Rendering of the Future National Museum of Intelligence and Special Operations

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners
 
 

Quotes of the Day:


"The habits of a vigorous mind are formed in contending with difficulties. Great necessities call out great virtues."
– Doris Kearns Goodwin, Leadership: In Turbulent Times

“That's the whole challenge of life - to act with honor and hope and generosity, no matter what you've drawn. You can't help when or what you were born, you may not be able to help how you die; but you can - and you should - try to pass the days between as a good man.”
~ Sam Damon in “Once an Eagle” by Anton Myrer

"I learned this, at least, by my experiment; that if one advances confidently in the direction of his dreams, and endeavors to live the life which he has imagined, he will meet with a success unexpected in common hours." 
– Henry David Thoreau, from Walden


1. The Curious Case of the U.S. Government’s Influence on 20th-Century Design

2. The Future Faces of Irregular Warfare: Great Power Competition in the 21st Century

3. Why Lasers Could Be Kryptonite for Drones

4. Scale of Chinese Spying Overwhelms Western Governments

5. Ukraine Faces Bleak Winter as Russia Ramps Up Assaults, U.S. Support Trickles In

6. Trump Suggests Using National Guard Against ‘Enemy from Within’ on Election Day

7. Washington’s Nightmare

8. Worldwide Efforts to Reverse the Baby Shortage Are Falling Flat

9. What Really Fueled the ‘East Asian Miracle’?

10. US will send a missile defense system and troops to run it to Israel to aid defense against Iran

11. China’s aggression tests US pact to defend Philippines

12. Killing of Japanese Boy Leaves Chinese Asking: Is This My Country?

13. Israel must destroy the Iranian nuclear project - opinion

14. Vladimir Putin’s spies are plotting global chaos

15. In Iceland, a hunt for Russian submarines and deeper U.S. relations

16.  Bolton: Odds that Trump would withdraw from NATO very high

17. China carries out 'total Taiwan blockade' drills

18. Trump requests military aircraft and vehicles amid Iran threat

19. America’s Foreign Policy Inertia

20. Cyber Transparency and the Restoration of U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability





1. The Curious Case of the U.S. Government’s Influence on 20th-Century Design


In honor of the OSS Donovan Award Dinner this week on October 19th I'm reposting this to remind us of the long lasting influence of the OSS on so much of our society.


RSVP for the Dinner  HERE The LTG Patrick Huges will be honored with the Donovan Award.


Perhaps we need to bring back the OSS so we can rebuild the reputation of government service for the good of our nation.


Of course as always, the article focuses on OSS as being the :direct precursor" of the CIA and the IC and fails to mention that it is also the direct precursor to US Special Operations Command.


This is one of the reasons why Congress has established that there will be a National Museum of Intelligence and Special Operations. Congress also authorized a Congressional Gold Medal for the OSS. The OSS Society continues to raise private funds for the establishment. of the National Museum. https://nationalintelligencemuseum.org/



This article is a deep dive into the OSS’s lasting influence.


“The look of these projects was subsequently so absorbed by postwar America, and by the private sector in particular, that it remains easy to overlook the Presentation Branch of the O.S.S. as a birthplace not just for contemporary design as we know it but for the way we now conduct professional life.”



The Curious Case of the U.S. Government’s Influence on 20th-Century Design

Known for its intelligence-gathering operations during World War II, the O.S.S. also helped shape the look of modern life.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/11/t-magazine/us-government-20th-century-design.html

 

Published Dec. 11, 2019Updated Dec. 18, 2019


A design by Eero Saarinen’s O.S.S. team for a State Department presentation room, which helped create the template for the situation room. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration

 

THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES was the first centralized foreign intelligence agency in the United States, the direct precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency. Founded during World War II by order of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the O.S.S. (or the Coordinator of Information, as it was originally called) was established “to collect, analyze, and correlate information and data bearing on national security, to make such data available to the President and such other officials as determined by the President, and to perform related supplementary activities.” And yet its role soon became much larger and more influential. The head of the O.S.S., Colonel William “Wild Bill” Donovan, quickly realized that the information produced by the global war, fought on multiple fronts and territories, needed to be painstakingly abstracted, graphically depicted and efficiently presented. The O.S.S. mission expanded to include not only information gathering through research and counterintelligence but also packaging and interpreting that information for the president and other key decision makers. 


Propaganda played a crucial role during World War II, with the O.S.S. leading efforts to demoralize the enemy and encourage resistance in Axis-controlled countries. They created a stamp bearing the face of Hitler rendered as a skull, produced radio broadcasts in German, spread pamphlets announcing a German general’s resignation and made films for new military recruits, such as the Hollywood producer Darryl F. Zanuck’s circa 1943 “Organization of the Army,” which was commissioned by General George C. Marshall. Through its manipulation of the art of information, the agency helped shape the look and philosophy of American imperialism. In doing so, the O.S.S. assembled a concentration of acumen and talent that rivaled those of the iconic schools and institutes that propagated design in the 20th century. It was the Bauhaus, but for war.

 

In his previous career as a lawyer, the exceptionally charismatic Donovan had been an enthusiast for the latest presentation techniques, like color pamphlets, which at the time were visionary. He brought these interests with him to the O.S.S., whose main headquarters were in Washington, D.C. “This type of warfare,” Donovan said in a speech before the House Appropriations Committee in 1944, “is largely fought underground and behind the enemy’s lines. … The typical field of operations of O.S.S. is those places where our armed forces are not in control — the various no-man’s lands.”

 

These “no-man’s lands” — the mercurial battlefields of espionage and morale generally — observed no disciplinary boundaries and few political niceties. Donovan and his colleagues were voracious for knowledge: They hired pioneering anthropologists and exiled German Marxists and adventurous filmmakers (the director John Ford, who had already won three Academy Awards by the time America entered the war, was an O.S.S. employee) to help with information campaigns. In her 2011 book, “A Covert Affair: Julia Child and Paul Child in the O.S.S.,” the journalist Jennet Conant wrote that the agency “had the lenient, idiosyncratic atmosphere of a small college, with the same tolerance for campus radicals, zealots and oddballs.” The office earned the nickname “Oh So Social” for its high concentration of Ivy Leaguers and also, possibly, for the relationships that blossomed under its auspices. Julia McWilliams, an O.S.S. employee, met her husband, Paul Child, a graphic designer, while they were both stationed in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka).

 

But while the O.S.S. is known for its intelligence-gathering operations and its dissemination of propaganda in enemy territory, its perhaps least heralded legacy is in the field of design. Crucially, the organization had its own dedicated design branch — renamed the Presentation Branch in 1944 — that oversaw the creation of graphics, maps,slides and short films about the war effort. (The design historian Barry Katz outlined this history in a groundbreaking 1996 article in the journal Design Issues.) These served various purposes, as requested by members of the military and Department of State. The Presentation team, often working with Research & Analysis and other O.S.S. divisions, explained the diet and nutrition of German city dwellers in order to help the United States government better understand the enemy; illustrated the correct use of weapons, like knives and grenades, and created models of weapons; detailed Japanese “superstitions” for the purposes of psychological warfare; and sent cartoonists to Indonesia to make studies of local iconography that could serve as anti-Japanese propaganda. For these efforts, the O.S.S. would draw on the expertise of an astonishing number of designers from across disciplines: Raymond Loewy, Henry Dreyfuss and Walter Dorwin Teague, who had all recently worked on the 1939 New York World’s Fair, with its focus on “The World of Tomorrow”; Walt Disney, the most powerful creator of animated myths in the 20th century; Lewis Mumford, an architecture writer for The New Yorker and an unsparing critic of modern technology; Orson Welles’s assistant on “Citizen Kane”; the designer of the Q-Tip box, who also — in his capacity at the O.S.S. — led the team that designed the logo for the United Nations.

 

The look of these projects was subsequently so absorbed by postwar America, and by the private sector in particular, that it remains easy to overlook the Presentation Branch of the O.S.S. as a birthplace not just for contemporary design as we know it but for the way we now conduct professional life. The O.S.S. pioneered the use of visual displays in conferences, now such a staple of business and industry that it’s hard to imagine them having an origin story — namely, at the War Department conference at the Pentagon in 1943, which convened business and labor leaders to get them onboard with the total war effort. The basic template of instructional pamphlets and posters — the kind you see on every airplane or near every fire exit — is also a feature of O.S.S. iconography, which offered minimalist, illustrated instructions on how to use a knife against a Nazi in hand-to-hand combat. With the Nuremberg Trials, for which the O.S.S. designed the courtroom — the placement of the military guard, the solitary witness box that made a testifier look guilty, the graphic displays of Nazi war crimes — the office created the look of political theater for years to come, a setting that was dramatic but controlled, a scene ready for C-Span. It was the Special Exhibits division of the O.S.S., headed by Eero Saarinen, who would become a pre-eminent postwar architect, that was responsible for honing the concept of the situation room, the stage where the bureaucratic mechanics of war would play out, and which would eventually become such a part of the culture — from “Dr. Strangelove” to the front page of The New York Times — that it would change the perception of how wars themselves are fought.

 

DESIGN WAS IN some sense the perfect profession to accompany the strange, “soft” side of the war effort, a kind of espionage in itself. In the 1940s, industrial design was, as a 1946 Museum of Modern Art exhibition described it, “a new profession,” suffused with energy, which promised to transform every aspect of daily life: from the spoon you used to stir your coffee to the roads you drove on to the way you communicated, interpreted and consumed ideas. With antecedents in British and European social democracy — the lectures and work of the socialist William Morris, the utopian ideas swirling around the Bauhaus in 1920s Germany positing that design should reflect a society at its most efficient and egalitarian — modern industrial design had a revolutionary mission. Design was art in everyday life. It could have universal applications.

 

Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, one of the early instructors at the Bauhaus, wrote in 1940 that a “designer trained to think with both penetration and scope will find solutions, not alone for problems arising in daily routine, or for development of better ways of production, but also for all problems of living and working together. There is design in family life, in labor relations, in city planning, in living together as civilized human beings.” When he wrote that, he was a refugee from Nazism in Chicago, where he had recently founded the New Bauhaus. The design historian Robin Schuldenfrei, in her 2012 book “Atomic Dwelling: Anxiety, Domesticity, and Postwar Architecture,” pointed out that Moholy-Nagy’s experimental, pragmatic approach to design made it adaptable when he was called upon to serve the war effort. Before too long, he and his school (renamed the Institute of Design in 1944) were working with the Army on poster design and with the Office of Civilian Defense in Washington on camouflage. In 1942, this titanic artist and photographer was described in the military journal Civilian Defense as “among the best informed men in America on camouflage techniques.”

 

In other words, it wasn’t just the O.S.S. that got involved in the design game. The Office of War Information, an agency aimed squarely at the American public, hired graphic designers to create legendary American war propaganda — including a shushing Uncle Sam (a reminder to people not to discuss troop movements). Charles and Ray Eames perfected their plywood-molding technique in designing splints for wounded soldiers. And R. Buckminster Fuller was contracted to deploy dozens of his Dymaxion Deployment Units — circular, aluminum, shedlike houses modeled after rural grain bins — at U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean and the Pacific. After the war, these figures would employ their respective methods in the American postwar design adventure. Without those molded splints, there might be no Eames plywood chair.

 

In the same way that Ford and General Motors halted production of cars in favor of tanks and bombers, contemporary design was changed by the experience of participating in the war effort. Though it’s still common sense to think of design as an essentially private, commercial profession involved in styling products for consumers, during World War II, designers found new, more democratic techniques and means for their work. Questions that would become mainstays of graphic design — of how to represent numbers, how to use color for emotional and dramatic effect, how to represent change over time in a single image — were revolutionized in the context of the American intelligence community. In fact, design may have reached the pinnacle of its influence and achievement as an arm of the government — impossible to imagine today, when federal subsidies for the arts, of any kind, are parsimonious.

 

But this elevation of the idea of design was arguably also the beginning of the end of its social pretensions. Designers had joined the O.S.S. to fight fascism, but by the end of the war, many were spread out across the intelligence community and conscripted into the American Cold War effort, whose reach, like that of design, was limitless. After all, the United States was attempting to win over “hearts and minds” — the entire beings of any individuals, anywhere — to its cause. Under the auspices of the State Department, exhibitions of the American way of life became common abroad. In 1959, a model American house set up in a Moscow park infamously became a staging ground for a debate — broadcast to millions — between the American vice president, Richard Nixon, and the Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, over the merits of their respective systems. Half a century later, “situation rooms” had become theaters of 24-hour pseudo-debate, as in the eponymously titled news show on CNN, or arenas for projecting presidential power, as in the famous image of President Barack Obama and his advisers watching the 2011 assault on Osama bin Laden’s compound. The wartime alliance of design and power did not produce a more peaceful world — only one in which the art of presentation came to overpower our understanding of that world.

 




2. The Future Faces of Irregular Warfare: Great Power Competition in the 21st Century



The Irregular Warfare Center's 328 Page PDF can be downloaded here: https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/publications/the-future-faces-of-irregular-warfare/


Also KJU's face made the cover, there is a dearth of information about north Korean Irregular Warfare.


Although Korea is mentioned some 20 times though the publication( generally in passing) there is no single chapter on north Korea and irregular warfare. In fact this is the only substantive paragraph on north Korea in the 328 pages. Disappointing but not surprising given that there is little interest in or understanding of Korea outside of those who have been condemned within the national security community to focus on it. north Korea is just not as cool as China, Russia, Iran, and violent extremist organizations 


Now my bias aside, there are many excellent essays in this compendium by many excellent authors.  This is an excellent reference and should be used in PME and graduate level education in national security studies. There are strong contributions from APCSS, JSOU, and CISA/NDU.


Excerpt:


North Korea: Devious Hermits 
North Korea, or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), decided to expand its proxy forces primarily through the Korean diaspora such as the Chosen Soren in Japan.416 The DPRK would complete its transformation into a criminal enterprise by raising capital through crypto crime, dark web dealing, synthetic methamphetamine production, the sale of its population as slave labor, and targeted assassination.417 The killing of Kim Jong Nam, Kim Jong Un’s half-brother, was a textbook example of DPRK proxy operations. Two unwitting, want-to-be actresses, one from Vietnam and the other from Indonesia, were told they were going take part in a prank show. They were trained in how to conduct the “prank,” and, after a few iterations, they were directed to conduct the prank on Kim Jong Nam in the Kuala Lumpur International Airport. However, this time the prank involved VX they were told to spray on the “target.” VX, one of the world’s most deadly nerve agents, was smuggled from the DPRK to Malaysia through state commercial airlines.418 Dramatic assassinations combining unwitting proxies and chemical warfare agents with state sponsored criminal activity sends a clear 


For anyone interested in north Korean irregular warfare I can provide these two articles. Also I will have a chapter in forthcoming JSOU publication on the north Korea threat.


Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula – Thoughts on Irregular Threats for north Korea Post-Conflict and Post-Collapse: Understanding Them to Counter Them (2010

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/irregular-warfare-on-the-korean-peninsula


Developing an Irregular Warfare Campaign for North Korea (2024)

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/developing-an-irregular-warfare-campaign-for-north-korea/The Future Faces of Irregular Warfare: Great Power Competition in the 21st Century



The Future Faces of Irregular Warfare: Great Power Competition in the 21st Century

https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/publications/the-future-faces-of-irregular-warfare/

The Irregular Warfare Center’s first book, The Future Faces of Irregular Warfare: Great Power Competition in the 21st Century, is an edited volume of essays on the future evolutions and trends of irregular warfare and competition. Written by leading scholars and practitioners of irregular warfare and national security, the book presents a forward-leaning analysis of how IW between the U.S. and its competitors is likely to play out in several key theatres, such as the Indo-Pacific and the Baltics, and in particular issue sets, such as climate change, misinformation and disinformation, economic coercion, and counterterrorism. The book serves to fill a gap in existing literature on the future trends and applications of IW—while much work has been done on attempting to define IW and show how IW trends are at play currently, less focus has been given to the evolution of IW. As such, this volume will be an important addition to the IW debate.


3. Why Lasers Could Be Kryptonite for Drones


What if laser weapons would completely neutralize drone capabilities? Would it halt the "drone revolution" in its tracks?  



Why Lasers Could Be Kryptonite for Drones

After decades of problematic development, the U.S. and others say they have harnessed the technology for military use


https://www.wsj.com/business/why-lasers-could-be-kryptonite-for-drones-88e4cd4e?mod=hp_lead_pos9


By Alistair MacDonaldFollow

Oct. 14, 2024 5:30 am ET

Earlier this year the U.S. Army shot down a number of hostile drones in the Middle East using a weapon long dismissed as more science fiction than reality—the laser. 

After decades of costly, problematic development, a growing number of countries from the U.K. to South Korea say they have harnessed the technology for military use. 

The role of lasers is likely to be narrow for the foreseeable future because of their large energy needs, limited range and problems with bad weather. But militaries say the new weapons could prove an effective way to shoot down drones, a key task as they look for cheaper ways to counter a proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, in combat.

Laser weapons shoot highly concentrated beams of light that deliver intense heat to their target. The beams, which travel at the speed of light, cut through metal to destroy engines, fuel tanks, electronics and other key parts of a target or can be used to “dazzle,” or blind, their sensors and cameras. 

“The old adage that lasers were five years from being amazing and always will be, that is changing,” said Doug Bush, the U.S. Army’s assistant secretary for acquisitions, logistics and technology.

“Lasers for counter drone (warfare) may have met their moment,” he said.

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In Ukraine and the Red Sea, drones are changing the way wars are fought. The U.S. and other countries are investing in a new way to retaliate: lasers. WSJ explains how one laser works and why the tech is so difficult to perfect. Photo: Alexandra Larkin

The U.S. has successfully deployed lasers at various places in the Middle East to shoot down UAVs, according to Bush. The U.S. Army declined to detail the operations. 

Military lasers have gained ground in recent years because of advances in the technology, and a growing need to find more cost-effective weapons amid the increasing threat from drones.

The U.S. and its allies typically shoot down low-cost drones with missiles that can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars apiece. Lasers are cheaper to operate—energy is the main cost—and don’t run out of ammunition provided there is a power supply.

For example, the U.K. government says the cost of operating its DragonFire laser is less than $13 a shot. Britain announced the weapon to much fanfare earlier this year, lauding its ability to hit a target the size of a coin from a kilometer away.

Window searches for targets in wider space.

1

Middle-range aperture looks at the target in more detail.

2

Telescope narrows in on target, allowing the system to assess whether it is a threat.

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DragonFire laser system

The U.K.'s DragonFire laser is a short-range air-defense system that uses an intense beam of light to cut through targets. The weapon can engage visible threats at the speed of light and promises low long-term costs at less than $13 a shot.

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Internal mirrors focus and stabilize a high-energy beam that is precise enough to hit a coin.

Sources: Leonardo, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory

Militaries are also exploring other new options to counter drones, including high-power microwave devices that can disrupt or even fry the electronics of aerial threats.

The path to laser weapons has been long and costly. Militaries have been experimenting with using lasers since U.S. physicists created them in the early 1960s.

Over the past two decades, the U.S. Navy tried a host of different systems without putting any into regular combat.

In the late 1990s, the U.S. Air Force and Boeing built a 12,000-pound laser that they shoehorned into a 747 aircraft. The so-called Airborne Laser was intended to shoot down planes and missiles that were hundreds of miles away but it faced numerous problems. 

One challenge was generating the huge amount of energy needed to produce a powerful beam over long distances, said Subrata Ghoshroy, an expert on laser technology who in 1997 presented a critical report on the project to a congressional committee. Any blemish on lenses that the laser passed through would also distort the beam, he said. 

The Airborne Laser project was canceled after a decade having cost some $6 billion.

Since then, laser technology has improved, making it more viable for militaries. 




U.S. Marines used a high-energy laser weapon during a weapons and tactics course in April 2024.

Cpl. Alejandro Fernandez/U.S. Marine Corps

One significant advancement has been the use of fiber lasers, first developed by the telecoms industry, said Paul Gray, a business development executive at QinetiQ, a British company that helped develop the DragonFire weapon. 

Fiber lasers amplify and focus light from hundreds of strands into a single beam. Earlier systems often relied on hazardous chemicals or gases to generate lasers.

Systems are also getting more compact. At a counterdrone technology contest held earlier this year by the Canadian military, officials said they were astounded at the small size of the lasers on show. A decade ago, laser makers would have turned up with huge power generators, said Lt. Col. Chris Labbé, head of the counter-uncrewed systems office of the Canadian Armed Forces.

The contest’s winner was a laser from Australia’s AIM Defence, which used a generator the size of a filing cabinet. 

Despite recent breakthroughs, lasers still have many of the same limitations, Ghoshroy and other experts say. Several nations have also boasted of laser capabilities that have yet to be deployed.

Israel has long touted its Iron Beam laser but its maker, Rafeal, says the system isn’t scheduled to be operational until the end of 2025. In the near term, laser weapons aren’t likely to defend against the sort of missile barrages Israel has recently faced, given missiles travel at high-speeds and laser weapons have a short range.


Boeing’s compact laser weapon system with a drone that it damaged. Despite recent breakthroughs, lasers still have limitations. Photo: CHENEY ORR/REUTERS

Russia has said it has used its laser system in Ukraine to hit targets 3 miles away. Ukraine says it hasn’t seen evidence of this.

The U.S. Department of Defense still spends about $1 billion annually on developing lasers and other so-called directed-energy weapons, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office.

The U.S. Navy has already deployed a laser made by Lockheed Martin on a destroyer while Britain’s Royal Navy has said it plans to field the U.K.’s DragonFire weapon in 2027, five years earlier than initially scheduled.

U.S. forces are also working on a range of other systems, including a laser that can deliver more than 300 kilowatts of energy. 

In the Middle East, the U.S. is trialing two that can be mounted on vehicles. One, capable of firing beams of 50 kW, has been placed onto a Stryker armored vehicle while another 20 kW system is being trialed on lighter vehicles.

Generating 50 kW of electricity for one shot is the equivalent of almost 6% of what the average U.S. household uses in an entire month. 

Keeping large amounts of energy focused on a target has long been the problem. Laser systems typically give off a lot of heat, with some systems losing up to 75% of the energy they generate, according to GAO. 

Absorbing or transferring that heat adds bulk, making lasers less mobile. 

The U.S. Army has struggled to incorporate its 50 kW system onto a vehicle. Aside from heat dissipation, the laser-equipped vehicles suffer more wear and tear when moving around, Bush told a Senate Armed Services Subcommittee earlier this year.


The U.K.’s Defense Ministry says its DragonFire laser can hit a target the size of a coin from a kilometer away. Photo: British Defence Ministry/Zuma Press

Britain’s DragonFire laser requires a generator so large it is housed in a 20ft container, which needs to be placed on a ship or truck. 

While Australia’s AIM Defence made its laser compact, the weapon shoots less than a mile. Such a short range would leave little margin for error when defending against a fast drone attack. 

Lasers’ biggest problem, though, may be the weather. Any rain, cloud, dust, wind or turbulence can absorb the beam and scatter it, experts say.

When South Korea tested a laser against a group of drones in July, the system failed to immediately identify and track one of the targets when clouds appeared. An official told reporters at the time that the laser’s performance deteriorates in poor weather.

QinetiQ’s Gray says weather such as strong winds can also affect the accuracy of more traditional weapons, and that laser technology will continue to improve.

“Drones, that is an entry-level performance for the technology,” he said.

Dasl Yoon contributed to this article.

Write to Alistair MacDonald at Alistair.Macdonald@wsj.com


4. Scale of Chinese Spying Overwhelms Western Governments



Should not be a surprise for the world's second oldest profession.


Espionage is a key element to all national security operations but it is especially critical for China to effectively conduct its Unrestricted Warfare strategy. It needs vast amounts of information beyond military capabilities. It needs detailed information about everything from finance, to health services, to the full range of infracture of a nation (to include especially cyber) so that it can apply pressure when and where necessary, create dilemmas, undermine adversary government authority, cause internal unrest and chaos, and ultimately to support warfighting when required.


And of course CHina must conduct effective counterintelligence operations to protect itself.



Scale of Chinese Spying Overwhelms Western Governments

Fears of escalation as China’s intelligence-gathering operation looks to consolidate Xi Jinping’s grip on power amid economic slowdown


https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/scale-of-chinese-spying-overwhelms-western-governments-6ae644d2?mod=hp_lead_pos1




China’s embassy in Berlin.

 

Markus Schreiber/Associated Press

By Max Colchester

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Updated Oct. 14, 2024 12:02 am ET




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LONDON—Beijing is conducting espionage activities on what Western governments say is an unprecedented scale, mobilizing security agencies, private companies and Chinese civilians in its quest to undermine rival states and bolster the country’s economy.

Rarely does a week go by without a warning from a Western intelligence agency about the threat that China presents.

Last month alone, the Federal Bureau of Investigation said a Chinese state-linked firm hacked 260,000 internet-connected devices, including cameras and routers, in the U.S., Britain, France, Romania and elsewhere. A Congressional probe said Chinese cargo cranes used at U.S. seaports had embedded technology that could allow Beijing to secretly control them. The U.S. government alleged that a former top aide to New York Gov. Kathy Hochul was a Chinese agent. 

U.S. officials last week launched an effort to understand the consequences of the latest Chinese hack, which compromised systems the federal government uses for court-authorized network wiretapping requests.

Western spy agencies, unable to contain Beijing’s activity, are raising the alarm publicly, urging businesses and individuals to be on alert in their interactions with China. But given the country is already deeply entwined in the global economy, it is proving a Sisyphean task, said Calder Walton, a national security expert at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. Western governments “are coming to terms with events, in many ways, after the events,” he said. 

The Chinese government’s press office, as well as the ministries of state security, public security and defense, didn’t respond to requests for comment. Beijing has previously denied allegations of espionage targeting Western countries while portraying China as a frequent target of foreign hacking and intelligence-gathering operations. 

Chinese leader Xi Jinping since taking power in 2012 has increasingly emphasized the importance of national security, calling on officials and ordinary citizens alike to ward off threats to China’s interests. The result is a sweeping information-gathering effort whose scale and perseverance dwarfs that of Kremlin espionage during the Cold War and has jolted Western spy agencies. 

China-backed hackers outnumber all of the FBI’s cyber personnel at least 50 to 1, according to the U.S. agency. One European agency estimates China’s intelligence-gathering and security operations may comprise up to 600,000 people. “China’s hacking program is larger than that of every other major nation, combined,” FBI Director Christopher Wray said earlier this year. 

Complicating the West’s response: Unlike with autocracies such as Iran or Russia, trade with China has for decades supported Western economic growth, which in turn underpins the West’s long-term security. Most countries simply can’t afford to slap China with sanctions and throw out its diplomats. “China is different,” says Ken McCallum, the head of the U.K.’s domestic-intelligence agency, MI5.


Ken McCallum, the U.K.’s MI5 spy chief, says compared with other autocracies, ‘China is different.’ Photo: Yui Mok/Associated Press

The malign activity risks intensifying as China’s economic growth slows under Xi’s increasingly authoritarian leadership. China’s intelligence apparatus will come under growing pressure to pilfer the innovation needed to bolster the economy and silence critics both at home and abroad, officials say. “It all boils down to the security of the regime,” said Nigel Inkster, a former director of operations at the British foreign-intelligence agency MI6.

Chinese activity ranges from the absurd to the hair-raising. In September, U.S. prosecutors alleged that five Chinese University of Michigan graduates were found in the middle of the night taking photos just feet away from military vehicles in a U.S. National Guard training exercise that included Taiwan military personnel. The men claimed to be stargazing. 

Earlier this year, the U.K. government said Chinese-linked hackers had accessed the nation’s voter-registration records, which include around 40 million people’s home addresses. The U.S. government is currently probing whether a Chinese state-linked hacking group burrowed into major U.S. broadband providers, potentially accessing U.S. law enforcement wiretaps. Intelligence officials fret China is stealing swaths of private data to train advanced AI models. 

As China becomes more assertive militarily, including increasing support for Russia in its war in Ukraine, its covert action also poses greater threats. Xi has ordered his military to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army, according to Western officials. A war over Taiwan could draw China into conflict with the U.S., which is committed to ensuring the democratically self-ruled island can defend itself.  

The FBI earlier this year said China had hijacked hundreds of routers and used them to infiltrate American water and energy networks, raising concern of a pre-emptive attack on U.S. infrastructure if Washington were to intervene in a Chinese attempt to claim Taiwan. Congress in December banned the Pentagon from using any seaport worldwide that deploys the Chinese cargo-data platform Logink, out of fear classified information could be disclosed.

China also pre-positioned malware on Indian power grids amid a border dispute in 2021 and on telecommunication networks in Guam, home to a large U.S. air base, according to analysts and officials.


China’s Xi Jinping has called on officials and citizens to ward off threats to the country’s interests, leading to a sweeping information-gathering effort. Photo: adek berry/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns recently said he had visited China twice in the past year “to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings and inadvertent collisions.”

There is growing worry of a dangerous mishap. Spy agencies in authoritarian states often tailor information to meet their bosses’ world views. For instance, Russia’s intelligence services told Russian President Vladimir Putin that Ukraine would fold quickly after he invaded. If Xi similarly received faulty information, or didn’t believe the information he was given, China could pre-emptively strike at vital foreign infrastructure. 

China doesn’t play by the old-school spy rulebooks, intelligence officials say. It doesn’t seem to care if it is caught red-handed and, unlike Russia, it rarely makes efforts to swap its spies when they are arrested. 

Another factor hampers a Western intelligence response: It is hard to spy on China. China’s intelligence operations are decentralized, stretching across myriad agencies and private-sector companies. They operate largely autonomously, making the system difficult to penetrate, and their methods appear haphazard, with a mix of both private and state actors seemingly loosely guided by overarching aims laid out by senior officials. China also purged a whole cadre of officials working as U.S. spies a decade ago. 

Underpinning China’s activity is Xi’s desire to consolidate his grip on power. He has cited the Soviet Union’s sudden collapse in 1991 as a warning of what could befall communist rule in China if ideological controls are loosened. He created a national security commission, which first convened in 2014, to centralize control over security work, and set an expansive definition of national security that spans the party’s political dominance as well as China’s economic strength and food sufficiency. 

This emphasis morphed into a fixation in recent years as Beijing clashed with Washington over territorial disputes, technological dominance and the causes of Covid-19. Further fueling paranoia were allegations by former U.S. intelligence contractor Edward Snowden that the U.S. had extensively hacked Chinese infrastructure including mobile phone networks. 

“Security is the prerequisite for development, and development is the guarantee of security,” Xi told officials. “Security and development must be promoted simultaneously.”

The U.S. in 2014 accused Chinese military officers of plundering American corporate secrets through hacking—and said it was outside the bounds of traditional espionage. 

The U.S. responded with tariffs and a campaign to stop its European allies from using China’s Huawei to build its next generation of telecom infrastructure.

Western democracies are trying to strike a balance now by continuing to do business with China while calling out Beijing’s spying. In May, Canadian intelligence officials said China likely tried to interfere in two past federal elections, including by busing in Chinese students to vote to secure the nomination of a preferred candidate. 


Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns has visited China over the past year to help avoid ‘inadvertent collisions.’ Photo: tom brenner/Reuters

Around the same time, Australian authorities sentenced a businessman with links to the Chinese Communist Party for trying to curry favor with a government minister by donating $25,000 to a local hospital. This spring, seven alleged Chinese spies were arrested during separate operations in Germany and Britain for acquiring a special laser and shipping it to China without authorization, spying on the European Parliament and targeting dissidents, respectively. 

Much of China’s information-gathering activity isn’t illegal. Most of China’s researchers and businesses aren’t involved in espionage, and many are credited with contributing to important advances in innovation that benefit Western economies.  

But European security officials say Chinese students and guest scientists also have become a prime conduit for Chinese espionage in the West. In the past, security officials kept a close eye on Chinese researchers who had studied at one of the “Seven Sons of National Defense,” a nickname for top Chinese universities with strong links to the military. Recently, the officials say, spies masquerading as researchers have grown better at hiding their tracks. One example is students who initially enroll in language or literature courses and then switch to quantum computing or other sensitive areas.

More than 20,000 people in the U.K. alone have been approached by Chinese agents on LinkedIn since 2022 in attempts to get them to hand over sensitive information, according to MI5, the U.K.’s domestic spy agency. 

MI5 has been touring universities warning them about collaborations with Chinese-backed consultancies or universities, which could inadvertently hand over valuable intellectual property. Spy agencies cannot “disrupt our way out of that challenge,” McCallum, the head of MI5, said recently.

Chun Han Wong and Bertrand Benoit contributed to this article.

Write to Max Colchester at Max.Colchester@wsj.com and Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com


5. Ukraine Faces Bleak Winter as Russia Ramps Up Assaults, U.S. Support Trickles In


We should recall Thomas Paine and the Summer Soldier Sunshine Patriot:


"the summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of their country"


Are we the "sunshine supporter?" Are we shrinking from support for Ukraine which could be the key to the defense of Europe and US interests in Europe? What happens if Ukraine falls to Russia? Are we willing to risk that? When do you do the right thing because it is the right thing to do? (Kant)


Ukraine Faces Bleak Winter as Russia Ramps Up Assaults, U.S. Support Trickles In

President Zelensky pleads for more arms and other assistance to help end the war on favorable terms, but Biden administration is skeptical

https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-faces-bleak-winter-as-russia-ramps-up-assaults-u-s-support-trickles-in-91f209ae?mod=hp_lead_pos11


By James MarsonFollow

Updated Oct. 14, 2024 12:02 am ET

KYIV, Ukraine—The war in Ukraine is barreling toward the end of its third year, with Russia pursuing relentless offensives despite heavy losses and Western leaders groping for a strategy to end the conflict.

With Western weapons deliveries limited and slow, Ukraine is facing a bleak winter. Its outnumbered and outgunned military is slowly but steadily losing ground on the main eastern front, trying to exact a heavy toll on Russia while minimizing its own losses.

Russian missile-and-drone attacks targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure are overwhelming the country’s air defenses, forcing rolling blackouts across the country that could worsen in winter.

Ukrainian troops are clinging to important strategic locations in the east, such as the high-lying city of Chasiv Yar, facing waves of Russian infantry and massive glide bombs that pulverize buildings. But in recent weeks, Russia has claimed the city of Vuhledar, advanced toward the logistics hub of Pokrovsk and prodded forward in other towns.


The roadside fire just outside Pokrovsk, Ukraine, following a missile strike by Russia. Photo: anton shynkarenko/Reuters


Paramedics prepare to take a Ukrainian soldier wounded in fighting in the Donetsk region to a hospital. Photo: roman pilipey/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

President Biden and other Western leaders have repeatedly said they want Ukraine to prevail, but are providing insufficient support to stop Russia and turn the tide, say Ukrainian officials and soldiers.

More worrying for Kyiv, former President Donald Trump has said that if he wins the November presidential election he would seek a quick peace deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has made clear he wants Ukraine’s capitulation. Russia, meanwhile, is planning to increase military spending by one-quarter next year, signaling its long-term commitment to overpowering its smaller neighbor.

On visits to European capitals and the U.S. in recent weeks, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky requested more weapons and security guarantees as part of what he has dubbed a “victory plan” aimed at ending the war on terms favorable to Ukraine.

The Biden administration, which has drip-fed weapons to Ukraine for fear of provoking Russia, has given a tepid response.

U.S. officials have said that Zelensky’s plan repackages some earlier requests, and noted that members of the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization are divided about whether to offer Ukraine a formal invitation to join.

Zelensky had intended to discuss his plan with Biden and other allies at a scheduled meeting in Germany last week, but the U.S. president canceled his trip because of Hurricane Milton in Florida.

“We’re going to have to sit down with the Ukrainians and kind of work through what can you actually do, versus what do you have on this list,” Air Force Gen. CQ Brown Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said on Wednesday.


Ukrainian front-line units are struggling with a lack of basic equipment and shortages of troops. Photo: Libkos/Getty Images


A residential building damaged by shelling in the town of Kurakhove, near the front line, in the eastern Donetsk region, Ukraine. Photo: roman pilipey/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Mykhailo Podolyak, a Ukrainian presidential adviser, said the plan was a detailed strategy encompassing military, economic, political and diplomatic steps necessary to compel Russia to end its war.

Among them is a request for more long-range missiles, known as ATACMS and Storm Shadow, and permission to fire them at military targets deep inside Russia. Podolyak said that could change Putin’s calculus by increasing domestic pressure, as well as weakening Russia’s front-line forces.

The U.S. has so far declined to grant permission, fearing Russia would view it as a major escalation.

Without more support for Ukraine, Podolyak said, the war could drag on for years and end up eroding Western nations’ global standing. Forcing Ukraine to negotiate from a position of weakness wouldn’t end the conflict, he said, but embolden Putin to press on with his main goal of total control over Ukraine.

“Why should he stop? He can compete with the West only with fear—that you will be afraid and he will get what he wants,” Podolyak said.

Kyiv has been striving to show it would put more support to good use. In August, Ukraine’s army launched a surprise assault on Russia’s Kursk region, quickly seizing around 100 towns and villages that it has largely held on to since.

How far ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles could reach into Russian territory

Ukrainian forces in Russia

Air bases

Russian forces in Ukraine and Kursk region

Other potential military targets

LATVIA

Baltic

Sea

RUSSIA

ATACMS

Max range:

186.4 miles

Moscow

LITHUANIA

Storm Shadow

Max range:

155 miles

BELARUS

POLAND

Kyiv

Kharkiv

UKRAINE

SLOV.

Dnipro

HUN.

MOL.

Odesa

ROMANIA

100 miles

100 km

Black Sea

Note: Potential Russian military and paramilitary targets within range as of Aug. 26; Russian and Ukrainian forces as of Oct. 10; ranges are approximate.

Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project

Andrew Barnett/WSJ

Ukraine also has launched a series of long-range strikes in Russia and occupied Ukraine, destroying ammunition and fuel stores.

Ukrainian front-line units are struggling with a lack of basic equipment, including armored vehicles and artillery, and shortages of troops. Ukraine’s government isn’t mobilizing anyone under age 25 to prevent demographic collapse, and more social turmoil, while military draft officers have been checking papers and handing summonses on the street, including outside a recent concert in Kyiv by one of Ukraine’s most popular bands.

Podolyak said the situation is improving and Ukraine is managing to carry out some troop rotations and to increase the size of its reserves. The French government said last week it is training and equipping a Ukrainian brigade, with around 2,300 soldiers exercising in France since the start of September.

On the home front, Ukrainians are increasingly exhausted by the war, and polls show an incremental increase in the number prepared for negotiations. But that doesn’t mean they are ready for concessions. Fewer than one in 10 would be prepared to surrender any territory to Moscow to end the war, according to an August survey by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, a Kyiv-based think tank.

The war has touched most families in Ukraine, hardening attitudes. “They are not ready to turn the page,” said Kostyantyn Batozsky, an independent political analyst in Kyiv.

Ukrainian officials and military analysts note that Russia is also struggling. Moscow’s forces haven’t achieved a significant breakthrough, despite massive efforts.

Russian forces endured the deadliest month of the war in September, according to U.S. analysts. Western intelligence assessments put losses at 1,200 dead and injured a day. Military advances are achieved mainly through costly ground assaults by infantry units that are packed with convicts drawn from jails by the offer of a pardon and a salary of the equivalent of more than $2,000 a month. Russia is filling its ranks by measures including constantly raising bonuses and recruiting foreigners.

“Ukraine is continuing to inflict casualties on Russia that would be unsustainable in any country that is not an absolute autocracy,” said John Nagl, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who is now a professor of warfighting at the U.S. Army War College.

Nagl said that, given Trump’s pledge to resolve the conflict, “Putin’s hope for a relatively easy victory hinges on a Trump win.” Until then, he said, “Russia continues to be willing to absorb casualties that make no operational or strategic sense.”

Cpl. Oleksandr Solonko, a Ukrainian drone pilot fighting on the eastern front, said that any peace deal other than one achieved by defeating the Russians on the battlefield would only briefly freeze the conflict, allowing them to rearm.

“They will attack again,” he said, “and it will continue like that until our country disappears from the world map.”


A burning field near Pokrovsk, a mining town close to Ukraine’s front line. Photo: oleksii filippov/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Daniel Michaels, Ievgeniia Sivorka, Nancy A. Youssef contributed to this article.

Write to James Marson at james.marson@wsj.com



6. Trump Suggests Using National Guard Against ‘Enemy from Within’ on Election Day


From the Wall Street Journal which is owned by Rupert Murdock who is decidedly friendly to the former president.


Has McCarthy been resurrected?

Trump Suggests Using National Guard Against ‘Enemy from Within’ on Election Day

The former president singled out Rep. Adam Schiff as one such enemy

https://www.wsj.com/politics/elections/trump-says-he-will-use-the-national-guard-against-the-enemy-from-within-52fd4187?mod=latest_headlines

By C. Ryan Barber

Follow and Jimmy Vielkind

Follow

Updated Oct. 14, 2024 5:26 am ET

Trump: ‘Enemy From Within’ Should Be Handled by Military on Election Day

You may also like


Trump: ‘Enemy From Within’ Should Be Handled by Military on Election Day

Play video: Trump: ‘Enemy From Within’ Should Be Handled by Military on Election Day

Former President Donald Trump suggested using the military against ‘radical left lunatics’ on Election Day during an interview with Fox News, downplaying any threat from his supporters. Photo: Ross Franklin/AP

Donald Trump suggested deploying the National Guard or military to respond to what he termed the “enemy from within” on Election Day, saying in an interview that aired Sunday that he was concerned about the prospect of chaos wrought by “radical left lunatics.”

“I think the bigger problem are the people from within. We have some very bad people. We have some sick people,” Trump said during an interview on Fox News’s “Sunday Morning Futures.” 

“It should be very easily handled by, if necessary, by National Guard, or if really necessary, by the military, because they can’t let that happen,” he said.

Trump’s remarks came in response to a question from the show’s host, Maria Bartiromo, about whether he was expecting “chaos” on Election Day. At first, Trump replied, “Not from the side that votes for Trump.”

When Bartiromo raised “outside agitators,” including individuals on the terrorist watch list, Trump turned to his political opponents. 

“I think the bigger problem is the enemy from within, not even the people that have come in and [are] destroying our country,” he said.

Regardless of the outcome of the election, Trump will be a private citizen on Election Day and won’t have the power to call on the National Guard.

In a later portion of the interview, the former president named Rep. Adam Schiff, a California Democrat running for Senate, as an “enemy from within.” Schiff served as a House manager in Trump’s first impeachment and later sat on the committee that investigated the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol by a mob of the former president’s supporters.

“The thing that’s tougher to handle are these lunatics that we have inside, like Adam Schiff,” Trump said. 

The comments marked just the latest instance of Trump signaling a more strongman governing style if elected to a second term. 

During a Saturday evening rally in Coachella, Calif., Trump again outlined his Operation Aurora plan to deport all of the Tren de Aragua gang and blamed immigrants in the country for rising crime and economic insecurity.

“We’re like an occupied country,” Trump said. “We’ll put these vicious and bloodthirsty criminals in jail or kick them out of the country.”

He also called Schiff a “major sleaze bag” before disparaging his physical appearance. 

In response, Schiff said in a social-media post that the remarks amounted to “yet another nonsensical rant about me filled with tired insults, lies about voting booths, and more, this time in my home state of California.”

“Seriously, Donald. Why are you so obsessed with me?” he wrote on X.

A man was arrested Saturday after attempting to gain access to Trump’s Coachella rally with illegal firearms.

Vem Miller, a 49-year-old resident of Las Vegas, was stopped at the perimeter of the rally after officers noticed his SUV had a fake license plate, Riverside County Sheriff Chad Bianco said during a press conference Sunday.

Miller was found to be illegally in possession of a shotgun, a loaded handgun and a high-capacity magazine. He also had several fake passports and fake IDs, Bianco said.

In earlier rhetoric on the campaign trail, Trump has threatened political opponents with retribution, including jail. 

Meanwhile, he has marveled at the governing might of overseas leaders. Of China’s Xi Jinping, Trump said, “He controls 1.4 billion people with an iron fist. He’s smart.”

On the debate stage, Trump invoked Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán when Vice President Kamala Harris, the Democratic nominee, said “world leaders are laughing” at him.

“They call him a strongman. He’s a tough person. Smart,” Trump said.

Harris’ campaign seized on the interview Sunday. In a statement, a campaign spokesman said Trump’s remarks “should alarm every American who cares about their freedom and security.”

“What Donald Trump is promising is dangerous, and returning him to office is simply a risk Americans cannot afford,” said Ian Sams, a senior spokesman and adviser for the campaign.

Write to C. Ryan Barber at ryan.barber@wsj.com and Jimmy Vielkind at jimmy.vielkind@wsj.com


7. Washington’s Nightmare


I hesitated sending this because I do not want to make a partisan statement but on the one hand this is an excellent history and discussion of the legacy of President Washington although it will be panned a s progressive screed against the former president.


But with the reporting in the Wall Street Journal about the former president's statements on using the National Guard against the enemy from within, it may be worth reflecting on the example of our first and greatest president which should be the basic role model for each and every president regardless of political party. I do not think any American could argue against President Washington setting the example about selfless service and service to our nation that should be emulated by each and every leader of our republic. 




Washington’s Nightmare

The reelection of Donald Trump would mark the end of George Washington’s vision for the presidency—and the United States.

By Tom Nichols

The Atlantic · by Tom Nichols · October 9, 2024

Last November, during a symposium at Mount Vernon on democracy, John Kelly, the retired Marine Corps general who served as Donald Trump’s second chief of staff, spoke about George Washington’s historic accomplishments—his leadership and victory in the Revolutionary War, his vision of what an American president should be. And then Kelly offered a simple, three-word summary of Washington’s most important contribution to the nation he liberated.

“He went home,” Kelly said.

The message was unambiguous. After leaving the White House, Kelly had described Trump as a “person that has no idea what America stands for and has no idea what America is all about.” At Mount Vernon, he was making a clear point: People who are mad for power are a mortal threat to democracy. They may hold different titles—even President—but at heart they are tyrants, and all tyrants share the same trait: They never voluntarily cede power.

The American revolutionaries feared a powerful executive; they had, after all, just survived a war with a king. Yet when the Founders gathered in 1787 to draft the Constitution, they approved a powerful presidential office, because of their faith in one man: Washington.

Washington’s life is a story of heroic actions, but also of temptations avoided, of things he would not do. As a military officer, Washington refused to take part in a plot to overthrow Congress. As a victorious general, he refused to remain in command after the war had ended. As president, he refused to hold on to an office that he did not believe belonged to him. His insistence on the rule of law and his willingness to return power to its rightful owners—the people of the United States—are among his most enduring gifts to the nation and to democratic civilization.

Forty-four men have succeeded Washington so far. Some became titans; others finished their terms without distinction; a few ended their service to the nation in ignominy. But each of them knew that the day would come when it would be their duty and honor to return the presidency to the people.

All but one, that is.

Donald Trump and his authoritarian political movement represent an existential threat to every ideal that Washington cherished and encouraged in his new nation. They are the incarnation of Washington’s misgivings about populism, partisanship, and the “spirit of revenge” that Washington lamented as the animating force of party politics. Washington feared that, amid constant political warfare, some citizens would come to “seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual,” and that eventually a demagogue would exploit that sentiment.

People who are mad for power are a mortal threat to democracy. They may hold different titles, but at heart they are tyrants.

Today, America stands at such a moment. A vengeful and emotionally unstable former president—a convicted felon, an insurrectionist, an admirer of foreign dictators, a racist and a misogynist—desires to return to office as an autocrat. Trump has left no doubt about his intentions; he practically shouts them every chance he gets. His deepest motives are to salve his ego, punish his enemies, and place himself above the law. Should he regain the Oval Office, he may well bring with him the experience and the means to complete the authoritarian project that he began in his first term.

Many Americans might think of George Washington as something like an avatar, too distant and majestic to be emulated. American culture has encouraged this distance by elevating him beyond earthly stature: A mural in the Capitol Rotunda depicts him literally as a deity in the clouds. In the capital city that bears Washington’s name, other presidents such as Abraham Lincoln and Thomas Jefferson are represented with human likenesses; Franklin D. Roosevelt even smiles at us from his wheelchair. Washington is represented by a towering, featureless obelisk. Such faceless abstractions make it easy to forget the difficult personal choices that he made, decisions that helped the United States avoid the many curses that have destroyed other democracies.

For decades, I taught Washington’s military campaigns and the lessons of his leadership to military officers when I was a professor at the U.S. Naval War College. And yet I, too, have always felt a distance from the man himself. In recent months, I revisited his life. I read his letters, consulted his biographers, and walked the halls at Mount Vernon. I found a man with weaknesses and shortcomings, but also a leader who possessed qualities that we once expected—and should again demand—from our presidents, especially as the United States confronts the choice between democracy and demagoguery.

The votes cast in November will be more consequential than those in any other American election in more than a century. As we judge the candidates, we should give thought to Washington’s example, and to three of Washington’s most important qualities and the traditions they represent: his refusal to use great power for his own ends, his extraordinary self-command, and, most of all, his understanding that national leaders in a democracy are only temporary stewards of a cause far greater than themselves.

I

A CITIZEN, NOT A CAESAR

Popular military leaders can become a menace to a democratic government if they have the loyalty of their soldiers, the love of the citizenry, and a government too weak to defend itself. Even before his victory in the Revolutionary War, Washington had all of these, and yet he chose to be a citizen rather than a Caesar.

It is difficult, in our modern era of ironic detachment and distrust, to grasp the intensity of the reverence that surrounded the General (as he would be called for the rest of his life) wherever he went. “Had he lived in the days of idolatry,” a Pennsylvania newspaper stated breathlessly during the war, Washington would have “been worshiped as a god.” He was more than a war hero. In 1780, when Washington passed through a town near Hartford, Connecticut, a French officer traveling with him recorded the scene:

We arrived there at night; the whole of the population had assembled from the suburbs, we were surrounded by a crowd of children carrying torches, reiterating the acclamations of the citizens; all were eager to approach the person of him whom they called their father, and pressed so closely around us that they hindered us from proceeding.

Washington was addressed—by Americans and visiting foreigners alike—as “Your Excellency” almost as often as he was by his rank. In Europe, a French admiral told him, he was celebrated as the “deliverer of America.” Alexander Hamilton, his aide-de-camp during the war, later described Washington as a man “to whom the world is offering incense.”

At the war’s outset, Washington had believed that defeat and death—whether on the battlefield or on a gibbet in London—were more likely than glory. He worried that his wife, Martha, might also face threats from British forces, and was so concerned about her reaction to his appointment as commander of the Continental Army that he waited days before writing to tell her about it. Patrick Henry described a chance encounter with Washington on the street in Philadelphia, shortly after the vote approving Washington’s command. Tears welled in the new general’s eyes. “Remember, Mr. Henry, what I now tell you,” Washington said. “From the day I enter upon the command of the American armies, I date my fall, and the ruin of my reputation.”

Instead, Washington’s reputation grew. Yet despite his surprising successes as a general and his rise as the symbol of American liberty, he never allowed the world’s incense to intoxicate him. Although he was a man of fierce ambition, his character was tempered by humility and bound up in his commitment to republican ideals: He led an American army only in the name of the American people and its elected representatives, and he never saw that army as his personal property. His soldiers were citizens, like him, and they were serving at his side in a common cause. “When we assumed the soldier,” he said to a group of New York representatives shortly before he took command, “we did not lay aside the citizen,” a sentiment that he repeated throughout the war.

In the 18th century, Washington’s deference to the people’s representatives and the rule of law would have seemed almost nonsensical to his European counterparts. Most military officers of the time served for life, after swearing allegiance to royal sovereigns whose authority was said to be ordained by God. Often drawn from the ranks of the nobility, they saw themselves as a superior caste and found little reason to assure civilians of their good intentions.

Washington, however, insisted that his men conduct themselves like soldiers who tomorrow would have to live with the people they were defending today. Despite continual supply shortages, he forbade his troops from plundering goods from the population—including from his Tory adversaries. Washington’s orders were prudent in the short term; his army needed both supplies and the goodwill of the people. But they also represented his careful investment in America’s future: Once the war was over, the new nation would depend on comity and grace among all citizens, regardless of what side they’d supported.

The painter John Trumbull’s depiction of George Washington resigning his military commission to Congress in 1783 (World History Archive / Alamy)

Most American presidents have had some sort of military experience. A few, like Washington, were genuine war heroes. All of them understood that military obedience to the rule of law and to responsible civilian authority is fundamental to the survival of democracy. Again, all of them but one.

During his term as president, Trump expected the military to be loyal—but only to him. He did not understand (or care) that members of the military swear an oath to the Constitution, and that they are servants of the nation, not of one man in one office. Trump viewed the military like a small child surveying a shelf of toy soldiers, referring to “my generals” and ordering up parades for his own enjoyment and to emphasize his personal control.

Trump was more than willing to turn the American military against its own people. In 2020, for instance, he wanted the military to attack protesters near the White House. “Beat the fuck out of them,” the president told the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley. “Just shoot them.” Both Milley and Defense Secretary Mark Esper (a former military officer himself) talked their boss out of opening fire on American citizens.

From the November 2023 issue: How Mark Milley held the line

Senior officers during Trump’s term chose loyalty to the Constitution over loyalty to Donald Trump and remained true to Washington’s legacy. Such principles baffle Trump—all principles seem to baffle Trump, and he especially does not understand patriotism or self-sacrifice. He is, after all, the commander in chief who stood in Arlington National Cemetery, looked around at the honored dead in one of the country’s most sacred places, and said: “I don’t get it. What was in it for them?”

A year ago, Trump suggested that Milley should be executed for actions he’d taken in uniform, including reassuring China of America’s political stability both before and after January 6, 2021. Esper has said that he thinks he and Milley, along with other senior defense officials and military officers, could be arrested and imprisoned if Trump returns to office. In a second term, Trump would appoint senior military leaders willing to subvert the military and the Constitution to serve his impulses. He already tried, in his first term, to bring such people to the White House, naming Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, for example, as his national security adviser. Flynn was fired after only 23 days for misleading White House officials about lying to the FBI and now travels the country promoting outlandish conspiracy theories. Trump has praised Flynn and promised to bring him back in a second term.

Trump is desperate to reclaim power, and he is making threats about what could happen if the American people refuse to give it to him. Washington, even before he became president, was offered an almost certain chance to take ultimate power, and he refused.

In 1783, Washington was camped with most of the Continental Army in Newburgh, New York. Congress, as usual, was behind on its financial obligations to American soldiers, and rumbles were spreading that it was time to take matters into military hands. Some men talked of deserting and leaving the nation defenseless. Others wanted to head to Philadelphia, disband Congress, and install Washington as something like a constitutional monarch.

Washington allowed the soldiers to meet so they could discuss their grievances. Then he unexpectedly showed up at the gathering and unloaded on his men. Calling the meeting itself “subversive of all order and discipline,” he reminded them of the years of loyalty and personal commitment to them. He blasted the dark motives of a letter circulating among the troops, written by an anonymous soldier, that suggested that the army should refuse to disarm if Congress failed to meet their needs. “Can he be,” Washington asked, “a friend to the army? Can he be a friend to this country?”

Then, in a moment of calculated theater meant to emphasize the toll that eight years of war had taken on him, he reached into his pocket for a pair of eyeglasses, ostensibly to read a communication from a member of Congress. “Gentlemen,” he said, “you must pardon me, for I have not only grown gray but almost blind in the service of my country.” Some of the men, already chastened by Washington’s reproaches, broke into tears. The Newburgh conspiracy, from that moment, was dead.

The presidential historian Stephen Knott told me that Washington could have walked into that same meeting and, with a nod of his head, gained a throne. “A lesser man might have been tempted to lead the army to Philadelphia and pave the way for despotism,” Knott said. Instead, Washington crushed the idea and shamed the conspirators.

Nine months later, Washington stood in the Maryland statehouse, where Congress was temporarily meeting, and returned control of the army to the elected representatives of the United States of America. He asked to be granted “the indulgence of retiring from the service of my country” and handed over the document containing his military commission. Washington, in the words of the historian Joseph Ellis, had completed “the greatest exit in American history.”

Jean-Antoine Houdon’s sculpture of George Washington makes explicit reference to the Roman military leader Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, who relinquished power and returned to his farm after delivering victory on the battlefield. (iStock / Getty)

Decades ago, the scholar S. E. Finer asked a question that shadows every civilian government: “Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely ask why they ever do otherwise.” The answer, at least in the United States, lies in the traditions instituted by Washington. Because of his choices during and after the Revolution, the United States has had the luxury of regarding military interference in its politics as almost unthinkable. If Trump returns to office with even a handful of praetorians around him, Americans may realize only too late what a rare privilege they have enjoyed.

II

A MAN IN COMMAND OF HIMSELF

Washington’s steadfast refusal to grasp for power was rooted not only in his civic beliefs, but also in a strength of character that Americans should demand in any president.

When he returned to Mount Vernon after the war, Washington thought he was returning permanently to the life of a Virginia planter. His mansion is small by modern standards, and his rooms have a kind of placidity to them, a sense of home. If you visited without knowing who once lived there, you could believe that you were wandering the property of any moderately successful older gentleman of the colonial era, at least until you noticed little details, such as the key to the Bastille—a gift from Washington’s friend the Marquis de Lafayette—hanging in the hall.

The estate is lovingly cared for today, but in 1783, after nearly a decade of Washington’s absence, it was a mess, physically and financially. Its fields and structures were in disrepair. Washington, who had refused a salary for his military service, faced significant debts. (When Lafayette invited him in 1784 to visit France and bask in its adulation, Washington declined because he couldn’t afford the trip.)

Barton Gellman: What happened to Michael Flynn?

But Washington’s stretched finances did not matter much to the people who showed up regularly at his door to seek a moment with the great man—and a night or two at his home. Customs of the time demanded that proper visitors, usually those with an introduction from someone known to the householder, were to be entertained and fed. Washington observed these courtesies as a matter of social duty, even when callers lacked the traditional referral. More than a year would pass after his return to Mount Vernon before he and Martha finally enjoyed a dinner alone.

Like many of the other Founders, Washington embraced the virtues of the ancient Stoic thinkers, including self-control, careful introspection, equanimity, and dispassionate judgment. He tried to overcome petty emotions, and to view life’s difficulties and triumphs as merely temporary conditions.

In the words of his vice president, John Adams, Washington had “great self-command”—the essential quality that distinguished him even among the giants of the Revolution and made him a model for future generations of American political and military leaders. Like anyone else, of course, he was beset by ordinary human failings. As his letters and the accounts of friends and family reveal, he was at times seized by vanity, anxiety, and private grievances. He was moody. His occasional bursts of temper could be fearsome. He never forgot, and rarely forgave, personal attacks.

But Washington was “keenly aware” of his own shortcomings, Lindsay Chervinsky, the director of the George Washington Presidential Library at Mount Vernon, told me, and this self-knowledge, bolstered by his sense of personal honor, governed nearly all of Washington’s actions. He rarely allowed his pride to congeal into arrogance, nor his insecurities to curdle into self-pity. He refused to carry on public feuds—or to tilt the power he held against those who had slighted him.

No American president was perfect. But they followed Washington’s example by embracing duty and accepting consequences for their decisions.

Washington’s embrace of Stoicism helped him to step outside himself and confront the snares of his own ego and appetites, and especially to resist many of the temptations of power. His favorite play, Cato, was about Cato the Younger, a noted Stoic thinker and Roman senator who opposed the rise of Julius Caesar. Washington studied the examples of the great Roman republicans, particularly the story of Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, the Roman military leader who saved his nation on the battlefield and then returned to his farm. (Washington would later serve as the first president of the Society of the Cincinnati, an organization of Revolutionary War veterans.) As the president and CEO of Mount Vernon, Douglas Bradburn, told me during a visit to the estate, Washington genuinely regarded the Roman general as an example to be followed.

The Stoic insistence on merciless honesty, both with oneself and with others, is what allowed Washington to act with vigor but without venom, to make decisions without drama—another of the many grim differences between the character of the first president and that of the 45th. The Washington biographer Ron Chernow writes that “there was cunning in Washington’s nature but no low scheming. He never reneged on promises and was seldom duplicitous or underhanded. He respected the public” and “did not provoke people needlessly.” He desired recognition of his service, but hated boasting.

Americans have long prized these qualities in their best presidents. Trump has none of them.

Washington’s personal code had one severe omission. I had to take only a short walk from the mansion at Mount Vernon to see the reconstructed living quarters of some of the 300 enslaved people who worked his fields. Like other southern Founders, Washington did not let his commitment to freedom interfere with his ownership of other human beings. His views on slavery changed over time, especially after he commanded Black troops in battle, and he arranged in his will to free his slaves. But to the end of his life, Washington mostly left his thoughts on the institution out of public debates: His goal was to build a republic, not to destroy slavery. He did not right all the wrongs around him, nor all of his own.

But Washington did set the standard of patriotic character for his successors. Some failed this test, and long before Trump’s arrival, other presidents endured harsh criticism for their belligerence and imperious ego. Andrew Jackson, for example, was a coarse and rabid partisan who infuriated his opponents; the New York jurist James Kent in 1834 excoriated him as “a detestable, ignorant, reckless, vain and malignant tyrant,” the product of a foolish experiment in “American elective monarchy.”

Many presidents, however, have emulated Washington in various ways. We rightly venerate the wartime leadership of men such as Lincoln and FDR, but others also undertook great burdens and made hard decisions selflessly and without complaint.

When a 1980 mission to liberate American hostages held in Iran ended in flames and the death of eight Americans in the desert, President Jimmy Carter addressed the nation. “It was my decision,” he said, both to attempt a rescue and to cancel the operation when it became impossible to continue. “The responsibility is fully my own.” Almost 20 years earlier, John F. Kennedy had taken the heat for the disastrous effort to land an anti-Communist invasion at Cuba’s Bay of Pigs, when he could have shifted blame to his predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower, from whom he’d inherited the plan. The day after JFK was assassinated, Lyndon B. Johnson began his tenure as president not by affirming his new power, but by convening Kennedy’s Cabinet and affirming instead the slain president’s greatness. He asked them all to stay on. “I rely on you,” he said. “I need you.”

Gerald Ford ended up in the Oval Office due to the failures of Richard Nixon, unelected and with no popular mandate to govern. And yet, at a time of great political and economic stress, he led the nation steadily and honorably. He pardoned Nixon because he thought it was in the nation’s best interest to end America’s “long national nightmare,” despite knowing that he would likely pay a decisive price at the polls.

President Joe Biden displayed a common sentiment with these leaders when he declined to run for reelection in July. Biden, reportedly hurt that he was being pushed to step aside, nonetheless put defeating Trump above his own feelings and refused to exhibit any bitterness. “I revere this office,” he told the nation, “but I love my country more.”

None of these men was perfect. But they followed Washington’s example by embracing their duty and accepting consequences for their decisions. (Even Nixon chose to resign rather than mobilize his base against his impeachment, a decision that now seems noble compared with Trump’s entirely remorseless reaction to his two impeachments, his inability to accept his 2020 loss, and his warnings of chaos should he lose again.) They refused to present themselves as victims of circumstance. They reassured Americans that someone was in charge and willing to take responsibility.

Trump is unlike all of the men who came before him. Among his many other ignoble acts, he will be remembered for uttering a sentence, as thousands of Americans fell sick and died during a pandemic, that would have disgusted Washington and that no other American president has ever said, nor should ever say again: “I don’t take responsibility at all.”

III

A PRESIDENT, NOT A KING

One of the defining characteristics of Washington’s approach to the presidency was that he was always trying to leave it. He had been drawn back into public life reluctantly, attending and presiding over the 1787 Constitutional Convention only after a violent tax revolt in Massachusetts, known as Shays’s Rebellion, convinced him that the republic was still fragile and in need of a more capable system of government. Washington returned to Mount Vernon after the meeting in Philadelphia, but he already knew from discussions at the convention that he would be asked to stand for election to the new presidency as America’s only truly unifying figure. His 1789 victory in the Electoral College was unanimous.

Washington had no intention of remaining president for the rest of his life, even if some of his contemporaries had other ideas. “You are now a king under a different name,” Washington’s aide James McHenry happily wrote to him after that first election, but Washington was determined to serve one term at most and then go back to Mount Vernon. In the end, he would be persuaded to remain for a second term by Hamilton, Jefferson, and others who said that the new nation needed more time to solidify under his aegis. (“North and south,” Jefferson told him, “will hang together if they have you to hang on.”)

An 1895 engraving of Shays’s Rebellion. The violent tax revolt convinced Washington that the United States was still fragile and drew him back into public life. (M&N / Alamy)

As he assumed the presidency, Washington was concerned that even a whiff of kingly presumption could sink America’s new institutions. Lindsay Chervinsky told me that Washington doubted the judgment and prudence of Vice President Adams not only because the vocal and temperamental Bostonian generally irritated him—Adams irritated many of his colleagues—but also because he had proposed bloated and pretentious titles for the chief executive, such as “His Highness, the President of the United States of America, and Protector of their Liberties.” Washington preferred the simpler title adopted by the House of Representatives: “President of the United States.”

The American people trusted Washington, but they didn’t trust an embryonic government created in a matter of months by a small group of men in Philadelphia. (When Washington took office, Rhode Island and North Carolina hadn’t even ratified the Constitution yet.) The first president sought to allay these suspicions by almost immediately undertaking a kind of reassurance tour, traveling throughout the states—the Virginian shrewdly chose to start in New England—to show Americans that the Constitution and the nation’s commander in chief were not threats to their liberties.

Donald Trump also traveled America once he was elected. After one of the most divisive presidential contests in modern American history, Trump embarked on a kind of victory tour through the states that had voted for him, and only those states. His campaign called it a “thank you” tour, but Trump’s speeches—praising his supporters, bashing his enemies—left no doubt about his intentions. “We are really the people who love this country,” he told a crowd in Mobile, Alabama. He was assuring his followers that although he now had to govern the entire nation, he was their president, an insidious theme that would lead directly to the tragic events of January 6.

In his first years in office, Washington could have shaped the new presidency to his liking. His fellow Founders left much in Article II of the Constitution vague; they disagreed among themselves about the powers that the executive branch should hold, and they were willing to let Washington fill in at least some of the blanks regarding the scope of presidential authority. This choice has bedeviled American governance, allowing successive chief executives to widen their own powers, especially in foreign policy. Recently, the Supreme Court further loosened the constraints of the office, holding in Trump v. United States that presidents have immunity for anything that could be construed as an “official act.” This decision, publicly celebrated by Trump, opens frightening opportunities for presidents to rule corruptly and with impunity.

Washington fought for the office rather than its occupant. Sharply cognizant that his every action could constitute a precedent, he tried through his conduct to imbue the presidency with the strength of his own character. He took pains not to favor his relatives and friends as he made political appointments, and he shunned gifts, fearing that they might be seen as bribes. He mostly succeeded: Those who came after him were constrained by his example, even if at times unwillingly, at least until the election of 2016.

Washington believed that the American people had the right to change their Constitution, but he had absolutely no tolerance for insurrectionists who would violently defy its authority. During his first term, Congress passed a new tax on distilled spirits, a law that sparked revolts among farmers in western Pennsylvania. What began as sporadic clashes grew into a more cohesive armed challenge to the authority of the United States government—the largest, as Ron Chernow noted, until the Civil War. In September 1794, Washington issued an official proclamation that this “Whiskey Rebellion” was an act of “treasonable opposition.” The issue, he declared, was “whether a small portion of the United States shall dictate to the whole Union.” He warned other Americans “not to abet, aid, or comfort the insurgents.”

In a show of force, Washington took personal command of a militia of more than 12,000 men and began a march to Carlisle, Pennsylvania—the only time a sitting president has ever led troops in the field. He had no wish to shed American blood, but he was ready to fight, and the rebellion dissipated quickly in the face of this military response. Later, in the first use of the pardon power, Washington spared two of the insurgents from the death penalty, but only after the legal system had run its course and they had been convicted of treason.

As the president’s second term neared its end, his advisers again implored him to remain in office, and again argued that the republic might not survive without him. Washington, his health fading and his disillusionment with politics growing, held firm this time. He was going back to Virginia. As with his retirement from military life, his voluntary relinquishment of power as head of state was an almost inconceivable act at the time.

In his farewell to the American people, the retiring president acknowledged that he had likely made errors in office, but hoped that his faults would “be consigned to oblivion, as myself must soon be to the mansions of rest.” In March 1797, the man who had sacrificed so much for his country that he had to borrow money to get to his first inauguration left Philadelphia as a private citizen. Less than three years later, he was dead.

IV

WASHINGTON BETRAYED

In a 2020 book about the first president, the historian Peter Henriques wrote that Washington “proved that his truest allegiance was to the republic by voluntarily surrendering power. It was the first of many peaceful transfers of power in the unprecedented American experiment.” Less than a year after the book’s publication, however, Trump would subvert this centuries-long tradition by summoning a mob against the elected representatives of the United States, after refusing to accept the result of the vote.

Trump stood by as insurrectionists swarmed the House offices and even the Senate chamber itself on January 6, in an attempt to stop the certification of the election by Congress. Hours later, after one of the worst single days of casualties for law-enforcement officers since 9/11, Trump finally asked his supporters to go home. “I know your pain,” he said, his words only emphasizing the delusional beliefs of the rioters. “I know you’re hurt. We had an election that was stolen from us.” He has since referred to the people convicted in American courts for their actions on January 6 as “patriots” and to those held in prison as “hostages.” He has promised to pardon them.

From the January/February 2022 issue: Trump’s next coup has already begun

Washington’s character and record ensured that almost any of his successors would seem smaller by comparison. But the difference between Washington and Trump is so immense as to be unmeasurable. No president in history, not even the worst moral weaklings among them, is further from Washington than Trump.

Washington prized patience and had, as Adams put it, “the gift of silence”; Trump is ruled by his impulses and afflicted with verbal incontinence. Washington was uncomplaining; Trump whines incessantly. Washington was financially and morally incorruptible; Trump is a grifter and a crude libertine who still owes money to a woman he was found liable for sexually assaulting. Washington was a general of preternatural bravery who grieved the sacrifices of his men; Trump thinks that fallen soldiers are “losers” and “suckers.”

Washington personally took up arms to stop a rebellion against the United States; Trump encouraged one.

Some Americans seem unable to accept how much peril they face should Trump return, perhaps because many of them have never lived in an autocracy. They may yet get their chance: The former president is campaigning on an authoritarian platform. He has claimed that “massive” electoral fraud—defined as the vote in any election he loses—“allows for the termination of all rules, regulations, and articles, even those found in the Constitution.” He refers to other American citizens as “vermin” and “human scum,” and to journalists as “enemies of the people.” He has described freedom of the press as “frankly disgusting.” He routinely attacks the American legal system, especially when it tries to hold him accountable for his actions. He has said that he will govern as a dictator—but only for a day.

Trump is the man the Founders feared might arise from a mire of populism and ignorance, a selfish demagogue who would stop at nothing to gain and keep power. Washington foresaw the threat to American democracy from someone like Trump: In his farewell address, he worried that “sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction” would manipulate the public’s emotions and their partisan loyalties “to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public liberty.”

Many Americans in 2016 ignored this warning, and Trump engaged in the greatest betrayal of Washington’s legacy in American history. If given the opportunity, he would betray that legacy again—and the damage to the republic may this time be irreparable.

This article appears in the November 2024 print edition with the headline “Washington’s Nightmare.” When you buy a book using a link on this page, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic.

The Atlantic · by Tom Nichols · October 9, 2024

8. Worldwide Efforts to Reverse the Baby Shortage Are Falling Flat



Of course some say there is nothing to see hee.



Worldwide Efforts to Reverse the Baby Shortage Are Falling Flat

Subsidized minivans, no income taxes: Countries have rolled out a range of benefits to encourage bigger families, with no luck

https://www.wsj.com/world/birthrate-children-fertility-europe-perks-family-04aa13a0?mod=hp_lead_pos7


By Chelsey DulaneyFollow

Oct. 13, 2024 9:00 pm ET

Imagine if having children came with more than $150,000 in cheap loans, a subsidized minivan and a lifetime exemption from income taxes.

Would people have more kids? The answer, it seems, is no.

These are among the benefits—along with cheap child care, extra vacation and free fertility treatments—that have been doled out to parents in different parts of Europe, a region at the forefront of the worldwide baby shortage. Europe’s overall population shrank during the pandemic and is on track to contract by about 40 million by 2050, according to United Nations statistics.

Birthrates have been falling across the developed world since the 1960s. But the decline hit Europe harder and faster than demographers expected—a foreshadowing of the sudden drop in the U.S. fertility rate in recent years. 


Vice President Kamala Harris in Raleigh, N.C., in August. Photo: jim lo scalzo/EPA/Shutterstock

Reversing the decline in birthrates has become a national priority among governments worldwide, including in China and Russia, where Vladimir Putin declared 2024 “the year of the family.” In the U.S., both Kamala Harris and Donald Trump have pledged to rethink the U.S.’s family policies. Harris wants to offer a $6,000 baby bonus. Trump has floated free in vitro fertilization and tax deductions for parents.

Europe and other demographically challenged economies in Asia such as South Korea and Singapore have been pushing back against the demographic tide with lavish parental benefits for a generation. Yet falling fertility has persisted among nearly all age groups, incomes and education levels. Those who have many children often say they would have them even without the benefits. Those who don’t say the benefits don’t make enough of a difference.

Two European countries devote more resources to families than almost any other nation: Hungary and Norway. Despite their programs, they have fertility rates of 1.5 and 1.4 children for every woman, respectively—far below the replacement rate of 2.1, the level needed to keep the population steady. The U.S. fertility rate is 1.6. 

Demographers suggest the reluctance to have kids is a fundamental cultural shift rather than a purely financial one.

“I used to say to myself, I’m too young. I have to finish my bachelor’s degree. I have to find a partner. Then suddenly I woke up and I was 28 years old, married, with a car and a house and a flexible job and there were no more excuses,” said Norwegian Nancy Lystad Herz. “Even though there are now no practical barriers, I realized that I don’t want children.”

The Hungarian model

Both Hungary and Norway spend more than 3% of GDP on their different approaches to promoting families—more than the amount they spend on their militaries, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 

Hungary says in recent years its spending on policies for families has exceeded 5% of GDP. The U.S. spends around 1% of GDP on family support through child tax credits and programs aimed at low-income Americans.


Orsolya Kocsis in Budapest hasn’t changed her mind about not wanting children. Photo: Akos Stiller for WSJ

Hungary’s subsidized housing loan program has helped almost 250,000 families buy or upgrade their homes, the government says. Orsolya Kocsis, a 28-year-old working in human resources, knows having kids would help her and her husband buy a larger house in Budapest, but it isn’t enough to change her mind about not wanting children.

“If we were to say we’ll have two kids, we could basically buy a new house tomorrow,” she said. “But morally, I would not feel right having brought a life into this world to buy a house.”

Promoting baby-making, known as pronatalism, is a key plank of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s broader populist agenda. Hungary’s biennial Budapest Demographic Summit has become a meeting ground for prominent conservative politicians and thinkers. Former Fox News anchor Tucker Carlson and JD Vance, Trump’s vice president pick, have lauded Orbán’s family policies.

Orbán portrays having children inside what he has called a “traditional” family model as a national duty, as well as an alternative to immigration for growing the population. The benefits for child-rearing in Hungary are mostly reserved for married, heterosexual, middle-class couples. Couples who divorce lose subsidized interest rates and in some cases have to pay back the support.

Hungary’s population, now less than 10 million, has been shrinking since the 1980s. The country is about the size of Indiana.

“Because there are so few of us, there’s always this fear that we are disappearing,” said Zsuzsanna Szelényi, program director at the CEU Democracy Institute and author of a book on Orbán.

Hungary’s fertility rate collapsed after the fall of the Soviet Union and by 2010 was down to 1.25 children for every woman. Orbán, a father of five, and his Fidesz party swept back into power that year after being ousted in the early 2000s. He expanded the family support system over the next decade.

Hungary’s fertility rate rose to 1.6 children for every woman in 2021. Ivett Szalma, an assistant professor at Corvinus University of Budapest, said that like in many other countries, women in Hungary who had delayed having children after the global financial crisis were finally catching up.

Then progress stalled. Hungary’s fertility rate has fallen for the past two years. Around 51,500 babies have been born there this year through August, a 10% drop compared with the same period last year. Many Hungarian women cite underfunded public health and education systems and difficulties balancing work and family as part of their hesitation to have more children.

Anna Nagy, a 35-year-old former lawyer, had her son in January 2021. She received a loan of about $27,300 that she didn’t have to start paying back until he turned 3. Nagy had left her job before getting pregnant but still received government-funded maternity payments, equal to 70% of her former salary, for the first two years and a smaller amount for a third year.



Kocsis at home in Budapest.

Akos Stiller for WSJ (2)

She used to think she wanted two or three kids, but now only wants one. She is frustrated at the implication that demographic challenges are her responsibility to solve. Economists point to increased immigration and a higher retirement age as other offsets to the financial strains on government budgets from a declining population.

“It’s not our duty as Hungarian women to keep the nation alive,” she said. 

Big families

Hungary is especially generous to families who have several children, or who give birth at younger ages. Last year, the government announced it would restrict the loan program used by Nagy to women under 30. Families who pledge to have three or more children can get more than $150,000 in subsidized loans. Other benefits include a lifetime exemption from personal taxes for mothers with four or more kids, and up to seven extra annual vacation days for both parents. 

Under another program that’s now expired, nearly 30,000 families used a subsidy to buy a minivan, the government said.

Critics of Hungary’s family policies say the money is wasted on people who would have had large families anyway. The government has also been criticized for excluding groups such as the minority Roma population and poorer Hungarians. Bank accounts, credit histories and a steady employment history are required for many of the incentives.

Orbán’s press office didn’t respond to requests for comment. Tünde Fűrész, head of a government-backed demographic research institute, disagreed that the policies are exclusionary and said the loans were used more heavily in economically depressed areas.


Eszter Gerencsér and her husband, Tamas, always wanted a big family. Photo: Akos Stiller for WSJ

Government programs weren’t a determining factor for Eszter Gerencsér, 37, who said she and her husband always wanted a big family. They have four children, ages 3 to 10.

They received about $62,800 in low-interest loans through government programs and $35,500 in grants. They used the money to buy and renovate a house outside of Budapest. After she had her fourth child, the government forgave $11,000 of the debt. Her family receives a monthly payment of about $40 a month for each child.

Most Hungarian women stay home with their children until they turn 2, after which maternity payments are reduced. Publicly run nurseries are free for large families like hers. Gerencsér worked on and off between her pregnancies and returned full-time to work, in a civil-service job, earlier this year. 

She still thinks Hungarian society is stacked against mothers and said she struggled to find a job because employers worried she would have to take lots of time off.

The country’s international reputation as family-friendly is “what you call good marketing,” she said.


Gina Ekholt said the government’s policies have helped offset much of the costs of having a child. Photo: Signe Fuglesteg Luksengard for WSJ

Nordic largesse 

Norway has been incentivizing births for decades with generous parental leave and subsidized child care. New parents in Norway can share nearly a year of fully paid leave, or around 14 months at 80% pay. More than three months are reserved for fathers to encourage more equal caregiving. Mothers are entitled to take at least an hour at work to breast-feed or pump.

The government’s goal has never been explicitly to encourage people to have more children, but instead to make it easier for women to balance careers and children, said Trude Lappegard, a professor who researches demography at the University of Oslo. Norway doesn’t restrict benefits for unmarried parents or same-sex couples.

Percentage of women in Norway with at least one child, by age

100%

Among

40-year-old

women

82.4%

75

35-year-olds

73.3%

50

30-year-olds

44.4%

25

25-year-olds

12.4%

20-year-olds

1.2%

0

1980

’90

2000

’10

’20

Source: Statistics Norway



Its fertility rate of 1.4 children per woman has steadily fallen from nearly 2 in 2009. Unlike Hungary, Norway’s population is still growing for now, due mostly to immigration.

“It is difficult to say why the population is having fewer children,” Kjersti Toppe, the Norwegian Minister of Children and Families, said in an email. She said the government has increased monthly payments for parents and has formed a committee to investigate the baby bust and ways to reverse it.

More women in Norway are childless or have only one kid. The percentage of 45-year-old women with three or more children fell to 27.5% last year from 33% in 2010. Women are also waiting longer to have children—the average age at which women had their first child reached 30.3 last year. The global surge in housing costs and a longer timeline for getting established in careers likely plays a role, researchers say. Older first-time mothers can face obstacles: Women 35 and older are at higher risk of infertility and pregnancy complications.

Gina Ekholt, 39, said the government’s policies have helped offset much of the costs of having a child and allowed her to maintain her career as a senior adviser at the nonprofit Save the Children Norway. She had her daughter at age 34 after a round of state-subsidized IVF that cost about $1,600. She wanted to have more children but can’t because of fertility issues.

She receives a monthly stipend of about $160 a month, almost fully offsetting a $190 monthly nursery fee.

“On the economy side, it hasn’t made a bump. What’s been difficult for me is trying to have another kid,” she said. “The notion that we should have more kids, and you’re very selfish if you have only had one…those are the things that took a toll on me.”

Her friend Ewa Sapieżyńska, a 44-year-old Polish-Norwegian writer and social scientist with one son, has helped her see the upside of the one-child lifestyle. “For me, the decision is not about money. It’s about my life,” she said.

Borbála Máriás contributed to this article.

Write to Chelsey Dulaney at chelsey.dulaney@wsj.com











9. What Really Fueled the ‘East Asian Miracle’?


This focuses mostly on Taiwan but also includes some discussion of Korea and Japan.


Key point on land reform:


He adds, “And actually, if you think about the experience of land reform more broadly in a global sense, I think our results actually bring the Taiwanese experience closer to the global experience, which is generally defined that land reform actually has been fairly disappointing in terms of its productivity impacts.”


You can listen to the podcast at this link or read the transcript below. https://www.theatlantic.com/podcasts/archive/2024/10/taiwan-east-asian-miracle-land-reform/680183/




What Really Fueled the ‘East Asian Miracle’?

New research upends conventional wisdom on what actually drives economic growth.

By Jerusalem Demsas

The Atlantic · by Jerusalem Demsas · October 8, 2024

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The transformation of several East Asian countries from developing, agrarian economies to highly developed, industrialized economies is one of the great success stories of the 20th century. According to one World Bank report, almost a billion people were pulled out of poverty as a result of fast growth in the region. But the questions of why this happened and how it can be replicated by other countries remain essential to answer for the roughly 700 million people trying to survive on less than $2.15 a day.

In today’s episode of Good on Paper, I talk with Oliver Kim, an economist working at Open Philanthropy, whose recent paper co-authored with Jen-Kuan Wang, a Ph.D. student at Penn State, investigates one country that was part of the “East Asian miracle”: Taiwan. In the 1950s, Taiwan pursued a series of land reforms that were widely credited for transforming its economy. Other countries in the region had pursued similar reforms—including mainland China, Japan, and South Korea—adding to the sense that these specific changes were important for understanding the region’s development. In broad terms, the story went like this: Taiwan redistributed land to the peasantry, which significantly increased the nation’s agricultural productivity and helped finance the country’s industrialization.

But Kim and Wang’s research casts doubt on this story. Diving into the data reveals a far more complicated picture of how land reforms spurred development in Taiwan, with implications for developing nations around the world.

“It is definitely true that Taiwan got richer during this time period,” Kim explains. “But you also have to remember from a critical historical perspective that this is playing an important propaganda role. And so a lot of Taiwanese historians, though they didn’t have the data that we have, have been questioning this narrative.”

He adds, “And actually, if you think about the experience of land reform more broadly in a global sense, I think our results actually bring the Taiwanese experience closer to the global experience, which is generally defined that land reform actually has been fairly disappointing in terms of its productivity impacts.”

The following is a transcript of the episode:

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Jerusalem Demsas: How does a nation pull its residents out of poverty and into the developed world? I think this is the most important question in economics, and it’s one researchers have struggled to answer.

To development economists, the rise of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, among others—what’s often called the East Asian miracle—has been a source of deep fascination. How did these countries so quickly enter the ranks of the global elite?

On today’s episode, we’re going to focus on Taiwan. How did this country go from a Japanese colony to an advanced industrial economy? And what lessons does it hold for other developing nations?

Over the course of the 1950s, Taiwan’s agricultural productivity took off, setting the stage for its transition to an industrial economy. Over essentially one decade, rice yields grew by more than 40 percent, unlocking a period of rapid economic growth. The traditional narrative is that land reforms are the key to development, particularly a set of reforms that redistributed land from wealthy landlords to the disaffected peasantry and thereby increased productivity.

It’s a nice story, one that puts equity and efficiency on the same side. But a new study casts doubt on whether this story is actually true.

[Music]

This is Good on Paper, a policy show that questions what we really know about popular narratives. My name is Jerusalem Demsas. I’m a staff writer here at The Atlantic, and today I’m joined by Oliver Kim. He recently co-authored a paper that is challenging deeply held beliefs about how development works.

His white paper shows that while redistribution of the land might have been a great policy on its own terms, when you dig into the data, it doesn’t explain Taiwan’s sudden burst of productivity. Other explanations make a lot more sense. We’re going to dig into them today.

All right. Oliver, welcome to the show.

Oliver Kim: Thank you for having me.

Demsas: So we’re here to talk about a very interesting new paper you wrote, but because it’s quite specific, I want us to step back a bit. There’s fundamentally one big question that development economics is trying to answer, and it’s: Why do some countries grow into developed nations where their residents are able to access high standards of living, and why do other nations fail to do so?

And one of the most important debates is centered on the divergence of East Asian countries like South Korea, Japan, and places like Taiwan from places in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. I’m hoping you can just situate us for a second back in the early 1960s. What was the state of these countries that we now think of as highly developed nations, at par or ahead of many Western nations, relative to what we consider developing nations today?

Kim: Sure. At the end of the Second World War—outside of basically Europe, North America, some other European offshoots—the basic condition in most of the world was poverty. And since then, in the present day, outside of basically if you’re lucky enough to find yourself sitting on a giant pool of oil, the only countries to really sustainably grow their economies to high-income status are really the East Asian tigers—Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and then Singapore and Hong Kong.

So I think one of the central questions in development is, Why did this miracle happen? And one of the primary reasons that’s been put forward by economists and economic historians is land reform, which is basically redistributing land from landlords to peasant farmers. Right around the end of the Second World War and the beginnings of decolonization, all these major East Asian economies had large, sweeping land reform. Japan had one around 1947 under American occupation. South Korea, similarly, had one in 1950. And Taiwan had perhaps the largest and most sweeping land reform, which occurred from 1950 to 1958.

And the logic behind land reform is fairly simple. If you think about what most developing countries do—if you go and visit a developing country or area, what most people do to survive is: they farm, right? So I think in the present day—I think the latest stat’s from 2022—something like 40 percent of the world’s population are farmers. And this is where most of the extreme sort of poverty is.

In Asia, immediately in the postwar period, agricultural productivity went up in the 1950s and early ’60s. The most famous example is that in Taiwan, rice yields went up by 40 percent over the course of the 1950s. And if you think about the rural poor, this is a huge increase to their incomes. And so a very influential sort of view in economics is to try and connect these two things and say that land reform had something to do with the growth in agricultural productivity.

And so this was famously articulated by Joe Studwell in his book, How Asia Works. And the idea is that if you basically redistribute land—you take it away from landlords who happen to own a lot of it, and you give ownership to the peasants who actually work on it—you can improve productivity. And so you can get something that’s actually very rare in economics: You can get something that’s good for both equity and efficiency. And so the idea is that East Asia had these large, sweeping, major land reforms, and other developing areas in the world didn’t. And so this was a major contributor to the East Asian divergence.

Demsas: Okay. This story then is about landlords, and by that we’re talking about landlords of agricultural land. And so essentially, at the base, it’s just redistribution, right? You’re talking about redistributing land from these large landholders to people who are farming small hectares of land.

I’m hoping you could actually walk us through, more specifically, what this is, because I know land reform looks very different in different places, and we’re largely going to be talking about your research in Taiwan. So what was land reform there? What were the three phases? And which is the important one?

Kim: Yeah. Land reform is this big, amorphous term in development, and it means a lot of different things to a lot of different people. But I think most people would agree that the most sort of meaningful form of land reform is what you described, which is redistribution.

I guess the model you can have in your head is that in a lot of developing countries, there are these landlords who own a lot of the land, but they don’t necessarily work it themselves. And in the worst case, you have absentee landlords, who don’t even live on the land that they farm, and they have poor, oppressed peasants who are basically doing all the work and tilling the land. And the idea behind land reform—which I think is pretty compelling, at least on the face of it—is that you take that land, and you give the peasants who actually work it rights to that land. And in the most sweeping case, you give them ownership of that land.

And so in Taiwan, as you mentioned, there were several different phases of this. Just to set the historical background, Taiwan has this very unique political history. The government that runs Taiwan, the Republic of China, is basically an exile regime. And so you had Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist Party, the KMT regime, that basically lose the civil war to Mao Zedong on the mainland of China, and they fled to Taiwan with something like a million of their supporters. And so this was a very sort of foreign regime that is almost a neocolonial setup, where they actually had very little ties to the local Taiwanese population, and they’ve just been kicked out by what was essentially a peasant revolution on the mainland of China.

And so you have this foreign regime coming into Taiwan, and they need to build their own domestic base of support. And they had this very recent experience where they were not very popular amongst the peasants. The KMT’s base on mainland China had been amongst landlords. It had been under urban elites. And so they needed to do something different, basically, to avoid getting thrown out a second time.

The first thing that they did was that they capped rent. So this happened in 1949. This is almost like rent control in a modern sort of rental sense. They capped the amount that these tenant farmers had to pay to the landlords. This is actually a fairly limited form of land reform, and it didn’t really do that much.

So the second thing that they did was: They just kicked out the Japanese, who had previously been the colonial overlords of Taiwan. And they took all the land that had previously been held by the Japanese, and they redistributed it to the peasant farmers. And that redistributed something around 20 percent of all arable land in Taiwan.

This still didn’t go far enough from a political perspective. And so the last stage, which ran from 1953 to the ’60s, is that they took any privately held land that was over a certain cutoff—this varied a little bit in terms of the quality of the land, but the most common cutoff was around three hectares for rice-paddy land—and they basically said, Any holding that is over that is going to get split up. So the landlord can retain up to three hectares, and then anything above that gets redistributed to the tenants who farm it. And these three phases collectively basically redistributed about a quarter of all arable land in Taiwan. And this ended up being, I think in a global sense, one of the most sweeping land redistributions in terms of the share of land that was redistributed.

Demsas: Yeah. You find that in all three stages—the three stages of land reform redistribute over 215,000 hectares of land. And for people like me who had to Google what a hectare was, that’s almost 2.5 acres per hectare. So that’s over 500,000 acres of land redistributed. So this is pretty massive. This is not some small amount of shift that’s happening here.

I appreciate you brought the historical perspective here, because part of the question that I had when I was learning about this is: Why didn’t the landholders become a political problem for the government, as well? There’s a lot of power that’s held by landholders. What did they compensate them with?

Kim: Yeah. So part of this has to do with the elite split that I was describing, where the KMT regime that comes over with a million followers—a lot of them who are soldiers with guns—they don’t feel a lot of connection to the local Taiwanese elites, the landlords there. And the KMT regime pretty quickly turns out to be very unpopular.

And so the Taiwanese actually rise up in 1947. It’s this deeply traumatic event in Taiwanese history called the 228 Incident. Local Taiwanese rise up. There’s a huge uprising throughout the island. They take over major cities. And the KMT, which still controls part of the mainland at this time, has to rush troops over, and they basically end up killing tens of thousands of people. This basically massacres a lot of the traditional Taiwanese elite. So that’s an important feature here, where there was very strong political and military coercion that essentially crushes what would be the nascent elite in Taiwan.

And so the split between the fact that you had this almost carpetbagger regime that came over, that had very little connection to the local Taiwanese—that enabled it. And there was some compensation that the KMT did. They did pay the landlords, in theory, for the land that they redistributed. But these payments actually, I guess, were not that economically significant in the final analysis.

Demsas: And so politically, this helps pacify the population. But that’s not the main mechanism by which most people think of land reform as having helped lead to the East Asian miracle, right? And it’s not just in Taiwan. As you mentioned, in the late 1940s, Japan and South Korea have similar land reforms. And in the 1970s, mainland China also has land reform.

And the mechanism is usually that land reform leads to greater agricultural productivity, right? So then you get a ton more productivity. That kind of output growth spurs the ability for people to move into manufacturing sectors. Is that the story? Can you break that down for us?

Kim: Yeah. The traditional story, which was famously articulated by Joe Studwell, is that land reform boosts agricultural productivity. And there’s a number of different mechanisms by which this can be true. But the most common one is that as you shrink the sizes of farms, paradoxically, yields—which is agricultural productivity over a unit of area, so the amount of stuff that you can grow over a hectare of land—that tends to go up.

And this is a deeply disputed sort of relationship in economics. There are a lot of advocates on one side. There are advocates on the other. But the historical view is—at least, in East Asia, in Taiwan and Japan—breaking up these land holdings that the landlords previously held and giving them to tenants had this effect of raising agricultural productivity.

And what my research basically finds with Jen-Kuan Wang (we’ve recently released this working paper) is that if you actually digitize the data—and this hadn’t been done before—but if you actually go into the Taiwanese archives, and you look in a very straightforward way at what actually happened in townships where there was more land reform, do you see more agricultural productivity growth? Do you see rice yields go up more?

We actually don’t really find a lot of strong evidence that was the case. So what we find, basically, is that in areas where there was more of phase two of the land reform—so remember, that’s where you redistribute the previously Japanese-held public land—in areas where there was more of that public land redistribution, you actually do find some small effect on rice yields. So rice yields go up by around 6 percent over 10 years as a result of this phase two of land reform.

Demsas: Is that because they’re converting things from sugar to rice?

Kim: Yeah. The idea there, basically, is that these are previously colonially held lands. The Japanese were previously mandating that you grow sugar. This was essentially feeding the Japanese empire, in a large sense. And once you lift that constraint, and you make farmers free to grow what they want, they choose to plant rice instead of sugar. And this is a classic economically liberal argument, but: You give people the freedom to choose, and they make more efficient decisions.

But the reform that everyone tends to focus on more—because it’s very rare, actually, that you have a case where you have a colonial overlord that gets kicked out, and you can redistribute their property. That can only usually happen once. The case that people typically fixate on in the case of Taiwan is phase three of land reform—this redistribution. And this obviously has a lot of resonance in present-day debates whenever there’s a lot of inequality in the world.

And the idea was that, basically, by taking land away from these landlords who own these larger estates, and you give them to these peasants, you boost agricultural productivity. But when we look in the data, when we go into the township-level data, and we run regressions on the stuff, we actually really can’t find this effect.

Demsas: So much really good economics is just in the data, right? It is in finding and cleaning data, actually going and testing theories. And one of the things that you make clear in your white paper is that this theory had not been tested by looking at the actual records on the ground in Taiwan. So can you walk us through what you did there and how you found that? Did not have access to this before?

Kim: Actually, it is a little surprising that this hadn’t been done before, because a lot of this was actually just sitting there. My co-author—I mentioned who I wrote this paper with, Jen-Kuan Wang—is Taiwanese, and he did a lot of digitization work, going into the government data archives. But the basic work, the initial regressions that we ran, actually it was just a book I pulled from the UC Berkeley library.

Demsas: What was the book?

Kim: The book was—they actually had, at the township level, the land-distribution statistics. So they had for each township in Taiwan, you know, How many people own plots that are between, like, zero and 0.5 hectares? Between 0.5 and 1 hectare? etc.

And so this very sort of commonly held story that this phase three of redistribution, that land-to-the-tiller reforms boost agricultural productivity—it doesn’t actually seem to be the case. And one reason that we hypothesize is, basically, that the farms that this created were just too small, actually, to be economically viable.

And so if you actually think about the context here—Taiwan is actually a pretty small place—the initial land holdings held by these landlords were just relatively small, and they just got broken down to an even smaller extent, to something like 0.2 hectares, which is, I think, less than an acre.

And these are just too small to support a growing family. And this had the perverse effect, basically, of pushing labor out of agriculture and into industry because these farms are just too small to support the families that were living on them. So this is very different.

Demsas: So people sold their land and moved to the city?

Kim: They often kept it, basically. In a lot of developing societies, I think there’s a lot of attachment to the land as a form of security, but it was just not enough to provide enough income to support a whole family. And so you had people leaving agriculture and starting to pursue part-time or even full-time employment in manufacturing, and that’s maybe related to the broader sort of transformation of Taiwan that people typically think of when they think of the East Asian miracle.

Demsas: And I want to ask you first: Were you surprised by the results of your study? Or did you expect to find productivity growth?

Kim: Yeah, I did. I mean, people on Twitter and stuff have been like, Oh, there’s been a lot of fighting, over, like, Oh, what this means for the Joe Studwell book, but like, Oh, this was an attempt to take down How Asia Works.

But I actually really like that book. And I was motivated to do this because I really did believe the story that land reform is good for productivity, and it had all these sort of positive effects on East Asian development. So yeah, I did go into this expecting to find a very strong result of land reform. So it was surprising to say the least.

Demsas: Okay, cool. I also enjoyed the Studwell book, so I’m glad I don’t have to throw that one out.

So there’s this question about whether small farms would be more productive than big farms, which is actually really, really important. In general, you would expect there to be economies of scale that come with bigger farms: You’re able to diversify your crops more in case of a problem. You’re able to invest in productivity-enhancing technology, whether that’s irrigation or whatever it is.

At some level, do you feel like the original land-reform story felt suspicious on face?

Kim: Yeah. So one thing that’s very interesting, particularly if you dive into the Taiwanese literature, is that local Taiwanese scholars are very skeptical of this story. And I brought up this political context, right? There’s a split—the KMT come in; they’re this foreign regime. This was a very brutal authoritarian regime. In a modern sense, this was an autocracy, right? And they need to build their local base of support, and so they play up this idea of land reform being this benevolent policy that was so good for the Taiwanese people, because it suits their interests, right?

Part of that might be true. It is definitely true that Taiwan got richer during this time period. But you also have to remember, from a critical historical perspective, that this is playing an important propaganda role. And so a lot of Taiwanese historians, though they didn’t have the data that we have, have been questioning this narrative and have been pointing to examples of the fact that, Hey, a lot of these farms were actually really small. A lot of people were actually pushed off the farm. Maybe the sort of miracle doesn’t have actually that much to do with KMT policy.

And so, yeah. I think adopting this critical historical perspective and saying, Hey, something about the story doesn’t seem quite right. And actually, if you think about the experience of land reform more broadly in a global sense, I think our results actually bring the Taiwanese experience closer to the global experience, which is generally defined that land reform actually has been fairly disappointing in terms of its productivity impacts.

Demsas: And I think that brings me to this broader observation that I’m hoping you can expand on, which is that so many debates about development, especially development—these are obviously developing nations—are being shoehorned into debates that are happening in Western countries about what sorts of economic policies are better.

And so in some ways it seems like there’s this larger debate about whether industrial policy, whether the government intervention in the market is an appropriate way to get to development. And then you have folks on the other side— the Washington Consensus, the more neoliberal economists—who are saying, No. We want free and open trade. We don’t want government intervention. And the industrial-policy people really, really like this land-reform story because it shows that there is a role for government to be intervening in the market. Is that how you see it, too?

Kim: Yeah. I think there’s always a bit of a danger from trying to transpose lessons in developing contexts to developed contexts, right? They’re deeply different in very fundamental ways. On the industrial-policy stuff, the example that everyone likes to bring up is: South Korea did a ton of industrial policy and experienced this massive developmental miracle, right? So there was massive intervention. The state heavily subsidized certain sectors—like steelmaking, like auto production, like shipbuilding—and then created these very successful industries and very successful firms that were able to compete on the global marketplace.

And I think there’s a real strong sort of temptation to try and take that logic and apply it to things like CHIPS [and Science Act] in the United States. I’m not saying, necessarily, that’s wrong. But you have to remember that the context in which Korea is implementing these policies is very different than what the United States is trying to do. Like, Korea when it was trying to build its domestic steel industry, or if you want to lump agricultural policy, so like Taiwan when it’s trying to develop its local agriculture—these are not new, frontier industries. These are not at the technological frontier.

You broadly know that you should be growing more food. You broadly know that a developed country, at least in the ’60s or ’70s—the hallmark of being a rich country is that you make your own steel, right? It’s not a mystery. Especially in Korea and Taiwan, which were former Japanese colonies, you can look over the water, and you can see your former colonial overlord, Japan, that’s doing pretty well economically by developing its domestic industries, doing all this industrial-policy stuff. And so it’s fairly simple to mimic that policy recipe and try to develop an industrial mix that catches up to countries that have already reached the frontier.

With things like CHIPS and modern industrial policy or things like electric cars, it’s much more difficult to have a guide in that sense. It’s unclear what the hallmarks of a highly rich society in the 21st or 22nd century is going to look like. So I think there’s a fundamental difference there. When you have the playbook and you have clear sort of historical examples—economists call these demonstration effects—when you have a demonstration effect that you can point to, the problem of what industrial sectors to prioritize becomes a lot easier.

[Music]

Demsas: All right. We’ll have more with Oliver after this break.

[Break]

Demsas: I want to step back broader and talk about why this really even matters. One mechanism that you guys are really undermining in your paper is the idea that land reform led to the East Asian miracle by increasing agriculture productivity.

But you hinted at this already, but there are other ways in which land reform could have helped propel Taiwan, South Korea, all these other countries into becoming a developed nation, into these high-GDP-per-capita countries. I’m hoping we can talk through some of those, because the elimination of that one causal pathway doesn’t actually mean we can say land reform isn’t important for understanding Taiwan’s or other countries’ pathway to development.

So I guess one pathway, which you hinted at, is a sort of political pathway, that you’re able to pacify the population of peasants who have already had this really, as you mentioned, traumatic uprising, have martial law now imposed, but you need to actually make sure that they’re not going to overthrow you. And so it staves off political demands for communism. Is that a pathway that you think is super valid for understanding what happened here?

Kim: Yeah. I think that’s central. I think you can’t really understand the history of East Asian development without understanding the fact that this all is happening in the context of the Cold War, right?

So I mentioned that Japan, South Korea, Taiwan all had these land reforms. These are all non-communist countries. But if you look at the map of East Asia, and you put the dates of land reforms across all countries—not just these three—on a map, you’ll notice there’s this kind of mirroring pattern. Japan has a land reform in ’47, but China also has one from ’45 to the ’50s, as Mao’s Communists take over. South Korea has one in 1950, but that’s because North Korea has one a couple years earlier.

And so the motivations, I think, are fairly obvious, which is that these are poor societies where most of the people are farmers, and across the border, in a lot of cases, you have very viable military threats, which are doing actually fairly popular programs of land redistribution that build up the support among the peasantry.

And so this is a very unique circumstance where the United States supports a lot of these very strong redistributionary measures in order to basically forestall the possibility of communist takeover. And this is not the kind of thing that’s very easy to do in a regression, like a formal statistical sense, but just knowing the historical context and the narrative of this history, it’s hard to see how these regimes could have survived without at least doing some form of land redistribution, at least building up some support amongst the farmers that made up the majority of their population. If these regimes had failed to survive, and they’d been swallowed up—let’s say Taiwan had been consumed by mainland China—you wouldn’t be talking about an East Asian miracle, probably.

And the exception that proves the rule is South Vietnam. So people forget that there was this other kind of American proto-colony in Southeast Asia. Just like Korea, Vietnam gets divided into two. There’s a communist northern half. There’s a capitalist southern half. And for particular reasons, the South Vietnamese regime basically avoids doing systematic land reform. And the American government very famously spends a lot of effort, blood, and treasure in this horrific and tragic war, which is called the Vietnam War, basically, trying to solve through coercive means what ultimately, I think, is an agrarian and a peasant sort of revolt. And part of the problem is that the South Vietnamese regime is beholden to the landlords. It’s a landlord-led government. And they’re not particularly interested until very late in the war in doing large-scale redistribution, because that’s where their wealth is tied up.

And what basically happens, of course, is that the South Vietnamese state gets hollowed out. It ultimately falls to a conventional invasion from the North, but it’s hard to argue, I think, that if they hadn’t done land reform earlier, they might have continued to exist. And failing to have done systematic land reform basically results in the regime failing to survive. And I think the East Asian states that did successfully do land reform avoided this fate.

Demsas: Okay. It sounds like you place a lot of value in that story. But as you mentioned, Joe Studwell, who writes How Asia Works—he has a few other pathways that he also theorizes. One is that landlords are forced to go do more productive things than just rent seeking. Previously before land reforms, you’re a landlord, you have a bunch of money, you have peasants working the farm, you get to raise your rents really high, and you have no incentive to really invest in that land and to increase productivity, because you’re just making a lot of money by just collecting those rents and not having to do anything else. Once your land is forcibly redistributed, in order to—you want to still be rich? You want to make money? You have to go do something more productive. Do you find that to be a valuable way of thinking about this?

Kim: Yeah. We’ve tried to find evidence for this. So the story in Taiwan is that, in compensation for the land reform, the landlords were compensated by the state, either in the form of land bonds, which basically is a claim on agricultural output. So I don’t know—you’re entitled to some number of kilograms of sweet potatoes in the next five years or something like that. My understanding is that those actually turned out to be fairly worthless.

And then the second thing that landlords were compensated with were shares of industrial companies. So Taiwan had a little bit of industry that had been leftover by the Japanese. The KMT state claims it, and they give shares to the landlords. And I think this is a little bit of what Joe Studwell is gesturing at. I’m a little bit more skeptical that this is as developmentally important, because one of the things that happens in Taiwan is that a lot of the growth in manufacturing—there is growth on the state-led sector, but the really most dynamic kind of growth-leading sectors of the economy are small-scale manufacturing.

And so these don’t really have much to do with the former—like, these lumbering, large-scale industrial enterprises that the government had redistributed these shares of. It’s more these new enterprises that sprout up in the countryside. And so that, I think, is maybe evidence against this view that it’s the landlords, in particular, who are the importance of entrepreneurs in development.

Demsas: Okay. To recap land reform: Your belief is that it largely is operating positively for growth by staving off communism and, potentially also, the low yields lead people to work more manufacturing. But you don’t really believe that there is some large productivity increase that comes from redistributing the land to the peasantry.

Kim: Yeah. That’s right. And I think this helps reconcile a little bit Taiwan with the global historical experience, right? It wasn’t unknown that South Korea and Taiwan did this. Throughout the ’70s, there were actually a lot of attempts at land reform in Latin America, elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

Now, there are a host of different reasons that this didn’t work. Often, as I mentioned, as I alluded to, in the case of South Vietnam, for political reasons, a lot of these land reforms ended up getting co-opted. But even in the instances where there was genuine redistribution, there just never were sort of the claimed productivity effects that you saw, or at least you claim to see, in South Korea and Taiwan.

And at least in the Taiwanese case, the study brings Taiwan back into line, I think, with the rest of historical experience. It’s not to say that agricultural productivity didn’t go up. Clearly, Taiwan got richer. Rice yields went up. But I think the balance of explanations and how much explanatory power you want to put on land reform versus more prosaic things—like the fact that there were, you know, improvements in fertilizer use, the fact that there were the development of higher-yield varieties sort of presaging the Green Revolution—these sort of more prosaic, technical developments probably are more important than this sort of very flashy, large-scale institutional change of land reform.

Demsas: But I also want to take a step back from land reform in particular, because in general, if you are downgrading the importance of one explanation for East Asian development, then you should be upgrading other explanations for East Asian development, right?

So I wanted to talk about some of the other reasons people often have for why nations develop or why nations fail, to quote Acemoglu, and see what you think of it now that you’ve done this study. Okay, let’s start with export discipline. Can you explain what that is and whether you feel more confident that it’s a reason for East Asian development?

Kim: Yeah. The idea there, basically, is that when you think of the East Asian countries, you typically actually think of manufacturing development. There’s actually this Calvin and Hobbes comic, I think from 1980s, where Calvin asked Hobbes to check the tag of his shirt because it says where he comes from. And Hobbes checks the shirt, and it says made in taiwan. It’s like he came from Taiwan.

I mean, the idea that Taiwan was making shirts back in the ’80s and now is doing things like TSMC and making microchips—that’s a tremendous transformation. But the common thread throughout this stuff is that it’s about making physical goods, industrial production that gets exported abroad. And the idea with export discipline is that there was a lot of industrial policy throughout the developing world throughout the ’60s and ’70s. And it was actually the policy consensus that the state has to do things to foster development.

And Joe Studwell’s argument in How Asia Works is that the differentiating kind of factor for the East Asian economies was the fact that they actually forced their big sort of industrial champions to export. And this basically disciplines the firm when a firm can just stay in the domestic market. So imagine you’re surrounded by big, tall tariff barriers; there’s really no incentive to innovate or to try and become more efficient.

Demsas: You have a captive audience.

Kim: You have a captive market. You have a captive audience. And in the comparative sense, this is what a lot of scholars view happened, for instance, in South Asia and India, in a lot of Latin American countries, where you had initially very well-intentioned policies, where it’s like, Okay. We want to foster an infant industry. We want to get industrialization going. To support that industry, to prevent it from just being strangled in the cradle, we need to have all these supports. We need to put up tariff barriers. We need to subsidize credit, all this kind of stuff.

Demsas: To make it easier for these industries not to have to compete with—

Kim: Yeah, to make these industries grow and to get them to a sufficient size that economies of scale kick in.

This is a very standard kind of economic argument, and it’s actually fairly sound. The problem is the political stuff, which is that once that firm is born and grows a little bit, it starts to create a constituency that actually really likes to have these barriers. It’s really nice to not have to compete with all these scary, big foreign firms that are potentially more efficient than you are.

And so the view is that what happened in South Asia and Latin America is, like, a lot of these controls and these barriers stayed up, and the firms are never forced to export—unlike, for instance, the Hyundais and Kias of the South Korean experience. In other countries, they never developed the productivity enhancements to become globally competitive, and so you didn’t have the sort of miraculous growth. I think this view is basically still pretty sound.

Demsas: So I think the more-popular ones that people generally tend to hear when they think about development and why it happens are these temperature and education explanations for development. So: Hotter places don’t develop well. And also, people should just invest in education. That’s why the East Asian tigers do so well, is because they have such well-educated populations. How do you think about those explanations?

Kim: Yeah. The temperature one is interesting. I think that goes back to Montesquieu or whatever.

Demsas: Yeah. It’s an old one.

Kim: Yeah, like, tropical. There’s always a little bit of, That’s a little suspect, in there.

Demsas: Oh, yeah.

Kim: I mean, Taiwan is pretty hot. Singapore, which I grew up partly in, is really hot. I don’t think there are very many economists who would seriously defend it. In a more analytical sense, Taiwan, Singapore, Vietnam, which is growing very quickly—they’re tropical climates, essentially. And so I don’t think that climate can necessarily be, like, the best explanatory sort of variable there.

The second one that you mentioned is education, right? Which I think is still very live as a hypothesis, right? And so the idea is that maybe because of cultural factors, like the sort of legacy of Confucianism, this legacy of meritocratic exams in these Confucian regimes, East Asian cultures valued a lot of education. And so that carried over to the modern period, where the educational attainment was relatively high. I think that education is obviously really, really important. I think it’s important from a rights basis. As an individual, it improves your earnings.

It’s a little bit more unclear to me how this works out at a societal level. So when you move from the specific, the micro, to the macro and the aggregate, this is a huge live debate in the development literature—how much, actually, educational attainment has gone up in the developing world.

Clearly, actual growth experience has been kind of disappointing, especially over the past four or five years. At least on paper, there have been a lot of reforms—understanding the East Asian experience, trying to apply it—there have been a lot of reforms trying to promote free primary education, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. There’s at least a lot of rhetoric from governments that they should be prioritizing education. Whether that has actually translated into increases in learning—like the actual test scores, for instance—that is a huge open question. And I don’t think there’s very good sort of international data, particularly from these very poor, developing countries, to understand how much these test scores have gone up.

There is also a lot of political incentives. I think Justin Sandefur from the Center for Global Development has an interesting paper showing that when Western donors attach a lot of conditions, basically, to—let’s say you want to hit certain targets in vaccination rates or something like that—the official government data goes up a lot, but when you actually do a survey, it doesn’t show that much of an increase.

So there’s a lot of reporting incentives, also, to say that educational attainment goes up a lot. So that’s just a very long tangent to say that I think there’s a strong case to be made that this was an important component of success in East Asia. Whether it’s on its own enough to explain stuff, and whether it can explain growth in development more broadly, in a global sense, the jury is still out on that.

Demsas: And then, the last one is sort of—I mean, the Why Nations Fail is the big developmental econ book that gets popular amongst noneconomists, too. And to oversimplify Acemoglu’s thesis here, there are these inclusive institutions that make development possible. Part of why I think that framework can be helpful here is that when you think about why a country is able to pursue or willing to pursue land reforms or is not able to or willing to pursue it—even if they have a lot of the information, there’s a level at which it’s almost like, Yeah. There are places where people can pursue good economic policy for kind of amorphous institutional reasons. And that’s very, very hard to isolate as a thing that you can tell countries to do.

Kim: Yeah. This is sometimes phrased a little bit pejoratively as the “get a better history” kind of view. Which is that, Oh, there are these long-standing, almost fundamental historical differences that determine your economic destiny. And there’s very little that you can do about that. Obviously, history matters. Countries don’t just drop out of coconut trees. They exist in the context that came before them, right? But history is not everything.

There was scholarly work, for instance, done about China and Confucian societies in the 1950s with the view that’s very different from today, which is that Confucian societies are actually not compatible with modern economic development.

So if you’re taking the vantage point of somebody from the 1950s, you just see in Chiang Kai-Shek’s regime collapse on the mainland, it’s not even like Korea and Taiwan are doing particularly well in a global sense. Like, the miracle stuff is sort of very nascent. And so it’s a very rational kind of response, as a sociologist, to say, Hey. Maybe these Confucian regimes are just not very good at adapting to the modern world.

Fast-forward 30 years, you have Lee Kuan Yew, the prime minister of Singapore, making a very forceful case globally, going around to different countries and saying, Hey. The reason you’re not doing well is because you don’t have Confucian values. Confucian societies—we value education. We’re more respectful of the government. We’re more organized, all this kind of stuff.

And so I think a lot of these more-ingrained cultural and institutional factors are actually not so ingrained when you take a broader view of history. They’re more malleable than people can make them out to be. And so there’s always this game that you can play about, Are institutions inclusive? Or are they exclusive?

So a first approximation looking at Taiwan in the 1950s, this period, which we’ve been describing as the period where the miracle is laying down roots, this is an autocracy. This is an authoritarian, right-wing, military dictatorship. This is not like a democracy where—actually, the other famous example in How Asia Works and in the history of development is South Korea, which we know is the example of a miraculous country.

One of the first things that happened under the dictator Park Chung Hee was that he took a lot of the prominent capitalists, and he threw them in prison. And he basically threatened to confiscate their property unless they started to dedicate their resources to the goal of national development. And throughout this period, there was a lot of state intervention in the economy. And so this just, prima facie, does not sound like inclusive institutions in the “democracy is good” kind of sense.

This is not to condone dictatorship and autocracy as a route to development, but it’s just saying that history is complicated, and, like, our views of this stuff kind of change depending on our vantage point. And I think it’s, maybe, a little bit of a blind spot to think of these things as too fixed, and they can move around, and there are opportunities I think that exists for nations to reshape their economic destinies.

Demsas: And so what’s really important about your paper—and I was reading through some of the other economists that have really focused on land reform in explaining East Asia’s divergence from Latin America or other countries or Southeast Asia—it’s almost like other countries have this template. They need to do land reform, and then they can develop. I wonder if you can talk to us a little bit about: Why wasn’t it possible for other countries to pursue this? And do you think that if they had, they would have gotten the benefits? Or is it kind of like, this is not the one-trick pony for development?

Kim: Yeah. So I think the political factors are really important to foreground here. There’s a scholar, I believe at the University of Chicago, called Michael Albertus who has a great book called Autocracy and Redistribution, which I think of as the canonical theory of, Why does actual, large-sweeping instances of land reform happen? And the answer that he basically gives is that land reform occurs when there’s a split in the elites, right? So as I mentioned, this is a fact you should always bear in mind.

What Albertus basically posits is that what you need to happen is that there’s a split in the elites. And so you have one group that advocates for reform and then separates from the landed class. And so this is what happened in East Asia, right? So I mentioned Japan and South Korea had these land reforms. Well, who actually implemented the land reforms? It was the American Army, in essence, occupying these countries in the aftermath of the collapse of Japan after World War II. In Taiwan, it was less an American military presence, but it was actually, again, this foreign KMT regime that didn’t have very close ties with the local elites that was free, basically, to impose a land reform through this essentially autocratic, authoritarian means.

And so there’s this weird kind of thing where, actually, authoritarian regimes—Albertus points out—are actually, in a lot of cases, more likely to engage in land reform because they have the capacity and the willingness to disempower and remove property from the main political class, who in a democracy might actually have more of a voice.

Demsas: Yeah. That reminds me of my favorite economist and philosopher, Amartya Sen, who has a book called Development as Freedom. There’s this larger debate where people talk about whether or not democracy or authoritarianism is going to lead to economic growth. And what Sen points out is that the ends of economic growth are freedom, whether it’s freedom from hunger or thirst or whatever it is, but those are just basic political freedoms.

People are wanting to have access to these basic goods—whether you’re disrespected inside, or you’re not going to be murdered on the basis of immutable characteristics or treated differently by your government—and so not treating democracy as, Oh. Well, authoritarian government might get you closer to having a higher GDP. But people also care about basic freedoms. And so I always think that that’s an interesting—

Kim: Yeah. That’s right. And also, Sen has this view of—it’s called the capabilities approach. What matters, basically, is, you know—it’s not necessarily just wealth or income; it’s what that wealth or income enables you to do and what sort of agency it gives you.

And I think that’s also a framing with which to view the land-reform stuff, which is that even if it didn’t necessarily have the claimed productivity impacts—so both having this equity boost but also this efficiency boost, so having your cake and eating it too—it’s enough just to have the equity boost.

Demsas: Yes. Exactly.

Kim: You made society more equitable. You gave a lot of very, very poor peasant farmers a little bit more security. You gave them control over their land. This is something that, politically, they’d been advocating for and fighting for for a very long time.

I think a lot of people on Twitter and elsewhere have been trying to read the paper as, Land reform is bad, or, Joe Studwell is wrong. I think that’s maybe too much of a simplification. Giving the poor more land is, I think, a pretty good thing in itself, and you didn’t actually lower productivity as a result. So I think the view is maybe a little bit more ambivalent than the triumphalist sort of narrative. But I think land reform should still be on the table.

Demsas: Well, we have one final question for you, which is: What is an idea that you initially thought was a good one but ended up only being good on paper?

Kim: Like a lot of people—maybe who are listening to this podcast—I got pretty involved in political-betting markets around 2016 or so. And I was peak econ brain at this point in time. One of the first things you learn if you’ve taken a little bit of intermediate micro[economics] theory is that conditional on the probabilities, you want to equalize your marginal utility across different states of the world. And that’s just a very nerdy, complicated way of saying that you want to hedge your bets, right?

And so when it comes to political-betting markets, I imagine like a lot of people listening to this podcast, I have very strong preferences about the outcomes. And so in the 2016 election, I put it as a small bet—like $25 or whatever—and Donald Trump as, like, as an emotional hedge, basically.

Demsas: So that if Hillary Clinton loses, at least you have some money.

Kim: Yeah. Exactly. You feel a little bit better about yourself. And in Homo economicus logic, this makes a whole lot of sense on paper. And I fully expected Hillary Clinton to win, just like a lot of people did. And of course, she loses. And I get my little, dinky payout, and I don’t really feel a lot better about myself. In fact, I feel a little bit dirty in having—

Demsas: How much money did you win?

Kim: I don’t remember. It was on the order of $30 or $40. It was not a whole lot of money. But yeah, it just didn’t feel good relative to how horrible those months were. So I think, yeah, there’s a sense in which the Homo economicus model is missing something. So that’s something that’s maybe better on paper than it actually is in reality.

Demsas: Well, we would need a randomized controlled trial here to see if you would have felt even worse if you hadn’t had the $30. So it seems unclear.

Kim: Yeah. Maybe. Maybe.

Demsas: Thank you so much for joining the show, Oliver.

Kim: Yeah. Thanks. This was a lot of fun.

[Music]

Demsas: Good on Paper is produced by Jinae West. It was edited by Dave Shaw, fact-checked by Ena Alvarado, and engineered by Erica Huang. Our theme music is composed by Rob Smierciak. Claudine Ebeid is the executive producer of Atlantic audio, and Andrea Valdez is our managing editor.

And hey, if you like what you’re hearing, please leave us a rating and review on Apple Podcasts.

I’m Jerusalem Demsas, and we’ll see you next week.

The Atlantic · by Jerusalem Demsas · October 8, 2024


10. US will send a missile defense system and troops to run it to Israel to aid defense against Iran



There is no greater demonstration of commitment than putting boots on the ground.


US will send a missile defense system and troops to run it to Israel to aid defense against Iran

AP · October 13, 2024




WASHINGTON (AP) — The United States will send a T erminal High Altitude Area Defense battery to Israel, along with the troops needed to operate it, the Pentagon said Sunday, even as Iran warned Washington to keep American military forces out of Israel.

Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder, Pentagon spokesman, said in a statement that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin authorized the deployment of the THAAD battery at the direction of President Joe Biden. He said the system will help bolster Israel’s air defenses following Iran’s ballistic missile attacks on Israel in April and October.

The delivery of the sophisticated missile defense system risks further inflaming the conflict in the Middle East despite widespread diplomatic efforts to avoid an all-out war. The Iranian warning came in a post on the social platform X long associated with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who noted the earlier reports that the U.S. was considering the deployment.

Israeli forces and Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon have been clashing since Oct. 8, 2023, when the Lebanese militant group began firing rockets over the border in support of its ally Hamas in Gaza. Late last month, Israel launched a ground invasion into Lebanon.

Israel is widely believed to be preparing a military response to Iran’s Oct. 1 attack when it fired roughly 180 missiles into Israel.

In a brief exchange with reporters before leaving Florida on Sunday, Biden said he agreed to deploy the THAAD battery “to defend Israel.” Biden spoke at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa after making a quick visit to to see the damage caused by Hurricane Milton and meet with first responders, residents and local leaders.


Ryder, in his statement, said the deployment “underscores the United States’ ironclad commitment to the defense of Israel, and to defend Americans in Israel, from any further ballistic missile attacks by Iran.”

It was not immediately clear where the THAAD battery was coming from or when it will arrive. Lt. Col. Nadav Shoshani, an Israeli army spokesman, declined to provide any timeline for its arrival, but thanked the U.S. for its support.

The U.S. deployed one of the batteries to the Middle East along with additional Patriot battalions to bolster protections for U.S. forces in the region late last year after the Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Hamas militants. Ryder also said that the U.S. sent a THAAD battery to Israel in 2019 for training.

It also is not unusual for the U.S. to have a limited number of troops in Israel, which the U.S. considers a key regional ally. There generally has been a small number of forces there consistently as well as routine rotational deployments for training and exercises.

The THAAD will add another layer to Israel’s already significant air defenses, which include separate systems designed to intercept long-range, medium-range and short-range threats. Israel recently retired its U.S.-made Patriot systems after decades of use.

According to an April report by the Congressional Research Service, the Army has seven THAAD batteries. Generally each consists of six truck-mounted launchers, 48 interceptors, radio and radar equipment and requires 95 soldiers to operate.

The THAAD is considered a complementary system to the Patriot, but it can defend a wider area. It can hit targets at ranges of 150 to 200 kilometers (93 to 124 miles), and is used to destroy short-range, medium-range and limited intermediate-range ballistic missile threats that are either inside or outside the atmosphere.

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency is responsible for developing the system, but it is operated by the Army. An eighth system has been funded and ordered and is expected to be in the field sometime next year.

____

Associated Press writers Jon Gambrell in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Aamer Madhani in Tampa, Florida, and Josef Federman in Jerusalem contributed to this report.

AP · October 13, 2024


11. China’s aggression tests US pact to defend Philippines



Comments from a number of us below.


China’s aggression tests US pact to defend Philippines 

by Brad Dress - 10/13/24 6:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4929656-philippines-china-tension-us-defense/



The growing tension between the Philippines and China has raised the question of whether the U.S. is willing to defend its ally against Chinese aggression, particularly in disputed territories of the Pacific Ocean.  

The U.S. and the Philippines have a mutual defense treaty, first signed in 1951, that obligates the countries to stand together in the event of an armed attack in the Pacific.  

But it has not always been clear if disputed reefs and territories in the South China Sea are included in the pact, or whether Washington is willing to go to war with China over the Philippines, especially as the U.S. military is already preparing for a potential war with Chinese forces over Taiwan. 

Secretary of State Antony Blinken, during a July visit to Manila, emphasized the U.S. will uphold its treaty obligations. 

“That extends to armed attacks on Filipino armed forces, public vessels or aircraft — including the coast guard — anywhere in the Pacific, including the South China Sea,” he said.

Experts who are closely watching the escalation between the Philippines and China agree the U.S. has been clearer since the Trump administration that it would defend its ally if it came down to it, but Beijing is increasingly pushing it beyond the theoretical. 

“It’s only a matter of time before China escalates to the point of actually killing American allies in the region,” said Markus Garlauskas, director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. “China’s approach is very incremental and they’re purposely trying to make it hard to define the point where a stronger response is required.” 

“The risk is very real that there could be a major escalation, but that China’s not going to make it easy for us or make it clear cut,” he continued. 

In recent months, Chinese boats have been accused of ramming Philippine ships and attacking Filipino sailors with water cannons and, in one scenario, machetes.  

Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said the threat from China is growing in a wide-ranging Bloomberg interview earlier this year. 

“Since the threat has grown, we must do more to defend our territory,” he said. 

There is likely to be hesitancy in Washington to begin a potentially brutal war with China, which boasts a larger navy than the U.S. and is inextricably intertwined with the American economy, at least in the short term. 

Jeffrey Ordaniel, director of Maritime Programs at the Pacific Forum, said there is already a “big question mark” of whether the U.S. would defend Taiwan, particularly after debate has raged among Republicans in Washington over supporting Ukraine. 

“If you’re talking about Taiwan, a democracy of 23 million people … what would make the Philippines believe that the United States would be willing to die for islands or island rocks?” he said. 

It’s not clear how domestic politics could also affect any U.S. intervention, including if a crisis were to break out under a potential second administration of former President Trump, who has been more cautious about defending American allies like Ukraine.  

But Republicans and Democrats alike are hawkish against China, and Trump’s former secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, was the first to clearly lay out that the U.S. would defend the Philippines anywhere in the Pacific. 

“There is a strong China hawk element among Trump’s advisors,” said David Maxwell, vice president at the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy. “That would weigh differently for Chinese malign activities in the Philippines versus Russia and Ukraine. … I think there will be a willingness to stand up to China.” 

China claims control over most of the South China Sea despite a 2016 international ruling rejection. It has disputes with several countries in the Pacific, including Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, but in recent years, its aggression against the Philippines has sparked the most concern. 

Maxwell said the potential for miscalculation between the Philippines and China is “much higher than miscalculation between China and Taiwan,” emphasizing the need for stronger deterrence, which he argued the Biden administration has failed to do in Ukraine and the Middle East. 

“Unfortunately, my criticism of this administration is that the prime directive for all national security and foreign policy is prevent escalation,” he said. “China is looking at our desire to prevent escalation [and that] actually gives them a lot of room to move, a lot of flexibility and a lot of freedom of action.” 

The U.S. has slammed China for aggression after each spat with the Philippines but so far has decided against intervention. 

Still, the risk is growing that China, under authoritarian leader Xi Jinping, will continue gray zone warfare tactics aimed at coercing the Philippines and dominating the South China Sea.  

Ordaniel, from the Pacific Forum, said China was “pushing the envelope” with gray zone tactics “until at some point you have a Chinese presence everywhere.” He argued it was critical for both the Philippines and the U.S. to sit down and discuss ways to increase deterrence. 

“The Philippines are not taking advantage of its alliance with the United States to increase deterrence and the United States is not being … forceful enough to tell the Philippines that, ‘Hey, our alliance credibility is on the line,’” he said.  

“The responses have not been adequate [and] China is going to continue to push the envelope, because essentially, there is impunity.” 

Ordaniel pushed for the U.S. to step up its diplomatic and militarily efforts to prevent China from increasing its aggression in the South China Sea, pointing to the need for U.S. naval escorts. 


China and the Philippines have primarily clashed over three disputed reefs in the South China Sea: Second Thomas Shoal, Sabina Shoal and Scarborough Shoal, the latter of which was the site of a Tuesday attack in which Chinese Coast Guard forces sprayed a Philippine boat with water cannons. China seized Scarborough Shoal in 2012, but it remains a flashpoint for conflict. 

Blinken, speaking Thursday in Laos, said the U.S. remains “concerned about China’s increasingly dangerous and unlawful actions in the South and East China Seas, which have injured people and harmed vessels” and “contradict commitments to peaceful resolution of disputes.” 

The most intense fighting has erupted at Second Thomas Shoal as the Philippines has reinforced the Sierra Madre, a beached ship run aground in 1999 and used as a supply station to enforce Manila’s claims on the shoal.  

China has sought to prevent resupply missions to the Sierra Madre by blocking and harassing ships with ship ramming maneuvers, water cannons and laser pointers, among other nonlethal weapons. 

But a June 17 conflict saw Chinese forces ram and board two boats and seize weapons from Filipino sailors. Chinese attackers also struck the ship and crew with machetes in a skirmish that saw one Filipino sailor lose his thumb. 

About a month later, the sides reached an agreement allowing the Philippines to supply the ship under China’s watch.

Benjamin Blandin, network coordinator of Yokosuka Council on Asia Pacific Studies, said the agreement was troubling. 

“This is all sort of legitimizing the very claim China has toward its neighbors,” he said. “It’s a short-term solution that avoids conflict in the short term, but it doesn’t solve anything.” 

While tensions have eased at Second Thomas Shoal, they are still flaring up at Sabina Shoal, where Manila and Beijing have traded accusations of ramming each other’s ships. 

A September standoff saw the Philippines back down from keeping its coast guard ship, the Teresa Magbanua, in Sabina Shoal amid fears of China building up its resources in the area. China had put some 200 ships on standby at the Spratly Islands, where it maintains some of its vast artificial island military bases, before the Philippines sent the ship away. 

The U.S. has offered to assist the Philippines with military escorts in the South China Sea, but Manila has increasingly pushed to resolve the matters on its own.  

Blandin said he supported the Philippines requesting assistance from Washington only in dire situations. 

“It’s important to keep requesting assistance from the U.S. to really extreme cases of tensions, where really the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard would be overwhelmed and incapable of reacting, or if there were people actually dying,” he said.  

He also pointed to concerns that “the U.S. is not exactly in a position of strength,” in the Indo-Pacific because the Navy is struggling to catch up to a larger Chinese naval force and has not fully pivoted resources and troops to Asia to counter Beijing. 

While there are concerns of escalation, experts say a Chinese conflict with the Philippines is likely to erupt at the same time as a Taiwan scenario.  

The U.S. has nine bases across the Philippines, including four it announced last year that include a site in Luzon some 300 miles from Taiwan. American forces operate in the Philippines on a temporary, rotational basis.  

But the bases, and the proximity to Taiwan, make the Philippines a key ally, along with Japan and South Korea, in the event of a war on the self-governing island nation, which China sees as historically part of the mainland and is preparing its forces to be ready to potentially attack or coerce in 2027.  

Alp Sevimlisoy, a millennium fellow at the Atlantic Council, said China seeks to “create multiple fronts with Taiwan.” 

“It’s banking on the fact that they can use conflict escalation moments and flash points with crucial U.S. allies simultaneously with a blockade with Taiwan,” he said. “If it only uses [the strategy] as a smoke screen for a wider Taiwan conflict, then even that makes the conflict even more difficult for us to counter.” 


12. Killing of Japanese Boy Leaves Chinese Asking: Is This My Country?



"China’s state-led xenophobia"

Killing of Japanese Boy Leaves Chinese Asking: Is This My Country?

Angry at what they view as China’s state-led xenophobia, taught in schools and prevalent online, some people are taking action, even at personal risk.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/14/business/japanese-boy-stabbing-china.html


Credit...Dongyan Xu


By Li Yuan

Oct. 14, 2024, 

5:01 a.m. ET

阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版

A Japanese boy was stabbed on his way to school in China on Sept. 18. That’s the date, in 1931, when Japan invaded China.

The child, who was 10 years old, was pronounced dead the next morning. The police arrested a 44-year-old man at the scene who they said had confessed to the attack. Japan’s leaders demanded answers. The Chinese government, calling the attack an “isolated incident,” told Japan to calm down and stop “politicizing” the killing.

Some Chinese people believe the boy was a victim of surging anti-Japanese sentiment fueled by China’s government with a virulent nationalism that is taught in schools and reflected online and in state media.

The evening the boy died, more than 50 Chinese attended a candlelight vigil in Tokyo and issued a statement: “The longstanding extreme nationalism and anti-Japanese education in China have misled some people’s perception of Japan, enabling ignorance and wrongdoing. We are committed to changing this troubling situation.”

Then, a week after his death, young activists, mostly in China but also some outside the country, started a memorial campaign. According to Chinese folklore, the souls of the deceased come back to visit their families after seven days before leaving for heaven.

“As Chinese citizens, we do not wish to grow up in a land of hatred,” the activists said in a statement co-signed by more than 200 people.

I interviewed many Chinese who were outraged at what they said was increasing xenophobic indoctrination. Some were in Japan or in the United States, but others were in China, where even public grief at times like these could be seen as dissent. They said that hating the Japanese had become a politically correct view to hold in China.

They asked themselves: Were they enablers of hate if they remained silent? What could they do to prevent future tragedies? They decided that they had to speak out; inaction would be cowardice.

So they laid flowers at the gate of the boy’s school in Shenzhen in southern China. They held small memorial services, some online and some in person. They co-signed statements with their real names and wrote social media articles and posts even though they knew the censors and the nationalist mobs would lash out at them.

“Some friends said to us, ‘Don’t write, don’t speak out, because you’ll get attacked,’” two Beijing law professors wrote on social media. “But that child has died. If we stay silent, we are all complicit.”

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“Silence, avoidance and turning a blind eye are all forms of indulgence in violence and show disregard for the deceased,” they wrote.

It’s hard to tell how many Chinese feel this way. But I have followed nationalism in China closely for years, through interviews and by studying what is said online. The anger people feel at the hatred education is more palpable now than anytime since China’s leader, Xi Jinping, put the country in an ideological straitjacket made of nationalism more than a decade ago.

Image


People laid flowers at the gate of the boy’s school in Shenzhen in southern China.Credit...David Kirton/Reuters

More than 200 people signed the two statements in their real names, a defiant act because China’s authorities are reflexively opposed to such organized actions.

A 24-year-old woman who signed a statement told me that she had been summoned by two state security officers and questioned for two hours. She said they had told her that the statement was “a deliberate act organized by anti-China forces, intending to stir up trouble and undermine the stability of Chinese society.”

The officers didn’t want to talk about the boy, she said. They cared only about who organized the statement and why anyone would sign it. “They showed zero respect for a life that was lost,” she said.

The officers’ attitude wasn’t surprising. Anti-Japanese content populates all types of media in China. A former Japanese ambassador told a Japanese newspaper that he had asked the Chinese authorities to take down online misinformation to no effect. The videos he was concerned about depicted Japanese schools in China as training grounds for future spies or showed fictional dramas of ordinary Chinese beating up Japanese.

Kuaishou, a major Chinese short video platform, punished more than 90 accounts that it said had spread harmful information and incited China-Japan antagonism. A former employee of another short video site said anti-Japanese content was popular because it attracted traffic and was not usually censored by the government.

Chinese people are repeatedly told that they should hate Japanese, Americans, Hong Kong democracy protesters, pro-independence Taiwanese and any critics of the Chinese government. It’s the only correct thing to do.

A migrant worker told me in an interview last year that his 11-year-old son had been offended when he explained the tensions between China and Taiwan. His son accused him of not being a good Chinese. He had been taught at school that Taiwan was part of China. For him, it was the one and only correct answer.

A Chinese woman who has been living in Europe for years wrote to me saying she didn’t dare to talk about the Japanese boy’s death with her father. “I’m terrified of hearing my father say, ‘He deserved it.’ If he does, I might have a nervous breakdown,” she wrote. “But this seems almost inevitable if nationalist sentiments continue to be stoked.”

In June, a middle-aged Chinese man attacked a Japanese mother and her son with a knife at a school bus stop in the eastern city of Suzhou. They were injured while the bus attendant, a Chinese woman, died trying to stop the man. Many people cheered the attack on social media — “They deserve it” and “Well done!” — while calling the Chinese woman “Traitor!”

The problem in China is how strictly the government controls speech, said Tomoko Ako, a sociologist focused on China at the University of Tokyo.

“A government should allow many kinds of opinions, including those critical of hate speech,” she said. Professor Ako is equally critical of online speeches in Japan that make sweeping statements about the Chinese people.

After a major Japanese newspaper wrote about the candlelight vigil in Tokyo, some Japanese left harsh comments on Yahoo Japan. “If you truly want to mourn, then denounce the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party,” one commenter wrote. “If you can’t do that, it’s just a gesture.”

That’s the dilemma that independent-minded Chinese face. At home, the powerful authoritarian state makes their efforts to push back against extreme nationalism seem negligible. A mantis trying to stop a chariot is the apt Chinese expression. Outside China, much of the world tends to look at the country and its people with suspicion.

The day after the death of the Japanese boy, a letter that appeared to be from his father circulated on China’s internet. He said he and his wife, who is Chinese, felt that they and their son belonged to both countries.

“We will not hate China, and likewise, we will not hold hatred for Japan,” the father wrote. “My only wish is that such tragedies never happen again.”

Many people shared the letter on social media, almost as a protest. Then it disappeared completely, something that only the top government censor could have ordered.

Li Yuan writes The New New World column, which focuses on China’s growing influence on the world by examining its businesses, politics and society. More about Li Yuan


13. Israel must destroy the Iranian nuclear project - opinion



Excerpts:

This is an opportunity that is not only rare but likely also the last before Iran breaks through with a nuclear bomb.
That is why in recent days there have been many voices in Israel encouraging, in fact demanding, that the government attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.
This call is correct and justified, but it is not accurate. This is because all the speakers directed their remarks to the Israeli government, while they should be directing their words and pressure to the American administration and the European community.
An Iranian bomb would cast a dark and threatening shadow over the world, cause instability, strengthen the Russia-China-Iran axis, and cause World War III, in which the United States itself would be attacked.
This is without mentioning the misery of the Iranian people and the peoples of the Middle East, who are already suffering from the regime of the ayatollahs.
Therefore, to use the successful images from the prime minister’s recent speeches at the UN, the Americans must head the coalition of the “blessing” and destroy the “curse” that the Iranians are trying to bring to the Middle East and the entire world.




Israel must destroy the Iranian nuclear project - opinion


The bottom line is that even if the United States does not assume its historic role, Israel has the obligation, and the right, to destroy the Iranian nuclear project.

By RUTH KABBESA ABRAMZONOCTOBER 14, 2024 03:21Updated: OCTOBER 14, 2024 13:11

Jerusalem Post

Anyone looking for an indication of Israel’s success against Hezbollah need not check the number of missiles the IDF destroyed or the number of those killed.

It is enough to look at a report that came out last week from Reuters, stating that Hezbollah is asking for a ceasefire now, regardless of the cessation of the fighting against Hamas.

Hezbollah’s announcement stands in stark contrast to the policy it has declared since October 8 of last year, and comes only against the backdrop of the organization’s military defeat.

Beyond the fact that Iran’s ring of fire around Israel was breached, Israel’s successes vis-à-vis Hezbollah have dramatic implications on several levels.

First, they constitute a tremendous opportunity for the Lebanese state to create stability, after Hezbollah’s prolonged and longstanding occupation of the Lebanese people and all its sources of livelihood and subsistence.

An Iranian missile is displayed during a rally marking the annual Quds Day, or Jerusalem Day, on the last Friday of the holy month of Ramadan in Tehran, Iran April 29, 2022. (credit: MAJID ASGARIPOUR/WANA (WEST ASIA NEWS AGENCY) VIA REUTERS)Second, they provide a stabilizing factor in regimes such as Jordan and Egypt. Third, they “maintain the path of peace” for “threshold countries” with a tendency toward the axis of evil, such as Turkey.

But beyond the shift in the regional power structure, the most important implications concern the evil regime of the ayatollahs and the Iran-Russia-China axis. Israel’s success, thank God, creates new opportunities that until a few weeks ago were completely unthinkable.

An opportunity has arisen that no one had realistically considered before the war, to cut off the head of the octopus, to liberate the Iranian people from the murderous regime of the ayatollahs, and to destroy the evil nuclear enterprise that it is working on.

A rare opportunity that should not be ignored

This is an opportunity that is not only rare but likely also the last before Iran breaks through with a nuclear bomb.

That is why in recent days there have been many voices in Israel encouraging, in fact demanding, that the government attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.

This call is correct and justified, but it is not accurate. This is because all the speakers directed their remarks to the Israeli government, while they should be directing their words and pressure to the American administration and the European community.

An Iranian bomb would cast a dark and threatening shadow over the world, cause instability, strengthen the Russia-China-Iran axis, and cause World War III, in which the United States itself would be attacked.

This is without mentioning the misery of the Iranian people and the peoples of the Middle East, who are already suffering from the regime of the ayatollahs.

Therefore, to use the successful images from the prime minister’s recent speeches at the UN, the Americans must head the coalition of the “blessing” and destroy the “curse” that the Iranians are trying to bring to the Middle East and the entire world.

The results of a successful attack will lead to the overthrow of the ayatollahs’ regime and the establishment of a benevolent regime in Iran, calm in the Middle East, and the breaking of the Russia-Iran-China axis of evil, which will help Ukraine and European countries.

Such an attack would bring calm and stability, and prevent an all-out global war.

The credit that Israel provided for the free world with the blood of its sons must be redeemed and realized now.

Contrary to the prevailing assessment that the United States will not embark on an adventurous move before elections, I would argue that in the present case, due to the special circumstances and the tremendous opportunity that has been created, the upcoming elections actually constitute an incentive for an attack.

The US should get involved

The incentive could come from President Joe Biden, who will want to make his mark in world history before he retires. This is also a golden opportunity for him to contrast himself with former president Barack Obama, who leads a Chamberlain policy vis-à-vis the ayatollahs.

Iran is Obama’s baby. The elimination of the ayatollahs’ regime could be Biden’s last word in the fight for his impeachment, which he says was waged by Obama.

The incentive could also come from Vice President Kamala Harris, who will see an opportunity in a successful strike that will liberate the free world from Iran’s shadow and contribute to geopolitical stability in the world, to reach elections on the waves of glory and secure the next four years in the White House.

Former president Donald Trump is likely to welcome the move, as he led a hawkish line against Iran and carried out the assassination of Qasem Soleimani.

He would certainly be happy to resolve these difficulties before taking office, if elected.

Whether Biden, Harris, or the convergence of interests of both, the coming days and articulate Israeli spokesmen should be used to mobilize the Americans to head the coalition of blessed countries and free the world from the curse of the ayatollahs.

The bottom line is that even if the United States does not assume its historic role, Israel has the obligation, and the right, to destroy the Iranian nuclear project.

This last opportunity must be exercised!

The writer is a senior researcher in the Israel Defense and Security Forum and an expert in management and governance.

Jerusalem Post



14. Vladimir Putin’s spies are plotting global chaos


Excerpts:


Russian disinformation campaigns are hardly new, acknowledges Sergey Radchenko, a historian of Russian foreign policy, pointing to episodes such as the Tanaka memorandum, an alleged Soviet forgery that was used to discredit Japan in 1927. Nor are proxy wars or assassinations a novelty. Soviet troops were already fighting in Yemen, disguised as Egyptians, in the early 1960s, he notes. The kgb’s predecessors and successors have killed many people abroad, from Leon Trotsky to ex-spy Alexander Litvinenko.
The genuinely new part, says Mr Radchenko, “is that whereas previously special operations supported foreign policy, today special operations are foreign policy.” Ten years ago the Kremlin worked with America and Europe to counter Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programme. Such co-operation is now fanciful. “It is as if the Russians no longer feel they have a stake in preserving anything of the post-war international order,” says Mr Radchenko. This period reminds him more of Mao’s nihilistic foreign policy during China’s Cultural Revolution than the Soviet Union’s cold-war thinking, which included periods of pragmatism and caution. Ms Hill puts it another way: “It’s Trotsky over Lenin”.
Mr Putin embraces these ideas. “We are in for probably the most dangerous, unpredictable and at the same time most important decade since the end of World War II,” he said in late 2022. “To cite a classic,” he added, invoking an article by Vladimir Lenin in 1913, “this is a revolutionary situation.” That belief—that the post-war order is rotten and needs rewriting, by force if necessary—also gives Russia common cause with China. “Right now there are changes the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years,” Xi Jinping told Mr Putin last year in Moscow, “and we are the ones driving these changes together.”
Russia’s foreign policy strategy, published in 2023, offers the bland reassurance that it “does not consider itself an enemy of the West…and has no ill intentions”. A classified addendum acquired by the Washington Post from a European intelligence service suggests otherwise. It proposes a comprehensive containment strategy against a “coalition of unfriendly countries” led by America. That includes an “offensive information campaign” among other actions in the “military-political, trade-economic and informational-psychological…spheres”. The ultimate aim, it notes, is “to weaken Russia’s opponents”.
This does not mean Russia is an unstoppable. It is increasingly a junior partner to China. Its influence has slipped in some countries, such as Syria. It does not always back up its own proxies—dozens of Wagner fighters were killed in an ambush by Malian rebels, aided by Ukraine, in July. And Russian subversion can be disrupted, says Sir Richard, by “good old-fashioned security and intelligence work” to identify the intelligence officers and criminal proxies behind it. The fact that Russia is increasingly reliant on criminals to carry out these acts, in part because Russian spies have been expelled en masse from Europe, is a sign of desperation. “Russia’s use of proxies further reduces the professionalism of their operations, and—absent diplomatic immunity—increases our disruptive options,” says Mr McCallum.
Russian meddling is intended to put pressure on nato without provoking a war. “We also have red lines,” says Ms Hill, “and Putin is trying to feel those out.” But if he is truly driven by a revolutionary spirit, convinced that the West is a rotten edifice, that suggests more lines will be crossed in the months and years ahead. 


Vladimir Putin’s spies are plotting global chaos

Russia is enacting a revolutionary plan of sabotage, arson and assassination

https://www.economist.com/international/2024/10/13/vladimir-putins-spies-are-plotting-global-chaos

Oct 13th 2024

 photograph: getty images

“We’ve seen arson, sabotage and more: dangerous actions conducted with increasing recklessness,” said Ken McCallum, the head of mi5, Britain’s domestic security and counter-intelligence agency, in a rare update on the threat posed by Russia and the gru, its military-intelligence agency. “The gru in particular is on a sustained mission to generate mayhem on British and European streets,” he said on October 8th.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has been accompanied by a crescendo of aggression, subversion and meddling elsewhere. In particular, Russian sabotage in Europe has grown dramatically. “The risk level has changed,” Vice-Admiral Nils Andreas Stensones, the head of the Norwegian Intelligence Service, said in September. “We see acts of sabotage happening in Europe now.” Sir Richard Moore, the chief of mi6, Britain’s foreign-intelligence agency, put it more bluntly: “Russian intelligence services have gone a bit feral, frankly.”

The Kremlin’s mercenaries have squeezed Western rivals out of several African states. Its hackers, Poland’s security services said, have tried to paralyse the country in the political, military, and economic spheres. Its propagandists have pumped disinformation around the world. Its armed forces want to put a nuclear weapon in orbit. Russian foreign policy has long dabbled in chaos. Now it seems to aim at little else.

Start with the summer of sabotage. In April Germany arrested two German-Russian nationals on suspicion of plotting attacks on American military facilities and other targets on behalf of the gru. The same month Poland arrested a man who was preparing to pass the gru information on Rzeszow airport, a hub for arms to Ukraine, and Britain charged several men over an arson attack on a Ukrainian-owned logistics firm in London. The men were accused of aiding the Wagner Group, a mercenary outfit now under the gru’s control. In June France arrested a Russian-Ukrainian national who was wounded after attempting to make a bomb in his hotel room in Paris. In July it emerged that Russia had plotted to kill Armin Papperger, the boss of Rheinmetall, Germany’s largest arms firm. On September 9th air traffic at Stockholm’s Arlanda airport was shut down for more than two hours after drones were spotted over runways. “We suspect it was a deliberate act,” a police spokesperson said. American officials warn that Russian vessels are reconnoitring underwater cables.

Even where Russia has not resorted to violence, it has sought to stir the pot in other ways. The Baltic states have arrested a number of people for what they say are Russian-sponsored provocations. French intelligence officials say that Russia was responsible for the appearance of coffins draped with the French flag and bearing the message “French soldiers of Ukraine” left at the Eiffel tower in Paris in June. Many of these actions are aimed at fanning opposition to aid for Ukraine. But others are intended simply to widen splits in society of all kinds, even if these have little or no link to the war. France says that Russia was also behind the graffiti of 250 Stars of David on walls in Paris in November, an effort to fuel antisemitism, which has surged since the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict.

Much of Russia’s activity has been virtual. In April hackers with ties to the gru seem to have manipulated control systems for water plants in America and Poland. In September America, Britain, Ukraine and several other countries published details of cyber-attacks by the gru’s Unit 29155, a group that was previously known for assassinations in Europe, including a botched effort to poison Sergei Skripal, a former Russian intelligence officer. The gru’s cyber efforts, which had been ongoing since at least 2020, were not just aimed at espionage, but also “reputational harm” by stealing and leaking information and “systematic sabotage” by destroying data, according to America and its allies.

Beyond Europe, gru officers have been in Yemen alongside the Houthis, a rebel group that has attacked ships in the Red Sea, ostensibly in solidarity with Palestinians. Russia, angered by America’s provision of long-range missiles to Ukraine, came close to providing weapons to the group in July, according to American officials who spoke to cnn, but reversed course at the last moment after strong opposition from Saudi Arabia. The fact that Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, was willing to alienate Muhammad bin Salman, the kingdom’s de facto ruler whom he had courted for years, is an indication of how Russia’s war has cannibalised its wider foreign policy.

“What Putin is trying to do is hit us all over the place,” argues Fiona Hill, who previously served in America’s national security council. She compares the strategy to the Oscar winning film: “Everything Everywhere All at Once”. In Africa, for instance, Russia has used mercenaries to supplant French and American influence in the aftermath of coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Around 100 advisers from the Africa Corps, a successor to the Wagner Group, arrived in Niger in April. America has been forced to close its last prized base in the country.

Russia’s meddling in America takes a very different form. In May Avril Haines, America’s Director of National Intelligence, called Russia “the most active foreign threat to our elections” above China or Iran. This was not merely about trying to shape America’s policy on Ukraine. “Moscow most likely views such operations as a means to tear down the United States as its perceived primary adversary,” she said, “enabling Russia to promote itself as a great power.” In July American intelligence agencies said that they were “beginning to see Russia target specific voter demographics, promote divisive narratives, and denigrate specific politicians”.

These efforts are generally crude and ineffectual. But they are prolific, intense and sometimes innovative. In September America’s Justice Department accused two employees of rt, a Kremlin-controlled media outlet that regularly spews out Russian talking points and lurid conspiracy theories, of paying $10m to an unnamed media company in Tennessee. The company, thought to be Tenet Media, posted nearly 2,000 videos on TikTok, Instagram, x and YouTube. (Commentators paid by the company denied wrongdoing, saying they were “victims of this scheme”). The department also seized 32 Kremlin-controlled internet domains designed to mimic legitimate news sites.

Russian propagandists are also experimenting with technology. CopyCop, a network of websites, took legitimate news articles and used Chatgpt, an ai model, to rewrite them. More than 90 French articles were modified with the prompt: “Please rewrite this article taking a conservative stance against the liberal policies of the Macron administration in favour of working-class French citizens.” Another rewritten piece included evidence of its instructions, saying: “This article…highlights the cynical tone towards the us government, nato, and us politicians.”

Russian disinformation campaigns are hardly new, acknowledges Sergey Radchenko, a historian of Russian foreign policy, pointing to episodes such as the Tanaka memorandum, an alleged Soviet forgery that was used to discredit Japan in 1927. Nor are proxy wars or assassinations a novelty. Soviet troops were already fighting in Yemen, disguised as Egyptians, in the early 1960s, he notes. The kgb’s predecessors and successors have killed many people abroad, from Leon Trotsky to ex-spy Alexander Litvinenko.

The genuinely new part, says Mr Radchenko, “is that whereas previously special operations supported foreign policy, today special operations are foreign policy.” Ten years ago the Kremlin worked with America and Europe to counter Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programme. Such co-operation is now fanciful. “It is as if the Russians no longer feel they have a stake in preserving anything of the post-war international order,” says Mr Radchenko. This period reminds him more of Mao’s nihilistic foreign policy during China’s Cultural Revolution than the Soviet Union’s cold-war thinking, which included periods of pragmatism and caution. Ms Hill puts it another way: “It’s Trotsky over Lenin”.

Mr Putin embraces these ideas. “We are in for probably the most dangerous, unpredictable and at the same time most important decade since the end of World War II,” he said in late 2022. “To cite a classic,” he added, invoking an article by Vladimir Lenin in 1913, “this is a revolutionary situation.” That belief—that the post-war order is rotten and needs rewriting, by force if necessary—also gives Russia common cause with China. “Right now there are changes the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years,” Xi Jinping told Mr Putin last year in Moscow, “and we are the ones driving these changes together.”

Russia’s foreign policy strategy, published in 2023, offers the bland reassurance that it “does not consider itself an enemy of the West…and has no ill intentions”. A classified addendum acquired by the Washington Post from a European intelligence service suggests otherwise. It proposes a comprehensive containment strategy against a “coalition of unfriendly countries” led by America. That includes an “offensive information campaign” among other actions in the “military-political, trade-economic and informational-psychological…spheres”. The ultimate aim, it notes, is “to weaken Russia’s opponents”.

This does not mean Russia is an unstoppable. It is increasingly a junior partner to China. Its influence has slipped in some countries, such as Syria. It does not always back up its own proxies—dozens of Wagner fighters were killed in an ambush by Malian rebels, aided by Ukraine, in July. And Russian subversion can be disrupted, says Sir Richard, by “good old-fashioned security and intelligence work” to identify the intelligence officers and criminal proxies behind it. The fact that Russia is increasingly reliant on criminals to carry out these acts, in part because Russian spies have been expelled en masse from Europe, is a sign of desperation. “Russia’s use of proxies further reduces the professionalism of their operations, and—absent diplomatic immunity—increases our disruptive options,” says Mr McCallum.

Russian meddling is intended to put pressure on nato without provoking a war. “We also have red lines,” says Ms Hill, “and Putin is trying to feel those out.” But if he is truly driven by a revolutionary spirit, convinced that the West is a rotten edifice, that suggests more lines will be crossed in the months and years ahead. 





15.  In Iceland, a hunt for Russian submarines and deeper U.S. relations


"The Hunt for Red October." One of the best books and films I have enjoyed. But there is a real hunt taking place every day.



In Iceland, a hunt for Russian submarines and deeper U.S. relations

The tiny island and NATO member is wary of Moscow’s renewed military presence in the waters of the North Atlantic.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/10/14/pentagon-iceland-navy-russia-submarines/



Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, participates in a P-8 anti-submarine warfare simulation in Keflavik, Iceland, on Oct. 10. (Defense Department photo by Benjamin Applebaum) (Benjamin D. Applebaum/Benjamin D. Applebaum; OCJCS)


By Dan Lamothe

October 14, 2024 at 6:00 a.m. EDT

KEFLAVIK AIR BASE, Iceland — The Pentagon’s top general strode to a P-8 Poseidon surveillance plane here on Thursday morning, boarding just before a cold rain turned to snow. The aircraft roared to life and ascended over craggy, black lava fields before heading out over the North Atlantic Ocean. U.S. forces aboard walked him through their mission: surveying the chilly waters for Russian submarines.


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The rare visit here by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., came as U.S. forces have observed a rise in Russian submarine activity in the Atlantic. Gen. Christopher Cavoli, the head of U.S. European Command, told the House Armed Services Committee Committee last year that Russian patrols are “at a higher level than we’ve seen in years.”


U.S. and Icelandic officials were reticent to discuss recent Russian submarine activity, but Brown’s visit underscored that U.S. operations here have evolved because of the war in Ukraine thousands of miles away, U.S. and Icelandic officials said.


Though Iceland has a pacifist tradition and no military, it has been a member of the NATO alliance since its founding after World War II and increasingly has partnered with the United States since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, hosting a P-8 squadron on a rotational basis and visits by fighter jets and B-2 stealth bombers.


Iceland has pledged to spend 4 billion annually in Icelandic krona, or about $30 million, through 2028 to provide Ukraine with a mixture of military and humanitarian support, and also signed on to an effort led by the Czech Republic to purchase ammunition for Ukrainian forces.


Brown, speaking to Navy personnel assembled in a hangar just before his flight, said he was scrutinizing Russia’s behavior not only in Ukraine, but as far away as South America.


“We want to be so good at what we do that every day our adversary wakes up and says, ‘Not today,’” Brown said. “And if they do say that today is the day, you want to be their worst nightmare.”


Iceland’s foreign minister, Thordis Kolbrun Reykfjord Gylfadottir, said in an interview that her country is ready to bear “more responsibility” in the alliance. Having U.S. forces in Iceland “hasn’t been easy politically through the decades,” she said, but the government needs to “stand on firm ground” and explain to its citizens what it means to be a reliable ally.


“Even though we don’t have a standing army, we definitely have a role to play,” she said. “I wouldn’t say there is line somewhere in the future on how far we go. It just depends on the developments around us.”

Gylfadottir said that despite Moscow’s focus on the war in Ukraine, Russia maintains significant undersea capabilities in the Arctic: “We have to be vigilant.”


The minister left the door open to larger numbers of U.S. forces deploying to Iceland in the future. “What we ask ourselves is not only does this make Iceland safer and the Icelandic public safer, but also what is our responsibility as the island between Europe and North America?” she said.


U.S. forces were first based in Iceland in 1941, replacing British troops who had landed a year earlier in an effort to prevent the country falling into Nazi hands. Ten years later, as the Cold War took hold, Washington and Reykjavik signed a bilateral agreement that called for U.S. troops to be based in Keflavik primarily to carry out air defense and maritime surveillance in the North Atlantic.


The arrangement largely held until 2006, when the administration of President George W. Bush, citing threats elsewhere in the world, decided to withdraw all U.S. forces from Iceland. At the time, there were about 1,200 U.S. troops, four fighter jets, and a handful of helicopters based there, The Washington Post reported at the time. The move was decried by Iceland’s ambassador to the United States, Helgi Agustsson, who said Iceland was “deeply disappointed.”


In 2016, the Obama administration signed a new deal with Iceland that allowed “increased rotational deployments as necessary, including but not limited to Anti-Submarine Warfare.” Iceland also agreed to allow the U.S. government to make upgrades to the air base, on the southwest corner of the island. The U.S. Air Force announced several airfield construction projects collectively worth $38 million in 2020, including an expansion of parking aprons and improvements to a cargo pad for handling explosives.


An Icelandic defense official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, noted a silver lining in the abrupt departure of U.S. forces in 2006.


“We had to take over much of the responsibilities very quickly, but I think we learned a lot during that process about what role we can play,” the defense official said. “We have made very significant changes in the last couple of decades since they left.” Perhaps most significant is the Iceland air defense system, a set of four powerful radar sites that each scrutinize hundreds of square miles of airspace.


Russian submarine capabilities have not changed, the Icelandic defense official said, but Russia’s willingness to challenge the norms of warfare has grown. He cited the regular bombing of Ukrainian civilians. “It’s the same government,” he said, “that’s doing that and operating the submarines and planes” in the North Atlantic.


What to know about Ukraine’s counteroffensive

The latest: The Ukrainian military has launched a long-anticipated counteroffensive against occupying Russian forces, opening a crucial phase in the war aimed at restoring Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty and preserving Western support in its fight against Moscow.

The fight: Ukrainian troops have intensified their attacks on the front line in the southeast region, according to multiple individuals in the country’s armed forces, in a significant push toward Russian-occupied territory.

The front line: The Washington Post has mapped out the 600-mile front line between Ukrainian and Russian forces.

How you can help: Here are ways those in the United States can support the Ukrainian people as well as what people around the world have been donating.


Read our full coverage of the Russia-Ukraine war. Are you on Telegram? Subscribe to our channel for updates and exclusive video.

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By Dan Lamothe

Dan Lamothe joined The Washington Post in 2014 to cover the U.S. military. He has written about the Armed Forces for more than 15 years, traveling extensively, embedding with five branches of service and covering combat in Afghanistan.follow on X @danlamothe





16. Bolton: Odds that Trump would withdraw from NATO very high




Certainly troubling.


Bolton: Odds that Trump would withdraw from NATO very high


by Juliann Ventura - 10/11/24 10:18 AM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4928390-john-bolton-donald-trump-nato-withdrawal-chances/?utm


Former White House national security adviser John Bolton warned that former President Trump is likely to withdraw from NATO if reelected in November.

Bolton, citing past threats from Trump about NATO allies not spending adequately on defense, told CNN’s Kaitlan Collins on Thursday that the odds are “very high.”

“For Republicans who believe that Trump will be OK in a second term — that he won‘t ditch support for Ukraine, that he won‘t withdraw from NATO, that he won‘t interpret the treaty of Washington in a way that makes it wholly useless, … go ahead and vote for Trump if you want, but for goodness stakes do it with your eyes open,” Bolton said in an interview on CNN’s “The Source.”

“The odds that he will withdraw from NATO are very high,” he added.

Collins had asked Bolton what his thoughts were on remarks made by Trump at the Detroit Economic Club earlier Thursday, when he reiterated that he would not protect NATO allies from Russian aggression.

The CNN host also mentioned veteran journalist Bob Woodward’s latest bombshell book that claims Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin have secretly been in touch at least seven times since the 45th president left the White House. Trump has denied the claims.

Bolton, who served under the Trump administration, acknowledged that the number of times Trump and Putin spoke is in dispute, however it “wouldn’t surprise [him] in the slightest” if the former president was in touch with the Russian leader.

“It would simply confirm what has been evident for some time: that Trump thinks he’s got a great personal relationship with Vladimir Putin,” he told Collins.

But, the former White House adviser added, “if he has a good relationship personally, then the U.S. and that country have a good relationship — that’s just utter nonsense.”

Bolton had previously warned of Trump’s departure from NATO, calling Trump’s foreign policy “erratic” in an interview last year.

“In a second Trump term, we’d almost certainly withdraw from NATO,” Bolton said at the time, citing the former president’s deal with the Taliban that led to the U.S. withdrawal, and his dealings with Iran.

The Hill has contacted the Trump campaign for comment.



17. China carries out 'total Taiwan blockade' drills



Is China telegraphing its punches or is all warfare based on deception?


Photos and graphics at the link: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13956619/China-carries-total-Taiwan-blockade-drills-military-completely-surrounding-island-government-vowed-resist-Beijing-attack.html



China carries out 'total Taiwan blockade' drills


China carries out 'total Taiwan blockade' drills, with its military completely surrounding the island after government vowed to resist any Beijing attack

By Taryn Pedler

Published: 04:13 EDT, 14 October 2024 | Updated: 04:38 EDT, 14 October 2024

Daily Mail · by Taryn Pedler · October 14, 2024

China is carrying out 'total blockade' drills around Taiwan after Taipei last week vowed to resist any Beijing attack.

China deployed fighter jets and warships to encircle Taiwan on Monday, in drills Beijing said were aimed at sending a 'stern warning' to 'separatist' forces on the self-ruled island.

Beijing has not ruled out using force to bring Taiwan under its control and Monday's drills represent its fourth round of large-scale war games in the past two years.

In May, after Taiwanese President Lai-Ching-te's inauguration, large scale drills were announced - dubbed Joint Sword 2024A - which combined air and sea operations and missile forces, surrounding Taiwan from all sides while simulating a blockade.

On Monday morning, the long-expected Joint Sword 2024B was launched – which China is describing as again surrounding Taiwan with combined operations practising to fight in 'all weather conditions'.


Taiwan is monitoring Chinese drills - dubbed Joint Sword 2024B - around the island


Footage captured the moment Taiwan's coast guard warned a Chinese vessel spotted near Matsu Islands


A diagram released by the coast guard showed four fleets encircling Taiwan and moving in an anticlockwise direction around the island


Armed military vehicles patrol outside the Songshan Airport in Taipei after China deployed fighter jets and warships to encircle Taiwan on October 14, in drills Beijing said were aimed at sending a 'stern warning' to 'separatist' forces on the self-ruled island


Taiwan Navy Kuang Hua VI-class missile boats maneuver at the Keelung military harbor in Keelung city, Taiwan

The drills are testing troops' 'joint operations capabilities' according to Captain Li Xi, spokesman for the Chinese military's Eastern Theater Command.

They are taking place in 'areas to the north, south and east of Taiwan Island,' he said.

The drills are 'focusing on subjects of sea-air combat-readiness patrol, blockade on key ports and areas', Li said.

They also practised an 'assault on maritime and ground targets', and fighter jets and warships had been deployed, Chinese state media said.

Read More

Growing tensions between China and Taiwan could tip the world into war and Beijing must come clean about 'biggest military build-up in peacetime history', James Cleverly warns

China's coast guard was also dispatched to conduct 'inspections' around the island.

Taiwan's defence ministry said Monday that 25 Chinese aircraft and seven navy vessels were detected around island at 8:00am local time.

A diagram released by the coast guard showed four fleets encircling Taiwan and moving in an anticlockwise direction around the island.

The coast guard of the eastern province of Fujian - the closest area on the mainland to the self-ruled island - also said it was conducting 'comprehensive law enforcement patrols' in waters near the Taiwan-controlled Matsu islands.

Taiwan said four 'formations' of China coast guard ships were patrolling around the island, but they had not entered its prohibited or restricted waters.

Reporters near the Hsinchu air force base, in the north of Taiwan, saw 12 fighter jets take off on Monday.

China on Monday warned that efforts towards 'Taiwan independence' and peace were 'irreconcilable' as its military launched its drills.

'Taiwan independence and peace in the Taiwan Strait are irreconcilable,' foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said, warning that 'provocations from pro-independence forces will inevitably face countermeasures'.

The United States has said China's actions were 'unwarranted' and risk 'escalation' as it called on Beijing to act with restraint.


This handout from China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theatre Command released on October 14 shows a map of locations of the 'Joint Sword-2024B' military drills being conducted by China around Taiwan


Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning warned that efforts towards 'Taiwan independence' and peace were 'irreconcilable'


The drills started before dawn today in a bid to send a 'stern warning', according to Beijing

Ching-te has been more outspoken than his predecessor Tsai Ing-wen in defending Taiwan's sovereignty, angering Beijing, which calls him a 'separatist'.

Lai vowed Monday to 'protect democratic Taiwan, and safeguard national security', while the defence ministry said it dispatched 'appropriate forces' in response to the drills.

Read More

China raises nuke fears, launches intercontinental missile with dummy warhead over Pacific Ocean

Outlying islands administered by Taipei were on 'heightened alert' and 'aircraft and ships will respond to enemy situations in accordance with the engagement rules', Taiwan's defence ministry said.

Beijing said its exercises served as a 'stern warning to the separatist acts of 'Taiwan Independence' forces'.

China has ramped up military activity around Taiwan in recent years, sending in warplanes and other military aircraft while its ships maintain a near-constant presence around the island's waters.

'In the face of enemy threats, all officers and soldiers of the country are in full readiness,' Taiwan's defence ministry said Monday.

Lai convened a high-level security meeting over the drills, said Joseph Wu, secretary-general of the National Security Council, who described the exercises as 'inconsistent with international law'.

In his speech Thursday celebrating the island's National Day, Lai vowed to 'resist annexation' of Taiwan and insisted Beijing and Taipei were 'not subordinate to each other'.


Two Taiwanese Air Force Mirage 2000 fighter jet armed with missiles scramble from the Hsinchu Air Base, following China's announcement of the military exercise Joint Sword-2024B that encircles Taiwan, in Hsinchu, Taiwan, on October 14


China's exercises have gradually moved closer to the island's shores


A military personnel keeps watch while on patrol outside Songshan Airport in Taipei on October 14


Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) announced on October 14 to conduct Joint Sword-2024B drills around Taiwan

Lai's Democratic Progressive Party has long defended the sovereignty and democracy of Taiwan, which has its own government, military and currency.

Beijing on Monday said the drills were 'a legitimate and necessary operation for safeguarding state sovereignty and national unity'.

Lieutenant Colonel Fu Zhengnan, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, said in a video shared by state media that the drills could 'switch from training to combat at any time.'

'If Taiwan separatists provoke once, the PLA's operation around the island will make their first move,' Fu said, referring to China's People's Liberation Army.

Taiwan's coast guard said Monday it had detained a Chinese man on one of its outlying islands after a possible 'grey zone intrusion', referring to tactics that fall short of a direct act of war.

During morning rush-hour in Taipei, people appeared to be largely unperturbed by the latest drills.

'I won't panic too much because they quite often have drills,' 34-year-old engineer Benjamin Hsiao told AFP.

'It's not the first time in recent years anyway, so I feel a bit numb.'

The current dispute between China and Taiwan dates back to a civil war in which the nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek were defeated by Mao Zedong's communist fighters and fled to Taiwan in 1949.

Since then, China and Taiwan have been ruled separately.

Daily Mail · by Taryn Pedler · October 14, 2024



18. Trump requests military aircraft and vehicles amid Iran threat



I imagine that we have some credible intelligence and that the Trump campaign, as noted, has been briefed.



But what if Iran does make an assassination attempt, or worse, succeeds? We would have to take decisive action against iran. Does the Iranian leadership think we would not respond?


Or are the Iranians trying to create a dilemma for us and providing indications that we can interpret that they hope will be exploited to create further divisions in the US and exacerbate the partisan divide that we have?




Trump requests military aircraft and vehicles amid Iran threat

There is no evidence tying Iran to two recent assassination attempts, but officials told the campaign that Iran is still plotting

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/10/11/trump-security-threats-iran-election-2024-campaign/?utm




Former president Donald Trump arrives to speak at a campaign event in Butler, Pa., on Oct. 5.

By Josh Dawsey and Isaac Arnsdorf

Updated October 11, 2024 at 3:16 p.m. EDT|Published October 11, 2024 at 11:55 a.m. EDT


Donald Trump’s campaign requested military aircraft for Trump to fly in during the final weeks of the campaign, expanded flight restrictions over his residences and rallies, ballistic glass pre-positioned in seven battleground states for the campaign’s use and an array of military vehicles to transport Trump, according to emails reviewed by The Washington Post and people familiar with the matter.


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The requests are extraordinary and unprecedented — no nominee in recent history has been ferried around in military planes ahead of an election. But the requests came after Trump’s campaign advisers received briefings in which the government said Iran is still actively plotting to kill him, according to the emails reviewed by The Post and the people familiar with the matter, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe sensitive discussions. Trump advisers have grown concerned about drones and missiles, according to the people.


In the emails over the past two weeks from campaign manager Susie Wiles to Ronald L. Rowe Jr., the head of the Secret Service, she expressed displeasure with the Secret Service and said the campaign recently had to cancel a public event at the last minute because of a “lack of personnel” from the Secret Service — instead only putting Trump in a small room with reporters. Wiles said Trump’s campaign is being hampered in its planning because of threats, and expects to hold far more events in the final weeks of the campaign.


She also wrote that the U.S. government has not been able to provide what the campaign views as an extensive enough plan to protect Trump. Rep. Michael Waltz (R-Fla.), a Trump ally who is on the House Intelligence Committee and the Butler assassination inquiry, wrote a letter to the Secret Service asking for military aircraft or additional protection for Trump’s private plane, according to a copy of the letter reviewed by The Post.


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Danielle Alvarez, a spokeswoman for Trump, declined to comment.

Secret Service officials did not answer specific questions about the discussions with the Trump campaign, but spokesman Anthony Guglielmi said in a statement that Trump is receiving “the highest levels of protection.” In a letter to the campaign, Rowe said the government is assessing what can be provided.


“Assistance from the Department of Defense is regularly provided for the former president’s protection, to include explosive ordnance disposal, canine units, and airlift transportation,” Guglielmi said. The Secret Service is also imposing temporary flight restrictions “over the former president’s residence and when he travels,” he added.

“Additionally, the former president is receiving the highest level of technical security assets which include unmanned aerial vehicles, counter unmanned aerial surveillance systems, ballistics and other advanced technology systems.”


Senior U.S. officials said it was unlikely the Trump campaign would be provided military planes based on the current intelligence.


One official said the other requests are being considered, but there are limitations on how many places the Secret Service can have bullet-resistant glass positioned at one time, and that glass is already being provided for his rallies.


“We are doing everything we can do to take on the threats that are actionable and real,” the official said.


The official said the U.S. government was frustrated by the Trump campaign releasing statements that they felt politicized the briefings the campaign was given on Iran.


The requests were first reported Friday by the New York Times.

Former U.S. officials said they were unaware of any presidential nominee getting a military jet. One person who has served under multiple Republican administrations in senior roles said it would be “extraordinary” for the Secret Service to grant such a request.

Trump’s opponent, Vice President Kamala Harris, receives protection from the U.S. Marines as vice president and flies on Air Force Two, which is a military airplane.


The Republican nominee has already started traveling with additional planes, and officials are also taking the precaution of dividing his motorcade at times and putting Trump in nondescript planes that do not have his name on the side instead of his longtime 757 jet.


The requests escalate a months-long battle between Trump’s team and the Secret Service, which has heightened after two assassination attempts on the former president. Granting such requests for a presidential candidate would be unprecedented, particularly a military plane to transport Trump. If the administration granted such assets, it would give Trump a distinct look in the final months that no challenger has ever had — and would remind voters visually, every day, that he is under threat.


Trump and his team have grown frustrated with the Secret Service in recent months, even as they praise Trump’s own security detail. The Secret Service has repeatedly escalated Trump’s security, but not to levels the campaign wants, the people said.


There is no evidence tying Iran to either of the recent assassination attempts, the people said, but the FBI has not ruled out the possibility of a connection. U.S. spies have determined that Iran’s leaders are seeking to take revenge on U.S. officials including Trump whom they hold responsible for a strike that killed Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani in 2020, but Iran’s ability to strike within the United States is limited, according to people briefed on the intelligence.

The FBI declined to comment on ongoing investigations.



Trump speaks from behind bullet-resistant glass during a campaign event in Butler, Pa., on Oct. 5. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post)


Trump has asked campaign advisers and U.S. government officials repeatedly whether Iran was behind the two gunmen who separately attempted to assassinate him on July 13 in Butler, Pa., and on Sept. 15 at Trump’s golf course in West Palm Beach, Fla., according to people familiar with the briefing. Several of Trump’s advisers have become convinced — even without evidence — that Iran was behind previous threats.


In June, undercover FBI agents met with a Pakistani man in Brooklyn who was seeking to hire hit men to assassinate an American politician on Iran’s behalf, according to charges unsealed in August. The foiled plot prompted national security officials to alert the Secret Service about unspecified Iranian threats to Trump. Authorities arrested the Pakistani man, Asif Merchant, 46, on July 12, the day before Trump’s Butler rally.


Investigators have not established a motive for the Butler shooter, Thomas Matthew Crooks, 20, who opened fire from a nearby roof, grazing Trump’s ear and killing one rallygoer before he was killed at the scene by a Secret Service countersniper. Crooks was a registered Republican, made a small donation to a liberal PAC, researched past assassinations and had photos of Trump and President Joe Biden on his phone.


People briefed on the Butler investigation said there is no evidence pointing to foreign ties.


The Trump campaign is also dealing with the fallout from Iranian hackers who stole sensitive campaign documents and tried to release them through the media or share them with the Biden campaign, according to federal prosecutors. An indictment released Sept. 27 of three Iranian nationals alleged a wide-ranging, years-long effort that included targeting one of Trump’s lawyers, former CIA officials and a former U.S. ambassador. In recent days, more campaign employees have been told they were targeted by the Iranians.


Trump’s late-September visit to a college football game in Tuscaloosa, Ala., entailed the most protection he has had since leaving office, with bullet-resistant glass and 150 metal detectors deployed to the stadium, according to one of the people. For his return to Butler on Oct. 5, a row of shipping containers lined the perimeter of the venue to block the view from a passing road. The security forces on-site included drones, helicopters, undercover officers, snipers and tactical teams.


Iran makes no secret of its intention to seek to kill Trump, analysts note.

An animated video showing a drone firing on Trump playing golf has resurfaced recently. The video was posted to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website on Jan. 14, 2022.


At the same time, notes former CIA official Norman Roule, “Iran is challenged by the fact that it lacks an extensive presence in the United States and is also under extensive scrutiny by U.S. law enforcement and intelligence services and their foreign partners.”


Unable to easily insert their own personnel into the United States, the Iranians have had to resort to “third country nationals and criminals” to try to carry out assassinations, he said.


Iran has likely felt able to threaten the former president based in part, he said, “on the lack of serious consequences by the West for its lethal operations” against former U.S. officials, activists and journalists in the United States and Britain, Roule said.


Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), a member of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs committee, said the available evidence on Crooks and the golf course suspect appears to more closely match the profile of homegrown violent extremists whom the FBI has identified as a rising domestic terrorism threat.


“There was intelligence about a potential threat from Iran, but the shooter on July 13th had no connection,” Blumenthal said. “I’m aware of no evidence at this time that the apparent would-be assassin in Florida had any tie to any other country.”


Iran’s desire for revenge is not new. Secretary of State Antony Blinken told Congress in 2022 that his predecessor, Mike Pompeo, was still receiving round-the-clock government security.


Biden directed the National Security Council to warn Iran’s government to stop plotting against Trump and former U.S. officials, adding that the United States would view any attempts on Trump’s life as an act of war.

A White House official said Biden’s strategy to address Iran’s lethal plots includes protective measures as well as disrupting threats through law enforcement actions. Biden has directed “every resource” for Trump’s protection and for agencies to provide threat information to his security detail, according to Security Council spokesman Sean Savett.


“We consider this a national and homeland security matter of the highest priority, and we strongly condemn Iran for these brazen threats,” Savett said in a statement. “Should Iran attack any of our citizens, including those who continue to serve the United States or those who formerly served, Iran will face severe consequences.”


Trump has started referencing the threats in settings such as news conferences and interviews.


“You’re in danger right now because of them and their challenge to me,” Trump told reporters at an Oct. 1 news conference in Milwaukee. Reflecting on going back to Butler, he recounted how the bullet that grazed his ear might have done more damage had he not been turning his head to look at a screen.


“Had I not made that turn, I would not be speaking to you people today,” Trump said.


Abigail Hauslohner and Ellen Nakashima contributed to this report.




19. America’s Foreign Policy Inertia



Excerpts:


History is replete with the remains of empires that were imprisoned by habit. From the Romans to the Habsburgs, fighting continual wars on multiple fronts against multiple foes led to mounting debts and eventually to irreversible decline. U.S. foreign policy today risks meeting the same fate. Washington appears stuck, reacting to events rather than shaping them, in a spiral that only gets worse as geopolitical divisions deepen, global challenges mount, and the American people turn inward. The United States cannot continue trying to keep the peace everywhere, all at once, at current levels of exertion—and there is no sign that American citizens are willing to spend and sacrifice much more for the privilege.
Changing this dynamic will be difficult, but change is sorely needed. The country deserves leaders who recognize that need. But more than that, the next president must make a plan to overcome the forces keeping U.S. foreign policy on its current path, and then see it through.



America’s Foreign Policy Inertia


How the Next President Can Make Change in a System Built to Resist It

By Christopher S. Chivvis and Stephen Wertheim

October 14, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Strategic Change in U.S. Foreign Policy · October 14, 2024

As the world evolves, the United States must adapt or suffer the consequences. The process of adaptation, however, is usually plodding, if it happens at all. Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden each attempted to steer U.S. foreign policy in new directions but met resistance from both domestic and foreign actors. The difficulty they encountered is no surprise. Since World War II, many U.S. leaders have attempted to change the country’s foreign policy, and their efforts have often fallen short. Inertia is a powerful force.

Take the two-decade war in Afghanistan as a recent example. For years, the U.S. operation was failing, with little prospect of stabilizing the country and securing a democratic government. Yet bureaucratic and political interests in Washington obstructed efforts to change course. President Barack Obama and his successor, Trump, both talked about ending the war, but ultimately just reduced troop levels. Biden finally completed the U.S. withdrawal in 2021, honoring a deal Trump had made with the Taliban. When the withdrawal got messy, however, Biden ended up paying a political price, even though the policy had high public support.

But the war did end, showing that meaningful shifts in U.S. foreign policy are not impossible. This is good news, because large adjustments are now needed. The era in which the United States could police the world is over, and Washington finds itself embroiled in conflicts it has diminishing capacity to resolve. Many analysts are thus calling for a major strategic reorientation—whether, for example, by enlarging the U.S. military so that it can sustain fights in multiple theaters or by handing off some burdens to U.S. allies and partners. Come January, Trump or his opponent in the 2024 election, Vice President Kamala Harris, could try to make big changes. Any effort to steer U.S. foreign policy in a new direction is sure to encounter formidable obstacles, however, and the new president will need a plan to overcome them.

THE SOURCES OF AMERICAN INERTIA

U.S. foreign policy is made in an institutional ecosystem conceived during World War II, expanded during the Cold War, and maintained through the post–Cold War period of American hegemony. The bureaucracies that design and implement foreign policy, including the Defense Department, the State Department, and the intelligence agencies, have been essential to making the United States powerful and capable. But strong bureaucracies are also conditioned to preserve the existing way of doing things. Each agency naturally safeguards its mission and resources, and major change is always a threat to someone.

As a result, bureaucratic resistance has frequently stymied change in Washington. President Jimmy Carter tried to withdraw U.S. forces from bases in South Korea in 1977, Obama attempted to close the Guantanamo Bay detention center in 2009, and Trump announced that U.S. forces would withdraw from Syria in 2019—but none of these efforts succeeded. Each time, the bureaucracy pushed back and won. Officials leak information to the public and slow-roll or even defy orders. This behavior can look like partisanship, a charge Trump levied while president. In fact, it is often simply what the U.S. bureaucracy is programmed to do.

Many leaders have attempted to change U.S. foreign policy, and their efforts have often fallen short.

Congress can also block presidential ambitions. The presidency holds immense power, but the legislative branch can derail changes to budgets, treaties, or administrative authorities. These areas of congressional jurisdiction are precisely those that matter for making major change. Congress may obstruct a presidential agenda for purely political reasons, especially if the opposing party controls the House of Representatives or the Senate. Senior congressional leaders who have been in office for decades command the national security committees and may hold entrenched views. Foreign governments and the private sector, meanwhile, lobby Congress to protect policies that favor them, inhibiting changes that may serve the broad public interest but challenge special interests.

In a system already resistant to change, human psychology reinforces inertia. Human sociability, conformism, and the sunk cost fallacy—which leads people to double down on a failing course of action—all contribute to maintaining the status quo. Officials and experts often try to make new facts fit their existing theories rather than adapt their theories to emerging realities. If they start to think differently, they encounter pressures to stop. Change may require admitting mistakes, which people usually don’t like to do. Politicians who revise their views stand out and become vulnerable to charges of flip-flopping. Analysts have incentives not to disagree too sharply with the rest of the foreign policy community, lest they be disqualified from jobs inside or outside government. And mainstream media outlets tend to seek out former government officials for commentary, creating an echo chamber that reinforces conventional wisdom.

CONSPICUOUS OBSTRUCTION

The forces that obstruct change were conspicuous during the Trump and Biden years. Both presidents sought to turn U.S. attention toward Asia while reducing the country’s role in the greater Middle East and limiting its defense commitments in Europe. Both struggled to achieve their goals.

The policymaking system in Washington thwarted some of Trump’s main initiatives. His attempt to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria came to naught after it elicited stark resistance from the military and little support from congressional Republicans. Eyeing a drawdown of U.S. forces in Europe, Trump cut the bureaucracy out and made the decision himself in the Oval Office. But foreign allies diluted his effort: the Polish government convinced Trump to shuffle some troops from Germany to Poland rather than remove them from the continent. One major foreign policy change Trump did manage to execute was to withdraw from the Iranian nuclear agreement. In that case, factors within the system worked in his favor: ditching the deal was a long-standing objective among Republican lawmakers and parts of the bureaucracy.

Meaningful shifts in U.S. foreign policy are not impossible.

Biden, for his part, took office intending to follow through on the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia,” but he ended up expending enormous political, financial, and military capital in the Middle East and Europe. After ordering the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in the first year of his term, Biden saw his approval ratings fall sharply as the Afghan government swiftly collapsed and U.S. personnel scrambled to evacuate. The pain of that experience dampened any enthusiasm for taking risks with further military pullbacks. At the outset, his administration aimed to right-size the U.S. posture in the Middle East, but in the end not much changed on the ground. This left U.S. forces dangerously vulnerable to attack by Iranian-aligned groups in the wake of Hamas’s assault on Israel in October 2023, increasing the stakes of the subsequent conflict for the United States. Unwilling to pay the price of backing away, the Biden administration wound up committing the United States more deeply to the Middle East, including by proposing a defense treaty with Saudi Arabia and sending aircraft carriers and 6,000 additional U.S. personnel to the region.

Similarly, Biden initially sought a “stable and predictable” relationship with Russia that would allow the United States to limit its involvement in European security. But after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Washington assumed a larger and costlier role than before. Biden has now increased U.S. troop levels in the region, supplied Ukraine extensively in its war effort, and toyed with a security guarantee for Kyiv. The administration took all these steps even though it ruled out the direct use of force against Russia and continued to insist that its primary focus lay in Asia.

Of course, Russia’s shocking invasion and Ukraine’s heroic defense demanded U.S. attention. But leading the way in providing aid to Ukraine, pledging U.S. support “as long as it takes,” and leaving the door open to Ukraine’s NATO membership were not the only possible responses. For example, the Biden administration could have put more energy into fostering negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, rebuffed Kyiv’s stated aim of recapturing all its territory, ruled out any postwar commitment to defend Ukraine with U.S. forces, and launched a transition to European leadership of European defense. Washington’s foreign policy operating code kicked in, however, encouraging Biden to put the United States at the center of a campaign, reminiscent of the Cold War, to rally the free world and contain Moscow’s authoritarian aggression.

MAKING CHANGE HAPPEN

Given the strength of the forces favoring continuity in U.S. foreign policy, the administration that enters the White House in January will need a plan if it wants to make any major changes. But a realistic plan should not count on sidelining or transforming the bureaucracy. Although previous U.S. presidents have had some success in using secrecy, as Richard Nixon did in bombing Cambodia and opening diplomacy with China, such tactics risk provoking bureaucratic defiance and congressional pushback, both of which limited Nixon’s achievements. Some advisers in Trump’s orbit hope to get around this problem in a potential second term by gutting the civil service, but that approach comes with a significant downside: the more Trump staffs the bureaucracy with inexperienced loyalists, the less competent these agencies will be to implement whatever policy change he wants.

The better approach is to get key agencies on board with the president’s preferred policy. The White House must identify influential bureaucrats and convince them that change serves not only the national interest but also their agencies’ interests. To counteract the Pentagon’s investment in the war in Afghanistan, for example, White House officials’ best argument to defense leaders would have been that continuing the war would reduce the military’s readiness for great-power competition.

Sometimes agents of change should work across multiple agencies through formal or informal channels. At the beginning of the Cold War, the State Department’s director of policy planning, Paul Nitze, collaborated with like-minded officials in the State and Defense Departments to develop the policy document NSC-68. President Harry Truman ultimately adopted it over the opposition of other top officials, producing a more expensive, militarized, and globe-spanning U.S. national security strategy. Under President Bill Clinton, advocates of NATO enlargement in the National Security Council and State Department were losing the debate until they persuaded the president to sound supportive of enlargement and then convinced the bureaucracy that it was time to implement the president’s policy.

Policymakers must also design and articulate their proposals with human psychology in mind. To overcome bias in favor of the status quo, they can map out a path of gradual change or frame the new policy as a mere update to existing policy. Proponents of expanding NATO membership, for example, began with admitting the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—three of the strongest candidates—into the alliance in 1999 while leaving the door open to other countries in the near future. When the alliance added seven more members in 2004, the move encountered far less opposition within the United States than before.

A change-seeking administration must seize on crises when they arise.

Policy change is often best presented in ways that harness loss aversion, the psychological tendency to assign greater significance to avoiding losses than to making gains of equal magnitude. Rather than promising the moon, agents of change ought to highlight the ways that their preferred policy can prevent negative outcomes. Leaving Afghanistan, for instance, offered no prospective benefits for the United States or its Afghan partners, but the withdrawal did keep the United States from squandering even more lives and money. In this case, officials’ loss aversion may have helped to overcome the countervailing pressure of the sunk cost fallacy; the argument to avoid future failures became more salient than the pressure to redeem past failures.

Finally, a change-seeking administration must seize on crises when they arise. Most significant U.S. foreign policy shifts since 1945 have come in times of upheaval. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, for example, was what finally convinced Truman to adopt NSC-68 after he had previously shelved the policy. The 9/11 attacks in 2001 pushed President George W. Bush to reorganize the U.S. intelligence community, launch the “war on terror,” and invade Iraq.

Crises enable change, but they do not predetermine what that change will look like. Often they elevate ideas, including the recommendations of NSC-68 and the invasion of Iraq, that were conceived prior to the events that triggered their adoption. A crisis comes with a window to debate the proper response, and advocates of policy change must be ready to take advantage. But they should beware: a solution that goes in search of a problem may cause new and bigger problems. Policymaking during a crisis carries other hazards, such as a bias toward action that can encourage rash decisions.

Even when the best-laid plans encounter the most favorable circumstances, foreign policy shifts bring political risk. If the next president wants to make change, he or she must be ready to spend precious political capital. Incoming administrations often prioritize domestic issues and take the path of least resistance on foreign policy. But deferring difficult foreign policy choices leaves the United States with worse options later on. For instance, the Biden administration never decided whether it would pay the political price of reentering the Iranian nuclear deal after Trump’s exit. Soon the opportunity dissipated and Tehran’s uranium enrichment advanced; now violence between Iran and U.S. regional partners is escalating and Iran’s incentives to cross the nuclear threshold are much greater. The cumulative effects of American inaction amount to self-injury. Because neglect could come back to haunt a president before the end of his or her term, a new administration should do the difficult work of changing policy proactively.

2025 AND BEYOND

A Harris or Trump administration will have several opportunities to shift course, and although no change will be easy to achieve, some methods will work better than others. One looming question is what to do about Ukraine. If the next president seeks to end the war in the near term, he or she will face determined opposition at home from elements of the bureaucracy and members of Congress. Other countries with a stake in the conflict—Ukraine and Russia, as well as NATO members—could also try to obstruct efforts to terminate the war by making public appeals, leveraging their influence in Washington, and mounting influence operations within the United States. Breaking the taboo on diplomatic negotiations could be difficult. The American president would need to speak to domestic and international audiences about the increasing cost and risks of continuing the conflict, and would have to cast a pragmatic settlement as the least bad option for the United States, NATO, and Ukraine. Rather than wholly repudiate prior U.S. strategy, the new administration should highlight how its approach would serve Washington’s principal aims since the beginning of the war in 2022, namely avoiding a direct war between NATO and Russia, preserving a sovereign and independent Ukraine, and strengthening Ukraine’s position at the negotiating table.

A Trump administration—and potentially a Harris administration, too—may also wish to see NATO allies shoulder more of the defense burden in Europe. Some speculate that Trump could unilaterally pull the United States out of NATO or yank large numbers of American troops out of Europe. But such drastic moves would produce enough resistance in Congress and the bureaucracy, as well as among U.S. allies, that the gambits would likely fail. To actually draw down the American presence on the continent, a new administration would need a plan to gradually shift the responsibilities and capabilities for defending Europe onto European countries. An incremental approach would help minimize domestic opposition, reduce the risk that Russia would take advantage of a security vacuum, and give Europe time to build up its defense-industrial base.

Deferring difficult choices leaves the United States with worse options later on.

If Harris wins, she may want to exert more pressure than Biden has mustered to get Israel to agree to a cease-fire with Hamas or Hezbollah or to reduce the civilian harm caused by Israeli military campaigns. She could also expand U.S. sanctions on violent Israeli settlers in the West Bank. Washington’s foreign policy apparatus would resist such moves strenuously, given the enduring support for Israel in both parties, reinforced by pro-Israel groups on Capitol Hill. But with political will, a plan to persuade bureaucratic actors, and a gradual but firm approach, a Harris administration could meaningfully shift policy. Biden, like Obama before him, tried to change Israeli behavior only toward the end of his administration, thereby limiting his leverage on an Israeli government prepared to wait him out. But Harris need not face the same constraint. She could begin her term insisting upon certain bottom lines, such as halting settler expansion and violence in the West Bank and taking other credible steps toward a two-state solution. This would leave her enough time to push through any domestic backlash before facing reelection. Trump, on the other hand, might give the Israeli far right license to accelerate efforts to drive Palestinians from their lands, an outcome that could intensify calls to rethink U.S. support for Israel within the Democratic Party and thereby deal lasting damage to U.S.-Israeli relations.

In addition, Harris might buck pressure in Washington to get ever tougher on China, choosing instead to build on Biden’s recent diplomatic progress with Beijing. Trump, too, could try to focus on fighting a trade war while moderating U.S.-Chinese security competition. Either administration could take a more reassuring line on Beijing’s core interests, including by lowering the temperature over Taiwan with a sincere effort to resuscitate the United States’ “one China” policy. Politicians from both parties, especially the opposing party, would accuse the president of weakness. To counter them, Harris or Trump could warn Americans that the costs of a hot or cold war with China would be steep, and that such a conflict could arrive soon if bilateral ties keep deteriorating. The next administration could also make clear to the bureaucracy that couching every pet initiative as a means of pushing back against China would no longer be effective in garnering White House support.

BREAK THE CYCLE

History is replete with the remains of empires that were imprisoned by habit. From the Romans to the Habsburgs, fighting continual wars on multiple fronts against multiple foes led to mounting debts and eventually to irreversible decline. U.S. foreign policy today risks meeting the same fate. Washington appears stuck, reacting to events rather than shaping them, in a spiral that only gets worse as geopolitical divisions deepen, global challenges mount, and the American people turn inward. The United States cannot continue trying to keep the peace everywhere, all at once, at current levels of exertion—and there is no sign that American citizens are willing to spend and sacrifice much more for the privilege.

Changing this dynamic will be difficult, but change is sorely needed. The country deserves leaders who recognize that need. But more than that, the next president must make a plan to overcome the forces keeping U.S. foreign policy on its current path, and then see it through.

  • CHRISTOPHER S. CHIVVIS is Director of the American Statecraft Program and a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  • STEPHEN WERTHEIM is a Senior Fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy.
  • They are co-authors of the report Strategic Change in U.S. Foreign Policy, on which this article is based.

Foreign Affairs · by Strategic Change in U.S. Foreign Policy · October 14, 2024



20. Cyber Transparency and the Restoration of U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability


Excerpts:


Given the state of affairs and both nations’ positions, an inevitable negotiated settlement to the Ukraine conflict could be the ideal moment to pursue a novel cyber confidence-building measure agreement as part of a broader agreement that could also see the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty extended beyond 2026. Russia will be eager to ensure its constructivist status as a guarantor of global stability and the nuclear order is upheld in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine. Russian leadership has also expressed its interest in the past of including cyber and space provisions into future arms control agreements. Simultaneously, the United States will be keen to restore strategic stability after a prolonged period of increased nuclear escalation, as well as lower the risk of any incidents with Russia should the relationship with China further deteriorate.
The United States is confronting changed geostrategic realities and multiple crises around the globe. Blazing a new path forward toward restoring cyber transparency through the application of confidence-building measures could do more than rehabilitate the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship — it could serve as a symbol of responsible world governance at a time when the globe is in a high degree of conflict and upheaval. This could set a precedent for potential follow-on negotiations with China, should the nation ever choose to join arms control negotiations. Should China refrain from participation, a comprehensive U.S.-Russian cyber arms control agreement could lay the groundwork for a 21st-century détente, which could be crucial should America find itself in a future existential battle with China. Just as détente and its associated measures defused tension and prevented nuclear escalation in the Cold War, such an approach could potentially yield much fruit for American foreign policy and the Asia pivot in the decades to come.



Cyber Transparency and the Restoration of U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Hunter Behrens · October 14, 2024

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has brought the risk of nuclear escalation back to the forefront of popular fears and policy concerns. With the onset of renewed great power competition between the United States and the Russian Federation over the last 20 years, strategic stability between these nations has suffered a catastrophic degradation and is now at its most perilous position since the end of the Cold War. This has been exacerbated by both Russia’s and America’s acquisition of advanced offensive cyber capabilities. These novel cyber weapons are creating more ambiguity, eroding trust and transparency, and have fundamentally redefined the state of strategic relations between the world’s two nuclear superpowers. These developments in the cyber domain are directly challenging key tenets of strategic stability, such as second-strike integrity and mutually assured destruction.

How can the world’s leading nuclear superpowers step back from such a precipice, especially in the present circumstances? Diplomatic engagement on strategic stability with the Russian Federation can help diminish the specter of nuclear escalation and conflict. Specifically, the United States and Russia could draw from the long and successful history of implementing confidence and security-building measures within the nuclear sphere to address the current crisis within the cyber domain.

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Novel Offensive Cyber Weapons and the Strategic Relationship

The 1990 U.S.-Soviet Joint Statement on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability defines strategic stability as a “strategic relationship that eliminates the incentives for a first nuclear strike.” Unfortunately, the principles that U.S.-Russian strategic stability has been based upon — mutually assured destruction and second-strike integrity — have been undermined by a multitude of factors, of which the collapse of arms control is only one. One of the main drivers of the collapse of strategic stability has been the erosion of the bilateral arms control infrastructure, which the United States and the Soviet Union built over multiple decades. Though numerical and technical nuclear parity certainly comprises a key pillar of strategic stability, it is constructivist mechanisms — such as arms control treaties and agreements — that foster trust, maintain transparency of intention, and prevent needless nuclear arms races, thereby preserving the strategic relationship.

After the U.S. unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the deployment of U.S. missile defense systems in central and eastern Europe — and the associated Russian violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty — the world has been witness to an increasingly brittle state of strategic stability between the United States and Russia. As a result, industrialized warfare rages in Europe today, while the last pillar of nuclear arms control — the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty — hangs on a thread. Novel offensive capabilities, such as those in the cyber domain, add another layer of ambiguity and complexity to a situation already on the precipice of nuclear war.

There are two significant cyber capabilities that are currently exerting negative influence upon strategic stability because they can negate the integrity of a nation’s nuclear second strike integrity and thereby undermine mutually assured destruction. The possibility of nuclear response to a debilitating cyber attack on critical infrastructure as described in the U.S. 2018 Nuclear Posture Review — as well as similar policies within Russia and China — demonstrates the growing influence of cyber weapons on the nuclear domain and shed light on the degree that the cyber sphere is complicating long-held notions of strategic stability. Given that mutually assured destruction and second-strike integrity have been a cornerstone of the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship for decades, their degradation has vastly increased ambiguity and further destabilized overall strategic stability. Though developments in the cyber domain are not the principal driver of the collapse of strategic stability, these new offensive capabilities are worsening tensions and increasing real and perceived vulnerabilities. Given these developments, the Nuclear Threat Initiative has argued that the risk of nuclear weapon use on the European continent is the highest it has been since the Cold War.

The first capability is designed to interfere with an adversary’s nuclear command, control, and communications systems, while targeting the delivery systems themselves via supply chain cyber disruptions. As mentioned previously, this capability directly targets the surety of nuclear second-strike capabilities, which is highly destabilizing for the mutually assured destruction principle and stability. The second destabilizing offensive cyber capability is one designed to disrupt — whether temporarily or catastrophically — an adversary’s critical infrastructure, such as power grids, water distribution plants, and communications, as well as other systems upon which advanced societies rely.

Both capabilities have created strategic ambiguity and are complicating traditional, long-held notions of deterrence, transparency, and adversary intent. Though there is an argument that strategic ambiguity can lead to caution and restraint by a nuclear power due to a lack of knowledge on adversarial capability and intent, Thomas Schelling got it right in 1966 when he wrote of the criticality of properly communicating and understanding intent and capabilities in order to preserve effective deterrence. Nuclear deterrence — given the advent of modern cyber weapons — is transforming from a space that was long defined by parity, stability, predictability, and mutual vulnerability into one defined primarily by obscurity, unknowns, and an erosion of trust. Multiple arms control experts, to include Alexey Arbatov of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, have argued that such cyber weapons are inherently destabilizing and that bilateral U.S.-Russian cyber confidence-building measures should be adopted to prevent further nuclear escalation. Confidence-building measures that were created and employed during the Cold War to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation could potentially serve as a guide toward application of such measures into the cyber realm.

In 1967, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara described the inherent risk of engaging in a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union and labeled such an endeavor as “foolish and futile.” Such an arms race is just as dangerous and ineffective today as it was in 1967. McNamara’s speech helped to jump-start strategic arms control negotiations, which would ultimately yield nearly a dozen treaties and decades of strategic dialogue between the United States and Russia. This robust history of cooperation and arms control legacy creates a rich pool of knowledge and expertise that can serve as inspiration for a modern, cyber-oriented bilateral confidence-building measure agreement between the United States and Russia. Modern confidence-building measures trace their history back to the détente era and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which included a set of measures that were designed to facilitate the strengthening of trust and transparency between the East and West — thereby reducing the risk of nuclear escalation and upholding stability. Such confidence-building measures helped lead to further arms control agreements and ultimately served as the building blocks for decades of strategic stability and dialogue.

Adapting Nuclear Measures to the Cyber Domain

One of the most effective confidence-building measures employed during the Cold War to reduce nuclear risk was information exchange between nations. This is one of the types of measures that is most suited for use in a bilateral cyber agreement that would further the building of trust and reduce ambiguity in the strategic relationship. If, in nuclear-related confidence-building agreements, the information exchange consisted of sharing data related to deployed nuclear delivery mechanisms and other technical data related to nuclear stockpiles, cyber confidence-building agreements would envision the exchange of information related to the cyber policies, intentions, and capabilities of each country. If designed and employed correctly, such an exchange could enable a new level of trust and dialogue that could serve the aim of preventing incidents and escalation. It is noteworthy that such a precedent does indeed exist between the United States and Russia.

In 2013, the U.S.-Russian Bilateral Presidential Commission established a set of bilateral provisions relating to cyberspace. The provisions were geared toward crisis stability and preventing escalation involving the use of information and communication technologies. The provisions provided for the constant exchange of cyber threat data, usage of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center for cyber security incident inquiries, as well as the establishment of a direct line between the White House cyber security coordinator and the Kremlin’s deputy secretary of the security council within the direct secure communications system. These provisions are an incredible example of how Cold War–era mechanisms designed to manage nuclear escalation can be applied to modern cyberspace — given that the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center and direct secure communications system were first created to manage nuclear crises amid the Cold War. The United States and Russia could build upon this experience and cooperation in future negotiations, as well as look to other multilateral institutions for guidance and expertise in crafting novel cyber confidence-building measures.

In addition to the precedent of U.S.-Russian cooperation in the cyber sphere, there is also a history of multilateral cyber confidence-building measure agreements under the auspices of the U.N. General Assembly that are geared toward strengthening stability and preventing crises. In the 2015 agreement by the assembly, which was based upon the recommendations of the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts, there were provisions that stipulated the exchange of information for cyber-related incidents, as well as the voluntary exchange of national views concerning critical infrastructure vulnerabilities. Such normative multilateral precedents of cyber confidence-building measures — coupled with the track record of nuclear-related measures that successfully prevented nuclear incidents and escalation over decades — illustrate the high degree of applicability of confidence-building measures into cyberspace and indicate their likely success in restoring strategic stability.

Specifically, the United States and Russia could focus their efforts on crisis prevention and stability measures that are geared toward the creation of mechanisms that facilitate consultations aimed at reducing misperceptions, escalation, and tensions that could arise from cyber incidents. Additionally, parties could exchange information concerning their national cyber organizations, policies, and strategy. The exchange of threat actor information, information on command and control for offensive cyber operations, as well as mutual declarations on the non-targeting of nuclear command and control systems, could foster mutual understanding and restore each nation’s confidence in the integrity of their second strike. Creation of a comprehensive bilateral confidence-building measure agreement that builds upon the normative success of the U.N., as well as factors in the dynamically changing geostrategic situation for both nations, should become the primary goal within the framework of U.S.-Russian strategic stability talks moving forward.

Strategic Détente

Political will in both Moscow and Washington will be necessary to make progress toward restoring transparency in cyberspace that is critical to rebuilding the strategic relationship. With no end in sight to the Russo-Ukrainian War, it is hard to imagine any viable path forward for a novel bilateral cyber confidence-building measure agreement. This is especially true, given that recent cyber operations during the conflict have only served to worsen the escalatory spiral. However, as history shows us, technological advances and novel offensive capabilities — especially when possessed in parity — can often create an impetus for change and solutions.

With the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty set to expire in 2026 — and the current U.S. administration offering strategic stability talks with no conditions — there is clearly expressed political will from the West in continuing negotiations on the strategic relationship. Given Russia’s constructivist views on the purpose of arms control, which are primarily concerned with furthering their status on the world stage and using it as leverage in other areas of the bilateral relationship, Russia has thus far ruled out strategic stability talks as long as the United States continues its support of Ukraine.

Given the state of affairs and both nations’ positions, an inevitable negotiated settlement to the Ukraine conflict could be the ideal moment to pursue a novel cyber confidence-building measure agreement as part of a broader agreement that could also see the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty extended beyond 2026. Russia will be eager to ensure its constructivist status as a guarantor of global stability and the nuclear order is upheld in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine. Russian leadership has also expressed its interest in the past of including cyber and space provisions into future arms control agreements. Simultaneously, the United States will be keen to restore strategic stability after a prolonged period of increased nuclear escalation, as well as lower the risk of any incidents with Russia should the relationship with China further deteriorate.

The United States is confronting changed geostrategic realities and multiple crises around the globe. Blazing a new path forward toward restoring cyber transparency through the application of confidence-building measures could do more than rehabilitate the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship — it could serve as a symbol of responsible world governance at a time when the globe is in a high degree of conflict and upheaval. This could set a precedent for potential follow-on negotiations with China, should the nation ever choose to join arms control negotiations. Should China refrain from participation, a comprehensive U.S.-Russian cyber arms control agreement could lay the groundwork for a 21st-century détente, which could be crucial should America find itself in a future existential battle with China. Just as détente and its associated measures defused tension and prevented nuclear escalation in the Cold War, such an approach could potentially yield much fruit for American foreign policy and the Asia pivot in the decades to come.

Become a Member

Hunter Behrens is a captain in the U.S. Air Force assigned to the national security affairs department at the Naval Postgraduate School and a former Russian interpreter for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. He can be contacted via LinkedIn.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Hunter Behrens · October 14, 2024




De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


 
 
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161



If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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