Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Freethinkers are those who are willing to use their minds without prejudice, and without fearing to understand things that clash with their own customs, privileges, or beliefs. This state of mind is not common, but it is essential for right thinking…"

– Leo Tolstoy

"People who live in an age of corruption are witty and slanderous; they know that there are other kinds of murder than by dagger or assault; they also know that whatever is well said is believed."

– Fredrich Nietzsche

“The best teachers are those who show you where to look, but don’t tell you what to see.”

– Alexandra K. Trenfor

1. A Coordinated Squeeze Forced Hamas to Accept a Deal It Didn’t Want

2. Trump May Send Tomahawks to Ukraine

3. Trump’s Fresh Tariff Assault Threatens China’s Fragile Economy

4. What to Know About the Gaza Deal (Updated)

5. Trump’s War Drums in Venezuela

6. Viktor Orban’s ‘Propaganda State’ Is Starting to Show Cracks

7. Ukraine Is Hitting Russia Where It Hurts: Its Oil Refineries

8. Suppose They Held a War and Nobody Came: Systemic Approaches to Shared Military Personnel Challenges

9. Putin Is Losing the Ukraine War: Escalation Is Coming

10. 'Captain, We Have Been Hit': A Tiny Nuclear Submarine 'Sank' $4.5 Billion Navy Aircraft Carrier

11. A conservative influencer was arrested in Portland. Trump was watching.

12. Hezbollah’s Information Warfare in the Post-October 7 Era

13. How it was possible to build and sustain public support for a war effort?

14. As Russian Aggression Turns West, Poland Says It’s Ready

15. India supplying Philippines the missiles it needs to fend off China

16. Gaza Hostages Are Freed, Ending Two-Year Captivity

17. Special Operations News – Oct 13, 2025

18. The Strategic Importance of Greenland: The Role of Tactical Missile and Air Defense in the Arctic

19. Blinding First, Striking Fast: Why the Marine Corps Needs Information Groups

20. ‘The Nuclear Age’ Review: The World and the Bomb by John Bolton

21. Why Gradualism Can Help in Gaza

22. The Coming AI Backlash: How the Anger Economy Will Supercharge Populism

23. NATO special forces head to the Arctic

1. A Coordinated Squeeze Forced Hamas to Accept a Deal It Didn’t Want

Maybe this will finally be the undoing of Hamas. (We can only hope).

A Coordinated Squeeze Forced Hamas to Accept a Deal It Didn’t Want

Under pressure from its overseas hosts and increasingly reviled at home, the militant group had little choice but to relent

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/a-coordinated-squeeze-play-forced-hamas-to-accept-a-deal-it-didnt-want-7753f9c8

By Jared Malsin

and Summer Said

Oct. 12, 2025 12:12 pm ET

Hamas gunmen in the Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza on Sunday. eyad baba/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Quick Summary

Hamas initially rejected President Trump’s peace plan, which required disarmament without guarantees for ending the war.View more

SHARM EL SHEIKH—When Hamas leader Khalil Al-Hayya first saw President Trump’s plan for peace in Gaza, which demanded that his group disarm with few concrete steps to ensure Israel would end the war, his immediate reaction was no.

The plan, heavily amended by Israel and presented to Hamas by the Qatari prime minister and Egypt’s spy chief, looked nothing like what Hayya had been led to expect, officials familiar with the discussions said. Hayya, who less than a month earlier had been a target of Israel’s audacious attack on Hamas in Qatar, told his visitors the group would keep its Israeli hostages until it had enforceable guarantees the war would end.

But two days later, Hamas came back to Arab mediators with a yes. The deal hadn’t changed. The pressure on Hamas had.

Egypt and Qatar told Hayya the deal was his last chance to end the war, according to the officials. They pressed Hamas to understand that holding the hostages was becoming a strategic liability, giving Israel a source of legitimacy to keep fighting.

The next day, joined by Turkey, they warned him that if Hamas didn’t approve the plan it would be stripped of all political and diplomatic cover; Qatar and Turkey would no longer host the group’s political leadership, and Egypt would stop pressing for Hamas to have a say in Gaza’s postwar governance, the officials said.

It was enough to get Hamas to agree to release all its hostages in Gaza and sign on to the first part of Trump’s peace deal, giving up what had been its most important bargaining chip to keep a seat at the table. While modifying its acceptance with heavy caveats that reflected its concerns about the deal, Hamas had given Trump an opportunity to declare victory and set the stage for a hostage release early this week.

“Hamas themselves have been under a lot of pressure from regional mediators,” said Tahani Mustafa, a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “Hamas also knows that they’re not probably going to politically survive this if things continue down this route, especially given that their popularity is declining.”

Qatar and Egypt didn’t reply to requests for comment. Asked about being pressured into a deal, Khaled Al-Qaddoumi, Hamas’s representative in Tehran, said the group had endorsed Trump’s proposal because it guaranteed Palestinians wouldn’t be forced out of Gaza and paved the way for humanitarian aid and reconstruction. Qaddoumi said the group is now counting on Trump to ensure Israel doesn’t go back to fighting.

The campaign that forced Hamas to accept a deal it didn’t want was the result of weeks of effort by the Trump team to bring Middle East powers including Egypt, Qatar and Turkey together in a coordinated push to get Hamas to agree to sign up.

Critics have long wanted Arab mediators to do more to pressure Hamas into ending the war. But this time, conditions were ripe.

“I think everybody just wanted to be done with this,” said Michael Ratney, a former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia and top diplomat in Israel.

Israeli attacks destroyed large parts of Gaza City. Abdel Kareem Hana/Associated Press

Palestinians this weekend returned to their neighborhood in Khan Younis, southern Gaza, after Israeli forces withdrew. ramadan abed/Reuters

Better relations with Turkey and the Gulf gave Trump leverage among countries with ties to Hamas. Meanwhile, the Gulf states had become alarmed that the war could endanger their own security after the Israeli airstrike against Hamas in Qatar.

Hamas also was under growing pressure at home—short on funds, barely able to keep up a guerrilla war against Israeli forces that have seized much of Gaza, and facing a Palestinian public that has suffered hunger and ruin and just wanted the war to be over.

Once Trump got Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to publicly agree to end the war, Hamas was cornered as the lone holdout.

The White House didn’t respond to requests for comment. A senior official who detailed how the agreement came together said the result was less about leverage and more about building trust.

Hamas was already showing some willingness to make concessions before Trump unveiled his plan. In August, the group dropped its demand that Israel withdraw completely from the corridor running along Gaza’s border with Egypt as well as security zones around the enclave’s borders with Israel.

It had also shown some willingness to turn over heavier weapons such as rocket launchers to Arab monitors and for some of its leaders to leave Gaza, Arab mediators have said.

Israel, meanwhile, had shrugged off international pressure to end the war and begun taking a harder line, launching a new offensive into the population center of Gaza City and demanding capitulation by Hamas to call off the fighting.

Though many aspects of the current deal have been on the table for the past year or more, the balance of power in the Middle East has shifted significantly, creating the conditions for a breakthrough.

Military and intelligence campaigns against Lebanon and Iran left the Arab world increasingly wary of Israel’s growing power and willingness to use it. The strike on Qatar, a U.S. ally that also hosts a major American military base, underscored the risk that the war could pierce the Gulf’s security bubble and destabilize even the wealthiest and most influential countries in the region, sharpening Arab nations’ opposition to the war.

Trump also began courting Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had been sidelined by President Joe Biden after years of diplomatic tension with Washington. Trump, who has a warmer relationship with Erdogan, afforded the Turkish leader his first White House meeting in more than half a decade in September. Erdogan also sat at the head of the table at a meeting of leaders from Muslim-majority countries at the United Nations where they discussed ways to resolve the war in Gaza.

“That reinforced Trump’s view that Erdogan is the go-to guy to force Hamas,” said Gonul Tol, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute.

Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Trump discussed the Gaza war during the United Nations General Assembly last month in New York. Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

Hamas leader Khalil Al-Hayya, gesturing, met last week with Egyptian, Qatari and Turkish officials in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, before a cease-fire in Gaza was announced. al-qahera news/Reuters

Erdogan dispatched his intelligence chief, Ibrahim Kalin, to join last week’s hostage-deal talks in the Egyptian resort town of Sharm El Sheikh. Bringing in Turkey added to the sense that the region was speaking with one voice in favor of a deal.

When Hayya arrived in Sharm El Sheikh to lead the talks for Hamas not long after Israel tried to kill him, it was a symbol of how the group had managed to survive more than two years of Israeli bombing aimed at eliminating the militant group after its deadly Oct. 7, 2023, attack that sparked the war.

In reality, though, Hayya and Hamas were running out of time as regional powers closed ranks. Before the meetings wrapped up on the first day, the mediators delivered a warning to Hamas: Put your faith in Trump’s plan or face endless war. You have five days to decide.

Before that deadline, with debates over key issues including the exact line of withdrawal for Israeli forces in Gaza and the list of Palestinian prisoners to be released still unresolved, Hamas formally agreed to the hostage release.

Write to Jared Malsin at jared.malsin@wsj.com and Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com

2. Trump May Send Tomahawks to Ukraine

And a comment I expect that I will receive from a friend and colleague: "Hopefully they will be used to target north Korean arms, ammunition, supplies, and forces that are supporting Putin's war."

Trump May Send Tomahawks to Ukraine

President threatens to send the long-range missiles if the war doesn’t end soon

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/trump-may-send-tomahawks-to-ukraine-4e99bf03?mod=hp_lead_pos4

By Natalie Andrews

Oct. 12, 2025 7:07 pm ET

People removing debris near a damaged home in Odesa, Ukraine, on Saturday. IGOR TKACHENKO/EPA/Shutterstock

Quick Summary

President Trump threatened to send Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine if Russia doesn’t agree to a peace deal.View more

President Trump threatened to send long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine, should Russian President Vladimir Putin continue to decline his efforts to negotiate a peace deal in the region.

“I might say, look, if this war’s not going to get settled, I’m going to send them Tomahawks,” Trump told reporters on Air Force One on Sunday as he flew overseas to Tel Aviv, where he is set to take part in a ceremony for a landmark peace deal between Israel and Hamas.

Trump is still hoping Moscow will make a deal to halt that conflict but has become frustrated at the lack of diplomatic progress and more open to pressuring Putin militarily. Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.

A decision to provide highly accurate Tomahawk missiles would be a major escalation in U.S. assistance. Last month, Trump met with Volodymyr Zelensky and told the Ukrainian president that he was open to lifting restrictions on Kyiv’s use of American-made long-range weapons to strike inside Russia, though he didn’t make any commitments to reverse a U.S. ban on such attacks.

On Sunday, he seemed more amenable, saying he planned to speak with Putin. “I might have to speak to Russia, to be honest with you, about Tomahawks,” Trump said. “Do they want to have Tomahawks going in their direction? I don’t think so.”

For months, the administration has blocked Ukraine from using U.S.-provided long-range missiles, including the Army Tactical Missile Systems, known as Atacms, to bomb Russia, leading to complaints from Kyiv that it couldn’t effectively punch back against Moscow.

“I might tell him that if the war is not settled, that we may very well do it,” Trump said.

The U.S. continues to provide weapons to Europe’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, which send them to Ukraine for its forces to use against Russia. Ukraine has continued to use drones and other indigenously made weapons to strike inside Russia. It is also developing the Flamingo, a Ukrainian-made long-range weapon, which officials in Kyiv say will reduce its dependence on U.S. and European arms.

In recent weeks, Trump has signaled a possible shift on his support for Ukraine, offering praise for Kyiv and condemning Russia for fighting an aimless war in Ukraine, where thousands of soldiers are dying in battle every week.

Write to Natalie Andrews at natalie.andrews@wsj.com

3. Trump’s Fresh Tariff Assault Threatens China’s Fragile Economy

How fragile is it?

Trump’s Fresh Tariff Assault Threatens China’s Fragile Economy

Beijing was already seeing economic momentum slow before announcement of latest 100% tariff increase; some bet measures won’t last

https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/trumps-fresh-tariff-assault-threatens-chinas-fragile-economy-d0b3a00d

By Hannah Miao

and Yoko Kubota

Oct. 12, 2025 9:00 am ET

Toy makers are among the Chinese manufacturers reckoning with a drop in U.S. orders. Qilai Shen/Bloomberg News

For thousands of manufacturers across China, it’s déjà vu—with implications for the country’s fragile economy.

Earlier this year, after President Trump raised tariffs on Chinese goods to 145% in April, American customers of Alan Chau’s toy factory in southern China abruptly froze orders, sparking a cash crunch that brought his business to the brink. So it came as a relief when the U.S. and China reached a trade truce weeks later in mid-May, rolling back most of their tariffs on one another—and allowing Chau to resume shipping his products again.

Now, less than six months later, prohibitively high tariffs could be the reality again for Chau and tens of thousands of other factory owners that make China a global manufacturing powerhouse. Trump said Friday that he would impose a 100% additional tariff on all Chinese goods, effective Nov. 1.

“That is literally an embargo,” said Chau. “Who is going to do business with China?”

After months of trade talks in which U.S. officials expressed cautious optimism about a breakthrough, the White House was caught off guard when Beijing in recent days unleashed a barrage of measures, showing off an array of tools in its trade-war arsenal, including tightened export restrictions on rare-earth materials that could hurt U.S. industries and an antitrust probe targeting American chip company Qualcomm.

On Sunday, Beijing blamed Washington for having first introduced new restrictions against China after the latest round of trade talks in September.

“Frequently threatening high tariffs is not the right approach to engaging with China,” Beijing’s Commerce Ministry said in a statement. The ministry said its new rare-earth restrictions would have only a limited impact on global supply chains, and that relevant countries had been informed ahead of the Thursday announcement. It also said the new rules weren’t an export ban but rather a set of requirements for export licenses.

Watch: Trump Speaks After Hitting China With 100% Additional Tariffs

Play video: Watch: Trump Speaks After Hitting China With 100% Additional Tariffs

President Trump announced a 100% additional tariff on China after Beijing placed new restrictions on the export of rare-earth minerals. Photo: Kent Nishimura/Reuters

So far this year, strong exports have helped China’s economy defy expectations of a deeper slump, as manufacturers made up for higher hurdles on trade with the U.S. by increasing shipments to the rest of the world. For the first eight months of the year, China’s exports to the U.S. fell more than 15% from the same period a year ago, while overall exports grew 5.9%, according to Chinese customs data.

But export growth slowed in August and governments around the world have complained about cheap Chinese goods flooding their markets. Meanwhile, momentum in other parts of China’s economy, such as consumer spending and investments, has softened in recent months. Beijing has launched a campaign to rein in production and head off spiraling price wars, weighing on near-term economic growth.

“The strength of China’s overall exports despite U.S. tariff barriers may have emboldened Xi to take the risk of an escalation in the trade war with the U.S.,” said Eswar Prasad, professor of trade policy at Cornell University and a former International Monetary Fund official.

“This approach could backfire given China’s persistently weak domestic consumption demand as well as rising concerns in other countries about being swamped by Chinese exports,” he added.

Tariffs on Chinese goods are paid for by U.S. importers but can hurt China’s factories by raising the cost of made-in-China products for Americans. That in turn can prompt U.S. buyers to shift purchases outside of China and cause Chinese manufacturers to lose business.

If the trade standoff worsens significantly, it could endanger China’s prospects of hitting its official target of around 5% growth in gross domestic product this year. Officials don’t appear to be worried yet, offering little sign that the government is preparing to launch more forceful stimulus measures.

Chau, whose toy manufacturing company is called GSNMC, said his customers were shocked by the latest turn and monitoring developments to see if production will need to be paused. He has one order of Christmas-themed toys already on its way to the U.S., which should arrive before the new tariff rate is set to take effect, but other contracts in the works are now at risk.

A worker produces Christmas decorations for export at a factory in Zhejiang province, China. Kevin Frayer/Getty Images

Losing future orders would be devastating to Chau’s business, which has already seen revenue shrink by about half this year compared with last year, even after tariffs for Chinese toys were lowered to roughly 30%. He may end up moving some manufacturing to Southeast Asia so his customers can avoid the higher tariffs on Chinese goods, something he had explored earlier this year but gave up on after the tariff truce made exporting from China feasible again.

Adam Dai, founder of fireworks exporter Miracle Fireworks, based in the central Chinese province of Hunan, said a few American customers have already reached out and asked that their shipments be held. They are waiting several days to assess the situation before deciding how to proceed, he added.

If the additional tariff takes effect, Dai expects his business to be affected much as it was in April. The U.S. relies on China for its fireworks, with some 99% of its imported consumer supplies and 75% of its fireworks for shows coming from China, according to the American Pyrotechnics Association and the National Fireworks Association.

After many manufacturers grappled with the earlier round of high tariffs, a local fireworks-industry association has encouraged exporters to consider diversifying beyond the U.S. market, Dai said. But such shifts haven’t come easy.

“I am sure all the customers will hold off the shipment. Then there will be no shipment from China to the U.S.,” Dai said. “If this policy lasts long, then we will have to stop production and wait.”

A fireworks store in St. Joseph, Mo. Arin Yoon for WSJ

Others aren’t counting on the 100% tariffs to last long—if they get enacted at all. Some analysts believe the U.S. and China could de-escalate tensions before the punitive measures go into effect. Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping were planning to meet at a regional gathering of leaders in South Korea at the end of the month.

“U.S.-China tensions are rising, but Trump’s threat of a 100% tariff is an empty gesture that is unenforceable,” said Dan Wang, a director on the China team at the political-risk consulting firm Eurasia Group, pointing to how tariffs were rolled back earlier this year amid market volatility and concerns from U.S. companies. “Judging by Trump’s track record, he wants a deal in which China will pay rent to enter the U.S. market, not prohibitively high tariffs on China that cause full decoupling.”

Jeffy Ma, who runs a hat manufacturer in Guangzhou called Ace Headwear, is monitoring the situation and waiting to hear whether his customers will put orders bound for the U.S. on hold for now.

His revenue hasn’t decreased this year despite the tariff hit. One client transferred some orders for the U.S. to other countries with lower tariff rates. But Ace Headwear offset the lost business with new customers from Europe, South Korea and elsewhere. Earlier this year, Ma’s company lowered prices by around 4% to offer some tariff relief to his customers, which include Fila, but couldn’t reduce prices any more because of already razor-thin profit margins.

Ma, for one, believes the 100% tariff is a negotiating tactic and will be rolled back by November. “Both sides are increasing their bargaining chips,” he said. “Such high tariffs cannot continue to exist.”

Write to Hannah Miao at hannah.miao@wsj.com and Yoko Kubota at yoko.kubota@wsj.com

4. What to Know About the Gaza Deal (Updated)

What to Know About the Gaza Deal

Israel and Hamas agree to first phase of peace plan, though key details are yet to be announced

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-hamas-peace-plan-gaza-explained-2a7442ac

By Michael R. Gordon

Updated Oct. 12, 2025 3:47 pm ET

Israelis have demonstrated for months for the release of all the hostages held in Gaza. Leo Correa/Associated Press

A deal to release hostages held by Hamas and establish a cease-fire in Gaza was approved Thursday by Israel’s government.

The deal was struck amid talks that followed after Israel and Hamas tentatively accepted a 20-point peace plan announced by President Trump. Trump sent his special envoy, Steve Witkoff, and son-in-law Jared Kushner to Egypt to finalize negotiations. Both of them visited Gaza on Saturday as part of the postwar planning.

Hamas told Israel it is ready to begin releasing hostages as soon as Sunday, according to people familiar with the situation, though Israel’s military believes the handover is more likely to happen on Monday.

A host of details still need to be resolved in a subsequent phase of the agreement, including how the Gaza enclave is to be governed, who will provide security, and Israeli demands that Hamas be disarmed.

These are the main elements of the first phase:

All living hostages held by Hamas are to be released.

Roughly 20 hostages are believed to be alive. Israel expects them to be returned on Monday, an Israeli official said, when Trump is scheduled to visit the Middle East.

The bodies of around 28 hostages who have died are to be handed over later. Hamas has said it would need at least 10 days to locate the bodies, according to people close to the talks. A multinational task force is being set up to help find the missing remains.

The families of hostages are waiting anxiously to see their captive relatives return after a monthslong struggle in the streets and lobbying world leaders.

Israel will release Palestinian prisoners.

Once all the hostages are returned, Israel is expected to release 250 Palestinians who are in Israeli prisons and 1,700 Palestinians who have been detained in Gaza during the conflict. Precisely who is on that list is being finalized.

Hamas has pushed to get as many big-name prisoners released as possible, including Marwan Barghouti, whom Israel jailed over his role in a Palestinian uprising in the early 2000s.

A cease-fire has gone into effect.

Israeli troops began withdrawing from parts of the Gaza Strip on Friday morning, Israeli and Arab officials said.

U.S. troops began to arrive in Israel on Thursday, the first of about 200 being sent to support the cease-fire in Gaza as part of an international team, according to U.S. officials.

The troops will help monitor the implementation of the cease-fire and eventual transition to a civilian government, according to a U.S. official. They will also help facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza.

Though celebrations have erupted in both Gaza and Tel Aviv, mediators and many civilians on both sides are holding their breath to see if the cease-fire will hold. Truces have given way to renewed fighting in Gaza before.

The deal provides for more humanitarian aid to be sent to Gaza.

The cease-fire agreement has led to an increase in humanitarian aid being sent to Gaza. On Sunday, the Egyptian Red Crescent said it sent 400 trucks loaded with more than 9,000 tons of humanitarian aid slated to cross into Gaza. Israeli officials said a total of 600 trucks carrying aid entered the enclave, providing food, flour, fuel, medicine and supplies such as tents, blankets and mobile bathrooms.

The precise details of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza are unclear.

A critical task in the coming days will be getting Israel and Hamas to agree on the exact lines for Israel’s initial military withdrawal.

Hamas wants Israel to exit from around 70% of Gaza in return for the release of hostages, Arab mediators said. Israel wants to vacate less territory, and the two sides are still negotiating this detail, according to people briefed on the negotiations.

The Rafah crossing with Egypt will open.

The border crossing will reopen to facilitate aid deliveries and allow for entry and exit of Palestinians. Some aid trucks have been entering Gaza in recent months, though in much lower numbers than what is needed, as the enclave endures a hunger crisis. Thousands of tons of aid was being prepared Sunday to cross into Gaza.

This explanatory article may be periodically updated.

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com

5. Trump’s War Drums in Venezuela

Are we going to war with Venezuela? Have we located a new Gulf of Tonkin in the Western hemisphere? Anyone know the location of the USS Maddox (DD-731)?

Trump’s War Drums in Venezuela

U.S. Navy assets in the Caribbean have the capacity to strike inside the country.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/trumps-war-drums-in-venezuela-5346a06d

By Mary Anastasia O’Grady

Oct. 12, 2025 12:30 pm ET

A photo of María Corina Machado in Buenos Aires, Oct. 11. francisco loureiro/Reuters

María Corina Machado, winner of the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize, has spent more than two decades working to restore modern liberal democracy in Venezuela. Her commitment to nonviolent change dates to the days of antidemocratic strongman Hugo Chávez. It continues under dictator Nicolás Maduro, who took over when Chávez died in 2013. Mr. Maduro, in contrast, wants only war, against his own people and against his neighbors. It increasingly looks as if he’s going to get it.

On Oct. 3, a U.S. drone dropped a bomb on a speedboat in the southern Caribbean, killing its crew of four, according to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. It was the fourth U.S. attack since September on what the Trump administration alleges have been vessels manned by terrorists trafficking drugs. The death toll from these strikes is 21.

In a speech at the Naval Station Norfolk on Oct. 4, President Trump referred to his strategy “to blow the cartel terrorists the hell out of the water” and said it’s working. “There are no boats in the water anymore. You can’t find them.”

It’s notable that Mr. Trump stopped short of declaring victory over the transnational criminal organizations he has sworn to destroy. The next step, he said, is to “start looking about the land because they’ll be forced to go by land. And let me tell you that’s not going to work out well for them either.”

What that means is anybody’s guess—and the uncertainty is undoubtedly intentional. But the threat is there and it’s aimed at Venezuela.

Since February the U.S. has designated nine Latin American cartels as foreign terrorist organizations. In August Mr. Trump reportedly issued a secret directive to the Pentagon to use force against them. Two drone strikes hit alleged cartel speedboats on Sept. 2 and Sept. 15. On Sept. 27 the State Department warned there might be more. In a post on X it said the administration “will degrade, dismantle, and eliminate foreign terrorist organizations. We will free the Western Hemisphere from the grip of narco-terrorists.” That message implies a wide range of targets.

Illegal drugs that enter the U.S. over land come across the southern and northern borders. Mexico and Canada are both democracies that currently cooperate with the U.S. against transnational criminal organizations. Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum allows U.S. surveillance flights inside the country and has turned over some 55 alleged criminals to U.S. law enforcement. Canada is one of America’s closest allies, even if Mr. Trump has made himself unpopular there with his rhetoric and trade war.

It’s hard to see how bombing the North American neighbors would end well. But the U.S. also accuses Mr. Maduro and his generals of sitting atop the Venezuelan narco group known as the Cartel of the Suns and of being in cahoots with another U.S.-designated Venezuelan gang, Tren de Aragua. If the U.S. president considers attacks on cartel operations anywhere in the region to be within his purview, it’s reasonable to assume that unseating Mr. Maduro is on the agenda.

The Navy buildup in the Caribbean points to something more than drug interdiction at sea. At least one of the three guided-missile destroyers there now has recently been in the Middle East, where it was engaged in fighting Yemen’s Houthis. These ships are capable of launching the surface-to-surface Tomahawk, which can travel long distances and potentially reach inside Venezuela to hit a cocaine lab or a cartel headquarters.

The Pentagon has also sent 10 F-35 jets to Puerto Rico and an Oct. 1 U.S. Marines post on X featured photos of an expeditionary unit training with machine guns on the island. “U.S. military forces are deployed to the Caribbean in support of the @Southcom, @DeptofWar war-directed operations, and @POTUS priorities,” the post said.

The Trump administration has at least two reasons for wanting Mr. Maduro gone. His drug trafficking is the one that gets more ink. But it’s a weak rationale for military aggression. America’s drug epidemic is a demand problem, as 50 years of drug warring demonstrates. Mr. Trump’s tough talk won’t change that reality.

The second defense of the high-risk use of force against Venezuela is that Mr. Maduro’s military dictatorship, financed by drug trafficking, exports revolution. Large waves of migration are destabilizing in themselves. But when they include organized-crime units assigned to sow chaos and inflict harm abroad, the risks go up. A January 2025 Federal Bureau of Investigation report titled “Venezuelan Government Officials Use Tren de Aragua to Undermine Public Safety” described dangers to the U.S. and American law enforcement.

Mr. Trump has cut diplomatic ties with Caracas, and his legal team reportedly argues that he has the authority to wage war on Mr. Maduro because the cartels threaten Americans. In any case Congress would have to stop him and isn’t, so far, willing to do so. The Republican consensus seems to be that Mr. Maduro is asking for it.

Write to O’Grady@wsj.com.

WSJ Opinion: The Art of the Gaza Peace Deal

Play video: WSJ Opinion: The Art of the Gaza Peace Deal

Journal Editorial Report: Paul Gigot interviews Foundation for Defense of Democracies CEO Mark Dubowitz.

Appeared in the October 13, 2025, print edition as 'Trump’s War Drums in Venezuela'.

6. Viktor Orban’s ‘Propaganda State’ Is Starting to Show Cracks

A leader cannot survive indefinitely on propaganda. It is always a house of cards. The lies will come tumbling down.

Viktor Orban’s ‘Propaganda State’ Is Starting to Show Cracks

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/12/world/europe/orban-hungary-media-propaganda-magyar.html

NY Times · Andrew Higgins · October 12, 2025

The Hungarian leader has secured power by keeping control over the news media. Now, a political opponent is starting to show the limits of his tactics.

Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary in June. For the first time, he is struggling to land a knockout blow on his opponents.

The Hungarian leader has secured power by keeping control over the news media. Now, a political opponent is starting to show the limits of his tactics.

Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary in June. For the first time, he is struggling to land a knockout blow on his opponents.

Listen to this article · 12:35 min Learn more

Reporting from Budapest and Hodmezovasarhely, Hungary

Oct. 12, 2025

Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary has long been hailed as a model by right-wing politicians in the United States and Europe, lauded for a string of election victories and his crackdowns on migrants and on activists pushing progressive social issues.

“It’s nice to have a strong man running your country,” President Trump said last year of Mr. Orban, who has been in power for 15 years.

Mr. Orban’s strength, reinforced by a sprawling propaganda machine geared to the destruction of his opponents, has seen off would-be rivals on both the left and the right in four consecutive elections.

Now for the first time, however, he is struggling to land a knockout blow on his enemies.

His most potent current rival, Peter Magyar, a former loyalist who heads a surging opposition movement, has in recent months been savaged by media controlled by Mr. Orban’s Fidesz party as an abusive husband, a traitor, a crook and a sex pest.

The nonstop vilification — described by Mr. Magyar as a “tsunami of lies” — has been surprising in only one respect: It has not worked.

“Until now, these campaigns are not a success. That is clear,” said Agoston Mraz, a Fidesz supporter whose Nezöpont Institute does polling for the government. Most opinion polls, though not Nezöpont’s, give Mr. Magyar’s upstart party, Tisza, a wide lead over Fidesz before a general election in the spring.

Peter Magyar, left, campaigning in Tatabanya, Hungary, last year. He has emerged as Mr. Orban’s most potent political rival.Credit...Akos Stiller for The New York Times

Mr. Orban’s current troubles, which have dented his aura of invincibility, come after a decade of tightening press control and a highly effective deployment of propaganda to crush previous rivals.

In addition, Mr. Magyar has gone on offense, hammering away at corruption. He has denounced what he calls “Orban’s Versailles,” a vast walled-off estate with mansions owned by the prime minister’s family, and has detailed the property holdings and other assets of Istvan Tiborcz, Mr. Orban’s son-in-law and a mysteriously successful businessman.

Mr. Magyar could still stumble, and Fidesz has a record of finding or inventing compromising material on its opponents — it destroyed a macho far-right challenger, Gabor Vona, with a campaign of innuendo suggesting that he was gay.

According to Laszlo Keri, who taught the prime minister at university, the growing cracks in Mr. Orban’s previously impregnable facade have shown the limits of what Mr. Keri described as “a propaganda state.”

While Hungary suffers from a falling birthrate, high inflation and a spluttering economy, the Fidesz-controlled news media laud Mr. Orban as a defender of the common man and Europe’s pre-eminent champion of “family friendly” policies.

“Orban and his media talk all the time about Hungary’s bright future, but people see their daily reality,” said Mr. Keri, who supports Mr. Magyar. He added, “There are two parallel worlds, and the tension between them makes people very angry.”

Laszlo Keri, one of Mr. Orban’s university professors.Credit...Akos Stiller for The New York Times

Even Mr. Orban’s efforts to rally support by targeting the L.G.B.T. community appear to be backfiring. In June, more than 100,000 people marched in the annual Pride parade in Budapest, far more than in previous such events, after the government banned it.

The event, Mr. Orban told supporters, was “repulsive and shameful” and showed why his political opponents, whom he accused of staging the march on orders from the European Union headquarters in Brussels, “must not be allowed near the helm of government.”

“This is a very sad story of a very talented politician who could have been an outstanding statesman not only in Hungary but in the whole of Europe,” Mr. Keri said. Mr. Orban and his party “have learned nothing over the last 15 years but how to attack and destroy their opponents,” he added.

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Liberal Beginnings

While Mr. Orban today relishes his image as a scourge of what he calls “woke globalists,” he started his political life as a champion of liberal values.

He attended Oxford University on a scholarship funded by George Soros, the Hungarian-born philanthropist he now casts as a satanic puppeteer behind liberal causes.

Mr. Orban’s political metamorphosis began after Fidesz flopped in a 1994 election.

“He saw that he could not become prime minister from the center,” recalled Zsuzsanna Szelenyi, a liberal who became a Fidesz member of Parliament after the 1989 collapse of communism. She split with Mr. Orban, she said, after he “pulled the whole party out of its original orbit.”

Mr. Orban campaigning after the first round of general elections in 1998.Credit...Reuters

Mr. Orban, she said, found inspiration in Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian media magnate and a pioneer of right-wing populism who had become prime minister of Italy just as Fidesz was struggling to stay afloat.

Mr. Orban did not undergo any ideological conversion, said Miklos Haraszti, 80, a liberal who bonded with Hungary’s future prime minister in the 1980s over their shared desire to topple communism but later broke with him.

Instead, Mr. Orban saw populist nationalism as an easier sell in a crowded political field, Mr. Harazsti said.

“Unfortunately, he changed sides” to win votes, he said.

Targeting the Media

Mr. Orban became prime minister in 1998 after tilting to the right. In 2002, he lost a general election, despite his government’s relatively successful record.

That government had secured NATO membership for Hungary, made progress toward joining the European Union and eased the pain caused by harsh austerity measures imposed under its predecessors.

The defeat, recalled Istvan Elek, a senior adviser to Mr. Orban at the time, “came as a terrible shock.” Mr. Orban, he said, blamed it on hostile news coverage and concluded that “dealing with the media has to be a priority.”

After eight years in the political wilderness, Mr. Orban returned as prime minister in 2010 and, blazing a trail later followed by like-minded leaders in Brazil and India, quickly began silencing or taking over outlets his Fidesz party considered hostile.

One of the first targets was Klubradio, a small but influential radio station. Andras Arato, its founder, said he was shocked by how quickly the new government moved. Soon after the 2010 election, he said, the national lottery and other state-controlled entities stopped advertising on Klubradio.

Demonstrators in Budapest in 2012 gathered in support of Klubradio, a small but influential radio station that became a target of Mr. Orban’s.

Private companies worried about upsetting the government followed suit. Then came unexpected tax inspections and a decision by Hungary’s media council, stacked with Mr. Orban’s supporters, to cancel the station’s frequencies outside Budapest.

“We lost 90 percent of our income in the first six months after Orban’s return,” Mr. Arato recalled.

Extending its campaign, the new government pushed through legislation empowering a new National Media and Communications Authority to impose heavy fines for coverage it considered unbalanced or offensive.

Andras Arato, the founder of Klubradio, in Budapest. He was shocked by how quickly the new government moved against the station after Mr. Orban returned to power.Credit...Akos Stiller for The New York Times

Klubradio finally went off the air in 2021 when the media authority refused to extend its license. It now exists only online. Scores of media outlets were subject to similar actions, leaving Fidesz in control, either directly or through loyal business groups, of most Hungarian news sources.

Hungary’s media scene has become so one-sided that “everything is warped,” said Miklos Borsa, a former anchor on Hungary’s state-controlled M1 television news channel. “It is like the funny mirrors you get in an amusement park.”

Migrant Crisis

Mr. Orban and his media machine went into overdrive during the migrant crisis of 2015-2016, when more than a million refugees and migrants crossed into Europe.

He took a tough stand, building a high fence and deploying security forces to prevent migrants from entering the country illegally.

Many other members of the European Union have since adopted Hungary’s approach. But Mr. Orban shocked even supporters of tight border controls by unleashing a torrent of often-racist abuse. He falsely characterized migrants as disease-ridden threats to public health, extremists planning terrorist acts and agents of a plot to replace native Europeans with foreigners.

Refugees and migrants at Keleti station in Budapest in 2015. Hungary took a tough stand as Europe experienced an influx of people fleeing unrest and conflict.Credit...Mauricio Lima for The New York Times

Krisztina Balogh, who was then a journalist with state television, recalled being asked by her editor to find a doctor “who will say on camera that migrants are bringing in diseases.”

The doctors she initially contacted said this was untrue, but she eventually found one, a Fidesz supporter, who provided what her editor wanted.

“This was just manipulation,” Ms. Balogh said. Opposition politicians, she recalled, were always presented on her state television as “weak, stupid and only interested in destroying what Fidesz had built.”

In 2018, Mr. Orban’s party won another landslide election victory.

The Challenge of Covid

Unlike today, the Fidesz media apparatus during the party’s first decade in power had an easy time making its message stick, trumpeting the government’s achievements.

The economy, juiced by billions of dollars in funding from Brussels, was growing fast after recovering from the 2008 global financial crisis, which had damaged the political fortunes of Hungary’s socialists, in power when the crisis hit. International investment surged and real wages rose.

The coronavirus pandemic ended all of that, pushing government propaganda in a new direction. As Hungary’s death rate rose to the third-highest in the world, its economy stalled and the public mood soured, Mr. Orban and his media machine revved up a culture war, stoking fury over issues like L.G.B.T.Q. rights.

Assailing his foes as radical leftists intent on turning Hungarian boys into girls, Mr. Orban introduced a raft of laws and constitutional changes targeting sexual minorities.

Protesters in Budapest in 2021 demonstrated against a Hungarian government effort to ban what it sees as the promotion of homosexuality and sex changes.

With an election approaching in 2022, it looked as though Fidesz could be vulnerable, given its poor record on the economy and public health. Mr. Orban’s fractious opponents united, rallying behind Peter Marki-Zay, a conservative, churchgoing small-town mayor with seven children.

Then Russia came to the rescue. Its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 provided Fidesz with a powerful line of attack, and the propaganda machine began denouncing Mr. Marki-Zay as a reckless enemy of peace.

“They realized that the war was their winning lottery ticket,” recalled Mr. Marki- Zay, who suddenly found himself branded a warmonger who would send Hungarians to fight Russia, something he had never suggested.

He tried telling voters that all he wanted to do was support efforts by NATO and the European Union to help Ukraine. But drowned out by distortions on television and in other news media controlled by the governing party, “I just could not get through to them,” he recalled.

Fidesz won another landslide.

New Attacks Loom

With an election just six months away, Fidesz has been scrambling to upgrade its lines of attack against Mr. Magyar, the conservative opposition politician.

Efforts to brand him as a closet liberal who supported L.G.B.T. rights flopped when Mr. Magyar stayed silent over the Budapest Pride parade ban. A push to knock him out of the running by prosecuting him for various purported crimes also foundered when the European Parliament, of which he is a member, refused last month to lift his immunity.

In another blow, a fierce critic of Mr. Orban’s rule, Laszlo Krasznahorkai, won the Nobel Prize in Literature on Thursday. The prime minister congratulated the self-exiled writer for bringing “pride to our nation.” Mr. Krasznahorkai thanked Mr. Orban for his congratulatory message but added: “I will always oppose his political action and ideas.”

Akos Hadhazy, a former local councilor for Fidesz who is now an opposition member of Parliament, said he worried most about what Mr. Orban might do if he fails to find effective new fuel for his propaganda machine to ensure that Mr. Magyar loses.

“In all hybrid regimes, there comes a time when propaganda is not enough,” he said of governments with both autocratic and democratic characteristics. When propaganda stops working, he added, “you need to take harsher measures to keep winning.”

Participants in a protest organized by Akos Hadhazy, an opposition member of Parliament, in Budapest in May.Credit...Akos Stiller for The New York Times

Mate Halmos contributed reporting from Budapest.

Andrew Higgins is the East and Central Europe bureau chief for The Times based in Warsaw, on temporary assignment in Shanghai.

See more on: Fidesz Party, Viktor Orban, Russia-Ukraine War

NY Times · Andrew Higgins · October 12, 2025

7. Ukraine Is Hitting Russia Where It Hurts: Its Oil Refineries

Excerpts:

The Ukrainian air counteroffensive has taken a toll on Russia’s refinery complex, a big part of the way Moscow makes money to fund its war. But, breathless reports aside, experts say Ukraine has not yet disabled half of Russia’s oil facilities or kneecapped 38 percent of Russia’s refinery capacity. That number is way over the top.

“Well, that’s just bollocks,” said Sergey Vakulenko, who until 2022 was a senior executive at a Russian energy firm.

What is true is that Ukraine has, thanks to the availability of mass-produced drones, been able to strike targets as far as 2,000 kilometers inside Russia. Small drones pack a small punch but can evade scattered Russian air defenses, or at least enough of them to do some damage. And Ukraine may, if the Economist is right, have already unleashed the Flamingo, its homegrown, warhead-packing cruise missile. Either way, direct U.S. support, whether in the form of Tomahawk cruise missiles or other long-range firepower, may not be make-or-break for Kyiv.

The bigger question is what, exactly, Ukraine hopes to achieve by its offensive. Russia has itself recently upped the pace of its attacks on Ukraine’s natural gas sector, after previously targeting mostly power plants. Turnabout is fair play, so striking Russian energy infrastructure after years of relentless assaults is but a baseline. But what is the objective?

Ukraine Is Hitting Russia Where It Hurts: Its Oil Refineries

Kyiv’s two-year offensive against Russian oil facilities has intensified, eating away at Moscow’s energy revenues.

By Keith Johnson, a staff writer at Foreign Policy covering geoeconomics and energy.

Foreign Policy · Keith Johnson

Economics
Russia
Ukraine

October 9, 2025, 2:27 PM

Russia’s War in Ukraine

Understanding the conflict three years on.

Suppose They Held a War and Nobody Came: Systemic Approaches to Shared Military Personnel Challenges

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/10/11/suppose-they-held-a-war-and-nobody-came/

by SWJ Staff

10.11.2025 at 11:01pm

Suppose They Held a War and Nobody Came: Systemic Approaches to Shared Military Personnel Challenges

Published by: Rand

By: Paul Cormarie, Stephen Dalzell, Naoko Aoki, Omar Danaf, Jan K. Gleiman (Editor-in-Chief of SWJ)

Download the report here.

Summary

Allies and partners of the United States in Europe and East Asia are having widespread, significant, systemic, and strategically relevant problems in developing military personnel. None of these countries are immune from the personnel challenges caused by demographic decline, social factors, and economic conditions, at a time when some are seeking to expand their forces. Not all U.S. allies and partners have given enough attention to the similar problems that they face. Their shortages in personnel have direct, indirect, and strategic effects for collective defense in Europe and potential combined defense operations in East Asia, ultimately affecting U.S. interests abroad; these effects deserve further study.

In this report, we propose that critical gaps in partner troop levels may not be inevitable but could be mitigated by moving away from an outdated personnel paradigm detached from modern societies. Variations in personnel patterns are more frequent than popularly believed; they often change over periods shaped by different strategic environments. As we have entered an era of multipolar, great power competition combined with emerging and disruptive threats, the new strategic landscape calls for a fresh approach to military staffing that differs from that of the post–Cold War era.

In this report, we find the following challenges for foreign militaries:

There is growing demand for personnel in Europe because of national and multinational plans to expand forces.
There is a decreasing supply of personnel. This trend is systemic in East Asia and Europe and risks making existing force objectives in Europe unsustainable.
Government responses tend to be similar, systematic across regions, and unsuccessful in shifting personnel trends.

These challenges can lead directly to a hollower and less capable force. Lower capacity can lead to lower readiness, lower flexibility, and a more expensive force that cannot take more of the burden in collective defense and potential combined defense operations. Overall, such impacts can ultimately lead to decreased deterrence, less effective responses to threats, and further tensions within U.S. alliances.

If these problems cannot be solved by simply recruiting more of the same kinds of people for the same kinds of services, the logical solution is for these countries to consider recruiting from different parts of their populations to serve in new ways or under new terms. By assessing the existing military personnel paradigm, we propose several solutions to refit patterns of military recruitment broadly across country lines. Although some foreign governments have experimented with some of these solutions already, these options present opportunities for a dramatic departure from the way we perceive military recruitment abroad and a career in the armed forces.

We explored the following possibilities:

• strategic conscription focused on converting conscripts into careerists

• a fuller continuum of service to improve retention

• eliminating the officer corps as a distinct status and increasing career options

• adapting fitness standards to national conditions

• modifying the time, place, or conditions of service

• recruiting foreigners with a path to citizenship

• privatizing mission components, including the lifting of some military constraints

• deviating from standard pay scales and offering more–market-based compensation

All these changes would represent a dramatic departure from existing models of military recruitment and personnel management. Not all of them would be appropriate for every country experiencing the problem. We recommend that the United States and its allies and partners collectively consider promoting dialogue on military personnel, building recruiting and retention centers of excellence, and applying machine learning and artificial intelligence to personnel management.1

1 This sentence was updated in October 2025 to clarify our recommendations.

Tags: Artificial Intelligence (AI), civil-military relations, East Asia, Europe, European Union, Jan "Ken" Gleiman, Japan, Military Compensation, Military Personnel, Military Recruitment, Naoko Aoki, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Omar Danaf, Paul Cormarie, RAND, retention, South Korea, Stephen Dalzell, Strategic Competition, SWJ Documents and Reports, Taiwan, US Military Reserves

About The Author

SWJ Staff
SWJ Staff searches the internet daily for articles and posts that we think are of great interests to our readers.

9. Putin Is Losing the Ukraine War: Escalation Is Coming

Excerpts:

“The only way to bring him to a negotiating table is by making him realize that he cannot kill his way out of the mistake he made on 24 Februrary 2022, when he began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. To do this, it is essential to continue to support Ukraine financially and militarily, and to undermine the foundations of the Russian war economy.”

Other equally strident voices are calling for the next Russian fighter aircraft to cross into NATO airspace to be shot down immediately, as well as for NATO warships to start sinking the vessels of Russia’s “shadow fleet.”This is the only way to “lay down a marker,” said one former senior NATO-nation military commander at the recent Warsaw Security Forum.

“A good beginning would be for the self-described MAGA acolytes in Hungary and Slovakia to listen to Mr. Trump and stop buying Russian oil, and to finally use the more than $200 billion of frozen Russian assets in Europe to give financial assistance to the victims of Mr. Putin’s war,” says Sikorski.

Russia, as “the largest country on earth, doesn’t need more land. It should take better care of what is already within its internationally recognized borders,” concluded Sikorski. “The leadership of Russia must understand that its attempt to rebuild Europe’s last empire is doomed to fail. The age of empires is over.”

Putin Is Losing the Ukraine War: Escalation Is Coming

nationalsecurityjournal.org · Reuben Johnson · October 12, 2025

Key Points and Summary – Vladimir Putin is losing the war in Ukraine; the West must prepare for escalation. Russia’s recent summer offensive failed militarily, resulting in massive casualties for little gain.

-More critically, Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes are crippling Russia’s economy by taking a huge portion of its oil refining capacity offline, leading to domestic fuel rationing and falling revenues.

Putin Back in 2023 Speaking. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

-With Putin’s back against the wall, the only way to force a negotiation is for the West to demonstrate unwavering military and financial support for Ukraine, making the war unwinnable for Moscow.

The Ukraine War Could Soon Go From Bad to Worse

WARSAW, POLAND – A combination of falling oil prices and Ukraine’s increasingly technological advantages in conducting long-range strikes on Russia’s oil industry has become the greatest threat to the continued rule of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The former KGB Lt. Col. “has his back against the wall. He is losing the economic war faster than he is gaining any military advantage in Ukraine,” writes long-time foreign policy analyst Ambrose Evans-Pritchard in Friday’s edition of the London Daily Telegraph.

“Putin is losing the war, so prepare for escalation”, reads the title of his most recent assessment. The summer offensive that Moscow was sure would result in a dramatic change in the situation on the battlefield did not achieve the Kremlin’s outcome. Putin’s military suffered some 800 casualties a day and ended up with little on the ground to show for it.

Russia also failed in its primary strategic objective: to break Ukraine’s fortress belt—a chain of well-defended cities and fortifications in the Donetsk region of the Donbas. The attempt to turn the tide of the war in Moscow’s direction fell well short of expectations.

“Russians are still harassing us and hunting civilians with drones, which is a horrible practice, but they are not achieving any strategic goal,” said Andriy Zagorodnyuk, Ukraine’s former defense minister, in an address to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London.

His assessment and that of others is that “the Russian home front is cracking—much as the German home front cracked from war exhaustion after the Kaiser threw everything into his failed spring offensive in 1918.” In addition to mounting problems in the cities,

Ukrainian drone strikes are “doing so much damage to Russian oil infrastructure and refineries that the country is having to import emergency fuel supplies from China, Korea and Belarus.”

Declining Oil Production

The Moscow agency Neftegaz estimates that 38 per cent of Russia’s primary refining capacity is out of action.

Ukraine also appears to be able to strike at will at almost any target on Russian territory. The attack this week on the Antipinsky oil refinery in Tyumen in western Siberia was 2,000 kilometers into Russian territory: it was the deepest strike of the war so far.

An Estonian Defense Forces M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) fires a training rocket during a live-fire exercise in Undva, Estonia, July 11, 2025. U.S. Army elements from Bravo Battery, 1st Battalion, 14th Field Artillery Regiment, 75th Field Artillery Brigade, supporting Task Force Voit, assisted in the training process. The task force was originally formed in 2023 to support the Estonian Defense Forces in the creation of a HIMARS unit. Task Force Voit works closely with the Estonian Armed Forces, sharing critical defense strategies, training, and military readiness support. The presence of U.S. troops in the region serves as a cornerstone of NATO’s commitment to security in the Baltic region. The task force provides combat-credible forces to V Corps, America’s only forward-deployed corps in Europe. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Rose Di Trolio)

HIMARS. Image Credit: U.S. Government.

“They have huge areas they can’t defend with air-defense systems. Russia cannot do anything substantial to protect those assets,” said Zagorodnyuk.

“It has amazed a lot of people because they didn’t think Ukraine could reach so far. We clearly see the effects of deep strike technology,” he said during his address at RUSI this past week.

Zagorodnyuk also said the old style of warfare is essentially dead, making most of Russia’s enormous military hardware useless. The war has become a race for developing advanced but easy-to-produce and inexpensive hardware, and Ukraine has consistently been a step ahead of the Russians.

The Wall Street Journal has also reported that the Trump administration is now actively helping Kyiv by providing intelligence for targeting these long-range strikes. This goes further than the previous administration, “crossing a line that Joe Biden never dared cross,” writes Pritchard.

At the same time, the brief period of optimism that there could soon be an end to the war, sentiments generated by the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska two months ago, has largely evaporated. From the Russian side, their continued predilection for claiming victim status has them calling out everyone but Putin himself, who continues to be the primary—if not singular—obstacle to bringing hostilities to a close.

“Our edifice of relations is collapsing, and the Americans are to blame,” said Sergei Ryabkov, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, echoing a familiar and shopworn accusation.

How You Have to Negotiate With Putin

Meanwhile, twenty regions across Russia are facing petrol rationing. Filling stations are limiting sales to 30 liters across large parts of the country and reportedly to as little as 20 liters in Crimea. Many of them have stopped selling 95 octane or above-grade petrol altogether.

According to an analysis by Goldman Sachs, Russia was producing 9.7 million barrels a day (b/d) of oil in 2023. However, the same analysts say this has dropped to nine million b/d and could fall to as little as 7.5 million b/d.

The refinery crisis is also causing a build-up of crude that cannot be stored. Goldman Sachs said the drilling companies are also feeling pressure from 17 percent interest rates and a rising “tax wedge.” The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air says total export revenues of Russian oil, gas, and coal have been declining for three years and fell to a new low of €546 million (£475m) a day in August.

The PAC-3 MSE is a highly sought-after air defense munition due to its advanced capabilities and versatility. As a next-generation interceptor, it offers improved range, speed, and maneuverability, making it an effective counter to a wide range of threats, including tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft. (Official U.S. Army photo)

Patriot Missile. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

“This is not enough to sustain a Russian war machine,” Prichard writes, when it is consuming a tenth of national income in one way or another. What he calls “fiscal attrition” could now combine with “a second graver threat to Russia: the prospect of a prolonged collapse in oil prices as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states flood the global market.”

What I See In Warsaw

Here in Warsaw, the well-known Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski, has penned a very direct op-ed in the October 9 New York Times. Putin’s “long-term goals have not changed: rebuild the Russian empire, undermine trans-Atlantic security guarantees, divide the West, and—last, but certainly not least—weaken the United States,” writes the Deputy PM. Four decades ago, the Polish statesman was a correspondent covering the war in Afghanistan between the Soviet Union’s armed forces and the mujahedin.

“The only way to bring him to a negotiating table is by making him realize that he cannot kill his way out of the mistake he made on 24 Februrary 2022, when he began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. To do this, it is essential to continue to support Ukraine financially and militarily, and to undermine the foundations of the Russian war economy.”

Other equally strident voices are calling for the next Russian fighter aircraft to cross into NATO airspace to be shot down immediately, as well as for NATO warships to start sinking the vessels of Russia’s “shadow fleet.”This is the only way to “lay down a marker,” said one former senior NATO-nation military commander at the recent Warsaw Security Forum.

“A good beginning would be for the self-described MAGA acolytes in Hungary and Slovakia to listen to Mr. Trump and stop buying Russian oil, and to finally use the more than $200 billion of frozen Russian assets in Europe to give financial assistance to the victims of Mr. Putin’s war,” says Sikorski.

Russia, as “the largest country on earth, doesn’t need more land. It should take better care of what is already within its internationally recognized borders,” concluded Sikorski. “The leadership of Russia must understand that its attempt to rebuild Europe’s last empire is doomed to fail. The age of empires is over.”

About the Author: Reuben F. Johnson

Reuben F. Johnson has thirty-six years of experience analyzing and reporting on foreign weapons systems, defense technologies, and international arms export policy. Johnson is the Director of the Asia Research Centre at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation. He is also a survivor of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. He worked for years in the American defense industry as a foreign technology analyst and later as a consultant for the U.S. Department of Defense, the Departments of the Navy and Air Force, and the governments of the United Kingdom and Australia. In 2022-2023, he won two awards in a row for his defense reporting. He holds a bachelor’s degree from DePauw University and a master’s degree from Miami University in Ohio, specializing in Soviet and Russian studies. He lives in Warsaw.

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10. 'Captain, We Have Been Hit': A Tiny Nuclear Submarine 'Sank' $4.5 Billion Navy Aircraft Carrier

'Captain, We Have Been Hit': A Tiny Nuclear Submarine 'Sank' $4.5 Billion Navy Aircraft Carrier

nationalsecurityjournal.org · Jack Buckby · October 13, 2025

Key Points and Summary – A look back at a stunning 2015 military exercise serves as a critical lesson for modern naval warfare. During the drill, the French nuclear attack submarine Saphir successfully penetrated the multi-layered defenses of the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group and scored a simulated “kill” on the American carrier.

Important: The aircraft carrier costs approximately $4.5 billion to build and would result in a massive loss of life in a real-world shooting war.

U.S. 5TH FLEET AREA OF OPERATIONS (Aug. 6, 2024) An Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Handling) signals aircraft on the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), Aug. 6. Theodore Roosevelt is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations to support maritime security and stability in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. (Official U.S. Navy photo)

(Jan 31, 2009) An F/A-18 Super Hornet assigned to the “Tomcatters” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 31 launches from the flight deck of USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71). The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier and embarked Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 8 are operating in the 5th Fleet area of responsibility and are focused on reassuring regional partners of the United States’ commitment to security, which promotes stability and global prosperity (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jonathan Snyder/Released)

-This embarrassing “sinking” was a major wake-up call, demonstrating that even the most powerful surface warships are highly vulnerable to stealthy submarines.

-The incident remains a key data point today, highlighting the growing risks to aircraft carriers in the modern era of drones and advanced missiles.

The Day a French Submarine ‘Sank’ a U.S. Aircraft Carrier

In March 2015, the French Rubis-class nuclear attack submarine Saphir (S602) successfully scored a “kill” against one of the United States Navy’s flagship assets during a U.S.-French exercise. It was an incident that would later become a turning point in undersea warfare debates, and is perhaps more relevant now than it was then.

During that drill, Saphir penetrated the layered defenses of USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) and its carrier strike group, evading detection long enough to register simulated torpedo hits on both the carrier and some elements of its screening escort vessels – the ships and assets designed to escort and protect the carrier.

The “sinking,” therefore, wasn’t real. Instead, it was a hypothetical “sinking” achieved and overseen under exercise rules rather than the result of firing live weapons.

The implications, however, were significant.

So significant, in fact, that they linger to today, and expose a major vulnerability: even the U.S. Navy’s most valuable ships are at risk when exposed to stealthy vessels under the water.

How did this small and relatively old French submarine manage to pull this off?

PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 11, 2025) – U.S. Navy Sailors direct an E/A-18G Growler, assigned to the “Vikings” of Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 129, on the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), Aug. 11, 2025. Theodore Roosevelt, flagship of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 9, is underway conducting exercises to bolster strike group readiness and capability in the U.S. 3rd Fleet area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Cesar Nungaray)

Aircraft Carrier Defeated: How Saphir Pulled It Off

The exercise took place off the coast of Florida, in the Atlantic Ocean, ahead of a U.S. deployment.

The French Ministry of Defense described the exercise in a now-deleted online article as part of training with the U.S. Carrier Strike Group 12, which is made up of the USS Theodore Roosevelt, Ticonderoga cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, and a Los Angeles-class submarine.

The exercise simulated assaults by adversaries targeting American territorial and economic interests. During the first phase of the exercise, the Saphir was embedded within the friendly force to support anti-submarine warfare.

It was during the second phase, however, that the Saphir was integrated into enemy forces and tasked with locating the Theodore Roosevelt and attacking the strike group.

According to accounts of the exercise by analysts, mainly based on limited information published online, Saphir moved slowly and quietly, limiting its acoustic signature to stay below detection thresholds.

The submarine then moved to periscope depth briefly to finalize plans for firing at the aircraft carrier, before dropping deeper again and launching exercise torpedoes that registered as hits.

When headlines say that the carrier “sank,” what it really means is that the airline would have sunk had those torpedoes been live ammunition.

When French naval sources initially published a blog post describing the outcome of the exercises, the U.S. Navy did not publicly contest the assertion that one of its carriers could theoretically be taken out by a submarine.

However, much of the original information initially published about the exercise has since been removed.

Why It Matters

The incident mattered then because aircraft carriers are the dominant and most valuable above-water naval asset for any modern force.

It matters now, in particular, because aircraft carriers are increasingly seen as vulnerable in an age of drone warfare, and as unmanned fighter jets are under development with plans to be deployed alongside traditional manned fighters.

Submarines are increasingly touted as the future of naval warfare, and aircraft carriers as “sitting ducks.”

The Saphir exercise demonstrated that a stealthy submarine, operating with patience, can be a formidable foe against even the most advanced aircraft carriers and vessels.

Even a relatively small SSN like the one from France, if not actively trapped or already identified, can exploit gaps in detection and shoot right into the heart of a carrier group.

Ultimately, the strike proved that the carrier isn’t invulnerable – it is just well protected.

And now, as drones become cheaper and easier to produce – and as adversaries like China work on unmanned fighter jets and bombers – there’s no telling how vulnerable current aircraft carriers may be without changes in how they operate and how they’re defended.

What Next?

The Saphir exercise revealed a weakness, and since then, the U.S. Navy has accelerated multiple initiatives to expand undersea dominance and harden its fleet.

On the submarine front, Electric Boat and the Navy’s Maritime Industrial Base program reflect a push to adopt new additive manufacturing techniques, better known as 3D printing, to reduce lead times for critical submarine parts.

The move could help the United States overcome major bottlenecks that lengthen the time it takes to build new platforms.

Additionally, work continues to progress on the use of both manned and unmanned assets at sea. For example, this year’s reports revealed that a team working with the U.S. Navy’s Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division in Newport completed the first recovery of a second-generation unmanned undersea vehicle into a Virginia-class submarine’s torpedo tube.

The milestone marks the progress made by the U.S. Navy Submarine Force in streamlining the launch and recovery of autonomous undersea vehicles from submarine torpedo tubes.

And to protect its carriers, the Navy is doubling down on modernization. It recently authorized the procurement of 837 Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) missile seekers to expand strike options for its carrier groups.

Meanwhile, the next generation of carrier aviation is on the way, with the F/A-XX program moving forward with funding now approved by Congress. Whatever aircraft comes from the project is intended to replace the Super Hornet and will operate alongside uncrewed systems, providing more strike options for carriers while also serving as a deterrent.

The U.S. is attempting to maintain its lead in underwater naval power by integrating manned and unmanned platforms; however, every significant global power faces the same threat, and the future of aircraft carriers remains notably uncertain at this stage.

About the Author:

Jack Buckby is a British author, counter-extremism researcher, and journalist based in New York who writes frequently for National Security Journal. Reporting on the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., he works to analyze and understand left-wing and right-wing radicalization, and reports on Western governments’ approaches to the pressing issues of today. His books and research papers explore these themes and propose pragmatic solutions to our increasingly polarized society. His latest book is The Truth Teller: RFK Jr. and the Case for a Post-Partisan Presidency.

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nationalsecurityjournal.org · Jack Buckby · October 13, 2025

11. A conservative influencer was arrested in Portland. Trump was watching.

I offer this as a study in media manipulation but not from a partisan position. PSYOP is being conducted by the extreme right and extreme left with one side being more effective than the other.

This article from the Washington Post (despite the one sided headline) offers a fairly balanced view of both sides and probably provides better insights into what is actually occuring on the ground though ideologues on both sides will likely still only believe what they are receiving through their filtered media.

But when I read something like this with the hate and vitriol on both sides it makes me think of only one question: "If you hate your fellow Americans who have political differences with you, are you complicit in the Dark Quad's political warfare strategy to exploit the political divisions of the US and actively subvert America or are you just a useful idiot?"

(That is my equivalent of the “when did you stop beating your wife?” question).

https://wapo.st/46YA5jH

A conservative influencer was arrested in Portland. Trump was watching.

As the president tries to send in the National Guard, a phalanx of conservative influencers is working to support his claim that Portland is burning.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/10/12/portland-ice-trump-antifa-nick-sortor/

Today at 6:00 a.m. EDT

By Robert Klemko and Joshua Partlow

PORTLAND, Ore. — During the four hours Nick Sortor sat in jail on the morning of Oct. 3, the conservative influencer wondered if anyone even knew he’d been arrested. He had no cellphone. He could make local calls, but he didn’t know anyone’s number in Portland.

Outside, though, his online allies were blaring the news: A right-wing journalist — and not the leftists who assaulted him at an ICE protest — had been arrested by Portland police. Within hours of his release, Sortor had a message from Donald Trump, via a White House aide: “Nick, I saw you on television,” the message read. “Great job. We’re behind you 100%. Let us know if there’s anything we can do. … President DJT.”

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Portland, Ore., has become a stage for President Donald Trump's war on antifa. But social media versus reality on the ground tells a different story. (Video: Robert Klemko, Alice Li, John Farrell/The Washington Post)

Over the next few days, conservative media spotlighted Sortor’s arrest to amplify Trump’s claims that leftists were engaging in destructive mayhem in Portland. By Wednesday, Sortor himself was at the White House, addressing a roundtable where Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi L. Noem compared antifa — a catchall concept used to describe loosely affiliated far-left groups — to the Islamist Hezbollah, one of the most heavily armed non-state military forces in the world.

“The fact that we are here today, on such short notice, shows how serious you guys are taking this issue,” Sortor told Trump and other Cabinet members. He continued: “The Portland politicians are literally willing to sacrifice their own citizens just to appease these antifa terrorists. It’s sickening. I’ve seen it first-hand, obviously.”

Floodlit by DHS spotlights, the square outside the ICE facility where Sortor was arrested is more stage than battleground, which in recent months has become a real-life, live-action set for an increasingly fevered standoff over the nation’s future. Sortor’s experience — and the White House’s use of it — shows how those events can be shaped and polished in a fractured media ecosystem that selectively spins 10-second video clips into furor, and ultimately policy, in an administration that has harnessed the power of social media to inspire and enrage.

Follow Trump’s second term

Much of the footage from Portland doesn’t originate from traditional TV networks but from a phalanx of activist-journalists, on both the right and the left, filming on their phones. Despite the protests largely being confined to one city block, it has resulted in a cascade of videos that has bolstered the conservative depiction of Portland as a city under siege by left-wing terrorists — video the White House has cited to justify and build support for deploying the National Guard to cities across the country.

Right-wing streamers gather in front of the ICE detention facility in Portland, Oregon, on Oct. 5, 2025. (Jordan Gale/For The Washington Post)

Right-wing streamers and left-wing protesters clash outside the Portland ICE detention center. (Jordan Gale/For The Washington Post)

In the weeks since Trump said he would send the National Guard to the city, two distinctly different scenes have developed. During the day, a crowd of mostly homegrown activists stage deliberately absurd protests designed to provoke or embarrass government officials, wearing pajamas, inflatable animal costumes, or, if all goes right at the planned Naked Bike Ride on Sunday, nothing at all.

But at night, the scene often turns violent, with leftist demonstrators exchanging blows with counterprotesters, at times shoving or spitting on federal law enforcement officers, lobbing fireworks and attacking conservative influencers and journalists. Portland police have largely held back, stepping in sporadically to make targeted arrests rather than clearing the block, to the frustration of federal authorities.

Almost every moment is captured to push a political message online, as leftists aim their phones at law enforcement officers and conservatives turn their cameras at those leftists, documenting their crimes, reveling in their frustration and celebrating the at-times violent arrests that result from their faceoffs with federal officers.

Last week, Sortor’s arrest inspired a group of camera-wielding Trump loyalists to stake out a chunk of sidewalk outside the facility. Some, like Sortor, describe themselves as journalists and are unabashed in their support for ICE and openly contemptuous of the leftist demonstrators, whom they accuse of being members of antifa. Several were invited into the ICE facility to film from the rooftops alongside federal agents with pepper ball guns trained on the protesters. Local and national media organizations including the Oregonian newspaper, Oregon Public Broadcasting , the Seattle Times and The Washington Post were denied interviews, much less entry. One influencer’s footage was adopted by the White House for a sizzle reel that set tear gas to music.

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THE WASHINGTON POST

When Sortor returned to the protest site the evening after his arrest, he received a hero’s welcome from his conservative allies, some of whom wore Charlie Kirk tribute shirts or carried American flags. Before his arrest, Sortor had snatched a burning American flag from a demonstrator and stomped out the flames. By the weekend, he was carrying the charred flag on a pole and shoving his way through the leftist sidewalk encampment.

“Nick, I’m sure you know, but we have about a hundred and something people live-streaming,” one of Sortor’s fans said while recording him on TikTok. “And anytime that we brought you up or talked about you we have tens of people in here talking about Nick’s a hero. We support you, Nick. We hope you’re doing okay.”

“Just know the nation’s behind you right now,” the fan told Sortor.

Leilani Payne fixes her hair outside the ICE detention center in Portland, Oregon. Payne, a 19 year old left-wing activist, was maced in the face by an ICE agent. (Jordan Gale/For The Washington Post)

The moment that brought Sortor to national attention, and eventually to the notice of the White House, began with a shot of pepper spray. Leilani Payne, 19, has been a fixture at the protests; she describes herself as anti-fascist, but says she isn’t aware of any organization or leadership structure behind the demonstration. On the night of Oct. 2, as agents cleared the sidewalk of protesters — though Payne did not make contact with officers or cross a blue line on the asphalt separating the ICE facility from the sidewalk on South Macadam Avenue — a federal officer pepper-sprayed her directly in the face.

“They really enjoy picking on people smaller than them,” Payne said later in an interview.

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Leilani Payne, an anti-fascist protester, is pepper sprayed by a Department of Homeland Security employee. (Video: Video courtesy of Bennett Haselton)

As pepper spray burned her esophagus, Payne’s screams of distress caught Sortor’s attention. By this point, he had also become a familiar figure outside the ICE facility, known for engaging in arguments with leftists and appearing on Fox News, where he accused Portland police of “openly siding with antifa terrorists.”

Sortor bent down and held his camera close to Payne’s face.

Payne’s fellow anti-fascists and leftist activists encircled Sortor. Sortor took a swing — and missed, he said — at a masked protester who kept blocking his path. In the scuffle, someone shoved him into a flower bed with the tip of an umbrella.

Portland police later arrested Sortor for disorderly conduct, along with two other people involved in the episode. Upon his release from jail, Sortor was interviewed by multiple news outlets, including Fox News. He claimed that police arrested him because he was a conservative.

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Anti-fascists and leftist activists took issue after Sortor filmed Payne and a scuffle ensued. (Video: Video courtesy of Rhein Amacher)

The day he was released, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Harmeet K. Dhillon sent the city a letter claiming “potential viewpoint discrimination,” citing incorrect claims proliferating across social media that Sortor was the only person arrested. By Monday, the Multnomah County District Attorney’s office had dropped the disorderly conduct charges against Sortor, while it continues to prosecute the other two people, the office said in a statement.

Over the past few years, Sortor has built a following by showing up at national dramas, sharing his videos and opinions with conservative programs. Two years ago, he was at the train derailment in East Palestine, Ohio, giving reports to Tucker Carlson. He argued with a heckler during an appearance on Stephen K. Bannon’s podcast from the scene of the Maui wildfires. Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson tweeted about what he called Sortor’s “toxic, false clickbait garbage” after a WWE appearance where Sortor claimed the crowd was booing Johnson for his lack of Maui philanthropy.

But nothing boosted Sortor’s stature like his Portland arrest.

“At least that horrible night made you famous,” Trump told Sortor at the White House on Wednesday. “You got something out of it.”

Right-wing streamers and left-wing protesters clash outside the ICE detention center. (Jordan Gale/For The Washington Post)

Afterward, Sortor was welcomed inside the ICE facility, which has opened its doors to a host of reporters and political commentators working for conservative news outlets or presenting as Trump loyalists. One of them, Quincy Franklin, has appeared at rallies across the Pacific Northwest alongside members of far-right groups Patriot Prayer and Hell Shaking Street Preachers, bellowing slurs over loudspeakers at Pride events. Another guest welcomed in by ICE was conservative commentator David Medina, a Jan. 6 rioter who vandalized House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s office during the 2021 riot at the U.S. Capitol.

ICE agents invited some inside for their own safety: After Katie Daviscourt, a reporter for the conservative online outlet Post Millennial, was assaulted by a masked demonstrator, she filmed the action from ICE’s roof the next evening. Protesters gazing up at her chanted “Nazi Barbie!”

Portland police said there have been 47 arrests near the ICE facility since June 8, including people associated with the leftist protest. But even though Daviscourt followed her attacker down the street and flagged down an officer, no arrest was made.

Aaron Schmautz, a Portland police sergeant who is president of the city’s police union, called the situation outside the ICE facility ugly — and avoidable. The city’s riot playbook calls for officers not to break up demonstrations but to keep them contained and to arrest people for observed violent behavior. But, Schmautz said, if officers are ordered to decisively break up the demonstrations, they may be hesitant because of a sympathetic posture from local elected officials toward the protests.

“When you have city officials encouraging people to break the law,” Schmautz said, “the politics betray the outcome.”

Federal officers face off with protesters outside the ICE detention center. (Jordan Gale/For The Washington Post)

The scene outside the ICE facility these days is far tamer than the street brawls that erupted over the past decade in Portland between rival protesters and federal law enforcement.

During Trump’s first term, gatherings by the Proud Boys and Patriot Prayer, an evangelical movement based in nearby Vancouver, Wash., often devolved into fights with leftist protesters. Portland is also home to the first anti-fascist organization, Rose City Antifa, formed in 2007 to oppose white supremacists in the Northwest. For months after Minneapolis police killed George Floyd in 2020, Portland saw nightly clashes between protesters, federal officials, and local police.

One of the conservative chroniclers of that time was Andy Ngo. He began covering the far left as a student at Portland State University in 2018 and was assaulted twice by leftists in 2019 and 2021.

Ngo said he’s received death threats from antifa members for years and moved to London in 2021 for his safety. He said the party atmosphere among leftist protesters in Portland betrays the toxicity of antifa’s online presence. This year, for example, a foreign-hosted website claiming to represent Rose City Antifa has doxed federal agents and encouraged violence, including a coordinated laser attack on federal helicopters monitoring protests.

“There’s been lots of threats that I didn’t publicize because I felt so isolated,” Ngo said. “I’m really demonized in the press, treated as persona non grata, and a liar, and illegitimate. I felt like, what was the point of sharing publicly that people want to kill me? No one’s going to condemn it.”

His work has enjoyed new attention since Trump’s Sept. 22 order labeling antifa a terrorist organization. And some of the conservative commentators in Portland have adopted Ngo’s gonzo, up-close-and-personal approach.

Justin Allen, a veteran of the Portland leftist protest scene, said he has seen a pattern emerge among right-wing streamers. “You saw folks like Andy Ngo start a cottage industry of antagonizing antifa and then filming what happens next,” said Allen, 40, who served in the Navy from 2005-2009. “And all you have to do is clip out the antagonism and then boom, you get your money and attention.”

“In any protest you have people who are there to cause problems,” Schmautz, the police union chief, said. “But there seem to be a lot more people who are trying to go out there and become relevant or famous than ever.”

Justin Allen, a veteran of Portland's leftist protest scene, outside the ICE detention center. (Jordan Gale/For The Washington Post)

The conservative journalists often don’t identify themselves to interview subjects and don’t share their social channel names with political adversaries. They seek out the most abrasive people on the left and work them into a fury, said Andrew Mercado, a YouTuber with 85,000 followers who was also live-streaming the Portland protests around the time of Sortor’s arrest.

Mercado, 32, who wore a flak jacket, a helmet and a patch identifying him as press, was careful to straddle the shifting DMZ between the left and right outside the facility.

“Some people come out and agitate and provoke the protester and kind of make themselves the story. I don’t consider that journalism,” he said. “I just want to focus on what’s happening and not put myself in it. I’m not going to get high views, but it’s important still to show it, whether it’s chaos or not.”

Federal agents clash with protesters outside the ICE facility in Portland. (Spencer Platt/Getty Images)

At 8:15 p.m. on Oct. 4, the day after Sortor’s release, the metal gates of the ICE facility swung open and dozens of federal police in respirators and helmets walked out, prompting protesters to cue up the “Imperial March” theme from “Star Wars” on a portable speaker. The police formed a semicircle in the intersection and stood in place for more than 10 minutes, as protesters showered them with insults. “Quit your f---ing job you stupid fascists,” one man shouted.

Suddenly, federal officers started shooting pepper balls. Later, they tossed canisters of tear gas at the feet of demonstrators. The canisters erupted in sparks and a cloud of white smoke.

After the protesters were forced to retreat several blocks away, federal police tore down a banner erected on a chain-link fence that said “ABOLISH ICE” in giant letters. Daviscourt, embedded with federal agents, tweeted video of ICE officers jogging back into their facility with the balled-up banner.

A gathering of conservatives — allowed to remain in place while the leftists were cleared from South Macadam Avenue — celebrated the banner’s seizure. Among them was Thomas Wayne Allen, 36, who had earned the nickname “TKO Tommy” since joining his fellow conservatives in Portland a few days earlier.

Thomas Allen, a Portland right-winger who just started his social media channels to document the unrest, was nicknamed “TKO Tommy” after getting into a fight with left-wing protester. (Jordan Gale/For The Washington Post)

One night, a man had kicked him, and Allen swung back. Daviscourt had filmed from the ICE roof as Allen connected with his seventh punch, dropping the man. Both were briefly taken into custody by Homeland Security and released. Allen was arrested by the Portland police the next day for disorderly conduct.

His Twitter account, amplified by Sortor and others, ballooned from a few hundred followers to more than 16,000 in days. After he accused leftists of smashing his car windows, he raised more than $3,000 through online fundraisers.

“It’s still so surreal,” said Allen, who was sporting a version of the white “Freedom” shirt Kirk was wearing when he was shot. “I never thought anything like this would happen in my life.”

The maker of the seized banner, Bennett Haselton, filed a police report for stolen property. (“This is not their jurisdiction. This is not their property,” he later said in an interview. “I come out every day with extremely low expectations for their behavior and I’m always disappointed.”)

Haselton said he came to the protests to document ICE abuses the right-wingers ignored, so he was on the spot for clashes between ICE and leftists that went viral — including the moment Payne was pepper-sprayed.

Haselton also captured video of federal officers shooting pepper spray into the sole airway of a leftist in an inflatable frog costume, who was trying to help a downed demonstrator. Liberals online were outraged and said the man could have been killed inside his inflatable suit. The frog, for his part, returned saying the spray tasted like peppermint and even shared a laugh with Sortor.

Last Sunday, Sortor embarked on a new mission to provoke the liberal protesters: Take the slightly charred American flag and walk through the leftist encampment.

A woman in a black hoodie and a gas mask stepped up to block Sortor’s path. He tried to push past her, but several men and women joined in shoving back.

“You’re no longer allowed to walk down the sidewalk in Portland,” Sortor said to his viewers as he was being jostled, “or else you’re going to get jumped and pushed and shoved and assaulted here.”

Sortor turned to another streamer who was filming him. “We’re live, right?”

What readers are saying

The comments reflect a strong sentiment that social media and right-wing influencers are playing a significant role in shaping public perception of the Portland protests. Many commenters criticize the portrayal of protesters as "leftists" and express concern over the influence of... Show more

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Hezbollah’s Information Warfare in the Post-October 7 Era

October 10, 2025 by Pierre-Yves Baillet Leave a Comment

irregularwarfare.org · Pierre-Yves Baillet

Editorial Note: Interviews for this article were conducted between December 2023 and February 2025. The sources include active Hezbollah cyber operatives as well as independent hackers with access to Hezbollah networks. Most interviews were conducted in person in Lebanon or by a local journalist working for the author of this article, with identities cross-verified through third-party contacts and supporting documentation.

In southern Lebanon, amid escalating tensions since the October 7 Hamas attack and Israel’s subsequent “Northern Arrow” military operation, Hezbollah has urgently reshaped its information warfare doctrine. Formerly a dominant political actor in Lebanon, the Shiite organization has seen its digital capabilities crippled and its propaganda networks disrupted as its political influence and combat power have waned. Now facing pressure on multiple fronts, including an intensive psychological and cyber campaign from Israel, Hezbollah’s cyber-combatants are pursuing a determined effort to modernize: leveraging Artificial Intelligence (AI), foreign alliances, and digital influence campaigns to regain control of the narrative in a war that is increasingly fought online as much as on the battlefield.

Hezbollah’s Pre-October 7 Strategy

In the years prior to the October 7 attacks, Hezbollah developed a sophisticated information strategy based on several pillars, including mastery of traditional media, extensive use of social networks, and psychological warfare. This was illustrated by testimonial from one information fighter of the party, who explained:

“We had a strategy, more precisely: a work plan and guidelines. Our main mission was to monitor different social media platforms and wage war against any account opposing the resistance, regardless of who operated it or where it was based.”

Before October 7, the Shiite organization could rightly boast of being the leading cyber power in Lebanon, with a primary tactic of spreading false information on social media. “Our main target has always been platforms like X (Twitter) and Facebook,” said one operative. Indeed, Hezbollah uses social media platforms as part of its communication and propaganda strategy. The group has also employed Facebook to support operations: Hezbollah operatives posed as women on the platform to lure targets into installing malicious applications, thereby enabling surveillance or control of their devices. The same fighter added that “We had numerous software tools and thousands of accounts allowing us to dominate counter-propaganda against the resistance and maintain control over X […]. We also had software that enabled us to hack vulnerable accounts on Facebook and X.”

The aftermath of October 7 offered opportunities to deploy this cyber framework. For instance, videos purportedly showing successful attacks on Israeli positions were widely circulated during the Israeli ground operation in southern Lebanon, though they were actually montages or footage from previous conflicts. This strategy sought to galvanize Hezbollah supporters and sow doubt among the Israeli population.

At the same time, Hezbollah has exploited incidents to accuse Israel of war crimes. Following an explosion at a hospital in Gaza in October 2023, Hezbollah quickly pointed the finger at Israel, spreading shocking images and damning testimonies. However, independent investigations later suggested that the explosion might have been caused by a defective rocket fired from Gaza.

Hezbollah operates a powerful media network to broadcast its narrative domestically without relying on Western or Israeli outlets. At the same time, it has developed the capacity to project its message abroad, leveraging influential individuals as well as politico-military organizations to penetrate adversary audiences. An additional cyber fighter explained: “We spread false rumors about attacks to incite panic in Israel. We also targeted Israeli soldiers on social media to demoralize them.” Furthermore, to support its information operations, Hezbollah has intensified its cyber operations by targeting strategic infrastructure and the accounts of Israeli officials. For instance, attacks on Israeli telecommunications systems and energy networks have briefly disrupted some military and civilian communications.

Lebanon’s Shiite party has also exploited leaks from Israeli databases to fuel disinformation campaigns. By infiltrating certain Israeli social networks, the party has successfully spread false reports of supposed attacks, creating confusion amongst the population and security forces. Hezbollah has also targeted the relatives of Israeli soldiers through digital harassment campaigns, sending anonymous messages to military families and insinuating that their loved ones were in imminent danger or had been captured in order to provoke intense psychological stress. Finally, the movement has also used influencer and sympathizer accounts to relay content favorable to its narrative, creating the illusion of broad international support for its actions. These actions have had a notable impact on the perception of the conflict abroad, particularly in certain Arab and Muslim communities. Hezbollah’s collaborations extend beyond the information sphere and Lebanon’s periphery, as one of the interviewed fighters revealed:

“We collaborated with the Iranians, Iraqis, Bahrainis, and the Saudi opposition, and personally, I coordinated with Pakistanis and Indians. We also worked together to hack and attack multiple infrastructure[s] in Israel, notably interfering with their navigation and GPS systems.”

Internal Struggles and Strategic Shift

Despite the development of doctrines and the establishment of a vast information system, Hezbollah’s use of information as a weapon remains limited according to the cyber-combatants interviewed. This is due to a lack of resources, internal dissension, and, above all, a lack of interest or vision. Hezbollah’s hackers do not hide their frustration with their superiors’ attitude, ascribing their leaders’ lack of faith in the impact of social media to the limited use of these platforms within the organization. Decision-makers did not truly believe in the power of social media, and as such, have hindered any attempt at modernization.

In the past, when faced with complex challenges, Hezbollah could rely on Iranian assistance, including access to black-market technologies and software to circumvent restrictions. “They always had a bigger budget than we did,” said a Hezbollah engineer. However, this collaboration came to an end—not due to a lack of willingness on Iran’s part, but because it necessitated closed and secure communication channels that were no longer operational. On several occasions, the leadership even considered disbanding the department, viewing it as redundant or unnecessary. In one striking example, when one of the interviewed fighters tried to explain the importance of strategic investment in social media, the response he received left him speechless: “We will simply ask people to stop believing what they read on social media.” The reaction, in his view, perfectly illustrated the disconnect between Hezbollah leadership and the operational realities of information warfare.

Instead, the operators interviewed align more closely with the Iranian vision—which considers the information weapon as a central aspect of warfare, implemented by the Revolutionary Guards—and opposed traditional Lebanese cadres who prefer to allocate resources to conventional weaponry and/or consider the information space insignificant. According to the cyber-combatants interviewed, high command has acknowledged its mistake and intends to give greater prominence and more resources to cyber and information warfare units. One of the fighters explained:

“A lot of commanders from the previous generation have been killed and the new ones are more aware of the importance of cyber skills and information for their organization. They are also aligned with Tehran’s vision, which seeks [for] Hezbollah to strengthen its cyber and informational capabilities. However, it will take at least two to three years to regain the operational capabilities that existed before October 2023.”

Israel’s AI Advantage

While rebuilding their forces, Hezbollah’s cyber combatants face an even greater challenge: keeping pace with Israel’s growing advantage in artificial intelligence. “Artificial intelligence is omnipresent in our daily lives, and its role in modern conflicts continues to grow. Without an effective counter-strategy, we risk an irreparable defeat,” explains a Hezbollah cyber combatant.

Hezbollah’s cyber operators insist that the use of AI in modern warfare is no longer speculation but a tangible reality. During recent confrontations, this threat manifested itself in several ways. For example, during the war, Israel used AI power software to analyze tera octets of data, which allowed them to disseminate false information through various channels, social networks included. In December 2024, Israeli forces used an advanced AI tool named “Habsora” to maintain a “target bank” that catalogued Hezbollah operatives along with their respective locations and routines. Then, by monitoring phone communications, they waited for the relatives of targeted individuals to attempt to contact them. Once these calls were made, the location was immediately identified and exploited for military purposes. According to Hezbollah’s cyber fighters, this tactic was widely used in Lebanon and Gaza, resulting in significant human losses.

Beyond these methods, Israel also leveraged artificial intelligence to manipulate public opinion while conducting targeted cyberattacks against computer systems, communications infrastructure, and personal devices. This latest escalation serves as a striking example of how emerging technologies are being used to dominate conflict. As one Hezbollah fighter reflected, “If Israel is my perpetual enemy, I must nonetheless acknowledge that its mastery of digital tools has given it a decisive strategic advantage. It is imperative to learn from this and rethink our own strategies in this new era of informational warfare.”

Israel’s Counteroffensive

In addition to its dominance in the use of AI, Israel has implemented a series of countermeasures aimed at containing Hezbollah’s media influence and protecting its own narrative. These measures include targeted censorship, digital disruption operations, defensive propaganda, and offensive cyberattacks.

Israel perceives this information war as a full-fledged strategic threat, as it impacts not only its international image but also the morale of its population and armed forces. To this end, the Israeli state has developed a media control strategy to limit the spread of Hezbollah’s messages, notably using cyberattacks to disrupt its communication infrastructure.

According to an article published by Haaretz in March 2024, the Israeli army orchestrated multiple cyberattacks against servers hosting Hezbollah-affiliated websites, rendering these platforms temporarily inaccessible. Additionally, Israel requested that American and European technology companies restrict Hezbollah’s digital presence on social media. In January 2024, Meta and X announced the removal of hundreds of accounts linked to Hezbollah propaganda, citing violations of their policies against incitement to violence. However, Hezbollah managed to bypass some of these restrictions by multiplying mirror accounts and encrypted channels on Telegram, reinforcing the clandestine nature of its communication.

The Israeli Defense Forces do not merely block Hezbollah’s messages; they also conduct psychological warfare against the organization. This strategy involves disseminating information designed to morally destabilize Hezbollah fighters and supporters, as well as targeted messaging directed at Hezbollah combatants and their families. According to Skeyesmedia, the Israeli intelligence services infiltrated pro-Hezbollah WhatsApp and Telegram groups to post demoralizing messages, suggesting that certain movement leaders had fled Lebanon in the face of escalating conflict.

Israel also conducts proactive cyberattacks against Hezbollah’s digital networks. In March 2024, an operation carried out by the Israeli military’s electronic intelligence service reportedly neutralized an internal communication network used by Hezbollah to coordinate its strikes. According to the Arab Center in Washington, DC, Israel also successfully introduced spyware into Hezbollah’s messaging systems, enabling the surveillance of internal communications and the compromise of attack plans. This technique aligns with a long-standing tradition of Israeli cyber-espionage, previously observed during operations against Iran’s nuclear program (e.g., Stuxnet).

Conclusion

Hezbollah’s experience in the post-October 7 era underscores the transformation of modern conflict into a multidimensional struggle where information warfare is as decisive as firepower. The group’s gradual embrace of social media manipulation, cyberattacks, and foreign alliances illustrates both its adaptability as well as its vulnerabilities. While Hezbollah has demonstrated the ability to shape narratives, disrupt Israeli networks, and project influence abroad, its efforts remain constrained by internal divisions, limited resources, and Israel’s technological superiority—particularly in artificial intelligence. The evolving clash between Hezbollah and Israel gives way to a broader truth: in contemporary wars, the battlefield extends into cyberspace, where control over perceptions and information flows can decisively alter the balance of power.

Pierre-Yves Baillet is a French war reporter. Holding a Master’s degree from the French Institute of Geopolitics, his research focuses primarily on irregular and hybrid warfare. He has worked in the Balkans, Ukraine, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Colombia.

Disclaimer: The Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI) does not independently verify the authenticity of interviews or statements provided by the author’s sources. The views, accounts, and claims presented herein are those of the author and interviewees and do not necessarily reflect the position of IWI, its editors, or affiliated institutions.

Image generated by ChatGPT (OpenAI), October 2025.

The views expressed are those of the author, and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

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Elena Pokalova The 2022 National Security Strategy focuses on US leadership in strategic competition over the future of international order. The document lays out the threats and challenges the United States faces…
Irregular Warfare in the Post-Soviet Space: The Republic of Moldova
Eastern Europe has historically served as an epicenter for influence operations, with a number of actors – particularly Russia – using influence tactics to shape political narratives and public opinion…
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irregularwarfare.org · Pierre-Yves Baillet

13. How it was possible to build and sustain public support for a war effort?

A profound piece from Matt Armstong. with an important reminder from Goring that we all know but seem to forget.

As an aside I am looking forward to the new film on Nuremberg that is coming out soon.

Please go to the link to see the image of an excerpt of the draft speech of William Benton from 1945. It is important os Goring's warning.

How it was possible to build and sustain public support for a war effort?

A question asked by American psychologist Gustave Gilbert to Hermann Göring at Nuremberg

https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/how-it-was-possible-to-build-and?utm

Matt Armstrong

Oct 12, 2025

Excerpt from an April 1946 draft of Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs William Benton’s speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. From the University of Chicago Library.

The following comes from my long-in-development-and-not-yet-complete book on the history and evolution of the Smith-Mundt Act. The Smith-Mundt Act, which some may not know about and others may need a reminder of, was a law allowing for the use of truthful information to counter disinformation, correct misinformation, and fill gaps in information through a variety of means, including exchanges, books, films, speaker tours, magazines, the commercial press, and news distribution. When the original legislation was introduced, the purpose was to address these issues, which were then the key lessons learned from the rise and impact of Nazi propaganda. It was not until later in 1946 that the exploitation of these by Soviet political warfare was realized, leading to a shift in the language around the pending bill that would later be known as the Smith-Mundt Act.

Field Marshall Hermann Göring was the highest-ranking Nazi to survive the war, be tried, convicted, and sentenced to death at the Nuremberg Tribunal. Gustave Gilbert, an American psychologist fluent in German working as a translator with the Nuremberg Tribunal, interviewed him. The interview took place in the days between Göring’s conviction and his suicide the day before he was to be hanged.

Gilbert wrote about this interview and interviews with other Nuremberg defendants in his book Nuremberg Diary (1947). Gilbert asked Göring how it was possible to build and sustain public support for a war effort, especially in Germany, which had barely recovered from the still recent disaster of World War I. The following is from Gilbert’s book. The italics are Gilbert’s.

“Why, of course, the people don’t want war,” Göring shrugged. “Why would some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best that he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece. Naturally, the common people don’t want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship.”

“There is one difference,” I pointed out. “In a democracy, the people have some say in the matter through their elected representatives, and in the United States, only Congress can declare wars.”

“Oh, that is all well and good, [replied Goering] but, voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country.”

Recommend Arming for the War We're In to your readers

Discussing the past and present of political warfare and public diplomacy

14. As Russian Aggression Turns West, Poland Says It’s Ready

Poland will never be caught flatfooted or surprised again.

As Russian Aggression Turns West, Poland Says It’s Ready

Warsaw has doubled the size of its military since 2014 and boosted military spending to nearly 5% as Russia grows more assertive

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/as-russian-aggression-turns-west-poland-says-its-ready-328a0a13

By Thomas Grove

and Karolina Jeznach | Photography by Maciek Nabrdalik for WSJ

Oct. 12, 2025 11:00 pm ET

Quick Summary

Poland has increased its military spending to 4.7% of GDP this year, the highest in NATO, and plans to boost it to 4.8% next year.View more

WARSAW—For more than a decade, Poland has prepared for the worst-case scenario: becoming the front line in a war between Russia and the West.

With an eye on growing Russian aggression in Europe, Warsaw’s military planners built out the country’s armed forces, turning it last year into the largest European military in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It ramped up military spending to 4.7% of gross domestic product this year—the highest in the alliance. A multibillion-dollar spending spree has put Poland among the biggest buyers of U.S. weapons.

The growth of the Polish military has reached a zenith just as Russian President Vladimir Putin escalates his standoff with the West. Last month, Polish airspace was violated by some 20 Russian drones, equipped with additional fuel tanks to help them fly farther.

The incursion, followed by other UAV sightings across Europe, triggered the first confrontation between NATO jet fighters and Russian drones over alliance territory—a step Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said had brought the country closest to open conflict since World War II. Putin has dismissed the drone incident and says European governments and NATO accuse it of provocations on a nearly daily basis.

Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine and recent steps to test the alliance have highlighted Poland’s long-ignored warning that Russia, under Putin, wants to resurrect its traditional sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.

Poland suffered under Russian occupation for centuries. Every schoolchild learns how larger European empires, including Russia, divided up the country among themselves in the 18^th and 19^th centuries, temporarily erasing it from the map. In WWII, the U.K. and France failed to prevent the country’s invasion by the Nazis, despite mutual defense treaties. When the Soviets followed with their own invasion, it led to half a century under Moscow’s heel.

Russia’s moves against Ukraine and now Europe make Polish policymakers nervous that they again are in the firing line—and this time Poland wants to be ready.

“This is our war,” Tusk said at the Warsaw Security Forum in September. “We decided to arm Poland and modernize the Polish army on a massive scale.”

Poland’s multibillion-dollar military spending spree has put it among the biggest buyers of U.S. weapons.

Poland’s military spending has endeared it to both its neighbors on NATO’s eastern flank and to President Trump, who wants to see Europe take care of more of its own security needs. In a meeting with new Polish President Karol Nawrocki, Trump extended his backing to Poland in a way he has offered few other European countries.

“We are with Poland all the way and we will help Poland protect itself,” he said.

In a trip to the Polish capital earlier this year, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said Warsaw is “a model ally.”

Russia is ambiguous about its intentions toward NATO. Late last year, Russia’s Defense Minister Andrei Belousov said Moscow’s military must be ready for a conflict with the alliance. At the same defense ministry meeting, Putin poured cold water on the idea and said the West was scaring its own population with fears that Russia was ready to attack. Earlier this month, he said the idea of Russia attacking NATO was nonsense and that Europe should deal with its own problems of migration and violence before picking a fight with Russia.

The Kremlin, though, has asked Trump to withdraw NATO troops and weapons from Central and Eastern Europe back to where they stood before the bloc’s eastward expansion began in 1999. It made a similar demand of former President Joe Biden before the invasion of Ukraine, Western intelligence officials say.

“Russia’s strategy is to resurrect the Soviet Union,” said Polish Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz. And that would put Poland in the crosshairs.

The country resolved to prepare itself for the possibility of a new conflict after Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in 2014 and launched a proxy war for control of the Donbas region.

While much of Europe was left hoping that would be the end of Russian aggression on the continent, Polish war planners spent a year analyzing the worst-case scenarios before they set out a series of reforms to expand the military, rapidly increasing the number of troops and boosting their tool kit.

Other European countries were “waiting for someone else to make the first move,” said Tomasz Szatkowski, a former Polish undersecretary of defense, who oversaw the strategic defense review that started its military reforms. “In the end, we were further ahead, not just of the rest of the eastern flank, but ahead of most countries in European NATO.”

Poland now has more than 210,000 military personnel, behind only the U.S. and Turkey in NATO. The first unit created after the reforms in 2018 was the 18th Mechanized Division, which is kept in a state of heightened readiness. Two more similar units are in the process of being formed. It has also created its territorial defense forces with tens of thousands of troops.

Poland’s borders with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Moscow ally Belarus make it a cornerstone of NATO planning.

Training is a priority. Last month, 30,000 troops, including from the 18th Division and U.S. and Dutch forces, embarked on a monthlong series of wargames, named Iron Defender, which gave Polish troops a chance to train on their arsenal of old and new weapons. Those included U.S. Abrams tanks, South Korean multiple rocket launchers and a Polish variant of the U.S. High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or Himars, which Ukraine has used against Russia.

Poland’s forces are increasingly well-equipped. Much of the equipment Poland has bought in the past few years is starting to roll in, and there is more to come. The country has bought some $50 billion worth of U.S. weapons, making it the top buyer of U.S. weapons in 2023-2024. Poland plans to boost military spending next year to 4.8%, Kosiniak-Kamysz said recently.

Today, the country finds itself a cornerstone in NATO’s planning for a conflict with Russia, and a crucial partner for the smaller Baltic countries of the alliance’s eastern flank, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Geography plays an important role. Poland shares not only a border with the Russian exclave Kaliningrad, but also Belarus, a close Moscow ally now enmeshed in Russia’s defense infrastructure. Russia considers Belarus airspace its own, and its railroads can quickly transport Russian troops to the Polish border. Russia has deployed nuclear-capable tactical missiles in Belarus.

“In a crisis, the defense of the Baltics will rely on the ability of the Polish armed forces, reinforced by the U.S., to tackle Kaliningrad and Belarus,” said Szatkowski, also a former Polish ambassador to NATO.

Importantly, Poland has had to sharpen its logistical capabilities over its vast territory to allow for the huge influx of NATO troops that would likely deploy there in case of a conflict. There are planned upgrades to some of its civilian airports to allow them to transport soldiers.

“In the case of war, Poland will be a very busy country because the military will mobilize, the economy will mobilize, but we would also have to prepare for NATO coming to—and through—Poland,” said Operational Commander of the Armed Forces Lt Gen. Maciej Klisz.

The task of building out Poland’s military has left it footing a massive bill. And while the country’s GDP growth for the next few years, expected around 3%, is higher than other European peers, the fiscal demands of maintaining the advanced weapons systems could outstrip Poland’s defense budget.

It is a measure of how seriously Poland and its neighbors see the Russian threat that Poland and Germany are now discussing the possibility of Berlin covering some of the cost as compensation for the damage it caused during WWII.

The German side hopes it would put an end to Polish demands for reparations, while placing the two countries on a similar defense footing.

“For Germans, reparations are a toxic issue,” said Janusz Reiter, Poland’s former ambassador to Germany and the U.S., “unlike the responsibility for securing the eastern flank via Poland.”

Write to Thomas Grove at thomas.grove@wsj.com

15. India supplying Philippines the missiles it needs to fend off China

India supplying Philippines the missiles it needs to fend off China

New Delhi is becoming Manila’s supplier of choice for high-quality but cost-effective missiles to point at China

asiatimes.com · Nguyen Thanh Long

The Re-Horizon 3 Program, approved in 2024 with a nearly 2-trillion-peso (US$34.5 billion) budget, focuses on strengthening the Philippines’ archipelagic defense system. Its acquisition list includes submarines, fighter aircraft, patrol vessels, destroyers, corvettes and, crucially, missile systems.

While the US, South Korea, Japan and France are arguably at the forefront of supplying submarines, patrol vessels and aircraft, Manila is turning to India for modern missiles, aimed chiefly at deterring China in the South China Sea.

In early August 2025, India and the Philippines elevated their bilateral ties to “strategic partnership.” The move is part of Manila’s broader strategy to avoid overreliance on the United States and to diversify its security partnerships.

Closer defense ties with India will allow the Philippines to enhance its limited defense capabilities through Indian advanced weapons, reduce dependence on any single supplier and build a lasting engagement with New Delhi as a trusted and supportive partner.

General Romeo Brawner Jr, chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), has publicly stated that the Philippines plans to acquire more weapons from India, noting that Indian arms are of “high quality but not expensive” as those from other suppliers.

India’s willingness to offer soft loans for Manila’s defense procurements adds to its appeal. India is also well-positioned to support the Philippines’ indigenous defense industry’s development through experience-sharing and potential technology transfers.

In practical terms, India’s missile systems could play a pivotal role in addressing the Philippines’ gaps in coastal and aerial defense. For decades, Manila invested little in missile capabilities, with security policy focused more internal security over external deterrence.

Its current defensive posture relies primarily on the Philippine Air Force’s three Spyder-MR batteries from Israel and three BrahMos batteries from India, operated by the Philippine Navy are configured chiefly for anti-ship missions rather than land-based threats. The Navy also has Korean C-Star anti-ship missiles, French Mistral 3 surface-to-air missiles and Israeli Spike missile systems.

However, this modest stockpile remains insufficient and not strategically distributed across all branches of the armed services to protect vulnerable outposts or the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Despite ongoing modernization, the Philippines still lags behind regional counterparts in military capabilities.

With Israeli arms contracts suspended over concerns related to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, Russian arrms deals off the table under US pressure and Western platforms such as the US Patriot prohibitively expensive, India stands out as a viable missile supplier in terms of both capability and affordability.

Indian missile systems match with the AFP’s operational requirements. The BrahMos missile, for instance, provides a key defensive buffer within the Philippines’ vast EEZ.

It can reach targets such as the hotly contested Scarborough Shoal, situated roughly 250 kilometers from a base in Zambales, where BrahMos batteries are deployed. The system’s mobility, allowing batteries to relocate, further complicates adversary targeting and improves survivability.

The Philippine Army aims to acquire more missile systems from India under its Land-Based Missile System Acquisition Project (LBMSAP) – a key element of the AFP’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) doctrine. A new procurement of nine BrahMos missile batteries for the Army is being finalized, far exceeding the Navy’s previous order of three batteries.

The Army’s recent announcement to expand its air defense missile systems coincides with unofficial reports that Manila may pursue India’s Akash surface-to-air missile system in a deal worth more than $200 million. The Akash’s operational effectiveness was flexed during this year’s Operation Sindoor, in which it successfully intercepted Pakistan’s Fateh-1 missile.

Although Manila has not confirmed the Akash deal, the system fits with Manila’s broader efforts to improve deterrence and the survivability of its strategic assets, particularly in response to China’s growing air power in the South China Sea.

Other reports suggest the AFP has also expressed interest in India’s “Pralay” tactical surface-to-surface missile. The Pralay could allow the AFP to strike high-value inland targets in China, such as radar sites, command centers, logistics hubs and airfields.

For an archipelagic state vulnerable to multi-vector attacks, this would be a crucial capability. However, export versions of the Pralay would likely be limited to a 290-kilometer range to comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) — meaning targets beyond this range would remain out of reach.

Since Manila already operates the BrahMos, adding more Indian missile systems would enhance interoperability and simplify training and maintenance. Beyond missiles, the Philippines could also consider acquiring coast guard vessels, helicopters or even submarines from India.

Still, even with lower costs, these systems are a major investment. Congress approved only 40 billion pesos (approximately $700 million) for the AFP modernization program in 2026, while Manila is also considering purchases of more fighter jets and offshore patrol vessels.

Without flexible financing options such as soft loans, sustaining high-value acquisitions would be challenging. Ultimately, Philippine defense planners must carefully assess national threats, budget constraints and operational needs to select systems that best serve the country’s long-term strategic goals.

asiatimes.com · Nguyen Thanh Long

16. Gaza Hostages Are Freed, Ending Two-Year Captivity

Gaza Hostages Are Freed, Ending Two-Year Captivity

The full release of 20 captives was a requirement of the current cease-fire. President Trump is due to address Israel's parliament shortly.

https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-hamas-gaza-hostage-peace-deal

Last Updated:

Oct. 13, 2025 at 5:20 AM ET

The last group of 13 Israeli hostages alive in Gaza has been handed off to the Israeli military, as President Trump arrived at the country's parliament ahead of his address. Seven captives held by Hamas returned to Israel earlier in the day.

The full release of the 20 remaining hostages was a requirement of the current cease-fire and a step that could push forward Trump's broader proposal to end the war and rebuild the enclave. Following the release, Israel and Hamas are expected to begin negotiating a peace deal that would see the U.S.-designated terrorist group disarm and give up power in Gaza.

Here's what else to know:

Israelis gathered, sang and celebrated as the transfers got under way.

The bodies of around 28 hostages who have died are to be handed over later in what could be a drawn-out process.

Once all the hostages are returned to Israel, it is expected to release 250 Palestinians from Israeli prisons and 1,700 who have been detained in Gaza.

A cease-fire in Gaza went into effect Friday and aid has resumed flowing.

A host of details still need to be resolved in a subsequent phase of the agreement, including how the Gaza enclave is to be governed.

"The war is over," Trump said as he traveled to the region to address Israel’s parliament. He is then set to attend a summit in Egypt aimed at spurring momentum for the broader plan.

See the latest updates below.

17. Special Operations News – Oct 13, 2025

Special Operations News – Oct 13, 2025

https://sof.news/update/20251013/?utm

October 13, 2025 SOF News Update 0

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: A combat rubber raiding craft (CRRC) prepares to deploy from the well deck of the Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7). U.S. military forces are deployed to the Caribbean in support of the U.S. Southern Command mission, Department of War-directed operations, and the president’s priorities. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Logan Goins)

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it 2 or 3 days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

U.S. SOF Staged Near Venezuela. The United States military presence in the Caribbean has increased over the past several weeks. This includes elements of U.S. special operations forces. Venezuela is accusing the U.S. of staging the U.S. SOF units in preparation for strikes against its civilian infrastructure and to conduct targeted assassinations. “U.S. Reportedly Moves Special Ops, Helicopters Close to Venezuela”, The Latin Times, October 9, 2025. See also “Hegseth announces task force to ‘crush’ drug cartels in Caribbean Sea”, The Hill, October 10, 2025.

New Cdr for 1 SOW. U.S. Air Force Col. Mark L. Hamilton assumed command of the 1st Special Operations Wing from Col. Patrick T. Dierig during a change of command ceremony at Hurlburt Field, Florida, Oct. 6, 2025. The 1 SOW is responsible for preparing special operations forces for worldwide missions in support of joint and coalition objectives. The 1 SOW at Hurlburt Field is one of six Air Force active duty special operations wings which fall under AFSOC. Hurlburt Field employs more than 7,600 military and approximately 1,700 civilian personnel. Previously, Col. Hamilton served as the 1 SOW’s Deputy Commander of Operations, where he was responsible for employing manned and remotely piloted fixed-wing aircraft, including the AC-130J Ghostrider, MC-130J Commando II and MQ-9 Reaper. (DVIDS, 6 Oct 2025)

VSO/ALP in Afghanistan. United States Special Forces entered Afghanistan initially on an unconventional warfare (UW) mission. It quickly evolved into foreign internal defense (FID) and contingency operation employing irregular Afghan security forces to improve the security situation. From 2002 to 2009 there were several programs along these lines but it wasn’t until the Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) programs began that real progress was being made on a large scale. Read more in an article by Donald Bolduc and Chris Hensley in “Special Operations Forces and Afghan Local Police Programs”, SOFREP, October 2, 2025.

U.S. SOF in the High North. U.S. Special Operations Forces and NATO Allies will unite in the High North for Exercise Adamant Serpent 26 on 12-29 October. Conducted since 2021 and led by U.S. Special Operations Command Europe, this annual exercise is designed to enhance readiness and interoperability with Allied special operations forces. This year’s exercise will focus on U.S. SOF and NATO Allies applying modern tactical warfighting techniques throughout Norway and Sweden. Nearly 400 U.S., Danish, Norwegian and Swedish forces will participate, demonstrating advanced operational integration to rapidly deploy units to arctic and subarctic environments. “U.S. Special Operations Forces and NATO Allies Prepare for Arctic Exercise Adamant Serpent 26”, SOCEUR, October 9, 2025.

SOCAFRICA in Libya. Special Operations Command Africa Civil Affairs (91st CA BN) joined forces with Libyan Security Forces, local medical providers, and the Director of the Department of Health in Zliten to execute a Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP). The MEDCAP initiative brought together 10 local medical providers, including two female practitioners, alongside U.S. and Libyan forces, to address healthcare challenges and build emergency response readiness. “U.S.-Libya Partnership Strengthened Through Collaborative Medical Civic Action Program in Zliten”, DVIDS, October 1, 2025.

U.S. Army SOF Prepares for War with Russia. SF operators specialize in unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense. They are uniquely qualified to work with European special operations units in preparation for a conflict with Russia. More than 30 years after the end of the Cold War, the 10th Special Forces Group is still preparing for Russia. “Army Special Forces Are Preparing for the Next War with Russia”, by Stavros Atlamazoglou, National Interest, October 8, 2025.

Former SOF General now with Reach Power. The firm announced the appointment of U.S. Army Major General (Ret.) Patrick B. Roberson to its Government Advisory Board. Roberson most recently served as Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and has over 34 years of service. (Business Wire, 8 Oct 2025)

IW Online Course for Homeland Defense. The DoD Irregular Warfare Center has announced that its newest online course is now available. Entitled “IW Approaches for Homeland Security and Defense“, it is designed for security professionals who work in the homeland security. (DVIDS, 22 Sep; 2025)

SOCOM Testing New Ammo and Weapons. One thing that United States Special Operations Command does well is testing for new weapons and systems to field to its special operators. This includes testing and fielding new weapons for its ‘ground’ SOF. “The military’s irregular warfare researchers are testing a new round, rifle, and machine gun”, We Are the Mighty, October 10, 2025.

SOF History

On October 10, 1951, the Ranger Course was conceived during the Korean War and was known as Ranger Training Command. “The Ranger Training Command was inactivated on this day in 1951 and became the Ranger Department, a branch of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Ga. Its purpose was, and still is, to develop combat skills of selected officers and enlisted men by requiring them to perform effectively as small unit leaders in a realistic tactical environment, under mental and physical stress approaching that found in actual combat.”

On October 12, 1961, Brigadier General William P. Yarborough, as commander of the Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC, met with President Kennedy to visit Fort Bragg. The meeting resulted in increased funding for Special Forces and the authorization of the Green Beret for wear as the official headgear of Special Forces. The President further showed his unfailing support for Special Forces in publishing an official White House Memorandum to the US Army dated April 11, 1962, which stated in part that “The Green Beret is again becoming a symbol of excellence, a badge of courage, a mark of distinction in the fight for freedom.”

On October 12, 1966, the 46th Special Forces Company was activated in Thailand.

On October 9, 1967, Che Guevara was executed in Bolivia. 8th SFG(A) trained the counter-guerrilla force that tracked down Che’s small guerrilla group.

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/cuba-intelligence/2020-10-09/che-guevara-cia-mountains-bolivia

On October 12, 1981, the 160th Special Operations Air Regiment (SOAR) was established.

On October 15, 1984, the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group was activated on Torii Station, Okinawa, Japan, under the command of Lt. Col. James L. Estep. 1st SFG(A) had previously been stationed on the island from 1957 until being inactivated in 1974 as part of an Army reduction in Special Forces strength.

On October 16, 1991, 2nd Battalion, 3rd SFGA was activated with HQs company, 2 SF companies, and a forward support company.

On October 16, 2006, the Psychological Operations branch was established.

National Security and Commentary

PMCs and Escalation Management. This paper assesses how Private Military Companies shape escalation management, deterrence, and WMD risks. “Mercenaries in the Battlespace”, Stimson Center, September 2025, PDF, 12 pages. https://www.stimson.org/2025/mercenaries-in-the-battlespace/

“The Enemy Within” or Handing Small Victories to Russia and China. David Maxwell, a retired SF 06, provides his perspective on a trend that points to the erosion of the nations democratic norms and institutions. He cites the rising public tolerance for political violence, political leader’s calls to use military force at home, and the institutionalization of irregular-warfare concepts for the homeland. We could be delivering a strategic gift to our authoritarian adversaries. “America’s Attack on the Enemy Within: Victory for the Dark Quad’s Political Warfare Strategy”, Small Wars Journal, October 8, 2025.

IW and Commercial Aviation. With its extensive passenger operations, global cargo networks, and huge daily movements, aviation is subject to use by irregular warfare practitioners. Learn more in “Flying the Not so Friendly Skies: Aviation as the New Irregular Warfare Battlefield”, Homeland Security Today, October 9, 2025.

IO, Intelligence, and Cyber

Collection on Propaganda & Psychological Warfare. The Hoover Institution has an unrivaled collection of posters and literature of propaganda from the Communist and Cold War eras. https://www.hoover.org/library-archives/collections/propaganda-psychological-warfare

WWII Museum and Intelligence. A podcast by the National World War II Museum will delve into the wartime tales of espionage and intrigue – highlighting the contributions of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner to the present-day Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). “WWII Museum podcast explores legacy of America’s first intel agency”, Military Times, October 9, 2025.

Hezbollah’s IO Campaign. Since the October 7 Hamas attack and the breakout of hostilities in Gaza, Hezbollah has reshaped its information warfare doctrine. The terrorist group is now leveraging Artificial Intelligence (AI) to modernize its information operations (IO) activities. Read more in an article by Pierre-Yves Baillet in “Hezbollah’s Information Warfare in Post-October 7 Era”, Irregular Warfare Initiative, October 10, 29025.

CT Infrastructure Diminished. Terrorism and violent extremism remains a constant threat in the United Stations. It has grown over the past several years, not decreased. Technology has made the threat of terrorism even greater requiring more assets to counter the threats. Yet in the past year our national security infrastructure that has existed for years to counter these threats have been diminished. “Dismantling counterterrorism infrastructure makes America less safe”, The Hill, October 8, 2025.

Intelligence Aids Proper Acquisition Programs. Specific intelligence on the opponents machines and weapons systems can help commanders fight in a war. Intelligence used to guide the acquisition process prior to conflict can contribute to victory during a war. “Beyond Decision Superiority: The Role of Intelligence in Innovation & Adaptation”, by Michael Borja, War on the Rocks, October 7, 2025.

Vetting of OSS. The U.S. defense community hs been using open source software (OSS) from unvetted foreign contributors. One glaring example was Microsoft’s use of China-based engineers to support its cloud systems. Without security, accountability, and support, using OSS is a ticking time bomb. Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software solutions need to be layered with rigorous enterprise security. Nicolas Chaillan, the former chief software officer for the Air Force and Space Force, provides the details in “The Right Way to Use Open Source in Defense”, Defensescoop, October 7, 2025.

Cyber Performance Enhancement. Members of the 179th Cyberspace Wing (CW) recently took part in the ANG Cyber High Performance Training in June 2025. The event was designed to give the cyber operators a competitive edge – improving human performance and team optimization. “Air National Guard members participate in Cyber High Performance Training”, by Master Sgt. Joseph Harwood, DVIDS, October 8, 2025.

Top CIA Legal Official Dismissed. Deputy Central Intelligence Agency Director Michael Ellis has replaced the agency’s general counsel with himself, the New York Times reported Monday citing people familiar with the matter. Fox guarding the hen house?

Ukraine Conflict

Turning the Tables on Russia. The ‘three day special military operation’ has lasted a lot longer than three days. Russia then settled down into a ‘war of attrition’ after having failed to achieve its objectives using tanks and armored vehicles in maneuver warfare. Ukraine’s continued update in strategy and tactics is keeping Russia from attaining victory on the battlefield. Read more by Robert F. Worth in “How Ukraine Turned the Tables on Russia”, The Atlantic, October 7, 2025. (subscription)

Russian Advances in Warfare. A comprehensive study on how Russia is making advancements in drone warfare. “Russian Force Generation & Technological Adaptations Update”, Institute for the Study of War, October 9, 2025.

Russian Offensive Halted. Howard Altman interviews a Ukrainian field commander about how the latest Russian summer offensive was stopped. “Inside the Fight to Stop Russia’s Biggest Battlefield Advance in a Year”, The War Zone, October 9, 2025.

LL of Ukraine War. Sam Scanlon writes on how the U.S. needs to look beyond the significant changes that first person view drones have brought to land warfare in Ukraine. He argues that there other more important lessons to be learned – to include other innovations across air , land, and sea that the United States can adapt for defense modernization. “Beyond FPVs: Learning the Lessons of the Ukraine War – All of Them”, Modern War Institute at West Point, October 8, 2025.

References:
Interactive Map. Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine by the Institute for the Study of War and Critical Threats. On storymaps.arcgis.com See also https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/maps.html
U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, Congressional Research Service, CRSIF12040, periodically updated, PDF, 3 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12040
Ukraine Conflict, National Security Info. https://www.national-security.info/ukraine-conflict.html

SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, or defense then we are interested.

Asia

Taiwan, IW, and the Mountains. Major Paul Rogers is a Special Forces Officer currently assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School where he is pursuing a Master’s Degree in Defense Analysis. He has provided an excellent analysis of how mountain warfare by a guerrilla force could aid Taiwan in resisting PRC’s possible occupation of Taiwan. About 70% of Taiwan is covered by steep and densely forested mountains as high as 13,000 feet, which create numerous opportunities for irregular warfare. Read more in “The Answers are in the Mountains: Countering Chinese Aggression with Irregular Warfare”, Small Wars Journal, August 29, 2025.

Lessons from Operation Spider’s Web. Drone warfare has certainly changed how nations think about national security and defense. China, with its immense industrial base and autocratic rule, is uniquely poised to learn the lessons from the Ukraine-Russia war and apply them to their national defense strategy. The U.S. should take not and adapt as well in order to meet the increased threats (and opportunities) that this change in warfare. “Imposing Costs in the Indo-Pacific: Lessons from Operation Spider Web”, Irregular Warfare Initiative, October 6, 2025.

Thinking Like Beijing. “In August 2025, 25 international experts gathered at Syracuse University to do something unusual: plan China’s invasion of Taiwan. For two days, academics, policy analysts, and current and former U.S. officials abandoned their typical defensive postures and attempted to inhabit Beijing’s offensive strategic mindset in a wargame. They debated not how America should respond to Chinese aggression, but how China might overcome the obstacles that have so far kept it from attacking the island nation.” The wargame, looked at from the side of the adversary, suggests that China may very likely adopt an alternative pathway to reunification that differs from the massive use of force. “A Wargame to Take Taiwan, from China’s perspective”, War on the Rocks, October 7, 2025.

Pakistan Bombs Kabul. An attempt to eliminate the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief who was located in Afghanistan has presumably failed. In response, the TTP have launched an operation against Pakistan soldiers and policemen. The TTP is a jihadist Pashtun nationalist militant group that operates along the Afghan-Pakistan border. It is an internationally designated terrorist group. The conflict has continued for several days with border posts attacked by both sides. The Taliban have asked for a ceasefire but Pakistan says no; they want to continue to eliminate TTP leadership.

Paragliders in Burma. A motorized paraglider flew over a crowd gathered for a Buddhist celebration and protest against the military and dropped some bombs onto the crowd. At least 26 people died as a result of the 7-minute long attack. Paragliders have become a fixture in the Myanmar’s military to defeat armed resistance groups. “Paragliders: The army’s lethal new weapon in Myanmar’s civil war”, BBC, October 10, 2025.

Thailand’s Southern Insurgency. The insurgency continues in the south of Thailand and the army is changing up its command structure to resolve the situation. “Army Chief reshuffles forces to tackle ‘Southern insurgency'”, The Nation, October 8, 2025.

Afghanistan, Middle East, and Africa

U.S. Hits al Qaeda-Affiliated Target. United States Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that its forces conducted a strike in Syria on October 2nd that killed a member of Ansar al-Islam, an al Qaeda affiliated terrorist group. The U.S. began withdrawing hundreds of military personnel in April 2025.

CAR’s Choice of Mercenaries. Moscow is attempting to phase out the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic and replace them with the Africa Corps. CAR is resisting. “Minerals, Mercenaries, and State Power: CAR’s Choice Between Wagner and Africa Corps”, Lansing Institute, October 7, 2025.

Yemen’s Civil War – No Winners. The civil war in Yemen has lasted over a decade and neither side in the conflict is emerging victorious. Both sides – the Houthi government and the internationally recognized government in Aden are facing huge challenges – economic, political, and military in nature. “Who’s Winning Yemen’s War? No One”, by Joshua Yaphe, National Interest, October 7, 2025.

Mali Gas Shortage. The rebels have made some strides into the interior of Mali. Over the past several days the rebels have set up roadblocks stopping fuel trucks from reaching the capital city. This has resulted in severe gas shortages at filling stations across the country.

Books, Podcasts, Videos, and Movies

Video – Emerald Warrior. U.S. Air Force Air Commandos assigned to Air Force Special Operations Command, Czech Air Force Service members and Royal Air Force service members participated in Emerald Warrior 25.2, Arizona, Nevada and, California, July 21-Aug. 11, 2025. (U.S. Air Force video by Airman 1st Class Luke Hirsch) Posted by DVIDS on 8 October 2025, 2 minutes. (slick video, nice production)

https://www.dvidshub.net/video/984060/emerald-warrior-252

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18. The Strategic Importance of Greenland: The Role of Tactical Missile and Air Defense in the Arctic

Conclusion:

As Arctic threats evolve, Greenland’s strategic role in missile defense must be treated as an operational necessity, not an afterthought. A coordinated U.S.-NATO approach, integrating joint tactical air defense systems and layered sensor networks, outlines the future success criteria essential for safeguarding North America’s Arctic flank. Strengthening the U.S. defensive posture in Greenland today will ensure stability in the future. Strategic defense of the continent must expand to meet the pace of threats developing against the homeland. This is certain and provides a meaningful purpose for strengthening relations with Greenland. What remains less clear is how to fully establish the tactical air defense enterprise needed in the North—one that can adequately protect the strategic air and missile defense assets that are becoming increasingly vital for countering emerging threats.

The Strategic Importance of Greenland: The Role of Tactical Missile and Air Defense in the Arctic

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/10/13/greenland-missile-defense-strategy/

by Troy Bouffard, by Colonel Steven Phillips (ret.), by Dr. James Morton, by Cameron Carlson

10.13.2025 at 06:00am

Introduction

Recent discussions between the United States and Greenland have largely centered on geopolitical issues, but Greenland’s increasing significance in Arctic missile defense demands greater strategic attention. This article examines how Greenland fits into United States (U.S.), North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategic defense frameworks, highlighting key tactical considerations. This article aims to present essential perspectives on joint and multinational defense considerations. As political debate continues regarding U.S. interests in Greenland, we strive to offer theoretical defense insights deliberately separate from other discourse and unconnected to any specific position.

Geographically, Greenland is becoming an increasingly important location for missile defense-related priorities, including North American Defense, U.S. Homeland Defense, Canadian Defense, and Allied Defense. In the context of the North American Arctic, defense capabilities at the western and eastern flanks are well developed and exercised, particularly regarding the Arctic as an avenue of approach for numerous threats. However, the central sector of North American defense (over-the-pole) has not required comprehensive layered defense until recent years. Adversarial threats that could exploit these central gaps continue to grow, potentially exploiting these gaps with recently developed hypersonic cruise missile variants. Greenland’s location, geography, and intrinsic potential for enhancing North American defense must be more carefully understood in strategic context.

The authors of this article focus on tactical considerations for a potential scenario in which a strengthened U.S.-Greenland strategic partnership presents opportunities for enhanced defense. The defense of Arctic strategic assets demands comprehensive integration of all warfighting physical and non-physical domains. When assessing the full spectrum of combat capabilities required to dominate the Arctic battlespace, northern ballistic missile defense architecture and early warning radar networks are critical strategic centers of gravity. These Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) nodes constitute vital strategic terrain that adversaries will target early, and in various methods. Protection of these strategic assets necessitates layered defensive capabilities, primarily through the deployment of robust, cold-weather-adapted short and medium-range air defense (SHORAD/MRAD) systems. Tactical protective measures must be specifically engineered to maintain operational effectiveness where the Arctic operating environment imposes unique logistical and force-projection challenges that defy traditional defense planning assumptions. Ultimately, success in this theater requires specialized Arctic tactical warfare capabilities and proficiency.

Strategic Background

Protecting U.S. missile defense infrastructure in Greenland relies on joint and allied doctrines for integrated air and missile defense. Joint Publication 3-01 (Countering Air and Missile Threats) guides U.S. defensive counterair (DCA) operations, emphasizing a layered air defense with multiple engagement opportunities and 360-degree coverage. This involves a mix of fighters, long- and medium-range surface-to-air missiles, short-range air defense systems, and a robust sensor array. These DCA principles—centralized planning, decentralized execution, and defense-in-depth—apply even in the Arctic’s unique environment.

NATO doctrine echoes similar concepts: NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) is a continuous mission in peace, crisis, and war to safeguard all Alliance territory with a 360-degree approach against air and missile threats. Defensive counterair in the Arctic domain must account for polar avenues of approach and the extreme geography but still follow joint/NATO doctrine by establishing control of the air to protect critical assets. This alignment ensures that U.S. and NATO plans for Arctic operations – including those in Greenland -are consistent with broader IAMD strategies as outlined in NATO policy and U.S. Arctic strategy. These doctrinal principles align with the 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, which emphasizes the North American Arctic—including Greenland—as vital to homeland defense.

The 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy specifically notes that the North American Arctic, including Greenland, is “vital for homeland defense,” hosting aerospace warning and control capabilities for NORAD. It calls for integrated deterrence and improved regional domain awareness – linked to NATO Allies – to keep the U.S. homeland secure. Accordingly, campaign plans should stress that any Arctic DCA plan must integrate with NATO IAMD and Joint IAMD doctrine, ensuring that U.S. short- and medium-range air defenses in Greenland are part of a broader, layered shield consistent with JP 3-01 and NATO principles.

Other strategic requirements will involve how combatant commands (GCCs) oversee and plan to defend Greenland’s missile defense sites. NORAD and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) prioritize homeland defense; threats to a site like Pituffik Space Base (formerly known as Thule) are integral to North American defense despite Greenland lying outside the continental U.S., but is now officially within the USNORTHCOM AOR. The Unified Command Plan currently assigns United States European Command (USEUCOM) responsibility for the European Arctic (Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, etc.). At the same time, USNORTHCOM covers the North American Arctic. This strategic arrangement necessitates close collaboration between two GCCs to ensure the United States is prepared to respond to crises and contingencies in the Arctic. For example, a USEUCOM concept plan (CONPLAN) for a conflict with Russia in the North Atlantic/Arctic would include coordination (operational handoff) with USNORTHCOM to protect the Greenland radar site and surrounding airspace. In an Arctic defense scenario, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) might share missile early warning data from satellites and radar sites in Greenland and coordinate any long-range strike options or reinforcement of missile defense as needed.

In accordance with the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy, each of the relevant combatant command’s (geographical and functional) campaign plans, concept plans (unclassified example) and operational plans (USNORTHCOM unclassified examples) would incorporate Greenland’s air defense through a unified effort: NORAD and USNORTHCOM might handle immediate air threat response as part of homeland defense, USEUCOM could include Greenland in NATO’s regional defense plans, and USSTRATCOM could ensure the defense of the strategic assets, supporting overall deterrence and missile defense architecture. Multi-command oversight guarantees that defending the missile defense hub in Greenland is not an isolated effort, but part of a comprehensive Arctic campaign plan aligned with U.S. homeland defense and allied collective defense.

Tactical Considerations

At the tactical level, protecting a fixed installation like a missile defense radar in Greenland (e.g. Pituffik Space Base: the AN/FPS-132) requires a layered air defense using short- and medium-range systems adapted to Arctic operations. The goal is defense in depth: engaging incoming threats at progressively closer ranges to shield the asset, as part of distributed defense across the North American Arctic. A notional layered setup could include Patriot batteries for medium-range/high-altitude coverage, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) for medium/low-altitude point defense, and SHORAD units (such as Avenger or IM-SHORAD with Stinger missiles, and potentially mobile guns or C-RAM systems) for last-line protection. Joint doctrine (JP 3-01) explicitly calls for combining long-range SAMs, medium-range SAMs, and SHORAD (along with fighter interceptors and electronic warfare) to create overlapping coverage. In the Arctic, this means Patriots might form the upper-tier against higher-flying aircraft or ballistic missiles, while NASAMS (using AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile [AMRAAM] missiles) provides mid-tier defense against cruise missiles or drones, and SHORAD covers any leakers or low-flying threats. All these “shooters” must be managed by a network of integrated sensors tailored to the Arctic domain. Like the entire Circumpolar North, Greenland’s high latitude presents radar coverage challenges. Hence, a mix of sensor types is critical, such as potential early-warning radars at Pituffik SB (for ballistic tracks), deployable air defense radars for low-altitude coverage, and overhead assets like AWACS or over-the-horizon radars. This diverse array of sensors would create a network linking sensors to shooters. Even future Army-owned systems such as Layered Laser Defense (LLD) systems could also factor in as tactical solutions to a strategic defense system.

It is also necessary to remember that the atmospheric conditions in the North American Arctic will have significant impacts on various air defense systems, especially with regards to detection, discrimination, and deployment (countermeasures). Issues such as optical attenuation (reduction in laser power and intensity), radar performance, visual and IR sensors, can be significantly impacted by ice crystals, snow, concentration, humidity, temperature, turbulence, and much more. However, adaptive optics, polarimetric radar, and other technologies could offer promising mitigation solutions to such effects. As a result, plans must account for emerging threats that adversaries could employ in the Arctic as well as the development of integrated defense networks combining various technologies to maintain continuous protection under such challenging environmental circumstances. Moreover, joint doctrine highlights 360-degree coverage to guard against various approaches, since threats may not follow predictable paths. Short/medium-range systems in Greenland would therefore be required and emplaced to cover all approach corridors. Hypersonic cruise missile threats and saturation attacks further complicate challenges, requiring exponentially more sophisticated defense solutions.

The Tactical Way Forward

The defining challenge is the identification and management of the forces (conventional as well as special operations forces) and capabilities required to perform these tactical, air and missile defense-related missions in the extreme, austere northern environments. Component (or possibly joint) elements – presumably under U.S. Army leadership – might have to establish (semi-)permanent air defense protections necessary to defend strategic infrastructure and mission. Just as likely are plans to integrate supplemental air-defense forces based on operational developments, such as crisis scenarios, hybrid threats, gray zone threats, contingencies, or outright conflict.

U.S. land forces and technology will have to embark on a tactical journey yet to be undertaken in the Arctic. The tactical elements as part of the layered defense system will need to meet military readiness standards, managed by DOD assessment and reporting requirements. These developments must be built into the combatant plans previously mentioned, and the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) updated to manage the scheduled movement of forces and resources to Greenland. Few can perform such complex technical mission requirements in the far north. The effective way to achieve the necessary readiness and proficiency in such conditions is to refocus resources, attention, and planning towards the Arctic as a forethought, and not as the afterthought it’s been since the end of the Cold War.

Conclusion

As Arctic threats evolve, Greenland’s strategic role in missile defense must be treated as an operational necessity, not an afterthought. A coordinated U.S.-NATO approach, integrating joint tactical air defense systems and layered sensor networks, outlines the future success criteria essential for safeguarding North America’s Arctic flank. Strengthening the U.S. defensive posture in Greenland today will ensure stability in the future. Strategic defense of the continent must expand to meet the pace of threats developing against the homeland. This is certain and provides a meaningful purpose for strengthening relations with Greenland. What remains less clear is how to fully establish the tactical air defense enterprise needed in the North—one that can adequately protect the strategic air and missile defense assets that are becoming increasingly vital for countering emerging threats.

Tags: air and missile defense, Air defense, Arctic, arctic strategy, NORTHCOM, strategy

About The Authors

Troy Bouffard
Dr. Troy J. Bouffard, U.S. Army (Ret.), has a Masters in Arctic Policy and a Ph.D. in Arctic Defense and Security at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. He is the director of the UAF Center for Arctic Security and Resilience. Dr. Bouffard is a research fellow with the United States Military Academy – Modern War Institute as well as an adjunct professor with the U.S> Army War College. He was also the former Arctic Advisor to U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowski as a congressional fellow. Dr. Bouffard was a defense contractor with USNORTHCOM and ALCOM from 2013-2022. Dr. Bouffard continues to lead projects for the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. He also continues to support various Arctic Council activities, including current efforts involving the Arctic Wildland Fire initiative.
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Colonel Steven Phillips (ret.)
Col. (ret) Stephen Phillips, is UAF staff as the director of the Department of Military and Veteran Services after a 26-year career as a U.S. Army Infantry Officer. Born, raised, and educated in Pennsylvania, Phillips’ military career took him to assignments in Kentucky, Georgia, Washington, Texas, and Virginia, along with numerous combat deployments to both Iraq and Afghanistan. He earned master’s degrees from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Naval War College during his service. Phillips was assigned to Fort Wainwright in 2020 and commanded 1st Brigade of Alaska’s own 11th Airborne Division for two years. In 2022 he was assigned as the deputy commander for Sustainment of the Division, along with holding duties as the commander of Arctic Support Command. Phillips and his spouse, Shea, reside in North Pole. They are raising three young children to embrace the amazing adventures that Alaska offers. Phillips begins work on Dec. 2, 2024.
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Dr. James Morton
Dr. James Morton serves as a Research Associate Professor with the Center for Alaska Native Health Research (CANHR) at the University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF), where my work focuses on advancing our understanding of health and wellness through behavioral and psychological perspectives. His primary research efforts emphasize strength-based approaches to enhancing organizational functioning while reducing suicide risk—particularly among military service members, Veterans, and Native Veterans. His academic background includes a Ph.D. in Counselor Education and Educational Psychology from Southern Illinois University Carbondale (a CACREP-accredited program), as well as master’s degrees in Clinical Mental Health Counseling (University of Missouri–St. Louis) and International Relations (University of Connecticut). He also holds a BA from UConn with a focus on developing countries and the Global South. Prior to my academic and research career, James served in the U.S. Army, retiring at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. His military service included time as an active-duty Special Forces soldier and as an Intelligence Officer within various special operations forces organizations. His final assignment was with Alaskan Command at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER), where he served as a liaison between the Department of Defense and federally recognized tribes.
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Cameron Carlson
Dr. Carlson is the founding director of the UAF Homeland Security and Emergency Management program, which has both an undergraduate and graduate degree. The practitioner-based program focuses on those who either desire or are currently working within the homeland defense, homeland security and or emergency management enterprise. He is also the founding director of CASR and as such helped create the tie between interdisciplinary academic and research scholarship for the growing diversity of security and resilience related concerns such as human, national, climate and energy security. Dr. Carlson is also the founding and now co-principal investigator of the USNORTHCOM/ALCOM Arctic Defense and Security Orientation (ADSO) program started in 2014. ADSO is the primary educational program responsible for baselining DOD knowledge of the Arctic region through an operational focus.

19. Blinding First, Striking Fast: Why the Marine Corps Needs Information Groups

Only minor mentions in passing of information and influence activities and psychological operations. There is insufficient emphasis on the human domain among the population and strategic political leadership.

The conclusion here outlines the main focus, tactical and operational. That is not a criticism of this essay because these capabilities are very much needed. But operations in the information environment go beyond the fight for information dominance against the enemy forces. Who is conducting operations in the information environment among the population and strategic leadership in the human domain?

Excerpt:

Attacking an adversary’s ability to orient has become a theory of victory: it is how marines win the fight for information. Marine expeditionary force information groups need not be a boutique experiment. They demonstrate how to practice maneuver warfare in the 21st century. To seize the initiative in an era of proliferated sensors, AI-enabled networks, and swarming systems, the Corps should task-organize information groups as tailored, multi-domain units of action tied to information coordination centers and support elements. Those capabilities let commanders blind, mislead, and fracture enemy decision cycles while protecting friendly information advantage — enabling multi-domain fires, safeguarding logistics, and opening seams for maneuver.

Blinding First, Striking Fast: Why the Marine Corps Needs Information Groups

Benjamin Jensen and Ian Fletcher

October 13, 2025

warontherocks.com · October 13, 2025

There is an active debate in the U.S. Marine Corps about the value of operations in the information environment as a central aspect of maneuver warfare. Some critics have called new force structure like the Marine expeditionary force information group a failed experiment. Separately, some leaders may be wondering whether marines should alter how they organize for combat. For example, should the Marine air-ground task force include an information combat element?

If war is violent, what do we mean by operations in the information environment? Sticks and stones break your bones, but what about words? They can trick enemies and set them up for a mighty fall. These operations use cyber tools, electronic warfare, deception, operational security, and targeted messaging to deny an adversary the ability to orient and coordinate on the battlefield. Joint doctrine treats these capabilities as central. If the Marine Corps is to be “first to fight,” it must be first to blind, mislead, and deny the enemy the means to respond. And that requires units designed to fight in the information environment.

Yet, while many commanders and staff sections understand the need to destroy, displace, disintegrate, and isolate an enemy physically, some struggle to see how information capabilities support these efforts as a core ingredient of modern combined arms. Each physical effect — whether isolation or destruction — depends on shaping how the enemy sees the battlespace. Know how the enemy sees and decides, blind them, and every strike can break their cohesion. Warfare rewards asymmetry.

We aim to close that gap by analyzing operations in the information environment alongside established military theory and by reviewing recent II Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group experiments with new concepts and task organizations.

We are not neutral. One of us commands the information group discussed. The other has been his longtime collaborator in thinking about how to fight and win by leveraging effects in the information environment. Through this collaboration we have learned that on a transparent battlefield, the most reliable path to advantage is to disorient the enemy: deny their sensors and signals, feed them false indicators, then strike decisively while they search for ghosts or exhaust themselves chasing phantoms. Our experience also shows that some critical aspects of combat are hard to recreate on a training range or in a schoolhouse. It requires broader discussion and dialogue in forums like War on the Rocks.

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What is a Marine Information Group?

The II Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group is a brigade-sized formation that combines intelligence, cyber, space, information activities, communications, and electronic warfare capabilities to support global contingencies ranging from reinforcing embassies and counter terrorism to amphibious operations and large-scale combat. Currently, the Marine Corps fields three of these formations.

The doctrinal basis is Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 8-10, Information in Marine Corps Operations. That publication treats the conversion of raw data into usable knowledge as a core element of combat power. The ability to generate, preserve, protect, and deny information — while disrupting an adversary’s ability to make information into combat power — creates a new form of advantage: systems overmatch. This term describes the technical advantage that accrues to the force better able to harness information to direct fires, maneuver combat formations, protect lines of supply, and make decisions. Winning requires seeing what the opponent cannot and exploiting that edge.

The central idea is that there is a single underlying fight for information in modern war. It links reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance to social media campaigns that shape morale and to cyber operations against enemy command and control systems. Like classic cavalry doctrine, victory depends on retaining freedom of action, hiding what matters from the enemy, developing the situation to clarify intent, and targeting enemy vulnerabilities quickly. In modern military operations envisioned in joint doctrine, this struggle reaches into cyberspace and space — and into a contest of narratives that determines how an adversary perceives and processes information.

The Theory of Victory: Disorientation

This central idea links to the OODA loop — observe, orient, decide, and act. The orient step is a crucial phase of synthesizing observed data by applying new information and mental models — often linked to past experiences and even cultural traditions — to create an understanding of the situation. It involves assessing your position, capabilities, and the environment, identifying gaps or errors in thinking, and forming a hypothesis of how to gain an advantage in time and space.

Operations in the information environment disrupt what an adversary observes through electronic warfare, deception, and operational security measures designed to limit what the enemy can see. Jam their communications. Trick their sensors. Hide your signatures. More important, these operations can reshape orientation by injecting true and false information and by exploiting psychological operations so the enemy acts based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the battlespace. Framed this way, disorienting an opponent is a form of maneuver: create shock and confusion, then exploit the resulting gaps in enemy action.

The Marines aren’t alone in seeing a new role for broad-based information operations that combine cyber, space, intelligence, electronic warfare, deception, and messaging. Joint doctrine names information as one of seven joint functions. In 2024, Adm. Samuel J. Paparo Jr., the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told the Senate that this capability was his number one priority. Specifically, he said “the joint force requires capabilities to blind … see … and kill.” Blinding and seeing are the heart of what doctrine calls information warfare and our vision of disorientation as new theory of victory.

The U.S. Army has likewise introduced concepts for “counter-command and control” warfare and created theater information advantage detachments to provide persistent sensing, targeting, and informational effects. And the Army is buying new equipment. Its Terrestrial Layer System family of systems converges cyber operations, electronic warfare, and signals intelligence to give brigade and division commanders organic tools to degrade enemy networks.

This is not new in concept. Wayne Hughes discussed anti-scouting and command and control countermeasures in Fleet Tactics decades ago, and Cold War maritime planners long debated how to defeat reconnaissance-strike networks that threaten capital ships. NATO even uses the phrase “cognitive warfare” to describe actions that degrade adversary rationality and create systemic fragility. After Desert Storm, analysts called that campaign the “first information war,” and the U.S. military codified command and control warfare in the mid-1990s: attack adversary command and control to blind and disorient their sequencing and response. Along the same lines, the Army integrated signals intelligence-driven targeting and electronic warfare central to Airland Battle with emerging concepts about computer network operations and inform and influence activities.

That history clarifies why the Marine Corps needs units organized to win the fight for information. Prior efforts often struggled since they relegated information operations, broadly defined, to a staff synchronization exercise at higher headquarters. Colonels stuck in endless meetings and removed from the battlefield struggle to respond in a timely manner. The bureaucracy takes its toll. Winning a fight for information requires more. It requires seeing information as a maneuver space, not as bureaucratic debate between competing staff sections. It requires dedicated formations that generate options for gaining operational advantages in the information environment to support offensive and defensive operations. And it needs unity of command under a commander responsible for information operations — not just coordination by a staff section.

This perspective is why II Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group has experimented with reorganizing into more flexible task groups, forces, and elements that can be integrated with expeditionary forces. Each is led by a commander. Each is charged to generate options in the information environment that disorient the enemy. For example, a task unit assigned to support a Marine expeditionary unit might pull signals intelligence Marines from 2nd Radio Battalion, all-source analysts from 2nd Intelligence Battalion, a fires liaison from 2nd Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, expeditionary communications and defensive cyber operators from 8th Communications Battalion, and influence and civil reconnaissance teams from an information maneuver company. This information task unit — led by a major — can provide timely options for the expeditionary commander to attack and protect information in ways that disorient the enemy while conducting amphibious operations.

This design also enables deeper joint and naval integration. The Navy’s information warfare commanders have proved valuable in recent campaigns against the Houthis, where they helped generate battlespace awareness (i.e., observe), deny the enemy easy attack vectors (i.e., disorient), protect command and control (i.e., decide) and synchronize combined kinetic and non-kinetic fires (i.e., act). Embedding similar capabilities with Marine expeditionary units and joint task forces expands options for forward deployed formations. You can fight outnumbered when you fight a blind man by putting a premium on disorientation as a key line of effort.

This vision set the stage for a series of experiments designed to test how to build and integrate specialized units into Marine formations that treat information as a maneuver space. First, in summer 2024, the information group embedded a task element with 2nd Marine Infantry Division to test integrating composite information capabilities — cyber, electronic warfare, psychological operations, and deception — with traditional combined arms. In early 2025, the focus shifted from the division to a regiment to test the ability of smaller detachments to support tactical units in large-scale exercises. In spring 2025, the experiments went international and tested supporting U.S. European Command as part of exercise Joint Viking, with the information group integrating with 10,000 servicemembers from nine different countries to signal NATO’s ability to deter Russia in the high north. The experiments culminated in August 2025 when a task unit from the II Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group completed external certification, signaling wider recognition of its ability to operate.

Why This is Needed to Wage Modern Warfare

Although Marine expeditionary force information groups were activated in 2017, the Marine Corps has a longer lineage of experimenting with information effects. That lineage reaches back to Gen. Al Gray’s intelligence-driven experiments in Vietnam and to surveillance and reconnaissance groups that operated from 1988 to 1999. The pattern is familiar and costly: Wars teach the Marine Corps the value of the fight for information, and peacetime often redirects attention and resources away from it.

The service should not repeat that mistake. Locking in the ability to operate in the information environment requires deliberate organizational and resourcing changes. At the center of the debate is whether to add an information combat element to the Marine air-ground task force. This should happen. You can’t fight on the modern battlefield without the ability to disorient the enemy. It is that simple.

This reform requires also adopting the coordination centers pioneered at the II Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group. These entities serve as the nervous system and brain for operations in the information environment. They monitor trends across the electromagnetic spectrum, data networks, and social media platforms, and deliver regular updates that link deployed units with higher headquarters. Those updates help commanders see the information landscape and take action to influence it and set conditions for follow-on operations.

Using tools like the Maven Smart System and established Marine Corps processes for managing information tasks, coordination centers can both track day-to-day competition in the information environment and provide reach-back support to deployed forces. Crucially, the centers give commanders a single place to synchronize effects, analyze options, and create unity of action.

When competition turns to crisis, these centers use subordinate information support elements that connect theater commanders’ needs to Marine forces preparing to deploy. These elements are aligned to specific threats and geography and perform a modern form of advance force operations in the information environment: securing critical data terrain, confusing an adversary, and shaping conditions while friendly forces close. This model operationalizes longstanding calls to align authorities for information operations across services.

These coordination elements also facilitate joint integration. When an information support element aligns with Army theater information advantage detachments, they can rapidly combine cyber operations, electronic warfare, and signals intelligence alongside deception and strategic communication to disorient the enemy. When marines arrive already integrated with those capabilities and across services, the joint force gains multiple ways to disrupt an adversary’s decision-making and create the systemic shock and dislocation the joint force needs to deploy and attack. Both services need deep sensing and counter-reconnaissance capabilities in the information environment if they are to realize Paparo’s goal of disorienting opposing battle networks like those fielded by China.

Attacking an adversary’s ability to orient has become a theory of victory: it is how marines win the fight for information. Marine expeditionary force information groups need not be a boutique experiment. They demonstrate how to practice maneuver warfare in the 21st century. To seize the initiative in an era of proliferated sensors, AI-enabled networks, and swarming systems, the Corps should task-organize information groups as tailored, multi-domain units of action tied to information coordination centers and support elements. Those capabilities let commanders blind, mislead, and fracture enemy decision cycles while protecting friendly information advantage — enabling multi-domain fires, safeguarding logistics, and opening seams for maneuver.

BECOME A MEMBER

Benjamin Jensen is the Frank E. Petersen chair at the School of Advanced Warfighting, Marine Corps University and the director of the Futures Lab at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Ian Fletcher is a Marine officer currently commanding the II Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group. The article includes comments and suggestions by the marines in his formation.

The views in this article are those of the authors and not those of Marine Corps University, the Defense Department, or any part of the U.S. government.

**Please note, as a matter of house style War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

Image: Lance Cpl. Alexander Hires via U.S. Marine Corps

warontherocks.com · October 13, 2025

20. ‘The Nuclear Age’ Review: The World and the Bomb

An important reminder from Ambassador Bolton:

Excerpt:

Nuclear weapons may seem like yesterday’s news in the world of cyberspace and artificial intelligence, but there is nothing like brute force to bring people back to reality. Mr. Plokhy has written a useful history of how we reached the present; he reminds us why each “next new thing” in other disciplines should not distract us from the continuing existential need to deal with the power of the sun’s nearest relatives here on earth.

‘The Nuclear Age’ Review: The World and the Bomb

Many advocated the internationalization of atomic weaponry after the war. Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle did not.

https://www.wsj.com/arts-culture/books/the-nuclear-age-review-the-world-and-the-bomb-6e90a901

By John Bolton

Oct. 12, 2025 8:12 am ET

The workings of history often seem inevitable: Bygone decisions appear inescapable, and the viability of alternate pathways easily discounted. Recent history is, however, recent—important moments not yet carved in stone. Serhii Plokhy’s “The Nuclear Age” ably presents the variability of political, military and ethical considerations that have been central to decision makers since the dawn of the atomic era in the 1940s.

Grab a Copy

The Nuclear Age: An Epic Race for Arms, Power and Survival

Mr. Plokhy, a professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard University, shows that nuclear theorizing and research were initially international, focused on peaceful rather than military applications. Faced with impending war in the 1930s, however, scientific internationalism fragmented, with physicists reverting to their national allegiances. Breaking the atom was no longer an academic proposition but profoundly threatening. On Oct. 11, 1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was presented with Albert Einstein’s now-famous letter on nuclear science’s wartime potential; Roosevelt saw that the challenge would be “to see that the Nazis don’t blow us up.” As Mr. Plokhy says, nuclear-deterrence strategy was born at that moment.

Subsequent moralizing about nuclear weapons, often by the scientists developing them, pales before Roosevelt’s willingness to act on his gut instinct. Berlin, Tokyo or Moscow might have beaten the U.S. to the atomic bomb, but they didn’t, because, Mr. Plokhy tells us, America was the only country “prepared and affluent enough to take the scientific, financial and, ultimately, military risk” to prevail.

To win World War II, President Harry Truman ordered atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The U.S. electorate believed Truman was right to avoid what Winston Churchill had called the “effusions of American blood” necessary to conquer Japan’s home islands. Any other presidential decision would have been criminal: That is basic democratic morality, notwithstanding unceasing criticism from the high-minded.

The war over, many advocated “internationalizing” atomic weaponry through the United Nations. Churchill disagreed—believing such schemes were futile and ineffective—as did many across the political spectrum. Mr. Plokhy cites the Labour prime minister, Clement Attlee: “The answer to an atomic bomb on London is an atomic bomb on another great city.” Charles de Gaulle rejected a possible Franco-German nuclear weapon to pursue an exclusively French bomb “which is not so much security as independence, a diplomatic advantage that reinforces the status” of France. And Truman did not shrink from building the hydrogen bomb, saying “we have got to have it if only for bargaining purposes with the Russians.”

Considering the persistent failures of the United Nations, it is nearly unimaginable that U.N. bodies could have effectively managed nuclear-weapons technology. The International Atomic Energy Agency is helpful, but when its members disagree politically, it is as paralyzed as the rest of the U.N. galaxy.

Internationalization’s failures foreshadowed the failures of arms control, which frequently founders on mistrust and a lack of effective verification. There have been exceptions, such as the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which bars nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space or underwater. Underground testing, though, is sufficiently difficult to detect that a comprehensive nuclear-testing treaty remains unattainable. Interestingly, Moscow’s resistance to intrusive verification was not always due to its efforts to conceal treaty violations. Mr. Plokhy quotes Nikita Khrushchev’s worry that Americans “would have discovered that we were in a relatively weak position, and that realization might have encouraged them to attack us.” So much for the “missile gap” that figured so prominently in John F. Kennedy’s 1960 presidential campaign.

Today, fierce disputes between Moscow and Washington about limiting weapons and delivery systems have become exponentially more difficult with Beijing’s rise as a near-peer competitor. China’s increasing warhead levels are creating a tripolar nuclear world, upsetting all the weapons requirements, deterrence strategies and arms-control formulas of the previously bipolar world. If arms control was implausible between two players, imagine adding a third.

The corollary to superpower arms-control efforts was preventing proliferation. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been helpful, but its most successful years are behind it. During the Cold War, the NPT provided mechanisms, for the West at least, to restrain the spread of nuclear technology—America’s strategy of “extended deterrence” offered its nuclear umbrella to allies, thus presenting a tacit counterproliferation strategy. Nonetheless, rogue states proceeded toward nuclear-power status through determination and subterfuge. Mr. Plokhy examines the range of successful nuclear proliferators, from India and Pakistan to Israel, Iran and North Korea. The record is increasingly discouraging—Western rhetoric has produced very little effective action.

Fear of using force against rogue states’ nuclear programs has often paralyzed decision makers until it was too late. Consider the original rogue state, China. At different times, both Washington and Moscow considered using force against Beijing’s nuclear program. Kennedy suggested it to Russia in 1963 but did not receive a positive response. Moscow suggested it to Nixon in 1969, and this time it was America that was not interested. Had the stars aligned differently, history would have been radically altered.

When the U.S. finally did deploy real force against a rogue state earlier this year, joining Israel’s assault against Iran’s nuclear-weapons facilities, it scored real successes but stopped too soon. Whether the use of force against other rogue states might now be appealing remains to be seen.

Nuclear weapons may seem like yesterday’s news in the world of cyberspace and artificial intelligence, but there is nothing like brute force to bring people back to reality. Mr. Plokhy has written a useful history of how we reached the present; he reminds us why each “next new thing” in other disciplines should not distract us from the continuing existential need to deal with the power of the sun’s nearest relatives here on earth.

Mr. Bolton, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, served as national security adviser from April 2018 to September 2019.

Appeared in the October 13, 2025, print edition as 'The World And the Bomb'.

21. Why Gradualism Can Help in Gaza

Excerpt:

By adopting a phased agreement, the Trump administration has been able to get both sides to halt a terrible conflict and come to the table. The challenge now is to galvanize the deal’s international backers to put in place what is necessary to sustain the agreement, regardless of the resistance it may face in both Israel and the Palestinian territories. Having fought a brutal war, both sides need to understand that the cost of failure is too high—and the benefits of compliance, however messy, too great—for the deal to collapse. But it will have to happen one step at a time.

Why Gradualism Can Help in Gaza

Foreign Affairs · More by Amr Hamzawy · October 13, 2025

Phased Peace Agreements Have Worked Before in the Middle East

Amr Hamzawy

October 13, 2025

Displaced Palestinians returning to northern Gaza, October 2025 Mahmoud Issa / Reuters

AMR HAMZAWY is Senior Fellow and Director of the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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As Western and international leaders take stock of the cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas that was signed in Egypt on October 9, many have raised doubts about the deal’s phased structure. According to the 20-point plan announced by U.S. President Donald Trump, the initial stage that is now unfolding calls only for a partial or limited Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the release of nearly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the release of the remaining Israeli hostages held by Hamas. The deeper issues, including questions over the postwar governance of Gaza and the stabilization force that will provide security in the territory, have been relegated to subsequent phases. To critics, the fact that these crucial issues have not been fully addressed at the outset suggests that the plan is bound to fail.

But the Trump plan’s gradualism is hardly novel in the context of crisis diplomacy in the Middle East. To the contrary, a phased approach, addressing the challenges of both immediate de-escalation and long-term transitional management, has for decades been the most viable strategy to ending conflicts in the region. Indeed, for more than 75 years, many of the most crucial peace agreements, including the armistice that ended the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979, have depended on such a structure. In both of these cases, preliminary agreements were followed by implementation phases, which required international or regional sponsorship to mobilize the political and technical tools needed to ensure compliance.

A close study of these historical examples shows that under the right conditions, phased agreements can not only withstand difficult challenges but also provide the incremental trust building and opportunities for negotiation that are necessary for more durable arrangements to take hold. The real challenge for the Trump plan, then, is not its phased structure. Rather, the overriding question is whether Washington and its international and regional partners can ensure that the necessary mechanisms, incentives, and penalties are in place to allow the subsequent steps the plan calls for to succeed.

LIMITED AIMS, GREATER DURABILITY

Phased peace agreements have a long history in the Middle East. Take the 1949 armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The agreements were not final peace settlements but arrangements to halt fighting and establish Israel’s de facto border, the so-called Green Line. The main function of the agreements was to provide space for de-escalation so that the groundwork for a transition to broader diplomatic arrangements could be established. Yet the agreements also contained practical mechanisms—field committees, UN monitoring, rules for prisoner exchanges, and provisions for humanitarian assistance.

In short, the armistice agreements created a temporary structure for the peaceful management of conflict in the Middle East, one that could either evolve or collapse depending on internal pressures and external guarantees. The 1949 agreements established a relative peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors that lasted until 1967, with the exception of the Suez crisis of 1956, in which France, Israel, and the United Kingdom invaded Egypt following the nationalization of the Suez Canal. The agreements’ long-term success owed to the fact they were was backed by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States and monitored by UN missions, including a peacekeeping force at the Egyptian-Israeli border.

Phased agreements became even more important in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. It was in that era that mediation efforts became faster and more active: the shuttle diplomacy pursued by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger led to successive disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and later between Israel and Syria. Each of these agreements was limited in military scope, involving only troop withdrawals, the creation of demilitarized zones, and measures to open communication channels and exchange prisoners. These steps resulted not from getting the belligerents to agree on an overarching settlement for a postwar order but rather from active U.S. sponsorship and technical enforcement of the agreements’ aims.

In the case of Israel and Egypt, the disengagement agreements laid the groundwork for subsequent peace negotiations that culminated in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979. In the case of Israel and Syria, the disengagement agreement signed in 1974 became a pillar of talks between the two parties in the early 1990s, when the United States and the Soviet Union launched the Madrid Peace Process for the Middle East, and is now once again at the core of the de-escalation negotiations between the Israeli government and Damascus.

In each of those instances, the United States did not stop mediating the moment an agreement was signed. Since U.S. officials were strongly invested in these deals and knew that American influence was at stake, Washington followed up with negotiation teams, diplomatic pressure, and aid or security packages to make sure the agreements did not collapse and could be reinforced in subsequent phases. The peace agreement between Israel and Hamas can be read in this light: the prominent involvement and leadership of the Trump administration in drafting and announcing the deal increases the likelihood that the United States will do what is necessary to ensure that the first phase leads to sustainable progress in successive stages.

THE SLOW PATH TO PEACE

Phased agreements can also lead to major breakthroughs. Among the most significant peace agreements since World War II were the Camp David accords, which led directly to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The accords did not seek an immediate resolution of all issues. Rather, they offered two frameworks, one for comprehensive peace between Israel and Egypt and another to address the Palestinian question and set the stage for future negotiations for Palestinian self-governance in the West Bank and Gaza. Although the latter was never fully implemented, by separating out these two tracks, the accords dialed down internal pressure in both countries and enabled the treaty to move forward.

Crucially, the accords were also accompanied by a U.S. commitment to facilitate negotiations, furnish aid to both countries, and ensure the parties’ compliance. The treaty that followed the Camp David talks was, notably, implemented in stages, beginning with gradual withdrawals and territorial exchanges. American sponsorship of the treaty went well beyond the signing of the deal. To induce compliance, Washington provided not only diplomatic support but also extensive economic and military assistance to both sides. U.S. troops also participated in a multinational peacekeeping force along the border.

As the case of Egypt and Israel in the years after the 1973 war demonstrates, when phased agreements are coupled with concrete international commitments—including economic and security guarantees and the deployment of international peacekeeping or monitoring forces—an initial de-escalation and stabilization phase can lay the foundation for a broader and enduring transformation. Today, peace between Egypt and Israel remains one of the pillars of stability in the Middle East.

Phased agreements can lead to major breakthroughs.

Another example of successful phased diplomacy is the 1994 Wadi Araba Treaty between Israel and Jordan. As with the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, it was carried out not in a single stroke but in successive stages. These phases included border demarcation; the reduction of each side’s military presence along their shared border; arrangements for water sharing in the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers and in the Araba region; economic cooperation, including the establishment of a free-trade zone; and successive security arrangements. Throughout this process, the United States acted as both the guarantor at the signing of the treaty and as an ongoing provider of guarantees and incentives to both sides. The success of the Wadi Araba Treaty was relative; in some areas, such as water-sharing arrangements and economic cooperation, its achievements have been limited. But overall, it demonstrated that bilateral agreements, when undergirded by long-term cooperation mechanisms and clearly articulated subsequent phases, can evolve into a sustainable system for managing complex conflicts—even ones that contain issues that resist final resolutions.

Of course, not all phased agreements have been successful. Consider the Oslo accords. When Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed the accords in 1993, the goal was to establish a multistage plan for enduring peace. Mutual recognition was to be followed by an interim stage, in which the newly created Palestinian Authority would govern the West Bank and Gaza, and Israeli troops would redeploy as Palestinian civil and security control gradually expanded. No later than the third year of the interim stage, permanent-status negotiations were to tackle issues such as borders, Israeli settlements, Palestinian refugees, and the status of Jerusalem. But the plan soon fell prey to shifting internal dynamics on both sides. Hard-line groups in Israel and in the Palestinian territories rejected the deal, and provocations led to renewed violence, causing the accords to unravel.

The larger lesson, however, was not about phasing but about implementation. The accords lacked the kinds of international commitments and effective enforcement tools necessary to ensure their survival under intense countervailing forces. The United States was not proactively involved in guaranteeing a good faith implementation of the plan, and there was no framework of incentives and sanctions to ensure compliance and progression. In the end, the Oslo accords largely failed not because they envisioned a gradual process but because that process was not sufficiently supported by the kinds of mechanisms, incentives, and pressure needed for success. Similarly, the January 2025 cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, a phased agreement that was meant to end the war in Gaza, also failed because of the absence of sustained U.S. involvement and the lack of regional and international pressures on Israel not to restart the war.

ENFORCED FLEXIBILITY

As Israel and Hamas undertake the first steps of the cease-fire, there is enormous hope that a more lasting settlement for Gaza can emerge. As these examples make clear, however, such an outcome is unlikely to happen on its own. As with previous phased agreements, the Gaza deal will require several decisive factors for continued success.

The first of these is sustained international and regional sponsorship. This means not merely the presence of the United States during the signing and the opening phase but also a clear commitment from Washington over the coming weeks that it will follow up, provide incentives, and impose sanctions when one or the other side fails to comply.

The presence of effective monitoring mechanisms is also critical. These may include joint committees, international monitoring missions, and possibly international peacekeeping forces. The Trump plan envisions an international stabilization force that will be tasked with various security duties, including overseeing the disarmament of Hamas. This force will also need to coordinate with humanitarian organizations to ensure the rapid provision of urgent relief. Without such concrete forms of international engagement, the deal may quickly erode.

Equally important, the United States and its international partners should tie specific incentives and sanctions to each phase of the deal. These could include postwar reconstruction, economic aid, security guarantees, and long-term diplomatic promises offered as inducements for compliance. Washington and its international and regional partners will need to manage local expectations, including by reassuring or accommodating influential domestic actors within both Israel and the Palestinian territories.

The Gaza deal will require sustained international and regional sponsorship.

Finally, as past agreements have shown, flexibility is the key. Given the complex nature of regional conflicts, an overly rigid plan is not likely to yield long-term success, whereas a plan amenable to modification would allow for further negotiation, mediation, and corrective measures in the face of implementation impasses or failures. Each side may be tempted to use negotiations to avoid going forward with the more difficult phases of the deal, but the flexible nature of the agreement can allow international and regional mediators to create new incentives for compliance.

International and regional guarantors of the Gaza agreement must work to transform it into a detailed road map with measurable timelines, joint monitoring committees, reporting mechanisms for violations, and international peacekeeping forces. This will require sustained diplomatic engagement from Washington; regional actors such as Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey; and European countries and UN agencies.

To ensure successful transitions from one phase of the agreement to the next, the United States and its partners should offer both Israel and the Palestinians a broad range of incentives for compliance—and threaten significant sanctions for violations. For example, they can offer to reduce Israel’s current diplomatic isolation in the Middle East and threaten to impose greater restrictions on arms sales. With regard to Hamas, disarmament can go hand in hand with a gradual rehabilitation of its rank and file (not the leadership), integrating them in the medium and lower strata of the newly built civilian administration for Gaza. To avoid Hamas’ non-compliance with the provisions of the agreement, the United States and its partners can threaten a more immediate and aggressive destruction of the movement’s remaining military and financial capabilities.

By adopting a phased agreement, the Trump administration has been able to get both sides to halt a terrible conflict and come to the table. The challenge now is to galvanize the deal’s international backers to put in place what is necessary to sustain the agreement, regardless of the resistance it may face in both Israel and the Palestinian territories. Having fought a brutal war, both sides need to understand that the cost of failure is too high—and the benefits of compliance, however messy, too great—for the deal to collapse. But it will have to happen one step at a time.

Foreign Affairs · More by Amr Hamzawy · October 13, 2025

22. The Coming AI Backlash: How the Anger Economy Will Supercharge Populism

The "anger economy." (exaggerated grievances communicated well?)

Excerpts:

Many of these findings seem to bode poorly for both the future of work and the future of democracy. But as our survey findings show, the right course of action—retraining, regulation, and social welfare—is also the one that people want most. If they want to respond to popular demand, policymakers could pass laws establishing and funding retraining programs that teach workers how to work alongside AI systems, develop skills in sectors less susceptible to automation, or transition into new roles created by AI. They could set up new income support programs for people caught between jobs. Finally, they could pass laws that regulate AI by requiring transparency in automated decision-making, mandating human oversight for high-stakes applications, and establishing liability frameworks for AI-caused harms, which would slow the most disruptive applications and ensure safer deployment without stifling innovation. Governments could pay for these proposals by taxing large AI companies. This would ensure that the businesses that profit from disruption also help manage its consequences.

These policies would not only help millions of workers. They could also help restore faith in government. By acknowledging workers who lose their employment to AI and offering them assistance, officials would demonstrate to voters that the state can, in fact, address their needs. In doing so, politicians would bolster their own political fortunes. According to research by the political economist Yotam Margalit, during the George W. Bush administration, incumbent parties performed better in counties where a larger share of laid-off workers qualified for retraining programs—evidence that voters’ access to government support mutes their potential political backlash to job loss. (The United States has funded retraining programs, but not nearly enough.)

Time, however, is running out. AI adoption is accelerating, and its deleterious effects on employment are no longer a speculative problem. They are already widespread and they will only accelerate in the months to come. Adaptive policies, meanwhile, will take years to yield results. If governments want to protect their economies—and themselves—they must act now.

The Coming AI Backlash

Foreign Affairs · More by Beatrice Magistro · October 13, 2025

How the Anger Economy Will Supercharge Populism

October 13, 2025

An anti-AI sign in San Francisco, California, July 2025 Carlos Barria / Reuters

BEATRICE MAGISTRO is Assistant Professor of AI Governance at Northeastern University.

SOPHIE BORWEIN is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia.

R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ is Flintridge Foundation Professor of Political and Computational Social Science and a Founding Co-Director of the Linde Center for Science, Society, and Policy at the California Institute of Technology.

BART BONIKOWSKI is Associate Professor of Sociology and Politics at New York University.

PETER JOHN LOEWEN is Harold Tanner Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and Professor of Government at Cornell University.

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The AI economic transformation has begun. In May, IBM declared that it had fired hundreds of employees and replaced them with artificial intelligence chatbots. Over the summer, Salesforce let go of large numbers of people thanks to AI; UPS, JPMorgan Chase, and Wendy’s are also slashing head counts as they automate more functions. College graduates are having a harder time finding entry-level jobs than they have in nearly a decade. And these trends are just the beginning. In survey after survey, corporations across the world say that they plan on using AI to transform their workforces.

Artificial intelligence will likely create new employment opportunities even as it disrupts existing ones, and economists disagree on whether the net effect will be job losses, job gains, or simply restructuring. But whatever the long-term consequences are, AI will soon become a major political issue. If there is significant disruption, officials will be confronted by workers furious about jobs lost to machines. Voters will make their frustrations known at the ballot box. Politicians will therefore have to come up with plans for protecting their constituents, and fast.

To create an effective strategy for addressing large-scale AI disruption, however, policymakers will need to understand how workers themselves perceive the technological threat. In November 2023, we surveyed 6,000 Americans and Canadians to gauge their level of concern about AI-induced mass layoffs and how the government should deal with the issue. Our findings revealed the scale of the challenge: respondents ranked fears about AI taking their jobs ahead of all other concerns about the technology, including its potential for military use.

When it comes to policy preferences, though, there is ground for both optimism and pessimism. On the positive side of the ledger, most respondents favored measures like retraining programs and expanded safety nets—technocratic fixes that economists believe can work. But on the negative side, many also supported new trade restrictions and immigration barriers, strategies that could make the problem even worse and that governments may well be tempted, for political reasons, to adopt. Multiple countries, after all, responded to the layoffs created by offshoring with harsh tariffs and more deportations—even though neither technique worked. If they are serious about solving the problem and not incurring another round of populist backlash, policymakers should start rolling out the right responses now, before AI layoffs ramp up and while the most effective solutions still command widespread support.

THEORY AND PRACTICE

To determine how voters want the government to manage AI layoffs, we did not conduct a simple poll. Instead, we wrote up 81 scenarios involving either AI adoption or offshoring in which the economic shock had different effects on employment and prices. In one scenario, for instance, AI reduced smartphone prices by 50 percent while eliminating 25 percent of factory jobs and creating 25 percent more data science positions; in another, prices remained unchanged while customer service jobs decreased by 25 percent and factory employment stayed constant. We then gave respondents four of these scenarios to examine, each randomly chosen. We also presented respondents with a menu of possible policy responses—retraining programs, an expansion of the safety net, regulations to govern the economic shock they had seen (either AI deployment or offshoring), trade barriers, and immigration restrictions—and asked whether they supported each one. Respondents were randomly asked to evaluate either AI or offshoring scenarios, not both, allowing us to compare whether voters responded differently to domestic technological change versus foreign competition, and whether similar economic tradeoffs generated similar policy preferences across different types of disruption.

The results were clear. Regardless of what political party they belonged to, respondents in both countries ranked worker retraining as their preferred policy. Average support clocked in at four out of five, where one represents strong opposition and five strong support. Regulation of AI was the second most popular policy, also with broad support across the political spectrum. Expanding social spending, meanwhile, came in third—albeit with much less support among Republicans in the United States and slightly less support from conservatives in Canada.

These outcomes were encouraging. Ask economists what policy they would recommend in response to AI-driven layoffs, and most would say retraining, regulation, or social insurance. The logic is simple. Technological change can be slowed, but it is almost impossible to stop, and so the best thing governments can do for affected citizens is to give them new skills, set sensible guardrails, and create new unemployment benefits.

The problem is that governments today rarely put these policies into practice. In response to recent economic shocks, such as when trade slashed manufacturing jobs from wealthy countries, most states did not set up large retraining systems. The regulatory picture is equally grim. Despite the AI boom, few governments have passed comprehensive legislation related to AI—the European Union’s AI Act being the notable exception. And safety-net expansions look even less likely, particularly at a time when many governments are laden with debt. In fact, Washington is slashing social programs, including public health insurance and nutritional assistance, as part of U.S. President Donald Trump’s signature One Big Beautiful Bill Act.

Optimists might hope that as AI-induced disruption increases, policymakers will feel compelled to invest in retraining, social programs, regulations, or some combination thereof. But history suggests that the pressure to regulate and compensate could actually wane as the years go by. When it comes to economic dislocation, politicians face what social scientists call time-inconsistency problems. Before a disruptive technology is widely adopted—or a trade agreement is signed—those who stand to benefit have strong incentives to promise compensation to those who will lose out, in order to secure political buy-in. But once the technology is deployed or the agreement is in place, the incentives to follow through evaporate. Reversing the change becomes too costly for the state. The balance of power often shifts decisively toward the winners, who no longer need to placate the losers. The result is that compensation gets underfunded, poorly implemented, or abandoned altogether.

FALSE PROMISE

The biggest risk, however, may not be that governments will ignore effective fixes. It is that they will adopt policies that will backfire. Many politicians, particularly on the populist right, might respond to AI layoffs by trying to restrict immigration and trade—just as they have to past economic problems.

If they do, the argument will be straightforward. If a government can’t shield its people from competition by robots, then at least it can protect them from competition by foreigners. But this zero-sum logic does not hold up in practice. Virtually every piece of research suggests that restricting immigration and trade will not stop companies from adopting AI. In fact, it may hasten layoffs. Reducing trade, for example, will raise input costs, shrink export markets, and heighten policy uncertainty—pressures that make labor-saving technologies like automation more attractive in exposed industries. Reducing immigration will further encourage AI use by increasing labor costs.

Analysts can try to make these likely consequences clear to voters. But protectionism often polls quite well, and substantial numbers of people already support such steps as responses to AI shocks. Overall, support for immigration restrictions averaged 3.4 out of 5.0 in our survey, while trade restrictions averaged 3.2. Among Republicans, the pattern is even more striking: support for immigration restrictions averaged 4.0 out of 5.0, making it their single most popular policy response, even higher than retraining. Trade restrictions came in at 3.5 among Republicans, roughly equal to retraining and well ahead of social spending. If AI layoffs keep rising, those figures could prove to be low-water marks. According to a study by the political scientist Nicole Wu, when Americans are told that robots threaten employment, Republicans become markedly more hostile to immigrants while Democrats turn against trade. Almost no one favors slowing the pace of AI itself.

There are other reasons why politicians might turn to exclusionary policies. One is that there are comparatively few barriers to implementing these kinds of measures. To set up and fund retraining programs, regulate AI, or expand social welfare, most governments would need to pass legislation and appropriate significant amounts of government spending. Deporting migrants, by contrast, rarely requires fresh laws, and can thus be done relatively quickly. Another is that immigration restrictions and tariffs yield clearly measurable results—thousands of foreigners gone, hundreds of millions of dollars in tariff revenue—in ways that other policies do not. Finally, nativism and protectionism offer voters someone or something to blame. It is easier, after all, to be angry at foreign workers and foreign products than it is to be angry at technological progress.

If voters embrace nativist policies in response to AI, they are unlikely to revert to more effective solutions. According to research on European democracies by the political scientists Alan Jacobs and Mark Kayser, when people negatively affected by economic change turn to far-right parties, they tend to stick with them. Politicians who profit by peddling anti-immigrant or anti-trade rhetoric certainly have few incentives to bring voters back to the center. In fact, some states and parties that have traditionally been hostile to immigration, including the Japanese government, are even outwardly promoting AI as a substitute for foreign workers.

GET AHEAD

Many of these findings seem to bode poorly for both the future of work and the future of democracy. But as our survey findings show, the right course of action—retraining, regulation, and social welfare—is also the one that people want most. If they want to respond to popular demand, policymakers could pass laws establishing and funding retraining programs that teach workers how to work alongside AI systems, develop skills in sectors less susceptible to automation, or transition into new roles created by AI. They could set up new income support programs for people caught between jobs. Finally, they could pass laws that regulate AI by requiring transparency in automated decision-making, mandating human oversight for high-stakes applications, and establishing liability frameworks for AI-caused harms, which would slow the most disruptive applications and ensure safer deployment without stifling innovation. Governments could pay for these proposals by taxing large AI companies. This would ensure that the businesses that profit from disruption also help manage its consequences.

These policies would not only help millions of workers. They could also help restore faith in government. By acknowledging workers who lose their employment to AI and offering them assistance, officials would demonstrate to voters that the state can, in fact, address their needs. In doing so, politicians would bolster their own political fortunes. According to research by the political economist Yotam Margalit, during the George W. Bush administration, incumbent parties performed better in counties where a larger share of laid-off workers qualified for retraining programs—evidence that voters’ access to government support mutes their potential political backlash to job loss. (The United States has funded retraining programs, but not nearly enough.)

Time, however, is running out. AI adoption is accelerating, and its deleterious effects on employment are no longer a speculative problem. They are already widespread and they will only accelerate in the months to come. Adaptive policies, meanwhile, will take years to yield results. If governments want to protect their economies—and themselves—they must act now.

Foreign Affairs · More by Beatrice Magistro · October 13, 2025

23. NATO special forces head to the Arctic

NATO special forces head to the Arctic

ukdefencejournal.org.uk · October 11, 2025

U.S. Special Operations Forces will join Danish, Norwegian and Swedish counterparts in Norway and Sweden from 12–29 October for Exercise Adamant Serpent 26, a U.S. Special Operations Command Europe–led Arctic and sub-Arctic drill aimed at sharpening rapid response and allied interoperability.

Running annually since 2021, Adamant Serpent will bring nearly 400 personnel together to apply “modern tactical warfighting techniques” across dispersed training areas in both nations. The scenario stresses swift deployment, integration and sustainment in harsh climates, reflecting the alliance’s renewed focus on the High North and Baltic approaches.

“Adapting to modern warfare requires a united front,” said Lt Gen Richard Angle, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command Europe. “Exercise Adamant Serpent demonstrates the robust partnership between the U.S. and our NATO Allies as we collaborate to address challenges in the High North.”

He added that SOF provide “critical capabilities that address complex security challenges in response to adversarial aggression.”

Norway will host significant infrastructure and ranges, including at Rygge Air Base, underpinning multi-domain serials with air support. “Adamant Serpent is a very strategic exercise and with current global security dynamics, this gives a realistic backdrop,” said Brig Gen Thomas Harlem of the Norwegian Air Force Warfare Center. “The interoperability with U.S. and Allied forces, combined with air support, is important to secure the High North.”

Sweden, now integrated into NATO planning, will contribute training areas to test mobility, logistics and joint effects in demanding terrain. “Hosting exercises such as these is important for us for many reasons,” said Lt Gen Carl-Johan Edström, Chief of the Defence Staff, Swedish Armed Forces. “It enhances our operational effect, and it shows our shared commitment to the security of the Baltic Sea Region and the High North.”

Organisers say the focus is on cohesive SOF task groups able to deploy, deter and, if required, fight alongside conventional forces, while validating communications, sustainment and cold-weather survivability. The exercise sits alongside a wider pattern of allied Arctic activity and complements standing air policing and maritime vigilance across NATO’s northern flank.

Adamant Serpent 26 underscores a simple premise: preparedness in the High North cannot be improvised. As Lt Gen Angle put it, the exercise is designed to reinforce the ability to “deploy, fight, and win as a unified, multinational force” before a crisis arrives.

ukdefencejournal.org.uk · October 11, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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