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Quotes of the Day:
"One idiot is an idiot. Two idiots are two idiots. Ten thousand idiots are a political party."
– Franz Kafka
"You cannot run away from a weakness; you must sometimes fight it out or perish. And if that be so, why not now, and where you stand?"
– Robert Louis Stevenson
"All the great things are simple, and many can be expressed in a single word: freedom; justice; honor; duty; mercy; hope."
– Winston Churchill
1. A Fight for the Future of US Special Operations Forces
2. Nuclear-War Risks Rise Again, Stoked by Global Conflicts
3. Bob Woodward talks about his new book and the most serious nuclear threat he’s covered
4. The Time Is Right for Ally-Shoring, and It’s About More Than Being Friends
5. How China’s Iran support could spark a Persian Gulf energy war
6. This is how North Korean troops could be used in Russia’s war in Ukraine
7. US Army rushes to boost defenses as Russia ups strike-drone autonomy
8. How the Army’s chief of staff plans to modernize the service
9. US warns Israel to boost humanitarian aid into Gaza or risk losing weapons funding
10. Training partners give US soldiers better backup in future combat
11. Army Already Preparing For V-280 Valor To Dramatically Transform Air Assaults
12. Army announces 'Master Combat Badge' to combine CIB and EIB for infantry soldiers
13. This division is learning what multidomain means for small units
14. Make counter-drone training as routine as marksmanship: Army general
15. US Senate makes big push to combat military suicides
16. Latest Taiwan drills show off PLA deterrence
17. Mongolia, The Forgotten Soviet Satellite
18. Exclusive: CNN sees inside elite Ukrainian drone mission flying deep into Russia
19. Today’s Axis of Evil is bigger and more dangerous than ever
20. THAAD Attitude: What to Make of the Air Defense System’s Combat Deployment to Israel
21. Is a Full-Scale Middle East War Already Here?
22. The Upside to Uncertainty on Taiwan
1. A Fight for the Future of US Special Operations Forces
I have to agree with Mr. Pincus and the SMA. Every excellent organization I have been part of has always been smaller than comparable organizations and they punched well above their weight and were far more efficient and effective than larger organizations.
However, as I learned from an officer in the Pentagon when I was a bit player in a fight among three CINCs and two services in the 1990s. I naively asked a question of how the services could stand in the way of the requirements of three warfighting CINCs (it was a food fight about who should provide base support to Army Special Operations helicopters that were going to be assigned to a host nation air force base where the US Air Force was the tenant unit providing base support to US Air Force units). The Pentagon officer looked me dead in the eye and said I did not understand and that the services did not care about warfighting. They are only concerned with protecting force structure and their budget.
Excerpts:
I’ve found over the years, as Sgt.Major Weimar implied, whether it was my time in Army Counterintelligence, running investigations for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, or reporting for The Washington Post, that smaller works better, and larger leads to bureaucracy.
A Fight for the Future of US Special Operations Forces
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/a-fight-for-the-future-of-us-special-operations-forces
Posted: October 15th, 2024
By Walter Pincus
Pulitzer Prize Winning Journalist Walter Pincus is a contributing senior national security columnist for The Cipher Brief. He spent forty years at The Washington Post, writing on topics that ranged from nuclear weapons to politics. He is the author of Blown to Hell: America's Deadly Betrayal of the Marshall Islanders. Pincus won an Emmy in 1981 and was the recipient of the Arthur Ross Award from the American Academy for Diplomacy in 2010. He was also a team member for a Pulitzer Prize in 2002 and the George Polk Award in 1978.
OPINION — “If the numbers are what they are, then we need to man SOF (Special Operations Forces) to the numbers we can man to make sure that we have the quality that we owe the country. That’s where SOF is. There’s no doubt in my mind. If we could have the Army we know we need, not the Army we can resource, which is why recruiting is so important, we probably wouldn’t be discussing the cuts that we’re discussing.”
That’s Sergeant Major Mike Weimer, the 17th Sergeant Major of the Army and the first Green Beret selected for the role, from an interview he gave the Green Beret Foundation last August.
I print it now because an October 7 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report has raised questions about the future of SOF and questions that Congress ought to consider, including the proposed reduction of SOF personnel, as Sgt. Maj. Weimer mentioned.
Just over two years ago, I wrote a column which said, “U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which has grown to become the world’s top counterterrorism (CT) force over the past 20 years, is now facing some change in mission and reductions in personnel under the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy…optimally suited to support the Joint Force and the Nation as part of integrated deterrence.”
I wrote in October 2022 that then-SOCOM Commander General Richard Clarke and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Christopher Maier had announced in their earlier “Vision and Strategy” statement that with China and Russia as major power competitors, “Over the next 10 years, we will modernize SOF, pioneer dynamic and unorthodox approaches (including the full toolkit associated with irregular warfare), leverage emerging technologies to mitigate adversarial activities by China, and create asymmetric advantages for current and future conflict.”
I pointed out back then that SOF, perceptively in line with the new strategy, had begun in 2014 in Ukraine to work with other allies to help build up the Ukrainian special operations forces. Those forces were already threatened by Russia, while counterterrorism was still the main focus of SOCOM.
But two years ago, SOCOM was still operating all over the world. During calendar year 2021, the Government Accountability Office found SOF had 28 action units or task forces operating, primarily in the Middle East (12) and Africa (6). And between 2018 and 2021, it had terminated 27 SOF task forces and transitioned another 30 to other missions.
SOCOM, which grew out of the failed 1980 raid to rescue American hostages in Iran, has become a major military force — from about 45,700 military and civilian personnel in 2001, to almost 74,000 in 2021 and today, “approximately 70,000 Active Duty, Reserve, National Guard, and civilian personnel assigned to its headquarters, its four components, and sub-unified commands,” according to the CRS report.
Falling numbers
Recently, however, as the Army has struggled to meet its goals, recruitment of Army Special Forces (Green Berets) soldiers has faltered. CRS reported that “between 2018 and 2020, the service recruited an average of 1,011 new Special Forces soldiers, missing its goal of 1,540 each year.” It also noted that this figure was the number of recruits that signed up for SOF, “not the total number of soldiers who make it all the way through Green Beret training. Those who don’t make it sometimes get second chances or are put into the regular Army infantry.”
In 2021, the Army scaled back the Green Beret recruiting goal and ended up with 1,358 new recruits. However, contracts dropped again to 779 recruits in 2022, as the service struggled to bring in new talent after the pandemic. Although the Army met its overall recruitment target in fiscal 2024, it has not yet made public the number of new Green Beret contracts.
Moreover, it takes a second year of training after joining the Army before you finish the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) and only then will you earn your Green Beret. The CRS reported, “That pass rate [for the SFQC] was between 60% and 80% in the early 2010s, but has plummeted to around 45% and 60% in recent years. It’s unclear what led to that lower pass rate, though failing land navigation accounts for roughly 70% of all failures…It is not known publicly if the SFQC pass rate and numbers of applicants for SFQC has improved from 2023 through 2024.”
The CRS report contained what I consider another important factor: “Fewer serving soldiers and junior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are volunteering for Army SOF, which could result in a less experienced, less knowledgeable, and less mature Army SOF, which could prove problematic in the highly complex and dynamic security environment where Army SOF currently operates.”
In 2023, according to the CRS report, the Army was considering cuts as deep as 10% to 20% of its special operations forces, with most coming from logistics and information warfare teams. But the actual plan was released on February 27, 2024. That day, the Army published a white paper which described “changes to its force structure that will modernize and continue to transform the service to better face future threats. Under the plan, the Army will reorganize over the next decade to ensure it can deliver trained, cohesive and lethal forces to meet future challenges in increasingly complex operational environments.”
The white paper said the Army examined its SOF “requirements for large scale combat in multiple theaters and applied additional modeling to understand the requirements for special operators during the campaigning phase of great power competition. This analysis indicated that that existing Army SOF force structure meets or exceeds demand in large-scale conflict relative to other capabilities.”
Working with SOCOM, the white paper said, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin “determined the Army could reduce Army special operations forces by approximately 3,000 authorizations. Specific reductions will be made based on an approach that ensures unique SOF capabilities are retained. Positions and headquarters elements that are historically vacant or hard-to-fill will be prioritized for reduction.”
The day the white paper was released, Army Secretary Christine Wormuth and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy A. George met with the Defense Writers Group. Discussing the SOF reductions, Wormuth echoed the white paper, saying, “We tried to identify obviously jobs that they’ve had trouble filling. Things again like print media, psyops kinds of capabilities that are sort of no longer needed. Those are the kinds of things that we looked to get rid of.”
Then, Congress jumped on the issue.
Rep. Mike Waltz (R-Fla.), a retired Army Green Beret and Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness, has been fighting the 3,000-person cut for more than a year – even before it was announced.
Back in October 2023, Waltz put out a statement saying, “I am stunned and appalled by reports indicating the U.S. Army will cut 3,000 troops from its special operations ranks as a means to manage their worst recruiting crisis since the Vietnam War. The Secretary of the Army is trying to claim she’s only cutting support troops like intelligence analysts, psychological operations troops, and logistics personnel. In reality, these support troops are critical to our special operators’ success in remote locations in 60-70 countries on any given day all over the world.”
This past June, when an amendment to the fiscal 2025 Defense Appropriations Bill which prohibits the “realignment or reduction of special operations forces end strength” in fiscal 2025 and 2026, was approved in the House version, Waltz told the Green Beret Foundation. “I’ve been fighting it [the SOF reduction] all day long and the Secretary of the Army keeps telling me, ‘No, these are the intel folks and the logistics folks and the support. These aren’t actual Green Beret trigger pullers.’ I just think it represents a fundamental misunderstanding of what those special operations trigger pullers need. We need embedded intelligence.”
When less is more
In a September 2024 letter to the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Austin stated that the department strongly objected to section 1044 of the House-passed bill, which would prevent reducing or realigning SOF end-strength authorizations for all of calendar years 2025 and 2026.
The CRS report suggested that that the language be removed and “the issue Army SOF force structure…could be subject additional examination and action by Congress in the future.”
Meanwhile, the fiscal 2025 Defense Authorization Bill has yet to pass Congress.
For guidance, I went back to what Sergeant Major of the Army Mike Weimer said last August as a Green Beret himself: “We’re at tension for the same talent. We’re in a resource-constrained environment. That’s a little bit of what you’re seeing. I go back to my SOF DNA. I don’t worry about it for SOF as long as we don’t compromise quality. We’ve accomplished a lot with very small numbers when it was the right people with the right leaders and trust…I’ll take that all day long. As a matter of fact, you’re usually more lethal and you get things done faster.”
I’ve found over the years, as Sgt.Major Weimar implied, whether it was my time in Army Counterintelligence, running investigations for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, or reporting for The Washington Post, that smaller works better, and larger leads to bureaucracy.
The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.
Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.
Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.
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2. Nuclear-War Risks Rise Again, Stoked by Global Conflicts
Unfortunately Elbrdige Colby's strategy is the path to abandon South Korea. We cannot be a one trick pony (China only) but that is what Colby would have us be. As I told him directly on VOA last February, his strategy is supporting Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy. Despite his protests (he doth do that too much) he is willing to split the ROK/US alliance so he can focus solely on China.
Excerpts:
Earlier this year, Elbridge Colby, a Pentagon official under former President Donald Trump, suggested that the U.S.-South Korea defense alliance should be reshaped to allow Washington to focus on Beijing. He said that South Korea should have all options on the table when it considers how to counter the North Korean threat. Last month, South Korea’s new defense minister used similar language on whether the country should pursue the bomb.
The Biden administration in 2023 sought to eliminate that option. It gave Seoul a greater voice in consultations on a potential American nuclear response to a North Korean attack in return for Seoul swearing off its own nuclear weapons.
Nuclear-War Risks Rise Again, Stoked by Global Conflicts
Arms reduction flourished with the Cold War’s end but now atomic arsenals are growing
https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/nuclear-war-risks-rise-again-stoked-by-global-conflicts-fa3333b6?mod=hp_lead_pos11
By Laurence Norman
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Updated Oct. 16, 2024 12:08 am ET
The Cold War’s end promised relief from nuclear nightmares. Long-adversarial governments agreed to eliminate warheads and collaborated to stop the spread of atomic weapons. That promise is now slipping away.
Russian President Vladimir Putin last month touted new rules on using nuclear arms, offering Moscow’s latest signal of readiness to use atomic weapons in its defense. North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is expanding. Iran is close to developing usable nuclear weapons, prompting fears of a Middle East arms race.
One of the two critical U.S.-Russian nuclear-arms-control treaties has collapsed. The other, which caps how many nuclear weapons Russia and the U.S. deploy, expires in early 2026. A pledge made by declared atomic powers during the Cold War to strive for disarmament looks less realistic than ever.
Roughly 60 years ago, President John F. Kennedy warned that by 1975 the world could have 15 to 20 nuclear powers. His fears were inflated: there are only nine today.
Still, the global nonproliferation system is in greater peril than at any time since the Cold War, says United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, Director-General Rafael Grossi. The threat of a nuclear confrontation, which a decade ago seemed fanciful, is no longer unimaginable.
Russian President Vladimir Putin last month touted new rules on using nuclear arms, offering Moscow’s latest signal of readiness to use atomic weapons in its defense. Photo: Alexander Nemenov/AFP/Getty Images
“The shared consensus among great powers on the importance of nonproliferation—which was critical to building and sustaining the nonproliferation regime since the 1960s—has eroded,” said Eric Brewer, a former director for counterproliferation at the National Security Council, now at the Nuclear Threat Initiative think tank. “I think at a minimum we’re going to end up in a world with more countries that are capable of building nuclear weapons.”
After the Berlin Wall fell, the U.S. and Russia cooperated to deactivate more than 3,000 strategic nuclear warheads located in the former Soviet republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. By 2012, Russia and the U.S. each held fewer than 5,000 warheads. In 1988, they had more than 41,000 and 23,500 respectively, according to the Federation of American Scientists.
South Africa, which had developed a small nuclear arsenal, became the first—and still only—country to scrap its nuclear weapons in the early 1990s. A decade later, Libya agreed to end its nuclear program. Iran, in the wake of the U.S. invasion of neighboring Iraq, agreed to start negotiations over its nuclear research.
Nonproliferation faced some setbacks. Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon in 1998, and North Korea did so in 2006.
Efforts to contain nuclear threats have centered on the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT. It codified a decision made by the two superpowers that limiting the spread of nuclear weapons was more important than seeking advantage by each giving its allies the bomb.
The NPT, which today has 191 signatories, commits countries without a bomb to using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and grants the U.N.’s IAEA oversight powers. It includes a pledge by nuclear-weapons states to work in good faith to reduce their arsenals.
U.S. Air Force members secure a titanium shroud at the top of a Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile. Photo: John Turner/U.S. Air Force/Associated Press
As tensions have grown among the U.S., China and Russia in recent years, the consensus around nonproliferation has frayed. Officials say Iran could be just months away from building a nuclear weapon, and Saudi Arabia has said it would follow suit if that happens. Top officials in South Korea and Turkey have talked about their countries going nuclear.
Russia’s actions since its invasion of Ukraine have raised the first real specter of nuclear-weapons use in decades. The invasion itself represented a violation of terms of a 1994 pact, under which Ukraine handed over Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory to Russia.
Russia has repeatedly pointed to its nuclear weapons as a means of defense, although Western intelligence agencies have detected no real steps to prepare for nuclear use.
Last month, while the U.S. and its allies debated allowing Ukraine to fire longer-range weapons into Russia, Putin announced a new nuclear doctrine which made the grounds for potentially using nuclear weapons more explicit.
Russia also has recently agreed to place nuclear weapons under its control in Belarus, which borders several North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, including Poland.
Today’s increasingly tense global environment makes ‘the attraction of nuclear weapons very strong,’ said Rafael Grossi, director-general of the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency. Photo: Joe Klamar/AFP/Getty Images
Moscow has openly flouted nuclear-related sanctions on North Korea, as part of a growing partnership in which North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has sent millions of artillery rounds to Russia.
Nikolai Sokov, former Russian diplomat and now senior fellow at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, said the weapons transfer to Belarus mirrors the nuclear sharing the U.S. has undertaken with allies. He said Putin’s nuclear talk has escalated because of concerns that the West wasn’t taking his red lines seriously enough. He said the nuclear-doctrine change was another case of Putin’s signaling.
“I quite honestly did not see any serious change in the nuclear doctrine,” he said.
Others see Russia’s actions as a dangerous loosening of the taboo around the use of nuclear weapons.
“Russia used its nuclear weapons as a cover for the 2022 aggression, when it wanted to prevent Western countries from coming to support of Ukraine,” said Lukasz Kulesa, director of proliferation and nuclear policy at the U.K.’s Royal United Services Institute think tank.
Former NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg accused the Kremlin last month of employing “a pattern of reckless Russian nuclear rhetoric.” NATO is pushing back by talking more openly about its annual Steadfast Noon nuclear drill, aiming to show both adversaries and citizens that it is prepared for conflict if needed. That exercise started Monday.
In this new environment, the dangers of a nuclear arms race are accelerating.
A jet fighter taking part in the NATO Steadfast Noon nuclear air drill in 2022. Photo: Kenzo Tribouillard/AFP/Getty Images
China’s nuclear expansion appears to be the most rapid and Beijing has so far refused negotiations on its plans. The Department of Defense has estimated that China’s current nuclear arsenal of roughly 500 weapons will reach 1,500 by 2035, putting Beijing on a par with Russia and the U.S. The U.K. announced in 2021 a raise in its cap on the number of nuclear weapons.
Some experts believe Russia and the U.S. may reach an informal understanding to keep deployed nuclear warheads capped once the New Start agreement ends in 2026. But, Washington also faces pressure to boost its nuclear stockpile. A congressionally appointed commission last year recommended that the U.S. prepare to expand its nuclear forces to deter the twin threats from China and Russia.
The U.S.’s future nuclear posture is only one of the debates swirling around nuclear weapons in Washington.
The growing focus on China’s military threat in Washington is tapping into long-existing debates about how committed the U.S. should be to its alliances in Europe and Asia—and in what form.
A news broadcast in Seoul showing a North Korean missile test last month. Photo: Jung Yeon-je/AFP/Getty Images
Earlier this year, Elbridge Colby, a Pentagon official under former President Donald Trump, suggested that the U.S.-South Korea defense alliance should be reshaped to allow Washington to focus on Beijing. He said that South Korea should have all options on the table when it considers how to counter the North Korean threat. Last month, South Korea’s new defense minister used similar language on whether the country should pursue the bomb.
The Biden administration in 2023 sought to eliminate that option. It gave Seoul a greater voice in consultations on a potential American nuclear response to a North Korean attack in return for Seoul swearing off its own nuclear weapons.
Some members of Congress have criticized the Biden administration’s plan to share nuclear technology with Saudi Arabia as part of the White House’s efforts to establish diplomatic relations between the kingdom and Israel. They say any potential agreement should prevent Saudi Arabia from being able to enrich uranium domestically.
Matthew Kroenig, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and one of the participants in the Congress’s nuclear strategy review, argues that despite the strains on the global nonproliferation system, the U.S. has the tools to shore it up.
“We focus on the problem children like Iran and North Korea but for the most part, 190 countries are following it,” he said of the NPT. “I do think a lot of it is in our hands…And I think the big one is extended deterrence and can we get our nuclear strategy in order and credibly assure our allies?”
The IAEA’s Grossi is less sanguine. Today’s increasingly tense global environment makes “the attraction of nuclear weapons very strong,” he said last month. “It’s a difficult moment, indeed.”
Write to Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com
3. Bob Woodward talks about his new book and the most serious nuclear threat he’s covered
Whatever you want to think about Woodward and his book, he has captured this important exchange. This is the way to talk to the Russians.
Excerpt:
DETROW: Can you walk us through some of the reporting that you've gathered of the direct phone calls from the secretary of defense and others to their counterparts in Russia saying, don't do this?
WOODWARD: Yeah. And, I mean, the most vivid one is Secretary of Defense Austin. There is a - I have a literal transcript, and if you'll permit me to read some of it - because It makes the knowledge that they have real. And it makes how they're dealing with this crisis - and so Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin - they agree in the NSC, let's call your counterpart, Sergei Shoigu. And first, Austin says to Shoigu, (reading) we know you are contemplating the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. First, any use of nuclear weapons on any scale against anybody would be seen by the United States and the world as a world-changing event. There is no scale of nuclear weapons use that we could overlook or that the world could overlook.
In other words, it's not just, hey. What's going on? It's, we know. And so here it goes on and says, if you did this, all the restraints that we have been operating under in Ukraine would be reconsidered, Austin said. And, quote, "this would isolate Russia on the world stage to a degree you Russians cannot fully appreciate." Shoigu says, quote, "I don't like kindly to being threatened." Austin says, I think in one of the bluntest open interchanges I've ever learned the details of at this high level, Mr. Minister - Austin said - I am the leader of the most powerful military in the history of the world. I don't make threats.
Bob Woodward talks about his new book and the most serious nuclear threat he’s covered
NPR · by By · October 15, 2024
NPR's Scott Detrow talks with legendary journalist Bob Woodward, whose new book War — like so many of his books about the American presidency over the last half century - is generating headlines.
Sponsor Message
SCOTT DETROW, HOST:
Legendary journalist Bob Woodward's new book, "War," like so many of his books about the American presidency over the last half-century, is generating headlines, like the one about the COVID test machine that then President Donald Trump sent Russian President Vladimir Putin in the early days of the pandemic...
(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING)
UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER #1: And new revelations from Bob Woodward about Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin.
(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING)
JAMIE GANGEL: ...That Trump secretly sent to Putin scarce COVID testing machines for his personal use.
DETROW: ...Or the seven secret phone calls Woodward reports that Trump had with Putin after Trump left office...
(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING)
UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER #2: The two have spoken as many as seven times since he left the White House.
UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER #3: Oh, wow.
DETROW: ...And the detail that Secretary of State Antony Blinken nudged President Joe Biden toward his decision to drop out of the race after that debate in June - a lot of eye-popping details. But these books that Woodward writes are about more than the juicy nuggets that rocket around cable news and social media. They take you into the room where it happened and into the key meetings where major decisions about war and peace are being made. That's especially valuable in an administration like Joe Biden's, which has been so careful and scripted in public appearances. Bob Woodward joins me now. Welcome to ALL THINGS CONSIDERED.
BOB WOODWARD: Thank you.
DETROW: I wanted to start with the war in Ukraine, actually, because we knew from public statements from President Biden, from National Security Advisor Jacob Sullivan and others that there were deep concerns about the threat of nuclear weapons. But in the book, you describe detailed meetings where the Biden administration is taking this incredibly seriously. They're very concerned. How real was the threat of nuclear weapons in the fall of 2022?
WOODWARD: Well, it becomes very vivid because of the intelligence and because of the assessment. It's 50%, a coin flip, as one of Biden's aides says. And the worry is so deep. Oh, my God, we're going to have nuclear use in the Biden presidency, which is the last thing or one of the last things he wants. And so they're all over it.
DETROW: Can you walk us through some of the reporting that you've gathered of the direct phone calls from the secretary of defense and others to their counterparts in Russia saying, don't do this?
WOODWARD: Yeah. And, I mean, the most vivid one is Secretary of Defense Austin. There is a - I have a literal transcript, and if you'll permit me to read some of it - because It makes the knowledge that they have real. And it makes how they're dealing with this crisis - and so Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin - they agree in the NSC, let's call your counterpart, Sergei Shoigu. And first, Austin says to Shoigu, (reading) we know you are contemplating the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. First, any use of nuclear weapons on any scale against anybody would be seen by the United States and the world as a world-changing event. There is no scale of nuclear weapons use that we could overlook or that the world could overlook.
In other words, it's not just, hey. What's going on? It's, we know. And so here it goes on and says, if you did this, all the restraints that we have been operating under in Ukraine would be reconsidered, Austin said. And, quote, "this would isolate Russia on the world stage to a degree you Russians cannot fully appreciate." Shoigu says, quote, "I don't like kindly to being threatened." Austin says, I think in one of the bluntest open interchanges I've ever learned the details of at this high level, Mr. Minister - Austin said - I am the leader of the most powerful military in the history of the world. I don't make threats.
DETROW: You've been covering national security for a while now. You've been covering administrations from the Nixon administration on. Was this the most serious nuclear threat that you've reported on?
WOODWARD: Yes because they're talking about it in dealing with Ukraine, in the way Putin looks at this and the doctrine of, we can't have a catastrophic battlefield loss. In that situation, we are dancing in history in a way, and they know it.
DETROW: What was Vice President Harris' role in all of these big national security conversations, these key moments that we're talking about - the beginning of the Ukraine war, the Russian nuclear threat, the early days of the Israel-Hamas war?
WOODWARD: She's going to presidents school. That's what vice presidents do. And as best I can tell, she's at almost all of the meetings. She gets involved. And at one point, they're trying to actually respond to - within the NSC, they're discussing what to do when Israel has really kind of pushed back Iran - I mean, not kind of but really eliminated massive numbers of ballistic missiles. And they're in the NSC. And Biden - I think she's remote on a screen. And he says, you know, what should we do? And she's the one who says, take the win.
DETROW: Yeah.
WOODWARD: Take the win. And Biden goes through his response and literally says, take the win to Netanyahu. That's his theme. Stop the momentum of this catastrophe.
DETROW: And that did lead to a slight cooling of the ramping up of tension between Israel and Iran, at least in that particular moment after that first wave of airstrikes on Israel.
WOODWARD: Yeah, exactly.
DETROW: I do want to ask - with Ukraine specifically, there are so many moments that you document where it could have gone either way. It could have expanded into a much more serious confrontation that drew in other countries. There could have been a nuclear exchange - any sense from the conversations you were having, from the interviews you were doing, how the Ukraine war would have played out differently had Donald Trump been in the White House?
WOODWARD: I quote Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser for Biden, saying that if Trump had been president, Putin would be in Kyiv now. Why? Because Trump, who loves dictators and the unity of power in one person, would have waved Putin right into Kyiv. There would have been no pushback. Why? And this is what Jake Sullivan says, which has a lot of truth. Trump loves dictators.
DETROW: Journalist and author Bob Woodward speaking about his new book "War."
(SOUNDBITE OF BADBADNOTGOOD AND GHOSTFACE KILLAH SONG, "EXPERIENCE")
NPR · by By · October 15, 2024
4. The Time Is Right for Ally-Shoring, and It’s About More Than Being Friends
Whomever is elected in a couple weeks must sustain and build on our silk web of alliances.
Excerpts:
After decades of reflexive globalism and tolerance of authoritarian economic coercion, a new vision of U.S. international leadership is emerging. On both sides of the political spectrum, there is an awareness that the United States must increase its investments in people, innovation, and infrastructure to strengthen the economy at home, while enhancing trade, sourcing, and the global coproduction system with countries that share American values and want to strengthen a rules-based global economic and political order. This is an approach we call ally-shoring.
...
Ally-shoring will also mean working together effectively to counter those countries that engage in economic and political coercion. This will mean building better mechanisms to crack down on Russia’s sanctions evasion, Iran’s terror financing, and China’s corruption and export dumping.
In short, the United States should focus on baking a bigger collective economic pie for the family of largely democratic nations by harnessing the advantages of international trade without the vulnerability posed by malign dictators who co-opt the multilateral tools of the global economy. For those who play by the rules, the enormous democratic consumer markets, as well as the benefits of democratic nations’ large-scale private and public direct investment, should be fully available. For those who choose not to play by the rules, the United States should implement strategic collective economic de-coupling in key sectors, alongside sanctions, tariffs, and trade barriers when necessary.
It is time to build new and enduring economic alliances—working together, producing more together, rewiring critical supply chains with trusted nations that share those goals and values. Doing so would enhance the liberal world’s combined economic strength and push back against the aggressive authoritarian powers that seek to build a corrosive global economy in their image.
To meet this moment, we need allies, not just friends.
The Time Is Right for Ally-Shoring, and It’s About More Than Being Friends
As the global economy realigns, the next U.S. president should formalize a liberal economic bloc of allied countries to stand up against authoritarian rivals.
Article by John Austin, Author and Elaine Dezenski, Author
October 15, 2024 8:47 am (EST)
cfr.org · by John Austin
After decades of reflexive globalism and tolerance of authoritarian economic coercion, a new vision of U.S. international leadership is emerging. On both sides of the political spectrum, there is an awareness that the United States must increase its investments in people, innovation, and infrastructure to strengthen the economy at home, while enhancing trade, sourcing, and the global coproduction system with countries that share American values and want to strengthen a rules-based global economic and political order. This is an approach we call ally-shoring.
Investments at home are vitally important to bring opportunity to those people and places feeling increasingly left behind in the global economy, as we wrote when we first introduced the idea of ally-shoring. But not every industry, supply chain, or ingredient should be simply reshored back to the United States. That is neither efficient nor productive for the U.S. economy. Rather, the United States should be leading an economic alliance of like-minded nations in a sub-global economy built around transparency, democracy, individual freedoms, and support for the rules-based order.
0\Ally-shoring and friendshoring (as the Joe Biden administration calls it) have become new buzzwords to describe a global supply chain rewiring that is already underway. Ally-shoring is about building new pathways for enhanced cooperation between like-minded nations in producing critical supplies and collaborating in key sectors in which democratic nations seek to maintain strategic advantages (such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, next-generation energy, and biotechnology).
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With China, Russia, Iran, and others more openly cementing their anti-Western economic and political alliance, the West needs to wake up and start working more closely together.
As well-intentioned as the Biden administration’s embrace of friendshoring has been, the next administration—whether Donald Trump’s or Kamala Harris’s—should animate ally-shoring. To do so, they will need to confront the difference between an ally and a friend. This is a necessary but highly complex task. For example, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi may be a friend to the United States befitting a red-carpet welcome at the White House, but he is still enabling Vladimir Putin’s war machine by gobbling up Russia’s cheap gas and oil.
Friendships are fickle and fragile. They change from administration to administration and evolve over time. Is Argentina a friend? Perhaps not under the Peronists, but maybe under Javier Milei? Is Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan a friend? Some days yes, some days no.
Alliances, by contrast, are strategic linkages between countries, not between their leaders. Allies recognize the importance of structural mechanisms, institutions, and durable relationships that tie one state’s interests to another’s. In the military context, allies frequently agree to joint defense to push back against common threats. In the economic realm, it is no different. The United States should integrate more deeply with other committed democracies to build a more robust, highly integrated alliance of nations with a shared economy organized around the principles of free trade and transparency.
Comprehensively animating the ally-shoring idea will mean uniting with other committed democracies to construct a system for those participants who are willing to protect, maintain, and participate in the open, rules-based international trade and economic order built around shared principles of free people and free trade.
It will mean building a compelling system that wins the hearts and minds of emerging markets—making a better development offer that involves mutually beneficial investment, well-designed infrastructure, open trade, and incentives to help develop new and diverse domestic industries.
It will mean working with international democracies to ensure freedom and rights while retaining the economic and innovation high ground, maintaining leadership in emerging technologies and critical sectors.
Ally-shoring will also mean working together effectively to counter those countries that engage in economic and political coercion. This will mean building better mechanisms to crack down on Russia’s sanctions evasion, Iran’s terror financing, and China’s corruption and export dumping.
In short, the United States should focus on baking a bigger collective economic pie for the family of largely democratic nations by harnessing the advantages of international trade without the vulnerability posed by malign dictators who co-opt the multilateral tools of the global economy. For those who play by the rules, the enormous democratic consumer markets, as well as the benefits of democratic nations’ large-scale private and public direct investment, should be fully available. For those who choose not to play by the rules, the United States should implement strategic collective economic de-coupling in key sectors, alongside sanctions, tariffs, and trade barriers when necessary.
It is time to build new and enduring economic alliances—working together, producing more together, rewiring critical supply chains with trusted nations that share those goals and values. Doing so would enhance the liberal world’s combined economic strength and push back against the aggressive authoritarian powers that seek to build a corrosive global economy in their image.
To meet this moment, we need allies, not just friends.
John Austin is a Senior Fellow with the Eisenhower Institute at Gettysburg College, and a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Brookings Institution.
Elaine Dezenski serves as senior director and head of the Center on Economic and Financial Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
cfr.org · by John Austin
5. How China’s Iran support could spark a Persian Gulf energy war
Excerpts:
Washington has to be concerned that Beijing sees an opportunity to deny or at least restrict Middle East energy to others.
Japan and South Korea, two American allies and targets of Chinese diplomacy in recent years, are also big takers of Middle East energy. Four of South Korea’s top five suppliers of crude — Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iraq and Kuwait — are in that region.
Japan is particularly vulnerable. Its Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry reported that in the first eight months of this year, the country obtained more than 96 percent of its crude imports from the Persian Gulf.
“Everyone says this is beginning to look like an energy war,” Bass told me. “China is angling to get control of the world’s light switch.”
How can China do that? By getting the support of all major regional producers.
Chinese leaders have made strides in that direction by entering into a $400 billion, 25-year “strategic partnership agreement” with Iran in 2021, brokering an agreement between long-time rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 and uniting 14 Palestinian factions with their July Beijing Declaration.
The U.S. has lost some interest in the region because in recent years it has been the world’s leading energy producer. America, as it is now called, is the “new Saudi Arabia,” pumping more crude oil than any other country in history for six years in a row. Also, no country now produces more natural gas.
As a result of the U.S. energy boom, the U.S. is a major supplier of crude oil to, among others, South Korea. In August, it was the South’s second-largest supplier of this commodity.
Yet America’s position as an energy exporter is threatened by those wanting to restrict or phase out drilling. Significantly, the Department of Energy has now paused the issuance of permits for the export of natural gas.
How China’s Iran support could spark a Persian Gulf energy war
by Gordon G. Chang, opinion contributor - 10/15/24 11:00 AM ET
https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/4932581-iran-military-threat-energy-infrastructure/
In a statement carried by state television on Oct. 1, Iran’s military vowed to attack energy infrastructure in the Middle East if the U.S. or its partners ramp up support of Israel.
In September 2019, drone attacks significantly damaged facilities operated by Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s state-owned oil company. Tehran, which denied responsibility, is widely believed to have been behind the strikes, which were launched from Yemen by Iran-backed Houthi militants. Moreover, the Houthis, Iranian proxies, have carried out persistent attacks on Red Sea shipping, including oil tankers.
As the war in the Middle East spreads, the possibility of disruption of global energy markets grows. Tensions have driven up oil in recent days, and some predict historically high prices if the Strait of Hormuz is blocked.
Some fear that Israel will soon destroy Iran’s oil ports and other facilities. Gulf states, worried about retaliatory strikes on their energy sites, have been lobbying Washington to persuade Israel not to hit oil targets in Iran.
Asian refiners do not appear to be overly concerned. They “remain confident” that the war will not disrupt flows of oil from the Persian Gulf to their facilities, believing both Israel and Iran “are likely to prefer keeping East Asia neutral in their conflict.”
So far, there have been almost no shortfalls or disruptions. No wonder feedstock managers, analysts, refiners and traders are “growing numb” to the war.
There is also a sense that China will act as a force for stability. The country, which is increasingly relying on oil-hungry factories to power its economy, has every incentive to maintain the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf.
“The long game for China is energy,” Jonathan Bass of Argent LNG told me this week.
An official at a “state-run Chinese refiner” told S&P Global, “If China ever faces any serious oil import flow disruption, I highly doubt Beijing will just sit and do nothing.”
“Very tough measures will be taken, such as military actions,” the official added.
So far, China has not suffered supply disruptions. The country last year took around 90 percent of Iran’s exports of crude oil.
Iran was not even in China’s top 10 suppliers of crude in August of this year. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar were, however.
China, according to its General Administration of Customs, obtained 54 percent of its crude oil from the Middle East in the January-August period.
China, unfortunately, is not a source of regional stability. Beijing in August publicly goaded Iran to retaliate against Israel, it backs Palestinian factions, providing diplomatic and propaganda support for Iran’s attacks. It has also been supplying weapons to Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis in addition to Iran itself. Iran can sustain the war against the Jewish state due in large part to Beijing’s backing.
Washington has to be concerned that Beijing sees an opportunity to deny or at least restrict Middle East energy to others.
Japan and South Korea, two American allies and targets of Chinese diplomacy in recent years, are also big takers of Middle East energy. Four of South Korea’s top five suppliers of crude — Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iraq and Kuwait — are in that region.
Japan is particularly vulnerable. Its Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry reported that in the first eight months of this year, the country obtained more than 96 percent of its crude imports from the Persian Gulf.
“Everyone says this is beginning to look like an energy war,” Bass told me. “China is angling to get control of the world’s light switch.”
How can China do that? By getting the support of all major regional producers.
Chinese leaders have made strides in that direction by entering into a $400 billion, 25-year “strategic partnership agreement” with Iran in 2021, brokering an agreement between long-time rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 and uniting 14 Palestinian factions with their July Beijing Declaration.
The U.S. has lost some interest in the region because in recent years it has been the world’s leading energy producer. America, as it is now called, is the “new Saudi Arabia,” pumping more crude oil than any other country in history for six years in a row. Also, no country now produces more natural gas.
As a result of the U.S. energy boom, the U.S. is a major supplier of crude oil to, among others, South Korea. In August, it was the South’s second-largest supplier of this commodity.
Yet America’s position as an energy exporter is threatened by those wanting to restrict or phase out drilling. Significantly, the Department of Energy has now paused the issuance of permits for the export of natural gas.
“We need permitting reform so that we can construct facilities and infrastructure to meet the needs of Americans and its allies and partners in, among other places, Asia,” Bass says. “It’s going to be a very dark night for our friends — and the world — when Xi Jinping controls energy.”
Gordon G. Chang is the author of “Plan Red: China’s Project to Destroy America and The Coming Collapse of China.”
6. This is how North Korean troops could be used in Russia’s war in Ukraine
The relationship between Russia and north Korea (as well as their relationships with China and Iran) is all about fear, weakness, desperation, and envy.
This is also an opportunity for us to see north Korea in action (if they send troops to fight in nKPA formations under nKPA leadership. It will be useful to observe their operations and tactics to compare them to the Army manual ATP 7-100.2 North Korean Tactics. Access the manual here: https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/atp7-100-2.pdf
This is how North Korean troops could be used in Russia’s war in Ukraine
Thousands of North Korean troops not expected to tilt the battlefield advantage towards Moscow but do highlight Russia’s desperation in face of high war losses.
by Chris York
October 15, 2024 10:08 PM
8 min read
kyivindependent.com · by Chris York · October 15, 2024
Russia's war in Ukraine may have reached a new stage this week, with reports that North Korea has moved from supplying Moscow with weapons to sending its own troops.
A Western diplomat familiar with the matter told the Kyiv Independent on Oct. 15 Pyongyang has sent 10,000 soldiers to Russia, but it’s unclear what kind of soldiers they are.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un signed a strategic defense agreement between Moscow and Pyongyang on June 19, further deepening military ties between the two countries.
North Korea has already supplied Russia with artillery shells and ballistic missiles, but sending troops would mark a significant geopolitical escalation in their cooperation.
But according to experts who spoke to the Kyiv Independent, for now at least, it's a sign of Russian desperation that could have limited effect.
"The disclosure that North Korean troops may appear on the front line is a direct consequence of catastrophic Russian casualties," John Foreman CBE, the U.K.'s former defense attache in Moscow from 2019 to 2022, told the Kyiv Independent.
"Their military effectiveness is questionable and they will be cannon fodder for Ukrainian defenders."
North Korea has sent 10,000 soldiers to Russia, Western source says
As Russia and North Korea deepen military ties, Western diplomats and experts stress that it shows Moscow’s increasing need for resources to continue waging its costly war in Ukraine.
The Kyiv IndependentAsami Terajima
How big is North Korea's army?
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Korean People's Army (KPA) is the fourth largest in the world in terms of personnel, with 1,280,000 active members and 600,000 in reserve.
Only China, India, and the United States have bigger standing armies. North Korea spent 36.32% of its entire gross domestic product on defense in 2023.
North Korean society is heavily militarized and all citizens are required to serve — reportedly 10 years for men, and eight for women.
"National defense is the supreme duty and honor of citizens," Article 86 of the country's constitution states.
In terms of weaponry, North Korea has a formidable arsenal that has alarmed the international community for decades.
The full extent of the country's nuclear weapons program is not known, but it is believed to have conducted six tests since 2006 and has enough fissile material for 40-50 nuclear missiles.
North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un (Center-R) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) walk past children attend a welcoming ceremony at Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea on June 19, 2024. (Vladimir Smirnov / POOL / AFP)Soldiers salute to pay their respects before the statues of late North Korean leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il at Mansu Hill as North Korea marks it 77th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) in Pyongyang, North Korea on Oct. 10, 2022. (Kim Won Jin / AFP via Getty Images)
It has also tested intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of carrying nuclear warheads, with a range far enough to strike the U.S.
North Korea is also widely believed to have an extensive chemical weapons program. In 2017, Kim Jong Un's older half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, was assassinated using the nerve agent VX, in a plot widely accepted as being orchestrated by Pyongyang.
Experts who spoke to the Kyiv Independent said that North Korea's most exotic and most deadly weaponry is unlikely to play a role in Ukraine, however.
"North Korea can provide two things," said Christoph Bluth, professor of international relations and security at the University of Bradford.
"One is cannon fodder, and the other is their vast arsenal of ammunition from the 1950s."
A lot of the latter is already in Ukraine. The Times, citing Western intelligence sources, reported earlier this month that half of all the artillery shells used by Russia in Ukraine are supplied by North Korea.
But Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelesnky's recent warnings make clear the relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow has now gone beyond just shells and missiles.
"This is no longer just about transferring weapons. It is actually about transferring people from North Korea to the occupying military forces," Zelensky said on Oct. 13.
Russia’s milbloggers celebrate executions of Ukrainian POWs in Kursk region
Russian pro-war milbloggers have reacted to yet more reports of Ukrainian POWs being executed by Moscow’s forces by seeking to justify the killings, while some have even called for more. In the latest case of what appears to be an increasingly common occurrence, Russian troops reportedly shot dead…
The Kyiv IndependentOleg Sukhov
How dangerous are North Korean troops?
According to Bluth, accurately assessing the effectiveness of North Korean troops is difficult, but their quality is likely to be low.
"They spend a lot of time in the army, but the quality of equipment they have and the quality of the training are rather dubious," he said.
Then, there is the lure of escaping the authoritarian North Korean regime. According to an Oct. 15 report by Ukrainska Pravda citing Ukraine’s intelligence services, 18 have already deserted their positions.
"So not only may they be poor soldiers, they may take the opportunity to desert if the opportunity presents itself," Foreman said.
People watch a television show North Korea's 75th anniversary of the founding of the armed forces day military parade released by Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) at the Seoul Railway Station in Seoul, South Korea on on Feb. 9, 2023. (Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images)
What will they be used for?
According to two sources, it's likely that after training, North Korean troops will initially be deployed to Kursk Oblast to defend against Ukraine's ongoing incursion launched more than two months ago.
The BBC's James Waterhouse, citing a Ukrainian military source, said Russia "is forming a unit of approximately 3,000 North Korean citizens close to its border with Mongolia in Ulan-Ude" to be deployed in Kursk Oblast.
In a post on Telegram, Andrii Kovalenko, the head of the counter-disinformation department at Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council, added that it can't be ruled out that they are later stationed in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.
"Manpower is the one thing North Korea has that Russia desperately needs," Bluth said.
He adds that while Russia's disregard for soldiers and its willingness to throw men into "meat assaults" is well documented, in North Korea, the leadership has even less regard for human lives.
"Kim Jong Un had his own uncle executed. So he is basically killing as many people as necessary to stay in power," he said.
"Life for North Korean conscripts is brutal and harsh, even without a war, and the consequences for refusing to fight would be extremely dire." In a press briefing on June 25, Pentagon spokesperson Pat Ryder said North Korean troops would become "cannon fodder" if they joined Russian forces on the battlefield in Ukraine.
"Life for North Korean conscripts is brutal and harsh, even without a war, and the consequences for refusing to fight would be extremely dire."
But in order to make any difference on the battlefield, they would have to be present in far larger numbers than what has so far been reported.
According to Ukraine's General Staff, Russia is losing more than 1,000 men per day, meaning 10,000 North Korean troops would only plug a gap for a week or so.
How worried should Ukraine be?
Foreman says he doesn't expect the numbers of North Korean troops currently being reported to "shift the dial dramatically" in Russia's favor.
"It’s a clear indicator of how far Russia and its military have fallen over the last two and a half years that it’s having to beg, borrow, and buy support from North Korea," he said.
But Dr. Jenny Mathers, Senior Lecturer in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, warns that it could well be just the beginning of North Korea sending troops to Ukraine.
North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un (L) walks with Russian President Vladimir Putin shortly after Putin's arrival in Pyongyang, North Korea early on June 19, 2024. (Gavriil Grigorov / POOL / AFP)
"This could just be step one — let's send a small number, see how it works on both sides," she said.
"Can the Russians integrate them, can they find uses for them, overcome language barriers and logistical issues? Can they manage with this relatively small number, and if they can, maybe they'll scale it up."
What's in it for North Korea?
Already isolated on the international stage, North Korea has little to lose from joining the war against Ukraine and further angering Kyiv's Western allies but a lot to gain from deepening relations with Russia.
"Russia is on the U.N. Security Council and has been vetoing any resolutions related to human rights or weapons of mass destruction in North Korea," Bluth points out.
"North Korea is basically isolating itself from any path to some sort of relaxation of the tensions with the U.S. or South Korea, so at the moment, North Korea is throwing in its lot with Russia."
Then there are the military benefits. In exchange for ammunition already supplied, Russia reportedly provided North Korea with technology to help it deploy spy satellites as well as tanks and aircraft.
Bluth said the deployment of troops could strengthen Pyongyang's hand in obtaining more military technology from Moscow, particularly missile guidance technology.
On Oct. 15, White House National Security Council spokesperson Sean Savett said the U.S. was "concerned" about reports of North Korean troops in Ukraine, but added: "Such a move would also indicate a new level of desperation for Russia as it continues to suffer significant casualties on the battlefield in its brutal war against Ukraine."
18 North Korean soldiers already deserted positions by Ukraine’s border, intelligence sources tell Suspilne
According to Suspilne’s sources, the North Korean soldiers deserted around 7 kilometers (4 miles) from the border with Ukraine.
The Kyiv IndependentNate Ostiller
Introducing official
merch from the Kyiv Independent
kyivindependent.com · by Chris York · October 15, 2024
7. US Army rushes to boost defenses as Russia ups strike-drone autonomy
Like airpower (which drones are obviously a part of of course) they add a third dimension to the global GO/Baduk board creating dilemmas as countries compete for influence over territory.
US Army rushes to boost defenses as Russia ups strike-drone autonomy
From the Red Sea to the Pacific, the drone and counter-drone game is accelerating.
By Patrick Tucker
Science & Technology Editor, Defense One
October 15, 2024 04:53 PM ET
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker
Russia is giving its armed drones more autonomy as Ukraine’s defenses tighten, a dynamic that has the U.S. Army working harder to bulk up its own anti-drone and -missile systems, service and industry officials said.
Defense One caught up with Sgt. Maj. Kellen Rowley, the top enlisted leader of the 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, at the AUSA conference in Washington, D.C. We asked him whether Russia is increasingly relying on autonomy software for drone attacks in order to thwart defensive measures that target the connection between the weapons and their operators.
“They are,” Rowley said. “They are becoming more adaptive. We saw them struggle quite a bit with dynamic targeting. As time has gone on, they’ve adapted.”
He declined to comment further.
An official from Epirus, which makes advanced counter-drone defenses, said greater autonomy was a growing trend in Russian drone attacks on Ukraine.
“There is clear evidence that full drone autonomy and swarming technology will become more pervasive in this new era of asymmetric warfare. One significant advancement in drone tech we’ve been closely tracking is the use of fiber-optic-guided and AI-enabled UAS that are immune to jamming and other EW countermeasures. Without a connection to jam or spoof, AI-enabled drones have seen success in Ukraine,” the official told Defense One.
Epirus makes the Leonidas high-powered microwave system, which is designed to overloads an incoming drone’s circuits with energy. That’s just one example of the various solutions that the Army is rushing to put in place to deal with drone threats that are growing more diverse and difficult to stop. Russia, Iran, China and North Korea are deepening their collaboration in multiple theaters, resulting in ever-more-capable drones emerging from adversaries that weren’t considered terribly high-tech.
Maj. Gen. David F. Stewart, a leader of the Army’s efforts on fires and anti-drone systems, told the crowd at AUSA that better drones and new tactics are enabling even low-tech adversaries to punch up their attacks, such as a Hezbollah drone strike that killed four Israeli soldiers on Sunday. “We're seeing a lot of changes in tactics to take these procedures from the adversary. Their flight profiles now are becoming more challenging for radar systems to detect,” said Stewart, the director of the Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office and director of fires at the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff. “I think the better capability to detect the Group 1, 2, and 3 would be very helpful.”
Brig. Gen. Patrick Costello, who leads the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, said that some new adversary drone weapons were emulating U.S. technology advancements, a trend further enabled by collaboration with Russia and China.
“North Korea recently unveiled a reconnaissance and multi-role UAV that employs a reverse engineered copy of a Hellfire missile similar to an RQ-4 and MQ-9. And so as we watch the relationships that are building,” Costello said.
He said the Army had just finished an engineering test with the Northrop Grumman XM1211 High Explosive Proximity round, an air-defense munition that is designed to explode near drones that may be attempting counter maneuvers.
“We want to extend it further,” he said, with work on an anti-drone proximity round that can be fired from an Mk19 40mm belt-fed automatic grenade launcher.
But the need for better drone defenses in more places is adding pressure on the Army to more quickly adapt as it meets the needs of partners. An example is last October’s decision to send two Iron Dome systems back to Israel.
U.S. Army Multi-Domain Task Force teams in the Indo-Pacific region are working to develop an entirely new capability to replace those Iron Domes: the Indirect Fire Protection Capability – High-Power Microwave, or IFPC-HPM, also from Epirus.
“We have soldiers out there testing the system. We will be employing it in the next couple of years. As the formation grows, we'll transition from structure of two Iron Dome batteries to a structure of three IFPC batteries, giving us nine platoons worth the capability,” he said. “Absolutely [we are] watching what's going on in CENTCOM, absolutely watching what's going on in UConn, taking every one of those lessons that we could, that we could apply to our theater.”
But counter-drone defenses are more complicated than roboticized attack drones for reasons beyond autonomy and technology, such as the increasing bureaucratic burdens of trying to work with more partners.
Said Rowley of the 10th AMDC, “I think probably our single biggest challenge is operating inside of NATO. There are 32 member nations in NATO, and our adversaries are exporting gaps to NATO policy. Group one, group one, UAS are able to operate below the threshold, and it's a challenging bit for us, under peacetime conditions and authorities for soldiers to recognize when they should or can engage..
All of that points to a need for more collaboration across the services, the U.S. government and with researchers, industry, and partners, said Stewart, the counter-drone office chief.
“I'm pushing for a whole-of-nation approach, not just a whole government. When we're talking about other interagency partners, it really is going to have to be academia. You're going to have to have the government involved, and then on down the line with the industry as well.”
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker
8. How the Army’s chief of staff plans to modernize the service
Despite my earlier comments about the services only being concerned with force structure and budget, the Army, like I believe all the services are, is focused on developing lethal warfighting capabilities to support the warfighting CINCs. Of course people will debate about how the services are going about this but I believe their intentions are pure and they are trying to do the right thing and not get it too wrong. And I am reminded of this statement from late MG Robert Scales:
"The objective of future gazing is not to get it perfectly right but to avoid getting it perfectly wrong"
https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/forecasting-the-future-of-warfare/#:~:text=
Excerpt:
“Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea represent an ‘Axis of Upheaval’ that is increasingly collaborating and conspiring to undermine democratic values and drive a wedge between us and our allies and partners,” George said. “Everything we do is about building lethality and cohesive teams, and given our current operating environment, we have to do it as fast as we can.”
How the Army’s chief of staff plans to modernize the service
Defense News · by Jen Judson · October 15, 2024
The U.S. Army will ramp up its efforts to transform its formations with next-level technology including capabilities to counter drone threats much faster, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George said at the Association of the U.S. Army’s annual conference Tuesday.
“We have to buy smart and fast,” George said in a speech at the annual Eisenhower luncheon. “Our budget is tight, our numbers are lean and that requires us to prioritize and make informed investments.”
When George became Army chief a year ago, he announced he would focus on using units in the field to transform the service “in contact,” putting capability into the hands of soldiers in realistic operational environments to advance things that work and scrap what doesn’t.
George said there are four major areas where “we will step on the gas” to continue the momentum established over the past year through a collection of initiatives to move faster, from working to obtain more flexible funding for specific capabilities to getting equipment into soldiers’ hands rapidly.
“First, our formations are going to dramatically improve their ability to counter enemy uncrewed systems,” George said. But this means ensuring a close alignment with the service’s effort to fix its current network and command-and-control capabilities.
RELATED
How the US Army is helping Ukraine with front line repairs
The 16th Sustainment Brigade is using video calls to help Ukrainian soldiers keep their equipment fighting as long as possible, the Army said.
“We have to give every formation the right systems to sense, seek, and defeat enemy UAS to enhance their protection and security,” George said.
The second area will focus on scaling the transforming in contact initiative to include using two Armored Brigade Combat Teams, two Stryker BCTs and additional Guard and Reserves formations for additional transformation in contact experimentation.
“At the end of [fiscal 20]25, every warfighting function – including protection and sustainment - will be part of our transformation efforts,” George said. “The technologies we will infuse in our formations are not years away – they are available now.”
The Army will also “double-down” on operational transformation, George said.
“This means expanding the range and improving the accuracy of long-range precision fires. We will continue to demonstrate the lethality and impact of land-based fires on all domains of combat,” he said.
Multi-domain task forces, which bring long-range precision fires capability, will be integrated into operational-level commands, according to George.
“Intelligence will play a critical role in this transformation – both in guiding our warfighting concept and in protecting our soldiers from fort to port to foxhole, securing our installations, and defending our modernization and research institutions from exploitation by our adversaries,” he said.
Lastly, the Army will continue to modernize and strengthen its industrial base.
“Enhanced production capacity with the corresponding concentration of stockpiles at the most likely points of need to ensure the delivery of ready combat formations,” George said. “We can buy the best weapons in the world, but they will be useless to us if we can’t scale the production of the ammunition we need for today’s battlefield.”
Already the Army is working to shore up its industrial base, moving away from single sources, upgrading old infrastructure and growing its magazine depth after sending millions of rounds to Ukraine.
The Army has gone from producing 14,000 155mm rounds to nearly 50,000 a month. The service is aiming to expand capacity to 100,000 rounds.
“But improving 155 rounds is not enough,” George said. “We must invest across all of our critical munitions inventories.”
America’s adversaries are working together more so than ever, he warned.
“Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea represent an ‘Axis of Upheaval’ that is increasingly collaborating and conspiring to undermine democratic values and drive a wedge between us and our allies and partners,” George said. “Everything we do is about building lethality and cohesive teams, and given our current operating environment, we have to do it as fast as we can.”
About Jen Judson
Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.
9. US warns Israel to boost humanitarian aid into Gaza or risk losing weapons funding
Coercing our ally?
US warns Israel to boost humanitarian aid into Gaza or risk losing weapons funding
By LOLITA C. BALDOR, TARA COPP and MATTHEW LEE
Updated 5:43 PM EDT, October 15, 2024
AP · by TARA COPP · October 15, 2024
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaks at a news conference during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Vientiane, Laos, Friday, Oct. 11, 2024. (Tang Chhin Sothy/Pool Photo via AP)
LOLITA C. BALDOR
TARA COPP
Copp covers the Pentagon and national security for the Associated Press. She has reported from Afghanistan, Iraq, throughout the Middle East, Europe and Asia.
twittermailto
AP · by TARA COPP · October 15, 2024
10. Training partners give US soldiers better backup in future combat
Training partners give US soldiers better backup in future combat
Defense News · by Todd South · October 15, 2024
The Army’s answer to training partner forces — its security force assistance brigades — is proving as helpful to the trainers as the students.
Col. Brandon Teague, commander of the 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade, or SFAB, at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, or JBLM, Washington, spoke with Army Times on Monday at the Association of the U.S. Army’s Annual Meeting and Exposition about the brigade’s work in the Pacific and how it’s growing the Army’s capacity to operate in the region.
For instance, the Thai military has been working in recent years with the SFAB on training and maintaining its Stryker units through an SFAB partnership using a specially trained team of Stryker advisors from the 7th Infantry Division, also at JBLM, and a unit from the Washington Army National Guard, Teague said.
The first SFAB units were formed in 2017 to fill a conventional military partner training force mission, first in Afghanistan. The brigades tailor their deployments down to the small-unit level, dispatching teams of no more than a dozen soldiers led by a captain to just about every combatant command across the globe.
“Even though we’re helping the partner, it’s mutual,” Teague said.
The arrangement came about because the combatant commanders across the globe, but especially in the Pacific, have requested more SFAB personnel across their areas as the brigades have grown, the colonel said.
While the work is keeping the Thai Stryker units moving, having a solid system for obtaining parts and conducting maintenance on the crucial vehicle also helps U.S. soldiers, Teague said.
That’s because should there be a ground fight in the region involving U.S. Strykers, they’ll likely need parts.
Early partnership and coordination ensures that should the Army need to lean on a partner, it can, Teague said.
In even more foundational areas, the SFAB’s work is building out a knowledge base that could save soldiers’ lives.
“The first line of care is buddy aid, the person on your left and right,” Teague said. “And the people in 5th SFAB’s left and right are our partners that we’re partnered with.”
For the first time, the Army sent a maneuver advisor team to Mongolia this year, which is assisting the nation’s military in preparing a platoon of Mongolian soldiers for a February rotation at the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center in Alaska, Teague said.
That follows years of training the next-door neighbor of China’s military in leadership fundamentals. One of the first requests from Mongolian military officials to the Army was to help them set up a noncommissioned officers academy, which the Mongolian military now runs.
The major focus areas for the SFABs, Teague said, involve aligning the people, technical aspects and procedures between the U.S. and partner units.
For example, during the current Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center rotation that the unit is conducting with the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii this month, the SFAB is working with the Japanese Self-Defense Force. The partnership works on the same kind of communication gear and communication protocols.
So, even though the brigade’s team might meet up with a different unit within the Japanese military than in a previous encounter, they’ll already be coordinated on their communications.
Those same communications challenges are being worked through with each of brigade’s partners, such as the Philippines, Mongolia, Thailand and other Pacific nations.
About Todd South
Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.
11. Army Already Preparing For V-280 Valor To Dramatically Transform Air Assaults
Army Already Preparing For V-280 Valor To Dramatically Transform Air Assaults
The V-280 will "deliver one Brigade Combat Team in one period of darkness, over 500 miles, arriving behind enemy lines, and be able to conduct sustained combat operations.”
Thomas Newdick
Posted on Oct 15, 2024 6:29 PM EDT
twz.com · by Thomas Newdick
The U.S. Army doesn’t expect to get its hands on the new V-280 Valor Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft, or FLRAA, until 2030 at the earliest, but it’s already developing tactics for when the advanced tiltrotor arrives. This fact illustrates just how much of a revolution FLRAA is anticipated to bring, including entirely overhauling the speed, range, and survivability of air assault operations.
Speaking earlier today at the Association of the U.S. Army’s annual symposium, Maj. Gen. Brett Sylvia, commanding general of the 101st Airborne Division, explained the degree to which FLRAA will change the way that historic division, and other Army units, will go to war.
U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Brett Sylvia, at that time 1st Cavalry Division Forward commander, now the commanding general of the 101st Airborne Division, at a combined arms rehearsal in Poland, June 6, 2020. U.S. Army photo by Spc. Javan Johnson Spc. Javan Johnson
The forthcoming arrival of FLRAA has led to a new concept of operations for the Army, which is now taking shape. This is Large-Scale, Long-Range Air Assault, or L2A2, and, simply put, it relies upon the new tiltrotor to be realized. As TWZ has explored in the past, the specific range and speed advantage of the V-280 Valor was very likely a significant reason why it was chosen for FLRAA ahead of Boeing’s rival SB>1 Defiant.
While the engineering and manufacturing development phase for FLRAA continues, the Army is practicing the L2A2 concept using the aircraft it has on hand.
According to Sylvia, L2A2 is defined by the ability to “deliver one Brigade Combat Team in one period of darkness, over 500 miles, arriving behind enemy lines, and be able to conduct sustained combat operations.”
“We can’t do that right now is because the platforms that we have organic to the 101st are not enough in order for us to be able to do that in one period of darkness,” Sylvia added.
U.S. Army soldiers from Task Force Black Cat inspect a UH-60 during a joint helicopter training mission at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, on September 13, 2021. U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Jacob Derry Staff Sgt. Jacob Derry
Instead, over the last 12 months, the “The Screaming Eagles” have undertaken four exercises to explore what it takes to move a Brigade Combat Team over that distance, all the while moving exclusively at night.
In the latest of these training events, the division’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team was moved to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Johnson, Louisiana. The 101st is home-based at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 575 miles distant, from where the simulated air assault was launched.
While moving from one location to the other was achieved, it required the division to set up two mission support sites and six Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs) en route to ensure the movement of the helicopter assault force.
More significantly, it also required three nights in order to be able to move that entire Brigade Combat Team under the cover of darkness. Meanwhile, staffing all of the mission support sites and FARPs, as well as related security and sustainment forces, required almost a thousand soldiers.
U.S. Air Force personnel conduct a Forward Area Refueling Point refueling of a U.S. Army UH-60 on March 5, 2021, at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia. U.S. Air Force photos Master Sgt. Wes Wright
The next part of the training was done as a simulation, this time involving the future Air Assault CAB, a formation created to ensure the Army can conduct L2A2.
As Sylvia explained, the Air Assault CAB is going to have four times the number of heavy-lift aircraft than what he has available today, and all of the unit’s UH-60 Black Hawks will be replaced by FLRAA.
U.S. Army soldiers from the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) watch as a CH-47 Chinook flown by the 101st Combat Aviation Brigade, 101st Airborne, conduct the sling-load movement of a vehicle. U.S. Army
“When we ran that in simulation, we were able to execute that one Brigade Combat Team move in one period of darkness, so we made our timeline,” Sylvia said. “But the second thing, and probably more critical than that, was that we cut in half that sustainment and security that we needed. We went down to one mission support site and only three Forward Arming and Refueling Points in order to be able to execute that. I don’t think I need to tell you what that does in terms of our survivability, because of our speed and our lower signature when we can execute that.”
Over the course of the next few years, the Army will continue to build its Air Assault Combat Aviation Brigade, to meet L2A2 aspirations. In the meantime, as Sylvia said, “We are doing the things in order to be able to build the foundation so that all we have to do is just receive the aircraft and we’ll be ready to execute.”
“What we can do, is we can build the tactics, techniques, and procedures, build the doctrine, build the structures, understand the sustainment in order to be able to do that.”
A V-280 Valor flies over the sea. Bell Textron Inc. V-280 flying over water. (Bell)
Sylvia also addressed how the Army was working to adapt how its future mission support sites and FARPs would look like so that they can survive and be effective during large-scale conflicts with peer or near-peer adversaries, including over significant distances, as will be found in the Indo-Pacific theater.
Sylvia said the 101st Airborne Division’s current training is exploring changes to support sites and FARPs so they can “operate in a semi-permissive or in a non-permissive environment.”
In the future, the Army’s FARPs will have to be “dispersed, distributed, and much smaller,” Sylvia noted.
Sylvia recalled one of the exercises that explored new ways of distributing FARPs.
“We didn’t land like we traditionally do, where you go, you take over an airfield, and you park all your aircraft out there in the field. So now we are taking our aircraft, we are parking them in a very distributed manner, not on airfields. We’re camouflaging the aircraft, camouflaging the FARPs out there.”
U.S. Air Force FARP technicians and 1st Special Operations Squadron loadmasters prepare to perform FARP operations with a U.S. Marine Corps UH-1 on February 14, 2018, at Chandy Range, Thailand. U.S. Air Force photo by Capt. Jessica Tait Capt. Jessica Tait
A resurgence in interest in camouflaging such assets to deceive opponents and otherwise help to conceal the movements and activities of friendly forces is something that we have examined in the past and is especially relevant for any future high-end fight involving the United States, such as one against China in the Pacific.
Initial findings have been highly encouraging, Sylvia noted.
“During one of our exercises, when we got done afterward, and we were talking with the opposing force commander, he said, ‘Hey, I had great success in finding and targeting your FARPs.’ And I said, ‘Yeah, how many did you get?’ And he said, ‘I got two.’ I said, ‘Did you know I had nine out there?’ And he said, ‘Obviously I wasn’t as good as I thought I was.’ And so that’s the point. We do have to think about how we do these things differently. New capabilities certainly are great, but I think our tactics and techniques are the things that are going to be most effective in the near term.”
A first FLRAA for the Army is expected to take to the air in 2026, with low-rate initial production slated to begin in 2028, leading to initial fielding in 2030.
While the Army may be pinning its hopes of achieving Large-Scale, Long-Range Air Assault firmly on FLRAA, that doesn’t mean the UH-60 will be disappearing any time soon.
A prototype V-280 Valor. Bell Textron Inc. V-280 Valor which Bell based its FLRAA bid on. (Bell)
Also speaking at AUSA today, Maj. Gen. Clair Gill, Commanding General at the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence and Fort Novosel, said that the future force mix will come down to the specific situation and operational demands at the time — as well as budgetary constraints.
“Would I love to put a FLRAA everywhere that there’s a Black Hawk? Sure. Do I think it’s affordable? Probably not,” Gill told reporters.
“The Black Hawk is coming up on 40 years old, I believe, and my sense is the Black Hawk is going to compete with the B-52 and C-130 for going the distance. We’re going to have Black Hawks in our formation as long as any of us are reading the news.”
“I think FLRAA is going to come on.” Gill continued. “We’re going to learn a lot about it. We’re going to scale it. We’re going to see where we are in the 2030s, once we go to full-rate production and we get that first limited test unit out, learn a lot about it, we got to figure out how we train it. We start proliferating it. And if it, if it is that game-changing technology and everybody says that we’ve got to double down, then maybe we buy more. But I think initially it’s going to be some sort of a mix, and I don’t see the Black Hawk going away.”
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
Staff Writer
Thomas is a defense writer and editor with over 20 years of experience covering military aerospace topics and conflicts. He’s written a number of books, edited many more, and has contributed to many of the world’s leading aviation publications. Before joining The War Zone in 2020, he was the editor of AirForces Monthly.
twz.com · by Thomas Newdick
12. Army announces 'Master Combat Badge' to combine CIB and EIB for infantry soldiers
From back in the day in the 1980s ("my day" perhaps not "the day") I recall some old timers who wore their EIB instead of the CIB because they said their EIB was harder to earn.
Army announces 'Master Combat Badge' to combine CIB and EIB for infantry soldiers
Equivalent awards will be issued for medics and other soldiers who have earned both a combat and expert badge in their field.
Jeff Schogol
Posted on Oct 15, 2024 5:40 PM EDT
taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol
The Army has authorized a new badge for soldiers who have earned both the Combat Infantryman Badge, or CIB, and an Expert Infantryman Badge, or EIB, the Army’s top enlisted leader announced on Tuesday. An equivalent top badge will be rolled out for combat veterans who also hold Expert Field Medical and Expert Soldier awards.
Dubbed the Master Combat Badge, the new decoration will signify that soldiers have received both a combat award and an expert badge for their military occupational specialty, Sgt. Maj. of the Army Michael R. Weimer said during the Association of the U.S. Army conference in Washington, D.C.
The new Master Combat Badge will mirror the existing combat badges, except the wreath will be gold rather than silver.
The new badge will solve a conflict that many combat-experienced soldiers face in preparing their uniforms. Badges awarded for combat experience — like the CIB — and those for expert skills are visually similar and worn on the same spot on a uniform — at the top of a soldier’s award ribbons. As a result, soldiers who qualify for both can only wear one.
In announcing the new badges, Weimer said that as a younger soldier, he admired soldiers who wore symbols that showed they had been in combat.
“I did look to the Panama guys,” Weimer said. “I did look to the Grenada guys, and we even still had a few Vietnam guys in my formation at that point in time. Whoever had a mustard stain on their jump wings, who had a Ranger scroll on their right shoulder, who had a CIB, it was motivating.”
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The three current expert badges are emblems of their jobs over a rectangle. The three combat badges add a wreath of laurel.
“The current policy doesn’t authorize Soldiers to wear both the Expert Badge and Combat Badge on their uniforms, even though they’ve earned them,” said Sgt. Maj. Eric Bassile, of the Army’s Policy Integrated Division. “They should be able to wear them with pride. That’s the idea behind the Master Combat Badge—a single badge that represents a Soldier’s sacrifice, hard work, and mastery of skills within their career management field.”
The CIB is given to soldiers in infantry or Special Forces who have served in direct ground combat — a testament that a soldier has faced the enemy in direct action. The EIB, which is also limited to infantry and Special Forces, is a skills badge awarded to soldiers who pass a rigorous series of tests on infantry skills, from marksmanship to land navigation.
Two other badges are awarded along similar lines to other MOSs: the Combat Medical and Expert Field Medical devices for medics; and the Expert Soldier and Combat Action awards for all other Army MOSs.
To cover all soldiers who have earned both awards, Bassile said, the Army will introduce three different versions of the Master Combat Badge: The Master Combat Infantryman Badge, the Master Combat Medical Badge, and the Master Combat Action Badge.
The Army was promoted to authorize the new badge because leaders were opting to wear their CIBs in lieu of their EIBs, Weimer said on Tuesday.
“I’ll be honest with you, not all CIBs are equal,” Weimer said. “ It’s just a true statement. They’re not equal. But all EIBs are equal, aren’t they? And I’m here to tell you the failure rate on the EIB is pretty high because it’s hard to get. That’s why it’s called ‘expert.’ And so, the Master Combat Badge will actually identify that you have both.”
The Master Combat Badge will be worn in the same location on the Army uniform as both the EIB and CIB, an Army official said on Tuesday.
Mariner and Mountaineering Badges Approved
In addition to the Master Combat Badge, the Army has also approved the Mariners and Mountaineering Badge, Weimer said on Tuesday.
But the Mountaineering Badge will no longer look like the famous ram’s head device of military lore.
“Who remembers the goat head for the mountain [badge],” Weimer asked audience members. “Yeah. that’s not going to be the badge. Just so you know, for the record. They’re in the process of redesigning the badge that will come up for approval. But I didn’t want the process to slow down the righteous reason the badge was requested.”
The Army will issue a policy that lays out which soldiers are eligible to wear the Mountaineering Badge, he said.
Weimer also said that his decision to recommend the Army approve the Mariner badge was solidified after he visited soldiers with the 7th Transportation Brigade, who operated a floating pier so that food and other emergency supplies could be transported to Gaza.
“Any of you that worked with our Army mariners before, you know exactly what I’m talking about – the way that they get after it,” Weimer said. “And that is a badge they earned.”
Update: 10/15/2024; This article was updated after publication with additional information about the Master Combat Badge’s design.
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taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol
13. This division is learning what multidomain means for small units
I recall being a company commander in 2d DIvision and we were preparing for another ARTEP. The battalion commander was not pleased with our company and battalion capabilities. Rather than continuing to train at the company and battalion level in preparation for the ARTEP he said we need to focus all our training on squads and platoons. So in the run up to the ARTEP we only conducted squad and platoon training and during the ARTEP we successfully conducted company and battalion operations.
Excerpts:
But much of the talk about MDO sits at the division and corps level, right?
Wrong.
“Seventy-five percent of my audience right now is captain and below, and you’re like, ‘What does this matter to me?’” Ferris said. “You’re the one who’s going to allocate that tool.”
The general pointed to the companies and battalions needing to be at their appointed battlefield location on time and ready to execute their tasks; otherwise, it will hurt their comrades.
Even though connecting the unit took a lot of work, Ferris said some of the basic soldier tasks caused the most friction.
This division is learning what multidomain means for small units
Defense News · by Todd South · October 15, 2024
As the Army adjusts its forces to a new way of warfare — multidomain operations — the division and corps focus of the fight can lead some subordinate units wondering about their roles.
One Army division is finding ways to practice the Army’s newest multidomain doctrine with partners, at home station and using space assets to test the mettle of its company and battalion commanders.
Soldiers with the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado, recently conducted the first division-level command post exercise as they prepare for their warfighter exercise in 2025.
The division planned a year ahead of this summer’s events, all to tie together Army National Guard, Marine Reserve, Air Force, Space Force, special operations forces and conventional units in a series of fast-paced fire missions.
Exercise Lethal Ivy ran for a week at the end of August at Fort Carson and the Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site, about a two-hour drive away from the installation.
The exercise saw 1,000 4th ID soldiers in the field working remotely and virtually with various joint units to coordinate simulated fire missions in Colorado, Kentucky and New Jersey, simulating the distances they’d likely face in Europe or corners of the Pacific.
Participating units put the Army’s multidomain operations doctrine, or MDO, which seeks to sense and strike, linking any shooting platform, Army or other military branch or ally, to the test. They configured ways to communicate quickly and rapidly converge windows to take out “enemy” assets and strike precisely.
But in the years since the service announced MDO and built its multidomain task forces to work with operational units in theater, units not aligned specifically to those regions are working out how they can execute these multiprong attacks that MDO requires.
Brig. Gen. Eugene “Buddy” Ferris, 4th ID deputy commanding general-maneuver, shared some insights from the effort while at the Maneuver Warfighter Conference at Fort Moore, Georgia, in September.
Much of the event’s audience was made up of captains, most attending the mandatory captains career course at the installation.
“This is a future concept, but right now it’s just a manual, it’s just an idea,” Ferris said.
Ferris first highlighted the real-world demands of practicing the new doctrine, pointing to the Russia-Ukraine war as an example.
Ferris noted intelligence is showing that Russian troops are firing up to 40,000 rounds daily and some days forces on either side are taking up to 1,000 casualties.
“Think about that, a battalion plus off the battlefield,” Ferris said.
But much of the talk about MDO sits at the division and corps level, right?
Wrong.
“Seventy-five percent of my audience right now is captain and below, and you’re like, ‘What does this matter to me?’” Ferris said. “You’re the one who’s going to allocate that tool.”
The general pointed to the companies and battalions needing to be at their appointed battlefield location on time and ready to execute their tasks; otherwise, it will hurt their comrades.
Even though connecting the unit took a lot of work, Ferris said some of the basic soldier tasks caused the most friction.
“Talking, supplying, resupplying and then coordinating and planning — that is where we learned we need to keep getting better,” Ferris said.
During the exercise, one of the units, which Ferris did not name, wasn’t at the line of departure — where units coordinate and begin an attack — on time.
Another unit had taken out enemy radars and artillery to open a window for the unit to move. But when the timing was off, the unit took 1,000 virtual casualties in the combined live and simulated exercise, Ferris said.
“I can only keep a convergence point open for so long,” Ferris said.
This is part of the adjustment, Ferris said, of the Army’s move from counterinsurgency operations, mostly happening at the company or platoon level, to MDO, which is moving brigades around the battlefield under division and corps support.
“You’ve got to recognize that you’re part of a bigger fight,” Ferris said.
In the lead up to the August event, 4th ID had to align their communications equipment and practices with Air Force, Army Guard and Marine Reserve units.
That effort alone required a lot of troubleshooting.
“How do you talk to the Air Force? How do you talk to a Marine Reserve unit, never mind an Army Reserve unit; you think an Army Reserve unit has stuff that’s old, wait until you see the Marines,” Ferris said.
Once they’re connected, Ferris said the subordinate units still set up their command posts like they would for a counterinsurgency operation where there wasn’t an aerial threat or enemy sensing.
“In our efforts to shrink a command post, we have forgotten the function of a command post,” Ferris said.
He saw well-developed brigade and division command posts, slimmed down with less personnel and gear, hiding effectively and running missions.
However, the battalions often simply set up four to five company command posts as they traditionally would, which makes those posts easy targets.
“I will tell you the whole team learned and we learned a lot,” Ferris said. “Did we get everything right? No. But I think the more we push the system and accept the fact that we may fail, we will get better.”
About Todd South
Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.
14. Make counter-drone training as routine as marksmanship: Army general
And as an aside, I think ISR to find drone C2 (launch and control location) will be a high priority in the drone v. drone fight. If we can locate and target drone C2 locations we should be able disrupt drone operations. But what if those locations are outside the combattant theater? Will we attack them? Will our adversaries ever try to attack our done C2 locations that are located in inspire the US?
Make counter-drone training as routine as marksmanship: Army general
Defense News · by Todd South · October 15, 2024
Soldiers recently deployed to the Middle East often had less than a minute to decide how to take down an incoming drone.
A unit detecting, intercepting and destroying a drone often took less than four minutes, said Maj. Gen. Scott Naumann, commander of the 10th Mountain Division.
To meet that threat, the two-star is working with his unit and using a soldier-created tool to prepare troops to counter drones more effectively.
“Training [counter-drone] should be as routine as drawing our rifles, going to the range and honing our marksmanship skills,” Naumann said at the Maneuver Warfighter Conference at Fort Moore, Georgia, in September.
The 2nd Brigade Combat Team experienced 170 one-way drone attacks between August 2023 and April 2024, according to Naumann.
That may seem like a lot, but if data from the Russia-Ukraine war is any indicator, Naumann said, units could face that many attacks or more in a matter of days.
“Let that sink in a little bit,” Naumann said. “Our formations were defending from fixed sites. We weren’t maneuvering on the offense, and we weren’t conducting large-scale combat operations.”
While deploying units are developing more effective training methods to counter drone attacks, the Army is also making such habits part of a soldier’s foundational skills.
The service announced last year that it would include counter-drone training in boot camp. Staff at the Center for Initial Military Training is writing the doctrine for this initiative, Army Times previously reported.
Sgt. Brent Hemphill, a squad leader with 2nd Battalion, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, described his experience responding to frequent rocket attacks during a recent deployment to Syria.
“After the initial months, rocket attacks became a regular occurrence, averaging two to three times a week, mostly at night,” Hemphill said in a release. “We’d grab our gear and head to bunkers. Depending on the situation, we’d either deploy as a quick reaction force or track down the attackers based on intel or witness reports.”
A similar experience during a 2022 deployment of the 10th Mountain’s 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Brigade Combat Team, to Syria sparked an idea for how to prepare soldiers for this new reality.
At the time, 1st Lt. Samuel Strobel was serving as a night battalion battle captain, according to an Army release, and his experiences, along with those of 1st Lt. Mitchell Crowley, would lead them to create the Randomized Enemy Action Contact Trainer, or REACT, system.
The application “generates essentially combat information about an incoming drone or rocket attack that helps simulate battle drills for an operations center,” Naumann said. Users can adjust conditions in the application to change the type or number of attacks, according to Naumann.
Naumann highlighted Strobel’s creation as an example of the innovation he and other leaders are seeking in all their formations.
About Todd South
Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.
15. US Senate makes big push to combat military suicides
US Senate makes big push to combat military suicides
Stars and Stripes · by Frank Larkin · October 14, 2024
In this photo provided by the Heroic Hearts Project, Jesse Gould adds 22 dog tags signifying the number of veterans estimated to die by suicide in one day, at a memorial paying tribute to the estimated 150,000 veterans who have lost their lives to suicide over the past 20 years, displayed near the U.S. Capitol in Washington on July 10, 2024. (Michael Schoen/Heroic Hearts Project via AP)
The U.S. Senate approved a measure recently that will help save the lives of people who have risked everything for the nation but who are on the precipice of self-destruction.
Championed by a bipartisan group of 40 lawmakers, the resolution designates Nov. 17 as “National Warrior Call Day,” a major effort that draws attention to those service members and veterans perilously disconnected from family, friends and support systems.
Disconnection from others is proving fatal for veterans, with experts reporting that two-thirds of veterans who die by suicide have had no contact with services. Many are battling alone.
National Warrior Call Day marks a coast-to-coast push to connect with veterans and service members. It asks that all Americans — especially active-duty and retired military personnel — call a warrior, someone who has worn or is currently wearing the uniform, and connect them with support, if necessary. The exhortation we stress to everyone is to make a call, take a call and be honest with the service member or veteran.
The establishment of National Warrior Call Day, an effort led by Sens. Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H., and Tom Cotton, R-Ark., is supported by the U.S. Congress, 27 Medal of Honor recipients, numerous veteran service organizations and several former secretaries of the Department of Veterans Affairs.
The National Warrior Call Day designation comes as suicides are climbing among veterans. For 2021, the most recent year of complete data examined by the VA, suicides increased by 1.8% compared to the previous year. The suicide rate far exceeds that of the general population, with veterans nearly twice as likely to die by suicide. What’s more, suicide is on the rise among women veterans for whom the rate increased over the previous year by 24% — significantly higher than the rate of increase among male veterans.
In the most recent annual assessment released last November, the VA found that suicide is the 13th leading cause of death for veterans overall and the second leading cause of death for veterans under the age of 45.
Among current U.S. service members, the trends are similarly tragic. A recent study released by the Pentagon found that Army troops are more likely to die from suicide than any other cause. The report, which examined a sample of troop deaths from 2012 to 2019, showed that soldiers are nearly nine times more likely to die by suicide than they are in combat.
National Warrior Call Day is essential for another important reason — to help reach those veterans and service members who may be suffering the effects of undiagnosed brain injuries.
Brain injuries are a signature injury of the last two decades of persistent conflict. The federal government acknowledges their prevalence — nearly 500,000 service members are believed to suffer from them. But they don’t acknowledge that their prevalence might also explain the tragically high suicide rates among veterans and servicemembers, despite growing evidence. A growing body of research is illuminating that underlying traumatic brain injury can mirror many mental health conditions.
Ending isolation is key to ending suicides. With its straightforward mission of imploring all Americans to connect with someone who has worn or is currently wearing the uniform and let them know they care, National Warrior Call Day can foster greater connectivity. Greater connection will save lives.
“Just as despair can come to one only from other human beings,” Elie Wiesel observed, “hope, too, can be given to one only by other human beings.”
National Warrior Call Day is an opportunity for each of us to do something so ordinary by making a call that results in the extraordinary — in a human connection that tethers someone to hope where there was none before.
Frank Larkin is a former Navy SEAL, 40th U.S. Senate Sergeant at Arms and father of a Navy SEAL son who died by suicide. He is chief operating officer of Troops First Foundation and chairman of Warrior Call.
Stars and Stripes · by Frank Larkin · October 14, 2024
16. Latest Taiwan drills show off PLA deterrence
Excerpts;
Three scenarios
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank, said in a report on August 22 that there are three scenarios in which the PLA may blockade Taiwan:
- All-out kinetic blockade: In seven days of joint live-fire exercises around Taiwan, the PLA will block entrances to key Taiwanese ports and attack the island’s energy import terminals, power grid and transportation infrastructure. It will also cut the island’s undersea internet cables and launch cyberattacks. It will use anti-ship and anti-aircraft cruise missile batteries to enforce the blockade for several more months until Taiwan is willing to negotiate.
- Mining blockade: It is a scaled-down version of the all-out kinetic blockade. The PLA will fire a dozen ballistic missiles over and around Taiwan just to intimidate Taiwan and international shipping companies and deter other countries from intervening. Chinese submarines will lay sea mines at the entrances of Taiwan’s major ports. Chinese forces will be deployed to blockade key ports. They will open fire only if they are attacked.
- Limited blockade: It is largely consistent with the second scenario but lacks mining.
Latest Taiwan drills show off PLA deterrence - Asia Times
A Washington-based think tank says it’s likely that China will launch an all-out kinetic blockade against Taiwan
asiatimes.com · by Jeff Pao · October 14, 2024
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched and completed the Joint Sword-2024B Exercise near Taiwan on Monday with a strong focus on deterring the United States from intervening in any possible battles in the Taiwan Strait.
The Eastern Theater Command of the PLA said Monday it had deployed the Liaoning aircraft carrier group to conduct exercises, along with its army, navy, air force and rocket force troops, on vessel-aircraft collaboration, joint air control and strikes on sea and land targets in the waters and airspace to the east of Taiwan.
”The drills aim to test the joint combat capabilities of multiple services in integrated operations inside and outside the island chain,” said Li Xi, spokesperson of the Eastern Theater Command.
He added that the drills, conducted in the Taiwan Strait and the north, south and east of the island of Taiwan, are a powerful deterrent to the separatist activities of “Taiwan independence” elements, and are legitimate and necessary actions to safeguard national sovereignty and national unity.
As of 4:30 pm, the Taiwanese military said the PLA had deployed a record total of 125 aircraft, 17 warships and 17 coast guard vessels in its exercise on Monday.
Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense said its military forces are standing on high alert and holding positions at sea and in the air to counter “irrational and provocative behavior” by China.
The drills came after Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te said in a speech on the Taiwanese National Day on October 10 that China has no right to represent Taiwan since the Republic of China (ROC) has a history of 113 years while the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is only 75 years old.
The US is seriously concerned by the PLA joint military drills in the Taiwan Strait and around Taiwan, said Matthew Miller, a spokesperson of the US Department of State.
The PRC response with military provocations to Lai’s routine annual speech is unwarranted and risks escalation, he said.
”We call on the PRC to act with restraint and to avoid any further actions that may undermine peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the broader region, which is essential to regional peace and prosperity and a matter of international concern,” he added. “We continue to monitor PRC activities and coordinate with allies and partners regarding our shared concerns.”
Taiwan’s Presidential Office called on China to “cease military provocations that undermine regional peace and stability and stop threatening Taiwan’s democracy and freedom.”
‘Area denial’ capability
On May 23 to 25, the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command held the Joint Sword-2024A exercise after Lai made his inauguration speech on May 20. Beijing said at that time that there would be more exercises later this year.
Chinese columnists said the PLA’s latest drills are a big step to push forward the reunification of mainland China and Taiwan.
“China wants to build joint combat capabilities that can match those of the US, which has an overwhelming advantage in its navy and air forces,” Shen Yi, a professor at the Department of International Politics, Fudan University of International Communication, says in an article published by Guancha.cn on Monday.
“Today’s Taiwan issue is a result of the previous incidents that aircraft, cruisers and destroyers of the United States’ 7th Fleet had transited the Taiwan Strait,” he said.
“The blockade of key Taiwanese ports is a newly-added mission in the Joint Sword 2024B exercise,” he said. “An over 10,000-ton coast guard ship, accompanied by four coast guard formations, was deployed. It has a larger tonnage than the US Navy’s Ticonderoga-class cruiser and Arleigh Burke-class shield destroyer.”
China’s large coast guard ship refers to a vessel with the hull number 2901, which has a nickname “monster ship” due to its displacement of 12,000 tons. For comparison, a Ticonderoga-class cruiser has a full load displacement of 9,600 tons while an Arleigh Burke-class shield destroyer has 8,300 to 9,700 tons.
Shen said the latest military drills and the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile into the Pacific Ocean on September 25 have sent a clear signal to the US that China is building an “area denial” capability that the US can no longer fight against. He said it’s only a matter of time until American military experts will recognize this.
Three scenarios
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank, said in a report on August 22 that there are three scenarios in which the PLA may blockade Taiwan:
- All-out kinetic blockade: In seven days of joint live-fire exercises around Taiwan, the PLA will block entrances to key Taiwanese ports and attack the island’s energy import terminals, power grid and transportation infrastructure. It will also cut the island’s undersea internet cables and launch cyberattacks. It will use anti-ship and anti-aircraft cruise missile batteries to enforce the blockade for several more months until Taiwan is willing to negotiate.
- Mining blockade: It is a scaled-down version of the all-out kinetic blockade. The PLA will fire a dozen ballistic missiles over and around Taiwan just to intimidate Taiwan and international shipping companies and deter other countries from intervening. Chinese submarines will lay sea mines at the entrances of Taiwan’s major ports. Chinese forces will be deployed to blockade key ports. They will open fire only if they are attacked.
- Limited blockade: It is largely consistent with the second scenario but lacks mining.
CSIS said the all-out kinetic blockade is believed to be the most likely approach China might take as the other two would leave the PLA highly exposed to escalation by Taiwan or interventions by the US.
Wang Shichun, a Chinese columnist, notes in an article on Monday that
It is the first time that China launched an exercise that aims to blockade Taiwan’s key ports and areas. By doing this, we can board, inspect and seize the ships that send US arms to Taiwan and stop other countries from sending oil and natural gas vessels to the island.
Wang says the Taiwanese government has been promoting the view that it only needs to resist the PLA’s attacks for a week to provide time for foreign powers to intervene in the war. But he says the US won’t be able to break the Chinese blockade.
“The CSIS report said the extent to which Washington and its allies intervene will determine the success or failure of a Chinese blockade,” he continues. “But I want to say that foreign interventions won’t be possible, as the initiative now lies with our army.”
Mao Ning, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry gave the official view in a media briefing on Monday:
If the US truly cares about peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and regional prosperity, it needs to abide by the one-China principle and the three China-US joint communiqués, act on its leaders’ commitment of not supporting ‘Taiwan independence,’ stop arming Taiwan and stop sending wrong signals to the “Taiwan independence” separatist forces.
Read: Sullivan secures one last Xi-Biden phone call
Follow Jeff Pao on X: @jeffpao3
asiatimes.com · by Jeff Pao · October 14, 2024
17. Mongolia, The Forgotten Soviet Satellite
Mongolia is. fascinating county and I have enjoyed visiting it and working with friends from Mongolia for the past couple of years.
Extensive historical photos at the link: https://www.rferl.org/amp/mongolia-soviet-era-photos-communism-socialism-democracy/33155566.html
Mongolia, The Forgotten Soviet Satellite
October 15, 2024 06:01 GMT
rferl.org · October 15, 2024
Features
A bust of Vladimir Lenin inside a hall of the museum dedicated to the Soviet founder in Ulan Bator in 1981.
Mongolia declared itself a “people’s republic” 100 years ago on November 26, 1924. But despite the name of its capital city remaining Ulan Bator (Red Hero), the country’s Soviet-linked past has been widely described as “forgotten.”
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev (center left) marks 50 years of the Mongolian People's Republic alongside Mongolia's communist leader Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal (center right) in Ulan Bator on November 1, 1974.
Jonathan Addleton, who served as the U.S. ambassador to Mongolia from 2009 to 2012, told RFE/RL that the country's Soviet-linked past is often overlooked because “it is the figure of Genghis Khan who looms largest in how Mongolia is viewed by the rest of the world. Nothing can ever overshadow or replace that image as the central feature of Mongolian history."
A street scene in Altanbulag, a Mongolian trading town on the border with Russia, in the late 1800s.
Additionally, Addleton says, due to its remoteness and the fact Mongolia never joined the Warsaw Pact -- the Soviet Union’s equivalent of NATO -- the country “never entered into the popular imagination in terms of what it meant to be a ‘Soviet satellite.’”
The Chinese governor of Altanbulag surrounded by his retinue in the late 1800s.
In 1924, the sparsely populated territory of today’s Mongolia had endured years as a sparring ground between China and forces from both sides of Russia’s Civil War. But the region remained de jure a part of China.
Mongolian soldiers photographed in the 1930s
Such was the uncertainty faced by Mongolia's largely nomadic population in 1924 that one young official poured cold water on the communist government’s grandiose “people’s republic” declaration by asking: "But what is a republic? Surely this is unknown in the provinces."
He called on delegates to explain to rural Mongolians "the aim and meaning of the new form of government."
A nomadic herder and his daughter on Mongolia’s plains in March 1936
One of the Kremlin’s early fact-finding missions to Mongolia reported back to Soviet leader Josef Stalin that the Chinese-claimed territory would be a useful “buffer along the southern borders of our country,” which could ensure Soviet and Chinese troops would not come face-to-face.
Women praying at a monastery in Mongolia in 1930
Mongolia was soon economically and politically dependent on the U.S.S.R. and mirroring Moscow's radical policies.
“You must develop socialism in a very short time, and for this purpose apply the experiences of the Soviet Union,” one Kremlin envoy instructed the Mongolian government.
A young Mongolian shepherd with his flock in the 1930s
In 1930, Ulan Bator reported “we are now confiscating the property of the feudal classes.”
As nomadic herdsmen were forced into communal farms and had their cattle seized by the state, some fled the country, while others rose up.
Buddhist stupas in Mongolia in 1936
In the early 1930s, some 30,000 people are estimated to have fled Mongolia and spontaneous rebellions broke out in some regions of the country.
“Fight to the death against the witches and demons of this ‘people’s government!’” was the rallying cry of one religiously inspired rebel group.
Khorloogiin Choibalsan
In 1937, Mongolia's Defense Minister Gelegdorjiin Demid was invited to Moscow and died en route from "food poisoning."
Then, in 1939, Mongolia’s popular prime minister, Anandyn Amar, was arrested and sent to Moscow, where he was eventually executed. The deaths opened the door to Khorloogiin Choibalsan, a favorite of Stalin, to seize power in Mongolia.
A Mongolian archer wearing Soviet medals
Under Choibalsan, the terror of Stalin’s great purges echoed through the halls of power in Ulan Bator. Choibalsan worked directly with the Soviet NKVD secret police to round up and execute “unreliable” government officials, before the state moved on to religious leaders.
The total number of victims of Mongolia’s Great Repression remains unknown, but from 1937 to 1939 some 17,000 lamas were executed and more than 700 monasteries were demolished.
A military parade in Ulan Bator in 1946
Throughout World War II, Mongolia was a vital source of aid to the Soviet military and, in 1945, China was pressured into giving up its claims on Mongolia by a victorious Soviet Union. A referendum on Mongolia's official independence from China resulted in what was claimed to have been a 100 percent vote in favor of the proposal.
Soldiers march during the 1946 parade in Ulan Bator.
Stalin personally showed interest in Mongolia, repeatedly leaning on its government to destroy religion in the country once and for all.
“You must deal firmly with the lamas,” he told Ulan Bator. “You must not forget that only those who are strong will be recognized.”
Soviet-made cars parked near yurts outside Ulan Bator in 1961.
As elsewhere in the Soviet sphere of influence, repressions in Mongolia became less severe after Stalin’s death in 1953, and the Kremlin's ruthless war on religious faith became more of a bureaucratic tussle.
Worshippers at the Gandan Monastery in Ulan Bator in 1962. Only elderly Buddhists were allowed to pray at the monastery at the time, with younger Mongolians permitted only as “casual viewers,” according to the original caption of this photo.
According to Addleton, Moscow was seen as the least bad option for Mongolians from its two powerful neighbors.
A street scene in Ulan Bator in 1969
“Realistically, the [Soviet] Russian connection was important for Mongolia in terms of both reasserting its independence and guaranteeing its sovereignty vis-à-vis China,” the ex-ambassador says.
A statue of Josef Stalin in front of Ulan Bator’s National Library in 1971
By the late 1980s, the Soviet Union had some 50,000 troops and 1,800 tanks, along with 320 planes and helicopters, stationed at several bases across the country.
Mongolians wait in lines to buy meat in Ulan Bator in 1988.
As democracy movements began gathering strength elsewhere on the fringes of the Soviet Union, Mongolians in the 1980s also started to push for freedom against a surprisingly lenient government.
A protester waves the flag of Mongolia's Democratic Party in Ulan Bator in July 1990.
Jambyn Batmonkh, the last leader of communist Mongolia, recalled resisting officials that were seeking a crackdown on protests against one-party rule, saying, “There is no need to utilize the police or involve the military.”
The protesters, he said, “are our children.”
In March 1990, Mongolia's Politburo was replaced and Batmonkh announced his resignation, paving the way for free elections.
People gather around a statue of Stalin that was pulled down and removed from in front of the National Library in early 1990.
Addleton says Mongolians he has spoken to about their country's era as a Soviet satellite “have expressed a wide range of views about the Soviet Union."
A Mongolian man on the steps of a monument in Ulan Bator commemorating the country's support of the Soviet Union during World War II. The photo was taken in independent Mongolia in 1996.
"While some have expressed bitterness toward the Stalinist-era purges during the 1930s and the execution of members of the Buddhist clergy," Addleton says, "others look back on the post-World War II era with a degree of appreciation and even nostalgia.”
rferl.org · October 15, 2024
18. Exclusive: CNN sees inside elite Ukrainian drone mission flying deep into Russia
Not so secret any more perhaps. But I suppose that is the intent of the Ukrainians. Narrative warfare. This is the future.
Excerpts:
CNN was granted unprecedented exclusive access to one of Ukraine’s long-range drone units, part of the GUR. Its members call themselves the Long-Range UAV Unit.
Only two people were authorized to speak on the record, and then only using their callsigns: Serge, the long-range drone operations commander of GUR, and Vector, unit commander. Serge said he had personally overseen more than 500 long-range drone attacks into Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
CNN spent two days traveling across the country with the drone unit as it prepared to launch more than 100 drones overnight into September 29 on a mission into Russia. CNN is not disclosing the location of the sites visited for operational security reasons.
Their target: an ammunition facility, specifically train carriages sitting inside the depot loaded with recently delivered Iranian missiles, according to the Ukrainians.
Sources told CNN in September that Tehran had recently completed the delivery of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia. Iran has vehemently denied supplying any. “Iran has NOT delivered ballistic missiles to Russia. Period!” Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi recently stated on his X account.
Exclusive: CNN sees inside elite Ukrainian drone mission flying deep into Russia | CNN
CNN · October 16, 2024
CNN gains exclusive access to Ukrainian elite drone unit
07:34 - Source: CNN
Ukraine CNN —
The spluttering roar of a propeller punctuates the perfect silence. Car headlights flick on, splitting the darkness. Their beams reveal not just a section of tarmac ahead, but one of Ukraine’s most top-secret weapons, controlled by its most clandestine agency.
Stuck to the nose of the gray machine is a yellow emblem of an owl, wings spread and grasping a sword – the unmistakable logo of Ukraine’s defense intelligence, the GUR.
Two pilots sporting the same owl patches on their fatigues make their final checks inside the car before a thumbs up: “Let’s go!”
A high-speed, 50-second chase ensues, before the 13-foot long, 23-foot wingspan AN-196 Liutyi drone disappears in an instant into the inky-black Ukrainian night.
The drone’s destination is a target deep inside Russian territory.
CNN
CNN was granted unprecedented exclusive access to one of Ukraine’s long-range drone units, part of the GUR. Its members call themselves the Long-Range UAV Unit.
Only two people were authorized to speak on the record, and then only using their callsigns: Serge, the long-range drone operations commander of GUR, and Vector, unit commander. Serge said he had personally overseen more than 500 long-range drone attacks into Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
CNN spent two days traveling across the country with the drone unit as it prepared to launch more than 100 drones overnight into September 29 on a mission into Russia. CNN is not disclosing the location of the sites visited for operational security reasons.
Their target: an ammunition facility, specifically train carriages sitting inside the depot loaded with recently delivered Iranian missiles, according to the Ukrainians.
Sources told CNN in September that Tehran had recently completed the delivery of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia. Iran has vehemently denied supplying any. “Iran has NOT delivered ballistic missiles to Russia. Period!” Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi recently stated on his X account.
The facility sits on the outskirts of the tiny village of Kotluban, in the Volgograd region of southwestern Russia.
A satellite image of the Kotublan ammunition depot taken on August 4, 2024.
Maxar Technologies
Long-range drone attacks have become an increasingly prominent part of the Russia-Ukraine war. As the land war has become more attritional, the air war has gathered speed, with the major development being in drone warfare.
In September, the unit’s drones hit a Russian ammunition depot between Moscow and St. Petersburg, in Tver region. The attack on Toropets, the Ukrainians claimed, resulted in the destruction of a depot storing Iskander tactical missiles, as well as aerial glide bombs and artillery munition. The strike caused massive explosions, visible for miles.
A satellite image shows smoke rising from multiple explosions at the ammunition depot in Toropets, Tver region, Russia, on September 18, 2024.
Maxar Technologies
And in July the Ukrainians say they hit an oil refinery on Russia’s Black Sea coast, causing a major fire there.
But Russian air defenses thwart many Ukrainian drone attacks. The GUR’s success rate, the unit tells CNN, could be transformed from 50% to 95% if the United States gave permission to use Western weapons in attacks on Russian soil.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned, however, that Moscow would consider any assault on it supported by a nuclear power to be a joint attack, singling out a mass launching of drones as one potential example.
Vector said many of Russia’s airfields, the origin-point of many of the air raids it conducts against Ukraine, are out of range. His drones, while highly effective, are not always that efficient – swarms of them are required to ensure their targets are hit. “Of course, we can send the UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), and we destroyed many places. But it’s not enough,” Vector says.
“We’re not asking only about the permission to send the missiles anywhere in Russia, we speak about the weapons which can help us to move this war from our territory,” Vector adds.
Inside the mission
Serge and Vector have been leading their unit’s attempts to hurt Putin at home.
Regardless of targets, their missions follow a rigid set of operating procedures that include meetings at various locations across Ukraine.
In an underground office with dark brown, seemingly never-ending Soviet corridors, Serge sits across from Vector in a white-walled room. No pictures hang on the wall, even the whiteboard remains blank. The meeting is to the point.
“There will be about 12 drones,” Serge says to Vector, who has a map in front of him detailing the target and range of the Russian air defense and electronic warfare systems. They then agree the target approach time of around 3 am and the launch intervals for the drones.
Vector scribbles two notes before standing abruptly and saying, “Everything is clear. Ready to complete the task.”
Planning the routes into Russia is done from a secret location. The routes the Liutyi takes can include more than 1,000 waypoints to avoid detection
Sebastian Shukla/Daria Tarasova-Markina/CNN
Outside on the street, Vector climbs into his vehicle. He beckons the CNN team to follow him, phones turned off.
As dusk draws in, the convoy pulls into a compound, articulated lorries lined up. A tiny room with a desk and two sets of bunk beds serves as the only light source for miles around.
Men dressed in black, balaclavas over their faces, wait to hear their orders. Vector delivers a short brief, adding that this mission will also involve other units. He orders his men to start preparing the routes and hands over a small USB key containing the information for the mission ahead.
“Any questions?” he asks. “None? Okay. Let’s get working.”
As his men scatter across the compound, Vector explains that the planning phase of these missions is critical. “Planning is maybe 60% part of the success, everything depends on the planning,” he tells CNN.
He points to the quality of Russia’s air defenses, especially over the past 12 months. “We’re successful guys and we find the windows,” he says, but it’s a challenge.
Route planning is seen underway. CNN has added blurs to this image for security reasons.
Sebastian Shukla/Daria Tarasova-Markina/CNN
Each drone will be programmed with more than 1,000 different waypoints, to evade Russia’s comprehensive air defense systems. There is tacit acceptance from Vector that some of this resembles a video game.
“It looks like we play with them,” Vector says jokingly, “but it’s not a game. It’s a war.”
Serge adds that not all men in his unit are career soldiers like him. He has served more than 20 years in the Ukrainian army and began flying drone missions in 2014 as Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions split away from Kyiv.
Decoy machines
In a warehouse, a Liutyi drone, produced predominantly in Ukraine, wingless for the time being, stands surrounded by green camouflage-painted crates containing multiple Rubaka kamikaze drones.
Vector explains that these smaller drones are crucial to the success of any mission. The aim is simple: to overwhelm the air defenses and draw Russian fire away from the Liutyi, which often carries a payload as great as 250 kilograms (550 pounds).
CNN
“They’re very simple, and we can use them with and without payloads,” he says of the smaller drones.
Cracking open one of the crates, he pulls out one of the decoy machines. Strips of metal foil have been added to the wings to fool Russian radar.
“We try to mix them, and we try to send them from different distances, different launch places… they try to destroy them. They send helicopters and missiles, they turn on the radio electronic warfare,” Vector explains.
Their targets are only military targets, Vector states. “Russia came inside our country. They destroyed a lot of electricity, a lot of houses, cities, villages.” But, he adds, “not all of them are stupid, and when they understand that war can come to them like they come to us, they will change something in their country. They will change the politics.”
One of the many articulated lorries has backed up for loading. In near darkness, drone bodies, followed by wings, are loaded three per truck by men whose faces are totally covered by balaclavas, and strapped down, ready to be taken to their launch sites.
Pilots make final checks to the drone before launch. They follow the drone at high speed until takeoff, then it flies autonomously to its target. CNN has added a blur to this image for security reasons.
Sebastian Shukla/Daria Tarasova-Markina/CNN
Across other parts of Ukraine roughly 80 other GUR operatives are preparing 90 other drones, not all the Liutyi, for flight.
Some 30% of all the drones being launched will be on decoy missions, Serge says. The drones have been programmed to fly anywhere between 450 and 550 miles, with the Liutyis being the spearhead, destined for the small town-turned-ammunition hub of Kotluban.
The men load the warheads carefully into the bodies of the drones. Each compartment is then sealed with the squeal of a drill.
Serge and Vector, now in full combat uniform, observe the final preparations. This launch is one of the largest Serge has ever conducted, he says.
“Maybe (the Russian people) don’t understand what’s going on in Ukraine, but when these UAVs arrive, they understand clearly what we have been living (with) for the past 10 years,” Vector chimes in.
Tracking the drones’ flight
In total darkness, the drones are pushed into position. The car with the pilots moves in behind. The propeller spurts into life and the pilots ensuring a smooth takeoff begin their high-speed chase down the tarmac. Once airborne the fully autonomous drone starts ticking off the myriad waypoints.
Vector hurtles after the drone before slamming on the brakes and proclaiming “perfect.” He turns the car around and blasts a patriotic song from his radio.
CNN
Earlier, he told CNN: “I don’t want my son or other children to have a war in the future, so I want to finish it in my life.”
Back at the planning base, the hours tick by and Vector, Serge and others keep tabs on the drones via trackers.
The success of the mission is monitored in three ways, they say: through human intelligence on the ground, the messages seen on Russian Telegram groups and, later, analysis using satellite technology. Only once all three have been assessed can a mission be deemed a success or not.
Preparations for drone launches take place under cover of darkness, with red lights used to minimise the chances of detection by reconnaissance drones.
Sebastian Shukla/Daria Tarasova-Markina/CNN
As the 3 am arrival window nears, Serge starts reading out messages he is seeing from Telegram channels across Russia. The widespread nature of this attack starts to become clearer. Various cities in southern Russia – Voronezh, Yesk, Rostov and Volgograd – all start reporting drones arriving in their airspace.
One video from Voronezh shows one of the decoy drones whizzing overhead. An audio clip of a woman in clear distress at what is happening above her head leaves Vector laughing.
Through these Telegram channels, he says, “we understand that we are having some success.”
Initial satellite imagery of the ammunition depot in Kotluban shows scorched fields, a result of burning grass, but seemingly little evidence of major explosions within – apparent signs of a near miss.
However, the GUR shared with CNN a video from the region of the depot. CNN was able to independently view and verify aspects of the video without a blur to check its authenticity.
A defense intelligence source told CNN that their knowledge of the camera’s location, combined with its distance from Kotluban, allowed them to ascertain that the explosions inside the depot were large.
CNN
The video, sped up, shows 11 explosions all occurring in a 56-minute timeframe between 2:22 and 3:18 am – exactly the period during which the drones arriving from Ukraine were expected to land.
CNN was able to independently verify, through sources, that a direct hit on the facility had taken place. CNN is not publishing the image to protect the source’s anonymity, but it was taken within 72 hours of the attack.
The image shows a number of objects scattered around the building and a building badly damaged.
Close-up before (left) and after (right) Maxar satellite images of the Kotluban facility show damage to a building and scattered debris in the later image, center bottom, taken in early October.
Maxar Technologies
A later Maxar Technologies satellite image, also obtained by CNN, shows less debris in the vicinity – an indication that the Russian military had cleaned up the site – but the same building, heavily damaged.
The mission to destroy Iranian-delivered missiles was a total success, the Ukrainians insist.
As the drones were heading towards Kotluban, Serge told CNN: “We are constantly forcing the enemy to think about what they did in February 2022. They must realize that we are getting stronger every day and we are bringing our victory and their defeat closer.”
CNN’s Gianluca Mezzofiore and Paul Murphy contributed to this report.
CNN · October 16, 2024
19. Today’s Axis of Evil is bigger and more dangerous than ever
As the CSA said this week: "The Axis of Upheaval"
Chirstopher has coined the Phrase: The "Dark Quad."
But we must keep in mind and empshizie in our public diplomacy and information campaigns that these relationships are based on fear, weakness, desperation, and envy.
Excerpts:
The Russia-China-Iran-North Korea axis of hostility can fairly be called the early, limited phase of World War III, fear of which has seriously restrained the Biden-Harris policy on Ukraine and the Middle East, just as it paralyzed the Obama administration regarding Russian moves in Ukraine and Syria and rationalized Donald Trump’s indulgence of Putin and Xi. Trump shudders about nuclear Armageddon as much as President Biden does, without understanding that accommodating the dictators only makes a fatal miscalculation more likely.
Beijing is betting that the West’s exaggerated fear of the Apocalypse will similarly hold back a vigorous U.S. response — whether under Biden, Trump or Kamala Harris — to an attack on Taiwan or the Philippines. And North Korea recklessly believes the same U.S. dread of global escalation in so many “other fronts in different places” will serve its own regional ambitions against South Korea and Japan. Pyongyang and its totalitarian accomplices hope America will be pulled in competing directions and unable to cope with the multiplicity of security challenges.
Although Blinken says the administration “does not seek bloc confrontation,” U.S. policymakers may have to rely on the Cold War prospect of mutually assured destruction to deter rash actions by members of the malevolent authoritarian axis.
Today’s Axis of Evil is bigger and more dangerous than ever
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4932788-russia-china-north-korea-axis-of-evil/?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=topic/northkorea
by Joseph Bosco, opinion contributor - 10/15/24 10:00 AM ET
Getty Images
Render of a chessboard. A king decorated with the USA flag is surrounded by other pieces decorated with flags of Iran, China, Russia and North Korea.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently expressed mild but potentially consequential confusion regarding the nature and scope of America’s proclaimed enemies.
His most recent article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs states: “A small number of countries — principally Russia, with the partnership of Iran and North Korea, as well as China — are determined to alter the foundational principles of the international system….While these countries are not an axis, and the administration has been clear that it does not seek bloc confrontation, choices these revisionist powers are making mean we need to act decisively to prevent that outcome.”
But when Blinken was asked to address the volatile situation in the Middle East during his press conference in Laos last week, he said, “Unfortunately, what we have is, among other things, a so-called axis of resistance led by Iran that looks to create other fronts in different places.”
The “different places” he was referring to are Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, the Red Sea and Israel itself. They are all locations where Iran and its proxies — Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis — are wreaking havoc.
But the axis of latent hostility toward, and active subversion of, the U.S.-led international order extends far beyond the Middle East and involves dangerous parties more powerful than Iran and its proxies — that is, those nuclear-armed states mentioned in Blinken’s article: Russia, China and North Korea.
Congressional leaders, including Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, House Speaker Mike Johnson and former House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer are not reluctant to revive George W. Bush’s original “axis of evil” label and expand it beyond Iran, Iraq, North Korea “and their terrorist allies” to include the two most critical partners and sponsors, Russia and China.
Hamas leaders, when they unleashed their long-prepared October 7 massacre, were surely aware that it was Vladimir Putin’s birthday. While carrying out their murderous rampage against innocent Israelis, Americans and others, they were delivering a gift to Putin.
The devastating attack on Israel served as a welcome diversion for the Russian leader. He was struggling to cope with Ukraine’s valiant resistance — with limited Western aid — to Russia’s second invasion of the country since its 2014 seizure of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea during the Obama-Biden administration.
Conversely, Hamas’s atrocity was deeply unwelcome for the Biden-Harris administration, whose attention was focused on threading a geopolitical needle: helping Ukraine survive without provoking Putin into further escalation, all the while keeping a wary eye on China’s increasingly aggressive posture toward Taiwan and North Korea’s continued menacing of South Korea.
Last week, on the anniversary of October 7, North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un extended his own birthday greetings to Putin, his “closest comrade,” as Moscow and Pyongyang deepened the strategic relationship affirmed during their June summit.
Simultaneously, on this tragic date, reports emanated from South Korea and Ukraine that North Korean soldiers, probably military engineers, had been killed there, the first instance of a third country sending uniformed military personnel to participate directly in Putin’s invasion. North Korea had already been supplying Russia with massive quantities of ammunition shells, missiles and other material used to strike Ukraine. In return, Moscow has given Pyongyang vitally needed technical assistance, as well as diplomatic and economic support, by blocking further United Nations sanctions.
Kim openly declared that he is joining China and Russia in a common struggle against “western hegemony and imperialism,” an unsurprising development given that North Korea is already dependent on China for economic, diplomatic and security support. Pyongyang’s declaration places it squarely in tandem with the “no-limits strategic partnership” that Putin and Xi Jinping proclaimed in February 2022, just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when they jointly pledged their opposition to “certain states” that pursue “hegemony” and “unilateral military advantage.” China voiced its support for Russia’s position on Ukraine, and Putin reciprocated by endorsing Beijing’s hostile intentions toward Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific.
Although Iran is certainly at the evil center of the destructive events in the Middle East, it is also doing its part to support Russia’s aggression with military drones to kill Ukrainians and destroy Ukraine’s cites and vital infrastructure.
All these lethal interactions and collaborative efforts are operationalizing the mutual diplomatic and ideological declarations of a joint anti-U.S., anti-Western strategy.
The Russia-China-Iran-North Korea axis of hostility can fairly be called the early, limited phase of World War III, fear of which has seriously restrained the Biden-Harris policy on Ukraine and the Middle East, just as it paralyzed the Obama administration regarding Russian moves in Ukraine and Syria and rationalized Donald Trump’s indulgence of Putin and Xi. Trump shudders about nuclear Armageddon as much as President Biden does, without understanding that accommodating the dictators only makes a fatal miscalculation more likely.
Beijing is betting that the West’s exaggerated fear of the Apocalypse will similarly hold back a vigorous U.S. response — whether under Biden, Trump or Kamala Harris — to an attack on Taiwan or the Philippines. And North Korea recklessly believes the same U.S. dread of global escalation in so many “other fronts in different places” will serve its own regional ambitions against South Korea and Japan. Pyongyang and its totalitarian accomplices hope America will be pulled in competing directions and unable to cope with the multiplicity of security challenges.
Although Blinken says the administration “does not seek bloc confrontation,” U.S. policymakers may have to rely on the Cold War prospect of mutually assured destruction to deter rash actions by members of the malevolent authoritarian axis.
Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He is a nonresident fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies and a member of the advisory board of the Global Taiwan Institute.
20. THAAD Attitude: What to Make of the Air Defense System’s Combat Deployment to Israel
Excerpt:
While these takeaways are meaningful in their own right, they also have implications for Army air defense artillery. Of the seven THAAD batteries available, four are now committed to outside of the continental United States (two in the Middle East, one in South Korea, and one in Guam). Not all the three batteries stateside are in a condition to immediately deploy either, as at least one is being used for flight tests and system upgrades. It is standard for air defense capabilities (including Patriot) to have at least one unit on this type of test mission, where both software and hardware are updated and tested in a constant iterative process. In the words of General Sline in Spies Like Us, “A weapon unused is a useless weapon.” But these deployments also constrain the US Army’s ability to respond to additional contingencies elsewhere given the limited number of systems available for rapid deployment, to say nothing of the increasing strain on the air defense force due to its ever-increasing operational tempo. These are critical factors the Army must account for as it prepares to meet the air and missile defense challenges of the future.
THAAD Attitude: What to Make of the Air Defense System’s Combat Deployment to Israel - Modern War Institute
mwi.westpoint.edu · by Peter Mitchell · October 15, 2024
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In an unprecedented move, the Department of Defense announced over the holiday weekend that it would be deploying a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to Israel to assist in defending Israeli airspace against Iranian ballistic missiles. By the time you’re reading this, it’s almost certainly already operational.
The deployment of US air defense systems to an allied country isn’t what’s unprecedented. It isn’t even the deployment to Israel, specifically. THAAD participated in a joint readiness exercise on Nevatim Air Base and later at an undisclosed site in the Negev back in March 2019. And Patriot battalions have regularly rotated through the biannual Juniper Cobra missile defense exercise. What’s different this time is that the United States has never before overtly deployed troops to Israel during an ongoing war. The combat deployment of THAAD marks a significant step in US-Israeli integrated missile defense cooperation, but it is also sending a strategic signal to Iran and other regional actors. While THAAD provides a substantial asset in terms of air defense capabilities, three important takeaways go beyond the technical details and tactical significance.
First, there is a strategic messaging component to the deployment. As proven in the past two missile exchanges between Israel and Iran (to say nothing of the relentless bombardments from Gaza and Lebanon), Israel possesses the most combat-tested and resilient air defense network on the planet. The newly deployed THAAD battery brings an additional AN/TPY-2 to the table. This trailer-sized radar is the most powerful mobile land-based radar in the world, and brings more situational awareness to the integrated network. In terms of interceptor capability, the Israeli long-range Arrow system is roughly equivalent to the THAAD, similarly capable of exoatmospheric interceptions. and is already integrated with Israel’s medium-range David’s Sling and short-range Iron Dome systems. Tactically, THAAD therefore is a buttressing of existing Israeli capabilities, rather than a gamechanger. Strategically, this move is less about bolstering specific Israeli capabilities and more about sending a clear strategic message to Iran and the Middle East more broadly. The presence of THAAD (and more importantly, the accompanying US soldiers) is a visible symbol of American commitment and vital interest in the conflict not spiraling out of control. It was possibly a step the White House agreed to during the October 9 phone call between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Joe Biden and is likely aimed at encouraging the Israelis to not rashly strike at vital Iranian nuclear or oil assets in their yet-to-be-launched retaliatory strike. A statement by Netanyahu supports this.
Second, the THAAD deployment expands an already broad network of US air defense assets in the Middle East. The United States already has multiple AN/TPY-2 forward-based radars deployed across the region observing Iran with long-range tracking and surveillance. On top of that, the United States has had an additional THAAD battery deployed in the Middle East, along with supporting Patriot battalions, since October 2023. By deploying a full THAAD battery to Israel itself, the United States is effectively expanding its air defense footprint in Israel with interception capabilities. This complements the AN/TPY-2’s function and enables a more comprehensive detection and interception capacity in the event of an attack. Notably, the United States is also assuming the risk that these American soldiers could end up deliberately targeted, either directly by Iran in the event of another drone or missile attack, or by Iranian proxies who have launched frequent attacks against US forces across the region over the past year.
Finally, the deployment raises the prospect of a permanent THAAD presence in Israel. Historically, THAAD deployments have transformed into permanent stations, as seen with the systems stationed in Guam (since 2013, the author is at left) and South Korea (since 2016). In addition to the political difficulties of removing air defense capabilities once they’re introduced—allies naturally want to maintain the coverage—the complexity of deploying THAAD involves substantial operational support. This is in no small part due to the tremendous power consumption and output of the AN/TPY-2 radar, which makes other tactical radars look like energy-efficient lightbulbs compared to a football stadium floodlight. For comparison, the Patriot’s electrical power plant consists of two 150-kilowatt generators. THAAD requires about ten times that amount, due to the inverse square law. The AN/TPY-2 requires two 1.1-megawatt prime power units, which drink fuel so greedily that it is almost always preferable to connect them into an electrical power grid. This, along with other factors—such as the need for considerable site security—has led to the establishment of permanent installations rather than temporary deployments, excluding exercise rotations like to Romania in 2019.
While these takeaways are meaningful in their own right, they also have implications for Army air defense artillery. Of the seven THAAD batteries available, four are now committed to outside of the continental United States (two in the Middle East, one in South Korea, and one in Guam). Not all the three batteries stateside are in a condition to immediately deploy either, as at least one is being used for flight tests and system upgrades. It is standard for air defense capabilities (including Patriot) to have at least one unit on this type of test mission, where both software and hardware are updated and tested in a constant iterative process. In the words of General Sline in Spies Like Us, “A weapon unused is a useless weapon.” But these deployments also constrain the US Army’s ability to respond to additional contingencies elsewhere given the limited number of systems available for rapid deployment, to say nothing of the increasing strain on the air defense force due to its ever-increasing operational tempo. These are critical factors the Army must account for as it prepares to meet the air and missile defense challenges of the future.
Maj. Peter Mitchell is a strategist, air defense expert, West Point instructor, and Modern War Institute contributor. You can follow him on X @peternmitchell
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Capt. Aaron Smith, US Army
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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Peter Mitchell · October 15, 2024
21. Is a Full-Scale Middle East War Already Here?
Excerpts:
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
Both sides would likely try to complement (or substitute for) their conventional military operations with further cyber strikes and covert actions. As to the latter, Israel’s advantage appears to be even greater than it would be in an air war. For decades, the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to assassinate VIPs and sabotage critical facilities inside Iran. It is unclear how long it took Israel to set up such operations, how easily it can improvise new ones, or whether it has others already prepared.
By contrast, Iran has come off as impotent in this arena as well. Although it has reportedly tried to kill senior Israeli officials, it has so far failed. Its best effort seems to have been a small terrorist attack on the night of October 1, which was carried out at the same time as its second missile and drone attack and which killed a half dozen people in Tel Aviv. Iranian personnel may have been involved in a number of small-scale terrorist attacks in Israel during the past year, but they all pale in comparison with Israel’s astonishing covert successes.
In the cyber realm, Iran appears to be in a somewhat stronger position but still seems outmatched by the Israelis. Iran has spent almost two decades developing its cyberwar capabilities, and they’ve gotten good enough to wreak havoc on undefended targets. The Iranians have even shown some ability to hit harder targets. But in cyber exchanges, the Israelis have consistently prevailed. For instance, during the summer of 2023, Iranian cyberattacks shut off the power at several Israeli hospitals and health clinics. But the Israelis responded by launching cyber-assaults of their own, shutting down gas stations across Iran. Tehran stopped its attacks.
Of course, the whole point of cyber-operations is that neither side knows what the other can do—because if they knew, they would eliminate their vulnerabilities. It is possible that Iran is holding some truly devastating cyberweapons in reserve. It is equally possible that Israel is, too—and so far, the evidence suggests that the Israelis are both more likely to hurt Iran and better prepared to limit the damage from Iranian attacks.
...
WHAT MIGHT MAKE IT WORSE?
For all these reasons, an expanded war between Israel and Iran is likely to consist of a sporadic series of assaults carried out by aircraft, missiles, drones, and cyberweapons, plus some covert operations and terrorist attacks. In other words, more—possibly much more—of the same. Iran would probably continue to limit its missile and drone attacks to Israeli military facilities for fear that hitting Israeli cities could push Israel to escalate to the kind of attacks that Iran could not match. And even if the Iranian regime decided simply to hurt Israel as much as it could regardless of the consequences for itself, the Islamic Republic is just not strong enough to do much damage. It could launch its entire inventory of several thousand missiles at Israeli cities and perhaps kill several hundred Israelis. And in that case, if the IDF decided to retaliate against Iranian cities with hundreds of missiles and airstrikes, it could probably kill thousands of Iranians—but that’s it. The Iranians would then be a spent force, and although the Israeli air force could sustain small airstrikes against Iran for weeks, unless Israel did something like deliberately bomb an Iranian mass participant event—say, a soccer match—it is unlikely there would be a huge increase in Iranian casualties. Neither country would be devastated by this kind of exchange; indeed, it is exceptionally difficult to imagine scenarios that would even bring them close to it.
It is far more likely that Israeli strikes would focus on Iranian military targets but could include civilian infrastructure—power plants, refineries, government buildings—and elements of the Iranian leadership, such as Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and military commanders. Even then, the Israelis would be unlikely to target Iran’s most senior leaders, such as President Masoud Pezeshkian or Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Israeli officials recognize that either man could be replaced by a more aggressive, less prudent figure willing to incur a tremendous price in order to inflict harm on Israel or, worse still, willing to commit Iran to building nuclear weapons regardless of the costs.
It’s possible to conjure black swan events—such as an Iranian-backed terrorist attack on Israel that kills hundreds or thousands of Israeli citizens—that could cause one side or the other to try to do more damage to the other in return. But the far more likely prospect is that even a wider conflict would remain constrained by the limitations of distance, diplomacy, and strategy that have shaped the war that is already underway.
Is a Full-Scale Middle East War Already Here?
Iran and Israel Face Limitations That Make Massive Escalation Unlikely
October 16, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by Kenneth M. Pollack · October 16, 2024
Many analysts watching the conflict in the Middle East have warned that the present fighting could escalate further. At the moment, such fears are concentrated on the prospect of a war between Iran and Israel.
Of course, that war is already underway. Iran has launched two direct attacks on Israel, while Israel has carried out one strike in response and is almost certainly preparing a second. A half dozen Iranian allies and proxies have attacked Israel, including in terrorist assaults; Israel has assassinated a passel of key Iranian leaders; and both sides have carried out cyber strikes.
So the real question is not what a war between Iran and Israel would look like but what an expanded conflict between them might entail. The answer, in essence, is this: more of what is happening right now, just with increased intensity. That is because both sides face significant material and strategic obstacles that make an imagined all-out war between them unlikely.
Iran trails Israel in almost all offensive and defensive capabilities, so it simply cannot inflict devastating damage. Israel, meanwhile, has a tremendous capacity for targeted strikes, but it does not have the variety of resources that a war of conquest or devastation against Iran would require. Both states are physically too far apart and lack the capacity to launch invasions by ground or sea. These obstacles mean that unconstrained warfare is doubtful, and even to the extent that there is an escalating exchange of blows, Armageddon is unlikely.
THE TYRANNY OF DISTANCE
The most important factor constraining a war between Iran and Israel is distance. The two countries do not share a border. At their closest points, they are 750 miles apart. Central Israel is almost 1,000 miles away from Tehran.
Moreover, between them lie Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Some of those countries are more aligned with Israel, some are more aligned with Iran, and some are hostile to both. The two potential antagonists can count on help from some—in terms of allowing their forces to pass and impeding those of the enemy—but cannot assume much more.
Jordan’s King Abdullah II, for instance, is a key, if tacit, ally of Israel but he rules over a majority Palestinian population that mostly hates the Jewish state, limiting how much he can support Israel. His country helped Israel shoot down the Iranian drones and cruise missiles that crossed its territory during Iran’s first missile attack on Israel on April 13. But Amman was careful to insist that it was merely defending its air space and would do so against all foreign intruders. Likewise, Syria is heavily dependent on Iran. But Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was taught by his father never to fight Israel, a lesson the Assads learned after repeated defeats in 1967, 1973, and 1982. As a result, although Iran can move forces through and base them in Syria, Damascus has so far prevented Tehran from mounting major attacks directly against Israel from Syrian territory for fear that Israel would expand its attacks there.
These realities make any kind of land invasion impossible in either direction. To invade Iran, Israeli ground forces would have to drive through Iraq and Jordan or Iraq and Syria, which would be logistically challenging and strategically foolish. Iran is 80 times as large as Israel, and even if Israel could find a way to get half of its dozen or so ground divisions there, they would be swallowed up by the Islamic Republic’s vast geographical expanse and would have little ability to accomplish anything meaningful, nor would Israel ever want to send so much of its citizen army so far away.
The most important factor constraining a war between Iran and Israel is distance.
The Israelis have been able to destroy key enemy facilities with small special forces teams inserted by air, and they very well might stage one or more such operations against important Iranian targets. But the Israeli military could not occupy Iranian territory in this way without a route to resupply and reinforce a first wave of air-dropped units.
The Israeli Defense Forces, of course, also boasts a capable navy, and Iran has a lengthy coastline. The IDF might mount a battalion-sized or even brigade-sized raid against an important Iranian coastal facility using one or more jury-rigged naval transports of some kind. But Israel lacks the amphibious assault and carrier-based air capabilities needed to mount a larger invasion from the sea. Unless Israel could base fighter squadrons in Bahrain or the United Arab Emirates, which is highly unlikely, maintaining a force ashore for more than a few hours in the face of Iranian missiles and airstrikes would be exceptionally difficult. Even if these forces could somehow seize and hold a beachhead, sustaining it would require getting Israeli transport vessels through both the Houthi-menaced Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Iranian-threatened Strait of Hormuz. Consequently, such a small raiding force could realistically destroy only one or a few high-value Iranian facilities near the sea before it had to withdraw out of range of Iranian air and sea forces.
Iran’s navy would face even more formidable obstacles trying to mount an amphibious invasion of Israel against the air, sea, and ground forces of the Jewish state, not to mention the logistical nightmare of trying to move and supply forces there by circumnavigating all of Africa. A ground offensive against Israel would be only slightly more appealing. In theory, Iran has the logistical advantage of free passage through Iraq and Syria. But its ground forces are the weakest and most backward element of its armed forces, and they would not stand a chance against an IDF mobilized to defend its heavily fortified positions on the Golan Heights. Iran knows this: that is why the government has not deployed large Iranian ground forces to the Damascus area. Instead, Iran has reportedly massed as many as 40,000 Afghan, Iraqi, Pakistani, and Syrian militiamen in southwest Syria who could be used to launch a massive assault without jeopardizing the lives of Iranian citizens or, Tehran hopes, triggering an Israeli response against Iran.
Yet that kind of attack would almost certainly result in a catastrophic defeat, with vast numbers of these lightly armed and poorly trained forces slaughtered by Israeli ground and air forces. That Tehran has not already attempted such an assault suggests they realize its futility. Israel’s invasion of Lebanon has greatly degraded Hezbollah—Iran’s ultimate deterrent against an Israeli attack on Iran. If Tehran thought these militias could save its close partner, it almost certainly would already have thrown them at the Israelis.
THIN AIR
These limits on ground operations mean that the conventional aspects of a wider war between Israel and Iran would fall mostly to their air forces, which are also limited in what they can do. Israel possesses ballistic missiles that could range all of Iran and has cruise missiles and drones that can do so from ships and submarines, and probably from Israel itself. No one knows how many of these Israel has, but it is not a huge number—probably in the high hundreds or low thousands for each. All have relatively small warheads, nothing like the payload that manned aircraft can deliver. That makes them very useful for destroying relatively small, high-value Iranian targets—military equipment and buildings, but not vast bases, let alone cities.
Although Iranian air defenses would complicate the operations of Israel’s manned aircraft, they would act as little more than an annoyance. The real problem for Israel would be the distance. Israel’s F-15s can certainly make those flights, but its cutting-edge F-35s and F-16s, which represent the bulk of its combat air force, have ranges of only about 600 miles. Israel’s long-range, standoff munitions can boost that figure by several hundred more, but it would still be a significant undertaking for those aircraft to hit targets in central Iran without aerial refueling.
Israel has a small number of long-range refueling aircraft, and although its air force has skilled pilots who routinely fly them in ways that no other country would dare, the planes are big and very vulnerable. It would be difficult and dangerous for Israel to employ them routinely in hostile airspace. Although none of Israel’s American-made fighter aircraft were designed to refuel one another in flight (a technique known as “buddy refueling”), the Israelis may have modified them to do so. That, however, would introduce other inefficiencies; half of Israel’s fighters would do nothing but refuel the other half. So unless Jordan or Saudi Arabia opens its airspace to the Israeli air force (as they apparently did on April 13 to combat the Iranian missile and drone attack on Israel), the Israelis would have to pick and choose when to employ manned aircraft to strike Iran.
Neither country is in a position to mount a massive, sustained air campaign against the other.
Iran has two air forces, one belonging to the regular armed forces and the other to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. But neither can hold a candle to the Israeli air force. Iran has no dedicated refueling aircraft and only a few dozen old French-made fighters that could buddy refuel. Its aircraft are overwhelmingly American models dating from the 1960s and 1970s and French and Soviet planes from the 1970s and 1980s. However many of them could even make the flight to Israel would not stand a chance against Israeli air defenses.
That would put the onus of an Iranian air campaign back on its missile and drone force. Like Israel, the Islamic Republic probably has hundreds (or even a number in the low thousands) of these left with the range to hit Israel. In its strikes on April 13 and October 1, however, Iran launched a combined total of 500 of them and did virtually no damage. There are reports that Russian technicians are trying to help the Iranians improve both the survivability and the lethality of these missiles, but the six months between those two Iranian attacks did not show any significant improvement. It is humiliating for Iran to keep striking and failing in this way. Worse, it invites far more painful Israeli retaliation.
What all of this should make clear is that Israel can inflict a considerable amount of pain on Iran through relatively small, highly precise air, drone, and missile strikes, whereas Iran will have trouble causing Israel much pain at all. And neither country is in a position to mount a massive, sustained air campaign against the other. That is why even an expanded war between them won’t look anything like the German Luftwaffe’s Blitz or the British-American Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany in World War II—or even anything that would look like more recent U.S. air campaigns against Serbia and Iraq, or the kind of air campaign Israel is now waging against Hezbollah.
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
Both sides would likely try to complement (or substitute for) their conventional military operations with further cyber strikes and covert actions. As to the latter, Israel’s advantage appears to be even greater than it would be in an air war. For decades, the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to assassinate VIPs and sabotage critical facilities inside Iran. It is unclear how long it took Israel to set up such operations, how easily it can improvise new ones, or whether it has others already prepared.
By contrast, Iran has come off as impotent in this arena as well. Although it has reportedly tried to kill senior Israeli officials, it has so far failed. Its best effort seems to have been a small terrorist attack on the night of October 1, which was carried out at the same time as its second missile and drone attack and which killed a half dozen people in Tel Aviv. Iranian personnel may have been involved in a number of small-scale terrorist attacks in Israel during the past year, but they all pale in comparison with Israel’s astonishing covert successes.
In the cyber realm, Iran appears to be in a somewhat stronger position but still seems outmatched by the Israelis. Iran has spent almost two decades developing its cyberwar capabilities, and they’ve gotten good enough to wreak havoc on undefended targets. The Iranians have even shown some ability to hit harder targets. But in cyber exchanges, the Israelis have consistently prevailed. For instance, during the summer of 2023, Iranian cyberattacks shut off the power at several Israeli hospitals and health clinics. But the Israelis responded by launching cyber-assaults of their own, shutting down gas stations across Iran. Tehran stopped its attacks.
Of course, the whole point of cyber-operations is that neither side knows what the other can do—because if they knew, they would eliminate their vulnerabilities. It is possible that Iran is holding some truly devastating cyberweapons in reserve. It is equally possible that Israel is, too—and so far, the evidence suggests that the Israelis are both more likely to hurt Iran and better prepared to limit the damage from Iranian attacks.
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
Both Iran and Israel face strategic conditions that further limit the potential scope of a conflict between them. Not only does Iran understand that it is fighting at a pronounced disadvantage against Israel in conventional and even unconventional warfare but the Iranians believe that Israel possesses an array of weapons of mass destruction. Although the Iranian regime is often accused of irrational behavior, the reality is that it has shown considerable prudence and would undoubtedly seek to avoid taking any action that could provoke a massive Israeli response.
Similar questions would probably also affect Israeli calculations. The IDF has the capacity to destroy various facilities critical to Iran’s nuclear program. But it has never done so for a crucial but typically overlooked reason: Israel and the United States fear that a large-scale Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear sites would prompt Tehran to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and declare that it had to build a nuclear arsenal as the only way to deter another Israeli attack. Tehran would then begin constructing more facilities deep underground to achieve that goal—like the facilities it already has at the Fordow plant near the city of Qom, which is immune to any of the aerial munitions Israel is known to possess. Thus, attacking the Iranian nuclear program might set it back for a few years, only to guarantee that Iran acquires a nuclear arsenal very soon thereafter. That would be a severe net negative for Israel.
Similarly, neither side is likely to want to interfere with Iranian oil exports. Iran’s regime remains almost completely dependent on oil revenues and would try to steer clear of any actions that might affect them. Israel knows that attacking Iranian oil exports could raise global oil prices, potentially infuriating the United States and many other countries. Given how much Israel still depends on American support, it seems unlikely that the Jewish state would touch that third rail, although it might opt to hit Iranian refineries, oil storage, and other facilities associated with Iranian domestic consumption.
WHAT MIGHT MAKE IT WORSE?
For all these reasons, an expanded war between Israel and Iran is likely to consist of a sporadic series of assaults carried out by aircraft, missiles, drones, and cyberweapons, plus some covert operations and terrorist attacks. In other words, more—possibly much more—of the same. Iran would probably continue to limit its missile and drone attacks to Israeli military facilities for fear that hitting Israeli cities could push Israel to escalate to the kind of attacks that Iran could not match. And even if the Iranian regime decided simply to hurt Israel as much as it could regardless of the consequences for itself, the Islamic Republic is just not strong enough to do much damage. It could launch its entire inventory of several thousand missiles at Israeli cities and perhaps kill several hundred Israelis. And in that case, if the IDF decided to retaliate against Iranian cities with hundreds of missiles and airstrikes, it could probably kill thousands of Iranians—but that’s it. The Iranians would then be a spent force, and although the Israeli air force could sustain small airstrikes against Iran for weeks, unless Israel did something like deliberately bomb an Iranian mass participant event—say, a soccer match—it is unlikely there would be a huge increase in Iranian casualties. Neither country would be devastated by this kind of exchange; indeed, it is exceptionally difficult to imagine scenarios that would even bring them close to it.
It is far more likely that Israeli strikes would focus on Iranian military targets but could include civilian infrastructure—power plants, refineries, government buildings—and elements of the Iranian leadership, such as Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and military commanders. Even then, the Israelis would be unlikely to target Iran’s most senior leaders, such as President Masoud Pezeshkian or Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Israeli officials recognize that either man could be replaced by a more aggressive, less prudent figure willing to incur a tremendous price in order to inflict harm on Israel or, worse still, willing to commit Iran to building nuclear weapons regardless of the costs.
It’s possible to conjure black swan events—such as an Iranian-backed terrorist attack on Israel that kills hundreds or thousands of Israeli citizens—that could cause one side or the other to try to do more damage to the other in return. But the far more likely prospect is that even a wider conflict would remain constrained by the limitations of distance, diplomacy, and strategy that have shaped the war that is already underway.
- KENNETH M. POLLACK is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and the author of Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness. During the Clinton administration, he served on the National Security Council, first as Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs and later as Director for Persian Gulf Affairs.
Foreign Affairs · by Kenneth M. Pollack · October 16, 2024
22. The Upside to Uncertainty on Taiwan
Excerpts:
For all these reasons, there are risks to clearing up ambiguity about how the United States might respond to Chinese provocations. Instead, the United States is right to continue its long-standing policy of effectively making a “threat that leaves something to chance,” in the memorable phrase of the economist and game theorist Thomas Schelling, generating uncertainty on one side about how the other will respond. Despite its ambiguity, then, there is much to commend in Taiwanese leaders’ focus on preserving “the status quo,” a term used by Lai both during the campaign and in his inaugural address. This approach is the very opposite of the lesson Khan draws from history. But not surprisingly, it is the one that most of Taiwan’s people prefer. In a February 2024 poll, more than 80 percent of respondents favored maintaining the status quo, whether temporarily or permanently.
Given the suspicions on all sides, maintaining the status quo is no easy feat. China has been reluctant to embrace such an approach, reflecting its growing unwillingness to accept indefinitely postponing unification. Nonetheless, each side can take concrete steps to shore up the status quo. China could withdraw its objections to the participation of Taiwan in international organizations in which statehood is not required and accept it as an informal participant in organizations in which statehood is required. (Beijing has taken that approach in the past; it accepted Taipei as an observer in the World Health Assembly from 2009 to 2016 and as a guest at the International Civil Aviation Organization Assembly in 2013.) Taiwan, in turn, could suspend its flagging efforts to gain formal diplomatic recognition from other countries. Each side could agree to respect tacit, if not formal, limits on military activities, such as staying on its side of the midline in the Taiwan Strait when conducting air operations. Most important, China could agree to resume dialogue with Taiwan’s government—which was halted after the election of Lai’s predecessor in 2016—in light of Lai’s stated commitment to the status quo.
Perhaps the most powerful lesson of Khan’s book concerns agency. Repeatedly, Khan reminds readers that the path to the present was not inevitable but was rather the product of choices made by leaders in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington. That history should serve as both a cautionary tale and motivation for leaders in all three capitals. Conflict in the Taiwan Strait is neither inevitable nor unlikely, but avoiding it depends on prudent policy choices by each of the three governments. As Khan and other critics of U.S. policy toward Taiwan are fond of pointing out, decades of ambiguity and compromise have left neither Taiwan nor China nor the United States fully satisfied. But almost by definition, any outcome that fully satisfied one party would be unacceptable to another, so Washington’s goal should be to find a status quo that all sides can live with. It’s a fine balancing act, but that is what diplomacy is all about.
The Upside to Uncertainty on Taiwan
How to Avert Catastrophe at the World’s Most Dangerous Flash Point
October 16, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by James B. Steinberg · October 16, 2024
By almost universal agreement, the Taiwan Strait has emerged as the most combustible flash point in the world. In recent years, China has dramatically increased the scale and intensity of its military operations around Taiwan, responding to what it claims are provocations by the island’s government and the United States. Taiwan, in turn, has increased its defense budget and enhanced its military preparedness, while the United States has upped the pace of its military activity in the region. Pundits, scholars, and even government officials spin out a dizzying array of apocalyptic scenarios involving Taiwan, from economic blockades that crash the global economy to a superpower nuclear war, whether triggered by an intentional invasion of Taiwan or an accidental collision of ships or aircraft. In a 2022 phone call with U.S. President Joe Biden, Chinese leader Xi Jinping issued a stark warning about the island: “Those who play with fire will perish by it.”
Not surprisingly, this sense of impending doom has spawned a flurry of policy prescriptions to avoid calamity. Some have called on the United States to make an unequivocal commitment to defend Taiwan (including with nuclear weapons, if need be) and declare that the island is not part of China. Others have focused on enhancing Taiwan’s defenses, offering vivid metaphors such as turning the island into a hard-to-swallow “porcupine” or creating an impassable “boiling moat” around it. A much smaller number of analysts have advocated cutting a deal with Beijing in which Washington ends its commitment to defending Taiwan and the island is left to fend for itself. Although the proponents of each boldly assert the superiority of their approach, the reality is that all these proposals are fraught with risk and uncertainty. All present difficult tradeoffs between competing U.S. interests and values.
How did the United States find itself in this predicament, and would a better understanding of the past help it chart a future course through the minefield? This is the motivating question behind Sulmaan Wasif Khan’s thought-provoking new book, The Struggle for Taiwan. Khan, a historian, makes his answer clear at the outset, arguing that “a full understanding of the triangular relationship between America, China, and Taiwan is needed if we are to avoid catastrophe.”
In providing his account of that relationship, Khan argues that “confusion has played the starring role in this tale so far.” U.S. and Chinese policies toward Taiwan, he elaborates, have hardly been informed by “grand strategy or even planning.” In his view, the real story is one of repeated missed opportunities by all sides. He criticizes presidents of both parties for failing to act boldly to definitively resolve Taiwan’s status, an outcome that he believes would have permanently eased the tensions that have dogged U.S.-Chinese relations. That prescription looks appealing in hindsight. But Khan underappreciates how the creative use of ambiguity and compromise allowed Washington to manage its fraught relationship with Beijing. Far from fueling conflict, uncertainty created the conditions for decades of peace and prosperity in East Asia.
WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN
Khan’s tale of American blunders begins with the 1943 Cairo conference. It was there that, as Allied leaders planned the postwar world, President Franklin Roosevelt decided to promise Taiwan, then still occupied by Japan, to Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist leader of China. Roosevelt could instead have pushed for a UN or U.S. trusteeship, which according to Khan would have prevented Taiwan from becoming a political football in the civil war between Chiang’s Nationalists and Mao Zedong’s Communists. From there, Khan sees a series of further missteps. President Harry Truman decided on neutrality between the competing claims of Chiang and Mao, satisfying neither side during the Korean War and setting the stage for the prolonged tensions between the United States and China. The “divided, confused” administration of President Dwight Eisenhower settled on a Taiwan policy that was “a mess of indecision and militarism,” leading it to miss an opportunity for a compromise on Taiwan in which the United States would have recognized Communist control of mainland China.
Even President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, normally heralded for their genius in orchestrating the U.S. opening to China, are faulted for a lack of strategic clarity. Khan criticizes the Shanghai Communiqué, a joint statement issued at the end of Nixon’s 1972 trip to China, for “fudging the Taiwan question.” By failing to publicly state what Kissinger had privately assured the Chinese—that the United States would not stand in the way of the likely political evolution of Taiwan toward unification with the mainland—Washington, Khan contends, missed its “best chance to return the island” to Beijing and settle the matter once and for all. Only President Jimmy Carter is singled out for praise, for his “decisiveness” in scrapping the U.S. defense pact with Taiwan in favor of recognizing Communist China. But Congress pulled him back when it passed the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which asserted that any threat to Taiwan would be “a grave concern to the United States” and provided for continued arms sales to the island. For Khan, the act left Washington “hopelessly confused about how committed to Taiwan’s defense it really was.”
In Khan’s view, the fatal flaw in U.S. policy has been its failure to go either all in for or all out against Taiwanese independence. There were opportunities to pick a side, but they were passed up. In a July 1949 memo, the American diplomat George Kennan argued that the United States (by itself or with others) should forcibly evict the Nationalists from Taiwan and establish an international regime that would hold a plebiscite to determine its future—an idea that had been mooted two years earlier by Truman’s envoy to China, General Albert Wedemeyer. The plan never came to fruition, but Khan argues that the Communists might well have gone along with it. It “seemed extreme at the time,” he writes, but “would certainly have been easier than dealing with what followed.”
Khan also faults China’s leaders for repeated missteps. He cites their continued insistence that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, even though they long ago acquiesced to the independence of Mongolia, which was also once an imperial outpost of the Qing dynasty. He also points to the tone-deaf threats to the Taiwanese people made by Zhu Rongji, China’s premier from 1998 to 2003, which only strengthened the arguments of Taiwanese who opposed unification with China. “Had Beijing steered clear of threats and bluster,” Khan writes, “it might conceivably have achieved peaceful unification.”
Far from fueling conflict, uncertainty created the conditions for decades of peace and prosperity in East Asia.
Khan sketches a series of counterfactuals that could have led to a more clear-cut—and, in his opinion, more stable—outcome. He doesn’t seem to care much which way things had gone, as long as Washington had picked one decisively. For him, had the United States fully embraced Taiwanese independence (at Cairo or during the Chinese Civil War) or fully acquiesced to Beijing’s claim (at the time of the Communists’ 1949 victory or during the rapprochement of the 1970s), it would have been spared the conundrum it faces today: opposing China’s efforts to coerce reunification yet skittish about committing to Taiwan’s defense and risking a war with Beijing. Khan is particularly critical of the many times U.S. administrations have failed to speak with one voice on Taiwan policy, not to mention the further muddles made when Congress has also gotten involved.
Of course, for those who defend U.S. policy, uncertainty is a virtue, not a vice. Often derided as “strategic ambiguity,” Washington’s approach is in fact a nuanced strategy that has promoted prudence on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, by declining to specify under what circumstances it might intervene militarily in a conflict between Taipei and Beijing. Accordingly, U.S. policy toward Taiwan lacks categorical obligations. There is no collective defense commitment, à la NATO’s Article 5 or the U.S.-Japanese security treaty. Rather, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States commits to treat “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means” as “a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” The act also commits the United States to provide Taiwan with defensive military equipment.
The Taiwan Relations Act is at the core of the United States’ long-standing “one China” policy. Under this policy, Washington provides Taiwan no official diplomatic recognition, but U.S. officials work closely with their Taiwanese counterparts on a variety of issues, from public health and economics to, increasingly, military and security matters. It offers no support for Taiwan’s membership in the UN or international organizations for which “statehood” is a criterion, but it does advocate for the island to play an active role in many multilateral arrangements and encourages other countries to have full diplomatic ties with Taiwan even if the United States doesn’t. Perhaps most important, the policy is built on the principle that Taiwan’s ultimate status must be resolved through peaceful means and enjoy the support of its people.
IN DEFENSE OF AMBIGUITY
Khan isn’t the only one bothered by strategic ambiguity; a growing number of pundits and former officials have also called for a shift to a more categorical policy of military and diplomatic support. On a number of occasions, Biden himself has explicitly stated that the United States would be willing to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan, although other officials subsequently qualified those statements, insisting that there had been no change in U.S. policy.
Khan has a point in questioning the U.S. approach. Ambiguity has its costs. As the Texas political activist and pundit Jim Hightower once observed, “There’s nothing in the middle of the road but yellow stripes and dead armadillos.” Muddling through, kicking the can down the road, splitting the difference—all can easily be seen as evidence of a lack of strategic clarity, tactics for getting by in the short term that ignore the long-term consequences of indecision. Ambiguity can embolden adversaries and unsettle friends.
But to say that ambiguity is often wrong does not mean that it is always so. There is something to the essayist H. L. Mencken’s aphorism “For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple and wrong.” Particularly when the United States has multiple interests at stake, it is simply not possible to craft a policy that maximizes all of them. Washington has a compelling interest in supporting those who fight for human rights and democracy, as the courageous citizens of Taiwan have done for decades, first against the authoritarian Nationalist governments and now in the face of pressure from Beijing. It has a strong interest in the peaceful settlement of disputes and the rejection of political, economic, and military coercion. And it is rightly concerned about China’s potential control of the strategic waters around Taiwan and of Taiwan itself. But the United States also has a compelling interest in avoiding a war, or even merely the profound economic disruption that would result from an escalating dispute with China. And many global challenges, from climate change to public health to the risks of AI, require U.S. cooperation with China.
A Taiwanese military exercise in Pingtung, Taiwan, July 2023
Ann Wang / Reuters
Khan reaches back into history to argue that Taiwan never really was part of China, contrary to official Chinese statements today that assert that it “has been China’s territory since ancient times.” Rather, he contends, the island was merely a colonial possession of the Qing dynasty and, as such, should have been allowed to benefit from the United States’ Wilsonian commitment to national self-determination and the broader post–World War II push for decolonization. It’s a nice debating point, one with considerable resonance in a country that was born by casting off colonial rule. But the United States has always wavered in its support for separatist movements. Compare, for example, its formal recognition of Kosovo’s independence in 2008 with its continuing refusal to support a similar claim by Iraqi Kurds. Often, U.S. leaders have favored political autonomy rather than de jure independence as a more prudent course.
When one looks at what has transpired in Taiwan over the past 80 years that Khan chronicles, it is rather mystifying why he and other critics consider U.S. Taiwan policy such a failure. Over that period, Taiwan was liberated from Japanese occupation, overcame authoritarian rule, and experienced breakneck economic growth. The island now features a vibrant democracy, ranks 14th globally in per capita income, and leads the world in one of its most crucial sectors, semiconductor manufacturing. Granted, the situation today is perilous, but seen from the perspective of 1943, where Khan begins his saga, it’s hard to argue that the outcome wasn’t a pretty good one for Taiwan—and the United States.
A powerful case in point demonstrating the value of the United States’ calibrated approach to Taiwan came in 1995 and 1996, when China fired missiles close to Taiwan to intimidate its leaders. To deter Beijing without provoking it, President Bill Clinton dispatched U.S. aircraft carrier groups near Taiwan but not into the Taiwan Strait. Khan acknowledges that this response successfully defused the crisis. “Had the United States put the carriers in the Taiwan Strait during the crisis (as is commonly misremembered), Beijing might well have found itself unable to back down,” he writes, adding that the situation could have “escalated all the way to general warfare.” Through this measured reaction, as well as a subsequent reaffirmation of the “one China” policy, the Clinton administration was able to create the context for a reengagement with China. That, in turn, led not only to more stable U.S.-Chinese relations but also facilitated Taiwan’s admission to the World Trade Organization and its continued pursuit of democratic reforms.
Given strategic ambiguity’s track record, it shouldn’t be surprising that the policy was pursued by presidents of both parties, including Ronald Reagan, who on taking office abandoned his earlier support for restoring the security guarantee for Taiwan, and George W. Bush, who made a similar course correction during his presidency. Although Khan is right to force readers to think critically about past choices, judged overall, U.S. policy toward Taiwan surely warrants a high passing grade, despite all the blemishes.
RUNNING OUT OF TIME?
But past performance is no guarantee of future results. U.S. policy has succeeded in part because all sides were content to push off a definitive resolution to the future, believing that time was on their side. For decades, China’s leaders hoped that its growing economic dynamism and prosperity would make unification increasingly attractive to the people of Taiwan and more acceptable to the United States. This belief was reinforced by an observation Kissinger made to the Chinese during a 1971 meeting in Beijing: “As a student of history, one’s prediction would have to be that the political evolution is likely to be in the direction which Prime Minister Zhou Enlai indicated to me. . . . We will not stand in the way of basic evolution.” From the U.S. perspective, the passage of time was thought likely to narrow the differences between Taiwan and the mainland, so that the two sides could come to an understanding in which Taiwan could preserve its democracy and respect for human rights, perhaps under the rubric of “one country, two systems.”
Today, many argue, the situation is far different, with none of the three parties believing that time is on its side. From the perspective of some in the United States and in Taiwan, China’s growing military and economic might means that Beijing will soon have the capability to prevail in a military conflict; even today, many argue, a successful defense of the island would be problematic. According to this camp, only by dramatically enhancing deterrence through an unambiguous commitment to Taiwan’s defense, including both military and political support, can a takeover be forestalled. From the perspective of China, political trends in Taipei and Washington are moving in the wrong direction. In January, Taiwan’s voters elected Lai Ching-te as president, a leader whom Beijing considers much more pro-independence than his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen. That, coupled with Congress’s increasingly militant support for Taiwan, means that the island is at risk of slipping from Beijing’s grasp. In a mirror image of the U.S. debate, hawks in China advocate accelerating their country’s military capability to subdue Taiwan.
It is this very mirror imaging that contributes to the current sense of crisis, a familiar pattern in which anxiety and insecurity lead one side to take preemptive measures that induce even more fear on the other side—what international relations theorists call the “security dilemma” or the “spiral model.” The more China flexes its muscles toward Taiwan, the more the United States promotes arms sales and Congressional visits to Taiwan to bolster deterrence. And the more it does that, the more China feels the need to escalate its threats to forestall future actions.
It’s easy to assert that strengthening deterrence by granting Taiwan a firm military guarantee would offer the best of all worlds, protecting Taiwan’s democracy while avoiding war by convincing China that any military venture would fail. Maybe—like all counterfactuals, it is impossible to disprove—but maybe not. This theory implies that China will use force only if it can be sure it will prevail, but who is to say that faced with an increasingly remote possibility of peaceful unification, China’s leaders won’t simply roll the dice? Even if the United States and Taiwan concluded that their combined forces were sufficient to repulse an attack, it is hardly certain that China’s generals would share that bleak assessment and convey it to their civilian overseers. Equally important, if Taiwan became more confident in the efficacy of deterrence, its leaders might feel more freedom to push the bounds of sovereignty and independence.
KEEPING THE PEACE
For all these reasons, there are risks to clearing up ambiguity about how the United States might respond to Chinese provocations. Instead, the United States is right to continue its long-standing policy of effectively making a “threat that leaves something to chance,” in the memorable phrase of the economist and game theorist Thomas Schelling, generating uncertainty on one side about how the other will respond. Despite its ambiguity, then, there is much to commend in Taiwanese leaders’ focus on preserving “the status quo,” a term used by Lai both during the campaign and in his inaugural address. This approach is the very opposite of the lesson Khan draws from history. But not surprisingly, it is the one that most of Taiwan’s people prefer. In a February 2024 poll, more than 80 percent of respondents favored maintaining the status quo, whether temporarily or permanently.
Given the suspicions on all sides, maintaining the status quo is no easy feat. China has been reluctant to embrace such an approach, reflecting its growing unwillingness to accept indefinitely postponing unification. Nonetheless, each side can take concrete steps to shore up the status quo. China could withdraw its objections to the participation of Taiwan in international organizations in which statehood is not required and accept it as an informal participant in organizations in which statehood is required. (Beijing has taken that approach in the past; it accepted Taipei as an observer in the World Health Assembly from 2009 to 2016 and as a guest at the International Civil Aviation Organization Assembly in 2013.) Taiwan, in turn, could suspend its flagging efforts to gain formal diplomatic recognition from other countries. Each side could agree to respect tacit, if not formal, limits on military activities, such as staying on its side of the midline in the Taiwan Strait when conducting air operations. Most important, China could agree to resume dialogue with Taiwan’s government—which was halted after the election of Lai’s predecessor in 2016—in light of Lai’s stated commitment to the status quo.
Perhaps the most powerful lesson of Khan’s book concerns agency. Repeatedly, Khan reminds readers that the path to the present was not inevitable but was rather the product of choices made by leaders in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington. That history should serve as both a cautionary tale and motivation for leaders in all three capitals. Conflict in the Taiwan Strait is neither inevitable nor unlikely, but avoiding it depends on prudent policy choices by each of the three governments. As Khan and other critics of U.S. policy toward Taiwan are fond of pointing out, decades of ambiguity and compromise have left neither Taiwan nor China nor the United States fully satisfied. But almost by definition, any outcome that fully satisfied one party would be unacceptable to another, so Washington’s goal should be to find a status quo that all sides can live with. It’s a fine balancing act, but that is what diplomacy is all about.
- JAMES B. STEINBERG is Dean of Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. He served as U.S. Deputy Secretary of State from 2009 to 2011 and as U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser from 1996 to 2000.
Foreign Affairs · by James B. Steinberg · October 16, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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