Quotes for the Day:

“Any intelligent fool can make things bigger, more complex, and more violent. It takes a touch of genius – and a lot of courage – to move in the opposite direction.” 

- E.. F. Schumacher

“I happen to think that the singular evil of our time is prejudice. It is from this evil, that all other evils grow, and multiply. In almost everything I've written there is a thread of this: man's seemingly palpable need to dislike someone other than himself.” 

- Rod Serling.

"Yet somehow our society must make it right and possible for old people not to fear the young or be deserted by them, for the test of a civilization is in the way that it cares for its helpless members." 

- Pearl Buck

1. Tossing Good Lives After Bad Interventions

2. Why Egypt and other Arab countries are unwilling to take in Palestinian refugees from Gaza

3. State Dept. official resigns, citing objection to Israel arms transfers

4. U.S. military open to drafting contingency plans with Japan, South Korea

5. MI5 head warns of 'epic scale' of Chinese espionage

6. Increased vigilance is needed to address unconventional warfare in the Indo-Pacific

7. Hamas' Victim Doctrine

8. Do Lessons from the Battles for Fallujah Apply to Gaza?

9. Biden admin encouraged to release intel on Gaza hospital blast

10. Unpacking the History of Urban Warfare and its Challenges in Gaza

11. A World on the Brink: Will US Alliances Hold To Defend Democracies?

12.  The devastating Gaza hospital blast is shrouded in uncertainty. Here’s what we know, and what we don’t

13. How volunteer guards foiled a carefully planned Hamas attack on one kibbutz

14.  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 18, 2023

15. Iran Update, October 18, 2023

16. Biden is expected to request $100 billion for Israel, Ukraine and other crises.

17. Putin deploys combat dolphins to take on Ukrainian commandos

18. It’s Time for America to Join the International Criminal Court

19. The New Economic Security State

20. The U.S.-Japanese-Philippine Trilateral Is Off-Balance

21. SOCOM wants new targeting tools for urban battles

22. The Commander’s Path to Victory: Communication Without Comms

23. Israel Enters the Gray Zone (Book Review)

24. When it comes to Israel and Ukraine funding, go big and go long

1. Tossing Good Lives After Bad Interventions

Not the usual national security fare. But Doug Bandow (always the contrarian) offers some very important food for thought. Those who advocate for interventions must be able to counter his arguments (with more than emotion - though use of "War Party" is sure to appeal to emotions).

Conclusion:

Credibility does matter—which is an important reason to avoid making stupid and unsustainable commitments, in place, degree, time, and length. In any case, as a superpower, the U.S. can and, to serve its own people, must break commitments that no longer serve its interests. Young Americans’ lives should not be sacrificed to pay for the War Party’s misdeeds. The best way to honor the nation’s war dead would be to stop sacrificing so many Americans’ lives for so little purpose.

Tossing Good Lives After Bad Interventions - The American Conservative

The American Conservative · by Doug Bandow · October 19, 2023

Washington’s War Party, a vociferous amalgam of foreign policy elites ranging left to right, continues to press for military intervention around the world. Scarcely a week passes without the U.S. threatening war, with Iran and North Korea as the most recent targets.

This militaristic policy is bipartisan, with Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, and what remains of America’s political center targeting supposed adversaries the world over. Although claiming to deter conflict, Washington actually threatens military action should other states reject the U.S.-constructed—and oft U.S.-violated—“rules-based order.”

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Some War Party members at least appear reluctant to set the world aflame. Others, like Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, an heir to the “fire-eater” secessionists of his state who lit the fuse of America’s Civil War, avidly campaign for war: the bigger, the better. Graham would unleash the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse worldwide, even dismissing the consequences of a nuclear war involving North Korea. Mississippi’s Sen. Roger Wicker proposed that the U.S. consider confronting Russia with nuclear weapons before Moscow had attacked Ukraine, a suggestion more properly emanating from Lewis Carroll’s Mad Hatter than a leading policymaker. The sheer inanity of such proposals has fueled increasing if sometimes inconsistent grassroots opposition to war among progressives, libertarians, and national conservatives.

There is no intelligible argument for taking America and the rest of the planet to the nuclear brink in most conflicts. North Korea’s rule and Russia’s aggression obviously violate humanitarian norms, but most members of the Washington War Party, irrespective of their public protestations, care little about the lives of others, at least if they are Africans, Arabs, and Asians. Consider the War Party’s legacy. The Bush administration’s illegal invasion of Iraq triggered sectarian carnage that killed hundreds of thousands of civilians. The Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations aided Saudi Arabia’s brutal aggression in Yemen, which also caused hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths. Hypocrisy and sanctimony aside, tragedies elsewhere, though heart-rending, do not warrant thrusting America and Americans into other people’s wars.

The more hard-headed analysts professing at least a few “realist” tendencies claim almost every fight to be in the country’s interest. (And not just any interest, but a “vital” or “existential” interest.) Most of the cases are anything but. Ukraine’s collapse, though a humanitarian debacle, would have minimal impact on American security. Moscow has no reason for war with the U.S.: there are no territorial disputes, most international squabbles, such as that over Syria, are of only peripheral importance, while Russia’s shift toward China, North Korea, and Iran reflects Washington’s contentious relationship with Moscow. Given Russia’s evident military weakness, even European states could defend themselves against the Putin regime if they put in a bit more effort.

If Washington has no reason to fight over such stakes for humanitarian or security reasons, then what? Surely economics is no justification, other than to avoid total social collapse. Better higher energy prices than endless war, given the casualties and costs so horrendous in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Biden administration’s apparent proposal to turn American military personnel into bodyguards for the Saudi royal family is grotesque in every way. Even if intended to moderate energy costs—in fact, the international energy market has diversified, while Riyadh has been reducing supply to hike oil prices—this would be a terrible bargain.

Finally, there is the “credibility” issue. It has become the kitchen-sink argument for endless war. Yes, the conflict might not be in America’s interest. It might be consuming good lives after bad interventions. It might be wasting vast amounts of cash. It might have no apparent end point after months, years, or even decades of fighting. Yet the U.S. must battle on because something worse might happen.

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Even some otherwise sensible skeptics of the War Party’s perpetual militaristic adventurism are sometimes lured upon these policy rocks by the modern Sirens of credibility mythology. For instance, J.D. Foster, a long-time policy denizen of Washington now escaped to Idaho, recently rebutted presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy’s proposal to shift attention from Ukraine to elsewhere. Foster rightly dismissed those who paint Vladimir Putin as the new Hitler: “Russia’s economy is spent. Russia is spent. Win, lose, or draw, Russia’s adventurism against European targets is over even if Putin avoids the Mussolini treatment.” However, America still must stay, said Foster. The reason “is China and American credibility.”

He listed past offenses by the “cut-and-run crowd”: Iraq, Afghanistan, and even Vietnam. (Surely Korea also should be on the list. As well as the War of 1812, when Americans accepted a draw with Great Britain, rewarding aggression for centuries to come!) If we now leave Ukraine, Foster believes, Beijing is likely to run amok in East Asia, with Xi Jinping the new (though largely naval-driven) Hitler. Thus, we must stay in Ukraine until something—as Foster admits, “victory” has not been defined—good happens. If not, the war presumably must be passed on to future generations.

Both Afghanistan and Vietnam were generational conflicts. The first ran 40-plus years, with the U.S. directly involved for 20. Notably, Russia stuck around for only 10. Alas, staying for more—perhaps a half or even full century—would not have brought victory. Members of the Taliban, though understandably abhorrent to the liberal West, were fighting for their country. Americans most certainly were not. And Washington’s allies, suffused with corrupt politicians and brutal warlords, drove far too many traditional, and especially rural, Afghans to the Taliban.

As for Vietnam, would Foster have had Washington remain there forever as well? Of course, members of the War Party insist that if only Americans remain steadfast, they can outlast the barbarian hordes. Those doing the dying—rarely the Vietnam refuseniks turned post-conscription hawks, such as Richard Cheney and other ivory-tower warriors bent on war here, there, and everywhere—understandably are less enthusiastic about endless conflict for purposes neither serious nor, often, even discernible.

Remaining in Iraq would have left American forces legally naked, with neither parliamentary approval nor a status of forces agreement. Rather than enjoy Ken Adelman’s long delayed cakewalk, American personnel would have been targeted by Sunni terrorists, such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, which was transmuted into the Islamic State; Shia nationalists, most notably the forces of Moqtada al-Sadr; and Iranian-backed militias, which in recent years targeted U.S. military facilities and embassy. How long would the American public have supported that deployment?

The credibility argument fails more broadly. First, it requires supporting a lost cause potentially forever, with American military personnel fighting and dying to prove that Americans will fight and die for no good reason, with no end in sight, or perhaps even possible.

Second, fighting endless wars drains resources away from other, more important interests. Indeed, engaging in conflicts of minimal significance to America’s security demonstrates an instinct for the capillary rather than the jugular. Washington’s adversaries most likely celebrate a decision-making process so contorted as to squander so many lives and so much wealth in secondary and tertiary theaters.

Third, other countries, certainly China and Russia, probably nuclear-armed North Korea, and perhaps Iran with its complex collection of proxy forces, view themselves as in a different category from most countries. Sure, the U.S. might fight endlessly in Afghanistan and Iraq. But that doesn’t mean most members of the War Party are prepared for a nuclear confrontation with Russia. And projecting military force thousands of miles from home to protect Taiwan would be highly uncertain, risky, and expensive, with likely consequences much worse than any of Washington’s military undertakings over the last two decades. At a minimum, wargamers expect the U.S. would lose a couple of aircraft carriers and hundreds of planes in a Sino–American conflict. Are Americans ready for that?

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Indeed, today’s credibility search is largely a political mind game more likely to distort than enhance Washington policymaking. Officials determined to rule the world irrespective of cost—believing the U.S. to be the indispensable power that stands taller and sees further, etc., etc.—constantly concoct convenient rationalizations. The War Party imagines that every American action is intensely scrutinized and no foreign power acts on its own initiative for its own reasons. Uncle Sam is so respected and feared that the mere wave of his pinky finger, so long as done vigorously and constantly, will cause foreign leaders to instantly take the fetal position, forgoing any action that might incur Washington’s displeasure. However, when the U.S. fails to intervene, intervene decisively, intervene constantly, and intervene everywhere, no matter how distant and unimportant the conflict, it communicates weakness and invites foreign challenge. The result is likely to be the onset of a new Dark Age, in which liberty is forever swept from the earth, never to reappear.

Hence, Americans must fund an endless proxy war against Russia. Never mind the cost when the U.S. is essentially bankrupt. Or the escalatory risk since Ukraine’s status matters far more to Moscow than America. Or the geopolitical blowback from cementing Russia’s alignment with China, North Korea, and Iran, which could turn conventional conflicts nuclear. Washington’s credibility is at stake!

Credibility does matter—which is an important reason to avoid making stupid and unsustainable commitments, in place, degree, time, and length. In any case, as a superpower, the U.S. can and, to serve its own people, must break commitments that no longer serve its interests. Young Americans’ lives should not be sacrificed to pay for the War Party’s misdeeds. The best way to honor the nation’s war dead would be to stop sacrificing so many Americans’ lives for so little purpose.

The American Conservative · by Doug Bandow · October 19, 2023

2. Why Egypt and other Arab countries are unwilling to take in Palestinian refugees from Gaza

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR

Egypt and other Arab countries are unwilling to take in Palestinian refugees from Gaza

As desperate Palestinians in sealed-off Gaza try to find refuge under Israel’s relentless bombardment in retaliation for Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack, some ask why neighboring Egypt and Jordan have replied with such staunch refusal. Read more.

Why this matters:

• The refusal from both countries is rooted in fear that Israel wants to force a permanent expulsion of Palestinians into their countries and nullify Palestinian demands for statehood in Gaza, the occupied West Bank and east Jerusalem.
• 
  
• Arab countries’ fears have only been stoked by the rise of hard-right parties under Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that talk in positive terms about removing Palestinians. “Egypt doesn’t want to be complicit in ethnic cleansing in Gaza,” said H.A. Hellyer, a senior associate fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
•  
• Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi has also said a mass exodus would risk bringing militants into Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, from where they might launch attacks on Israel, endangering the two countries’ 40-year-old peace treaty.

Related coverage ➤ 

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Why Egypt and other Arab countries are unwilling to take in Palestinian refugees from Gaza

BY JACK JEFFERY AND SAMY MAGDY

Updated 8:36 PM EDT, October 18, 2023

AP · October 18, 2023

CAIRO (AP) — As desperate Palestinians in sealed-off Gaza try to find refuge under Israel’s relentless bombardment in retaliation for Hamas’ brutal Oct. 7 attack, some ask why neighboring Egypt and Jordan don’t take them in.

The two countries, which flank Israel on opposite sides and share borders with Gaza and the occupied West Bank, respectively, have replied with a staunch refusal. Jordan already has a large Palestinian population.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi made his toughest remarks yet on Wednesday, saying the current war was not just aimed at fighting Hamas, which rules the Gaza Strip, “but also an attempt to push the civilian inhabitants to ... migrate to Egypt.” He warned this could wreck peace in the region.

Jordan’s King Abdullah II gave a similar message a day earlier, saying, “No refugees in Jordan, no refugees in Egypt.”

Their refusal is rooted in fear that Israel wants to force a permanent expulsion of Palestinians into their countries and nullify Palestinian demands for statehood. El-Sissi also said a mass exodus would risk bringing militants into Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, from where they might launch attacks on Israel, endangering the two countries’ 40-year-old peace treaty.

Here is a look at what is motivating Egypt’s and Jordan’s stances.

A HISTORY OF DISPLACEMENT

Displacement has been a major theme of Palestinian history. In the 1948 war around Israel’s creation, an estimated 700,000 Palestinians were expelled or fled from what is now Israel. Palestinians refer to the event as the Nakba, Arabic for “catastrophe.”

In the 1967 Mideast war, when Israel seized the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 300,000 more Palestinians fled, mostly into Jordan.

The refugees and their descendants now number nearly 6 million, most living in camps and communities in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. The diaspora has spread further, with many refugees building lives in Gulf Arab countries or the West.

After fighting stopped in the 1948 war, Israel refused to allow refugees to return to their homes. Since then, Israel has rejected Palestinian demands for a return of refugees as part of a peace deal, arguing that it would threaten the country’s Jewish majority.

Egypt fears history will repeat itself and a large Palestinian refugee population from Gaza will end up staying for good.

NO GUARANTEE OF RETURN

That’s in part because there’s no clear scenario for how this war will end.

Israel says it intends to destroy Hamas for its bloody rampage in its southern towns. But it has given no indication of what might happen afterward and who would govern Gaza. That has raised concerns that it will reoccupy the territory for a period, fueling further conflict.

The Israeli military said Palestinians who followed its order to flee northern Gaza to the strip’s southern half would be allowed back to their homes after the war ends.

Egypt is not reassured.

El-Sissi said fighting could last for years if Israel argues it hasn’t sufficiently crushed militants. He proposed that Israel house Palestinians in its Negev Desert, which neighbors the Gaza Strip, until it ends its military operations.

“Israel’s lack of clarity regarding its intentions in Gaza and the evacuation of the population is in itself problematic,” said Riccardo Fabiani, Crisis Group International’s North Africa Project Director. “This confusion fuels fears in the neighborhood.”

Egypt has pushed for Israel to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza, and Israel said Wednesday that it would, though it didn’t say when. According to United Nations, Egypt, which is dealing with a spiraling economic crisis, already hosts some 9 million refugees and migrants, including roughly 300,000 Sudanese who arrived this year after fleeing their country’s war.

But Arab countries and many Palestinians also suspect Israel might use this opportunity to force permanent demographic changes to wreck Palestinian demands for statehood in Gaza, the West Bank and east Jerusalem, which was also captured by Israel in 1967.

El-Sissi repeated warnings Wednesday that an exodus from Gaza was intended to “eliminate the Palestinian cause … the most important cause of our region.” He argued that if a demilitarized Palestinian state had been created long ago in negotiations, there would not be war now.

“All historical precedent points to the fact that when Palestinians are forced to leave Palestinian territory, they are not allowed to return back,” said H.A. Hellyer, a senior associate fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Egypt doesn’t want to be complicit in ethnic cleansing in Gaza.”

Arab countries’ fears have only been stoked by the rise under Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of hard-right parties that talk in positive terms about removing Palestinians. Since the Hamas attack, the rhetoric has become less restrained, with some right-wing politicians and media commentators calling for the military to raze Gaza and drive out its inhabitants. One lawmaker said Israel should carry out a “new Nakba” on Gaza.

WORRIES OVER HAMAS

At the same time, Egypt says a mass exodus from Gaza would bring Hamas or other Palestinian militants onto its soil. That might be destabilizing in Sinai, where Egypt’s military fought for years against Islamic militants and at one point accused Hamas of backing them.

Egypt has backed Israel’s blockade of Gaza since Hamas took over in the territory in 2007, tightly controlling the entry of materials and the passage of civilians back and forth. It also destroyed the network of tunnels under the border that Hamas and other Palestinians used to smuggle goods into Gaza.

With the Sinai insurgency largely put down, “Cairo does not want to have a new security problem on its hands in this problematic region,” Fabiani said.

El-Sissi warned of an even more destabilizing scenario: the wrecking of Egypt and Israel’s 1979 peace deal. He said that with the presence of Palestinian militants, Sinai “would become a base for attacks on Israel. Israel would have the right to defend itself ... and would strike Egyptian territory.”

“The peace which we have achieved would vanish from our hands,” he said, “all for the sake of the idea of eliminating the Palestinian cause.”

AP · October 18, 2023

3. State Dept. official resigns, citing objection to Israel arms transfers

His resignation letter can be accessed on LinkedIn here: https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7120512510645952512/

State Dept. official resigns, citing objection to Israel arms transfers

Josh Paul’s exit marks a rare public show of internal dissent from the Biden administration’s robust support for its closest ally in the Middle East

By Michael Birnbaum

October 18, 2023 at 9:59 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Michael Birnbaum · October 19, 2023

A State Department official who worked on arms transfers to foreign powers resigned Wednesday over the Biden administration’s handling of the conflict in Israel and Gaza, declaring he could not support further U.S. military assistance to Israel and calling the administration’s response “an impulsive reaction” based on “intellectual bankruptcy.”

The official, Josh Paul, was director of congressional and public affairs at the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which handles arms transfers. His departure marks a rare measure of internal discomfort over the administration’s robust support for Israel, the United States’ closest ally in the Middle East. More broadly, it was an unusual public show of dissent within President Biden’s foreign policy apparatus, which has worked to prevent such expressions of frustration from spilling over into view.

Paul had spent more than 11 years in his role, which coordinates relations with Congress and public messaging for a key office that deals with military aid. He said that he could not countenance continuing in a job that he said was contributing to the deaths of Palestinian civilians.

“Let's absolutely note the horror of what Hamas did, and the scale of it. And therefore I fear the scale of the potential Israeli response or ongoing Israeli response,” Paul said in an interview. “I recognize the Israeli government's right to respond and to defend themselves. I guess I question how many Palestinian children have to die in that process.”

Israel-Gaza war

(Mohammed Saber/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)

In a visit to Israel, President Biden pledged an aid package for the nation while the U.S. says Israel was “not responsible” for a blast at a Gaza City hospital that killed hundreds earlier this week. Follow the latest news and read more on what’s behind the Israel-Hamas war.

End of carousel

Paul said the robust U.S. military assistance for Israel was effectively giving the country a green light to do what it wants against Gaza, regardless of the civilian toll. The Israeli government has declared that it plans to destroy Hamas and has told the residents of Gaza City and northern Gaza to move southward, a request U.N. observers have declared will create a humanitarian disaster.

The State Department declined to comment, citing policy on discussing personnel matters. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has spent the last week hopscotching the Middle East in a bid to create regional support for Israel’s right to defend itself and avoid a regional war, but also to push Israel to respect humanitarian concerns in Gaza.

Biden, visiting Israel on Wednesday, declared that the United States is “going to stand with you.” But he urged Israelis to draw a distinction between Palestinians and Hamas, and to minimize civilian casualties.

“The vast majority of Palestinians are not Hamas,” he said. “Palestinian people are suffering greatly as well.”

Paul said that he had encountered other dilemmas while working on military assistance inside the State Department, but that he had always felt he could “bend things in the right direction.” Not so this time, which was the biggest reason he resigned, he said.

“There’s no questioning on this one. There’s no space for substantive dissent within the system on this one. And that’s what led me to my decision,” he said. He said there wasn’t a single precipitating moment that led to his resignation Wednesday, simply the feeling of being party to a slew of decisions that he disagreed with and felt powerless to influence.

Although State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs also has had a major role in arms transfers to Ukraine after Russia invaded last year, Paul’s academic background and career has long intertwined with Israel and the Palestinian territories. He wrote his master’s thesis about Israeli counterterrorism and civil rights, he said, and worked in Ramallah, in the West Bank, on security sector governance with the Palestinian Authority. And, in his resignation letter, he said he had “deep personal ties to both sides of the conflict.”

Paul said he spent last week on a preplanned leave, giving him more space to watch what was happening from the outside and to contemplate his decision. Since he publicly announced his resignation in a two-page declaration posted on LinkedIn, he said he had received many expressions of support from State Department colleagues.

“What I’ve heard is, ‘Thank you,’ ‘We’re with you,’ all that sort of thing,” he said.

The Washington Post · by Michael Birnbaum · October 19, 2023

4. U.S. military open to drafting contingency plans with Japan, South Korea

Excerpts:

To address a multipolar world, the general hopes that U.S. allies and partners will play a bigger role in maintaining the rule-based international order.

"Whatever help that we can get from other allies and partners I think would be appreciated," he said.

Asked about whether a trilateral contingency planning with Tokyo and Seoul would be useful to deal with North Korean provocations, Cotton responded, "I think so," indicating that the U.S. is open to discussing such plans.

"As you think about what the pacing challenge is in the region, it's more than a [North Korea] contingency. It's how do we work together as allies and partners in regards to [China]," he said, suggesting that the joint contingency plans would include responses to China as well as North Korea.

U.S. military open to drafting contingency plans with Japan, South Korea

Washington still vigilant against North Korea and China amid Israel crisis, general says

https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/U.S.-military-open-to-drafting-contingency-plans-with-Japan-South-Korea

RYO NAKAMURA, Nikkei staff writer

October 18, 2023 05:00 JST

WASHINGTON -- The American military is willing to discuss with Japan and South Korea forming trilateral operational plans for contingencies involving North Korea and China, the top U.S. general for nuclear operations suggested to Nikkei.

U.S. forces face simultaneous challenges on multiple fronts across the world, ranging from the unprecedented attack on Israel by Palestinian militant group Hamas to Russia's 20-month-old invasion of Ukraine, while China and North Korea continue to take provocative actions in the Indo-Pacific region.

"We haven't taken our eye off the ball on what we see across the globe, especially in my portfolio, even with what we're seeing in the Middle East," said Gen. Anthony Cotton, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, in a phone interview on Monday. He stressed that the U.S. is still closely watching North Korea and China.

"I'm confident that the nation is able to support Ukraine, Israel and maintain global readiness throughout the world," said Cotton, who oversees nuclear and global strike operations.

To address a multipolar world, the general hopes that U.S. allies and partners will play a bigger role in maintaining the rule-based international order.

"Whatever help that we can get from other allies and partners I think would be appreciated," he said.

Asked about whether a trilateral contingency planning with Tokyo and Seoul would be useful to deal with North Korean provocations, Cotton responded, "I think so," indicating that the U.S. is open to discussing such plans.

"As you think about what the pacing challenge is in the region, it's more than a [North Korea] contingency. It's how do we work together as allies and partners in regards to [China]," he said, suggesting that the joint contingency plans would include responses to China as well as North Korea.

In April, senior leaders from the American, Japanese and South Korean navies boarded the U.S. nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarine Maine in Guam for the first time as Tokyo and Seoul reset bilateral relations.

"I think that's just that beginning," Cotton said. "That shows that that relationship has changed and it's getting tighter and tighter as we move forward in a very positive way."

"I don't think that it's ever been as strong as it has been now," he said.

The potential for trilateral planning is built on the "Spirit of Camp David" joint communique adopted in August by the three countries' leaders. They committed to consult with one another on handling regional crises on the premise that contingencies affect their common security.

"First, we're elevating our trilateral defense collaboration to deliver in [the] Indo-Pacific region," U.S. President Joe Biden said at a joint news conference. "That includes launching annual multidomain military exercises, bringing our trilateral defense cooperation to ... unprecedented levels."

Christopher Johnstone, Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said Washington should play a leading role in building "sinews of connectivity" between the U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan alliances.

"It's time to push the three governments to begin to operationalize the agreements at Camp David and build meaningful defense cooperation that goes beyond periodic exercises and strategic-level discussions," Johnstone said. "We need mechanisms for contingency planning and for operational coordination," he said.

Cotton's willingness to tighten three-way defense cooperation may reflect the sense of urgency in Washington about the deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific.

North Korea is expected to launch a military satellite by the end of October. Cotton referred U.S. responses to policymakers but vowed to coordinate with allies and partners in the region, with Japan and South Korea in mind.

Cotton also reiterated that China's nuclear buildup is "wholly inconsistent" with its long-standing policy of having a minimum deterrent.

The Pentagon's annual report on Chinese military power warned last year that the Asian country's nuclear warheads would likely reach about 1,500 by 2035. This would bring China closer to 1,550 -- the maximum number of warheads that the U.S. can deploy under its New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty framework with Russia.

A congressionally mandated panel argued last week that the U.S. should prepare for simultaneous war with China and Russia, given that it will need to deter the two nuclear powers simultaneously for the first time in the 2030s.

Cotton indicated that "right now, as we have a geopolitical environment that puts us in the position of two near-peer adversaries, we have to consider all of those options."

The American defense strategy is designed to handle a war in one theater. If the U.S. faces two wars, in both the Indo-Pacific and Europe, its strategies and capabilities will need adjusting.

Chinese President Xi Jinping will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing on Wednesday. They are likely to advance security and economic cooperation with the common goal of undermining the U.S.-led international order.

"We have to watch the transactional relationships that we see with all those that we could consider as adversaries and watch that really closely," Cotton warned.

5. MI5 head warns of 'epic scale' of Chinese espionage

Excerpt:

More than 20,000 people in the UK have now been approached covertly online by Chinese spies, the head of MI5 said.

MI5 head warns of 'epic scale' of Chinese espionage

BBC · by Menu

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• 1 hour ago

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By Gordon Corera

Security correspondent, BBC News

More than 20,000 people in the UK have now been approached covertly online by Chinese spies, the head of MI5 said.

It comes amid a new warning to tens of thousands of British businesses of the risk of having their innovation stolen.

Ken McCallum was speaking to the BBC at an unprecedented public appearance of the security chiefs of the 'Five Eyes' alliance in California.

The heads of US, UK, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand security agencies appeared together.

They did so for the first time to warn of commercials secrets being obtained by China.

Stanford University in California was chosen as the venue for the first public meeting because it lies in the heart of Silicon Valley. In both public statements and a closed session with entrepreneurs and investors, security chiefs warned that cutting-edge research is being stolen.

"We have seen a sustained campaign on a pretty epic scale," Mr McCallum told the BBC in an interview during the event.

Image caption,

The heads of US, UK, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand security agencies come together

In the past, MI5 focused on protecting government secrets from foreign spies but now the fear is that innovation is often stolen from small companies, start-ups and researchers who may not previously have worried about security.

"If you're working today at the cutting edge of technology then geopolitics is interested in you, even if you're not interested in geopolitics," Mr McCallum said.

MI5 is trying to warn tens of thousands of UK companies who are potentially at risk, and doing so requires the security service to go public in a way it has not done before.

Mr McCallum said that MI5 had now seen suspected Chinese agents approach over 20,000 people in the UK over professional networking sites like LinkedIn, in order to try to cultivate them to provide sensitive information, double the previously reported figure.

Image caption,

MI5 boss Ken McCallum

In the last year, MI5 has also seen more than 20 instances of Chinese companies considering or actively trying to gain access to sensitive technology developed by UK companies and universities through investments or other means where the full role of China is hidden, often through complicated company structures.

That has included at least two Chinese companies seeking to avoid the scrutiny required under law to access sensitive technology of UK companies undetected.

Another Chinese company is believed to have acquired stolen research data from a top UK university. And there are thought to be attempts to bypass and undermine the management and regulatory controls at another two top institutions in order to access and influence cutting-edge research.

MI5 and its allies also disrupted the acquisition of a sensitive UK tech company itself linked to UK military supply chains and the supply chains of other major western commercial companies. China has consistently denied accusations of espionage and wrong-doing.

• ‘Chinese spy’ targeted thousands over LinkedIn
• MI5 warns of spies using LinkedIn to steal secrets

The consequences of research being stolen in cutting-edge fields like Artificial Intelligence are not just for a company's profitability but also for the future of western countries, the head of MI5 warned.

"These technologies are at a historic moment where they are beginning to change our world in some pretty fundamental ways," Mr McCallum told the BBC.

"And we know that authoritarian states are laser-focused on the opportunities that these technologies may present for them."

AI, in addition to the data collected by China, could even offer the chance to interfere with politics in a far more effective way, he warned.

Concerns over China were echoed by other members of the Five Eyes alliance.

"China has made economic espionage and stealing others' work and ideas a central component of its national strategy and that espionage is at the expense of innovators in all five of our countries," FBI Director Chris Wray told journalists.

"That threat has only gotten more dangerous and more insidious in recent years."

He said there were more than 2,000 current FBI investigations linked to China and that at one point his organisation was opening a new investigation every 12 hours.

Image source, FBI

Image caption,

The security chiefs appeared together for the first time to warn of technological innovation being stolen by China.

"All nations spy," Mike Burgess - the head of Australia's security service - said at the public event featuring the five spy chiefs, "but the behaviour we are talking about here goes well beyond traditional espionage." He argued the scale was unprecedented in human history and needed to be called out.

Decoupling western economies from China would be unrealistic and damaging, the security chiefs argued, and so instead the priority is to identify and protect sensitive areas. Their appearance was timed with the launch of new guidance to reach those who would previously not have had contact with security services.

The meeting took place in the shadow of events in the Middle East and concerns of increased radicalisation and threats domestically.

"We can focus on more than one thing at one time," the FBI Director said, describing the threat from China as "existential".

BBC · by Menu

6. Increased vigilance is needed to address unconventional warfare in the Indo-Pacific

I am sure the doctrine experts are pulling their hair out reading this "definition" or description of unconventional warfare. But the Professor is actually correct in describing it as a "blanket term" and one that is used among academics, the press, and the pundits to describe the activities that most people intuitively associate with unconventional warfare. But it also illustrates the complexity of (and arguments over) UW. Is UW a mission? Is it about the objective? Is it about tactics and unique actions and activities? Is it about certain kinds of forces? Is it a phenomenon? Is it a type of warfare? Is it a special operation? Is it a strategy? 

Excerpt:

Unconventional warfare is a blanket term used to describe all military and quasi-military operations outside of conventional warfare, namely wars fought between states. It includes, but is not exclusive to, revolutionary wars and their constituents, subversion and guerrilla operations, as well as other types of special operations.

Increased vigilance is needed to address unconventional warfare in the Indo-Pacific

The attack by Hamas on Israel using unconventional tactics should be a wake-up call for security planners

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2023/10/17/japan/unconventional-warfare/?utm

BY STEPHEN R. NAGY

CONTRIBUTING WRITER

 SHARE

Oct 17, 2023

The surprise attack on Israel by Hamas militants on Oct. 7 raises the specter of unconventional warfare being waged to achieve political objectives in other parts of the world as well, including in Japan’s backyard.

Unconventional warfare is a blanket term used to describe all military and quasi-military operations outside of conventional warfare, namely wars fought between states. It includes, but is not exclusive to, revolutionary wars and their constituents, subversion and guerrilla operations, as well as other types of special operations.

The tactics used by Hamas are clear examples of unconventional warfare. These include the launching of "homemade" rockets, the breaching of Israeli borders using motor gliders, bulldozers and boats, as well as the indiscriminate killing and kidnapping of civilians — including children and the elderly — to use as hostages.

As Japan and other like-minded states watch the conflict between Israel and Hamas unfold, it is critical to remain vigilant and to enhance deterrence in the Indo-Pacific against the plurality of security threats that exist — including the possibility of unconventional wars erupting, which could potentially lead to larger conventional conflicts.

Key areas of concern continue to be Taiwan, sea lanes in the South China Sea, the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, North Korea’s development of weapons of mass destruction and the Himalayan Plateau where Indian and Chinese troops clashed in May 2021.

When looking at the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and the waters around the Senkaku Islands, China is the primary source of instability with its efforts to change the status quo, including through the use of unconventional means.

A recent example of these unconventional tactics occurred at Whitsun Reef near the Philippines in March 2021, when the Philippine government's National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea received a report that around 220 Chinese fishing vessels were observed as moored off the reef. These swarming tactics on Beijing's part are meant to overwhelm smaller states to dissuade them from pursuing their own territorial claims.

In the case of the Senkaku Islands, the Japan Coast Guard continuously monitors the number of China Coast Guard and other vessels that enter Japan's contiguous zone surrounding the islets.

The use of coast guard vessels versus merchant vessels complicates Japan’s efforts to secure its administrative control over the islands. And a recent change to Article 21 of China’s Coast Guard Law noted that, “Measures such as forcible eviction may be taken against illegal acts committed by foreign military vessels. ...” This language suggests that China is using its constabulary forces within Japan's sovereign territory, complicating matters on how Tokyo can respond.

Chinese merchant vessels present a different problem around the Senkaku Islands. As they move freely in and out of Japanese waters, they send back GPS data to China. This data is used to build a legal case that Japan does not have exclusive administrative control over the islands, a legal tactic — or lawfare — meant to erode Japan’s territorial claims.

Taiwan presents an even more difficult unconventional warfare challenge. China's People's Liberation Army Air Force regularly crosses into the Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone, putting strain on the Taiwanese Air Force, which is forced to respond. The cutting of two submarine internet cables linked to Taiwan by Chinese ships in February, the flooding of Taiwan with disinformation ahead of presidential elections and the conducting of numerous military exercises in waters surrounding the island, especially the massive drills held after the visit by former U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi in August of 2022, are all forms of unconventional warfare.

If they are not managed appropriately, these tactics have the potential to cascade into a military conflict.

Using diplomatic channels and coordinated diplomacy, Japan needs to work with like-minded partners to convey that the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait and the waters around the Senkakus should remain free for the international public good.

The growing number of statements about peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait in multilateral statements by NATO, the Group of Seven and even in the recent Camp David Principles announced by Japan, South Korea and the U.S. have all inserted language about Taiwan. Concerns about sea lines of communication in the South China and East China Seas should be included as well.

Along with diplomacy, increased vigilance about unconventional threats in the region must be backed up with enhanced deterrence capabilities such as counterstrike options and the the provision of arms, equipment and training to Taiwan and other Southeast Asian states.

The Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness is a good example of how Japan can use minilateral partnerships like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to contribute to maritime security in the region. Expanding the number of partners that can plug into the initiative can enhance its effectiveness.

The Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral summit may help dissuade North Korea from engaging in both conventional and unconventional warfare activities, especially if the three nations hold joint military drills and security consultations.

The tension between India and China on the Himalayan Plateau also constitutes a challenge to regional stability as unconventional tactics are used by China to inculcate their forces into Indian territory. Enhancing India’s ability to get resources to the region through the building of infrastructure may be an effective means to allow India to better defend itself against Chinese unconventional tactics.

Hamas’ attack on Israel should be a wakeup call for security planners in the Indo-Pacific as well. It should be seen alongside Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Japan and like-minded countries can no longer separate their security needs from other parts of the world. The “successes” and failures of Hamas and Russia will inevitably be studied by China, North Korea, Russia and Iran to advance their strategic objectives.

Vigilance and deterrence will be required in order to decrease the chances that revisionist states use conventional or unconventional warfare to achieve their geopolitical ambitions. Military, nonmilitary and diplomatic tools should be part of the toolkit to address these challenges. Japan’s diplomatic, economic and security partnerships, including its internationally trusted reputation and commitment to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region should be leveraged to achieve this objective.

Stephen R. Nagy is a professor at the International Christian University in Tokyo and a visiting fellow with the Japan Institute for International Affairs.

7. Hamas' Victim Doctrine

I just heard LTG (RET) Mark Hertling describe Hamas' "Victim Doctrine." I think this is really a key concept that the press, pundits, spokes people should emphasize in their talking points.

We must recognize Hamas' strategy, understand it, EXPOSE it ,and attack it with a superior political warfare and information strategy. You are making a key contribution by exposing the victim doctrine. It is only by exposing the strategy can we inoculate the international community to it.

This might seem so basic and common sense and obvious. But if so, why is no one really trying to inform and educate the world to understand this strategy? Why are so few people addressing it? And yes I really that is is easy to accuse those of trying to counter this of "vicitm blaming."

Here is an article from 2015 describing it.

https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/Did%20the%20UN%20panel%20not%20know%20about%20the%20Hamas%20victim%20doctrine%20-%20An%20article%20by%20Gabi%20Siboni%20in%20i24.pdf

Opinion

Did the UN panel not know about the Hamas victim doctrine?

Gabi Siboni

Published June 23rd 2015

Members of the UN Human Rights Council panel, which presented its findings Monday regarding Israel's war with Gaza last summer, should have been made aware of the doctrine that guided Hamas actions in Operation Protective Edge.

In an interview with Hamas chief Khaled Mashal on the Yahoo web site toward the end of the operation, in late August 2014, he said the following: “We do not target civilians, and we try most of the time to aim at military targets and Israeli bases." He went on to argue that his organization has a problem because it does not “have

sophisticated weapons. … so (precise) aiming is difficult.” The fact that these things are being said and published on a major web site indicates the extent to which this organization is pulling the wool over the eyes of international media organizations.

Things have gone so wrong, that Hamas assumes, and rightly so, that the international community willingly soaks up such arguments and accepts them. Human rights groups and investigating committees pay lip service and demand that Hamas investigate and prosecute war criminals. Such was the case with the Goldstone commission after Operation Pillar of Defense, and with Human Rights Watch that demanded of Hamas to punish those who committed war crimes. As if they were blind to the fact that operations against civilians from within residential centers, schools and hospitals are the declared tactics of Hamas.

Hamas easily identified Israel's weakness in international public opinion, and worked to refine and develop this approach through the development of a deadly and cynical "victim doctrine." One of the "achievements" of Hamas during Operation Protective Edge was the significant implementation of "the victim doctrine”, the main concept of which is exposing civilians to Israel Defense Forces fire. Hamas perfected the system when storing equipment in compounds of international aid organizations. They launched rockets toward Israel near a Red Cross center for dialysis and polio treatment and near an UNRWA school, knowing well that Israel would retaliate and, what’s more mind boggling, clearly intending for civilians who took shelter in those facilities to be hurt. The resulting photos could then play well on international media and the world stage - an integral element of the “victim doctrine.”

There is nothing new in the fact that organizations operating in the Gaza Strip fire at Israeli civilians from within Palestinian population centers. However, it seems that during Operation Protective Edge they honed this method to monstrous proportions. One should also not ignore the fact that the installation of rocket launchers in the facilities of international organizations requires advance preparation, including excavations and transport. It’s hard to imagine that such preparations were made without the people in these complexes taking note. It would be interesting to know what workers of the international organizations or visitors to those sites knew and thought. Why did no one issue a warning? Or did Hamas know how to deal with these international bodies from the lessons of previous operations?

The IDF put out a wealth evidence about the extent of the phenomenon, but associating this phenomenon with a systematically organized doctrine has not yet permeated Israeli and international public opinion - and was certainly not clear to members of the UN investigative panel.

The truth cannot be concealed and only those who avert their eyes do not see it. The moral bankruptcy of many good people in the international community does not bode well and Israel will face many more difficult days in dealing with the cynical “victim doctrine". The UN committee was as blind as many international institutions and good people in their attitude towards Israel. This, however, should not weaken Israel’s belief in its just ways and not let itself get confused by the cynical choir whose voices are echoed by the committee.

Col. (res.) Dr. Gabi Siboni is head of the Military and Strategic Program at INSS.

8. Do Lessons from the Battles for Fallujah Apply to Gaza?

Excerpts:

While Fallujah and Gaza are dissimilar in terms of military operations and policy resolve, they are similar in their mutual lack of an end state. After Fallujah was retaken in late 2004, it was not tied to the larger problem that the Iraq war was just sputtering on. There was no movement to immediately quash the al-Qaida stranglehold on Ramadi, a large city only 20 miles away.

Similarly concerning Gaza, there is no movement by U.S. policymakers to acknowledge that Iran is the controlling malevolent force behind Hamas. There's no indication that the administration understands that Iran's enmity is implacable.

Do Lessons from the Battles for Fallujah Apply to Gaza?

military.com · by 18 Oct 2023 Military.com | By Bing West · October 18, 2023

The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Military.com. If you would like to submit your own commentary, please send your article to [email protected] for consideration.

Fallujah, Iraq, was the scene of two major battles in 2004 that have become among the most famous from two decades of the Global War on Terrorism. The city housed about 300,000 residents in 40,000 to 50,000 concrete homes and apartments spread over 10 square miles.

Gaza City is roughly twice that size, with 800,000 residents packed into 17 square miles. They are similar in geography, penury and structure. But for potential military operations, they are strikingly dissimilar. In both Gaza City and Fallujah, most residents fled before the assault. But as I explained in my book, "No True Glory," success in the Fallujah battle depended upon the coordinated advance of experienced small unit infantry -- squads and platoons.

There were two separate fights. In April 2004, four American contractors were murdered in Fallujah. In response, the White House ordered then-Maj. Gen. Jim Mattis to seize the city against his advice. Rather than employ heavy indirect firepower, Mattis chose speed by small infantry units. Fifty squads had advanced halfway across the city in less than a week, supported by precision airstrikes. But the press was fixated on civilian casualties, causing President George W. Bush to flinch. He ordered Mattis to pull his troops out.

In November, the Marines were ordered to retake the city. The attack required much heavier firepower to root out the terrorists who had had six months to prepare. In the April attack, 150 airstrikes destroyed 100 buildings, with artillery scarcely used. In the November attack, 14,000 artillery and mortar shells and 2,500 tank rounds were employed, along with 540 airstrikes; 18,000 buildings were damaged or destroyed. As the residents returned, U.S. engineers restored the water and power systems.

Altogether in the two battles, there were 700 airstrikes in 34 days of combat. Israel has already exceeded that number, and the ground battle has not yet commenced. The Israeli Defense Forces lack the numerous battle-experienced small infantry units the U.S. employed in Fallujah. The ground operation in Gaza will be fought with massive indirect fires, inflicting far heavier material damage.

The same is true in terms of publicity and its policy effect. When the Marine assault in April of 2004 was portrayed by the press as shocking, President Bush ordered the Marines out. Al-Qaida and a range of other insurgent groups then took over the city.

In the Gaza case, horror and repugnance at Hamas have evoked widespread American press support for Israel's forthcoming ground battle. This includes acceptance of widespread destruction and civilian suffering. President Joe Biden has pledged full support, to include weapons and munitions. Whether Israel will permit reporters to embed with its ground forces is not known. Nevertheless, unlike in the April battle in Fallujah, there is no reason to believe that press coverage will dramatically alter the firmness of White House support.

While Fallujah and Gaza are dissimilar in terms of military operations and policy resolve, they are similar in their mutual lack of an end state. After Fallujah was retaken in late 2004, it was not tied to the larger problem that the Iraq war was just sputtering on. There was no movement to immediately quash the al-Qaida stranglehold on Ramadi, a large city only 20 miles away.

Similarly concerning Gaza, there is no movement by U.S. policymakers to acknowledge that Iran is the controlling malevolent force behind Hamas. There's no indication that the administration understands that Iran's enmity is implacable.

-- A former assistant secretary of defense and combat Marine, Bing West is author of "No True Glory: A Firsthand Account of the Battle for Fallujah." He has written a dozen books about America's wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

military.com · by 18 Oct 2023 Military.com | By Bing West · October 18, 2023

9. Biden admin encouraged to release intel on Gaza hospital blast

We have to fight the war in the information domain.

Updated Oct 19, 2023, 6:27am EDT

POLITICS

Biden admin encouraged to release intel on Gaza hospital blast

https://www.semafor.com/article/10/19/2023/biden-admin-pressured-to-released-intel-on-gaza-hospital

Planet Labs PBC/Handout via REUTERS

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THE NEWS

The White House is facing calls from members of Congress to release more information publicly that led to its conclusion that Israel was not behind the explosion at a hospital in Gaza earlier this week.

Senators, who received a classified briefing from administration officials on Wednesday about Israel, backed up the administration’s conclusion that an errant strike from a terrorist group caused the explosion, which is believed to have killed hundreds of people on Tuesday. But some argued that officials should release as much as they can publicly to combat what they described as misinformation about the blast.

“I think it is very important that the intelligence community and others lean forward as much as possible to bring that evidence to light, since there are clearly protests not only in the West Bank but around the world,” Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Mark Warner, D-Va. told reporters Wednesday afternoon.

“This is being debated in the press around the world and clearly there are some press outlets that are not friendly to the United States, not friendly at all to Israel, that may be simply not showing or telling the full story,” he said. “We could rebut that.”

Sen. Thom Tillis, R-N.C. said he encouraged the Biden administration to lay out the conclusions using “pictures, graphs, and charts” so that “the democratic world” could see the “information that led the president to take the position he did.” “I think that that’s forthcoming,” he added.

Hamas blamed an Israeli strike for the blast. Some progressives — including Reps. Rashida Tlaib, D-Mich. and Ilhan Omar, D-Minn. — in the U.S. also blamed Israel and reiterated calls for a ceasefire.

10. Unpacking the History of Urban Warfare and its Challenges in Gaza

Excerpts:

The Gaza Strip has unique characteristics. Boasting a dense population of approximately 2 million within a mere 141 square miles, the area’s demographic dynamics contrast sharply with places like Fallujah and Grozny before their devastating conflicts. In these locations, a direct assault led to massive civilian casualties and infrastructural damage. Given Gaza’s even greater population density, the repercussions of a direct assault could be far more catastrophic.

Beyond the immediate conflict, there’s the question of long-term governance and peacekeeping. The ‘Chechenization’ during the Second Chechen War offers an interesting strategy. Instead of a prolonged foreign military presence, the conflict shifted towards local governance with pro-government Chechen forces taking charge.

For Gaza, a similar transition could be beneficial. Once Hamas’s influence is weakened, a tripartite collaboration between Israel, the US, and Egypt could be envisioned. Given Egypt’s distrust of Hamas under President el-Sisi, due to Hamas’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, the United States could influence Egypt to play a pivotal role in assisting with the training and deployment of a local force in Gaza. This force would not only be adept at understanding the cultural and socio-political nuances but could also facilitate rebuilding trust among the residents. It’s a vision that’s ambitious, but in the aftermath of conflict, bold and innovative solutions often hold the key to sustainable peace.

Unpacking the History of Urban Warfare and its Challenges in Gaza • Stimson Center

Lessons learned from historical examples of urban warfare and how success and victory are not so easily achievable

By Carlo J.V. Caro

In Grand Strategy

October 17, 2023

stimson.org · · October 17, 2023

Throughout history, wars have frequently revolved around city sieges and defenses, with large open-field battles being comparatively less common. Multiple examples of past urban warfare prove that technological military superiority doesn’t necessarily ensure victory. Battles such as Hue in the Vietnam War and Fallujah in the Iraq War demonstrate that achieving victory in an urban conflict does not necessarily translate to success in the larger war.

Urban Warfare

Cities have long been at the heart of military campaigns. As far back as 1274 BC, the Hittites and Egyptians clashed near Kadesh in modern Syria. Ancient Athens resisted three Persian invasions and the Punic War concluded with Rome destroying Carthage. In 1453, the fall of Constantinople marked the end of the Byzantine Empire. 18th-century Prussian general and military strategist Carl von Clausewitz viewed war as a continuation of politics, a concept rooted in the Greek word “polis” meaning city—this same root gave rise to terms like “cosmopolitan” and “police.” Aristotle perceived politics as the affairs of the city.

During the Cold War, urban guerrillas escalated operations in various Latin American nations, meeting resistance from police and military forces. Anti-colonial uprisings compelled conventional forces to craft strategies for urban counterinsurgency. Significant confrontations took place in Hue in 1968 and Suez in 1973. The 1990s gave rise to the myth of conventional military superiority. However, events in Mogadishu, Somalia, and the Chechen capital of Grozny challenged this perspective. These episodes demonstrated that having advanced military technology doesn’t guarantee success against local armed groups in dense, unfamiliar urban environments. In fact, some older technologies may prove more effective. For instance, the older 7.62mm bullets can penetrate walls better than the more modern NATO standard 5.56mm rounds. Somalia also revealed the limitations of relying solely on superior firepower. The October 1993 defeat of Ranger troops at the hands of armed youths in Mogadishu served as a sobering lesson. Notably, civilians accounted for more than half of the casualties suffered by American forces.

Win the Urban Battle, Lose the Conflict

The 1968 Battle of Hue stands as a stark representation of how tactical maneuvers can have profound strategic implications in urban warfare. As Vietnam’s third-largest city, Hue witnessed 26 days of intense fighting among its 140,000 civilians against a combined force of roughly 7,500 from the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong. While the US Army eventually regained control, the extensive devastation—leaving about 80% of the city in ruins and uprooting an estimated 116,000 inhabitants—alongside substantial casualties, eroded South Vietnamese and American political support for the war. This demonstrates a critical challenge in urban warfare: one can win the battle but lose the broader conflict.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Fallujah emerged as a formidable challenge for Coalition forces. The city’s intricate network of streets, structures, defenses, and its civilian populace made for a challenging urban battlefield. Although the Coalition excelled in open-field combat, they faced increased difficulties in Fallujah’s urban confines. The Vietnam-era notion of “destroying the city to save it” was not a viable approach in this context. The deployment of troops without cultural knowledge of their area of operation contributed to the estrangement of the population.

Lessons from Russia’s Chechen Wars

During the First Chechen War that began in 1994, the Russian Federation sought to reclaim the breakaway Republic of Chechnya. The urban combat that unfolded in this conflict was intense, with both sides employing distinct strategies. Chechen fighters, usually grouped in squads of about 25 men, were predominantly equipped with handheld anti-tank weapons and precision firearms. They set up three defense lines in the city around fortified posts. Underground tunnels and basements played a pivotal role in their maneuvers, providing shelter from Russian artillery and air raids.

On the Russian side, the military initially approached Grozny with tactics more suited to conventional warfare. The first unit that ventured into the center of Grozny, the Maikop Brigade, suffered staggering losses within two days: 800 out of 1,000 men, 20 of its 26 tanks, and 102 of its 120 armored vehicles. Coupled with their inadequate training, subpar equipment, political meddling, and stringent timelines, the Russians found themselves at a significant disadvantage.

In 1999, the Russians returned to Grozny encircling the city, effectively cutting off Chechen reinforcements and supplies and opting for massive bombardments before sending in ground troops. Russian forces displayed enhanced flexibility in their operations. Forward air controllers and artillery observers were integrated into lower-level units, ensuring more accurate targeting. Moreover, they used electronic warfare units to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum, disrupting Chechen communications. The planning was more aligned with a focus on controlling strategic points like street intersections, avenues, and even underground areas to restrict Chechen mobility. However, this victory came at a heavy cost. Much of the city was left in ruins, and the civilian casualties were tragically high.

Looking Back Across History of Urban Warfare

Every city has its own unique identity shaped by factors such as urban layout, cultural traditions, religious practices, languages, ethnic backgrounds, building materials, climate, and governance. Current intelligence frameworks may struggle to gather sufficient data. Thus, operating in a city means venturing into relatively unknown terrain. Methods that succeed in one city might fail in another.

Additionally, the cities with their mix of planned and chaotic design along with the three-dimensional nature of urban warfare complicates information collection for the invading force. As a result, military mapping systems aren’t always apt for urban landscapes. While standard military operations might use maps scaled at 1:200,000 or 1:100,000, urban operations demand more detail, possibly 1:25,000 or even more precise.

In contrast, when it comes to mechanized warfare, appropriately adapted combat vehicles can significantly enhance infantry operations even in urban terrains with tall structures. For urban combat, Russian doctrine recommended a numerical superiority of 6 to 1. In Grozny, the Russians, despite having a 5 to 1 ratio, struggled due to an initial lack of concentrated combat power. They learned the importance of securing every building they captured, or else the Chechens would reclaim it, slowing the Russian advance.

Even with infantry support, a lone combat vehicle is at risk from concealed anti-tank units. In the Gaza Strip in 2006, the IDF identified vulnerabilities in their main battle tanks during urban operations, especially when operating with hatches battened down. Challenges such as limited visibility and hindered turret mobility in constricted streets led to considerable enhancements to the Merkava Mk.3.

A pivotal enhancement for increasing combat vehicle situational awareness in urban terrains is the introduction of a stabilized dual-axis panoramic sight for tank commanders. This sight is equipped with state-of-the-art FLIR (Forward-Looking Infrared) and closed-circuit TV, ensuring effective operations both day and night.

Gaza’s Distinctive Challenges

The Gaza Strip has unique characteristics. Boasting a dense population of approximately 2 million within a mere 141 square miles, the area’s demographic dynamics contrast sharply with places like Fallujah and Grozny before their devastating conflicts. In these locations, a direct assault led to massive civilian casualties and infrastructural damage. Given Gaza’s even greater population density, the repercussions of a direct assault could be far more catastrophic.

Beyond the immediate conflict, there’s the question of long-term governance and peacekeeping. The ‘Chechenization’ during the Second Chechen War offers an interesting strategy. Instead of a prolonged foreign military presence, the conflict shifted towards local governance with pro-government Chechen forces taking charge.

For Gaza, a similar transition could be beneficial. Once Hamas’s influence is weakened, a tripartite collaboration between Israel, the US, and Egypt could be envisioned. Given Egypt’s distrust of Hamas under President el-Sisi, due to Hamas’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, the United States could influence Egypt to play a pivotal role in assisting with the training and deployment of a local force in Gaza. This force would not only be adept at understanding the cultural and socio-political nuances but could also facilitate rebuilding trust among the residents. It’s a vision that’s ambitious, but in the aftermath of conflict, bold and innovative solutions often hold the key to sustainable peace.

Carlo J.V. Caro has an advanced degree in Islamic Studies from Columbia University and is a political and military analyst. He has published numerous articles in the US and Israel on foreign affairs and security.

stimson.org · · October 17, 2023

11. A World on the Brink: Will US Alliances Hold To Defend Democracies?

Conclusion:

It is as though the world were on the brink. Any spark could blow up the elaborate framework that’s balancing forces in a delicate standoff. The Hamas onslaught in Israel, and the overwhelming Israeli response, show just how easily the sparks can explode into a limited war — and then, God forbid, into a much greater conflagration that nobody wants.

A World on the Brink: Will US Alliances Hold To Defend Democracies?

Published 10/18/23 09:00 AM ET

Donald Kirk

themessenger.com

Certain parallels between the North-South confrontation on the Korean peninsula and the response to the Hamas attack on Israel are more than a little disquieting.

Just as the Americans sent an aircraft carrier, the Gerald Ford, to the Mediterranean coast of Israel, so they sent another carrier, the Ronald Reagan, and a B52 bomber to South Korea. Their visits make a symbolic point: U.S. forces can deal with crises on widely separated fronts. That is less than totally certain, however, when you consider the worsening build-up of arms everywhere.

Victor Cha, Korea expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, summarized the gravity of the problem during a talk in Seoul to introduce his latest book, “Korea: A New History of South and North,” co-authored with Ramon Pardo of King’s College, London. Rail traffic across the 18-kilometer-long Tumen River border between North Korea and Russia, he observed, had vastly increased in recent weeks.

Whatever was beneath the tarpaulins covering the freight cars was hidden, said Cha, but the North Korean dictator, Kim Jong Un, was making good on promises he made to Russian President Vladimir Putin to ship artillery shells and other munitions for the Russians’ war in Ukraine. And the Russians no doubt were repaying the favor with gear the North Koreans need to put a satellite into orbit and to upgrade their basic arsenal, including an air force that dates from the Soviet era.

No one quite expects war to break out in the near future between U.S. and Russian forces in Ukraine, or between the U.S. and North Korea, or between the U.S. and Iran and the Iran-armed Hamas in Gaza or Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, but Cha and Pardo make clear the unpredictability of the future, at least as far as North Korea goes.

“Against all odds, the small, isolated regime has survived while bigger counterparts have collapsed,” they write. “But at the same time, North Korea is resilient until the day that it is not.”

The element of surprise dominates the parallels and links between conflict from eastern Europe to the Middle East to East Asia.

Might China go to war to recover the “lost” island province of Taiwan, despite frequent air and naval exercises in surrounding skies and waters? Wouldn’t Chinese President Xi Jinping prefer to improve frayed ties with the U.S. while exercising a restraining influence on North Korea?

Maybe so, but the potential for conflict strains relations and raises sensitive questions everywhere. As of this past July, the war since its start had cost the U.S. a stupendous $46.6 billion — security assistance ($18.3 billion), weapons and equipment ($23.5 billion) and grants and loans for weapons and equipment ($4.7 billion). Next in line is Israel, getting $3.8 billion from the U.S. this year — and maybe more, to make good on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s vow to destroy Hamas in Gaza.

Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine and Hamas’s assault on southern Israel have cost thousands of lives. Obviously, it’s necessary to defend Ukraine, just as Israel must destroy Hamas.

Both these struggles could go on for a long time. Israeli forces may rampage through Gaza in coming days and weeks, but then they will face the danger not only from Arab countries, with which the Israelis have been trying to form decent relations, but also from Iran and Turkey and others colluding against them.

As it has done since its founding in 1948, Israel may weather the storm, but that’s to say nothing of the storm clouds forming over Asia. The United States formed a defensive line from alliances in Northeast Asia with Korea and Japan, down through strengthened ties with the Philippines and, miraculously, rosy relations with Vietnam, whose Hanoi regime inflicted the most humiliating defeat in American history in the Vietnam War.

The U.S. network extends “down under” to Australia, anchor of AUKUS, the Australia, United Kingdom, U.S. alliance, and on to India, included in what’s called the Quad, a non-military grouping with military overtones that also includes Australia and Japan.

Nothing is guaranteed, though. India prides itself on “neutrality” and counts on Russia not only for nearly half of its oil but also for armaments ranging from tanks to planes to ships — all vital for defense against China, nibbling away at its northern borders.

India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, moreover, is upset with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s charge that India engineered the assassination of a Sikh terrorist on Canadian soil. Try as they might to convince the Indians otherwise, the Americans are suspected of having passed on secret intelligence on the alleged plot to the Canadians.

It is as though the world were on the brink. Any spark could blow up the elaborate framework that’s balancing forces in a delicate standoff. The Hamas onslaught in Israel, and the overwhelming Israeli response, show just how easily the sparks can explode into a limited war — and then, God forbid, into a much greater conflagration that nobody wants.

Donald Kirk has been a journalist for more than 60 years, covering conflict in Asia and the Middle East. Now a freelance correspondent covering North and South Korea, he is the author of several books about Asian affairs.

themessenger.com

12. The devastating Gaza hospital blast is shrouded in uncertainty. Here’s what we know, and what we don’t

The devastating Gaza hospital blast is shrouded in uncertainty. Here’s what we know, and what we don’t

https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/18/middleeast/gaza-hospital-explosion-israel-wwk-explainer-intl

By Rob Picheta

 6 minute read 

Updated 3:06 AM EDT, Thu October 19, 2023

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CNN — 

A day after a deadly blast tore through Al-Ahli Baptist Hospital in Gaza, sparking protests across the region, the United States has released its own assessment of what caused the devastation.

Israel has laid out evidence that it said shows a misfire by militant group Islamic Jihad caused the blast, and US President Joe Biden on Wednesday backed that explanation, citing US intelligence. A spokesperson for the National Security Council later said that analysis of overhead imagery, intercepts and open-source information suggested that Israel is “not responsible.”

Palestinian officials and several Arab leaders nevertheless accuse Israel of hitting the hospital amid its ongoing airstrikes in Gaza. Islamic Jihad – a rival group to Hamas – has denied responsibility.

Hundreds are believed to have died in the attack, according to the Hamas-controlled Health Ministry in Gaza, and images of the bloody aftermath have spurred protests across the region.

Here’s a look at what we know – and don’t know – so far.

A view shows the aftermath of the deadly blast on Wednesday.

Ali Jadallah/Anadolu/Getty Images

What happened at the hospital?

Video of the moment of the blast at the Al-Alhi Baptist Hospital, geolocated by CNN, shows the sky light up as a large explosion erupts on the hospital grounds, sending a cloud of flame and smoke into the air.

In the building, there was panic. Dr. Fadel Na’eem, head of the orthopedic department, said he was performing surgery when a deafening blast sounded through the hospital. He said panic ensued as staff members ran into the operating room screaming for help and reporting multiple casualties.

He told CNN in a recorded video: “I just finished one surgery and suddenly we heard a big explosion, we thought it’s outside the hospital because we never thought that they would bomb the hospital.”

Some of those wounded in the blast were taken to Gaza City's Al-Shifa Hospital.

Mohammed Al-Masri/Reuters 

Women and children wait for treatment at Al-Shifa Hospital on Tuesday night.

Abed Khaled/AP

After he left the theater, Dr. Na’eem said he found an overwhelming scene. “Many people were beheaded. Everywhere there was a big fire,” he said. “The medical team scrambled to tend to the wounded and dying, but the magnitude of the devastation was overwhelming. The number was big and huge that we can’t do anything.”

While it is difficult to independently confirm how many people died in the blast, the bloodshed could be seen in images from the aftermath shared on social media. In photos and videos, young children covered in dust are rushed to be treated for their wounds. Other bodies lay lifeless on the ground.

The Ministry of Health in Gaza has said the death toll is over 400.

What the Israelis and Palestinians have said

Palestinian officials blamed Israel for the attack on Tuesday evening.

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Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson Jonathan Conricus told CNN on Wednesday that the “first packet of information” was “evidence that clearly supports the fact that it could not have been an Israeli bomb.”

Israel says that its intelligence shows a “failed rocket launch” by the Islamist militant group Islamic Jihad group was responsible. The Islamic Jihad movement denied those assertions as “false and baseless.”

The IDF also released audio that it claimed captured a conversation between two Hamas operatives in which they spoke of a rocket launch from a cemetery near the hospital. According to an IDF translation of the conversation, one of the alleged operatives says: “They are saying that the shrapnel of the missile is local shrapnel and not like the Israeli shrapnel.”

CNN cannot verify the authenticity of the recordings.

GALLERY

In pictures: The deadly clashes in Israel and Gaza

On Tuesday, the IDF presented imagery that it says proves the destruction at the hospital could not have been the result of an airstrike, saying there were no visible signs of craters or significant damage to buildings that would result from such a strike.

A video posted by the official State of Israel’s account on social media platform X on Tuesday night was also presented as evidence that the hospital was struck in outgoing rocket fire from militants. But the timestamp on the video appeared not to match up with the time that the explosion took place, and the tweet was later edited to remove the video.

Israel Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lior Haiat told CNN: “We received the video, we thought it was from an official source but when we contacted him he said he got it from somewhere else, so we took it off.”

On Wednesday, officials in Gaza also claimed that the Al-Ahli Baptist Hospital was damaged by two Israeli shells four days ago, after which the IDF warned the hospital’s management to evacuate the premises. CNN has reached out to the IDF for comment on the claim.

What US intelligence suggests

The US government currently assesses that Israel “was not responsible” for the blast, according to the US National Security Council (NSC).

Biden, who was making a high-stakes visit to Israel on Wednesday, told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that the damage at the hospital “appears as though it was done by the other team, not you.”

“But there’s a lot of people out there not sure, so we’ve got a lot – we’ve got to overcome a lot of things,” Biden added.

US currently assesses that Israel is 'not responsible' for Gaza hospital blast

The NSC on Wednesday afternoon leaned further into its assessment: “Intelligence indicates that some Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip believed that the explosion was likely caused by an errant rocket or missile launch carried out by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The militants were still investigating what had happened,” spokesperson Adrienne Watson said.

Officials told CNN separately that the initial evidence gathered by the US intelligence community suggests that the hospital strike came from a rocket launched by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group.

Among the evidence is a blast analysis that suggests it was a ground explosion rather than an airstrike that hit the hospital, one of the sources said. There was no singular crater suggesting there was a bomb, but there was extensive fire damage and scattered debris that is consistent with an explosion starting from the ground level, according to the source.

That analysis is one data point that’s led intelligence officials to lean toward assessing that the attack on the hospital was a rocket launch gone wrong.

Still, the blast analysis is just one of the things being examined by the intelligence community, which has surged intelligence collection assets to the region.

How has the world reacted?

A number of countries have expressed horror at the loss of life at the hospital, and urged caution in attributing blame until the circumstances become clear.

The United Nations has called for a careful investigation. Until independent investigators are able to assess the incident in detail, it is unlikely that the world will know with certainty what led to the blast.

Israel has provided the US with intelligence it has gathered related to the deadly Gaza hospital explosion, according to an Israeli official and another source familiar with the matter.

Anger erupts across Middle East over Gaza hospital blast as Biden arrives in Israel

Several Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq issued statements condemning Israel and accusing its military of bombing the hospital.

Meanwhile, thousands of protesters shouting anti-Israel slogans gathered in Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt, and Tunisia. Protests also rocked the occupied West Bank city of Ramallah.

Reporting by CNN’s Kareem Khadder, Eyad Kourdi, Donald Judd, Richard Allen Greene, Tim Lister and Chloe Liu, CNN

13. How volunteer guards foiled a carefully planned Hamas attack on one kibbutz

I am sure many similar stories will emerge. But note the intelligence that Hamasa had and used to plan these attacks.

How volunteer guards foiled a carefully planned Hamas attack on one kibbutz

https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/18/middleeast/hamas-documents-invs

By Casey Tolan, Matthew Chance, Florence Davey-Attlee, Scott Glover and Curt Devine, CNN

 8 minute read 

Updated 7:05 PM EDT, Wed October 18, 2023

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CNN — 

When Hamas militants broke through the Gaza fence in this month’s unprecedented attack on Israel, the kibbutz of Mefalsim – less than two miles from the border – was on the front lines. Toting AK-47 rifles and grenade launchers, one group of militants headed straight for the community’s gates, while another group moved to destroy its generator, according to security videos and local residents.

That precision, local Israeli security personnel say, was no accident: The fighters seemed to have known exactly where they were headed.

CNN has reviewed documents that Israeli officials say were Hamas attack plans, which suggest that the group collected remarkably granular detail on its targets. But neither of the attacks went according to plan – thanks in part to a handful of volunteer guards who defended their neighbors in dramatic firefights.

'They're opportunistic and adaptive': How Hamas is using cryptocurrency to raise funds

Photos of the plan to attack Mefalsim were posted online by an Israeli first responder group, which said it was recovered from the body of a slain Hamas fighter. Two local Israeli security personnel told CNN they independently saw photos of the plan, and it closely matched the Hamas fighters’ tactics during the attack.

The color-coded document includes detailed information about the kibbutz’s guards and security. It says that one group of militants would break through the community’s fence, while others were ordered to “capture soldiers and civilians and to keep hostages” for negotiation.

Yarden Reskin, a member of Mefalsim’s volunteer security force who spent hours exchanging fire with militants – helping prevent any deaths inside the community – said he was shocked by the level of detail.

“They knew everything,” Reskin said. “They knew where are the gates, they knew where are the generators, they knew where is the armory, they knew basically how many of us on the security team… they had very, very good intel.”

Another purported Hamas document laying out plans to attack the nearby kibbutz of Sa’ad, which CNN obtained from a senior Israeli government official, was even more chilling. It listed the attackers’ goal as “inflicting the maximum possible human casualties.”

Like in Mefalsim, the plans didn’t come to fruition, with a first responder group and a local resident telling CNN that no residents had died inside Sa’ad.

Homemade rockets and modified AK-47s: An annotated look at Hamas' deadly arsenal

The difference between the detailed plans and what occurred on the ground is a sign of the chaos that spread during the attack, as Hamas fighters encountered far less resistance from the Israeli military than they expected. Despite the billions of dollars Israel has spent securing its border and developing one of the world’s most renowned intelligence operations, its armed forces were caught off guard.

CNN translated the documents but has not independently verified their origin. Several spokespersons for Hamas, which has been designated a terrorist organization by the US, did not respond substantively to messages asking for comment or confirmation about the plans.

Experts said that the planning documents suggest that Hamas had meticulously collected intelligence on targeted communities to prepare for the weekend assault – even if those plans didn’t all come to fruition. Matthew Levitt, who directs a program on counterterrorism and intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and reviewed the documents for CNN, said that “the granularity of this is very surprising.”

“There was a tremendous effort put into this,” he said. “This was a very carefully planned operation that involved the kind of intelligence processing and dissemination that I don’t think many people thought Hamas had.”

Hamas officials have claimed that its fighters were told not to kill women and children – and that such killings were the result of other unaffiliated militants who streamed across the Gaza border during the chaos of the attack. But Israeli officials and experts have argued that the planning documents show that inflicting civilian casualties was a central part of the group’s mission.

“The execution was not just some rogue actor,” Levitt said. The documents, he said, suggest that killing civilians “is exactly what they planned to do.”

Outnumbered and outgunned

Mefalsim, a community home to about 1,000 people, has long been a target of Hamas rockets because of its proximity to Gaza. So when locals received alerts about incoming rocket fire around 6:30 a.m. Saturday morning, they knew to head to their bomb shelters.

But the kibbutz residents soon realized this onslaught was different from any previous one. Reskin, who’s lived in Mefalsim his entire life, was huddling with his family in their home’s shelter when he heard a barrage of gunshots from nearby. “I kissed my wife, kissed my two little girls, and went out the door to see what I can do,” he said.

Reskin said that he was shocked to see black-clad fighters holding AK-47s just outside the kibbutz gates. He and a handful of other guards engaged in several skirmishes with the attackers for hours, often going up against larger numbers and firepower.

Security camera videos from Mefalsim posted on Telegram by a group of Israeli first responders show militants approaching the kibbutz’s main gate and shooting a man running toward it, before exchanging fire with guards. At one point, there were just three security guards “fighting against a force of about 15 or 16 terrorists,” another volunteer guard, Eli Levi, told CNN. Details of the battle were previously reported by the Wall Street Journal.

They followed evacuation orders. An Israeli airstrike killed them the next day.

Later, Israeli military forces arrived and defeated additional militants approaching the community, Reskin and Levi said. While the attackers killed at least one civilian and potentially others outside the kibbutz gates, and a handful of residents were injured, no one was killed inside the community, according to Reskin and Levi.

Reskin said he later saw photos of the Hamas planning document, which lists details about the security force and estimates of how long it would take for reinforcements from the Israeli military to arrive.

The document is dated 2022 on its cover, potentially suggesting that the attack had been in the works for a year or longer – although another page lists the date June 15, 2023.

Seeing the document convinced him that the attack was “something they are planning for years,” Reskin said. “It’s not something you’re planning in weeks or months.”

Levi, who also saw a copy of the plan, said that the attack strategy appeared to have been followed by the Hamas militants. Some fighters had attacked a power generator, the location of which was marked on a map, he said, and others had tried to take control of the main gate.

“Most of the things actually happened as they were written down,” Levi said.

Colin P. Clarke, a senior research fellow at The Soufan Center, a security nonprofit, who reviewed alleged Hamas documents for CNN, said that the granular information the group had collected on individual kibbutzim raised the possibility that the terrorist group had human sources inside Israel.

“The level of detail is extraordinary,” Clarke said. The extent of planning “just shows a thinking about the long-game in a way that most terrorist groups don’t have the organization for,” he said.

Clarke said that the fact that the group was able to gather this level of information shows not only that “Hamas vastly improved in its operational capabilities, but Israel was asleep at the wheel.”

‘We thought we were safe’

One document, which a senior Israeli official provided to CNN, details plans to attack Sa’ad, a community of about 850 people a few miles south of Mefalsim.

The document, which was first reported by NBC News, says that Hamas fighters’ mission was “controlling the kibbutz and inflicting the maximum possible human casualties on it, and holding hostages.” CNN has not independently verified the document’s authenticity.

Similar to the Mefalsim plan, the document lists information about the kibbutz and its security, including detailed information about the number of guards protecting the community.

One group of fighters was directed to breach the kibbutz fence and destroy the guard room before “gathering hostages in the dining room and preparing to transfer a number of them to the strip.” A second group was directed to “collect hostages and hand them over to the first group.”

Israeli forces patrol areas along the Israeli-Gaza border.

Ilia Yefimovich/picture alliance/dpa/Getty Images

The document also says that the groups were supposed to “control” and “inspect” two schools, and search a “youth movement area.” And it includes in-depth satellite image maps of the Kibbutz and the surrounding area.

But like in Mefalsim, Hamas did not successfully attack Sa’ad – no one died, according to the first responders group. It’s unclear why: several other nearby communities – some of which were identified on a map in the plan – were attacked by Hamas fighters who killed civilians, according to Israeli officials.

Sarah Pollack, a resident of Sa’ad who spent Saturday holed up in her family’s bomb shelter, said the kibbutz was hit by a rocket from Gaza, and some residents who were outside the community during the attack were killed. But no militants entered the kibbutz, and no one was killed inside the gates, she said.

“We don’t know how to explain that,” she said in an interview from her hotel near Arad in Israel, where she and her family had been evacuated after the attack. “It’s a huge, huge question to us. It’s a miracle.”

Pollack said seeing the extensive details that Hamas had about Sa’ad in the planning documents was chilling. “Shockingly, the details are very accurate… horribly accurate,” she said.

Even though Sa’ad escaped with far less death and destruction than neighboring kibbutzim, Pollack said the attack had deeply shaken residents’ sense of safety in what she described as a “lovely, lush, beautiful green area with gardens and trees that we’re so proud of.”

“We thought there was a physical barrier between the Gaza Strip and Israel to protect us, we thought we were safe,” she said. “We were very wrong.”

CNN’s Audrey Ash and Scott Bronstein contributed to this report.

14. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 18, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources claimed that likely company-sized elements of two Ukrainian naval infantry brigades conducted an assault across the Dnipro River onto the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 17-18.
• Russian sources expressed pronounced concern about ongoing Ukrainian activity on the east bank of Kherson Oblast and framed these activities as part of a potential larger Ukrainian operation.
• ISW will not speculate on the scope and prospects of ongoing Ukrainian activity on the east bank of Kherson Oblast but does not assess that Ukrainian forces have created a bridgehead on the east bank of Kherson Oblast suitable for the further maneuver of sizeable mechanized forces at this time.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Western media reported that the US has thus far provided Ukraine with a limited number of ATACMS missiles, and the Kremlin issued a muted response to the provision of these systems
• Satellite imagery from October 17 suggests that the Ukrainian ATACMS strike on the Berdyansk airfield likely substantially damaged Russian aircraft and airfield infrastructure, but ISW cannot yet confirm the extent of the damage.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated his desire to deepen Russian-Chinese economic and political ties but did not announce any practical changes at the One Belt One Road International Forum in Beijing, China on October 18.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, in the Avdiivka direction, southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced south of Avdiivka.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 18, 2023

Oct 18, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 18, 2023

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, and Mason Clark

October 18, 2023, 5:45pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on October 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian sources claimed that likely company-sized elements of two Ukrainian naval infantry brigades conducted an assault across the Dnipro River onto the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 17-18. Geolocated footage published on October 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Pishchanivka (14km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River) and into Poyma (11km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River).[1] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that two Ukrainian “assault groups” landed on the east bank of the Dnipro River and broke through initial Russian defenses, temporarily occupying all of Poyma and positions on the northern outskirts of Pishchanivka on the afternoon of October 17.[2] The milblogger later claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces back from these positions towards the Dnipro River.[3] The milblogger claimed that a Ukrainian sabotage group is still operating in Pishchanivka as of the afternoon of October 18. The milblogger, however, suggested that Russian forces only maintain positions on the southern outskirts of the settlement. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also acknowledged the Ukrainian operations, claiming that Russian forces stopped four Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Pidstepne (16km east of Kherson City) and Poyma.[4] Another prominent Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces occupied Poyma on the night of October 17 to 18.[5]

Russian sources expressed pronounced concern about ongoing Ukrainian activity on the east bank of Kherson Oblast and framed these activities as part of a potential larger Ukrainian operation. The majority of Russian claims about developments on the east bank are largely single-sourced to one prominent Russian milblogger who has recently heavily focused his reporting on this section of the front.[6] Russian sources characterized the reported assaults as a Ukrainian effort to expand a “bridgehead” on the east bank and the initial stages of a larger offensive operation across the Dnipro River.[7] Russian President Vladimir Putin similarly described Ukrainian activity in Kherson Oblast as the “next counteroffensive” and continued his typical rhetorical line by painting all Ukrainian offensive operations as a failure.[8] The prominent Russian milblogger who is the basis for many of these claims has expressed concern about a Ukrainian offensive across the Dnipro River on and off throughout 2023 and escalated his warnings in late September 2023. The milblogger reacted to the reported assault on the night of October 17 to 18 by accusing the Russian MoD of not taking the threat of a Ukrainian crossing seriously.[9]

Russian concerns about the ability of Russian forces to repel a potential Ukrainian offensive operation across the Dnipro River may be partially connected to the condition of the Russian grouping of forces on the left bank. The Russian command has drawn relatively more elite units from the Kherson direction to support defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast in recent months due to likely viewing Kherson as a quiet sector, and the current force composition in the area is likely relatively less combat effective.[10] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated on October 17 that Russian forces were still redeploying trained units from the Kherson direction to the Zaporizhia and eastern directions.[11] The Russian military may have recently redeployed elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army (Central Military District) and the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) to the Kherson direction, however, but it is unclear where in Kherson Oblast elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army are currently deployed.[12] Ukrainian counteroffensive operations reportedly previously rendered the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade combat ineffective as of September 22.[13]

ISW will not speculate on the scope and prospects of ongoing Ukrainian activity on the east bank of Kherson Oblast but does not assess that Ukrainian forces have created a bridgehead on the east bank of Kherson Oblast suitable for the further maneuver of sizeable mechanized forces at this time. However, it is noteworthy that prominent and generally reliable Russian sources are discussing Ukrainian activities on the east bank as occurring at a larger scale than previously documented tactical cross-river raids by Ukrainian forces. ISW will continue to monitor the area closely and assess control of terrain changes and Russian responses, in line with its standing policy of not forecasting Ukrainian actions.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions south of Bakhmut and had partial success south of Robotyne.[14] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Klishchiivka, 5km southwest of Bakhmut.[15]

Western media reported that the United States has thus far provided Ukraine with a limited number of ATACMS missiles. The Associated Press reported on October 17 that an unnamed US official stated that the United States provided Ukraine with “fewer than a dozen” missiles “within the last few days.”[16] The New York Times (NYT) reported on October 18 that two unspecified Western officials stated that the United States sent “about 20” ATACMS to Ukraine.[17] Russian President Vladimir Putin stated at a press conference in Beijing on October 18 that the ATACMS are “fundamentally incapable of changing the situation on the frontline.”[18] The Kremlin does not view the provision of ATACMS to Ukraine as an escalatory step, and the United States has not crossed a Russian “red line” by providing Ukraine with these missiles. Ukraine will need additional ATACMS to sustain the operational effects of their use on the arrayment of Russian aviation assets and logistics.[19]

Satellite imagery from October 17 suggests that the Ukrainian ATACMS strike on the Berdyansk airfield likely substantially damaged Russian aircraft and airfield infrastructure, but ISW cannot yet confirm the extent of the damage. Several open-source intelligence analysts amplified satellite imagery of the Berdyansk airfield and suggested that it shows at least seven burned-out areas where satellite imagery previously showed various Russian helicopters, and additionally noted that many helicopters have since moved.[20] A Ukrainian reserve officer stated that prior to the strike, Russian forces had Mi-28, Mi-24, and Ka-52 helicopters at the airfield, and suggested that the extent of the damage is likely more widespread than depicted in preliminary satellite imagery.[21] Ukrainian military sources previously reported that the Ukrainian strike destroyed nine helicopters, one anti-aircraft missile launcher, special equipment, ammunition depots, and runway infrastructure, but ISW cannot fully confirm these Russian losses with available imagery at this time.[22]

Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated his desire to deepen Russian-Chinese economic and political ties but did not announce any practical changes at the One Belt One Road International Forum in Beijing, China on October 18. Putin stated that close Russian and Chinese foreign policy coordination is especially necessary in “current difficult conditions” and emphasized Russian and Chinese cooperation through multilateral formats including the One Belt One Road Initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).[23] Putin claimed that economic cooperation between Russia and China is integral to strengthening Russian economic, technological, and financial sovereignty.[24] Putin notably did not emphasize Russian-Chinese security cooperation, possibly due to China’s reticence at the no-limits partnership that Russia wants to establish, as ISW has previously reported.[25] Putin also held bilateral talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and available Kremlin readouts of the meeting similarly stressed economic ties between Russia and China.[26] Putin’s visit to China and meeting with Xi does not appear to have resulted in any substantial change in the Chinese reticence to establish the Kremlin’s desired level of bilateral relationship or any breakthroughs in the degree of Chinese military support to Russia. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov notably claimed on October 18 that almost all of Russia’s dual-use civilian drones come from China and stated that the Russian government aims to increase domestic civilian drone production to 41 percent by 2025.[27] ISW has previously observed reports that China often exports dual-use equipment to Russia, including civilian drones, which Russian forces can employ on the battlefield in Ukraine.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources claimed that likely company-sized elements of two Ukrainian naval infantry brigades conducted an assault across the Dnipro River onto the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 17-18.
• Russian sources expressed pronounced concern about ongoing Ukrainian activity on the east bank of Kherson Oblast and framed these activities as part of a potential larger Ukrainian operation.
• ISW will not speculate on the scope and prospects of ongoing Ukrainian activity on the east bank of Kherson Oblast but does not assess that Ukrainian forces have created a bridgehead on the east bank of Kherson Oblast suitable for the further maneuver of sizeable mechanized forces at this time.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Western media reported that the US has thus far provided Ukraine with a limited number of ATACMS missiles, and the Kremlin issued a muted response to the provision of these systems
• Satellite imagery from October 17 suggests that the Ukrainian ATACMS strike on the Berdyansk airfield likely substantially damaged Russian aircraft and airfield infrastructure, but ISW cannot yet confirm the extent of the damage.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated his desire to deepen Russian-Chinese economic and political ties but did not announce any practical changes at the One Belt One Road International Forum in Beijing, China on October 18.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, in the Avdiivka direction, southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced south of Avdiivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk on October 18 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) on the night of October 17, although ISW has not observed evidence of this claim.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 18 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka, Ivanivka (19km southeast of Kupyansk), and Kyslivka (21km southeast of Kupyansk).[30] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on October 18 that Russian offensive activity in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction has significantly increased in the past two weeks and that elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army and 1st Guards Tank Army (both of the Western Military District) and the newly-created 25th Combined Arms Army have been attacking with limited success on this front, consistent with ISW’s observations.[31]

Russian sources claimed on October 18 that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful counterattacks near Kupyansk. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka, Ivanivka, Pershotravneve (21km northeast of Kupyansk), and Orlyanka (22km east of Kupyansk).[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Tymkivka (18km east of Kupyansk).[33]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on October 18 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the direction of Makiivka (20km southwest of Svatove) on the night of October 17, though ISW has not observed evidence of this claim.[34] A Russian news aggregator claimed on the night of October 17 that fighting was ongoing near Torske (14km west of Kreminna).[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 18 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Makiivka.[36] Footage published on October 18 purportedly shows elements of the 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps) operating near Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[37] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov posted footage on October 18 purportedly showing the Chechen “Amur” Group of the “Hunters” Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment operating near the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna).[38]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on October 18. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Serhiivka (14km southwest of Svatove), and Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna).[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Nadiya (15km southwest of Svatove), Kuzmyne (3km southwest of Kreminna), and Shepylove (8km south of Kreminna).[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut on October 18 and reportedly advanced south of the city. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacks toward the railway line near Klishchiivka (5km southwest of Bakhmut).[41] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces managed to advance northeast of Klishchiivka, and another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces crossed the railway near a waste heap in the Klishchiivka area.[42] A Russian media aggregator seemingly refuted claims that Ukrainian forces advanced past the railway line, however, and reported that Russian forces are reliably defending the railway between Klishchiivka and Andriivka (8km southwest of Bakhmut).[43]

Russian forces continued limited and unsuccessful counterattacks near Bakhmut on October 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks near Klishchiivka.[44] A Russian milblogger posted footage reportedly of the 83rd Air Assault (VDV) Brigade and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade destroying Ukrainian equipment in the Bakhmut direction.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction on October 18 and made confirmed advances. Geolocated footage from October 17 shows that Russian forces counterattacked Ukrainian positions just north of the E50 highway south of Avdiivka and advanced along the local Soborna street towards the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant on the southern outskirts of Avdiivka.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to consolidate their positions on the southern outskirts of Avdiivka before launching attacks on the “Tsarska Okhota,” which the milblogger claimed is a highly fortified position.[47] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued attacking southwest, south, and north of Avdiivka, and one milblogger remarked that Russian forces expanded their zone of control near Pervomaiske (10km southwest of Avdiivka), Stepove (5km northwest of Avdiivka), and Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka).[48] Avdiivka City Head Vitaly Barabash noted that Russian forces appear to be regrouping near Avdiivka, and warned that there will likely be a new stage of fighting in coming days.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun reported that Russian forces are regrouping near Avdiivka and have not given up efforts to surround the city.[50]

Russian sources are increasingly complaining about the poor conditions facing Russian forces fighting near Avdiivka. One Russian correspondent who is purportedly fighting near Avdiivka and who notably presented an optimistic overview of the situation in the first days of the Russian assault claimed that the situation is now unchanged and remarked that the poor performance of Russian counterbattery fire is the “number one problem across the board” in this area.[51] Another Russian Telegram user amplified screenshots of messages sent by a Russian soldier near Avdiivka in which the soldier complains about foul sanitary conditions within Russian trenches and reports that Ukrainian artillery and helicopter fire are preventing Russian forces from moving out of trenches.[52]

Ukrainian forces conducted limited counterattacks near Avdiivka on October 18 but did not make any confirmed gains. Geolocated footage posted on October 17 indicates that Ukrainian forces may have conducted a limited counterattack just north of the E50 highway south of Avdiivka, but subsequent footage of the same positions suggests that Russian forces subsequently counterattacked and advanced beyond the Ukrainian positions towards the southern outskirt of Avdiivka.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces improved their positions near Vodyane and occupied new positions in the adjacent forest area.[54]

Russian forces continued ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City on October 18 and did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled upwards of 20 Russian attacks near Marinka (on the southwest outskirts of Donetsk City) and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[55] Ukrainian 79th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade Spokesperson Yaroslav Chepurnyi noted on October 18 that Russian forces have intensified artillery, drone, and guided aerial bomb strikes on Marinka in recent weeks and reported that Russian forces typically storm multiple Ukrainian positions within Marinka at the same time.[56] A Russian media aggregator claimed that Russian forces are continuing to advance within Marinka.[57]

Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City on October 18.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

The Russian “Vostok” Battalion, reportedly active in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked an unspecified section of this frontline on the night of October 17 to 18.[58]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 18 but did not make any claimed or confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 18 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Novomayorske (18km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and south of Zolota Nyva (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and Prechystivka (17km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[59] A Russian milblogger posted footage claiming to show elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) operating near Mykilske (4km southeast of Vuhledar).[60]

The Russian MoD claimed on October 18 that elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Chervone (9km east of Hulyaipole).[61]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 18 and reportedly advanced. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified partial success south of Robotyne.[62] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Verbove (10km east of Robotyne).[63] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations along the Kopani-Robotyne-Novoprokopivka-Verbove line (5km northwest to 10km east of Robotyne).[64] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian infantry groups conducted a "large-scale” attack on Verbove and Novoprokopivka (2km south of Robotyne) with four or five units of equipment and groups of 20 people each.[65] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Kopani (5km northwest of Robotyne) on October 17.[66]

Russian forces continued counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 18 but did not make any claimed or confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to restore lost positions east of Mala Tokmachka (7km southeast of Orikhiv) and southwest of Robotyne.[67] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian forces are constantly probing Ukrainian defenses and attempting to regain lost positions southwest of Robotyne.[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces counterattacked from Kopani to Novodanylivka (6km north of Robotyne), southwest of Robotyne, and near Verbove.[69] Russian milbloggers amplified footage claiming to show elements of the Russian “Osman” Spetsnaz unit, the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), and the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, SMD) operating in the Orikhiv direction.[70]

The Russian MoD reported that Russian Black Sea Fleet naval aviation destroyed a Ukrainian naval drone in the Black Sea on the night of October 17.[71] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces destroyed two Ukrainian naval drones west of Cape Tarkhankut.[72]

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated during a press conference in Beijing on October 18 that Russian Aerospace (VKS) forces are beginning to patrol the airspace over the Black Sea with MiG-31 aircraft armed with Kh-47M2 Kinzhal hypersonic air-launched ballistic missile systems.[73] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuri Ihnat stated that Putin’s threat does not fundamentally change the situation for Ukraine and the flights are possibly intended to pose a threat to NATO countries (such as Romania) within the range of Kinzhal missiles.[74]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported on October 17 that the number of convictions against Russian military personnel for serious crimes has increased to a record level in the first half of 2023.[75] Russian courts sentenced 32 Russian military personnel for homicide in the first half of 2023, in comparison with an average of 20 homicide sentences per year in previous years.[76] Notably more Russian military personnel also received sentences for causing grievous bodily harm and sexual assault in the first six months of 2023 than in previous years.[77]

The Russian State Duma proposed two laws on October 18 that will grant mobilization deferments to student workers who are sponsored by their employers, as well as Russian teachers and doctors in rural areas.[78] The Kremlin continues to codify mobilization deferments likely to assuage discontent over continued crypto-mobilization efforts and address persistent human capital shortages.

Russian authorities reportedly opened a missile manufacturing plant in Nekrasovka Raion, Moscow that will produce air defense missiles.[79] Russian sources reported that high-ranking Russian military officials and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited the plant in May 2023 and that Russian authorities constructed the facility in eight and a half months.[80] Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin stated that the missile plant should begin producing missiles within a year.[81]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated a standard Russian information operation aimed at portraying Ukraine and the West as prolonging the war by refusing to negotiate. Putin claimed at a press conference in Beijing on October 18 that a peace settlement would be possible if Ukraine stopped “theatrical gestures” and the West “took concrete steps” toward negotiations.[82] The Kremlin has not taken any meaningful steps towards opening negotiations beyond calling for, effectively, a complete Ukrainian surrender and the achievement of the Kremlin’s war goals, as ISW has previously documented.[83]

The Russian government has reportedly fined Russian citizens almost 200 million rubles (about $2 million) since the start of the war under the law against “discrediting” the Russian military. Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported on October 18 that Russian courts have fined Russians about 194 million rubles (about $1.9 million) in administrative cases for discrediting the Russian military since the law came into force in March 2022.[84]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin held a joint board meeting of the Russian and Belarusian ministries of defense in Moscow on October 18.[85] Shoigu and Khrenin both delivered boilerplate rhetoric about Russian-Belarusian military integration efforts and reiterated claims about alleged NATO aggression against the Union State.[86] Khrenin stated that Russian and Belarusian authorities are currently negotiating an agreement that will include measures for Russian defense industrial base (DIB) facilities to repair Belarusian equipment.[87] It is unclear why the Belarusian military would need to rely upon Russian DIB facilities to repair equipment, however, especially considering the current constraints placed on the Russian DIB by Russian operations in Ukraine.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

15. Iran Update, October 18, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-18-2023

Key Takeaways:

1. Palestinian militias continued indirect fire into Israel from the Gaza Strip. Palestinian militias targeted 21 IDF military positions with mortars and rockets in Southern Israel.
2. The rate of clashes between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces in the West Bank expanded by 470 percent.
3. CTP-ISW recorded 20 Attacks from Lebanon into Israeli territory, which is double the number of attacks recorded on October 17.
4. Two Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted separate attacks on US forces stationed at the al Harir airbase and Ain al Asad airbase in Iraq.
5. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq established the al Aqsa Joint Operations Room in support of Hamas' al Aqsa Flood operation.
6. Iranian officials and media are blaming the United States and Israel for the explosion at the al Ahli hospital in the Gaza Strip and warning about the potential expansion of the conflict as a result.

IRAN UPDATE, OCTOBER 18, 2023

Oct 18, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, October 18, 2023

Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Brian Carter, and Amin Soltani

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments and in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Key Takeaways:

1. Palestinian militias continued indirect fire into Israel from the Gaza Strip. Palestinian militias targeted 21 IDF military positions with mortars and rockets in Southern Israel.
2. The rate of clashes between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces in the West Bank expanded by 470 percent.
3. CTP-ISW recorded 20 Attacks from Lebanon into Israeli territory, which is double the number of attacks recorded on October 17.
4. Two Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted separate attacks on US forces stationed at the al Harir airbase and Ain al Asad airbase in Iraq.
5. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq established the al Aqsa Joint Operations Room in support of Hamas' al Aqsa Flood operation.
6. Iranian officials and media are blaming the United States and Israel for the explosion at the al Ahli hospital in the Gaza Strip and warning about the potential expansion of the conflict as a result.

Gaza Strip

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Palestinian militias continued indirect fire into Israel from the Gaza Strip on October 18. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas’ militant wing—claimed responsibility for nine mortar and rocket attacks.[1] The al Qassem Brigades also launched four waves of rockets at Tel Aviv in response to Israeli “massacres against civilians.”[2] Saraya al Quds—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed responsibility for another 16 rocket attacks.[3] The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades—the militant wing of Fatah—claimed two rocket attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip.[4] This rate of attacks is consistent with the rate that CTP-ISW observed in recent days.

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Palestinian militias targeted 21 IDF military positions with mortars and rockets in southern Israel. The IDF evacuated and designated the periphery of the Gaza Strip as a military zone on October 11.[5] ISW previously reported that the IDF deployed units to this area in recent days, which suggests that the militias seek to target IDF military assets in addition to civilian areas, such as Tel Aviv.

IDF airstrikes into the Gaza Strip continued to kill senior Hamas officials. The IDF reported that it killed the commander of Hamas’ anti-tank unit in the Gaza City Brigade, who was a prominent weapons dealer and coordinator for attacks.[6] The IDF also killed Hamas’ naval forces commander.[7]

West Bank

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and marches in the West Bank.

The rate of clashes between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces in the West Bank expanded by 470 percent on October 18.[8] CTP-ISW recorded 40 distinct clashes in the West Bank.[9] Clashes also expanded geographically to 37 cities and towns. Anti-Israel demonstrations within the West Bank tripled on October 18, compared to the previous two days.[10] Demonstrators mobilized rapidly after the Gaza hospital explosion on October 17. This is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that the rate of clashes would increase after the bombing.[11] Immediately after the explosion, Hamas called for clashes across Israel and the Palestinian territories.[12] Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) similarly called for a "day of unprecedented anger” in response to the hospital explosion and Biden’s visit to Israel.[13] Demonstrators in the West Bank likely responded to LH’s call as well as Hamas’.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

CTP-ISW recorded 20 Attacks from Lebanon into Israeli territory on October 18, which is double the number of attacks recorded on October 17.[14] The attacks targeted locations across the entire length of the Israel-Lebanon border. Fifteen of the attacks targeted military positions.[15] LH claimed responsibility for 15 attacks on military and civilian targets along the Israel-Lebanon border.[16] LH militants targeted Kiryat Shmona with nine rockets.[17] LH also launched an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) at Metulla for the fourth consecutive day.[18] The Israeli government announced it was evacuating northern settlements within five kilometers of the Israel-Lebanon border on October 18, which includes Kiryat Shmona and Metulla.[19]

LH sources told a Lebanon-focused analyst on October 16 that Hezbollah recalled its cadres from abroad.[20] This is consistent with Syrian opposition media reporting since at least October 10, which claimed that LH redeployed forces from Syria to Lebanon.[21]

Palestinian militias remain active in southern Lebanon, likely with the approval of LH. The al Qassem Brigades said on October 18 that three of its militants died during an operation near Margoliot on October 14.[22] CTP-ISW previously assessed that LH probably approves attacks from southern Lebanon into Israel given the extent to which LH controls southern Lebanon.[23]

Syrian President Bashar al Assad blamed the United State and Israel for the Gaza hospital bombing on October 17 and called for three days of mourning.[24] CTP-ISW did not record any attacks related to the Israel-Hamas war into or from Syria on October 18, however. Over 1,000 Iraqi Popular Mobilization forces deployed to Homs Province from Iraq in the past several days, according to local opposition media.[25] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also transferred Iranian-backed militias from eastern Syria to southern Syria, the Golan Heights, and Lebanon from eastern Syria on October 16 and 17.[26]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Two Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted separate attacks on US forces stationed at the al Harir airbase and Ain al Asad airbase in Iraq on October 18.[27] CTP-ISW previously reported that elements of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, including Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, have threatened to attack US forces if the United States intervenes in the Israel-Hamas war.[28] It is unclear if the two attacks were coordinated or if the IRGC Quds Force ordered the attacks.

• The Islamic Resistance of Iraq – an umbrella group of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias – claimed responsibility for targeting US forces stationed at the Ain al Assad airbase.[29] US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that US forces engaged two drones, destroying one and damaging the other.[30] Two unidentified US officials reported that the two drones were one-way attack drones targeting the base.[31] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias last targeted the base in May 2022.[32]
• Tashkil al Waritheen—an Iranian-backed militia—claimed responsibility for conducting a drone attack targeting US forces stationed at the al Harir airbase in Iraqi Kurdistan.[33] Waritheen claimed responsibility on behalf of the al Aqsa Joint Operations Room. Iraqi Kurdistan-based Shafaq News cited an unidentified Iraqi source, who claimed that it was unclear what damage, if any, the drone had done on the base.[34] Tashkil al Waritheen reports directly to Iran’s IRGC Quds Force.[35] CENTCOM reported that US forces stationed al Harir airbase destroyed the drone targeting the airbase.[36]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq established the al Aqsa Joint Operations Room on October 18 in support of Hamas' al Aqsa Flood operation.[37] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq released its statement following accusations that Israel and the United States were responsible for the explosion at the al Ahli Hospital in the Gaza Strip on October 17. The Islamic Resistance of Iraq is comprised of Iranian-backed militias, such as Asaib Ahl al Haq, Kataib Hezbollah, Badr Organization, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Seyyed al Shohada, Ashab al Kahf, and Kataib Imam Ali.[38] Two unidentified members of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias cited by Associated Press reported that Iran has not given orders to ”join the wider battle on Israel.”[39] Prominent Iranian-backed militias issued statements condemning Israel for allegedly striking the al Ahli Hospital but did not call for attacks as they had previously threatened to do.[40]

Iranian officials and media are blaming the United States and Israel for the October 17 explosion at the al Ahli hospital in the Gaza Strip and warning about the potential expansion of the conflict as a result. President Ebrahim Raisi claimed that “US-Israeli bombs” were dropped on the hospital on social media on October 18, echoing claims from Iranian officials and media since October 13 that the United States is playing a direct role in the Hamas-Israel war.[41] Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian claimed that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was present in the Israeli operations room during a meeting with his Qatari counterpart Sultan bin Saad al Muraikhi in Jeddah on October 18.[42] IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency claimed that the United States had devised the Israeli attack to disincentivize an Israeli ground operation into Gaza.[43] Several Iranian regime outlets claimed either that American munitions were used in or that the United States had authorized the strike on the hospital.[44] These same outlets claimed that Iranian protesters were holding the United States responsible for the specific attack and greater Israeli “crimes” in Gaza on October 18.[45]

• President Ebrahim Raisi stated that Israel’s “criminal, crazy, and illegal actions” will expand the war to the region during a meeting with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva on October 17.[46] The Raisi administration similarly issued a statement on October 18 warning that the hospital bombing “will not go unanswered.”[47] The Artesh—Iran's conventional military—also published a statement on October 18 condemning Israel for allegedly attacking the al Ahli hospital and warning that the Artesh is looking to respond “forcefully” to the attack and bring the “criminals” to trial.[48]
• Expediency Discernment Council member and former IRGC Commander Major General Mohsen Rezaei warned on October 18 that a “big storm” is coming and pointed to the potential for the formation of new Islamic militant groups seeking to enter the conflict with Israel.[49] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf similarly warned that Israel is “opening up the gates of hell with their own hands and are filling all Muslims with wrath,” further arguing that Muslims are ready to make sacrifices to confront Israel.[50]
• Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri echoed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s October 17 remarks that “the resistance” will lose its patience were Israel to continue its “war crimes” within a statement condemning the alleged attack on the al Ahli hospital on October 18.[51] IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency published an article warning that “the resistance” will deliver an “even harder slap” against the Israeli regime while pointing to the “activation” of LH on the northern front.[52] “The resistance” is the term that Iranian officials and media use to describe the proxy and partner militias that Iran sponsors throughout the Middle East.

Iran and elements of its Axis of Resistance have been messaging that the Hamas-Israel war could expand geographically into a multi-front conflict since October 13.[53] CTP-ISW is closely monitoring the situation to forecast whether such a scenario is becoming more or less likely. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran seeks to avoid entering a direct conflict with Israel, however.[54] Iranian officials, for instance, combined their warnings about the risk of conflict expansion on October 18 with calls for the international community to help bring about a ceasefire and impose punitive measures on Israel for its “war crimes,” including severing diplomatic ties and imposing an oil embargo and broader economic sanctions.[55] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran would likely provide material and financial support to its proxies to fight Israel rather than get directly involved in the Israel-Hamas war were this war to expand into a regional conflict.[56]

Palestinian militias are using the October 17 explosion on the al Ahli hospital in the Gaza Strip to frame the United States as a belligerent in the Israel-Hamas war. The IDF said that PIJ conducted a rocket attack that failed and hit the active hospital. The IDF spokesman noted that 450 rockets from the Gaza Strip have failed and fallen short since October 7.[57] The Hamas-run Health Ministry contrastingly and falsely claimed that an Israeli airstrike hit the hospital and that hundreds of people died. A senior adviser to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Hamas of inflating civilian casualty numbers.[58]

• The IDF released an audio recording of two Hamas militants discussing how PIJ fired the rocket and noted that the rocket at the impact site was locally made. Independent analysts on Twitter and Bellingcat noted that images of the aftermath of the attack are inconsistent with reports of missiles or joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs).[59]
• A Twitter user posted on October 17 that “"The Wall Street Journal: 'The bomb that was dropped on the hospital was an American MK-84” and that "this bomb is precision-guided, largest in MK family, and has about 950 kg weight."[60] Newsweek confirmed that the claim is false.[61] US President Joe Biden said the data that the Department of Defense showed him says Israel was not to blame for the attack.[62]
• The PIJ spokesman echoed Iranian rhetoric that the bombs used to strike the Gaza hospital were American bombs.[63] Hamas released a statement that the US adoption of the Israeli narrative that PIJ misfired a rocket is considered participation in the attack.[64] Hamas also stated its appreciation to cancel the US-Jordan-Palestinian Authority-Egypt summit scheduled for October 18.[65]

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas cancelled his attendance at the joint US-Egypt-Jordan summit following the explosion on the Al Ahli Hospital in Gaza.[66] Abbas, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi, Jordanian King Abdullah II, and US President Joe Biden were scheduled to discuss the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi also stated that Jordan would only host the summit in the future if Israel agreed to stop all attacks and deliver aid to the Gaza Strip.[67]

Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated Tura News circulated calls to protests in solidarity with Palestinians at the US Embassy in Baghdad on October 18.[68] Ashab al Kahf called for Iraqis, “youth of the popular mobilization,” and other supporters to demonstrate in Tahrir Square, Baghdad on October 17 following the explosion the al Ahli Hospital. Protesters gathered in Tahrir Square and attempted to approach the US embassy but were blocked by Iraqi security forces.[69]

Iranian regime outlets and officials are attempting to generate further momentum for the current Israel-Hamas war. Iranian media circulated disturbing images of severely wounded or killed Palestinian children on October 18.[70] IRGC-affiliated media published a series of responses to Israel’s “infanticide” in Gaza and recirculated calls for the expansion of ”anti-Zionist” demonstrations in the West Bank.[71] Several Iranian officials and outlets claimed that millions of ordinary Iranians are prepared to volunteer in the fight against the Israeli regime.[72]

Violent protests occurred at US positions in the Middle East following LH calls for a “day of rage” in solidarity with the Gaza Strip. Hundreds of protesters demonstrated outside of the US Embassy in Beirut and attempted to remove barbed wire and barricades.[73] Some people burned a building near the embassy.[74] The embassy issued a travel advisory not to travel to Lebanon and recommended that US citizens leave the country.[75] Protesters attempted to storm a US base in Turkey, according to a pro-Axis of Resistance telegram.[76]

16. Biden is expected to request $100 billion for Israel, Ukraine and other crises.

We have to ask where all this money is coming from. A billion here and a billion there.

Biden is expected to request $100 billion for Israel, Ukraine and other crises.

The emergency funding request to Congress, which would also include funds to fortify border security, is expected by Friday.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/18/us/politics/biden-funds-israel-ukraine-taiwan.html

• Share full article

Israeli soldiers around a mortar launcher firing toward Gaza from Be’eri, Israel, on Tuesday.Credit...Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times

By Karoun Demirjian

• Oct. 18, 2023

President Biden is expected to ask Congress in the coming days to approve about $100 billion in emergency funds to arm Israel, Ukraine and Taiwan and fortify the U.S.-Mexico border, according to multiple people familiar with the plan.

The funding request, which lawmakers expect to receive by Friday morning, would cover a full year and is aimed at insulating the security funding from the partisan spending battles that have hamstrung recent efforts to supply Ukraine with weapons and other assistance to beat back a Russian invasion.

The package is expected to include about $10 billion in mostly military assistance to help Israel, as well as around $60 billion for Ukraine, according to aides familiar with the discussions, who described the emerging proposal on the condition of anonymity because it has yet to be announced. The balance of the $100 billion is expected to be dedicated to border security and helping beef up the defenses of Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region, in order to better counter threats from China.

Mr. Biden is scheduled to deliver remarks Thursday night from the Oval Office on the American response to the wars in Israel and Ukraine.

Reactions to the Conflict in the U.S.

• Jewish Americans: For many American Jews, there have been too many emotions to process. Young people spoke of fear, shock, solidarity and helplessness.
• Palestinian Americans: U.S. Palestinians are dismayed by the violence, but some said that politicians and news outlets are overlooking historical context.
• Evangelicals: Many evangelical pastors condemned Hamas’s assaults, urging their congregations to pray for a country to which many of them feel intense spiritual, cultural and political connections.
• Harvard University: A coalition of more than 30 student groups posted an open letter blaming Israel for the Hamas attacks. Within days, students affiliated with those groups found themselves at the center of a free speech controversy.

Over the last week, senior White House officials and Senate leaders signaled their intention to link aid for multiple national security objectives. The strategy reflects the growing urgency surrounding the war in Ukraine and the sudden outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas.

They are pursuing one large package of aid despite objections from Republicans in the House, where the majority of G.O.P. members enthusiastically support equipping Israel with the weapons to fight Hamas but have soured on continuing to send military assistance to Ukraine for its fight against Russian aggression.

Last month, the majority of House Republicans voted against continuing a $300 million program to train and equip Ukrainian fighters. While the measure ultimately passed with Democratic support, the vote reflected a dampening of support in the Republican Party for helping Ukraine. Some G.O.P. lawmakers argue doing so siphons money away from domestic security concerns and could put the United States closer to a direct confrontation with Russia.

Republicans in both the Senate and House have insisted that they would need concessions from Democrats to support additional funds for Ukraine, including strict immigration restrictions and border security funding. Accomplishing that became easier in recent days, after the Biden administration announced that it would revive construction of a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border.

On Wednesday, some Republicans expressed cautious support for the idea of a combined national security package.

“From what I know generally, I’d be inclined to, presuming that the border security piece of it is real border security,” Senator Kevin Cramer, Republican of North Dakota, told reporters Wednesday.

But it is not clear how swiftly Congress might be able to pass such a bill. Legislative activity in the House has been at a standstill for more than two weeks, as Republican lawmakers struggle to elect a speaker.

In the Senate, however, leaders are promising to move quickly on the measure.

“I asked Secretary Austin when he needs funding for our ongoing efforts. His answer was crystal clear: Yesterday,” Senator Chuck Schumer, the majority leader, told reporters after a classified briefing at the Capitol with Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III and other top defense, diplomatic and intelligence officials.

“The Senate will not wait” to act on such requests, Mr. Schumer added. The New York Democrat has previously said he intends to put an emergency national security spending package on the Senate floor within a couple of weeks.

17. Putin deploys combat dolphins to take on Ukrainian commandos

Putin deploys combat dolphins to take on Ukrainian commandos: Trained animals are moved closer to the front line following spate of raids in Crimea

• Satellite images indicate dolphin pens at Novoozerne, near Ukrainian forces

By WILL STEWART

PUBLISHED: 03:54 EDT, 19 October 2023 | UPDATED: 03:56 EDT, 19 October 2023

Daily Mail · by Will Stewart · October 19, 2023

Russia has moved its unique combat dolphins closer to the war frontline in the Black Sea, it has been revealed.

The specially trained anti-sabotage mammals had been deployed at the harbour entrance in Sevastopol.

But satellite images now indicate dolphin sea pens at Novoozerne, 56 miles to the north, closer to where Ukrainian special forces have made incursions and landed on the Crimean peninsula.

The dolphins are trained for use against enemy divers intruding in harbours to plant limpet mines or for reconnaissance.

They have been taught to alert their human controllers - or deliver lethal strikes from underwater guns.

Satellite images (pictured) now indicate dolphin sea pens at Novoozerne, 56 miles to the north, closer to where Ukrainian special forces have made incursions and landed on the Crimean peninsula

A small Russian 'spy dolphin' carries a bomb during a training exercise (file image)

Novoozerne is a former Soviet submarine base where Russia has deployed missile corvettes, landing craft and some support vessels including a submarine support ship, says OSINT researcher H I Sutton who analysed satellite images to spot the dolphin pens

Novoozerne is a former Soviet submarine base where Russia has deployed missile corvettes, landing craft and some support vessels including a submarine support ship, says OSINT researcher H I Sutton who analysed satellite images to spot the dolphin pens.

'The deployment is likely to defend against Ukrainian special forces who present a real threat in the area,' reported the researcher in Naval News.

'Trained dolphins are considered effective against military divers.

'There is no human, however athletic or well trained, who can out-swim them.

'And their inbuilt sonar gives them an even greater advantage.'

The mammal move towards the war zone by Vladimir Putin's forces comes as the dictator has been forced to shift the bulk of his warships from Sevastopol - headquarters of his Black Sea Fleet - to Novorossiysk due to Ukrainian missile and drone strikes.

The bottlenose dolphin squadron was conscripted by Putin when he seized Crimea from Ukraine in 2014.

'We had to practically start from scratch to teach the [mammals] to search for objects under the water because the Ukrainian Navy hardly worked with them,' a Russian source said at the time.

However, footage shows how dolphins have been trained to use underwater guns since Soviet times.

Russian army trainers work with the sea mammals so they can protect valuable navy assets (file images)

The specially trained anti-sabotage mammals had been deployed at the harbour entrance in Sevastopol (pictured)

The dolphins are trained for use against enemy divers intruding in harbours to plant limpet mines or for reconnaissance (file image)

Retired Captain Yury Plyachenko, a military trainer, explained: 'The dolphin should have signalled, and if necessary it was ordered to destroy an underwater saboteur,

'It was armed with an underwater gun.'

A Russian state TV broadcast said: 'This is what the underwater gun looked like.

'It was attached to a dolphin with a special fixture, and a mammal could shoot.'

Rare archive footage showed a dolphin attacking a diver .

'The man had no chance in this battle,' viewers were told.

'It was next to impossible for a diver to get to ships and stay unnoticed if dolphins were patrolling them.'

The military dolphin training programme — long based in Sevastopol — dates back to Cold War era of the 1970s when the Soviet Union utilised the animals to search for mines or spy on foreign ships.

Russia has kept silent about the current role of its naval dolphins and how they have coped with repeated explosions from Ukrainian missiles as well as both aerial and sea drones in Sevastopol.

The dolphin deployment to Novoozerne - with Putin putting them in harm's way - may indicate they are seen as militarily useful.

Putin's forces appear increasingly worried about Ukraine targeting Crimea, and severing supply lines to the peninsula, as a prelude to recapturing the territory.

Or the dolphin move could suggest desperation from the Russians.

Daily Mail · by Will Stewart · October 19, 2023

18. It’s Time for America to Join the International Criminal Court

Excerpts:

None of this is to say that the United States cannot help the ICC without formally joining the court. It can. But the long-standing fear that joining the ICC would expose U.S. citizens to unfair prosecution is likely a boogeyman: according to the court’s “complementarity” rule, if a country undertakes genuine investigations into its own personnel and, where appropriate, prosecutes offenders, the ICC, which is a court of last resort, will not have jurisdiction over their citizens. The ICC has upheld its side of this principle in the past, withdrawing from Colombia in 2021 and proving its promise to defer to national governments that conduct their own proceedings.

Well beyond Ukraine, the United States can better promote democratic values such as accountability and human rights as an ICC member than as a nonmember. The United States simply does not like to defer to supranational bodies unless it is in the driver’s seat. But in the case of the ICC, this notion has now come to its limit. The “law for thee but not for me” that the United States wishes to apply to Russia is simply not tenable—legally, politically, or morally.

Putin may not have his day in court. For a trial to occur, Putin would need to be arrested and transferred to The Hague. Nonetheless, the charges against him hold important symbolic value. Even if Putin is never apprehended, he will live as a fugitive of the law and be a pariah on the world stage. By answering Putin’s illegal conduct with a legal process, the international community is attempting to reaffirm its commitment to the rule of law and to distinguish itself from Putin, who so clearly despises it. To do that successfully, however, the United States must first recognize that the rules it applies to the world apply to itself, too.

It’s Time for America to Join the International Criminal Court

Holding Putin to Account Will Require Offering the Court More Than Just Intelligence

By Kelebogile Zvobgo

October 19, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Kelebogile Zvobgo · October 19, 2023

This July, U.S. President Joe Biden ordered his government to begin sharing information with the International Criminal Court’s investigation into atrocities committed in Ukraine. It was a surprising decision: the United States is not a member of the ICC, and for months the U.S. Department of Defense resisted the idea of assisting this ICC investigation, concerned about treading on a slippery slope that could one day lead to prosecutions of U.S. military and intelligence personnel. But both the White House and Congress appear to have set the Pentagon’s concerns aside. In August, with Biden’s support, Congress passed an appropriations bill authorizing the government to share U.S. intelligence on the war in Ukraine with ICC prosecutors.

In one sense, this shift is a positive development for the court, which needs all the help it can get. In March, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin; the path from that to putting him on trial is full of obstacles. But in another sense, Washington’s moves may set the court back as different standards of justice come to light.

Going back decades, the official U.S. position has been that the ICC does not have jurisdiction over the nationals of nonmembers such as Israel, Russia, and the United States itself. The ICC has tried to investigate U.S. actions in Afghanistan, an ICC member state, and the United States has always resisted such scrutiny on principle. But if Washington helps the ICC build evidence in cases against Russians for their actions in Ukraine—a country that has formally accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction—then it is suggesting this principle does not apply.

Such open hypocrisy undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of a court that already struggles to prove to the world that it can apply justice fairly and achieve real outcomes. The ICC needs help in compiling evidence about abuses in Ukraine. But the sad truth is that as long as the United States remains outside the ICC, the desperately needed help the country is providing with regard to Ukraine could also damage the court’s reputation and greater aims.

Even if Biden and Congress have the best intentions, they also have dismantled the clearest arguments the United States ever had for not joining the court and for claiming that U.S. forces cannot be prosecuted in The Hague. Perhaps surprisingly, most Americans, in fact, support the United States joining the ICC. Russia’s war in Ukraine has only made clearer the contradictions in U.S. policy, and it is time for the United States to finally join the court.

HAVING IT BOTH WAYS

In 1998, 120 countries adopted the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, a multinational body tasked with investigating and prosecuting individuals accused of atrocities—notably war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The United States helped draft the treaty, and President Bill Clinton signed it in 2000. But the United States never became a full member. The U.S. Senate did not ratify the Rome Statute—nor did most people expect it to.

By signing the Rome Statute without it being likely that Congress would ratify it, Clinton apparently wanted the United States to have its cake and eat it, too. As a signatory, Washington could, according to the ICC’s rules, continue to have a seat at the table in future negotiations about the court’s jurisdiction. Clinton’s successors, Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump, then took every opportunity to shield U.S. military and intelligence professionals from ICC scrutiny, particularly for crimes allegedly committed on territories over which the ICC has jurisdiction.

In 2002, Bush “unsigned” the Rome Statute, telling the international community that the ICC did not have jurisdiction over the United States. After launching the “war on terror,” he also worried that allies could hand over U.S. personnel to the ICC, and he conditioned many offers of aid on “bilateral immunity agreements” that shielded U.S. military and intelligence personnel from potential arrest and transfer to the ICC. That did not stop the ICC from launching a preliminary examination in 2006 into suspected war crimes and crimes against in Afghanistan, including possible torture committed by U.S. personnel. Afghanistan is an ICC member, and the court’s jurisdiction relies more on where alleged abuses occurred than on who committed them.

A FEINT TOWARD JUSTICE

Obama rewrote Bush’s playbook slightly, providing the ICC diplomatic and logistical support for select investigations. But he continued to reject the possibility of ICC investigations into U.S. service members. Because Clinton had signed the Rome Statute, the Obama administration participated in a 2010 review conference to consider amendments to the treaty. That conference added a fourth international crime to the list the ICC could prosecute: aggression, or “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, integrity or independence of another State.”

The principle of nonaggression is foundational to the rules-based international order. Yet it has been challenged again and again, including when powerful countries such as the United States, Russia, and China have threatened, and in some cases committed, aggression. At the 2010 conference, however, the U.S. delegation successfully lobbied for an important distinction: that, in prosecuting aggression, the ICC would not have jurisdiction over the nationals of nonmember states. This apparent win for the United States was a loss for the ICC.

When Trump took office in 2017, he went to even more extreme lengths to shield U.S. nationals as well as those of Israel, a key U.S. ally. After the ICC expanded its preliminary examinations of suspected crimes in Afghanistan and in the Palestinian territories into full investigations, in 2020 Trump put economic sanctions on the ICC’s chief prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, and her deputy, Phakiso Mochochoko. Trump threatened to do the same to any individuals or organizations that helped the ICC in these investigations.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Facing international pressure, in April 2021, Biden reversed Trump’s sanctions. But U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken reiterated that the ICC does not have jurisdiction over U.S. or Israeli forces acting anywhere. Perhaps trying to gain the favor—and aid—of the United States for the ICC’s work, the court’s chief prosecutor, Karim Khan, announced in September 2021 that he would deprioritize the investigations into U.S. personnel in Afghanistan.

Now, however, by supporting the ICC’s investigations against Russia for its acts in Ukraine, the White House and Congress have said the quiet part out loud: the United States believes the ICC does, indeed, have jurisdiction over acts committed by nonmember-state forces—just not over U.S. forces and the forces of its select allies such as Israel. If the United States held Russia to the standard to which it holds itself, it would have to reject the ICC’s claim of jurisdiction over Russians in Ukraine, and the Russian military would enjoy impunity for its serious crimes. But the United States has made an exception for its rival. This is a huge problem because it makes the United States’ double standard explicit.

Such double standards corrode the very principle of an international rule of law. And it particularly undermines the ICC, which has been beleaguered since its inception by accusations of bias. The ICC’s first set of charges—but likely not its last—against Putin concern the unlawful transfer of hundreds of Ukrainian children from Ukraine to Russia. Putin, who is accused alongside another Russian official involved in the transfer, Maria Lvova-Belova, is the fourth sitting head of state that the ICC has formally accused of serious crimes.

Russian propagandists are degrading the court’s efficacy by weaponizing the U.S. double standard.

Putin is clearly worried: his government has put a number of ICC officials, including Chief Prosecutor Khan, on a wanted list. And this past August, he had to strike an agreement with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa not to attend a meeting of the BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) hosted in South Africa; South Africa is an ICC member, and if Putin traveled there, Ramaphosa would have been obligated to hand him over to the court.

Russian propagandists, however, are already degrading the court’s efficacy by weaponizing the United States’ double standard. They argue that behind the West’s principled rhetoric lies a purely selfish wish to protect its interests and hurt the interests of its adversaries. The West, that argument goes, is no better than Russia and must be resisted at all costs.

JOIN THE CLUB

In the coming weeks and months, the ICC may pursue further charges against Putin, Russian soldiers, and Russian intelligence operatives. Intelligence sharing between Washington and The Hague will improve the chances of successful trials. U.S. intelligence agencies have already reportedly collected evidence of Russian plans to target civilian infrastructure, in addition to evidence concerning the deportation and transfer of children.

None of this is to say that the United States cannot help the ICC without formally joining the court. It can. But the long-standing fear that joining the ICC would expose U.S. citizens to unfair prosecution is likely a boogeyman: according to the court’s “complementarity” rule, if a country undertakes genuine investigations into its own personnel and, where appropriate, prosecutes offenders, the ICC, which is a court of last resort, will not have jurisdiction over their citizens. The ICC has upheld its side of this principle in the past, withdrawing from Colombia in 2021 and proving its promise to defer to national governments that conduct their own proceedings.

Well beyond Ukraine, the United States can better promote democratic values such as accountability and human rights as an ICC member than as a nonmember. The United States simply does not like to defer to supranational bodies unless it is in the driver’s seat. But in the case of the ICC, this notion has now come to its limit. The “law for thee but not for me” that the United States wishes to apply to Russia is simply not tenable—legally, politically, or morally.

Putin may not have his day in court. For a trial to occur, Putin would need to be arrested and transferred to The Hague. Nonetheless, the charges against him hold important symbolic value. Even if Putin is never apprehended, he will live as a fugitive of the law and be a pariah on the world stage. By answering Putin’s illegal conduct with a legal process, the international community is attempting to reaffirm its commitment to the rule of law and to distinguish itself from Putin, who so clearly despises it. To do that successfully, however, the United States must first recognize that the rules it applies to the world apply to itself, too.

• KELEBOGILE ZVOBGO is Assistant Professor of Government at William & Mary and Founder and Director of the International Justice Lab.

Foreign Affairs · by Kelebogile Zvobgo · October 19, 2023

19. The New Economic Security State

Excerpts:

The government also needs to draw on new ideas and new sources of expertise, as do the universities and think tanks that supply Washington with talent. That means hiring fewer economists and political scientists and more people who understand logistics, cybernetics, and material sciences. At a bare minimum, the United States needs to attract more people into government with a deep understanding of supply chains and global finance. In addition to bolstering the parts of the government that already have such experience and talent, such as the Treasury Department, this effort might involve new institutions along the lines of the U.S. Digital Service, which has attracted people from the information technology industry into government, to provide expertise across the different areas of economic security.

Finally, the U.S. government should consider creating an Economic Security Council to mediate between the National Security Council and the National Economic Council while drawing on and building up sources of expertise within the government, including the National Laboratories and the International Trade Commission. That might, in turn, support some more formal apparatus of coordination among policy principals in the various parts of the federal government that touch on economic security. Rather than creating another bureaucratic monstrosity, this should be as small and agile as the National Security Council was originally supposed to be, providing a switchboard to help connect the parts of the government that have an economic security mandate. Alternatively, some members of the National Security Council and the National Economic Council could wear two hats, informally integrating economic and national security discussions.

Such suggestions are only a starting point for debate, but that debate must start now. The Biden administration rightly wants to avoid a world in which the United States and China get drawn into a dangerous process of decoupling. The risk is that existing U.S. institutions may pull the country relentlessly in the direction that it wants to avoid. To get economic security right in a highly interdependent world marked by serious great-power competition, the U.S. government must reinvent itself.

The New Economic Security State

How De-risking Will Remake Geopolitics

By Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman

October 19, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World Economy · October 19, 2023

In April 2023, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan begged his listeners’ indulgence for straying out of his lane by delivering a major address about economics. But his actual argument—that decades of free-market zealotry had weakened the country’s national security—was anything but apologetic. “Ignoring economic dependencies that had built up over the decades of liberalization had become really perilous—from energy uncertainty in Europe to supply-chain vulnerabilities in medical equipment, semiconductors, and critical minerals,” Sullivan said. “These were the kinds of dependencies that could be exploited for economic or geopolitical leverage.” Sullivan acknowledged both the costs and the benefits of markets but emphasized how the economic liberalization pursued by past U.S. administrations had not created peace. Instead, a simplistic faith in the magic of markets had hollowed out U.S. industry, welcomed a rising adversary (China) into free-trade arrangements, and riddled global supply chains with critical security vulnerabilities.

In the past decade, economics and national security have collided, turning government inside out and upside down. The definition of security has expanded beyond matters related to warfare and terrorism, as previously disregarded economic and environmental problems such as food insecurity, energy shortages, inflation, and climate change have moved to the “very core” of the official U.S. National Security Strategy. Sullivan’s duties now involve the global marketplace as much as they do missile systems, and international economics officials such as U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo and U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai spend more and more of their time thinking about national security questions. They have little choice. Officials cannot easily disentangle trade and commerce from security when U.S. markets are intertwined with those of adversaries, consumer electronics are readily weaponized, and beefed-up graphics chips are the engines of military artificial intelligence.

The “new Washington consensus” of U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration, as expounded by Sullivan, attempts to escape two very different traps. It breaks from the conventional approach of the post–Cold War era, when politicians and pundits prioritized markets over security, hoping that economic liberalism and interdependence would underpin peace. But it also avoids reviving the prior Cold War–era assumption that security trumped markets, when the denizens of Washington feared that trading with the Soviet Union was tantamount to giving succor to the enemy.

The economies of the United States and China are inextricably entangled, however much economic nationalists in both countries resent that fact. There is no plausible way to completely unwind this interdependence or detach the civilian and military economies from each other without causing irreparable harm to American society. That is why U.S. officials have borrowed European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s language about “de-risking,” the process of managing the vulnerabilities generated by an interdependent world. They see their job as keeping as much of the global economy intact as possible and solving shared problems while defusing the most urgent security threats.

This enormous task does not fall into the domain of either traditional national security or free-market economics. It is an effort to maintain economic security, one that looks to prevent economic shocks that could destabilize society and hopes to limit the growing use of interdependence as a tool of coercion. Protecting economic security means keeping an eye on the trajectories of growth and innovation while managing anticipated security threats and creating enough policy bandwidth to tackle unanticipated ones. It cannot be reduced to either missile systems or market regulations, and it involves messy tradeoffs and decisions over which economic restrictions will defuse threats without undermining growth and which measures might help tackle shared global problems, such as climate change, without substantially damaging American security and prosperity.

Security and economics have had separate policy lanes until the recent past, which is why the work that Sullivan, Raimondo, and Tai are doing has become so complicated. The United States is still tied to the legacy of the Cold War, when policymakers tended to think that security trumped economics, and to the legacy of the era of globalization that followed, during which they mostly assumed that economics trumped security. But the two eras have had an asymmetric effect on the present: although Washington bulked up its security muscles during the Cold War, its economic brain actively shrank during the giddy excesses of globalization, when everyone believed that markets knew best and that government should steer clear of trying to direct the economy. That dynamic makes it more likely that Cold War reflexes could hijack the new economic security agenda, pushing the country down a risky path of tit-for-tat escalation between the major powers.

To address the new problems of economic security and avoid a downward spiral that could threaten the global economy, U.S. officials must reckon with a major task: nothing less than a transformation of the U.S. government. The past offers the wrong guidance, and the current predicament calls for an exacting reassessment. Several U.S. allies, notably Japan and the European Union, have retained greater control over markets in the interest of economic security; the United States can learn from them. Only a considerably reformed economic security state will be suited to a world that is both highly interdependent and filled with security risks.

THE VISIBLE HAND

Over the last two years, the Biden administration has regularly turned to Cold War laws and institutions to strengthen the country’s economic security. When Biden declared limits on U.S. investments in China in August, he invoked emergency powers legislation from the 1970s. When he wanted U.S. industries to produce critical minerals for the transition to a post-carbon economy in 2022, he used the 1950 Defense Production Act. Washington’s new measures to deny Beijing access to the semiconductors it needs for military artificial intelligence were empowered and justified by the Trump administration’s reform of export control regulations. But that system of export controls itself dates back at least as far as the 1949 Export Control Act.

All these tools were crafted in simpler times, when the U.S. government was more powerful and when it subordinated markets to the needs of national security. During the Cold War, the government intervened directly in large parts of the economy, cutting off nearly all trade with the Soviet Union for extended periods. It saw itself as engaged in an existential conflict with an adversary committed to an alien way of organizing the economy and society and thus developed policy instruments to ensure that its own economy supported military power and limited interdependence with its enemy to a bare minimum.

Security and economics can no longer have separate policy lanes.

The Defense Production Act was originally one element of a vast military bureaucracy that was empowered to plan the security economy by allocating resources, controlling wages and prices, and even, in principle, seizing private property. Export controls were a linchpin of the Cold War economy. The U.S. diplomat and foreign policy thinker George Kennan had warned in his famous 1947 essay in these pages, written under the pseudonym “X,” that the Soviet Union saw trade as an economic weapon. As the scholar Bruce Jentleson has documented, U.S. policymakers listened, using export controls to minimize economic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union for decades. The export control regime was unimaginably strict by today’s standards, affecting the United States’ economic relations with its allies, too. The historians Mario Daniels and John Krige have found that by the mid-1980s, 40 percent of U.S. exports required government approval, and 90 percent of licenses were granted for trade with other “free countries.”

Defense production planning and Cold War export controls were wide ranging, but their aim was simple: to support U.S. military production and strangle the Soviet economy.

The United States routinely worried that its allies might become economically dependent on its adversary and did what it could to prevent such ties from forming. When European countries and the Soviet Union built a joint gas pipeline in the 1980s, the Reagan administration retaliated with sanctions and even threatened the Europeans with the withdrawal of the U.S. security guarantee.

REIGN OF THE MARKET

By the time the Cold War ended, Washington had already, under the administrations of Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, moved away from economic interventionism. The collapse of the Soviet Union seemed like an unqualified victory for market openness over state planning. The original “Washington consensus” recommended that the state retreat from direct involvement in the economy and embrace the free movement of capital. Multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, demanded radical economic changes in return for aid. Great-power competition seemed a relic of antiquity, and expanding interdependence the wellspring of a better world to come.

The result was that the United States didn’t simply stand by as globalization took hold. It vigorously encouraged it, betting that markets would not just increase prosperity but underpin security, too. A complex and interdependent global economy would mean that war—with all its economic disruptions—would be increasingly unthinkable, and warmongering dictatorships might become more liberal and peace loving as their economies became more free.

The gamble had sharp limits. The United States, after all, never abandoned its goal of military supremacy. But the belief that interdependence depressed the likelihood of conflict allowed U.S. officials to be initially sanguine about the vast increase in global trade, financial flows, and the complexity of supply chains. In their view, the widening and deepening of commercial ties would make the world safer, not more dangerous. Policymakers in the West broadly assumed that economic activities were best handled by private enterprise. Washington liberalized critical infrastructure, and the government looked on with indifference as U.S. telecommunications manufacturers, such as Lucent, were bought out by foreign firms or went under. The Department of Commerce subcontracted the key aspects of Internet regulation to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, a nonprofit incorporated under California law. Governments across the globe increasingly outsourced core national security missions, such as those to do with space flight and satellite technology, to private companies, in the belief that businesses could do such work cheaper and better than could the state.

Biden speaking at a factory in Auburn, Maine, July 2023

Jonathan Ernst / Reuters

They weren’t completely wrong. Markets can indeed do some things better than states. But as Adam Smith, the founder of modern economics, observed in The Wealth of Nations, it was “the first duty of the sovereign” to protect “the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies”; such responsibilities could not just be ceded to the marketplace. Businesses want to maximize profits, not provide loosely defined public goods for the citizens of a particular country.

Over the last few years, the consequences of these decisions have been clear for all to see. The COVID-19 pandemic illustrated how many businesses had failed to become resilient, sending shock waves through global supply chains. Russia took advantage of decades of somnolence in Europe to try to exploit its neighbors’ reliance on Russian gas after the invasion of Ukraine. But Russia also discovered that it, too, was vulnerable: in a matter of days, the United States and European countries cut off access to Russian central bank reserves held abroad.

Markets can provide great flexibility and adapt to shocks over time, but they no longer offer a general alternative to geopolitics as they seemed to in the wake of the Cold War. Indeed, great-power strategy and markets are thoroughly entangled. The United States and China are trapped in a feedback loop of action, counteraction, and hostile suspicion, but their markets are heavily enmeshed. And great-power competition and interdependence are combining to generate new problems. Companies such as the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei could create a global telecommunications infrastructure with Chinese characteristics. The United States and Europe could do to China’s central bank reserves what they did to Russia’s. If China embargoed or attacked Taiwan, disrupting the operations of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the world’s largest producer of semiconductors, the results would affect the entire world economy. Information networks, financial flows, and supply chains fueled explosive economic growth, but they also created new geopolitical vulnerabilities. The United States now has to manage its economic security in a highly interdependent and highly competitive world, where countries are inevitably tempted to exploit the weaknesses of others.

BRAWN OVER BRAIN

Even as the global economy became vastly more complex and more dangerous, the United States’ capacity to understand and manage it eroded. The Cold War version of the U.S. state sought to limit economic exchange with adversaries, and then the globalization-focused version sought to promote it. Now, policymakers have to grapple with interdependence, a vastly more complex task than that faced by U.S. officials in the past.

In the wake of the Cold War, manufacturing logistics were the domain of private industry, not government. Today, official Washington still has little understanding of global supply chains, even though they are critically important to economic security. The U.S. government has conducted reviews of supply chains across four areas it deems critical and has mandated that government departments review risks to relevant supply chains; yet it must rely on incomplete commercial databases and imperfect and nonstandardized information disclosed with great reluctance by private firms. Often, businesses themselves have a limited understanding of their own supply chain vulnerabilities. Even if they know what their suppliers are doing, they do not always have a clear view into the roles of their suppliers’ suppliers.

The United States’ capacity to understand the global economy has eroded.

Furthermore, as the United States seeks to limit China’s ambitions, it has to take complex and uncertain technological risks. The United States has adopted a “small yard, high fence” approach to technology control, with strong measures taken to restrict a limited set of products and techniques. Doing that well, however, requires a degree of surgical precision that would be hard to achieve even with a detailed understanding of the global economy and the likely future paths of innovation. It requires a deep understanding of the sectors involved. But the U.S. government does not have the institutions and structures in place to arrive at such an understanding, which would require gathering extensive market information, making it useful across siloed bureaucracies, and applying it to questions of national security.

Export control legislation passed by the U.S. Congress in 2018 mandated future presidential administrations to focus restrictions on “emerging and foundational technologies” without specifying any particular ones. The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security is seeing substantial budget increases, but it still needs far greater scientific and decision-making resources to implement export controls effectively. Without these resources, it is hard to make more than educated guesses about the future direction of innovation and where chokepoints in the global economy might emerge. Perhaps it makes sense for Washington to hold back China’s ambitions for military artificial intelligence through export controls on specialized semiconductors. But it is also possible that doing so may spark successful indigenous investment in China, allowing Beijing not just to evade Washington but to outrun it.

The United States cannot assume that it is still the global technology leader across the board. In some areas, such as the development of batteries and photovoltaics that are essential for the green economy, China is clearly ahead. That fact leads to difficult decisions. The United States might be tempted to steal a page from China’s playbook and encourage inward investment by Chinese battery technology companies, so that it can learn from and emulate its rival. But such a move might just create new vulnerabilities and dependencies. China could deny the United States access to these technologies, which could pose a major headache.

Such dilemmas require both the application of policy muscle and, crucially, the intelligence to plan for unexpected consequences. Without such preparation, the risk is not just that the United States will make mistakes but that its preponderance of enforcement muscle may overwhelm its capacity to make intelligent decisions. When policymakers need to solve a problem, they usually build on whatever tools they have readily available, creating a feedback loop that short-circuits consideration of whether it might be better to start afresh. The result could then be that as the U.S. security state leans into economics, it overemphasizes those tools of coercion aimed at limiting interactions rather than those aimed at maintaining a healthy economic exchange. And if China and other adversaries respond similarly, as is likely, a mix of miscalculations and overreactions could dangerously imperil the global economy.

HAMMER, MEET NAIL

To understand the risk, consider the recent history of U.S. sanctions, which emerged as a favorite tool during Washington’s so-called war on terror. After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the United States moved to take advantage of the many flaws and vulnerabilities in the global economy to promote its own security. The U.S. government compelled SWIFT, the financial messaging service, to provide it with data on its enemies and gradually deployed dollar power to cut Iran out of the global financial system. As under the Biden administration, these measures depended on old emergency powers and World War II– and Cold War–era institutions, such as the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, which became the heart of U.S. sanctions policy.

These innovations led to some striking early successes, such as bringing Iran to the negotiating table over its nuclear weapons, but at the cost of a deeply worrying long-term dynamic. U.S. achievements were not the result of comprehensive planning but of continual improvisation, as underresourced policymakers adapted existing tools and institutions in a hurry, responding to urgent security needs. Sanctions, in particular, became a go-to solution, paving the way for what might be termed a “sanctions industrial complex” that advocates for ever more sanctions, with the benefit of little strategic thinking.

Some officials, such as Jack Lew, who served as treasury secretary during the Obama administration, worried that the overuse of sanctions might lead to the gradual undermining of U.S. financial power by encouraging countries to work around the U.S. dollar–dominated financial system. But sanctions have just kept expanding and have increasingly become Washington’s security tool of first resort.

Republican members of Congress are already sponsoring legislation to take authority over export controls away from the Department of Commerce and give it instead to the Department of Defense. The risk is that this shift will systematically skew decisions about economic security so that they overemphasize traditional security concerns, which focus on strangling adversaries, and undervalue the more novel aspects of security, such as building up the shared ability among the United States and its allies to coordinate innovative policy. If brawn overwhelms brain on sanctions and export controls, Washington could lose sight of the contributions that innovation, growth, and greater economic opportunity make to securing the United States.

LEARNING FROM OTHERS

Avoiding this scenario will require the U.S. government to create the institutions and capacities necessary for intelligent economic security policy. Luckily, it does not have to do this from scratch and can learn from both the solutions and the difficulties of its closest allies, countries that confront similar questions and have sometimes moved more rapidly to adapt to the new needs of a changing world.

It is no surprise, for example, that Japan has been quick to reorganize its state apparatus in recent years. Despite formidable U.S. pressure to liberalize in the 1980s and 1990s, the Japanese government never fully retreated from maintaining a strong role in economic planning. That helped Japan adapt to Chinese coercion in 2010, when a maritime dispute escalated into a possible crisis as China threatened Japan’s access to rare-earth minerals. The country’s high-tech sector relied on Chinese sources for over 90 percent of its supply, so the government pivoted to domestic seabed extraction as well as trade agreements with alternative suppliers. In just a decade, Japan was able to reduce its rare-earths dependency on China to under 60 percent, offering an example of how diversification can bolster economic security.

As the questions of economic security have grown more acute, Japan has also reshaped its bureaucracy. It appointed its first economic security minister to the cabinet in 2021 and followed up with a new national security strategy in 2022 that made “promoting economic security” a core objective. At the same time, the government passed new legislation, the Economic Security Promotion Act, which gives the administration the legal authority to coordinate an all-of-government effort, backed by a budget of roughly $7 billion, aimed at minimizing supply chain dependencies and promoting innovation in critical sectors. Crucially, the government is interested not just in safeguarding Japan’s security but also in generating economic growth. Because it has dedicated economic security institutions, Japan finds it easier than the United States, which also has passed large subsidy programs, to coordinate its actions to match both domestic economic goals and international security imperatives.

The Japanese government has also looked to protect its economy through global cooperation. At the G-7 summit in Hiroshima in 2023, the group agreed to “work together to ensure that attempts to weaponize economic dependencies by forcing G-7 members and our partners including small economies to comply and conform will fail and face consequences.” Japan, then, played a key role in getting several of the largest economies of the world to start thinking collectively. This, in turn, will help anchor the new U.S.–Japanese–South Korean initiatives that seek to coordinate technology policy in pushing back against China.

Responding to the coming challenges, however, will involve more than reorganizing bureaucracies. The United States needs to build a comprehensive economic security strategy. Sullivan’s speech rightly noted the ways in which economic interdependence has created new security vulnerabilities; he urged building greater resilience to address these weaknesses. U.S. officials, however, have said little about how they plan to do so.

The port of Keelung, Taiwan, February 2023

I-Hwa Cheng / Reuters

Here, U.S. policymakers can learn from the experience of the European Union, whose strengths and weaknesses are nearly opposite to those of the United States. The EU fell harder for free-market doctrine than even the United States did. It had little choice: its founding treaties were built around freedom of movement for goods, services, money, and people; they had little to say about security. Jealous member states prevented the EU’s precursor, the European Economic Community, from building any real national security muscle during the Cold War. Europe invested instead in those areas in which it had authority, creating a powerful economic bureaucracy responsible for its internal market and trade relations.

This combination of strengths and weaknesses led Europe to develop its own approach to economic security. Rather than leaning on Cold War defense authorities that it does not have, the EU has repeatedly repurposed market-building regulations toward new goals. In response to U.S. President Donald Trump’s misuse of sanctions, the COVID-19 shock, and China’s 2022 freezing of trade relations with Lithuania to punish the Baltic country for allowing the opening of a de facto Taiwanese embassy, European officials are turning the machinery of the single market to protect the EU. To map its vulnerabilities, the EU is developing an assessment tool to identify whether particular trade links carry high, medium, or low risks. That will enable the EU to pursue its policy of de-risking by fostering continued trade and exchange in low-risk areas and considering how best to protect itself when it comes to higher-risk ones.

Simply mapping out potential threats in this way makes it less likely that policymakers will slip into a spiral of decoupling, disrupting the world economy by recklessly severing ties with adversaries and rivals. Crucially, this approach assesses not just the risks generated by dependencies but also the risks generated by policy responses. That does not mean the EU will inevitably produce smarter policy; because the EU has little traditional security experience, it may underestimate some risks that straddle the military-economic divide, such as China’s civil-military fusion whereby the Chinese government seeks to unite the research capabilities and resources of its civilian scientific and commercial sectors with its military and defense industrial sectors.

The EU has also responded to mounting economic security threats through new legislation that will allow it to use its common trade policy to punish states that attempt to coerce it. It is also considering strengthening its so-called blocking rules, which would forbid European firms from complying with foreign sanctions to better dissuade hostile actions by others. Again, for better and for worse, the EU is more hesitant to use direct coercion than is the United States. EU officials told us that they hope they will not have to deploy these instruments and that the mere fact of their existence might be a sufficient deterrent. That is likely too optimistic, as deterrents are credible only when others believe that they will be used. The EU will almost certainly have to develop and use more coercion, perhaps changing the EU’s governing treaties to prevent rogue members such as Hungary from vetoing collective sanctions.

All this fits into the EU’s preference for de-risking (managing the risks of continued interdependence) over decoupling (detaching economies from one another as in the Cold War). Similarly, the EU’s new Economic Security Strategy, released in June, does not start from the sorts of traditional national security concerns that have motivated the United States. Instead, the EU strategy emphasizes that societies must prepare for economic shocks in addition to external attempts to exert influence on European economies and curtail the EU’s autonomy. Europe may still use tools such as sanctions and export controls to protect itself, but the emerging strategy could quite as easily direct the EU toward diversification through new trade agreements or subsidies for critical sectors. Like Japan, the EU seeks to reconcile the imperatives of growth and innovation with the needs of security.

REINVENTION, NOT REFORM

Drawing a detailed blueprint for the U.S. economic security state will require a lengthy and difficult debate. Still, Sullivan, Raimondo, and Tai—and those who succeed them—should address three priorities in particular.

Most obviously, the United States needs to set out its own comprehensive economic security strategy. Turning de-risking from a catch phrase to a coherent approach will require a lot of work—work that should be guided by a formal policy document that will send an important signal to the government agencies that will fulfill its mission as well as to the broader public. Different parts of the U.S. government have begun to examine specific policy tools, such as sanctions, even if these investigations have not gone nearly as far as some would like. Integrating these separate elements into a coherent policy will require an all-of-government approach as well as input from concerned parties, including both industry and civil society.

Making changes to carry out that strategy risks creating a bureaucratic morass, as happened when the Department of Homeland Security was created in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Washington will need to get better at collective intelligence and decision-making, shifting authority around appropriately: to this end, the government should consider creating an economic security intelligence apparatus on a par with other intelligence arms of the U.S. government but with a very different mission. At a minimum, the United States needs to properly resource the sorely understaffed Office of Science and Technology Policy, which provides the executive branch with scientific advice, and revive the badly missed Office of Technology Assessment, which did the same for Congress.

Experts on bureaucracy, such as Jennifer Pahlka, have documented how rules and culture undermine the flexibility of the federal government, and senior officials lament how incredibly complex and time-consuming it is even to solicit advice from outside government. These are general problems, but once the government establishes what works and what does not and begins to intervene regularly in the economy, they have urgent consequences. New government powers would also produce new risks to civil liberties. The federal government may struggle to rein in abuses if it builds up its capacities for economic intelligence. A rogue president such as Trump could deploy detailed maps of the economy to help friends and hurt enemies.

To get economic security right, the U.S. government must reinvent itself.

The government also needs to draw on new ideas and new sources of expertise, as do the universities and think tanks that supply Washington with talent. That means hiring fewer economists and political scientists and more people who understand logistics, cybernetics, and material sciences. At a bare minimum, the United States needs to attract more people into government with a deep understanding of supply chains and global finance. In addition to bolstering the parts of the government that already have such experience and talent, such as the Treasury Department, this effort might involve new institutions along the lines of the U.S. Digital Service, which has attracted people from the information technology industry into government, to provide expertise across the different areas of economic security.

Finally, the U.S. government should consider creating an Economic Security Council to mediate between the National Security Council and the National Economic Council while drawing on and building up sources of expertise within the government, including the National Laboratories and the International Trade Commission. That might, in turn, support some more formal apparatus of coordination among policy principals in the various parts of the federal government that touch on economic security. Rather than creating another bureaucratic monstrosity, this should be as small and agile as the National Security Council was originally supposed to be, providing a switchboard to help connect the parts of the government that have an economic security mandate. Alternatively, some members of the National Security Council and the National Economic Council could wear two hats, informally integrating economic and national security discussions.

Such suggestions are only a starting point for debate, but that debate must start now. The Biden administration rightly wants to avoid a world in which the United States and China get drawn into a dangerous process of decoupling. The risk is that existing U.S. institutions may pull the country relentlessly in the direction that it wants to avoid. To get economic security right in a highly interdependent world marked by serious great-power competition, the U.S. government must reinvent itself.

• HENRY FARRELL is the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Agora Institute Professor of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University.
• ABRAHAM NEWMAN is a Professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and in the Department of Government at Georgetown University.
• They are the authors of Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World Economy.

Foreign Affairs · by Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World Economy · October 19, 2023

20. The U.S.-Japanese-Philippine Trilateral Is Off-Balance

Excerpts:

Getting It Right

In light of these considerations, what does an optimal balance in the U.S.-Japanese-Philippine trilateral relationship look like? First, leaders in all three countries should deemphasize overt transactionalism in the trilateral. This means avoiding the perception that Washington’s top priority is locking Manila into a series of agreements that could compromise its freedom of action. Washington is seeking greater basing and overflight rights, and it makes sense for the United States to secure some formal agreements when trilateral relations are at a high point. But there is a risk in overemphasizing the on-paper aspects of the partnership at the expense of building mutual trust.

Second, Washington should join Manila in encouraging Tokyo to play a more prominent role in shaping the dynamics of the trilateral relationship. Japan enjoys a high level of trust in the Philippines — more than any other country, according to several polls. If there are concerns within the United States about certain Philippine defense capabilities or strategies, it seems preferable to cede some leadership to Tokyo rather than defaulting to a U.S.-dominated approach. Indeed, defense experts in Manila frequently stated that while their main desire was for the trilateral to become more Filipino, in the absence of that, a more Japanese-led relationship would also be welcomed.

Finally, all three parties would benefit from focusing future trilateral security cooperation away from a potential conflict over Taiwan as much as is feasible. This specific focus could obfuscate broader, and arguably more universally shared, strategic objectives, including deterrence in the South China Sea, improving the capabilities of the Philippine Armed Forces, and working toward greater trilateral military interoperability. Notably, the June 2023 trilateral Coast Guard exercise and its focus on protecting local fishing rights was widely praised by those I spoke to in Manila. Advancing shared objectives helps reinforce a shared trilateral alignment on regional security. As a result, by subtly shifting the focal point away from Taiwan, all three countries could, somewhat paradoxically, strengthen their deterrence posture vis-à-vis Taiwan.

The U.S.-Japanese-Philippine Trilateral Is Off-Balance - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Ryan Ashley · October 19, 2023

As geopolitical tensions rise in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S.-Japanese-Philippine security trilateral is rapidly emerging as a potentially pivotal defense arrangement. It has already garnered widespread attention and positive headlines in Washington and Tokyo, especially following the grouping’s inaugural meeting of national security advisors and first-ever trilateral Coast Guard exercise in June. Leaders on both sides of the Pacific have stated their desire for this arrangement to take a leading role on security matters in the East and South China Seas, collectivizing efforts to counter aggressive and illegal Chinese behavior.

However, as this trilateral continues to evolve, subtle cracks in Manila’s confidence are emerging. While many of these concerns have yet to appear in ongoing reporting and analysis of the U.S.-Japanese-Philippine trilateral, my field research over the past summer uncovered several points of frustration from Philippine defense leaders and commentators toward the arrangement. Specifically, there are growing concerns in Manila about the country’s ability to maintain an independent relationship with and strategy toward China, about Tokyo’s inclination to defer to Washington on security decisions, and about the unintended weakening of Japanese-Philippine bilateral security ties as a result of the trilateral’s solidification.

A balanced U.S.-Japanese-Philippine security trilateral can address collective security concerns in the East and South China Seas, as well as send a potent deterrent signal to China against any potential ambitions on Taiwan. As a result, getting the balance right matters. An unequally weighted trilateral relationship could, rather than bolstering a collective regional security posture, end up weakening its very premise. By promoting a reduction in overt transactionalism, an amplified role for Japan, and an appreciation for the trilateral’s value beyond Taiwan, all three countries can ensure that this new relationship can effectively meet the challenges facing the Indo-Pacific.

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Old and New Concerns

Complaints of an overbearing or unreliable Washington are nothing new in Manila. For decades, mutual trust in the U.S.-Philippine defense alliance has ebbed and flowed. Relative high points, such as the signing of the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement under President Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino, are often followed by relative low points, such as the drift away from U.S. cooperation during the years of President Rodrigo Duterte. Today, the alliance between the Philippines and the United States appears stronger than at any point in recent memory. Since taking office in June 2022, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has prioritized strengthening the U.S.-Philippine security relationship, a stance perhaps best evidenced by the February 2023 expansion and revival of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which allows the U.S. military access to nine Philippine military bases in close proximity to geopolitically critical flashpoints near Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Compared to the fluctuating U.S.-Philippine relationship, defense ties between Tokyo and Manila have been more consistent, though less deep-rooted. The relationship took a significant turn in 2012 after the Scarborough Shoal incident, which, beginning with Tokyo’s 2013 transfer of Coast Guard vessels, initiated a decade of continuous growth. Even during the Duterte era, Japan and the Philippines strengthened their defense bonds, with Japan increasing its port calls, enhancing bilateral capacity building, and transferring ships and equipment. This steady evolution has culminated in one of Manila’s most trusted security partnerships today.

Yet the extent of Manila’s current concerns became clear to me during my field research in July and August of 2023, during which I conducted a series of interviews with both current and former Philippine defense officials. These individuals were affiliated with prominent institutions including the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, and government-connected think tanks. While the insights garnered might predominantly represent elite opinions, it’s crucial to note that such perspectives are critical to understanding developing security issues like the U.S.-Japanese-Philippine trilateral.

The first widely cited concern by Philippine defense leaders and experts toward the U.S.-Japanese-Philippine trilateral is its potential to limit Manila’s leverage in managing relations with Beijing. The bulk of these concerns come from a perception that America’s and Japan’s main motivations in expanding security relations with the Philippines revolve around Taiwan. The strategic position of the largest and most populated Philippine island of Luzon, located just 250 kilometers from Taiwan’s southern coast, makes the country an appealing partner and optimal location for basing in the event of a conflict. Yet not all leaders in Manila are ready to embrace an American- and Japanese-backed vision of an enhanced military posture in the northern Philippines.

To be sure, there are relevant and strategically critical motivations for the Philippines to be deeply concerned about any Chinese attempt to seize Taiwan, including the safety of the nearly 200,000 Philippine overseas workers on the island. For that reason, some politicians and defense leaders in the Philippines regularly advocate for a stronger stance on the issue. Nevertheless, the debate on a Philippine role in a war over Taiwan is far from settled. There is no consensus in Manila, however rough and ambiguous, on the topic in the manner of those apparently emerging today in Washington and even Tokyo. The closest Manila has come to a statement of military support for Taiwan were vague comments made by the Philippine ambassador to the United States in 2011 that Manila might allow Washington to use bases on its territory “if it is important for us, for our security.” Marcos himself has never shifted from a neutral stance on Taiwan and described his views in an interview: “I learned an African saying: When elephants fight, the only one that loses is the grass. We are the grass in this situation. We don’t want to get trampled.”

Some Philippine politicians have been promoting the idea that Washington is trying to entrap Manila in a future war over Taiwan. However implausible this may seem in Washington, U.S. policymakers should not expect this suspicion to vanish or shift toward more unambiguous support for Taiwan. The United States and Japan should instead acknowledge the intricate balance Manila strives to maintain in its foreign relations. Pushing too hard for a specific stance on Taiwan could strain the strategic partnership and compromise broader regional security goals.

Japan’s Muted Voice

The second concern is based on the perception in Manila that Tokyo tends to defer to Washington on security issues. As a result, Philippine defense leaders stressed to me that any disputes within the trilateral inevitably end with Japan backing American preferences, leaving the Philippines alone in its dissent. This can create a consistent “2+1” dynamic in trilateral forums where Manila is constantly outvoted.

This perception of Japanese deference is likely somewhat overstated, as Japan frequently engages with security partners in Southeast Asia on an independent basis from the United States. Indeed, as discussed above, its relationship with Manila is a prime example of this. Yet the concern has real historical and political roots that cannot be overlooked. Japan’s post–World War II alliance with the United States, coupled with the intricate dynamics of its defense-sensitive domestic politics, has led to a longstanding tendency to align with American preferences on security issues within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. This alignment often involves Japanese politicians using the concept of Gaiatsu or “outside pressure” as a justification for pursuing otherwise controversial security reforms or actions, as seen in the deployment of Japan Self-Defense Forces to Iraq in 2004.

Consequently, from the perspective of the Philippines, Tokyo’s tendency toward deference can make the trilateral partnership with Japan and the United States seem even more American-dominated than its bilateral relationship with Washington. As a result, increasing alignment on security goals between Washington and Tokyo can appear more constraining than reassuring to Manila as trilateral ties deepen.

Trading a Bilateral for a Trilateral?

Finally, interviews with multiple defense leaders and experts in Manila revealed a clear displeasure with the possibility that an expanding U.S.-Japanese-Philippine trilateral could come at the expense of the highly prioritized bilateral defense relationship with Japan itself. The Philippine-Japanese bilateral relationship is deeply important to leaders in Manila who, while seeking a closer defense relationship with Washington, seek to simultaneously diversify their security partners. Indeed, one of the motivations for deepening the Philippine-Japanese defense relationship came after the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident, which is still remembered in Manila as a moment of American unreliability. While the aftermath of the incident resulted in a deepening of bilateral security ties between the Philippines and United States, Manila also responded to its loss of the Scarborough Shoal through a project of expanded defense relations with Tokyo.

It is not clear that Philippine-Japanese bilateral security cooperation has actually slowed as a result of progress in the trilateral relationship. In February 2023, for example, Japan and the Philippines signed a defense agreement enabling future bilateral security cooperation including expanded bilateral exercises and greater access rights for Japan Self-Defense Forces soldiers in the Philippines. Nevertheless, the security relationship with Japan is appealing for Manila precisely because it provides the opportunity to work more closely with a strategically aligned U.S. ally without risking the backlash from Beijing that direct cooperation with Washington would provoke.

So, were this bilateral relationship to be even partially subsumed under an umbrella of a trilateral including the United States, the Philippines would lose one of the primary benefits of working with Japan in the first place. The delicate balance Manila has struck between cultivating its security ties with both Tokyo and Washington allows it to navigate the complex geopolitics of its region while minimizing risks. Given the often volatile nature of U.S.-Philippine security ties, linking them even partially to the much stabler relationship with Tokyo appears risky to Manila.

Getting It Right

In light of these considerations, what does an optimal balance in the U.S.-Japanese-Philippine trilateral relationship look like? First, leaders in all three countries should deemphasize overt transactionalism in the trilateral. This means avoiding the perception that Washington’s top priority is locking Manila into a series of agreements that could compromise its freedom of action. Washington is seeking greater basing and overflight rights, and it makes sense for the United States to secure some formal agreements when trilateral relations are at a high point. But there is a risk in overemphasizing the on-paper aspects of the partnership at the expense of building mutual trust.

Second, Washington should join Manila in encouraging Tokyo to play a more prominent role in shaping the dynamics of the trilateral relationship. Japan enjoys a high level of trust in the Philippines — more than any other country, according to several polls. If there are concerns within the United States about certain Philippine defense capabilities or strategies, it seems preferable to cede some leadership to Tokyo rather than defaulting to a U.S.-dominated approach. Indeed, defense experts in Manila frequently stated that while their main desire was for the trilateral to become more Filipino, in the absence of that, a more Japanese-led relationship would also be welcomed.

Finally, all three parties would benefit from focusing future trilateral security cooperation away from a potential conflict over Taiwan as much as is feasible. This specific focus could obfuscate broader, and arguably more universally shared, strategic objectives, including deterrence in the South China Sea, improving the capabilities of the Philippine Armed Forces, and working toward greater trilateral military interoperability. Notably, the June 2023 trilateral Coast Guard exercise and its focus on protecting local fishing rights was widely praised by those I spoke to in Manila. Advancing shared objectives helps reinforce a shared trilateral alignment on regional security. As a result, by subtly shifting the focal point away from Taiwan, all three countries could, somewhat paradoxically, strengthen their deterrence posture vis-à-vis Taiwan.

Become a Member

Ryan Ashley is an intelligence officer in the U.S. Air Force with extensive operational experience in East Asia and Japan and a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Texas Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs. He is also a lecturer with the Air Force Special Operations School. He has previously published on East Asian security and international relations with War on the Rocks, Nikkei Asia, and The Diplomat.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent those of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Ryan Ashley · October 19, 2023

21. SOCOM wants new targeting tools for urban battles

I am always intrigued by what we can learn from contracting information.

SOCOM wants new targeting tools for urban battles

defensescoop.com · by Jon Harper · October 18, 2023

Special Operations Command is on the hunt for new non-line-of-sight targeting systems to help commandos fight in cities.

In a special notice posted on Sam.gov this week, SOCOM unveiled plans for feasibility studies and rapid prototyping. Program Executive Office SOF Warrior is partnering with the Tampa, Florida-based SOFWERX tech hub on the effort, which may include participants from industry, academia, national labs and other government partners.

The aim is to “develop concepts and components of systems that utilize an open architecture to enable rapid, precise, operator-controlled Non-Line of Sight (Non-LOS) targeting in urban, surveilled environments,” according to the notice.

“Recent battlefield advancements with fixed and mobile sensors are changing the relational dynamic between opposing sides in the close-in fight. Autonomous vehicles and remotely placed sensors have made it very difficult to ingress to and operate in static, fixed locations with Line-of-Sight (LOS) of opposing positions,” it states.

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The envisioned solution is to create new networks of sensors and supporting technologies that enable “virtual” line-of-sight targeting and allow commandos to remain in unexposed positions.

According to the notice, SOCOM is interested in sensors that can provide “unique discriminating data” to assist in obtaining non-LOS targeting solutions, platforms that can help standardize sensor control and data formatting, and potential “collaboration” between a variety of sensors such as radar, electro-optical, infrared, hyperspectral and more.

Other focus areas include data networking (including transport, backhaul and short-range data links), data processing, data visualization, data analytics and artificial intelligence.

For the AI component of networked systems, Special Operations Command is looking for algorithms that can be used to “group, correlate, and synchronize data to build a complete, accurate and actionable picture” for dependable target recognition at the tactical edge. That includes enabling increased identification rates of intended targets, better discrimination of decoys, and the ability to “maintain target lock while maneuvering in 3-D space,” according to the notice.

“In situations in which a human operator cannot maintain direct LOS, targeting data must be obtained, integrated, and validated to ensure the entire situation is fully understood before kinetic action is initiated. This sensor to integration to visualization process for the operator must occur almost instantaneously to take advantage of fleeting opportunities of the close-in fight. There are many commercially driven opportunities that should be investigated, and the myriad of issues must be better understood to develop a complete close-in, non-LOS targeting system. Further, the system should have an open architecture to permit easy technology insertion. This system will rely heavily on Artificial Intelligence and due to its complex nature will need advanced means to evaluate and train with it in many differing scenarios,” per the notice.

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PEO SOF Warrior plans to use the forthcoming feasibility studies and rapid prototyping to look at requirements and conduct technology evaluations, which could lead to contract awards.

Responses to the special notice are due Nov. 8. Following a downselect, feasibility studies or a rapid prototyping event could happen as early as December, according to the notice.

defensescoop.com · by Jon Harper · October 18, 2023

22. The Commander’s Path to Victory: Communication Without Comms

Hmmm.. an interesting read. "Leader vision" versus "manager logic."

Conclusion:

Don’t confuse a good story with the best story. If you do, you’ll exit leader vision for manager logic, searching for more and better data, and becoming passive instead of proactive. Remember, in shifting domains, there are many possible paths to victory. Trust your common sense and take the first good route you see. Your quick initiative will boost the odds of succeeding.

The Commander’s Path to Victory: Communication Without Comms - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Angus Fletcher, Tom Gaines · October 17, 2023

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Here’s the straight dirt: comms wins wars. It dispatches orders, masses fires, updates intel, stops fratricide, coordinates evolving mission sets, and maintains command and control.

Lesson finished, right? Except for one last fact: the enemy knows that comms wins wars. Which is why any near-peer adversary will hunt with violence for our satellite communication systems, tactical datalinks, wireless intercoms, vehicular transceivers, handheld devices, digital terminals, and GPS transponders. And you can bet that despite our most creative countermeasures, the enemy will be effective. Radios will jam. Routers will go haywire. Satellites will fall out of the sky.

Really, then, comms wins wars, but only if allowed to function unimpeded. In a war characterized by contested communications environments, victory will go to the force that adapts best when comms gets hit, punching ugly holes in networks, fragmenting information capacity, and necessitating tighter, intermittent, asynchronous bursts. So, how can we be that winning force? How can we compensate for discontinuous comms and maintain the communication needed for success? By leveraging the decentralized intelligence of individual units to coordinate in blackout via shared understanding of the greater mission. Or, more simply, commander’s intent.

This should be no problem, because commander’s intent is US Army doctrine. But this will in fact be a very big problem because the Army has long struggled to convert this doctrine into practice. We’re good at defining what commander’s intent is—but not so good at explaining how to execute it.

Happily, however, we can improve. We arrived at specific conclusions about how we can improve recently when we combined our experience—one of us is a signal officer with a decade in special operations forces (SOF), while the other is an expert in narrative cognition, the science of how the brain creates plans and communicates them—embedded in high-performing teams across SOF, and studied how they developed and executed commander’s intent. In doing so, we surfaced their tacit knowledge—that is, the root behaviors that drove success but lurked in the subconscious, where soldiers themselves could not perceive or articulate it. We then rendered that tacit knowledge into explicit processes and instructions by translating it into brain-training exercises for underperforming teams. We did not seek to turn tacit knowledge into PowerPoint slides, acronyms, and definitions. Instead, we did what SOF cadre do when they build obstacle courses and shoot houses: develop a practice-based method for instilling better behaviors—after which we tested the method in scientific trials across SOF, conventional forces, and the civilian world.

Here’s what we learned.

The Key

Commander’s intent requires leaders on both ends of the communication. This means leaders are necessary not just for creating and issuing intent but also for receiving and executing it. Only a leader can take intent and translate it into coordinated actions that the commander wants.

So, what’s a leader? A leader is someone who possesses vision. And vision, in turn, is the psychological capacity to create and communicate a story of the future. This is what enables leaders to influence what happens next. And what happens isn’t spreadsheets, probabilities, and other timeless datapoints. It’s temporal: actions and events, causes and effects. It’s a story.

The story nature of vision is why the same brain regions that go active in screenwriters go active when you’re leading. Screenwriters and leaders are both makers of narratives. The difference is that a successful commander brings the narrative into reality by acting on it.

The Mindset

Since commander’s intent requires leaders on both ends, transmitter and receiver, your communication chain must be populated with leaders. And since your communication chain extends throughout your entire organization, all your personnel—from top to bottom—need to be leaders. Everyone must be able to create and communicate stories of what happens next.

This sounds a tall order, but we know that the Army can achieve it precisely because it has achieved it, over and over. The Army boasts a centuries-long track record of creating leaders, from five-star generals to bootcamp privates. There’s just one hitch: the Army can’t say, exactly, how it created all those leaders. The secret lies buried in (you guessed it) tacit knowledge.

Let’s surface that knowledge. What the Army knows, in its bones, is that every one of us is born to lead. Our ancestors evolved in small groups that had to survive in fast-changing environments. At any moment, a fresh member of the pack might be called upon to take charge of a vital task, hatching and sharing a successful plan. The archaic humans who met that evolutionary challenge lived, passing onto us, as our biological inheritance, a brain that has leadership in its DNA.

You might not believe that. You might have seen others—or yourself—struggle to command. But that’s not because some of us missed out on the leader gene. It’s because we’ve been trained out of our biology. Our modern world immerses us, from grade school through professional military education, in logic. Logic is math, memorization, and definitions. It trains managers, because managers (unlike leaders) must be trained, since there are no large bureaucracies in nature. And it’s great that we can be managers. Managers keep standard operating procedures running when life is stable and data plentiful. But life isn’t always stable and data isn’t always plentiful—like, for example, in war. In war, every crack and crevice of operations becomes infused with volatility and fog. Which is why war makes managers confused and hesitant. And why war requires us to switch off classroom logic and switch on vision, awakening the leaders in our primal brains.

Here are three exercises to practice doing so, based on our study of high-performing SOF teams.

Exercise 1: Simplify the Future into One Critical Action and Why

When we embed with effective commanders, we repeatedly hear the same messages. Don’t make it complicated! Forget that long list of tasks! Gather your teams and say: “Here’s the main thing that happened. And here’s the big thing we do now.”

In other words: Leaders deal in stories—simple ones. And commander’s intent is one of those simple stories. It comes, always, in two parts, each reducible to a single sentence. The first part is the one imperative objective, the critical action needed for mission success: Take that hill. The second part is the reason for the objective: To provide cover for that unit below.

In short, commander’s intent is the simplest possible story of what must be done and why.

This story works for two interlocked reasons. First, the initial part of the story (which conveys what must be done) provides absolute clarity of action. Critically, it avoids the problem of dueling priorities—for example, Take that hill, and don’t lose any soldiers. Dueling priorities are two (or more) stories masquerading as one. And they are a command fail. They spawn confusion, shift liability, abandon responsibility, and splinter effect. Dueling priorities are pervasive in the modern military. But they don’t have to be. To purge them, rank your priorities into a strict hierarchy. Decide if the objective is Take that hill, with as little loss of life as possible, or Don’t lose any soldiers, but take that hill if you can. Either way, by confining your story to one critical action, your intent will be precisely clear.

Second, the next part of the story (which conveys why something must be done) allows the leader on the ground to shift the plan in response to circumstance. A leader who arrives on the scene and sees that another hill provides better cover can proceed to that other hill. Likewise, a leader who sees that the unit below has moved on will not need to take any hill at all.

Exercise 2: Break the Master Plan into Specific Stories for Each Team Element

Effective commanders don’t hand everybody the same script. They give each person a precise role by specifying that person’s one critical action in the bigger narrative.

The commander starts by writing the full script, the master plan that will produce success, and then breaks that plan into smaller scripts for the staff, who then display their own leadership by devising even smaller scripts for their subordinates.

Let’s say the master plan is Take that hill, to provide cover for the unit below. That’s the plan solely for the commander, who might tell a subordinate team leader, Put suppressive fire on that hill, so other teams can capture it. The team leader might then tell one of her soldiers, Keep the machine guns supplied with ammo, so that the gunners can continuously maintain suppressive fire.

Each individual script has the same two-part structure: the critical action and why it must be done. The objectives of these scripts stack together to support the commander’s intent—the one critical action in the commander’s master plan.

The more you practice this method, the more effective your organization will get at independently coordinating its individual actions. In effect, it will get better at communicating without comms. Each leader, from top to bottom, will improve at converting commander’s intent into simple stories for the teams below. That will in turn prompt all of these leaders to think more like a commander, making them better at understanding intent from above (or, if necessary, at providing the commander with constructive feedback to eliminate dueling priorities and sharpen intent). And this method will also help subordinates understand what information needs to be passed back up the chain to the commander. Instead of distracting the commander’s attention with news of minor setbacks and surprises, they will only relay intel that directly impacts the critical action, requiring a command-level pivot. If you are thinking that this sounds like commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), that’s because it is. The commander had a script for how the story is going to play out. CCIR is the feedback for the commander to determine if the situation is unfolding according to the original vision, or if the plot has turned.

You will improve at executing operations, and if operations don’t work, you will know that the fault wasn’t a communication breakdown. The thing that needs fixing is the big plan.

Exercise 3: Respond to Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity

The Army has long had a shorthand means of describing situations in which events are turning in ways a commander didn’t anticipate, bending and even breaking the plan: VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity). In such a situation, if you can’t make contact with your commander, you must revise the plan by thinking like your commander. You must communicate without comms.

But first you must make sure that VUCA is actually occurring. Your brain comes equipped with a potent VUCA detector, known as your fight-or-flight response. That response has evolved over millions of years to be exquisitely sensitive to environmental volatility, which fight-or-flight signals by jolting you with aggression or panic. Your brain is not, however, perfect at recognizing VUCA. Sometimes (especially if you’re tired, stressed, or surprised) your fight-or-flight response fires too quickly, pushing you to change the plan when the plan is fine.

To doublecheck your fight-or-flight response, perform the leadership technique of “emotion reset.” We’ve provided detailed instructions in this Harvard Business Review article, but the skinny is this: Remember, vividly, a previous time when you’ve succeeded in a similar situation, telling your brain, We’ve done this before. If your pulse calms when you do this, then you were just imagining VUCA. Stick with the key objective that your commander issued. But if your pulse remains elevated, then VUCA is real. It’s time to review your key objective.

To accomplish that review, recall the second part of your commander’s intent: why you need execute the mission. With that why in mind, activate your leader vision and survey the situation. What’s an effective plan to achieve your commander’s why given the new conditions? What’s a good story you can create and communicate to your team?

Don’t confuse a good story with the best story. If you do, you’ll exit leader vision for manager logic, searching for more and better data, and becoming passive instead of proactive. Remember, in shifting domains, there are many possible paths to victory. Trust your common sense and take the first good route you see. Your quick initiative will boost the odds of succeeding.

That’s the basics of how to win when comms break. We could tell you more. Much more. But you’ve got our intent. You can lead yourself from here.

Angus Fletcher (PhD, Yale) is professor of story science at Ohio State’s Project Narrative. His most recent books are Wonderworks (Simon and Schuster, 2021) and Storythinking (Columbia University Press, 2023).

Lieutenant Colonel Tom Gaines is currently assigned as the ACoS G6 at 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), Fort Liberty, North Carolina.

Special Thanks to Major Nicholas Dockery, Master Sergeant Earl Plumlee, and all the other leaders who participated in our SOF Leadership Project.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. Simone Lara, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Angus Fletcher, Tom Gaines · October 17, 2023

23. Israel Enters the Gray Zone (Book Review)

Excerpts:

On balance, the authors appear rather sanguine (with some caveats) about Israel's efforts to "Target Tehran." It's not hard to understand why. But in this part of the world, there are no permanent victories—only permanent battles. The terrorist assault by Hamas last weekend only underscores this.

Even before the mass murder perpetrated by Hamas, a fascinating debate began to unfold in Israel's security establishment about whether the "Campaign Between the Wars" is a sufficient substitute for a major operation that delivers a crippling blow to the regime, its proxies, and its nuclear program. Expect that debate to heat up after Hamas is neutralized in Gaza. Israel will be looking further downrange.

Israel Enters the Gray Zone

REVIEW: 'Target Tehran: How Israel is Using Sabotage, Cyberwarfare, Assassination—and Secret Diplomacy—to Stop a Nuclear Iran and Create a New Middle East'

freebeacon.com · by Jonathan Schanzer · October 15, 2023

A pitched battle is underway in the Middle East. After a murder orgy perpetrated last weekend by the Iran-backed terrorist group Hamas—one that left more than a thousand people dead—Israel is on a counteroffensive. It's unclear what will be left of Hamas when the guns fall silent. But to understand the headlines, one must first understand the history.

In the 1980s, Iran launched a proxy campaign against Israel, deploying terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas to wage asymmetric wars against the Jewish state. For years, Israel struck back at these proxies while the clerical regime remained safe. Then, about a decade ago, spurred in part by Iran's nuclear advances, Israel began to take the fight to the regime.

Target Tehran by journalists Yonah Jeremy Bob and Ilan Evyatar is the story of Israel's long-overdue gray zone war against Iran. The campaign includes hundreds or possibly even thousands of daring airstrikes in war-torn Syria, where the Iranians have been operating under the fog of war to arm Hezbollah with advanced weaponry. But it doesn't end there. It also includes high-stakes cyberattacks, clever psychological operations, the exfiltration of valuable intelligence, complex military strikes inside Iran, attacks on Iranian vessels out at sea, and more. Many of the targets have been directly tied to Iran's nuclear program, including the assassination of nuclear scientists.

As the Israeli strategy evolved, however, Iran's nuclear program would not be the only target. As former Israeli prime minister Naftali Bennett noted, the goal was to consistently weaken the regime that has consistently called for the destruction of Israel. The goal was to convey to Iran's theocratic leaders, in no uncertain terms, that aggression against Israel would be not only futile. It would also come at a cost.

This resulting body of work, which some Israelis call the "campaign between the wars," has gained the admiration of Sunni Arab nations that historically viewed Israel as an enemy state. One reason for their change of heart: The centuries-old animus between the Sunni states and Shiite Iran is even more acrimonious than the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed, the Arab states slowly came to realize that aligning with Israel, the region's undisputed power, was the best way to hedge against an aggressive Iran.

This epiphany, after more than six decades of futile efforts to boycott or even wage war against Israel, yielded diplomatic breakthroughs in 2020. That was when the administration of Donald Trump brokered landmark normalization agreements between Israel and Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Sudan. Today, the Biden administration thinks it might be able to broker an agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia (although the fate of these negotiations hangs in the balance after the Hamas assault last weekend).

In writing this book, the authors gained access to some of the Mossad's top people. The spy agency has undeniably been a primary player in Israel's shadow war. But, as the authors note, Aman (military intelligence), Unit 8200 (cyber), and other agencies have played important roles, too. Nevertheless, it is Yossi Cohen, the dapper and cunning Mossad director from 2016 to 2021, who emerges as the book's protagonist (probably because he granted the authors more time). His predecessor, Tamir Pardo (2011-2016), earns some credit for the early stages of the gray zone campaign. Meir Dagan (2002-2011) is also justifiably acknowledged as a pioneer of the tactics and strategies deployed in the gray zone. Today, the new Mossad director, David Barnea, continues the fight.

The authors begin the book by describing the 2018 operation that exposed the existence of a secret warehouse outside of Tehran. The facility contained hundreds of thousands of documents with technical details about Iran's march toward a nuclear bomb. After two years of surveillance and planning, the Israelis broke in and spirited out many of those documents, only to reveal their contents and prove that the Iranian regime had been lying for years about the peaceful or civilian nature of their program. As the authors note, it was "perhaps the largest physical heist of intelligence materials from an enemy capital in the history of espionage."

Another chapter is devoted to the 2020 assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the "Robert Oppenheimer of Iran," who was cut down in the town of Absard, 40 miles east of Tehran, by a "remote-controlled, satellite-linked machine" that identified him using facial recognition technology, pumped him full of 13 bullets, and then self-destructed. Unfortunately for Israel and the West, the authors correctly note that Fakhrizadeh "created a network of scientists that will continue his work." This, of course, means that Israel's gray zone campaign must continue, as well.

Yet another chapter explores the "virtual battlefield." Both sides of this conflict have landed their punches in cyberspace. Iran has penetrated the phones of Israeli leaders, hacked Israel's water network, and infected Israeli companies with ransomware. But the Israelis have the edge in cyber, with multiple successful penetrations of the nuclear program, hacking operations that have thrown the Iranian economy for a loop, and psychological operations that have served to rally the Iranian people against their reviled regime. But the authors warn that "Israeli society is much more dependent on technology. Hence, they have … much more to lose." Cyber is therefore a realm to watch closely as the gray zone war drags on.

On balance, the authors appear rather sanguine (with some caveats) about Israel's efforts to "Target Tehran." It's not hard to understand why. But in this part of the world, there are no permanent victories—only permanent battles. The terrorist assault by Hamas last weekend only underscores this.

Even before the mass murder perpetrated by Hamas, a fascinating debate began to unfold in Israel's security establishment about whether the "Campaign Between the Wars" is a sufficient substitute for a major operation that delivers a crippling blow to the regime, its proxies, and its nuclear program. Expect that debate to heat up after Hamas is neutralized in Gaza. Israel will be looking further downrange.

Target Tehran: How Israel is Using Sabotage, Cyberwarfare, Assassination—and Secret Diplomacy—to Stop a Nuclear Iran and Create a New Middle East

by Yonah Jeremy Bob and Ilan Evyatar

Simon & Schuster, 368 pp., $28.99

Jonathan Schanzer, a former terrorism finance analyst at the United States Department of the Treasury, is senior vice president for research at the nonpartisan think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Published under: Book reviews , Espionage , Hamas , Iran , Israel , Middle East , Nuclear Iran , Terror Attack

freebeacon.com · by Jonathan Schanzer · October 15, 2023

24. When it comes to Israel and Ukraine funding, go big and go long

When it comes to Israel and Ukraine funding, go big and go long - Breaking Defense

In this op-ed, retired Army general John Ferrari discusses why Congress needs to pass supplemental funding for Ukraine and Israel, and quickly.

breakingdefense.com · by John Ferrari · October 18, 2023

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III meets with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Tel Aviv, Israel (DoD photo by Chad J. McNeeley)

The House of Representatives remains grasped by chaos, and even when a Speaker is elected, the appetite for Ukraine spending appears to be limited. And yet, writes retired Army general John Ferrari below, Congress needs to find a way to pass a supplemental for both Ukraine and Israel — and make it a big one.

With our government’s dysfunction on full display to the world, war rages in both Europe and the Middle East. To assume our adversaries are not taking note would be foolish: Russia is both continuing its terror in Ukraine while deepening its relationship with North Korea. Meanwhile, China continues to aggressively challenge America’s ability to operate in the international waterways around Taiwan. And the Middle East is on a knife’s edge in what could set off a regional conflagration.

In order to convince Hamas and our state adversaries that we have both the will and capacity to thwart their aggression, Congress should pass, as soon as legislatively possible, an emergency wartime supplemental funding bill of $100 billion.

Yes, that seems like an eye watering figure on paper. But given the coming election year and the slim margins of power within the House, Congress will have one and only one realistic opportunity to pass this emergency funding. Therefore, the dollar amount needs to be sufficient to last until the next Congress is seated in early 2025, and passed without expiration dates tied to its funds.

The White House, at least broadly, seems to be on the same page, with Bloomberg reporting on Tuesday that President Joe Biden is considering a $100 billion supplemental that would cover Israel, Ukraine, some border security and funding for Taiwan. That would be good, but the dollar total isn’t the only part that matters: Congress has to do the right thing in structuring the aid so it is as flexible as possible. Additionally, Congress needs to keep the government funded in three weeks, so a supplemental needs to happen soonest and without brinksmanship, in a bipartisan manner.

We cannot be sure of where our adversaries will strike next or what assistance Ukraine or Israel will need over the next eighteen months, so Congress should appropriate this supplemental into one account, allowing the president to allocate money as necessary. Congress hasn’t traditionally provided the executive branch with this much discretion, but with two wars ongoing and a third war or hostilities involving China or North Korea always on the horizon, the president is in need of this flexibility.

While the president sets policy, Congress appropriates money. And in this case, they can exercise that authority by directing that the funds be spent to deepen the magazines of every single munition in the Defense Department’s arsenal. Oftentimes, the Pentagon only replenishes weapons expended, leaving it time and again reacting to the daily warfighting expenditure reports. Only by buying munitions for ourselves and for our allies to fight multiple wars over multiple years can we rest assured that we won’t run out of ammo before our adversaries run out of willpower. Our risk as a nation is not that we have too many weapons, it is that we have too few. We simply need, immediately, to buy more of everything.

The Pentagon should strive to get the majority of the supplemental’s funds on contract and into the hands of weapons manufacturers within ninety days of the law’s enactment, as unspent money does no good. Although our industrial base remains anemic, the solution to getting it to produce in greater quantities is a series of large contracts over multiple years. Congress, as part of this emergency appropriation, should grant the president with blanket multiyear procurement authority in addition to the funding. This will signal to industry that even when the money is spent, more is on the way. Only with this assurance will industry expand capacity and, more importantly, invest in expanding and retaining its workforce.

Appropriating $100 billion in the face of national deficits that are approaching $2 trillion will be unpopular with many. But that’s exactly the point: It’s a clear signal to our allies and adversaries alike that Congress will not let conflict spiral into another world war, and that even amongst our political dysfunction at home, we remain committed to America’s role abroad.

With Russia and China and the world’s most vicious terrorist organizations banking on America quickly losing interest in waging a long war, it’s also a signal that America won’t cave in fighting a drawn-out conflict. Preparing for a short war is almost the certain way to have a long war; If you prepare for a long war, you have a shot at breaking the will of your opponent early. Accidents, strategic opportunism, and a belief that America will only tolerate one quick war at a time could be the exact ingredients that spark a global conflict. This must be avoided at all costs.

Spending money to win today’s wars and deter future conflicts is money well spent. Congress needs to remember its primary job.

Retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. John Ferrari is a senior nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute think tank. Ferrari previously served as a director of program analysis and evaluation for the Army.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: [email protected]