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Quotes of the Day:
“Consider your origins; you were not made to live as brutes, but to follow virtue and knowledge.”
– Dante
"A slave is one who cannot speak his thoughts."
– Euripides
"The perfect dictatorship would have the appearance of democracy, but would basically be a prison without walls in which the prisoners would not even dream of escaping. It would essentially be a system of slavery, where through consumption and entertainment, the slaves would love their servitudes."
– Aldous Huxley
1. Negotiating with North Korea in the Shadow of Great Power Rivalry
2. South Korea's president calls for more self-reliant military as questions arise about US commitment
3. Curtains for the US-Korea military alliance?
4. Denuclearization of North Korea: No ‘END’ in Sight
5. US Pushes South Korea to Strengthen Self-Reliance
6. South Korea’s APEC Summit: A Test for Lee Jae-myung’s ‘Pragmatic’ Diplomacy
7. Unification Minister: North Korea Among Three Capable of Striking U.S.
8. Editorial: Wartime Control Transfer Should Depend on Reliable War Prevention
9. Seoul awaits U.S. response on revised investment deal: presidential office
10. Lee apologizes over past rights violations in foreign adoption cases
11. How North Korea’s love-hate relationship with English complicates Seoul ties
12. N. Korea's FM vows to bolster diplomatic exchanges, cooperation with China
13. PM voices hope for China's positive contribution to inter-Korean relations
14. North Korea holds public trials for breast augmentation doctors and patients
15. N. Korea seen as preparing for military parade marking party anniv.: JCS
16. Lee calls for crackdown against anti-Chinese rallies
17. ROK activists attempt to send food and supplies to North Korean POWs in Ukraine
18. David Maxwell discusses South Korea's military spending increase, the largest in over 15 years, which supports the goal of developing independent warfighting capabilities and transitioning operational control (OPCON).
19. Fault Lines Daily Summary - October 2, 2025 (Korea "Plus")
20. Why we must take a human rights up-front approach to North Korea
1. Negotiating with North Korea in the Shadow of Great Power Rivalry
Is conventional or traditional negotiating with north Korea even possible? Are we trying to apply international relations theory or a time tests negotiation processes with north Korea while it is doesn't recognize any of those techniques?
Or to put it another way, are we playing chess and north Korea is playing Go/Baduk? Or are we playing by football rules while north Korea using rugby rules. - or no rules at all?
But most importantly, do we have sound assumptions about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime? That must be the only start point for any action toward north Korea.
Excerpts:
North Korea’s radical disarmament proposals remain unrealistic, but they can still challenge allied unity and deterrence. The United States and South Korea must reinforce extended deterrence, coordinate closely with Japan, and carefully manage the China factor to guide Pyongyang toward pragmatic engagement and prevent further destabilization in Northeast Asia.
However, dialogue with North Korea remains essential to manage nuclear risks and to prevent miscalculation that could escalate into conflict. While North Korea has emphasized strategic balance or a balance of power with the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance since the Eighth Party Congress, this strategic balance inherently carries the risk of nuclear escalation, as North Korea exploits such opportunities as a tool of deterrence. Notably, North Korea’s nuclear forces law outlines five conditions for nuclear use. To stabilize this precarious balance until the prospect of denuclearization becomes feasible, sustained dialogue and engagement with Pyongyang are necessary to reduce the risks of nuclear escalation.
Negotiating with North Korea in the Shadow of Great Power Rivalry
Choong-Koo Lee
October 2, 2025
warontherocks.com · October 2, 2025
The United States and South Korea have converged on the idea of dialogue with North Korea. But can it work? Will it?
U.S. President Donald Trump has repeated his intention to meet North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un, while Elbridge Colby, the current undersecretary of defense for policy, expressed support in December 2024 for focusing on “limiting the range of North Korean [intercontinental ballistic missiles].” During the recent U.S.-South Korean summit in late August, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung also asked Trump to play a role in making peace in the Korean Peninsula, including efforts to hold a future U.S.-North Korean summit. The United States and South Korea agreed to pursue the denuclearization of North Korea in a phased manner.
In response, Pyongyang has rejected the phased denuclearization proposal, insisting that an essential condition for negotiation with the United States is its acceptance of North Korea’s status as a nuclear power. After Trump and Lee announced their intention to negotiate with Kim, North Korea began building bargaining leverage by showcasing its modernized missile production capacity and advanced long-range missile technology. On Sept. 4, 2025, Kim also met General Secretary Xi Jinping of China to discuss strategic cooperation on international and regional issues, likely including Xi’s emphasis on peace and stability on the peninsula. These developments could indicate North Korea’s preparation to pursue nuclear arms reduction negotiation with the United States, based on China’s understanding and support. After his return from Beijing, Kim inspected the test of a solid-fuel engine for Hwasong-20, which has a longer range that its predecessors. By extending the range of its intercontinental ballistic missiles, North Korea intends to press America to negotiate on its terms.
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North Korea’s Approaches on Arms Reduction
North Korea advanced pragmatic and gradual arms reduction proposals to the United States when it sought to improve bilateral relations under conditions of great power rapprochement. North Korea’s arms reduction proposals in the mid-1980s exemplified Pyongyang’s pragmatic approach. In July 1987, through a government statement, North Korea proposed a three-phased arms reduction to South Korea, aiming to downsize both militaries to 100,000 personnel by 1991. With this proposal, Pyongyang revealed an incremental approach to the longstanding issue of withdrawing U.S. forces from Korea, arguing that U.S. troops should be withdrawn in accordance with mutual reduction by both Koreas. On Nov. 8, 1988, North Korea repeated the same plan in a more detailed manner, declaring that U.S. forces also should be withdrawn in three years by the end of 1991 — starting from the removal of nuclear weapons in 1989 to the withdrawal of the U.S. ground forces in 1990 and concluding with the withdrawal of U.S. naval and air forces from South Korea.
Moreover, on May 31, 1990, North Korea proposed arms control and disarmament to achieve the gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea and phased closure of U.S. military bases without raising the U.S. Forces Korea issue directly. This phrasing of a “joint effort” of the South and North reflected Pyongyang’s pragmatic stance, in that it did not frame the withdrawal of American troops as a precondition of inter-Korean military dialogue, as it did in earlier proposals.
Even though the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea was unacceptable to the United States and South Korea during the Cold War, the shift from the demand of an immediate pullout to advocating a gradual reduction represented a strategic adjustment of North Korea’s security policy toward the U.S.-South Korean alliance. Against the backdrop of U.S.-Soviet reconciliation at the Reykjavik Summit, this shift indicated that North Korea was testing the possibility of coexistence with the U.S.-South Korean alliance.
On the other hand, North Korea continued to press radical and large-scale demands through unilateral proposals to the United States when Pyongyang primarily pursued the support of allied countries. North Korea’s Cold War behavior illustrates this pattern. Immediately after the Korean War armistice signing, North Korea urged the United States and China to withdraw their forces from the Korean Peninsula simultaneously. As Chinese troops completed their withdrawal by the end of 1958, North Korea criticized the United States for failing to do the same, and continued to demand the immediate and unconditional removal of U.S. forces in Korea. Since the Soviet Union pursued peaceful coexistence with Washington in the late 1950s, Pyongyang’s peace offensive also coincided with Soviet foreign policy and consequent international communist movements around the world.
At the same time, North Korea proposed unilateral concessions by the United States to exploit U.S. domestic political change in Washington. Beyond its traditional demand for the instant and unconditional withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, North Korea also brought the issue of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea to the forefront of its propaganda beginning in 1976. In September that year, North Korea’s official newspaper again argued that the United States should remove all nuclear weapons from the South. This demand was triggered by the initiation of the Team Spirit military exercise that year and heightened tension after the Axe Murder Incident. Pyongyang escalated its call for the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons the following year, aiming to exploit U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s campaign pledge to reduce the U.S. military presence in South Korea and nuclear weapons there. At the Joint Conference of All Political Parties and Social Organizations on Jan. 25, 1977, just five days after Carter’s inauguration, North Korean participants insisted that the United States withdraw all its lethal weapons from the Peninsula to reduce the danger of nuclear war in the region.
Anticipating North Korea’s Future Negotiation Strategy
Although Pyongyang has cautiously signaled interest in dialogue with the United States, its main pillar in foreign affairs has been alliance diplomacy since the Eighth Party Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in January 2021. At the Party Congress, Kim concluded that the external environment required a tough strategy against hostile countries while expanding ties with socialist countries and cooperation with revolutionary and progressive parties. He defined this as his “power for power, goodwill for goodwill” strategy. This approach repeated Pyongyang’s worldview that international affairs are a power struggle between progressive forces and imperialists. The strategy had remained irrelevant in the globalization era. However, the Russo-Ukraine War provided North Korea with an opportunity to revive its military alliance with Moscow. After a September 2023 summit, cooperation expanded from arms trade to the dispatch of North Korean troops. Kim also joined Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing for China’s military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, using the occasion to secure economic cooperation with Beijing, and expressing a desire to expand trade with China at the summit with Xi.
Alongside alliance diplomacy, North Korea pays close attention to U.S. domestic politics. With Trump’s return, the forthcoming U.S. National Defense Strategy is expected to prioritize homeland security, implying optimization of overseas deployments regardless of region. Recalling how it exploited Carter’s campaign pledges, Pyongyang may press the second Trump administration to shift primary defense responsibility to allies, including South Korea.
Like during the Cold War, North Korea is likely to combine appeals to allies with efforts to exploit domestic political shifts in Washington. It may propose sweeping and radical arms reduction measures, portraying U.S. rejection as proof of hostile intent. For example, in July 2016, Pyongyang presented five preconditions for denuclearization of talks: disclosure of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea (though Washington declared their withdrawal in September 1991, and Seoul confirmed their nonexistence three months later), removal of U.S. nuclear bases, cessation of strategic asset deployments, provision of negative security assurances, and declaring withdrawal of U.S. military forces from South Korea. Pyongyang may once again invoke these conditions in future talks as conditions to stop its nuclear weapon development.
If Washington accepts, North Korea may return to negotiations, though outcomes would be limited to a freeze of fissile material production and restrictions on intercontinental ballistic missile range. Still, radical proposals of this sort could strain the U.S.-South Korean alliance and undermine trilateral security cooperation with Japan.
How to Deal with North Korea’s Radical Approach
The United States might perceive that the North Korean request to remove nonexistent nuclear U.S. weapons from South Korea and to withdraw U.S. forces — essential for the defense of South Korea and Japan — as superficially attractive. Trump mentioned the idea of “complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea” during his first presidency, but refrained from pushing the idea, reserving it as “a second-term priority.” Some experts have worried that the second Trump administration would try to make a deal with North Korea at the expense of U.S. forces in Korea. In 2025, Washington was reviewing its overseas force posture with a focus on deterring China, without excluding the possibility of reducing U.S. forces in Korea.
However, the United States should realize that accepting North Korea’s radical and large-scale proposal would cost more than it would yield. Above all, it would undermine irreplaceable alliance cooperation with South Korea. Such cooperation is critical to rebuilding the U.S. naval shipbuilding industry and closing the shipbuilding capacity gap with China. A significant reduction of U.S. forces in Korea would also erode Japan’s confidence in U.S. security commitments in the Indo-Pacific region. In return, Washington could expect at best only a temporary suspension — neither irreversible nor complete — of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
Therefore, Washington should take proactive measures to prevent such demands from alienating its Asian allies. The key to coping with the North Korean suggestion will be close consultation by the United States with Seoul and Tokyo to jointly assess and respond to it.
In particular, accepting the North Korean demand for negative security assurances could undermine extended deterrence for South Korea and Japan. If Washington pledges not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea, it would effectively remove nuclear weapons from the toolkit of U.S. extended deterrence, thereby weakening the expected cost of North Korea’s nuclear use.
When North Korea approaches negotiation with the United States in a confrontational manner, as it is currently doing, reinforcing deterrence and allied cooperation is more efficient than yielding to Pyongyang’s exaggerated disarmament demands. For example, in the case of U.S. homeland security, establishing an integrated system of extended deterrence between Washington and Seoul will be essential to enable a rapid response to North Korea’s nuclear threats. Washington and Seoul can cooperate to detect North Korea’s increasing number of mobile missile launchers and the locations of the systems, and deepen trilateral cooperation with Japan to trace North Korea’s long-range missiles collaboratively. In addition, the three allies will be able to support one another in enhancing missile defense capabilities.
During the Cold War, the United States prioritized defending its alliance with South Korea, treating North Korea’s radical and sweeping disarmament proposals as deceptions preceding further provocations. In the late 1950s, the U.S. government chose to deploy tactical nuclear warheads to the Korean Peninsula rather than responding to North Korea’s demand to withdraw U.S. forces immediately. The Carter administration in the 1970s also retracted the promise to pull out American troops from Korea in response to criticism in Congress and concerns over destabilization of the Northeast Asian security landscape. The Cold War experience suggests that the current U.S. government will likewise need to prioritize security imperatives.
To induce North Korea to adopt a more pragmatic and constructive negotiating posture, it is necessary to highlight Pyongyang’s need to improve relations with Washington. For instance, when the Russo-Ukrainian War draws to a close, Moscow could persuade North Korea to support U.S.-Russian negotiations. In line with the logic of North Korean diplomacy, such support would be interpreted domestically as making improved relations with the United States a legitimate foreign policy goal.
Nevertheless, North Korea may cling to its dogmatic and radical demands, leading to another failure of the U.S.-North Korean denuclearization talks. What follows will largely depend on China’s reaction to Pyongyang’s isolation. If Beijing pursues denuclearization of North Korea on the basis of its long history dialogue with Washington, the trajectory of the Korean Peninsula will differ significantly from a scenario in which China instead restores its traditional ties with North Korea to preserve its buffer zone. Xi stated that the Chinese Communist Party and government attached “great importance to the traditional friendship between China and the [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea].” Should this stance continue while Russo-North Korean ties weaken, cooperation between Beijing and Pyongyang will likely experience a resurgence. In this scenario, North Korea could persist in its nuclear weapon development policy with diplomatic and economic support from China. To prevent unchecked proliferation by Pyongyang, Washington and Seoul must also address the China factor.
Peace and Stability?
North Korea’s radical disarmament proposals remain unrealistic, but they can still challenge allied unity and deterrence. The United States and South Korea must reinforce extended deterrence, coordinate closely with Japan, and carefully manage the China factor to guide Pyongyang toward pragmatic engagement and prevent further destabilization in Northeast Asia.
However, dialogue with North Korea remains essential to manage nuclear risks and to prevent miscalculation that could escalate into conflict. While North Korea has emphasized strategic balance or a balance of power with the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance since the Eighth Party Congress, this strategic balance inherently carries the risk of nuclear escalation, as North Korea exploits such opportunities as a tool of deterrence. Notably, North Korea’s nuclear forces law outlines five conditions for nuclear use. To stabilize this precarious balance until the prospect of denuclearization becomes feasible, sustained dialogue and engagement with Pyongyang are necessary to reduce the risks of nuclear escalation.
BECOME A MEMBER
Choong-Koo Lee, Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses. His research has covered North Korea, U.S.-Chinese relations, and the impact of emerging technologies on security and defense. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official positions of the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses or the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea.
Image: Midjourney
warontherocks.com · October 2, 2025
2. South Korea's president calls for more self-reliant military as questions arise about US commitment
It is painful to read that the US commitment is suspect.
And there is no such thing as a transfer of wartime OPCON.
South Korea's president calls for more self-reliant military as questions arise about US commitment
AP · HYUNG-JIN KIM · October 1, 2025
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — South Korea’s president vowed Wednesday to sharply increase defense spending and build a more self-reliant military, as U.S. President Donald Trump’s “ America First” agenda raises questions about the U.S. security commitment to its Asian ally.
A tariff war instigated by Trump’s administration and his transactional approach to security threaten to erode many South Koreans’ trust in the U.S. There are concerns that he may demand much higher South Korean payments for the U.S. military presence in the country or possibly downsize America’s military footprint to focus more on China.
In an Armed Forces Day ceremony Wednesday, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung described the South Korea-U.S. military alliance as “solid” and didn’t mention any concerns about Trump’s policies. But he repeatedly stressed an intention to build a strong military that can independently defend the country from external threats.
“We should move toward a strong, self-reliant defense, based on our pride and confidence in our military power,” Lee said. “To ensure peace and prosperity for the Republic of Korea, we must not depend on anyone else but strengthen our own power.”
Building a more independent military
To boost a self-reliant defense posture, Lee said his government would increase next year’s defense spending by 8.2% to introduce advanced weapons systems like AI combat robots, autonomous drones and precision-guided missiles.
The government will also actively foster the defense industry and improve soldiers’ welfare by upgrading their service conditions and compensation systems, he said.
Lee, a liberal who espouses greater peace on the Korean Peninsula, made no direct mention of North Korean military threats and may have been attempting to avoid provoking the country, though he said South Korea’s spending on defense is 1.4 times more than North Korea’s gross domestic product. Bolstering South Korea’s military readiness would clearly be aimed at increasing deterrence against potential aggressions from North Korea, which has nuclear weapons.
The North recently has repeatedly rejected Lee’s overtures, though it signaled interests in restoring diplomacy with Trump.
A weakening of the U.S. security commitment could seriously shake South Korea’s security as it has no nuclear weapons and is under the so-called U.S. “nuclear umbrella” protection, which guarantees a devastating American response in the event of an attack on its ally. The U.S. has about 28,500 troops in South Korea.
Transferring wartime operational control
A potentially sensitive issue for the alliance is an implementation of a previous agreement to transfer wartime operational control of the allied forces to a binational command led by a South Korean general with a U.S. deputy. The commander of the U.S. forces in South Korea currently has wartime operational control of South Korea’s military.
Many South Koreans view reclaiming their own military’s wartime operational control as a matter of national sovereignty but others worry that would result in loosening of the alliance. Some observers say the Trump administration would use the transfer as a way to reduce spending and concentrate on China but it would still want to maintain influence on the Korean Peninsula.
Elbridge Colby, Trump’s undersecretary of defense for policy, said at his Senate confirmation hearings in March that he would carefully review the “delicate issue” of transferring wartime operational control.
“I believe that President Trump’s vision of foreign policy involves empowering capable and willing allies like South Korea, and thus I support efforts to bolster South Korea’s role in the alliance,” Colby said.
Colby provided more detailed comments in a 2024 interview with Yonhap news agency.
“South Korea is going to have to take primary, essentially overwhelming responsibility for its own self-defense against North Korea because we don’t have a military that can fight North Korea and then be ready to fight China,” he said.
Lee reaffirmed his support of the transfer Wednesday.
“The Republic of Korea will lead a joint defense posture with Washington by regaining the operational control based on firm ROK-U.S. alliance,” Lee said. “Solid combined defense capability and posture will not only bring peace and stability to the Korean Peninsula but also contribute to the region’s stability and shared prosperity.”
AP · HYUNG-JIN KIM · October 1, 2025
3. Curtains for the US-Korea military alliance?
Yes we are at an inflection point. But it does not have to be a negative outcome. The key is an effective and robust alliance modernization plan.
Both countries need the alliance. We just need the alliance to be properly constructed and positioned to support our mutual interests.
Excerpts:
The critical question now is what “solid” truly means: continued reliance on the United States, or the consolidation of an independent Korean power capable of shaping its own destiny. All signs increasingly point to the latter.
An era of independent Korean military power – capable not only of defending its own borders but also of assuming a more prominent role in regional security – is on the horizon.
Regional actors such as Japan, India and Australia would do well to take note of these underlying shifts in Korean strategic thinking and adjust their policies accordingly, as the emergence of a more autonomous South Korea is likely to reshape the Indo-Pacific’s security architecture.
For decades, the alliance was the anchor of South Korea’s survival. Today, it may be the constraint that prevents Seoul from realizing its full potential as a sovereign actor.
The beginning of the end of the US–Korea military alliance is not about rupture or betrayal. It is about evolution – an alliance gradually yielding to autonomy, and a nation preparing, at last, to stand on its own.
Curtains for the US-Korea military alliance? - Asia Times
asiatimes.com · Lakhvinder Singh · October 2, 2025
The US–Korea military alliance, forged in the crucible of the Cold War, has long been regarded as one of the most resilient and indispensable pillars of East Asian security.
Since the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953, the alliance has not only deterred war on the Korean Peninsula but also anchored America’s strategic posture in Northeast Asia. Yet recent political developments in both Washington and Seoul raise the sobering question of whether the alliance is nearing a historic inflection point.
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s Armed Forces Day speech, delivered with all the symbolic weight such an occasion demands, reaffirmed the “solidity” of the alliance with Washington.
But embedded within his rhetoric was a powerful subtext: a call for South Korea to build a strong, self-reliant military capable of standing on its own in a volatile region. In hindsight, Lee’s words may be remembered as the beginning of the gradual unraveling of a partnership that has defined East Asian security for more than seven decades.
The Trump shock
At the heart of this emerging transition lies the shifting nature of US foreign policy under President Donald Trump’s “America First” agenda. For decades, Washington presented itself as a consistent and reliable security guarantor.
But Trump’s transactional approach to alliances – marked by tariffs, repeated threats to withdraw US troops and demands for dramatically higher host-nation support – has shaken confidence in America’s staying power.
In Seoul, anxiety is growing that Washington may one day downsize its 28,500-strong troop presence or dilute its commitment to the “nuclear umbrella” that deters North Korean aggression.
Unlike its northern adversary, South Korea lacks nuclear weapons and has depended for generations on the credibility of US extended deterrence. However, the perception that Washington’s resolve is increasingly contingent on financial contributions and its global competition with China has eroded public trust.
For many South Koreans, Trump’s approach marks a stark departure from the alliance’s founding principles of mutual sacrifice and shared security, introducing an element of doubt that may prove difficult to overcome.
Stressed alliance
The constraints facing Seoul go well beyond trade and North Korea. On issue after issue, Washington has pressed South Korea in ways that suggest an alliance increasingly skewed toward US strategic and economic interests, with little regard for Seoul’s domestic and security dilemmas.
Washington’s insistence on sharply increasing Seoul’s financial contributions to maintain US forces in Korea has been a major flashpoint. Demands as high as $10 billion annually have been floated, a figure that would impose a crushing burden on an economy projected to grow less than 1% this year.
US officials cite NATO’s 5% of GDP benchmark for defense spending as precedent. Yet this comparison ignores the vastly different geopolitical and economic realities South Korea faces. For Washington, the imperative is to cut costs and extract more from allies; for Seoul, it is a question of economic sustainability.
Another contentious issue is Washington’s push for “strategic flexibility” – the right to redeploy US forces stationed in Korea to other theaters, such as Taiwan or the South China Sea. For South Koreans, this raises profound sovereignty concerns and risks entangling the nation in conflicts unrelated to its core security interests.
The possibility of being drawn into a Taiwan crisis is particularly alarming, given that China is one of South Korea’s largest trading partners and holds direct leverage over North Korea. If South Korea were dragged into a military confrontation with Beijing, the peninsula could once again become the frontline of a much larger regional conflict.
The 2015 bilateral nuclear energy agreement, which bars Seoul from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent fuel, has also become a point of contention. South Korea has quietly pushed greater autonomy over its nuclear energy program, citing concerns over energy security and the pursuit of technological advancement.
Yet US resistance remains firm, even as North Korea has become a fully fledged nuclear power. Washington’s unwillingness to accommodate Seoul’s legitimate energy needs is perceived by many Koreans as hypocritical and patronizing – unbecoming of an equal partnership.
Trade relations between the two allies remain fraught. Washington continues to press Seoul for trade concessions, demanding greater Korean investments in the United States, expanded market access for American firms, tighter intellectual property protections and limits on South Korea’s industrial subsidies.
If fully met, including a Trump demand for $350 billion worth of Korean investments in the US, could weaken Seoul’s competitiveness amid structural stagnation, widening inequality and demographic decline. For many in Seoul, this pattern reinforces the perception that the alliance has become a vehicle for advancing Washington’s agenda at Korea’s expense.
Taken together, these pressures illustrate the narrowing policy space available to Seoul under the current alliance framework.
Turn toward autonomy
President Lee’s call for greater self-reliance is significant. His announcement of an 8.2% increase in defense spending, raising the budget to 66.3 trillion won ($47.1 billion) and prioritizing AI-driven combat systems, autonomous drones and precision-guided missiles, conveys not just ambition but strategic necessity.
Lee’s declaration that South Korea must “not depend on anyone else but strengthen our own power” is a clear articulation of strategic autonomy – a goal long pursued by Korean leaders but consistently constrained by reliance on American protection. By emphasizing indigenous capabilities, Seoul is positioning itself for a future in which external guarantees may no longer be dependable.
Equally consequential is Lee’s push to complete the long-discussed transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the US commander to a Korean-led joint command. While often portrayed in Washington as a technical matter, for South Koreans it is a profound question of sovereignty.
The symbolism of reclaiming wartime command authority – after decades of foreign control – cannot be overstated. For critics, OPCON transfer risks undermining deterrence. For supporters, it represents the maturation of the Korean state into a fully sovereign power.
The contradiction at the heart of the alliance is now starkly apparent. Both Trump and Lee speak of maintaining a “solid” alliance, yet their actions chart divergent trajectories.
Trump seeks to reduce US entanglements and shift burdens onto allies, while Lee seeks to reclaim sovereignty and avoid overdependence. Ironically, though driven by different motivations, their policies converge in practice: a gradual loosening of the alliance masked by the rhetoric of solidarity.
This dynamic raises profound questions about the future: Will the alliance evolve into a looser partnership focused on coordination rather than command?
Will South Korea’s pursuit of self-reliance clash irreparably with US efforts to integrate Korean forces into its Indo-Pacific strategy against China? Or will the two nations reconcile sovereignty with solidarity, redefining the alliance for a new era?
A more unsettling possibility is that mounting stress within the alliance could eventually push South Korea to consider the unthinkable – distancing itself from Washington and, under certain conditions, moving closer to Beijing’s strategic orbit.
The long goodbye?
It would be premature to declare the US–Korea alliance dead. The two nations still share vital interests, from deterring North Korea to maintaining stability in East Asia.
The alliance’s institutional architecture – joint exercises, intelligence-sharing and defense-industrial cooperation – remains robust. Moreover, the presence of nearly 30,000 American troops on South Korean soil is not easily dismantled.
Yet history may record this moment as the start of a deliberate transition – from dependency to autonomy, from unquestioned alliance to pragmatic partnership.
Facing demographic decline, economic stagnation and mounting security pressures, South Korea can no longer afford to stake its survival entirely on the reliability of a partner whose priorities are increasingly elsewhere.
President Lee’s words captured both the challenge and the aspiration: “Solid combined defense capability and posture will not only bring peace and stability to the Korean Peninsula but also contribute to the region’s stability and shared prosperity.”
The critical question now is what “solid” truly means: continued reliance on the United States, or the consolidation of an independent Korean power capable of shaping its own destiny. All signs increasingly point to the latter.
An era of independent Korean military power – capable not only of defending its own borders but also of assuming a more prominent role in regional security – is on the horizon.
Regional actors such as Japan, India and Australia would do well to take note of these underlying shifts in Korean strategic thinking and adjust their policies accordingly, as the emergence of a more autonomous South Korea is likely to reshape the Indo-Pacific’s security architecture.
For decades, the alliance was the anchor of South Korea’s survival. Today, it may be the constraint that prevents Seoul from realizing its full potential as a sovereign actor.
The beginning of the end of the US–Korea military alliance is not about rupture or betrayal. It is about evolution – an alliance gradually yielding to autonomy, and a nation preparing, at last, to stand on its own.
asiatimes.com · Lakhvinder Singh · October 2, 2025
4. Denuclearization of North Korea: No ‘END’ in Sight
The unbridgeable gulf can only be crossed with change inside north Korea that leads to unification.
Unification first, then denuclearization.
Execepts:
This divergence crystallizes the paradox facing the peninsula: Seoul sees coexistence as the path to peace, while Pyongyang sees coexistence as the obstacle to peace. For Lee, END embodies hope; for Kim, it marks an illusion.
The back-to-back speeches and subsequent nuclear inspection leave little doubt about North Korea’s trajectory. Kim’s categorical rejection of denuclearization, his accusations of Seoul’s hidden ambitions, and his acceleration of nuclear programs converge on a single point: the END initiative faces its own “end” before it has even begun.
Lee sought to revive dialogue with assurances of respect, restraint, and coexistence. Yet Kim’s words underscored a diametrically opposed worldview: peace is guaranteed by nuclear force, security through deterrence, and eventual unification only through the disappearance of the other.
The gulf remains unbridgeable. For policymakers in Seoul and beyond, the conclusion is sobering: there is, as yet, no “END” in sight. As Kim himself declared, “denuclearization is absolutely impossible for us … not now and not ever.”
Hopes of building peace under the new Lee administration have already been dashed. It is time to return to the drawing board and craft a fresh policy approach capable of drawing the North Korean leadership back to the negotiation table. Persisting with the current framework – tying denuclearization to normalization – will only prove a futile exercise. The sooner the Lee administration recognizes this reality, the better it will be for the Korean Peninsula and the stability of the wider region.
Denuclearization of North Korea: No ‘END’ in Sight
Based on recent speeches by top leaders, a profound and unbridgeable gulf between the two Koreas continues to define the peninsula.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/10/denuclearization-of-north-korea-no-end-in-sight/
By Lakhvinder Singh
October 01, 2025
Credit: Depositphotos
The speeches of South Korean President Lee Jae-myung at the United Nations General Assembly on September 23 and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at the Supreme People’s Assembly on September 21 reveal a profound and unbridgeable gulf that continues to define the Korean Peninsula. Both leaders invoked the language of peace, but their visions proved not only divergent but fundamentally irreconcilable.
Lee Jae-myung’s Vision: END as a Pathway
Lee’s remarks in New York projected cautious optimism and principled pragmatism. He presented what he called “a new journey toward a Korean Peninsula of peaceful coexistence and joint prosperity.” This framework was grounded in three assurances meant to reassure Pyongyang: “The Republic of Korea will respect the other side’s system, will not pursue any form of absorption-based unification, and has no intention of hostile acts.”
The initiative’s essence was captured in the acronym END: Exchange, Normalization, Denuclearization. According to Lee, lasting peace would require building trust step by step. On the nuclear issue, he laid out a phased roadmap: “suspension of nuclear and missile capability advancement,” then nuclear reduction, and finally dismantlement.
To give the plan credibility, Lee pledged external support: “We will actively support and cooperate with efforts to normalize relations between North Korea and the international community, including the United States.” His message was clear – denuclearization should not be seen as unilateral surrender but as part of a structured bargain tied to normalization.
Kim Jong Un’s Rebuttal: Absolute Rejection
Yet even before Lee spoke, North Korea had already rejected his idea. Kim’s speech at the Supreme People’s Assembly was categorical and scornful. He ridiculed the phased approach Lee promoted: “Recently they came up with the idea of ‘phased denuclearization,’ which has led to the destroying with their own hands of the justification and foundations for negotiation with us.”
Kim dismissed the proposal as a recycled failure: the “so-called ‘suspension-reduction-denuclearization,’ is nothing other than a copy from the ‘workbook’ of his predecessors who dreamed of disarming us.” For Kim, dismantling his nuclear arsenal was not a point for negotiation but a betrayal of North Korea’s sovereign survival strategy.
Kim rejected outright the sanctions-for-denuclearization bargain: “For what should we turn to ‘denuclearization’? To avoid sanctions? Never. Never ever. I say ‘denuclearization’ is the last, last thing to expect from us.”
Whereas Lee’s END initiative assumed Pyongyang’s willingness to pursue gradual disarmament, Kim dismissed the very premise.
Nuclear Recognition, Not Denuclearization
Yet Kim’s stance was not total isolationism. He signaled conditional openness to dialogue, but on radically different terms than those offered by Lee. Instead of denuclearization, he suggested arms control – premised on recognition of North Korea as a legitimate nuclear state.
Kim’s olive branch was directed not to Seoul but to Washington, and specifically to U.S. President Donald Trump: “If the United States, freeing itself from its absurd pursuit of other’s denuclearization and recognizing the reality, wants genuine peaceful coexistence with us, there is no reason for us not to come face to face with it. Personally, I still have a good memory of the current US President Trump.”
By invoking nostalgia toward Trump while excluding Seoul, Kim underscored his calculation: North Korea seeks bilateral engagement with Washington, bypassing South Korea entirely. As he put it: “We have no reason to sit together with it [South Korea] and will do nothing together with it. I make clear that we will not deal with it at all.”
This statement undercut the very foundation of Lee’s END initiative. For Pyongyang, coexistence with Seoul is not a path to peace but a conceptual impossibility. Kim stressed: “The reunification of the two entities, which have become completely heterogeneous and mutually exclusive, can never be achieved unless one of them ceases to exist.”
He went further, accusing Seoul of duplicity:
The recently formed Lee Jae Myung government of [South Korea] is advocating a ‘line of compromise’ with us, talking about ‘improvement of relations’ and ‘peace,’ in a bid to make a distinction between it and its preceding governments. But nothing has changed substantially. In view of its wild ambition for ‘unification by absorption,’ it puts in the shade its preceding vicious “conservative” regimes, which set the anti-[North Korea] policy as a state policy.
Thus, Lee’s premise of mutual respect collided with Kim’s view that difference itself is intolerable.
The Immutable Nuclear Line
Kim’s rejectionism extended beyond rhetoric. On September 26, only days after his Assembly speech, he convened a high-level meeting with scientists and technicians from the nuclear weapons institute. The participants and venue made priorities clear. According to state media, Kim guided an “important consultative meeting on nuclear material production and nuclear weapons manufacturing.”
He reviewed progress on the “2025 capacity expansion plan for the nuclear material production sector,” expressing satisfaction that “thanks to the thorough implementation of two major tasks set forth by the [Workers’] Party’s new strategic line … the key links in enhancing the nation’s nuclear capability had been completely solved.”
The signal was blunt: North Korea is not merely sustaining its nuclear program but accelerating it. Kim declared that “steadily growing nuclear technological strength and enhanced capabilities of the country” provide both “a reliable guarantee for the struggle of our people, the victorious advance of our cause, and the security of our future.”
Nuclear Force as the Guarantee of Peace
In both his Assembly address and subsequent inspection, Kim reiterated a consistent logic: peace is guaranteed not through dialogue but through strength. He insisted that “the logic of maintaining peace and ensuring security by force – centered on strong deterrence, that is, nuclear force – is our immutable position.”
For him, nuclear weapons are not bargaining chips but the foundation of survival: “Continuing to advance the nation’s nuclear response posture is the top-priority task essential under the current security environment of the Republic, the most accurate choice for the present and the future of the state, and an unchangeable duty that we must uphold.”
He reinforced this doctrinal line: “We must constantly sharpen and modernize the nuclear shield and sword that reliably guarantee the sovereignty, security, interests, and right to development of the state.”
Kim pledged state support for the sector: “The Party and the state will provide and prioritize all possibilities and conditions necessary for the sustainable development of the nuclear technology sector.” He urged scientists to internalize the Workers’ Party’s line: “All nuclear technology experts must deeply recognize the essence of the Party’s line on strengthening nuclear capabilities.”
He even linked nuclear achievements to political milestones, calling on scientists to “greet the 9th Congress of the Party with outstanding research results and brilliant achievements in production.” His directive was clear: North Korea must “ceaselessly advance the nation’s self-defensive nuclear capabilities.”
The “END” at the Beginning
The contrast between Lee and Kim could not be sharper. Lee offers coexistence, gradualism, and phased denuclearization. Kim rejects dialogue, insisting on nuclear expansion and the doctrine of deterrence. Lee’s END – Exchange, Normalization, Denuclearization – is designed to open doors. Kim’s categorical assertion that “denuclearization is absolutely impossible for us” slams those doors shut.
This divergence crystallizes the paradox facing the peninsula: Seoul sees coexistence as the path to peace, while Pyongyang sees coexistence as the obstacle to peace. For Lee, END embodies hope; for Kim, it marks an illusion.
The back-to-back speeches and subsequent nuclear inspection leave little doubt about North Korea’s trajectory. Kim’s categorical rejection of denuclearization, his accusations of Seoul’s hidden ambitions, and his acceleration of nuclear programs converge on a single point: the END initiative faces its own “end” before it has even begun.
Lee sought to revive dialogue with assurances of respect, restraint, and coexistence. Yet Kim’s words underscored a diametrically opposed worldview: peace is guaranteed by nuclear force, security through deterrence, and eventual unification only through the disappearance of the other.
The gulf remains unbridgeable. For policymakers in Seoul and beyond, the conclusion is sobering: there is, as yet, no “END” in sight. As Kim himself declared, “denuclearization is absolutely impossible for us … not now and not ever.”
Hopes of building peace under the new Lee administration have already been dashed. It is time to return to the drawing board and craft a fresh policy approach capable of drawing the North Korean leadership back to the negotiation table. Persisting with the current framework – tying denuclearization to normalization – will only prove a futile exercise. The sooner the Lee administration recognizes this reality, the better it will be for the Korean Peninsula and the stability of the wider region.
Authors
Guest Author
Lakhvinder Singh
Dr. Lakhvinder Singh is a Seoul-based scholar and policy analyst specializing in India–Korea relations, Indo-Pacific security, and global governance. He serves as director of the Department of Peace and Security Studies at the Asia Institute. With doctorates in Korean Studies and International Politics, Singh has published extensively on geopolitics, technology, and economic strategy.
5. US Pushes South Korea to Strengthen Self-Reliance
There can be a positive perfect storm if we undertake a substantive alliance modernization process.
But it pains me to read the words in this excerpt:
Through all these actions, the Trump administration clearly demonstrated that South Korea is no longer a valued U.S. ally but only a foreign state that Washington seeks to extract money from – as much as possible.
The increasing economic pressure, highlighted by the soaring tariff burden and disproportionate investment demands, makes one thing clear: South Korea must actively dismantle its reliance on the U.S. market. The strategic shift must center on aggressive market diversification. Seoul needs to pivot its focus toward high-growth regions like Southeast Asia and India, while simultaneously deepening trilateral economic cooperation with East Asian neighbors such as China and Japan. Furthermore, Seoul must prioritize securing trade access across the globe, including expanding penetration into the European market. Assuming that Trump would continue demanding South Korea to make more investments in the U.S., South Korea’s economic stability now depends on its ability to forge robust and self-sustaining trade relationships independent of Washington’s capricious policies.
Lastly, the anti-U.S. sentiment stemming from Trump’s transactional diplomacy has profound implications for South Korea’s security posture. Trump has repeatedly demanded that South Korea pay more for the stationing of the 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea, including its annual budget for defense. His reckless behavior and consistent demands for increased defense contributions have created a crisis of confidence that the U.S. might not protect South Korea if North Korea threatens to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile toward the mainland of the U.S.
For many South Koreans, this fear has reignited a critical domestic debate: self-reliance in the face of nuclear threat. With North Korea already possessing nuclear weapons, the priority for a growing segment of South Koreans is shifting from relying on the U.S. extended deterrence to securing an independent nuclear capability.
Regardless of Lee’s hope to construct peace on the Korean Peninsula without seeking to develop nuclear weapons, Seoul may face unbearable demands from the public over nuclear development unless Washington’s gesture toward Seoul remains truly “ironclad.”
US Pushes South Korea to Strengthen Self-Reliance
Amid the formation of the China-North Korea-Russia coalition, South Korea is now facing unexpected challenges created by its own ally.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/us-pushes-south-korea-to-strengthen-self-reliance/
By Mitch Shin
September 30, 2025
U.S. President Donald J. Trump visits with President Lee Jae-myung of South Korea in the Oval Office, Aug. 25, 2025.
Credit: Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok
Since the end of World War II, the United States has been the most powerful country in the world. It took the lead in setting up the current rules-based international order, and its power further strengthened in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite the new era of great power competition with China, the United States’ global influence is still unmatched, even if the gap has narrowed considerably.
South Korea, one of the key allies of the U.S. in East Asia, has pinned its own security to the power and influence of the United States since the 1950-53 Korean War. Enhancing the level of bilateral relations between the two countries has been the top priority for every South Korean president. This unwavering focus is reflected in the economic sphere as well. As of 2024, the U.S. is nearly on par with China as South Korea’s top export destination, accounting for 18.7 percent of total exports, just shy of China’s 19.5 percent.
Given how U.S. President Donald Trump has treated South Korea since he returned to the White House, however, South Koreans now believe that the U.S. may not be on their side.
In late July, two days before the deadline set by Trump to impose a 25 percent levy on all goods imported from South Korea, Seoul and Washington reached a deal to decrease the tariff rate to 15 percent. Seoul was under pressure to reach a deal with the U.S., as the European Union and Japan had already succeeded in lowering the levy.
Yet despite Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s confirmation of the deal, months later the two countries seemed to have been still negotiating over a key part of the deal – Seoul’s investment of $350 billion in the United States. According to an interview with foreign press ahead of his visit to New York last week, Lee said that he would be impeached should he accept the deal offered by the Trump administration.
Washington is reportedly demanding that South Korea hand over the $350 billion to the U.S. “in cash.” South Korean leaders have rejected this out of hand as unrealistic. Lee said the South would face another financial crisis like the one suffered in 1997 should it accept Trump’s demand.
It is understandable for the the Trump administration to demand that South Korea make investments to revive some devastated sectors of the U.S. economy such as ship building, considering the sacrifice of the U.S. troops made during the Korean War and its economic assistance to South Korea for the past decades, which was one of the main backgrounds for the South’s rapid economic development. However, Trump’s consistent demands for Lee to accept this unrealistic deal has clearly engendered anti-U.S. sentiment. Many South Koreans believe the U.S. is now extorting South Korea, not trying to reach a reasonable agreement.
Trump’s reckless behavior hasn’t helped. Hours before having a summit meeting with Lee on August 25, the U.S. president posted on Truth Social, saying “What is happening in South Korea? It looks like a purge or revolution.” His post bolstered the baseless accusations of far-right extremists in South Korea who believe that Yoon Suk-yeol, the impeached president, was the victim of political persecution. The far-right narrative claims, without evidence, that the South’s elections in the 2020s were rigged by the intervention of China – which brings up with their claims that Yoon’s illegal declaration of martial law, the cause of his impeachment, was justified. The Constitutional Court disagreed, and unanimously removed Yoon from office on April 4.
Some experts dismissed Trump’s harmful post as a strategy to create leverage ahead of the first meeting with Lee. However, he clearly overlooked the fact that his careless behavior toward Lee and South Korea has stoked anti-Trump and anti-U.S. sentiment among South Koreans.
When media reported over 300 South Korean workers had been detained by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement this month, South Koreans questioned how that could even be possible considering the so-called “ironclad” alliance between South Korea and the United States. The workers had been helping establish a $7-plus billion South Korean battery plant in Georgia – the same sort of investment Trump has been demanding.
Through all these actions, the Trump administration clearly demonstrated that South Korea is no longer a valued U.S. ally but only a foreign state that Washington seeks to extract money from – as much as possible.
The increasing economic pressure, highlighted by the soaring tariff burden and disproportionate investment demands, makes one thing clear: South Korea must actively dismantle its reliance on the U.S. market. The strategic shift must center on aggressive market diversification. Seoul needs to pivot its focus toward high-growth regions like Southeast Asia and India, while simultaneously deepening trilateral economic cooperation with East Asian neighbors such as China and Japan. Furthermore, Seoul must prioritize securing trade access across the globe, including expanding penetration into the European market. Assuming that Trump would continue demanding South Korea to make more investments in the U.S., South Korea’s economic stability now depends on its ability to forge robust and self-sustaining trade relationships independent of Washington’s capricious policies.
Lastly, the anti-U.S. sentiment stemming from Trump’s transactional diplomacy has profound implications for South Korea’s security posture. Trump has repeatedly demanded that South Korea pay more for the stationing of the 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea, including its annual budget for defense. His reckless behavior and consistent demands for increased defense contributions have created a crisis of confidence that the U.S. might not protect South Korea if North Korea threatens to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile toward the mainland of the U.S.
For many South Koreans, this fear has reignited a critical domestic debate: self-reliance in the face of nuclear threat. With North Korea already possessing nuclear weapons, the priority for a growing segment of South Koreans is shifting from relying on the U.S. extended deterrence to securing an independent nuclear capability.
Regardless of Lee’s hope to construct peace on the Korean Peninsula without seeking to develop nuclear weapons, Seoul may face unbearable demands from the public over nuclear development unless Washington’s gesture toward Seoul remains truly “ironclad.”
Authors
Contributing Author
Mitch Shin
Mitch Shin is a chief correspondent for The Diplomat, covering the Korean Peninsula.
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6. South Korea’s APEC Summit: A Test for Lee Jae-myung’s ‘Pragmatic’ Diplomacy
Is this make or break for the Lee admaintrion and South Korea? Will this put South Korea on the map as a global pivotal state that chooses to be a peaceful nuclear power, that is a partner in the arsenal of democracy, that supports human rights and the rules based international order?
Excerpt:
Overall, APEC 2025 in Gyeongju is more than a forum for economic cooperation; it may also serve as a crucial venue for dialogue, negotiation, and the management of disputes among major powers. The summit constitutes a critical test for South Korea’s diplomatic orientation under President Lee Jae-myung in its early phase, and whether his approach of “pragmatic flexibility” can deliver substantive outcomes.
South Korea’s APEC Summit: A Test for Lee Jae-myung’s ‘Pragmatic’ Diplomacy
With Trump, Xi, and possibly Putin set to attend, the APEC Summit will bring a host of critical sideline meetings.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/south-koreas-apec-summit-a-test-for-lee-jae-myungs-pragmatic-diplomacy/
By Cao Nguyen Khanh Huyen
September 29, 2025
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung (left) and U.S. President Donald Trump give the thumbs-up sign ahead of their summit meeting at the White House, Aug. 25, 2025. Lee will host Trump at the end of October for the APEC Summit.
Credit: Official White House Photo
The APEC Summit 2025, scheduled to open on October 31 in Gyeongju, South Korea, has attracted considerable attention from the international community. This is not only because South Korea is assuming the role of host for the first time in 20 years since APEC 2005, but also due to the confirmed participation of U.S. President Donald Trump. On the Chinese side, President Xi Jinping has yet to issue an official response; however, Trump’s announcement that a bilateral meeting with Xi would take place on the sidelines of the summit suggests a strong likelihood of Xi’s attendance.
In addition, the Russian news agency TASS reported that South Korea has extended an invitation to Russian President Vladimir Putin, though Moscow has left open the question of participation. Should this year’s summit bring together both the United States and China, and potentially Russia, it would constitute a notable diplomatic achievement for the Lee Jae-myung administration, reinforcing South Korea’s role as a “bridge between East and West” and signaling its efforts to reclaim a leading position in Asia after years of political, economic, and social turbulence.
Ahead of APEC 2025, three major diplomatic issues are of particular concern. First, the potential for progress in China-U.S. relations within the framework of the summit. Second, the prospects for South Korea to improve and expand bilateral ties with participating major powers, especially the U.S., China, and Japan. Third, the feasibility of resuming North Korea-U.S. negotiations or inter-Korean dialogue, particularly if the U.S., China, and Russia all confirm their participation in Gyeongju.
Regarding China-U.S. relations, Trump’s confirmation that he will attend, coupled with his statement that he would meet Xi Jinping on the sidelines, is a significant signal. If materialized, this would mark the first encounter between the two nations’ leaders in South Korea in 13 years, since the meeting between Presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao during the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit in March 2012. Moreover, APEC 2025 would represent the first face-to-face dialogue between Trump and Xi in more than six years, following their meeting at the G-20 Summit in Osaka (June 2019). It would be the first such meeting since Trump began his second term.
With such a series of firsts, the Gyeongju summit may serve as a prelude, paving the way for subsequent high-level visits. Both Washington and Beijing require official as well as informal channels to address key issues such as tariffs, trade conflicts, and supply chain resilience. Prior to this, the two sides had already demonstrated goodwill through a telephone conversation described as “highly productive.”
Against a backdrop of intensifying China-U.S. competition, South Korea inevitably faces mounting pressures. The failure of the previous administration to balance relations with the two powers remains a costly lesson for President Lee Jae-myung. With his doctrine of “pragmatic flexibility,” Lee seeks to strengthen the alliance with the U.S. while simultaneously stabilizing relations with China. Should both Washington and Beijing attend the Gyeongju summit, it would provide South Korea with an important opportunity to operationalize its balancing strategy and improve bilateral ties with its two most critical partners.
Unlike former progressive leaders such as Roh Moo-hyun or Moon Jae-in, Lee does not approach Washington from a stance of “relative autonomy” or seek to reduce dependence, the policies that once caused strains in bilateral ties. Instead, he opts for a softer, more flexible approach, prioritizing dialogue despite U.S. tariff pressures. The successful hosting of the South Korea-U.S. Summit in August 2025 stands as one of his administration’s achievements, simultaneously consolidating the alliance and securing an agreement to reduce tariffs on South Korean exports to the U.S. to 15 percent, down from the originally proposed 25 percent.
Nonetheless, challenges persist. A $350 billion investment agreement with the United States has been likened to a latent risk, potentially exposing South Korea to financial risks absent a currency swap arrangement and careful policy coordination. Moreover, the detention of 300 South Korean nationals during a U.S. crackdown on illegal labor in early September 2025 fueled anti-American sentiment domestically, further complicating bilateral relations.
With respect to China, Xi Jinping’s potential attendance at APEC could signal a “thaw” in China-South Korea relations, which deteriorated under President Yoon Seok-yeol due to Seoul’s perceived pro-U.S. tilt. Yoon even attempted to blame Chinese political interference to justify his declaration of martial law in December 2024 – allegations dismissed groundless not only by Beijing, but by South Korea’s Constitutional Court, which impeached Yoon in April 2025.
Lee’s cautious diplomacy has been evident since his inauguration: his first overseas trip was to Japan rather than the U.S. or China. Furthermore, while preparing for summits with Tokyo (August 23) and Washington (August 25), he dispatched a special delegation to Beijing led by former National Assembly Speaker Park Byeong-seug. Similarly, while Lee himself did not attend China’s military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of victory in World War II, he sent current National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik in his stead. Such steps reflect a careful and meticulous balancing act: avoiding provocation toward China while maintaining cooperation with the U.S. and Japan.
One of the most anticipated uncertainties of APEC 2025 is whether Gyeongju will become the “stage” for historic handshakes, potentially revitalizing inter-Korean or North Korea-U.S. dialogue. The handshake between Woo and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at the Beijing military parade in early September 2025 rekindled hopes for inter-Korean engagement.
Despite Seoul’s overtures, North Korea’s responses have offered little optimism. Pyongyang openly criticized South Korea-U.S. joint exercises, dismissed the Lee administration’s three-phase denuclearization plan as essentially unchanged from that of his predecessor, and declared denuclearization to be “unconstitutional,” reaffirming its refusal to abandon nuclear weapons.
At the same time, Pyongyang has left the door open to talks with Washington, provided the U.S. abandons its “futile obsession with denuclearization,” recognizes reality, and pursues genuine peaceful coexistence. Notably, this statement came only three days after Trump announced his planned meeting with Xi, suggesting that Pyongyang continues to monitor China-U.S. dynamics closely. While the likelihood of a Kim-Trump meeting at APEC 2025 appears slim, improved China-U.S. relations through the summit could open the way for a North Korea-U.S. summit following Trump’s anticipated visit to China in early 2026.
For South Korea, pursuing direct dialogue with the North in isolation would prove highly challenging. Instead, Seoul may leverage the support of key partners at APEC 2025. In a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on September 17 in Beijing, South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun emphasized that Xi’s presence at the summit would not only promote bilateral relations but also positively influence efforts to revive inter-Korean dialogue.
As for Russia, although its participation remains uncertain, Seoul’s invitation highlights the Lee administration’s commitment to multilateral diplomacy. Given Russia’s strategic partnership with North Korea, strengthening ties with Moscow could provide Seoul with another channel to facilitate dialogue with Pyongyang and further operationalize its pragmatic yet flexible diplomatic strategy.
Overall, APEC 2025 in Gyeongju is more than a forum for economic cooperation; it may also serve as a crucial venue for dialogue, negotiation, and the management of disputes among major powers. The summit constitutes a critical test for South Korea’s diplomatic orientation under President Lee Jae-myung in its early phase, and whether his approach of “pragmatic flexibility” can deliver substantive outcomes.
Authors
Guest Author
Cao Nguyen Khanh Huyen
Cao Nguyen Khanh Huyen, Ph.D, is a lecturer of the International Studies Division of Ho Chi Minh City University of Education (HCMUE). All views expressed in this article are the author’s alone
7. Unification Minister: North Korea Among Three Capable of Striking U.S.
Why is the Unification Minister talking out of school? It is almost like he wants to feed the narrative of the retrenchers that the US must withdraw its forces from the Korean peninsula because it doesn't want to trade Los Angeles for Seoul. (which is one of the most ignorant and dangerous tropes we hear about the US presence in Korea). This narrative actually supports the Kim family regime's political warfare strategy.
Unification Minister: North Korea Among Three Capable of Striking U.S.
Comments Contradict Official Stance on ICBM Capabilities, Spark Government Concerns
https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2025/10/01/BCRAU2AXRNHMRP4MINFDWUHC2A/
By Kim Min-seo
Published 2025.10.01. 00:53
Updated 2025.10.01. 09:58
Chung Dong-young, Minister of Unification, holds a press briefing in Berlin, Germany, on the 29th, local time. /Yonhap
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, currently visiting Germany, stated on the 29th (local time), “North Korea has become one of the three countries capable of striking the U.S. mainland,” adding, “We must calmly acknowledge what needs to be acknowledged.” While his remarks aimed to highlight North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities, they drew concerns that equating North Korea with nuclear-armed permanent U.N. Security Council members like China and Russia might imply “acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear state.”
◇“North Korea’s Strategic Position Has Changed”
Minister Chung, in Germany to attend the 2025 International Korea Forum (GKF) and other events, held a press briefing in Berlin. He said, “North Korea claims to be a strategic state, and its position has indeed changed. It is different from where it was seven years ago. We must start from this reality.” This reflects the view that the situation has shifted since 2018, when U.S.-North Korea summits in Singapore discussed denuclearization.
This aligns with a July statement by Kim Yo-jong, Vice Department Director of the Workers’ Party of Korea, who noted, “It is necessary to recall that 2025 is not 2018 or 2019.” Kim Yo-jong emphasized that denuclearization is no longer a topic for negotiation, unlike during the first and second U.S.-North Korea summits in Singapore (2018) and Hanoi, Vietnam (2019). Minister Chung’s remarks echoed this stance. Kim Yo-jong had previously asserted that North Korea holds an “irreversible nuclear-armed state status.”
Minister Chung also commented on the 2019 Hanoi summit, stating, “If a small deal had been reached by accepting North Korea’s demands, the course of the nuclear issue would have been very different.” At the time, North Korea proposed dismantling the Yeongbyon nuclear facility in exchange for sanctions relief, but the U.S. demanded the declaration of all nuclear facilities, warheads, and missiles. Though the talks collapsed due to North Korea’s refusal, Minister Chung referenced Choe Son-hui’s remark that the U.S. “missed a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity,” adding, “Unfortunately, that statement was correct.”
These comments led Minister Chung to classify North Korea as “one of the three countries capable of striking the U.S. mainland.” This diverges from the government’s previous assessments. South Korea and the U.S. have maintained that North Korea’s re-entry technology—critical for an ICBM to withstand reentry into the atmosphere—remains unverified. President Lee Jae-myung recently stated, “North Korea’s ICBM development has only left the re-entry technology phase.” A government official clarified, “Minister Chung’s remarks were intended to raise awareness about the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, not a shift in the government’s official stance.”
◇Concerns Over ‘Messaging Inconsistencies’ Within the Government
Recently, Minister Chung has voiced positions conflicting with the Office of National Security on issues such as restoring the September 19 inter-Korean military agreement, President Lee Jae-myung’s E.N.D initiative toward North Korea, and the two-state theory. While the National Security Office and Ministry of National Defense urge caution on reinstating the September 19 agreement—which includes halting drills near the border—Minister Chung advocated for its “preemptive restoration within the year” on the 19th. Regarding the E.N.D framework (Engagement, Normalization, Denuclearization), he stated, “Dialogue (engagement) should come first,” differing from National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac’s stance that “there is no order or priority.”
Minister Chung has also actively promoted converting Kim Jong-un’s “hostile two-state theory” into a “peaceful two-state framework.” This contrasts with Wi’s explanation that “the government does not endorse or recognize the two-state theory.” Within and outside the government, concerns are growing over Minister Chung’s persistent messaging that diverges from the Office of National Security. One official remarked, “North Korea is refusing dialogue, so there’s no urgency for policy acceleration, yet Minister Chung is moving too quickly.”
Sources within the National Security Office reportedly find Minister Chung’s remarks increasingly awkward. A government official stated, “The principle is to maintain a consistent tone in government messaging, but Minister Chung’s divergent statements do not help the administration.”
8. Editorial: Wartime Control Transfer Should Depend on Reliable War Prevention
The sentiment is correct in this OpEd. But there is no such thing as transfer of the wartime OPCON. There will only be a simple change of command of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command from a US General to a Korean General. The command relationships will remain the same. The ROK/US CFC will continue to answer to both nations equally as it does now. The US does not have OPCON of Korean forces nor will Korea have OPCON of US forces. The ROK/US CFC has OPCON of both forces for both the ROK and US governments who manage CFC through the permanent military committee.
Every Commander of the ROK/US CFC since 1978 has said that he works for both presidents equally. That will be the same when a ROK general takes command of CFC.
Editorial: Wartime Control Transfer Should Depend on Reliable War Prevention
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/10/02/2BKC6BC2UBHCNL7PKNRVSJFCGU/
Current Military Shortfalls Delay Transfer Until Capabilities Verified
By The Chosunilbo
Published 2025.10.02. 00:10
President Lee Jae-myung salutes at the 77th Anniversary of the Founding of the Armed Forces (Korean Armed Forces Day) commemorative ceremony held at Gyeryongdae in Chungcheongnam-do on the 1st. /Newsis
President Lee Jae-myung stated in his Armed Forces Day commemorative speech on the 1st, “We will recover wartime operational control rights based on a solid South Korea-U.S. alliance and lead the joint defense posture, and self-reliant national defense is inevitable.” Since the Trump administration, a situation has emerged where it is difficult to fully trust the U.S. For this reason, the president’s remarks have a valid aspect.
The issue lies in the capabilities of our military. If the South Korean military can lead efforts to decisively prevent war and overwhelm North Korea during wartime, then the wartime operational control authority should be transferred. However, the current South Korean military lacks the capability to properly execute wartime operations involving the detection, tracking, interception, and counterattack of North Korean nuclear weapons. It is well known that South Korea significantly falls short of the standards for transferring wartime operational control, particularly in surveillance and reconnaissance. Only the U.S. military possesses nuclear counterattack assets. Acquiring such capabilities will require significant time and at least tens of trillions of Korean won.
The decision on whether to transfer wartime operational control should not be based on political reasons such as ‘sovereignty’ but on which side can more reliably prevent war. This should be the primary criterion above all else. The transfer should occur only when it is objectively verified that the South Korean military can decisively prevent war. No one would consider the current time to be that moment.
· This article has been translated by Upstage Solar AI.
9. Seoul awaits U.S. response on revised investment deal: presidential office
Will this be the straw that breaks the alliance's back?
Seoul awaits U.S. response on revised investment deal: presidential office | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Woo Jae-yeon · October 2, 2025
SEOUL, Oct. 2 (Yonhap) -- The presidential office said Thursday it is awaiting a response from Washington after proposing a revised plan for managing a US$350 billion investment fund.
Presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung confirmed during a briefing that the revised proposal for the memorandum of understanding had been sent to the U.S. government.
Her comments followed an earlier interview in which Kim Yong-beom, the presidential chief of staff for policy, first mentioned the submission of the revised plan to local media.
"We are in the midst of negotiations, so I can't discuss the details." Kang said, adding that Seoul has "various scenarios in mind" and is working to "devise a plan to benefit both countries."
In a trade deal signed in July, Seoul pledged to invest $350 billion in the United States. In exchange, Washington agreed to lower a proposed reciprocal tariff on South Korea from 25 to 15 percent, and slash its tariff on South Korean autos from 25 to 15 percent.
Presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung speaks during a briefing at the presidential office in Yongsan, Seoul, on Oct. 2, 2025. (Yonhap)
jaeyeon.woo@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Woo Jae-yeon · October 2, 2025
10. Lee apologizes over past rights violations in foreign adoption cases
This is important. But we are all complicit: South Korea and every country in the international community, to include the US, who accepted children for adoption.
We all need to acknowledge and apologize for our mistakes.
(LEAD) Lee apologizes over past rights violations in foreign adoption cases | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · October 2, 2025
(ATTN: REVISES lead)
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Oct. 2 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung on Thursday apologized for the suffering experienced by overseas adoptees in the past and vowed stronger efforts to protect their rights.
Lee issued the message on Facebook a day after South Korea formally became a contracting party to the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, completing full ratification 12 years after signing the pact.
Recalling the country's troubled history, Lee noted that South Korea was once stigmatized as a "child-exporting country," having sent more than 170,000 children abroad for adoption since the 1950-53 Korean War, according to official records. He also acknowledged cases of human rights violations in the process.
"My heart is still very heavy when I think of the anxiety, pain and confusion overseas adoptees must have felt after being sent to a foreign land, unable even to speak their mother tongue," Lee wrote.
"On behalf of the Republic of Korea, I extend my heartfelt apology and words of comfort to overseas adoptees, their families and their birth families who have suffered," he added, referring to South Korea's official name.
Lee stressed that the enforcement in July of the Special Act on Domestic Adoption and the Special Act on Intercountry Adoption has provided the domestic legal basis to implement the convention.
"Relevant ministries should closely cooperate to safeguard the rights of adoptees and to establish a human rights-centered adoption system, and come up with effective support measures to assist overseas adoptees in tracing their roots," he added.
President Lee Jae Myung delivers an address to an event marking the 19th World Korean Day at a hotel in Seoul on Oct. 2, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
ejkim@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · October 2, 2025
11. How North Korea’s love-hate relationship with English complicates Seoul ties
A "language colony." I had not heard that before but it makes sense from the regime's Propaganda and Agitation Department. And I am sure the acronym "END" only works in English. There is not a Korean acronym for "END." END is definitely for English speaking international audiences.
That does not mean the South is a "language colony." It really means it is an advanced country that is a player in the global community and recognizes that international communications matter.
How North Korea’s love-hate relationship with English complicates Seoul ties
DPRK will see Lee Jae-myung’s E.N.D. policy as proof South is a ‘language colony,’ despite also promoting English study
https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/how-north-koreas-love-hate-relationship-with-english-complicates-seoul-ties/
Tatiana Gabroussenko October 1, 2025
English lessons at a North Korean elementary school | Image: KCTV
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung announced his plan to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula with a new acronym last week — E.N.D., or “Exchange, Normalization and Denuclearization” — but there’s good reason to doubt his awkward English-language shorthand will appeal to Pyongyang.
Ignoring the fact that denuclearization looks like a pipe dream in 2025, the new acronym hardly strikes an optimistic note for inter-Korean affairs, carrying associations of despair and finality. Former President Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy” did a better job of projecting hope, though even that name suggested to the DPRK that the South just wanted to lull them out of their suspicions.
The new South Korean initiative has an even bigger problem than connotations, however: Using English for a policy about improving inter-Korean relations implies that Lee’s proposal is aimed primarily at international audiences, not the DPRK’s leadership.
By ignoring the common language of the two Koreas, the E.N.D. proposal will repulse North Korean policymakers and unintentionally reinforce the DPRK propaganda narrative that South Korea is a “language colony” and a “land without nationality.”
Lee Jae-myung speaks at the U.N. General Assembly in Sept. 2025 | Image: ROK Presidential Office
‘A LANGUAGE CESSPOOL’
This idea has long been a favorite theme of North Korean propaganda materials, including radio plays formerly aired by the channel “Voice of Unification” that targeted South Korean listeners.
Two representative examples are “I Do Not Understand” (모른다, aired March 14, 2022) and “Land Without Nationality” (국적없는 땅, aired March 26, 2023), both constructed as dialogues between Koreans.
In “I Do Not Understand,” the North Korean characters Yongnam and Kkotsun contrast the mongrel language of the South with the reputedly pure Korean of the North.
Yongnam: “In South Korea, our language and writing are looked down upon, and a decadent and post-apocalyptic trend is prevalent, considering the use of foreign words and Konglish to be ‘cool.’”
Kkotsun: “Yes! According to a survey and analysis of everyday terms used in South Korea by linguists, only 5% of South Korean words are of Korean origins, and 95% of them are foreign words and Konglish. Indeed, South Korea is a language cesspool (언어오물장) and language colony (언어식민지) like no other in the world.”
The play contrasts the South Korean attitude to North Korea, where “everyone actively uses our words and writings and thoroughly rejects the intrusion of foreign words into our lives.” A side character states:
“In North Korea, our unique language and writing are developing without losing their vitality. In publications and street signs, there is no shadow of foreign words anywhere.
The reality of the two social systems, which are truly in stark contrast, clearly shows that Korean-style socialism is the flower garden of the nation’s vitality and national identity, where the soul of the nation is alive and blooming, and that South Korean society is a wasteland and a graveyard of national culture where the spirit of the nation is brutally trampled.”
“Land Without Nationality” employs a popular motif about ROK citizens failing to understand conversations and TV programs polluted with English words, imagining a conversation between two South Korean overseas workers.
The elder colleague Kim talks about how North Koreans use the Korean language when naming buildings like Korea Hotel, Seosan Hotel and Hyangsan Hotel, contrasting this with the “Lotte,” “Hyatt” and “Grand” hotels in the South.
“The street signs, the trademarks and instructions engraved on the products are all full of foreign words. So is South Korea really the land where the Korean people live? I just feel a sense of rejection and shame,” he states.
Kim complains that his nephew speaks a mixture of English and Japanese so he cannot understand him by phone. He laments that up to 90% of South Korean words are taken from foreign languages.
In response, his colleague Pak Seil claims: “Our President Yoon Seok-yeol not long ago said that our word for National Memorial Park is uncouth and that it would be cooler to call it by the English name! If the president likes to use English and foreign words more than our language, how can I really call my land the land where Korean people live?”
The conversation ends predictably as the colleagues agree that the “entire people should rise up against Yoon Seok-yeol’s anti-national rotten ‘politics.’”
Many actual North Koreans appear to share this view presented by official propaganda.
A few years ago, I had a chat with a middle-aged North Korean man in an international airport, who looked like a cadre working overseas to earn foreign currency. When referring to South Koreans he had met overseas, he said they cannot be considered Koreans because they speak, dress and behave like foreigners.
In his mind, North Koreans were the true keepers of the national linguistic heritage.
A training college for foreign language teachers in North Korea | Image: KCTV
IN THE SAME SHOES?
Some may agree that South Korea’s fascination over English is often over the top, in large part due to its export-oriented economy and dependency on foreign clients. Like many other countries, the ROK has faced a steady creep of English loanwords entering the national lexicon.
However, one should not forget that English also enjoys a very high status in North Korea, and for similar reasons. As a small country with few natural resources, the DPRK desperately needs international connections and considers English a crucial tool for establishing them.
The University of Foreign Languages is one of the most prestigious universities in Pyongyang. North Korean interpreters are exceptionally bright and knowledgeable people who must pass through serious competition to get this education.
The recently aired TV drama “New Spring in Paekhakpeol” demonstrates that North Koreans are eager to learn English more and on a mass scale.
In one episode, the corrupt cadre Kang Wonok shares her dream to take out a private loan and pay for private lessons for her daughter so that she can enter the University of Foreign Languages. Kang is soon arrested, and her plans are left unrealized.
Another episode introduces Chuhyang, the daughter of the county party secretary and a fresh graduate from Kim Hyongjik’s Pedagogical University in Pyongyang who knows English, Chinese and Russian. The conscientious father does not allow Chuhyang to stay in Pyongyang but sends her to the uncomfortable rural school to teach the local kids, prohibiting her to reveal that she is his daughter.
Before Chuhyang begins her work, the village party secretary asks a few questions in English to check her knowledge and is satisfied by her level. At night, the father and daughter secretly speak English by video call in order to polish their pronunciations.
A scene from “New Spring in Paekhakpeol” where the village party secretary checks Chuhyang’s ability to speak English | Image: KCTV
The greedy mothers of the local kids try to pay Chuhyang for private tutoring, yet her father comes to the school enraged and suspends his daughter from teaching for a month. After returning to work, Chuhyang teaches all kids evenly and without payment.
Thus, the drama recognizes the problem of poor English knowledge in the DPRK and proposes solving this problem through free mass education.
The high status of English in North Korea does not imply concessions to the Western way of life, ideological liberalization or infiltration of foreign cultural patterns. Indeed, traces of foreign languages are barely visible in DPRK public spaces, and road signs and the names of the hotels are written only in Korean.
This practice may change if necessary, however. The newly opened Wonsan Kalma beach resort, originally intended for foreign guests, carries many signs in English.
Signs at the Wonsan Kalma resort featuring English | Image: KCTV
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Yet no matter how important English is for both Koreas to communicate with the world, DPRK propaganda shows that it continues to look down on the way English has permeated South Korean society.
When it comes to inter-Korean cooperation, use of the Koreas’ common language and cultural symbols will likely lead to better results with Pyongyang, and may produce better ideas than “E.N.D.”
Seungyeon Chung contributed reporting to this article. Edited by Bryan Betts
12. N. Korea's FM vows to bolster diplomatic exchanges, cooperation with China
N. Korea's FM vows to bolster diplomatic exchanges, cooperation with China | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · October 2, 2025
By Kim Soo-yeon
SEOUL, Oct. 2 (Yonhap) -- North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui has vowed efforts to strengthen diplomatic exchanges and cooperation with China in her congratulatory message to China's top diplomat, Wang Yi, on China's key anniversary, state media reported Thursday.
Choe's message was delivered to celebrate the 76th anniversary of China's founding the previous day, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
In the letter, Choe said the two nations have an "important" mission to develop their bilateral ties through diplomatic cooperation, highlighting that the North and China have reached "complete" consensus on key issues during her recent trip to Beijing.
North Korea "will make joint efforts to further develop its cooperative relations with China and strengthen bilateral exchange and cooperation in the diplomatic field," read the message, carried by the KCNA.
Choe returned home Tuesday after making a four-day trip to China. She made her first one-on-one meeting with Wang since taking office in June 2022 and also met with China's Premier Li Qiang.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un traveled to Beijing last month to attend China's military parade. At that time, Kim and Chinese President Xi Jinping held their first talks in more than six years, in a sign that the bilateral ties have been restored after remaining strained by North Korea's close alignment with Russia.
North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui (L) shakes hands with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi as they meet for talks in Beijing on Sept. 28, 2025, in this photo carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · October 2, 2025
13. PM voices hope for China's positive contribution to inter-Korean relations
Are the north and South competing for China's favor?
We should keep in mind that it is unlikely that China will contribute to solving South Korea's security challenges.
PM voices hope for China's positive contribution to inter-Korean relations | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Haye-ah · October 2, 2025
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, Oct. 2 (Yonhap) -- Prime Minister Kim Min-seok has said South Korea wishes for China to make positive contributions to inter-Korean relations, including to achieve North Korea's denuclearization.
Kim made the remark in an interview with the Hong Kong weekly, Yazhou Zhoukan, ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping's expected visit to South Korea for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit on Oct. 31 and Nov. 1.
"We always hope that China will make positive contributions when it comes to inter-Korean relations," he said in the interview conducted Sept. 22 and published Thursday, in response to a question about whether Seoul plans to request Xi's assistance regarding inter-Korean exchanges.
Prime Minister Kim Min-seok speaks during a national tourism strategy meeting in Seoul on Sept. 25, 2025. (Yonhap)
"That includes contributions to both promoting peaceful dialogue between South and North, and realizing the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," he added.
The prime minister rejected notions that China has established a new trilateral "alliance" involving China, Russia and North Korea to counter the trilateral partnership between South Korea, the United States and Japan.
"We take note of President Xi Jinping's affirmation that he does not want confrontation between blocs," he said. "We continue to believe the Chinese government is maintaining its established stance of promoting peace and dialogue, and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, and that it will stick to its position of peacefully resolving issues between South and North."
On the possibility of a meeting between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the APEC summit, the prime minister said it would be "good" if the two leaders meet, but that the probability of Kim's summit attendance via invitation is "low."
He also cast doubt that inter-Korean relations will improve at a time when the North Korean leader remains "cold" toward the South.
The prime minister addressed a host of other foreign policy issues, including U.S. demands for South Korea to increase its defense spending and tensions in the Taiwan Strait.
He said South Korea is continually strengthening its security posture to achieve "self-reliant defense" and that its growing spending on defense is based on its own needs, regardless of the "surrounding situation."
South Korea also hopes for the Taiwan Strait to be "stabilized peacefully" but will not, in principle, enter into a conflict outside the Korean Peninsula without the consent of the Korean people, he said.
"The South Korea-U.S. alliance primarily focuses its capabilities on peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula."
hague@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Lee Haye-ah · October 2, 2025
14. North Korea holds public trials for breast augmentation doctors and patients
It is hard to believe this kind of thing takes place in north Korea.
North Korea holds public trials for breast augmentation doctors and patients
One doctor was caught performing the procedure at home using silicone imported from China
By Jeong Seo-yeong - October 2, 2025
https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-holds-public-trials-for-breast-augmentation-doctors-and-patients/?tztc=1
FILE PHOTO: A clip from a North Korean video showing a public struggle session obtained by Daily NK in March 2023. (Daily NK)
As growing numbers of North Koreans become curious about breast augmentation surgery, the regime is seeking to quash the practice by holding public trials for both practitioners and patients.
“A public trial was held at a culture center in downtown Sariwon in mid-September for a doctor who performed illegal breast augmentation and two women who received the procedure,” a source in North Hwanghae province told Daily NK recently.
The backgrounds of the doctor and the two women, as well as the circumstances of their arrest, were described in detail during the trial, which reportedly created a stir among attendees.
The doctor had been caught performing the procedure at home using silicone imported from China, despite having little medical experience and dropping out of medical school before completing his surgery program.
After receiving orders from the Central Committee to stay vigilant for illegal plastic surgery, Sariwon police surveyed neighborhood watch units about the practice. A police officer then posed as an interested patient, infiltrated the home of a doctor rumored to be performing plastic surgery, and caught him in the act.
Prosecutors presented evidence acquired by police, including wads of cash, imported silicone implants, and medical equipment used by the doctor in the illegal procedures.
Public shaming and warnings
Throughout the proceedings, the doctor stood on stage with his head lowered, while the two women in their twenties standing beside him were too ashamed to raise their eyes.
When the two women confessed during the trial to receiving the procedure because they wanted a better figure, the prosecutor railed against “women under a socialist system who have been corrupted by bourgeois customs and engaged in degenerate capitalist practices.”
The judge also condemned breast augmentation surgery as “non-socialist behavior” and warned that the women would face severe punishment. “Instead of being faithful to their groups and organizations, these women were consumed with vanity and ultimately became toxic influences eroding our socialist system,” the judge said.
During the trial, police reportedly patted down the accused women to confirm they had actually undergone breast augmentation, much to the shock of onlookers.
Police announced during the trial that women suspected of having had plastic surgery will have to undergo physical exams. Neighborhood watch unit leaders are supposed to escort any women with noticeably changed figures to a doctor to determine whether they have gone under the knife.
Women in their twenties in Sariwon are anxious that they will come under suspicion and be forced to undergo physical exams.
“Some people at the trial joined the chorus of criticism, commenting that doctors will do anything to make a buck. But others were more sympathetic and suggested that the doctor had entered that line of work because he was struggling to make a living,” the source said.
Read in Korean
15. N. Korea seen as preparing for military parade marking party anniv.: JCS
The only thing the regime does well: Parades.
Will they out do China's parade from last month?
N. Korea seen as preparing for military parade marking party anniv.: JCS | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · October 2, 2025
SEOUL, Oct. 2 (Yonhap) -- North Korea appears to be preparing for a large-scale military parade, possibly at nighttime, to mark next week's key party anniversary, South Korea's military confirmed Thursday.
The North is set to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea on Oct. 10. North Korea has staged a military parade on party anniversaries that end in zero or five.
"There are signs of North Korea preparing for a military parade involving tens of thousands of people, which our military is closely monitoring," Col. Lee Sung-jun, spokesperson for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), said in a regular press briefing.
Lee said the military detected movements of vehicles and some military equipment, but did not further elaborate.
The JCS official said the North may stage a nighttime military parade, but it remains to be seen whether the event will take place near midnight or before then.
Analysts have raised views that Pyongyang may showcase the next-generation Hwasong-20 intercontinental ballistic missile under development during the military parade or test-launch it around the anniversary.
This Sept. 9, 2023, file photo, released by the North's Korean Central News Agency, shows a nighttime military parade marking the North's 75th state founding anniversary taking place in Pyongyang. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · October 2, 2025
16. Lee calls for crackdown against anti-Chinese rallies
Does this look like kowtowing to China?
Lee calls for crackdown against anti-Chinese rallies | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · October 2, 2025
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Oct. 2 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung on Thursday called for a crackdown against anti-Chinese rallies and other demonstrations against foreigners, saying such discriminatory acts and hate speech harm national interests.
Lee made the call at a meeting with senior aides amid concerns that ongoing anti-China protests in downtown Seoul could undermine the growing influx of Chinese visitors following the launch of a new temporary visa-free entry program for group tourists earlier this week.
"Rumors and hate speech targeting specific countries and their people are being spread indiscriminately, and racially discriminatory rallies continue," Lee said. "These utterly harmful, self-destructive acts that damage our national interest and image must be completely eradicated."
Lee noted the Myeongdong shopping district in Seoul has become vibrant following the introduction of temporary visa-free entry for Chinese tourists, hoping the influx of travelers would boost domestic spending and aid economic recovery.
"At a time when we should be grateful, encouraging and welcoming, how can we instead engage in hatred, insults and abusive behavior?" he said.
The president urged relevant ministries to step up the crackdown on acts threatening security of foreign travelers and to introduce stern measures to eliminate racially discriminatory acts.
President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a meeting with senior aides at the presidential office in Seoul on Oct. 2, 2025. (Yonhap)
ejkim@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · October 2, 2025
17. ROK activists attempt to send food and supplies to North Korean POWs in Ukraine
ROK activists attempt to send food and supplies to North Korean POWs in Ukraine
Civic group hopes to encourage DPRK soldiers to settle in South Korea as their detention enters 10th month
https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/rok-activists-attempt-to-send-food-and-supplies-to-north-korean-pows-in-ukraine/
Jooheon Kim October 2, 2025
North Korean soldiers captured by the Ukrainian military in Kursk | Image: Volodymyr Zelensky via Telegram
South Korean activists are attempting to send material assistance and defection information to North Korean POWs held in Ukraine, advocating for the soldiers’ resettlement in the South as their detention enters its 10th month.
“A total of 2.15 million won ($1,535) will be delivered to the North Korean prisoners in Ukraine in the form of food and other essential supplies,” Jang Se-yul, the head of Gyeore’eol Unification Solidarity, told NK News on Thursday.
Jang said the funds will go toward providing food, medical supplies, books and daily necessities to the two POWs, whom Ukraine announced it had captured back in January.
A video message from defectors who served in the DPRK military will be delivered to the North Korean soldiers, said Jang, a defector and former North Korean army officer.
Tae Yong-ho, a high-profile North Korean defector and former ROK lawmaker, contributed to the funds being sent and said the effort can help improve the POWs’ understanding of the South.
“The prisoners don’t realize that around 34,000 North Korean defectors live in South Korea. When informed of this, they reject it as false,” he told NK News, citing those who have had access to the prisoners in Ukraine.
The funds will be delivered through Docu & News Korea, a South Korean documentary production company that has frequently covered the war in Ukraine and accompanied an ROK lawmaker who met with the POWs.
“A Ukrainian human rights group recommended that the ROK firm handle the delivery, saying it would speed things up,” Jang said.
But the activist explained that because Ukraine is a travel-restricted country for ROK citizens, members of Docu & News Korea are currently in Poland awaiting approval from Seoul’s foreign affairs ministry to enter Ukraine.
“The government is actively making multifaceted efforts to secure the transfer of the North Korean POWs, but we ask for your understanding that we cannot disclose details of this sensitive diplomatic matter concerning their protection,” a ministry official told NK News.
Jang said he reached out to Kyiv’s defense ministry about meeting the POWs but has not yet received a response. But he voiced optimism about the possibility of delivering the supplies even if a meeting isn’t possible.
“Through this reporting team, our most important message is not just about delivering food, medicine or letters, but that North Korean escapees in South Korea, the U.K., Japan and the U.S. are raising funds for them,” he said.
Meanwhile, Gyeore’eol Unification Solidarity is also working with an association run by ethnic Koreans in Ukraine to support the North Korea prisoners’ mental health and provide essential supplies.
Jang Se-yul (left), head of Gyeore’eol Unification Solidarity, poses for a photo with Tae Yong-ho after Tae’s donation of 1 million won for the DPRK POWs. | Image: Courtesy of Jang Se-yul
According to Jang, three North Korean soldiers have been captured since Pyongyang dispatched thousands of troops to Ukraine last year, but one of them died by suicide. The two surviving prisoners of war are reportedly living in a state of deep fear and anxiety.
“They are held in the same prisoner of war camp as Russian soldiers, but have a separate area within the facility,” Jang said.
He explained that many North Korean soldiers are indoctrinated to believe that they must commit suicide if they are captured. Failure to do so can lead to severe punishment for their families back, such as being sent to political prison camps.
The fate of the two North Korean POWs has been an issue of concern since their capture, with President Volodymyr Zelensky initially indicating that Kyiv wanted to exchange the captives for Ukrainian troops held by Russia.
After one of the POWs who reportedly expressed a desire to resettle in the South, rather than be repatriated, Seoul declared its willingness to accept him, though experts said legal hurdles could stand in the way.
The Ukrainian Embassy in Seoul previously told NK News that Ukraine strictly follows its international obligations and pays close attention to official requests from Seoul about the captured North Korean soldiers, stating that authorities are reviewing the matter.
North Korea and Russia have strengthened military cooperation since the start of the war in Ukraine in Feb. 2022, with the DPRK supplying large quantities of weapons and ammunition and thousands of troops under a mutual defense pact established last year.
Edited by Alannah Hill and Bryan Betts
18. David Maxwell discusses South Korea's military spending increase, the largest in over 15 years, which supports the goal of developing independent warfighting capabilities and transitioning operational control (OPCON).
My interview on the John Batchelor show with Gordon Chang. OPCON transition was not on the agenda, but like the good lawyer that Gordon is when I mentioned it he asked for the followup to explain it (I opened the door with my "testimony." Had I been more agile on my feet I would have responded with this more concise and simple explanation:
But there is no such thing as transfer of the wartime OPCON. There will only be a simple change of command of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command from a US General to a Korean General. The command relationships will remain the same. The ROK/US CFC will continue to answer to both nations equally as it does now. The US does not have OPCON of Korean forces nor will Korea have OPCON of US forces. The ROK/US CFC has OPCON of both forces for both the ROK and US governments who manage CFC through the permanent military committee.
Every Commander of the ROK/US CFC since 1978 has said that he works for both presidents equally. That will be the same when a ROK general takes command of CFC.
David Maxwell discusses South Korea's military spending increase, the largest in over 15 years, which supports the goal of developing independent warfighting capabilities and transitioning operational control (OPCON).
https://audioboom.com/posts/8785635-david-maxwell-discusses-south-korea-s-military-spending-increase-the-largest-in-over-15-years
David Maxwell discusses South Korea's military spending increase, the largest in over 15 years, which supports the goal of developing independent warfighting capabilities and transitioning operational control (OPCON). He clarifies that the complexity of OPCON transfer is often misunderstood as a sovereignty issue. Maxwell notes that North Korea is thriving due to growing support from China and Russia, making Kim Jong-un less motivated to normalize relations with the United States.
19. Fault Lines Daily Summary - October 2, 2025 (Korea "Plus")
Fault Lines Daily Summary - October 2, 2025
Daily news and analysis tracking the cracks and shifts at the fault lines of global power — with Korea at the epicenter.
https://hutchinsong.substack.com/p/fault-lines-daily-summary-october-5e6?utm
George Hutchinson
Oct 02, 2025
Surface Scan
South Korea begins October with APEC as its diplomatic focal point, treating the summit as the key venue to break the tariff deadlock with Washington while deferring military drills and cracking down on anti-China protests to ease tensions and manage Beijing’s sensitivities ahead of the summit. At home, labor unrest, cyber vulnerabilities, and political pressures pose challenges for Seoul as it seeks to project stability, even as record exports and market gains provide leverage. Regionally, Pyongyang is pulling closer to Beijing and Moscow, preparing a military parade and welcoming rare international validation just as Seoul probes for space to soften rhetoric on sensitive issues. Globally, fiscal dysfunction in Washington, deepening Russia–Iran coordination, and volatile energy markets highlight the risks of supply shocks and fragmented sanctions enforcement. These crosscurrents place Seoul at the epicenter of converging pressures, forcing it to balance alliance commitments, economic momentum, and domestic fragility on the eve of APEC.
Epicenter
Summary:
• APEC summit seen as key to ending Korea–U.S. tariff impasse — Experts and industry officials are urging Seoul to treat the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting (Oct 31–Nov 1) as a pivotal forum to finalize stalled trade negotiations with Washington. Major gaps remain between Seoul and Washington—including the U.S. demand for a $350 billion investment “up front.” Leaders hope sideline meetings at APEC will enable breakthrough discussions.
Source: Korea Times — APEC summit crucial for breaking tariff stalemate with U.S.
• Hoguk military exercise postponed for APEC — Reflecting this prioritization, the ROK Defense Ministry confirmed it will delay its large-scale Hoguk joint exercise until November to avoid overlapping with APEC. Officials stressed that readiness will not be compromised, but critics warn the delay could be read as a signal of hesitation at a time when deterrence must remain credible. The adjustment underscores how APEC diplomacy is increasingly dictating Seoul’s military calendar.
Source: Yonhap — S. Korea to postpone Hoguk military exercise to Nov. for APEC summit
• Visa-free policy boosts arrivals from Qingdao — Similar diplomatic prioritization is already yielding visible effects in another arena—tourism flows under Seoul’s visa-free program. China’s Xinhua reported a surge in travelers from Qingdao to South Korea. The early tourism bump offers proof of concept for Lee’s outreach to Beijing, but comes as domestic protests against the policy intensify.
Source: Xinhua — Qingdao in E China sees surge in travelers to S. Korea under its temporary visa-free policy
• Lee orders crackdown on anti-Chinese protests — In response to that unease, President Lee ordered ministries to stamp out anti-Chinese demonstrations, warning they damage South Korea’s international image and risk undercutting economic initiatives. The order reflects diplomatic sensitivities toward Beijing, with APEC looming as the next stage for showcasing stable relations.
Sources: Reuters — South Korea President Lee orders crackdown on anti-Chinese, anti-foreigner rallies; JoongAng Daily — Lee calls for crackdown on anti-Chinese rallies; Korea Times — President orders ministries to stamp out anti-China rallies, citing harm to nat’l image
• Airport labor unrest ahead of Chuseok — Domestic strain is not limited to anti-China protests. Airport workers at Incheon and other hubs are refusing overtime and staging strikes in the run-up to the Chuseok holiday, pressing demands for better wages and conditions. Though disruptions remain limited, the timing threatens public confidence in stability just as the government is trying to project order before APEC.
Sources: Chosun Ilbo — National Airport Workers Strike Ahead of Chuseok Holiday; Korea Times — Incheon airport’s security workers refuse overtime during Chuseok holiday
• Seoul reinforces security posture with OPCON and new assets — President Lee reaffirmed his pledge to “regain” wartime operational control and place Korea at the center of the combined defense posture with the U.S., framing the shift as essential to national security. Defense Minister Ahn underscored the message in meetings with U.S. officials on drone cooperation, while Seoul committed to a $2 billion purchase of Global 6500 surveillance aircraft. These moves illustrate how Seoul pairs OPCON transition with tangible alliance investments.
Sources: Hankyoreh — Lee vows to ‘regain’ OPCON, have Korea take lead in joint defense posture with US; Korea Times — Defense chief, US army secretary discuss alliance, drone cooperation; Stars & Stripes — South Korea agrees to $2 billion purchase of Global 6500 surveillance aircraft; Korea Times — Lee’s OPCON gamble
• Expanded U.S. visa access for Korean firms — Complementing the defense track, Washington agreed to allow Korean workers to perform installation and repair work in U.S. factories under B-1 and ESTA visas. The concession eases bottlenecks for Korean firms but falls short of broader reforms Seoul seeks.
Source: Hankyoreh — US to allow installation, repair work at factories under B-1 visa, ESTA after consultations with Korea
• Record exports lift markets — On the economic front, South Korea posted record monthly exports of $65.95 billion in September, led by semiconductors and AI demand, while the KOSPI broke 3,500 for the first time. Analysts welcomed the achievement but warned that U.S. tariff threats and global slowdown risks could still erode the gains. The upbeat export surge stands in sharp contrast to the political strains described earlier, giving Seoul both leverage and vulnerability.
Sources: Hankyoreh — Korea posts record $65.95 billion in exports in Sept. despite US tariff pressure; Korea Herald — Seoul shares break 3,500 for 1st time on chip rally; Maeil Business (Pulse) — Korea’s record exports are no cause for complacency
• Data center fallout deepens — Yet vulnerabilities persist at home. Authorities restored 110 online services after the Daejeon data center fire, but 125,000 officials’ records were lost and negligence is suspected after raids on NIRS offices. The scale and depth of the crisis have exposed serious damage to South Korea’s cyber infrastructure, reinforcing long-standing concerns about vulnerability to North Korean cyber operations. Beyond the technical fallout, the episode is now tarnishing Seoul’s global image just as it seeks to present resilience at APEC.
Sources: Korea Times — 110 online gov’t services restored after data center fire; Chosun Ilbo — G-Drive Fire Destroys 125,000 Officials’ Data; Chosun Ilbo — Lithium Battery Fire Traced to Insufficient Discharge Before Removal; Korea Herald — Police raid NIRS offices over Daejeon data center fire; Chosun Ilbo — Police Probe Fire at National Information Resources Service, Suspect Negligence
Impact:
South Korea is entering APEC with diplomacy at the forefront. The summit is seen as the key venue to break the tariff deadlock with Washington. To reduce tensions during APEC, Seoul is postponing its Hoguk exercise until later in November. The visa-free program, already producing tangible gains in Chinese tourism, is simultaneously sparking protests that forced Lee to crack down in order to manage Beijing’s sensitivities ahead of APEC. Domestic strains are compounded by airport labor unrest, while security policy tilts toward great self-reliance through accelerated OPCON transfer, new surveillance assets, and closer U.S. defense consultations. Expanded U.S. visa access for Korean workers offers some relief to industrial bottlenecks, even as trade barriers remain unresolved. Record exports and a buoyant stock market give Seoul leverage, but tariff risks and slowing global demand temper confidence. Against these gains, the Daejeon data center fire has exposed deep cyber vulnerabilities while damaging Seoul’s cyber infrastructure image just as it seeks to showcase resilience leading to APEC. These dynamics collectively reveal Seoul attempting to juggle diplomatic opportunity, alliance calibration, and domestic fragility all at once, with APEC as the crucible where success or failure will resonate most.
Shifting Plates
Summary:
• Seoul looks to China’s constructive role in inter-Korean ties — Prime Minister Kim Min-seok expressed hope that Beijing could contribute positively to easing inter-Korean tensions, highlighting China’s enduring leverage in regional stability. His comments set the stage for Seoul’s broader effort to manage relations with Beijing while sustaining its alliance posture with Washington and Tokyo.
Source: Yonhap — PM voices hope for China’s positive contribution to inter-Korean relations
• Unification Ministry mulls renaming NK human rights center — In that same vein of calibration, Seoul is reviewing whether to rename the North Korean Human Rights Records Center in an effort to reduce diplomatic friction with Pyongyang. The adjustment illustrates how Seoul is weighing symbolic steps to keep a pathway to inter-Korean dialogue possible.
Source: Chosun Ilbo — Exclusive: Ministry of Unification Reviews Renaming North Korean Human Rights Center
• North Korea leans further on Beijing — Yet even as Seoul moderates, Pyongyang is doubling down: North Korea’s foreign minister pledged to expand diplomatic exchanges and practical cooperation with China, casting the partnership as a foundation for resisting external pressure. This tightening embrace underscores the divergence between Seoul’s hopes for Beijing’s constructive role and Pyongyang’s reliance on China as a shield.
Source: JoongAng Daily — North Korea’s FM vows to bolster diplomatic exchanges, cooperation with China
• Pyongyang strengthens military partnership with Moscow — Reinforcing that tilt, North Korea’s defense chief traveled to Moscow and declared “full support” for Russia, describing the two countries as “closely united in bloody battles.” The meeting highlighted how Pyongyang is embedding itself in the Russia–China camp just as Seoul is striving to balance great-power ties.
Sources: Reuters — Russian, North Korean defence ministers meet; Yonhap — N. Korean defense chief voices ‘full support’ for Russia in meeting with Moscow counterpart; JoongAng Daily — North Korea pledges support for Russia amid deepening military ties; Yonhap — N. Korea’s defense chief says Pyongyang, Moscow closely united in ‘bloody battles’
• Military parade preparations underway — At the same time, Pyongyang is preparing a domestic display of strength: South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that North Korea is organizing a large military parade for the Workers’ Party anniversary on October 10. Such events serve several purposes, including bolstering internal legitimacy while showcasing military capabilities to external partners and adversaries.
Sources: Korea Times — N. Korea seen as preparing for military parade marking party anniversary: JCS; JoongAng Daily — North Korea seen preparing for military parade for Workers’ Party anniversary
• Laos leader to attend NK party anniversary — In a show of validation, KCNA reported that Laotian President Thongloun Sisoulith will visit Pyongyang to attend the Workers’ Party anniversary celebrations. The rare visit by a foreign head of state underscores Pyongyang’s efforts to break out of isolation and highlight international recognition of its party and leadership.
Source: Yonhap — Laos’ leader to visit N. Korea to mark key party anniv.: KCNA
Impact:
These developments underscore how the regional balance is shifting in ways that complicate Seoul’s diplomacy. Prime Minister Kim Min-seok’s appeal for China’s constructive role and the Unification Ministry’s review of sensitive human rights language show Seoul probing for space to keep dialogue open, even as it reinforces its U.S. security alliance. Yet Pyongyang is moving in sharper, opposite direction, tightening its embrace of Beijing and deepening military solidarity with Moscow, signaling a hardened adversarial bloc. Preparations for a large-scale parade and the participation of Laos’ president give North Korea both a domestic stage to project strength and an international platform for validation. For South Korea, the juxtaposition is stark: while it courts Chinese cooperation and softens rhetoric to preserve diplomatic options, Pyongyang is consolidating external support and showcasing its alignment with the Russia–China axis, narrowing the room for Seoul’s balancing act.
Global Ripples
Summary:
• Markets cautious despite U.S. shutdown — Asian equities advanced as investors looked past the federal government shutdown and focused on dovish rate expectations. Yet analysts warn the shutdown is becoming a slow-boil political crisis, raising deeper concerns about U.S. fiscal credibility and governance dysfunction that could eventually spill into global markets. Such uncertainty also casts doubt on Washington’s long-term capacity to underwrite security commitments, a vulnerability closely watched in Europe as the Ukraine war drags on.
Sources: AP via The Hill — Asian shares advance as investors shrug off the US shutdown; CNN — The government shutdown is a slow-boil political crisis
• Ukraine targets Russian energy hubs — Ukrainian drone and missile strikes on oil refineries have caused fuel shortages inside Russia, tightening pressure on Moscow’s wartime economy. The surge in attacks illustrates Kyiv’s shift toward targeting infrastructure critical to Russia’s war sustainability, while also intensifying risks of escalation. Because oil refineries are central to global supply, the strikes carry potential knock-on effects for energy markets, reminding investors that disruptions in Russia’s fuel system can ripple far beyond the battlefield. These risks are magnified by Washington’s growing role in enabling such long-range operations.
Source: BBC — Surge in Ukrainian attacks on oil refineries sparks Russian fuel shortages
• Long-range escalation risks — The conflict is further intensifying with Washington pledging to provide Ukraine intelligence support for long-range strikes on Russian energy facilities, even as Moscow warned the U.S. against supplying Tomahawk missiles. This confrontation highlights the sharpening boundaries of the war and sets the stage for wider repercussions in global energy flows.
Sources: Newsweek — Russia Issues Blunt Warning to Trump on Tomahawks for Ukraine; Reuters — US to give Ukraine intelligence on long-range energy targets in Russia
• China reins in shadow fleet — Those energy flows are now facing fresh disruption from Asia: Beijing has imposed restrictions on the “shadow fleet” transporting sanctioned Russian and Iranian oil. The move complicates Moscow and Tehran’s ability to bypass Western controls and signals Beijing’s willingness to calibrate its support to avoid secondary sanctions or reputational costs. The shift dovetails with Russia’s push to deepen alternative partnerships elsewhere.
Source: Newsweek — How China’s ‘Shadow Fleet’ Ban Deals Blow to Allies Russia and Iran
• Moscow and Tehran tighten partnership — The Russian Foreign Ministry hailed the entry into force of a new Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Iran, describing it as a milestone in deepening ties. In parallel, Russia denounced “illegal” Western sanctions on Iran as exacerbating the nuclear crisis, further binding Moscow and Tehran in opposition to Western pressure. This consolidation places renewed urgency on Western efforts to police global oil markets.
Sources: Russian MFA — Foreign Ministry statement on Russia–Iran Strategic Partnership Treaty; Economic Times— Russia says ‘illegal’ sanctions on Iran deepen crisis over its nuclear program
• G7 pledges to tighten oil enforcement — G7 nations responded by announcing they will target firms and countries continuing to expand purchases of Russian oil, underscoring the West’s determination to restrict Moscow’s revenues. Yet enforcement challenges remain considerable, leaving gaps that major importers continue to exploit.
Source: Reuters — G7 nations say they will target those continuing to increase Russian oil purchases
• India’s oil calculus — New trade data showed only a slight dip in India’s Russian oil imports in September, with Russia remaining New Delhi’s largest supplier despite U.S. pressure. The figures highlight how sanctions enforcement collides with energy imperatives in major emerging markets, leaving Russia with resilient revenue streams despite Western tightening.
Sources: Indian Express — Slight dip in India’s Russian oil imports in September, but no meaningful impact of US pressure visible yet; TASS — Russia remains India’s largest oil supplier in September
Impact:
Global currents are converging in ways that directly touch South Korea’s economic vulnerabilities. The U.S. shutdown not only shakes investor confidence but raises questions about Washington’s long-term capacity to sustain security commitments, a vulnerability Ukraine is closely tracking. Kyiv’s strikes on Russian oil refineries, now paired with U.S. intelligence support for long-range targeting, tighten the pressure on Moscow but also risk turbulence in global energy markets that Seoul relies on. China’s decision to restrict its shadow fleet further constrains Russian and Iranian oil flows, while Moscow and Tehran’s new strategic partnership seeks to counteract Western sanctions, reinforcing a polarized energy landscape. G7 vows to tighten enforcement highlight Western resolve, yet India’s steady intake of Russian oil underlines how market demand often trumps political pressure. For South Korea, the result is an increasingly fragmented global oil regime where supply shocks, sanctions loopholes, and fiscal instability in Washington all interact to shape both export opportunities and energy security risks.
Convergence
APEC has become the lens through which South Korea’s multiple pressures converge. Diplomatically, Seoul is betting on the summit to break its tariff impasse with Washington, while also postponing military drills and clamping down on anti-China protests to ease tensions and preserve stability with Beijing. Regionally, Pyongyang is showcasing its embrace of China and Russia through military displays and rare international validation, undercutting Seoul’s efforts to keep dialogue open while reinforcing its U.S. alliance. Globally, Washington’s fiscal dysfunction, escalating strikes on Russia’s energy network, and fragmented oil sanctions add volatility that directly touches Korea’s export engine and energy security. For Seoul, the path to APEC success is narrow: it must show progress on trade talks with Washington, manage sensitivities with Beijing, and contain domestic strains, with the summit serving as a test of its economic diplomacy, internal stability, and alliance credibility.
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20. Why we must take a human rights up-front approach to North Korea
Human rights are not only a moral imperative, they are a national security issue, Kim Jong Un must deny the human rights of the Korean people in the north to develop his nuclear weapons and to remain in power.
Voices Oct. 1, 2025 / 5:04 PM
Why we must take a human rights up-front approach to North Korea
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/10/01/perspective-human-rights-north-korea/9541759349459/
By David Maxwell
History shows that human rights pressure directed at Kim Jong Un could delegitimize Pyongyang’s claim to absolute authority. Photo by KNCA/EPA
Oct. 1 (UPI) -- North Korea remains one of the world's most repressive regimes, systematically violating the rights of its 26 million people. For decades, U.S. and allied policy has focused primarily on nuclear weapons and deterrence while supporting the amazing "Miracle on the Han."
Yet, without addressing the underlying conditions of repression in the north, such approaches are incomplete and unsustainable. A "human rights up-front" strategy is not only a moral obligation, but a strategic necessity.
The experience of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, especially the provisions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Basket III, offers an instructive model.
Although dismissed at the time as symbolic, Basket III's human rights commitments ultimately empowered dissidents and eroded the legitimacy of communist regimes across Eastern Europe. Applying these lessons to North Korea suggests that centering human rights in policy could catalyze change on the Korean Peninsula.
The precedent of OSCE Basket III
The Helsinki Final Act consisted of three "baskets": security in Europe, economic, scientific and environmental cooperation, and human rights and humanitarian concerns. Basket III affirmed commitments to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, information and family reunification.
Though initially viewed as a concession to Western publics, Basket III proved transformative. Groups such as Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and Poland's Solidarity invoked Helsinki's language to hold their governments accountable.
Western governments and NGOs amplified these voices through the Helsinki monitoring groups, laying moral and political foundations for democratic transitions in the 1980s. As Daniel C. Thomas observed, "the most durable impact of Helsinki was its legitimation of human rights discourse and practice in Eastern Europe."
The lesson is clear: Embedding human rights into diplomatic frameworks can create space for gradual, but profound, change even in closed authoritarian systems.
North Korea's human rights record
North Korea presents one of the gravest cases of systemic abuse today. The 2014 U.N. Commission of Inquiry concluded that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea commits "systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations" amounting to crimes against humanity. These include arbitrary detention, political prison camps (kwan-li-so), enforced disappearances, restrictions on movement and deliberate policies contributing to starvation.
The U.S. North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004, reauthorized in 2018, affirms that promoting human rights is integral to U.S. policy on the peninsula. Yet, in practice, nuclear negotiations have often sidelined human rights concerns. By failing to link human rights with security, past diplomacy has left the regime's internal structures of repression untouched.
Why a human tights-up-front strategy matters
• Moral imperative: The international community cannot ignore crimes against humanity. To do so undermines the credibility of liberal democracies.
• Strategic leverage: Human rights pressure delegitimizes Pyongyang's claim to absolute authority. As in Eastern Europe, international recognition of individual dignity can empower latent civic forces.
• Alliance cohesion: Prioritizing rights aligns with democratic values shared by South Korea, Japan, Europe and the United States. A human rights agenda prevents diplomacy from devolving into narrow great-power bargaining.
• Path to unification: A future unified Korea cannot be built on repression. Addressing rights now lays groundwork for transitional justice and national reconciliation.
Practical applications of Basket III lessons
Drawing on the Helsinki experience, a rights-up-front approach to North Korea should include:-
• Embedding human rights in negotiations: Any new diplomatic framework -- whether bilateral, trilateral or multilateral -- must include explicit human rights provisions alongside arms control. For example, discussions on sanctions relief could be conditioned on measurable steps such as allowing family reunifications or humanitarian access.
• Information and influence operations: Just as Helsinki legitimized dissident publications, information flows into North Korea are critical. Expanding radio, digital platforms and content-sharing supports the "right to seek, receive and impart information" recognized by the U.N.'s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which North Korea is a party.
• Institutionalizing monitoring mechanisms: Building on the OSCE's Helsinki monitoring groups, allies could establish joint "North Korea Human Rights Forums" to track compliance, amplify defector testimony and ensure rights remain central to policy.-
• Accountability and transitional justice: Continued support for U.N. documentation, preparation for future tribunals and sanctions targeting perpetrators ensure that crimes do not fade into impunity. This mirrors how Helsinki created long-term accountability pressures on Eastern bloc elites.
Opposing views
Skeptics warn that pressing human rights risks derailing nuclear talks. But the Helsinki experience shows the opposite: Moral clarity gave diplomacy staying power and legitimacy. Others argue that Pyongyang is impervious to rights discourse. Yet, the same was said of communist regimes in the 1970s. Seeds of dissent often germinate invisibly until conditions shift. By investing now in human rights discourse, the international community prepares the ground for future transformation.
Others will argue that neither the Lee nor Trump administration have any inclination to address human rights in North Korea because it could imperil other initiatives they are considering. However, just as President Ronald Reagan told Mikhail Gorbachev to "tear down this wall" against the advice of advisers, Lee and Trump should speak in unison to Kim Jong Un and say, "open up this DMZ." Nor must civil society be deterred by administration policies.
Conclusion: Toward a free and unified Korea
The OSCE's Basket III reminds us that human rights are not secondary to security. They are inseparable from it. For North Korea, a human rights up-front strategy serves moral and strategic ends -- affirming the dignity of the Korean people in the north, while weakening the foundations of dictatorship.
As the U.N. Commission of Inquiry emphasized, "the gravity, scale and nature of these violations reveal a state that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world." Confronting such abuses is not optional. It is central to the pursuit of peace, stability, and ultimately, a free and unified Korea -- a United Republic of Korea.
David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation, where he focuses on a free and unified Korea. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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