Quotes of the Day:

"I salute the man who is going through life always helpful, knowing no fear, and to whom aggressiveness and resentment are alien."

– Albert Einstein

"The Chinese use two brush strokes to write the word 'crisis.' One brush stroke stands for danger; the other for opportunity. In a crisis, be aware of the danger - but recognize the opportunity." 

– John F. Kennedy

"Retribution often means that we eventually do to ourselves what we have done unto others." 

– Eric Hoffer

1. The Importance of Foreign Information Access in North Korea

2. The Respected Daughter Goes to China

3. Future Missile/Space Developments Presaged; WMD Possession Underscored

4. Kim Jong Un’s Apparent Last-Minute Beijing Visit

5. Microsoft: Russia, China increasingly using AI to escalate cyberattacks on the US (and north Korea)

6. Asia’s Trump Problem: The Region Lacks Leaders Who Connect With the U.S. President

7. Russia Is Arming Drones With North Korean Cluster Weapons, Report Says

8. North Korean soldiers are flying drones for Russia and directing strikes in Ukraine, Kyiv says

9. DAPA chief says China's Hanwha sanctions to 'clearly' affect MASGA project

10. Defense chief says Osan Air Base raid did not require U.S. consultations

11. N. Korea operating 4 political prison camps with up to 65,000 detainees: report

12. N. Korea's Kim vows to bolster bilateral ties in message to China's Xi

13. N. Korea, Russia sign agreement on forestry cooperation

14. Industry minister, Lutnick meet to narrow gaps over Korea's US$350 bln investment plan

15. N. Korea's FM vows to strengthen 'strategic, tactical' cooperation with Russia

1. The Importance of Foreign Information Access in North Korea

We cannot stress this enough. This supports my fourteen words.

"Unification first, then denuclearization, the path to unification is through information and human rights."

And it is a tragedy that the ROK and US governments have ended broadcasts into north Korea. We should be ashamed of ourselves.

Hannah Oh and Gyuri Kang from north Korea gave powerful testimonies last week. I have pasted them directly below Martyn's hessay here. They can also be downloaded at the link. I strongly recommend reading them.

I was so moved by both their testimonies and I am grateful to 38th North for publishing them so we can share them.

Excerpt:

That’s why I speak out. If I don’t tell my story, who will tell it for me?

Right now, in North Korea, there is someone just like me—sitting in a dark room, secretly watching a South Korean broadcast, quietly wondering: Could I also live like that?

When I reflect on these words above from Gyuir Kang I ask myself could I live like that in north Korea? Would I, could I, survive in the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State of north Korea. The suffering that 26 million Koreans in the north live with their entire lives is unimaginable to us. Gyuri Kang and Haannoh Oh give a glimpse of what it is like to live there, to have access to information, and to escape and live in freedom.

The Importance of Foreign Information Access in North Korea

• By: Martyn Williams
• October 15, 2025Human Security

https://www.38north.org/2025/10/the-importance-of-foreign-information-access-in-north-korea/

For decades, North Koreans have relied on illicit foreign information to provide news, information, entertainment, knowledge and—perhaps most importantly—ideas they would otherwise never have access to. 

But since the beginning of this year, the amount of radio and television programming being beamed into North Korea has plummeted. Radio broadcasting is down by 85 percent and television broadcasting has been eliminated after cuts made by the US and South Korean governments. 

On October 8, 38 North hosted an event that explored the potential impact of these cuts to North Korean access to foreign information. It also featured testimonies from two North Korean escapees on how foreign information influenced their lives and why continued efforts to get information into the North Korean people is important.  

Figure 1. Jenny Town, Martyn Williams, Rohit Mahajan, Hannah Oh and Gyuri Kang speak on a panel at the Stimson Center on October 8, 2025. (Photo: Iliana Ragnone/38 North)

Programming 

“Many defectors, like me, can remember the exact episode of a TV show, the specific South Korean song, or even the traffic report, that planted the first seeds of doubt. And it makes you wonder: if life is so different out there, why does it have to be this way here?” said Gyuri Kang. 

Kang left North Korea in 2023 with her family in a rare escape during the prolonged pandemic lockdown across the maritime border. 

The broadcasts she watched were beamed across the border by the South Korean government. After South Korea ended analog television broadcasting in 2013, the government broadcasts were the only South Korean television programming available in North Korea. 

“To escape my reality, at night I secretly watched South Korean TV shows on a television that was smuggled in from China,” she said. “This turned my world upside down. Two people I knew were executed for watching and sharing foreign media. But no matter how much they tried to repress us, frustrated young people like me continued watching forbidden content as a way to forget reality.” 

For Hannah Oh, who escaped in 2019, it was a South Korean sitcom that made a lasting impression. 

“I’ll never forget one called ‘High Kick 3’,” she said. “In one episode, there was a story about a man who fell into debt and was being chased by collectors. But what shocked me was that his family wasn’t punished for it. In North Korea, if one person “sins” the entire family is condemned.” 

It was that, she said, that showed her life could be different in South Korea and people are free to make their own choices. 

“This realization changed me. Information, even in the form of a sitcom, was hope. And it was worth risking everything for,” she said. 

Background 

The number of people reached by the radio and TV broadcasts is difficult to know due to the inability to conduct audience surveys, but the significant effort and resources spent by the North Korean regime to block them provides some indication of their penetration. 

Radio and TV broadcasts were routinely jammed in an attempt to make them difficult or impossible to receive. The state-backed broadcasters, almost all of which are now off the air, countered by using multiple frequencies simultaneously so that at least one channel could usually get through. 

Smaller broadcasters do not have those resources, often using a single frequency. Given so few broadcasts now, and North Korea’s enormous jamming capacity, the limited programming that remains on air faces a much more difficult time being heard inside North Korea. 

In addition to broadcasts, information has often entered North Korea on USB sticks and memory cards, and secretly distributed and traded inside the country. However, this path took a major hit during the COVID-19 pandemic when the implementation of stricter border controls made smuggling in illicit goods and information significantly more difficult.  

Laws 

Perhaps the greatest testament to the effect that foreign information has inside North Korea can be seen in its laws. The Anti-reactionary Thought and Culture Law passed in 2020 threatens a life sentence in a labor camp or death for spreading large amounts of foreign content. 

Such is the effect foreign content has had, that law was followed, in 2023, with the related Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Law which targets the use of South Korean slang, phrases and even fonts. 

Both Kang and Oh said maintaining the flow of information into North Korea is vital. 

“Hope is dangerous for the North Korean government,” said Kang. “But the moment you realize life could be different, hope begins to take root. And once hope exists, change is no longer unimaginable.” 

“What sparks that change is information,” said Kang. 

Oh said she sees information as more than a convenience but as a lifeline. 

“Without access to information, you can’t see a way forward, let alone build a future,” she said. 

Investing in the North Korean People: Broadening Access to Information in North Korea October 8, 2025 | Stimson Center, Washington, DC

Testimony of Gyuri Kang

You were never supposed to know my name, see my face, or hear my story. Because I was one of 26 million lives hidden inside North Korea.

I was born in the capital, Pyongyang, in 2001. The first time the North Korean government decided my future without my consent, I was only a child. My family was exiled to a rural fishing village in South Hamgyong Province. We were being punished because my grandmother believed in religion.

At school, we were taught that “we live in the most dignified nation in the world,” but outside those walls, people were collapsing from hunger in the streets. Careless words overheard by a neighbor could turn into a knock at the door in the middle of the night.

This is how the North Korean government maintains control over people. By convincing you that survival depends on submission.

I returned to Pyongyang as an adult. I majored in table tennis at Pyongyang University of Physical Education and imagined myself making a new life, built on talent and hard work. But reality was nothing like what I had dreamed.

I came to understand a deep, painful truth: In the end, everything was determined by how well you obeyed, not how hard you worked. I wanted to help support my mother and aunt, so I moved to the coast to try and build a life of my own. My mother used all of her hard-earned life savings to buy me a small wooden fishing boat so I could start a business harvesting clams.

The boat was more than a way to make a living. It was a daily reminder of her sacrifice, and the depth of their love and trust in me.

But the harder I worked, the more government officials came to me demanding baskets of clams and money. Every night I agonized over how to protect my people and keep my business going, and how I should respond.

To escape my reality, at night I secretly watched South Korean TV shows on a television that was smuggled in from China. This turned my world upside down.

Two people I knew were executed for watching and sharing foreign media. But no matter how much they tried to repress us, frustrated young people like me continued watching forbidden content as a way to forget reality.

Foreign media has quietly found its way into North Korea for decades. Many defectors like me, can remember the exact episode of a TV show, the specific South Korean song, or even the traffic reported that planted the first seeds of doubt.

And it makes you wonder: if life is so different out there, why does it have to be this way here?

The thing about information is once you know, you cannot unknow it. Now that I had seen the truth, I could never go back to the person I was before.

Escaping North Korea cannot be explained by the simple word “leaving.” This was especially true for me because I escaped together with my mom and aunt.

On the night we left, we climbed into my boat and pushed off into the dark water. I gripped the rudder and let the current carry us south, carefully navigating around the guard posts and patrol boats who were on the water looking for people like us.

Arrest. Endless investigations. Humiliation. Public trials. Political prison camp.

Suddenly, a patrol ship appeared. Its lights stabbed the water, blinding us, and started coming closer and closer.

It was coming for us.

We had agreed that if capture became inevitable, we would rather take our own lives. But I refused to give in.

Suddenly, the patrol boat stopped and turned back around. We had reached the maritime border. And as the sun rose, we saw the outline of land. A South Korean fisherman steered his boat toward us and said, “Welcome. You are safe now.”

It’s been almost two years since we arrived in South Korea. That day, my mother, my aunt and I took turns showering, laughing, and saying to each other, “So this is what a human life feels like.”

For the first time in my life, I could choose my studies, my job, my clothes, my hobbies even the way I spoke—for myself.

I have been studying hard and was recently accepted into Ewha University. I have also been active in North Korean human rights activism, and I even started a YouTube channel to show the world what it looks like to start a new life in South Korea.

Hope is dangerous for the North Korean government. But the moment you realize life could be different, hope begins to take root. And once hope exists, change is no longer unimaginable.

My dream is that someday North Korea will be a place where young people choose their own paths, where no one is punished for their words, and where every person lives as the true owner of their life.

While so much of North Korea’s reality is dark, change is already happening. And what sparks that change is information.

That’s why I speak out. If I don’t tell my story, who will tell it for me?

Right now, in North Korea, there is someone just like me—sitting in a dark room, secretly watching a South Korean broadcast, quietly wondering: Could I also live like that?

The future of North Korea is not yet written. But every story told, every life rescued, and every piece of information that crosses the border, that future draws closer.

Freedom is not given, but it is something we can achieve. With your support, we can write a future where

all North Korean people are free. Thank you.

Investing in the North Korean People: Broadening Access to Information in North Korea October 8, 2025 | Stimson Center, Washington, DC

Testimony of Hannah Oh

I want you to imagine waking up tomorrow in a place without the internet, without access to outside information—only the news and stories the government permits. A place where people are executed for sharing foreign media, and where families risk their lives just to stay in touch across borders.

For 26 million people in North Korea, this is their reality. And 6 years ago, I was one of them.

I was born in Hoeryong, a city in the northernmost part of North Korea near the Tumen River. Winters were brutal and there were frequent shortages of fuel and electricity. My father was a high school physics teacher. He was quiet, loyal and diligent. But despite his hard work and loyalty to the regime, the monthly rations he received were not enough for our family.

So in order to survive, my mother began selling goods at the market. She wanted a better life for us. And that hope led her to the unthinkable—escaping North Korea.

Three times she tried. Three times she was caught. And each time she was imprisoned and sent to a labor camp.

The prison camp was a living hell. My mother saw women waste away from hunger and die from simple illnesses. I was just 13 when I visited her, carrying a bowl of rice. In North Korea, it falls to families to provide for their imprisoned relatives.

My mother made a choice to save her family, but North Korean society saw her as a criminal. My father, who had led a quiet life as a teacher, was denied opportunities at work. And our family was labeled as traitors. We were being punished, but I didn’t understand why.

That was the reality we faced in North Korea.

In 2013, on her fourth attempt, my mother finally escaped and made it to South Korea. She worked tirelessly to send money back to North Korea to help our family. She also slowly opened a window into another world.

Using a smuggled Chinese cell phone I was unable to speak to my mother from time to time. And on our secret calls, she shared with me many things about the world outside North Korea. She also recognized similarities between North and South Korea and its people, and reminded me that despite decades of division, we are still one people.

I secretly began watching South Korean sitcoms. I’ll never forget one called “High Kick 3.” In one episode, there was a story about a man who fell into debt and was being chased by collectors. But what shocked me was that his family wasn’t punished for it.

In North Korea, if one person “sins” the entire family is condemned. But this showed me that in South Korea, life could be different. And you were free to make your own choices.

This realization changed me. Information, even in the form of a sitcom, was hope. And it was worth risking everything for.

Meanwhile, I continued to face obstacles in my day to day life. I had learned how to code and use software like [P]hotoshop, and I dreamed of going to university after graduation.

But because my mother had defected, I was rejected. So I used my computer skills to find work as a photographer and photo editor. Hoping to advance my career, I volunteered for the “shock brigade,” a group sent to do manual labor at dangerous construction sites[,] thinking it could be my way to a promotion.

It wasn’t.

I was sent to the Samjiyon district, a place known for its harsh winters. I demolished buildings in minus 40-degree weather without protective gear. Dust filled my lungs, and sweat froze my clothes solid. My only relief was being able to sleep in a crumbling basement.

When I returned, expecting the promotion I had been promised, my supervisor simply said, “Let’s wait a little longer.”

That was the moment I understood my mother. She had risked her life to escape because she was after something more fundamental than a better life.

She wanted to live like a human being.

In 2019, I made the same choice and escaped. With the help of Liberty in North Korea, I made it safely to South Korea and reunited with my mom. But freedom wasn’t as easy as I thought it would be.

In North Korea, my tech and computer skills had helped me survive. I had always thought that “no matter where I go, as long as I have a computer, I’ll be fine.”

But in South Korea, I struggled with something as simple as a new keyboard layout. In school, subjects like social studies felt foreign because I had grown up in a completely different education system with distorted versions of history and philosophy.

But eventually I found my place in science. The formulas and equations in math and science were the constant, unchanging truths I could always count on. I decided to major in electrical engineering. It wasn’t easy but I was determined to stay ahead and not fall behind in our rapidly changing world.

Now my goal is to become an engineer who can help bridge North and South Korea’s science and technology industries when the two countries are one again. More than ever, I see that information isn’t just about knowledge and convenience—it’s a lifeline.

Without access to information, you can’t see a way forward, let alone build a future. And right now, the people I left behind are more cut off than ever before. During the pandemic, North Korea closed its borders to an unprecedented extent. Soldiers along the border had shoot-to-kill orders for anyone trying to escape. Around 90% of the markets were forced to shut down, leaving families to starve.

The UN reported that nearly half the population faced food insecurity, while the World Health Organization rated North Korea’s access to medical care as the lowest in the world.

A few years ago, when my father became very sick, I was able to send him money for medical care. But most North Koreans don’t have that chance.

Without someone on the outside, they are not only cut off from resources and information, but from hope itself. For many, their future depends on a lifeline from the outside world.

Last year market the 20^th anniversary of the North Korean Human Rights Act. But its reauthorization ahs since been halted, directly impacting the work of many NGOs who are working on this issue and sending critical information and resources into the country.

We have an opportunity to be a lifeline for people inside North Korea today. And to remind them that they have not been forgotten.

With your support we can rescue and support more North Korean refugees, and get more outside information and technology to people inside the country and to empower them to not only see a way forward, but to ultimately determine their own future.

Thank you.

2. The Respected Daughter Goes to China

Excerpts:

KJU knows that none of his or his sister’s children will be able to assume office for at least 10 years without regency. KJI began working at the WPK Central Committee when he was 23 years old. KJU himself became the leader of the DPRK when he was 27.

Until Kim Ju Ae, her siblings and/or cousins reach their 20s, KJU and his advisers will most likely focus on strategic policies to shape the domestic and regional landscape his successor will have to traverse. He will have to tweak the DPRK political and decision-making culture to accommodate a potential co-leadership and create the process and organizational interface to ensure a smooth transition. Part of this will involve publicity and indoctrination efforts justifying fourth-generation succession. If Ju Ae is selected as successor, then part of these publicity and indoctrination efforts will attempt to create conditions to support North Korea’s first female supreme leader.

Hereditary succession is an existential concern of the North Korean leadership, like its WMD program. Fortunately, as with nuclear negotiations, KJU has time on his side.

The Respected Daughter Goes to China

• By: Michael Madden
• October 15, 2025

https://www.38north.org/2025/10/the-respected-daughter-goes-to-china/

This article is from the second edition (July-September 2025) of 38 North’s new quarterly product, North Korea Briefing, that monitors key internal developments in North Korea. For the full series, click here.

Kim Jong Un (KJU) visited China from September 2 to 4, 2025 to attend the 80th anniversary of China’s victory in the Second World War. Kim Ju Ae accompanied her father, expanding the types of public activities in which she participates.

Kim Ju Ae was the first child of a North Korean leader to openly go on an official foreign visit since her grandfather, Kim Jong Il (KJI), accompanied Kim Il Sung on a 1965 visit to Indonesia. There were rumors that KJU and his brother Jong Chol joined their father KJI on his 2007 visit to China and rumors KJU went to China in 2010. Neither rumor has ever been substantiated. Kim Ju Ae was not observed participating in any public engagements and according to the ROK government, she did not leave her accommodation at the DPRK Embassy in Beijing during the entire visit.[1]

We might contrast Kim Ju Ae against Nikolai Lukashenko, the third son of Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko. The younger Lukashenko was first brought out in public when he was 4 years old and greeted foreign leadership.

Figure 1. (Left) Kim Jong Un and his daughter stepping off the train in Beijing (Photo: Korean Central Television); (right) Nikolai Lukashenko, aged 8, meeting then Cuban leader Raul Castro in 2012 (Photo: Cubadebate).

Context and Implications

 Kim Ju Ae’s visit to China fits the pattern of her activities in the DPRK—she is along for the ride and has few interactions outside of those with her father and his close aides. Going on a foreign visit adds another credential to her list of public engagements, which suggests she is being prepared to become a core North Korean elite, either the next supreme leader or a top party official.

Currently, based on the type of events in which Ju Ae participates and the senior DPRK officials with whom she interacts, she is the odds-on favorite as leadership successor. And yet, hereditary succession is still in early innings, and nothing is known of KJU’s other children. Ju Ae may not become supreme leader, but her presence in DPRK public life in the early 2020s indicates that some thought is being paid to next-generation political leadership.

KJU’s own succession to the supreme leadership has probably motivated him to begin some degree of planning. After all, his succession drive was somewhat hurried and improvised, driven by his father’s flagging health and a lack of a systemized framework for KJU to acquire the experience and skills commensurate to the supreme leadership. When he became leader, KJU had some loose ends to tie up: he had to reclaim all the six keys of the North Korean leadership and win over some of his father’s close aides. What KJU might envision for his successor, of which he was largely deprived, is a co-leadership period in similar fashion to KJI and Kim Il Sung.

The Six Keys

Based on past DPRK practices in succession and transition, there are about six keys of the North Korean supreme leadership. The keys refer to the bare minimal number of organizations, processes, and personnel that the supreme leader or a fledgling Kim leader needs to monopolize and control to lay claim to stable leadership. The keys are derived from prior analytic assessments by the author that focused on KJI’s succession in the years 1974 to 1976 and 1987 to 1992, transition planning from 2007 to 2009, and KJU’s succession and transition from 2009 to 2014. The keys are:

• Command and control of North Korea’s armed forces and strategic weapons;
• Control over Office No. 39 and the WPK Finance and Accounting Department;
• Control of paperwork traffic across the regime;
• Control of personnel appointments and status in the Military Security Command, State Security Department, and the Ministry of Public Security;
• Control over press, media, and broadcasting; and
• Control of the Guard Command and Personal Secretariat.

KJU knows that none of his or his sister’s children will be able to assume office for at least 10 years without regency. KJI began working at the WPK Central Committee when he was 23 years old. KJU himself became the leader of the DPRK when he was 27.

Until Kim Ju Ae, her siblings and/or cousins reach their 20s, KJU and his advisers will most likely focus on strategic policies to shape the domestic and regional landscape his successor will have to traverse. He will have to tweak the DPRK political and decision-making culture to accommodate a potential co-leadership and create the process and organizational interface to ensure a smooth transition. Part of this will involve publicity and indoctrination efforts justifying fourth-generation succession. If Ju Ae is selected as successor, then part of these publicity and indoctrination efforts will attempt to create conditions to support North Korea’s first female supreme leader.

Hereditary succession is an existential concern of the North Korean leadership, like its WMD program. Fortunately, as with nuclear negotiations, KJU has time on his side.

1. [1]
2. Two members of KJU’s travel party to China also did not make any observed public appearances—Ju Chang Il, head of the Party’s Propaganda and Agitation Department, and Kim Jae Ryong, director of the Party’s Disciplinary Investigation Department.

3. Future Missile/Space Developments Presaged; WMD Possession Underscored

Excerpt:

A Reminder of North Korea’s CW 

A July 9 media report claimed that, according to an unnamed “high-ranking” source in North Korea, Pyongyang “is elevating chemical weapons to serve as strategic weapons alongside nuclear weapons” and views “their importance [is] gradually increasing.” This source also said North Korea “considers chemical weapons a strategic deterrent and has exponentially expanded research, development and production,” is “systematically developing them as battlefield weapons in preparation for a full-scale war,” and considers CW “the highest means to respond immediately before the use of nuclear weapons.”  

Bring back Dr. Bruce Bennett and do Coral Breeze in Korea like we did in the 1990s.

Future Missile/Space Developments Presaged; WMD Possession Underscored

• By: Vann H. Van Diepen
• October 15, 2025

https://www.38north.org/2025/10/future-missile-space-developments-presaged-wmd-possession-underscored/

This article is from the second edition (July-September 2025) of 38 North’s new quarterly product, North Korea Briefing, that monitors key internal developments in North Korea. For the full series, click here.

Figure 1. New, large jetty completed at Sohae Satellite Launching Station on imagery from July 2025. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2025. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Developments during the third quarter reflected ongoing efforts to support future ballistic missile and space-launch systems as well as the achievements of North Korea’s WMD efforts over many years. A new solid-propellant strategic missile was presaged, and Pyongyang may be furthering preparation for a new, large space-launch vehicle. Russia deemed the North’s nuclear weapons program an “understandable” method of protecting national security. New alleged references to the North’s chemical weapons (CW) program also surfaced. 

New Hwasong-20 Solid ICBM Flagged 

A September 2 North Korean press report noted for the first time the development of a Hwasongpho (Hwasong)-20 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that is to be the “next-generation” follow-on to the Hwasong-19 solid-propellant road-mobile ICBM flight-tested once in October 2024. Both missiles reportedly will have a “new-type solid-fuel engine using the composite carbon fiber material” that has been static (ground)-tested eight times over the past two years. A ninth such test, termed “the last one in the development process,” reportedly occurred on September 8. 

Context and Implications 

Finalizing ground testing may mean the first Hwasong-20 flight test will occur within a few months, although the status of its other subsystems is unknown. Photos of the September 8 test suggest the new motor is at least the same size as that flown on the Hwasong-19. It remains to be seen whether the Hwasong-20 will be longer, consistent with a longer road-mobile missile launcher chassis revealed in September 2024. The two press articles claimed the new motor has a maximum thrust of 1,960-1,971kN, akin to that of the first stage of the 1980s US Peacekeeper ICBM. Carbon fiber motor cases will permit the missile to have greater range and/or payload than equivalent-sized ICBMs using heavier steel, fiberglass, or kevlar cases. That greater boost capability probably would be most useful for lofting the multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payload the North is in the early stages of developing. MIRVs also would be consistent with the press claim that the new motor “heralds a significant change in expanding and strengthening the nuclear strategic forces.” 

New Jetty at Sohae Satellite Launching Station 

Commercial satellite imagery from July 9 indicates a large jetty has been completed at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station after some 28 months of construction. Work on the pier-like structure picked up in April 2025, according to separate analysis in 38 North, and includes a docking slip for large vessels, what appear to be rails for a crane, and the surfacing of a dirt road from the dock area to the rest of the launching station. 

Context and Implications 

The addition of the jetty suggests that the North intends to send cargo to the launch facility that is larger than what can be accommodated by the existing rail link. Such cargo could be related to a new, large space-launch vehicle (SLV) for which the North probably has been preparing a launch pad at Sohae since March 2022. A larger SLV could be intended for future, larger low-orbit reconnaissance or weather satellites, multiple launches of low-orbit satellites on a single booster, or geostationary launches of communications satellites. 

Russia “Understands” North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program 

In a July 12 press conference after a “strategic dialogue” with North Korea, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that “It is precisely because” the North Korean leadership’s conclusions regarding national defense “were made in a timely manner that no serious actor contemplates a military strike against the DPRK today.… The technologies applied by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are a result of efforts by North Korean scientists. We respect the DPRK’s actions and understand the reasons why they carry out their nuclear program.” 

On September 26, Kim Jong Un “guided an important consultative meeting related to the production of nuclear materials and weapons” that reviewed “the plan for 2025 to increase the capacity of the nuclear-material production field” as well as next year’s plan according to North Korean state media. Kim stated that “steadily evolving the state’s nuclear response posture is an essential top priority task.” 

Context and Implications 

Lavrov’s “understanding” of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is consistent with Russia’s vetoes of UN Security Council actions to ramp up sanctions against North Korea in May 2022 and to extend the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea in March 2024. It also reflects Moscow’s many years of varied noncompliance with existing UN sanctions. These public remarks underscore that Russia will not be part of the solution to the North Korean nuclear problem, at least in the absence of Pyongyang’s own agreement to nuclear limitations, and the threat that Moscow might become, if it has not already, part of the problem by directly assisting North Korean nuclear weapons and delivery programs. 

With or without Russian assistance, North Korea clearly intends to continue expanding production of fissile materials and nuclear weapons, consistent with Kim’s January 2023 call for “an exponential increase of the country’s nuclear arsenal.” The North’s development of tactical nuclear weapons and (if successful) MIRV missile payloads, and its ongoing increases in nuclear-armed ballistic and cruise missile deployments, will all drive demand for more fissile material and nuclear weapons. 

A Reminder of North Korea’s CW 

A July 9 media report claimed that, according to an unnamed “high-ranking” source in North Korea, Pyongyang “is elevating chemical weapons to serve as strategic weapons alongside nuclear weapons” and views “their importance [is] gradually increasing.” This source also said North Korea “considers chemical weapons a strategic deterrent and has exponentially expanded research, development and production,” is “systematically developing them as battlefield weapons in preparation for a full-scale war,” and considers CW “the highest means to respond immediately before the use of nuclear weapons.”  

Context and Implications 

Although the sourcing and content of this report cannot be corroborated, it serves as a useful reminder in these nuclear-focused times that North Korea is widely assessed to have a longstanding, substantial, weaponized CW stockpile (as well as a biological weapons program). Such a stockpile likely has served, since at least the 1980s, as a “strategic deterrent” against population targets in South Korea and Japan, including US citizens and forces there—well before the North’s acquisition of nuclear weapons starting in the 1990s. North Korean CW also has substantial potential to facilitate a conventional attack against the South by impeding allied ground and air operations, and the flow of reinforcements and supplies.  

How the North would sequence or integrate conventional, chemical, and nuclear operations is unknown, but CW would clearly add to its military options and complicate alliance planning. While current open-source data on the size, type, and location of any North Korean CW stockpile is essentially nonexistent, alliance planning needs to take the CW threat fully into account. 

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Download North Korea Briefing (July-September 2025) here.

4. Kim Jong Un’s Apparent Last-Minute Beijing Visit

Kim Jong Un’s Apparent Last-Minute Beijing Visit

• By: Michael Madden
• October 15, 2025

https://www.38north.org/2025/10/kim-jong-uns-apparent-last-minute-beijing-visit/

This article is from the second edition (July-September 2025) of 38 North’s new quarterly product, North Korea Briefing, that monitors key internal developments in North Korea. For the full series, click here.

Kim Jong Un’s (KJU) apparent last-minute decision to visit Beijing probably caused some drama for the Chinese hosts, but showed unusual efficiency for travel on KJU’s part, suggesting a possible shift in his foreign travel style. The presence of Ju Chang Il, head of the Party’s Propaganda and Agitation Department, alongside KJU in Beijing highlights Ju’s growing influence and involvement in strategic decision-making. Kim Jae Ryong, head of the Party’s discipline department, also accompanied Kim Jong Un to China, becoming the second Party official involved in personnel affairs to make an overseas trip this year. Deploying party personnel managers abroad appears aimed at ensuring effective execution of agreements with China and Russia and may suggest Pyongyang is adjusting its network of overseas managers to ensure effective bilateral ties with these countries.

Was Kim Jong Un a Last-Minute Guest in Beijing?

Kim Jong Un was treated like a star attraction at the 80^th Victory Day celebrations in Beijing. Circumstantial evidence, such as his accommodation and meeting arrangements with President Putin in Beijing, suggests KJU decided to visit China at the last possible minute. North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced the trip on August 28, five days before he arrived.

Instead of staying at Diaoyutai or another state guesthouse or hotel, KJU stayed at the DPRK Embassy in Beijing. This could have been due to privacy concerns for him and his daughter Kim Ju Ae. On the other hand, if KJU was a last-minute guest, the North Koreans may have decided not to trouble their Chinese hosts by compelling them to find KJU and his travel party last-minute accommodations.

KJU’s meeting with Putin following the Victory Day parade was scheduled only after the North Korean delegation arrived in China. After KJU’s trip was announced, a Putin adviser told Russian media on August 29 that KJU had been invited for a bilateral meeting with Putin. After KJU arrived, the Russian delegation was still waiting on a reply. North Korea typically likes to keep foreign leadership in suspense about meeting the leader, but this dynamic has only been evident in Pyongyang, not a foreign visit. KJU and the delegation also may have been waiting on Xi Jinping’s availability before finalizing details for the bilateral meeting with Putin.

Context and Implications

This strongly suggests that, aside from some Victory Day events, KJU’s decision to visit Beijing was made last-minute and he left Pyongyang with an open-ended itinerary. KJU’s late RSVP to China was a subtle power flex which foreshadows increased flexibility in how the leader travels outside North Korea.

KJU and his advisers may have slow-walked the decision to go on the trip, perhaps deliberating on messaging, the geopolitical landscape, and impact. KJU’s last-minute decision probably created a degree of charming drama in Beijing (a surprise VIP guest) and disruption (scheduling last-minute meetings). Whatever the reason KJU delayed the Beijing visit decision, a short turnaround time on his arrival and staying in the embassy shows an unusual amount of efficiency and flexibility for foreign travel on KJU’s part. This could be a new precedent for how he conducts foreign engagements.

PAD Director Ju Chang Il Rises with China Trip

This year has not been particularly kind to North Korean elites. KJU began the year by publicizing a series of scandals in regional party organizations.[1] During events and engagements, he has become more remote and inaccessible to the wider leadership.[2] He disappeared and did not replace one senior party secretary and demoted the head of the military’s political officers.

Amid these tensions with party elites, Ju Chang Il, the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD) Director, has risen to the ranks of KJU’s close aides by accompanying KJU to Beijing.[3] Despite being on the trip, Ju was one of two members of KJU’s travel party that did not attend the Xi meeting.

Figure 1. Ju Chang Il (annotated) with other senior North Korean officials arriving in Beijing on September 2, 2025 (Photo: Korean Central Television, Annotation by author)

Context and Implications

PAD Director Ju Chang Il has become a core elite in the WPK in a year of headwinds for North Korean elites.

When Ju’s predecessor, PAD Director and WPK Secretary Ri Il Hwan, went missing in January 2025, Ju assumed Ri’s ceremonial role at public events.[4] Initially, it appeared Ju was a temporary surrogate until Ri returned to office. However, going to China and being in the train meeting room with KJU shows Ju is involved in strategic advice and decision-making.

Ju Chang Il has not assumed Ri Il Hwan’s slot on the Secretariat. Traditionally, the PAD director has concurrently held Secretariat status. However, Ri’s portfolio on the Secretariat was divided between the PAD and workers’ and social organizations. The PAD was added to Ri’s portfolio in 2023. It is highly probable that the Secretariat-PAD divide will be resolved at the Ninth Party Congress.

Kim Jae Ryong Brings Personnel Discipline to Beijing

Kim Jae Ryong, WPK Disciplinary Investigation Departments Director, traveled to China with KJU but did not make any observed public appearances. Kim’s presence on the trip was publicized in a state media report on KJU’s return to the DPRK.

Figure 2. Kim Jae Ryong (annotated) on KJU’s train arriving in the DPRK on September 5, 2025. (Photo: Korean Central News Agency, Annotation by author)

Kim Jae Ryong was the second WPK official involved in personnel affairs to go on a foreign trip in 2025, after Ri Hi Yong, WPK Secretary and Director of the WPK Cadres Affairs Department, led a delegation to Russia in February. While their overseas roles and position may diverge, it is notable that the Party’s top two personnel managers went on foreign trips this year.

Context and Implications

Sending party personnel managers on foreign visits is probably a concerted effort to ensure effective implementation of any agreements North Korea makes with Russia and China. One way to do this is by having loyal and effective management to mitigate graft and malfeasance that have previously ailed North Korea’s bilateral relationships. It indicates Pyongyang might be adjusting its network of overseas managers to ensure effective bilateral ties with Russia and China.

Download PDF

Download North Korea Briefing (July-September 2025) here.

1. [1]
2. “DID Cracks Down on Cadres,” NK Leadership Watch, February 10, 2025, https://www.nkleadershipwatch.org/2025/02/10/did-cracks-down-on-cadres/.
3. [2]
4. “North Korean Leadership through Strategic Revolving Doors,” 38 North, April 24, 2025, https://www.38north.org/2025/04/north-korean-leadership-transitions-a-strategic-revolving-door/
5. [3]
6. PAD director is a core leadership position, but Ju did not publicly evince the usual access and influence of his predecessors prior to KJU’s recent Beijing visit.
7. [4]
8. “Ri Il Hwan, where you at,” NK Leadership Watch, February 12, 2025, https://www.nkleadershipwatch.org/2025/02/12/ri-il-hwan-where-you-at/.

5. Microsoft: Russia, China increasingly using AI to escalate cyberattacks on the US (and north Korea)

Do we recognize that we are in a cyber war right now? Do we understand that it is a key line of effort in China's Unrestricted Warfare strategy, Russia's New Generation or Nonlinear Warfare strategy or Iran's unconventional warfare strategy or north Korea's political warfare strategy with Juche characteristics (with its all-purpose sword)?

Excerpts:

The U.S. is the top target for cyberattacks, with criminals and foreign adversaries targeting companies, governments and organizations in the U.S. more than any other country. Israel and Ukraine were the second and third most popular targets, showing how military conflicts involving those two nations have spilled over into the digital realm.

Russia, China and Iran have denied that they use cyber operations for espionage, disruption and disinformation. China, for instance, says the U.S. is trying to “ smear ” Beijing while conducting its own cyberattacks.

...

North Korea has pioneered a scheme in which it uses AI personas to create American identities allowing them to apply for remote tech jobs. North Korea’s authoritarian government pockets the salaries, while the hackers use their access to steal secrets or install malware.

It’s the kind of digital threat that will face more American organizations in the years to come as sophisticated AI programs make it easier for bad actors to deceive, according to Nicole Jiang, CEO of Fable, a San Francisco-based security company that uses AI to sniff out fake employees. AI is not only a tool for hackers, but also a critical defense against digital attackers, Jiang said.

“Cyber is a cat-and-mouse game,” she said. “Access, data, information, money: That’s what they’re after.”

Microsoft: Russia, China increasingly using AI to escalate cyberattacks on the US

By  DAVID KLEPPER

Updated 4:19 PM EDT, October 16, 2025

Leer en español 

https://apnews.com/article/ai-cybersecurity-russia-china-deepfakes-microsoft-ad678e5192dd747834edf4de03ac84ee

AP · DAVID KLEPPER · October 16, 2025

WASHINGTON (AP) — Russia, China, Iran and North Korea have sharply increased their use of artificial intelligence to deceive people online and mount cyberattacks against the United States, according to new research from Microsoft.

This July, the company identified more than 200 instances of foreign adversaries using AI to create fake content online, more than double the number from July 2024 and more than ten times the number seen in 2023.

The findings, published Thursday in Microsoft’s annual digital threats report, show how foreign adversaries are adopting new and innovative tactics in their efforts to weaponize the internet as a tool for espionage and deception.

AI’s potential said to be exploited by US foes

America’s adversaries, as well as criminal gangs and hacking companies, have exploited AI’s potential, using it to automate and improve cyberattacks, to spread inflammatory disinformation and to penetrate sensitive systems. AI can translate poorly worded phishing emails into fluent English, for example, as well as generate digital clones of senior government officials.

Government cyber operations often aim to obtain classified information, undermine supply chains, disrupt critical public services or spread disinformation. Cyber criminals on the other hand work for profit by stealing corporate secrets or using ransomware to extort payments from their victims. These gangs are responsible for the wide majority of cyberattacks in the world and in some cases have built partnerships with countries like Russia.

Increasingly, these attackers are using AI to target governments, businesses and critical systems like hospitals and transportation networks, according to Amy Hogan-Burney, Microsoft’s vice president for customer security and trust, who oversaw the report. Many U.S. companies and organizations, meanwhile, are getting by with outdated cyber defenses, even as Americans expand their networks with new digital connections.

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Companies, governments, organizations and individuals must take the threat seriously if they are to protect themselves amid escalating digital threats, she said.

“We see this as a pivotal moment where innovation is going so fast,” Hogan-Burney said. “This is the year when you absolutely must invest in your cybersecurity basics,”

US is a popular target

The U.S. is the top target for cyberattacks, with criminals and foreign adversaries targeting companies, governments and organizations in the U.S. more than any other country. Israel and Ukraine were the second and third most popular targets, showing how military conflicts involving those two nations have spilled over into the digital realm.

Russia, China and Iran have denied that they use cyber operations for espionage, disruption and disinformation. China, for instance, says the U.S. is trying to “ smear ” Beijing while conducting its own cyberattacks.

In a statement emailed to The Associated Press on Thursday, Iran’s mission to the United Nations said Iran rejects allegations that it is responsible for cyberattacks on the U.S. while reserving the right to defend itself.

“The Islamic Republic of Iran does not initiate any form of offensive cyber operation against any state,” the mission wrote in the statement. “However, as a victim of cyber operations, it will respond to any such threat in a manner proportionate to its nature and scale.”

North Korea has pioneered a scheme in which it uses AI personas to create American identities allowing them to apply for remote tech jobs. North Korea’s authoritarian government pockets the salaries, while the hackers use their access to steal secrets or install malware.

It’s the kind of digital threat that will face more American organizations in the years to come as sophisticated AI programs make it easier for bad actors to deceive, according to Nicole Jiang, CEO of Fable, a San Francisco-based security company that uses AI to sniff out fake employees. AI is not only a tool for hackers, but also a critical defense against digital attackers, Jiang said.

“Cyber is a cat-and-mouse game,” she said. “Access, data, information, money: That’s what they’re after.”

AP · DAVID KLEPPER · October 16, 2025

6. Asia’s Trump Problem: The Region Lacks Leaders Who Connect With the U.S. President

Excerpts:

An ideological odd couple relationship seemed possible between Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, who was elected in June. Lee pulled off a masterful Oval Office performance on August 25, reassuring Trump of South Korean investment commitments to the U.S. economy and talking down tariff levels. Although Lee comes from the progressive left and filled his team with political advisers who are veterans of the pro-democracy protests of the 1980s, which were partly shaped by anti-American (and even pro–North Korean) views, he has proven a pragmatist on foreign policy determined to strengthen ties with the United States and Japan. But in September, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials raided a Hyundai plant in Georgia, looking for workers overstaying their visas. The image of more than 300 South Korean employees being marched away as prisoners outraged the South Korean public, who had just been told that the relationship between Washington and Seoul was growing stronger. South Korean support for the U.S. alliance was around 90 percent, but anti-American voices within Lee’s progressive circle are now emboldened, and the relationship between Lee and Trump is in need of repair. Trump’s attendance at APEC later this month offers a chance for reconciliation, if both sides can take advantage of it.

...

Abe’s disciplined approach to Trump, and to competition with China, provided the conceptual glue needed to cement an Asia strategy that also benefited Japan—the United States’ own version of a free and open Indo-Pacific framework. The August meeting between Trump and European leaders had a similar purpose, allowing Europe to stabilize U.S.-Ukrainian policy, keep Zelensky in the fight, and bolster Europe’s security in spite of Putin’s welcome in Alaska.

But without a skillful manager like Abe, the trajectory of Trump’s Asia approach remains uncertain. Some in the current administration share the first Trump administration’s alarm about Chinese hegemonic ambitions. Others—including, it appears, Trump—see diplomacy with China as an opportunity for trade deals in the near term and are willing to set aside other concerns. As key pillars in the U.S. security architecture built over the past 20 years are crumbling (such as the Quad), U.S. allies are urging greater American engagement with the Indo-Pacific, especially after major cuts to development assistance created openings for Chinese coercion in the region.

The second Trump administration is certainly more difficult to manage given the president’s love of tariffs and general unpredictability, and no current Asian leader can claim a mandate at home comparable to Abe’s. But although no Abe-like Trump whisperer currently exists among Asia’s leaders, that absence cannot be allowed to remain. Asian leaders have an even greater incentive to keep Washington in play than they did in 2017 because of China’s ambitions, and only the United States has the composite power Asia needs to maintain regional defenses and deter Beijing’s aggression. Despite Trump’s unpredictability, key members of his administration are ready to step up engagement with Asia. This time, however, the initiative will likely come only from the top. Thus, personal relationships with Trump are even more important for Asian powers than they were during Trump’s first term. Whatever combination of flattery, persuasion, and political alignment is required, Asian leaders should learn from their European counterparts and ensure that the United States stays in the game.

Asia’s Trump Problem

Foreign Affairs · More by Michael J. Green · October 17, 2025

The Region Lacks Leaders Who Connect With the U.S. President

Michael J. Green

October 17, 2025

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington, D.C., August 2025 Brian Snyder / Reuters

MICHAEL J. GREEN is CEO of the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and Henry A. Kissinger Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

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In August, just days after U.S. President Donald Trump had welcomed Russian President Vladimir Putin to a summit in Alaska, a remarkable image emerged from the White House. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had scrambled to Washington to meet with Trump and shore up U.S. support for Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s invasion. But Zelensky was not alone: joining him at his meeting with Trump were the leaders of Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, as well as the European secretary-general of NATO and the president of the European Commission. A photo of the entire group provided a corrective of sorts to the images that had emerged of Trump and Putin greeting each other warmly in Anchorage.

The European leaders’ decision to accompany Zelensky reflected a combination of courage and pragmatism. It would have been easier to condemn Trump for welcoming Putin onto U.S. soil, or to hold a countersummit in Europe and avoid the potential domestic political embarrassment of paying homage in the Oval Office. But those options would have required the European leaders to believe that they can prevent a Russian victory in Ukraine (and guarantee their own countries’ security) without U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic power. And they know that they cannot do so.

So instead, they leveraged their strengths—Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s ideological proximity to Trump, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s relatively frequent contact with him, and Finnish President Alexander Stubb’s unique rapport with him (based in no small part on Stubb’s golfing prowess)—to charm, cajole, and push the disruptive U.S. president more or less in the right strategic direction. The result was an agreement to ship advanced U.S. weapons systems to Ukraine via NATO purchases, with Trump even considering Kyiv’s request for Tomahawk missiles.

For European leaders, this collaborative effort to spur Trump to stick with U.S. allies—and with the alliance system the United States itself had built—represented a sharp departure from his first term. Back then, European leaders played supporting parts at best: their voters disdained Trump, and their personal temperaments limited their ability to connect with him. While they struggled, the leading role of “Trump manager” within the U.S. alliance network was played by Asian leaders—most masterfully by Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister at the time. A famous photo taken at the G-7 summit in Quebec in 2018 captures Abe’s approach. In it, German Chancellor Angela Merkel appears to impatiently confront a defiant or dismissive Trump while French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minster Teresa May seem to be backing Merkel. Meanwhile, a pained Abe stands by Trump’s side, mimicking the U.S. president’s body language and perhaps looking for an opportunity to diffuse the tension.

The Trump team came to office in 2017 with no clear concept for their Asia strategy, so Abe helped convince them to adopt Japan’s “free and open Indo-Pacific” framework. When Trump threatened to rain “fire and fury” on North Korea, Abe promised Japan’s support—but quietly added conditions that defined whether force should actually be used. Where many world leaders sought to avoid confrontations with the mercurial U.S. president, Abe held 20 meetings, 32 phone calls, and five rounds of golf with Trump during his first term. “It wasn’t really 20 summits,” one Japanese diplomat quipped to me, “but the same summit 20 times.”

Abe understood that American power was indispensable to Japan’s interests and worked to shape it with considerable success. And during Trump’s first term, Asian leaders followed his example. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi managed to get Trump to join him in Texas in 2019 for an appearance before 50,000 members of the Indian diaspora; the rally was titled “Howdy Modi.” Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and his ambassador in Washington, Joe Hockey, formed close relationships with Vice President Mike Pence and Trump’s national security team to stay aligned on China strategy and engagement in the South Pacific. And even South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who came from the political left and was an unlikely partner for Trump, rallied to the U.S. president’s side to encourage diplomacy with North Korea.

But in Trump’s second term, Asian leaders have struggled to manage their alliances with Trump. No one has stepped forward to fill the hole left by Abe, who resigned in 2020 owing to illness and was assassinated in 2022. This is surprising for a number of reasons. For one, in some respects, Trump’s approach to the region resembles an “Asia first” strategy far more than it did during his first term. Moreover, polls conducted in 2024 showed that in Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea, people were initially far less alarmed about Trump’s return than were Europeans. Nor can Asian leaders’ relative reticence be pegged to their political standing. European leaders are not in stronger political situations than they were last time or than Asian leaders are today: Starmer’s approval numbers are underwater, as are those of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and Macron is barely holding on to power. And although European leaders are certainly more motivated to make the transatlantic relationship work because of the war in Ukraine, this does not fully explain the passive approach among Asian leaders, given the increased military and economic threat from China.

Having lost its leading Trump whisperer in Abe, Asia seems somewhat at sea in its relationship with the United States. It is possible that the role could be filled by the newly selected leader of Japan, Sanae Takaichi, a protégé of Abe’s who shares a number of his views (although her political future is uncertain after the defection of her party’s main coalition partner on October 10). But thus far in Trump’s second term, no Asian ally has managed to make inroads with the U.S. president comparable to Abe’s. As a result, U.S. strategy in Asia remains muddled, and Asian leaders are missing the full benefits of American partnership, including greater security against China.

NO ABE HERE

In private, one factor that Asian officials repeatedly point to in explaining their recent passivity is the policymaking process of the second Trump administration, which is more chaotic and unpredictable than it was during the first term. Back then, they could count on reliable and influential partners inside the administration, such as National Security Adviser H. R. McMaster, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Matt Pottinger, who served as senior director for Asia on the National Security Council. This time around, in contrast, the administration’s periodic purges of alleged globalists and a diminished role for the NSC have made it more difficult for allies to know where to dock on key issues or to expect counterparts in Washington to take initiative without first knowing Trump’s position.

Trump’s tariff policies also rattled Asian leaders in ways that even his first-term musings about war and peace with North Korea did not. Australia can easily survive the ten percent tariffs levied by the administration, but Trump threatened additional 200 percent tariffs on pharmaceuticals—a third rail in Australian politics—if Australia does not start paying more for U.S.-manufactured drugs. Meanwhile, Tokyo is resigned to the 15 percent tariffs levied on Japanese exports to the United States, but the 100 percent tariffs on semiconductors that Trump has floated would be devastating for Japanese firms. And India is angry and perplexed that it must endure 50 percent tariffs for buying Russian oil even as Trump embraced Putin in Alaska and dropped the threat of further U.S. economic sanctions on Moscow.

The reasons why this dissatisfaction has not produced a more robust effort to manage Trump vary in each country. In Japan, the main problem has been the political weakness of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Despite frustration over tariffs and some polls showing that only 16 percent of the Japanese public trusts Trump, support for the U.S.-Japanese alliance remains at 90 percent or more, mostly owing to the sense of a shared threat from China. The Japanese public would take an approach like Abe’s if they could get it, but nobody has emerged with Abe’s domestic political strength or acumen for Trump. Former Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s early gains in a February meeting with Trump were undone by U.S. tariffs and Ishiba’s weak standing within his own party (he resigned in early September, triggering October elections). His successor, Takaichi, is more conservative, supports a “Japan first” approach, and has hawkish views on China that could resonate with the Trump administration.

Trump, however, is beginning to soften his own stance on China ahead of a planned 2026 visit to Beijing and hopes for a positive trade agreement with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. If she becomes prime minister, Takaichi is likely to meet Trump for the first time in a matter of weeks at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in South Korea, and although she would be right to caution Trump about China, as Abe did, such a warning is riskier in the face of Trump’s shifting priorities. If Trump pushes aside Takaichi in favor of U.S.-Chinese relations, she will suffer politically at home. But Beijing’s announcement on October 9 that it would expand export restrictions on rare-earth metals (which are critical for technology manufacturing) sparked a combative response from Trump, who threatened an additional 100 percent tariff on Chinese imports and suggested he would cancel his plan to meet with Xi at APEC. Trump is due to visit Japan at the end of October, and Takaichi may be able to use the new tension between Trump and Xi to her advantage—but only if she can get her house in order first.

Asia seems somewhat at sea in its relationship with the United States.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese appears domestically strongest, having clobbered the conservatives in national elections in May. But despite some phone calls with Trump and a photo op at the UN General Assembly, he has maintained an arms-length relationship with the U.S. president compared with his counterparts in Japan or South Korea. When Albanese visits the White House on October 20 for his first official meeting with Trump, he’ll have the advantage of a long-standing alliance between Australia and the United States. Australia has fought alongside the United States in all of the latter’s major conflicts since World War I, and the two countries maintain strong defense and intelligence-sharing practices (of growing importance for both sides given competition with China). As part of the AUKUS agreement, signed in 2021, Australia agreed to purchase multiple U.S. Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines. This year’s iteration of Talisman Sabre, a bilateral military training exercise between the United States and Australia, was the largest since the program started in 2005. Canberra is also ready to work with Washington on securing supply chains for critical minerals, given Australia’s extensive mining resources.

But there have also been discordant notes in the alliance that the two leaders will have to manage. The Pentagon’s decision to review the value of AUKUS rattled Australian officials; the U.S. ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, blasted Australia for its recognition of Palestinian statehood; and the two governments could not be further apart in their positions on climate change. Albanese’s Labor government has also used a more moderate tone in its response to the China threat than has the United States, emphasizing the stabilization of relations with Beijing—although that could be a positive for Albanese, if Trump’s own approach to China continues to shift. Trump is deeply unpopular with the Labor Party’s left flank—Pew surveys show that negative views of Trump are much stronger in Australia than other parts of Asia—and some of Albanese’s advisers argue that he should keep a low profile around the American president. Albanese, however, is committed to his first meeting in Washington, where he has an opportunity to pull Trump into deeper engagement with the region—especially Southeast Asia and the Pacific, which are under pressure from China and critical to Australia’s security.

An ideological odd couple relationship seemed possible between Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, who was elected in June. Lee pulled off a masterful Oval Office performance on August 25, reassuring Trump of South Korean investment commitments to the U.S. economy and talking down tariff levels. Although Lee comes from the progressive left and filled his team with political advisers who are veterans of the pro-democracy protests of the 1980s, which were partly shaped by anti-American (and even pro–North Korean) views, he has proven a pragmatist on foreign policy determined to strengthen ties with the United States and Japan. But in September, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials raided a Hyundai plant in Georgia, looking for workers overstaying their visas. The image of more than 300 South Korean employees being marched away as prisoners outraged the South Korean public, who had just been told that the relationship between Washington and Seoul was growing stronger. South Korean support for the U.S. alliance was around 90 percent, but anti-American voices within Lee’s progressive circle are now emboldened, and the relationship between Lee and Trump is in need of repair. Trump’s attendance at APEC later this month offers a chance for reconciliation, if both sides can take advantage of it.

Perhaps no U.S. ally was more confident about Trump’s return than Modi—and no one has been more disappointed. On top of the 50 percent tariffs he levied against India, Trump infuriated New Delhi by taking full credit for ending the military clash that broke out in May between India and Pakistan and then inviting Pakistan’s army chief to the White House. To many in India, this resembles a symbolic return to the kind of regional policy that Washington pursued 25 years ago, before it forged a strategic partnership with India. Modi could have gone the Abe route and brushed off these slights, instead working to push Trump in a better direction. But that would have been out of character for Modi, and now that his party’s governing majority in parliament has been reduced and the Indian economy is slowing, he, too, faces a more challenging domestic political situation than he did during Trump’s first term. Trump did wish Modi a happy birthday on September 17, and Modi replied warmly. But if Trump’s expected absence at the Quad summit in India later this year is any indication, the relationship between Washington and New Delhi appears likely to remain broken for a while.

SPURRED BY BEIJING

Abe’s disciplined approach to Trump, and to competition with China, provided the conceptual glue needed to cement an Asia strategy that also benefited Japan—the United States’ own version of a free and open Indo-Pacific framework. The August meeting between Trump and European leaders had a similar purpose, allowing Europe to stabilize U.S.-Ukrainian policy, keep Zelensky in the fight, and bolster Europe’s security in spite of Putin’s welcome in Alaska.

But without a skillful manager like Abe, the trajectory of Trump’s Asia approach remains uncertain. Some in the current administration share the first Trump administration’s alarm about Chinese hegemonic ambitions. Others—including, it appears, Trump—see diplomacy with China as an opportunity for trade deals in the near term and are willing to set aside other concerns. As key pillars in the U.S. security architecture built over the past 20 years are crumbling (such as the Quad), U.S. allies are urging greater American engagement with the Indo-Pacific, especially after major cuts to development assistance created openings for Chinese coercion in the region.

The second Trump administration is certainly more difficult to manage given the president’s love of tariffs and general unpredictability, and no current Asian leader can claim a mandate at home comparable to Abe’s. But although no Abe-like Trump whisperer currently exists among Asia’s leaders, that absence cannot be allowed to remain. Asian leaders have an even greater incentive to keep Washington in play than they did in 2017 because of China’s ambitions, and only the United States has the composite power Asia needs to maintain regional defenses and deter Beijing’s aggression. Despite Trump’s unpredictability, key members of his administration are ready to step up engagement with Asia. This time, however, the initiative will likely come only from the top. Thus, personal relationships with Trump are even more important for Asian powers than they were during Trump’s first term. Whatever combination of flattery, persuasion, and political alignment is required, Asian leaders should learn from their European counterparts and ensure that the United States stays in the game.

Foreign Affairs · More by Michael J. Green · October 17, 2025

7. Russia Is Arming Drones With North Korean Cluster Weapons, Report Says

No surprise. But north Korea is hiking important (and deadly) contributions to Putin's War.

Russia Is Arming Drones With North Korean Cluster Weapons, Report Says

Though Pyongyang has largely pulled its soldiers off the front lines in Ukraine, it is expanding the types of ammunition it supplies to Russia.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/16/us/politics/russia-north-korean-cluster-weapons.html?utm

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A previously unknown North Korean cluster munition that was used as the warhead in a Russian drone found near Kherson, Ukraine, in September.Credit...Conflict Armament Research

By John Ismay

Reporting from Washington

Oct. 16, 2025

Russian forces are using small drones armed with North Korean cluster munitions in attacks in southern Ukraine, as North Korea expands its support for Russia’s military, according to a report published on Thursday by a weapons research group.

Independent investigators who visited Ukraine last week examined a previously unknown type of North Korean cluster munition that was fitted to a Russian drone found near the city of Kherson on Sept. 23.

Cluster munitions are a class of military ordnance that break apart in midair and scatter smaller explosive or incendiary weapons, often called bomblets, over a large area.

North Korea has supplied Russia with soldiers, artillery shells and ballistic missiles, but the use of North Korean bomblets as warheads in small Russian drones has not previously been reported.

The investigators said the bomblet had been heavily modified and attached to a “first-person-view drone.” That type of drone relays a video feed that enables a soldier to more easily direct it to a target.

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The report was published by Conflict Armament Research, an independent group based in Britain that identifies and tracks weapons and ammunition used in wars. Ukrainian government authorities have invited the researchers to the country throughout the war to analyze and document Russian military hardware.

The group has found that even the most advanced Russian munitions rely on low-tech parts made by Western firms that have been smuggled into the country despite international sanctions.

Image

Russian servicemen learning how to use a first-person-view drone at a training range in the Rostov-on-Don region of southern Russia in 2024.Credit...Arkady Budnitsky/EPA, via Shutterstock

The report comes as President Trump has said he may send U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine to press Russia to negotiate an end to its three-and-a-half-year war. He is expected to meet with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine at the White House on Friday to discuss possible Tomahawk sales, which would give Kyiv the ability to launch salvos of missiles into Moscow.

Markings on the North Korean bomblet show that it was made in 2000. It was retrofitted with 3-D-printed parts holding an electronic detonator that would explode when the drone impacted its target.

According to Damien Spleeters, one of the group’s researchers who documented the modified warhead, the North Korean bomblet appears to be a copy of an American munition first used in combat during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

That weapon, called the M42 Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition, is roughly the size of a D-cell battery. They were packed into shells and rockets that U.S. artillery troops used to blanket suspected Iraqi Army positions, dispensing nearly 14 million of the bomblets on enemy forces during the 37-day war.

The M42 has largely been restricted from use by American forces because of its high failure rate and the hazard unexploded bomblets present to friendly forces as well as civilians in post-conflict areas.

Regardless, the Biden administration agreed to send 155-millimeter artillery shells containing M42-type submunitions to Ukraine in July 2023. At the time, the Pentagon called them “highly effective and reliable” and said it had consulted with Congress and allied nations before sending them.

The modifications seen to the previously unknown North Korean bomblet, which some Ukrainian officials have called the JU-90, required careful preparation.

“The 3-D printed parts designed and built specifically for this munition speak to a more sophisticated effort,” Mr. Spleeters said. “It’s a more systematic kind of improvisation.”

The discovery, his team wrote, “establishes yet another direct material link between the North Korean defense industry and the war in Ukraine.”

Russia produces the fuselage of some first-person-view drones, but most if not all of their other components are made in China, Mr. Spleeters said.

John Ismay is a reporter covering the Pentagon for The Times. He served as an explosive ordnance disposal officer in the U.S. Navy.

A version of this article appears in print on Oct. 17, 2025, Section A, Page 10 of the New York edition with the headline: Russia Puts Little Bombs From an Ally On Its Drones. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

8. North Korean soldiers are flying drones for Russia and directing strikes in Ukraine, Kyiv says

Learning.

North Korean soldiers are flying drones for Russia and directing strikes in Ukraine, Kyiv says

https://www.businessinsider.com/north-koreans-fly-drones-for-russia-direct-strikes-in-ukraine-2025-10?utm

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By Jake Epstein

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North Korean soldiers training. Pyongyang has deployed forces to Russia to fight against Ukraine. KCNA/via REUTERS

2025-10-16T16:05:12Z

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• North Korean forces are using drones to identify Ukrainian troop positions, Kyiv said on Thursday.
• The aerial intelligence is then used to direct Russian strikes.
• The development sheds new light on North Korea's continued participation in the war.

North Korean forces are flying drones for Russia and directing strikes against targets in Ukraine, Kyiv said on Thursday, offering new details about Pyongyang's involvement in the war.

The Ukrainian military said that the North Korean soldiers are operating in Russia's Kursk region, where Kyiv launched a surprise cross-border offensive in August 2024. Pyongyang deployed forces there a few months later to help Moscow repel the Ukrainian advances.

From Kursk, North Korean units are using drones to conduct aerial reconnaissance missions over the neighboring Sumy region in Ukraine, identifying troop positions and supporting Russian follow-on strikes against identified targets, Kyiv said.

Ukraine has "intercepted communications between North Korean drone operators and personnel of the Russian army," Kyiv shared in a statement published to the Telegram messaging app. It said that North Korean drone operators "adjusted the fire of multiple launch rocket systems against Ukrainian positions."

Kyiv published footage of what appears to be a North Korean soldier squatting next to a pile of first-person-view (FPV) drones, cheap quadcopter drones that are used for both reconnaissance and strike missions.

Neither Russia's defense ministry nor its embassy in the US immediately responded to Business Insider's request for comment on the development.

It's unclear how long North Korean forces have been supporting Russian operations inside of Sumy. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said last month that his forces had thwarted a Russian offensive in the region.

Ukraine published footage of what looks like a stack of drones next to a North Korean soldier. General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces

Around 11,000 North Korean soldiers deployed to Kursk last fall to help Russia recapture hundreds of square miles of territory lost to Ukraine during its shock offensive there.

North Korea had no experience in major combat operations before it sent troops to Russia, which trained them in drone operations, artillery, infantry tactics, and clearing out trenches. Soldiers sent to Kursk were mainly used for brutal front-line assaults. The Ukrainians said they were little more than cannon fodder.

Western intelligence estimated earlier this year that thousands of North Korean troops had been killed or wounded fighting against Ukraine. The latest update from Kyiv on Thursday suggests Pyongyang's forces have taken on more of a support role.

Kyiv said that "due to critical manpower losses and the failure of the offensive operation in Sumy Oblast, Russian occupation forces continue to involve North Korean troops in active combat operations."

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has acknowledged that his forces have suffered losses in Russia. Last year's deployment came after Moscow and Pyongyang inked a mutual defense pact, a sign of increasingly close ties between the two heavily sanctioned states.

North Korea has also provided Russia with missiles and artillery, as well as ammunition, in addition to its soldiers. Ukraine has vowed to treat Pyongyang's participation in the war the same as it does Moscow on the battlefield.

The Ukrainian military has been "documenting all confirmed instances of foreign formations participating in armed aggression," Kyiv said on Thursday. "All forces involved in aggression against Ukraine will be neutralized in accordance with the laws and rules of warfare."

Russia's armed forces have suffered tremendous losses fighting against Ukraine. On Tuesday, Britain's defense ministry said some 332,000 soldiers have been killed and wounded since the start of the year. The estimated cost since the start of the full-scale invasion is over 1.1 million.

9. DAPA chief says China's Hanwha sanctions to 'clearly' affect MASGA project

China's unsresticted warare at work.

DAPA chief says China's Hanwha sanctions to 'clearly' affect MASGA project | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · October 17, 2025

SEOUL, Oct. 17 (Yonhap) -- China's recent sanctions against five U.S.-linked subsidiaries of South Korean shipbuilder Hanwha Ocean Co. will "clearly" have an impact on a landmark South Korea-U.S. shipbuilding cooperative project, the chief of Seoul's arms procurement agency said Friday.

On Tuesday, Beijing announced it would impose retaliatory measures against the five U.S.-based subsidiaries, accusing them of cooperating with a U.S. investigation targeting China's maritime and shipbuilding industries.

"Ultimately, it could have an impact on the Make American Shipbuilding Great Again (MASGA) initiative," Seok Jong-gun, minister of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), said during a parliamentary audit session.

"While no immediate impact is expected as there are no MASGA-related contracts that have been inked, it is assessed there will clearly be an influence given issues regarding material," Seok said, in response to an analysis suggesting the scope of damage could reach up to US$60 million over the next two years.

The DAPA chief did not specify the amount of potential damage, saying it has not been analyzed.

Hanwha has been at the forefront of efforts by Seoul and Washington to deepen shipbuilding cooperation as the Trump administration seeks to revitalize America's shipbuilding industry at a time when China is believed to have more than 230 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States.

The latest measures announced by Beijing include prohibiting Chinese individuals and organizations from engaging in transactions or cooperation with the U.S. units of Hanwha.

Seok Jong-gun, minister of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, attends a parliamentary audit session on Oct. 17, 2025. (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · October 17, 2025

10. Defense chief says Osan Air Base raid did not require U.S. consultations

Defense chief says Osan Air Base raid did not require U.S. consultations | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · October 17, 2025

SEOUL, Oct. 17 (Yonhap) -- Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back said Friday a raid at Osan Air Base by a special counsel team was not an issue that requires consultations with the United States, after the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) reportedly lodged a formal complaint over the action.

Ahn's remarks came after USFK Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. David Iverson reportedly sent a letter to Seoul's foreign ministry, expressing concerns over the team's search conducted in July at the air base jointly run by the allies, as part of its investigation into former ousted President Yoon Suk Yeol's martial law bid.

While the team searched an Air Force Master Control & Reporting Center operated by the South Korean military, the U.S. military reportedly took issue, believing it should have consulted beforehand with the USFK, considering investigators would have to go through areas under its control.

"It was not something that required consultations with the U.S.," Ahn said during a parliamentary audit session, stressing the search took place in areas governed by the South Korean military.

Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back attends a parliamentary audit session at the National Assembly in Seoul on Oct. 17, 2025. (Yonhap)

"The South Korean and U.S. militaries only use the entrance and the exit together, and their spaces are separately divided," Ahn said. "Since the search and seizure took place in the South Korean area, it was assessed as a matter that does not have to be notified to the U.S."

In this context, Ahn said the raid does not violate the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) on hosting U.S. troops in South Korea.

The defense chief said he was aware of the complaint through the foreign ministry but was told by the foreign minister that misunderstandings have been ironed out.

On Thursday, the special counsel team denied violating SOFA, saying investigators were authorized to enter the facility in advance and were escorted by South Korean troops to the area in question in accordance with a memorandum of understanding between the allies.

The USFK said it "fully cooperates" with South Korean investigative authorities, without further commenting on external entities' ongoing investigations.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · October 17, 2025

11. N. Korea operating 4 political prison camps with up to 65,000 detainees: report

We must have a humn rights upfront approach.

N. Korea operating 4 political prison camps with up to 65,000 detainees: report | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · October 17, 2025

SEOUL, Oct. 17 (Yonhap) -- North Korea is operating four political prison camps, where up to 65,000 people are believed to be imprisoned and placed under forced labor, a report showed Friday.

North Korea is currently operating four prison camps -- Camp 14, Camp 16, Camp 18 and Camp 25 -- in South Phyongan Province and North Hamgyong Province, according to the report by the state-funded Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU).

The latest report was updated from its 2013 report with U.S. satellite imagery and testimonies from North Korean defectors.

North Korea has long been labeled one of the worst human rights violators in the world. The North does not tolerate dissent, holds thousands of people in political prison camps and keeps tight control over outside information.

This file photo, provided by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea on Dec. 1, 2016, shows a satellite image of a political prison camp in Chongjin, North Hamgyong Province, taken Jan. 18, 2003. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Camp 14, established in Kaechon, South Phyongan Province, in 1965, was expanded after followers of Jang Song-thaek, an uncle of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un who was executed in 2013 for plotting to overthrow the regime, were transferred from Camp 18.

Camp 18 was initially placed in Pukchang County of North Hamgyong Province but relocated to the current location in Kaechon in 2006.

Camp 16 is located near the Punggye-ri nuclear testing site in North Hamgyong Province. Outside experts raised the possibility that inmates at the prison camp might be mobilized for labor at the nuclear facility.

Camp 25 in Chongjin, North Hamgyong Province, is a prison-like facility unlike other political prisons that look like a village from the outside. It has a capacity to host around 5,800 detainees.

The report estimates that around 53,000 to 65,000 people are being detained across the four facilities, down from the 80,000 to 120,000 estimate in the 2013 report.

However, it said the decline in the number was not due to the North's move to improve its human rights situation but driven in part by the closure of Camp 15, also dubbed the Yodok concentration camp, known for its notorious brutality.

North Koreans are subject to imprisonment at these facilities when they act against Kim Jong-un's orders or the ruling party's line, commit an anti-state crime or engage in religious activities.

North Korea, which has previously outright denied the existence of such prison camps, indirectly recognized the facilities for the first time during a universal periodic review at the U.N. office in Geneva in November.

sookim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · October 17, 2025

12. N. Korea's Kim vows to bolster bilateral ties in message to China's Xi

50% of the Dark Quad or CRInK.

N. Korea's Kim vows to bolster bilateral ties in message to China's Xi | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · October 17, 2025

By Kim Soo-yeon

SEOUL, Oct. 17 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has vowed to further strengthen the North's relations with China in his letter to Chinese President Xi Jinping, state media reported Friday.

Kim delivered the message Thursday, expressing his thanks for Xi's recent letter sent to celebrate the North's 80th anniversary on Oct. 10 of the founding of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

"It is our party and government's steadfast stance that we will carry forward traditional, cooperative relations between the North and China and further develop them," Kim was quoted as saying by the KCNA.

The North's leader also vowed to vigorously develop the bilateral relations in a bid to promote the welfare of the two nations' people and "safeguard the stability of the region and the world."

Kim has not directly commented on Korean Peninsula or Taiwan issues, but his message apparently meant North Korea will support China's stance on key regional issues and cooperate with Beijing in a way that will defend the two nations' interests.

In a meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang last week in Pyongyang, North Korean Premier Pak Thae-song voiced the North's support for China's move to "firmly defend the core interests, including the Taiwan issue."

Kim traveled to Beijing last month to attend China's military parade and held his first talks with Xi in more than six years, signaling that ties have been restored after remaining strained by North Korea's close alignment with Russia.

This file photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Sept. 5, 2025, shows North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un (L) and Chinese President Xi Jinping having talks in Beijing on the previous day on the sidelines of China's military parade. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · October 17, 2025

13. N. Korea, Russia sign agreement on forestry cooperation

And more of the Dark Quad or CRInK.

The common denominator? KJU.

N. Korea, Russia sign agreement on forestry cooperation | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · October 17, 2025

SEOUL, Oct. 17 (Yonhap) -- North Korea and Russia have signed an agreement on the forestry sector in an effort to expand exchanges and cooperation between the two sides, state media reported Friday.

The North and Russia signed the protocol in Pyongyang the previous day after holding a meeting of a joint forestry subcommittee related to economy and trade cooperation between the two countries, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The meeting discussed detailed issues over how to "expand and develop exchanges and cooperation in the forestry sector," the report said.

For the meeting, a delegation from Russia's industry and trade ministry, led by Grigory Gusev, deputy director of the ministry's timber industry department, arrived in North Korea on Wednesday.

The forestry subcommittee has been in operation for nearly three decades between the two countries, with the North having dispatched woodcutters to Russia to earn foreign currency amid prolonged international sanctions.

Experts speculated the two nations may have discussed North Korea's dispatch of workers to Russia, which has suffered a labor shortage amid its war with Ukraine.

South Korea's spy agency said in April that North Korea had sent around 15,000 workers to Russia.

North Korea has sent workers abroad, including to Russia, China, Mongolia and Africa, to earn hard currency in violation of U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions against Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs.

A delegation from Russia's industry and trade ministry arrives in North Korea on Oct. 15, 2025, to attend a meeting of a joint forestry subcommittee related to economy and trade cooperation between the two countries, in this photo carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · October 17, 2025

14. Industry minister, Lutnick meet to narrow gaps over Korea's US$350 bln investment plan

Some might say they are negotaiting the extortion payments to reduce the tarrifs.

(4th LD) Industry minister, Lutnick meet to narrow gaps over Korea's US$350 bln investment plan | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · October 17, 2025

(ATTN: ADDS photo, more info in paras 4-6)

By Song Sang-ho, Cho Joon-hyung and Park Sung-min

WASHINGTON, Oct. 16 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan and U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick held their latest round of talks in Washington on Thursday as the two countries strive to bridge differences over how to implement Korea's US$350 billion investment pledge under a trade deal struck in July.

Their meeting came as Seoul has stepped up efforts to expedite negotiations to finalize the details of the trade deal by sending top officials, including Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol; Kim Yong-beom, presidential chief of staff for policy; and Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo, to the U.S. capital.

This undated photo, provided by South Korea's industry ministry, shows Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan (R) and U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

The presidential chief of staff and the trade minister also joined the meeting.

"We had sufficient talks for two hours," Kim, the presidential aide, told Yonhap News Agency as he and the industry minister walked out of the Commerce Department.

He refused to comment when asked if there was any progress in the trade negotiations.

It remains unknown whether the two sides will resume talks on Friday.

Kim Yong-beom (R), presidential chief of staff for policy, and Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan (C) walk out of the Commerce Department in Washington on Oct. 16, 2025. (Yonhap)

The two countries reached a framework trade deal in late July, under which Seoul has committed to investing $350 billion in the U.S., among other pledges, in return for Washington's agreement to lower its "reciprocal" tariff and sector-specific duty on South Korean autos to 15 percent from 25 percent.

But the deal has yet to go into force amid negotiations to narrow gaps over a set of sticking points, including how to fund the investment package.

Earlier in the day, the industry minister and the presidential chief of staff met with Russell Vought, director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) -- an office that oversees U.S. shipbuilding efforts -- to discuss bilateral shipbuilding cooperation.

"We had constructive talks on various matters with respect to the MASGA project," Industry Minister Kim told reporters, referring to the Make American Shipbuilding Industry Great Again (MASGA) project, an initiative that Korea proposed to help rebuild the U.S. shipbuilding industry as part of the trade deal.

Kim Yong-beom (L), presidential chief of staff for policy, and Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan visit the White House in Washington on Oct. 16, 2025. (Yonhap)

The MASGA project is known to involve constructing new shipyards in the U.S., nurturing shipbuilding personnel and reestablishing related supply chains, as well as cooperating on maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) projects. It contributed to reaching the July trade deal.

Asked if Seoul officials discussed China's recent sanctioning of five U.S.-linked units of South Korean shipbuilder Hanwha Ocean, the minister said that the meeting did not touch on the issue.

"We discussed what projects (regarding the MASGA initiative) we can carry out," he said.

The officials' visit to the OMB came as the office is a "very crucial" entity for shipbuilding projects, although it is not directly involved in the trade negotiations, presidential chief of staff Kim told reporters before entering the White House.

"(We are visiting the office) as we want to listen to what it has to say and share each other's view on shipbuilding industrial cooperation between our country and the U.S.," he said.

Upon arrival at an airport near Washington earlier in the day, the presidential aide told reporters that Seoul and Washington are engaging in trade negotiations in the "most earnest and constructive" atmosphere to date.

"Taking stock of how (the negotiations) have been so far, we are at a juncture when the two countries are engaging in negotiations in the most earnest and constructive atmosphere," Kim said upon arrival at Dulles International Airport.

"(We) will do our utmost to ensure that negotiations will be wrapped up well in a direction that serves (Korea's) national interests," he added.

Kim Yong-beom (2nd from R), presidential chief of staff for policy, along with Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan, speaks to the press upon arrival at Dulles International Airport, near Washington, on Oct. 16, 2025. (Yonhap)

Asked to comment on U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's remarks Wednesday that he expects an outcome from the negotiations within the next 10 days, the presidential official took them as an auspicious sign, saying, "Doesn't the U.S. appear to be likely to make many concessions then?

"When the U.S. expects a result within 10 days, that apparently represents its interim assessment of the negotiations with us, and I read it as a sign that is not bad," he said. "We hope that the U.S. will reflect more of our position as much as it can."

Kim also reiterated Seoul's position that it would stick to its negotiation principles rather than rush to reach a deal.

Seoul's key officials involved in the trade negotiations converged in Washington, adding to the hope that the two sides can make substantial progress ahead of an expected summit between South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump on the occasion of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit set to begin late this month in Korea.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · October 17, 2025

15. N. Korea's FM vows to strengthen 'strategic, tactical' cooperation with Russia

Wishful thinking?

N. Korea's FM vows to strengthen 'strategic, tactical' cooperation with Russia | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · October 17, 2025

SEOUL, Oct. 17 (Yonhap) -- North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui has said the North will strengthen its strategic and tactical cooperation with Russia, assessing the bilateral ties are developing in "unprecedented width and depth," state media reported Friday.

Choe made the remarks in her speech at a reception, hosted by the Russian Embassy in North Korea, the previous day on the occasion of the 77th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two nations, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The North's top diplomat said bilateral ties between North Korea and Russia have been developing in "unprecedented width and depth" since they signed a mutual defense treaty in June last year.

"We will do everything to promote the comprehensive development of the bilateral relations and further strengthen strategic and tactical cooperation (with Russia)," Choe was quoted as saying by the KCNA.

North Korea and Russia have been expanding cooperation in the military and other areas, with Pyongyang sending troops and ammunition to support Moscow's war with Ukraine.

At the reception, Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexandr Matsegora said Pyongyang-Moscow relations have developed to the levels of a strategic partnership and alliance, according to the Russian Embassy's Telegram channel.

Highlighting that North Korean troops dispatched to Russia's Kursk border region marched while holding the national flags of the North and Russia at the Oct. 10 military parade in Pyongyang, Matsegora said Russia "will never forget their feats."

North Korea forged diplomatic relations with the former Soviet Union on Oct. 12, 1948. Choe attended a reception hosted by the Russian Embassy in Pyongyang for the second straight year to celebrate the anniversary.

North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui (at the podium) delivers a speech at a reception hosted by the Russian Embassy in North Korea on Oct. 16, 2025, to celebrate the 77th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the North and Russia, in this photo carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · October 17, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com