Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

 
 

Quotes of the Day:


"The propagandist's purpose is to make one set of people forget that certain other sets of people are human."
- Aldous Huxley

“Because fanaticism and ignorance is forever busy and needs feeding, and soon, your honor, with banners flying and drums beating, we’ll be marching backward.… Backward- to the glorious ages of that sixteenth century when bigots burned the man who dared bring enlightenment and intelligence to the human mind! “ 
- Henry Drummond, Inherit the Wind

"Humble because of knowledge; mighty by sacrifice." 
- Rudyard Kipling


1. Putin touts solidarity with China in Xi’s pitch for new world order as crisis grips Middle East

2. War in Ukraine Latest: Russian Airfield Hit in ‘Most Serious Strike’ of the War

3. Ukraine Fires ATACMS Missiles at Russian Forces for the First Time

4. What we know about the deadly blast at a Gaza City hospital

5. Understanding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Guide from War on the Rocks

6. Underground Nightmare: Hamas Tunnels and the Wicked Problem Facing the IDF

7. Inside Biden’s Reversal on Sending Long-Range Missiles to Ukraine

8. Allied Spy Chiefs Warn of Chinese Espionage Targeting Tech Firms

9. Chinese jets ramp up incidents with US aircraft, new videos show

10. Ukraine’s special forces use daring raids and distraction tactics in bid to free Crimea

11. Israel and Hamas at war: Latest news

12. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 17, 2023

13. Iran Update, October 17, 2023

14. How China's Belt and Road Initiative is changing after a decade of big projects and big debts

15. U.S. Ambassador Visits Detained Wall Street Journal Reporter Evan Gershkovich

16. Israel's Strategic Crisis - Sir Lawrence Freedman

17. Marine unit in Japan soon adopting ‘littoral’ name amid force changes

18. Terrorists could be inspired by Hamas, spymasters warn

19. Expert Guidance: Law of Armed Conflict in the Israel-Hamas War

20. What Comes After Hamas?

21. What Israel Can Learn From America’s Counterterrorism Missteps – The Strategic Case for Adhering to the Laws of War

22. How Hamas’s carefully planned Israel attack devolved into a chaotic rampage

23. U.S., Taiwan on front lines in fight against disinformation: Envoy




1. Putin touts solidarity with China in Xi’s pitch for new world order as crisis grips Middle East


Excerpts:


That signature foreign policy has marshaled hundreds of billions in Chinese finance to build ports, power stations, bridges, rails and roads around the world – significantly expanding China’s international interests and influence along the way.
More than 150 countries have cooperated on the program, which Beijing says has mobilized “up to a trillion dollars in investments,” spurring growth in developing nations.
But it faces increasing headwinds as China’s economic growth engine slows amid a shifting financial climate worldwide and questions about its high costs for countries – from debt to environmental impact.
China’s infrastructure building spree has now made it the world’s largest debt collector, analysts say.
In his address Wednesday, Xi brushed aside criticisms and reiterated his commitment to the initiative.
“What has been achieved in the past 10 years demonstrates that Belt and Road cooperation is on the right side of history. It represents the advancing of our times and it’s the right path forward,” he said.
Xi also proposed an eight-part action plan on the Belt and Road initiative, including the full removal of restrictions on foreign investment in Chinese manufacturing and an initiative on global artificial intelligence governance.


Putin touts solidarity with China in Xi’s pitch for new world order as crisis grips Middle East

https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/18/china/china-bri-forum-opening-ceremony-intl-hnk/index.html?utm_term=169762208499601fda28af934&utm_source=cnn_Meanwhile+in+China+%E2%80%93+10.18.2023&utm_medium=email&bt_ee=ufJhNcBVxZ5wtI0prINpSU93F%2BP75iXrnOxyus4PssxhPOFwbBjpOtg4OmIljaPd&bt_ts=1697622084998

 

By Simone McCarthy and Nectar Gan, CNN

 5 minute read 

Updated 4:51 AM EDT, Wed October 18, 2023



Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russia's President Vladimir Putin head to a group photo session during the third Belt and Road Forum at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on October 18.

Grigory Sysoyev/Pool/AFP/Getty Images

BeijingCNN — 

Russian President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday touted his country’s deep alignment with China as he appeared on stage as guest of honor at a global gathering in Beijing, where Chinese leader Xi Jinping pitched his vision for a reshaped world order.

In a previously unannounced speech at the opening ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum, Putin hailed Xi’s flagship foreign policy initiative as “aiming to form a fairer, multi-polar world.”

Russia and China share an “aspiration for equal and mutually beneficial cooperation,” which includes “respecting civilization diversity and the right of every state for their own development model” – he added, in an apparent push back against calls for authoritarian leaders to promote human rights and political freedoms at home.


Ad Feedback

Putin spoke after Xi, who welcomed two dozen world leaders and more than a hundred delegations to an event marking the 10th anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative – an ambitious yet controversial undertaking to boost connectivity and trade across the world with Chinese infrastructure projects.

Addressing the foreign guests in an ornate room in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, Xi lauded his initiative for providing an alternative development model for the world, saying it “established a new framework for international cooperation.”

The gathering took place under the shadow of a war in the Middle East that threatens to escalate into broader regional conflict – and served as a stark showing of the deepening divisions between world powers.

As leaders and representatives from countries mostly in the Global South gathered in the Chinese capital, US President Joe Biden landed in Israel later on Wednesday in a show of staunch support for the American ally, which has vowed to eliminate Hamas following the Islamic militant group’s brutal attack on Israel earlier this month.

China and Russia have both called for ceasefire in the spiraling conflict and have declined to explicitly condemn Hamas – cutting a stark contrast to the outpouring of support for Israel from the US and leaders across Europe.


China and Russia criticize Israel as divisions with the West sharpen

At the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire.

“I’m fully aware of the deep grievances of the Palestinian people after 56 years of occupation, yet as serious as these grievances are they cannot justify the acts of terror against civilians committed by Hamas on October 7 (which) I immediately condemned,” he said.

“But those events cannot justify the collective punishment of The Palestinian people.”

Xi did not address the conflict in his speech, but he alluded to an apparent shift in global power and leadership. “Changes of the world, of our times and of historical significance are unfolding like never before,” he said.

“China is endeavoring to build itself into a stronger country and rejuvenate the Chinese nation on all fronts by pursuing Chinese modernization. The modernization we’re pursuing is not for China alone, but for all developing countries through joint efforts.”

In a thinly veiled swipe at the United States, the Chinese leader said China opposed unilateral sanctions, economic coercion, decoupling and supply chain disruption.

“Ideological confrontation, geopolitical rivalry and bloc politics are not a choice for us,” he said.

“Viewing others’ development as a threat or taking economic interdependence as a risk will not make one’s own life better or speed up one’s development.”

Other world leaders in attendance, including Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Indonesia’s Joko Widodo, also gave addresses, with many echoing Xi’s call for increased global development and a more multilateral, cooperative world.

Xi and Putin held talks after the event. Calling Putin “my old friend,” Xi hailed the deepening of political trust between the two nations and their “close, effective strategic coordination,” China’s state broadcaster CCTV reported.

The visit to Beijing is an exceptionally rare overseas trip for Putin, who is shunned by the West and wanted by the International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes in Ukraine.

His meeting with Xi comes as Russia continues to wage destructive attacks on Ukraine, where two people were killed Wednesday after a Russian missile strike on the city of Zaporizhzhia, according to Ukrainian officials.

An alternative world order

Xi, the most powerful and assertive Chinese leader in decades, has been ramping up efforts to project China as an alternative leader to the US – with a vision for how global security and development should be ensured.

Hosting leaders in Beijing – China’s first major international event since the end of the Covid-19 pandemic – is a key part of his push to pitch that vision to nations it has forged close ties with over the past decade as Xi aimed to vastly expand his nation’s global influence.

World leaders, representatives and delegations from more than 140 countries – including in the Middle East and the Taliban – are attending the gathering marking one decade since the launch of Xi’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative.

But it also comes as China faces stark challenges at home, with a slowing economy, high unemployment and a series of recent unexplained shake-ups in the upper echelons of the ruling Communist Party.

Beijing aims to gloss over these challenges at the gathering to project its power and laud its contributions to global development as a prime example of its superior leadership.


China is celebrating a decade of the Belt and Road Initiative. What is it about?

That signature foreign policy has marshaled hundreds of billions in Chinese finance to build ports, power stations, bridges, rails and roads around the world – significantly expanding China’s international interests and influence along the way.

More than 150 countries have cooperated on the program, which Beijing says has mobilized “up to a trillion dollars in investments,” spurring growth in developing nations.

But it faces increasing headwinds as China’s economic growth engine slows amid a shifting financial climate worldwide and questions about its high costs for countries – from debt to environmental impact.

China’s infrastructure building spree has now made it the world’s largest debt collector, analysts say.

In his address Wednesday, Xi brushed aside criticisms and reiterated his commitment to the initiative.

“What has been achieved in the past 10 years demonstrates that Belt and Road cooperation is on the right side of history. It represents the advancing of our times and it’s the right path forward,” he said.

Xi also proposed an eight-part action plan on the Belt and Road initiative, including the full removal of restrictions on foreign investment in Chinese manufacturing and an initiative on global artificial intelligence governance.



2. War in Ukraine Latest: Russian Airfield Hit in ‘Most Serious Strike’ of the War



War in Ukraine Latest: Russian Airfield Hit in ‘Most Serious Strike’ of the War

kyivpost.com

Armed Forces of Ukraine War in Ukraine

Ukraine Hits Russian Airfield, Burns Helicopters in ‘Most Serious Strike’ of the War

Russian milbloggers predict the Kremlin won't learn anything: “This will happen again as long as the war continues.” They claimed US ATACMS were used even as Washington drags its feet on delivery.

by Kyiv Post | October 17, 2023, 1:25 pm |


File photo:Ukrinform


Ukraine has claimed it struck Russian airfields in Berdyansk and Luhansk with long-range weapons overnight, destroying aircraft on the ground and other military equipment.

In a post on social media, Ukraine’s military said: “On the night of Oct. 17, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) carried out successful strikes on helicopters and airfield equipment of the Russian occupying forces in the temporarily-occupied Luhansk and Berdyansk.”

A subsequent AFU statement said that at least two Russian Air Force helicopters sitting on the ground at Berdyansk were destroyed, and the artillery system and an ammunition warehouse at the airfield were hit as well.

Video recorded by residents purportedly in the vicinity recorded anti-aircraft fire in a dark sky, and possible anti-aircraft missile launches, followed by three heavy, extended explosions. Social media reports said the Ukrainian strikes were shortly after 2:30 a.m.


Kyiv later claimed to have destroyed nine helicopters, an air defence launcher, an ammunition warehouse and said it had damaged runways. It also claimed Russian forces had suffered losses in the operation.

Aircraft known to be based by the Russian Air Force at Berdyansk airport include Ka-52 and Mi-8 general-purpose helicopters, and Mi-24 and Mi-28 helicopter gunships.

More on this topic

Ukraine Can Be ‘Energy Exporter to Europe’ – Naftogaz CEO

CEO Oleksiy Chernyshov said it will become realistic for Naftogaz to be compensated the $5 billion The Hague ruled Moscow owed it through the confiscation of other Russian assets.

The Berdyansk airport strike and substantial Russian Air Force equipment damage were widely confirmed by Russian milbloggers, with one describing it as “one of the most serious blows of all time in the Northern Military District. If not the most serious.”

They said: “There are losses in both people and technology. It’s pointless to write about the fact that ‘we need to draw conclusions so that this doesn’t happen again. This will happen again as long as the war continues. We must be prepared for this.”


They also claimed the attack was carried out by ATACMS missiles though, officially at least, Ukraine does not currently have any of the weapons.

Russians dumb enough to still keep helicopters and jets in occupied Ukraine are probably reconsidering after seeing two of their airfields go up in smoke last night.

Here, one Berdyansk, other was in Lugansk.

Helicopters were destroyed. pic.twitter.com/Egi56Bw206
— Jay in Kyiv (@JayinKyiv) October 17, 2023

Polish Opposition Wins Parliamentary Majority in Tight Vote

GRAPHIC WARNING: ‘Masterpiece Video’ Shows Ukrainian Drone Hunting Russian Soldier

Ukraine Hobby Drones Score Record Number of Russian Armor Kills in Avdiivka

President Zelensky said Kyiv's "assault operations" had achieved results. "I am grateful to those who are effectively destroying the occupiers' logistics bases on our land," he said in a statement.

He also thanked "every warrior" for defending key frontline areas in the east and south of the country.

A midnight statement from the Berdyansk occupation authority had claimed all incoming weapons were intercepted and suggested that city residents remain calm.

Berdyansk airport, located to the north of the city, is some 110-20 km from the closest Ukraine-controlled territory likely suitable for a long-range missile launch. It was not clear what weapons the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) used to hit the airfield.

The Moscow-associated Voenniy Osvedomitel information platform was among pro-Russia Telegram channels reporting on Tuesday morning that US-manufactured ATACMS ballistic missiles tipped with cluster munitions warheads had carried out the strike on Berdyansk airport, without offering substantial evidence.


The official Ukrainian army statements did not specify the weapon or weapons used.

Ukraine has since the first days of the invasion repeatedly asked Washington for the ATACMS tactical ballistic missile, a weapon designed for American HIMARS launchers already in AFU operation, and ranging out to 500 km.

The US has dragged its feet on a possible ATACMS transfer on grounds that American delivery of a ballistic missile system to Ukraine could trigger Kremlin aggression.

US-delivered HIMARS precision-guided rockets, thus far the most effective and destructive long-range weapon in AFU use, and thanks to overhead-burst warheads and high accuracy, one of the AFU’s go-to weapons for airfield strikes, have a maximum range of 80 km.

Ukraine’s domestically-produced Vilkha rocket has a rated range of 130 km, but thus far in the war, Kyiv has been unable to manufacture the munition in quantity. Ukraine at the start of the war also had limited stocks of Tochka-U ballistic missiles, but reserves of that weapon are likely exhausted, military analysts have said.

France and Britain in May kicked off transfers of Storm Shadow anti-ship missiles in limited quantities. Known as SCALP when manufactured by France, the missile has a reported range of 300-350 km.


AFU strike planners have to date used Storm Shadow/SCALP for long-range naval and naval infrastructure strikes, most notably on Sept. 14 when Storm Shadow salvos destroyed a Russian navy submarine and amphibious assault ship in drydock in Sevastopol harbor.

kyivpost.com



3. Ukraine Fires ATACMS Missiles at Russian Forces for the First Time




Ukraine Fires ATACMS Missiles at Russian Forces for the First Time

U.S. missiles were secretly deployed to Ukraine in recent days

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/ukraine-fires-atacms-missile-at-russian-forces-for-the-first-time-3bebcdb1

By Michael R. Gordon

Follow

, Nancy A. Youssef

Follow

 and Matthew Luxmoore

Follow

Updated Oct. 17, 2023 2:23 pm ET

YOU MAY ALSO LIKE

1:46



0:05

/

7:32

TAP FOR SOUND

As Ukraine struggles to take back territory from Russia, it’s relying on foreign missile supplies. Here’s a look at the capabilities of the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, which the Biden administration agreed to provide a limited number of to Ukrainian forces. Photo illustration: Xingpei Shen

Ukraine launched ATACMS missiles at Russian forces on Tuesday, marking the first time that the U.S.-provided weapons have been used since Moscow invaded the country.

A small number of the missiles have been secretly sent to Ukraine in recent days, where they will augment Kyiv’s capability to carry out long-range strikes at Russian forces during an important stage of its counteroffensive, according to people familiar with the matter.

Ukraine has long sought ATACMS, a surface-to-surface missile that can be fired by the Himars, or High Mobility Artillery Rocket System launchers, the U.S. first provided last year.

On Tuesday, the Ukrainian military’s communication department said on the Telegram messaging app that it “made well-aimed strikes on enemy airfields and helicopters near the temporarily occupied Luhansk and Berdyansk.”

The ATACMS models that were provided have a range of about 100 miles.

The U.S. decision to send the ATACMS, which stands for the Army Tactical Missile System, has been long in the making. Ukraine repeatedly said the missiles were essential to its war plan, giving it the range it needed to strike targets behind the front lines in Russian-held Ukrainian territory.


Ukraine had long sought ATACMS, a surface-to-surface missile that can strike well behind Russian lines. PHOTO: HANDOUT/REUTERS

Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces said the attacks caused dozens of Russian casualties and destroyed nine Russian helicopters, an air defense launcher and an ammunition depot. It said the military struck the two airfields after receiving intelligence that Russia was using them as a major base for aircraft, military hardware and ammunition in the occupied territories.

In a video message posted online, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that Ukraine had the missiles, saying that “ATACMS have proven themselves” and are being “implemented accurately.” In his message, Zelensky also thanked the U.S.

Yuriy Ihnat, the spokesman for Ukraine’s Air Force, said that long-range strikes against Russian air bases are a crucial part of Ukraine’s broader strategy of weakening Russian forces as Ukraine continues its counteroffensive.

Such strikes, he said, will force the Russian military to keep its helicopters farther from the front. As a result, Russian helicopters would need to fly farther to reach the front lines, which would diminish their ability to apply firepower and give Ukrainian forces more time to track those flights.

The U.S. decision to send the ATACMS has been the subject of public debate for more than a year. U.S. lawmakers repeatedly pressed the White House to provide the weapons. The decision by Britain and France to provide longer-range cruise missiles to Ukraine earlier this year also raised questions about why the White House wasn’t willing to take a similar step.

At first, the Biden administration held back from providing the missiles because it was worried they might be used by Ukraine to strike targets inside Russia, risking a direct U.S.-Russia clash.

Ukraine attacks on Russian air bases

Russian-controlled area

RUSSIA

Kyiv

Kharkiv

UKRAINE

Luhansk

Donetsk

Zaporizhzhia

Kherson

Berdyansk

Odesa

Sea of Azov

CRIMEA

100 miles

Black Sea

100 km

Note: Russian-controlled area as of Oct. 16

Sources: Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project (Russian-controlled area); staff reports

Andrew Barnett/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The Pentagon was so concerned about the risk of escalation that it initially had the Himars rocket launchers it provided to Ukraine modified so they couldn’t be used to fire ATACMS missiles should Kyiv acquire them from other sources.

Ukraine sought to ease those concerns by vowing it wouldn’t use American-supplied weapons to strike targets inside Russia. Kyiv also had a record in honoring similar pledges with the cruise missiles Britain and France provided.

Yet after the administration’s worries over escalation faded, the Pentagon expressed concern that supplying ATACMS would eat into stockpiles of the weapons it needed for its war plans against future threats.

This summer, the administration’s attitude began to change when it was apparent that the Ukrainian counteroffensive was moving slowly in the face of formidable Russian defenses and U.S. national-security adviser Jake Sullivan asked what other military support Washington might provide.

President Biden’s decision in July to send cluster munitions to Ukraine also facilitated the ATACMS decision. The U.S. has a cluster-munition variant of the missile called APAM, which stands for anti-personnel, anti-materiel, that didn’t figure as prominently as other ATACMS models in the U.S. war plans.

On Aug. 10, the National Security Council staff drafted a memo outlining a number of options to help Ukraine’s forces, and noted the APAM variant could have a significant effect on the battlefield.

On Aug. 30, the council’s principals committee, a cabinet-level body led by Sullivan, recommended unanimously that the weapon be provided.

When Zelensky visited Washington in late September, Biden told the Ukrainian president he was willing to provide ATACMS missiles to help with Ukraine’s counteroffensive.

The first use of ATACMS comes as the counteroffensive, aimed at bisecting Russian occupying forces in the south of the country, is making only incremental advances. Ukrainian forces in August penetrated Russia’s main defensive line, but have been unable to achieve a large-scale breakthrough.

Last week, Russia launched an offensive in the east aimed at surrounding the small industrial town of Avdiivka, apparently calculating that it had manpower to spare and that Ukraine’s counteroffensive had run out of steam.

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Matthew Luxmoore at matthew.luxmoore@wsj.com




4. What we know about the deadly blast at a Gaza City hospital


What we know about the deadly blast at a Gaza City hospital

AP · by Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · October 18, 2023

Wounded Palestinians arrive to al-Shifa hospital in Gaza City, central Gaza Strip, after arriving from al-Ahli hospital following an explosion there, Tuesday, Oct. 17, 2023. The Hamas-run Health Ministry says an Israeli airstrike caused the explosion that killed hundreds at al-Ahli, but the Israeli military says it was a misfired Palestinian rocket. (AP Photo/Abed Khaled)

Share

WASHINGTON (AP) — This is what we know about Tuesday’s deadly blast at a hospital in Gaza City.

— In the dark of early evening in Gaza, reports emerged of an explosion at Gaza City’s al-Ahli hospital. Al-Ahli was crowded both with victims of 10 days of Israeli airstrikes and with families and others who have taken refuge on hospital grounds.

— Video that The Associated Press confirmed as being from the hospital showed an orange ball of fire and flames engulfing the building and grounds.

— The video showed the outside of the hospital, where countless Palestinian families had been camping out. Torn bodies covered the grass, with slain children lying among dead adults.

— Gaza’s Hamas-run Health Ministry blamed an Israeli airstrike, and said it killed at least 500 people.


— Israeli authorities soon after denied involvement, saying a misfired Palestinian rocket appeared to blame.

— Outraged over the hospital blast, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Jordan’s King Abdullah II announced they were pulling out of a planned Arab summit Wednesday with President Joe Biden.

— The White House and Jordan’s government announced within hours of the attack that Biden’s meeting with Arab leaders was off.

— Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt and other Arab nations condemned the hospital attack, or declared days of national mourning. Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi declared the hospital explosion “a clear violation of international law ... and humanity.”

— Protests erupted in some Arab cities. In Beirut, protesters roamed the city on motorcycles and gathered outside the French embassy and a U.N. facility, in protests against the international community’s response to the civilian deaths in Gaza. Throngs of Jordanians gathered outside the Israeli Embassy in Amman.

AP · by Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · October 18, 2023




5. Understanding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Guide from War on the Rocks


Understanding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Guide from War on the Rocks - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by WOTR Staff · October 16, 2023

In light of the unprecedented assault by Hamas on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, and the subsequent Israeli campaign on Gaza, we here at War on the Rocks have curated this list of articles and podcasts to help you gain a deeper understanding of the history, drivers, background, and events that define the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Whether you are a soldier or a student, a policymaker or a pundit, a teacher or a techie, this will be useful for you.

These resources go back to 2014 and are organized by focus: strategy, military operation, diplomacy, regional responses, and more. Make sure to become a member today to seamlessly access all of these articles and podcasts.

Strategy & Policy

The Meaning of the Attack on Israel, with Bruce Hoffman and Ryan Evans

Israel Attacked by Hamas Militants, with Michael Koplow

Why Hamas Attacked Israel, with Devorah Margolin

A Major Pivot in Hamas Strategy, by Devorah Margolin

“Building a Better Ceasefire for Gaza,” by Jonathan Lincoln (07/23)

“Israel’s Political Crisis,” with Michael Koplow (07/23)

“An Unprecedented Crisis in Israel,” with Michael Koplow (03/23)

“Israel’s New Right-wing Coalition Government,” with Michael Koplow (01/23)

“Elections in Israel,” with Gabriel Mitchell (11/22)

“Assessing the Israel-Palestine Crisis,” with Natan Sachs (05/21)

“Israeli National Intelligence Culture and the Response to Covid-19,” by Itai Shapira (11/20)

“Recognizing That Israel is Not an Occupying Power in Gaza is Good for Everyone,” by Gilead Sher and Dana Wolf (07/16)

“Annexing the West Bank Would Compromise Israel’s Security and Core Values,” by Gilead Sher and Tami Yakira (6/20)

“Israel’s Political and Constitutional Crisis,” with Shane Mason and Daniel Kurtzer (5/20)

“Israel Goes to the Polls…Again,” with Shane Mason and Natan Sachs (3/20)

“The Strategic Implications of Israel’s Turn to the Sea,” by Ehud Eiran and Aviad Rubin (9/19)

“Israel’s Forthcoming Security Dilemma,” by Nadav Pollak (7/17)

“Israel’s Gaza Withdrawal 10 Years Later: More Successful Than You Think,” by Daniel Byman (8/15)

“Towards a Gaza Cease-Fire: Talking and Shooting in Cairo,” by Michael Baskin (9/14)

“Eyeless in Gaza – Are We Blind to an Enduring Reality of War?” by Michael Vlahos (8/14)

“Israel and Gaza: Force is Futile,” by Clare Yorke (7/14)

“Why a Gaza Ceasefire is So Difficult,” by Jacob Stoil (8/14)

“The Rise of the Feral Adversary,” by Alon Paz (11/14)

“Israel and the Demise of ‘Mowing the Grass,’” by T.X. Hammes (8/14)

“Coercive Disclosure: Israel’s Weaponization of Intelligence,” by Ofek Riemer and Daniel Sobelman (8/19)

“Jerusalem, In Search of an Honest Broker,” by Beverley Milton-Edwards (12/17)

Military Operation

“Israeli Operations in Jenin,” with Gabi Mitchell (07/23)

“Israel Versus Islamic Jihad,” with Yael Mizrahi Arnaud (08/22)

“Israel Targets the Head of the Octopus,” with Dion Nissenbaum (06/22)

“Turn on the Light, Extinguish the Fire: Israel’s New Way of War,” by Eran Ortal (01/22)

“Israel’s Iron Dome,” with Ankit Panda (05/21)

“Israel-Palestine Crisis,” with Khaled Elgindy (05/21)

“Five Lessons From Israel’s Wars in Gaza,” by Raphael S. Cohen (08/17)

“The Drone Threat to Israeli National Security,” by Michael Shkolnik (01/17)

“The War Doctrine Israel Does Not Talk About,” by Ron Tira (09/16)

“Peering into the Past and Future of Urban Warfare in Israel,” by David Betz (12/15)

“The Role of Anti-Access/Area Denial in Controlling Escalation in Gaza,” by Shimon Arad (9/18)

“The Ties That Bind: Families, Clans, and Hizballah’s Military Effectiveness,” by Michael Eisenstadt and Kendall Bianchi (12/17)

“Going At It in Gaza: New Realities in an Old Conflict,” by Jacob Stoil (7/14)

“Peering into the Past and Future of Urban Warfare in Israel,” by David Betz (12/15)

Tech, Ethics, and the City in Israel’s Looming Urban Battlefield, with John Amble and Ryan Evans

“More Than a Missile: Judging Iron Dome,” by Zachary Goldman (8/14)

“Israel’s Iron Maginot Line System,” by Mark Stout (8/14)

“Israel’s Intelligence Wars,” by Shay Hershkovitz (3/16)

Diplomacy

“U.S.-Saudi-Israeli Diplomacy,” with Khaled Elgindy (09/23)

“Compartmentalizing the American Alliance with Israel From the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” by Yael Mizrahi-Arnaud and Abe Silberstein (12/20)

“On a Collision Course: Avoiding a War Between Israel and the ‘Axis of Resistance,’” by Daniel Sobelman (12/17)

“Libya’s Foreign Minister Meets Israeli Counterpart,” with Nicholas Danforth and Jalel Harchaoui

“As Israel, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates Normalize Ties, China Looks on Warily,” by Michael Singh (10/20)

“The F-35 Triangle: America, Israel, the United Arab Emirates,” by Barbara A. Leaf and Dana Stroul (9/20)

“The United Arab Emirates and Israel Just Came Clean on Their Extra-Marital Affair,” by Gilead Sher and Yoel Guzansky (8/20)

“Diplomatic Breakthrough: Israel, United Arab Emirates Normalize Ties,” with Shane Mason and Natan Sachs

“Resetting the U.S.-Israel Alliance,” by Michael Eisenstadt (2/15)

“Is Israel Becoming a Strategic Liability for the United States?” by Richard Klass (1/15)

Regional Responses

Israel’s 9/11? How Hamas Terrorist Attacks Will Change the Middle East, by Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware

“Iranian Drone Proliferation is Scaling Up and Turning More Lethal,” by Nakissa Jahanbani, Muhammad Najjar, Benjamin Johnson, Caleb Benjamin, and Muhammad Al-Ubaydi (09/23)

“Iran’s Increasingly Decentralized Axis of Resistance,” by Nancy Ezzedine and Hamidreza Azizi (07/22)

“Iran, Its Partners, and the Balance of Effective Force,” by John Raine (03/20)

“How Iran Helped Houthis Expand Their Reach,” by Thomas Juneau (8/21)

“Is the Israeli-Lebanese Maritime Boundary Agreement Replicable?” by Gabriel Mitchell (11/22)

“How to Make the Most of the Israeli-Lebanese Maritime Deal,” by Hanin Ghaddar (10/22)

“Israel and Lebanon Agree on a Maritime Border,” with Nicholas Danforth and Hanin Ghaddar (10/22)

“A New ‘Good Fence?’: Turkey Should Learn Lessons from Israel’s Experience in Lebanon,” by Dylan Maguire (1/20)

“The Islamic State and Israel’s Arab Citizens,” by Elisabeth Marteu (12/16)

“From Marriage of Convenience to Bitter Divorce: The Unraveling of Ties Between Hamas and Isil’s Sinai Affiliate,” by Michael Shkolnik (1/18)

“Mini-Hizballahs, Revolutionary Guard Knock-Offs, and the Future of Iran’s Militant Proxies in Iraq,” by Michael Eisenstadt and Michael Knights (5/17)

“Facing Up to Foreign Influence: How Outsiders Helped Create Lebanon’s Current Crisis,” by Nicholas Noe (12/21)

“What Do U.S.-Iranian Tensions Mean for Israel,” by Amos Yadlin and Ari Heistein (6/19)

“Israel’s Deepening Involvement with Syria’s Rebels,” by Elizabeth Tsurkov (2/18)

“Horns of a Dilemma: Middle East Realignment and Israel,” with Danielle Plekta (10/18)

More

“Gaza: And So it Begins,” by Jean-Pierre Filiu (09/14)

“(W)archives: With Allenby at Gaza,” by Mark Stout (08/14)

“The United States, the 1967 Lines, and the Future of the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” by Galen Jackson (5/20)

“Strength, Wisdom, and Israel’s Character,” with Ambassador Dennis Ross (2/20)

“Israel, Egypt, The Palestinians, and the Legacy of the Camp David Accords, 40 Years Later” by Gilead Sher (9/18)

“The Python Problem: Reflections on the War on Terror, 17 Years Later,” by David A. Brown, Timothy Hoyt, and Craig Whiteside (9/18)

Lists and Contests

warontherocks.com · by WOTR Staff · October 16, 2023


6. Underground Nightmare: Hamas Tunnels and the Wicked Problem Facing the IDF


Excerpts:

But the hard truth is that the depth and scale of Hamas tunnels in Gaza will surpass Israel’s specialized capabilities. It may come down to IDF infantry and engineers dealing with tunnels as they discover them.
It will also not be a simple matter of finding and destroying Hamas tunnels for several reasons. Gaza is not the mountainous and sparsely populated terrain of Afghanistan, for instance, where in 2017 the US military dropped America’s most powerful nonnuclear bomb—the 21,600-pound GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast bomb—on an ISIS cave and tunnel complex. Moreover, Hamas will likely put weapons and explosives in tunnels that can trigger unintended explosions elsewhere or travel through to other parts of the tunnel network, causing damage where the IDF didn’t foresee. Finally, Hamas will likely put civilians and hostages in their tunnels as human shields. All of this means that Israel will have to take a deliberate approach to each of the tunnels they will discover.
There is no uniform solution to the problem that tunnels will present Israeli ground force, undoubtedly one of the biggest they will face in Gaza. Dealing with each tunnel will require a situation-dependent mix of capabilities. But above all, given the scale and complexity of the underground infrastructure in Gaza, one thing is certain: overcoming the challenges posed by tunnels will require a lot of time.


Underground Nightmare: Hamas Tunnels and the Wicked Problem Facing the IDF - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by John Spencer · October 17, 2023

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

If Israel launches a ground campaign into Gaza to clear the dense areas of Hamas military capability—and all indications are that it intends to—Israeli forces can expect to face a wide range of challenges. Some of these are common features of modern urban warfare history, while others stem from the unique characteristics of Gaza’s urban terrain. But one challenge spans both categories: tunnels. Subterranean spaces have featured in other urban battles—not only recently but stretching back to ancient history. But the scale of the challenge in Gaza, where hundreds of miles of tunnels crisscross below ground in the enclave, is entirely unique. This expansive underground complex is the wicked problem—one for which no perfect solution exists—awaiting Israeli ground forces.

Tunnel warfare is not new. From medieval mining and countermining, its long history extends through the subterranean component of the World War I battles of the Somme, Vimy Ridge, and Messines to the deep natural and manmade tunnels used at Mariupol, Bakhmut, and Soledar during the ongoing war in Ukraine. The US military’s experience with tunnels includes the Civil War sieges of Vicksburg, Mississippi in 1863 and Petersburg, Virginia in 1864, the massive underground complexes of the Vietnam War, and both to al-Qaeda and ISIS tunnels in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq. In Vietnam, where North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces used miles of tunnel networks to protect their supply routes, military forces, and bases in places like Cu Chi, the problem became so severe that it forced the development of new tactics such as sending soldiers, called tunnel rats, into tunnels armed with only a pistol and flashlight.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are very aware of the presence of Hamas tunnels in Gaza. They often refer to the group’s tunnel systems as the “metro.” The destruction of these tunnel complexes was one of the objectives of previous ground campaigns into Gaza, in 2008 and 2014. In total, there were believed to be over three hundred miles of tunnels in 2021, when Israel claimed to have destroyed sixty miles of tunnels during an eleven-day bombing campaign. Even if those tunnels have not been rebuilt or replaced, that means that it is likely that there remain hundreds of miles of intricate, complex, and deep tunnel infrastructure in Gaza. It is a veritable city underneath the cities on Gaza’s surface.

In the event of a ground campaign launched by Israel, Hamas would use its tunnels both defensively and offensively. The way it employed these spaces against the IDF during Israel’s 2014 Operation Protective Edge offers clues about what to expect in the days and weeks ahead.

Defensively, Hamas will use tunnels to escape IDF observation and attack. Any Hamas military capability that survives Israel’s current air campaign will mostly be deep underground. Hamas will have already placed its leadership, fighters, headquarters, communication, weapons, and supplies like water, food, ammunition in its tunnel complexes to prepare for the ground assault by Israeli forces. The tunnels will allow fighters to move between a series of fighting positions safely and freely under massive buildings, even after the IDF drop thousand-pound bombs on them. Hamas tunnels often have generator power, air ventilation, water pipes, and stockpiles of food that will allow the group’s fighters to better withstand the most basic challenges, like normal exhaustion, that result from urban siege and isolation. Hamas leaders and fighters will use the tunnels to remain mobile to escape entire sections of the combat area when they feel they are about to be decisively attacked or surrounded. Importantly, Hamas has also dug a large portion of its tunnels under, and connected to, civilian sites like school, hospitals, and mosques in dense urban areas. Among other reasons for doing so, this is part of its defensive lawfare strategy.

Offensively, Hamas tunnels allow the group’s forces to conduct protected and surprise attacks. They will use the tunnels to infiltrate behind IDF positions to surprise Israeli forces that might not be as well prepared or equipped for combat as those spearheading the campaign, like those in logistical areas. Interconnected tunnels under urban areas will allow Hamas to move quickly between prepared attack positions with caches of sniper rifles, antitank munitions, rifle-propelled grenades, and other weapons and ammunition. Tunnels will be the vital element of Hamas’s guerrilla warfare strategy. Its fighters will form small hunter-killer teams that move underground, pop up, strike, and pop quickly back into a tunnel. Hamas also uses the tunnels to hide and move rockets. These rockets can be remotely detonated or transported to hidden launch sites at the last minute. Hamas will also have many tunnels rigged with hundreds of pounds of explosive to function as tunnel bombs under main roads and buildings that the IDF might be lured into.

Entering tunnels presents unique tactical challenges, many of which cannot be addressed without specialized equipment. In some cases, it can be impossible to breathe without oxygen tanks in tunnels, depending on their depth and air ventilation. It can also be impossible simply to see. Most military night-vision goggles rely on some ambient light and cannot function when it is entirely absent. Any military navigation and communication equipment that relies on satellite or line-of-sight signals will not work underground. A weapon fired in compact spaces of tunnels, even a rifle, can produce a concussive effect that can physically harm the firer. A single defender can hold a narrow tunnel against a much superior force.

Of course, not all military tunnels and bunkers are the same. I have seen firsthand the wide variety, having been in North Korean invasion tunnels discovered in South Korea, Iraqi military bunkers, defensive bunkers and tunnels in Nagorno-Karabakh, and Hezbollah tunnels along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Two features typical of Hamas tunnels are important to note. First, Hamas tunnels are almost all very narrow, largely because of the prefabricated concrete sides and tops Hamas favors to build them. The average Hamas tunnel is just two meters high and a meter wide, making entering, moving through, fighting in them extremely hard. Second, because of Israel’s advancements tunnel detection and destruction, Hamas has dug its tunnels deeper and deeper. In 2020, Israel found a Hamas tunnel that descended 230 feet below the surface, the deepest found up to that point.

On the other side of the equation, there are a number of particular capabilities available to the IDF to deal with the challenge of Hamas tunnels. I have studied the phenomenon of subterranean warfare in conflicts around the world, have worked with leading scholars and experienced military practitioners to better understand its role in urban warfare, and am a founding member of first and only International Working Group on Subterranean Warfare. Of all the forces I have studied, the IDF has done the most work to prepare for dealing with tunnels in war.

The IDF has the capability to find, recover hostages from, clear, neutralize, and destroy tunnels. There are specialized units like the IDF Combat Engineering Corps’s Yahalom Unit, an elite commando unit whose soldiers specializes in finding, clearing, and destroying tunnels. The large force includes subordinate units like Sayfan, which trains to handle the threat of unconventional weapons, Samur, which specializes in entering, clearing, and destroying tunnels. The Yahalom is one of the largest units in the world that trains, mans, equips, experiments, and develops new ways to deal with underground warfare. The IDF’s canine unit, Oketz, has dogs trained for operating underground. And the IDF, police, and intelligence services all have special units—like Sayeret Matkal, the Yamam, and others—who share best practices for dealing with terrorists and combatants underground.

The Yahalom and other IDF units also have special equipment specifically developed for tunnels. Tunnel reconnaissance units, for example, use ground and aerial sensors, ground-penetrating radar, drilling equipment, and other systems to find tunnels. There are radios and navigation technologies that to work underground, night-vision goggles that use thermal and other technologies to see in complete darkness, and a suite of remote or wire-controlled flying or crawling robots that can look into and map tunnels without risking soldiers. The IDF also uses virtual reality training simulators that allow soldiers to train for underground warfare even when they aren’t at the physical training sites that include subterranean environments.

Israel has also developed special tactics for dealing with tunnels once they are found. It has a wide range of ground-penetrating munitions like the GBU-28, which can penetrate one hundred feet into the earth or through twenty feet of concrete. IDF ground forces also have multiple types of explosives to collapse or seal tunnels. They also have plenty of bulldozers they can use to seal tunnels—a tactic the US Marines employed when it sealed Japanese defenders in their caves and tunnels during the last part of the 1945 Battle of Iwo Jima. When multiple Hezbollah tunnels were discovered along Israel’s norther border during Operation Northern Shield in 2017, the IDF poured truckloads of wet cement into the tunnels to close them. Egypt is known for trying to neutralize Hamas cross-border smuggling tunnels along its border with Gaza by flooding them with seawater and sewage.

But the hard truth is that the depth and scale of Hamas tunnels in Gaza will surpass Israel’s specialized capabilities. It may come down to IDF infantry and engineers dealing with tunnels as they discover them.

It will also not be a simple matter of finding and destroying Hamas tunnels for several reasons. Gaza is not the mountainous and sparsely populated terrain of Afghanistan, for instance, where in 2017 the US military dropped America’s most powerful nonnuclear bomb—the 21,600-pound GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast bomb—on an ISIS cave and tunnel complex. Moreover, Hamas will likely put weapons and explosives in tunnels that can trigger unintended explosions elsewhere or travel through to other parts of the tunnel network, causing damage where the IDF didn’t foresee. Finally, Hamas will likely put civilians and hostages in their tunnels as human shields. All of this means that Israel will have to take a deliberate approach to each of the tunnels they will discover.

There is no uniform solution to the problem that tunnels will present Israeli ground force, undoubtedly one of the biggest they will face in Gaza. Dealing with each tunnel will require a situation-dependent mix of capabilities. But above all, given the scale and complexity of the underground infrastructure in Gaza, one thing is certain: overcoming the challenges posed by tunnels will require a lot of time.

John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute, codirector of MWI’s Urban Warfare Project, and host of the Urban Warfare Project Podcast. He is also a founding member of the International Working Group on Subterranean Warfare. He served twenty-five years as an infantry soldier, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He is the author of the book Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connection in Modern War and coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Israel Defense Forces

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

mwi.westpoint.edu · by John Spencer · October 17, 2023


7. Inside Biden’s Reversal on Sending Long-Range Missiles to Ukraine



Excerpts:

The helicopters and other aircraft that the Russians were lining up on occupied territory, usually at airports, were targets. At meetings, Mr. Austin agreed because the version of the ATACMS under discussion had a range of only 100 miles and were armed with cluster munitions that spread out to do maximum damage to unprotected targets like the aircraft.
Cluster munitions are banned by an international convention because “duds” left on the ground can injure civilians, often children, who pick them up. The United States has never ratified the convention, but would be highly unlikely to use the weapons. In July, the United States sent other types of cluster munitions to Ukraine, drawing widespread condemnation.
The ATACMS proposal was embraced by other administration officials, and Mr. Biden agreed. He told Mr. Zelensky when they met in Washington last month, but they agreed not to announce the decision.
It leaked out, but the timing of the shipments remained secret, part of an effort to take the Russians by surprise, before they had time to move their helicopters out of range. Which is what appears to have happened on Tuesday.


Inside Biden’s Reversal on Sending Long-Range Missiles to Ukraine​


By David E. Sanger

David E. Sanger, who has covered the intersection of national security, technology and politics for more than three decades, reported from Washington.

Oct. 17, 2023


The New York Times · by David E. Sanger · October 17, 2023

The story is more complex than a caricature in Washington that President Biden is cautious to a fault, and says no until the pressure is insurmountable.


Ukrainian soldiers during a training session in Kharkiv, Ukraine.Credit...Lynsey Addario for The New York Times


Oct. 17, 2023

From the opening days of the war in Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky told President Biden there was one weapon he needed above all others: Long-range missiles, known as ATACMS, that could reach air bases and Russian troops more than 100 miles behind the lines.

For the better part of 18 months, Mr. Biden had one response, both publicly and in his sometimes tense private meetings with Mr. Zelensky: No.

The weapons, he said, could cross one of the “red lines” of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, a possibility the president had to take seriously since Mr. Putin was episodically threatening to unleash tactical nuclear weapons.

After blasts at two air bases in Russian-held territory in southern and eastern Ukraine on Tuesday, it became clear that Mr. Biden had changed his mind, again. Amid the wreckage of Russian helicopters, there was evidence that the bases had been struck by American-supplied ATACMS — Army Tactical Missile Systems — that were the last big unfulfilled ask from Mr. Zelensky.

The story of how that happened, as described by several administration officials, is more complex than a caricature circulating in Washington that Mr. Biden is cautious to a fault, and says no until the pressure is insurmountable.

In this case, there was plenty of pressure. Some came from members of Congress, including Representative Jason Crow, a Colorado Democrat and former Army Ranger, who wrote to the White House that Ukraine needed weapons “to target deep supply lines and Russian command and control centers.” Mr. Crow added that while systems already provided to Ukraine were being used “to devastating effect,” the Russians “have adapted to ensure key assets are outside their range.”

A push also came from Mr. Zelensky at the NATO summit in Vilnius in July, when the Ukrainian leader made no secret of his anger that Mr. Biden and Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany had blocked any clear statement that Ukraine was on a path to NATO membership.

With a touch of bitterness, he told reporters “there is no decision” from Mr. Biden on the issue of ATACMS, and he added: “It is better not to raise the issue because there are expectations of the people, the military, everyone.” It would be better, he said, “to do it first, and then share information on how it happened.”

But officials in the White House insist that it runs a vigorous review process to make sure that weapons meet needs. In July, Mr. Biden’s aides said, they came to see what one called a “clear use case” for ATACMS. It was the one Mr. Crow had identified, using the ATACMS to target supply lines and air bases that Ukraine could not reach. At a July 14 meeting in the office of Jake Sullivan, the president’s national security adviser, he and Jon Finer, his primary deputy, talked with a small group of officials about developing options.

The study came at a moment of division in the Biden administration. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken had long been pressing for giving the Ukrainians more weapons sooner. Otherwise, Mr. Blinken said, the United States looked reluctant to give aid, and reactive. In public, he was more discreet, saying only that he was “forward leaning” on arming Ukraine.

Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III took the other side. The United States had a limited supply of ATACMs, and turning them over to the Ukrainians, who were running through ammunition at a much faster clip than needed, would leave the United States and its allies vulnerable. Readiness is not just a word, Mr. Austin argued, it is a necessity.

There was also a budget issue. The White House was running down more than $40 billion Congress had allocated for military help to Ukraine, and a growing number of Republicans were objecting to more spending. ATACMS were not cheap, about $1.5 million each.

By September, the group Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Finer organized came back with an analysis and a proposal. Escalation no longer seemed a major issue, they concluded. Britain had started supplying its Storm Shadow missiles in June, with ranges approaching the ATACMS, and Mr. Putin barely reacted.

The helicopters and other aircraft that the Russians were lining up on occupied territory, usually at airports, were targets. At meetings, Mr. Austin agreed because the version of the ATACMS under discussion had a range of only 100 miles and were armed with cluster munitions that spread out to do maximum damage to unprotected targets like the aircraft.

Cluster munitions are banned by an international convention because “duds” left on the ground can injure civilians, often children, who pick them up. The United States has never ratified the convention, but would be highly unlikely to use the weapons. In July, the United States sent other types of cluster munitions to Ukraine, drawing widespread condemnation.

The ATACMS proposal was embraced by other administration officials, and Mr. Biden agreed. He told Mr. Zelensky when they met in Washington last month, but they agreed not to announce the decision.

It leaked out, but the timing of the shipments remained secret, part of an effort to take the Russians by surprise, before they had time to move their helicopters out of range. Which is what appears to have happened on Tuesday.

David E. Sanger is a White House and national security correspondent. In a 38-year reporting career for The Times, he has been on three teams that have won Pulitzer Prizes, most recently in 2017 for international reporting. His newest book is “The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage and Fear in the Cyber Age.” More about David E. Sanger

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 9 of the New York edition with the headline: Inside Biden’s Reversal On Sending New Weapons

The New York Times · by David E. Sanger · October 17, 2023




8. Allied Spy Chiefs Warn of Chinese Espionage Targeting Tech Firms


Excerpts:

U.S. national security officials have said that preventing Beijing from imposing its rules on people overseas is a top priority. The United States is working to shut down illegal overseas police stations that the Justice Department says are used to monitor and intimidate dissidents.
Mike Burgess, the director general of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization, said China was exploiting the openness of the West, and the desire of Western universities to collaborate.
“All nations spy, all nations seek secrets and all nations seek strategic advantage, but the behavior we are talking about here goes well beyond traditional espionage,” he said.



Allied Spy Chiefs Warn of Chinese Espionage Targeting Tech Firms


By Julian E. Barnes

Reporting from Menlo Park, Calif.

Oct. 18, 2023, 5:04 a.m. ET

The New York Times · by Julian E. Barnes · October 18, 2023

F.B.I. officials say more than half of Chinese spying efforts aimed at stealing technology occurs in Silicon Valley.


“We are dealing with another unprecedented threat,” said Christopher A. Wray, the F.B.I. director. “There is no greater threat to innovation than the Chinese government.”Credit...Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times


Oct. 18, 2023, 5:04 a.m. ET

The United States and its allies vowed this week to do more to counter Chinese theft of technology, warning at an unusual gathering of intelligence leaders that Beijing’s espionage is increasingly trained not on the hulking federal buildings of Washington but the shiny office complexes of Silicon Valley.

The intelligence chiefs sought to engage private industry in combating what one official called an “unprecedented threat” on Tuesday as they discussed how to better protect new technologies and help Western countries keep their edge over China.

The choice of meeting venue — Stanford University, in Silicon Valley — was strategic. While Washington is often considered the key espionage battleground in the United States, F.B.I. officials estimate that more than half of Chinese espionage focused on stealing American technology takes place in the Bay Area.

It was the first time the heads of the F.B.I. and Britain’s MI5 and their counterparts from Australia, Canada and New Zealand had gathered for a public discussion of intelligence threats. It was, in effect, a summit of the spy hunters, the counterintelligence agencies whose job it is to detect and stop efforts by China to steal allied secrets.

“That unprecedented meeting is because we are dealing with another unprecedented threat,” said Christopher A. Wray, the F.B.I. director. “There is no greater threat to innovation than the Chinese government.”

The warnings come as the United States and China engage in an intense, and expanding, spy-versus-spy contest, and as U.S. officials say that China’s espionage efforts have reached across every facet of national security, diplomacy and advanced commercial technology in the United States and partner nations.

The intelligence chiefs said they were making the case to private industry that the security interests of the West were aligned with their business interests. No one profits if China steals intellectual property, they argued.

The spy chiefs said China is intensely interested in Western artificial intelligence, a technology that will allow countries to improve their intelligence collection and analysis and is set to be a driver of economic gains for years.

Just before the spy chiefs met on Tuesday, the Biden administration announced that it was limiting the sale of advanced semiconductors to China, a restriction that could curb China’s development of artificial intelligence.

At a news conference on Tuesday evening, Mr. Wray said China was stealing American technological know-how and then turning around and using the stolen knowledge to steal more.

“They are using A.I. to improve their already massive hacking operations, in effect using our own technology against us,” Mr. Wray said.

Ken McCallum, the director general of MI5, said that the number of investigations into Chinese espionage had risen substantially in Britain since 2018, and that China had increased the number of approaches it has made to potential informants there. The technologies China is trying to steal have potential to transform both economics and security, and China is undertaking an ambitious effort of large scale, he said.

“If you are anywhere near the cutting edge of tech, you may not be interested in geopolitics, but geopolitics is interested in you,” Mr. McCallum said.

The intelligence chiefs said China was using hacking, pressure on Chinese students, informants in Western companies and joint ventures with Western firms to try to steal critical technology.

David Vigneault, the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, said Western companies needed to understand that China had “changed the rules of the game.” He said laws in China compelled its nationals anywhere in the world to provide information to Beijing’s intelligence services.

“It means they have a way to coerce people here in our countries to essentially tell them, to give them the secrets,” Mr. Vigneault said.

U.S. national security officials have said that preventing Beijing from imposing its rules on people overseas is a top priority. The United States is working to shut down illegal overseas police stations that the Justice Department says are used to monitor and intimidate dissidents.

Mike Burgess, the director general of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization, said China was exploiting the openness of the West, and the desire of Western universities to collaborate.

“All nations spy, all nations seek secrets and all nations seek strategic advantage, but the behavior we are talking about here goes well beyond traditional espionage,” he said.

Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades. More about Julian E. Barnes

The New York Times · by Julian E. Barnes · October 18, 2023


9. Chinese jets ramp up incidents with US aircraft, new videos show




Chinese jets ramp up incidents with US aircraft, new videos show

militarytimes.com · by Meghann Myers · October 17, 2023

The Pentagon on Tuesday released more than a dozen previously classified photos and videos of “coercive, high-risk” interactions with Chinese fighter jets that have occurred since early 2022. The surge of incidents, Defense Department officials say, is causing concern that any accident that may result could spark active conflict between the U.S. and China.

The release is a subset of roughly 180 similar interactions with Chinese fighters since fall 2021, Ely Ratner, the Pentagon’s top civil official on China and Indo-Pacific issues, told reporters during a briefing Tuesday.

The sharp increase represents “more [incidents] in the past two years than in the decade before that,” Ratner added. The Washington Post was first to report on the material’s release.

A series of videos released by the Dept. of Defense shows Chinese fighter jets repeatedly encroaching closely on U.S. aircraft over the South China Sea.

The Pentagon called the incidents “coercive” and “high-risk” rather than the more frequently used “unsafe and unprofessional” terminology, though Ratner declined to list the criteria that separate the two classifications.

“In other words, flying off my wing at 15 feet for 45 minutes has too much of a chance to lead to an accident,” Navy Adm. John Aquilino, the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, offered as an example.

The declassified images and videos include “reckless maneuvers, close approaches at high speeds in the air, releasing objects and projectiles like flares, and other dangerous behavior,” according to a Pentagon release.

The Pentagon believes these confrontations are part of a strategy on the part of the Chinese military, Aquilino added.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has spoken privately with his Chinese counterparts about the interactions “when he’s had the opportunity to do that,” Ratner said.

About Meghann Myers

Meghann Myers is the Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy, personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members.


10.  Ukraine’s special forces use daring raids and distraction tactics in bid to free Crimea



Ukraine’s special forces use daring raids and distraction tactics in bid to free Crimea

https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/18/europe/crimea-ukraine-raids-jet-skis-intl-cmd/index.html?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

By Vasco Cotovio, Frederik Pleitgen, Daniel Hodge and Kostyantyn Gak, CNN

 7 minute read 

Published 12:07 AM EDT, Wed October 18, 2023








Video Ad Feedback

See how this Ukrainian battalion used jet skis to land in Russian-occupied territory

02:34 - Source: CNN

Kyiv, UkraineCNN — 

A swarm of Ukrainian jet skis races across the ocean under pitch black skies, visible only from the infra-red camera of a drone watching from above. They slow down as they approach the shore to avoid detection and hurry onto dry land.

“Crimea will be Ukrainian,” one of the men says in video footage seen by CNN after landing, holding a Ukrainian flag.

That soldier was call-sign “Muzykant,” meaning “the musician” in English. He was a violinist who became a soldier with Ukraine’s special forces. Muzykant is the squad leader of the Bratstvo battalion which, along with Ukraine’s defense intelligence and other units, carried out the infiltration into Crimea earlier this month.

ADVERTISING

“I was so high on adrenaline,” Muzykant told CNN, explaining that the whole operation felt like a blur. “I only really understood I had been to Crimea after we returned to our base. I realized we had completed a colossal task.”

That amphibious operation, early in October, was an infiltration by Ukraine’s special forces into Russia’s biggest stronghold in occupied Ukraine, part of a recent trend that has seen Kyiv increase its attacks on the peninsula. The exact date and time of the attack have not been disclosed.


Ukraine's recent focus on Crimea draws skepticism from corners of the Biden administration

Muzykant was one of 10 Bratstvo battalion soldiers involved in the night assault on Crimea, in cooperation with other Ukrainian units – the total number of operatives is still unknown. They sailed through rough seas on larger speedboats, before switching to lower profile jet skis when they were in range of the peninsula. They then raced towards the shore, destroyed Russian military equipment placed by the sea and headed back, all in a matter of hours.

The objective was not just to sabotage some of the military equipment Moscow keeps close to the shore, but also to convey a message to Ukrainian citizens in the territory.

“We did it so that people in Ukraine and in occupied Crimea don’t lose spirit and keep faith in Crimea returning to Ukraine,” Muzykant said. Russian forces illegally annexed Crimea in 2014. The peninsula holds a deep symbolic importance to Russian President Vladimir Putin and it’s a strategically vital logistics hub for the Kremlin’s war effort.


The soldier with the call-sign 'Muzykant' said he believes the danger he incurs on these missions is worth it.

Vasco Cotovio/CNN

Muzykant said the dangerous operation took months of planning to prepare the Ukrainian soldiers for the many risks they would face.

“While we were landing the sea was stormy, the waves were up to 2 meters (6.6 feet) high,” he explained. “Plus the Russian warships were patrolling the sea, the Raptors. There were four of them, each with a crew of 20 Russian soldiers armed with heavy machine guns and a 30-millimeter gun.”

But the Bratstvo battalion was able to navigate those dangers. They reached the peninsula and executed their mission.

Enter your email to subscribe to the CNN Five Things Newsletter.

close dialog

You give us five minutes, we’ll give you five things you must know for the day.


Sign Me Up

By subscribing you agree to our

privacy policy.

“We trained a lot for this mission. Everybody knew their role, what they were supposed to do on the shore,” Muzykant explained. “On the way back after the task the Russian warships were chasing us, but we managed to escape.”

None of the Bratstvo battalion soldiers was injured or captured, but Ukrainian defense intelligence acknowledged losses, although did not provide further details. It also said casualties on Moscow’s side were much more significant.


The Bratstvo Batallion says they were the first Ukrainian units to make it onto occupied Crimea.

Vasco Cotovio/CNN

Moscow said it had captured one of the Ukrainian soldiers that landed in Crimea, releasing videos of his interrogation on national television, but it refused to elaborate on any losses on the Russian side.

Capture, injury or death are all risks Muzykant is prepared to take for missions he believes are necessary.

“It’s not just moral support to our people in Crimea, but also help to our forces in the trenches,” he said. “We divert the enemy’s attention towards us, and the enemy is forced to relocate their personnel and vehicles to (the) Crimean seaside.”

The Crimean front

October’s assault was one of many that Ukrainian forces have carried out on the peninsula in recent months.

In September, strikes hit the headquarters of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in the Crimean city of Sevastopol. The missiles used were seemingly the long-range UK-donated Storm Shadow.

Ukraine has also struck the Kerch bridge linking Crimea to mainland Russia multiple times.

Kyiv’s forces damaged a Russian ship and a submarine when it struck one of the dry docks used by the Black Sea Fleet on September 13, and Ukraine has carried out multiple attacks on the Saki air base, from where Russia launches some of its attack aircraft.


Ukraine identifies ships hit in Sevastopol attack, claiming 'irreparable loss' to Russia

Russia has promised retaliation on several occasions, calling the attacks “acts of terrorism,” but Ukraine has continued to carry out strikes on the peninsula. In addition to drones and missiles, it’s long been speculated that Kyiv’s special forces were operating in Crimea, but their profile was raised with the amphibious October raid.

One of the Bratstvo unit’s founders and a key planner behind the surgical strike, Dmytro Korchynskyi, said attacking the peninsula was key for Ukraine’s counteroffensive effort.

“Crimea is a military base they (Russia) still consider to be well defended. So for us it’s vital,” Korchynskyi explained. “And also it’s vital from the military-political point of view. We can’t let anybody forget Crimea is Ukrainian and we will always operate there.”

“We are fighting a trench war on the front lines and success there is not always obvious – special operations of this kind in the rear or on the sea, inspire and give (our soldiers) energy to keep fighting,” he added.

And while striking Russian assets with drones and missiles is important, he believes having Ukrainian soldiers on the ground distracts Moscow and forces Russia to relocate assets.


Bratstvo battalion founder and adviser, Dmytro Korchynskyi says attacks on Crimea are "vital" for Ukraine's war effort.

Vasco Cotovio/CNN

“Every soldier that is guarding the beach is one that is not present at the Zaporizhzhia front,” he said.

Those operations behind enemy lines, deep into Russian controlled territory, are reliant on support from the local population, Korchynskyi said.

Monitoring military facilities

Ukrainians living under Russian occupation have long been organizing themselves into resistance groups, locally referred to as Partisans. They have been active across occupied Ukraine, most notably in Kherson and Melitopol, but also Crimea.

One of the groups operating in the peninsula goes by the name Atesh, which means fire in the Tartar language. The group agreed to talk to CNN via an encrypted messaging service, declining to speak on camera to protect members’ identities.

Atesh also refused to comment on whether they were involved in the September strike on the headquarters of the Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol, but said they keep constant tabs on the Russian military and communicate any movements to the Ukrainians.


A satellite image shows smoke billowing from Russia's Black Sea fleet headquarters after a missile strike in Sevastopol, Crimea, on September 22 2023.

Planet Labs PBC/Handout/Reuters

CNN was able to corroborate the group’s involvement with Ukraine’s intelligence services.

Their work, the group said, is important yet extremely dangerous and members are actively sought by Russian authorities, including the Federal Security Service (FSB).

“They use various means of wiretapping the area (apartments, cafes or any other premises) and also (make) attempts to introduce FSB agents into our movement,” Atesh said. “Attempts by the Russians to infiltrate our ranks are constant, but our team skilfully finds them. In addition, we have very strict filtering of potential agents and most agents operate autonomously to prevent information leakage.”

“Agents of our movement understand all the risks and strictly follow safety measures,” they added.

Ready for liberation

The Partisans say they are only able to effectively fulfill their missions because they enjoy “the broad support of local residents,” and claim these coordinated attacks from the air and the sea are boosting their ranks.

“Our movement and other resistance movements are only getting bigger and stronger,” they said “The occupiers know this very well. The pro-Ukrainian residents of Crimea are ready for the liberation of the peninsula.”

Korchynskyi said that liberation is the ultimate goal of these raids, and Ukrainian forces have been slowly perfecting them, especially amphibious tactics.


The bridge connecting the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula across the Kerch Strait in July 2023.

Stringer/Reuters

Muzykant knows there’s still some time and plenty of hard work before Ukrainian forces are able to launch a bigger offensive on Crimea but more – and more daring – raids are on the horizon.

“We weaken them by destroying their military equipment and personnel but they become more attentive,” he explained. “They become better. So every next task is harder.”

Ultimately, he says he’s driven by the belief Ukrainians in Crimea are waiting for them.

“They are waiting for our sign to start the fight against the Russian aggression,” he explained.

The very early stages of that fight may already be unfolding.



​11. Israel and Hamas at war: Latest news




Israel and Hamas at war: Latest news

Reuters

Oct 18 (Reuters) - A strike on a Gaza hospital killed hundreds of Palestinians, deepening tensions in the Middle East and raising the stakes for U.S. President Joe Biden as he flies to Israel on Wednesday to signal support for its war against Hamas.

CONFLICT

* The blast at Al-Ahli al-Arabi hospital killed between 300 and 500 people, according to health ministry sources and a civil defence chief in Gaza. Palestinian officials said an Israeli air strike hit the hospital, while Israel blamed the blast on a failed rocket launch by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group, which denied responsibility.

* "The entire world should know: It was barbaric terrorists in Gaza that attacked the hospital in Gaza, and not the IDF," Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, referring to the Israel Defense Forces.

* Daoud Shehab, a spokesman for Islamic Jihad, told Reuters: "This is a lie and fabrication, it is completely incorrect. The occupation is trying to cover for the horrifying crime and massacre they committed against civilians."

* The Israeli military urged Gaza City residents to relocate southward, saying in a new evacuation advisory there was a "humanitarian zone" with down the coast of the Palestinian enclave.

* Yossi Landav, 55, has worked in search and rescue for 33 years but nothing could prepare him for what he saw in the aftermath of a Hamas attack in southern Israel which killed at least 1,300 people.

DIPLOMACY AND PROTESTS

* Biden will pose "tough questions" and seek a sense of Israel's plans and objectives in the days and weeks ahead in meetings with Netanyahu, the Israeli war cabinet and other Israeli leaders.

* "He'll be asking some tough questions, he'll be asking them as a friend, as a true friend of Israel, but he'll be asking some questions of them," White House spokesperson John Kirby told reporters on Air Force One during the flight to Tel Aviv.

* Jordan cancelled a summit it was to host in Amman on Wednesday with Biden and the Egyptian and Palestinian leaders to discuss Gaza, Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi said.

* The hospital blast drew condemnation across the Arab world, and protests were staged at Israel's embassies in Turkey and Jordan and near the U.S. embassy in Lebanon, where security forces fired tear gas toward demonstrators.

* Palestinian security forces in Ramallah fired tear gas and stun grenades to disperse protesters throwing rocks and chanting against President Mahmoud Abbas as popular anger boiled over after the deadly Gaza hospital attack.

* Lebanon's Iran-backed Hezbollah militant group denounced what it said was Israel's deadly attack on the Al-Ahli al-Arabi hospital in Gaza, which is run by the Anglican church, and called for "a day of unprecedented anger" against Israel and Biden's visit.

* The United Nations Security Council will now vote on Wednesday on a Brazilian-drafted resolution that calls for humanitarian pauses in the conflict between Israel and Palestinian militants Hamas to allow humanitarian aid access to the Gaza Strip.

* The U.S. State Department will continue to offer government-sponsored charter flights to Europe from Tel Aviv to help Americans leave Israel through at least Sunday.

* The U.S. State Department raised its travel alert for Lebanon to "do not travel," citing the security situation related to rocket, missile, and artillery exchanges between Israel and Hezbollah.

* Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau cited a marked rise in antisemitism in Canada after Palestinian Islamist group Hamas' attack on Israel and Israel's subsequent deadly air strikes in Gaza.

ANALYSIS

* Whatever unfolds in Gaza war, judgment day looms for Netanyahu

* EXPLAINER-Why Gaza's Rafah border crossing matters, and why Egypt is keeping it shut

EXPLAINER-What you need to know about Hezbollah, the group backing Hamas against Israel

FACTBOX-US aircraft carriers - What they bring to the Middle East

Compiled by Lincoln Feast; Edited by Gerry Doyle and Miral Fahmy

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Acquire Licensing Rights, opens new tab

Reuters



12. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 17, 2023




Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2023


Key Takeaways:

  • Ukraine used US-provided ATACMS long-range missiles to strike Russian targets in occupied Ukraine for the first time on October 17.
  • The Ukrainian ATACMS strikes on operationally significant Russian airfields in Ukraine will likely prompt the Russian command to disperse aviation assets and withdraw some aircraft to airfields further from the frontline.
  • The Russian military has consistently shown it can adapt to new Ukrainian strike capabilities — but only after suffering initial and pronounced losses from Ukrainian capabilities Russian commanders realistically should have prepared for.
  • The arrival of ATACMS long-range missiles also presents a significant threat to Russian ammunition depots in rear areas and will likely force the Russian command to choose between fortifying existing depots or further dispersing depots throughout occupied Ukraine.
  • The Russian information space expressed widespread fear over the use of ATACMS, and Russian concerns over the possibility of future strikes will likely impact Russian decision-making beyond the current Ukrainian ability to sustain regular ATACMS strikes.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) reportedly issued an informal warning to a prominent Russian milblogger who is often critical of the Ministry of Defense’s conduct of the war on October 16 for discrediting the Russian military.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and advanced in certain areas of the front.
  • Russia continues to take steps to codify the inclusion of volunteer formations within Rosgvardia.
  • The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) continues efforts to consolidate control of orthodox diocese in occupied areas of Ukraine.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin held bilateral negotiations with Hungarian President Viktor Orban and Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh in Beijing on October 17.



RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 17, 2023

Oct 17, 2023 - ISW Press


Download the PDF





Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 17, 2023

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, and Mason Clark

October 17, 2023, 6:30pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on October 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukraine used US-provided ATACMS long-range missiles to strike Russian targets in occupied Ukraine for the first time on October 17. The Wall Street Journal and other Western media outlets confirmed on October 17 that the US “secretly” provided Ukraine with ATACMS with a range of 165km in recent days and reported that Ukrainian forces already used ATACMS to strike Russian-controlled airfields in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast and Luhansk City, Luhansk Oblast.[1] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also stated in his nightly address on October 17 that ATACMS “have proven themselves” but did not directly confirm ATACMS were used in these strikes, and multiple Russian sources claimed Ukrainian forces used ATACMS in the Berdyansk strike.[2] Various Russian sources amplified images reportedly of ATACMS M74 cluster submunitions found at the site of the strike in Berdyansk.[3] The US likely transferred the ATACMS systems in secret to provide Ukrainian forces operational surprise, and the overall shock in the Russian information space suggests that Ukraine achieved the desired effect. Ukrainian Special Operations Forces Command did not specify that Ukrainian forces used ATACMS in the strikes but stated that the strikes destroyed nine Russian helicopters of various models, other unspecified special equipment, an anti-aircraft missile launcher, an ammunition warehouse, and damaged runway infrastructure.[4] Footage reportedly from the Berdyansk airfield shows heavy fires and explosions due to the continued detonation of ammunition in an ammunition depot.[5] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data from October 17 also confirms heat signatures following explosions in Berdyansk but has not yet confirmed heat signatures at the Luhansk airfield.[6]

The Ukrainian ATACMS strikes on operationally significant Russian airfields in Ukraine will likely prompt the Russian command to disperse aviation assets and withdraw some aircraft to airfields further from the frontline. Russian forces notably operated rotary-wing aircraft from the Berdyansk airfield in the early months of the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast to great effect against large mechanized Ukrainian assaults.[7] Previous satellite imagery of the Berdyansk airfield showed that Russian forces dispersed aircraft across the airfield, and Ukrainian forces were likely only able to conduct strikes on individual aircraft with previously available long-range missiles.[8] The cluster munition–armed version of the ATACMS long range missiles will allow Ukrainian forces to conduct strikes on Russian airfields that can more widely destroy Russian aircraft and other assets. Russian milbloggers immediately drew parallels between the Ukrainian strikes on the Berdyansk and Luhansk City airfields and a series of Ukrainian HIMARS strikes on the Chornobaivka airfield in Kherson Oblast during the 2022 Kherson counteroffensive.[9] The arrival of Western-provided HIMARS allowed Ukrainian forces to conduct repeated strikes on the Chornobaivka airfield, which caused significant Russian aviation losses, and Russian command withdrew military equipment and aviation from the airfield due to their inability to combat Ukrainian HIMARS strikes.[10] Russian milbloggers noted that Russian forces adapted their airfields to Ukrainian long-range strike capabilities but that ATACMS are a new missile threat which will similarly force the Russian command to adapt once again.[11] The Russian military has consistently shown it can adapt to new Ukrainian strike capabilities — but only after suffering initial and pronounced losses from Ukrainian capabilities Russian commanders realistically should have prepared for.

The likely dispersal of Russian aircraft at airfields throughout occupied Ukraine and the relocation of aviation assets further away from the frontline will likely disrupt Russian aviation support for defensive efforts and localized offensive operations. The relocation of aircraft to airfields further in the rear will likely impact the loitering time that Russian aviation will have to support operations. This will likely be particularly significant for Russian rotary-wing aircraft, which operated in relatively small sections of the frontline for long periods of time to degrade advancing mechanized Ukrainian forces at the beginning of the counteroffensive in June and July of 2023.[12] The dispersal of aviation assets at a larger number of airfields will also likely present the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) greater coordination and sustainment challenges.

The arrival of ATACMS long-range missiles also poses a significant threat to Russian ammunition depots in rear areas and will likely force the Russian command to choose between fortifying existing depots or further dispersing depots throughout occupied Ukraine. The arrival of HIMARS to Ukraine in June 2022 allowed Ukrainian forces to conduct an operationally significant interdiction campaign in support of counteroffensive operations in Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts, part of which targeted overly concentrated Russian ammunition depots.[13] The Russian command reluctantly moved away from using highly concentrated ammunition depots, extending Russian logistics along longer ground lines of communications (GLOCs), which ultimately complicated the provision of ammunition and supplies to the frontline to a certain degree.[14] ATACMS will likely present Russian forces with a similar challenge, and Russian forces can either focus on fortifying existing depots or create an even more dispersed and therefore over-extended logistics system for ammunition.

The Russian information space expressed widespread fear over the use of ATACMS, and Russian concerns over the possibility of future strikes will likely impact Russian decision-making beyond the current Ukrainian ability to sustain regular ATACMS strikes. Russian sources bemoaned the strikes on the Berdyansk and Luhansk City airfields as one of the most devastating Ukrainian strikes on a Russian target since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[15] Russian sources particularly credited the use of ATACMS for the severity of the strike and expressed fears that the Russian command would not adapt quickly enough to the new missile threat.[16] The Russian command will likely have to consider the potential Ukrainian use of ATACMS when making operational and tactical decisions about the placement of military assets regardless of the frequency of such strikes, and the current level of Russian concern suggests that this calculation may be particularly pronounced in the coming weeks. Ukraine has likely only received a limited number of ATACMS, however, and will need more if it is to sustain and amplify these initial effects.[17]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions south of Bakhmut and had partial success west of Verbove (10km east of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast).[18] Geolocated footage posted on October 16 also indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced northwest of Zaliznyanske (9km northwest of Bakhmut).[19]

The US confirmed on October 17 that all 31 previously pledged American M1 Abrams main battle tanks have arrived in Ukraine.[20] US Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) Spokesperson Colonel Martin O’Donnell reported that all of the Ukrainian servicemembers who trained on the tanks alongside US forces in Germany have also returned to Ukraine.[21] US military officials noted that it will likely take some time for Ukraine to deploy the Abrams to the frontline.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on October 17 of Russian forces operating the new TOS-2 “Tosochka” thermobaric artillery system in Ukraine.[22] The Russian MoD claimed that Central Military District (CMD) Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops used the TOS-2 system to strike a Ukrainian fortified area in an unspecified area of the front, potentially in reference to Avdiivka, where some CMD elements have recently deployed to support offensive operations north of Donetsk City.[23] Russian media responded to the MoD’s footage and noted that the TOS-2 is a modernized and improved version of the TOS-1A “Solntsepek” system that Russian forces have heavily employed across the theater in Ukraine.[24] Thermobaric artillery systems such as the TOS-1A and TOS-2 are military district–level assets, and their commitment to certain sectors of the front may be indicative of Russian operational prioritization of certain areas.[25]

The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) reportedly issued an informal warning to a prominent Russian milblogger who is often critical of the Ministry of Defense’s conduct of the war on October 16 for discrediting the Russian military, the latest in a series of government efforts to gain further control over the Russian information space. The milblogger claimed on October 17 that he writes candidly about the situation on the front to better inform Russian military leadership about the issues on the front that local commanders are unwilling to report.[26] The milblogger claimed that MVD is targeting Russian milbloggers who helped publicize the mistreatment of elements of the Russian 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) in the Kherson direction in late August 2023, which ultimately resulted in the removal of the brigade’s commander.[27] The milblogger articulated a list of 14 other channels that “speak the truth and are not afraid,” some of which ISW has observed be critical of the Russian military.[28] The milblogger likely shared this list of channels to coalesce support for targeted milbloggers, and the list does not indicate that these channels are part of an organized group.

Russia continues to set various legislative conditions to prepare the information space for the March 2024 presidential elections. The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading on October 17 that clarifies provisions on the Russian law on presidential elections and stipulates that campaign materials cannot be shown on sites restricted by the Russian Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor).[29] The bill will also ban people from taking photographs and videos at polling stations, require registered candidates to submit information to their electoral commission if they have a criminal record, and establish a cost limit for the production of campaign materials.[30] Several of these provisions already exist in laws governing basic electoral rights, but these provisions will clarify the specific law on presidential elections in advance of the March 2024 election cycle.

Key Takeaways:

  • Ukraine used US-provided ATACMS long-range missiles to strike Russian targets in occupied Ukraine for the first time on October 17.
  • The Ukrainian ATACMS strikes on operationally significant Russian airfields in Ukraine will likely prompt the Russian command to disperse aviation assets and withdraw some aircraft to airfields further from the frontline.
  • The Russian military has consistently shown it can adapt to new Ukrainian strike capabilities — but only after suffering initial and pronounced losses from Ukrainian capabilities Russian commanders realistically should have prepared for.
  • The arrival of ATACMS long-range missiles also presents a significant threat to Russian ammunition depots in rear areas and will likely force the Russian command to choose between fortifying existing depots or further dispersing depots throughout occupied Ukraine.
  • The Russian information space expressed widespread fear over the use of ATACMS, and Russian concerns over the possibility of future strikes will likely impact Russian decision-making beyond the current Ukrainian ability to sustain regular ATACMS strikes.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) reportedly issued an informal warning to a prominent Russian milblogger who is often critical of the Ministry of Defense’s conduct of the war on October 16 for discrediting the Russian military.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and advanced in certain areas of the front.
  • Russia continues to take steps to codify the inclusion of volunteer formations within Rosgvardia.
  • The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) continues efforts to consolidate control of orthodox diocese in occupied areas of Ukraine.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin held bilateral negotiations with Hungarian President Viktor Orban and Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh in Beijing on October 17.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukranian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas
  • Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 17 and made confirmed advances in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage posted on October 17 shows that Russian forces advanced about 1.5km west of Yahidne towards Ivanivka, about 20km southeast of Kupyansk.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Kupyansk direction near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk), and Kyslivka (23km southeast of Kupyansk) and in the Svatove direction near Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove) and Nadiya (15km southwest of Svatove).[32] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash reported that Russian forces are concentrating near Synkivka, Ivanivka, Stelmakhivka, and Nadiya in an effort to consolidate advantageous positions before the onset of more challenging weather conditions.[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations towards Kupyansk and improved their tactical positions northeast of Kupyansk and west of Svatove.[34] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing through fortified areas west of Ploshchanka (20km southwest of Svatove) and that Russian forces continue to strike Ukrainian crossings across the Oskil River that runs west of Svatove.[35]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited and unsuccessful counterattacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 17.[36] Several Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are unsuccessfully trying to dislodge Russian troops from their positions around Kupyansk and near Svatove.[37]


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions near Bakhmut on October 17 and made confirmed advances. Geolocated footage posted on October 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced northwest of Zaliznyanske (9km northwest of Bakhmut).[38] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces repelled nine Ukrainian attacks in the Donetsk direction.[39] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[40] Russian milbloggers claimed on October 16 that fighting continued near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut) and along the Klishchiivka-Andriivka-Kurdyumivka line (7–13km southwest of Bakhmut).[41] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets claimed that Ukrainian forces broke through Russian defenses north of Klishchiivka manned by elements of the 1428th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]).[42]

Russian forces continued attacks near Bakhmut on October 17 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Klishchiivka and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[43] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated that Russian forces are counterattacking near Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut) and transferring reserves to the area.[44] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1428th Motorized Rifle Regiment retreated from the railway line near Klishchiivka on October 15, while elements of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade retreated from the railway line towards Odradivka (7km south of Bakhmut).[45] Mashovets warned that elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division), and 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) may counterattack near Andriivka in the future.


Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on October 17 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Avdiivka and south of Tonenke (5km west of Avdiivka).[46] Ukrainian military officials noted that the intensity of Russian attacks near Avdiivka has decreased.[47] Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs Freedom Legion serviceman Major Maksym Morozov stated that Russian forces have not established footholds in the few positions they captured near Avdiivka and are withdrawing from these positions.[48] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are gaining a foothold in unspecified captured positions in the Avdiivka direction, however.[49] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces achieved unspecified tactical successes in the southern part of the Avdiivka direction.[50] The milblogger claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Russian forces are advancing near Stepove (7km northwest of Avdiivka) and are attempting to advance near Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka) and Opytne (3km southwest of Klishchiivka). Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to advance near Spartak (4km south of Avdiivka) but noted that Russian forces have not advanced east of Avdiivka.[51] Another prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also attacked on Avdiivka’s southern approaches, in the direction of Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka), and near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[52] A Russian milblogger claiming to be serving in the Avdiivka direction claimed on October 16 that Russian forces are “stuck” in their positions near Avdiivka and are struggling to advance further due to the Ukrainian defenses.[53] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces attacked near Sieverne and advanced south of Avdiivka and near Stepove (7km northwest of Avdiivka) on October 16.[54] Mashovets noted that the Russian military may transfer additional DNR units, including the 1st and 9th Brigades, the 10th Tank Battalion, 13th “Somalia” Separate Assault Battalion, and 80th ”Sparta” Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, as well as the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) near Opytne or the Vodyane-Tonenke road.


Russian forces conducted attacks southwest of Donetsk City on October 17 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City) and Novomykhailivka (10km south of Marinka).[55] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted attacks in Marinka and near Stepne (14km south of Donetsk City).[56] The Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Press Service stated that Russian forces have increased their attacks in the Marinka direction.[57]

Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City on October 17.


Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful limited ground attacks along the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on October 17. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian assaults near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group northeast of Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[58] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an assault near Pryyutne on October 16 but did not specify an outcome.[59]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 17 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled five Russian assaults south of Zolota Nyva (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and Prechystivka (17km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[60] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 16 that Russian forces attempted to improve their tactical positions near Pryyutne and Novomayorske (18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[61]


Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 17 and reportedly advanced. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction and achieved partial success west of Verbove (10km east of Robotyne).[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces with armored vehicle support advanced to an unspecified position northwest of Verbove.[63] A Russian news aggregator claimed on October 16 that Ukrainian forces advanced near Verbove but failed to establish a foothold in the area.[64] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on October 17 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Robotyne, Kopani (5km northwest of Robotyne), Novoprokopivka (2km south of Robotyne), and Verbove.[65]

Russian forces continued counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 17 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks southwest of Novodanylivka (6km north of Robotyne), near Robotyne, and west of Verbove.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces successfully counterattacked between Robotyne and Kopani after repelling a Ukrainian assault in the area.[67] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked from Novoprokopivka towards Robotyne but did not specify an outcome.[68]



Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian landing attempts on the left bank of Kherson Oblast on October 16 and 17. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian landing attempt near Kozachi Laheri (24km east of Kherson City) and Pidstepne (17km east of Kherson City) on October 16 and 17.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 17 that Russian forces also repelled several Ukrainian infantry groups of up to 20 personnel each that attempted to advance from marsh areas north of Oleshky (7km southeast of Kherson City) towards Oleshky and Pishchanivka (16km southeast of Kherson City).[70]


Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to target rear areas in southern Ukraine and occupied Crimea on October 17. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Skadovsk (60km south of Kherson City) with three HIMARS rockets.[71] Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Skadovsk with newly acquired long-range missiles, a likely reference to ATACMS, though ISW has not observed any other reporting that this strike was conducted with ATACMS.[72] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) complexes downed eight Ukrainian drones targeting Crimea.[73]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia continues to take steps to codify the inclusion of volunteer formations within Rosgvardia. The Russian State Duma adopted the first reading of a bill on October 17 that will allow volunteer formations within Rosgvardia’s composition.[74] ISW previously reported that Russian Chairperson of the State Duma Committee on Information Policy Alexander Khinshtein initially proposed this bill on September 21 over the backdrop of increasing reports that Wagner Group personnel are operating alongside Rosgvardia.[75] Rosgvardia has recently undergone several substantial reforms to its composition and recruitment practices following the Wagner Group’s June 24 armed rebellion, and the codification of volunteer formations under the auspices of Rosgvardia is likely an effort to absorb and maintain control over some disparate Wagner Group elements while still expanding Rosgvardia’s recruitment pool and bolster Russia’s domestic security apparatus.[76]

Russian “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky complained about the disparity in the treatment of Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) soldiers and Russian soldiers serving in regular formations.[77] Khodakovsky claimed on October 17 that proxy forces who are not directly part of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)’s system, namely units operating as part of the DNR’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, do not receive state awards for military service or requisite medical care even though they have been fighting in Donbas for longer than regular Russian forces.[78] Khodakovsky related the story of two DNR soldiers who were meant to receive prosthetics from a hospital affiliated with the Russian MoD but who were then discharged before getting their prosthetics.[79] ISW has previously reported on prevalent tensions between DNR and regular Russian formations which are likely complicating the Russian military command’s efforts to integrate DNR and other irregular forces into the regular Russian military.[80]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) continues efforts to consolidate control of orthodox diocese in occupied areas of Ukraine. The ROC reported on October 11 that ROC leadership attended a meeting to hear about developments from the ROC’s Educational Committee and on the establishment of the Inter-diocene Center for Training of Church Specialists at the Luhansk Diocese.[81] The Ukrainian Resistance Center responded to the ROC’s report on October 17 and noted that the shortage of pro-ROC clerics in occupied Luhansk Oblast has forced the ROC to create an “interparochial training center” in the Luhansk and Alchevsk dioceses under Metropolitan Panteleimon (Vasyl Povoroznyuk).[82] Luhansk Oblast occupation head Leonid Pasechnik previously formalized the integration of several Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) dioceses, including the Luhansk and Alchevsk dioceses, into the ROC on July 15, and the ROC appears to be escalating efforts to control these dioceses and train additional clerics using ROC methods and spiritual doctrine. ISW has previously reported on various manipulations by the ROC in occupied areas of Ukraine as part of a wider Russian campaign of religious prosecution in occupied territories.[83]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian President Vladimir Putin held bilateral negotiations with Hungarian President Viktor Orban and Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh in Beijing on October 17. Orban stated that Hungary is committed to saving everything it can in its bilateral relationship with Russia.[84] Putin and Khurelsukh discussed the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline, which will transport Russian gas from western Siberia to China through Mongolian territory.[85] Putin is scheduled to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping on October 17.

The Russian State Duma adopted a bill withdrawing Russia’s ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in its first reading on October 17.[86] The Russian Foreign Ministry reiterated that Russia does not intend to conduct a nuclear test, following previous statements that it will not resume testing unless the US does so first.[87]

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu highlighted the importance of Russian artillery system and ammunition production on October 17 during a meeting at the Russian National Defense Management Center and a visit to a new Almaz-Antey missile plant in Moscow Oblast.[88] Shoigu stated that the Almaz-Antey missile plant will also produce air defense systems for the Russian military. Shoigu noted the importance of Russian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises in “quickly replenishing” Russian artillery systems and ammunition stocks.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that units of the 120th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade, the 6th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade, and the 19th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade conducted combat readiness checks and combined arms exercises.[89]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


13. Iran Update, October 17, 2023



Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-17-2023


Key Takeaways:

  1. Palestinian militias continued indirect fire into Israel on October 17, attacking civilian and military targets.
  2. The rate of small arms clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants in the West Bank remained low after peaking on October 13.
  3. Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh called for mobilization in the West Bank following an explosion at a hospital in Gaza.
  4. CTP-ISW recorded 10 attacks from Lebanon into Israeli territory on October 17, including seven against military targets. LH activity on Israel’s northern border creates opportunities for further operations against Israel.
  5. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated what other senior Iranian officials are saying about the Hamas-Israel war during a speech.
  6. Senior IRGC commanders are framing Hamas’ al Aqsa Flood operation as a prelude to future attacks on Israel.



IRAN UPDATE, OCTOBER 17, 2023

Oct 17, 2023 - ISW Press







Iran Update, October 17, 2023

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Brian Carter, and Nicholas Carl 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments and in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Key Takeaways:

  1. Palestinian militias continued indirect fire into Israel on October 17, attacking civilian and military targets.
  2. The rate of small arms clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants in the West Bank remained low after peaking on October 13.
  3. Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh called for mobilization in the West Bank following an explosion at a hospital in Gaza.
  4. CTP-ISW recorded 10 attacks from Lebanon into Israeli territory on October 17, including seven against military targets. LH activity on Israel’s northern border creates opportunities for further operations against Israel.
  5. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated what other senior Iranian officials are saying about the Hamas-Israel war during a speech.
  6. Senior IRGC commanders are framing Hamas’ al Aqsa Flood operation as a prelude to future attacks on Israel.


Gaza Strip


Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Palestinian militias continued indirect fire into Israel on October 17. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas’ militant wing—claimed responsibility for 26 mortar and rocket attacks.[1] Saraya al Quds—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed responsibility for another five rocket attacks.[2] The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades—the militant wing of Fatah—claimed two mortar attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip.[3] CTP-ISW recorded reports of five unclaimed mortar and rocket strikes as well. This rate of attacks is consistent with the rate that CTP-ISW observed on October 16.

CTP-ISW recorded one report of an infiltration from the Gaza Strip near Zikim on October 17.[4] An IDF helicopter killed two individuals on the beach.[5] CTP-ISW cannot independently confirm this report.


Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Palestinian militias are hitting civilian and military targets in their indirect fire attacks. Hamas is continuing to target civilians throughout Israel from the Gaza Strip, including in Tel Aviv, Beersheba, and Haifa.[6] Hamas targeted Israeli forces with mortars and rockets near Sufa, Mufakim, Eshkol, and Kfar Azza in five separate attacks on October 17.[7] Palestinian militias are also continuing to target southern Israeli towns that the IDF has evacuated and designated as military zones. Ninety percent of Sderot’s civilians have departed the city, for instance, which Israel designated a militarized zone on October 16.[8] The IDF deployed units to this area in recent days, suggesting that the militias seek to target IDF military assets in addition to civilians.[9]

IDF airstrikes into the Gaza Strip have killed several senior Hamas officials since the war began on October 7. Three senior IDF officers told the New York Times that the goal of Israeli operations is to “wipe out the top political and military hierarchy of Hamas.”[10] Multiple separate IDF airstrikes into the Gaza Strip killed Hamas’ Shura Council chief, the al Qassem Brigades Central Brigade commander, and at least two relatives of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh on October 17.[11] Israel has conducted at least 10 airstrikes against senior Hamas, PIJ, and other militia officials since October 8.[12]  

West Bank


This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and marches in the West Bank.

The rate of small arms clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants in the West Bank remained low on October 17 after peaking on October 13. CTP-ISW recorded seven small arms clashes in the West Bank and five demonstrations in support of the Palestinian resistance and denouncing Israeli attacks into the Gaza Strip. Hamas remains committed to expanding the war to the West Bank.[13]

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh called for mobilization in the West Bank following an explosion at a hospital in the Gaza Strip on October 17, which may increase the rate of clashes in the coming days.[14] The IDF said that PIJ conducted a rocket attack that failed and hit the active hospital.[15] The Hamas-run Health Ministry contrastingly claimed that an Israeli airstrike hit the hospital. The explosion has reportedly killed hundreds.[16] ISW cannot independently verify the cause of the explosion or the exact death toll.[17] The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claimed to attack IDF positions in the West Bank in response to the explosion.[18]

LH-affiliated Al Mayadeen claimed on October 16 that the IDF’s focus on the West Bank throughout 2023 contributed to its intelligence failure ahead of Hamas’ October 7 attack.[19] The report said that IDF redeployments from southern Israel to the West Bank drew IDF attention away from the Gaza Strip. It also alleged that Hamas deceived Israel by not interfering in conflict between Israel and other Gaza-based Palestinian militias throughout the year.

Senior Iranian regime officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have called for the arming of Palestinian militias in the West Bank since August 2022, as CTP-ISW has reported extensively.[20] These calls have coincided with an uptick in kinetic activity in the West Bank during the past year.[21] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami previously specified during an interview with the Supreme Leader’s website in August 2022 that Iran seeks to arm Palestinian groups’ ”infantry” in the West Bank to conduct more ground operations against Israeli security forces and stoke unrest.[22] The Iranian focus on the West Bank in addition to several reports noting the flow of weapons into the territory this year via Iran‘s proxy network in the Levant suggests that the West Bank remains a threat to Israel.

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas canceled a meeting scheduled for October 18 with US President Joe Biden and other leaders in the Middle East, according to a senior Palestinian official.[23] Abbas withdrew from the summit to protest the explosion at the hospital in the Gaza Strip.[24] The Palestinian Authority was founded in 1994 and is the governing body that oversees the West Bank.[25]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights


This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and marches in the West Bank.

CTP-ISW recorded 10 attacks from Lebanon into Israeli territory on October 17, including seven against military targets. Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) claimed responsibility for all 10 attacks on military and civilian targets along the Israel-Lebanon border, including an anti-tank missile attack on Metulla that wounded two IDF soldiers.[26] This is the third consecutive day that LH has targeted Metulla. The IDF called for civilians to immediately evacuate Metulla and other areas along the Lebanese border.[27] The IDF separately killed at least two LH militants attempting to plant explosive devices near Hanita along the Israel-Lebanon border on October 17.[28]

LH activity on Israel’s northern border creates opportunities for further operations against Israel. LH has targeted dozens of Israeli military targets in northern Israel since October 7, including Israeli border outposts, surveillance, military equipment, and barracks. CTP-ISW previously reported that Iran and elements of its Axis of Resistance, including LH, are preparing for the Hamas-Israel war to expand into a regional conflict.[29] Israeli officials have furthermore reported on LH efforts to transport weapons to Lebanon via the Damascus and Aleppo international airports.[30] The IDF has conducted three airstrikes on those airports in recent days to disrupt possible Iranian military transfers to the Levant.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated what other senior Iranian officials are saying about the Hamas-Israel war during a speech on October 17. Khamenei echoing these talking points demonstrates his support for them and signals to the rest of the Iranian regime that these are the official positions.

  • Khamenei warned that the continuation of Israeli “crimes” against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip will make resistance groups “impatient” and that “no one will be able to stop [these groups].”[31] “Resistance groups” is the term that Iranian officials use to describe the proxy and partner militias that Iran sponsors throughout the Middle East. Khamenei’s warning resembles similar warnings from Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian since October 9. Abdollahian posted on X (Twitter) on October 16 that the expansion of the Hamas-Israel war to “other fronts” is becoming “inevitable.”[32] Abdollahian separately warned that resistance groups may take “preemptive” measures against Israel during an interview on Iranian state television on October 16.[33]
  • Khamenei also accused the United States of determining Israel’s “current policy” vis-a-vis the Gaza Strip, echoing claims from Iranian officials and media since October 13 that the United States is playing a direct role in the Hamas-Israel war.[34] IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, for instance, recirculated Lebanese Hezbollah’s assertion that the United States is the “real owner” of the Hamas-Israel war and that Israel is “merely implementing American decisions.”[35] Tasnim similarly alleged on October 16 that American military commanders are overseeing some operations against the Gaza Strip because Israeli officers are suffering from “mental and psychological confusion.”[36] Abdollahian accused the United States of encouraging Israel to conduct more attacks against civilians in the Gaza Strip during a phone call with EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell on October 17.[37] Members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance—including Lebanese Hezbollah and the Bashar al Assad regime—have criticized the US role in the conflict as well.[38]

Senior IRGC commanders are framing Hamas’ al Aqsa Flood operation as a prelude to future attacks on Israel. Former IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari framed the attack as a “warmup” to prepare and train for future operations against Israel in an interview on October 15.[39] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami similarly described Hamas’ operation as the “first stage” of Israel’s “hasty collapse.”[40] IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi added on October 17 that the Axis of Resistance will inflict a new “shockwave” on Israel if it continues its “atrocities” against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.[41]



14. How China's Belt and Road Initiative is changing after a decade of big projects and big debts




How China's Belt and Road Initiative is changing after a decade of big projects and big debts

AP · October 17, 2023


BEIJING (AP) — China’s Belt and Road Initiative looks to become smaller and greener after a decade of big projects that boosted trade but left big debts and raised environmental concerns.

The shift comes as leaders from across the developing world descend on Beijing this week for a government-organized forum on what is known as BRI for short.

The initiative has built power plants, roads, railroads and ports around the world and deepened China’s relations with Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Mideast. It is a major part of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s push for China to play a larger role in global affairs.

WHAT IS THE BRI?

Called “One Belt, One Road” in Chinese, the Belt and Road Initiative started as a program for Chinese companies to build transportation, energy and other infrastructure overseas funded by Chinese development bank loans.


The stated goal was to grow trade and the economy by improving China’s connections with the rest of the world in a 21st-century version of the Silk Road trading routes from China to the Middle East and onto Europe.

Xi unveiled the concept in broad terms on visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013 and it took shape in the ensuing years, driving the construction of major projects from railroads in Kenya and Laos to power plants in Pakistan and Indonesia.

HOW BIG IS IT?

A total of 152 countries have signed a BRI agreement with China, though Italy, the only western European country to do so, is expected to drop out when it comes time to renew in March of next year.

“Italy suffered a net loss,” said Alessia Amighini, an analyst at the Italian think tank ISPI, as the trade deficit with China more than doubled since Italy joined in 2019.

China became a major financer of development projects under BRI, on par with the World Bank. The Chinese government says the initiative has launched more than 3,000 projects and “galvanized” nearly $1 trillion in investment.

China filled a gap left as other lenders shifted to areas such as health and education and away from infrastructure after coming under criticism for the impact major building projects can have on the environment and local communities, said Kevin Gallagher, the director of the Boston University Global Development Policy Center.

Chinese-financed projects have faced similar criticism, from displacing populations to adding tons of climate-changing greenhouse gases to the atmosphere.

WHAT ABOUT THE DEBT TRAP?

Chinese development banks provided money for the BRI projects as loans, and some governments have been unable to pay them back.

That has led to allegations by the U.S., India and others that China was engaging in “debt trap” diplomacy: Making loans they knew governments would default on, allowing Chinese interests to take control of the assets. An oft-cited example is a Sri Lankan port that the government ended up leasing to a Chinese company for 99 years.

Many economists say that China did not make the bad loans intentionally. Now, having learned the hard way through defaults, China development banks are pulling back. Chinese development loans have already plummeted in recent years as the banks have become more cautious about lending and many recipient countries are less able to borrow, given their already high levels of debt.

Chinese loans have been a major contributor to the huge debt burdens that are weighing on economies in countries such as Zambia and Pakistan. Sri Lanka said last week that it had reached an agreement with the Export-Import Bank of China on key terms and principles for restructuring its debt as it tries to emerge from an economic crisis that toppled the government last year.

WHAT’S NEXT FOR BRI?

Future BRI projects are likely not only to be smaller and greener but also rely more on investment by Chinese companies than on development loans to governments.

Christoph Nedopil, director of the Asia Institute at Griffith University in Australia, believes that China will still undertake some large projects, including high-visibility ones such as railways and others, including oil and gas pipelines, that have a revenue stream to pay back the investment.

A recent example is the launch of a Chinese high-speed railway in Indonesia with much fanfare in both countries.

On the climate front, China has pledged to stop building coal power plants overseas, though it remains involved in some, and is encouraging projects related to the green transition, Nedopil said. These range from wind and solar farms to factories for electric vehicle batteries, such as a huge lithium-ion battery plant that has stirred environmental concerns in BRI-partner Hungary.

___

Associated Press Business Writer Colleen Barry in Milan contributed to this report.

AP · October 17, 2023



15. U.S. Ambassador Visits Detained Wall Street Journal Reporter Evan Gershkovich




U.S. Ambassador Visits Detained Wall Street Journal Reporter Evan Gershkovich

Lynne Tracy’s meeting with Gershkovich comes a week after a Russian court denied an appeal to release him

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/u-s-ambassador-visits-detained-wall-street-journal-reporter-evan-gershkovich-9c6ff8b1?mod=wknd_pos1

By Ann M. Simmons

Follow

Updated Oct. 17, 2023 8:00 pm ET




U.S. Ambassador Lynne Tracy visited with Evan Gershkovich on Tuesday. PHOTO: EVGENIA NOVOZHENINA/REUTERS

The U.S. ambassador to Russia visited jailed Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich on Tuesday, a week after a Russian court upheld an extension of his pretrial detention.

Gershkovich, a 31-year-old U.S. citizen who was accredited by Russia’s Foreign Ministry to work as a journalist in the country, was detained by agents from Russia’s Federal Security Service, or FSB, while on a reporting trip in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg on March 29. He is being held on an allegation of espionage that he, the Journal and the U.S. government vehemently deny.

Tuesday’s visit is the fifth to Gershkovich by U.S. Ambassador Lynne Tracy since the reporter was detained.

On Tuesday, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow posted a statement on the social-media platform X, saying that “Evan remains in good spirits despite his challenging circumstances. We continue to call for his immediate release,” it said.


Detained Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich at a court hearing in Moscow last week. PHOTO: YURI KOCHETKOV/SHUTTERSTOCK

The Biden administration has said Gershkovich, the first American journalist arrested on an espionage accusation in Russia since the end of the Cold War, isn’t a spy and has never worked for the government. The State Department has designated the reporter as wrongfully detained, a status that unlocks a broad U.S. government effort to free him.

Relations between the U.S. and Russia have been severely strained since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine started in February 2022.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has blamed the U.S. for the war, saying that Washington has pursued a foreign policy that has destabilized the world and threatened Russia. Washington has condemned Moscow’s assault on its smaller neighbor as unjustified. The U.S. and its European allies have imposed tough sanctions on Russia and are providing large-scale military and economic aid to Ukraine in its fight to expel Russian forces from its territory.

WSJ’s Evan Gershkovich: A Timeline of His Detainment

YOU MAY ALSO LIKE

WSJ’s Evan Gershkovich: A Timeline of His Detainment

Play video: WSJ’s Evan Gershkovich: A Timeline of His Detainment

Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich was detained in Russia on March 29 while on a reporting trip and accused of spying. Here’s a breakdown of the events surrounding his arrest and what comes next. Illustration: Todd Johnson

The issue of consular access to Americans who are jailed in Russia has been a contentious one between the U.S. and Russia. The 1963 Vienna Convention signed by both countries requires that states be allowed consular access to their nationals who are arrested or detained in other nations.

Since his arrest almost seven months ago, Russian courts have rejected several appeals by Gershkovich’s lawyers, at least one of which requested he be granted bail, agree to constraints on his movements or be allowed to await trial under house arrest.

Gershkovich’s initial pretrial detention was scheduled to expire on May 29. On Oct. 10, a Russian court upheld the extension of his confinement through Nov. 30. No date for his trial has yet been set. In Russia, it is rare for people accused of espionage to be acquitted.

READ EVAN GERSHKOVICH’S WORK


On the Ground in Putin's Russia: Coverage of a Country at War

Russian authorities haven’t publicly provided evidence to support the spying allegation against the reporter. Russian officials have said the case is adhering to the legalities of the country’s judicial system.

U.S. officials say they are engaging with officials in countries that hold Russian citizens in custody and are open to incorporating those prisoners in a deal to free Gershkovich and other Americans detained in Russia. But they have warned that securing his release “could be potentially tough.”

Russian officials have hinted at the possibility of a deal, but said that any consideration of a swap involving Gershkovich would have to wait until a court issues a verdict in his case.

Like Gershkovich, Paul Whelan, a U.S. citizen and former U.S. Marine, has been designated as wrongfully detained by the U.S. government. He was convicted of espionage in 2020 and is serving a 16-year sentence in a Russian penal colony. His family and the U.S. government say he isn’t a spy and Whelan has said he is innocent.

Write to Ann M. Simmons at ann.simmons@wsj.com







16. Israel's Strategic Crisis - Sir Lawrence Freedman


Excerpts:


The most important question is what is to be achieved. Assuming that Israel can fight its way to Gaza City, which would be the most likely objective of a major incursion, what then? It can destroy a lot of Hamas’s military infrastructure, but it is unlikely that it can remove its entire political leadership. Military commanders might stay to manage the resistance, and a number of them have reportedly already been killed, but many of the political figures will be away by now. Israel cannot install a new government because the fact that Israel was installing it would deprive it of legitimacy. And I have seen no Israeli analysts with any appetite for a prolonged occupation.
...
Without much optimism we can describe the first steps if a diplomatic path is to be followed. From Israel a cease-fire, if only temporary, to allow the humanitarian crisis to be addressed and work to begin on how the crisis can be managed over the short-term. Israel also has its own problems with hundreds of thousands of people moved away from the borders from Gaza and Lebanon, still some rocket attacks, and a level of military mobilisation that is costly and disruptive to maintain. So long as the rockets keep on coming, and the hostages continue to be held, it will be difficult for Netanyahu to declare a cease-fire.
The real challenge is to find an agreed political formula for Gaza which at least reduces Hamas’s political and military role. The only possibility I can see for the medium-term is one involving the Palestine Authority, as it is the obvious alternative government to Hamas, but this will require boosting its standing in the West Bank. This is for want of anything better. Up to now the main achievement of Mahmoud Abbas, the Chairman of the PA, has been his survival as otherwise he is only associated with corruption and ineffectuality. With riots in the West Bank his standing has been further damaged. The PA therefore could not cope on its own but would be supplemented by the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which currently provides many basic services in the strip, and a contact group of key Arab states with relations with Israel, necessarily including Egypt and Qatar which is the most likely intermediary with Hamas (a number of Hamas’s leaders live in Qatar).
...
If Biden is unable to make any political progress, the war may continue on its expected course with Israeli troops entering Gaza in numbers, seeking to impose its own solution on the territories. But it is hard to see how that will get it to a substantively different situation than intensive diplomacy. As Gaza will never be run by a pro-Israeli politician it might as well start thinking now about who else can bring stability to the territory.





Israel's Strategic Crisis

https://samf.substack.com/p/israels-strategic-crisis?utm_campaign=email-post&r=7i07&utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email


LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

OCT 18, 2023


Share


President Biden heads to the Middle East

After the crisis caused by being caught by surprise on 7 October, Israel now faces a second crisis as its government struggles to find a strategy to meet its stated objective of pushing Hamas out of Gaza and rendering it incapable of further atrocities in the future. Even before the uproar surrounding the tragedy at the Al Ahli hospital, the dominant issue was becoming the dire situation in Gaza rather the security of Israel. To understand how we have reached this point – so quickly – we need to go back to the way that Israeli strategy was set before its implications were fully appreciated.

The Land War in Israel’s Strategy

As the scale of the horrors of 7 October were being realised, the country was declared to be at war. That day, 300,000 reservists were called up and a military build-up began on the southern border in preparation for a major incursion into Gaza. Electricity and water were cut off and bombing campaign was launched to dismantle as much as possible of Hamas’s infrastructure from the air. Soon it was telling Gazans to move from the north of the territory to the south, as UN agencies described a developing humanitarian crisis. Initially the time allowed was 24 hours, presumably reflecting the urgency of the moment. This was never going to be enough despite many Palestinians moving as fast as they could from the north to the south of the territory, or searching for safe places, some of which have turned out to be very unsafe.

Yet after all this urgency, and talk of a coming land war, nothing has yet happened and Israeli officials are now suggesting that it is possible nothing will happen.

Because Israel started by talking up a ground attack it seemed as if it was almost obliged to launch one. There was an alternative – still to mobilise and prepare while insisting that such an attack was but one option under consideration. This is more or less where we are now, except that the government seems to have lost confidence not only as it comes to appreciate the challenges of a land operation but also the perplexing situation in which it finds itself.

To say that the land war will be postponed indefinitely may be a prediction too far. The forces are still there, poised for action, and preparations continue, in terms of training and surveillance of likely routes of attack. The Israeli government knows that it already faces a popular backlash, following the intelligence failures that allowed the attacks to happen. If, having talked up the promise of a decisive operation it then steps back because it does not know how to deliver it, that will lead to even more anger. But the backlash could be even greater if more lives are lost and more credibility squandered in an operation that does not achieve its war aims. This is why in the past, despite his rhetorical bellicosity, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has always been wary of authorising such operations.

Since the strategy was set in motion on 7 October the composition of the government has changed. An opposition leader, Bennie Gantz, has joined the government and sits in the War Cabinet, with two influential colleagues in attendance. These are Gadi Eizenkot, like Gantz, a former IDF Chief of Staff, and Ron Dermer, Israeli Ambassador to Washington from 2013 to 2021. In and around the government tensions are now reported about the obvious issues – what to do about the hostages, whose families have now formed their own pressure group, and what to do about the possibility of a second front to the north, with Hezbollah threatening to enter the war from Lebanon. One option reportedly considered, and dismissed, was to pre-empt Hezbollah’s threatened pre-emption by striking its military facilities first.

A land offensive was always a daunting prospect. Urban warfare is hard. We have seen in Ukraine how tenacious defenders, taking cover in the rubble of battered and depopulated cities, can hold up an attacking force for a long time. I cannot think of a recent example of a properly defended built up area falling quickly to an offensive, even one relatively-well executed. Grozny in Chechnya, Aleppo in Syria, Mosul in Iraq, Bakhmut in Ukraine all took time, with the defenders only being shifted as they and their surroundings took a pounding from air and artillery strikes. In this case the Hamas fighters, numbering about 30,000, can operate out a labyrinth of underground tunnels. The Israelis have experience of fighting in these conditions and have developed tactics to cope, but there is a trade-off between a methodical approach, slowly unpicking the defences, and the high casualties likely to be incurred if they rush. And the more they take their time the more international pressure to stop will grow.

The most important question is what is to be achieved. Assuming that Israel can fight its way to Gaza City, which would be the most likely objective of a major incursion, what then? It can destroy a lot of Hamas’s military infrastructure, but it is unlikely that it can remove its entire political leadership. Military commanders might stay to manage the resistance, and a number of them have reportedly already been killed, but many of the political figures will be away by now. Israel cannot install a new government because the fact that Israel was installing it would deprive it of legitimacy. And I have seen no Israeli analysts with any appetite for a prolonged occupation.

The Hezbollah threat has to be taken seriously. It is doubtful that their leader Hassan Nasrallah really wants a war, because of the impact on Lebanon, where it is already widely blamed for many of the country’s recent problems, but if intense fighting does develop inside Gaza then he will come under enormous pressure to act. Hezbollah has a substantial army, though not one that would expect to last long if it crossed the border into Israel.  But its arsenal of rockets is formidable – far more than Hamas’s. If it had orchestrated strikes with Hamas it would have stressed Israel’s Iron Dome air defences.

When Hamas opened its attack on 7 October with an intense barrage, the Iron Dome could not deal with everything although it was never completely overwhelmed. Damage and casualties were caused by the attacks but they were mitigated by a combination of the air defences and shelters. They did far less harm than the Hamas fighters who infiltrated into Israel. Now replenished, the Iron Dome should be able to cope with a separate Hezbollah attack though its missile are more accurate and lethal. They would still pose a problem Israel can well do without.

The Crisis in Gaza

Linked to all of this is a desperate humanitarian crisis. Hamas uses Gaza as a base from which to attack Israel. It does not separate its military capabilities from civil society, so that they are harder to find and when found can only be attacked by risking civilian casualties. There is nothing Israel can do to degrade Hamas as a military entity – siege, air strikes, ground attack – that will not affect ordinary Gazans, whose life is already miserable enough. Hamas’s priority has been its politico-military projects. This is why it is blockaded by Egypt as well as Israel (Hamas is the Palestinian branch of the Moslem Brotherhood, which briefly provided the government of Egypt until displaced by a military coup led by the current president, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi.)

Israel’s critics argue that the whole situation is its historic fault, for which ordinary Gazans should suffer no more, and so Israel’s best course is to ease their plight and find a better way to coexist. The Israeli government argues that coexistence is impossible so long as Hamas is in charge, and so Israel’s need for security means that it must take necessary action, even though this will add to the pain of Gaza.

Those sympathetic to Israel’s predicament but anxious about its methods, have advised Israel that it has a right to defend itself but must do so with the minimum harm to civilians. That as we have seen is easier said than done. To be sure of hitting only the right targets, even with accurate strikes, requires first-class intelligence and, as was evident in the way it was caught out on 7 October, Israel’s local knowledge of the state of affairs inside Gaza is not as good as it was. Whether or not the detailed intelligence offered by Israel to demonstrate Islamic Jihad’s culpability for the hospital’s destruction defuses some of the condemnation coming Israel’s way, the sense of gathering chaos and catastrophe in Gaza has created pressure to end the siege and air strikes. Because of the intense reaction to the scenes from the hospital, Biden has had to postpone his planned trip to Jordan, at least until after that country’s three days of mourning for the victims of the hospitals. 

Before this the starting point for international diplomacy was already not dealing with Hamas or even the hostages, but ending the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken tweeted on Monday:

‘Today, at our request, the United States and Israel have agreed to develop a plan that will enable humanitarian aid from donor nations and multilateral organizations to reach civilians in Gaza, including the possibility of creating areas to help keep civilians out of harm’s way.’

Then wording is telling. This was an American and not an Israeli initiative. The diplomacy to get this far has been substantial, for which Blinken deserves credit, with Egypt and Jordan both having to be persuaded that Israel’s aim was not to push Palestinians out of Gaza in the hope that they will go somewhere else, and that they will only allow people to get out if humanitarian assistance can get in.

Diplomatic Next Steps

As President Biden arrives in Israel he seems to be determined to push Israel towards a better strategy. After the Hamas attacks he provided a strong statement of solidarity, and moved warships in position as a warning to Iran not to get involved. All this was appreciated by Israelis. This is a typical Biden approach - steadfast support followed by lots of hard questions. He has made clear that he is wary of a land invasion and worried about the heavy loss of Palestinian life. Biden’s own experience with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have left him sceptical when any general claims that he can solve a long-standing conflict by eliminating the enemy. American generals have been visiting their Israeli counterparts to assess the realism of their plans.

Meanwhile he is putting US at the centre of a new diplomatic effort. This is what President Obama wanted to avoid. He disliked American entanglements in Middle Eastern affairs, in which every effort to solve one problem just seems to make another one worse and where it is necessary to cultivate relations with dubious regimes. But the region keeps on drawing the US back in, because of the global consequences of more disorder, from high oil prices to a possible war with Iran.

And the US is still the power best positioned to orchestrate an effort to de-escalate this crisis. Whatever his faults Biden does have diplomatic skills, as shown by his ability to maintain the coalition supporting Ukraine. The US is the only country that has relations with the key regional players, other than Iran and Hezbollah. But to talk with Arab leaders in a constructive way he may need to distance himself more from Israel’s current tactics, and he needs a possible plan around which to structure his conversations.

Absent from all this is Russia, It is worth noting that before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine it would have been hard to keep President Putin out of any international initiative. He had decent relations with Netanyahu, who has notably failed to give much support to Ukraine. Russia has sided more with Hamas, for after all Iran has now become an important arms supplier to Russia and getting at Israel can be a way of getting at the US. (For his part President Zelensky was quick to condemn the Hamas attacks, possibly with an eye of US Congressional opinion as much as Israeli). In the past Russia would have worked with the US to come up with an agreed UN Security Council resolution. But Putin is too distracted by his own war and lacks the capacity and the network for a serious political initiative of his own. Only Biden is in position to get concessions from the Israelis.

Without much optimism we can describe the first steps if a diplomatic path is to be followed. From Israel a cease-fire, if only temporary, to allow the humanitarian crisis to be addressed and work to begin on how the crisis can be managed over the short-term. Israel also has its own problems with hundreds of thousands of people moved away from the borders from Gaza and Lebanon, still some rocket attacks, and a level of military mobilisation that is costly and disruptive to maintain. So long as the rockets keep on coming, and the hostages continue to be held, it will be difficult for Netanyahu to declare a cease-fire.

The real challenge is to find an agreed political formula for Gaza which at least reduces Hamas’s political and military role. The only possibility I can see for the medium-term is one involving the Palestine Authority, as it is the obvious alternative government to Hamas, but this will require boosting its standing in the West Bank. This is for want of anything better. Up to now the main achievement of Mahmoud Abbas, the Chairman of the PA, has been his survival as otherwise he is only associated with corruption and ineffectuality. With riots in the West Bank his standing has been further damaged. The PA therefore could not cope on its own but would be supplemented by the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which currently provides many basic services in the strip, and a contact group of key Arab states with relations with Israel, necessarily including Egypt and Qatar which is the most likely intermediary with Hamas (a number of Hamas’s leaders live in Qatar).

This is the opposite direction to which the current Israeli government wished to move. As part of the gathering indictment against this government is the claim that Netanyahu preferred Hamas to the PA because it shared his rejection of a two-state solution. Netanyahu might now have little choice but to go along with a diplomatic process to explore options so long as he can claim that the conclusion is not pre-determined, but at any rate his days at the top of Israeli politics are numbered. It will not take many defectors for his tiny parliamentary majority to vanish even before another election.

If Biden is unable to make any political progress, the war may continue on its expected course with Israeli troops entering Gaza in numbers, seeking to impose its own solution on the territories. But it is hard to see how that will get it to a substantively different situation than intensive diplomacy. As Gaza will never be run by a pro-Israeli politician it might as well start thinking now about who else can bring stability to the territory.




17. Marine unit in Japan soon adopting ‘littoral’ name amid force changes


What is in a name?



Marine unit in Japan soon adopting ‘littoral’ name amid force changes

marinecorpstimes.com · by Irene Loewenson · October 18, 2023

A Marine regiment in Japan is getting renamed in November as it prepares to reorganize into a unit focused on sensing and disrupting in China’s backyard.

The United States and Japan revealed in January that the Okinawa, Japan-based 12th Marine Regiment would become the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment by fiscal year 2025. The name change — slated for Nov. 15, the Corps said Tuesday — is a major first step in that transition.

The 12th Marine Littoral Regiment will be the second unit whose mission is to put into practice the Corps’ new spread-out style of amphibious operations in the Indo-Pacific.

The Marine Corps didn’t respond by time of publication to Marine Corps Times’ question about why the unit was redesignating so far ahead of the October 2024 deadline.

RELATED


Japan to OK new US Marine littoral regiment on Okinawa

Japan on Wednesday will formally approve U.S. plans for a new Marine quick-reaction force on Okinawa.

The shift from the 12th Marine Regiment, with an artillery focus, to the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment, with a broader mission, was announced in a U.S.-Japan agreement that heightened the military alliance between the two countries.

American and Japanese diplomats decided in January that the U.S. military needed to boost its presence in Japan, including by placing more forces there with the ability to conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

Marine littoral regiments are meant to serve as “stand-in forces,” groups of troops positioned near an adversary, watching out for aggressive behavior, and working to deter and disrupt it. Stand-in forces are geared particularly toward competing with the Chinese military, as the Corps makes plain in its planning document for the concept.

For instance, a Marine littoral regiment could protect a Navy carrier strike group trying to navigate through a strait, by firing an anti-ship missile at an enemy ship blocking the waterway — a scenario the Marine Corps tested during an August 2022 exercise.

A Marine littoral regiment is made up of three smaller elements: a littoral combat team, a littoral anti-air battalion and a combat logistics battalion. The Marine Corps expects it to have between 1,800–2,000 Marines and sailors, according to the Marine Corps’ explanation of the littoral regiment concept.

The littoral combat team will contain an infantry battalion and an anti-ship missile battery, according to that explanation. It will be able to set up expeditionary advanced bases — small, temporary outposts in contested areas that the Corps hopes will be easy to maintain and hard for adversaries to track down.

The littoral anti-air battalion is supposed to monitor and defend the air in support of the regiment, according to the Marine Corps, while the combat logistics battalion will be tasked with keeping the regiment’s forces fed and fueled even in hard-to-reach or dangerous locations.

The “littoral” name signifies that the regiment will focus on areas close to shore.

Marine littoral regiments will come equipped with the new Navy Marine expeditionary ship interdiction system, or NMESIS, for long-range strikes on enemy vessels; the long-endurance MQ-9A Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle, for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and the Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar, or G/ATOR, a radar system for air defense.

A now-deactivated 12th Marine Regiment battalion in 2021 tested out the NMESIS during an exercise, firing a missile that flew more than 100 nautical miles before hitting its target, a decommissioned frigate. The deactivation of that unit, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, took place because the Marine Corps is cutting some traditional cannon artillery in favor of rockets and missiles.

Despite the name, the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment will be only the second regiment of its kind. The first, the Hawaii-based 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment, was activated in March 2022.

The 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment reached initial operational capability at the end of September, Marine spokeswoman 1st. Lt. Erin Scudder told Marine Corps Times via email on Tuesday.

RELATED


Marine littoral regiment fends off traditional regiment in exercise

“It’s not capable of everything we set out and designed, but it is a capable operational unit," Maj. Gen. Jay Bargeron said.

But the unit “is a credible force that has been exercising in the theater for the past 1.5 years,” Scudder said via email.

The 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment “maintains the ability to deploy to key terrain on short notice, sense the battlespace, and integrate joint force firepower with allies and partners’ capabilities now,” Scudder said.

The Corps plans to place one more littoral regiment somewhere in the Indo-Pacific, for a total of three, according to the service’s planning documents.

The Marine Corps created the concept for Marine littoral regiments as part of the branch’s Force Design 2030 initiative, a set of sweeping changes to the Corps’ approach and capabilities.

A driver of the changes is the worry that potential adversaries, especially China, could use precision strikes to destroy large, slow-moving U.S. forces.

“Forces that can continue to operate inside an adversary’s long-range precision fire weapons engagement zone (WEZ) are more operationally relevant than forces which must rapidly maneuver to positions outside the WEZ in order to remain survivable,” Gen. David Berger, then the Marine commandant, wrote in the 2020 document unveiling Force Design 2030.

The soon-to-be 12th Marine Littoral Regiment will remain stationed in the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa. But the reorganization won’t bring additional U.S. service members to Okinawa, the Corps emphasized in a news release Tuesday.

Okinawa makes up less than 1% of the total land area of Japan but is home to more than 70% of the Japanese land used for U.S. military bases, according to the prefecture. Locals have protested against the large U.S. presence on the island, complaining especially of noise, crime and environmental impacts.

The regiment’s redesignation ceremony will take place on Marine Corps Base Camp Butler, Okinawa, according to the news release Tuesday.

The 12th Marine Regiment is participating in the training exercise Resolute Dragon, in which the Marines will spread out across Japan’s islands " in a similar manner to what is designed for the MLR,” the news release said.

About Irene Loewenson

Irene Loewenson is a staff reporter for Marine Corps Times. She joined Military Times as an editorial fellow in August 2022. She is a graduate of Williams College, where she was the editor-in-chief of the student newspaper.

marinecorpstimes.com · by Irene Loewenson · October 18, 2023


18. Terrorists could be inspired by Hamas, spymasters warn



Do not ignore terrorism. Revisionist powers (China and Russia), rogue powers (Iran and north Korea), AND violent extremist organizations.





Terrorists could be inspired by Hamas, spymasters warn

Five Eyes security alliance says world faces ‘its greatest threat since the end of the Cold War’


The Times · by Fiona Hamilton, Chief Reporter, California · October 18, 2023

MI5 is “paying very close attention” to Islamists in the UK amid fears that the events in the Middle East could inspire a terrorist atrocity, its director-general said.

Ken McCallum warned that Islamist radicals as well as antisemites and neo-Nazis pose a threat to the Jewish community in the wake of the “monstrous attacks” by Hamas. Spies are understood to have stepped up their monitoring because of the conflict between Israel and Hamas.

McCallum said that MI5 is “attuned to the risk” that lone terrorists could be inspired by violence in the Middle East, or that terrorist groups “may choose to strike in a new way” after Israel was caught by surprise by the nature of the assault by Hamas.

What is Hamas and what does it want?

The situation could also embolden Iran, he said, with the hostile state already linked to more than a dozen

McCallum, speaking at an unprecedented security summit with the UK’s closest intelligence allies, said: “There clearly is the possibility that profound events in the Middle East will either generate more volume of UK threat and/or change its shape in terms of what is being targeted, in terms of how people are taking inspiration.”

Advertisement

McCallum appeared in public for the first time with counterparts from the Five Eyes Alliance, Britain’s decades-old intelligence partnership with the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Their gathering in California’s Silicon Valley is intended to send a “powerful signal” that the world is facing its greatest threat since the end of the Cold War, McCallum said, citing the aggression of authoritarian states such as Russia and China.

MI5 and its allies unveiled a campaign warning businesses in the West of the “exponential growth” of China’s economic espionage. Behind closed doors the agencies will be discussing the impact of the Hamas attacks.

Speaking to reporters, McCallum warned that the threat from Iran could intensify. In 12 months MI5 had foiled 15 Tehran-linked plots aimed at dissidents and media organisations. The regime could also “move into new directions”, McCallum said, raising the spectre of a wider terror threat.


Mike Burgess of Australia, David Vigneault of Canada, Christopher Wray of the United States, Andrew Hampton of New Zealand and Ken McCallum of the UK meet in California

He said that the UK was working with Israel to “establish the facts as quickly as possible”. Six Britons are dead and up to ten are thought to be held as hostages in Gaza. McCallum acknowledged that his agency might provide leads or intelligence to teams trying to track them but declined to give details.

He emphasised that the UK’s threat level had not changed but that the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, which makes the decision, was monitoring the situation and that MI5 was “paying very close attention”.

He added: “Terrorists can draw inspiration not just from things they see happening inside the UK but things they see happening in the Middle East or on the continent or elsewhere.”

The Metropolitan police said there would be a “highly visible” police presence for the Euro 2024 qualifier between England and Italy at Wembley after police shot dead a gunman who killed two in Brussels.

Advertisement

McCallum pointed to repeated warnings by MI5 and police about the threat of self-initiated terrorists who are inspired by online propaganda or videos of violence elsewhere.

“And so of course, in the current climate, we and our partners are particularly attuned to the risk that terrorist organisations may choose to strike in a new way, or perhaps that individuals choose to respond often in spontaneous or unpredictable ways,” McCallum said.

“Sadly in the particular case of Jewish or Israeli individuals or entities, they face risk potentially from those of an Islamist extremist mindset and those of an extreme right-wing, antisemitic or neo-Nazi type mindset. We see both those forms of terrorism in the UK.”

Israel was caught by surprise by Hamas’s assault. Sir Alex Younger, the former head of MI6, described it not as an intelligence failure but a “failure of imagination”.

Asked if the attack prompted a re-think of the type of activities that could be carried out against the UK, McCallum said that he told new recruits on their first day that “we work against people who are creative, and who will continually seek to get around our nation’s defences”.

He added: “I spent the bulk of my career countering terrorism. It never loses the power to sicken me. MI5 will continue to work without fear or favour to protect the UK national security wherever we see threats.”

Advertisement

Christopher Wray, the director of the FBI, echoed concerns about the impact on domestic terrorism. He said: “The threat picture continues to evolve and here in the US we cannot and do not discount the possibility that Hamas or other foreign terrorist organisations could exploit the conflict to call on their supporters to conduct attacks on our own soil.

“And we are also particularly alert to the potential these events have to inspire violence against Jewish Americans or Muslim Americans, institutions and houses of worship.”

The Times · by Fiona Hamilton, Chief Reporter, California · October 18, 2023


19. Expert Guidance: Law of Armed Conflict in the Israel-Hamas War



A useful tutorial and reference. War crimes will be a continued topic of discussion for as long as the Hamas - Israeli war continues.


Graphics at the link: https://www.justsecurity.org/89489/expert-guidance-law-of-armed-conflict-in-the-israel-hamas-war/




Expert Guidance: Law of Armed Conflict in the Israel-Hamas War

by Ryan Goodman, Michael W. Meier and Tess Bridgeman

October 17, 2023

justsecurity.org · by Ryan Goodman

Skip to content

Justsecurity.org

October 17, 2023

The following describes the law of armed conflict (LOAC), also known as international humanitarian law, that applies to the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. We identify where the law is well settled and clear, and where it is less so.

We do not apply the law to any alleged facts. Indeed, whether any conduct violates the law would generally require a fact-driven, case-by-case analysis.

We hope this guidance will assist policymakers, diplomats, analysts, reporters, scholars, and the public at large.

1. Equal Application Principle

A bedrock principle is that the laws of war apply equally to all belligerent parties. Both sides must comply with LOAC.

That principle holds regardless of which side attacked first, whether the initial attack complied with international law, which side is acting in lawful self-defense, and irrespective of the relative justice of the causes involved.

 2. Sources 

LOAC treaties and customary international law govern the conflict between Israel and Hamas. Customary international law involves rules that States accept as binding international obligations that have not been codified in a treaty between the parties.

Every State in the world has ratified the Geneva Conventions of 1949. While some may dispute if or when exactly Palestine became a State for those purposes, the ICRC website includes Palestine’s accession to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (as well as other LOAC treaties). Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions sets out minimum standards for all parties to an armed conflict, including State forces and non-State armed groups. Those include key protections for civilians and for combatants who are no longer taking part in hostilities, such as detainees and the sick and wounded. Common Article 3 prohibits murder, cruel treatment, torture, outrages against personal dignity, and degrading or humiliating treatment for civilians and for combatants who have been captured or wounded.

Customary international law further regulates the conduct of hostilities by all belligerents, and provides protections for civilians and civilian objects (such as medical facilities, schools, etc. that are not in military use). The law requires belligerents to distinguish at all times between combatants and civilians (who can never be made the object of attack) and take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects. Attacks that aim to target civilians, or that would cause excessive harm to the civilian population compared to the anticipated military gain (i.e., disproportionate attacks) are prohibited.

3. What body of LOAC applies to the conflict?: International versus non-international armed conflict

LOAC distinguishes between two types of conflict:

  • International armed conflict – a declared war or any other armed conflict between two or more States
  • Non-international armed conflict – an armed conflict between a State and a non-State organized armed group or an armed conflict between non-State armed groups

The distinction is important because the LOAC rules for a non-international armed conflict are less detailed (e.g., no prisoner of war status or combatant immunity for non-state armed groups) and there is a shorter list of war crimes applicable in a non-international armed conflict. For a comparison, scan the shorter list of war crimes for non-international conflicts versus international conflicts in the treaty of the International Criminal Court (Article 8).


For many of the issues involved in the Israel-Hamas conflict, the distinction is irrelevant. That’s because certain conduct (e.g., targeting civilians, taking of hostages) would be a violation of the law and a war crime regardless of the type of conflict. In other words, the conduct would come within the inner concentric circle — and amount to a war crime in both types of conflict. For some issues, however, the distinction between the type of conflict may be relevant (e.g., whether the use of human shields is a war crime or how difficult it would be to establish that it is; and whether disproportionate attacks on civilian infrastructure can be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court, to name two examples).

At a minimum, the laws of war applicable to non-international armed conflict apply to the Israel-Hamas conflict. However, there are several ways in which the situation might be considered an international armed conflict:

  • If Gaza is considered occupied territory, or becomes occupied in whole or in part during the course of the conflict;
  • If Palestine is considered a State;
  • If sufficient ties exist, or come to exist, between another State and Hamas such that the State wields overall control over Hamas, not only by equipping and financing it but also by coordinating or helping in the general planning of its military activity; or
  • If the conflict widens to include Israel directly fighting one or more States who join the fight alongside Hamas

4. What’s the difference between a violation of LOAC and a war crime? What is a “grave breach” of the Geneva Conventions?

LOAC imposes a broad set of obligations on parties to a conflict. It is a violation of international law to fail to comply with these obligations, but only some LOAC violations amount to a war crime. The term “war crime” denotes those LOAC violations that can result in individual criminal responsibility. Generally, only serious LOAC violations constitute a war crime. It depends on whether the obligation itself could ever incur criminal liability (some obligations don’t), and it depends on whether the actors have the requisite mental element, or state of mind, to satisfy the elements of a crime (“mens rea” in legalese).

The Geneva Conventions do not refer to “war crimes,” but rather “grave breaches.” All grave breaches constitute war crimes, even though not all war crimes are grave breaches. A grave breach can occur only in an international armed conflict. All States have universal jurisdiction over LOAC violations that qualify as a “grave breach,”, whether the States is involved in the conflict or not.

Generally, the mental state required to commit a war crime is “willfulness.” In the case of killing civilians (or destroying civilian infrastructure), willfulness includes both purposeful attacks on civilians as well as civilian casualties that result from certain forms of recklessness in targeting. Recklessness includes when an attacker consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to civilians or civilian objects.

Negligence is a lower threshold than recklessness. Negligence includes, for example, when an attacker should have known the probable consequence of their action was to kill civilians (or civilian objects) rather than combatants (or military objects).

Under the law of armed conflict, a State or non-State group may be legally on the hook if members of its armed forces kill civilians out of negligence, but the individual would not be criminally liable.


For more on that topic, read Ryan Goodman, Explainer: What Mental State is Required to Commit a War Crime?, Just Security, September 1, 2016.

5. Who qualifies as a “civilian” versus a “combatant” and why does it matter?

A fundamental objective of LOAC is to protect civilians – including individual civilians and the civilian population – and civilian objects from the harmful effects of hostilities. Parties to the conflict must distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and shall direct their operations only against military objectives. “Military objectives” are objectives that by their “nature, location, purpose, or use” make an “effective contribution” to military action, and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite military advantage.

“Combatants” include (1) members of a State’s armed forces; (2) members of military or volunteer corps; (3) participants in a levée en masse; and (4) commanders and fighters in non-state armed groups. Combatants are subject to attack during hostilities unless they are captured or incapacitated, such as by injury.

“Civilians” include those individuals who do not belong to one of the combatant categories above. Civilians may not be made the object of attack. They lose their immunity from attack only if and for such time as they “directly participate in hostilities” (more on this below).

Note-1: De-activated reservists are generally considered civilians until they are mobilized.

The International Committee of the Red Cross, for example, states:

“For the purposes of the principle of distinction, membership in regular state armed forces ceases, and civilian protection is restored, when a member disengages from active duty and re-integrates into civilian life, whether due to a full discharge from duty or as a deactivated reservist.”

Note-2: Settlers, no matter how objectionable their conduct and in violation of international law, are civilians and may not be made the object of an attack.

Note-3: Civilians who are political supporters of an organized armed group or a State do not lose their status as civilians due to such support.

Note-4: Some non-State organizations – especially ones that exercise governance over a territory like Hamas – often have a military wing and a civilian wing. It is accordingly important to know when Israel states that it is targeting or has killed members of Hamas, what exactly that means in practice.

The separation between a military wing and civilian wing of a non-State actor can generally be fairly clear. More difficult cases may involve civilians who appear to exercise authority over military forces (consider the equivalent of a head of state who is also commander-in-chief) and law enforcement/police units depending on whether they take on a military role. Those cases on the margin should not distract from cases in the main wherein the distinction is often obvious.

Note-5: Members of the civil defense are civilians. Civil defense organizations are defined by the humanitarian tasks they perform in protecting the civilian population against dangers arising from hostilities (see ICRC Civil Defense Fact Sheet). Civil defense activities for the purpose of protecting civilians include warning, evacuation, management of shelters, and rescue.

6. Taking of hostages = war crime

Taking of civilian hostages is strictly forbidden at all times, by all parties, and would constitute a war crime in both international and non-international armed conflict.

7. Torture and rape = war crimes

Torture and rape are strictly forbidden at all times, by all parties, and would constitute war crimes in both international and non-international armed conflict.

8. Directly targeting civilians = war crime

Directly targeting civilians is strictly forbidden at all times, by all parties, and would constitute a war crime in both international and non-international armed conflict.

Note-1: All civilians are protected from being made the object of an attack. There are no subcategories of civilians. For instance, there is no category of “innocent civilians” as distinct from other civilians. Nor is any allowance given to attacking civilians who politically support an organized armed group or a State. They all count the same as any other civilian.

Note-2: The only time there is an exception to this rule, which is likely to have little or no relevance to the central issues in the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict, is if and for such time as a civilian takes up arms (ie., joins the fight on either side). Only in that circumstance can a civilian lose their immunity from attack, and only for so long as they are directly participating in hostilities.

Note-3: The obligation to direct attacks only against combatants and military objects and never to direct attacks against civilians or civilian objects is known as the “basic rule” of international humanitarian law and comes under the “principle of distinction.” A related prohibition is that of indiscriminate attacks. Attackers must refrain from using weapons that cannot distinguish between military and civilian targets. For example, firing a missile that is of a nature to strike a military objective and civilians or civilian objects without distinction can amount to a war crime (Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Article 51(4)).

9. Attacks that disproportionately harm civilians = war crimes

A fundamental precept in LOAC is the rule of proportionality.

The rule is straightforward: Combatants must refrain from a military attack if the expected loss of civilian life or injury to civilians incidental to the attack would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.

Violations of this rule can be a war crime.

It is important to recall the state of mind required for conduct to be criminal. Purposefully or recklessly killing civilians in violation of the rule of proportionality can amount to a war crime. In contrast, an attack that results in disproportionate loss of civilian life due to negligence would be unlawful, though not criminal.

Proportionate to what? In public discourse, commentators often compare the number of civilians lost on one side of a conflict versus the other. That is not what is meant by proportionality under the laws of war applicable during armed conflict. Those comparisons may be best discussed in terms of morality or in terms of a separate body of international law governing the necessary and proportionate use of force in self-defense. In LOAC, a proportionality assessment takes into account the expected civilian harm as compared to the concrete and direct military advantage that is expected to be gained as of the time of the attack.

10. Targeting civilian infrastructure and disproportionality targeting civilian infrastructure = war crime

The same two rules just discussed with respect to civilian persons (8 and 9) also apply to civilian objects. The protection of civilian infrastructure is often a vitally important issue in urban warfare.

Directly targeting civilian objects is strictly forbidden and constitutes a war crime in both international and non-international armed conflict. Likewise, combatants must refrain from a military attack if the expected damage to civilian objects incidental to the attack would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. Violations of that rule of proportionality may amount to a war crime if done purposefully or recklessly.

Important note on residential apartment buildings with military units inside.  

Israel apparently adopts a highly unusual view of LOAC that would allow greater license to destroy an entire residential apartment building in which an enemy military facility is found — and to do so without the standard proportionality analysis. The generally accepted view is that an attack on a civilian apartment building in such cases must consider whether the civilian infrastructure that is expected to be destroyed is excessive in relation to the expected military advantage (ICRC, United States, International Law Association; ICRC report surveying States’ views and leading scholarship). The outlier position adopted by Israel is that “as a matter of law, the building is a single military objective, and therefore damage to other parts of the building need not be considered as collateral damage” (Merriam & Schmitt 2015; Eli Bar-On 2021). This conception of the rule does not appear to include a limiting principle that would apply to other civilian objects, including medical facilities, houses of worship, schools, and the like.

Note-1: The military manual of at least one other State – Denmark – appears to agree with Israel’s legal position. However, that manual also states: “Danish armed forces are required to recognise damage to the non-military ‘share’ of the dual-use object as collateral damage when the non-military share is of particular and direct importance to protected persons” (emphasis in original).

Note-2: To avoid confusion, it is important to make clear that Israel’s legal position would still consider any loss of civilian life or injury to civilians in the proportionality analysis. It is the civilian infrastructure – the building itself – which drops out of their equation.

11. All feasible precautions to minimize civilian harm

Combatants must take all feasible precautions to minimize incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects (Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Article 57). “In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population,” as set forth in Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.

A violation of the rule of feasible precautions is clearly a violation of LOAC. That said, surprising to many, as a matter of international law, such a violation generally cannot incur criminal liability. Of course, systematic violation of this rule may provide strong evidence of criminal intent to purposefully or recklessly kill civilians or a disproportionate number of civilians (or damage to civilian objects).

12. Human shields

Defenders’ obligations: The involuntary use of civilians as human shields is unlawful. Such conduct is a war crime in international armed conflict and likely, but not definitely, in non-international armed conflict. For example, the sections of the International Criminal Court treaty covering war crimes in international armed conflict include the offense of “utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations.” No such offense is contained in the sections on war crimes in non-international armed conflict.

Attackers’ obligations: Defenders are certainly responsible for the deaths of civilians that they use as human shields. Nevertheless, individuals who are involuntary human shields do not lose their right to be treated as civilians. As the Israeli High Court explained in 2009, “What is the law regarding civilians serving as a ‘human shield’ for terrorists taking a direct part in the hostilities? Certainly, if they are doing so because they were forced to do so by terrorists, those innocent civilians are not to be seen as taking a direct part in the hostilities. They themselves are victims of terrorism.”

The enemy’s use of civilians as involuntary human shields does not relieve attacking forces from their own responsibilities. In conducting an attack, commanders must take into account those civilians used as involuntary human shields both in the proportionality analysis and in the obligation to minimize harm to civilians.

For more information, readers may be interested in Beth Van Schaack, Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law: A Guide to the Legal Framework, December 7, 2016.

13. Collective punishment

Collective punishment is strictly forbidden and can amount to a war crime in both international and non-international armed conflicts. Collective punishment includes the imposition of penalties on civilians for actions that they themselves did not personally commit.

As early as the 1949 Geneva Convention on Protection of Civilians, States made clear that this prohibition “rul[es] out the idea that the community might bear at least a passive responsibility” (ICRC Commentaries).

14. Siege warfare

The laws of war permit siege warfare – otherwise known as “encirclement” – against enemy armed forces and other military objectives, but the laying of sieges must comply with all relevant LOAC rules.

The principle of distinction – a siege must be directed only against enemy armed forces and military objectives while exercising constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects.

Among the most important conditions on siege warfare is the prohibition on starvation of civilians. For additional reading on this topic, see Tom Dannenbaum, The Siege of Gaza and the Starvation War Crime, Just Security, October 11, 2023; Beth Van Schaack, Siege Warfare and the Starvation of Civilians as a Weapon of War and War Crime, Just Security, February 4, 2016.

The prohibition on starvation may be met through deprivation of relief supplies. The International Criminal Court treaty states, in the context of international armed conflict, “Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions.”

The principle of proportionality – some experts conclude that, like the law of blockades, a siege must comply with the principle of proportionality. On this view, the impact on the civilian population must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained from the siege (Maxime Nijs, International Review of the Red Cross: 2020, including sources in fn. 83; Michael Schmitt, Sqn. Ldr. Kieran Tinkler and Durward Johnson, The UN Yemen Report and Siege Warfare, Just Security, September 12, 2019). See also U.S. Department of Defense, Law of War Manual § 5.20.2 (2023) (“Military action intended to starve enemy forces, however, must not be taken where it is expected to result in incidental harm to the civilian population that is excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated to be gained.”).

See also the section below on access to humanitarian relief.

15. Access to humanitarian relief

“The parties to the conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction,” states the ICRC’s assessment of governing international law (see also Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, Article 18(2); Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Articles 69-70). Consent of the State is required, but such consent cannot be withheld arbitrarily. For competing views on what is meant by arbitrarily withholding consent for relief supplies, see Akande and Gillard: 2016 and Watts: 2019.

Note-1: There is one exception to the rule on consent: the consent of an occupying power cannot be withheld (Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians, Article 59).

Note-2: The ICRC Commentaries to Additional Protocol II state:

“The fact that consent is required does not mean that the decision is left to the discretion of the parties. If the survival of the population is threatened and a humanitarian organization fulfilling the required conditions of impartiality and non-discrimination is able to remedy this situation, relief actions must take place. In fact, they are the only way of combating starvation when local resources have been exhausted. The authorities responsible for safeguarding the population in the whole of the territory of the State cannot refuse such relief without good grounds. Such a refusal would be equivalent to a violation of the rule prohibiting the use of starvation as a method of combat as the population would be left deliberately to die of hunger without any measures being taken.”

16. Forcible displacement of civilians versus lawful evacuation

Forcible displacement of a civilian population is unlawful both in international and non-international armed conflict. It is considered a war crime in an international armed conflict and might be a war crime as well in a non-international armed conflict. However, if conducted as part of an attack on a civilian population, the forcible transfer of civilians can amount to a crime against humanity (ICRC; International Criminal Court treaty), whether in an international or non-international armed conflict or no armed conflict at all.

The prohibition on forcible displacement is subject to an important exception “in cases where the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons (such as clearing a combat zone) require the evacuation” (ICRC Rule 129 (emphasis added)).

An occupying power, for example, has the legal right, and in certain circumstances a duty, to perform an evacuation for the safety of civilians. The ICRC Commentaries to the Geneva Convention on Protection of Civilians states: “If therefore an area is in danger as a result of military operations or is liable to be subjected to intense bombing, the Occupying Power has the right and, subject to the provisions of Article 5, the duty of evacuating it partially or wholly, by placing the inhabitants in places of refuge.”

The difference between unlawful forcible displacement and lawful evacuation may turn on the following conditions:

  1. Whether (a) the purpose is to protect civilians from the effects of military attacks, or (b) it is for an illicit purpose such as to change the demographic makeup of an area or indefinitely remove inhabitants as a security buffer;
The ICRC Commentary states: “Clearly, imperative military reasons cannot be justified by political motives. For example, it would be prohibited to move a population in order to exercise more effective control over a dissident ethnic group.”
Official statements blaming the local civilian population for atrocities committed by enemy forces would be relevant evidence of an illicit purpose. It would have to be determined whether the sentiment expressed in such statements has shaped the policy of removal.
  1. Whether the measure would remove civilians to a third country;

In non-international armed conflicts “evacuations may never involve displacement outside the national territory” (ICRC Rule 129; Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Convention, Article 17(2)).

  1. Whether the measure is effectuated by shutting off food, water, and other essentials to the civilian population.

Relevant here is Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Convention, which states: “Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition” (Article 17(1)).

Note: Forcible displacement can occur “by means of threats” (ICRC Commentary).

17. Criminal enforcement

International Criminal Court

In 2015, Palestine deposited an instrument of accession with the International Criminal Court. The past and current ICC Prosecutors and a three-judge panel (a “pre-trial chamber”) concluded on this basis that the Court has jurisdiction over crimes allegedly committed in Gaza. That claim of jurisdiction is not without legal controversy, as Israel has long contested it.

In the days following the Hamas massacre inside Israel, the ICC Prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan KC stated, in an interview, that the Court’s jurisdiction reaches Hamas’s conduct inside Israel. He explained that the Court’s jurisdiction includes crimes committed by nationals of State Parties (see International Criminal Court treaty Article 12(2)(b)).

National courts’ war crimes trials

Courts in foreign countries might be able to hold trials for war crimes committed outside their own territory even if the alleged perpetrator(s) and the victim(s) are not nationals of the State where the trial takes place. Exercising the authority of “universal jurisdiction,” Germany has led the way including holding trials for war crimes committed in Syria.

The United States recently passed legislation allowing the Justice Department to prosecute war crimes in such cases if the perpetrator is later located in the United States.

States in which such trials might take place would be on even firmer legal footing if the victim(s) or perpetrator(s) are nationals of their State.

IMAGE: (L) Members of the Ezz-Al Din Al-Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of the Hamas movement, parade on a truck with rockets in a street in Khan Yunis, in the southern Gaza Strip on May 27, 2021 (Thomas Coex/AFP via Getty Images); (R) An Israeli soldier stands atop a tank in a field near the kibbutz Beeri in southern Israel on October 14, 2023, close to the spot where 270 revellers were gunned down or burnt in their cars by Hamas gunmen at the Supernova music festival in the Negev desert seven days earlier (Thomas Coex/AFP via Getty Images).

Signups for A.M. & P.M. Emails

Scroll within to view all topics.

About the Author(s)

Ryan Goodman

Ryan Goodman (@rgoodlaw) is co-editor-in-chief of Just Security and Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law at New York University School of Law.

Michael W. Meier

Michael Meier (@MWMeier23) recently served as the senior civilian adviser to the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General on matters related to the Law of Armed Conflict. Since 2023, he is Visiting Professor, Emory University School of Law and Acting Director, Emory International Humanitarian Law Clinic.

Tess Bridgeman

Tess Bridgeman (@bridgewriter) is co-editor-in-chief of Just Security and Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the Reiss Center on Law and Security at NYU School of Law. She previously served as Special Assistant to the President, Associate Counsel to the President, and Deputy Legal Adviser to the National Security Council (NSC), and prior to that served at the U.S. State Department in the Office of the Legal Adviser as an attorney adviser in the Office of Political-Military Affairs and as Special Assistant to the Legal Adviser.

Send A Letter To The Editor

justsecurity.org · by Ryan Goodman




20. What Comes After Hamas?


What is the acceptable durable political arrangement that will serve, protect, and advance national interests?


Excerpts:

The political aim here would be to revive a moribund Palestinian Authority that lost its authority over Gaza in 2006, the last time elections for the Palestine Legislative Council were held. The current president of the PA, Mahmoud Abbas, was last elected in 2005. Despite the suspicion and doubt with which many Palestinians regard Abbas and the PA, Arab states will not cooperate with any attempt to reset the administration of Gaza without a role for the body. Nor will the major powers of the global South—with the possible exception of India, which has grown closer to Israel in recent years—approve of such a plan if control of the territory did not return in some form to Palestinians. Indeed, many Arab states as well as those in the global South might demand more than elections and the reassertion of PA control over the territory; they might demand that Israel make territorial concessions and halt settlement construction in the West Bank; without securing gains on the ground, a restored PA in Gaza will lack credibility and appear like a mere puppet regime. Israel may balk at the prospect of making such concessions, but the centrist members of the unity government might help tip the balance.
None of these measures will matter without swift action to rebuild a devastated Gaza. This is where Saudi Arabia becomes critical to the success of the transfer of Gaza from Israeli control to the UN and the subsequent consolidation of the Palestinian Authority’s hold over both the West Bank and Gaza. The cost of reconstruction will be substantial. Public infrastructure – including hospitals, schools, roads, electrical substations, water pipes, sanitation systems, and government offices—will probably be in ruins. To clear the rubble alone will take time and money. The United States will certainly try to be a generous contributor and, with Israeli cooperation and a functioning House of Representatives, Congress will appropriate the necessary funds. Saudi Arabia, however, not only has the funds to make a difference, but its participation will also lend the enterprise the kind of regional legitimacy that will strengthen the Palestinian Authority.
Many hurdles stand in the way of such an arrangement coming to pass. China and Russia may choose to obstruct the passing of the necessary resolution at the UN Security Council. Arab states may be unwilling to join what many of their citizens see as an occupying force in the strip. And Israel may refuse to make concessions to the Palestinians in the wake of Hamas’s attacks and an Israeli military victory. But one purpose of diplomacy is to probe intentions and spur the consideration of a wider the range of options in a contingency. This is what the moment requires. The alternative is Gaza as an eternal dystopia, with violence metastasizing around the broader region, and states less able to deal with all manner of social and environmental disarray—in other words, a Middle East transformed, but not quite as Washington envisaged it.





What Comes After Hamas?

A Plan to Return the Gaza Strip to Palestinians and Keep Israel Safe

By Steven Simon

October 18, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Steven Simon · October 18, 2023

Israel’s offensive against the Gaza Strip is ramping up. After the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas spilled out of Gaza to stage a brutal attack on Israel on October 7, the enclave is now under siege. Israel has cut off the delivery of electricity, water, fuel, and food. Israeli warnings have led hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza to flee their homes and Israeli bombs have killed thousands already. And all this ahead of a much anticipated ground invasion that will likely lead to significant casualties on both sides. Some analysts, such as Marc Lynch in Foreign Affairs and Hussein Ibish in The New York Times, have argued that “invading Gaza will be a disaster” and that Israel “will be walking into a trap.” They could well be right. Military operations in urban terrain are notoriously difficult and deadly. And Hamas, as a social movement and not just a militant outfit, will be impossible to fully uproot.

But Israel may yet achieve its maximalist war aim of destroying Hamas’s leadership and military capacity. The Israel Defense Forces have now deployed 350,000 reservists and 170,000 active-duty personnel. Although the bulk of these forces will be allocated to the northern front facing Lebanon and the militant group Hezbollah, there will be plenty of soldiers left for operations in Gaza. Meanwhile, Hamas can deploy at best 15,000 fighters. The IDF have complete control over Gaza’s airspace, coastline, and land border. In order to smash Hamas, the Israeli public is prepared to tolerate high casualties in addition to the significant losses it has already incurred. And Israel has the support of essential outside players, not least the United States. It is hard to envisage more favorable conditions for the difficult campaign Israel is contemplating.

This raises a major question: what happens if Israel does manage to defeat Hamas? Although the Biden administration views a ground offensive and the blockade of Gaza as a risk to regional stability—and worries about an unfolding humanitarian disaster—the United States’ ability to alter Israel’s course at this point is limited. Israel might have narrowed its own options if it is shown to be responsible for the October 17 bombing of al-Ahli Arab hospital in northern Gaza that killed hundreds. But if the planned Israeli assault is a fait accompli, the United States and its partners must start to think carefully about a range of scenarios, including a Gaza without Hamas.

The incapacitation of the militant group will be bloody, but Hamas’s removal could provide a fleeting opportunity to bring about a new dispensation in Gaza that is better than what came before it. Whether it will have been worth the human suffering will be debated after the war. But if Israel defeats Hamas, the United States should work with regional and international powers to find a way to transfer Israeli control of Gaza to the temporary stewardship of the United Nations, backed by the strong mandate of a UN Security Council resolution. This UN mission would then help return Gaza to Palestinian control. Unless the ultimate objective is revival of the Palestinian Authority and its control of Gaza, Arab countries will be reluctant to participate in such a day-after plan. It will still be a hard sell in Israel where distrust of the UN runs deep. But such a process would not just spare Palestinians in Gaza the prospect of an indefinite Israeli occupation and repeated rounds of destructive skirmishes—or even wars—with Israel, but also, by restoring Palestinian Authority administration in Gaza, preserve the possibility of a two-state solution that now appears so unattainable.

REGIME LIQUIDATION

The opportunity to establish a better arrangement in Gaza would in large part be a function of the defeat of Hamas. But other developments may make such an outcome more likely. Israel is now ruled by a new emergency coalition government that includes centrists, who in the past have endorsed a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and include two former IDF chiefs of staff, Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot. The Israeli war cabinet reflects a diversity of views that can help serve as a counterweight to the extreme right, which moved to the foreground of Israeli politics after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu formed a new government late last year.

The Biden administration’s new eagerness to reassert a U.S. role in the Middle East—beyond its fitful attempts to constrain Iran’s nuclear program—will also help. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in particular, wants to demonstrate the utility of diplomacy as an instrument of policy and the current crisis is tailor made for this goal. He is currently shuttling among regional capitals. Although the war in Gaza has scotched the mooted normalization of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia as facilitated by the United States, the negotiating process has opened lines of communication that make the coordination of policies between the three countries regarding the future of Gaza a real possibility.

Israeli forces now face a potentially long and grinding campaign in the territory. The outcome of this campaign remains uncertain. Hamas fighters know this dense urban landscape, riddled with tunnels and potential booby traps, better than their IDF opponents. External forces, including Iran and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, may launch attacks on Israel in the hope of complicating any Israeli advance in Gaza. But the preponderance of strength remains with Israel. Buoyed by the support of its superpower backer, the United States, Israel may well succeed in its goal of flushing out Hamas’s leadership and destroying the group’s ability to rule Gaza. Much will then depend on who controls the ground after Israel withdraws.

AFTER HAMAS

Israel’s answer to this question is not clear. Its postwar plan seems to involve a tight blockade of Gaza that sharply restricts imports, rigid controls on the movement of people across the boundary between Israel and Gaza, and a system of opportunistic raids and airstrikes launched from Israel on targets within Gaza when deemed necessary by emerging intelligence information. Control of Gaza would presumably devolve to warlords or a Hamas successor organization that can rule over the rubble but be unable to kill Israelis. Such an arrangement may not prove especially durable. After all, Hamas acquired an arsenal and constructed a sprawling network of tunnels despite stringent Israeli controls and the close surveillance of Gaza. It is hard—perhaps impossible—to seal off Gaza in a long-term, impermeable way. Israel would make itself a jail warden, presiding indefinitely over an immense prison camp (to which Gaza has long been compared). For Israel, and for the Palestinians in Gaza, handing off control to a third party would be the better course of action. Otherwise, the situation will eventually revert to a grimmer version of the status quo ante, only with many more people dead on both sides and Gaza’s vital infrastructure pulverized.

There is at least one alternative to this bleak forecast. The United States could lead a contact group, a clutch of neighboring states and selected outside powers, namely Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the EU, the UN, and the Palestinian Authority. The group would develop a plan to transfer control of Gaza from Israel to the UN once combat operations have ceased. This would be an enormous undertaking for the UN, whose institutional capacity is already strained, encumbered by a rigid and complicated bureaucracy. Setting these defects aside, the key step at this stage would be the securing of a UN mandate in the form of a Security Council resolution authorizing member states to organize a transitional administration for Gaza, maintain civil order and public services in coordination with Israel, and develop a plan for elections in the West Bank and Gaza. China and Russia, veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council, may stymie such a resolution. But ensuring that the request for a mission came from, say, Egypt and was endorsed by the Palestinian Authority (an observer state at the UN) might make it easier for China and Russia to abstain in a Security Council vote or even support the endeavor.

What happens if Israel does manage to defeat Hamas?

There are precedents: a 1999 UN Security Council resolution placed Kosovo under temporary UN administration, mandating two entities—UNMIK, which served as a transitional administration, and KFOR, which was a NATO force carrying out the instructions of the UN Security Council. Moreover, a UN mandate does not dictate the requirement for a UN mission. Here, the precedent of a 2023 UN Security Council resolution authorizing a Kenyan peacekeeping force in Haiti, permits a non-UN mission to draw, on a reimbursable basis, from UN supply stocks. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe had such an authority for its monitoring mission in Ukraine from 2014 to 2022 and the African Union for its forces in Somalia from 2007 to 2022. This procedure gives the organizers of the mission, such as the contact group, free rein to build the best team possible. And because the mission may not be a UN one, skeptical Israelis may be reassured of its utility.

Once the UN Security Council approves a resolution that mandates a transitional arrangement in Gaza, the subsequent mission will have to be appropriately sized, structured, and defined. Since time would be of the essence, the contact group, in coordination with UN agencies, would have to identify and recruit donor states, and equip and deploy the peacekeeping and “protection of civilians” units. Essential equipment, from vehicles to computers, would be drawn from UN stocks. The mission’s rules of engagement would have to permit firing in self-defense and the peacekeepers’ primary function would be policing. The force itself would have to comprise troops from Arab states, in part to minimize language barriers but also to reinforce the notion that the mission is led by Arabs. Applying the rule of thumb of five peacekeepers per 1,000 civilians, the force would have to be sizable, upwards of 10,000 troops or more. The UN mission headquarters would liaise with Israeli authorities, UN headquarters, and the contact group.

The interim UN-backed administration would bear some resemblance to the UN governance mission in Kosovo, where the UN has managed a relative success in a fragile environment, and to the UN mission in Libya, where it backs one of two rival governments. There is no shortage of UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations capable of organizing elections. With the election of a new president and a new Palestinian legislative body, the UN mission would shift from its Kosovo-like role to one more like the UN mission in Libya where the international organization supports an elected government. The UN mission will require a powerful head, someone capable of standing up to both Israelis and Palestinians and of dealing with senior officials from outside powers—somebody like Sigrid Kaag, the deputy prime minister of the Netherlands, who previously served as a high-ranking UN official and envoy in Syria and Lebanon.

THE RESTORATION

The political aim here would be to revive a moribund Palestinian Authority that lost its authority over Gaza in 2006, the last time elections for the Palestine Legislative Council were held. The current president of the PA, Mahmoud Abbas, was last elected in 2005. Despite the suspicion and doubt with which many Palestinians regard Abbas and the PA, Arab states will not cooperate with any attempt to reset the administration of Gaza without a role for the body. Nor will the major powers of the global South—with the possible exception of India, which has grown closer to Israel in recent years—approve of such a plan if control of the territory did not return in some form to Palestinians. Indeed, many Arab states as well as those in the global South might demand more than elections and the reassertion of PA control over the territory; they might demand that Israel make territorial concessions and halt settlement construction in the West Bank; without securing gains on the ground, a restored PA in Gaza will lack credibility and appear like a mere puppet regime. Israel may balk at the prospect of making such concessions, but the centrist members of the unity government might help tip the balance.

None of these measures will matter without swift action to rebuild a devastated Gaza. This is where Saudi Arabia becomes critical to the success of the transfer of Gaza from Israeli control to the UN and the subsequent consolidation of the Palestinian Authority’s hold over both the West Bank and Gaza. The cost of reconstruction will be substantial. Public infrastructure – including hospitals, schools, roads, electrical substations, water pipes, sanitation systems, and government offices—will probably be in ruins. To clear the rubble alone will take time and money. The United States will certainly try to be a generous contributor and, with Israeli cooperation and a functioning House of Representatives, Congress will appropriate the necessary funds. Saudi Arabia, however, not only has the funds to make a difference, but its participation will also lend the enterprise the kind of regional legitimacy that will strengthen the Palestinian Authority.

Many hurdles stand in the way of such an arrangement coming to pass. China and Russia may choose to obstruct the passing of the necessary resolution at the UN Security Council. Arab states may be unwilling to join what many of their citizens see as an occupying force in the strip. And Israel may refuse to make concessions to the Palestinians in the wake of Hamas’s attacks and an Israeli military victory. But one purpose of diplomacy is to probe intentions and spur the consideration of a wider the range of options in a contingency. This is what the moment requires. The alternative is Gaza as an eternal dystopia, with violence metastasizing around the broader region, and states less able to deal with all manner of social and environmental disarray—in other words, a Middle East transformed, but not quite as Washington envisaged it.

Foreign Affairs · by Steven Simon · October 18, 2023


21. What Israel Can Learn From America’s Counterterrorism Missteps – The Strategic Case for Adhering to the Laws of War



But what happens when emotion trumps reason and chance?


Excerpts:

Gaza is not Iraq or Syria. But there are lessons that can be drawn from the U.S. experience in those countries. The United States undermined its own mission by failing to prioritize civilian protection. The unlawful actions of ISIS, including using human shields, should have made protecting civilians more critical—not less—for U.S. strategy.
Just as the international community developed and adopted the Geneva Conventions after the barbarity of World War II, the Pentagon created policies to protect civilians at least in part as a response to its failures in places such as Mosul and Raqqa. The U.S. military believed it could do better, and that realization should galvanize the United States to engage with its friend Israel to protect civilians and adhere to international law. U.S. officials should draw upon their own mistakes to remind Israel that violating the laws of war comes with moral, legal, and practical consequences that will last far beyond the end of the fighting. What happens now in Gaza will determine Israel’s credibility on the world stage. The United States was rightly outraged at Hamas when it went after Israeli civilians. Now, Washington needs to make sure that Israel steers clear of targeting civilians in its response.



What Israel Can Learn From America’s Counterterrorism Missteps

The Strategic Case for Adhering to the Laws of War

By Sarah Yager

October 18, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Sarah Yager · October 18, 2023

When Hamas-led Palestinian fighters launched their deadly assault in Israel on October 7, many foreign governments rushed to support Israel. The United States was particularly fervent in declaring that Israel had a right to self-defense, and it expedited military assistance to the country without conditions.

Now, Israel appears ready for a ground invasion of Gaza in an effort, it says, to destroy Hamas. Israel Defense Forces have launched thousands of airstrikes on the enclave, massed hundreds of thousands of troops on the border, and warned Palestinian civilians to evacuate the northern part of the territory. Gaza is a small, densely populated place whose 2.2 million people have nowhere to go.

In responding to the unspeakable crimes of Hamas, Israel should abide by the laws of war—not only to comply with international legal obligations—but also for moral and strategic reasons. U.S. President Joe Biden has said as much in an interview, noting that “democracies like Israel and the United States are stronger and more secure when [they] act according to the rule of law.”

Hamas’s attacks against civilians in Israel, including opening fire on crowds, killing people in their homes, and taking women and children as hostages, is clearly unlawful. Unfortunately, in their initial response to Hamas’s atrocities, the Israel Defense Forces have themselves engaged in unlawful conduct. U.S. officials still have time to influence Israel before the land war begins. They should have a tough conversation with Israel about its conduct, publicly criticize Israel when it harms civilians, and curb military transfers to Israel when U.S. weapons are used to violate international law.

RULES FOR A REASON

Clear evidence has already emerged that Israel is violating international law enshrined in the Geneva Conventions. On October 11, the Israeli authorities cut off water, electricity, fuel, internet, and food to Gaza, amounting to unlawful collective punishment of the civilian population. Although Israeli officials have restored water to some parts of southern Gaza, they are keeping the taps shut in most of the territory. On October 12, the International Committee of the Red Cross issued a statement noting that without power, Gaza’s hospitals are “turning into morgues.” On October 12, Human Rights Watch reported that Israel used white phosphorous, which can be used as a smokescreen or as weapon, in operations in Gaza and Lebanon. Because white phosphorus can cause excruciating burns and long-term medical suffering, its use in populated areas violates the Geneva Convention’s requirement to take all feasible precautions to avoid civilian injury and loss of life.

U.S. officials have either been unwilling or unauthorized to condemn these Israeli violations of international humanitarian law. When asked whether the United States was providing any guidance to Israel on civilian casualties, National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby said the administration wanted to avoid “armchair quarterbacking the tactics on the ground by the IDF.” If the United States wants to maintain that it believes in international law, it cannot waver in holding Israel accountable for how it conducts hostilities.

U.S. officials have no trouble criticizing other governments for violations of international law. Last year, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield condemned Russia’s conduct in the war in Ukraine, pointing to “the plight of people in Mariupol” who had “been without food, water, electricity, or gas for weeks.” The Biden administration may have reacted differently to Russia than it did to Israel because it believes Hamas’s atrocities justify Israel’s conduct. But the rules guiding behavior in war don’t depend on whether the war itself is justified or whether the opposing side follows them. If they did, no party to a conflict would ever feel an obligation to abide by the laws of war.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin have repeated that they are concerned about civilian protection in Israel’s operations. But they need to go further. If U.S. officials do not publicly stand against indiscriminate attacks, cutting civilians off from water and power, and the use of white phosphorus in populated areas, they damage U.S. credibility. When the United States lets violations of international humanitarian laws slide, it harms its ability to uphold the rules-based international order, now and in the future. The next time the United States condemns Russia for bombing an apartment block or hospital, Russian President Vladimir Putin will surely claim unfair treatment.

LEARN FROM MY MISTAKES

The United States is perhaps the only country that can influence Israel in this moment. The U.S.-Israeli security relationship dates back to Israel’s creation after World War II. Since then, Israel has been the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. military assistance, accepting more than $158 billion (not adjusted for inflation), according to the Stimson Center. The militaries of the United States and Israel share intelligence and have trained together for decades.

The United States has a duty to make sure its partners uphold agreed-on standards. In a 2016 executive order that remains in place today, then President Barack Obama declared that the United States will “engage with foreign partners to share and learn best practices for reducing the likelihood of and responding to civilian casualties.” The 2022 Civilian Harm Mitigation Response Action Plan initiated by Austin articulates that U.S. security partners are under the same legal obligations as U.S. forces to minimize harm to civilians. The new Conventional Arms Transfer policy of 2023 allows the State Department to stop transferring arms to countries that harm civilians with U.S. weapons.


The United States is perhaps the only country that can influence Israel in this moment.

Washington should not waive these commitments for its closest partners. The United States crafted these policies in response to its own missteps. Extensive civilian harm caused by U.S. forces and its partners in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria bred deep mistrust, even hatred, of the United States and likely aided recruitment by armed groups. Heavy-handed operations left tens of thousands of civilians displaced, adding to regional instability. The deaths and injuries suffered by civilians across counterterrorism operations have never been accurately counted or recognized, but they are still present in the daily lives of victims and their families. U.S. officials aiming to help Israel in this moment of crisis should share what they’ve learned about the risks of failing to meet a high standard of conduct.

Scores of U.S. failures can inform Israel’s actions in Gaza. Take the U.S. military’s 2016 operation to defeat the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, in Mosul, Iraq. ISIS fighters operated amid a population of 2.5 million people. The group dug tunnels between the homes of Iraqi families so its fighters could find safe passage. The old city of Mosul was a warren of narrow streets and packed residences and markets. Yet just two weeks before U.S. forces attacked, Washington had no military plans for what to do with the civilian population. The U.S. military dropped leaflets from airplanes telling civilians to stay away from ISIS. Of course, there was no way for civilians to comply; ISIS would execute anyone holding a flyer. As fighting intensified, nearly 900,000 civilians fled Mosul, some of whom were shot in the back by ISIS as they tried to escape. The U.S. military destroyed infrastructure, including a water facility, and more than 5,000 homes in the old city. Many civilians died because the U.S. military used large bombs, artillery, rockets, and mortars with wide-area effects in densely populated areas.

Although the U.S. military promised the most “precise air war in history,” the reality was anything but. After the destruction of Mosul, the United States made similar mistakes in an operation in Raqqa, Syria. According to a report from the RAND Corporation, “As many as 80 percent of the buildings were deemed uninhabitable” after a U.S.-led coalition bombed ISIS in Raqqa, and “several thousand civilians who had survived months of shelling and street fighting had nowhere to go for safe drinking water within the wreckage.” Mosul and Raqqa needed billions of dollars to rebuild and their civilian populations continue to suffer in ways that are impossible to calculate. Even if Iraqi and Syrian civilians were relieved to be free from brutal ISIS rule, many of those who lived through U.S.-led operations were devastated, losing property and family members. The U.S. military seemed to forget the lesson espoused by General Stanley McChrystal, who commanded international forces in Afghanistan, and warned in 2009 that for every civilian killed, many more insurgents were created.

PULL YOUR FRIENDS ASIDE

Gaza is not Iraq or Syria. But there are lessons that can be drawn from the U.S. experience in those countries. The United States undermined its own mission by failing to prioritize civilian protection. The unlawful actions of ISIS, including using human shields, should have made protecting civilians more critical—not less—for U.S. strategy.

Just as the international community developed and adopted the Geneva Conventions after the barbarity of World War II, the Pentagon created policies to protect civilians at least in part as a response to its failures in places such as Mosul and Raqqa. The U.S. military believed it could do better, and that realization should galvanize the United States to engage with its friend Israel to protect civilians and adhere to international law. U.S. officials should draw upon their own mistakes to remind Israel that violating the laws of war comes with moral, legal, and practical consequences that will last far beyond the end of the fighting. What happens now in Gaza will determine Israel’s credibility on the world stage. The United States was rightly outraged at Hamas when it went after Israeli civilians. Now, Washington needs to make sure that Israel steers clear of targeting civilians in its response.

SARAH YAGER is Washington Director at Human Rights Watch. She previously served as the first Senior Adviser on Human Rights to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the U.S. Department of Defense.

Foreign Affairs · by Sarah Yager · October 18, 2023




22. How Hamas’s carefully planned Israel attack devolved into a chaotic rampage



Graphic images at the link: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/16/hamas-attack-israel/?utm


Excerpt:


“This was a unique mixture of state-of-the-art, disciplined planning, combined with … barbarism and brutality,” said Shimrit Meir, a former senior adviser in the previous Israeli government.




How Hamas’s carefully planned Israel attack devolved into a chaotic rampage

By Shira Rubin, Sarah Dadouch and Steve Hendrix

October 16, 2023 at 4:26 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Shira Rubin · October 16, 2023

This story contains graphic images.

TEL AVIV — On the morning of Oct. 7, hundreds of Hamas militants switched on their GoPros and cellphones and began live-streaming the deadliest attack in Israel’s history, massacring at least 1,400 people and abducting nearly 200, according to Israeli authorities.

What began as a highly organized stealth attack, using drone technology to overtake Israeli military observation points, soon devolved into a bloody and chaotic rampage. It underscored Hamas’s capacity for sophisticated planning and indiscriminate killing; the ability of the group to conceal details of a massive offensive operation; and its struggle to manage fighters once they had bulldozed their way through Israel’s border fence.

It was, by both Palestinian and Israeli accounts, a staggering and unexpected Hamas victory and an indictment of Israel’s vaunted military and intelligence services.

Hamas’s political leadership in exile said it was shocked at the lack of resistance: “We were expecting to get a smaller number of hostages and return, but the army collapsed in front of us, what were we to do?” Ali Barakeh, a Beirut-based Hamas representative, said in an interview with The Washington Post on Monday.

“The Israeli army has become a paper tiger,” Barakeh continued, “and that’s why the number of hostages was so big, and the number of Israeli casualties was so big.”

Miri Eisin, a former senior intelligence officer in the Israel Defense Forces, said the operation was the result of at least two years of planning, a period that included two conflicts between the IDF and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a smaller militant group in Gaza. At the time, Hamas was criticized for standing on the sidelines as PIJ leaders were eliminated by Israeli strikes.

It was part of a vast con, said Eisin, “to lull Israel into complacency,” while Hamas gathered intelligence and quietly built up its capabilities. The fighters’ apparent knowledge of Israeli border towns could have been gleaned in part from the thousands of Gazans who crossed the Israeli border on a daily basis, Eisin said, earning wages in the same communities that were overrun.

Israel-Gaza war

(Mohammed Saber/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)

President Biden will visit Israel on Wednesday to show solidarity “in the face of Hamas’s brutal terrorist attack” before traveling to Jordan to discuss Gaza’s humanitarian crisis. Follow the latest news and live updates.

End of carousel

“Those who attacked Israel are not terrorist squads, but a commando brigade belonging to a large army, numbering in the tens of thousands, built over time with funds intended for humanitarian causes,” said Meir Ben Shabbat, a former Israeli national security adviser, adding that some of the militants carried “data files on the territories and settlements they raided.”

In a rare all-staff memo made public on Monday, Ronen Bar, the director of Israel’s Shin Bet intelligence agency, took responsibility for the failure to foresee the attack: “The responsibility is mine,” Bar wrote. “Despite a series of actions we carried out, unfortunately … we were unable to establish sufficient deterrence so as to thwart the attack.”

By posting footage of the assault on its Telegram page, Hamas magnified the psychological warfare against Israelis and glorified the killing rampage for its online audience of supporters.

“Time for photographs,” said one militant, pointing his phone at a body, blood running down the sidewalk. Another man in a flak jacket shot a rifle into the air.

The gunmen held hundreds of families hostage in their homes, forcing some to feed them, or to watch as they killed relatives, witnesses have said.

The militants burned corpses, beheaded a wounded man with a garden hoe and fatally shot drivers as they entered residential towns, according to hours of videos gathered by the Israeli military, some of which were shared with journalists on Monday. The images could not be independently verified by The Post.

The Israeli military is holding a number of gunmen from Gaza whom it captured in the course of the attacks, officials said, and the captives have provided material and information that remains classified.

The militants had equipped themselves for a prolonged incursion, the IDF said Monday.

“They came with a lot of food, ammunition, medical aid,” said IDF spokesman Daniel Hagari. “They were not just planning to be there for a couple of hours.”

But the footage that has flooded social media also shows Hamas struggling in real time to deal with its horrifying success.

As the killing expanded to more than 20 Israeli towns and kibbutzim, one video shows militants trying to cram a large group of wounded hostages, two bodies deep, into the back of a pickup truck. Militants who streamed in on motorcycles scrambled to find vehicles to carry their hostages back to Gaza. In Kfar Azza, militants went down the lines of parked cars, breaking windows and looking for one to steal. Yaffa Adar, an 85-year-old grandmother from the community of Nir Oz, was ferried over the border on a golf cart.

In 2011, Israel traded more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners for a single Israeli soldier. Palestinian militants now hold 199 hostages, Israeli officials confirmed Monday.

“This was a unique mixture of state-of-the-art, disciplined planning, combined with … barbarism and brutality,” said Shimrit Meir, a former senior adviser in the previous Israeli government.

Barakeh, the Hamas representative, said the aim of attack was “to free Palestinian prisoners, stop Israeli aggression on al-Aqsa Mosque, and to break the siege on Gaza,” Instead, the assault has led to unprecedented Israeli airstrikes on Gaza, killing more than 2,700 people, and has rallied much of the world behind Israel as it prepares for a large-scale land invasion.

“We have prepared ourselves for the ground assault; we’re not afraid of it,” Barakeh said.

“Hamas thinks they carried out this operation, this thing that they called an attack for their freedom, and through their framing, they believe that they will win the coming war against Israel,” said Eisin, the former IDF intelligence officer. “But just as Hamas removed all red lines in targeting civilians, so too will Israel retaliate,” she said, predicting “a war for which we don’t yet have the words to describe.”

The Hamas attack was, above all, an opportunistic one, experts said, a response to Israeli and Palestinian political dysfunction.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his far-right government had spent months pushing through a plan to weaken his country’s judicial system, setting off nationwide protests, including among military reservists.

In the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority — Hamas’s longtime rival — was teetering on collapse, seen by many as complicit in Israeli raids that have made 2023 the deadliest year for Palestinians in the occupied territory in two decades. The authority, and its aging leader Mahmoud Abbas, stood to gain from a U.S. diplomatic push to normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, efforts that may have been permanently derailed by the attack.

Hamas sought to “make themselves relevant, and to this end, its tactics were atrocities,” said Anat Kurz, a senior fellow at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies. As fighters temporarily seized hundreds of kilometers of Israeli territory, many Palestinians rejoiced.

“We finally realized that Israel can be broken,” said Ghassan Khatib, a former Palestinian politician in the West Bank. He believes Hamas would sweep Palestinian national elections if they were held tomorrow.

Dadouch reported from Beirut and Hendrix from Jerusalem.

The Washington Post · by Shira Rubin · October 16, 2023





23. U.S., Taiwan on front lines in fight against disinformation: Envoy



Excerpts:

Beijing's information efforts on Taiwan used to be "primarily focused on promoting a positive narrative, making the argument that unification will restore cultural ties and bring economic benefits to Taiwan," Shullman said.
As support for the "one country, two systems model" in Hong Kong has faded in Taiwan, however, Chinese disinformation is now primarily directed at undermining trust and democracy in Taiwan and in Taiwan's democratic government, Shullman said.
With Taiwan's rich experience in combating Chinese disinformation warfare, however, it has also become an expert in this area, according to Shullman.
"Taiwan has combined high-tech efforts with more analog solutions, like improving government communication, crowdsourcing and maintaining tools for fact-checking and countering conspiracies and propaganda, and expanding the media literacy of education," he said.



U.S., Taiwan on front lines in fight against disinformation: Envoy - Focus Taiwan

focustaiwan.tw · by Link · October 17, 2023

Taipei, Oct. 17 (CNA) The United States and Taiwan are standing on the front lines in the fight against disinformation and have both experienced harmful disinformation in their respective democratic elections, the U.S.' top envoy to Taipei said Tuesday.

Speaking at the opening ceremony of a workshop on combating disinformation, American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Director Sandra Oudkirk praised Taiwan for its respect for "fundamental freedoms" and its strong commitment to the "free exchange of ideas."

"At a time of democratic backsliding and human rights abuses elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific, Taiwan serves as an invaluable model to others," she said. AIT represents U.S. interests in Taiwan in the absence of official diplomatic ties.

In the age of the internet and the emergence of artificial intelligence, however, the challenges brought by the spread of disinformation to open democratic societies are becoming more challenging, the AIT director said.

The "United States, Taiwan and many others are on the front lines as we grapple with the spread of disinformation and propaganda, particularly as foreign actors seek to use social media and emerging technologies to manipulate public discourse ... and undermine confidence in our democratic institutions," she said.

Amid this threat, such a forum was important for sharing experiences and best practices with like-minded representatives from governments, civil society and academia from all around the world, Oudkirk said.

"We believe a well-informed citizenry is key to the strength of democratic institutions, healthy and robust public debate, based on facts, evidence and research are integral to effective civic engagement," Oudkirk said.

The de facto U.S. ambassador to Taiwan made the address during the opening ceremony of the two-day Indo-Pacific Workshop on Countering Disinformation organized by the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, a government-funded NGO.

At Tuesday's opening ceremony, David O. Shullman, senior director of the Global China Hub at the Atlantic Council, an American think-tank, warned of China's disinformation campaign targeting Taiwan.

Beijing's information efforts on Taiwan used to be "primarily focused on promoting a positive narrative, making the argument that unification will restore cultural ties and bring economic benefits to Taiwan," Shullman said.

As support for the "one country, two systems model" in Hong Kong has faded in Taiwan, however, Chinese disinformation is now primarily directed at undermining trust and democracy in Taiwan and in Taiwan's democratic government, Shullman said.

With Taiwan's rich experience in combating Chinese disinformation warfare, however, it has also become an expert in this area, according to Shullman.

"Taiwan has combined high-tech efforts with more analog solutions, like improving government communication, crowdsourcing and maintaining tools for fact-checking and countering conspiracies and propaganda, and expanding the media literacy of education," he said.

(By Joseph Yeh)

Enditem/ls

focustaiwan.tw · by Link · October 17, 2023






De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


 
 

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com



If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:


"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website
Facebook  Twitter  Pinterest  
basicImage