Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"The truth has no defense against a fool determined to believe a lie."

– Mark Twain

"We have to abandon the idea that schooling is something restricted to youth. How can it be, in a world where half the things Amanda knows at twenty are no longer true at age forty – and half the things he knows at forty hadn't been discovered when he was twenty."

– Arthur C. Clarke

"One who believes in himself has no need to convince others."

– Lao Tzu

1. Trump Administration Authorizes Covert C.I.A. Action in Venezuela

2. Could unconventional deterrence meet Australia’s defence challenges?

3. Al Qaeda Rises Amid Afghan-Pakistani Conflict

4. AUSA 2025 CSA's Recognized Articles of the Year/ AUSA Authors’ Forum/ Echoes from the Front: The Harding Project and a New Era of Army Communication

5. At the US Army Association Show in Washington DC, a Big Focus on Fighting Drones

6. Ukraine Wants Tomahawks. Trump Has to Decide if They Would Help End the War.

7. Israel and Hamas Start Next Phase of Talks on Trump Plan

8. Netanyahu Says He Has Won the War. Can He Win the Peace?

9. Hanwha open to acquiring other US shipyards, expanding Philly

10. China Played Its Strongest Card to Get Trump’s Attention. Will it Work?

11. Bridging the Geopolitical Divide in Cyber Governance: The Role of Middle Power Cyber Diplomacy in Advancing Global Norms for Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace

12. The Grey Beard Brigade

13. The Things that Bedevil U.S. Cyber Power

14. Interwar Adaptations: Leveraging Partner Experiences for Future Conflicts

15. The End of Cybersecurity by Jen Easterly

1. Trump Administration Authorizes Covert C.I.A. Action in Venezuela

Perhaps revealing the covert action was part of the covert action plan.

Also, I would think every covert action should have a plan for exposure. The planners should ask the question, when the action is exposed, how can I exploit the exposure for positive effects?

The boarder question I have is what are we trying to achieve with Venezuela? What is the acceptable, durable political arrangement that will serve, protect, and advance US national security and economic interests ?

Excerpts:

Mr. Trump acknowledged on Wednesday that he had authorized the covert action and said the United States was considering strikes on Venezuelan territory.

“We are certainly looking at land now, because we’ve got the sea very well under control,” the president told reporters hours after The New York Times reported the secret authorization.

Any strikes on Venezuelan territory would be a significant escalation. After several of the boat strikes, the administration made the point that the operations had taken place in international waters.

The new authority would allow the C.I.A. to carry out lethal operations in Venezuela and conduct a range of operations in the Caribbean.

The agency would be able to take covert action against Mr. Maduro or his government either unilaterally or in conjunction with a larger military operation. It is not known whether the C.I.A. is planning any specific operations in Venezuela.

But the development comes as the U.S. military is planning its own possible escalation, drawing up options for President Trump to consider, including strikes inside Venezuela.

Trump Administration Authorizes Covert C.I.A. Action in Venezuela

The development comes as the U.S. military is drawing up options for President Trump to consider, including possible strikes inside the country.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/15/us/politics/trump-covert-cia-action-venezuela.html

Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela’s authoritarian leader, in Caracas last month. American officials have been clear, privately, that the Trump administration aims to drive Mr. Maduro from power.Credit...Adriana Loureiro Fernandez for The New York Times

By Julian E. Barnes and Tyler Pager

Reporting from Washington

Oct. 15, 2025

Updated 5:17 p.m. ET

Leer en español

The Trump administration has secretly authorized the C.I.A. to conduct covert action in Venezuela, according to U.S. officials, stepping up a campaign against Nicolás Maduro, the country’s authoritarian leader.

The authorization is the latest step in the Trump administration’s intensifying pressure campaign against Venezuela. For weeks, the U.S. military has been targeting boats off the Venezuelan coast it says are transporting drugs, killing 27 people. American officials have been clear, privately, that the end goal is to drive Mr. Maduro from power.

Mr. Trump acknowledged on Wednesday that he had authorized the covert action and said the United States was considering strikes on Venezuelan territory.

“We are certainly looking at land now, because we’ve got the sea very well under control,” the president told reporters hours after The New York Times reported the secret authorization.

Any strikes on Venezuelan territory would be a significant escalation. After several of the boat strikes, the administration made the point that the operations had taken place in international waters.

The new authority would allow the C.I.A. to carry out lethal operations in Venezuela and conduct a range of operations in the Caribbean.

The agency would be able to take covert action against Mr. Maduro or his government either unilaterally or in conjunction with a larger military operation. It is not known whether the C.I.A. is planning any specific operations in Venezuela.

But the development comes as the U.S. military is planning its own possible escalation, drawing up options for President Trump to consider, including strikes inside Venezuela.

The scale of the military buildup in the region is substantial: There are currently 10,000 U.S. troops there, most of them at bases in Puerto Rico, but also a contingent of Marines on amphibious assault ships. In all, the Navy has eight surface warships and a submarine in the Caribbean.

The new authorities, known in intelligence jargon as a presidential finding, were described by multiple U.S. officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the highly classified document.

Mr. Trump ordered an end to diplomatic talks with the Maduro government this month as he grew frustrated with the Venezuelan leader’s failure to accede to U.S. demands to give up power voluntarily and the continued insistence by officials that they had no part in drug trafficking.

The C.I.A. has long had authority to work with governments in Latin America on security matters and intelligence sharing. That has allowed the agency to work with Mexican officials to target drug cartels. But those authorizations do not allow the agency to carry out direct lethal operations.

The Trump administration’s strategy on Venezuela, developed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, with help from John Ratcliffe, the C.I.A. director, aims to oust Mr. Maduro from power.

Mr. Ratcliffe has said little about what his agency is doing in Venezuela. But he has promised that the C.I.A. under his leadership would become more aggressive. During his confirmation hearing, Mr. Ratcliffe said he would make the C.I.A. less averse to risk and more willing to conduct covert action when ordered by the president, “going places no one else can go and doing things no one else can do.”

Image

A street market in Caracas, the Venezuelan capital. John Ratcliffe, the C.I.A. director, has said little about what his agency is doing in the country.Credit...Adriana Loureiro Fernandez for The New York Times

The White House and the C.I.A. declined to comment.

On Wednesday, Mr. Trump said he had made the authorization because Venezuela had “emptied their prisons into the United States of America.”

The president appeared to be referring to claims by his administration that members of the Tren de Aragua prison gang had been sent into the United States to commit crimes. In March, Mr. Trump proclaimed that the gang, which was founded in a Venezuelan prison, was a terrorist organization that was “conducting irregular warfare” against the United States under the orders of the Maduro government.

Trump Administration: Live Updates

Updated Oct. 15, 2025, 8:50 p.m. ET47 minutes ago

An intelligence community assessment in February contradicted that claim, detailing why spy agencies did not think the gang was under the Maduro government’s control, though the F.B.I. partly dissented. A top Trump administration official pressed for the assessment to be redone. The initial assessment was reaffirmed by the National Intelligence Council. Afterward, the council’s acting director, Michael Collins, was fired from his post.

The United States has offered $50 million for information leading to Mr. Maduro’s arrest and conviction on U.S. drug trafficking charges.

Mr. Rubio, who also serves as Mr. Trump’s national security adviser, has called Mr. Maduro illegitimate, and the Trump administration describes him as a “narcoterrorist.”

Mr. Maduro blocked the government that was democratically elected last year from taking power. But the Trump administration’s accusations that he has profited from the narcotics trade and that his country is a major producer of drugs for the United States have been debated.

The administration has asserted in legal filings that Mr. Maduro controls Tren de Aragua. But an assessment by U.S. intelligence agencies contradicts that conclusion.

While the Trump administration has publicly offered relatively thin legal justifications for its campaign, Mr. Trump told Congress that he decided the United States was in an armed conflict with drug cartels it views as terrorist organizations. In the congressional notice late last month, the Trump administration said the cartels smuggling drugs were “nonstate armed groups” whose actions “constitute an armed attack against the United States.”

White House findings authorizing covert action are closely guarded secrets. They are often reauthorized from administration to administration, and their precise language is rarely made public. They also constitute one of the rawest uses of executive authority.

Select members of Congress are briefed on the authorizations, but lawmakers cannot make them public, and conducting oversight of possible covert actions is difficult.

While U.S. military operations, like the strikes against boats purportedly carrying drugs from Venezuelan territory, are generally made public, C.I.A. covert actions are typically kept secret. Some, however, like the C.I.A. operation in which Navy SEALs killed Osama bin Laden in 2011, are quickly made public.

The agency has been stepping up its work on counternarcotics for years. Gina Haspel, Mr. Trump’s second C.I.A. director during his first administration, devoted more resources to drug hunting in Mexico and Latin America. Under William J. Burns, the Biden administration’s director, the C.I.A. began flying drones over Mexico, hunting for fentanyl labs, operations that Mr. Ratcliffe expanded.

The covert finding is in some ways a natural evolution of those antidrug efforts. But the C.I.A.’s history of covert action in Latin America and the Caribbean is mixed at best.

In 1954, the agency orchestrated a coup that overthrew President Jacobo Árbenz of Guatemala, ushering in decades of instability. The C.I.A.-backed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961 ended in disaster, and the agency repeatedly tried to assassinate Fidel Castro. That same year, however, the C.I.A. supplied weapons to dissidents who assassinated Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina, the authoritarian leader of the Dominican Republic.

The agency also had its hands in a 1964 coup in Brazil, the death of Che Guevara and other machinations in Bolivia, a 1973 coup in Chile, and the contra fight against the leftist Sandinista government of Nicaragua in the 1980s.

Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades.

Tyler Pager is a White House correspondent for The Times, covering President Trump and his administration.

A version of this article appears in print on Oct. 16, 2025 of the New York edition with the headline: U.S. Authorizes Covert Action In Venezuela to Pressure Maduro. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

See more on: National Intelligence Estimates, U.S. Politics, Nicolás Maduro, Donald Trump, John Ratcliffe

2. Could unconventional deterrence meet Australia’s defence challenges?

The paper can be downloaded at this link. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/unconventional-deterrence-in-australian-strategy/

Sigh... for many anything that is not conventional is unconventional.

Excerpts:

In this context, ‘unconventional’ means concepts and capabilities that lie outside conventional military warfighting (state-on-state, force-on-force, battlefield-centric) and indeed, outside conventional manifestations of state power through diplomacy and statecraft. Unconventional methods operate indirectly against an adversary’s vulnerabilities, exerting influence and imposing costs through a target population or audience. Exemplar methods include resistance warfare, guerrilla operations, unarmed or armed propaganda, subversion and sabotage.

Most recently, unconventional deterrence logic was shown by US, NATO and Ukrainian special operations forces before and during the current conflict in Ukraine, through deterrence-by-detection, asymmetric strike and support to resistance concepts. As Australia considers the implementation of the NDS, such adaptations are worth considering as ways to generate the asymmetry that Australia’s situation demands.

...

There is also a competition gap as Australian concepts of deterrence do not address the nature of competition as currently practised by China and other autocratic regimes such as Russia, North Korea and Iran.

A competition gap can be addressed by illuminating lessons from our historical experience of strategic competition, including successes and failures. One way we could compete is by supporting regional partners and like-minded countries to realise their total defence strategies. Indeed, in terms of Australia’s relations with our neighbouring continent, the strategic premise for unconventional deterrence is the need to develop security with Asia, as opposed to security against Asia (as in the Defence of Australia strategy of the 1990s) or security in Asia (the Forward Defence strategy of the 1950s to 1970s).

Our paper explores these options, offering the concept of unconventional deterrence as an organising principle for special operations, cyber, and other specialised capabilities that might be rapidly fielded by Defence and other agencies, and could best be orchestrated through an empowered national security adviser reporting directly to the National Security Committee of Cabinet. It also offers a comparative analysis, demonstrating that like-minded middle powers have embraced unconventional deterrence concepts in their military strategies, and are using these to face down their own beyond-peer threats.

Could unconventional deterrence meet Australia’s defence challenges? | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · Sally Burt · October 14, 2025

As Australia prepares its 2026 National Defence Strategy (NDS), the nation must recognise that a window of strategic risk exists now and will do so into the early 2030s. The first AUKUS submarines—US Virginia-class boats—will not be delivered until 2032, while the purpose-built SSN-AUKUS will not arrive until the early 2040s. Similar timeliness challenges exist elsewhere within the Integrated Investment Program.

We cannot, in effect, solve a 2027 deterrence problem with 2032 deterrent capabilities.

Australia’s traditional reliance upon ‘great and powerful friends’ and extended nuclear deterrence now seems no longer assured. There is no equivalent to NATO’s Article 5 for Indo-Pacific security. Even if there were, adversaries’ demonstration of grey-zone capabilities—aiming to weaken alliances, isolate targets, erode resolve and impose costs—suggests formal alliance commitments may be insufficient.

Conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East are demonstrating that smaller players—both middle powers and non-state actors—can generate strategic asymmetry against major powers, in turn deterring them from initiating conflict or escalating in conflict. As recently identified in Britain’s Strategic Defence Review, Ukraine is pioneering a new way of war; British decision-makers have recognised the need to rapidly adapt and are using Special Operations capability to drive this adaptation.

In a new paper titled Unconventional deterrence in Australian Strategy, we explore asymmetric and emergent methods of deterrence and ask whether they might be appropriate for Australia. We organise these concepts under the term ‘unconventional deterrence’ to differentiate them from traditional concepts of conventional and nuclear deterrence, which broadly conform to the logics of deterrence by punishment or deterrence by denial. Today’s technologies, however—along with the emergent realities of information and influence operations in a post-industrial information age—offer new asymmetries, new ways to create and apply both military and non-military elements of national power, and thus new mechanisms to deter beyond-peer adversaries from armed aggression.

In this context, ‘unconventional’ means concepts and capabilities that lie outside conventional military warfighting (state-on-state, force-on-force, battlefield-centric) and indeed, outside conventional manifestations of state power through diplomacy and statecraft. Unconventional methods operate indirectly against an adversary’s vulnerabilities, exerting influence and imposing costs through a target population or audience. Exemplar methods include resistance warfare, guerrilla operations, unarmed or armed propaganda, subversion and sabotage.

Most recently, unconventional deterrence logic was shown by US, NATO and Ukrainian special operations forces before and during the current conflict in Ukraine, through deterrence-by-detection, asymmetric strike and support to resistance concepts. As Australia considers the implementation of the NDS, such adaptations are worth considering as ways to generate the asymmetry that Australia’s situation demands.

An expanded concept of unconventional deterrence might operate independently from, or in concert with, conventional deterrence, responding flexibly to counteract an adversary’s approach. Former US secretary of defense Lloyd Austin’s challenge to allies—of generating collective integrated deterrence—could partly be addressed in this manner.

We do not suggest that unconventional deterrence can replace traditional, conventional deterrent capabilities. Rather, we argue that conventional and unconventional concepts executed together, whether unilaterally or alongside allies and partners, might yield an integrated deterrence effect greater than the sum of its parts.

There is also a competition gap as Australian concepts of deterrence do not address the nature of competition as currently practised by China and other autocratic regimes such as Russia, North Korea and Iran.

A competition gap can be addressed by illuminating lessons from our historical experience of strategic competition, including successes and failures. One way we could compete is by supporting regional partners and like-minded countries to realise their total defence strategies. Indeed, in terms of Australia’s relations with our neighbouring continent, the strategic premise for unconventional deterrence is the need to develop security with Asia, as opposed to security against Asia (as in the Defence of Australia strategy of the 1990s) or security in Asia (the Forward Defence strategy of the 1950s to 1970s).

Our paper explores these options, offering the concept of unconventional deterrence as an organising principle for special operations, cyber, and other specialised capabilities that might be rapidly fielded by Defence and other agencies, and could best be orchestrated through an empowered national security adviser reporting directly to the National Security Committee of Cabinet. It also offers a comparative analysis, demonstrating that like-minded middle powers have embraced unconventional deterrence concepts in their military strategies, and are using these to face down their own beyond-peer threats.

aspistrategist.org.au · Sally Burt · October 14, 2025

3. Al Qaeda Rises Amid Afghan-Pakistani Conflict

Al Qaeda Rises Amid Afghan-Pakistani Conflict

Why America should care about a South Asian skirmish.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/al-qaeda-rises-amid-afghan-pakistani-conflict-d97d08ae

By Melissa Skorka

Oct. 15, 2025 5:07 pm ET

A Taliban member keeps guard in Kabul, Oct. 13. wakil kohsar/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

South Asia is a powder keg. Afghanistan’s Defense Ministry last week accused Pakistan—once the patron of the Taliban, who now rule Afghanistan—of launching cross-border airstrikes and “breaching the skies” of Kabul. Islamabad contends the relationship broke down because of the threat to Pakistan from terrorists operating out of Afghanistan. A Pakistani security official told Reuters that Islamabad had targeted the Pakistani Taliban’s leader in its strikes. The same day as the airstrikes, India announced it would re-establish its embassy in Kabul—New Delhi’s boldest engagement with the Taliban government in four years.

Since then, Afghan and Pakistani forces have exchanged heavy fire across the frontier in one of their sharpest clashes in years. And nuclear-armed India and Pakistan are edging toward conflict.

The situation is combustible, and the blast could reach the U.S. This year, the Afghan Taliban has been quietly lifting restrictions on foreign and regional militants operating on Afghan soil. It’s particularly disturbing that Afghanistan’s permissive turn “coincides with mounting indications that al Qaeda’s ambitions for external operations are once again on the rise,” says Colin Smith, the United Nations Coordinator of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team.

A recent Pakistani Taliban offshoot—Ittehad ul-Mujahideen, or IMP—could buoy al Qaeda’s rise. The new group’s constituent factions from the Pakistani Taliban have historically had strong affiliations with al Qaeda, and IMP has successfully moved into a power vacuum in Afghanistan left by the Islamic State Khorasan Province. IMP’s aim is evident: Hit Pakistan’s security architecture while preparing to export violence into Indian-administered Kashmir.

IMP’s rise could create internecine violence or, worse, deeper coordination between jihadist networks. Either way, Pakistan’s overstretched forces face a revitalized insurgency that could extend into India and beyond.

IMP isn’t a parochial faction. It’s part of a broader terrorist recalibration across South and Central Asia. The growing Afghan-Pakistani terrorist hub threatens trade routes through the Persian Gulf, complicates counterterrorism coordination with regional powers, and could dangerously strengthen connections between South Asian and Middle Eastern terrorists, particularly in Syria.

Washington can’t afford complacency. To today’s border clashes from turning into war, the U.S. should appoint a dedicated envoy for South Asia security—empowered to coordinate intelligence, engage reluctant partners, and press Pakistan, India and the Gulf states to act. This wouldn’t require a costly anti-insurgency U.S. military effort, just focused attention from our leaders. And pulling it off would demonstrate American resolve to combat terrorism, reassure allies, and deny militants strategic hesitation that they can further leverage.

If President Trump decisively defuses India-Pakistan tensions, he could avert a regional disaster and show a measure of statesmanship that eluded his predecessors.

Ms. Skorka served as a strategic adviser to the commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (2011-14) and to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (2024-25).

WSJ Opinion: A Fractured World

Play video: WSJ Opinion: A Fractured World

We may be seeing peace break out in the Middle East, but it’s still trade war elsewhere - especially with China. Donald Trump has threatened a 100% tariff on the rival superpower if Beijing goes through with its plan to impose tough restrictions on exports of the rare earth minerals critical to the U.S. economy. These could well be mere negotiating tactics but they’re a reminder of the wider friction that now dominates global economic relations. On this episode of Free Expression, Gerry Baker speaks with Neil Shearing, Group Chief Economist of Capital Economics and author of “The Fractured Age: How the Return of Geopolitics Will Splinter the Global Economy.” They discuss Shearing’s argument that the world is dividing into two giant economic blocs and what that might mean for stability and peace. They also talk about some unusual developments in global markets of late, especially a weakening dollar and a soaring gold price - the last of which Shearing believes is driven by Chinese official policy.

Appeared in the October 16, 2025, print edition as 'Al Qaeda Rises Amid Conflict in South Asia'.

4. AUSA 2025 CSA's Recognized Articles of the Year/ AUSA Authors’ Forum/ Echoes from the Front: The Harding Project and a New Era of Army Communication

Three events that were overlooked by most AUSA participants (I know because I was there and most of you were not).

AUSA Authors’ Forum

CSA’s Recognized Articles of the Year (A Harding Project Event)

Video at the link: https://www.dvidshub.net/video/984827/ausa-2025-csas-recognized-articles-year

Echoes from the Front: The Harding Project and a New Era of Army Communication

I know everyone comes to AUSA to see the awesome displays of equipment (so impressive) and of course to see old friends (it is great to catch up). But the overlooked value of AUSA is the investment in intellectual capital. And the Harding Project is one investment in our Army’s intellectual capital. If you look at the great army transformations in the interwar years in the 1930’s and the post Vietnam transition to AirLand battle, the foundation for transformation is in the 6 inches between the ears of visionary leaders. As we transition in contact with the Army Transition Initiative it is the same six inches between the ears of our young soldiers and leaders that will create the conditions for success. While we always have to have the skill to out fight our enemy, it is our ability to out-think the enemy that will cause us to be successful along the entire spectrum of conflict from competition to the gray zone and irregular warfare to large scale combat operations. I applaud those who can shoot, move, and communicate with communication including transmitting (writing and speaking) innovative ideas and developing new concepts and doctrine that will make us win.

I attended the Harding Project's CSA Article Award Winners hosted by General Hodne. It was appropriately hosted by him as every one of the articles was relevant to the Army's future. I reflected on the articles and the authors' responses to Kyle Atwell's questions and I thought the best Army "think tank" is well ... the Army - the range of authors, from brilliant NCOs to a former Battalion Commander with a PhD who wrote a cutting edge "moneyball" article with his battalion master gunner and two platoon leaders on how to use data to improve gunnery made me think that the future of our Army is in great hands. With all due respect to the FFRDCs and think tanks that are conducting Army related research, the real intellectual capital for the development of our future Army is in the Army, not outside of it. And if any FFRDC and think tank is not relying on that intellectual capital then its research is suspect.

(I did attend an excellent event that was standing room only: Warriors Corner: Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Modernization Efforts)

AUSA Authors’ Forum

Monday, Oct 13, 2025 13:00 - 15:00 EDT

Location: Room 145 A, Convention Center

Description

PANEL 1

Preparing for the Next Fight

PANEL 2

Special Forces and Urban Operations

Speaker(s):

Moderator: CSM W. Douglas Gibbens, United States Army Retired, Senior Fellow, Association of the United States Army

Panelist: Dr. Arthur T. Coumbe, Author, Soldiers in the Schoolhouse: A Military History of the Junior ROTC (University of Kentucky Press)

Panelist: CSM Daniel K. Elder, United States Army Retired, Author, NCO School: How the Vietnam-Era NCO Candidate Course Shaped the Modern Army (University of North Georgia Press)

Panelist: COL Bryan N. Groves, United States Army, Author, When Presidents Fight the Last War: The Oval Office, Sunk Costs, and Wartime Decision-Making since Vietnam (University Press of Kentucky)

Panelist: COL David G. Jesmer, United States Army Retired, Presenter, Green Berets, Clan Militia, and Blue Helmets: The Illustrated History of Army Special Forces in Somalia (University of North Georgia Press)

Panelist: Dr. John P. Sullivan, Co-editor, Urban Operations: War, Crime, and Conflict (KeyPoint Press)

Panelist: Dr. Russell W. Glenn, United States Army Retired, Author, Brutal Catalyst: What Ukraine’s Cities Tell Us About Recovery from War (KeyPoint Press)

Location: Room 145 A, Convention Center

CSA’s Recognized Articles of the Year (A Harding Project Event)

Monday, Oct 13, 2025 15:30 - 16:30 EDT

Location: Room 145 A, Convention Center

Harding Project Events General Session

Speaker(s):

Speaker: MG Linda M. Singh, United States Army Retired, Owner and CEO, Kaleidoscope Affect LLC, Senior Fellow, Association of the United States Army

Speaker: LTC Matthew Arrol, United States Army Retired, Command and Control and Mission Planning Lead, Army Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, IronMountain Solutions, Inc., Co-Author: “Army Fires: Enabling Joint Convergence in a Maritime Environment”. Military Review.

Speaker: GEN David M. Hodne, Commanding General, United States Army Transformation and Training Command

Moderator: MAJ Kyle Atwell, Director of the Harding Project, Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Army

Panelist: LTC Jon Bate, Action Officer, J5 Strategy, Plans, & Policy, The Joint Staff, United States Army, Co-Author: “A Data-Centric Approach to Increasing Crew Lethality: Proposing ‘Moneyball for Gunnery'". Infantry.

Panelist: 1LT Adam Hendrick, Tech Platoon Leader, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, United States Army, Co-Author: “Tactical UAS: Three-Tiered UAS Manning for Increased Lethality and Situational Awareness”

Panelist: SSG Kevin Rasins, Support Operations Ground Supply Section Non-Commissioned Officer In Charge, 101st Airborne Division Sustainment Brigade, United States Army, Author: “Striking a Balance: Leadership Versus Management in the Modern Army”. NCO Journal.

Echoes from the Front: The Harding Project and a New Era of Army Communication

Speaker(s):

Speaker: CSM W. Douglas Gibbens, United States Army Retired, Senior Fellow, Association of the United States Army

Moderator: JoAnn Naumann, Command Sergeant Major, United States Army Special Operations Command

Panelist: MAJ Kyle Atwell, Director of the Harding Project, Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Army

Panelist: LTC Joe Byerly, United States Army Retired, Founder, From the Green Notebook

Panelist: Ryan Evans, Founder, “War on the Rocks”

Warriors Corner: Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Modernization Efforts

Speaker(s):

Speaker: MG Jason C. Slider, Commanding General, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Special Operations Center of Excellence S

peaker: BG Kirk Brinker, Acting Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command

Speaker: BG Joseph W. Wortham, Commanding General, 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), United States Army

S peaker: COL Roger P. Waleski, Commander, United States Army Special Operations Aviation Command

S peaker: COL Kitefre Oboho, Commander, 75th Ranger Regiment, United States Army

5. At the US Army Association Show in Washington DC, a Big Focus on Fighting Drones

Excerpts:

The Way Ahead

The US Army is on the right path in seeking solutions to drone-based warfare. But the road ahead is strewn with many potholes, especially if cheap drones become more stealthy and utilize autonomous guidance and target detection. The Russians, for example, have recently modernized their Geran-2 drone incorporating some artificial intelligence capability and sensor integration allowing the drone to go after individual enemy targets such as machine-gun nests and other visually identifiable aimpoints. Recovered Russian drones were found stuffed with US and allied components, including a NVIDIA chipset. Current sanctions and other measures cannot keep up with technology proliferation, and US Army solutions will need to come up with smart solutions that keep pace with battlefield evolution and innovation.

If the US Army was fighting in Ukraine today, it would not have a full capability to deal with drone threats. It is obvious there is a need to move far more quickly and smartly.

At the US Army Association Show in Washington DC, a Big Focus on Fighting Drones

Can we move fast enough?

https://weapons.substack.com/p/at-the-us-army-association-show-in?r=7i07&utm

Stephen Bryen

Oct 15, 2025

substack.com · Stephen Bryen

The Association of the US Army held its annual large scale show in Washington DC (October 13-15). A wide range of new products and solutions tailored to Army needs were featured at the show. Featured ground systems include the Oshkosh Striker with the new Medium Caliber Weapon System and the AM General MIMIC-V for special operations, while a major focus on drone and counter-drone capabilities was evident. Other key systems highlighted were General Dynamics’ PERCH and MUTT XM, which integrates loitering munitions and a Gatling gun for counter-UAS, and the General Dynamics NEXUS Stryker (a new version of a command and control vehicle).

New solutions at the show focused on helping the Army operate against enemy drones.

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The Ukraine war has changed land warfare significantly, rendering the use of armored platforms including tanks and infantry fighting vehicles difficult in a drone-heavy combat environment. One outcome has been resorting to small units, three to five soldiers to achieve certain combat objectives.

A swarm of drones test capabilities during a battle exercise at National Training Center on May 8, 2019, at Fort Irwin, Calif. (James Newsome/U.S. Army)

The Russians, for example, have been using motorcycles and even horses, a huge step back in time from a combat perspective. Both sides also increasingly feature standoff weapons, but find it difficult to capitalize even where they can knock out a command post or cluster of enemy soldiers.

Russian soldiers during a horse-mounted training in the Donetsk region, 2025. (Photo: Russian media)

Drones have also replaced, to some degree, long range aviation and missiles. Deep precision strikes by the Russians on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, and by Ukraine on Russian territory, illustrates the usefulness of attack drones on fixed targets. While both sides understand they will sacrifice many drones to knock out a target, and use some of them as decoys, overall the costs of operation are much lower than a conventional fighter jet or bomber-led attack, and the consequences far more acceptable when it comes to manpower, which survives operations and the cost of hardware which is lost.

The technologies that have appeared at AUSA mostly are intended to improve drone detection and methods to destroy them. So far, none of the technology promoted shows any great ability to seek out the operators and, inter alia, to destroy drone supply chains.

Multi-Layered Defense: The Components of Counter-UAS Systems

Modern counter-drone systems employ a layered approach, integrating various technologies to cover the full spectrum of drone defense—from early detection to neutralization. The solutions on display at AUSA 2025 exemplify this strategy.

Detection and Sensing Technologies

At the heart of any effective counter-drone system is the ability to detect and identify aerial threats early. Several exhibitors at AUSA are demonstrating advanced sensor technologies, including long-range thermal cameras, radio frequency (RF) detection systems, and electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) cameras. Motorola Solutions, for example, is showcasing an integrated network of RF sensors and thermal cameras designed to track drones and detect their operators. These sensors form the backbone of early warning systems, especially useful in low-visibility conditions or complex urban environments.

Electronic Warfare and Jamming

Once a drone is identified, neutralization typically involves non-kinetic methods such as RF jamming and signal spoofing. Trust Automation is presenting its GAT™ UAS jammer at AUSA—a compact, weapons-mountable device capable of disrupting drone communications and disabling threats without the need for physical destruction. These jammers are particularly useful in scenarios where the use of kinetic force may result in collateral damage, such as near civilian populations or critical infrastructure.

Trust Automation’s Small-Unmanned Air Defense System (SUADS), which provides both fixed-site protection — such as Air Force base defense operations — and rapidly deployable defense for key assets and units in combat zones.

As more and more drones are capable of autonomous operations, and are equipped with multiple sensors to seek out targets and provide self-situational awareness, jammers will inevitably focus on scout and reconnaissance drones which must communicate, and less on attack combat drones that may not need radio communications. Moreover, on the battlefield there already are combat drones connected by fiber optics that are not jammable.

A Ukrainian soldier shows an example of a fiber-optic FPV drone. (АрміяІнформ photo)

Directed-Energy Weapons

For higher-end threats or swarm scenarios, directed-energy weapons like high-energy lasers are gaining traction. Previous AUSA exhibitions featured systems such as Leonardo DRS’s Stryker-mounted laser weapons, designed to destroy drones mid-flight with precision. These systems offer a cost-effective and scalable solution for neutralizing multiple drones in rapid succession, a key capability in defending against mass drone attacks.

Counter-UAS Directed Energy Stryker

The problems facing laser solutions are making them small enough and sufficiently portable to play a sustained role in combat scenarios. Israel, for example, is already putting lasers on tanks and combat vehicles. Called Lite Beam, the Israeli system is already deployed and has registered some early success.

Lite Beam ((photo credit: RAFAEL ADVANCED DEFENSE SYSTEMS))

Autonomous Interceptors and Drone-on-Drone Defense

One of the more novel technologies on display comes from Ondas, whose Iron Drone Raider uses autonomous drones to intercept and disable enemy UAS in flight. These drone-on-drone systems represent a shift toward fully autonomous, AI-enabled defense platforms that can respond to threats without constant human input, improving reaction time and reducing operator workload.

Drone on drone warfare in theory makes good sense, but operationally has many challenges. The Ukrainians claim they have already knocked out some Russian drones in drone on drone combat. As a practical solution, this solution probably works best for protecting fixed site targets such as command centers, airfields or infrastructure, mostly because it is a potentially cheap solution compared to the cost of air defense systems. How it compares to using lasers is an issue that needs to be sorted out.

In dense combat environments, cheap systems without effective IFF (Identification Friend of Foe), presents an operational challenge.

Command and Control Integration

Technology alone is insufficient without the infrastructure to manage it. Many systems at AUSA are paired with advanced command and control (C2) platforms that integrate sensor data, streamline decision-making, and automate responses. Motorola Solutions is presenting a SaaS-based control system developed in partnership with SkySafe, which combines drone tracking data with situational awareness tools. These platforms enable forces to identify not only the drone but also its flight path and potential operator location—critical information in both kinetic and electronic countermeasures.

Portability, Modularity, and Rapid Deployment

Flexibility is another essential feature of modern C-UAS systems. Exhibitors such as Trust Automation are showcasing modular systems like the Small-Unmanned Air Defense System (SUADS), which can be rapidly deployed in both fixed-base and mobile operations. These solutions are built to adapt to different mission needs—from protecting military convoys on the move to securing remote outposts or urban areas.

Operational Challenges and Real-World Applications

The capabilities displayed at AUSA 2025 are a direct response to operational challenges faced by U.S. and allied forces. The growing use of drone swarms—where dozens of small UAS coordinate attacks—demands fast, scalable defenses. Joint Army experiments have simulated such scenarios, validating systems that can detect and defeat 40+ drones simultaneously. Moreover, the widespread availability of low-cost commercial drones has made them accessible to insurgents, criminal groups, and hostile state actors alike. This increases the need for adaptable, rules-of-engagement-sensitive defenses that work across all theaters of operation.

Key challenges these technologies aim to overcome include:

Detection of low-observable drones with small radar cross-sections
Minimizing collateral damage through non-kinetic defeat methods
Integration with existing air defense networks
Rapid deployment and mobility for front-line and field use
Scalability for swarm defense and large area coverage
Complexity and support (and in the case of jammers and lasers, adequate electrical power/recharging)
Training and integration in current-day forces

The Way Ahead

The US Army is on the right path in seeking solutions to drone-based warfare. But the road ahead is strewn with many potholes, especially if cheap drones become more stealthy and utilize autonomous guidance and target detection. The Russians, for example, have recently modernized their Geran-2 drone incorporating some artificial intelligence capability and sensor integration allowing the drone to go after individual enemy targets such as machine-gun nests and other visually identifiable aimpoints. Recovered Russian drones were found stuffed with US and allied components, including a NVIDIA chipset. Current sanctions and other measures cannot keep up with technology proliferation, and US Army solutions will need to come up with smart solutions that keep pace with battlefield evolution and innovation.

Nvidia Jetson IO microchip, used for the AI-powered features. (Source: HUR)

If the US Army was fighting in Ukraine today, it would not have a full capability to deal with drone threats. It is obvious there is a need to move far more quickly and smartly.

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substack.com · Stephen Bryen

6. Ukraine Wants Tomahawks. Trump Has to Decide if They Would Help End the War.

Excerpts:

A highly accurate missile with a powerful warhead that can fly more than 1,000 miles, the Tomahawk can reach targets inside Russia far beyond any of the weapons the U.S. has provided to Kyiv until now.

The Pentagon is ready to move forward on short notice if Trump gives the word. But he is still weighing whether providing the missiles to Ukraine would drive Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table and bring a speedy end to the war.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who is scheduled to meet Trump at the White House on Friday, is seeking Tomahawks along with other weapons, arguing that additional firepower will help force Putin into talks.

“They want to go on the offensive,” Trump said, referring to Ukraine, in remarks to reporters Wednesday at the White House. “I’ll make a determination on that.”

Ukraine Wants Tomahawks. Trump Has to Decide if They Would Help End the War.

President weighs whether giving the missiles to Kyiv would help bring Russia to the negotiating table

https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-wants-tomahawks-trump-has-to-decide-if-they-would-help-end-the-war-cad135d7

By Michael R. Gordon

, Robbie Gramer

and Alistair MacDonald

Oct. 15, 2025 11:00 pm ET

Tomahawks would enable Ukraine to strike deep inside Russian territory. Justin Wolpert/U.S. Navy

WASHINGTON—The Tomahawk cruise missile that President Trump is considering for Ukraine has been the weapon of choice for decades for U.S. presidents seeking decisive military solutions.

A highly accurate missile with a powerful warhead that can fly more than 1,000 miles, the Tomahawk can reach targets inside Russia far beyond any of the weapons the U.S. has provided to Kyiv until now.

The Pentagon is ready to move forward on short notice if Trump gives the word. But he is still weighing whether providing the missiles to Ukraine would drive Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table and bring a speedy end to the war.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who is scheduled to meet Trump at the White House on Friday, is seeking Tomahawks along with other weapons, arguing that additional firepower will help force Putin into talks.

“They want to go on the offensive,” Trump said, referring to Ukraine, in remarks to reporters Wednesday at the White House. “I’ll make a determination on that.”

Barents Sea

BGM-109 Tomahawk

1,553 miles

Norway

Finland

Russia

Omsk

St. Petersburg

Yekaterinburg

Sweden

Chelyabinsk

Kazan

Baltic Sea

Moscow

Belarus

Poland

Kazakhstan

Kyiv

Ukraine

500 miles

Black Sea

500 km

Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies (missile ranges); Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project (Russian forces)

Daniel Kiss/WSJ

Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko and Andriy Yermak, Zelensky’s closest adviser, traveled to Washington to meet with administration officials ahead of the Friday meeting. Ukrainian officials also met with representatives of major U.S. defense-industry companies involved in production of Tomahawk missiles and other weapons, including RTX and Lockheed Martin.

Cruise missiles alone are unlikely to shift the course of the war unless the White House is prepared to provide them in large numbers and allow Ukraine latitude to strike a range of targets deep inside Russia, analysts said.

Even then Tomahawks, which fly at subsonic speeds at a low altitude, could be vulnerable to Russian air defenses.

The Pentagon would also have to supply Ukrainians with ground launchers that can fire the missiles. Tomahawks are usually fired from warships and submarines at sea. While the Pentagon and defense contractors are developing a variety of ground-based launchers, the systems are in short supply.

A bigger issue for the White House is assessing how Moscow would respond to such an escalation in U.S. support for Kyiv. Kremlin officials have warned against providing the weapons, vowing that they would take unspecified steps in response.

But the Ukrainian dependence on the U.S. for training on the system and targeting intelligence would ensure Washington has control over how the missiles could be used, which could lessen the risk that Kyiv would use them against sensitive Russian targets that might prompt Moscow to escalate its attacks in Ukraine or beyond.

“There is a lot involved in firing a long-range system, and the Ukrainians would need a lot of help for targeting, mission planning, just operating the weapon,” said Tom Karako, director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “The corollary benefit to the United States is control, inasmuch as the U.S. might not want the Ukrainians putting this through the window of the Kremlin.”

BGM–109 Tomahawk

In operation: 1983

Range: 777–1,553 miles

Payload: 1,001 lbs.

Diameter: 1 ft 8.47 in

Length: 18 ft 2.5 in

TOMAHAWK

RAYTHEON

Source: The Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

Ming Li/WSJ

The U.S. fired numerous Tomahawks from sea at an Iranian nuclear facility in June, and the weapons have been used regularly by other presidents, including by Bill Clinton, who fired a salvo of them in 1993 attacks in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

Though the Biden administration provided Ukraine with the Army Tactical Missile Systems, known as Atacms, it never seriously considered providing Tomahawks, largely because of its concern it could prompt a confrontation with Moscow that could escalate the war.

Atacms missiles have a range of about 190 miles, far shorter than Tomahawks.

The Kremlin has warned that sending Tomahawks would be a significant escalation. “If Tomahawks are transferred to Ukraine, it will lead to serious consequences,” Dmitry Peskov, spokesman for the Kremlin, warned Sunday.

Trump has mused repeatedly about providing the weapons, at times suggesting that he would only do so after talking with Putin. Trump’s frustration has grown as Putin has rebuffed the White House’s proposals that he meet with Zelensky and as Russian drone and missile attacks on Ukraine have escalated. On Wednesday, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth sought to reinforce Trump’s message during a meeting in Brussels with North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense ministers.

“If there is no path to peace in the short term, then the United States, along with our allies, will take steps necessary to impose costs on Russia for its continued aggression,” Hegseth said.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth at NATO headquarters in Brussels. nicolas tucat/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Officials say that the U.S. only has a small number of Typhon ground-based launchers, which can be used to fire Tomahawks and are in high demand as part of the American effort to counter Chinese military power in the Indo-Pacific.

Other ground-based launchers could be adapted to fire the Tomahawks, including a new launch vehicle made by Oshkosh Defense. Tomahawks can also be ground-launched from an Mk-41 launcher, which is normally found on Navy ships but has been modified for onshore use.

Delivery and training could take a few months, if Trump gives the go-ahead, U.S. officials said.

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS

What kind of military support should the U.S. supply to Ukraine? Join the conversation below.

Proponents of sending the Tomahawk say it would expand Ukraine’s ability to strike important Russian targets well behind the front lines, including fuel depots, air bases, tank factories and even Russia’s drone plant that manufactures deadly Iranian-designed Shahed drones.

Sending the Tomahawk, advocates say, could encourage other Western nations to provide more in the way of long-range systems.

The British have provided Kyiv with the Storm Shadow, an air-launched cruise missile. The French have provided the Scalp, which is their variant. Berlin has been so far unwilling to offer Ukraine the Swedish-German Taurus cruise missile, which has a range of 300 miles.

Ukraine has developed its own cruise missiles, including one called the Flamingo, and have used some against targets in Russia. But Zelensky has said that production of the Flamingo won’t be ramped up until December or January.

Ukraine’s ‘Flamingo’ Cruise Missile Can Strike 1,800 Miles Into Russia

Play video: Ukraine’s ‘Flamingo’ Cruise Missile Can Strike 1,800 Miles Into Russia

Designed to carry a one-ton warhead, the Ukrainian-built ‘Flamingo’ cruise missile can cause serious damage deep inside Russian territory. Here’s what we know about it. Photo: AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky

Ukraine has also used homegrown long-range drones to strike Russia’s energy infrastructure. But drones move slowly, can be shot down more easily and carry small explosive payloads.

The U.S. has been quietly providing intelligence for months to help Ukraine target Russia’s energy facilities, U.S. officials said, confirming a recent report in the Financial Times. The Wall Street Journal reported in September that Trump has signed off on U.S. intelligence sharing for such long-range strikes.

Zelensky has other weapons priorities he is also expected to pursue in Washington, including securing more antimissile interceptors for U.S.-supplied Patriot batteries.

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com, Robbie Gramer at robbie.gramer@wsj.com and Alistair MacDonald at Alistair.Macdonald@wsj.com

7. Israel and Hamas Start Next Phase of Talks on Trump Plan

Israel and Hamas Start Next Phase of Talks on Trump Plan

Discussions have begun even as Israel demands Hamas turn over more bodies of deceased hostages

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-and-hamas-start-next-phase-of-talks-on-trump-plan-3c4ecd36

By Summer Said

and Vera Bergengruen

Updated Oct. 15, 2025 8:36 pm ET

Palestinians walk through the rubble in Gaza City. Ebrahim Hajjaj/Reuters

Quick Summary

Israel and Hamas began negotiating the second phase of a Trump-outlined plan to end the war in Gaza.View more

Israel and Hamas began negotiating the second phase of a plan outlined by President Trump to end the war in Gaza, as debates continued about the militant group’s failure to return all the bodies of dead hostages as required in the first phase.

Hamas handed over the bodies of two more hostages to Israel on Wednesday, a day after both sides accused each other of violating the cease-fire that was part of the deal that released all 20 living detainees from Gaza.

Mediators were still negotiating with Hamas over releasing a few more bodies. The latest transfer means that the bodies of nine of the 28 dead hostages are now back in Israel.

U.S. officials on Wednesday said they didn’t believe the deal had been violated, saying Hamas had “honored” its commitment to release all live hostages and that U.S. and mediators were still working “to get as many bodies out as possible.”

“We continue to give them the intelligence that the Israelis have, and we’ll keep working in good faith until we’re able to exhaust that mechanism,” a senior U.S. official said.

Earlier on Wednesday, Israel said three bodies turned over by Hamas a day earlier were Israeli hostages, but that a fourth body wasn’t a match.

“Hamas is required to make all necessary efforts to return the deceased hostages,” the Israeli military said.

Trucks loaded with humanitarian aid on the Egyptian side of the Rafah border crossing waited to enter the Gaza Strip early Wednesday. AFP/Getty Images

A 20-point plan laid out by Trump required the militant group to hand over all living and dead hostages in the first phase. The second phase takes on thornier issues such as postwar governance in Gaza, new security arrangements under an Arab-led force and the disarmament of Hamas.

Mediators are discussing sending an initial group of 1,000 Palestinian police trained by Egypt and Jordan to help provide security in Gaza, Arab officials said. Earlier this year, Egypt and Jordan began training Palestinians for a force they hoped would reach 10,000, The Wall Street Journal reported.

The plan could face pushback from Israel, which has resisted security forces from the Palestinian Authority, the Hamas rival that governs parts of the West Bank. But the international force called for under the Trump plan will also be difficult to assemble, with Arab governments reluctant to look like occupiers.

Israelis celebrated Monday’s return of the last 20 hostages still alive in Gaza. But Hamas only returned four of the 28 bodies left in the enclave that day. Israel responded Tuesday by telling humanitarian groups that it was cutting back the amount of humanitarian aid promised under the agreement to put pressure on Hamas to return the deceased. Later that day, Hamas turned over four more bodies.

Hamas had told mediators that it doesn’t know where all the bodies are, and Israel’s intelligence services agree many will be hard to find. But Israel expected Hamas to turn over more bodies than the four it delivered Monday, and families of the hostages have turned it into a political issue by publicly pressuring the government to demand the rest. The two sides agreed to set up an international task force to search for the remaining bodies.

U.S. officials are discussing a program to motivate residents to help to locate the bodies and “pay rewards for that type of good behavior,” one of the officials said. They have also discussed bringing in a Turkish team of more than 80 specialists in body retrieval who are trained in searching rubble in the aftermath of earthquakes, the official said.

Questions also remained over the opening of the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and Israel, which was supposed to be opened after the first phase of the deal but remains closed on both sides.

Write to Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com and Vera Bergengruen at vera.bergengruen@wsj.com

8. Netanyahu Says He Has Won the War. Can He Win the Peace?

Excerpts:

“With Trump involved heavily, anything is possible,” Krasna said. “But significant normalization in the next year or two—that’s hard for me to see, especially before Israeli elections.”

Netanyahu’s long record, association with the Gaza war and with the more extreme members of his coalition will make it more difficult to rebuild much global public support for Israel without a change in government or absent a breakthrough in peace deals, said Daniel Shapiro, a former U.S. envoy to Israel under the Obama administration.

In many ways, Netanyahu’s room for maneuver is limited. As a politician, the war’s end and return of the hostages is likely to give him a bump in popularity. Yet he remains a broadly unpopular leader who will likely face a reckoning with the Israeli public over failing to prevent the Hamas-led attacks on Oct. 7, 2023, and what some see as a slow government response in the days and weeks that followed.

At the same time, no other Israeli politician is likely to beat Netanyahu if future security is the main issue in the next election.

“One of his arguments to the Israeli electorate is who do you trust to prevent creation of a Palestinian state?” Shapiro said.

Netanyahu Says He Has Won the War. Can He Win the Peace?

The leader who has long played a hawk in Israeli politics now confronts the challenge of steering the country to the other side of a peace deal

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-netanyahu-peace-deal-wartime-leader-f778e677

By Dov Lieber

and David Luhnow

Oct. 15, 2025 9:00 pm ET

Benjamin Netanyahu has towered over Israeli politics for decades. nathan howard/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

TEL AVIV—Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has emerged as a wartime leader of a regional superpower, who resisted enormous pressure to halt its two-year conflict with Hamas and inflicted severe damage on Israel’s enemies.

Now, the country’s longest-serving prime minister faces an arguably more difficult challenge: How to lead Israel to a new era of peace.

Such a role won’t sit naturally with a man who for decades has played a hawk in Israeli politics, casting himself as the only politician who can keep the nation safe. The role is made more difficult by the war with Hamas itself, which eroded Israel’s international standing and deepened regional hostility, making peace with Palestinians and neighboring countries harder to achieve.

During his speech this week to the Israeli Parliament to mark the cease-fire in Gaza and the return of Israel’s living hostages, Netanyahu summed up the challenge ahead for him and his country by quoting King Solomon’s meditations in Ecclesiastes.

“To everything there is a season, and a time for every matter under heaven. A time for peace, and a time for war. The last two years have been a time for war. The coming years will hopefully be a time for peace,” he said.

It won’t be easy. For a start, many short-term obstacles loom. Hamas still hasn’t agreed to disarm and is now waging a violent crackdown to restore its power in Gaza, and there is no agreed framework for how the enclave will be governed or by whom.

Hanwha open to acquiring other US shipyards, expanding Philly - Breaking Defense

“We are all in on Philly, and we're looking at expanding even in and around Philly shipyard, but ultimately, it’s a geographically isolated island where there’s not enough space to do everything that we’d like to do. So, we are looking at other opportunities," Hanwha Global Defense chief Michael Coulter told Breaking Defense in an exclusive interview.

By Justin Katz and Aaron Mehta on October 15, 2025 9:10 am

breakingdefense.com · Justin Katz · October 15, 2025

AUSA 2025 — The head of Hanwha Global Defense said “everything is on the table” moving forward as the company aims to increase ship production capacity inside the United States, including both expansion at its new Philadelphia shipyard and acquisitions of other existing yards.

“We would like to recreate the capacity we have at our shipyard in Korea, in the United States,” Michael Coulter, the company’s CEO and president, told Breaking Defense in an interview Monday. “We are all-in on Philly, and we’re looking at expanding even in and around Philly Shipyard, but ultimately, it’s a geographically isolated island where there’s not enough space to do everything that we’d like to do. So, we are looking at other opportunities.”

Asked specifically if that includes further acquisitions, Coulter said “We’re looking at everything. Everything’s on the table.”

Since closing its $100 million acquisition of Philly Shipyard last December, the South Korean conglomerate has aggressively expanded its presence in the United States to include recruiting Coulter, a former Leonardo DRS executive, in his current role as the head of global defense.

The shipyard is currently building National Security Multi-Mission Vessels (NSMV) — platforms being purchased by the Transportation Department for mariner training — and commercial tankers ordered by Hanwha Shipping.

While the contracts to build NSMVs pre-date Hanwha’s acquisition of the shipyard, Coulter said the theory behind the company ordering ships from its own shipyards revolves around training the workforce.

“We are in the process already of hiring the right workforce [and] transferring the technology, but it’s going to take a little bit of time to get there,” he said. “The idea is a lot of that work is going to end up happening for the first ship or two in Korea. But we’re bringing workforce from the United States to Korea to understand how it’s done. … As we proceed through the ship class, we’ll do more and more work to ultimately build them here in Philly.”

Separately, Coulter said that Hanwha is actively approaching other American shipbuilders to become an outsourcing partner for larger programs, a concept that major primes and the Pentagon have described as “distributed shipbuilding.”

“I wouldn’t say they’ve [talks] progressed very far, but I would say we have put the offer on the table, both with the US government, US Navy, and all of the major shipbuilders in the United States that we’re interested in being a partner,” he said. “We believe we have technology that can help the United States solve its shipbuilding problem, and we’re interested in having those conversations.”

Since Hanwha acquired Philly Shipyard, several other international companies have moved or shown interest in making similar purchases inside the United States. Reuters reported in September that South Korea’s HD Hyundai Heavy was considering such an acquisition, and Canada’s Davie is working through the process of purchasing facilities in Texas where it plans to build icebreakers.

breakingdefense.com · Justin Katz · October 15, 2025

10. China Played Its Strongest Card to Get Trump’s Attention. Will it Work?

Excerpts:

Days after Mr. Trump said he would impose 100 percent tariffs on Chinese goods next month, China added five American subsidiaries of a South Korean shipping company to its sanctions list. On Tuesday, Mr. Trump threatened to cut off U.S. purchases of Chinese cooking oil.

By Wednesday, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent suggested the U.S. government would counter Chinese economic measures by exerting more control over private American businesses in key strategic sectors.

The escalating tensions threaten to wipe out any progress the two sides have made in the past five months to roll back punitive measures they had taken against each other. They also raise the question of whether Beijing pushed its strategy too far by making clear that China will use the minerals as a geopolitical weapon.

China Played Its Strongest Card to Get Trump’s Attention. Will it Work?

Xi Jinping’s need to project strength before a crucial meeting of Communist Party leaders may help explain why Beijing announced new rare earth controls.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/15/world/asia/china-trump-tariffs.html

President Trump greeting China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, at the Group of 20 Summit in Osaka, Japan, in 2019.Credit...Erin Schaff/The New York Times

By David Pierson

Reporting from Hong Kong

Oct. 15, 2025

Leer en español 阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版

China’s decision to tighten export controls on rare earth metals was not only about strengthening its grip on the world’s supply of the crucial minerals. It was also a high-stakes ploy to jolt President Trump into paying attention to what Beijing felt were attempts by his subordinates to sabotage a U.S.-China détente, analysts say.

Evidently, it worked: Mr. Trump has redirected his focus toward trade with China. But China’s move also unnerved governments and businesses in Europe, and sparked another round of tit-for-tat trade blows, rattling stock markets.

Days after Mr. Trump said he would impose 100 percent tariffs on Chinese goods next month, China added five American subsidiaries of a South Korean shipping company to its sanctions list. On Tuesday, Mr. Trump threatened to cut off U.S. purchases of Chinese cooking oil.

By Wednesday, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent suggested the U.S. government would counter Chinese economic measures by exerting more control over private American businesses in key strategic sectors.

The escalating tensions threaten to wipe out any progress the two sides have made in the past five months to roll back punitive measures they had taken against each other. They also raise the question of whether Beijing pushed its strategy too far by making clear that China will use the minerals as a geopolitical weapon.

Image

A dried-out lake filled with waste from ore from which rare earths had been removed in Baotou, China. In the background are rare earth refineries, steel mills and chemical factories.Credit...The New York Times

China was reacting to a Sept. 29 decision by the U.S. Department of Commerce to expand the number of companies, including potentially Chinese ones, blacklisted from acquiring American technology. That move surprised Beijing, which thought the countries had reached a truce in their trade war after four rounds of negotiations and a Sept. 19 phone call between Xi Jinping, the Chinese leader, and Mr. Trump, Chinese analysts said.

Flexing China’s control over rare earths — akin to poking Mr. Trump in the eye — may also have been intended by Mr. Xi to demonstrate his strength to a domestic audience before a crucial meeting of Communist Party leaders next week.

“If you are the leader and you just had a phone conversation” with the U.S. president, “and then 10 days later, they slapped you on your face, what would you do ahead of a major political event?” said Wu Xinbo, dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai.

Chinese state media have hailed rare earths as the ultimate weapon in trade negotiations with the United States, with one television commentator saying the restrictions dealt a “fatal blow.”

Image

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent talking to the media after trade talks with the Chinese vice premier, He Lifeng, in Madrid in September.Credit...Thomas Coex/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Analysts who have spoken to Chinese officials said that Beijing believed that the Commerce Department move — which would target thousands of Chinese companies — was the work of hawkish members of the Trump administration. The sense in Beijing was that Mr. Trump, who was focused on Gaza peace talks and the U.S. government shutdown, needed to be made aware of the consequences of these moves.

“By launching a very strong counterattack on the U.S. side, Beijing is reminding Donald Trump that you have to take a hands-on approach to relations with China” and not let “hawkish people” derail relations between the two countries, Professor Wu said.

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in China? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

Beijing was particularly aggrieved because it felt it had shown good will to the Trump administration by agreeing to allow the sale of TikTok, the analysts said.

The question now is whether Beijing’s gambit will succeed in getting the Trump administration to back down, or if it results in a full-blown trade war that could lead to a global slowdown. Already, it has led to a broader backlash, with the European Union trade commissioner accusing China of weaponizing its hold on the minerals and urging the European bloc to coordinate with Group of 7 nations to push back against the restrictions.

“The Chinese miscalculated,” said Yun Sun, the director of the China program at the Stimson Center in Washington, who is currently visiting Beijing. “People around the world saw the rules and were shocked and considered it an overreaction.”

For China, threatening to cut off access to its rare earth minerals has been its ace card against the United States.

Beijing controls most of the world’s supply of those metals, which are needed for virtually every modern-day technology, including semiconductors, robots and jets. Earlier this year, the same tactic helped persuade the Trump administration to suspend its threat to impose sky-high tariffs on Chinese goods.

Image

A container ship arriving at a port in Oakland, Calif., this month. Credit...Justin Sullivan/Getty Images

But this time, China went a step further. It extended its controls extraterritorially, meaning that exporters anywhere in the world would have to apply for a license to sell products with even trace amounts of Chinese rare earths.

It is probably not a coincidence that China is taking such an assertive posture ahead of a Communist Party meeting to lay out the blueprint for the country’s plan for the coming five years.

Chinese leaders typically want to project stability and strength during the meetings to burnish their legitimacy, analysts say.

“You have to respond strongly so that you can — I wouldn’t say save face — but you have to consolidate your political position and show to a domestic audience that you are strong enough to protect China’s national interests in the face of the provocation,” Prof. Wu added.

With tensions heating up again, it is unclear if Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi will meet on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in South Korea later this month, as had been anticipated.

Image

President Lee Jae Myung of South Korea speaking in August at a Philadelphia shipyard owned by Hanwha Group, a South Korean conglomerate that the Chinese government has blacklisted. Credit...Matthew Hatcher/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Both sides continued to up the ante in the past week. They began charging higher port entry fees for each other’s shipping firms. The Chinese government blacklisted five American subsidiaries of the South Korean shipping company Hanwha, accusing the subsidiaries of “supporting and assisting” the United States in its moves in the shipbuilding industry.

Mr. Trump said in a Truth Social post that Beijing was harming American soybean farmers. He threatened to restrict more trade with China, including by boycotting Chinese cooking oil.

U.S. analysts say that the Chinese Ministry of Commerce appeared to be aware that it may have overreached, as the ministry sought to reassure the world that the new controls would not be used widely and did not represent a blanket ban, even as it vowed to fight back against any tariffs.

China was overly confident that it could get Washington to walk back its latest sanctions and, at the same time, avert any global blowback, analysts said.

Image

A farmer near a soybean field ready for harvesting in Cordova, Md., this month. China, once the biggest buyer of U.S. soybean exports, is halting orders. Credit...Roberto Schmidt/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

But China can ill afford more trade tensions on top of its existing troubles with the United States. Exports are among the few engines of growth for a Chinese economy suffering from a prolonged property crisis and a deflationary spiral, caused by overproduction in key industries and falling prices.

Evan S. Medeiros, a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University who was an Asia adviser to President Barack Obama, said China could have pushed back without threatening economic coercion against its geopolitical rivals.

“This is a hell of a way to get Trump’s attention,” Prof. Medeiros said. “You get somebody’s attention by waving your hands in the air, not by arming yourself to the teeth and just promising you’re not going to use a 50-caliber machine gun on them.”

The new rare earths export controls, which are modeled after U.S. export controls, were likely developed well in advance of their unveiling, experts said. Some analysts say that suggests Beijing was merely looking for a pretext — like the new Commerce Department rules — to deploy the new measures.

“Xi fundamentally doesn’t want to give the U.S. rare earths, or really any ‘strategic materials’ it has,” said Kirsten Asdal, head of the China-focused consultancy firm Asdal Advisory. “The party has articulated that the country that controls the upstream inputs will enjoy the ability to develop the most advanced technology and keep it from others.”

Lily Kuo contributed reporting from Taipei, Taiwan, and Berry Wang from Hong Kong.

David Pierson covers Chinese foreign policy and China’s economic and cultural engagement with the world. He has been a journalist for more than two decades.

A version of this article appears in print on Oct. 16, 2025, Section A, Page 9 of the New York edition with the headline: China Got Trump’s Attention but Renewed a Risky Game. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

See more on: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Commerce Department, Communist Party of China, Donald Trump, Xi Jinping

11. Bridging the Geopolitical Divide in Cyber Governance: The Role of Middle Power Cyber Diplomacy in Advancing Global Norms for Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace

Excerpt:

Conclusion

Mired in the zero-sum game of high-level politics, great powers increasingly find it hard to reach significant and lasting agreements in different areas, including responsible state behavior in the digital domain. This context has opened an opportunity for middle powers to assume greater agency in the international system, serving as a stabilizing and constructive force in the cyber domain. Although middle powers’ influence may face significant domestic and international constraints, they possess a unique capacity to foster trust and dialogue through transparency, legal clarity, and multistakeholder engagement. As geopolitical tensions deepen, the world may benefit from increasingly relying on these diplomatically agile states, who can play a meaningful role in finding common ground among great powers, promoting norms, and building coalitions on responsible state behavior in cyberspace to contribute to a more peaceful, secure and stable digital environment for all.

Bridging the Geopolitical Divide in Cyber Governance: The Role of Middle Power Cyber Diplomacy in Advancing Global Norms for Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/10/16/bridging-the-geopolitical-divide-in-cyber-governance-the-role-of-middle-power-cyber-diplomacy-in-advancing-global-norms-for-responsible-state-behavior-in-cyberspace/

by Ana Paola Riveros Moreno de Tagle

10.16.2025 at 06:00am

Abstract: Great powers are actively trying to impose their views on responsible state behavior in cyberspace in an attempt to obtain a strategic advantage. Lack of convergence has fomented an increasingly fragile global arena where mistrust prevails. Although middle powers’ influence may face significant domestic and international constraints, they can play a stabilizing and constructive role in finding common ground among great powers, promoting norms, and building coalitions on responsible state behavior in cyberspace with the aim of contributing to a more peaceful, secure and stable digital environment for all.

Introduction

As the internet continues to exert growing influence in multiple aspects of our existence, conflicting visions about what constitutes responsible state behavior in cyberspace have become a key component of strategic competition. Great powers are actively trying to impose their views to obtain a strategic advantage that will help them consolidate their power in an international environment characterized by a zero-sum approach. Multiple efforts to establish consensus among governments are facing an impasse as great powers find it difficult to adopt compromises that may imperil their vital interests. Lack of convergence has fomented an increasingly fragile global arena where mistrust prevails, jeopardizing international security and stability, and evidencing the need to find innovative ways to advance agreements. This article argues that, given this complex global context, middle power cyber diplomacy can contribute to a more peaceful, secure and stable digital global environment by finding common ground among great powers, promoting norms, and building coalitions on responsible state behavior in cyberspace.

The Global Cyber Security Landscape

Over the past two decades, relevant stakeholders have been working towards the development of cyber norms that can reduce the risks posed to the international order by cyber threats. The most significant results to date have been produced by the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE), comprised of 25 members, including the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council. Between 2004 and 2021, the UN GGE produced important milestones: it confirmed that international law applies to cyberspace and is essential for maintaining peace and stability, and listed 11 voluntary non-binding norms on responsible state behavior in cyberspace.

In 2017, the UN GGE failed to reach an agreement. Topics that apply only in situations of armed conflict, such as the implementation of international humanitarian law, countermeasures, and the right to self-defense in cyberspace, were the main issues of disagreements. As a result, in 2019 the UN General Assembly supported Russia’s proposal to create an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) aimed at “making the United Nations negotiation process on security in the use of information and communications technologies more democratic, inclusive and transparent”. In 2021, both groups issued their final reports. “The establishment of dual tracks and the slow progress reflect the competing visions that states have in the development of cyber governance”.

States’ efforts to define the rules of the road in cyberspace outside of the UN have also taken place. The 2018 Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace defined nine common principles that addressed key issues, including the protection of the public core of the internet, the defense of electoral processes, the prohibition of hacking back operations by non-state actors, and the acceptance and implementation of international norms of responsible behavior. The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) proposed in 2019 eight norms that supported cyber stability, “a condition in which individuals and institutions can be reasonably confident in their ability to use cyber services safely and securely, change is managed in relative peace, and tensions are resolved without escalation”.

Additionally, proposals have emanated from the private sector and civil society. The Tallinn Manual process, initiated in 2009, provides guidance on how existing international law applies to cyberoperations in and out of armed conflict. The 2017 Digital Geneva Convention by Microsoft calls on states to exercise restraint in developing cyber weapons, to commit to nonproliferation activities, and to avoid a mass event. Similarly, the Oxford Process builds consensus among scholars around “both positive and negative obligations of States in their foreign and domestic behavior pursuant to key principles and rules of international law – such as sovereignty, non-intervention, international human rights law and international humanitarian law”.

This non-exhaustive overview of the cybersecurity landscape demonstrates that cyberspace has become a major and favorable battleground for strategic competition. By trying to influence internet governance, great powers seek to gain an advantage in their contests with each other and consolidate their power in the fifth domain. Norms of responsible state behavior follow the same logic, since they are an integral part of global governance.

The United States has retained a disproportionate influence over the internet’s architecture, a position that other global powers are challenging with alternative models of internet governance. While the United States advocates for a multi-stakeholder approach based on an open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet that prioritizes free speech and free market; other great powers, like China, prioritize state sovereignty and place the state over the rights of individuals to facilitate a more controlled and closed digital environment that contributes to social stability and safeguards national political security. As strategic competition and internet governance fragmentation intensify, great powers will be less willing to negotiate the adoption of shared norms.

The absence of binding international norms governing state behavior in cyberspace poses growing risks to global stability and security. As we become more dependent on the digital world, also grows our vulnerability to malicious cyber activities that erode trust. At the global level, trust is at the heart of states’ interactions, it is what enables international cooperation and the sharing of information that will lead to peace and stability. “The lack of norms about appropriate uses of cyber-operations makes it difficult for states to trust that others will use restraint”, perpetuating a cycle of insecurity, aggression, and instability.

The impasse in recent years on negotiations to define rules of responsible state behavior in cyberspace does not mean that norms are irrelevant or unnecessary. “Norms create expectations about behavior that make it possible to hold other states accountable. Norms also help legitimize official actions and help states recruit allies when they decide to respond to a violation.” Mindful about the importance of crafting global rules over time to manage this wicked problem, middle powers have a particular interest in bringing a measure of order to cyberspace given their characteristics and their increasing dependence on the digital domain.

The Stabilizing and Constructive Role of Middle Power Cyber Diplomacy: Strategies, Tools, and Constraints

Although there is no set definition of middle power, experts generally agree that these countries are willing and able to influence the trajectory of global governance, including the cyber domain. Middle powers lack the military dominance or economic incentives to impose their will on other states; tend to be highly integrated into the global economy to boost their development; are strong advocates of multilateral institutions where they can exercise influence; and are vulnerable to cyberthreats given their high degree of interconnectedness. To exert their strategic activism, middle powers “contribute to building norms that not only influence the trajectory of global cyber governance but also restrain great powers and safeguard their own agency and interests”. Therefore, “middle powers are not solely driven by a sense of altruism”, they are strategic players seeking a more secure, stable and peaceful cyberspace where they can thrive.

History has witnessed successful middle power diplomacy. After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Mexico launched a campaign to denuclearize the region that culminated with the adoption of the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). The document prevents the spread and use of nuclear weapons in the area, and its protocols require The Netherlands and the five nuclear powers of the UN Security Council to respect the agreement within the territories under their international responsibility in the zone of application of the Treaty.

As a result of the effective activism of Mexico as a middle power, the Treaty was the first attempt to successfully denuclearize a populous region; allowed the region “to deploy its economic capacity and resources for peaceful economic development rather than expending them on unproductive nuclear arms races”; and inspired similar agreements and initiatives worldwide. Mexico was able to form a powerful coalition of small and mid-size countries with the aim of limiting the ambitions of nuclear powers in the region while protecting the national security interests of the Latin-American and Caribbean countries.

Effective middle power diplomacy in cyberspace

1: Middle powers as reliable neutral partners

As great power competition intensifies, middle powers seek to establish themselves as reliable partners to all sides and to exert an independent, flexible, self-interested activism with a “growing desire… for more control over the shape of the global order and greater influence over specific outcomes”. This is also true in cyberspace, where strategic competition has prevented great powers from reaching an agreement on responsible state behavior. Middle powers are well-positioned to bridge the divide as impartial actors that can effectively and constructively engage with multiple great powers at once to facilitate dialogue, reconcile differences, and uphold global cooperation.

As one of the most digitized countries in the world, The Netherlands sees cyberthreats as a significant menace to its strategic security interests and digital way of life. To address these challenges The Netherlands has committed itself to promoting an international rules-based order, playing an active role in finding common ground between like-minded and non-like-minded countries “on smaller specific topics that could cascade into a wider consensual understanding of regulation that is needed for activities in the realm of cyberspace”, such as the protection of the public core of the internet.

The Netherlands has participated in the UN GGE, the OEWG, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to enhance constructive discussions on the interpretation of international law. It organized the Fourth Global Conference on Cyberspace in 2015, whose Global Forum on Cyber Expertise strengthened cyber-related international cooperation. It launched the GCSC in 2017. Additionally, it supported the development of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 by offering training courses on the applicability of international law in cyberspace; and by leading the Hague Process to “ensure states have a voice in the efforts to set forth the international law that governs their activities in cyberspace”. By relying on new platforms that promote dialogue and capacity-building measures, The Netherlands has positioned itself “as a non-threatening actor with a tradition of honest brokerage” that can facilitate and positively influence the adoption of cyber norms.

2: Middle powers as norm entrepreneurs

Middle powers can also act as norm entrepreneurs to establish new international standards of behavior. Multilateral institutions play a crucial role in achieving this objective because they give middle powers the opportunity to rely on their soft power diplomacy to alter other state’s preferences and patterns of behavior. With a strategic long-term vision, middle powers seek to define a new normal that will not only protect and advance their interests in and through cyberspace but also respond to an international community increasingly affected by cyberthreats, conferring them a certain degree of respectability and good reputation.

Estonia has played a key role as norm entrepreneur by leveraging its expertise and knowledge as a highly reliant state on information and communication technologies, as well as its relatability and reputation among other states to facilitate dialogue and negotiations in multilateral fora. After the 2007 Russian cyberattacks that left Estonians disconnected from the internet for several weeks, Estonia has tried to strike a balance between strong cyber defense capabilities and the need to apply existing international law to cyberspace to promote responsible state behavior.

In 2004 Estonia proposed the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, which has hosted the Tallinn Manual process since its inception. It has promoted the adoption and implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, raising awareness about the need for international legal frameworks, confidence building measures to combat cybercrime, and capacity-building programs to help developing nations implement the Treaty and strengthen their digital infrastructure. Its diplomatic efforts were crucial in revitalizing the UN GGE after the “2007 attacks showed that inter-state conflicts could have a cyber dimension”, and in achieving a consensus report in 2015 about 11 voluntary non-binding norms on responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Additionally, it co-chaired the GCSC’s normative work in 2019. By becoming one of the first countries to understand the importance of international cooperation in managing cybersecurity, Estonia has relied on negotiations and dialogue within multilateral institutions to reach agreements on norms, consolidating “itself as a cyber norm entrepreneur if not as a cyber norm pioneer”.

3: Middle powers as coalition builders

In international relations alliances are key to advancing political objectives. In the cyber domain, “coalition-building among middle powers can make a real difference in advancing thematic agendas [by focusing on creating consensus], even if support from one or more great powers is not forthcoming”. Alliances generate awareness on issues of concern, provide initiatives with greater legitimacy, bestow concerted actions with stronger impact, and gather the critical mass necessary to prompt nations to join a desired trend. Middle powers can also use their soft power, such as capacity building initiatives, to build stronger partnerships, adding to their reputation and neutral stance in international negotiations.

Singapore has “always supported a rules-based multilateral system in every domain of the global commons, … keenly aware that the alternative –where might makes right– would be disastrous for a small state like Singapore”. It has mainly relied on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to propel initiatives aimed at defining responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Since 2016, it has annually hosted the ASEAN Ministerial Conference on Cybersecurity. Also, it encouraged ASEAN to become the first and only regional organization to subscribe in principle and implement the UN GGE’s 11 voluntary non-binding norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, serving as a reference for other countries.

Aware of the importance of international cooperation to set the rules of the road in the digital space, Singapore has also leveraged its soft power to strengthen its alliances. In 2016, it established the ASEAN Cyber Capacity Programme focused on cyber policy, legislation, strategy development and incident response. The ASEAN-Singapore Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence has helped deepen the region’s cyber security capabilities and enhanced its ability to respond to emerging global cyber threats. Furthermore, Singapore supported the launch of the ASEAN Regional CERT in 2024. By leading these initiatives, Singapore has built a reputation as a middle power committed to responsible state behavior in cyberspace, garnering the support of ASEAN countries and hoping that other nations will join these efforts.

Challenges that constrain middle powers’ influence

Although middle powers have the potential to lead an inclusive process aimed at defining norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, they face significant constraints. On the international front, “middle-sized nations frequently find themselves in difficult diplomatic circumstances where they have to balance the conflicting interests of more powerful nations”, forcing them to dilute their goals or choose sides when their vital interests are at play. Also, middle powers’ heavy dependence on regional organizations or coalitions can restrict their room for maneuver, reducing their strategic agency. Additionally, relying on non-enforceable norms gives transgressions the power to hinder or revert progress, undermining middle powers’ efforts.

On the national front, lack of specialized talent, dedicated resources, technical capacity, internal coordination, and policy consistency through time can thwart middle power’s efforts, weakening their credibility. Political or social instability, as well as institutional weakness can deviate attention and necessary resources away from international activism. Moreover, “lack of domestic appetite for… middle-power roles and/or an increase in perceived risks of carrying out such roles in the midst of geopolitical tensions could diminish the political will and capital targeted towards shaping global… governance”.

Although some experts believe that the current global structural transition and domestic trends are discouraging middle powers’ activism and pushing them towards extinction, the committed and sustained efforts of The Netherlands, Estonia, and Singapore towards defining a rules-based digital order show that middle powers are steadfast and agile strategic players with a long-term vision focused on achieving a peaceful, secure and stable digital global environment that can safeguard their interests in and through cyberspace.

Recommendations

The following recommendations identify key actions that middle powers can take to elevate their influence in building a more peaceful, secure and stable cyber domain:

1: A professional, well-resourced, objectives-oriented, and committed diplomatic cyber force increases middle power’s credibility and reputation as effective, capable, reliable, and responsible stakeholders in cyberspace. This requires establishing a cyber diplomacy unit within foreign ministries tasked with addressing cyber issues from a crosscutting approach, coordinating interagency efforts before international actors, and training professional cadres on cyber diplomacy to advance middle power’s interests.

2: “In a cyber domain that is largely owned and operated by the private sector, meaningful progress in developing and upholding expectations for responsible behavior will require much closer cooperation between governments and industry, as well as civil society”. By maintaining a constructive and consistent dialogue with the private sector and civil society, middle powers add meaningful and influential voices to their efforts, gradually cement progress, make it incumbent upon states to comply with norms, and avoid potential setbacks.

3: Middle powers must engage with other middle powers from different geographical regions to build the critical mass necessary to detonate changes in states’ preferences and patterns of behavior that will lead to a more secure and stable cyber domain. This will reinforce the neutrality of their approach; balance the influence and concerns of stronger nations; enrich the international standard-setting process with different perspectives and experiences; and create the collective impact required to advance norms of responsible state behavior. Middle powers are more effective and have greater impact when working in concert.

Conclusion

Mired in the zero-sum game of high-level politics, great powers increasingly find it hard to reach significant and lasting agreements in different areas, including responsible state behavior in the digital domain. This context has opened an opportunity for middle powers to assume greater agency in the international system, serving as a stabilizing and constructive force in the cyber domain. Although middle powers’ influence may face significant domestic and international constraints, they possess a unique capacity to foster trust and dialogue through transparency, legal clarity, and multistakeholder engagement. As geopolitical tensions deepen, the world may benefit from increasingly relying on these diplomatically agile states, who can play a meaningful role in finding common ground among great powers, promoting norms, and building coalitions on responsible state behavior in cyberspace to contribute to a more peaceful, secure and stable digital environment for all.

Tags: cyber governance, cyber security, Middle Powers

About The Author

Ana Paola Riveros Moreno de Tagle
Paola is a Mexican career diplomat currently posted at the Embassy of Mexico in Washington, D.C., Mexico’s most important diplomatic mission. Since joining the Mexican Foreign Service in 2007, she has represented her country in various capacities in Jamaica, China, and the Organization of American States. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from ITAM and has just finished her M.A. in Global Security with a cybersecurity concentration at Arizona State University.

12. The Grey Beard Brigade

I was talking to one of my old bosses this week (a four star) and he said there are many who are ready to share their knowledge and experience and help.

I made this comment previously but I think it emphasizes our need to invest in intellectual capital. I am bullish on the soldiers currently serving but their creativity and innovation could be informed by experience.

If you look at the great army transformations in the interwar years in the 1930’s and the post Vietnam transition to AirLand battle, the foundation for transformation is in the 6 inches between the ears of visionary leaders. As we transition in contact with the Army Transition Initiative it is the same six inches between the ears of our young soldiers and leaders that will create the conditions for success. While we always have to have the skill to out fight our enemy, it is our ability to out-think the enemy that will cause us to be successful along the entire spectrum of conflict from competition to the gray zone and irregular warfare to large scale combat operations. I applaud those who can shoot, move, and communicate with communication including transmitting (writing and speaking) innovative ideas and developing new concepts and doctrine that will make us win.

Let's ensure that the Army is benefiting from the wisdom and experience that Scott is pointing out.

Excerpts:

The Time to Ask is Now

To be sure, the Army has much to do in recruiting quality personnel, building on its sound doctrine, designing rigorous training, developing and fielding the best equipment, and providing the resources to exercise at every echelon and at full scale, all in preparation for conventional war. It’s time to ask some people who know how to do that to pitch in with sound advice based on their experiences and wisdom. And in the process, achieve what Secretary Hegseth has made clear: “Lethality is our calling card, and victory our only acceptable end-state.”

The Grey Beard Brigade

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/10/16/the-grey-beard-brigade/

by L. Scott Lingamfelter

10.16.2025 at 06:00am

If you are like me, a soldier in the United States Army from 1973 to 2001, you have likely been disappointed with the Army’s drift over the past three decades. It was not an exclusive downward slide. The same has occurred in the Army’s sister services. In that span of time, physical fitness and appearance standards declined. The skill sets required to engage in conventional war, now characterized as large-scale combat operations (LSCO), have atrophied alarmingly, the fancier name notwithstanding. Likewise, the readiness of our forces during years of counterinsurgency (COIN) wars degraded as combat formations—corps, divisions, brigades, battalions, and companies and batteries—were hollowed out and refashioned to accommodate the frequent rotation of fighting forces in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan.

In the process, we gutted key Army branches like the artillery, air defense, and engineers, to bolster the need for manpower in bespoke Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) that were combat centerpieces during COIN operations. Indeed, the Army unwisely eliminated both division and corps artillery formations, which were essential to combined arms capabilities in LSCO. This was mindless. Indeed, a huge blunder.

Even now, that illogic continues as the Army’s armored cavalry, aviation assets, and special forces are being defenestrated to account for the manpower needs of other branches. That is a poor way to address manpower, and sadly, it is consistent with the decomposition of combat power and skills in the wake of the COIN years.

Moreover, weakening the contribution of critical army branches fails to recognize that the Army fights with combined arms, which contemplate the synchronization of essential capabilities to create the necessary impacts to overwhelm the enemy on the battlefield. That combat principle has not changed. It remains sound doctrine. Indeed, if anything, it has been reconfirmed by what we are seeing—or should have seen—in Ukraine as that country struggles fighting a war of attrition for its survival against a Russian invasion.

The ill-advised structural manipulations, loss of combat skills, and lack of rigor in soldier discipline and training have combined to create a hollow Army that will be hard-pressed to meet the challenges of future war that almost certainly lie ahead. Those wars will be fought on highly lethal and transparent battlefields that will test our ability to apply our doctrine and skills in LSCO successfully. The Army has considerable work to do to get ready.

Back to Divisions: Rebuilding for LSCO

In truth, there have been glimmers of hope in recent years following COIN. Army leaders have wisely concluded that if it is necessary to fight and win in LSCO, immediate change is required. Once again, the division has been reestablished as the fundamental synchronizing agent of combat power. The base piece will no longer be the BCT, which, although bulked up for COIN, would have been insufficient to coordinate the complex and inherent synchronization actions of divisions in the 1990s. Divisions must be trained to do this again, consistent with the 2024 Army Force Structure Transformation Initiative.

Yet, divisions require more combat power, including three whole maneuver brigades, an aviation brigade, necessary reconnaissance assets, and a Division Artillery (DIVARTY) with a full complement of direct and general support battalions to support the division’s main effort in combat as well as orchestrate and conduct the division’s counterfire fight. Moreover, a robust sustainment, engineering, air defense, and communications component is essential to support the division. Declaring the division’s revival is necessary, but it is hardly sufficient. The Army must do more than breathe life into this body. It must provide sinew and muscle. The Army is inadequate in both.

Enter the Secretary of War’s presentation to the nation’s generals and senior non-commissioned leadership at Quantico, Virginia, on 30 September 2025. In particular, Army generals and sergeants major were present to observe the proceedings. And some of the central points made then now give them the license to determine what must be done to repair our Army in meaningful ways.

“Lethality is our calling card, and victory our only acceptable end-state.” —Secretary Pete Hegseth

However, what caught my ear—and I am sure those like me who fought in the First Gulf War in 1991—was Secretary Pete Hegseth’s acknowledgment concerning the capabilities and readiness of the Army and joint forces to fight and win in that conflict. He correctly pointed to the 1980s Reagan military buildup that preceded the Gulf War. He also recognized the contributions of senior Army leaders of that era, many of whom had fought in the Vietnam War. The financial investment in military capability, combined with the wisdom of combat veterans who wrote the AirLand Battle doctrine we executed in the sands of the Middle East, set the conditions for victory. We should take note of that now. But more importantly, it was the warrior spirit, training, and abilities of US Army soldiers and their joint service comrades who fought in that conflict that produced victory.

In that regard, Secretary Hegseth correctly noted the business of our services today, to wit, “From this moment forward, the only mission of the newly restored Department of War is this: war fighting, preparing for war, and preparing to win, unrelenting and uncompromising in that pursuit.”

That must be the focus of America’s Army. We must rebuild our combined arms capability. We must properly structure ourselves to fight. We must equip our soldiers with the finest and most lethal weapons. And we must train with rigor to be ready to fight, as if combat will come upon us at “0-dark-30” tomorrow.

Call in “The Grey Beard Brigade”

However, the Army’s leadership faces a penultimate challenge. Simply put, it is challenging for officers and non-commissioned officers to reimagine the kind of Army to fight in LSCO when they have never experienced that sort of war firsthand. And in that regard, they have “forgotten” that which they did not know.

Many of our senior leaders—fine as they may be, indeed combat tested during COIN—lack the experience of how we prepared to fight before 1990, when the Army was keenly focused on conventional war, just as we must be for LSCO now. Nor have they trained with the same rigor as the Army did in the 1980s and 90s, when it was preparing for an invasion of the North German plain by the forces of the Warsaw Pact. And most concerning, this Army has not fought within full-fledged divisions operating under robust corps on expansive and dangerous battlefields that will test the heart and abilities of the best of soldiers. Gone are the days when whole divisions conducted force-on-force maneuvers over vast expanses of terrain as we did in the days of REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) to test our skills at echelon and scale. But there’s good news. Many who did are still here to help the Army “remember” what it has not learned about preparing division echelons and their subordinates for combat.

It is time for the Secretary of the Army to direct and assemble—now—a “Grey Beard Brigade,” volunteer teams of former warfighters, to be dispatched across the Army to help units at all echelons learn and reconnect to what they must do to fight and win in conventional war. They must know what those of us who have served in years past understood, including the lessons we learned in planning, operating, training, moving, shooting, communicating, maintaining, deploying, and redeploying in both war and peace.

Yet it is difficult to imagine what you have not experienced, especially given the span of time that now exists between the last conventional war and the one that lies ahead for the Army. The soldiers of the Vietnam and Gulf War eras have long since retired. The good news is that they still understand—seasoned as they are—what must be done to achieve the ultimate challenge of any army: to fight and win in combat.

The Time to Ask is Now

To be sure, the Army has much to do in recruiting quality personnel, building on its sound doctrine, designing rigorous training, developing and fielding the best equipment, and providing the resources to exercise at every echelon and at full scale, all in preparation for conventional war. It’s time to ask some people who know how to do that to pitch in with sound advice based on their experiences and wisdom. And in the process, achieve what Secretary Hegseth has made clear: “Lethality is our calling card, and victory our only acceptable end-state.”

Many of us are only a call away.

Tags: COIN, Combined Arms, Division Artillery, Force Design, large scale combat operations, Military Reform, Pete Hegseth

About The Author

L. Scott Lingamfelter
L. Scott Lingamfelter is a retired US Army Colonel and combat veteran (1973-2001) and former member of the Virginia House of Delegates (2002-2018). He is the author of Desert Redleg: Artillery Warfare in the First Gulf War (University Press of Kentucky, 2020) and Yanks in Blue Berets: American UN Peacekeepers in the Middle East (UPK, 2023). He is authoring a new book on the future of warfare.

13. The Things that Bedevil U.S. Cyber Power

Excerpts:

Conclusion

America’s cyber forces are unmatched in talent, innovation, and strategic capability. But talent and resources alone are not enough. Senior leaders and policymakers should trust, empower, and integrate these forces at every level of warfare.

This is not merely one marine’s opinion — it is a reflection born of time spent at the forward edge of operations, shoulder to shoulder with America’s allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. It is a perspective shaped by watching incredible marines and joint teammates produce brilliance, only to be constrained by policy and authority structures built for another era.

The time for reform is now. The United States should act with urgency, with courage, and with a bias for action. Empower your people. Trust their judgment. Let them do what warfighters were trained to do.

In doing so, the U.S. military will ensure that America remains not only a cyber superpower in name, but a force capable of shaping operational outcomes and strategic success in the 21st century and beyond.

The Things that Bedevil U.S. Cyber Power

Jeffrey Edwards

October 16, 2025

warontherocks.com · October 16, 2025

Cyber operations have become a defining feature of modern conflict, a front line that shapes the contours of global power competition. Yet despite daily headlines about Chinese hackers breaching defense contractors, Russian ransomware crippling pipelines, and Iranian cyber operatives probing our critical infrastructure, there remains a persistent and increasingly dangerous gap between America’s strategic cyber ambitions and the way these capabilities are integrated into warfighting. Without urgent action, the service could end up with a cyber force that looks formidable, but rests upon weak tactical foundations.

While U.S. Cyber Command has unmatched resources, the centralization of offensive cyber authorities has created a dangerous gap between strategic vision and operational reality. By sidelining forward-deployed units and commanders, the United States is limiting its ability to compete effectively against adversaries who already integrate cyber at every level of warfare.

The Department of Defense ought to delegate risk-informed cyber authorities to operational commanders, empower forward-deployed teams, and reform policy so that cyber effects can be employed with the same trust and discipline as other combat capabilities.

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The Disconnect Between Strategy and Reality

On paper, the United States fields the most capable cyber force in the world. The reality is different. Military cyber operations remain highly centralized under U.S. Cyber Command. While strategic-level operations and access should remain under strict oversight, the near-total consolidation of offensive cyber authorities at the national level leaves forward-deployed units and combatant commanders without the tools they need to compete effectively in the contested battlespace. The United States is fighting a domain-centric war with one arm tied behind its back.

This misalignment between strategic guidance and operational flexibility is not just an inefficiency. It is a vulnerability.

Exploit Production: It’s Not Just Volume

A common critique of America’s cyber posture is that the military does not produce exploits and capabilities at the scale of adversaries like China. And it is true that the Chinese cyber apparatus — state-directed, university-supported, and bolstered by an extensive contractor network — generates cyber exploits at a dizzying rate.

But this is a false comparison. The United States has deliberately taken a different path — one grounded in operational precision, strategic necessity, and the minimization of escalation risks. America’s national cyber strategy does not demand quantity; it demands quality. Tailored, risk-informed, strategically aligned cyber operations are the hallmark of U.S. warfighting.

Yet even a strategy of precision requires capability at the edge. The Marine expeditionary force information groups, the U.S. Army’s multi-domain task forces, and similar service-retained units in battle positions all over the globe need the tools, authorities, and processes to employ cyber effects in real time. It is not about stockpiling exploits. It is about equipping those closest to the problem with what they need to create strategic impact through operational or tactical excellence.

Authorities: Balance Is Not Control

Today, offensive cyber authorities reside almost exclusively with U.S. Cyber Command and its subordinate command, the Cyber National Mission Force. This structure ensures strategic oversight, but at a cost: it disempowers operational units that understand the battlespace, the adversary’s tactics, and the needs of their commanders.

Marine expeditionary force information groups, multi-domain task forces, and similar formations are staffed with highly trained marines and soldiers who are embedded with forward-deployed forces, speak the language of their environment, and routinely work alongside our allies and partners. Yet they remain largely spectators when it comes to offensive cyberspace operations. Cyber National Mission Force units suffer from inconsistent training, short staffing, and conflicting demands from service cyber components — conditions that undercut readiness before the battle even starts. Cyber Command has assumed responsibilities for force generation without the policy, process, or culture to sustain those forces. As a result, marines and soldiers on the forward edge detect malicious activity, but have no mandate or authority to act until a much larger command structure steps in.

The Department of Defense and the Joint Staff should develop delegated authorities for cyber, akin to the fire support coordination measures used in physical combat. Commanders in the field are trusted with munitions that can kill and destroy — surely, with proper safeguards, they can be trusted with effects that disrupt and degrade.

This is not a call for unfettered autonomy. It is a call for balance: strategic control with operational flexibility. This shift should begin now.

Managing Risk with Discipline, Not Fear

The primary reason for cyber centralization is risk: the risk of escalation, of compromising intelligence sources and methods, and of unintended collateral effects. These risks are real, but they are not unique to cyber.

Every domain carries risk. The services trust commanders to employ artillery, air strikes, and special operations in fluid environments. They equip them with rules of engagement, legal advisors, and clear commanders’ intent. They accept risk because the absence of action is often the greater danger.

Why are cyber operations treated categorically different?

American military forces should mature their approach. Cyber operations require the same level of disciplined planning, legal scrutiny, and strategic alignment as kinetic ones — but they should not be paralyzed by unique burdens. Risk can be managed. What cannot be managed is a future where American forces are outpaced in cyberspace because they refused to decentralize when it mattered most.

The Enemies Who Already Get It

Adversaries do not wrestle with the same debates that tie down American cyber forces. China, Russia, and Iran already view cyber as a fully integrated component of military and national power. They do not ask whether cyber effects belong at the tactical level. They assume it.

China’s cyber operations have evolved far beyond espionage. Beijing now uses cyberspace to pre-position, shape, and prepare the battlefield, striking at logistics networks, critical infrastructure, and military systems. These efforts are not afterthoughts; they are baked into joint campaign planning and calibrated to impose costs well before the first missile is launched.

Russia offers another lesson. The timing of cyber operations often defines their effectiveness. Moscow understands this principle. Its campaigns against Ukraine frequently sought to shape the environment before and during combat, synchronizing disruption of networks with missile strikes and electronic warfare. These operations have not always delivered systemic effects, but the intent is clear: Russia sees cyber as a flexible, opportunistic tool of war.

Iran demonstrates the asymmetric power of cyberspace. Lacking the conventional capacity of China or Russia, Tehran employs cyber as a cost-effective tool to deter, harass, and undermine regional adversaries. From targeting Gulf state infrastructure to probing U.S. networks, Iran uses cyber in ways that impose real operational and political friction disproportionate to its size.

These examples highlight what U.S. forces have yet to fully embrace: Cyber is neither a niche capability nor an exotic add-on. It is a standard tool of statecraft and warfighting. While adversaries press forward with integrated cyber campaigns, U.S. Cyber Command and the services remain bogged down in centralized authorities, bureaucratic caution, and what one analyst called “seven years of failure” to generate credible combat outcomes at scale.

If the United States is to deter and defeat such adversaries, it must do more than match their strategic employment of cyber. It must surpass them operationally by empowering tactical cyber operators to act at the speed of battle. Otherwise, the nation risks maintaining a cyber force that is strategically impressive on paper but operationally impotent in practice.

The Value of Forward-Deployed Expertise

From direct experience conducting cyber operations with III Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group in the Indo-Pacific, I witnessed firsthand the value that small, agile, forward-deployed cyber teams bring to the fight. These marines possess regional knowledge, cultural understanding, and operational relationships that cannot be replicated from a command center thousands of miles away. They understand the pulse of the adversary. They know how to speak the operational language of maneuver commanders. They build trust with allies and partners who live in the shadow of adversarial cyber threats.

These teams are not a theoretical capability. They are an existing, underutilized asset. And until senior leadership unlocks their full potential, the military will continue leaving operational impact on the table.

The tenacity of marines to meet the enemy in the cyber trenches is unquestionable. What is in question is the system that shackles them. When marine cyber operators on the tactical edge detect, disrupt, or repel a malicious cyber attack against American key terrain, they cannot immediately pivot to a counter-offensive. Unlike artillery or aviation, where commanders have the authority to respond decisively in real time, cyber operators must first push their findings up the chain of command, across multiple headquarters, and ultimately to U.S. Cyber Command — the only force currently holding the authorities to launch offensive cyber operations. Several times, marines stood at the line of departure — geared up, prepared, and ready to fight the adversary in the cyber trenches — yet were ordered to hold because policy and authority restricted them from acting. The justification was framed as preserving “strategic unity of effort,” but to those on the ground, it felt more like being sidelined and told to wait for the varsity team to arrive.

U.S. Cyber Command likely believed it was acting in the best interest of mission success by waiting for more experienced cyber operators to assess and execute. Fleet commanders, often unfamiliar with the full scope of their cyber authorities and capabilities, complied when asked to hold. From a senior leadership perspective, the decision prioritized proven skill sets and established authorities to ensure mission effectiveness. However, service-retained cyber forces — though not under U.S. Cyber Command’s operational control — are equally trained and capable. Many of the marines had extensive experience at Fort Meade, supporting both offensive and defensive national-level missions. Despite this, tactical operators who had already detected and engaged threats often experienced frustration. The delay in action, driven by strategic caution, risked losing fleeting opportunities and appeared to undervalue their contributions.

This reflects a broader tension between strategic risk management and the urgency of seizing time-sensitive opportunities at the tactical edge.

By the time that reporting is complete, the adversary is often long gone. The fleeting opportunity to seize initiative, exploit vulnerabilities, and impose costs evaporates. What could have been a decisive tactical counterstrike instead becomes a sterile after action report.

This bottleneck is not a reflection of a lack of skill or will at the tactical level — it is the product of a risk-averse structure that centralizes authority at the expense of operational tempo. In the Indo-Pacific, where adversaries probe and strike in seconds, waiting hours or days for decisions from Washington is not just inefficient — it is strategically dangerous.

If the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army are trusted to maneuver infantry squads under fire, call in close air support, or employ precision fires with strategic consequences, then forward-deployed marines and soldiers should also be trusted to employ flexible cyber responses within commander’s intent. Denying them this authority undermines the very reason they exist: to fight and win in the digital battlespace alongside American forces in the physical one.

Turning Doctrine into Reality

The military’s embrace of joint all-domain operations is one of the most important conceptual shifts in modern warfighting. It recognizes that to create dilemmas for adversaries, it should integrate capabilities across land, sea, air, space, and cyber.

The Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 and the concept of joint all-domain operations strategy both emphasize cyber as a key enabler. But to move from vision to reality, the military should enable cyber effects to be employed at the operational and tactical level. Doctrinal rigidity can be an obstacle to effective tactical-level cyberspace planning and operations. Joint publications that force cyber planners into simplified paths or fixate on point targets often misalign with the multidimensional, networked realities of cyber war. Forward-deployed teams who understand local terrain and adversary behavior are among the few who can exploit complexity — if given autonomy.

Warfighters do not need new doctrine. They need implementation. They need policy reform. And they need leaders willing to accept the risk that comes with empowering the edge.

Empowering the Human Factor

Leadership in warfare is built on trust. Senior leaders trust their junior leaders and service members to make decisions under fire, to operate with incomplete information, and to act with judgment shaped by training, mentorship, and experience.

The same should hold true in cyber. Operators and planners at the tactical edge are often closest to the fight, most attuned to the environment, and best positioned to act quickly and decisively.

Empowerment does not mean recklessness. It means building the training pipelines, certification standards, and mission command structures to allow the best people to do what they are trained to do. From my mentors and my own journey, one enduring lesson remains: If you want excellence, you should create space for it. You should give your people the authority, trust, and support to act.

A Call for Immediate Action

The United States cannot afford to drift toward cyber irrelevance at the operational level. If American forces are to maintain cyber superiority in an increasingly contested global environment, they should act now. The margin for delay is gone.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff should develop delegated authorities by creating robust frameworks that delegate limited, risk-informed offensive cyber authorities to Combatant Commands and operational units under clear strategic oversight. Commanders should plan operations that integrate cyber at the edge that enable service-retained cyber teams to conduct operations that shape theater objectives, in concert with other kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. Commanders should also treat cyber risk with the same discipline and operational logic they apply in other environments, and trust professional judgment. Leaders and organizations should train and certify tactical leaders who meet service-level and joint standards while building robust certification programs that ensure cyber operators can execute missions legally, ethically, and effectively. Lastly, senior leaders, commanders, and policymakers should be equipped to understand cyber not as a niche capability but as a domain of warfare that demands integration across warfighting functions such as fires and maneuver.

Conclusion

America’s cyber forces are unmatched in talent, innovation, and strategic capability. But talent and resources alone are not enough. Senior leaders and policymakers should trust, empower, and integrate these forces at every level of warfare.

This is not merely one marine’s opinion — it is a reflection born of time spent at the forward edge of operations, shoulder to shoulder with America’s allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. It is a perspective shaped by watching incredible marines and joint teammates produce brilliance, only to be constrained by policy and authority structures built for another era.

The time for reform is now. The United States should act with urgency, with courage, and with a bias for action. Empower your people. Trust their judgment. Let them do what warfighters were trained to do.

In doing so, the U.S. military will ensure that America remains not only a cyber superpower in name, but a force capable of shaping operational outcomes and strategic success in the 21st century and beyond.

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Jeffrey Edwards is a Marine cyberspace warfare officer with 14 years of active-duty service, including at Cyber Command, Indo-Pacific Command, and Central Command. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

**Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

Image: Midjourney

warontherocks.com · October 16, 2025

14. Interwar Adaptations: Leveraging Partner Experiences for Future Conflicts

Yes, we must examine the history for lessons. Donovan and the Lodge Act following WWII are two useful examples (though I am biased toward both).

Excerpts:

Historical Precedent

Since the American Revolution, foreign officers with combat experience and training in military theory have contributed to the United States’ success on the battlefield. Notable figures include Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben and the Marquis de Lafayette. Von Steuben, a Prussian veteran of the Seven Years’ War, went on to publish the Continental Army’s “Blue Book,” a foundational text for all citizen-soldiers of the Continental Army. Today, the “Blue Book” still exists in various forms throughout the US Army. More specific to irregular warfare, the Marquis de Lafayette, another European aristocrat with a formal military education, was also a key leader of the Continental Army and led American soldiers to victory against British forces on several occasions. As a key advisor to Washington, he orchestrated ambush attacks, led reconnaissance forces, and even planned tentative direct action raids onto the British Isles.

During World War II, Major General William Donovan drew upon his experience as an observer in Spain to leverage foreign, combat-experienced veterans upon his founding of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The Spanish Civil War, spanning from 1936 to 1939, provided a proving ground for the Soviet and Axis powers – with adversaries developing groundbreaking doctrine on combined arms operations, combat aviation, and irregular warfare. After the war, Donovan remarked, “I looked at the situation in Spain, because it was very evident to anyone who could understand that the Civil War was a laboratory for testing out what was going to be done during the new war.” Inspired by his Spanish experiences, Donovan sought out subject matter experts from diverse backgrounds, including British colonial policemen, Spanish Civil War guerrilla leaders, and Tsarist Russian officers. These veterans shared lessons learned about Spanish sabotage techniques and Soviet guerilla doctrine, and also validated OSS force structure as the United States prepared to enter the Second World War.

Veterans of foreign conflicts remained at the tip of the United States’ clandestine and irregular warfare apparatuses into the Cold War, facilitated by the passage of the Lodge-Philbin Act in 1950. The Lodge-Philbin Act permitted the recruitment of foreign nationals into the United States Army in a bid to leverage Eastern Bloc and Central European citizens’ cultural knowledge, language skills, and even previous battlefield experience – characteristics that play a key role in irregular warfare. As a result, many of the soldiers who first joined Army Special Forces upon its foundation in 1952 were international enlistees from the Lodge Act, institutionalizing unique cultural and tactical knowledge that would not have been possible in a homogenous, American-only organization.

More recent efforts to integrate foreign battlefield and cultural experiences into the Army (such as the MAVNI program) have had mixed success due to concerns over information security. Lessons from the MAVNI program, however, can help to mitigate information security risks during the integration of foreign MPEP personnel, who will have lower clearance requirements than MAVNI enlistees. In an era as dynamic and tumultuous as the 21st century, the DoW cannot afford to overlook the lessons our partners and competitors have already learned.

Interwar Adaptations: Leveraging Partner Experiences for Future Conflicts

October 16, 2025 by Jacob McDonnell Leave a Comment

irregularwarfare.org · Jacob McDonnell

The War in Ukraine has precipitated massive shifts in warfighting methodologies, highlighting the utility of the “irregular approach” in peer-level combat. While waging a counterattack throughout last month, Ukrainian forces relied on reconnaissance capabilities and small group infantry assaults to develop an asymmetric advantage. This most recent battlefield activity builds on a trend that has emerged since the 2022 Russian invasion. Massed mechanized assaults have almost disappeared from the frontlines, while drone warfare and electronic warfare have become new nexuses of combat power. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have become adept at launching long-range strategic strikes using Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS), performing Suppression of Enemy Air Defense, targeting Russian infrastructure in rear areas, and even launching social media campaigns as a form of Military Information Support Operations, among other notable irregular capabilities. Each of these tasks represents a capability crucial to the US Army’s vision for Multi-Domain Operations. While the United States learns valuable lessons through its materiel support via security assistance programs, the fullest value of its partnership can only be realized by leveraging human programs that institutionalize knowledge exchange between the UAF and the Department of War (DoW). Successful programs during the American Revolution, the Second World War, the Cold War, and the Global War on Terrorism have proven the benefits of personnel exchanges. Just as the United States has historically implemented lessons from its global allies, the DoW must leverage the experiences of its partners in the UAF via the DoW’s Military Personnel Exchange Program (MPEP).

Historical Precedent

Since the American Revolution, foreign officers with combat experience and training in military theory have contributed to the United States’ success on the battlefield. Notable figures include Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben and the Marquis de Lafayette. Von Steuben, a Prussian veteran of the Seven Years’ War, went on to publish the Continental Army’s “Blue Book,” a foundational text for all citizen-soldiers of the Continental Army. Today, the “Blue Book” still exists in various forms throughout the US Army. More specific to irregular warfare, the Marquis de Lafayette, another European aristocrat with a formal military education, was also a key leader of the Continental Army and led American soldiers to victory against British forces on several occasions. As a key advisor to Washington, he orchestrated ambush attacks, led reconnaissance forces, and even planned tentative direct action raids onto the British Isles.

During World War II, Major General William Donovan drew upon his experience as an observer in Spain to leverage foreign, combat-experienced veterans upon his founding of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The Spanish Civil War, spanning from 1936 to 1939, provided a proving ground for the Soviet and Axis powers – with adversaries developing groundbreaking doctrine on combined arms operations, combat aviation, and irregular warfare. After the war, Donovan remarked, “I looked at the situation in Spain, because it was very evident to anyone who could understand that the Civil War was a laboratory for testing out what was going to be done during the new war.” Inspired by his Spanish experiences, Donovan sought out subject matter experts from diverse backgrounds, including British colonial policemen, Spanish Civil War guerrilla leaders, and Tsarist Russian officers. These veterans shared lessons learned about Spanish sabotage techniques and Soviet guerilla doctrine, and also validated OSS force structure as the United States prepared to enter the Second World War.

Veterans of foreign conflicts remained at the tip of the United States’ clandestine and irregular warfare apparatuses into the Cold War, facilitated by the passage of the Lodge-Philbin Act in 1950. The Lodge-Philbin Act permitted the recruitment of foreign nationals into the United States Army in a bid to leverage Eastern Bloc and Central European citizens’ cultural knowledge, language skills, and even previous battlefield experience – characteristics that play a key role in irregular warfare. As a result, many of the soldiers who first joined Army Special Forces upon its foundation in 1952 were international enlistees from the Lodge Act, institutionalizing unique cultural and tactical knowledge that would not have been possible in a homogenous, American-only organization.

More recent efforts to integrate foreign battlefield and cultural experiences into the Army (such as the MAVNI program) have had mixed success due to concerns over information security. Lessons from the MAVNI program, however, can help to mitigate information security risks during the integration of foreign MPEP personnel, who will have lower clearance requirements than MAVNI enlistees. In an era as dynamic and tumultuous as the 21st century, the DoW cannot afford to overlook the lessons our partners and competitors have already learned.

Policy Recommendation

In keeping with this legacy of cooperation and innovation, the Army should institute a formal exchange program for onboarding UAF veterans of the Russo-Ukrainian War. The Military Personnel Exchange Program is a promising candidate for such an effort, with MPEP allowing the US Army to exchange American officers/NCOs with foreign counterparts in both operational and generating force assignments. These personnel would serve as instructors and consultants at our Centers of Excellence, from the Navy’s Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence to traditional Army Transformation and Training Command formations such as the Maneuver Center of Excellence and Fires Center of Excellence. Such an exchange would facilitate a knowledge transfer of the most cutting-edge battlefield developments, ensure that existing curricula are relevant and applicable to modern challenges, and enable the rapid dissemination of that information into the operational Army. By incorporating the experience of Ukrainian combatants, the Army can improve the realism, practicality, and efficacy of its training and doctrine.

The implementation of MPEP personnel, however, does not have to end at training or doctrine development. MPEP personnel currently serve in a variety of operational assignments throughout our Army, particularly at many division headquarters. Onboarding foreign MPEP personnel at echelons below brigade provides an opportunity to enhance the exchange of tactics and doctrine at the tactical level and offers immense opportunities for mutual benefit:

MPEP billets in US battalion-level formations will insert leaders with experience operating in modern, resource-constricted, and highly denied Operational Environments at points of friction.
Partner nations will receive American officers and NCOs with extensive knowledge of operating and fighting with US equipment. As an example, US materiel now makes up approximately 30% of the Ukrainian arsenal.
US officers embedded in NATO formations in Eastern Europe will have an opportunity to observe the constantly evolving nature of the modern Operational Environment and return to their units with a better understanding of how to adapt to new battlefield developments.
UAF officers on exchange with American units will have an opportunity to observe US modernization initiatives (such as Transformation in Contact), which they can draw inspiration from following their return home.
In newly raised American UAS or Multi-Domain Task Force formations, embedded Ukrainians will be able to impart some of their experience developing targeting processes and share best practices.

At the company level, the benefits of these exchanges become even more potent. American junior officers undergoing training at Basic Officer Leader Course or Captains Career Course already encounter International Military Student Officers with extensive combat experience. They may encounter Jordanian Special Forces lieutenants who had conducted Direct Action raids against militant groups weeks prior to reporting to the Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course, Ukrainian border guard officers who were manning trenches mere months before coming to Fort Benning, or Korean infantry captains who had spent years leading patrols on the DMZ before attending the Maneuver Captains Career Course. While exposure to these individuals in a training environment is beneficial, there could be even greater value in distributing them throughout the operational force. Lower echelon exchanges would enable partner forces to identify features of US platoons and companies they would like to implement back home and would act as sounding boards for our own doctrine and best practices.

For Special Operations Forces, the same benefits of personnel exchange exist today as they did for Detachment A in 1950s West Berlin: training on the most cutting-edge TTPs, absorbing firsthand cultural and language knowledge, and building unparalleled interoperability with partner forces. Special Operations Command writ large already maintains exchanges, both via regular Joint Combined Exchange Trainings, ongoing MPEP exchanges, and even their own Special Operations Liaisons that embed within allied SOF formations. While SOCOM is already far ahead of the conventional force in facilitating knowledge transfer with partners, it too could be well served by deepening existing exchanges and dispersing partner servicemembers down to the Operational Detachments-A, Platoon, or Team levels.

The Army’s sister services stand to gain even more through MPEP exchanges. Lacking its own navy, the UAF has come close to crippling one of the most powerful naval forces in the world, inflicting immense losses with innovative new anti-ship drones and munitions. The US Air Force, having recently completed training a cohort of Ukrainian F-16 pilots, is already learning from the UAF’s fielding efforts of US fixed-wing platforms on its battlefields. The Marine Corps, like the Army, also stands to benefit from the tactics, techniques, and procedures that Ukrainian servicemembers have developed through their own amphibious operations. Because of the expansive scope of the Russo-Ukrainian Conflict, the benefits of personnel exchanges have the potential to be of immense value to each of the services.

While commanders and senior leaders may be hesitant to give foreign personnel access to leadership roles in their formations—or to send our capable officers/NCOs on assignment to foreign militaries—interoperability has always been a core tenet of the American way of war. The vast majority of our engagements over the past century have been conducted with allies and the United States remains the only member of NATO to invoke Article 5. Expanding MPEP is not only an operational necessity, but serves as a tribute to the United States Armed Forces’ historic legacy and status as an international “partner of choice”.

Conclusion

As tactics and doctrine continue to evolve in Europe, the Department of War should institutionalize lessons learned in Ukraine in order to maintain a competitive edge over potential adversaries. The advantages of MPEP are comprehensive and bidirectional. An opportunity exists for both nations to leverage partner experience and address knowledge gaps that would otherwise remain undiscovered. As the US Army institutes its Transformation Initiative and sister services conduct their own modernization efforts, they may find that there is no substitute for hard-earned combat experience.

Department of War leaders should remember that interoperability has long been a cornerstone of the American way of war. If the United States expects to fight and win alongside its allies in future conflicts, it must be prepared to seamlessly integrate these allies into its Warfighting Functions through shared doctrine and training. While the adage goes that “experience is the best teacher,” it does not have to be our own blood that pays tuition. By embedding Ukrainian veterans through MPEP, the United States can ensure the US Army learns the right lessons now—before the next war comes to test us.

Author Bio: 2LT Jacob McDonnell is an Infantry Officer and recent West Point graduate. His past research includes Capstone Projects for J2 AFRICOM and the Commanding General of USASOC. He has also conducted broadening assignments with the Office of Defense Cooperation in Skopje, North Macedonia, and alongside the French Gendarmerie Nationale. 2LT McDonnell previously served as a member of the IWI Development team.

Main Image: Ukrainian special forces wave to pilots from the 101st Combat Aviation Brigade during Exercise Combined Resolve 14 at Hohenfels, Germany, September 24, 2020. Courtesy of DVIDS.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

15. The End of Cybersecurity by Jen Easterly

Excerpts:

Cybersecurity should no longer mean a permanent defensive struggle.

Making real progress is now possible—and is crucial to U.S. defense. The Pentagon spends billions each year on cybersecurity operations and employs tens of thousands of personnel to defend vulnerable software systems. Reducing preventable software flaws would free up resources and personnel to focus on deterring and disrupting adversaries—for instance, expanding offensive cyber-capabilities to impose costs on those who target U.S. critical infrastructure—shifting the balance of power from constant defense to proactive deterrence.

These changes will also unleash the full potential of the cybersecurity sector, which is increasingly inseparable from AI itself. The future of cyber work lies not in reacting to yesterday’s breaches but in engineering trust into the fabric of digital life by securing the algorithms, data, and infrastructure that power the global economy. Human expertise and machine intelligence will work in concert to strengthen critical systems, safeguard innovation, and preserve the United States’ technological edge.

Cybersecurity should no longer mean a permanent defensive struggle. It should mean the deliberate design of a safer digital world. With the right policies, the right incentives, and the right application of AI, the United States can finally move from defending the past to securing the future. This is how cybersecurity truly ends: not with perfect protection but with systems resilient enough to withstand disruption.

The End of Cybersecurity

Foreign Affairs · More by Jen Easterly · October 16, 2025

America’s Digital Defenses Are Failing—But AI Can Save Them

Jen Easterly

October 16, 2025

Researching AI and cybersecurity in Cambridge, Massachusetts, September 2025 Shannon Stapleton / Reuters

JEN EASTERLY is a Visiting Fellow of Practice at the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University. She served as the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security from 2021 to 2025.

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In November 1988, the Morris worm—an experimental computer program written by a curious graduate student—unintentionally crippled the early Internet and exposed for the first time the serious consequences of poorly designed software. Nearly 40 years later, the world still runs on fragile code riddled with the same kinds of flaws and defects. Amid frequent news reports about hacks and leaks, a key truth is often overlooked: the United States does not have a cybersecurity problem. It has a software quality problem. The multibillion-dollar cybersecurity industry largely exists to compensate for insecure software.

The impact of persistent weaknesses in U.S. software is playing out in real time. Since at least 2021, for instance, hackers connected to China’s Ministry of State Security and People’s Liberation Army have exploited the same types of flaws that the Morris Worm feasted on decades ago. These groups—referred to as Salt Typhoon and Volt Typhoon—have taken advantage of unpatched systems, poorly secured routers, and devices built for connectivity rather than resilience to infiltrate telecommunications networks, transportation systems, and power utilities. And just this year, Russian Federal Security Service hackers exploited an unpatched flaw in networking devices to compromise thousands of routers and switches connected to U.S. infrastructure. As more institutions, from hospitals to ports, rely on software to function, unsafe code is a growing threat to the United States.

These vulnerabilities endure because software vendors face few incentives to prioritize security. It remains cheaper and faster to shift the costs of insecurity downstream to customers. And because much of the code that underpins critical infrastructure is decades old, rewriting it securely has long been too expensive and time-consuming to make business sense.

But capabilities—including the accelerating power of artificial intelligence—are emerging to fix these software problems across entire digital ecosystems. This could spell the end of cybersecurity as we currently know it—and make the United States much less vulnerable as a result. But the window to take advantage of new technology is closing as U.S. adversaries, too, are looking to use AI to enhance their cyberattack capabilities. Now is the time for U.S. government agencies, large companies, and investors to work together to fundamentally shift economic incentives and use AI to improve the United States’ digital defenses. Cyberspace will never be completely safe. But the cybersecurity market as it currently exists does not have to be a permanent feature of the digital age. A better and more secure approach to software is within reach.

MISALIGNED MARKETS

In the popular narrative, hackers—whether they are individual rogue actors, state-sponsored groups, or teams backed by criminal syndicates—are mysterious and clever, deviously exploiting careless employees and misconfigured servers. But most intrusions do not succeed because attackers wield exotic cyberweapons. They succeed because widely deployed technology products are installed with well-known and preventable defects.

The core issue is economic, not technological. Most buyers have no practical way to judge whether the software they purchase is secure. They must take vendors at their word, which creates little incentive for the designers or sellers of software to invest in protections that customers cannot see or measure. As a result, software vendors compete on aspects that are more obvious to buyers: lower prices, getting their products to market first, and convenient functionalities such as one-click integrations with other systems or easy remote access. But focusing on these features often comes at the expense of adequate safeguards against cyber threats. Market forces simply do not incentivize prioritizing security in the design process.

This has led to the rise of the cybersecurity aftermarket—a sprawling ecosystem of antivirus systems, detection capabilities, firewalls, and much more—which essentially provide bolt-on solutions to address software insecurities. And although the cybersecurity industry has evolved into an impressive community of talented innovators, its interventions are necessarily rearguard actions. Cybersecurity systems limit the damage of malware that should never have been able to spread, clean up breaches that should never have occurred, and fix flaws that should never have existed.

Software companies also deprioritize security in their product design because they are rarely held liable for security failures. In the United States, there is no enforceable baseline standard for what security protections software must have, nor are there penalties for insecure software, essentially making unsafe design a rational business choice. When catastrophic breaches occur, software companies create patches rather than redesign the product to be more secure. This is largely because the party that suffers is the customer. Until these companies are held liable and regulators enforce standards, exploitable code will remain the foundation of digital infrastructure. It is cheaper and faster for vendors to ship unsafe products and let customers and cybersecurity teams shoulder the burden of guarding their weak points.

These perverse incentives must be shifted. Prevention would be much better than a set of inconsistently applied and sometimes flimsy cures. U.S. cyberspace is porous, and only the creators and sellers of software can change outcomes at scale. An individual user cannot make encryption mandatory; a vendor can. A hospital cannot rewrite a commercial application to avoid data corruption; a vendor can. A city cannot secure the code that runs its water system; a vendor can. Responsibility must sit at the point of production, not consumption.

NEW TECHNOLOGY, NEW POSSIBILITIES

For decades, even well-intentioned software companies could not justify efforts to create more secure products. It was both too costly and too challenging. But increasingly powerful artificial intelligence is changing this calculus. New technology holds the promise of making it possible to cheaply and effectively produce newer, safer code and also fix the weaknesses of older code, which would drastically reduce cyber-risk to global digital infrastructure.

Artificial intelligence is already reshaping software engineering. Major technology firms report that AI systems generate roughly a quarter of their code, a share that could rise above 80 percent within the next five years. Relying on AI to fix software has some risks: because AI models are learning from decades of imperfect human code, they could reproduce the same vulnerabilities that plague current software. But these systems not only learn from existing code; they also learn from every known flaw and attempted fix. Trained purposefully on secure coding standards and continuously refined through feedback, AI can correct human errors, not perpetuate them. Over time, AI will produce more secure code than any human developer can.

AI systems could also be used to repair defects in widely used software. From 2023 to 2025, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) ran an AI Cyber Challenge to test whether AI systems could autonomously find and patch software flaws. The results were impressive. Leading models identified the majority of the vulnerabilities that the organizers had seeded in the code and even discovered previously unknown weaknesses—doing in minutes, and at a fraction of the cost, what takes expert teams days or weeks. Private sector firms, including companies such as Google, Meta, and Microsoft, which build software that Americans use every day, are taking similar action, using AI systems to detect and fix vulnerabilities.

AI systems could autonomously find and patch software flaws.

Most important, AI will help tackle the hardest challenge in securing software: aging code that supports much of the world’s digital infrastructure. Major software tools, including word processors and email systems, and critical sectors, such as banking and transportation, all run on software written decades ago. The design choices made when this code was written have left deeply rooted weaknesses. Rewriting all this legacy code to be more secure has, until recently, been prohibitively expensive and risky—the digital equivalent of trying to rebuild an airplane mid-flight. But as AI becomes increasingly powerful, it offers the promise of millions of agents simultaneously reading, understanding, and transforming insecure code at scale. AI is thus an economic breakthrough as well as a technical one: it makes the painstaking work of rewriting the network of insecure software affordable.

Critics will argue that AI will only weaken cybersecurity by arming attackers with faster, stealthier, and more adaptive tools. This risk is real: AI will enable adversaries to automate their offensive strategies at the same time as defensive systems automate detection and response. But the more profound impact of AI should be upstream, in prevention rather than reaction. By helping to build software that eliminates the vulnerabilities that adversaries seek to exploit, AI can address the root cause of cyber insecurity.

The implications of AI for cyberdefense are transformative. Instead of purchasing an endless cascade of products to compensate for defective software, organizations could pay for software that is measurably more secure out of the box—and for AI-assisted tools that maintain its defenses automatically. Programmers will no longer write code that needs fixing later; AI assistants will help them create systems with security built in from the start. Before new products go live, automated checks could scan for weak spots—just as cars are crash-tested before reaching the road. Old, fragile systems will be continuously modernized, removing dangerous flaws that attackers exploit today. As this becomes the norm, the entire model of cybersecurity will change. Security will become a standard feature of digital life, not a costly add-on.

FROM CHAOS TO COHERENCE

But these changes are not guaranteed to happen. Ending the cybersecurity aftermarket by creating high-quality software at scale requires ambitious leaders willing to take bold action. Incremental tweaks won’t close the gap between today’s fragile, defect-ridden ecosystem and a future in which software is designed to be secure. Governments, technology vendors, customers, and investors must take steps to align incentives for producers and consumers, accelerate innovation, and make security a visible feature of software.

Most critically, the AI systems that will help secure software must themselves be built securely. AI models can be manipulated through corrupted training data; they can make unpredictable decisions that even their creators can’t fully explain; they may depend on software components sourced from untrustworthy suppliers; and they can introduce entirely new weaknesses that adversaries can exploit, such as the potential to trick an AI model into revealing sensitive data. Rolling out AI-enabled features as quickly as possible, without first ensuring they are secure, would only repeat the same mistakes that created today’s fragile digital ecosystem.

The White House AI Action Plan, released in July, acknowledges these challenges, calling for security, transparency, and accountability to be built into AI systems from the outset. Achieving these goals will require cooperation between the public and private sectors, including the establishment of shared testing environments to rigorously evaluate the safety of AI-enabled systems before they are deployed. It also needs mechanisms to verify the provenance of AI models (that is, who created, trained, and modified them) and to audit how models and their training data perform over time. Clear guardrails on the development, deployment, and use of AI systems should be designed to prevent abuse while preserving room for innovation. California’s new AI accountability law, enacted in September, provides one model for how to establish transparency and risk-assessment obligations that could shape a coherent national approach.

At the same time, to shift market incentives, policymakers and industry leaders must work together to create clear, standardized benchmarks that make software products’ security features visible to buyers. Just as customers can evaluate cars through crash-test ratings, appliances through energy-efficiency labels, or food through nutrition labels, buyers should have a similar ability to assess how the software products that Americans rely on every day are built. Consumers should know whether basic protections like secure authentication are turned on by default, how quickly security flaws are fixed, and whether products give customers the tools to detect and recover from intrusions.

Security should be a standard feature of digital life, not a costly add-on.

The foundations of such efforts exist. In January 2025, the Biden administration launched the U.S. Cyber Trust Mark, a label to certify that Internet-connected devices such as smart home products meet standard cybersecurity criteria. Similar to how Energy Star labels verify products’ energy efficiency and encourage consumers to buy efficient appliances, the Cyber Trust Mark will help market forces reward companies that invest in security. But the program should be expanded. All software products, not just Internet-connected devices, should have transparent labels to enable a race toward security as the default.

Regulators also have a responsibility to ensure that the burden for software vulnerabilities falls on vendors, not buyers. Cybersecurity regulation, however, has largely evolved sector by sector. As a result, pipelines, railways, financial services, and communications systems are each governed by different standards, which are enforced by different agencies. The patchwork of overlapping requirements drives superficial compliance rather than genuine risk reduction. A better approach, as recommended by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission—a bipartisan panel of lawmakers, former officials, and industry leaders established by Congress in 2019—would be to focus on the software that underpins every sector, not the sector itself, by establishing a clear liability framework to hold software producers responsible when negligent design or development practices lead to security failures. Because software now forms the foundation of nearly every major institution, establishing such a framework at the level of software would realign economic incentives toward building safer products and shift accountability from end users to those best positioned to prevent harm: the makers of the code itself.

In addition to improving software liability, harmonizing remaining sector-specific cybersecurity rules is critical. Conflicting mandates leave companies navigating inconsistent demands from multiple regulators. A more effective model would consolidate leadership under the Office of the National Cyber Director, an entity created by Congress in 2021 to coordinate national cybersecurity policy, which would empower a single entity to drive strategy, determine priorities, and ensure policy coherence rather than regulatory chaos. Giving ONCD the mandate to set the agenda—and the resources to enforce it—would make it the government’s strongest driver of systemic software security.

ONCD could also facilitate the adoption of more secure software by fixing the federal government’s software procurement process. The U.S. federal government is the single largest buyer of software on the planet. Yet more than four years after the Department of Homeland Security submitted secure software standards for inclusion in the Federal Acquisition Regulation, the corpus of processes governing public procurement, there is still no finalized rule requiring vendors to attest to secure development practices. The FAR process—designed more for paperclips than patches—is too slow for a domain in which threats evolve by the minute. Federal procurers could take a lesson from the finance corporation JPMorgan Chase, which recently issued an open letter to its software suppliers setting clear expectations that their products should prioritize security over rushing features to market. Early reports suggest that its vendors are responding by strengthening development practices and offering greater transparency—a demonstration of how purchasing power can drive accountability upstream.

THE FUTURE IS NOW

The consequences of America’s failure to solve its software quality problem are becoming more severe. Power grids, hospitals, pipelines, ports, and financial networks now run almost entirely on software, leaving them exposed to escalating risks of corruption and disruption. Companies and regulators can continue treating software insecurity as a fact of nature—reacting to breaches, layering on patches, and blaming users—or they can make security the default setting.

Despite growing awareness of the problem among both policymakers and businesses, progress toward effective solutions has been limited. Some agencies have advanced initiatives encouraging software companies to build security into their products, but there is still no binding national framework. The issue rarely ranks as a political priority—neither in Congress, which has yet to pass sweeping liability or design mandates, nor in the executive branch, which oscillates between rhetoric and restraint. Meanwhile, powerful industry lobbies and major technology firms continue to resist reforms that might raise costs or slow the race for feature-rich product releases. But the Trump administration’s continued focus on harnessing the federal government’s vast procurement power—and on expanding initiatives promoting more secure design for both traditional and AI-enabled software—offers a potential inflection point. If coupled with clear standards and enforcement mechanisms, these efforts could begin to transform security from an afterthought into a market expectation.

Cybersecurity should no longer mean a permanent defensive struggle.

Making real progress is now possible—and is crucial to U.S. defense. The Pentagon spends billions each year on cybersecurity operations and employs tens of thousands of personnel to defend vulnerable software systems. Reducing preventable software flaws would free up resources and personnel to focus on deterring and disrupting adversaries—for instance, expanding offensive cyber-capabilities to impose costs on those who target U.S. critical infrastructure—shifting the balance of power from constant defense to proactive deterrence.

These changes will also unleash the full potential of the cybersecurity sector, which is increasingly inseparable from AI itself. The future of cyber work lies not in reacting to yesterday’s breaches but in engineering trust into the fabric of digital life by securing the algorithms, data, and infrastructure that power the global economy. Human expertise and machine intelligence will work in concert to strengthen critical systems, safeguard innovation, and preserve the United States’ technological edge.

Cybersecurity should no longer mean a permanent defensive struggle. It should mean the deliberate design of a safer digital world. With the right policies, the right incentives, and the right application of AI, the United States can finally move from defending the past to securing the future. This is how cybersecurity truly ends: not with perfect protection but with systems resilient enough to withstand disruption.

Foreign Affairs · More by Jen Easterly · October 16, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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America’s Digital Defenses Are Failing—But AI Can Save Them

Jen Easterly

MISALIGNED MARKETS

NEW TECHNOLOGY, NEW POSSIBILITIES

FROM CHAOS TO COHERENCE

THE FUTURE IS NOW

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