S. Army has been central to helping Ukraine and reassuring NATO allies since the beginning of the war, Wormuth said.
“I’m confident the Army is on the right track to realize our vision for the Army of 2030, and enable our soldiers, families and civilians to excel and thrive,” she said.
About Jen Judson
Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.
15. FDD | China wins human rights vote at UN, exposing flaws of Biden’s reform plan
Excerpt:
Given this week’s vote, the Biden administration and Congress should condition U.S. political support for the UNHRC on mandatory structural reforms. That includes requiring open ballots for all UNHRC elections, which could dissuade UN General Assembly members from casting votes in favor of serial human rights abusers. Beyond strengthening support for groups championing the Uighurs’ cause, the Biden administration should evaluate additional sanctions against Chinese entities and individuals supporting Beijing’s crimes and ramp up enforcement of the Uighur Forced Labor Prevent Act to prevent goods produced in Xinjiang from entering U.S. markets.
FDD | China wins human rights vote at UN, exposing flaws of Biden’s reform plan
fdd.org · by Craig Singleton China Program Deputy Director and Senior Fellow · October 7, 2022
The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) this week voted down a proposal from the United States, Britain, Turkey, and others to hold a debate about the Chinese government’s persecution of Uighur Muslims and other ethnic minorities in China’s Xinjiang province. The vote marked a major diplomatic victory for Beijing and a setback for the Biden administration’s plan to reform the council via deeper engagement.
In August, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights released a long-delayed report concluding that the Chinese government committed “serious” human rights violations against Uighurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities. Based on witness interviews, the report noted that “allegations of patterns of torture or ill-treatment, including forced medical treatment and adverse conditions of detention” were “credible,” as were “allegations of individual incidents of sexual and gender-based violence.”
The report assessed that the “extent of arbitrary and discriminatory detention [of Uighurs and other ethnic minorities] … may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.” The report was released hours before former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet stepped down from her position after announcing she would not seek a second four-year term for “personal reasons.”
Before the report’s release, Chinese diplomats at the UN circulated a petition lobbying other countries to prevent its publication, asserting the report could “intensify politicization and bloc confrontation in the area of human rights.” While this effort failed, Beijing strongly condemned the report’s findings, claiming the “so-called Xinjiang issue is a fabricated lie [made] out of political motivations, and its purpose definitely is to undermine China’s stability and to obstruct China’s development.”
The proposal that came before the UNHRC this week only sought to hold a debate about the report’s findings, stopping short of appointing either an investigative team or a special UN rapporteur to evaluate crimes being committed in Xinjiang. Of the 47 countries that make up the council, 17 voted in favor of the proposal, 19 against, and 11 abstained. Every country that voted against the proposal is a signatory of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a trillion-dollar program that seeks to deepen China’s economic and security interests around the world, primarily through investments in infrastructure.
Notable abstentions included Ukraine, which recently accused Russia of massacring civilians in eastern Ukraine, as well as Armenia, itself the victim of the first genocide of the twentieth century, in which as many as 1.2 million people perished.
The vote’s failure draws into sharp focus the Biden administration’s decision to rejoin the council in 2021, reversing a Trump-era withdrawal due to the organization’s deference to dictatorships and double-standards regarding Israel. In announcing Washington’s return to the UNHRC, Secretary of State Antony Blinken claimed the “best way to improve the Council, so it can achieve its potential, is through robust and principled U.S. leadership.” Nevertheless, this week’s vote — in which UNHRC members ignored the findings of the UN’s own human rights office — represents a betrayal of the council’s mission. It also underscores how the UNHRC has become a club for the world’s worst dictatorships, who wield their influence to create a culture of impunity for repressive regimes.
Given this week’s vote, the Biden administration and Congress should condition U.S. political support for the UNHRC on mandatory structural reforms. That includes requiring open ballots for all UNHRC elections, which could dissuade UN General Assembly members from casting votes in favor of serial human rights abusers. Beyond strengthening support for groups championing the Uighurs’ cause, the Biden administration should evaluate additional sanctions against Chinese entities and individuals supporting Beijing’s crimes and ramp up enforcement of the Uighur Forced Labor Prevent Act to prevent goods produced in Xinjiang from entering U.S. markets.
Craig Singleton, a national security expert and former U.S. diplomat, is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he contributes to FDD’s China Program and International Organizations Program. For more analysis from Craig, the China Program, and the International Organizations Program, please subscribe HERE. Follow Craig on Twitter @CraigMSingleton. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Craig Singleton China Program Deputy Director and Senior Fellow · October 7, 2022
16. Five reasons why the Crimean bridge explosion is significant
It’s personal for Putin
Russian logistics ‘crippled’
Ukraine celebrated the blast
Heightens nuclear fears
Russia’s deadly response
Five reasons why the Crimean bridge explosion is significant
The Hill · by Julia Mueller · October 10, 2022
An explosion Saturday caused the partial collapse of Kerch Bridge, which connects Russia to the Crimean Peninsula, an apparent attack that struck both Russia’s supply lines and a symbol of Russian power in the area.
According to reports and videos of the incident, a truck blew up and ignited fuel tanks on a passing train, cutting off part of the lone bridge passage to Crimea, which Russia annexed from Ukraine in 2014.
The incident comes after Russia made an escalatory move to annex four occupied regions of Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has accused Ukraine in the bridge explosion, which he called a “a terrorist act,” and is expected to meet with his Security Council Monday. Ukraine has not assumed responsibility.
Here’s are some of the reasons why the Kerch Bridge explosion is significant in the wider war.
It’s personal for Putin
The Kerch Bridge incident may affect Russian President Vladimir Putin personally, England’s Ministry of Defense said in an intelligence update Sunday.
“This incident will likely touch President Putin closely; it came hours after his 70th birthday, he personally sponsored and opened the bridge, and its construction contractor was his childhood friend,” the update cautioned.
The bridge is viewed as the Russian leader’s major, concrete manifestation of his stated claims to retake Ukraine. Russia invaded and occupied Crimea in 2014.
Putin celebrated the opening of the nearly $4 billion bridge in 2018 by driving a dump truck across the span as international powers condemned its construction as violation of international law and rejected Russia’s claims to Crimea.
Russian logistics ‘crippled’
The explosion also dealt a blow to Russia’s war effort, cutting off a crucial avenue for Russian troops and supplies as fighting continues in Ukraine.
The incident halted train and automobile traffic and has reduced the transit potential of the 12-mile bridge, which bypasses the Kerch Strait.
The bridge is Russia’s most important link to neighboring Ukraine, as the entryways through other recently annexed areas are less established and more difficult to access.
Timothy Snyder, Yale historian of Russia and Ukraine, tweeted on Saturday that the bridge explosion “cripples Russian logistics and dissolves the major symbol of Putin’s power.”
A bridge engineer told the Wall Street Journal that it would take several months to restore damaged sections of the bridge.
Ukraine celebrated the blast
While Kyiv hasn’t claimed responsibility for the explosion, some Ukrainian officials celebrated the incident.
The official Twitter account for Ukraine’s government posted Saturday night, sharing just the English phrase “sick burn.”
While many Russians view the Kerch Bridge as a symbol of Moscow’s influence in the area, many Ukrainians see the bridge as representative of Russian occupation.
“The guided missile cruiser Moskva and the Kerch Bridge – two notorious symbols of russian power in Ukrainian Crimea – have gone down. What’s next in line, russkies?” Ukraine’s Defense Ministry Tweeted Saturday, referencing the bridge collapse and damage earlier this year to an important Russian warship.
Ukrainian President Volodymy Zelensky responded to the explosion in his address Saturday night, saying the future for Ukraine is “sunny.”
“This is a future without occupiers. Throughout our territory, in particular in the Crimea,” he said.
Heightens nuclear fears
Former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mike Mullen cited the bridge explosion Sunday as the latest setback for Russia that raises the potential threats of a nuclear attack.
Putin has also put the international community on high alert with his recent rhetoric about nuclear weapons.
“He’s a cornered … animal and I think he’s [become] more and more dangerous,” Mullen said. “I think we have to take him seriously and think through what the requirements would be to respond to that. It also speaks to the need to get to the table.”
Following a string of Ukraine gains last month, Putin delivered a high-profile speech mobilizing hundreds of thousands of military reservists and warning “we will certainly use all means available to us” to defend Russia, adding, “This is not a bluff.”
A number of U.S. officials, including President Biden, have expressed grave concerns over Putin’s single-handed power over the weapons’ possible deployment, though they have said there are no signs of an imminent attack.
Russia’s deadly response
In the wake of the Kerch Bridge explosion, Ukrainian officials announced Sunday that Russian overnight strikes killed at least 17 in Zaporizhzhia, a Ukrainian city claimed by Moscow in the recent annexations.
Zelensky called the strikes “merciless” in a post to his Facebook page.
“Absolute meanness. Absolute evil. Savages and terrorists. From the one who gave this order to everyone who fulfilled this order. They will bear responsibility. For sure. Before the law and before people,” he wrote.
Former NATO commander says Kerch Bridge explosion ‘very significant psychologically’ Vast majority of red-state seniors have been vaccinated, despite GOP vaccine resistance
Anatoliy Kurtev, secretary of Zaporizhzhia’s city council, wrote on Telegram that 40 people were injured by the blasts, which he said also damaged 50 high-rise buildings, four educational institutions and 20 other private-sector buildings.
Outside of the city lies Europe’s largest nuclear power plant, which Russian military forces have occupied since early in the war.
Zelensky has long condemned Russia’s “nuclear terror” and “nuclear blackmail” at Zaporizhzhia, and warned last week that Russian leaders are beginning to “prepare their society” for the weapons’ use.
The Hill · by Julia Mueller · October 10, 2022
17. FDD | Ukraine’s NATO Bid is a Test of the “Open Door”
Excerpts:
The United States should welcome Zelenskyy’s NATO bid. On the battlefield, Ukraine has proven to have the best military in Europe — and one of the best in the world at this point. It would greatly benefit U.S. interests to have such an ally on NATO’s eastern front with Russia. If the White House drags its feet, Congress should weigh in with its support.
Going forward, Kyiv will likely push ahead with efforts to secure stronger cooperative guarantees with NATO members, such as the new Kyiv Security Compact, while its formal application is pending. This practical process will help fortify Zelenskyy’s claim that Ukraine is already a NATO ally in fact — if not yet in name.
FDD | Ukraine’s NATO Bid is a Test of the “Open Door”
fdd.org · by Peter Doran Adjunct Senior Fellow · October 7, 2022
Ukraine has formally applied for full membership in NATO. This historic move will be a major test to the alliance’s official “open door” to new members.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made the announcement on September 30, 2022 — just hours after Russian President Vladimir Putin proclaimed Russia’s illegal “annexation” of four contested Ukrainian regions (Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia). The timing was significant. Zelenskyy upstaged Putin, rallying his domestic support and adding international political momentum to a recent series of impressive Ukrainian military victories.
In explaining the move, Zelenskyy framed the bid as a natural recognition of facts on the ground. “De facto, we have already made our way to NATO. De facto, we have already proven compatibility with Alliance standards,” he said. “Today, Ukraine is applying to make it de jure.” He also indicated Ukraine’s intention to apply for membership under a simplified process that would fast-track the application, as was the case with Sweden and Finland.
Kyiv will now need to overcome possible objections from member states, including the fact that it is still fighting a defensive war against Russia. Officially, the alliance maintains an “open door” for membership to every democracy in Europe. Allies recently reconfirmed this position at the NATO Madrid Summit in June. Ukraine’s application will test if NATO’s theoretical open door remains shut to Ukraine in practice. All 30 members of the alliance must unanimously approve Ukraine’s application for the bid to succeed. This will put a high premium on Ukraine’s ability to rally diplomatic support from within the alliance.
Immediately after the announcement, NATO’s three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) enthusiastically endorsed the application. “Ukraine’s Baltic friends fully support welcoming Ukraine into NATO,” said Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Reinsalu. Shortly after, the three Baltic presidents joined a letter signed by the presidents of six additional NATO members who endorsed Ukraine’s membership bid (Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, North Macedonia, and Montenegro).
The initial response outside of Central Europe and the Baltics was more cautious. Speaking in Washington, Canadian Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly quickly restated her country’s openness to Ukraine. “We believe that Ukraine should be part of NATO,” she said. “It’s been our position for now more than a decade, and we believe in the open-door policy.” Meanwhile, the Biden administration was keen to kick the can down the road. “Our view is that the best way for us to support Ukraine is through practical on the ground support in Ukraine, and that the process in Brussels should be taken up at a different time,” said National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan.
The White House’s desire for delay is not new. Ukraine has been in the alliance’s waiting room for over a decade. Back in 2008 at NATO’s Bucharest Summit, the United States and its allies formally declared that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of NATO.” Ever since, Washington has declined to say precisely when that might be, while always maintaining that NATO’s door was open to them. Zelenskyy’s announcement now acts as a forcing mechanism, pushing allies to honor their word.
The United States should welcome Zelenskyy’s NATO bid. On the battlefield, Ukraine has proven to have the best military in Europe — and one of the best in the world at this point. It would greatly benefit U.S. interests to have such an ally on NATO’s eastern front with Russia. If the White House drags its feet, Congress should weigh in with its support.
Going forward, Kyiv will likely push ahead with efforts to secure stronger cooperative guarantees with NATO members, such as the new Kyiv Security Compact, while its formal application is pending. This practical process will help fortify Zelenskyy’s claim that Ukraine is already a NATO ally in fact — if not yet in name.
Peter B. Doran is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD). Follow him on Twitter @PeterBDoran. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Peter Doran Adjunct Senior Fellow · October 7, 2022
18. FDD | Growing Trade Signals Deeper Ties Between Iran and Turkey
Excerpts:
The Biden administration should be wary of any increase in trade between Iran and Turkey that points toward sanctions evasion, for which there is ample precedent. In a six-count indictment in October 2019, federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York charged Halkbank, a major Turkish public lender, with fraud, money laundering, and sanctions offenses related to the bank’s alleged participation in “a multibillion-dollar scheme to evade U.S. sanctions on Iran.” The prosecutors accused the bank of helping Tehran transfer $20 billion worth of restricted funds, with at least $1 billion laundered through the U.S. financial system. While Turkey has appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to invalidate the indictment on jurisdictional grounds, the administration has good reason to be suspicious.
In addition to monitoring Turkish trade with Iran, the United States should be willing to help secure oil and natural gas offsets for Turkey to reduce its dependency on Iranian energy sources. Furthermore, the U.S. government should look for common ground with Ankara given their shared concern about Iranian proxy networks, especially in Iraq and Syria. High-level dialogue between Ankara and Washington on Iran could be a valuable means to contain Iranian regional aspirations if Erdogan is prepared to respect sanctions.
FDD | Growing Trade Signals Deeper Ties Between Iran and Turkey
fdd.org · by Sinan Ciddi Non-Resident Senior Fellow · October 7, 2022
According to Turkish government sources, bilateral trade between Turkey and Iran increased sharply over the last six months. Although formally a U.S. ally through NATO, Turkey appears determined to deepen its economic ties with Tehran, recalling its facilitation of Iranian sanctions evasion prior to 2016.
In September, the Turkish Institute of Statistics (TUIK) reported a 49 percent increase in non-oil and gas imports from Iran in March through August 2022 as compared to the same period during the previous year. (The data is available in files posted for download on the TUIK website.) Additionally, Turkey reported a 20 percent increase in overall exports to Iran in the first six months of 2022 as compared to 2021.
The rise in trade between the two neighbors is broadly reflective of Turkey’s desire to increase bilateral trade with Iran. During the July 2022 meeting of the Turkey-Iran High Level Cooperation Council, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared, “we have reached $7.5 billion as of now. I believe that we will achieve $30 billion” — an aspiration mirrored by his Iranian counterpart.
These aspirations may not be plausible, however, as the level of trade between Ankara and Tehran has fallen dramatically over the past several years, due in part to the reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran in 2018 and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the first six months of 2020, trade declined by 73 percent, and overall Turkish imports from Iran are approximately 50 percent lower than they were in 2017. This year’s increase hints at a post-pandemic recovery and/or an intention by both regimes to increase trade to pre-pandemic levels and possibly surpass it.
Independent of economic matters, Tehran and Ankara remain suspicious of one another’s intentions. Although both Erdogan and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi have expressed interest in combatting Kurdish separatist movements, they favor opposing policies in places such as Syria and Iraq, where Turkey would like to see Iranian influence diminished.
The Biden administration should be wary of any increase in trade between Iran and Turkey that points toward sanctions evasion, for which there is ample precedent. In a six-count indictment in October 2019, federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York charged Halkbank, a major Turkish public lender, with fraud, money laundering, and sanctions offenses related to the bank’s alleged participation in “a multibillion-dollar scheme to evade U.S. sanctions on Iran.” The prosecutors accused the bank of helping Tehran transfer $20 billion worth of restricted funds, with at least $1 billion laundered through the U.S. financial system. While Turkey has appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to invalidate the indictment on jurisdictional grounds, the administration has good reason to be suspicious.
In addition to monitoring Turkish trade with Iran, the United States should be willing to help secure oil and natural gas offsets for Turkey to reduce its dependency on Iranian energy sources. Furthermore, the U.S. government should look for common ground with Ankara given their shared concern about Iranian proxy networks, especially in Iraq and Syria. High-level dialogue between Ankara and Washington on Iran could be a valuable means to contain Iranian regional aspirations if Erdogan is prepared to respect sanctions.
Sinan Ciddi is a non-resident senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he contributes to FDD’s Turkey Program and Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP). For more analysis from Sinan, the Turkey Program, and CMPP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Sinan on Twitter @SinanCiddi. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CMPP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Sinan Ciddi Non-Resident Senior Fellow · October 7, 2022
19. US information attacks undermine global security, stability - China Military
The PLA "critique" on US information warfare!
Note these two excerpts. The Army Futures Command has been identified as a threat! Perhaps that can be used to justify its future since the PLA seems to fear it.
On the one hand, the technologies and skills may be updated. The US military will continue to use AI, big data, cloud computing, and other tools to make information warfare more effective. For example, the US Army Futures Command is busy setting up a software plant to train its software developers and platform engineers. The United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is also putting together a cyber military intelligence group to develop complex information environments.
On the other hand, the negative impacts may keep emerging. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once said without mincing words that hackers can support the Internet civilians protesting on the street of Russia. That’s what we did during the Arab Spring. I was the Secretary of State then, and I thought we could attack the network of Russian government bodies. America’s smearing of other countries, concoction of fake news, and spread of lies and rumors will all come back to hurt itself. As New York Times commented, the US has lost its credibility.
US information attacks undermine global security, stability - China Military
eng.chinamil.com.cn · by Huang Panyue
US cyber warfare officers are processing intelligence.
American media recently revealed that some social media companies have discovered and shut down huge amounts of fake accounts that are suspected to be operated by the US military to carry out secret information warfare in order to better manipulate overseas audiences. As a matter of fact, the American military’s secret information warfare is no news anymore and relevant combat forces have already formed a primary scale and are likely to exert negative impacts on global security and stability.
Weaponization of social media
What the US media recently revealed about the military’s information warfare is just the tip of the iceberg. From Operation Mockingbird launched during the Cold War to buy the media to manipulate public opinions to the “washing powder” and “white helmet” activities in the new century that gave the excuse to start wars on Iraq and Syria, the US has become pretty adept at fabricating and spreading disinformation to get what it wants. Within the US military, information warfare and psychological warfare have become important forms of combat. The US Commandant of the Marine Corps David Berger said the Marines Corps hope to take the upper hand in the information race because controlling, understanding and using the information usually puts them at an advantage.
Regarding top-level design, the US DoD has guided the army, navy and air force since 2015 to release their revised manuals on social media management and use, and the Marines Corps and National Guard have also released such manuals. After Biden came into office, he re-evaluated the security status of the military’s social network management and gave orders that specify the rules and requirements regarding social media’s confidentiality issue, logging in on social media platforms, and online information.
In practice, the US military has conducted targeted information warfare for different scenarios and with different effects. This is particularly effective in regions with a less developed network. For instance, due to the low literacy rate, lack of Internet, and the confiscation of smart phones by anti-government armed forces, the information environment in rural Somalia is extremely controlled. The US psychological warfare team and Somalian National Army disseminated brochures, posters, stickers and leaflets there along with explanatory pictures, which has have taken some effect.
Normalized use of information warfare in the future
German writer Michael Lüders pointed out in his book Die scheinheiligeSupermacht (The Hypocritical Superpower) that the US government is very adept at selecting and distorting facts, limiting the source of information and polarizing public opinions in order to blur the facts and influence people’s judgment . Going forward, the US military may continue to step up the execution of psychological warfare, whose potential consequences shall not be underestimated.
On the one hand, the technologies and skills may be updated. The US military will continue to use AI, big data, cloud computing, and other tools to make information warfare more effective. For example, the US Army Futures Command is busy setting up a software plant to train its software developers and platform engineers. The United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is also putting together a cyber military intelligence group to develop complex information environments.
On the other hand, the negative impacts may keep emerging. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once said without mincing words that hackers can support the Internet civilians protesting on the street of Russia. That’s what we did during the Arab Spring. I was the Secretary of State then, and I thought we could attack the network of Russian government bodies. America’s smearing of other countries, concoction of fake news, and spread of lies and rumors will all come back to hurt itself. As New York Times commented, the US has lost its credibility.
eng.chinamil.com.cn · by Huang Panyue
20. Musk's proposal for China-Taiwan relations gets slammed: Our freedom is 'not for sale'
Excerpts:
One China analyst said Musk's proposal on Taiwan "deserves a great deal of unpacking and maybe even a bit of a reality check."
"The only problem with this for Mr Musk is that the people of Taiwan simply don't agree with that type of arrangement," Bates Gill of the Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis, told CNBC's "Squawk Box Europe" on Monday.
Gill suggested Musk may want to take a closer look at the nuances around issues such as the relationship between China and Taiwan.
"The world's wealthiest man obviously feels he has a lot to say on these geopolitical questions. I would only suggest that he take a lot harder look at the realities, the historical precedents and geopolitical contestation that surround all of these questions before giving us all a lesson in diplomacy," Gill said.
Musk's proposal for China-Taiwan relations gets slammed: Our freedom is 'not for sale'
KEY POINTS
- Tesla CEO Elon Musk recommended Taiwan become “a special administrative zone” of China with an arrangement that could potentially be more “lenient” than Hong Kong.
- Taiwanese politicians, which have previously rejected the idea of “one country, two systems” like Hong Kong, hit back at Musk’s suggestion.
- Musk’s recommendation was, however, praised by China’s ambassador to the U.S.
CNBC · by Arjun Kharpal · October 10, 2022
Elon Musk waded into geopolitics once more suggesting an arrangement whereby Taiwan becomes a "special administrative zone" of China, with Beijing likely having some control over the self-ruled island. That suggestion has drawn the ire of Taiwanese politicians. Taiwan's government has previously rejected such a proposal.
Jim Watson | AFP | Getty Images
Elon Musk has weighed in on China-Taiwan relations, and Taiwanese politicians are not impressed.
The billionaire suggested an arrangement whereby China would have some control over Taiwan, but the country's de facto ambassador to the U.S., Hsiao Bi-khim tweeted on Saturday that the island's "freedom and democracy are not for sale."
Beijing views democratically self-ruled Taiwan as a renegade province that needs to be reunified with the mainland. China has not ruled out the use of force to do so.
In an interview with the Financial Times published Saturday, Musk said his recommendation "would be to figure out a special administrative zone for Taiwan that is reasonably palatable, probably won't make everyone happy."
"And it's possible, and I think probably, in fact, that they could have an arrangement that's more lenient than Hong Kong," he added.
Hong Kong has been run under a policy of "one country, two systems" by China since it handover from Britain in 1997. This has allowed the city to run as a semi-autonomous region under Beijing's rule.
But critics have argued that the national security law passed in 2020 in Hong Kong has eroded some of the freedoms promised under the one country, two systems arrangement.
Musk's suggestion was praised by Beijing but criticized by Taiwan.
On Saturday, Qin Gang, China's ambassador to the U.S., thanked Musk for his suggestion of a special administrative zone for Taiwan.
"Peaceful reunification and One Country, Two Systems are our basic principles for resolving the Taiwan question," he said in a tweet.
The ambassador added Taiwan "will enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region, and a vast space for development."
However, Taiwan has repeatedly rejected a one country, two systems arrangement.
"Any lasting proposal for our future must be determined peacefully, free from coercion, and respectful of the democratic wishes of the people of Taiwan," Hsiao added Saturday.
On Monday, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen delivered the National Day address. She did not reference Musk's comments, but did talk about relations with China.
"I want to make clear to the Beijing authorities that armed confrontation is absolutely not an option for our two sides. Only by respecting the commitment of the Taiwanese people to our sovereignty, democracy, and freedom, can there be a foundation for resuming constructive interaction across the Taiwan Strait," Tsai said, according to an official transcript of her speech.
"Provided there is rationality, equality, and mutual respect, we are willing to work with the Beijing authorities to find a mutually agreeable arrangement for upholding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. This is our shared responsibility."
Musk's Taiwan idea needs 'reality check'
Musk, who runs electric car maker Tesla and is currently looking to close a deal to buy social networking site Twitter, has form when it comes to wading into geopolitics.
The billionaire drew the ire of Ukrainian politicians last week after posting a poll on Twitter about what he claimed was the likely outcome of the war with Russia.
Musk has also been very flattering of China, one of Tesla's largest and most critical markets and where its Shanghai Gigafactory is based.
One China analyst said Musk's proposal on Taiwan "deserves a great deal of unpacking and maybe even a bit of a reality check."
"The only problem with this for Mr Musk is that the people of Taiwan simply don't agree with that type of arrangement," Bates Gill of the Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis, told CNBC's "Squawk Box Europe" on Monday.
Gill suggested Musk may want to take a closer look at the nuances around issues such as the relationship between China and Taiwan.
"The world's wealthiest man obviously feels he has a lot to say on these geopolitical questions. I would only suggest that he take a lot harder look at the realities, the historical precedents and geopolitical contestation that surround all of these questions before giving us all a lesson in diplomacy," Gill said.
CNBC · by Arjun Kharpal · October 10, 2022
21. British Official Stresses Threat From China Even Amid Russian Aggression
British Official Stresses Threat From China Even Amid Russian Aggression
nytimes.com · by David E. Sanger · October 10, 2022
The director of Britain’s cyber and electronic intelligence agency said he was skeptical about how far China would go to support Russia’s aggression.Credit...Jade Gao/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
A top British intelligence official will warn in a speech on Tuesday that while Russia’s aggression has created an urgent threat, China’s expanding use of technology to control dissent and its growing ability to attack satellite systems, control digital currencies and track individuals pose far deeper challenges for the West.
In an interview on Monday ahead of his address, the official, Jeremy Fleming, who heads GCHQ — the British electronic intelligence-gathering and cyber agency made famous for its role in breaking the Enigma codes in World War II — also said he was skeptical about how far China would go to support Russia’s aggression.
“I don’t think that this is a ‘relationship without limits,’” he said, using the term that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and President Xi Jinping of China employed when they met at the Beijing Olympics early this year, just before the invasion of Ukraine. In light of Russia’s dismal battlefield performance and its brutality, he said, China “needs to be weighing up the advantages and disadvantage of continuing to align themselves strongly with Russia.”
Mr. Fleming’s agency — formally called Government Communications Headquarters, the counterpart to the National Security Agency in the United States — plays an increasingly central role in tracking Russian communications and preparing for the day when China’s advances in quantum computing may defeat the kinds of encryption used to protect both government and corporate communications.
A three-decade veteran of the British intelligence services, Mr. Fleming rarely speaks in public. But in recent months, several of Britain’s spy chiefs have deliberately taken a carefully crafted public role in describing future security threats.
Mr. Fleming has gone further, detailing the capabilities and rules surrounding Britain’s use of offensive cyber capabilities, which it employed in Syria against terror groups and reportedly against Russian forces in Ukraine, a subject Mr. Fleming declined to discuss.
Yet in the interview, he described Russia as “a disrupter” that was “unpredictable in its actions at the moment.” But he said the performance of Russia’s military had revealed deep weaknesses, and excerpts from his forthcoming speech describe Mr. Putin’s decision-making as “flawed,” its forces as “exhausted” and its reliance on mobilizing 300,000 “inexperienced conscripts” as evidence of Mr. Putin’s “desperate situation.”
“The Russian population has started to understand that, too,” he argued. “They’re seeing just how badly Putin has misjudged the situation.”
He added, “They’re fleeing the draft, knowing their access to modern technologies and external influences will be drastically restricted.”
But Mr. Fleming’s warning is another reminder of the speed at which the Western allies have come to view themselves as in direct competition, and sometimes in conflict, with both of the world’s other major nuclear superpowers. Of the two, he clearly regards Russia as the more manageable.
Until recent years, most European nations have been muted in their public critiques of Beijing and its ambitions, because trade with China became critical to growth, especially for Germany. Britain even permitted Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant that the United States fears could pose a security threat, to provide some 5G equipment to Britain’s communications network — under some strict conditions — until sanctions imposed on the company by the United States made that impossible.
Mr. Fleming’s warnings about the strategies behind China’s investment in new technologies, and its effort to create “client economies and governments,” sound much like speeches given by his American counterparts for the past five or more years. But he spoke just before the opening of a Communist Party congress starting in Beijing on Sunday at which Xi Jinping is expected to be named to a third five-year term as the country’s top leader.
Mr. Fleming said that in the case of China, this could be “the sliding-doors moment in history,” in which the United States and its allies may soon discover that they are too far behind in a series of critical technologies to maintain a military or technological edge over Beijing.
He described China’s move to develop central bank digital currencies that could be used to track transactions as a shift that could also “enable China to partially evade the sort of international sanctions currently being applied to Putin’s regime in Russia.” He said that was one example of how China was “learning the lessons” from the war in Ukraine, presumably to apply them if it decided to move against Taiwan and prompted further efforts by the U.S. and its allies to isolate it economically.
Mr. Fleming also described China’s moves to build “a powerful antisatellite capability, with a doctrine of denying other nations access to space in the event of a conflict.” And he accused China of trying to alter international technology standards to ease the tracking of individuals, part of its effort to repress dissent, even the speech of Chinese citizens living abroad.
But his biggest warning surrounded dependence on Chinese companies that are closely linked to the state, or that would have no choice but to turn over data on individuals upon demand by the Chinese authorities. The Huawei experience, he said in the interview, “opened our eyes to the extent to which even the biggest businesses in China are ultimately wrapped up with the Chinese state” and have no choice but to comply “because of the way in which the Communist Party works and the national security laws operate.”
Yet in the Huawei case, the United States and its European partners have yet to offer truly competitive alternatives for much of the company’s networking equipment, officials from many countries say. “We have to be able to provide alternatives,” Mr. Fleming said. When pressed on whether Europe and the United States had provided those alternatives in the years since the campaign against Huawei gained traction, he acknowledged, “No, we don’t.”
Last week, the Biden administration announced sweeping new limits on the sale of semiconductor technology to China, hoping to cripple Beijing’s access to critical technologies that are needed for supercomputers, advanced weapons and artificial intelligence applications.
It was a sign of how fast the world’s two largest economies had become engaged in a clash over technological advantage, with the United States trying to establish a stranglehold on advanced computing and semiconductor technology that China views as essential to its own ambitions.
But Mr. Fleming conceded that over the next few months, he would be focused — as American leaders are — on the question of whether Russia might seek to use a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine to make up for its failures on the battlefield.
“This is a concerning moment,” he said. But he noted that Mr. Putin had been cautious and “has been careful not to escalate beyond the borders of Ukraine.”
“He’s been careful not to escalate in terms of the types of weapons they’re using,” he said.
He added: “We’re in a situation where escalation risks are very real.” But if “Putin decided he would make use of tactical nuclear weapons,” he said, it would be a “complete departure” from his past action and from Russian military doctrine.
nytimes.com · by David E. Sanger · October 10, 2022
22. The end of the brown beret: Air Force special ops squadron shuts down after 28 years advising allied aviators
I just do not understand this move.
The end of the brown beret: Air Force special ops squadron shuts down after 28 years advising allied aviators
A unit you’ve never heard of played a major role building up friendly air forces for decades.
BY DAVID ROZA | PUBLISHED OCT 10, 2022 11:00 AM
taskandpurpose.com · by David Roza · October 10, 2022
A little-known Air Force squadron that played a key role in the Global War on Terror was shut down last week in a ceremony at Duke Field in Florida.
The unit, the 6th Special Operations Squadron, was one of only two Air Force squadrons dedicated to helping foreign air forces learn how to use light aircraft to defeat insurgents, terrorists, or other threats in their own countries.
“The unit had a significant impact around the world as one of the very few units to execute this mission,” said Lt. Col. Sean Williams, 6th SOS commander at the ceremony on Thursday. “Today is not a finish line, it’s not the end of a mission set, it’s a milestone.”
In August, Task & Purpose reported on the pending inactivation of the 6th Special Operations Squadron and the 711th Special Operations Squadron, a reserve unit that performs the same mission as the 6th. The Air Force will also shut down the 81st Fighter Squadron, based in Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, which taught Afghan Air Force pilots how to fly A-29 light attack aircraft.
The unit closures occur as the larger Air Force pivots to move away from counterinsurgency warfare and devotes much of its resources to preparing for the possibility of a large-scale conventional war. Still, some veterans of aviation advisory missions say that the unit closures mean the service could lose the ability to strengthen allies and partners so they can defeat emerging threats.
“[W]e are at an inflection point in the air advisor enterprise,” one senior Air Force official with direct engagement with the air advising program told Task & Purpose in August, “and the Air Force needs to decide whether it wants to take its version of security force assistance — air advising — seriously or just assume that someone else does it.”
Combat Aviation Advisors from the 6th Special Operations Squadron stand in formation during a flag furling ceremony at Duke Field, Florida, on Oct. 6, 2022 (Tech. Sgt. Michael Charles/U.S. Air Force)
The 6th SOS traces its lineage back to the jungles of Burma during World War II, but its modern role of advising friendly air forces for counterinsurgency warfare began in Southeast Asia in the 1960s. Under Operation Waterpump during the Vietnam War, U.S. airmen trained Royal Laotian Air Force pilots and Hmong civilians to fly T-28 civilian trainer aircraft in light ground attack and scouting roles in order to support Laotian ground troops in their war against Laotian communist guerillas and North Vietnamese troops.
“It was honest warring, primitive, a throwback to combat flying in the First World War,” wrote James Parker Jr., a CIA officer working with the Hmong, in 1972, according to the aviation history website Balloons to Drones. “The Hmong flyers strapped as many bombs and bullets as they could get on their planes and went out and found North Vietnamese to attack — flight after flight, hour after hour, day after day […] the major part of our close fire support was left to the T-28s.”
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Airmen also trained pilots in similar situations in Central and South America before the unit that preceded the 6th SOS was shuttered in 1974, according to the Air Force. But in 1994, the unit was reactivated and redesignated as the 6th SOS. Its mission under U.S. Special Operations Command was to help allies and partners conduct Foreign Internal Defense, where U.S. allies or partners are fighting counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, or counternarcotics campaigns.
A 6th Special Operations Squadron combat aviation advisor instructs a class on battlefield drills in a host nation. (U.S. Air Force)
Throughout their modern existence, the 6th and 711th SOS closely resembled U.S. Army Special Forces units due to the latter’s expertise in training allies and partners to fight on the ground. Combat aviation advisors do the same thing, but in the air. In fact, CAAs and Green Berets often find themselves working shoulder-to-shoulder downrange, said Air Force Master Sgt. Justin Prewitt, a combat aviation advisor, on the Air Force Special Warfare veteran-run podcast Ones Ready.
“The closest analogue that our predecessors had to look at in order to build out this aviation foreign internal defense mission set was the Army Special Forces,” Prewitt said in a 2021 episode about combat aviation advisors. “It was pretty easy to steal some pages from their playbook and then kind of put that aviation mindset on top of that.”
Prewitt explained that there is no specific “combat aviation advisor,” job in the Air Force. Instead, CAA units were made up of volunteer airmen who already had extensive experience in their specialties and who volunteered to take on the role for four to five years. Prewitt said the units took airmen from 14 enlisted career fields and six commissioned career fields, including pilots, aircraft maintainers, intelligence analysts, security forces (the Air Force equivalent of military police), and communications specialists.
According to the Air Force, those volunteers then underwent a 12 to 18-month training pipeline to train them in light infantry weapons and small unit tactics and also give them language and culture training so they could better bridge the gap with their students. Once the combat aviation advisors knew where they are going, they would then lease and practice on aircraft similar to the ones operated by the country hosting them.
“That way we can show up qualified and ready to rock and roll with that specific airframe,” Prewitt explained.
U.S. Air Force Capt. Christopher Spangenberg, combat aviation advisor – instructor pilot with the King Air 350 Military Transition Team, talks with the first all Iraqi air force flight crew to fly a King Air 350 light transport aircraft at New al-Muthana Air Base, Iraq, on Sept. 6, 2008 (Tech. Sgt. Paul Villanueva II/U.S. Air Force)
Over the past 30 years, 900 combat aviation advisors have gone through the 6th SOS, deploying to more than 45 partner nations and working on more than 40 different types of aircraft, according to the Air Force. Those aircraft are often helicopters or propeller-powered fixed-wing aircraft, including Cessnas and cropdusters armed with Hellfire missiles or other weapons or sensor systems.
Combat aviation advisors have a proven track record. Starting in the early 2000s, they taught Filipino aviators how to operate UH-1 Huey helicopters effectively against the Abu Sayyaf Group, an Islamic separatist organization. Prewitt, who was part of that mission, said he was particularly proud of establishing a tactical flight medic program where they trained Filipino medics in tactical casualty care and care-in-flight skills. That made a difference, the airman explained, because before that the Filipino ground forces were hesitant to close with the enemy due to the fear that medical evacuation would not be possible.
“That was really a game changer in their foreign internal defense issues,” he said. “Building that confidence in their ground forces based upon a capability that we were able to build with our aviation forces—that enabled them to get after these issues a little bit more aggressively than they had in the past.”
U.S. Air Force Maj. Kevin Skelton, a 6th Special Operations Squadron AC-208 evaluator pilot and combat aviation advisor, conducts a walk-around of an AC-208 with Latvian Air Force Majs. Girts Volframs, aviation squadron commander, and Linards Gurtins, AN-2 flight commander. (2nd Lt. Jason Barkey/U.S. Air Force)
In Afghanistan, airmen from the 6th and 711th SOS helped stand up the Special Missions Wing, which the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction said in 2020 was “one of Afghanistan’s most capable forces.” The SMW was the special operations wing for the Afghan military, where it flew counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions, according to the report.
Perhaps in part because of their hard work overseas, combat aviation advisors were recognized in 2018 with a special perk: a brown beret they could wear in uniform. The charcoal brown color “signifies fertile soil and reminds the wearer daily to look for potential where others see barrenness,” according to an Air Force press release. It also signified “grit, hard work and commitment to transform potential into capability.”
Brown was a popular color in 2018: that same year, the Army unveiled berets with a similar color for members of Security Force Assistance Brigades to wear. For the Army, the color represented “the muddy boots,” of SFAB soldiers always fighting side-by-side with their partners. The color was a little more figurative in the Air Force.
“I can tell you what I expect when I see a brown beret,” Lt. Gen. Brad Webb, then-chief of Air Force Special Operations Command, said at the ceremony where the berets were first donned by combat aviation advisors. “I expect to see a cultural expert–one that has a complete understanding of a host nation’s customs, culture and way of life.”
Despite the success of the SMW, not everything was working in the aviation advisory missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, as two Air Force officers recently explained.
“The U.S. military utilized aviation advisors in an ineffective ad hoc approach that we can best describe as an amateur pickup game—random, inexperienced personnel working together briefly before rotating out,” wrote Col. Tobias Switzer and Lt. Col. Jonathan Magill in an essay on aviation that was published on Tuesday by West Point’s Modern War Institute.
A 711th Special Operations Squadron Combat Aviation Advisor watches a C-145 Combat Coyote as it comes in for landing on an unimproved runway March 15, 2021 near Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. CAAs advise, assist and instruct service members from partner nations on how to best perform their specialized mission. (Senior Airman Dylan Gentile/U.S. Air Force)
Units like the 6th and 711th SOS brought institutional knowledge to the art of combat aviation advising. However, much of the rest of U.S. military aviation training and advising in Iraq and Afghanistan was done on an haphazard basis where individual augmentees were plucked from joint or coalition forces, dropped into the advisory mission with little training on how to do it, then replaced with another inexperienced augmentee as soon as they began to learn something, Switzer and Magill wrote.
“In effect, advisor missions were forced to continually climb the learning curve only to slide back down when advisors departed en masse with their hard-won knowledge and experience,” they wrote.
With the inactivation of the 6th SOS and the pending inactivation of the 711th SOS, the Air Force is dissolving “the vast majority of its in-aircraft aviation advising capability, proving once again the perishable nature of this important mission within the service,” Switzer and Magill wrote. There will still be the Air Force’s Mobility Support Advisory Squadrons, but those units specialize in logistics and mobility, not so much combat operations.
“The U.S. military will have such a limited capacity that it will likely have to employ an ad hoc approach when the need for large-scale air advising arises again,” the officers said.
The 6th Special Operations Squadron patch is seen on the sleeve of a Combat Aviation Advisor during a flag furling ceremony for the 6th SOS at Duke Field, Florida, on Oct. 6, 2022. (Tech. Sgt. Michael Charles/U.S. Air Force)
The military can still make large-scale air advising work, but it will need to track advisor experience across the military in order to recall practiced advisors if needed; design personnel rotations that better sustain continuity in advising cycles; use an onboarding process for new advisors that actually works; and put defense contractors to better use, Switzer and Magill said.
No matter what, it seems that the brown beret and the institution it represents will be shelved for the foreseeable future. But who knows, with the on-again, off-again history of the 6th Special Operations Squadron, maybe it will come back some day.
“Airmen of the 6th SOS carried on a legacy deploying to partner nations around the world,” said Colonel Caleb Nimmo, commander of the 492d Special Operations Wing, of which the 6th SOS is a component, at the inactivation ceremony. “Their accomplishments honor those that came before them and set the standard for future Air Commandos.”
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taskandpurpose.com · by David Roza · October 10, 2022
23. The Army is struggling to stay out of the culture war
The Army is struggling to stay out of the culture war
armytimes.com · by Davis Winkie · October 10, 2022
WASHINGTON — Amid attacks from conservative cable news personalities, the Army’s top leaders said they stand by their diversity and inclusion efforts during a Monday press briefing at the 2022 Association of the U.S. Army conference.
But they’re trying to thread the needle through a very narrow gap.
At Monday’s press event, Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said “the key for senior leaders in an environment that is [politicized]...is to exercise good judgement...[and] not get drawn into, frankly, the inflammatory kind of environment that Twitter really lends itself to.”
Wormuth added that she emphasizes “keeping the Army apolitical and keeping it out of the culture wars, because we have got to be able to have a broad appeal.”
“We get criticized sometimes for being ‘woke.’ I’m not sure what ‘woke’ means,” explained the Army’s top civilian. Diversity and inclusion measures don’t mean “we are not focused on warfighting...[or] readiness,” she added.
But the culture wars are already here for the Army.
The service recently faced backlash for its handling of an inspector general investigation into social media posts Maj. Gen. Patrick Donahoe made in 2021 after conservative Fox News host Tucker Carlson devoted a segment to criticizing women in uniform. Carlson and other conservatives have sharply criticized equity efforts, with some even singling out individual junior troops for participating in advertising campaigns that focused on diversity and inclusion.
Army Times first reported Donahoe could face discipline for his tweets, and Task and Purpose reported the allegations in detail on Oct. 5. The service has not yet decided what his punishment will be while it completes its review of the report and Donahoe’s response.
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A source familiar with the move said he faces punishment for his social media conduct.
According to the investigation report, the Army IG faulted Donahoe for tagging Carlson in a tweet that celebrated a female tank crewmember’s reenlistment ceremony. Army Times obtained a copy of the document.
The IG also faulted Donahoe for tweets responding to online “trolls” who had very few followers and for a public post to a subordinate enrolled in training at Fort Benning. But the report said allegations of toxic leadership and reprisal against an officer who filed an IG complaint were “not substantiated.”
Donahoe’s defenders are most frustrated with the IG’s findings on the Carlson interaction, arguing he was standing up for women in the Army in the face of a concerted attack from partisan media. Some even expressed regret over their own silence.
“I regret now that I didn’t weigh in, at the time, on the side of our women who choose to serve,” tweeted Brig. Gen. Rob Wooldridge of the California National Guard on Saturday evening. “In the future, I hope to exhibit something approaching [Donahoe’s] moral courage when confronted with a similar situation.”
Wormuth declined to comment on Donahoe’s case when asked if her comments about “keeping the Army apolitical” were in reference to Donahoe’s tweets.
“I’m not going to comment on an ongoing investigation,” said Wormuth. “I do want our leaders to be able to have a social media presence, and to be able to speak up for soldiers and defend [them] if they’re being unduly attacked.”
But her statement came with a caveat.
“[S]enior leaders have to choose their words very carefully...we’re in an environment where things that people say — including things that the [chief of staff] and I say — can be taken totally out of context,” Wormuth said. “I think it just demonstrates that difficulty, frankly, of being in the public arena and not being accused of taking a partisan side.”
The service’s top officer, Gen. James McConville, said he believes the IG process is “a fair system.”
“There’s plenty of due process and appeals in that, but it does take time,” he said. “I believe that the system will handle that case in the appropriate manner.”
About Davis Winkie
Davis Winkie is a senior reporter covering the Army, specializing in accountability reporting, personnel issues and military justice. He joined Military Times in 2020. Davis studied history at Vanderbilt University and UNC-Chapel Hill, writing a master's thesis about how the Cold War-era Defense Department influenced Hollywood's WWII movies.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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