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Quotes of the Day:
"Totalitarianism in power invariably replaces all first rate talents, regardless of their sympathies, with those crackpots and fools whose lack of intelligence and creativity is still the bet guarantee of their loyalty.
– Hannah Arendt
"The opinion of 10,000 men is of no value if none of them know anything about the subject."
– Marcus Aurelius
"Caretake this moment. Immerse yourself in its particulars. Respond to this person, this challenge, this deed. Quit evasions. Stop giving yourself needless trouble. It is time to really live; to fully inhabit the situation you happen to be in now."
– Epictetus
1. North Korean listeners express loss after Radio Free Asia broadcasts end in July
2. Unification minister confirms two-state approach for Koreas
3. US takes ‘final’ steps to cut off Cambodian firm aiding North Korean cybercrime
4. US-South Korea alliance is evolving after Trump-Lee summit, top diplomat says
5. Army Korea’s move to longer duty tours to come in stages, general says
6. General Atomics' Gray Eagle STOL Drone Will Be Made In Korea
7. North breaks tradition, incorporates some of South's pop culture style in anniversary event
8. Presidential policy chief, industry minister to visit Washington for follow-up tariff talks
9. Top S. Korean business leaders to visit U.S. amid AI project talks, trade negotiations
10. N. Korea's Kim, Trump could meet on occasion of APEC summit in S. Korea: unification minister
11. Seoul to revive foundation in charge of suspended inter-Korean industrial park
12. Hidden grammar of US-Korea alliance
13. Ex-US Navy rear admiral hired by Hanwha a week before Chinese sanctions landed
14. U.S. Army may soon test South Korea’s new wheeled K9A2 howitzer
15. Seoul plans first civilian nuclear bunker under public housing complex
16. Quick Take: New Drone Launching System Shown
17. Why international relations theory, negotiations fail with North Korea
1. North Korean listeners express loss after Radio Free Asia broadcasts end in July
No surprise here.
A victory for Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy.
North Korean listeners express loss after Radio Free Asia broadcasts end in July
People who secretly tuned into foreign broadcasts describe how programming shaped their worldview and offered hope
By Lee Sang-yong - October 15, 2025
https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korean-listeners-express-loss-after-radio-free-asia-broadcasts-end-in-july/
dailynk.com · October 14, 2025
Screenshot
Two North Korean individuals who secretly listened to Radio Free Asia for years expressed profound loss after the U.S.-funded broadcaster ceased transmissions in early July due to changes in government policy, telling Daily NK the shutdown closed off a vital “window for communicating with the outside world.”
Daily NK interviewed individuals living in Hoeryong, North Hamgyong province (in their 40s) and Sinuiju, North Pyongan province (in their 50s), who described how RFA broadcasts had fundamentally altered their understanding of their country and the wider world.
A, an individual in Hoeryong, said he had been listening to RFA radio broadcasts since 2018. “I would turn on the radio after midnight or at dawn and tune the frequency to listen,” he said. “I could hear news about ‘the lower village’ (South Korea) and world affairs that are unknowable here (in North Korea), and it became a ‘yardstick’ for gauging the flawed political reality.”
A added, “Here everyone lives thinking the world is all like this, but listening to the broadcasts, I could realize how difficult it is to live here and that another society exists. I even developed a desire to live in the lower village.”
Meanwhile, B, an individual in Sinuiju, said, “I listened (to RFA radio broadcasts) starting in early 2003. I mainly tuned the frequency during dawn hours, and it was very helpful for learning about world affairs.”
B also said, “Before listening to the broadcasts, I didn’t know how the world worked, but listening to the broadcasts made the world look different and gave me new hope. Through the broadcasts, I had a reassuring feeling of communicating with the outside world.”
Radio offered comparison to regime propaganda
These remarks from A and B show that RFA and other radio broadcasts to North Korea have served not merely as news channels but as a “window” changing North Korean people’s thinking and emotions. The fact alone that they tuned frequencies to listen to outside broadcasts during secretive times like night or dawn shows that individuals approached prohibited information on their own.
What they commonly describe is that “their eyes for seeing the world changed.” Through radio broadcasts to North Korea, they learned about South Korea and world affairs and situations, realizing that the society they live in is not absolute. Radio broadcasts to North Korea served as a “yardstick of comparison” that created cracks in regime propaganda.
These individuals also candidly shared their feelings of emptiness and regret over the suspension of RFA radio broadcasts. A said, “At first I couldn’t believe it. I can’t understand why this situation occurred.” B said, “I was disappointed to the point that life lost its flavor. I don’t know why this happened.”
After RFA radio broadcasts were cut off, they are finding other ways, such as listening to Japanese and Chinese broadcasts or hearing outside news through Chinese ethnic contacts, but they expressed frustration, saying “more comparable information is needed.”
Both individuals agreed that “the broadcasts must resume.”
A expressed hope for the broadcasts’ resumption, saying, “It’s truly regrettable because listening to news about the lower village and overseas gave me new hope.” B revealed his earnest feelings, saying, “Here we can only learn about the outside world through broadcasts. I’m waiting for the communication window to reopen.”
Meanwhile, according to a report published last year by the Unification Media Group, demand for portable radio devices in North Korea appears to remain high.
While North Korean authorities continue to emphasize fixed frequencies and strengthen control through the law on rejecting reactionary ideology and culture, 19% of the 100 North Korean people who participated in the survey at that time said they listen to radio. Additionally, listening frequency was found to be “almost every day” at 5.6% and “more than once a month” at 44.4%, indicating relatively high numbers of active listeners.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · October 14, 2025
2. Unification minister confirms two-state approach for Koreas
“peaceful two-state framework?”
So disappointing and dangerous. The assumption that the Lee administration is making could result in serious challenges to South Korea.
And this decision is condemning their 26 million Korean brothers and sisters in the north to a life sentence on death row.
Unification minister confirms two-state approach for Koreas
Posted October. 15, 2025 07:36,
Updated October. 15, 2025 07:36
https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20251015/5901031/1
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said Monday that the government is likely to adopt his proposal for a “peaceful two-state framework” for the Koreas, which is under discussion at the National Security Council. Since taking office, Chung has argued that the Koreas are effectively two separate states, promoting his so-called “peaceful two-state theory.”
During a parliamentary audit of the Unification Ministry, People Power Party lawmaker Ahn Cheol-soo asked whether Chung would continue promoting the theory. Chung said he would. When lawmakers questioned whether the idea violates the Constitution, he clarified that it refers to “a two-state framework within the special relationship toward unification,” not legal recognition of two separate countries.
He said institutionalizing a peaceful two-state framework is key to advancing unification, and that progress has stalled because the Koreas have not reached that stage. Responding to claims that his view conflicts with National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac, who has said he does not support the theory, Chung said Wi was referring only to legal recognition and that their positions are aligned.
Addressing reports of friction between “independence” and “alliance” factions within the government’s foreign and security team, Chung said an alliance without independence lacks principle, while independence without alliance leads to isolation. He described the team as an “independent alliance” and said distinctions between the two camps may have been relevant 20 years ago, but the current administration operates as a single unit. A senior presidential official said Chung’s remarks were understandable for a unification minister.
On the same day, the Unification Ministry announced a reorganization plan that includes creating a Peace and Cooperation District Promotion Team to manage efforts to reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex and restoring the Kaesong Industrial District Foundation. The complex, which began full operations in 2005 as a symbol of inter-Korean economic cooperation, has been closed since February 2016. During the audit, Chung said the ministry would restore the foundation and prepare for the complex’s reopening.
The ministry said it will submit the reorganization plan for public notice on Tuesday. The plan calls for reinstating key inter-Korean exchange and cooperation departments, including the Inter-Korean Dialogue Headquarters, which were reduced or abolished under the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, and increasing staff from 533 to 600.
Oh-Hyuk Kwon hyuk@donga.com
3. US takes ‘final’ steps to cut off Cambodian firm aiding North Korean cybercrime
We must defeat the all purpose sword.
News
US takes ‘final’ steps to cut off Cambodian firm aiding North Korean cybercrime
New rule barring Huione Group from financial system part of broader action against cybercrime and trafficking in region
https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/us-takes-final-steps-to-cut-off-cambodian-firm-aiding-north-korean-cybercrime/
Anton Sokolin October 15, 2025
People using computers at the Grand People's Study House in Pyongyang on Sept. 4, 2015 | Image: NK News
Washington took “final” measures to cut off a Cambodia-based finance company from the U.S. financial system on Tuesday, seeking to eliminate a “critical node” in North Korea-linked cryptocurrency laundering.
The U.S. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a “final rule” on Tuesday targeting Phnom Penh-based Huione Group, a financial services network accused of funneling proceeds from cyber heists carried out by the DPRK and transnational criminal organizations.
U.S. financial institutions are now barred from maintaining accounts for or processing transactions involving Huione Group, effectively blocking the conglomerate’s direct or indirect access to the American financial system, FinCEN said.
The action came as part of the U.S. and U.K.’s “largest ever” joint action against cybercriminal networks and human trafficking in Southeast Asia, targeting over a hundred actors across the region, according to the Treasury.
FinCEN’s move finalizes its earlier decision to blacklist Huione Group as a “financial institution of primary money laundering concern” for facilitating more than $4 billion in illicit transactions since 2021, including at least $37 million in cryptocurrency stolen by North Korean hackers.
Huione Group, formerly registered in Hong Kong, laundered assets from cyber heists through multiple subsidiaries and affiliates such as online marketplace Haowang Guarantee, virtual payment provider Huione Pay PLC and virtual asset service Huione Crypto, according to FinCEN.
It allegedly carried out these actions on behalf of actors including the DPRK’s notorious Lazarus Group cyber syndicate.
U.S. blockchain intelligence firm Chainalysis found in June that Haowang continued processing transactions through a mirror site after its main homepage shut down in May following FinCEN’s initial blacklisting.
One cybersecurity expert said Huione’s return from the dead was expected given trends after similar crackdowns. Another expert compared the fight against networks like Huione to playing “whack-a-mole,” stressing the need to target individuals behind these operations rather than the entities that can easily reincarnate under new banners.
Chainalysis similarly called for an “ecosystem-wide response” against the infrastructure enabling such schemes, arguing that enforcement should go beyond simple takedowns and involve cross-border cooperation between law enforcement and financial intelligence units.
Washington’s latest designations follow a report estimating that North Korean cybercriminals have stolen more than $2 billion in cryptocurrency so far this year, triple of last year’s haul of $700 million, driven by a record-breaking $1.5 billion theft from Dubai-based exchange Bybit in February.
Meanwhile, the Treasury’s broader joint action with the U.K. imposed “sweeping sanctions” on 146 targets linked to the Prince Group Transnational Criminal Organization, another Cambodia-based “transnational criminal empire” accused of running online investment scams, along with its ethnic Chinese leader Chen Zhi and other associates.
The Prince Group also engaged in “pig butchering” forcing its human trafficking victims to lure others into shady investments while being subjected to “barbaric methods of control,” including “physical abuse, isolation, restriction of movement, arbitrary fines and fees, threats of sexual exploitation and confiscation of personal documents and electronics,” the Treasury said.
Cambodia has recently gained media attention following the death of a South Korean university student who was allegedly tortured after being lured to the country by scammers. The case exposed a rise in abductions of South Korean citizens in Cambodia, with dozens still missing amid Seoul’s diplomatic efforts to repatriate victims.
Edited by Bryan Betts
4. US-South Korea alliance is evolving after Trump-Lee summit, top diplomat says
No, No, No. The US DOES NOT have operational authority over South Korea's military. The ROK/US Combined FOrces COmmand has operational authority over designated ROK and US forces with the missions of deterrence and defense. The ROK/US CFC is not a US command (despite the fact that a US General commands it). The Commander of the ROK/US CFC answers to the Military Committee which is made up of representatives of both nations' National Command and MIlitary Authorities (NCMA - but no longer described with this acronym). The ROK/US CFC is a bilateral command that belongs to or is "owned" by both the ROK and US in equal partnership.
Excerpts:
The U.S. has held operational authority over South Korea’s military since the Korean War. Seoul may assume that authority once it demonstrates agreed-upon military capabilities, which are not publicly disclosed.
The Combined Forces Command, headquartered at Camp Humphreys about 40 miles south of Seoul, now heads South Korea’s military during wartime. The command is led by a U.S. four-star general with a South Korean general serving as deputy.
US-South Korea alliance is evolving after Trump-Lee summit, top diplomat says
Stars and Stripes · David Choi and Yoojin Lee · October 14, 2025
South Korean soldiers work security during a Freedom Shield drill at Goyang Training Center in Dongducheon, South Korea, March 13, 2025. (Jameson Harris/U.S. Army)
CAMP HUMPHREYS, South Korea — The United States and South Korea are deepening their “future-oriented” strategic alliance, senior officials said this week, even as Seoul works to reclaim wartime control of its military from Washington.
Speaking Monday before lawmakers during a parliamentary hearing in the capital, Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said the two countries have formed “deepened trust” since Presidents Donald Trump and Lee Jae Myung held their first summit last month in the U.S. capital.
Lee urged Trump to be proactive in building ties with North Korea and later pledged to raise Seoul’s annual defense spending by more than 8%.
“South Korea and the U.S. promised to closely cooperate to peacefully solve the problems on the Korean Peninsula,” Cho said at the hearing. “South Korea expressed its strong determination to pursue the modernization of a reciprocal, future-oriented alliance, in response to the changing environment.”
The U.S. “welcomed the proposal, reaffirmed its firm defense commitment and agreed to further strengthen the extended deterrence between the two countries,” he added.
Cho’s remarks came a month after the presidential office in Seoul pledged to reclaim wartime operational control of its forces within five years.
The U.S. has held operational authority over South Korea’s military since the Korean War. Seoul may assume that authority once it demonstrates agreed-upon military capabilities, which are not publicly disclosed.
The Combined Forces Command, headquartered at Camp Humphreys about 40 miles south of Seoul, now heads South Korea’s military during wartime. The command is led by a U.S. four-star general with a South Korean general serving as deputy.
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back echoed Cho’s comments during Monday’s hearing and said he disagreed with the notion that U.S. Forces Korea’s deterrence extends beyond North Korea to China.
USFK is responsible for about 28,500 American troops stationed on the peninsula. Its official mission is to defend South Korea from attack, though its presence is also viewed as a regional counterbalance to China, one of Pyongyang’s closest allies.
Beijing has long opposed the 2017 deployment of a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, anti-ballistic missile battery in South Korea, calling it a regional threat.
Meanwhile, North Korea on Friday showcased its military arsenal, including the Hwasong-20 intercontinental ballistic missile — theoretically capable of reaching the continental U.S. — during a parade marking the 80th anniversary of the ruling party’s founding in Pyongyang.
David Choi
David Choi
David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.
Yoojin Lee
Yoojin Lee
Yoojin Lee is a correspondent and translator based at Camp Humphreys, South Korea. She graduated from Korea University, where she majored in Global Sports Studies.
Stars and Stripes · David Choi and Yoojin Lee · October 14, 2025
5. Army Korea’s move to longer duty tours to come in stages, general says
Army Korea’s move to longer duty tours to come in stages, general says
militarytimes.com · Hope Hodge Seck · October 14, 2025
The Eighth Army in Korea is already accepting soldier transfers under a new “tour normalization” system that began Oct. 1. But not every installation in the country is ready yet to accept soldiers and their families for longer tours.
Speaking to reporters at the Association of the United States Army’s annual meeting on Monday, Maj. Gen. Hank Taylor, Eighth Army commander, said the unit had embarked on a phased implementation model, with the southern installations, including Camp Humphreys, adopting tour normalization before the northern ones.
Called 3-2-1, the newly implemented tour normalization model will see soldiers accompanied by their families serving a three-year tour in Korea and unaccompanied troops serving two years. One-year tours will be reserved for those granted an exception to policy, due to housing, medical, education or other needs, Army officials have said.
This will add a year to the previous standard of a two-year tour length for accompanied soldiers — a move that officials have said will add stability as the services aim to build military capabilities in the region.
“When you think about where I manage Korea, from all the way in the south to all the way to the [Demilitarized Zone], right to the [Joint Security Area], we did a lot of good preparation,” Taylor said. “We thought, as we put that request in, we have an implementation model … we’re focused right now on where we have an immediate capability to do that, which is our southern area, in our Seoul area and Camp Humphreys.”
It will take up to four years, Taylor said, for the smaller installations and outposts in the north to be ready to receive families.
“It’s really ensuring that we have all the resources available,” he said. “So as we tell families, we’re going to bring it, we know you’re here – we’ve got schools, we’ve got hospitals, we have that care.”
RELATED
Longer assignments coming soon for troops heading to South Korea
Longer tours will bring more stability for military forces and improve readiness and service members' quality of life, officials said.
Air Force Col. William Parker, U.S. Forces Korea’s director of personnel, previously told Stars and Stripes that certain bases, like the Marine Corps’ Camp Mukuk and Kunsan Air Base, would remain closed to service members with families for the foreseeable future as the military builds up infrastructure and support systems.
“We’ve all been in turnover, you know, and when you leave, there’s always gaps, and so we’re really taking a lot of those gaps away,” Taylor said. “And then just think, people are becoming more knowledgeable about the mission and their equipment that they have. So that’s what we’re really trying to do, is increase readiness by reducing that instability.”
The Army re-established its 528th Military Intelligence Company in August in an effort to adapt to an “ever-changing battlefield,” officials said at the time. Taylor didn’t directly address questions about emerging challenges soldiers in South Korea were facing from threats, including increasingly capable North Korean rocket artillery.
“We continue to modernize in all those capabilities, and then it is truly having leaders that are trained, understanding the threat, having the early warning, and all those things,” Taylor said. “That’s how you protect yourself in those types of environments, is understanding and having the resources available to execute the mission.”
6. General Atomics' Gray Eagle STOL Drone Will Be Made In Korea
I know I am a broken record, but South Korea is truly a partner in the Arsenal of Democracy.
General Atomics' Gray Eagle STOL Drone Will Be Made In Korea
South Korean-built Gray Eagle STOL drones will be offered to the local armed forces, as well as the U.S. military and other customers.
Thomas Newdick
Published Oct 14, 2025 1:30 PM EDT
23
twz.com · Thomas Newdick
The TWZ Newsletter
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
The next stage in the evolution of the Gray Eagle Short Takeoff and Landing (GE STOL) drone sees General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI) team up with South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace for co-development and co-production of the uncrewed aircraft system, with work set to begin immediately. A demonstrator for the medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) drone has already operated from a South Korean amphibious assault ship, but the new partnership will see production of the Gray Eagle STOL for all customers taking place in South Korea.
GA-ASI and Hanwha Aerospace had an official signing ceremony at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual symposium today. That ceremony took place alongside GA-ASI’s company-funded Mojave STOL drone, which has been flying for years and is being used as a proof-of-concept demonstrator for the Gray Eagle STOL.
GA-ASI’s Mojave demonstrator during takeoff and landing trials on a dirt strip near El Mirage, California, in August 2023. GA-ASI
As for the Gray Eagle STOL, this is the latest iteration of GA-ASI’s MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS. At the center of the Gray Eagle STOL is its ability to operate from remote or austere locations with rough strips and limited logistical support. GA-ASI says the aircraft will be able to operate from semi-improved surfaces, including dirt roads, open fields, beaches, and parking lots. The same capabilities render it suitable for flying from aircraft carriers and big-deck assault ships, too.
In the past, GA-ASI has described the Gray Eagle STOL as its “most rugged UAS design,” although it’s worth noting that the basic MQ-1C Gray Eagle for the U.S. Army already put something of a premium on efficiency and usability. The original MQ-1C Gray Eagle was tailored for warfare in the Middle East, uses a heavy-fuel piston engine instead of a turboprop, and can be operated by a cadre of enlisted soldiers.
MQ-1C Gray Eagle. U.S. Army
Under the new joint initiative, GA-ASI and Hanwha plan to build a production-representative Gray Eagle STOL aircraft, which should take to the air in 2027. The companies will, in the meantime, establish a production line that will be able to provide the Gray Eagle STOL to customers in the United States and South Korea, as well as globally, and which should result in cost savings for the drone. The first deliveries to customers should take place in 2028.
“GA-ASI and Hanwha are committed to investing in this project and building development and production capabilities in South Korea,” said GA-ASI President David R. Alexander. “We’ll be leveraging the expertise of both companies to quickly bring the Gray Eagle STOL to global customers.”
“This landmark agreement marks the beginning of a new phase in U.S.-Korea defense cooperation, extending beyond traditional alliance structures to deliver next-generation, runway-independent UAS solutions that maximize commanders’ options in the face of evolving mission demands,” GA-ASI said in a statement.
The next steps will see GA-ASI and Hanwha Aerospace working closely together to complete the design phase for the drone and then establish a production facility in South Korea. The final assembly and manufacturing of the GE STOL will be the responsibility of Hanwha in South Korea, with GA-ASI handling the final integration. Meanwhile, GA-ASI will continue to produce other Gray Eagle models at its plant in San Diego, California.
An early rendering of the Gray Eagle Short Takeoff and Landing (GE STOL) drone. GA-ASI
GA-ASI says the new partnership “offers the fastest path with lowest risk to operational capability.”
“Co-producing GE STOL in South Korea and the U.S. will create jobs and help Hanwha secure talent in related fields as well as foster our domestic (Korean) UAS industry ecosystem,” said Jae-il Son, president and CEO of Hanwha Aerospace. “Hanwha is poised to become a comprehensive UAS company capable of executing everything from design to production and maintenance based on our capabilities, which span from fighter jet engines to radar and avionics equipment.”
For Hanwha, the Gray Eagle STOL also presents a way of gaining a foothold in the South Korean military. The country’s armed forces already operate a diverse drone fleet, including Israeli-supplied aircraft. However, on the domestic front, this segment is currently dominated by Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) and Korean Air, both of which already build drones for the South Korean military.
However, GA-ASI has already been working closely with the South Korean Ministry of Defense as it continues to develop the Gray Eagle STOL drone.
Last year, the Mojave demonstrator was used in a demonstration when it took off from the Republic of Korea Navy’s amphibious landing ship ROKS Dokdo, as it was underway off the coast of Pohang, South Korea.
The Mojave drone at the rear of the flight deck of the Dokdo amphibious assault ship in the Sea of Japan. Republic of Korea Armed Forces
The Mojave has also been used for takeoff and landing trials aboard the British aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales in 2023.
Other milestones for the demonstrator drone have included live-fire testing at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, using the Dillon Aero DAP-6 Minigun, and operations from a dirt strip to prove its STOL credentials, something we have reported on before. The stated performance of the Mojave includes a takeoff run of 400 feet for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, or 1,000 feet when armed with 12 Hellfire missiles.
Clearly, having Hanwha Aerospace onboard the Gray Eagle STOL program, including local production, should make the drone even more attractive to South Korea.
As well as operating from the two Dokdo class amphibious assault ships — the drone doesn’t necessarily need a catapult for launch or arresting gear for recovery — the Gray Eagle STOL could be a valuable addition to the South Korean military’s land-based units.
The Republic of Korea Navy’s amphibious landing ship ROKS Dokdo takes part in maneuvers in waters near Busan, South Korea, in June 2013. Republic of Korea Armed Forces
For the Republic of Korea Army, the Gray Eagle STOL’s runway independence would be a huge advantage during any kind of conflict with North Korea. In the past, GA-ASI has outlined the fact that the drone’s commanders “can choose virtually any bases of operation and take advantage of unconventional locations not normally affiliated with unmanned aircraft or aviation operations as an added level of survivability and surprise.”
In such a scenario, it would likely be in heavy demand for reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA), as well as strike. Meanwhile, its manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) capability could see it operate closely with the Republic of Korea Army helicopter fleet, including the AH-64E Apache.
A Republic of Korea Army AH-64E Apache during a live-fire military exercise in Pocheon in September 2022. Photo by Anthony WALLACE / AFP ANTHONY WALLACE
The Gray Eagle STOL is also intended, from the ground up, to be rapidly deployed to remote locations by C-130 Hercules cargo aircraft, a type also operated by South Korea. GA-ASI says the drone can be ready to fly from austere locales in as little as 1.5 hours once rolled out the back of a C-130. This makes it ideal for different sorts of distributed and expeditionary operations.
As well as the aforementioned Mojave weapons, the Gray Eagle STOL is planned to be armed with launched effects, a capability that it inherits from the improved Gray Eagle 25M. The latter was developed to provide the U.S. Army with the option to procure a more advanced version of the MQ-1C, which would incorporate various enhancements to better meet the demands of a future conflict, likely to be expeditionary peer conflicts rather than a counterinsurgency fight.
Concept artwork from GA-ASI showing a Gray Eagle 25M launching the company’s Eaglet air-launched drones. GA-ASI
GA-ASI has previously underlined the potential use of this drone to tackle enemy air defense systems in a large and very contested battlefield — just like the one that South Korea could face if it goes to war with its neighbor. In this scenario, the drone would lob its launched effects toward the air defenses before acting as a “quarterback,” relaying data gathered by the smaller drones to other friendly elements, be they aircraft, long-range fires, or other platforms.
Gray Eagle 25M. GA-ASI
At the same time, the growing questions around the survivability of drones like this need to be acknowledged. The Gray Eagle STOL and its relatives are potentially vulnerable even when faced by lower-end adversaries, a fact that has been underscored by the scale of losses suffered by U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones when faced by Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen. The use of LEs at standoff distances and the addition of self protection and electronic warfare pods, as well as combined force tactics, will help them in the fight in the years to come.
The Gray Eagle STOL would also port other advanced technologies over from the Gray Eagle 25M, including the EagleEye synthetic aperture radar, which can detect and track ground targets out to 50 miles and maritime targets out to 124 miles. GA-ASI is also working to introduce an increased-range active electronically scanned array (AESA) antenna, which is intended to allow it to operate beyond the weapons effects zone of many threat systems.
As we have highlighted in the past, the Gray Eagle STOL would also seem to offer a broad portfolio of capabilities that could be of particular relevance to the U.S. military as it prepares for a future high-end conflict, especially one fought in the Pacific against China.
In the past, GA-ASI has specifically said that the “Gray Eagle STOL might go with American forces into an expeditionary base deep downrange, co-locating with them as necessary to support missions, including delivery of supplies with the range to reach from island chain to island chain for units separate from the main body. Operating from a semi-prepared landing zone, a dirt road, or any paved surface, it expands commanders’ options.”
Other roles planned for the Gray Eagle STOL include logistics, and GA-ASI has explored the idea of underwing pods capable of carrying up to 1,000 pounds of cargo. This could be of particular interest for the U.S. military, as it looks increasingly at diverse distributed logistics chains as an essential requirement for supporting future operations in contested environments, especially in the context of a potential future high-end conflict, including in the Pacific.
With these kinds of peer and near-peer conflicts in mind, the Gray Eagle STOL is also intended to be more resilient to hostile electronic warfare jamming, especially to GPS networks. It will have vision-based navigation that can be used to overcome GPS jamming and have SATCOM anti-jam technologies.
Ultimately, the Gray Eagle STOL should emerge as a drone that’s able to fly a wide range of missions, from a variety of land bases and ships. It’s clear that, with their new partnership, GA-ASI and Hanwha Aerospace foresee interest from operators outside of the U.S. and South Korean militaries, too.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
Staff Writer
Thomas is a defense writer and editor with over 20 years of experience covering military aerospace topics and conflicts. He’s written a number of books, edited many more, and has contributed to many of the world’s leading aviation publications. Before joining The War Zone in 2020, he was the editor of AirForces Monthly.
twz.com · Thomas Newdick
7. North breaks tradition, incorporates some of South's pop culture style in anniversary event
If you cannot beat them, join them. Although perhaps counterintuitive to some, this illustrates the success and threat of South Korea's influence or soft power. The regime cannot stop its spread so it has to find a suitable alternative or substitute.
Wednesday
October 15, 2025
dictionary + A - A
North breaks tradition, incorporates some of South's pop culture style in anniversary event
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-10-15/national/northKorea/North-breaks-tradition-incorporates-some-of-Souths-pop-culture-style-in-anniversary-event/2420552
Published: 15 Oct. 2025, 14:42
Updated: 15 Oct. 2025, 18:01
A scene from ″Long Live the Workers’ Party of Korea,″ a mass gymnastics and performing arts performance held in North Korea on Oct. 12. [SCREEN CAPTURE]
North Korea staged a massive mass games and performing arts event, “Long Live the Workers’ Party of Korea,” on Sunday to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the ruling Workers’ Party. The show mixed traditional North Korean spectacle with modern elements that echoed South Korean pop culture.
Kim Jong-un praised the event as a flawless display of the nation’s “resilience, potential and power.” He used the occasion to highlight closer ties with China, Russia and several Southeast Asian nations.
Related Article
Footage aired by the state-run Korea Central TV showed a performer believed to be singer Jong Hong-ran — previously known for her bold fashion at the 2022 Victory Day concert — appearing with her signature full bangs, donning a white pantsuit and performing a tightly choreographed routine with backup dancers.
The show’s stage direction marked a notable departure from the traditional format of North Korean performances. Backup dancers in short skirts and high heels performed synchronized routines that resembled those seen on South Korean trot competition shows. Musicians in shoulder-baring dresses swayed as they played violins, adding a modern, almost cinematic aesthetic to the show.
The overall presentation included upbeat rhythms, pop-style arrangements and multimedia effects, a stark contrast to North Korea’s usual slower, more solemn productions. Despite the country’s ongoing enforcement of its “Law on Rejecting Reactionary Thought and Culture,” aimed at curbing the spread of South Korean pop culture, the event signaled a selective embrace of global entertainment elements.
A scene from ″Long Live the Workers’ Party of Korea,″ a mass gymnastics and performing arts performance held in North Korea on Oct. 12. [SCREEN CAPTURE]
Experts say the regime is reinforcing a strategy of “North Korean-style sophistication” as a tool of state propaganda.
Speaking at a post-performance military parade to encourage participants, Kim emphasized the success of the event. Kim “extended warm congratulations to all the participants who splendidly celebrated the 80th founding anniversary of the great Party with ardent loyalty and patriotism,” according to the state-run Korean Central News Agency. Analysts interpreted the remarks as a reflection of Pyongyang’s growing confidence amid strengthened trilateral ties with China and Russia, as well as expanding outreach to Southeast Asia.
High-profile foreign attendees included Chinese Premier Li Qiang, Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev and senior representatives from Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) nations including Vietnam, Laos and Indonesia.
A scene from ″Long Live the Workers’ Party of Korea,″ a mass gymnastics and performing arts performance held in North Korea on Oct. 12. [SCREEN CAPTURE]
The show also included large-scale gymnastics exhibitions, featuring schoolchildren performing tumbling routines to depict blooming flowers. In the finale, children ran toward Kim with arms outstretched, shouting “Thank you, Father Marshal!”
Midway through the event, performers showcased acrobatic stunts and military-themed displays, including wrestling sequences, horse parades, flaming hoop jumps, single-rope descents by special forces and feats of strength, emphasizing North Korea’s trademark fusion of “hardness and artistic beauty.”
However, such complex choreography is reportedly the result of harsh training conditions. Participants are said to undergo more than six hours of rehearsal daily while dealing with restrictions on food, water and even restroom use. Western observers have previously described North Korea’s mass games as a form of collective human rights abuse.
A scene from ″Long Live the Workers’ Party of Korea,″ a mass gymnastics and performing arts performance held in North Korea on Oct. 12. [SCREEN CAPTURE]
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
BY BAE JAE-SUNG [kim.minyoung5@joongang.co.kr]
8. Presidential policy chief, industry minister to visit Washington for follow-up tariff talks
Presidential policy chief, industry minister to visit Washington for follow-up tariff talks | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · October 15, 2025
SEOUL, Oct. 15 (Yonhap) -- The presidential chief of staff for policy, Kim Yong-beom, and Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan will depart for Washington this week for follow-up tariff negotiations, officials said Wednesday, with the talks expected to focus on details of South Korea's US$350 billion investment package.
Presidential chief of staff for policy Kim, who plans to head for the United States on Thursday, is scheduled to meet with U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, a presidential official said, without elaborating on the schedule.
Separately, the industry minister will also head for Washington on Thursday for tariff negotiations, according to ministry officials.
Their visit comes as South Korea and the U.S. have reported little progress over details of the $350 billion package of investment in principle as the two nations agreed on a framework deal in July to lower U.S. tariffs against South Korean goods.
Seoul has demanded Washington establish a currency swap deal because such a direct investment could trigger a financial crisis without safeguards.
On Monday, the presidential office said the U.S. has shown a response on some revised proposals in trade talks, possibly including Seoul's investment pledge, after Foreign Minister Cho Hyun told a parliamentary audit that the government is reviewing an alternative proposal by Washington on how Seoul would finance the investment package.
Kim Yong-beom, the presidential chief of staff for policy, briefs on President Lee Jae Myung's meeting with Open AI CEO Sam Altman in this Oct. 1, 2025, file photo. (Yonhap)
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · October 15, 2025
9. Top S. Korean business leaders to visit U.S. amid AI project talks, trade negotiations
Top S. Korean business leaders to visit U.S. amid AI project talks, trade negotiations | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Chang Dong-woo · October 15, 2025
SEOUL, Oct. 15 (Yonhap) -- Heads of South Korea's major conglomerates are set to travel to the United States this week at the invitation of SoftBank Group Chairman Masayoshi Son to discuss cooperation on a massive artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure project, according to industry sources Wednesday.
Son recently invited the heads of Samsung, SK, Hyundai Motor and LG to visit the U.S. as SoftBank pushes ahead with the US$500 billion Stargate project, aimed at building a network of AI data centers across the country in partnership with OpenAI and Oracle, according to the sources.
Samsung Electronics Co. Chairman Lee Jae-yong and Hyundai Motor Group Executive Chair Euisun Chung, currently in Japan for a trilateral economic dialogue involving South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, are expected to head to the U.S. shortly.
SK Group Chairman Chey Tae-won is reportedly scheduled to depart on Thursday, while LG Group Chairman Koo Kwang-mo is also expected to join the delegation.
Their visit will coincide with the trip to Washington by presidential chief of staff for policy Kim Yong-beom and Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan, who are slated to hold follow-up discussions on the ongoing bilateral tariff negotiations.
Industry watchers say the business leaders' visit may serve to back the government's negotiating position by presenting U.S. investment plans by the business conglomerates.
In late August, Lee and Chung, along with Hanwha Group Vice Chairman Kim Dong-kwan, traveled to the U.S. ahead of a bilateral summit, lending weight to government efforts in the negotiations.
The upcoming meeting is expected to take place at Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach, Florida, the private resort of U.S. President Donald Trump.
Although it remains unclear whether Trump will attend the upcoming meeting, observers said the choice of venue raises the possibility of a surprise encounter among Trump and the South Korean business leaders.
President Lee Jae Myung (C, rear) holds a meeting with heads of major business conglomerates at the presidential office in Seoul on Aug. 19, 2025, in this file photo released by the presidential office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
odissy@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Chang Dong-woo · October 15, 2025
10. N. Korea's Kim, Trump could meet on occasion of APEC summit in S. Korea: unification minister
I have only seen this kind of speculation. I have seen no evidence that Kim Jong Un is even interested in communicating through letters, much less meeting on the fringes of APEC.
But if a meeting does happen we have to wonder about the cost to the ROK and US. Surely KJU will extort an exorbitant amount of money. It is afterall a mafia-like crime family cult.
(LEAD) N. Korea's Kim, Trump could meet on occasion of APEC summit in S. Korea: unification minister | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Chae Yun-hwan · October 14, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS more details in last 3 paras)
SEOUL, Oct. 14 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un could meet with U.S. President Donald Trump on the occasion of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders' summit later this month, possibility at the border village of Panmunjom, the unification minister suggested Tuesday.
Minister Chung Dong-young raised the possibility during a parliamentary audit session in response to a question by Rep. Yoon Hu-duk of the ruling Democratic Party.
"Based on the analysis of open information and data, both the U.S. and North Korean leaders appear ready (for talks)," he said, adding that Kim's remarks about having "good memories" of Trump indicate he is conditionally willing to meet him.
Kim made the remarks at a key parliamentary meeting last month, noting that North Korea is open to talks with the U.S. if its demand for the North's denuclearization is dropped.
Trump is expected to visit South Korea in late October to attend APEC events in the southeastern South Korean city of Gyeongju.
"Now, the key lies in the determination of President Trump," the minister said, citing the inter-Korean truce village of Panmunjom, located on the border between the two Koreas, as the most likely venue for the meeting.
Chung claimed the summit could take place if Trump expresses willingness to hold discussions on South Korea-U.S. military exercises, which Pyongyang has long condemned as preparations for an invasion against it.
The minister also said the North's leader is the only person in his country who can make a decision on resolving the issue of families separated by the 1950-53 Korean War, noting his ministry believes an inter-Korean summit must take place within 2026.
Chung, however, said it would realistically be difficult to push for a summit before South Korea's local elections scheduled for June next year.
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young speaks during a parliamentary audit session on Oct. 14, 2025. (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Chae Yun-hwan · October 14, 2025
11. Seoul to revive foundation in charge of suspended inter-Korean industrial park
What incentive does Kim have to accept this since he is getting so much support from Russia and China? Why does he want to risk the information contamination from exposure to people from the South? Can the ROK government make it sufficiently financially lucrative to the regime to overcome the risk of information exposure?
Seoul to revive foundation in charge of suspended inter-Korean industrial park
Move comes as Lee administration looks to restart economic projects with North Korea despite it showing no interest
https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/seoul-to-revive-foundation-in-charge-of-suspended-inter-korean-industrial-park/
Jooheon Kim October 15, 2025
North Korean workers at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, Sept. 2013 | Image: Joint Photo Press Corps
Seoul will revive the government foundation overseeing the suspended Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) in North Korth, under a push to restart inter-Korean economic projects.
ROK Unification Minister Chung Dong-young announced the plans in a statement to lawmakers during an audit on Tuesday.
“We are also exploring the progressive normalization of existing inter-Korean economic projects. We will start by restoring the Kaesong Industrial Complex Support Foundation to prepare for the reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex,” the minister said.
His comment came after the ministry announced its plan to set up a Peace Cooperation Zone Promotion group to oversee inter-Korean economic projects, including the KIC.
The previous Yoon administration dissolved the foundation, citing longstanding “operational inefficiencies.” It noted at the time that the government had spent about $5.4 million annually and nearly $45 million in total since the industrial complex closed.
The decision to dissolve the foundation last year came as Pyongyang reportedly ran more than 30 factories at the complex without Seoul’s approval.
Since then, North Korea has given no indication that it is interested in restarting the KIC, in line with its rejection of inter-Korean ties and policy describing the South as a separate “enemy” state.
NK Pro satellite analysis last month also showed that Pyongyang has been dismantling a $38 million South Korean government tower in the KIC.
The KIC opened in 2004, and over 100 South Korean companies, ranging from textiles and semiconductors to car parts, once operated there, employing tens of thousands of North Korean workers.
But Seoul suspended its operations in early 2016 following Pyongyang’s nuclear test and satellite launch.
The two Koreas later opened a joint liaison office in the complex during a period of diplomacy in 2018, but North Korea later destroyed the building amid renewed tensions.
The revival of the foundation comes after Chung met with ROK entrepreneurs who previously conducted business in the KIC in July and apologized, saying the closure of the complex was the government’s responsibility, not that of the companies.
Ahead of Chung’s audit, a survey by the Korea Federation of SMEs found that 80% of South Korean manufacturing SMEs that previously operated in the Kaesong Industrial Complex would consider returning if it reopens.
According to the survey, 87% of former Kaesong tenants evaluated the complex’s economic performance as positive. A broader poll including companies without business experience in Kaesong found that 46% said inter-Korean economic cooperation has a positive impact on South Korea’s economic development and business growth.
A total of 200 out of 500 manufacturing companies replied to the survey, including 55 of 124 tenant companies.
Edited by Bryan Betts
12. Hidden grammar of US-Korea alliance
Fascinating analysis from Dr. Kim. I think we need to deeply reflect on her essay here.
Excerpts:
That trust has been stress-tested repeatedly. Trade disputes, defense cost negotiations and fluctuations in domestic political climates naturally create moments of friction. The alliance has endured due in large part to these connective layers that act as stabilizers, absorbing the shocks that would otherwise reverberate through official channels. The alliance’s quiet endurance is far from accidental; it’s the result of decades of institutional, cultural and social investment that has made misunderstandings less likely, even when disagreement is unavoidable.
This conduit redefines how influence travels. Power that once flowed vertically through rote channels now circuits laterally and transversely through networks of expertise: ROK firms in the U.S. defense supply chain, U.S. universities and research institutions collaborating with Korean labs, think tank dialogues illuminating mutual perceptions. Each functions as a robust node in a broader ecosystem of trust and influence. In some ways, the strength of the alliance is not measured in rigid signatures or platitudinous summits but in the everyday fluency with which both sides navigate the complexities of the dynamic.
...
The U.S.-Korea alliance is no longer solely determined by who commands; who connects is just as critical to its future. In an era of shifting regional dynamics, scaffolding interests and amplified pressures, a deep and nuanced understanding of both sides’ languages, logics and stakes may be the alliance’s most reliable stabilizer. Its future will be written less in treaties and agreements than in trust — and in the quiet wiring that sustains both sides, even when the world around them grows louder.
Hidden grammar of US-Korea alliance - The Korea Times
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/20251014/hidden-grammar-of-us-korea-alliance
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
Soo Kim
We often measure the strength of alliances by firepower and formal agreements. In practice, though, their resilience is defined by layers beyond what meets the wandering eye. Who ensures mutual understanding in times of discord, who translates strategy and policy implementation across assumption-baked cultures, who exchanges subtle nods and warnings? Quiet actors in the alliance — insiders fluent in both languages, cultures and logics — wield as much heft in the U.S.-Korea partnership as any treaty clause.
To say that the U.S.-Korea alliance functions and operates in a purely top-down and formulaic structure would be a gross simplification of the complexities and vastly intersected reality that a seven-decade partnership entails. It goes without saying that government-to-government, department-to-department and leader-to-leader coordination remains critical to fostering alliance efficiency. Yet today, economic interdependence, artificial intelligence (AI) and innovation cooperation, and cultural fluidity wield greater clout in Washington and Seoul’s strategic alignment than before. Thus, it would not be an overstatement to say that in practice, bilateral cooperation in AI or semiconductors can influence regional security in ways that conventional alliance matters may not be able to reach.
What binds these seemingly supplementary, if not tangential, networks may be less about traditional hierarchy than the decades-old trust and deep understanding between the two countries. Clearly, this requires grasping nuances and implied communications; misreading the other’s intent or communication that grossly “misses the mark” across cultures can have ripple effects beyond a simple transaction. In this context, the most consequential decisions are made by and with the help of those who can interpret signals accurately, anticipate reactions and manage perceptions quietly and discreetly. This type of influence rarely makes headlines but plays a pivotal role in not only strengthening the alliance, but also pitching the trajectory of the partnership as well.
What’s emerging is a new anatomy of the alliance, one that operates less through command than through connection — a web of relationships, conversations and nuance that operates beneath the surface to continually reshape and define the tone and tenor of the partnership. The relationship no longer operates in discrete spheres of defense, tech, diplomacy and policy. Rather, these orbits overlap in language, currency and influence. In composite, they allow the alliance to adapt, mature and evolve in real time.
Practically, this means that the alliance now depends on a far broader range of custodians than ever before. A researcher at a joint AI study lab, an executive in a semiconductor investment partnership, a cultural producer navigating the narratives of both cultures — these individuals can now contribute to the meaningful work of alliance stewardship. Their roles are neither symbolic nor circumscribed within their professional domains. They shape how each country perceives the other’s competence, credibility and intent — the unseen metrics that sustain trust when formal diplomacy is tested.
That trust has been stress-tested repeatedly. Trade disputes, defense cost negotiations and fluctuations in domestic political climates naturally create moments of friction. The alliance has endured due in large part to these connective layers that act as stabilizers, absorbing the shocks that would otherwise reverberate through official channels. The alliance’s quiet endurance is far from accidental; it’s the result of decades of institutional, cultural and social investment that has made misunderstandings less likely, even when disagreement is unavoidable.
This conduit redefines how influence travels. Power that once flowed vertically through rote channels now circuits laterally and transversely through networks of expertise: ROK firms in the U.S. defense supply chain, U.S. universities and research institutions collaborating with Korean labs, think tank dialogues illuminating mutual perceptions. Each functions as a robust node in a broader ecosystem of trust and influence. In some ways, the strength of the alliance is not measured in rigid signatures or platitudinous summits but in the everyday fluency with which both sides navigate the complexities of the dynamic.
This fluency should not be taken for granted. As global competition intensifies and tests the bounds of convention, the alliance must continually renew the shared base of literacy and fluency that allows both sides to interpret the world — and the bilateral alliance — through a similar strategic frame. Strategic divergence can begin as a divergence of meaning, as concepts like “self-reliance,” “autonomy,” “deterrence” and “future-oriented” carry slightly different connotations and end states. In this case, sustaining alignment calls for more than mere policy coordination; it requires a disciplined, conscious attentiveness to language, perception and intent.
The quiet work of connections carries weight. It may unfold in the margins of conferences, in joint research or in the careful phrasing of public remarks; collectively, it defines the cadence of the alliance — how it listens, adapts and endures over time. The ability to read each other, accurately and authentically, is what evolves an alliance from a formal, static arrangement into a resilient one.
The U.S.-Korea alliance is no longer solely determined by who commands; who connects is just as critical to its future. In an era of shifting regional dynamics, scaffolding interests and amplified pressures, a deep and nuanced understanding of both sides’ languages, logics and stakes may be the alliance’s most reliable stabilizer. Its future will be written less in treaties and agreements than in trust — and in the quiet wiring that sustains both sides, even when the world around them grows louder.
Soo Kim is a former CIA analyst and strategic risk consultant.
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
13. Ex-US Navy rear admiral hired by Hanwha a week before Chinese sanctions landed
Again, China is conducting unrestricted earache against both the ROK and the US. China cannot allow MASGA (make American shipbuilding great again) to come to fruition. And of course Hanwha is one of the major ROK defense companies that contributes to the Arsenal of Democracies.
Ex-US Navy rear admiral hired by Hanwha a week before Chinese sanctions landed
Tom Anderson was recruited just before measures against five Hanwha Ocean units amid rising Sino-US rivalry
https://www.tradewindsnews.com/people/ex-us-navy-rear-admiral-hired-by-hanwha-a-week-before-chinese-sanctions-landed/2-1-1885565
Rear Admiral Thomas Anderson addresses the Naval Sea Systems Command’s assumption of command ceremony at the Washington Navy Yard in September 2023.
Photo: Laura Lakeway/US Navy
TradeWinds
Published 14 October 2025, 06:32
China’s latest sanctions on five US-linked subsidiaries of Hanwha Ocean came just a week after the South Korean group announced it had hired a retired US Navy rear admiral.
Tom Anderson joined Hanwha Defense USA as president of its US shipbuilding business at a time when Hanwha has been a key protagonist in the early efforts to revive the American industry.
Throughout his 34 years of naval service, Anderson held various leadership roles, including program executive officer, ships, and acting commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command.
The spotlight is now on whether Anderson, well-versed in the navy’s shipbuilding and procurement structure, will contribute to lowering the high entry barriers in the US shipbuilding market in the future.
“The relationship is growing both in significance and importance, for sure,” said Thomas Lim, associate research fellow at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS).
“Hanwha Ocean has secured MRO contracts from the US Navy since 2024, and Hanwha is an important part of South Korea’s Make American Shipbuilding Great Again (MASGA) project to help the US shipbuilding and maritime industry.”
Lim noted that Hanwha currently has MRO deals for three US naval ships — a “significant” achievement that reflects trust and strong technical performance.
“MRO functions are critical for maintaining operational readiness. Such deals require deep technical expertise and a credible level of trust between both parties, testament to a positive bilateral relationship growing in strength,” he added.
South Korean shipbuilders have been attempting to enter the construction market beyond the maintenance, repair and overhaul business of American naval ships.
It has not been easy, due to strict regulations, such as the US priority procurement policy, noted the South Korean daily JoongAng Ilbo.
On LinkedIn, Anderson said he was excited to join Hanwha to “make significant positive contributions to the US maritime industrial base”.
“Those of you who know me know that I’m passionate about delivering the capability our nation needs in the form of ships,” he said
Anderson describes himself as a “strong programme and project management professional skilled in Government, Navy, Operational Planning, Systems Engineering and Quality Management”.
Washington is increasingly recognising the need to tap into its South Korean ally’s shipbuilding expertise, because of the advancement in China’s naval shipbuilding capabilities in recent years.
Anderson has been visiting South Korean shipyards, including Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, to explore cooperation opportunities between the US Navy and the South Korean shipbuilding industry.
In particular, he visited the research and development facilities of the two shipbuilders in September 2024 to inspect the technology of South Korea’s special shipbuilding projects.
Mike Smith, CEO of Hanwha Defense USA, said: “This is a pivotal time for the navy and US shipbuilding writ large.
“Tom brings a wealth of experience and unique perspectives that will accelerate the delivery of novel solutions to our customers’ most elusive industrial base challenges.”
Amidst escalating Sino-US trade tensions, Hanwha is now in a similar situation, just like South Korea is often described as a “shrimp between whales” - a metaphor for Korea and its geopolitical position in East Asia, surrounded by larger powers like China, Japan, Russia, and the United States.
On whether Hanwha can walk on the thin line between Beijing and Washington, Lim said this would be difficult.
“The sanctions are a product of the ongoing great power competition, with economic levers pulled by both sides,” he said.
“Hanwha’s growth over the past five years has been significant, but South Korea’s shipbuilding capacity is a key part of the economic package presented to the US to strengthen bilateral relations in the Trump era.”
“It’ll be interesting to see how South Korea responds in terms of negotiations — the China–South Korea relationship has remained robust, particularly on the economic end,” Lim added.
14. U.S. Army may soon test South Korea’s new wheeled K9A2 howitzer
U.S. Army may soon test South Korea’s new wheeled K9A2 howitzer
https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2025/u-s-army-may-soon-test-south-koreas-new-wheeled-k9a2-howitzer
armyrecognition.com · Jérôme Brahy
Hanwha Aerospace USA announced the production of the wheeled variant of the K9A2 self-propelled howitzer, with testing by the US Army scheduled in early 2026.
Hanwha Aerospace USA announced on October 9, 2025, that it has begun manufacturing a wheeled version of the K9A2 155 mm self-propelled howitzer for potential use in U.S. Army long-range precision fire programs. Company representatives confirmed that testing is scheduled for early 2026, and the system will be displayed at the Association of the U.S. Army 2025 exposition in Washington, D.C., under the Common Gun System framework that aligns tracked and wheeled artillery configurations for shared logistics and training.
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The new Mobile Howitzer (MH) mounts a K9A2 automatic turret on an 8x8 truck chassis and is now being offered to the U.S. Army as part of ongoing artillery modernization efforts following the cancellation of the Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ECRA) program. (Picture source: Army Recognition)
The wheeled K9 configuration, also known as the wheeled Mobile Howitzer (MH), maintains the same 155 mm turret architecture as the K9A2, incorporating fully automatic loading and firing functions and ammunition storage entirely within the turret. Equipped with a 52-caliber gun common to both the K9A1 and K9A2, the wheeled K9 will be identical to its tracked counterparts, apart from being mounted on a heavy 8x8 truck chassis using an adapter and a stabilizing ring to ensure the accuracy during firing. Ready to fire in under 30 seconds, the Mobile Howitzer carries 30 rounds of 155 mm ammunition and 192 charges, can be operated by a reduced crew of two or three operators, achieves a rate of fire of nine rounds per minute, and can achieve a burst rate of three rounds in 15 seconds.
Hanwha states that the Mobile Howitzer is truck-agnostic, meaning it can be mounted on different 8x8 chassis, including the Czech Tatra 815-7 and American Mack Defense. Moreover, the new 8x8 variant of the K9 Thunder is paired with a wheeled resupply vehicle derived from the K10 Ammunition Resupply Vehicle (ARV), forming a complete operational system. Hanwha notes that this configuration, currently in the prototyping phase, enables customers to select between tracked and wheeled platforms offering the same level of performance, ensuring high mobility, reduced maintenance, and compatibility within existing K9 logistics and fire control networks.
The principal upgrade over existing tracked models lies in the 58-caliber barrel measuring approximately 9 meters in length, representing the longest barrel developed for a 155 mm artillery system to date. This longer gun enables a maximum firing range exceeding 70 kilometers when using guided or base-bleed munitions. A 52-caliber configuration, similar to that of the standard K9A2, remains available for operators preferring conventional setups, offering a firing range of 40 kilometers with standard shells and up to 50 kilometers when using the M982A1 Excalibur precision-guided round. The 58-caliber solution aims to provide a longer reach with reduced crew requirements and faster automation cycles while retaining K9A2’s full autoloading capability. Previous U.S. Army efforts to field a similar barrel length under the XM1299 ERCA program were abandoned due to barrel wear under sustained firing conditions, which Hanwha seeks to address through optimized metallurgy and charge configurations.
The K9A2, from which the wheeled model derives, features several internal and structural upgrades compared to the earlier K9A1. It integrates an automatic turret capable of firing up to ten rounds per minute, new rifling and chrome plating that extend barrel life to approximately 1,500 rounds, an improved modular charge system, an electric drive replacing electrohydraulic systems, and a fire suppression and air-conditioning suite for enhanced crew safety. Composite rubber tracks, supplied by Soucy Defense, reduce vibration and overall vehicle weight by over two tons, freeing additional payload capacity for protection modules. The K9A2 carries 48 ready rounds in its turret, allowing a sustained firing rate between four and six rounds per minute. It supports the use of insensitive modular charges and is designed for operation by a crew of three or, in emergencies, two. Development of the K9A2 continues, with the Republic of Korea Armed Forces targeting operational introduction in 2027 and full capability across upgraded fleets by 2034.
Hanwha Aerospace’s next stage of development is the K9A3, an unmanned 155 mm self-propelled howitzer equipped with a 58-caliber barrel and a maximum range of 80 kilometers. The K9A3 integrates remote and autonomous operation capabilities, allowing full firing and mobility control without onboard personnel. It is designed to function as part of a networked artillery system supported by the K11A1 Fire Direction Control Vehicle, which can coordinate up to three howitzers. The K9A3 incorporates enhanced armor modules, a 12.7 mm remote weapon station, and compatibility with future sensor and AI-based targeting architectures. Hanwha’s long-term roadmap includes integrating unmanned and manned K9 systems under Manned-Unmanned Teaming concepts, enabling dispersed batteries to conduct shoot-and-scoot missions with minimal human exposure in high-threat environments.
The wheeled K9 variant enters a competitive global market dominated by systems such as the German KNDS RCH 155, French CAESAr Mk II, Israeli ATMOS 2000, and Rheinmetall’s HX3-based 155 mm system. The British Army’s decision in 2024 to procure the RCH 155 as part of its Mobile Fires Platform program led Hanwha to refocus on wheeled artillery solutions after its K9A2 was not selected. The new Hanwha platform is designed to achieve similar operational characteristics, including automation and long-range performance, at potentially lower sustainment costs. Unlike the RCH 155, which can fire while moving, the Korean design requires stabilising spades before firing, similar to the Rheinmetall HX3, slightly increasing setup time but maintaining mechanical simplicity.
Hanwha has indicated that the wheeled gun’s turret is modular and can also be fitted onto other chassis, such as the KTSSM or Tigon armored vehicle, depending on export customer preferences. The project is currently funded through internal company resources, but is expected to be proposed for inclusion in South Korea’s future export weapon system development initiatives. At the same time, Hanwha’s strategic approach to the U.S. market combines product adaptation and industrial localisation. The South Korean company has expressed readiness to establish a vertical supply chain in the United States, emphasising the use of American manufacturing capacity, job creation, and local production of key munitions components.
Hanwha Defence USA has confirmed that about 40 per cent of the K9’s existing supply chain already involves U.S. sources. The company is investing in domestic manufacturing of 155 mm modular charge systems, solid rocket motors, base bleed units, and propellants. It is also expanding through strategic acquisitions, including a $100 million investment in the Philadelphia Shipyard and an interest in Austal USA, aiming to secure a broader U.S. industrial footprint. Hanwha Aerospace’s total planned investment for its U.S. expansion is valued at roughly 1.3 trillion won, or nearly $1 billion, and supports its long-term goal of building resilience and interoperability within allied defense production networks.
The K9 Thunder family remains the foundation of Hanwha Aerospace’s artillery production, with approximately 2,000 units built or on order across ten countries as of early 2024. Operators include South Korea, Poland, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Australia, Egypt, and Romania. The K9A1 variant demonstrated full interoperability with Raytheon’s M982A1 Excalibur during trials at the Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona, where it achieved sub-meter accuracy in point-detonating mode and a five-meter altitude burst in Height-of-Burst configuration. Romania became the tenth member of the K9 user community in July 2024 and the third global operator of the K10 ammunition resupply vehicle. The K9 platform maintains more than 50 per cent of the global self-propelled howitzer market share due to its standardised ammunition compatibility, modular turret systems, and multi-national logistics networks. With the K9A2 and the new wheeled variant now in production, Hanwha Aerospace’s artillery portfolio spans tracked, wheeled, and future autonomous systems designed for interoperability with U.S. and allied command-and-control environments.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
armyrecognition.com · Jérôme Brahy
15. Seoul plans first civilian nuclear bunker under public housing complex
Seoul plans first civilian nuclear bunker under public housing complex
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/seoul-plans-first-civilian-nuclear-bunker-under-public-housing-complex
straitstimes.com · October 13, 2025
SEOUL – The authorities in Seoul plan to build the South Korean capital’s first civilian bunker capable of withstanding a nuclear attack underneath a public housing complex by 2028, a city government official said on Oct 13, to guard against threats by the North.
The metropolitan government and Seoul Housing and Communities Corp plan the shelter for 999 households designed to withstand nuclear, biological or chemical attacks, the official said.
The bunker in the basement of the housing complex will span 2,147 sq m, accommodate up to 1,020 people at a time, and be equipped for 14 days of survival.
The Seoul Shinmun newspaper, which first reported the plan, said it was the first such move by a local government in the face of a heightened nuclear threat from neighbouring North Korea.
At a massive military parade on Oct 10,
North Korea displayed its latest ballistic missiles
capable of carrying nuclear warheads to targets in South Korea or as far as the United States.South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has said the most realistic path to lowering the risk from the North is to secure a freeze on its manufacturing of nuclear bombs and missiles, but Pyongyang has rejected diplomatic overtures for now.
South Korea has nearly 19,000 bomb shelters nationwide, more than 3,200 of them in Seoul, but the vast majority are not built to protect against nuclear, chemical or biological attacks.
They are mostly situated in subway stations or basements and parking garages in private apartments and commercial buildings designated as shelters with the consent of owners. REUTERS
straitstimes.com · October 13, 2025
16. Quick Take: New Drone Launching System Shown
Photos at the link.
Quick Take: New Drone Launching System Shown
https://www.38north.org/2025/10/quick-take-new-drone-launching-system-shown/
Among the new weaponry shown during North Korea’s October 10 parade marking the 80th founding anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea was a truck-based drone launching system.
This new launch system can house six loitering munition-type drones, each within its own enclosure. The six enclosures make up a single structure. Pistons move the structure to an angle that can launch drones in an upwards trajectory.
Based on previously published photographs, the drones appear associated with the canard design rail-launched models North Korea has been testing, or a variant of them. They have a small rocket to give them an initial boost.
Figure 1. New drone launching system on display at Workers’ Party of Korea parade on October 10, 2025. (Source: Korean Central Television)
The parade featured four of these trucks, each apparently loaded with six drones. North Korea has shown censored photographs of what appears to be the same drone during testing. In addition, Kim Jong Un recently called for production of all drones to be increased.
Figure 2. Drone with canard design shown rail-launched with an initial boost. (Source: Korean Central News Agency)
Drones were also on display at the Defense Development 2025 exhibition that recently took place in Pyongyang. The first edition of the expo occurred in 2023 and is where the country’s modern drone program made its debut.
The large Saetbyol-4 (샛별-4 or Morning Star 4) drone does not appear to have been displayed at this year’s expo. However, the Saetbyol-9 (샛별-9 or Morning Star 9), which is similar to the US MQ-9, was on display alongside several smaller drones.
Figure 3. Saetbyol-9 (샛별-9 or Morning Star 9) drone on display at the Defense Development 2025 expo alongside several smaller drones. (Source: Korean Central News Agency)
17. Why international relations theory, negotiations fail with North Korea
We must understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. By doing so we can see that conventional international relations theory does not work with Kim Jong Un.
Therefore, we need a new strategy, one that has never be been tried: A "Two Plus Three Strategy."
Voices Oct. 14, 2025 / 2:29 PM
Why international relations theory, negotiations fail with North Korea
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/10/14/perspective-korea-policies-new-strategy/3061760458895/
By David Maxwell
A new intercontinental ballistic missile is displayed during a military parade celebrating the 80th founding anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea at the Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea, on Friday Photo by Korea Central News Agency/EPA
Oct. 14 (UPI) -- For more than seven decades, diplomats, strategists and scholars have sought to resolve "the Korea question," which is the unnatural division of the peninsula that paragraph 60 of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement declared must one day be settled peacefully.
Yet, despite countless rounds of talks, communiqués and summits, the peninsula remains divided, the armistice unreplaced, the North possesses nuclear weapons and 26 million Koreans remain captive under the most despotic regime of the modern era.
The failure is not one of effort or sincerity, but of paradigm. Traditional international relations theory and conventional negotiation strategies have repeatedly misdiagnosed the problem, treating North Korea as a normal state rather than what it is: a revolutionary, criminal, and hereditary cult whose survival depends on perpetual hostility.
Because every conceivable traditional technique, such as deterrence, containment, maximum pressure, inducement, arms control, summit diplomacy, sanctions relief and even maximum regime engagement, has been tried and failed, the time has come for a new approach: the "Two Plus Three Strategy."
This strategy recognizes that the key to solving the Korea question lies not in negotiating with the Kim family regime, but in helping the Korean people in the North create the conditions for change themselves.
The structural failure of traditional international relations theory
Classical realism views states as rational actors pursuing survival within an anarchic system. Liberal institutionalism presumes that engagement, commerce and dialogue can socialize regimes toward cooperation. Constructivism argues that shared norms and identity can reshape behavior.
All three lenses assume a basic rationality and self-preservation instinct tied to the welfare of a population. North Korea violates each assumption. The Kim regime's legitimacy derives not from performance or consent, but from absolute control through surveillance, repression and ideological isolation.
It does not behave as a rational state maximizing national interest. It acts as a family-run mafia enterprise whose overriding imperative is regime survival at all costs. The welfare of the population is irrelevant except insofar as it sustains the regime's security.
Attempts to apply realist balance-of-power logic (e.g., deterrence and containment) ignore the regime's need to fabricate external threats to justify internal control.
Liberal hopes that trade and aid might induce moderation fail because any influx of information or prosperity threatens the regime's monopoly on truth.
Constructivist efforts to foster mutual understanding collapse because the North's ideological foundation of Juche and Songun, and hereditary deification rejects coexistence as ideological heresy.
In short, the Kim family regime does not seek peaceful coexistence. It seeks permanent confrontation to sustain its domestic control. The problem is not miscommunication between rational states, but the irreconcilable nature of a totalitarian system whose very identity depends on the division of Korea -- until it can achieve domination.
Exhaustion of conventional negotiation strategies
Since 1953, nearly every U.S. administration and South Korean government has tried some permutation of negotiation, deterrence, pressure and inducement:
• Armistice diplomacy (1950s-60s): Failed to transform the ceasefire into peace because Pyongyang refused mutual recognition.
• Sunshine Policy and engagement (1990s-2000s): Delivered billions in aid and investment, which the regime diverted to weapons programs and elite enrichment.
• Six-party talks (2000s-2010s): Produced photo-ops and temporary freezes, but never disarmament. Each time, Pyongyang pocketed concessions, cheated on verification and resumed provocations.
• Maximum pressure and sanctions (2010s-2020s): Weakened, but never altered core behavior, as China and Russia provided lifelines and the regime expanded illicit finance and cyber theft.
• Deterrence-plus-dialogue Stabilizes crises but institutionalizes the division, granting the regime strategic space to advance its nuclear capabilities.
Every cycle follows the same pattern: provocation, negotiation, concession, violation, new provocation. The world mistakes the regime's tactical feints for strategic compromise. The result has been strategic paralysis -- 72 years of "crisis management" without resolution and generations of Koreans in the North condemned to indoctrination, starvation and imprisonment.
The Kim dynasty has mastered "blackmail diplomacy:" It fabricates crises to extract benefits, knowing that outside powers prioritize stability over transformation.
In this sense, conventional negotiation sustains but does not solve the problem. Each proposal for "peaceful coexistence" with Pyongyang effectively concedes the permanent division of Korea and abandons the people of the north to tyranny.
Moral and strategic bankruptcy of "Peaceful Co-existence"
The notion of peaceful coexistence between North and South Korea and "respect" for the North Korean system appeals to fatigue, not foresight. It offers the illusion of stability while entrenching an intolerable status quo.
To accept coexistence is to normalize crimes against humanity: political prison camps, generational punishment, mass surveillance, forced labor and absolute information control. It is to tell 26 million Koreans that their freedom is inconvenient to our diplomacy.
Strategically, coexistence also perpetuates instability. A nuclear-armed, brittle dictatorship cannot co-exist peacefully. It must externalize tension to survive. Its nuclear arsenal is not a bargaining chip, but an insurance policy for regime longevity and coercive leverage.
Each year of co-existence strengthens the regime's weapons complex, deepens China's buffer and weakens the moral legitimacy of the free world.
History teaches that totalitarian systems collapse not through appeasement, but through the empowerment of their people and the erosion of internal control. The division of Korea is not a frozen conflict -- it is an unfinished liberation.
As paragraph 60 of the Armistice reminds us, the ultimate objective is a "peaceful settlement of the Korea question," meaning an end to unnatural division, not its management. True peace will come not from coexistence with tyranny but from the emergence of a free and unified Korea.
The case for a new "Two Plus Three Strategy"
Because the old frameworks have failed, a new strategic construct is required -- one that integrates military deterrence with political hardball, human-rights advocacy and information empowerment. The Two Plus Three Strategy provides that framework.
The Two:
1. Deterrence and defense: Maintain and modernize combined ROK-U.S. deterrence to prevent war, deny coercion and defend the South and United States from attack from the North. Strengthen integrated air-missile defense, cyber and space resilience and combined multi-domain operations.
2. Diplomacy and strategic strangulation: Coordinate a unified alliance narrative that exposes the regime's criminal nature, isolates it diplomatically and makes clear that normalization is impossible without transformation. Interdict its global illicit activities and cut off external funding.
The Three:
1. Human rights up-front: Center all policy on the rights and dignity of the Korean people in the North, linking any negotiation to measurable human-rights progress. Elevate human rights from a "secondary issue" to the moral and strategic foundation of policy.
2. Information and influence: Break the information blockade through broadcasting, digital engagement and escapee networks. Empower Koreans in the North with knowledge of the outside world and the truth about their regime. Information is the modern form of liberation.
3. Preparation for unification: Build alliance structures, economic planning, and transitional-justice frameworks for an eventual unified Korea -- a United Republic of Korea that inherits legitimacy from the South's democratic institutions and fulfills the promise of 1945 liberation and the 1919 Korean March First Declaration of Independence.
This strategy does not seek the regime's immediate collapse through force, but rather its gradual internal disintegration through exposure, empowerment and erosion of control.
It treats the Korean people as the main effort -- not the regime. It recognizes that sustainable peace will emerge only when the Korean people in the North themselves are able to act as agents of their own destiny.
Toward a solution of the Korea Question
Solving the Korea question requires courage to abandon comforting illusions. Traditional diplomacy has preserved the armistice but perpetuated injustice. The Two Plus Three Strategy reframes the challenge: from regime management to human liberation; from coexistence with tyranny to completion of Korea's unfinished revolution of freedom.
Practically, this means aligning all instruments of national power -- diplomatic, informational, military, economic and moral -- around three imperatives: deter aggression, empower the people and prepare for unification.
It means mobilizing the global community not for another round of fruitless negotiations, but rather for a sustained campaign of political warfare: exposing crimes, amplifying truth and supporting escapees and diaspora who are the vanguard of a future free and unified Korea.
Most importantly, it restores agency to the Korean people themselves. They, not foreign diplomats or think-tank theorists, will ultimately resolve the division. Our task is to create the conditions in which they can. The Two Plus Three Strategy provides a roadmap.
From armistice management to liberation strategy
After 72 years, we must admit that traditional approaches have achieved only an uneasy stalemate and immeasurable human suffering. The persistence of the Kim family regime is not proof of its strength, but of our strategic failure to think differently.
The world has tried every conventional method: appeasement, sanctions, deterrence and negotiation, and none has worked because the premise has been wrong. We have negotiated with a regime that does not negotiate in good faith and sought coexistence with a system that cannot coexist with the free world.
The time has come to shift from managing the armistice to fulfilling its purpose. Paragraph 60 of the 1953 agreement remains the mandate: to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korea question.
Peaceful, however, cannot mean passive, and settlement cannot mean surrender to division. The only genuine peace will be the peace of a free and unified Korea -- a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK), whole and democratic, standing as a beacon of liberty in Asia and the world.
The Two Plus Three Strategy is not simply another policy option. It is the moral and strategic necessity of our time. It acknowledges that the path to peace runs through the freedom of the Korean people. Anything less is coexistence with oppression -- and history will judge us for having abandoned 26 million Koreans to darkness when collectively, South Korea, the United States and the international community had the power to help them see the light.
David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society, and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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