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Quotes of the Day:
“We can define our way to failure. We must understand our way to success.”
- Robert Jones
“Without ambition one starts nothing. Without work one finishes nothing. The prize will not be sent to you. You have to win it.”
- Ralph Waldo Emerson
“Falling down is not failure. Failure comes when you stay where you have fallen.”
- Socrates
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 18 (Putin's War)
2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (18.10.22) CDS comments on key events
3. Retired U.S. generals, admirals take top jobs with Saudi crown prince
4. Key findings from The Post’s series on veterans’ lucrative foreign jobs
5. The U.S. Isn’t Ready to Face China on the Battlefield
6. Russian President introduces martial law in Kherson, Zaporozhye, DPR and LPR regions
7. Iranian Shahed-136 Drones Increase Russian Strike Capacity and Lethality in Ukraine
8. Opinion | The world continues to ignore the radicalization of India
9. Xi Jinping’s Strategy of Conflict
10. 'Massive blackouts' as 30% of Ukraine's power stations destroyed in just over a week, Zelensky says
11. Why Biden's National Security Strategy Is Destined to Fail
12. China’s Surveillance State Pushes Deeper into Citizens’ Lives
13. The Hunt for Phish: How Agents Netted a Terrorist Jewel Thief
14. McCarthy signals GOP-led House likely to oppose more aid to Ukraine
15. Most Ukrainians want to keep fighting until Russia is driven out, poll finds
16. FDD | For Sanctions to Work in Bosnia, EU Must Join the U.S.
17. Homeland Defense in the Information Space: Learning from Russian Influence Campaigns in Eastern Europe
18. Big Tech Goes to War
19. China and the ‘Two Arctics’
20. ASEAN bracing for US-China rivalry to explode
21. Analysis | Americans agree democracy is at risk. They disagree vehemently on why.
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 18 (Putin's War)
Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces continued to target critical Ukrainian civilian infrastructure with air, missile, and drone strikes.
- Russian troops conducted a limited ground attack in northern Kharkiv Oblast, seemingly suggesting that Russian forces may retain territorial aspirations in Kharkiv Oblast despite massive losses during recent Ukrainian counteroffensives.
- Current and former US officials confirmed that members of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are in Russian-occupied Crimea to train Russian forces on how to use the Iranian drones they purchased, thereby enabling likely Russian war crimes.
- Belarus continues to provide its territory and airspace to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine but remains highly unlikely to enter the war on Russia’s behalf.
- Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast to regain lost positions.
- Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations across the entire frontline in Kherson Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and ammunition depots in central Kherson Oblast.
- Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
- Russian authorities are struggling to cope with their reduced logistics capacity through Crimea following the attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge.
- Russian occupation authorities kidnapped Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) personnel, likely to strengthen physical control over the ZNPP’s operations.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that mobilization ended on October 17 in Moscow Oblast, and Russian civilians continue to express their dissatisfaction with Russian mobilization.
- Russian occupation officials are attempting to incentivize Ukrainian citizens under Russian control in northern Kherson Oblast to flee to Russia as Ukrainian forces advance, and occupation authorities may increasingly force Ukrainian civilians to relocate further behind the frontlines or to Russia in the coming days.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 18
understandingwar.org
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 18
Karolina Hird, Katherine Lawlor, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Mason Clark
October 18, 8:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces continued to target critical Ukrainian civilian infrastructure with air, missile, and drone strikes on October 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 19 missile strikes and 68 air strikes against over 10 areas, including Kyiv, Zhytomyr City, Kharkiv City, Dnipro City, Kryvyi Rih, Zaporizhzhia City, Mykolaiv City, Odesa City, and other areas in Donetsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv Oblasts.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces targeted unspecified areas with 43 kamikaze drones, 38 of which Ukrainian forces shot down.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces continued to strike Ukrainian infrastructure and military command facilities.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 18 that Russian strikes between October 10 and October 18 destroyed 30% of Ukrainian power stations in a likely attempt to demoralize Ukrainian civilians that is unlikely to succeed.[4]
Current and former US officials confirmed to the New York Times on October 18 that members of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are in Russian-occupied Crimea to train Russian forces on how to use the Iranian drones they purchased, thereby enabling likely Russian war crimes.[5] ISW had assessed on October 12 that any Iranian personnel in Ukraine were likely IRGC drone trainers.[6] The New York Times reported that it remains unclear whether Iranian trainers are flying the drones themselves, or merely teaching Russian forces how to do so. Russian forces have directed dozens of Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones against civilian targets in Ukraine since mid-September, prioritizing creating psychological terror effects on Ukrainian civilians rather than achieving tangible battlefield effects.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unequal implementation of partial mobilization is causing social fractures that are driving the Russian information space to further marginalize ethnic minority communities. As ISW has previously reported, an October 15 shooting at a Belgorod Oblast training ground was likely a natural consequence of the Kremlin’s continued policy of using poor and minority communities to bear the brunt of force generation efforts while protecting ethnic Russians and wealthier Russian citizens.[7] Russian sources blamed that shooting on two ethnically Tajik Russian citizens who had been forcibly mobilized.[8] The Russian information space has largely responded with virulently xenophobic rhetoric against Central Asian migrants and other peripheral social groups. “A Just Russia” Party Chairperson Sergey Mironov posted a long, xenophobic critique of Russia’s migration policy on October 18, claiming that mobilization exposed systemic fractures within the Russian immigration system.[9] Mironov blamed military commissars for allowing people who pose a threat to Russian security into the Russian Armed Forces and accused military commissariats of keeping their doors wide open for individuals from Central Asia. Mironov proposed a moratorium on granting Russian citizenship to citizens of Tajikistan.[10] Mironov’s calls for immigration reform demonstrate the role that partial mobilization has seemingly played in catalyzing ethnic divisions, racism, and xenophobia in the Russian domestic space, especially against ethnic minorities.
Belarus continues to provide its territory and airspace to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine but remains highly unlikely to enter the war on Russia’s behalf. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 18 that Belarus continues to allow Russia to use Belarusian military infrastructure and airspace to launch missile, air, and Shahed-136 drone attacks on Ukraine.[11] Geolocated social media footage shows Russian military hardware moving through Belarus by rail, which is consistent with ISW’s previous assessments that Belarus will continue to engage in the war as a co-belligerent without Belarusian forces directly participating in combat operations.[12] The Russian Armed Forces are almost certainly too degraded to reopen a northern front against Ukraine from Belarusian territory in the coming months. The Ukrainian General Staff also noted that Belarusian Armed Forces are conducting covert mobilization under the guise of training sessions, although mobilization in Belarus is likely an attempt by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to demonstrate his support to Putin rather than a tangible indicator of Belarusian military involvement in Ukraine.[13]
Russian troops conducted a limited ground attack in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 18, seemingly suggesting that Russian forces may retain territorial aspirations in Kharkiv Oblast despite massive losses during recent Ukrainian counteroffensives. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled a Russian attack on Ohirtseve, a settlement 2km south of the international border and about 50km northeast of Kharkiv City.[14] The nature of this limited incursion is unclear, but it may suggest that Russian troops are continuing offensive operations near the border. Considering the current, constantly degrading state of Russian offensive capabilities in Ukraine, Russian troops are very unlikely to make any gains in this area.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces continued to target critical Ukrainian civilian infrastructure with air, missile, and drone strikes.
- Russian troops conducted a limited ground attack in northern Kharkiv Oblast, seemingly suggesting that Russian forces may retain territorial aspirations in Kharkiv Oblast despite massive losses during recent Ukrainian counteroffensives.
- Current and former US officials confirmed that members of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are in Russian-occupied Crimea to train Russian forces on how to use the Iranian drones they purchased, thereby enabling likely Russian war crimes.
- Belarus continues to provide its territory and airspace to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine but remains highly unlikely to enter the war on Russia’s behalf.
- Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast to regain lost positions.
- Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations across the entire frontline in Kherson Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and ammunition depots in central Kherson Oblast.
- Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
- Russian authorities are struggling to cope with their reduced logistics capacity through Crimea following the attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge.
- Russian occupation authorities kidnapped Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) personnel, likely to strengthen physical control over the ZNPP’s operations.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that mobilization ended on October 17 in Moscow Oblast, and Russian civilians continue to express their dissatisfaction with Russian mobilization.
- Russian occupation officials are attempting to incentivize Ukrainian citizens under Russian control in northern Kherson Oblast to flee to Russia as Ukrainian forces advance, and occupation authorities may increasingly force Ukrainian civilians to relocate further behind the frontlines or to Russia in the coming days.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
- Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Eastern Ukraine: (Oskil River-Kreminna Line)
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast to regain lost positions on October 18. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian troops recaptured Horobivka, a settlement in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast about 16km northeast of Kupyansk.[15] The Russian MoD also claimed that Russian troops conducted a limited spoiling attack around Kyslivka, around 20km southeast of Kupyansk. The Ukrainian General Staff and Russian sources notably stated that Russian forces shelled Kotlyarivka, just south of Kyslivka, indicating Ukrainian forces have advanced southeast of Kupyansk up to the Kotlyarivka area.[16]
Russian forces likely continued defensive operations west of the Svatove-Kreminna line on October 18. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian troops repelled Ukrainian attempts to cross the Zherebets River around Stelmakhivka and Andriivka, both about 14km west of Svatove.[17] A Russian milblogger also reported that Russian troops stopped Ukrainian forces from advancing directly on Svatove.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Ukrainian troops repelled a Russian attack on Bilohorivka in Luhansk Oblast (10km south of Kreminna), which suggests that Russian troops continue to conduct limited ground attacks in western Luhansk Oblast to regain ground near the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area.[19] Russian sources indicated that Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) troops are focusing on defensive operations and attempting to regain ground west of Lysychansk.[20]
Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)
Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations across the entire frontline in Kherson Oblast on October 18. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces defeated a Ukrainian offensive in the direction of Kherson City near Zelenyi Hai (20km northwest of Kherson City) on October 18.[21] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack in the direction of Bruskinske, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River.[22] Different Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to break through Russian lines near Mylove (north of Beryslav) and are accumulating forces to launch a new counteroffensive toward Beryslav within the next 24 hours.[23] ISW offers no assessment of these claims. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces defeated a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance platoon attempting to bypass Ukrainian positions near Nova Kamyanka (about 40km northeast of Beryslav).[24]
Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and ammunition depots in Central Kherson Oblast on October 18. Ukraine’s Southern Operational command reported that Ukrainian forces conducted about 100 fire missions and destroyed two Russian ammunition depots near or around Beryslav on October 18.[25] A local Kherson Telegram channel reported explosions in Russian-occupied Muzykivka (4km north of Kherson City), Kakhovka (6km east of Nova Kakhovka), and Nova Zburivka (approximately 47 km southwest of Kherson City).[26]
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut and Avdiivka on October 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks northeast of Bakhmut near Bakhmutske and south of Bakhmut near Ivanhrad and Klishchiivka.[27] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults on the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut and Soledar to the northeast.[28] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on October 17 that Russian forces plan to capture Bakhmut by the end of October, though ISW assesses they are highly unlikely to do so.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled ground attacks northeast of Avdiivka near Novokalynove and southwest of Avdiivka near Marinka and Pervomaiske.[30] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia claimed that DNR forces are using UAVs to consolidate control over Pervomaiske, and geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces still maintain positions in Pervomaiske as of October 18.[31]
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian authorities are struggling to cope with their reduced logistics capacity through Crimea following the Ukrainian attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge on October 8. Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Regional Development Marat Khusnullin stated on October 18 that authorities will complete dismantling the damaged spans of the Crimean bridge by the end of December 2022, indicating that Russian forces will likely have reduced logistics capabilities through Crimea for months.[32] Ukrainian sources shared footage of a large traffic jam in front of the Kerch Strait Bridge and claimed that one car passes through the inspection point every 40 minutes.[33]
Russian forces continued routine artillery, air, and missile strikes west of Hulyaipole and in Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts on October 18. Ukraine’s Operational Command South reported that Russian forces struck Berenezhuvate and Kutsurub hromadas in Mykolaiv Oblast, Dnipro City, Nikopol, and Kryvyi Rih.[34] Ukrainian and Russian sources also reported that Russian forces targeted Zaporizhzhia City and Odesa City with loitering munitions.[35] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces destroyed the Ukrainian Government Communications Center space communications station in Paliivka, Odesa Oblast, about 17km northwest of Odesa City, but ISW cannot confirm this claim or assess its possible impact.[36] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Russian forces fired artillery against Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups in the Zaporizhia direction and force concentrations near Orikhiv.[37]
Russian occupation authorities kidnapped Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) personnel on October 17, likely to strengthen physical control over the ZNPP’s operations. Ukrainian state nuclear agency Energoatom reported that Russian authorities kidnapped and relocated ZNPP Information Technology Service Head Oleh Kostyukov and Assistant General Director Oleh Oshka and that their current whereabouts and condition are unknown.[38] A member of the Russian occupation administration in Zaporizhia Oblast criticized the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) call to establish a demilitarized zone at the ZNPP and stated that ZNPP occupation authorities have ruled out the possibility of demilitarization.[39]
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that mobilization ended on October 17 in Moscow Oblast, giving legal force to Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin’s October 17 announcement.[40] The MoD likely ended mobilization in Moscow, a relatively wealthy and educated oblast, in an effort to subdue criticism among Moscow residents amid reports of illegal mobilization in the city, as ISW assessed on October 17.[41] Mobilization will likely continue to disproportionately affect poorer and majority-minority oblasts in the coming weeks as Russian officials wind down mobilization to prepare to administer the delayed but usual autumn conscription cycle, which is set to begin November 1.
Russian civilians continue to express their dissatisfaction with Russian mobilization. An unidentified person set fire to a Russian military enlistment office in Mukhorshibir, the Republic of Buryatia with a Molotov cocktail on October 17.[42]
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian occupation officials are attempting to incentivize Ukrainian citizens under Russian control in northern Kherson Oblast to flee to Russia as Ukrainian forces advance, and occupation authorities may increasingly force Ukrainian civilians to relocate in the coming days. The head of Russia’s Kherson occupation administration, Vladimir Saldo, announced an “organized, gradual displacement” of civilians from four towns on the right bank of the Dnipro River on October 18.[43] The newly-appointed head of Russia’s military operations in Ukraine, Sergey Surovikin, claimed on October 18 that Ukrainian forces were preparing indiscriminate missile strikes on Kherson City and preparing to breach the Nova Kakhovka dam.[44] He claimed that such a breach would flood the right bank of the river. Surovikin announced that the Russian military would “ensure” the departure of Kherson civilians. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin announced on October 18 that Ukrainian civilians in Russian-annexed Kherson will receive housing vouchers, material support, and other unspecified financial compensation for leaving Kherson to live, work, and purchase homes in Russia.[45] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on October 17 that Russian authorities sent instructions to museums in occupied areas to prepare to transfer valuable exhibits from Ukraine to Russia.[46]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[39] https://t.me/vrogov/5639; https://ria dot ru/20221017/zaes-1824601700.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch%3Ftext%3D;
[46] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/10/17/na-pivdni-okupanty-evakuyuyut-rodyny-ta-grabuyut-muzeyi-j-zavody/
understandingwar.org
2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (18.10.22) CDS comments on key events
CDS Daily brief (18.10.22) CDS comments on key events
Humanitarian aspect:
As of the morning of October 18, 2022, more than 1,240 Ukrainian children are victims of full- scale armed aggression by the Russian Federation, Prosecutor General's Office reports. The official number of children who died and were wounded during the Russian aggression is 425, and more than 815 children, respectively. However, the data is not conclusive since data collection continues in the areas of active hostilities, temporarily occupied areas, and liberated territories. According to the state child search portal "Children of War," as of October 18, 251 children considered missing, 8,276 — deported, and 6,741 — found.
The bodies of 5 murdered children were exhumed in Lyman. Investigators found four children in a mass burial at the cemetery. Another boy was buried by the mother in her own yard. The National Police preliminary established that all of them died due to Russian shelling [of the shrapnel wounds]. After the examinations, the children will be reburied.
At night and in the morning, the Russians again struck several Oblasts of Ukraine.
At night, Russia shelled Mykolaiv with S-300 missiles. A two-story building was hit, and one person died. Five Shahed-136 drones were shot down. Two series of explosions were recorded in Kharkiv in the morning. Around 06:30 in the morning, the Russians struck the northern part of Kryvyi Rih.
Kyiv was attacked in the morning; two critical infrastructure objects were damaged, and work continues to eliminate the consequences. 3 hits at the power supply facility in Kyiv's Left Bank district were confirmed. Three people have died; all of them were employees of the affected critical infrastructure facility, confirmed Kyiv's mayor Vitaliy Klitschko. There were interruptions in the electricity and water supply on the Left Bank of the capital; people were queuing for drinking water. Emergency power outages were possible in other areas of the city. However, just in 2 hours, energy specialists restored electricity supply to 2,108 households using a backup power supply.
The death toll has risen to 5 after yesterday's kamikaze drone attack on Kyiv. The body of another deceased resident - an elderly woman - was found under the rubble of the building, said Vitaliy Klitschko.
The enemy fired two rockets at the energy infrastructure in Dnipro. Due to severe damage, some areas of Dnipro, Sinelnykove and Vasylkovka (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) were left without electricity. In addition, one of the Dnipro water canal pumping stations has been disconnected from the energy supply, the head of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration, Valentyn Reznichenko, said. During the night of October 18-19, the Nikopol district of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast was shelled from "Grady" and heavy artillery.
The Russians hit an energy supply facility in Zhytomyr with two missiles. The city's mayor reported no electricity or water supply after Russian missile attacks on the energy infrastructure. In addition, the Zhytomyr Oblast Military administration said that 11 towns and villages of the Zhytomyr Oblast were temporarily left without electricity.
Today, Russian aircraft attacked Ukrainian cities from the Rostov region. Such a maneuver leaves less time for air defense forces to react compared to an attack from the Caspian Sea, the command of the Ukrainian Air Force explained a large number of hits on infrastructure facilities this morning.
Over the past week (October 10 -18), 408 infrastructure objects were subjected to Russian attacks and destruction, of which more than 45 were energy infrastructure objects. In addition, 180 residential buildings were damaged, the press service of the Ministry of Community and Territorial Development said. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that since October 10, 30% of [Ukraine's] power plants had been destroyed due to Russian strikes, which led to massive power outages throughout the country.
Ukrainian energy company DTEK warned of possible power outages. Due to morning strikes on the energy infrastructure, power outages are possible in Kyiv and the Dnipro. Ukrainians are asked to charge phones and power banks and limit the use of energy-intensive appliances: boilers, washing machines, heaters and air conditioners.
Occupied territories:
Russian invaders once again abducted employees of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, Energoatom reports. Yesterday, October 17, Russian [occupation authorities] detained Oleh Kostyukov, head of the ZNPP information technology service, and Oleh Osheka, deputy general director of the plant, and took them in an unknown direction. Until now, nothing is known about their condition and whereabouts. Energoatom appealed to IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi and the entire world community to make every effort and take all possible measures to free ZNPP workers from the captivity of Russian terrorists.
Operational situation
(please note that this part of the report is mainly on the previous day's (October 17) developments)
It is the 237th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to defend Donbas"). The enemy tries to maintain control over the temporarily captured territories. It concentrates on disrupting the actions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, and continues offensive attempts in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions.
The Russian military shells the positions of the Ukrainian troops along the entire contact line, fortifies defensive positions and frontiers in certain directions, and conducts aerial reconnaissance. In violation of the norms of international humanitarian law, the laws and
customs of war, they strike Ukraine's critical infrastructure and residential quarters. During the past 24 hours, the enemy launched 10 missile and 58 air strikes, and carried out up to 60 rounds of anti-aircraft fire.
During the past day, areas of more than 35 Ukrainian towns and villages, including Kyiv, the towns in Kyiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv Oblasts, were hit by enemy attacks; Bilohorivka, Terny, Krasnohorivka and Maryinka in Donetsk Oblast; Nova Kamianka and Biloghirka in Kherson Oblast. The enemy used cruise, aviation and anti-aircraft guided missiles. In addition, Russian troops launched 43 UAVs from southern Ukraine, 37 of which were destroyed by Ukrainian air defense. Most of the UAVs were Iranian Shahed-136. Five "Shahed-136" drones struck objects in the Shevchenkiv district of Kyiv, particularly the "Ukrenergo" building.
Near the state border, the enemy shelled with the artillery of various types Senkivka in Chernihiv Oblast; Seredyna-Buda, Dmytrivka in Sumy Oblast; Khatnie, Starytsia, and Strilecha in Kharkiv Oblast.
The threat of missile and airstrikes and the use of "Shahed-136" attack UAVs from the territory of the Republic of Belarus remains.
The aviation of Ukrainian Defense Forces carried out 22 strikes during the past day. The hits on 18 areas of enemy concentration of weapons and military equipment, a stronghold point, and three positions of the enemy's anti-aircraft missile systems were confirmed. Ukrainian air defense units shot down 3 cruise missiles. In addition, Ukraine's missile troops and artillery hit the command and control post, the area of concentration of manpower, weapons and military equipment, two air defense and artillery targets, one ammunition depot and other enemy military targets.
On October 16, The Washington Post reported that Iran would supply Russia with additional missiles, including Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar short-range ballistic missiles, in addition to Shahed- 136, Mohajer-6 and Arash-2 UAVs.
The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low. Kharkiv direction
• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the
RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;
• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps,
2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.
Over the past day, units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled the enemy attack in the area of Berestove. The Russian troops with various types of artillery shelled the Ukrainian Defence Forces' positions in Bilohorivka, Grekivka, Zarichne, Nadiya, Novoehorivka, and Terny. Near Terny, the enemy also used attack UAVs.
Ukrainian Defense Forces continue to attack northwestern Svatovo; in the Kupyansk region, they are preparing to advance eastward to Nizhnia Duvanka.
Russian troops are increasing the engineering equipment of their line Svatove - Kreminna - Lysychansk. They carried local counterattacks west of Kreminna with the aim of returning the lost territory between Lyman and Kreminna, and tried an unsuccessful attack at Torske.
Kramatorsk direction
● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;
● 252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th, and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.
With mortars, barrel and jet artillery, the enemy fired at Ukrainian positions in the areas of Berestove, Hryanykivka, Dvorichna, Kotlyarivka, Serebryanka and Stelmakhivka.
Donetsk direction
● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.
The enemy inflicted fire damage from tanks, mortars, barrel and rocket artillery along the contact line and unsuccessfully attacked Bakhmutske, Ivangrad, Klishchiivka, Pervomaiske and Maryinka of the Donetsk Oblast.
Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut and Bakhmutske, Soledar, Berestove, and Spirne, near Mayorsk, south of Avdiyivka in the area of Maryinka, Krasnohorivka, Pobieda, Nevelske, Vodyane, Novomykhailivka.
Russian troops stormed Ukrainian positions near Opytne and repelled a Ukrainian attack on Russian positions north of Bakhmut in the direction of Striapivka.
Zaporizhzhia direction
● Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.
The enemy shelled more than 15 towns and villages, including Biloghirya, Bogoyavlenka, Vuhledar, Malynivka, Orihiv and Shevchenko.
The Ukrainian Defense Forces struck Russian personnel and military equipment concentration near Marfopol, Tokmak, Polohy, Kamianka-Dniprovska, Melitopol, Berdyansk, Voskresenka, and Vasylivka, and the concentration of Russian personnel and equipment near Molochansk, Energodar, Orikhiv, and Hulyaipole.
Russian troops continued artillery, aviation, and missile strikes west of Hulyaipole and on the cities of Zaporizhzhia and Nikopol.
Tavriysk direction
- Vasylivka – Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 42, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7 km;
- Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd, and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 37th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 10th, 16th, 346th separate SOF brigades, 239th air assault regiment of the 76th Air assault division, 217th and 331st parachute airborne regiments of the 98th airborne
division, 108 air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault battalion of the 7th Air assault division, 11th and 83rd separate airborne assault brigade, 4th military base of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 7 military base 49 Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 126th separate coastal defence brigades, 127th separate ranger brigade, 1st and 3rd Army Corps, PMCs.
The Russian troops shelled military and civilian infrastructure. Areas of more than 20 towns and villages along the contact line were damaged by fire. The enemy made more than 30 UAV sorties to conduct aerial reconnaissance.
The Ukrainian Defense Forces tried to advance south from the Nova Kamianka - Dudchany frontier toward Mylove and Pyatykhatky and break through the Russian defenses in the Davydiv Brid area. They destroyed two Russian ammunition warehouses and an air defense facility near Beryslav.
Russian troops continue to restore crossings across the river near Kherson, equipped a barge bridge near the Antoniv bridge.
The Russian occupiers are building fortifications by looting the local population, violating all norms of international humanitarian law, laws and customs of war. Thus, in Blahodatne, they [forcibly] take building materials and metal constructions from private households of civilians to equip their position.
Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:
The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and to maintain control over the captured territories.
In the open sea, the Russian naval group consists of 6 ships and boats located along the southwestern coast of Crimea. Among them are two carriers of cruise missiles - two corvettes of project 21631 with 16 "Caliber" missiles.
In the waters of the Sea of Azov, enemy patrol ships and boats are on the approach to the Mariupol and Berdyansk seaports to block the Azov coast.
Enemy aviation continues to fly from Crimean airfields Belbek and Gvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 14 Su-27, Su-30 and Su-24 aircraft were deployed from Belbek and Saki airfields.
The enemy continues shelling Ukrainian ports and coastal areas. On the night of October 18, the enemy again shelled Odesa, Mykolaiv and other places in southern Ukraine with "Shahed-136" kamikaze drones and S-300 air defense missiles. Also, on the morning of October 17, the enemy attacked Ukraine with two Kalibr missiles from a ship from the sea area near Crimea.
Due to the repair of the Crimean Bridge, there was a massive accumulation of cargo waiting to be crossed through the Kerch Strait. The waiting time in the queue is 4-6 days, depending on the direction and weather conditions. The enemy is studying alternative logistics methods for supplying its grouping of troops in the Kherson Oblast through the occupied Azov region, with the main hub in Melitopol.
The Turkish military conducted tests of a short-range ballistic missile over the Black Sea. The rocket was launched on Tuesday, October 18, at around 7:00 a.m. from a mobile platform from an airport near the port city of Rize. According to the publication's sources, the rocket flew 561 km and fell into the Black Sea near the coast near Sinop.
Secret development of the missiles, called Typhoon in Turkish, has been going on for several years, sources say. At the same time, the representative office of the Ministry of Defense, which controls the development of the country's weapons, refused to disclose any information about the project.
"Grain Initiative": The bulk carrier PANGEO, which will deliver 40,000 tons of wheat to the people of Yemen, is already the 6th vessel chartered by the World Food Program (WFP) of the United Nations as part of helping countries fight the food crisis. The first 5 ships delivered more than 120,000 tons of wheat to Ethiopia, Somalia, Yemen and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, 51,400 tons of Ukrainian wheat is being unloaded from the SUPER HENRY bulker in Kenya. This is the first vessel among those that have already exported wheat for the needs of this country. "For us, it remains a priority to provide African and Asian countries with Ukrainian grain and oil. To date, more than
4.3 million tons of food have been exported to the countries of these continents. Saturating the market with Ukrainian agricultural products is what we can and are doing to prevent a food crisis in the world. Under the current conditions, all port services are working at full capacity with the aim of prompt loading of grain carriers and tankers," commented Deputy Minister of Infrastructure of Ukraine Yuriy Vaskov. In addition, today, as part of the "Grain Initiative", 4 more ships with almost 50,000 tons of food for Asian countries left the ports of Greater Odesa. During the 2.5 months of operation of the "grain corridor", 353 ships already exported more than 7.8 million tons of agricultural products.
Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 18.10
Personnel - almost 65,850 people (+350);
Tanks 2,548 (+11);
Armored combat vehicles – 5,219 (+14);
Artillery systems – 1,622 (+23);
Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 372 (+6); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 188 (+1); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 3,985 (+16); Aircraft - 268 (0);
Helicopters – 242 (0);
UAV operational and tactical level – 1,276 (+35); Intercepted cruise missiles - 318 (+2);
Boats / ships - 16 (0).
Ukraine, general news
The Ukrainian parliament, Verkhovna Rada, recognized the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria as temporarily occupied by Russia and condemned the genocide of the Chechen people. Two hundred eighty-seven deputies voted "yay".
The head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba, submitted a proposal to cut diplomatic relations with Iran to the president due to Russia's use of Iranian drones against the civilian infrastructure of Ukraine. Kuleba also added that Tehran is responsible for destroying relations with Ukraine. Furthermore, a draft law on breaking diplomatic relations with Iran and recognizing it as a sponsor of terrorism has been submitted to the Verkhovna Rada. Also, Ukraine would appeal to international institutions to recognize Iran as a terrorist state and strengthen sanctions.
Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs refuted Russian allegations about foreign diplomatic missions departing Kyiv. "Now, there are many false allegations about the functioning of foreign diplomatic missions. Mostly, they are made by Russian sources in order to sow panic. The latest example is the sudden "closure" of the Serbian embassy, which actually left Kyiv back in March," the diplomat noted. "No embassy has reported intentions to leave Ukraine," he said. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs perceives the recommendations of the embassies of China and Egypt regarding the departure of citizens of these countries from Ukraine as reactions to the massive shelling on October 10.
The Cabinet of Ministers created the Coordination Headquarters for the return to Ukraine of citizens from temporarily occupied territories through third countries.
Ilya Vityuk, the head of the Cyber Security Department of the SBU, announced that more than 100,000 calls from Ukrainians were sent to the chatbot created by the Security Service of Ukraine for reporting on enemy troops, equipment and sabotage reconnaissance group. As a result, they made it possible to destroy hundreds of units of Russian equipment and eliminate several Russian generals due to the courage of ordinary Ukrainians, who risked their lives to take pictures and send information.
International diplomatic aspect
"Another kind of Russian terrorist attacks: targeting (Ukraine's) energy & critical infrastructure. Since Oct 10, 30 [percent] of Ukraine's power stations have been destroyed, causing massive blackouts across the country. No space left for negotiations with Putin's regime," Volodymyr Zelenskyy twitted. Moscow has been hitting Ukraine's energy infrastructure with waves of missile and drone strikes.
At the beginning of the war, Russia's official rhetoric insisted that the Russian Army was targeting "Ukrainian nationalists" and only military targets. Russians, in their manner, blamed all civilian casualties and destruction on the Ukrainian Armed Forces and called Russia's genocide mass
killings "staged". Now Moscow doesn't even bother to cover up its war crimes. According to Article 8(2)(b)(ii) of the 1998 ICC [Rome] Statute, "intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives," constitutes a war crime in international armed conflicts. By attacks on thermal power plants and other energy infrastructure, Russia intentionally targets civilian objects [far from the frontline], objects that are not military targets. Furthermore, the Kremlin commissioned these attacks with the knowledge that they would result in civilians' accidental death or injury and damage to civilian objects.
The White House "strongly condemns Russia's missile strikes," and the attacks continue "to demonstrate Putin's brutality," commented the strikes US President's spokesperson. She said the United States "will continue to impose costs on Russia, hold them accountable for its war crimes."
In the coming days, NATO's Secretary-General announced the delivery of anti-drone air defense systems to Ukraine to counter the threat of multiple Iranian-made kamikaze drones. Germany has already delivered a state-of-the-art IRIS-T air defense system, and the US will soon provide NASAMS. However, the quantity of the promised systems won't be able to solve the issue of Russian missile attacks. To make things worse, Tehran agreed to provide Moscow with more drones and ballistic missiles that would replenish at least a part of what's being said, two-thirds of missiles Russia had already fired at Ukraine.
Failing to achieve anything tangible on the battleground, the Kremlin intends to impose enormous suffering on civilians, pushing the government to accept a new status quo (de facto defeat). The US's self-imposed limitation on the types of weapons supplied to Ukraine and prohibition on targeting the Russian territory is unable to timely provide necessary types of air defense systems in needed quantities, multiplying the cost Ukraine would pay for its sovereignty and independence. Ukraine badly needs means to target platforms (bombers, jets, ground launchers, command and control centers, and alike), which is the only efficient way to deal with missile and drone threats and avoid a humanitarian catastrophe of even more enormous magnitude than we've already seen.
Donald Tusk, the leader of Poland's largest opposition party, called on the ruling party to fully clarify the facts surrounding a scandal that cost his party elections related to illegal wiretapping of top politicians and Russian coal imports. He is convinced that Russia was involved. "I am calling for the establishment of a parliamentary investigative committee so that no one in Poland can speculate that Law and Justice's power was, in fact, installed by the Russian services," the politician said. Meanwhile, Germany's head of the national cybersecurity agency has been dismissed following reports of his possible ties to Russian intelligence. In addition, meta recently reported shutting down a large Russia-operated network operating since May that has been distributing anti-Ukraine content across several European countries — including Germany, France, Italy, the UK, and Ukraine. Russia's malign activities, traditional and cyber espionage, and influence operations remain a severe security threat to the free world countries that require a more aggressive approach.
Russia, relevant news
After yesterday's fall of a military plane near a residential building in Yeysk, Russia, 15 people died, including 3 children - the Russian sources reported.
Russian companies began to receive up to 40% of defective microchips from China; earlier, the share of unusable microchips was about 2%, Kommersant reports. The reason is the termination of the official cooperation of foreign distributors with Russian partners and, as a result, the import of electronics and components through unofficial suppliers.
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3. Retired U.S. generals, admirals take top jobs with Saudi crown prince
I guess it is good work if you can get it (financially lucrative for sure).
I took this law seriously when I retired. I was not about to accept foreign government employment. I had no idea 95% of requests are granted and enforcement is almost non-existent.
Excerpts:
Under federal law, retired U.S. military personnel — generally defined as those who served at least 20 years in uniform and are entitled to a pension — are restricted from receiving anything of value from foreign governments that could compromise their sworn allegiance to the United States.
The prohibition stems from the foreign emoluments clause of the Constitution, which forbids federal officeholders to accept gifts, jobs or titles “from any King, Prince, or foreign State” without the consent of Congress. The law applies to military retirees because they can be recalled to active duty at any time. In 1977, Congress delegated the authority to approve veterans’ foreign work to the Pentagon and State Department.
Those approvals are necessary before the retirees can accept any compensation, even travel expenses, from a foreign government or state-owned company. Retirees may work only as civilians, not as uniformed personnel.
Those seeking authorization for foreign work must also pass a background check and counterintelligence review. The State Department and the armed forces have wide latitude to deny any application they think “would adversely affect the foreign relations of the United States.” But The Post investigation found that approval is almost automatic. Of the more than 500 requests submitted since 2015, about 95 percent were granted.
The armed forces rely on retired military personnel to self-report their intent to work for foreign governments. Many veterans don’t bother. The Post identified scores of retirees on LinkedIn who say they have taken military contracting jobs in the Persian Gulf, but for whom there is no record of federal approval.
There is no criminal penalty for violating the law. Enforcement is almost nonexistent.
The Defense Department can withhold retirement pay from those who ignore the rules. But the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, which administers military payrolls, has docked the pensions of “fewer than five” people, according to Steve Burghardt, an agency spokesman. He declined to identify the individuals, specify the time frame or provide other details, citing privacy concerns.
Retired U.S. generals, admirals take top jobs with Saudi crown prince
The Washington Post · by Craig Whitlock · October 18, 2022
More than 500 retired U.S. military personnel — including scores of generals and admirals — have taken lucrative jobs since 2015 working for foreign governments, mostly in countries known for human rights abuses and political repression, according to a Washington Post investigation.
In Saudi Arabia, for example, 15 retired U.S. generals and admirals have worked as paid consultants for the Defense Ministry since 2016. The ministry is led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the kingdom’s de facto ruler, who U.S. intelligence agencies say approved the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a Post contributing columnist, as part of a brutal crackdown on dissent.
Saudi Arabia’s paid advisers have included retired Marine Gen. James L. Jones, a national security adviser to President Barack Obama, and retired Army Gen. Keith Alexander, who led the National Security Agency under Obama and President George W. Bush, according to documents obtained by The Post under Freedom of Information Act lawsuits.
Others who have worked as consultants for the Saudis since Khashoggi’s murder include a retired four-star Air Force general and a former commanding general of U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
Retired Gen. James L. Jones, center, national security adviser at the time, with Defense Secretary Robert Gates at Camp Lejeune, N.C., in 2009. Jones has two firms that have held contracts with the Saudi Defense Ministry. (Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images)
Most of the retired U.S. personnel have worked as civilian contractors for Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Persian Gulf monarchies, playing a critical, though largely invisible, role in upgrading their militaries.
Armed forces of the United States
Marine Corps,
Retired
James
L. Jones
Rank
★★★★
Gen.
Years of U.S. service
40
U.S. military retirement
2007
Foreign government employment
Security consultant, Ironhand Security / Saudi Defense Ministry
Security consultant, Jones Group Intl. / Government of Libya
U.S. government service
• White House national security adviser, 2009-2010
• Commandant, Marine Corps, 1999-2003
All the while, the gulf countries’ security forces have continued to commit human rights abuses at home and beyond their borders. With shared intelligence, aerial refueling and other support from the U.S. government and contractors, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have intervened in Yemen’s civil war to disastrous effect, triggering a global humanitarian crisis and killing thousands of civilians, according to United Nations investigators.
Foreign governments have long advanced their interests in Washington by paying Americans as lobbyists, lawyers, political consultants, think tank analysts and public relations advisers. But the hiring of retired U.S. military personnel for their expertise and political clout has accelerated over the past decade as oil-rich gulf monarchies have splurged on defense spending and strengthened their security partnerships with the Pentagon.
End of carousel
Congress permits retired troops as well as reservists to work for foreign governments if they first obtain approval from their branch of the armed forces and the State Department. But the U.S. government has fought to keep the hirings secret. For years, it withheld virtually all information about the practice, including which countries employ the most retired U.S. service members and how much money is at stake.
Saudi soldiers fire artillery from Jazan, on the kingdom's Red Sea coast, toward the border with Yemen in April 2015, just weeks after a Saudi-led coalition intervened in Yemen's civil war. (Hasan Jamali/AP)
Click or tap these icons to see the FOIA documents and other source material.
To shed light on the matter, The Post sued the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, the Marine Corps and the State Department in federal court under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). After a two-year legal battle, The Post obtained more than 4,000 pages of documents, including case files for about 450 retired soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines.
1
1 The Post submitted its first FOIA requests for the documents in May 2020. After getting little or no response from the military services and the State Department, The Post filed a lawsuit in federal court in April 2021. Read the legal complaint.
The documents show that foreign governments pay handsomely for U.S. military talent, with salary and benefit packages reaching six and, sometimes, seven figures — far more than what most American service members earn while on active duty. At the top of the scale, active four-star generals earn $203,698 a year in basic pay.
In comparison, the government of Australia has given consulting deals worth more than $10 million to several former senior U.S. Navy officials. A consulting firm owned by six retired Pentagon officials and military officers negotiated a $23.6 million contract with Qatar, a Persian Gulf sheikhdom that hosts a major U.S. air base, though the proposal later fell through. In Azerbaijan, a retired U.S. Air Force general was offered a consulting gig at a rate of $5,000 a day.
Retired generals and admirals command the most money, but former enlisted personnel can also collect hefty foreign paychecks on top of their U.S. military pensions, records show.
Saudi Arabia hired a former Navy SEAL to work as a special operations adviser for $258,000 a year. The UAE gave annual compensation packages worth more than $200,000 to helicopter pilots and $120,000 to aircraft mechanics. In Indonesia, a government-owned mining firm employed a retired U.S. Marine master sergeant as a transportation consultant at a rate of $500 a day, plus living expenses.
2
Many U.S. generals and admirals have profited from connections built during wartime by later working for Middle Eastern countries where they were once stationed. Records show that a few American officers even negotiated jobs with foreign governments while they were still on active duty.
Military officials redacted the pay packages for retired generals and admirals, as well as the names of lower-ranking personnel. In legal motions, U.S. officials argued that releasing the information would violate former service members’ privacy and could subject them to “embarrassment and harassment” and “unfairly harm their public reputation.”
The Post identified some of the names and redacted details through reporting. It has continued to sue the armed forces and the State Department to obtain the rest of the information.
In September, U.S. District Judge Amit P. Mehta ruled largely in favor of The Post and ordered the government to release the pay packages and other withheld material.
In his order, Mehta called the government’s privacy arguments “unconvincing.” In particular, he added, “the public has a right to know if high-ranking military leaders are taking advantage of their stations — or might be perceived to be doing so — to create employment opportunities with foreign governments in retirement.”
3
An attorney for the Justice Department said it was considering an appeal of the judge’s decision.
The Project On Government Oversight (POGO), a nonprofit watchdog group based in Washington, filed a similar public-records lawsuit against the State Department to learn more about how former U.S. service members are selling their military expertise to foreign powers. POGO shared the documents it received from the State Department with The Post.
Read the Project On Government Oversight's own investigation into the documents
Brandon Brockmyer, POGO’s director of investigations and research, said retired senior military officers often testify before Congress and appear on television to debate national security, but rarely divulge whether they are on a foreign government’s payroll.
“The public is working on the assumption that their sole loyalty is to the United States,” he said. “The public has the right to know whether and how a foreign power has access to their expertise.”
Prohibited without permission
Under federal law, retired U.S. military personnel — generally defined as those who served at least 20 years in uniform and are entitled to a pension — are restricted from receiving anything of value from foreign governments that could compromise their sworn allegiance to the United States.
The prohibition stems from the foreign emoluments clause of the Constitution, which forbids federal officeholders to accept gifts, jobs or titles “from any King, Prince, or foreign State” without the consent of Congress. The law applies to military retirees because they can be recalled to active duty at any time. In 1977, Congress delegated the authority to approve veterans’ foreign work to the Pentagon and State Department.
Those approvals are necessary before the retirees can accept any compensation, even travel expenses, from a foreign government or state-owned company. Retirees may work only as civilians, not as uniformed personnel.
Those seeking authorization for foreign work must also pass a background check and counterintelligence review. The State Department and the armed forces have wide latitude to deny any application they think “would adversely affect the foreign relations of the United States.” But The Post investigation found that approval is almost automatic. Of the more than 500 requests submitted since 2015, about 95 percent were granted.
The armed forces rely on retired military personnel to self-report their intent to work for foreign governments. Many veterans don’t bother. The Post identified scores of retirees on LinkedIn who say they have taken military contracting jobs in the Persian Gulf, but for whom there is no record of federal approval.
There is no criminal penalty for violating the law. Enforcement is almost nonexistent.
The Defense Department can withhold retirement pay from those who ignore the rules. But the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, which administers military payrolls, has docked the pensions of “fewer than five” people, according to Steve Burghardt, an agency spokesman. He declined to identify the individuals, specify the time frame or provide other details, citing privacy concerns.
Documents show that one case involved retired Army Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, 63, who briefly served as national security adviser to President Donald Trump. An investigation by the Defense Department’s inspector general found that Flynn collected $449,807 from Russian and Turkish interests in 2015, one year after he retired from the Army, but failed to clear his work with U.S. officials.
4
4 Using FOIA, The Post obtained the inspector general’s investigation into Flynn in July. Read the documents.
Armed forces of the United States
Army,
Retired
Michael
Flynn
Rank
★★★
Lt. Gen.
Years of U.S. service
33
U.S. military retirement
2014
Foreign government employment
Speaker / RT television network, Russia
U.S. government service
• White House national security adviser, 2017
• Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2012-2014
Flynn’s unauthorized work for foreign governments came to light after he was photographed sitting next to Russian President Vladimir Putin at a 2015 gala in Moscow celebrating the 10th anniversary of Russia Today, or RT, a propaganda arm of the Kremlin. RT paid Flynn $38,557 to travel to Moscow and speak at the event.
Flynn’s ties to Russian officials led to his downfall. In 2017, he pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about his contacts with the Russian ambassador to the United States. Trump pardoned him three years later.
An image from a Dec. 10, 2015, video shows retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, right, reaching out to shake hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin at a Russia Today anniversary gala in Moscow. (Ruptly/AP)
The inspector general opened an investigation into Flynn’s work for foreign governments in 2017, but the case took five years to resolve. In May, the Army ordered him to forfeit the $38,557 that he received from the Moscow trip. But Army officials decided, without explanation, not to penalize him for the remaining $411,250 he collected from Russia and Turkey.
5
5 Flynn acknowledged the financial penalty in a television interview in May, but suggested it was politically motivated. Read the Army’s letter to him.
Flynn’s work for Russia helped prompt Congress to pass legislation in 2019 and 2020 requiring the Pentagon to submit annual reports to lawmakers about retired generals and admirals who work for foreign powers. Since then, the Pentagon has complied, but its reports include only a few lines of information and do not name the generals and admirals.
Of the 500 cases reported to the armed forces and State Department since 2015, only one involved Russia. In that instance, a retired Air Force colonel sought — and received — permission in March 2020 to take a $300,000 job as an executive with a satellite-launch company based in the United States but majority-owned by the Russian government.
6
6 The satellite company is International Launch Services Inc., which is majority-owned by the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center in Moscow. The retired Air Force colonel was seeking approval to become the firm’s senior vice president and general counsel. Read the documents.
The documents released in response to The Post’s lawsuits include no other instances of retired military personnel seeking to work for nations that the U.S. government categorizes as “foreign adversaries,” such as China, North Korea, Iran, Cuba or Venezuela.
‘We did real, serious, detailed work’
Almost two-thirds of the jobs taken by U.S. veterans have been in the Middle East and North Africa, where governments pay top dollar for American military expertise honed by two decades of war and counterterrorism operations in the Arab world.
Documents show that 25 retirees from the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps were granted permission to take jobs in Saudi Arabia. Most were high-ranking officers who received job offers to serve as consultants to the Saudi Defense Ministry.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at an investment conference in Riyadh on Oct. 24, 2018. Journalist Jamal Khashoggi was killed inside the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul three weeks earlier. (Giuseppe Cacace/AFP/Getty Images)
Since 2015, the ministry has been ruled by Prince Mohammed, whose leadership has upended the status quo in the Middle East.
Two months after Mohammed became defense minister at age 29, Saudi Arabia led a coalition of regional forces — with intelligence, refueling and logistical support from the United States — that intervened militarily in Yemen’s civil war. The move further destabilized the kingdom’s much poorer neighbor, and an estimated 375,000 people have died in the fighting or of hunger.
In June 2017, Mohammed amassed even more power when his father, 82-year-old King Salman, shook up the Saudi line of succession and named him crown prince, or heir apparent. Mohammed quickly seized control of the kingdom’s institutions and sidelined potential competitors to the throne, arresting more than 200 princes and other prominent Saudis.
He also cracked down on dissenters outside the kingdom.
In October 2018, a team of Saudi assassins flew from Riyadh to Istanbul to silence Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi-born journalist who had criticized the crown prince in opinion columns in The Post. Khashoggi was lured into the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, where the hit squad killed him and dismembered his corpse with a bone saw, according to a Turkish government investigation.
Saudi officials first denied any knowledge of what happened to Khashoggi. Later, they admitted that Saudi agents were responsible and blamed them for carrying out a “rogue operation” without the crown prince’s knowledge. But U.S. intelligence agencies concluded Mohammed had ordered the killing and noted that seven members of the hit squad served on his personal security detail.
A prominent beneficiary of Mohammed’s reign has been 78-year-old James L. Jones, the retired general who served as Obama’s national security adviser and had been commandant of the Marine Corps. Jones owns two Virginia-based consulting firms — Ironhand Security LLC and Jones Group International LLC — that have held contracts to advise the Saudi Defense Ministry.
Jones applied for authorization to work for the Saudis in November 2016 and received U.S. approval four months later, documents show. In an interview, Jones said he was approached by Adel al-Jubeir, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, who asked him to meet with Mohammed during the prince’s visit to the United States that year to discuss the possibility of consulting for the Defense Ministry.
7
7 The State Department approved Jones’s request to work for the Saudis in March 2017. Read his application.
“The crown prince basically said that he was concerned about the amount of money that Saudi Arabia was spending on military hardware and equipment, as opposed to capabilities,” Jones said. “[He] was wondering if there was something that we could do to help them in transforming their Ministry of Defense and the armed forces into something that would be more useful and less expensive.”
Saudi Arabia spends more on its military than any other nonnuclear power in the world. In 2021, its defense budget exceeded $50 billion — roughly the same as in Britain, a country with nuclear arms.
Jones said he agreed to conduct an organizational assessment of the Saudi armed forces for Prince Mohammed starting in 2017, but only after checking with officials at the White House, State Department and Defense Department and obtaining their support. “Had that not been the case, I would not have done it,” he added.
To carry out the project, Jones assembled a team of about a dozen former senior Pentagon officials, including William S. Cohen, who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton administration. A spokesman for Cohen said he worked on the team for about a year.
Documents show that four retired generals obtained U.S. permission in 2017 to work with Jones’s team in Riyadh: Charles Wald, a four-star Air Force general; Michael Barbero, a three-star Army general; Arnold Punaro, a two-star Marine general; and John Doucette, a one-star Air Force general.
8
8 Read Barbero’s application to work for the Saudis. Read Doucette’s documents.
Others mentioned in the story
Carousel - $Others mentioned in the story: use tab or arrows to navigate
Armed forces of the United States
Air Force,
Retired
Charles
Wald
Rank
★★★★
Gen.
Years of U.S. service
35
U.S. military retirement
2006
Foreign government employment
Security consultant, Ironhand Security / Saudi Defense Ministry
Principal adviser, Jones Group Intl. / Government of Libya
U.S. government service
• Deputy commander, U.S. European Command, 2002-2006
• Commander, U.S. Central Command Air Forces, 2000-2001
Armed forces of the United States
Army,
Retired
Michael
Barbero
Rank
★★★
Lt. Gen.
Years of U.S. service
38
U.S. military retirement
2013
Foreign government employment
Security consultant, Ironhand Security / Saudi Defense Ministry
Senior adviser, Intelligent Decisions Systems / Kuwaiti Defense Ministry
National security consultant, Jones Group Intl. / Government of Libya
U.S. government service
• Director, Joint IED Defeat Organization, 2011-2013
• Commander, NATO Training Mission - Iraq, 2009-2011
Armed forces of the United States
Marine Corps,
Retired
Arnold
Punaro
Rank
★★
Maj. Gen.
Years of U.S. service
35
U.S. military retirement
2003
Foreign government employment
Security consultant, Ironhand Security / Saudi Defense Ministry
U.S. government service
• Staff director, Senate Armed Services Committee, 1987-1995
• Director of Reserve Affairs, Headquarters Marine Corps, 2001-2003
Armed forces of the United States
Army,
Retired
Karl
Eikenberry
Rank
★★★
Lt. Gen.
Years of U.S. service
35
U.S. military retirement
2009
Foreign government employment
Senior adviser / Saudi Defense Ministry
U.S. government service
• Commander, U.S. forces in Afghanistan, 2005-2007
• U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, 2009-2011
Armed forces of the United States
Air Force,
Retired
John
Doucette
Rank
★
Brig. Gen.
Years of U.S. service
29
U.S. military retirement
2015
Foreign government employment
Security consultant, Jones Group Intl. / Saudi Defense Ministry
U.S. government service
• Deputy commander, NATO Joint Warfare Center, 2012-2014
• Commander, 36th Wing, 2010-2012
Armed forces of the United States
Army,
Retired
Douglas
Lute
Rank
★★★
Lt. Gen.
Years of U.S. service
35
U.S. military retirement
2010
Foreign government employment
Senior adviser, Jones Group Intl. / Government of Libya
U.S. government service
• U.S. ambassador to NATO, 2013-2017
• White House deputy national security adviser, 2007-2013
End of carousel
Barbero and Doucette did not respond to requests for comment. Punaro, 76, a longtime Pentagon adviser and former congressional staffer, said he worked for Jones as a consultant from April 2017 to April 2018, traveling to Riyadh every month or two.
“We did real, serious, detailed work,” Punaro said, adding that the group briefed U.S. officials on their progress. He declined to say how much he was paid, citing a confidentiality clause in his contract with Ironhand Security.
9
Gen. Jones, seen in 2016 in New York, said he agreed to consult for the Saudis starting in 2017, but only after obtaining U.S. approval. “Had that not been the case, I would not have done it,” he said. (Riccardo Savi/Getty Images/Concordia Summit)
Wald, 74, spent 35 years in the Air Force, including as deputy commander of U.S. forces in Europe and as a forward air controller and F-16 pilot who flew in combat in Vietnam and Bosnia. He headed Jones Group International’s business in the Middle East until last year. In an interview, he said he felt it was important to help the Saudis improve their military so the United States didn’t have to act as their primary protector. “It’s time for the U.S. not to be doing all the defense of the Middle East,” he said.
10
10 Wald received approval from the State Department to work for the Saudis and Ironhand Security in March 2017. Read his application. He later became president of Jones Group Middle East, overseeing the firm’s operations in the region. He left the company in September 2021.
Though the U.S. military has refused to disclose the compensation packages earned by retired generals, other public records show that the Saudis pay their consultants generously. Four lower-ranking retired officers working for Jones — two Marine colonels, an Army colonel and a Navy captain — earned salaries ranging from $200,000 to $300,000 to advise the Saudi Defense Ministry. Military officials redacted those officers’ identities, asserting that the public had no right to the information.
11
11 One Marine colonel earned a monthly salary of $25,000 as an Ironhand Security project manager, reviewing “internal military modernization reports” for the Saudi Defense Ministry. Read his application.
Jones’s companies continue to advise the Saudis on how to reorganize their military command structure so that the armed forces can operate jointly instead of as separate fiefdoms, documents show. Traditionally, the primary mission of the Saudi military and security services has been to guarantee the protection and survival of the al-Saud family, with different princes controlling different branches as competing power centers.
Officials with the Saudi Embassy in Washington did not respond to requests for an interview.
Because of Saudi Arabia’s vast oil deposits, U.S. presidents since Franklin D. Roosevelt have pledged to help defend the kingdom militarily. Saudi Arabia buys more U.S. weapons than any other country in the world by far. More than 200 active-duty American troops are stationed in Saudi Arabia as trainers and advisers.
But Washington has long struggled to reconcile its robust security partnership with Saudi Arabia and the kingdom’s troubling record on human rights.
The U.S.-Saudi security partnership came under severe strain after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks — 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals — and again over the war in Yemen, and then again after Khashoggi’s assassination. During his 2020 presidential campaign, Joe Biden promised to make Saudi Arabia “pay the price and make them, in fact, the pariah they are.”
Yet, less than two years later, President Biden traveled to Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, and exchanged a fist bump with Prince Mohammed to reaffirm the relationship. During their meeting at the Al Salam Royal Palace, the two leaders addressed a range of issues, including oil production and human rights.
Since then, the relationship has again hit the skids. On Oct. 5, Saudi Arabia, Russia and other members of the OPEC Plus cartel announced they would slash oil production to raise prices. The decision infuriated the Biden administration. It accused the Saudis of siding with Moscow, whose oil is under Western sanctions because of the war in Ukraine. Biden warned that the Saudi government will face “consequences,” but didn’t say how.
President Biden meets with Prince Mohammed at Al Salam Royal Palace in Jiddah on July 15. Upon Biden's arrival, the two men fist-bumped. (Bandar Algaloud/Saudi Royal Court/Reuters)
After Khashoggi, business as usual
Another high-profile senior officer who has done business with Saudi Arabia is Keith Alexander, 70, who served as director of the National Security Agency as well as the first head of the U.S. Cyber Command.
In July 2018, Alexander’s consulting firm, IronNet Cybersecurity, signed a partnership agreement with the Saudis to develop a new institution: the Prince Mohammed bin Salman College of Cyber Security. The college billed itself as the kingdom’s first training program for cyberwarfare and was established under the direction of Saud al-Qahtani, an influential aide to the crown prince.
12
12 The Saudi Press Agency publicly announced IronNet’s partnership with the college in July 2018.
Armed forces of the United States
Army,
Retired
Keith
Alexander
Rank
★★★★
Gen.
Years of U.S. service
40
U.S. military retirement
2014
Foreign government employment
Adviser, IronNet Cybersecurity / Mohammed bin Salman College of Cyber Security, Saudi Arabia
Adviser, IronNet Cybersecurity / Japanese Ministry of Economy, Transportation and Industry
Adviser, IronNet Cybersecurity / Monetary Authority of Singapore
Adviser / Singapore National Research Foundation
Committee member / Singapore Infocomm Development Authority
U.S. government service
• Director, National Security Agency, 2005-2014
• Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, 2010-2014
Qahtani also oversaw a network of computer hacking and surveillance operations that targeted the crown prince’s critics and enemies around the world, including Khashoggi. U.S. officials have accused him of managing the plot against the Post contributor. In November 2018, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on Qahtani, declaring that he “was part of the planning and execution of the operation that led to the killing.”
Yet two months later, during the Trump administration, the State Department approved Alexander’s request to help develop the cyberwarfare college and serve on its board of advisers, documents show. U.S. officials redacted details on how much money Alexander stood to earn.
13
Alexander, who is the founder, chief executive and chairman of IronNet, declined to comment. Bridget Bell, a spokeswoman for IronNet, said that the firm’s contract with the Saudis “focused on the development of the college’s educational efforts” and that the arrangement lasted until 2020.
Alexander was originally supposed to serve on the college’s board of advisers, but he never attended any meetings “nor worked directly on the company’s contract,” Bell said. She added that Alexander and IronNet did not “have any interaction” with Qahtani.
Army Gen. Keith Alexander, seen here in 2013, retired from the military in March 2014. He soon founded IronNet Cybersecurity, which went on to receive U.S. approval — weeks after Khashoggi's killing — to help the Saudis develop a cyberwarfare college. (Win McNamee/Getty Images)
Alexander has also served as a cybersecurity consultant to other foreign governments. Since 2017, he has sought U.S. approval for four separate deals to advise the governments of Singapore and Japan.
14
Many U.S. companies ceased doing business with Saudi Arabia in the weeks after Khashoggi’s murder, including lobbyists and public relations firms that had represented the kingdom in Washington. At the time, a spokesperson for Jones told the Daily Beast that the retired Marine general was “disturbed” and “horrified” by Khashoggi’s death, and downplayed his firms’ work in Riyadh, saying one contract with the Saudis had recently ended and a second was scheduled to expire soon.
In fact, Jones’s firms not only remained in Saudi Arabia but expanded their partnership with the Defense Ministry after Khashoggi’s slaying.
In his interview with The Post, Jones said he was “very shocked and surprised at what evidently happened” to Khashoggi. But he said Jones Group International applied for, and accepted, more work from the Saudi Defense Ministry in 2019 because “we received encouragement” from the Trump administration to do so. He said his companies now hold four Saudi contracts and employ 53 Americans in Riyadh. Of those, eight are retired generals and admirals, and 32 are lower-ranking military retirees.
“Nobody ever came to us and said, ‘Hey, we think you ought to pull out,’ ” Jones added. “I don’t know what the alternative would have been if we had pulled away. I was worried that [the Saudis] would possibly drift off to other relationships with the Chinese and the Russians, and I didn’t think that would be very good.”
But Wald, the retired four-star Air Force general, said he and other Jones Group consultants debated whether to stop working with the Saudis after Khashoggi’s assassination. “We discussed that almost every day,” he recalled. “We asked ourselves, are we basically turning a blind eye toward immorality? Or supporting a legitimate government?” In the end, they decided to stay.
Wald said Saudi Arabia had made “measurable progress” on reforming its military by the time he stopped working for Jones Group in September 2021. Yet he said he was glad to leave Riyadh. “I certainly don’t regret that I’m not there anymore,” he added. “The Saudis aren’t always easy to work with.”
In recent years, Jones Group International has expanded into other foreign markets. In 2019, Jones, Wald and two retired Army lieutenant generals working for the company — Michael Barbero and Douglas Lute — applied for and obtained U.S. approval to advise the Libyan government on the disarmament and reintegration of militia fighters, documents show.
15
Jones Group was hired by the U.N.-backed government in Tripoli at the time. U.S. military officials redacted information on how much money Libyan officials paid the retired generals. But a retired Army colonel who applied for federal approval to work for Libya with Jones Group reported that he expected to earn $10,000 a month.
16
16 The Army redacted the colonel’s name, but he had worked for the Defense Intelligence Agency for four years, overseeing “strategic intelligence products on Libya.” Read his application.
A delegation of representatives from Jones Group International arrives at Mitiga International Airport, east of Libya's capital, Tripoli, on Aug. 25, 2020. (AFP/Getty Images)
In his application, Wald noted that when he was an Air Force colonel, he planned Operation El Dorado Canyon, the 1986 U.S. airstrikes on Libya that nearly killed then-ruler Moammar Gaddafi. Wald told The Post that Jones Group worked in Libya for only a few months.
17
“Libya is a nut case,” he said. “Their government is ineffective. Their military is ineffective. … Their military is basically a ragtag group of militias.”
Jones said his company stopped working in Libya at the State Department’s request because of the country’s political instability. Lute, who served under Jones in the Obama White House as a deputy national security adviser, declined to comment. Barbero, an infantry officer who held senior command positions in Iraq and retired from the Army in 2013, did not respond to requests for an interview.
Rubber-stamping the requests
Officials from the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps declined interview requests about their approval processes for foreign employment. But records show they rarely reject a job request.
R. Philip Deavel, a lawyer who oversaw the Air Force program from 2012 to 2016, said in an interview that he denied a small number of applications by retired personnel to work for “Third World countries with a reputation for brutality in conflict.” He declined to name the countries.
Overall, however, Deavel said he viewed most of the job opportunities as supportive of U.S. foreign policy. He said the countries involved were almost always friendly to Washington and looking for American expertise to make their militaries more professional. “If you embed with another military as trainers, it may not make that country into Switzerland, but it won’t make it worse,” he said.
Once the armed forces approve employment requests, the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs performs a final review. But records produced by the government suggest that the bureau functions as little more than a rubber stamp, authorizing all but five cases since 2015.
State Department officials declined interview requests from The Post to discuss their criteria for approving applications from retired military personnel to work for the Saudis and other foreign governments. But in a written response to questions, the department said it took human rights considerations into account and was “confident” that security cooperation with the Saudis “will serve to elevate respect for human rights.”
“The President has made it clear that the rule of law and respect for human rights are front and center in U.S. foreign policy. We will continue decades of U.S. partnership to help strengthen Saudi Arabia’s defenses through security cooperation, defense trade, training, and exercises, but we are also clear-eyed about the challenges ahead,” it said.
18
18 The State Department called its high approval rate of foreign-employment requests “reasonable,” noting that it was only conducting a secondary review of applications already scrutinized by the armed forces.
One of the few cases denied by the State Department concerned a retired Navy commander who landed a $291,000-a-year job with Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI), a state-owned arms supplier, as its director for weapons systems. The Navy approved the request in August 2020, but the State Department overruled the decision four months later, concluding that the arrangement would “adversely affect the foreign relations of the United States.” No further explanation was given.
19
SAMI was founded by the Saudi government in 2017. It is wholly owned by the Public Investment Fund, a $620 billion sovereign wealth fund controlled by Prince Mohammed. SAMI’s mission is to help the kingdom create a domestic arms industry and reduce its dependence on the United States and other foreign suppliers.
20
20 The Saudi Public Investment Fund also invested $2 billion last year in a private equity firm run by Jared Kushner, Donald Trump’s son-in-law, according to a New York Times report.
In August 2020, the Navy gave preliminary approval to another retired officer — Timothy Carter, a former executive with Northrop Grumman — to take a job with SAMI as its executive vice president for weapons and missiles. Carter’s annual compensation was even more lucrative: $514,200 in salary and living expenses, plus a yearly bonus worth up to $330,000.
What happened to Carter’s application after that is unclear. A Navy spokeswoman said the service has been waiting more than two years for the State Department to make a final determination. The State Department did not respond to questions about the case. Carter did not respond to requests for comment.
Regardless, Carter didn’t wait for a green light from U.S. officials before he began working for the Saudis. SAMI announced his hiring on Sept. 4, 2019, almost a full year before he received tentative approval from the Navy. Documents show Navy officials were aware he had already taken the job.
21
21 The Navy redacted Carter’s name from the documents, but his job title and other details match his online biography at SAMI. Read his application.
Under federal law, the Defense Department can force retirees to pay back any foreign money they receive before their applications are approved. But there is no evidence the armed forces have ever imposed penalties in such cases.
The retired military cashing in with repressive governments
A new Washington Post investigation has uncovered the fact that hundreds of veterans have taken lucrative foreign jobs — often for countries with known human rights abuses. U.S. officials approved these contracts — but fought to keep them secret.
Tuesday, October 18, 2022
Working without approval
The Post found that many military retirees take foreign jobs or gifts without notifying the U.S. government at all. The armed forces and the State Department have no mechanism to identify such cases. Unless rulebreakers come to public attention — as did Flynn — or someone reports them, they have no reason to fear getting in trouble.
Karl Eikenberry, 70, is a retired three-star Army general who commanded U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan and later served as the U.S. ambassador in Kabul. Since 2021, Eikenberry has also described himself in multiple online biographies as a senior adviser to the Saudi Defense Ministry. But there is no record of his seeking clearance for the job from the Army or State Department. He did not respond to messages seeking comment.
Retired Gen. Karl Eikenberry, then U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, at the July 2011 funeral for a slain brother of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. In years since, Eikenberry has described himself as a senior adviser to the Saudi Defense Ministry. (Massoud Hossaini/AFP/Getty Images)
By examining LinkedIn profiles and other publicly available sources, The Post identified 20 other retired officers — including four generals and admirals — who reported working for Jones Group International or Ironhand Security as advisers to the Saudi military but for whom there is no record of federal approval.
Among them are Edward Cashman, a retired Navy rear admiral; Sean Jenkins, a retired Army major general; and Cathal O’Connor, a retired Navy rear admiral. All began working for Jones Group in 2021, within weeks of their retirement from the U.S. military.
None of the three responded to requests for comment. Jones said his employees are instructed to “complete all of the requirements that they need to do” before working with the Saudis.
Other generals have moved to Saudi Arabia for employment after they were forced to retire from the U.S. military for misconduct.
Bradley Becker, a retired Army three-star general, was hired by Jones Group International in September 2020 as a project manager in Riyadh. Becker’s military career ended in 2019 after the Army relieved him of command for engaging in “an inappropriate relationship with a woman” while he was separated from his wife. Becker did not respond to messages seeking comment. Last year he told Task & Purpose, a news site that covers the military, that he did not commit adultery and was merely communicating with a woman while going through a divorce.
The rules about what foreign jobs require U.S. government approval are fuzzy and open to interpretation. The armed forces have said authorization is necessary if veterans work directly for a foreign government, or if foreign officials can exert control over their employment or compensation by a private firm.
Retirees who are assigned by large U.S. companies — such as Lockheed Martin or General Dynamics — to work with foreign governments are generally exempt. The distinction is that foreign governments cannot hire or fire those individuals, and that their employers can reassign them to other jobs if they fall out of favor with their foreign clients.
For example, retired Navy Rear Adm. Steven G. Smith worked in Riyadh from 2017 to 2020 as an adviser to the Defense Ministry under a contract with Booz Allen Hamilton, a major international consulting firm. Smith did not seek approval for the work from the Navy and the State Department. He told The Post he did not need it because he worked directly for Booz Allen “and was not involved in any contract issues with the Saudis.”
The military services have at times applied inconsistent standards on what qualifies as foreign control. The Marines, for example, have concluded that retirees who work for U.S. subsidiaries of firms owned by foreign governments do not need U.S. approval. Other services have said they do.
In May 2020, the Army denied an application by a retired officer who had a $300,000-a-year job lined up with Jones Group International to serve as a consultant to the Saudi Defense Ministry. It cited disciplinary problems in his military record.
At the same time, the Army said it was “unclear” whether the officer needed U.S. authorization because he was working for Jones Group International, an American company. The Army informed the officer that if the Saudi government had “control over your activities,” then he could not take the job.
22
The Army redacted the name of the officer from the documents, but details of his service record match the biography of David Haight, another general who left the U.S. military under a cloud. Haight was demoted three ranks — from major general to lieutenant colonel — and forced to retire in 2016 over a personal misconduct scandal.
An Army investigation determined that Haight, a married Army Ranger who had served as a brigade commander in Afghanistan, embraced a “swinger lifestyle” and carried on an 11-year affair with a female government employee. Adultery is a punishable offense under military law, and Army officials said Haight’s sexual escapades put him at risk of blackmail.
23
23 USA Today reported extensively on Haight’s double life and downfall. Haight’s attorney told the paper he deeply regretted the affair but denied it affected his military service. Haight also was a top aide to Adm. Mike Mullen, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Read the Army inspector general’s investigation.
Haight began work in Riyadh as a consultant to the Saudis in July 2019, eight months before the Army handed down its decision on his application, according to his LinkedIn profile. In a brief phone interview, Haight said he left the job in December 2021. He added that while he worked in an advisory capacity for the Saudi Defense Ministry, his contract was with Jones Group International.
Asked if he had any concerns about the Saudi government’s human rights record, Haight said Jones Group “was always very careful that our efforts were consistent with U.S. policy to bring stability to the Middle East” and to professionalize the Saudi military.
The distinction between state-controlled firms and independent ones is often blurry in nondemocratic countries, especially absolute monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, where the royal family dominates commerce and there is little transparency in the business sector.
In February, for example, a brand-new Saudi defense contractor — Scopa Industries Corp. LLC — opened for business with an ambitious agenda.
Describing itself as the kingdom’s “preeminent defense company,” Scopa said its purpose was “to meet the guidance” of Prince Mohammed by contributing to “the defense revolutionary process” and creating domestic jobs. The firm is owned by the Ajlan family, a conglomerate run by three billionaire brothers. In practice, however, Saudi companies cannot operate in the defense sector without the blessing of the crown prince.
Scopa Industries’ website features five American senior advisers: Barbero, retired Navy Vice Adm. Rich Brown, retired Rear Adm. Michael A. Brown, retired Army Col. Dominic Caraccilo and retired Air Force Col. Todd Harmer.
Harmer said in an email that his activities for Scopa Industries “are in full compliance with US laws and regulations,” but declined to comment further. The other American advisers to Scopa Industries did not respond to interview requests.
Another Saudi defense contractor, Vinnell Arabia LLC, employs hundreds of Americans to train the Saudi Arabian national guard. Vinnell Arabia is a joint venture of Northrop Grumman, the giant U.S. defense firm headquartered in Falls Church, Va., and Arab Builders for Trading, a Riyadh firm owned by a brother-in-law of the kingdom’s late King Abdullah IV.
As of 2015, a Northrop Grumman subsidiary owned 51 percent of Vinnell Arabia, according to court papers the company filed in response to a federal lawsuit in Virginia. But the Riyadh-based firm also submitted a declaration stating that it was subject only to Saudi law and that “no American employer — including Northrop Grumman — exerts any control over Vinnell Arabia.”
Documents show that none of Vinnell’s American employees have applied for permission from U.S. officials to train Saudi forces since at least 2015. Vinnell Arabia did not respond to a request for comment.
About this story
Photos used in the card illustrations from Department of Defense.
Editing by David Fallis and Sarah Childress. Research by Alice Crites. Copy editing by Martha Murdock and Christopher Rickett. Photo editing by Robert Miller and Wendy Galietta. Video editing by Jason Aldag. Design and development by Frank Hulley-Jones, Stephanie Hays and Talia Trackim. Design editing by Christian Font and Matt Callahan. Project management by Wendy Galietta.
The Washington Post · by Craig Whitlock · October 18, 2022
4. Key findings from The Post’s series on veterans’ lucrative foreign jobs
Key findings:
Hundreds of retired U.S. military personnel have taken foreign jobs
Most are hired by countries known for human rights abuses, political repression
Americans’ work for the Saudis expanded after Khashoggi’s assassination
The retired military cashing in with repressive governments
The UAE is the most popular foreign job market
Before serving Trump, Mattis worked for the UAE
Requests to work for foreign governments are largely rubber-stamped
Key findings from The Post’s series on veterans’ lucrative foreign jobs
The Washington Post · by Craig Whitlock · October 18, 2022
Americans working for the federal government who also receive money — or emoluments — from foreign powers became an issue for the first time in years under President Donald Trump when he and some in his administration were accused of violating the rules. Retired military personnel are subject to the same rules — though these former troops receive little scrutiny. The Washington Post wanted to know: To what extent are they seeking work from foreign governments?
The Post sued the armed forces and the State Department to obtain the records on foreign jobs sought by military personnel, including the type of work, compensation and countries involved. So far, The Post has obtained more than 4,000 pages of documents, including case files for about 450 retired soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines.
The government had resisted releasing the records under the Freedom of Information Act, arguing that disclosure was not in the public interest and violated the privacy of military personnel. After a two-year legal battle, U.S. District Judge Amit P. Mehta ruled in September that the government’s arguments were “unconvincing.”
“The public has a right to know if high-ranking military leaders are taking advantage of their stations — or might be perceived to be doing so — to create employment opportunities with foreign governments in retirement,” Mehta wrote.
End of carousel
Here are key takeaways from what those records reveal:
Hundreds of retired U.S. military personnel have taken foreign jobs
More than 500 retired U.S. military personnel — including scores of generals and admirals — have taken jobs as contractors and consultants for foreign governments since 2015, cashing in on their military expertise and political clout.
Most have worked as civilian contractors for Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Persian Gulf monarchies, playing a critical, though largely invisible, role in upgrading their militaries.
Foreign governments pay handsomely for U.S. military talent, with salary and benefit packages reaching six and sometimes seven figures — far more than what most American service members earn while on active duty.
Retired generals and admirals command the most money, but former enlisted personnel can also collect hefty foreign paychecks on top of their U.S. military pensions, records show.
Most are hired by countries known for human rights abuses, political repression
Fifteen retired U.S. generals and admirals have worked as paid consultants for the Saudi Defense Ministry and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who U.S. spy agencies say ordered the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
Among those who have worked as paid military advisers to Saudi Arabia since Khashoggi’s slaying are a former White House national security adviser, a former director of the National Security Agency and a former commander of U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
Retired Army Gen. Keith Alexander, director of the NSA during the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, received approval from the State Department to work for the Saudis two months after Khashoggi’s assassination. The Saudis hired Alexander to help develop a new institution: the Prince Mohammed bin Salman College of Cyber Security. Alexander’s consulting firm worked for the Saudis until 2020.
Americans’ work for the Saudis expanded after Khashoggi’s assassination
Retired Gen. James L. Jones, a former NATO commander and Marine commandant, expanded his consulting business with the Saudi Defense Ministry following Khashoggi’s assassination.
His firm now employs eight retired U.S. generals and admirals in Riyadh, plus 32 lower-ranking U.S. military retirees.
In a Post interview, Jones said he was “very shocked and surprised at what evidently happened” to Khashoggi. But he said the U.S. government encouraged him to keep working for the Saudis. “I don’t know what the alternative would have been if we pulled away. I was worried that [the Saudis] would possibly drift off to other relationships with the Chinese and the Russians.”
The retired military cashing in with repressive governments
A new Washington Post investigation has uncovered the fact that hundreds of veterans have taken lucrative foreign jobs — often for countries with known human rights abuses. U.S. officials approved these contracts — but fought to keep them secret.
Tuesday, October 18, 2022
The UAE is the most popular foreign job market
Over the past seven years, 280 retired U.S. service members have worked as military contractors and consultants for the United Arab Emirates, more than for any other country by far.
The Emiratis have relied on U.S. military contractors and advisers to build what many experts regard as the strongest military in the Arab world. But the UAE has used its armed forces to intervene in civil wars in Yemen and Libya, worsening the humanitarian crises in both countries.
The Emiratis pay well for U.S. help. A former Navy SEAL received a $348,000 salary, plus $54,400 for expenses, to work as a UAE firing range instructor. A retired U.S. Army colonel accepted a $324,000-a-year job as an adviser to the Emirati army.
Before serving Trump, Mattis worked for the UAE
Retired Marine Gen. Jim Mattis served as a military adviser to the UAE before becoming secretary of defense for Trump.
A spokesman for Mattis said he advised the UAE on “the operational, tactical, informational and ethical aspects” of military operations, but accepted no compensation for his work.
Shortly after he resigned as Pentagon chief, Mattis applied for federal permission to work with the Emiratis again and gave a speech in Abu Dhabi. Documents show he was supposed to receive an “honorarium” from the UAE, but a Mattis spokesman said he accepted only reimbursement for travel expenses.
Former admirals are consulting with Australia on top-secret technology
Former U.S. Navy leaders are working as paid, confidential advisers to the government of Australia to help it acquire top-secret nuclear submarine technology from the United States and Britain.
Australia is now trying to finalize a deal with the United States and Britain to build a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines that could cost more than $74 billion. The outcome will have global ramifications and could alter the military balance of power in Asia among the United States, its allies and China.
Since 2015, retired U.S. admirals and other former senior U.S. Navy leaders have received consulting deals from the Australian government worth more than $10 million combined.
Some retired U.S. admirals have worked for the Australian government as paid advisers while simultaneously consulting for the U.S. Navy. One retired U.S. admiral was hired by the government of Australia to serve as its deputy secretary of defense and to oversee its submarine program.
Requests to work for foreign governments are largely rubber-stamped
Retired troops seeking foreign work must first obtain approval from their branch of the armed forces and the State Department. The Post found these requests are largely rubber-stamped: Of more than 500 submitted since 2015, about 95 percent were granted.
The Post also identified scores of retirees on LinkedIn who say they have taken military contracting jobs in the Persian Gulf, but for whom there is no record of federal approval. There is no criminal penalty for violating the law. Enforcement is almost nonexistent.
The Defense Department can withhold retirement pay from those who ignore the rules. But the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, which administers military payrolls, has docked the pensions of “fewer than five” people, according to Steve Burghardt, an agency spokesman. He declined to identify the individuals, specify the time frame or provide other details, citing privacy concerns.
The Washington Post · by Craig Whitlock · October 18, 2022
5. The U.S. Isn’t Ready to Face China on the Battlefield
I am late sending this one out form Seth Jones.
Is the arsenal of democracy running low on supplies and more importantly can it replenish those supplies and sustain them if we go to war? I worry about the answer to that rhetorical question.
The U.S. Isn’t Ready to Face China on the Battlefield
The invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated critical deficiencies in America’s defense industrial base.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-s-isnt-ready-to-face-china-on-the-battlefield-national-security-missile-systems-pentagon-taiwan-war-conflict-strike-11665947059?reflink=article_email_share&st=recjh8bnch4h37j&utm_source=pocket_mylist
By Seth G. Jones
Oct. 16, 2022 5:33 pm ET
The Biden administration is doubling down on its recognition of China as America’s main competitor. The recently released National Security Strategy and the soon-to-be-released National Defense Strategy—Congress has already received a version of the latter—conclude that China poses the most significant threat to the U.S. What administration officials haven’t said, however, is that the U.S. isn’t fully prepared to fight a major war against China.
The war in Ukraine has exposed deficiencies in America’s defense industrial base that could jeopardize the ability to fight a war with China. The capabilities for fighting are also essential for deterring China. Washington’s assistance to Ukraine has depleted U.S. stocks of some weapons systems and munitions, such as Stinger surface-to-air missile systems, M777 howitzers, 155mm ammunition, and Javelin antitank missile systems.
These challenges highlight an even more serious concern: The U.S. defense industrial base is inadequately prepared for the wartime environment that now exists. It is operating in a peacetime environment. In a major regional conflict—such as a war with China in the Taiwan Strait—U.S. munitions needs likely would exceed Pentagon plans and stockpiles.
In nearly two dozen iterations of a Center for Strategic and International Studies war game that examined a U.S.-China war in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. expended all its joint air-to-surface standoff missiles and long-range precision-guided antiship missiles within the first week of the conflict. These missiles are critical because of their ability to strike Chinese naval forces from outside Chinese defenses.
The U.S. is not the only country facing this challenge. In a recent war game involving U.S., U.K. and French forces, the U.K.’s Third Division exhausted national stockpiles of critical munitions in just over a week.
Solving these problems will take time.
Defense companies are generally unwilling to take financial risks without contracts in place, including multiyear contracts. While the U.S. Defense Department signs multiyear contracts for ships and airplanes, it generally does not sign multiyear contracts for munitions. This risk aversion is compounded if companies have to make additional capital investments, especially brick-and-mortar ones.
There are also workforce and supply-chain constraints on increased demand for weapons systems and munitions required for one or more major wars. Companies need to hire, train, and retain workers. Supply chains for the U.S. defense sector are also not as secure as they should be, with some businesses shutting down or moving supply chains overseas—sometimes to unfriendly countries.
In other cases, there aren’t alternative sources for key weapons systems and munitions. The Javelin, for instance, relies on a rocket motor without a major secondary option. There are also significant vulnerabilities with some rare-earth metals, on which China has a near monopoly; other elements such as titanium and aluminum; semiconductors and other microelectronics.
Finally, time is a major constraint. It can take roughly two years to produce some types of missiles and systems, such as the Patriot Advanced Capability PAC-2/PAC-3 air- and missile-defense system, Tomahawk V, air-launched cruise missile, and long-range precision strike missile. These lead times are generally to deliver the first missiles—not the last ones. Filling inventories requires sustained multiyear investment. Brick-and-mortar investments for factories take even longer.
These challenges don’t have quick or easy solutions. That means we have to begin now. One step is for the Pentagon to reassess total munition requirements for one or more major wars. This might include modeling the expenditure rates of critical guided munitions among land, naval and air forces in a major conflict at various levels of intensity.
The Pentagon also needs to focus on targeted investments in key munitions and weapons systems, such as long-range precision strike and integrated air and missile defenses. These investments should include signing multiyear contracts.
During World War II, U.S. and allied defense industrial production was essential to defeating both Germany and Japan. But it didn’t happen overnight. If the U.S. is serious about competing with China, it needs to put its money where its mouth is. The defense industrial base is a critical place to start.
Mr. Jones is senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and author, most recently, of “Three Dangerous Men: Russia, China, Iran and the Rise of Irregular Warfare.”
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WSJ Opinion: How to Make Russia, China and Iran Take the U.S. Seriously
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WSJ Opinion: How to Make Russia, China and Iran Take the U.S. Seriously
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Main Street: Critics warn that talk of military action will kill any hope of a diplomatic solution with Iran. But the opposite is closer to the truth (10/16/21). Images: AFP/Getty Images Composite: Mark Kelly
Appeared in the October 17, 2022, print edition as 'The U.S. Isn’t Ready to Face China on the Battlefield'.
6. Russian President introduces martial law in Kherson, Zaporozhye, DPR and LPR regions
Because they cannot pacify these regions? Is there resistance within these regions?
Russian President introduces martial law in Kherson, Zaporozhye, DPR and LPR regions
fanabc.com
Addis Ababa, October 19, 2022 (FBC) – Martial law has been imposed in the four regions that recently voted to become part of Russia amid the conflict with Ukraine, as Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the decision on Wednesday, according to reports by multiple media outlets.
RT reports that the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics, as well as Kherson and Zaporozhye Regions, already had martial law in place when they became parts of Russia, Putin explained. So, the decision provides the legal basis for it to remain in place under Russian sovereignty, he said during a meeting of the National Security Council.
The document signed by Putin introduces martial law starting midnight on Thursday. It also orders various parts of the Russian government to submit corresponding action plans within three days, the report added.
In a separate decree signed on Wednesday, the Russian president ordered a state of ‘mid-level response’ in several other parts of the country bordering Ukraine.
These include the Crimean Republic, the city of Sevastopol, as well as Krasnodar, Belgorod, Bryansk, Voronezh, Kursk, and Rostov Regions. This is a special regime that gives officials additional authority to ensure security and rapid reaction to any emergencies, says RT’s report.
fanabc.com
7. Iranian Shahed-136 Drones Increase Russian Strike Capacity and Lethality in Ukraine
Conclusion:
On balance, the Shahed-136 has not proven to be a game-changer for Moscow, but it does provide additional precision-strike capacity and capability. Eventually, however, Russian stocks will need replenishment. Reports from the Ukrainian military indicate Russia has already expended well over 100 of these munitions and had around 300 left as of October 14. Last week, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed Moscow hopes to buy 2,400 more Shahed-136s, while The Washington Post on Sunday cited unnamed officials as saying Iran is preparing to send Russia “dozens” more Mohajer-6s and an unspecified larger number of Shahed-136s. Whether Tehran can quickly supply that many remains to be seen.
Iranian Shahed-136 Drones Increase Russian Strike Capacity and Lethality in Ukraine | FDD's Long War Journal
longwarjournal.org · by John Hardie & Ryan Brobst · October 18, 2022
Russia has conducted dozens of strikes against civilian and critical infrastructure targets across Ukraine over the past week, including with the Shahed-136 loitering munition. While the Shahed-136 is unlikely to change the overall direction of the conflict, it has increased Russia’s long-range strike capacity as Moscow’s traditional missile stocks dwindle. It also provides some additional capability and capacity against frontline Ukrainian positions, likely offering greater lethality than Russia’s indigenously produced loitering munitions.
Moscow is behind the curve in developing drones and is now racing to catch up. While the Russian military fields various UAVs for combat and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) roles, insufficient capacity has undermined Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. To help redress this weakness, Moscow turned to Tehran, which began pouring resources into its drone program in the 1980s and has since emerged as a regional UAV power and serial proliferator.
Back in July, the White House warned that Iran was “preparing to provide Russia with up to several hundred UAVs, including weapons-capable UAVs, on an expedited timeline.” Declassified U.S. intelligence indicated Tehran showcased various drones to Russian delegations in June and early July and began training Russian operators later that month. In mid-August, Russian cargo aircraft allegedly began picking up scores of Iranian drones, while Tehran dispatched advisors to Russia, and allegedly even into occupied Ukrainian territories, to help the Russians get going. The Russians reportedly began testing the Shahed-136 in Ukraine in August, and visual evidence of its employment in Ukraine first surfaced in mid-September.
In addition to the Shahed-136, Russia has also employed its smaller cousin, the Shahed-131, along with the Mohajer-6 unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV). U.S. and allied officials initially indicated Moscow was interested primarily in Iran’s Shahed-191 and Shahed-129 UCAVs. So far, neither has been visually confirmed to be in Russia’s possession, although a Ukrainian military report indicated Russia had received the Shahed-129. Unlike with Russia’s indigenously produced drones, Moscow is not releasing propaganda videos starring its new Iranian-supplied arsenal, so open sources may not present a full picture of which systems Russia has received or how it is using them.
Open-source evidence indicates Russia is using the Shahed-136, which Moscow has styled as the “Geran-2,” primarily for long-range strikes against predetermined static targets. In this way, the Russians are essentially using the Shahed-136 to compensate for their dwindling supply of cruise missiles. The Shahed-136 carries a much smaller warhead — 40 kg, according to Yuriy Ignat, spokesman for Ukraine’s Air Force Command, versus 450 kg on Russia’s Kh-101 air-launched cruise missile, for example. But it is also far cheaper and therefore more numerous, costing thousands rather than hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars per munition.
One of the advantages of propeller-powered drones such as the Shahed-136 is the efficiency of their engines, which allows them to travel long distances and loiter above potential targets despite their small size. Estimates of the Shahed-136’s maximum range vary. Claims go as high as 2,500 km and as low as several hundred kilometers. Ignat claimed its range is 1,000 km, which tracks with an investigation by Ukrainian experts who studied a downed Shahed-131 (essentially a smaller version of the Shahed-136) and estimated its range at 900 km. Assuming that 1,000 km figure is roughly accurate, Russia can use the Shahed-136 to strike anywhere in Ukraine from the relative safety of Crimea or Belarus, as well as other occupied parts of Ukraine.
The Shahed-136 can be fired from a mobile, truck-mounted launcher, making it difficult to detect and neutralize “left of launch.” The loitering munition is also difficult to detect by radar, thanks to its small size, low altitude and speed, and ability to change direction in flight and attack weak spots in air defense coverage. The Ukrainians have achieved some success in downing them with surface-to-air missiles and even small-arms fire. But in sufficient numbers, the Shahed-136 can overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, particularly at night, when Ukrainian troops have a harder time visually acquiring the munition. Russia reportedly is using the loitering munitions in pairs, with one flying above the other to serve as a back-up if the lower one is downed. If the first munition is successful, the second can be directed toward a different target.
In addition to conducting long-range strikes, accounts from Ukrainian servicemembers suggest Russia has also employed the Shahed-136 against frontline targets, such as Ukrainian armored vehicles and artillery positions. However, the Shahed-136 appears to lack a camera, meaning the Russians are likely using other drones, such as the Mohajer-6 or Russia’s Orlan-series UAVs, along with special operations forces, to scout targets. The Shahed-136 can likely receive in-flight targeting updates, speeding up the kill chain and allowing the munition to adjust mid-flight if the target repositions. While the Shahed-136’s apparent reliance on commercial-grade GNSS navigation reduces precision, its relatively large warhead — far bigger than those on Russia’s Lancet or KUB loitering munitions — can help compensate.
Using the Mohajer-6 as a relay would also increase the range at which the operator can control the Shahed-136. Otherwise, the loitering munition, which communicates with the ground control station via radio (rather than satellite), would lose contact with the station after only a few dozen kilometers when flying at a low altitude to avoid detection. With that additional reach, the Shahed-136’s control range can far exceed that of the Lancet or KUB.
However, the Shahed-136 has not enabled Russia to counter the Western-supplied rocket artillery systems wreaking havoc against the Russian rear, as some Russian commentators hoped and some Ukrainian officials and Western analysts feared. Ukraine’s HIMARS and MLRS rocket artillery systems likely “shoot and scoot” too quickly for the GNSS-dependent Shahed-136 to strike. Some have asserted the munition may contain an infrared sensor, which would allow it to home in on vehicles, but the remains of downed Shahed-136s offer no proof of such a sensor. Moreover, despite receiving Iranian UAVs, Russia may still suffer from a shortage of UAVs that can conduct reconnaissance at sufficient ranges to hunt the rocket artillery systems.
Likewise, there has been no clear evidence that the Shahed-136 possesses an anti-radiation capability, which would enable it to home in on radar emitters. Such a capability would pose a grave danger to Ukrainian ground-based air defenses, which have hamstrung the Russian Air Force. But the Shahed-131 studied by the Ukrainian experts did not have an anti-radiation seeker, and images of Shahed-136s downed in Ukraine do not appear to show one, either. It is possible that there are variants of the Shahed-136 that have infrared or anti-radiation capabilities, but such models have not been publicly recorded in Ukraine.
On balance, the Shahed-136 has not proven to be a game-changer for Moscow, but it does provide additional precision-strike capacity and capability. Eventually, however, Russian stocks will need replenishment. Reports from the Ukrainian military indicate Russia has already expended well over 100 of these munitions and had around 300 left as of October 14. Last week, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed Moscow hopes to buy 2,400 more Shahed-136s, while The Washington Post on Sunday cited unnamed officials as saying Iran is preparing to send Russia “dozens” more Mohajer-6s and an unspecified larger number of Shahed-136s. Whether Tehran can quickly supply that many remains to be seen.
John Hardie is the deputy director of FDD’s Russia Program. Ryan Brobst is a research analyst at FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power.
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Tags: Iran, russia, ukraine
longwarjournal.org · by John Hardie & Ryan Brobst · October 18, 2022
8. Opinion | The world continues to ignore the radicalization of India
Conclusion:
As the world remains silent in the face of increasing injustice in India, I am reminded of an old Egyptian proverb: “Oh Pharaoh, who turned you into a tyrant?” “No one stopped me,” he replied.
Opinion | The world continues to ignore the radicalization of India
The Washington Post · by Rana Ayyub · October 17, 2022
Last week, India’s Supreme Court took on an issue that has turned into a major political controversy: the hijab. In February, the southern state of Karnataka had banned women from wearing the hijab in classrooms — enraging Indian Muslims and delighting Hindu nationalists, who saw the state’s move as another triumph in their continuing campaign against Muslims in India.
The court’s decision ended up showing just how polarized India’s religious landscape has become. One of the judges on the panel declared wearing headscarves a matter of personal choice; the other essentially dismissed the problem, saying that the hijab was not “essential” to Islam.
But India’s Muslims can’t simply act as if the issue doesn’t exist. Muslim girls in India are fighting — just like their counterparts in Iran — for their fundamental right to dress and live on their own terms. Many Muslim girls were barred from entering school premises or sitting for exams when they insisted on wearing the hijab, which they believe is a fundamental right. These women believe that the general attack on the hijab is merely a pretext — part of the wider assault on every aspect of the Muslim identity.
That such an assault is well underway can no longer be denied, even if some people in the international community persist in ignoring it. On the streets of India today, Hindu nationalists have been seen brandishing swords and chanting provocative slogans outside mosques. Videos shared on social media of mob attacks on Muslims are far too common. And Muslim students and activists have seen their houses demolished by state officials without due process, clearly as retribution for speaking up against atrocities. The news organization Scroll recently reported that many Muslims are leaving India due to “rising majoritarianism.”
Just this month, India has witnessed a spate of incidents involving targeted attacks on the Muslim community.
In the first week of October, a mob barged into a heritage mosque in the city of Bidar, performed a Hindu ceremony and chanted the slogan “Jai Shri Ram” (Glory to Lord Rama). Then a disturbing video went viral showing several Muslim men being tied to a lamppost in Gujarat, after they were accused of trespassing and disturbing a Hindu festival. As the men were flogged, allegedly by police officers in civilian clothes, the crowds chanted nationalist slogans and danced. A similar incident took place last month, when people associated with an ultra-right-wing group called the Bajrang Dal reportedly assaulted Muslim boys for participating in the Hindu festival of Navratri, accusing them of enticing Hindu girls.
Extremists clearly feel empowered, and it is not hard to guess why. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is at the peak of his power. His crackdown on independent media and his Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) increasing dominance across all of India’s institutions are limiting society’s capacity to push back against such radicalism.
Members of his party, meanwhile, have added fuel to the fire: A sitting BJP member of Parliament, Pragya Thakur, recently stated that Muslims should not be allowed in Hindu festivals. Thakur is on trial for allegedly taking part in a bombing that killed six people near a mosque; she was elected while out on bail, after spending eight years in jail. Another BJP lawmaker appeared to call for a “total boycott” of Muslim businesses recently, with crowds cheering and clapping in response.
Modi, who has one of the biggest followings on social media of any Indian, has not called for inclusion or for an end to the violence against Muslims. Nor has he publicly reprimanded his lawmakers for speech that has further encouraged communal hate in India.
At the same time, the outside world doesn’t seem willing to stand up for India’s Muslims and other minorities. World leaders apparently prioritize maintaining strategic relations with India to counter China and Russia, not understanding that this willful and convenient ignorance is amplifying state-sanctioned violence against the 220 million Muslims in India.
Britain has recently offered a glaring example of the long reach of sectarian hatred allegedly emanating from India. Last month, the city of Leicester experienced an outpouring of communal violence between Hindu and Muslim communities. A BBC investigation has shown that the disinformation that led to the violence was inflamed by social media accounts from India. These fault lines are also present in the United States: An Indian independence day celebration in New Jersey in August controversially featured a piece of construction equipment similar to bulldozers used in India to demolish Muslim homes.
It was another reminder that the hate and division growing in India will not stop at its borders. A statement by Human Rights Watch released this month warned of a surge in crimes against Muslims in India. Yet the Modi government has mocked all criticism by human rights groups and international media as attempts to discredit his government.
As the world remains silent in the face of increasing injustice in India, I am reminded of an old Egyptian proverb: “Oh Pharaoh, who turned you into a tyrant?” “No one stopped me,” he replied.
The Washington Post · by Rana Ayyub · October 17, 2022
9. Xi Jinping’s Strategy of Conflict
Conclusion:
A Disaster Looms for Xi Jinping
Thus has Xi Jinping created for himself another cyclical problem. His legitimacy rests on the culmination of his grandiose global aims, whether reuniting Taiwan with the mainland or completing the colonization of the South China Sea. Failure to achieve them puts the Party leader at risk at home. This risk is then mitigated with ever more draconian purges. Indeed, Xi has mixed a recipe for disaster, both for himself and for the People’s Republic of China. Dangerous days are ahead.
Xi Jinping’s Strategy of Conflict
19fortyfive.com · by Dan Blumenthal and Cindy Chen · October 18, 2022
As the People’s Republic of China marks its 20th party congress this month, Chinese President Xi Jinping is poised to shepherd both the Chinese Communist Party and the nation into a new and dangerous era. The foundations of China’s “harmonious rise” – public quiescence predicated on sky-high growth – have crumbled. Xi has responded by centralizing power, relying increasingly on the coercive tools of his internal security services to govern. But the Chinese leader’s effort to build a 21st-century police state promises growing internal risk, and this will likely translate into conflict-seeking abroad.
China’s Xi Jinping at BRICS Summit. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Xi Jinping’s Cycle of Purges
The trouble has been building for many years. Xi reached power in 2012 after decades of explosive growth and what the Party calls managed capitalism. Xi came into the office convinced of growing and dangerous challenges to the Chinese Communist Party. He fretted that, like the Soviet Communist Party before it, the CCP regime’s rule could be undone by lax party discipline, disintegrating ideological fervor, and too much openness to the rest of the world. The same year, he gave a speech decrying Soviet leaders’ “rejection” of Lenin and Stalin’s ideology.
Not long after, Xi created a Central National Security Commission to address a broad and newly defined set of threats – political, cultural, and ideological. The Chinese leader called the approach “holistic security,” and its central pillars should surprise nobody: Xi must be at the core of all political and policy decision-making, and only constant political purges can maintain party purity and security. No one is immune, and a series of senior officials have been forced out (or driven to suicide, in cases such as Gen. Zhang Yang, a former head of the Central Military Commission’s Political Work Department). Even the purgers have been purged, including figures such as Fu Zhenghua, a former deputy minister of public security, and Sun Lijun, formerly vice minister of public security.
There is a grim, inexorable logic to this cycle. At some point, each official in charge of safeguarding the party from ideological and political threats will know too much and grow too powerful for Xi’s comfort, necessitating their removal. Such Stalin-style behavior rarely ends well. But Xi Jinping is doubling down, his thinking recorded faithfully in the party’s theoretical journal Quishi:
“Of all the ruling parties of the world, how many have dared to fight corruption on such a large scale, and with such great intensity and tireless persistence, as our Party? Some people tout the West’s multi-party rotating rule, and tripartite ‘separation of powers’ and such, and do not believe that our Party can turn the blade inward and carve out its own decaying flesh. The Chinese Communist Party’s courage in the practice of self-revolution has given them a resounding and powerful answer.”
The People’s Liberation Army has likewise seen the “blade:” In 2016, two vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission, Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, were arrested and removed from office. Xi is apparently haunted by the Soviet military’s “professionalism” during the Soviet collapse, as he explained himself:
“Why must we stand firm on the Party’s leadership over the military? … Because that is the lesson from the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, where the military was depoliticized, separated from the Party and nationalized, the Party was disarmed. A few people tried to save the Soviet Union. They seized Gorbachev, but within days it was turned around again, because they didn’t have the tools of dictatorship.”
To avoid just that fate, Xi has taken concrete steps to ensure that the party commands the gun through unprecedented military reforms. He introduced new bodies to enforce political loyalty and strengthen his personal control over the military. He built a network of trusted allies to act as his eyes and ears within. He has also ensured that career advancement will depend more upon ideological purity and subservience to political leadership, leading military officials to spend precious hours studying “Xi Jinping thought” rather than training.
The Trouble Doesn’t Stay in China
The Chinese economy has also been a victim of Xi’s holistic security. Party cells now have a prominent place in corporate boardrooms, wielding considerable influence over decision-making. Xi Jinping thus crushed Jack Ma, former chairman and founder of the Alibaba conglomerate and China’s richest man, while seeking to break the central market positions of megaliths such as Alibaba, Tencent, and Didi through high-profile market interventions.
Chinese President Xi Jinping.
The CCP’s campaigns to reinvigorate domestic ideological fervor will not deter the party from foreign adventures. Indeed, China was more bellicose during the Cultural Revolution under Mao, a likely inspiration for Xi’s current effort. A foreign enemy is vital to mobilize party cadres and justify the politics of purges. Just as Mao did, Xi Jinping will cement the CCP’s hold on power by vilifying foreign countries. (Japan and the United States are particular favorites.) But this strategy, while arguably sound at home, will generate ever greater tensions between China and the rest of the world, in turn generating even greater pushback against China’s global ambitions.]
A Disaster Looms for Xi Jinping
Thus has Xi Jinping created for himself another cyclical problem. His legitimacy rests on the culmination of his grandiose global aims, whether reuniting Taiwan with the mainland or completing the colonization of the South China Sea. Failure to achieve them puts the Party leader at risk at home. This risk is then mitigated with ever more draconian purges. Indeed, Xi has mixed a recipe for disaster, both for himself and for the People’s Republic of China. Dangerous days are ahead.
Expert Biography: Dan Blumenthal is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he focuses on East Asian security issues and Sino-American relations. Mr. Blumenthal has served in and advised the US government on China issues for more than a decade. Before joining AEI, Mr. Blumenthal served as senior director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the US Department of Defense. He served as a commissioner on the congressionally mandated US-China Economic and Security Review Commission from 2006 to 2012, and he was vice chairman of the commission in 2007. He also served on the Academic Advisory Board of the congressional US-China Working Group.
Cindy Chen is a Research Assistant at AEI.
19fortyfive.com · by Dan Blumenthal and Cindy Chen · October 18, 2022
10. 'Massive blackouts' as 30% of Ukraine's power stations destroyed in just over a week, Zelensky says
'Massive blackouts' as 30% of Ukraine's power stations destroyed in just over a week, Zelensky says | CNN
CNN · by Sana Noor Haq,Gul Tuysuz,Uliana Pavlova · October 18, 2022
CNN —
Thirty percent of Ukraine’s power stations have been destroyed in just over a week, leading to “massive blackouts” across the country, President Volodymyr Zelensky said Tuesday, as the Kremlin steps up attacks on critical energy infrastructure.
“Another kind of Russian terrorist attacks: targeting energy & critical infrastructure. Since Oct. 10, 30% of Ukraine’s power stations have been destroyed, causing massive blackouts across the country,” Zelensky tweeted Tuesday.
He added that there was “no space left for negotiations with (Russian President Vladimir) Putin’s regime.”
The Russian Defense Ministry later confirmed that the country’s military had launched high-precision strikes on “energy systems” in Ukraine.
“During the day, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation continued to strike with long-range high-precision air and sea-based weapons on military command and energy systems of Ukraine, as well as arsenals with foreign-made ammunition and weapons, all designated targets were hit,” Lieutenant-Colonel Igor Konashenkov said Tuesday.
The death toll in Kyiv continues to climb this week, officials said. At least five people were killed Monday following Russian attacks with Iranian-made “kamikaze” drones and at least three people died in separate strikes on Tuesday.
Russia has rapidly increased targeted attacks on Ukrainian energy facilities, leaving multiple cities with power deficits.
Maxar Technologies/Reuters
‘Save water as much as possible’
Moscow has targeted key Ukrainian power facilities in recent days, leaving areas in at least three cities without power.
A residential neighborhood in the capital Kyiv is experiencing power cuts and water outages, local energy company DTEK said on Facebook Tuesday.
“Russian shelling has damaged a critical infrastructure facility in the Desnyansky district, causing interruptions in the electricity supply to the residents of the Troyeshchyna residential district and the water channel that supplies water to the Left Bank of the capital,” the company said.
In Dnipropetrovsk region, at least three areas, including parts of Dnipro city, experienced electrical outages and a water pumping facility lost power after Russia launched two missiles at an energy facility, causing “fire and severe destruction,” according to local authorities.
A CNN team in Dnipro saw from a distance the aftermath of a hit on a power plant in Dnipro and smoke rising from the facility.
Further west, the mayor of Zhytomyr said in a statement that the city was experiencing power and water cuts, with hospitals running on back up energy.
The mayor of Kyiv called on residents to save "electricity" and "water," as a Russian missile strike damaged a power plant in the city.
State Emergency Service of Ukraine/Reuters
Residents in the Ukrainian capital were also urged by local officials to limit electricity and water usage, after two key infrastructure complexes were hit on Tuesday.
“Currently, the provision of electricity and water supply services is partially limited in many houses on the left bank of the capital … I appeal to all Kyiv residents to save electricity as much as possible,” the city’s mayor, Vitali Klitschko, said on Telegram.
“For residents who have low pressure in the water supply network – save water as much as possible now.”
The World Health Organization (WHO) has warned of a “humanitarian emergency” as Putin’s military assault on Ukraine approaches the “brutal” winter months.
“Too many people in Ukraine are living precariously, moving from location to location, living in substandard structures or without access to heating. This can lead to frostbite, hypothermia, pneumonia, stroke and heart attack,” Hans Henri P. Kluge, the WHO’s regional director for Europe, said Friday.
“The destruction of houses and lack of access to fuel or electricity due to damaged infrastructure could become a matter of life or death if people are unable to heat their homes.”
CNN’s Uliana Pavlova, Fred Pleitgen, Victoria Butenko and Maria Kostenko contributed reporting.
CNN · by Sana Noor Haq,Gul Tuysuz,Uliana Pavlova · October 18, 2022
11. Why Biden's National Security Strategy Is Destined to Fail
Mackenzie Eaglen knows the budget and military resourcing.
Excerpts:
For the current fiscal year, the military simply does not have the dollars to achieve all that is asked of it. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said last week there is no “dissonance between what’s in the [NSS] and what’s in the budget.”
If only that were true. If the administration is serious about its new National Security Strategy, it will make this clear with its 2024 defense budget topline request. The Biden administration must ensure this request adequately accounts for inflation, provides a solid demand signal to our defense industrial base, and grows our defense spending by at least 3% to 5% real growth, with an emphasis on procurement over R&D.
Why Biden's National Security Strategy Is Destined to Fail
19fortyfive.com · by Mackenzie Eaglen · October 17, 2022
The Biden administration’s newly released National Security Strategy (NSS) calls for a military that can essentially do it all – from “backstopping diplomacy, confronting aggression, deterring conflict,” to fighting and winning the nation’s wars. Focusing the military on its core functions is wholly appropriate. But to do so ably requires robust policies, capable leaders, and sufficient resources in place.
National Security Strategy: Aspirational Only?
Unfortunately, the National Security Strategy is based on a false premise. The document states that America’s military power “continue[s] to grow, often outpacing those of other large countries.”
In reality, America’s conventional and nuclear deterrents are at a nadir and in dramatic need of rebuilding. With repeated defense budgets that do not keep pace with inflation and a bureaucracy on autopilot, the state of the military is unlikely to be reversed soon.
If the Biden administration’s past budget submissions are any indication, this White House strategy may simply be aspirational.
In an echo from the National Defense Strategy released earlier this year, the NSS labels China as the military’s “pacing challenge” and calls Russia an “acute threat.” While acknowledging that Russia threatens the international order, the National Security Strategy labels China as the only other country with the intent, and increasingly the capability, to reshape the international order.
The security strategy calls for a military that’s able to deter both of these countries while also “disrupt[ing] the terrorist threat to the homeland.” To do so, however, the Defense Department must first reset the ratio of procurement-to-R&D spending in next year’s budget request. For FY 2023, that ratio is an astoundingly low 1.3 to 1. Making matters worse, this year’s president’s budget request for defense would have lowered the ration to 1.11 to 1.
Thankfully, Congress stepped in.
Wars Aren’t Fought in Laboratories
During the Reagan build-up and the Cold War era, the procurement-to-R&D ratio was $2.74 to $1.00. In the mid-2000s, during the wars in the Middle East, it was $2.07 to $1.00. History shows that when defense capabilities are needed in the moment – or even within five years’ time – the armed services need money not only to field systems, but to field enough of them to matter.
A healthy ratio of purchasing to development sits closer to 2.25 to 1, which can be achieved by moving $45 billion out of the research and development account for each of the next five fiscal years. Without ample funding to take products from the experiment and prototype phases, and to field tangible capabilities in quantities that can aid warfighters, the Pentagon wastes time and money on systems that never make it out of the laboratory.
Reconfiguring this all-important ratio for 2024 will help reverse the trend of a shrinking, aging force.
The same theme of words over action continues in the NSS’s section on the Defense Industrial Base. The administration hopes for a workforce that can quickly manufacture the capabilities our military needs now, and invest in the next generation of technologies. If only things were that simple. The war in Ukraine has drawn down U.S. munitions and other stocks, once-hot production lines are now dormant, and inflation plus supply-chain woes are disrupting contractors’ operations. Leaders are finding they cannot simply turn production lines back on after they have starved industry.
A Dissonant National Security Strategy
Congress and defense officials must buy lots of needed equipment like they do ships: through multiyear procurement contracts, which provide a solid demand signal over the long-term. Such signals keep manufacturing lines moving and incentivize companies to make capital investments. The military needs this steady approach for more than just the big-ticket items, such as the Javelins, Stingers, and munitions that we have been sending in great amounts to Ukraine. Here again, Congress, particularly the Senate, is taking action by adding multiyear procurement contracts to defense bills.
Asking the U.S. military to modernize, deter and defeat enemies, maintain a robust nuclear triad, and seamlessly cooperate with allies and partners requires sustained, predictable, and robust resources above inflation each year.
For the current fiscal year, the military simply does not have the dollars to achieve all that is asked of it. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said last week there is no “dissonance between what’s in the [NSS] and what’s in the budget.”
If only that were true. If the administration is serious about its new National Security Strategy, it will make this clear with its 2024 defense budget topline request. The Biden administration must ensure this request adequately accounts for inflation, provides a solid demand signal to our defense industrial base, and grows our defense spending by at least 3% to 5% real growth, with an emphasis on procurement over R&D.
A 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, Mackenzie Eaglen is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she works on defense strategy, defense budgets, and military readiness. She is also a regular guest lecturer at universities, a member of the board of advisers of the Alexander Hamilton Society, and a member of the steering committee of the Leadership Council for Women in National Security.
19fortyfive.com · by Mackenzie Eaglen · October 17, 2022
12. China’s Surveillance State Pushes Deeper into Citizens’ Lives
Can this be exploited?
China’s Surveillance State Pushes Deeper into Citizens’ Lives
Xi has taken government tracking to new levels during the pandemic
https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-china-surveillance-covid-11666187151
By Brian Spegele
Oct. 19, 2022 11:55 am ET
SHANGHAI—In many parts of Xi Jinping’s China, state surveillance and Covid-19 controls begin the moment you step out the door in the morning.
The day might start with a government-mandated Covid test from workers in white hazmat suits. Without proof of a negative result, public spaces are off limits, including office buildings, grocery stores and parks.
Surveillance cameras keep watch over the city streets. In a cab on the way to work, the driver requires you to scan a QR code for a government database tracking people’s movements. Scan again when stopping by Starbucks for coffee and then again at the office.
If the database shows you’ve crossed paths with someone infected by the virus, you’ll likely be forced into quarantine. It may be in a hotel room, at a converted convention center, or if lucky, at home with an alarm installed on the front door.
The Chinese state has stretched far deeper into citizens’ lives since Mr. Xi took power in 2012. Covid has pushed the controls to entirely new levels. Such measures are increasingly testing the faith of Chinese citizens in a government that is no longer delivering the supercharged economic growth that underpinned popular support for decades.
When Mr. Xi took office, he set in motion a campaign to put the Communist Party back at the center of public life. Beijing increased censorship of social media, expanded surveillance and cracked down on private enterprise. He is expected to secure a third term as the country’s leader following the party’s twice-a-decade congress this week, after a steady drive to consolidate power.
CHINA UNDER XI JINPING
In a rare public protest last week, two banners appeared on a bridge in Beijing ahead of the congress. Slogans on the banners included “We Want Freedom, Not Lockdowns” and “Depose the Traitorous Dictator Xi Jinping.” Police quickly arrived and the banners were taken down.
“I trust them less, definitely,” said Krissy Gu, who runs a fitness and dance studio and has endured two extended lockdowns since the beginning of 2020, including the earliest one in the city of Wuhan in 2020 and one in Shanghai this spring that lasted two months. The government had initially said it would last four days.
Ms. Gu went to graduate school in Boston and stayed in the U.S. for several years, then returned to China in 2017. “I just felt like I could do all the things I wanted to do” in China, she said. She launched her studio in downtown Shanghai and got involved with local theater.
She is considering leaving China again, this time for a Ph.D. in Europe. “This year is my first time to start to think about me as a citizen and the relationship with the government,” she said. “I think it has happened to a lot of people.”
A surveillance camera hangs on a bridge in Shanghai.
PHOTO: ALY SONG/REUTERS
A health-tracking code on a building in the Lujiazui financial district of Shanghai.
PHOTO: QILAI SHEN FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
The State Council Information Office, which handles press inquiries for senior leaders, and Shanghai’s government didn’t respond to requests for comment.
The surveillance extends far beyond Covid. Chinese authorities combine data from biometric tools such as facial recognition with ID numbers and behavioral data collected by tech companies to identify actions they consider threatening to social order. In the far northwestern region of Xinjiang, faces, voices and physical movements are tracked in real time using cameras and other surveillance tools powered by artificial intelligence as part of a campaign to forcibly assimilate ethnic Uyghurs and other minority groups.
The increasing intrusions into daily life build on growing frustration over an economic slowdown, brought on in part by Covid lockdowns, that has made it harder to find jobs. Mr. Xi has cracked down on technology and education companies in an effort to rein in private sector risk-taking and assert greater state control over the economy. As of August, the urban youth unemployment rate sat at 18.7%, according to government statistics.
In China’s beleaguered property market, government restrictions on developers’ borrowing have helped spark falling prices. Over the summer, a movement to boycott paying mortgages on stalled real-estate projects spread to numerous cities.
Consumer confidence measured by the National Bureau of Statistics hit a new level of pessimism in April, and has since remained depressed as pandemic controls have endured.
Public opinion will likely start to rebound whenever China eases Covid controls, especially if the economy strengthens as a result. Economists expect output to grow around 3% this year, missing the government’s 5.5% target. Some are reconsidering when China’s economy will surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest, or if it ever will. The government has given little information about how its Covid policy might evolve going forward.
In the case of a 6-year-old boy who recently tested positive for Covid days after landing in Shanghai on a domestic flight, the government first placed 400 of the boy’s close contacts into quarantine. Then officials began tracking down secondary contacts—people who had come into contact with others deemed to be close to the boy.
Authorities descended on an IKEA after determining that a close contact of the boy had also visited the store, then left. Verified video footage showed people attempting to escape as security officers tried to barricade shoppers inside.
Authorities locked down an IKEA in Shanghai in August while tracking Covid cases.
PHOTO: QILAI SHEN FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Covid testing on the street in Shanghai on Oct. 12.
PHOTO: ALEX PLAVEVSKI/SHUTTERSTOCK
The government tested 83,000 people in connection with the boy’s case. No one besides the boy tested positive, according to the city government.
China’s government says its approach to Covid has saved lives, and many Chinese support the controls. Official statistics say about 5,200 people in mainland China have died of Covid, compared with more than 1 million in the U.S. Mr. Xi has labeled his effort against Covid as a “People’s War,” a phrase that harks back to the Mao era’s revolutionary fervor.
The lowest rungs of China’s government have been handed far more authority to control their neighborhoods. Government workers and volunteers monitor Covid-19 risks and report on residents’ activities.
Prior to Mr. Xi, the government had gradually retreated from people’s lives beginning in the late 1970s, allowing them to take up more private pursuits. Many foreign executives until recently saw China’s leadership as pragmatic above all else.
“Now ideology is trumping the economy,” the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China said recently when it released its latest position paper on the country.
Shanghai during a Covid lockdown in May.
PHOTO: ALEX PLAVEVSKI/SHUTTERSTOCK
Tracking public opinion in China is notoriously difficult. The government jails critics and academic freedom has eroded. On social media, posts critical of the government are frequently suppressed or deleted.
Before Covid-19 and even through the early days of the pandemic, some Western scholars found through surveys that Chinese were broadly supportive of the government, and that their satisfaction levels had grown in the previous two decades.
Mr. Xi won support from many Chinese after taking office for a wide-ranging anticorruption campaign and efforts to reduce poverty. These initiatives, and Chinese state media’s depiction of a decadent and decaying U.S., fostered greater nationalism.
Much of the recent frustration has been directed at local officials rather than at the central government.
In southwestern Guizhou, one of China’s poorest regions, anger crescendoed in recent weeks. A bus transporting residents into forced quarantine crashed in the middle of the night, killing 27 people and injuring 20 others. A local official expressed remorse, but was met with cynicism.
A protest formed online. “We’re all on the bus,” many users wrote.
A mother of two young children said she was on a different bus that night, forced into quarantine after her 4-year-old tested positive, only to be later cleared of the virus.
“I’m extremely sad and indignant,” she later wrote on the Chinese platform Zhihu. “Apart from empathy, I lament even more that our freedom and our lives might merely hinge on another person’s careless decision.”
A man tries to break out of a quarantine fence in Shanghai in June.
PHOTO: ALEX PLAVEVSKI/SHUTTERSTOCK
Morning commuters lined up to scan a tracking code and show their health status on their phones at an office building in Shanghai last month.
PHOTO: QILAI SHEN FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
When Mr. Xi took power, a growing high-speed rail system whisked travelers around the country. Today, carrying a large suitcase can prompt questions about a person’s movements. A business traveler upon arriving home can expect calls from the police about where they’ve been.
Like many Chinese from the provinces, Yuan Yuyu dreamed of launching a career in Beijing. A college graduate with a computer-programming degree, Ms. Yuan landed a job in the capital and booked a train ticket there in early 2020.
When the pandemic hit, Ms. Yuan said her ticket was suddenly canceled due to travel restrictions. Her job offer dried up.
She stayed in her home city in Shaanxi province and found work at a company that makes pre-packed roujiamo, a local specialty food similar to a hamburger.
She began dating a man who shared her love of travel, and they decided to get married in the groom’s hometown of Xi’an this spring. But the nearby city where they lived wouldn’t let them leave due to the Covid controls.
A day before the wedding, their city lifted the restrictions and the couple rushed to Xi’an for the ceremony. They awoke in the morning to find that Xi’an had banned public gatherings. A few family members gathered at Ms. Yuan’s in-laws’ apartment instead.
She’s now hunkering down at home, too wary to go anywhere.
“You never know if you’ll get locked down in some random place,” she said. “It’s a big problem.”
Xi Jinping’s China
The Wall Street Journal examines Xi Jinping’s first decade in power to better understand the changes he wrought—and the risks they create for China and the world.
Write to Brian Spegele at brian.spegele@wsj.com
13. The Hunt for Phish: How Agents Netted a Terrorist Jewel Thief
The Hunt for Phish: How Agents Netted a Terrorist Jewel Thief
coffeeordie.com · by Carl Prine · October 18, 2022
Abdullahi Ahmed “Phish” Abdullahi, the bumbling international gem thief who knocked off a jewelry store to fund ISIS terrorists, will stay behind bars in the US.
In San Diego on Monday, Oct. 17, US District Judge Thomas J. Whelan sentenced the 37-year-old Canadian to two decades in a federal penitentiary for providing material support to Islamic State group terrorists.
Abdullahi inked a plea deal with federal prosecutors 10 days before Christmas that capped his jail time at 20 years. He’s been incarcerated since his extradition from Edmonton in 2017.
His criminal defense attorneys in California declined comment when contacted by Coffee or Die Magazine.
An armed jihadist stands next to the wreckage of a Syrian government forces aircraft that was shot down by militants of the Islamic State group over the Syrian town of Raqqa on Sept. 16, 2014. The plane crashed into a house in the Euphrates Valley city, the sole provincial capital entirely out of Syrian government control, causing deaths and injuries on the ground, Syrian Observatory for Human Rights monitoring group said. STR/AFP via Getty Images.
STR/AFP via Getty Images.
Abdullahi’s case shined a light not only on ISIS radicalization of Somali refugees living and often moving between the US and Canada but also on how members of that community turned in their own relatives.
The probe by US authorities and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police uncovered a conspiracy by a rogue’s gallery of terrorists and their funders known in the files as “Tooth,” “Little Man,” “Farmer,” “Zooman,” “Sleepy,” and their money man, “Phish” Abdullahi, conspirators who called themselves “akhs” operating within a larger and law-abiding Somalia population of “homies in N.A.,” or North America.
Their volunteers jetted in a steady “caravan” from San Diego, Minneapolis, Calgary, and Edmonton to Turkey, crossing the border to join ISIS in Syria. They texted, fired off emails, or took to social media to showcase their battlefield exploits — “skills on da court” — and “three-point shot” sharpshooting when “smashing the manz in ball,” their enemies, mostly Free Syrian Army insurgents also fighting the Damascus dictatorship.
They called their firearms “strap” and the money from funders like Abdullahi, “gwap.” When they got “shahada” — slain in Syria as so-called martyrs — the conspirators would say they got “benched” or their foes managed to “sub us out.”
Social media posts captured Hanad Mohallim, who was killed fighting for the Islamic State group in Syria. The 19-year-old Minneapolis man was a cousin of convicted terrorist finanier Abdullahi Ahmed “Phish” Abdullahi, 37. US Department of Justice photo.
US Department of Justice photo.
At the center of it was Abdullahi, a refugee from war-torn Mogadishu who settled in the US before becoming a naturalized Canadian citizen. Between late 2013 and the end of 2014, he helped send at least six men to Syria to join the Islamic State group and continued to send them funds by wire transfer to Gaziantep, Turkey.
But everyone Phish helped get to Syria died. Four were his cousins: Hamsa Kariye, 30; Hirsi Kariye, 23; Mahad Hirsi, 20; and Hanad Mohallim, a 19-year-old Minneapolis man.
The other two included Douglas McCain, 33, a friend Abdullahi met when he lived in San Diego.
“I wish u the best and inshallah we’ll be all together on the front lines just like I been dreaming about lately,” Phish messaged them. “May allah bless ur hearts and fill it with joy and happiness on the front and may u brothers bring destruction to the cowards.”
Social media posts captured Hamsa Kariye, 30 (left), and Hirsi Kariye, 23, before they were killed fighting for the Islamic State group in Syria. They were cousins of convicted terrorist financier Abdullahi Ahmed “Phish” Abdullahi, 37. US Department of Justice photo.
US Department of Justice photo.
Canadian detectives and American agents interviewing relatives of Hamsa Kariye and Mahad Hirsi began to uncover the conspiracy in late 2014, according to court records.
And they later followed the money by reading Abdullahi’s draft emails and private Facebook messages to the men, who had been pipe fitters in Canada before they became militants.
The ring entered the FBI’s radar because Mohallim’s mother traveled to Turkey to try to woo her son to return to the US and then called the FBI to turn him in.
That sparked Abdullahi’s warnings to other co-conspirators that law enforcement might try to detain them in airports before they made it to the Middle East.
A security camera captured Abdullahi Ahmed “Phish” Abdullahi leaping over a counter to loot a jewelry store display case on Jan. 9, 2014, in Edmonton, Canada. US Department of Justice photo.
US Department of Justice photo.
At the same time, detectives in Edmonton were trying to solve the brazen Jan. 9, 2014, heist of VJ Jewellers in Edmonton.
Orchestrated by Abdullahi to get money to fly McCain and Mohallim to Turkey, the brutal robbery injured a 64-year-old shop owner, who was flung to the floor, his head wrapped in a towel, to keep him from shouting for help.
Pinned to the ground by Abdullahi, the shop owner remembered one of the men telling him, “We could just kill you, but we don’t want to. Just keep quiet. Keep quiet!”
And when of the neighbors heard the shop owner screaming for help and approached, he was met by a henchman pointing a pistol at him.
“Just shoot him! Just shoot him!” yelled one of the robbers, shortly before Abdullahi and his accomplices fled the scene in a white minivan, just ahead of the police.
A woman works in the kitchen of her damaged house in the war-ravaged village of Habash, some 180 kilometers north of Iraq’s capital Baghdad, on April 25, 2022, eight years after heavy fighting between Islamic State group jihadists and the army ended. Photo by Ahmad Al-Rubaye/AFP via Getty Images.
Photo by Ahmad Al-Rubaye/AFP via Getty Images.
Authorities estimated Abdullahi’s crew made off with up to $30,000 in jewelry he’d stuffed into a pillowcase. But in the wake of the highly publicized stickup, Phish struggled to pawn or fence the gems.
He ended up spending months trying to convert the jewelry to cash, ultimately getting pennies on the dollar for their value. It became a wrinkle in his larger plan to defraud and rob non-Muslims — people he slurred as “kuffar” — to finance jihadists at home and abroad.
But that bungled plot also was a departure from Abdullahi’s previous petty criminality.
Between 2002 and 2011, he faced misdemeanor charges for disorderly conduct; riot in the third degree; curfew violations; providing false information four times to police officers; unlawful carrying of a firearm; driving on a suspended license; disturbing the peace; public fighting; and resisting arrest.
But his rap sheet seemed to end in Canada, where he toiled as an oil rig worker and founded a nonprofit to help the growing Somali refugee community there.
A US Marine fires an M777-A2 howitzer in the early morning in Syria, June 3, 2017, targeting elements of the Islamic State group. US Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Matthew Callahan.
US Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Matthew Callahan.
Both prosecutors and defense attorneys settled on a 20-year sentence — a decade below the max — because Abdullahi’s radicalization waned as his cousins died on the battlefield, and he no longer believed in jihad by the time he pleaded guilty.
Letters penned by relatives to the judge also painted a complicated portrait of the man.
A cousin in Canada, Guled Kariye, recalled Abdullahi’s compassionate work with disabled people. He described Phish taking food left over from their stall at San Diego farmers markets to give to the homeless at Ocean Beach.
Another cousin in Minnesota, Hodan A. Dualeh, recollected Abdullahi stopping after rainstorms to pluck frogs and earthworms from the pavement so they wouldn’t be trampled.
But prosecutors weren’t fully convinced about Phish’s humanitarian motives.
“The entirety of Abdullahi’s criminal conduct represents a unique and violent brand of criminality that simultaneously shows no respect for human life or the rule of law,” wrote Assistant US Attorneys Shane Harrigan and Fred Sheppard in a joint Oct. 6 memorandum to the judge. “He committed violent acts to support the violent terrorist activities of one of the most deadly and brutal terrorist organizations on this planet.”
coffeeordie.com · by Carl Prine · October 18, 2022
14. McCarthy signals GOP-led House likely to oppose more aid to Ukraine
Political points with the base versus national security considerations?
McCarthy signals GOP-led House likely to oppose more aid to Ukraine
The Washington Post · by Eugene Scott · October 18, 2022
House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) is signaling that if Republicans win the House majority in next month’s midterm elections, the GOP is likely to oppose more aid to Ukraine in its war with Russia.
Since the invasion in February the majority of congressional Republicans and Democrats have united in authorizing billions of dollars in U.S. military and humanitarian assistance to Kyiv as a geopolitical and moral stand against Vladimir Putin’s aggression.
McCarthy, who could be House speaker if Republicans triumph, indicated that that could end in a GOP-led House.
“I think people are gonna be sitting in a recession and they’re not going to write a blank check to Ukraine,” he recently told Punchbowl News. “They just won’t do it.”
McCarthy suggested that Americans want Congress to focus on issues closer to home.
“There’s the things [the Biden administration] is not doing domestically,” he said. “Not doing the border, and people begin to weigh that. Ukraine is important, but at the same time, it can’t be the only thing they do, and it can’t be a blank check.”
The United States has authorized upward of $60 billion in aid to Ukraine, with more than $18.2 billion in security assistance given since January 2021. The Senate voted to finalize more than $40 billion in new military and humanitarian assistance in May, with Republicans being the only lawmakers voting against that package — the largest investment in Ukraine thus far.
Eleven Republican senators and 57 House GOP members opposed the legislation, arguing that more needs to be done to account for how the money is spent and to trace weapons and equipment sent to the battlefield.
On Friday, the United States announced an additional $725 million in security assistance for Ukraine, including more ammunition for high mobility rocket systems, or HIMARS, as well as precision-guided artillery rounds, antitank weapons and Humvees, according to a Pentagon statement.
Although most of the congressional leadership, most notably Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), have been steadfast in support for Ukraine, voters in several states in January could send Republicans to Washington who are eager to oppose aid. The number of those wary of foreign aid and adherents of former president Donald Trump’s “America First” agenda are expected to grow in the next Congress.
In September, J.D. Vance, the venture capitalist and author who is locked in a close race for a U.S. Senate seat representing Ohio, said he wants “the Ukrainians to be successful” but not because of continued U.S. funding.
“I do think that we have to get to a point, and this is where we do disagree, we’ve got to stop the money spigot to Ukraine eventually,” he told the ABC affiliate in Toledo. “We cannot fund a long-term military conflict that I think ultimately has diminishing returns for our own country.”
Vance added, “I think we’re at the point where we’ve given enough money in Ukraine, I really do. … The Europeans need to step up. And frankly, if the Ukrainians and the Europeans, more importantly, knew that America wasn’t going to foot the bill, they might actually step up.”
Europe has provided a significant amount of military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
In Arizona, Republican Senate nominee Blake Masters criticized the additional funding for Ukraine in May, claiming that the money should be used instead to build a wall at the U.S.-Mexico border.
“Under Joe Biden, it’s always America last,” he said in a video he tweeted. “Let’s be clear about what this means. It means no cease-fire. It means another foreign war where we pay for everything. Many more thousands of people will die. There’s no resolution, no end in sight. The risk of course is that a proxy war can escalate into an all-out nuclear war between nuclear powers.”
In New Hampshire, Republican Senate candidate Don Bolduc said last week that more spending is not the answer to improving conditions in Ukraine.
“We must hold the administration accountable,” he told New Hampshire’s ABC affiliate. “We just can’t print this money. It’s money we don’t have, and it’s equipment that’s being thrown at a problem without any strategy, without any policy, and it’s not going to get the job done.”
These Republicans could join Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), who in May temporarily held up $40 billion of aid to Ukraine, saying, “you can’t save Ukraine by dooming the U.S. economy.”
Nevada Republican Senate nominee Adam Laxalt tweeted in May that the $40 billion U.S. aid to Ukraine was a “shockingly abhorrent proposal.”
The loudest voices on the right on the issue, such as Fox News’s Tucker Carlson, have been outspoken in questioning aid to Ukraine.
The Conservative Political Action Conference in September posted, then deleted, a tweet that echoed Kremlin language and called for a halt to “gift-giving to Ukraine.” It later issued a statement reaffirming its stance on U.S. assistance. “We must oppose Putin, but American taxpayers should not be shouldering the vast majority of the cost,” it said.
A September Pew Research poll found that most Republicans and Democrats say that the U.S. is providing “about right” or “not enough” support to Ukraine, though 32 percent of Republicans said the U.S. is providing “too much,” a figure that has more than tripled since March (9 percent). Relatedly, Americans’ concern about Ukraine being defeated and taken over by Russia dropped from 55 percent in May to 38 percent in September.
McCarthy’s comments to Punch Bowl News drew an incredulous response from Rep. Adam Kinzinger (R-Ill.), who tweeted at McCarthy, “What in the absolute bloody hell is happening to @GOPLeader.”
Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has warned that if the GOP wins the House, help for Ukraine would be in jeopardy.
“I just see a freight train coming, and that is Trump and his operation turning against aid for Ukraine,” he said on MSNBC. “House Republicans, if they were to take the majority, being preternaturally against anything Joe Biden is for — including the war in Ukraine — and there being a real crisis where the House Republican majority would refuse to support additional aid to Ukraine.”
White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said Tuesday that she did not want to engage in hypotheticals about what could happen if Republicans gained control of the House, but she said the president would continue to support the Ukrainian people’s efforts to defend themselves.
“We will continue to work with Congress and continue to monitor those conversations on these efforts and support Ukraine as long as it takes,” she said. “We are going to keep that promise that we’re making to the brave Ukrainians who are fighting every day to fight for their freedom and their democracy.”
Scott Clement and Azi Paybarah contributed to this report.
The Washington Post · by Eugene Scott · October 18, 2022
15. Most Ukrainians want to keep fighting until Russia is driven out, poll finds
We have rarely supported a friend, partner, or ally who sustains such a will to fight. Probably not since the Korean War and our Korean allies.
Most Ukrainians want to keep fighting until Russia is driven out, poll finds
The Washington Post · by Leo Sands · October 18, 2022
Seventy percent of Ukrainians are determined to keep fighting until their country wins the war against Russia, according to a Gallup poll conducted in early September, amid counteroffensives that retook swaths of land in the country’s south and east.
Nearly all who supported continuing the fight defined victory as retaking all territories seized by Russia since 2014, including Crimea, Gallup said.
The survey, published Tuesday, was conducted by telephone last month and preceded Russia’s barrages last week and this week against Kyiv and energy facilities across Ukraine, as well as deadly drone strikes this week in the capital.
On Tuesday, another round of attacks hit power facilities in Kyiv; in Dnipro, in central Ukraine; and in Zhytomyr, which is about 85 miles west of the capital.
The governor of the Zhytomyr region, Vitaliy Bunechko, said that about 150,000 people in the regional capital and surrounding villages had lost electrical service as a result of the attack and that by early evening, authorities had restored service to about 100,000 of them.
“The repairmen are working continuously without stopping until the end of the day and promise to fully restore energy supply in populated areas,” Bunechko said in a telephone interview. He added, however, that officials might be forced to introduce “temporary emergency shutdowns.”
“We’re moving forward in stages,” he said.
Bunechko said that two people had suffered “light injuries” in the attack and that he could not comment on the extent of the damage until engineers surveyed the site.
Moscow seems to hope that depriving Ukrainians of electricity, heat, and water service will break their will to keep fighting. But Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other officials have insisted that infrastructure attacks will only steel the nation’s resolve to fight until Russia is defeated.
Posting on Twitter on Tuesday, Zelensky accused Russia of terrorism. “Another kind of Russian terrorist attacks: targeting energy & critical infrastructure,” he wrote. “Since Oct 10, 30% of Ukraine’s power stations have been destroyed, causing massive blackouts across the country. No space left for negotiations with Putin’s regime.”
It was impossible to independently verify Zelensky’s 30 percent figure, and it was not entirely clear how the president was measuring the damage. But with tens of thousands of people without power, and some municipal governments rationing service, it was clear that the airstrikes have taken a toll.
In Strasbourg, France, where the European Parliament was in session, top European Union officials said they would help Kyiv restore critical services and withstand Moscow’s effort to leave Ukraine cold and dark during the winter.
“We are in this together and we will stand by their side,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said at a news conference in Strasbourg. “We will deal with whatever Putin tries, together with Ukraine — to fend that off and to make sure that they stay interconnected with us and that they have the support from our side,” she added.
Up until just two weeks ago, von der Leyen said, Ukraine had been exporting electricity to its European neighbors, generating much-needed revenue for the country, which has seen its economy collapse amid Russia’s invasion.
Kadri Simson, the European commissioner for energy, said Brussels was providing financial assistance to Ukraine and supplying critical equipment needed for repairs. “To repair their grids and thermal power plants, you also need this specific equipment,” Simson said.
Ukrainian officials greeted the Gallup poll results as a sign that the country has the appetite — and stamina — to continue the fight. “It’s a choice between either a fight or a genocide,” Ukrainian lawmaker Maryan Zablotskyy, a member of Zelensky’s party, told The Washington Post.
Support for the war effort is so high, Zablotskyy said, because Ukrainians know the alternative is the horrors inflicted by Russian troops in cities they have captured. “We have seen what Russia does in places where there is no fighting. Any sort of resistance is better than the fate of the people who have been conquered by Russia,” he said. “This is existential.”
Support for Ukraine’s military registered at nearly universally high levels, with 94 percent reporting they had confidence in their armed forces. Despite fears of worsening economic conditions and degraded quality of life, the data showed public confidence in the national government, led by Zelensky, to be at the highest level recorded in 17 years of Gallup polls.
Rather than exacerbating long-standing divisions among Ukrainians concerning Russia and the West, the poll found, President Vladimir Putin’s invasion has given the country a common sense of purpose and boosted hopes of closer ties with the E.U. and NATO.
A majority of Ukrainians think that within 10 years their country will be a member of the E.U. (73 percent) and NATO (64 percent), according to Gallup, reflective of a broader optimism among the country’s population about Ukraine’s future.
Even so, the study reveals potential cracks in popular support for Ukraine’s fight to victory. One of the biggest divisions ran along gender lines, with 76 percent of Ukrainian men in favor of continuing the war effort compared with 64 percent of women.
The most pronounced differences were regional — with support for fighting until victory strongest in Kyiv (83 percent) and western Ukraine (82 percent) and significantly lower in the east (56 percent) and in the south (58 percent), closer to the front lines and the grinding ground battle.
Zablotskyy acknowledged that support for the war may differ among the regions, but he also noted the higher proportion of Russians living in some parts of the country. “Nineteen percent of Ukrainian citizens consider themselves Russian,” he said, referring to recent demographic polling, and they primarily reside closer to the Russian border in the country’s east. He suggested that those Ukrainians may be more susceptible to pro-Russian messaging.
Across the country as a whole, 26 percent of Ukrainians say the government should negotiate an end to the fighting as quickly as possible.
It is difficult to compare popular support for the war effort with equivalent levels in Russia, where freedom of speech is heavily restricted and reliable surveying is difficult. But some polling appears to show that Russians are less likely to support fighting to victory.
Beatriz Ríos in Strasbourg and David L. Stern in Mukachevo, Ukraine, contributed to this report.
The Washington Post · by Leo Sands · October 18, 2022
16. FDD | For Sanctions to Work in Bosnia, EU Must Join the U.S.
Excerpts:
Unfortunately, these sanctions likely will have no serious effect on the level of corruption or democratic backsliding in Bosnia, because the sanctioned parties have few business ties with the United States. As such, it is essential that Washington convince the European Union to join these and future sanctions against bad actors in Bosnia, who tend to do more business and travel in Europe. In March 2022, the Council of the European Union adopted a decision “extending its framework measures on individuals or entities” who undermine the stability of Bosnia. Germany has argued for sanctioning Dodik, but Hungary has balked, arguing it would be “counterproductive” for Bosnia’s EU integration. Hungary has a long history of doing Moscow’s bidding in the Balkans, and the European Union should put pressure on Hungary to support sanctions. This should be a major focus of U.S.-EU cooperation in the Balkans.
Bosnia must not descend back into the chaos it experienced in the 1990s. Western powers can help prevent it from doing so by holding accountable the entities and individuals that seek to tear apart the country.
FDD | For Sanctions to Work in Bosnia, EU Must Join the U.S.
fdd.org · by Ivana Stradner Research Fellow · October 18, 2022
The U.S. Treasury Department on September 26 and October 3 imposed sanctions against prominent Bosnian individuals and entities for allegedly engaging in corruption and eroding democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Coming amid what Treasury called “BiH’s most serious political crisis since 1995,” these designations aim to fight corruption and promote democracy but will likely have little practical effect.
The September 26 package targeted Diana Kajmakovic, whom Treasury called a “brazenly corrupt BiH state prosecutor with links to criminal organizations.” According to Treasury, Kajmakovic has “helped hide evidence, prevent prosecution, and otherwise assist criminal activity in exchange for personal gain” in support of narcotics traffickers and other criminals.
The October 3 sanctions targeted two individuals and one company. The first individual is Fadil Novalic, prime minister of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which together with Republika Srpska (RS) forms the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to Treasury, Novalic repeatedly leveraged “his position of political influence for personal or party gain,” including by misusing pensioner data to facilitate campaign ads during the run-up to the country’s 2018 elections.
Treasury also designated Slobodan Stankovic, one of Bosnia’s wealthiest businessmen, and his Republika Srpska-based engineering firm, Integral Inzenjering A.D. Laktasi. The department accused Stankovic and Integral of leveraging their “proximity to RS leadership” to secure lucrative construction contracts, which “are often handed to Stankovic without fair and open competition.”
Treasury’s sanctions, issued pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14033, freeze any U.S. assets of the designated parties and bar them from the U.S. financial system. Signed by President Joe Biden in June 2021, E.O. 14033 empowers Treasury to designate persons who engage in corruption related to the Western Balkans or who undermine peace, stability, or democracy in the region, including by obstructing the implementation of regional peace agreements. Treasury’s recent designations are the fourth and fifth sanctions packages issued under this authority.
Since the Dayton Agreement ended the Bosnian War in 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been held together by a delicate balance between the Serb-run Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-majority Federation. However, Milorad Dodik, the Serb member of Bosnia’s tripartite presidency, is now threatening — with Russian and Serbian backing — that Republika Srpska will secede. This could reignite ethnic violence in the country and destabilize the broader region. Treasury sanctioned Dodik under E.O. 14033 in January, having already designated him under a different authority in 2017.
Unfortunately, these sanctions likely will have no serious effect on the level of corruption or democratic backsliding in Bosnia, because the sanctioned parties have few business ties with the United States. As such, it is essential that Washington convince the European Union to join these and future sanctions against bad actors in Bosnia, who tend to do more business and travel in Europe. In March 2022, the Council of the European Union adopted a decision “extending its framework measures on individuals or entities” who undermine the stability of Bosnia. Germany has argued for sanctioning Dodik, but Hungary has balked, arguing it would be “counterproductive” for Bosnia’s EU integration. Hungary has a long history of doing Moscow’s bidding in the Balkans, and the European Union should put pressure on Hungary to support sanctions. This should be a major focus of U.S.-EU cooperation in the Balkans.
Bosnia must not descend back into the chaos it experienced in the 1990s. Western powers can help prevent it from doing so by holding accountable the entities and individuals that seek to tear apart the country.
Ivana Stradner is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where she contributes to the Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP). For more analysis from Ivana and CEFP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Ivana on Twitter @ivanastradner. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CEFP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Ivana Stradner Research Fellow · October 18, 2022
17. Homeland Defense in the Information Space: Learning from Russian Influence Campaigns in Eastern Europe
I am going to beat the dead horse here (from the 2017 NSS):
"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
Access NSS HERE
Homeland Defense in the Information Space: Learning from Russian Influence Campaigns in Eastern Europe - Modern War Institute
Olga R. Chiriac and Jahara Matisek | 10.19.22
mwi.usma.edu · by Olga R. Chiriac · October 19, 2022
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On August 23, 2021, unknown organizers coordinated the “Baltic Way 2021” celebration to mark thirty years of freedom in the Baltic states, with advertising across social media promoting it. However, according to officials at the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence and Latvian cyber warfare military personnel we interviewed, the event was likely established and funded by Moscow. It quickly turned into, according to one Latvian military officer, an “anti-vax, anti-government meeting that celebrated ‘freedom’ and promoted conspiracies.” Fortunately, attendance was quite low, but this is the sort of sociopolitical-information warfare that has been occurring in Eastern Europe for decades.
A blending of social and political issues in the information environment allows an adversary to weaponize civil society in a way that leads to anomie, confusion, and hyperpolarization, ultimately aiming to undermine democracy and the social contract. The growing prominence of smartphones, constant connectivity, and social media has intensified such adversarial influence actions against the democracies of Eastern Europe, just as it has in the United States. And this influence is accomplished cheaply—Russia is “spending approximately $4 billion a year (comparable value) on cyber-influence operations against the West.”
Traditional American security afforded by the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean is no more. While Eastern Europe is physically closer to the Kremlin, the tactics used by Russian agents are easily employed against unsuspecting Americans via cyberspace and social media—posing a threat to US national interests around the globe and to American homeland defense. Without proper preparation, the US will suffer in the next crises, as China (and other adversaries) have learned lessons from the 2022 Russo-Ukraine War and are improving their joint operations in tandem with narratives as part of broader cognitive warfare efforts to achieve certain nonkinetic effects and influence objectives in their favor.
Russian Information Warfare in the Digital Age
Russia, and increasingly China (as well as other adversarial countries like Iran and North Korea), see tremendous value in pursuing cheap, low-risk influence operations via the internet and social media. Pushing conspiracies upon unsuspecting citizens, especially in Eastern Europe, creates an alternative reality, which is weaponized to the benefit of Russia and others. In such a milieu, social media warriors working on behalf of Beijing and Moscow generate false and misleading information about various events to sow division along sociopolitical lines, which creates and amplifies grievances by further polarizing societies.
Taking a page from the Russian playbook, China continues punishing Lithuania for withdrawing from the 17+1 diplomatic framework in between Beijing and countries in Central and Eastern Europe, opening representative offices in Taiwan, and allowing a reciprocal “Taiwanese” office in Vilnius to be opened instead of using Beijing’s preferred term of “Taipei.” This has even led China to pressure multinational companies into cutting supply chain links with Lithuania. According to Lithuanian defense officials interviewed in September 2021, the country had previously been subject to an average of about four unique cases of Chinese disinformation attacks per month. However, after the diplomatic scuffle began, Chinese disinformation attacks against Lithuania increased to over one hundred a month. China has roughly one million personnel dedicated to conducting information operations; the United States only has about thirty thousand such personnel. Clearly, China can conduct information and influence campaigns against other countries, particularly in the cyber domain, with a level of intensity, scale, depth, and breadth that the United States and its allies and partners cannot match.
As social media comes to increasingly dominate the daily lives of citizens—TikTok displaced Google as the most visited website in 2021—the data-information sphere occupied by each individual will increasingly construct his or her social and digital reality. Adversarial countries like China and Russia will increasingly leverage such a shift in how the average person interprets reality, both to influence their own populations and to alter and shape foreign audience perceptions. With over 6.6 billion smartphone users globally, this becomes a liability and vulnerability to be exploited for influence in a way that was not possible in the pre-internet age. Such a dependency on connectivity and information, presents a new battlespace arena for adversaries to exploit.
Such developments in the way individuals interact has major ramifications for geopolitical competition. For instance, during the US-led pullout of Afghanistan in August 2021, Moscow touted narratives about how the United States and NATO would abandon Ukraine in the next crisis. According to some Ukrainians interviewed in August 2021, Ukrainian social media was flooded with Russian trolls amplifying these narratives. Shaping the information environment in such a way can slowly alter individual perceptions of reality, and possibly polarize individuals and elected leaders into subscribing to a reality that a foreign power wants them to believe.
Russian Influence Campaigns in Eastern Europe
Since Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined NATO in 2004, Russia has been attempting to shape the information space in the Baltic region in its favor. For instance, Moscow launched the Baltic Media Alliance in 2005 to serve Russian-speaking populations in the Baltics. Such efforts by Moscow are meant to undermine strategic and defense thinking in each Baltic country—officials interviewed across the Baltics described how much planning has been dedicated to trying to stay ahead of Russian narratives. For instance, one Latvian official admitted in an interview—before the Russian invasion of Ukraine—that Riga could not reintroduce military conscription because Russia held substantial sway (i.e., information control) over Russian-speaking Latvians, who form a quarter of the population.
Once the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, Russian dis-, mal-, misinformation campaigns shifted focus from COVID-19 and anti-NATO propaganda against the West to supporting the war efforts in Ukraine. Internally, Moscow advanced narratives in favor of the Russian “special military operation,” and externally, oriented operations against the West and its elected leaders into believing the Ukrainians are corrupt, thuggish Nazis. Interestingly, because resources with which to conduct information operations online are not infinite, the relative emphasis on particular subjects might reflect the priorities of adversarial influence campaigns. In that regard, it is illuminating that researchers noticed a “bot holiday” in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when COVID-19 disinformation that had trended on social media since early in the pandemic dropped off. Moreover, Swedish and Finnish officials interviews in September 2022 mentioned anticipation of Russian influence operations against their countries after they announced their intentions of joining NATO, but were surprised by the limited number that took place. That is likely because of a greater Russian interest in the information war surrounding Ukraine—and against any pro-Ukraine sympathizers.
Domestically, Russian leadership seeks to control the information space, ensuring favorable narratives are presented to the population. In part it does this through legal measures—its communications regulator blocking or slowing down Western social media platforms and threatening lawsuits and fines against Western social media companies, for instance. have been implemented in Russia that alter the information landscape. Such tactics have little effect in the international information environment, however, so to advance its influence campaigns globally Moscow leverages those same Western platforms. In addition to the Russian security and intelligence agencies, it is widely known that the Internet Research Agency, often referred to as a troll farm or troll factory, is a private organization with deep Kremlin ties that has supported Russian government information and influence operations. In addition to leveraging social media as an instrument, targeted campaigns take advantage of cultural sensitivities or historical traumas of target populations to create animosity against their own pro-Western governments.
In cases like those of Moldova, Ukraine, or Georgia, the common Soviet past is framed in a positive narrative alongside those that simultaneously seek to intimidate opposition. In former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact members that are now members of the European Union and NATO—Lithuania, Poland, and Romania—the effort is often to portray these countries as US proxies under tight American control. Romania for example, host of a NATO missile defense system at Deveselu military base and the NATO Multinational Division Southeast, is often mentioned when framing NATO as an offensive alliance with military equipment on the “borderlands” of the Russian Federation. This has been an increasingly frequent theme since the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System became operational.
Understanding Russian Logic to Improve Resilience
It is perhaps ironic that Russia employs social media so eagerly for its influence campaigns, given that the Russian security establishment perceives social media as a threatening medium for civil society to organize itself and produce mass protests that could ultimately lead to civil unrest and even regime collapse. Events such as Euromaidan in Ukraine, and particularly the way the protest movement used social media, are viewed as validation of the skewed Russian perspective that social media was conceived in Silicon Valley to collect intelligence against, destabilize, and even remove foreign governments. To some extent, this likely represents a case of mirror-imaging bias among Russian leaders, since meddling in foreign politics and societies—particularly undermining democratic movements or popular uprisings—is a foundational element in Russian irregular warfare. The key point, however, is that Russian skepticism of Western social media platforms notwithstanding, the growth of the internet and the phenomenon of hyperconnectivity have lowered the threshold for Russia (and others) to conduct shaping operations against unsuspecting individuals, both at home and abroad.
Solutions that counter such influence operations in Eastern Europe and in other liberal democracies are not easy. While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy calls on Europe to ban Russian media—“Not a single Russian propaganda-monger should stay on the territory of the EU,” he said, “[and] not a single Russian state TV channel should be allowed to keep working on the territory of the EU”—this is not a reasonable, long-term solution in liberal, democratic societies where free speech is a hallmark. Instead, Western media outlets and political leaders should invest more time in addressing Russian propaganda and influence operations, letting transparency and honesty triumph.
Short- and long-term reforms are needed in the West. This requires substantial political will on the part of elected leaders. First, it requires politicians—on the left and right—to avoid destructive domestic political discourse and conspiracy theories that are created and amplified by social media warriors and bots working on behalf of Beijing and Moscow. Second, civic education and digital literacy should become codified as a pillar of US national security and encouraged among NATO allies. Such templates for digital literacy and resilience could be learned from Sweden’s Total Defence and Finland’s Comprehensive Security concepts. Both countries—soon to be NATO members—uniquely emphasize the value of resilience, psychological defense, preparedness, and strengthening of civil society in support of whole-of-nation civil defense against foreign influence operations meant to weaken the country from within. Third, US leaders should consider the ways that Ukraine’s strategic communications and its Ministry of Digital Transformation have enabled it to sustain internal and external support for repelling Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Achieving future success in the next crisis means creating and empowering the right organizations dedicated to digital transformation and strategic communications, ensuring that “integrated deterrence” can actually be achieved via a whole-of-government approach through the information domain. Finally, if using the current model of Ukrainian success against Russia, the United States should similar be identifying opportunities for empowering and encouraging organic counterinfluence operations against China and Russia. The way that “NAFO” has been able to coalesce a global following of netizens in trolling Russia is instructive. It will require a change in the way the US government in particular conceptualizes and responds to risk in the information environment, but the United States and its partners must recognize and take advantage of the value provided by a NAFO-like movement and other global civil society actors. Doing so will be vital to staying left of digital boom to succeed in the next crisis or conflict.
Until the United States and its allies and partners adopt digital countermeasures, China and Russia will keep influencing their own citizens and Western populations in the cyber domain. The “new battlespace“ has arrived—and it means anti-Western regimes will attack civil society via information campaigns meant to divide and polarize target societies, while also weaponizing narratives that generate support for Chinese and Russian actions on the global stage. In digital spaces, the front lines are everywhere and nowhere all at once—and just as much vigilance will be needed in protecting critical infrastructure as is needed in protecting the average citizen. There must be purposeful efforts across the US government and military to generate resilience, proactively shape the information space, and exploit new narratives in adversarial countries.
The United States must excel in the digital age, just as it did in the industrial age. American political and military leaders must integrate sociopolitical-information operations into defensive strategies for the homeland and for achieving success in offensive operations against adversaries beyond North America.
Dr. Olga R. Chiriac is a Black Sea State Department Title VIII research fellow for the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC and an associated researcher at the Center for Strategic Studies in Romania. She is an alumna of the Arizona Legislative and Government Internship Program and her research and forthcoming work is on the application of cognitive sciences in security and defense, with a focus on joint special operations and the maritime domain.
Lieutenant Colonel Jahara “FRANKY” Matisek, PhD, (@JaharaMatisek) is a military professor in the National Security Affairs Department at the US Naval War College and is the fellowship director for the Irregular Warfare Initiative and a DoD Minerva researcher. He is a command pilot that previously served (2018–2022) as an associate professor in the Military and Strategic Studies Department at the US Air Force Academy. His book, Old and New Battlespaces, describes how adversaries use strategic schismogenesis and employ sociopolitical-information warfare to weaponize everything in society, as every citizen becomes a combatant.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization the authors are affiliated with, including the Naval War College.
Image credit: Tracy Le Blanc (adapted by MWI)
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mwi.usma.edu · by Olga R. Chiriac · October 19, 2022
18. Big Tech Goes to War
Excerpts:
Such public-private communication and collaboration on national security issues is not unprecedented. For example, since 2015, U.S. Space Command has established four commercial integration cells and has been open about the relevance of the commercial space industry to military space domain awareness and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. Currently, nine U.S. space companies are members, including Maxar Technologies. Similarly, commercial cyberspace companies have been engaging with each other and the government since the establishment of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers in 2003. While these centers were set up to share information about threats to U.S. critical infrastructure, they provide an excellent model for the exchange of sensitive or national security information in the midst of crisis and combat operations.
The Ukrainian military has become dependent on technology and, therefore, on Elon Musk’s decisions.
A key objective of these partnerships should be the ability to anticipate and coordinate when a tech company will engage in a conflict and when it will not. Government and industry leaders must discuss what happens when market forces and international relationships could lead to very different corporate decisions. Take, for example, a potential conflict with China. American companies are unlikely to abandon the democratic principles that enabled their rise, but their decisions to act may be more constrained by significant infrastructure, financial, or personnel investments in China. If the government were to begin to depend on tech companies for certain capabilities and find them to be unreliable, the United States could be caught short during a crisis. Understanding the needs and constraints on both sides, well in advance, could help avoid misunderstandings and missteps.
This issue, of course, is now playing out with Starlink. The Ukrainian military has become dependent on technology and, therefore, dependent on Musk’s decisions. Musk has decided not to support Ukraine’s request to activate Starlink in Crimea, and Starlink services have been recently unreliable in Ukraine, especially in areas controlled by Russia. It also appears as though Musk has asked the Pentagon to pick up funding for Starlink in Ukraine, although he currently says he will continue funding Starlink. His request for funding could be a business decision. His decision on where and where not to activate Starlink is reportedly based on his personal assessment of the risk of Russian escalation. A private company is deciding all of this, independent of government policies or objectives.
These events in Ukraine should serve as a call to action for government leaders. Tech companies have demonstrated how businesses can support military and security operations as well as their independent power and willingness to act. Now is the time to reach out to tech company leaders and initiate substantive and continuing conversations about these companies’ abilities and plans. The relationships built may be a game-changer for current and future conflicts.
Big Tech Goes to War
To Help Ukraine, Washington and Silicon Valley Must Work Together
October 19, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Christine H. Fox and Emelia S. Probasco · October 19, 2022
Even before he made a bid to buy Twitter, Elon Musk was an avid user of the site. It is a reason Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov took to the social media platform to prod the SpaceX CEO to activate Starlink, a SpaceX division that provides satellite internet, to help his country in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion. “While you try to colonize Mars—Russia try [sic] to occupy Ukraine!” Fedorov wrote on February 26. “We ask you to provide Ukraine with Starlink stations.”
“Starlink service is now active in Ukraine,” Musk tweeted that same day. This was a coup for Ukraine: it facilitated Ukrainian communications in the conflict. Starlink later helped fend off Russian jamming attacks against its service to Ukraine with a quick and relatively simple code update. Now, however, Musk has gone back and forth on whether the company will continue funding the Starlink satellite service that has kept Ukraine and its military online during the war.
The tensions and uncertainty Musk is injecting into the war effort demonstrate the challenges that can emerge when companies play a key role in military conflict. Technology companies ranging from Microsoft to Silicon Valley start-ups have provided cyberdefense, surveillance, and reconnaissance services—not by direction of a government contract or even as a part of a government plan but instead through the independent decision-making of individual companies. These companies’ efforts have rightly garnered respect and recognition; their involvement, after all, were often pro bono and could have provoked Russian attacks on their networks, or even their people, in retaliation.
But this is new territory for U.S. companies and for the U.S. government. The Biden administration must now figure out how to harness the power and willingness of these companies in ways that will help, and not harm, strategic interests going forward. To do that, policymakers should carefully consider why companies are getting involved and what the government can do to more meaningfully partner with them to serve U.S. foreign policy interests.
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
U.S. businesses have a long history of working with the U.S. government in the midst of war. During World War II, Ford Motor Company repurposed its assembly lines to build equipment needed by the military, such as vehicles, aircraft engines, and even the B-24 bomber. More recently, service contractors such as Kellogg, Brown, and Root built and staffed bases, providing logistical support in Iraq and Afghanistan. But these companies were contracted by the U.S. government for those services. That is not the case for many of the tech companies operating in Ukraine.
Companies both small and large, private and public, have supported Ukraine’s military operations. Planet, Capella Space, and Maxar technologies—all satellite companies—have supplied imagery helpful to the Ukrainian government and its cause. The imagery has done everything from inform ground operations to mobilize global opinion, thanks to the publicity garnered on Twitter and prominent news outlets. Primer.AI, a Silicon Valley start-up, quickly modified its suite of tools to analyze news and social media, as well as to capture, translate, and analyze unencrypted Russian military leaders’ voice communications. Even Clearview AI, a New York–based start-up focused mostly on law enforcement in the United States, volunteered its facial-recognition services to aid Ukrainian officials in countering disinformation and to help identify victims and war criminals.
Microsoft has played a particularly active role, announcing the launch of new teams to work “around the clock” to defend Ukrainian organizations and government agencies from “an onslaught of cyberwarfare.” It has protected against attacks on critical infrastructure, which run on Microsoft products. Microsoft even went so far as to take legal and technical measures to remove internet launching points Russians were using for their attacks. In April, Microsoft published its own intelligence report, attributing specific attacks to Russian units and constructing a detailed timeline of events, ahead of U.S. Cyber Command’s own announcement in July.
Quarterly investor reports referenced support for Ukraine as part of ESG programs.
Market considerations were one reason these companies got involved. All had some past or future business planned with the U.S. government. A desire to remain on good terms could have influenced their decisions to engage in a conflict where the Biden administration has a stated national security interest. A company such as Microsoft also has an economic incentive to defend the integrity of its products. By identifying and eliminating vulnerabilities exploited by the Russians, Microsoft improved the security of its systems writ large.
Corporate branding played a role too. Companies made online posts about their involvement, released reports about Russian cyber-activities, and posted social media messages and press releases. Quarterly investor reports also referenced support for Ukraine as part of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) programs. Maxar’s satellite imagery of Ukraine was provided free to news agencies as part of its “Data Philanthropy” effort.
Some company leaders appear to have been key to spearheading support to Ukraine. Microsoft President Brad Smith has long affirmed his conviction in protecting the “subtle and sensitive” barrier “between freedom and its opposite, totalitarianism.” Sean Gourley, the founder of Primer.AI, has a history of working with the U.S. government on national security issues and has former government executives on his board. And, of course, Musk’s rapid responses on Twitter give reason to believe that he personally drives his company’s decision to engage.
LEFT HAND TALK TO RIGHT HAND
These technology companies’ efforts have been laudable and, in most cases, are aligned with the U.S. government’s work on Ukraine. But the U.S. government now needs to build relationships and a plan for coordination in the midst of the crisis in Ukraine and before another crisis emerges elsewhere. Initially, these engagements should be at senior levels because decisions are being made and driven by the top. Frequent informal exchanges would help national security leaders gain an appreciation of the impact of and potential responses to corporate-specific challenges, such as threats to overseas infrastructure or employees. Ideally, over time, government and industry partners could form close working relationships at senior and middle levels that government leaders could more readily use to anticipate corporate actions and to coordinate in the midst of a crisis.
These relationships could also help government officials understand and anticipate the capabilities that an adversary’s corporations could bring to a conflict since tech companies are often more aware of the threat posed by competitors. And continuous interaction will help to establish communication pipelines for the unanticipated challenges inevitable in future conflicts.
Such public-private communication and collaboration on national security issues is not unprecedented. For example, since 2015, U.S. Space Command has established four commercial integration cells and has been open about the relevance of the commercial space industry to military space domain awareness and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. Currently, nine U.S. space companies are members, including Maxar Technologies. Similarly, commercial cyberspace companies have been engaging with each other and the government since the establishment of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers in 2003. While these centers were set up to share information about threats to U.S. critical infrastructure, they provide an excellent model for the exchange of sensitive or national security information in the midst of crisis and combat operations.
The Ukrainian military has become dependent on technology and, therefore, on Elon Musk’s decisions.
A key objective of these partnerships should be the ability to anticipate and coordinate when a tech company will engage in a conflict and when it will not. Government and industry leaders must discuss what happens when market forces and international relationships could lead to very different corporate decisions. Take, for example, a potential conflict with China. American companies are unlikely to abandon the democratic principles that enabled their rise, but their decisions to act may be more constrained by significant infrastructure, financial, or personnel investments in China. If the government were to begin to depend on tech companies for certain capabilities and find them to be unreliable, the United States could be caught short during a crisis. Understanding the needs and constraints on both sides, well in advance, could help avoid misunderstandings and missteps.
This issue, of course, is now playing out with Starlink. The Ukrainian military has become dependent on technology and, therefore, dependent on Musk’s decisions. Musk has decided not to support Ukraine’s request to activate Starlink in Crimea, and Starlink services have been recently unreliable in Ukraine, especially in areas controlled by Russia. It also appears as though Musk has asked the Pentagon to pick up funding for Starlink in Ukraine, although he currently says he will continue funding Starlink. His request for funding could be a business decision. His decision on where and where not to activate Starlink is reportedly based on his personal assessment of the risk of Russian escalation. A private company is deciding all of this, independent of government policies or objectives.
These events in Ukraine should serve as a call to action for government leaders. Tech companies have demonstrated how businesses can support military and security operations as well as their independent power and willingness to act. Now is the time to reach out to tech company leaders and initiate substantive and continuing conversations about these companies’ abilities and plans. The relationships built may be a game-changer for current and future conflicts.
- CHRISTINE H. FOX served as the Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense (2013–2014) and the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (2009–2013).
- EMELIA S. PROBASCO is a Senior Fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET).
Foreign Affairs · by Christine H. Fox and Emelia S. Probasco · October 19, 2022
19. China and the ‘Two Arctics’
Conclusion:
The issue of the Arctic will likely subside, at least for now, as a priority while China navigates the domestic and foreign policy changes that will appear after the 20th National Party Congress concludes. What can be said at this stage, however, is that Beijing will inevitably need to make policy course corrections in its Arctic interests to better reflect the country’s limitations and the murky emergence of the two Arctics and their uncertain future.
China and the ‘Two Arctics’
As Arctic multilateralism fractures over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s approach to the region is in need of a rethink.
thediplomat.com · by Marc Lanteigne · October 18, 2022
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This year’s ninth Arctic Circle Assembly (ACA) in Reykjavík, Iceland, concluded last week after a series of panels and debates not only concerning the various directions being taken by the far north in terms of environmental pressures, but also on the shifting political winds and the aftershocks from the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Despite the Arctic not being directly affected by the conflict, the region is nonetheless being more frequently examined through a strategic lens as a result of the war, especially since two Arctic states, Finland and Sweden, are now seeking membership in NATO.
Moreover, a major question hanging over the proceedings was whether it is still possible to talk about a single Arctic region, at least politically, as well as to what degree states beyond the Arctic, including in the Asia-Pacific, may need to adjust their engagement of the circumpolar north as a result. As has been illustrated over the past few months, including at the ACA, China is facing the most serious strains among non-polar states in adjusting to a possible world with “two Arctics.”
Specifically, the Arctic Council, where Russia currently holds the chair position, remains in a de facto state of suspension. Seven members of the organization, now commonly referred to as the “A7,” opted in March to implement a “pause,” suspending contact through the organization with Moscow. Although many at the ACA were quick to point out that much Council work was still taking place at a lower level and avoiding Russian participation, there is nonetheless concern about the long-term impact of the split on the Arctic Council’s future.
Non-Arctic states who are formal observers in the Council and who have been dependent upon the organization to enhance their own Arctic interests, including Asian governments China, India, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea, are also contemplating the future effects of the bifurcation. Some have attempted to press on with individual Arctic policy platforms. New Delhi released its government Arctic White Paper in March this year, and Seoul is planning on updating its own Arctic strategy in December, reflecting the growing internationalization of the far north in the wake of climate change, developing economic opportunities, and the high risk of overt geopolitical competition for influence and resources.
Among the “Asia-Arctic” States, Beijing’s Arctic diplomacy has been affected by its determination to walk an increasingly narrowing line between maintaining ties with the Vladimir Putin regime while also seeking to avoid being viewed by the international community as providing support for Russian actions. Beijing’s own Arctic interests have been negatively affected by this “neutrality” policy, as best illustrated by the waning fortunes of the Polar Silk Road.
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That initiative had been launched with great ambition five years ago as a Sino-Russian initiative, adjacent to the greater Belt and Road, but since then the PSR has repeatedly run into political and financial obstacles, further exacerbated by Chinese firms’ recent worries about being caught in the same network of sanctions targeting Russian companies. During the ACA, a representative from the Chinese shipping firm COSCO noted special circumstances that prompted the company to refrain from sending its vessels through the Northern Sea Route (NSR) via the Arctic waters off Siberia this year.
A hardening U.S. stance on China’s Arctic presence is yet another growing obstacle. There is a growing tendency in Washington to frame both Russia and China as joint challengers to Arctic security despite the considerable differences between the two powers in both policy and capabilities – the most important of these being that Russia has a vast Arctic geography and China has none.
The U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region paper published this month emphasized that Russia’s attack on Ukraine had strained Arctic diplomacy, and that Moscow was challenging freedom of navigation in the NSR. However, China was also cited as a regional challenger. To support this conclusion, the paper cited China’s “doubled investments” in the far north over the past decade (omitting the point that many of these investments have either failed or remain in abeyance, such as the Kuannersuit uranium and rare earths mine and the Isua iron mine projects, both in Greenland); that China had “expanded its icebreaker fleet” (since 2018, China now has two polar region-capable icebreakers, so technically correct); and that China was developing research with potential dual-use civilian and military applications.
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The response from China’s often hyper-nationalistic news service Global Times pointed to the U.S. policy document as further proof that Washington sought to “militarize” the Arctic, (without alluding to Russia’s own actions along those lines in recent years), in tandem with the addition of two Arctic states to NATO.
The differing narratives between the United States and China over Beijing’s Arctic interests were thrown into stark relief during the final plenaries at the Arctic Circle. The chair of NATO’s Military Committee, Robert Bauer, delivered a blunt speech about the state of regional security, which included the statement that Beijing was undermining the “rules-based international order.” He did not, however, cite any specific examples of how China was acting against Arctic governance, other than references to the Polar Silk Road and China’s identification as a “near-Arctic state.”
His remarks were promptly criticized by China’s Ambassador to Iceland He Rulong, who was in the audience and who accused the NATO official of taking an “arrogant” stance. Bauer then challenged the ambassador to explain why Beijing had demurred from condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine, prompting applause from the audience. He responded that his government was acknowledging specific historical circumstances affecting Russian actions and that China itself was a “peacemaking” country. Although the two officials shook hands after the exchange, the affair demonstrated both how cooled Sino-American relations are spilling over into the Arctic as well as the high level of difficulty facing Beijing as it navigates a political Arctic much different from five years ago, when China’s own Arctic White Paper was released.
A subsequent speech by China’s Special Representative on Arctic Affairs, Gao Feng, also illuminated the contradictions ahead for the country’s policies in the region. Gao was asked by the conference chair, Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, whether China would participate in an Arctic Council without Russian participation. The response was that it was too soon to answer, but Gao also stated that as the Council operates by consensus, it would be difficult from a procedural standpoint for the chair of the group to be transferred from Russia to Norway, an event scheduled to take place in May of next year, without Moscow’s participation.
The issue of the Arctic will likely subside, at least for now, as a priority while China navigates the domestic and foreign policy changes that will appear after the 20th National Party Congress concludes. What can be said at this stage, however, is that Beijing will inevitably need to make policy course corrections in its Arctic interests to better reflect the country’s limitations and the murky emergence of the two Arctics and their uncertain future.
Marc Lanteigne
Marc Lanteigne is an associate professor of political science at UiT - The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø, and the editor of the Arctic news blog Over the Circle.
thediplomat.com · by Marc Lanteigne · October 18, 2022
20. ASEAN bracing for US-China rivalry to explode
ASEAN bracing for US-China rivalry to explode
Strategic region on edge as China points to ‘stormy seas’ ahead and US fires more punitive economic measures at Beijing
asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · October 19, 2022
Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping’s fiery address before the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th Congress has dominated recent headlines, not least regarding his comments on Taiwan.
Despite Xi’s vow to pursue “peaceful unification” with the self-ruling island, the Chinese leader expressed his willingness to use force and flex muscles amid “stormy seas” in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment.
Xi’s hardline ideological positioning and seeming refusal to loosen domestic political and Covid-19-related restrictions has raised concerns over the future of China’s sputtering economy.
For the first time in three decades, numerous countries in the region, from India to Bangladesh, Vietnam and the Philippines, are expected to outpace the Asian powerhouse for the foreseeable future. A decade earlier, Hong Kong-based expert Wily Lam warned about the perils of China’s more inward and ideological turn under Xi’s leadership.
In Southeast Asia, however, there are also growing concerns over an increasingly ideological turn in America’s foreign policy bereft of a constructive economic strategy. Both the Biden administration’s newly-released National Security Strategy (NSS) document, as well as the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, have shown that the Democratic-led administration is more Trump than Obama when it comes to Indo-Pacific affairs.
By all indications, Washington has fully embraced ideologically-driven geopolitical competition with China and Russia. In response, Singapore has warned of the possibility of major powers “sleepwalking” into a major conflict in the near future.
To put things into perspective, China alone was mentioned 55 times in the NSS while key Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam were not even mentioned at all. The region’s largest nation, Indonesia, was mentioned only once, similar to US treaty allies such as the Philippines and Thailand. The whole Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was mentioned only three times.
Meanwhile, there is no clear constructive US economic strategy. The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) was mentioned four times, but without any clear sign of a major breakthrough in American trade and investment policy anytime soon.
The fate of a US-led Digital Trade Pact in the region is now also in doubt. To make matters worse, there is a growing possibility that Biden will skip the much-ballyhooed summits in Thailand, Cambodia and potentially even in Indonesia later this year.
To be sure, the Biden administration’s strategic posture is largely a response to the aggressive turn in Russia’s as well as China’s foreign policy. While Russia pressed ahead with its invasion of Ukraine, China has ramped up its military activities in the Taiwan Straits. That aggression has coincided with deepening military and strategic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing.
Chinese troops under a Russian flag in a file photo. Image: Screengrab / RT
In many ways, the Biden administration has continued the predecessor Trump administration’s geopolitical assertiveness and trade wars. Nevertheless, Washington seems more reactive than constructive in its strategic outlook and approach.
This is particularly the case in Southeast Asia, a vital strategic theater in the Indo-Pacific. When Biden won the presidency in 2020, there were widespread hopes that Washington would re-embrace the multilateralist and trade-oriented approach of the Obama administration.
Authoritative surveys showed that Southeast Asian policymakers and thought leaders largely preferred to build ties with a Biden-led US over China. To its credit, Washington began reciprocating Southeast Asian goodwill in its first six months in office.
By the middle of 2021, the new Democratic administration had seemingly embraced the maxim that 80% of diplomacy is simply showing up in regional capitals, including at ASEAN-led summits.
Top US cabinet members such as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Vice President Kamala Harris all visited key Southeast Asian capitals throughout the second half of 2021. Singapore and Vietnam, in particular, hosted top US officials twice in just a matter of weeks.
The Biden administration also ramped up its “vaccine diplomacy”, donating more than 23 million vaccine doses and over US$158 million in emergency health and humanitarian assistance to Southeast Asia nations. In response, grateful regional leaders such as Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte publicly thanked America and, crucially, began reviving frayed defense ties.
The new US leadership also reassured its regional allies and partners, especially Taiwan and the Philippines, of its defense commitments in the event of a conflict with China. The upshot was increasingly robust defense relations with both Manila and Taipei during Biden’s second year in office. By the end of 2021, the Biden administration seemed in a strong position to reassert its regional leadership.
The real challenges, however, laid ahead. On one hand, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as well as growing Sino-Taiwanese tensions reinforced the Trump era focus on “great power competition.”
This was clearly on display in the Biden administration’s newly-released strategic strategy document, which underscores how China is “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”
The new document warns of China’s “ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific” as part of a long-term goal of “becom[ing] the world’s leading power.” In response, Washington has vowed to “defend our interests” and “compete responsibly” through “our network of allies and partners” in the Indo-Pacific region.
The Biden administration is starting to overlook Southeast Asia after a strong diplomatic start. Image: Facebook
As leading Indo-Pacific strategist Raja Mohan argues, the newly-released NSS clearly shows that “the United States is determined to defend its primacy against China in the economic and security domains.”
While embracing a new era of heightened competition with China (and Russia), the Biden administration has yet to present any constructive economic strategy in the region. So far, much of Washington’s economic strategy has been punitive, including the recent round of semiconductor sanctions against China that came right before the release of the NSS.
Given the centrality of China to regional production networks, such punitive measures risk a major blowback, especially for neighboring countries.
“The Biden administration’s latest move is a very serious one, I’m sure they have considered it carefully,” said Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong following the US imposition of a new set of sanctions on Beijing targeting its access to semiconductor-making equipment.
“It can have very wide ramifications,” the Singaporean leader warned. The Southeast Asian leader has also expressed concerns over a lack of consensus on how to approach China’s bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which was an outgrowth of the Obama administration’s regional economic strategy.
While Washington has ramped up punitive measures, it has yet to provide any clear blueprint for its regional economic strategy. Neither has there been any substantive updates on the proposed Digital Free Trade Agreement with Indo-Pacific nations, which was announced last year, or the Biden-led IPEF, which was announced earlier this year.
Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong is worried about a possible US-China clash in the region. Photo: Pool
Meanwhile, China has pressed ahead with a number of multi-billion-dollar infrastructure projects from Laos to Indonesia under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Beyond the absence of a concrete American alternative to China’s economic initiatives, Southeast Asian states are also worried about trade wars and investment restrictions turning into kinetic conflicts.
“Around us, a storm is gathering. US-China relations are worsening with intractable issues, deep suspicions and limited engagement,” the Singaporean leader warned ahead of the release of the NSS document.
“This is unlikely to improve anytime soon. Furthermore, miscalculations or mishaps can easily make things much worse,” he continued, echoing his heir-apparent, deputy prime minister Lawrence Wong’s expressed fears of the US and China “sleepwalk[ing] into conflict.”
Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on Twitter at @richeydarian
asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · October 19, 2022
21. Analysis | Americans agree democracy is at risk. They disagree vehemently on why.
Read Federalist 10 to understand our problems today. Our founding fathers understood human nature and that nature has not changed.
The Federalist Papers : No. 10
The Same Subject Continued
The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
From the New York Packet. Friday, November 23, 1787.
MADISON
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.
...
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
Charts at the link: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/10/18/democracy-risks-democrats-republicans/?utm_source=feedly&utm
Analysis | Americans agree democracy is at risk. They disagree vehemently on why.
The Washington Post · by Philip Bump · October 18, 2022
There’s a fable to be written about a group of sailors who learn that their boat is taking on water. The crew divides into factions, each insistent that they understand the reason that the boat is sinking: One blames cracks in the hull, another broken bilge pumps. Instead of fixing the problem, their time is consumed with arguing over it. Eventually they’re just swimming there, sharks circling, fighting about who was right.
So it is with American democracy — though, happily, the ship for now remains afloat.
It’s been clear for some time that Americans see the country’s political system as endangered. Polling released this week by the New York Times and Siena College reinforces that point: 7 in 10 Americans believe it is. In fact, there’s an unusual bipartisanship to the issue: 7 in 10 Democrats, Republicans and independents all share that conclusion.
Of course, it’s easy to tell when the boat is taking on water; you need only check the moisture level of your shoes. What’s trickier is figuring out why and whether the problem can effectively be addressed. And there our expected partisan divide reemerges.
The pollsters asked respondents to summarize the threat in one or two words. Answers varied, but the most popular responses included government (including things like corruption and politicians in general), Republicans (including Donald Trump), Democrats (including President Biden) and societal or political divisions (including polarization). There’s irony to 1 in 12 respondents pointing to political divisions, of course, given that those divisions are on immediate display in the other answers.
A quarter of Democrats, for example, identified Trump or the GOP. A quarter of Republicans identified Biden or Democrats. The most common answer from independents was government and politicians more generally.
Then the pollsters asked about specific issues: Did, say, the mainstream media pose a threat to American democracy? If so, was that threat major or minor?
As it turns out, 84 percent of respondents said yes, the mainstream media posed a threat to democracy, including 6 in 10 who said it posed a major threat. That was the highest percentage of any of the 10 options the pollsters presented — in part because it was one of the few options for which there was bipartisan support.
In general, there were wide differences in what partisans viewed as a threat to democracy. Republicans were more likely to point to voting systems (vote by mail or voting machines), and Democrats were more likely to point to institutions like the Supreme Court or the electoral college.
If we rank the options by the percentage of respondents who said it was a major threat to democracy, that pattern is more stark. Among Democrats, it’s Trump at 84 percent. About 4 in 5 Republicans said both the media and Biden were major threats to democracy.
All voters
Democrats
Republicans
1.
Mainstream media (59%)
Donald Trump (84%)
Mainstream media (80%)
2.
Donald Trump (45)
Republican Party (57)
Joe Biden (78)
3.
Joe Biden (38)
Supreme Court (48)
Democratic Party (66)
4.
Federal government (33)
Electoral College (42)
Voting by mail (55)
5.
Democratic Party (33)
Mainstream media (38)
Federal government (50)
6.
Voting by mail (33)
Federal government (14)
Voting machines (32)
It’s impossible here not to point out how some of the answers work hand-in-hand. The mainstream media, for example, has been assiduous in pointing out that voting by mail is safe and unaffected by significant examples of fraud — something that runs contrary to Trump’s presentations of the 2020 presidential contest. Perhaps the argument is that voting by mail slows down vote-counting, leaving the system open to challenges from bad-faith actors like Trump who want to sow doubt about the legality of those ballots. But that seems unlikely. It seems more likely that the media’s insistence on the reality of what happened in 2020 is at odds with what Republicans want to believe, which then increases skepticism about the media. (In the Times-Siena poll, 6 in 10 Republicans identified Trump as the “legitimate winner” in 2020.*)
Not all of the reasons proffered to explain the sinking boat are actually possible causes.
Regardless, this helps explain why addressing the threat to democracy doesn’t translate into political energy. Yes, most people think the country is at risk, but there’s so little agreement on the cause that there’s no route to actually addressing the problem. If half the country thinks we need to end mail-in voting and vote Republican, and the other half thinks we need to overhaul the Supreme Court and elect Democrats, there’s no possible agreed-upon solution for the agreed-upon problem.
Our best hope, then, is that somehow the boat isn’t sinking at all. Otherwise? Here come the hammerheads.
*Another 6 in 10 who’d heard of the film “2000 Mules” found it believable.
The Washington Post · by Philip Bump · October 18, 2022
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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