Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

Prime Minister Winston Churchill said: “You have enemies? Good. That means you’ve stood up for something sometime in your life.”

Gen. Donovan said he had greater enemies in Washington than Hitler had in Europe.

Be Like Donovan.

"People demand freedom of speech as a compensation for the freedom of thought, which they seldom use."

– Soren Kierkegaard

“After you died I could not hold a funeral,

And so my life became a funeral.”

After you died I couldn’t hold a funeral,

So these eyes that once beheld you became a shrine.

These ears that once heard your voice became a shrine.

These lungs that once inhaled your breath became a shrine.

― Han Kang, Human Acts. 2024 Nobel Peace Prize 2024

1. U.S. Investigates Intelligence Leak About Israel’s Plans for Attacking Iran

2. Pentagon Chief Arrives in Kyiv Without Any Sign of Budging on Ukraine’s Biggest Weapons Requests

3. After Sinwar, the ICC Stands Exposed

4. How the U.S. Should Respond to the Death of Yahya Sinwar

5. Propaganda war: Israel, Hamas battle over final images of Yahya Sinwar

6. Opinion The election is a referendum on America’s role in the world

7. Israel Killed Sinwar by Forcing Him From the Tunnels

8. Sinwar’s fatal mistake: Hamas leader refused Arab offer to escape Gaza- WSJ

9. Israel targets Hezbollah's financial arm and begins striking Beirut

10. Strike on Netanyahu home ‘a signal’ Iran proxies not incapacitated, expert says

11. Ukraine Must Turn the Tide Before It Can Negotiate

12. A U.S. Reset With Mexico Is Still Possible

13. The West Has to Believe that Democracy Will Prevail

14. Navy pronounces missing EA-18G Growler jet aviators deceased

15. How one warship thwarting a Houthi attack a year ago changed the Navy

16. US, Canada sail through Taiwan Strait days after Chinese exercise

17. New cases of political violence roil U.S. ahead of contentious election

18. Should retired generals and admirals be organizing into partisan groups to influence the election?

19. Future of US defense depends on culture shift prioritizing innovation

20. How Climate Change Is Reshaping Global Security And The Military

1. U.S. Investigates Intelligence Leak About Israel’s Plans for Attacking Iran

Not good.

Excerpts:

The reports describe the types of aircraft and munitions the Israeli military is expected to use in an attack, which the documents say could come without additional warning.

Adding to U.S. concerns, the classified assessments were disseminated by a pro-Iran site, Middle East Spectator, which says it received them from an anonymous source.

Among the concerns for U.S. investigators is “the potential for further leaks of highly classified documents,” said Jamil Jaffer, a former senior official in the Justice Department’s national-security division.

The National Security Council referred questions to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which declined to comment. House Speaker Mike Johnson said in an interview with CNN that he has been informed that a U.S. government investigation is under way.

U.S. Investigates Intelligence Leak About Israel’s Plans for Attacking Iran

Two highly classified reports about Israel’s preparations for striking Iran were posted online by a pro-Iran site

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/u-s-investigating-intelligence-leak-about-israels-plans-for-attacking-iran-e6b53968?mod=latest_headlines

By Michael R. Gordon

and Dustin Volz

Oct. 20, 2024 1:41 pm ET

Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, right foreground, met with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, left foreground, at the Pentagon in June. Photo: Saul Loeb/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

WASHINGTON—The U.S. is investigating the leak of top-secret American documents that show Israel military preparations for an expected strike on Iran, U.S. officials said Sunday.

The two leaked reports were prepared last week by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which analyzes imagery gathered by American reconnaissance satellites and other intelligence.

Neither document indicates Israel’s potential targets, and one cautioned that the agency’s analysts “cannot definitely predict the scale and scope of a strike on Iran.”

The reports describe the types of aircraft and munitions the Israeli military is expected to use in an attack, which the documents say could come without additional warning.

Adding to U.S. concerns, the classified assessments were disseminated by a pro-Iran site, Middle East Spectator, which says it received them from an anonymous source.

Among the concerns for U.S. investigators is “the potential for further leaks of highly classified documents,” said Jamil Jaffer, a former senior official in the Justice Department’s national-security division.

The National Security Council referred questions to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which declined to comment. House Speaker Mike Johnson said in an interview with CNN that he has been informed that a U.S. government investigation is under way.

Smoke from an Israeli bombardment in southern Lebanon on Saturday. Photo: Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The leak comes as Israeli officials say they are planning a retaliatory attack on Iran and the Biden administration is renewing its push to bring an end to the fighting in Gaza.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office didn’t respond to a request for comment on whether the disclosures might affect Israel’s plans for its strike, which is intended as a response to an Iranian attack against Israel earlier this month with about 120 ballistic missiles.

The U.S. has urged Israel to avoid targeting Iran’s oil and nuclear infrastructure and has moved to buttress Israel’s defense by sending its ally an advanced antimissile system.

The leak raised concerns among some Israeli officials about the U.S. ability to protect closely held information that affects its ally.

An Israeli attack helicopter flies over northern Israel near the border with Lebanon. Photo: Jalaa Marey/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The documents began circulating online last week after Middle East Spectator posted them within a Telegram channel and on X. It described them as a disclosure about the steps “the Zionist regime” is taking to prepare for an attack on Iran.

Middle East Spectator describes itself as an “open-source news aggregator” that is staffed by independent journalists. A number of Middle East officials and experts say that it is known for promoting pro-Iranian information.

Several former U.S. intelligence officials said the documents bore hallmarks of authentic classified files, including their verbiage and formatting. But some said they might have been edited or pasted together from different pages.

The Israeli Air Force preparations for a strike on Iran involved air-launched ballistic missiles and covert drones, which are use to carry out surveillance over Iran and throughout the region, according to one of the documents. The Israeli military, one noted, sought to conceal some of this activity by placing screens over shelters for F-15 aircraft, among other steps.

The remains of a missile in Arad, Israel. Photo: Erik Marmor/Getty Images

The Israelis conducted a large-scale air exercise on Oct. 15, which one of the documents said was likely intended to practice midair refueling and search and rescue, in the event pilots are shot down. Other steps taken by Israel include dispersing naval vessels and some of its military aircraft.

Middle East Spectator said it first became aware of the files when they were shared in a Telegram channel with 7,000 members, where it believes the source was likely a participant. It added: “We have no connection to the original source, which we assume to be a whistleblower within the U.S. Department of Defense.”

In a statement late Saturday evening on X, Middle East Spectator said it was “not aware of any additional leaked classified U.S. documents.”

Nancy A. Youssef, Brett Forrest, Lara Seligman and Summer Said contributed to this article.

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Dustin Volz at dustin.volz@wsj.com

2. Pentagon Chief Arrives in Kyiv Without Any Sign of Budging on Ukraine’s Biggest Weapons Requests

Excerpts:

Some officials argued for limiting U.S. weapons to Ukraine to keep Moscow from escalating in response. But Austin’s main concern has been addressing Ukraine’s urgent needs first—usually ammunition and air-defense interceptors. Facing funding limits from Congress, Austin had to pick and choose what was sent, he said.

“Blinken sees it as a simple or almost moral decision, where Austin is weaving in the practicalities,” said Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Pentagon officials argue that Austin deserves credit for Ukraine’s battlefield successes. Ukraine has inflicted 600,000 casualties on Russian forces since the beginning of the war, despite Russia’s significant advantage in artillery ammunition, said a senior DOD official. That is due in part to the quality of the weapons the West has provided, including giving priority to precise, NATO-standard 155mm artillery shells, the official said.

“Certainly we focus on just how hard the battlefield situation is,” the official said. “But we also have to have that perspective of, you know, we did help Ukraine defeat Russia’s strategic objective” of conquering Ukraine.

Pentagon Chief Arrives in Kyiv Without Any Sign of Budging on Ukraine’s Biggest Weapons Requests

Lloyd Austin has helped bolster Ukraine’s fight against Russia but has argued for limiting military aid

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/pentagon-chief-arrives-in-kyiv-without-any-sign-of-budging-on-ukraines-biggest-weapons-requests-c46c7a16?mod=latest_headlines

By Lara Seligman

Oct. 21, 2024 1:34 am ET

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has led the Western response to the war since its early days. Photo: francois walschaerts/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

KYIV—Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin arrived in Kyiv on Monday bearing a message of strong U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s war effort but with no new military assistance or permission for its forces to use long-range missiles inside Russia.

Austin, a former four-star Army general, has led the Western response to the conflict since the early days of the war, coordinating more than $64 billion in U.S. military aid for Kyiv and tens of billions more from Europe.

But his visit to Kyiv, an unannounced stop that will likely be his last to the Ukrainian capital as Pentagon chief, underscored the continuing debate over whether the Biden administration—and Austin himself—has hobbled Ukraine’s war effort with a cautious approach to providing American-made weapons and restrictions on their use.

The administration has refused to budge on Ukraine’s two primary asks: allowing its forces to strike into Russia with U.S.-supplied weapons, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership.

Austin arrived in Kyiv with no major announcements, aides said.

Austin’s incremental approach has allowed Ukraine to survive but not to shift the war decisively, critics say. With more of the weapons Ukraine asked for in the early days of the conflict, according to the critics, Kyiv wouldn’t be losing ground today on the front lines—a claim Austin’s defenders reject.

Ukrainian servicemen ride atop a tank in Ukraine’s Donetsk region. The country asking the West for more weapons. Photo: roman pilipey/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The notion that Ukraine would be winning if only the U.S. had supplied more advanced weapons is “one of the greatest myths in Washington,” said Colin Kahl, who served as the Pentagon’s top policy official until July 2023.

“It engages in a series of magical thinking, where you can move things instantaneously, give Ukrainians things they are not trained on, have them appear out of thin air, and it assumes there is no trade-offs,” Kahl said.

Those trade-offs are likely to intensify no matter who wins the White House in November.

If Vice President Kamala Harris is elected, she will likely carry on President Biden’s policies, but could face cuts in funds for Ukraine if Republicans retain control of the House and win a majority in the Senate. Donald Trump, has vowed to end the war quickly if elected and recently called Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky “one of the greatest salesmen I’ve ever seen” for extracting military aid from Congress.

In Kyiv, Austin is set to meet with Zelensky and Defense Minister Rustem Umerov. His visit comes as Ukrainian forces are losing ground in the East, and Zelensky has struggled to persuade the West to support his “victory plan,” which includes requests for additional weapons as well as NATO membership.

The Biden administration last week announced its latest package of military aid for Ukraine, including $425 million worth of air defenses, air-to-ground missiles, armored vehicles and other munitions.

The Biden administration’s overly cautious approach has often been too little, too late, said Heather Conley, senior adviser at the German Marshall Fund.

“If we would’ve been clear and upfront and given them full capabilities, would that have sent a different message to [Russian President Vladimir] Putin? Maybe he would have recalculated a bit what he was doing,” said Conley. “But he saw delay, hesitancy.”

Ukrainian servicemen fired artillery toward Russian positions in the Donetsk region earlier this year. Photo: roman pilipey/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Austin has often been the voice of restraint, citing concerns about dipping too far into U.S. weapons stockpiles, the unsuitability of certain systems for Ukraine’s terrain or climate, and the difficulties of training Ukrainian forces, according to current and former U.S. officials.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken has typically argued for sending more equipment faster, the officials said. Biden has usually sided with Austin.

“We’ve watched this fight evolve over time, and each time it does evolve, we have risen to the occasion to meet the needs, to make sure that they were effective on the battlefield, and they have been effective,” Austin told a small group of reporters traveling with him to Kyiv.

Austin initially opposed providing the U.S. Army’s modern Abrams tanks, arguing they would be too difficult for the Ukrainians to maintain in the field. In January 2023, the Pentagon reversed course and recommended Biden send 31 tanks.

The decision prompted Germany to begin sending its Leopard tanks, giving Ukraine a small but effective armor force.

The Pentagon also held out sending Ukraine long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems because of worries about keeping enough in U.S. arsenals. When the administration sent the missiles in March, it did so secretly and in limited numbers. It still refuses to allow Kyiv to fire them into Russia.

Some officials argued for limiting U.S. weapons to Ukraine to keep Moscow from escalating in response. But Austin’s main concern has been addressing Ukraine’s urgent needs first—usually ammunition and air-defense interceptors. Facing funding limits from Congress, Austin had to pick and choose what was sent, he said.

“Blinken sees it as a simple or almost moral decision, where Austin is weaving in the practicalities,” said Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Pentagon officials argue that Austin deserves credit for Ukraine’s battlefield successes. Ukraine has inflicted 600,000 casualties on Russian forces since the beginning of the war, despite Russia’s significant advantage in artillery ammunition, said a senior DOD official. That is due in part to the quality of the weapons the West has provided, including giving priority to precise, NATO-standard 155mm artillery shells, the official said.

“Certainly we focus on just how hard the battlefield situation is,” the official said. “But we also have to have that perspective of, you know, we did help Ukraine defeat Russia’s strategic objective” of conquering Ukraine.

Ahead of Ukraine’s underwhelming counteroffensive last summer, American military officials urged the Ukrainians to concentrate their forces in an effort to penetrate Russia’s defenses in a single thrust. Instead, Ukraine dispersed its forces at points along the front line and failed to make significant gains.

Even if Ukrainian officials haven’t always heeded U.S. advice and still bristle at restrictions on military aid, their military has managed to limit Russia’s advances, a task that once appeared almost impossible.

Write to Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com

Corrections & Amplifications

Colin Kahl served as the Pentagon’s top policy official until July 2023. An earlier version of this article incorrectly said he left the position in July 2024. (Corrected on Oct. 21)

3. After Sinwar, the ICC Stands Exposed

Excerpts:

There was never any chance of Sinwar standing trial in The Hague or being deterred by the prospect. While an ICC indictment means something to a democracy like Israel, it is meaningless to terrorists who have no respect for international opinion, and already live in hiding to escape being killed as illegal enemy combatants under the traditional rules of war.

Mr. Khan knows all of this. He rushed to seek arrest warrants, before seriously investigating or even talking to the Israelis, as he had promised U.S. Senators he would, for its effect on Israel. When Mr. Khan was dangling his threat, the goal seemed to be to deter Israel from entering Hamas’s stronghold of Rafah. After Israel went in, Mr. Khan made his announcement to try to stop the tanks.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proved him wrong by safely evacuating Rafah’s civilians. Then Israel uncovered tunnels to Egypt, hostages and now Sinwar in Rafah. The Hamas No. 1 seems to have been flushed out of his tunnels by Israel’s military pressure.

Mr. Khan was wrong about Rafah, as were President Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris, who said she had “studied the maps.” They blocked arms to Israel over it. But Rafah’s centrality to Israel’s mission and to the chance of peace in postwar Gaza is now clear.

After Sinwar, the ICC Stands Exposed

Israel has stripped the International Criminal Court of its fig leaf.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/after-sinwar-the-icc-stands-exposed-hamas-middle-east-36dad43b?mod=latest_headlines

By The Editorial Board

Oct. 20, 2024 4:57 pm ET

Karim Ahmad Khan, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), at a conference in 2023 Photo: mykola tys/Shutterstock

The death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar has left many so-called moderates in grief. The Palestine Liberation Organization’s executive committee, led by President Mahmoud Abbas, offered condolences on Sinwar’s “martyrdom,” calling the mastermind of the Oct. 7 massacre a “great national leader.” Does anyone think this group, which the Biden Administration would have rule postwar Gaza, would thwart terrorism?

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also saluted Sinwar—while receiving Iran’s foreign minister and Hamas’s top terrorists-in-suits for meetings. Another day in the life of a NATO ally.

Hardest hit by Sinwar’s death, however, should be Karim Ahmad Khan, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Recall that Mr. Khan had claimed to be evenhanded by seeking arrest warrants for a trio of Hamas leaders—Yahya Sinwar, Ismail Haniyeh and Mohammed Deif—alongside Israel’s Prime Minister and Defense Minister.

The moral equivalence was offensive, but now that all three Hamas chiefs have been killed, Israel has stripped Mr. Khan of his fig leaf. He is prosecuting Israelis alone for their defensive war to free hostages and defeat the death squads who want to repeat their Oct. 7 attack.

There was never any chance of Sinwar standing trial in The Hague or being deterred by the prospect. While an ICC indictment means something to a democracy like Israel, it is meaningless to terrorists who have no respect for international opinion, and already live in hiding to escape being killed as illegal enemy combatants under the traditional rules of war.

Mr. Khan knows all of this. He rushed to seek arrest warrants, before seriously investigating or even talking to the Israelis, as he had promised U.S. Senators he would, for its effect on Israel. When Mr. Khan was dangling his threat, the goal seemed to be to deter Israel from entering Hamas’s stronghold of Rafah. After Israel went in, Mr. Khan made his announcement to try to stop the tanks.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proved him wrong by safely evacuating Rafah’s civilians. Then Israel uncovered tunnels to Egypt, hostages and now Sinwar in Rafah. The Hamas No. 1 seems to have been flushed out of his tunnels by Israel’s military pressure.

Mr. Khan was wrong about Rafah, as were President Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris, who said she had “studied the maps.” They blocked arms to Israel over it. But Rafah’s centrality to Israel’s mission and to the chance of peace in postwar Gaza is now clear.

Yet the White House is still protecting the ICC. Over Mr. Biden’s objections, 42 House Democrats joined Republicans in early June to pass a bill sanctioning the ICC. The measure likely could pass the Senate, but Sens. Chuck Schumer and Ben Cardin have done the White House’s bidding and sat on it, despite pressure by Sen. Jim Risch and other Republicans.

Mr. Schumer promised bipartisan negotiations on an ICC sanctions bill. He never delivered, so the U.S. does nothing as the ICC expands its jurisdiction and stands poised to take up Hamas’s political struggle against Israel.

How the U.S. Should Respond to the Death of Yahya Sinwar

It’s time to put pressure on Qatar, a U.S. ally that has provided refuge to Hamas leaders.

thedispatch.com · by Jonathan Schanzer and Natalie Ecanow · October 21, 2024

Hamas chief and October 7 mastermind Yahya Sinwar is dead. In contrast with the recent series of strikes that culminated in the death of Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, this was not one of those signature Israeli pinpoint operations driven by intelligence. It was dumb luck that a handful of young Israeli soldiers on patrol stumbled upon the most wanted man in Gaza. Regardless, the momentum of this war has unmistakably shifted.

And now it’s crucial to capitalize on this shift in momentum. That’s not likely to happen through garden variety calls for diplomacy by the Biden administration. The proper move for the White House is to play hardball—and not with Israel, for a change. Rather, it’s with Qatar.

First, some background: Sinwar became Hamas’ leader in Gaza in 2017. He consolidated his control of the group in August following the assassination of Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh, adding the political and military files to his portfolio—all while running the war from underground tunnels.

In consolidating power, Sinwar snubbed Hamas’ de facto foreign minister, Khaled Meshal, who had been expected to succeed Haniyeh. Operating out of Hamas’ external headquarters in Qatar, Meshal appeared destined for obscurity. What a difference a few months can make. Meshal today is among the last remaining recognizable figures on the Hamas org chart. It’s likely (although not certain) that he will reemerge as one of the group’s top leaders.

Meshal is a founding member of Hamas. His decades-long career in the terrorist organization has taken him from Kuwait to Jordan (where he survived an Israeli assassination attempt), to Syria (where he became head of the group’s politburo), and finally to Qatar, where Meshal emerged as the group’s chief envoy.

Meshal has lived like royalty in Qatar since 2012. Reports suggest that he has amassed billions of dollars while he has been based in the tiny Gulf emirate. Remarkably, the U.S. government, under both Democrat and Republican administrations, has failed to call upon Qatar to freeze his assets and arrest him. The logic for doing so is no great mystery. Meshal is a U.S. specially designated global terrorist (SDGT), a designation that bears clear legal and economic consequences.

And yet, even as Qatar continued to host Meshal and a gaggle of other Hamas leaders, the Biden administration bestowed upon the regime in Doha the distinction of “major non-NATO ally.” The White House also extended the lease on Al Udeid, the American air base in Qatar, this past year, as Hamas leaders based there continued to reject ceasefire deals and refused to release the Israeli hostages held by their counterparts in Gaza. This was all infuriating. But Sinwar’s death gives the U.S. an opportunity to make up for lost time and compel Qatar to act like a true ally and expel one of the world’s top terrorists. Doha should be forced to freeze Meshal’s assets and then extradite him to the U.S. or Israel. Meshal’s inclusion on the SDGT list justifies such action on its own, as do the terrorism, murder conspiracy, and sanctions-evasion charges that the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed against him in September. And just last month, Meshal encouraged Palestinians in the West Bank to return to “attacks of self-sacrifice”—suicide bombings—against Israelis.

But before Meshal is sent elsewhere to account for his crimes, the Qataris should sit him down in front of a camera at the Al-Jazeera headquarters in Doha. The Qatar-controlled television station has been cheerleading for Hamas for the last 13 months—if not the last 28 years. Meshal must be compelled to surrender unconditionally on behalf of Hamas and to call for the release of the remaining 101 hostages (seven of whom are American citizens).

Meshal’s surrender would not mean the end of Hamas, but it would mean the end of war in Gaza. Moreover, Meshal’s surrender could jumpstart the process of de-Hamasification in Gaza, which is a core Israeli objective and an essential aspect of postwar planning and reconstruction.

The war will not end until Hamas waves the white flag. And Qatar is the key. But if the Biden administration waits too long to wield its influence, the Qataris may allow Meshal to leave for another jurisdiction hospitable to Hamas, perhaps Turkey.

Former Qatari Foreign Minister Khalid bin Mohammed Al Attiyah once publicly touted Meshal as a “dear guest of Qatar.” That is no longer sustainable, if it ever was. The U.S. has missed too many opportunities to deal with Meshal and hold Qatar accountable. Sinwar’s death gives Washington its best opportunity yet to do so, and to facilitate the end of this yearlong crisis in the process.

Jonathan Schanzer

Jonathan Schanzer is senior vice president for research at Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow him on Twitter @JSchanzer.

Natalie Ecanow

Natalie Ecanow is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a non-partisan research institute in Washington, D.C., focusing on national security and foreign policy.

thedispatch.com · by Jonathan Schanzer and Natalie Ecanow · October 21, 2024

5. Propaganda war: Israel, Hamas battle over final images of Yahya Sinwar

Must win the battle of the narrative.

Propaganda war: Israel, Hamas battle over final images of Yahya Sinwar

Israel is trying to portray images of the Hamas leader’s final moments as those of a fugitive. His supporters have seized on the same visuals to glorify him as a fighter.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/20/yahya-sinwar-gaza-hamas-isarel-drone/

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, who was killed on Wednesday, arrives at a rally in Gaza City in April 2023. (Mohammed Abed/AFP/Getty Images)

By Steve Hendrix

October 20, 2024 at 1:30 p.m. EDT

JERUSALEM — The Israeli military’s year-long pursuit of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar finally ended Wednesday in a battle that took his life. Now comes the battle to define his death.

Israel and its allies are racing to portray Sinwar’s demise in the Gaza Strip as that of a fugitive — hunted, flushed from his underground hideout and gunned down on the run. The military released graphic photos of his corpse and drone footage of his final moments, showing a wounded figure slumped in a chair, alone and bleeding. A “coward’s end,” “a rat out of his hole” and “a worm” were some of the phrases used by Israeli commentators.

Sinwar’s supporters have seized on aspects of the same images — the dirty combat fatigues, a Palestinian kaffiyeh wrapped around his face — to glorify him as a warrior who went down fighting. The video, they say, shows not defeat but defiance, a mortally wounded fighter who finds the strength to hurl, however futilely, a piece of wood at the drone with his one good arm.

In much of the Arab world at least, Israel is losing the propaganda war, according to experts in the region. Within hours, the images released by the Israel Defense Forces were put on posters and plastered on walls in Jenin and other militant strongholds in the West Bank. Users on Arab social media turned them into memes to celebrate what they viewed as a heroic end.

Footage shows Hamas leader's last moments

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Drone video released by the Israel Defense Forces shows a man the IDF identifies as Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar throwing a stick at the drone. (Video: Israel Defense Forces via Storyful)

Iran’s mission to the United Nations released a statement contrasting Sinwar’s final actions with those of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, whom it described as betraying his supporters by having “begged” for his life when pulled out of a hole by American forces in 2003. The image of Sinwar “standing on the battlefield — in combat attire and out in the open, not in a hideout, facing the enemy” would only strengthen his following, the Iranians predicted.

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They’re probably right, said Beverley Milton-Edwards, a senior fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, who sees the episode as a win for Hamas “in the battle of narratives.”

An IDF official stood by the decision to release the images, telling The Washington Post that the military felt an obligation to document the scene and share it with the Israeli public.

“We’re being transparent; this is what happened,” said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. “We know that no matter what visuals come out, there is going to be a campaign by Hamas to make him a hero.”

Almost immediately after DNA and fingerprint testing confirmed Sinwar’s identity, the IDF began describing the circumstances leading to his death. Israeli troops operating around Rafah on Wednesday had, by chance, come across three Hamas fighters, with one trailing the others.

A firefight erupted, they said. The man in the rear, now believed to be Sinwar, was wounded, although IDF officials have said “there is no evidence” that he participated in the shooting.

The injured figure fled alone into a nearby house. The surveillance drone was flown in and recorded him in the bloody armchair, head covered and face concealed. Tank rounds were fired into the room and, the next morning, troops entered to find Sinwar’s body.

That account, along with the photos and footage released afterward, was at odds with Israel’s frequent descriptions of him hiding underground, shielding himself with Israeli captives, Milton-Edwards noted.

“He wasn’t in a tunnel, he didn’t have cowering and emaciated Israeli hostages tied to him, there were no Palestinian human shields,” said Milton-Edwards, co-author of “Hamas,” a history of the group.

“Those images of Sinwar have already entered the pantheon of Hamas and other militant groups,” she said, and will likely lead to “more support, more recruits and more impetus for the resistance.”

That Sinwar died not in a carefully coordinated raid but in a chance encounter on a routine patrol, the IDF official said, was a testament to Israel’s military strategy, tightening the vise on Hamas’s last redoubts in the south and allowing soldiers to capitalize on his “mistake” when he emerged from the tunnels. The circumstances of his death don’t change the fact that Sinwar spent “95 percent” of the past year underground, the official said.

“Obviously, this didn’t reflect the true nature of his behavior throughout the war,” the official said. On Sunday, to help drive home that point, the IDF released footage of Sinwar entering a tunnel with his family a day before the Oct. 7 attacks last year.

A photo of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar appears on a TV screen at a barbershop in the West Bank city of Bethlehem on Thursday. (Mahmoud Illean/AP)

But that is not the image many Palestinians are likely to remember. In Ramallah, the West Bank city controlled by Fatah, Hamas’s main political rival, Faisal Sayid, 60, was watching the news at a cafe the morning after Sinwar’s death was announced.

Sinwar was “not hiding as a coward as the Israelis were saying,” he said. “He was at the top of his game and fighting,” Sayid said, and his final fight would “go down in history.”

The main audience Israeli officials were thinking of when they released the materials was the Israeli public, according to a person close to Israel’s senior security leadership, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter. Sinwar was Israel’s No. 1 enemy, and officials felt it was important to provide immediate, and undeniable, proof of his death.

Inside Israel, the images of Sinwar were greeted with an outpouring of joy and relief — on the streets and on social media. Some Israelis posted videos of themselves dancing with printouts showing the dead Hamas leader.

Even Israelis who demanded for months that the government reach a cease-fire and hostage-release deal with Sinwar, including the families of hostages, expressed satisfaction that the IDF finally brought down the architect of the Oct. 7 attacks.

President Joe Biden, in a statement Thursday hailing Sinwar’s death, compared the moment in Israel “to the scenes witnessed throughout the United States after President Obama ordered the raid to kill Osama bin Laden in 2011.”

But there were notable differences, too: After American commandos took out the leader of al-Qaeda in Pakistan, the United States did not publicly release photographs of his body, which was quickly buried at sea following DNA identification. Footage of the raid itself was also held back to prevent it from being used as a propaganda tool.

Israel might have been better served by taking the same kind of restrained approach with the Sinwar materials, according to Michael Milshtein, a former head of Palestinian civilian affairs for the Israeli military.

“Maybe an announcement is enough, or a single, more generic photo,” he said. “It was not really necessary to provide all the details,” he said, which have “contributed to the myth of Sinwar.”

But keeping those details under wraps may no longer be possible when all soldiers carry smartphones. Some of the first unconfirmed images of Sinwar were posted by IDF troops in the area, bypassing any strategic messaging.

“There are pros and cons to it, but in the year 2024, it is very hard for visuals not to get out,” the Israeli official said.

Claire Parker in Ramallah contributed to this report.

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By Steve Hendrix

Steve Hendrix has been the Washington Post's Jerusalem bureau chief since 2019. He came to the Post in 2000 and has written for just about every section of the paper: Foreign, National, Metro, Style, Travel, the Magazine. He has reported from the Middle East, Europe, Africa, Asia, the Americas and most corners of the United States.follow on X @SBHendrix

6. Opinion The election is a referendum on America’s role in the world

Can the rules based international order survive either candidate? Can either candidate ensure its survival?

Opinion The election is a referendum on America’s role in the world

The post-World War II international order is hanging in the balance.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/10/21/harris-trump-foreign-policy-election/?utm

Former president Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris. (Eduardo Munoz and Nathan Howard/Reuters)

By Max Boot

October 21, 2024 at 5:45 a.m. EDT

American voters tend be pretty parochial in their approach to elections, focusing on domestic issues above all. I’m not sure if enough of them are fully aware of the stakes in this presidential election. The choice between Vice President Kamala Harris and former president Donald Trump is a referendum not only on America’s future but also on the entire world’s.

The United States remains by far by the most powerful country in the world: It spends more on defense than the next 10 countries combined, and its economic output accounts for roughly one-quarter of the global total. What America does matters. A lot.

In the 1930s, the United States pursued a policy of protectionism and isolationism. No coincidence, World War II soon followed. Germany’s and Japan’s neighbors were too weak to deter and defeat those fascist dictatorships on their own. They desperately needed American help, and they did not receive it until it was nearly too late.

After 1945 in the United States, the greatest generation sought to rectify that mistake by constructing a new world order based on free-trade pacts and security alliances. That approach was staggeringly successful: Democracy and prosperity spread around the world. Great power conflict has been averted. The United States has been the biggest beneficiary among major nations of the international system that it created along with its allies: U.S. gross domestic product per capita in 2023 was $73,600, compared with just $39,800 for Russia and $22,100 for China.

Now those historic achievements are imperiled by the possibility that Trump could return to office and implement “America First” policies reminiscent of the 1930s. Only if Harris wins is the United States likely to continue pursuing the policies that have undergirded its prosperity and security since 1945.

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It is, of course, impossible to predict the exact course of a second Trump administration because Trump is so erratic and illogical — and so easily influenced by anyone who stokes his insatiable ego. As he ages, the 78-year-old real estate promoter appears even more disconnected from reality. That, in itself, is of great concern, since the world relies on steady U.S. leadership, and that could be replaced by chaos and confusion in a Trump White House. But on certain issues Trump has been all too clear about his intentions.

He intends, for one, to hike tariffs dramatically — by 20 percent, at least, and probably far more — to the highest levels since the 1930s. “To me, the most beautiful word in the dictionary is ‘tariff.’ And it’s my favorite,” Trump said on last week. An invincible economic ignoramus, he continues to insist U.S. consumers would not pay the tariffs — but they would. The cost of the tariffs would further increase when other nations imposed retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports. “We’d be facing higher interest rates, slower growth, higher inflation,” a financial analyst told The Post. We’d also be facing a world in which the United States is locked in trade wars with its closest allies.

Those divisions would be exacerbated if Trump pursues the security policies he has hinted at. Trump has said he told allies he would encourage the Russians to do “whatever the hell they want” to NATO allies that didn’t pay enough for defense. “The odds that he will withdraw from NATO are very high,” warned John Bolton, Trump’s former national security adviser.

Bob Woodward’s new book reports that Trump, since leaving office, has had as many as seven conversations with Vladimir Putin and that he sent the Russian dictator coronavirus-testing equipment when it was in critically short supply. The Kremlin has already confirmed the coronavirus tests, and Trump did not exactly deny his calls with Putin when asked about them. The exact nature of Trump’s relationship with Putin remains mysterious, despite years of investigations, but it is evident that the former — and possibly future — U.S. president has a nauseating affinity for the Kremlin despot.

It was disturbing to hear Trump boast last month, while meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, that he has a “very good relationship” with Putin. Would Franklin D. Roosevelt have boasted of his relationship with Adolf Hitler while meeting with Winston Churchill? At Trump’s lone debate with Harris, he refused to say he wants Ukraine to win the war. He has been relentlessly critical of U.S. aid to Ukraine, and last week he bizarrely blamed Zelensky for Putin’s war of aggression. Trump has pledged to end the war in a day, which could only be accomplished by forcing Ukraine to accede to Russian demands.

Harris, by contrast, pledged in her Democratic convention speech to “stand strong with Ukraine and our NATO allies,” has denounced Russian “crimes against humanity” and in the presidential debate said that if Trump were still president, “Putin would be sitting in Kyiv right now.” If you want Ukraine to remain an independent state, the choice on Nov. 5 couldn’t be clearer.

While Trump would imperil the post-1945 world order fostered by the United States, Harris would defend it. Despite the inevitable sexist cavils about her qualifications or ability to lead, she is better prepared to be commander in chief than many of the men who have occupied that position. As vice president, she has met more than 150 world leaders, embarked on 17 foreign trips and regularly contributed to discussion in the Situation Room about matters of war and peace.

It’s hard to point to Harris’s exact contributions to the shaping of President Joe Biden’s foreign policy, but then it was also hard to point to Vice President George H.W. Bush’s contributions to Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy. That’s the nature of being vice president: Your role is to advise the president behind the scenes and loyally support their policies in public.

When Harris has revealed her own views, however, they have been reassuringly mainstream. “I believe it is in the fundamental interest of the American people for the United States to fulfill our long-standing role of global leadership,” she told the Munich Security Conference in February, adding, “This approach makes America strong, and it keeps Americans safe.”

She’s right, which is why more than 700 former national security officials — and more than 100 Republican national security leaders — have endorsed Harris. By contrast, only about half of Trump’s own Cabinet has backed him, and those who oppose him include his vice president, the ultraconservative Mike Pence. Retired Gen. Mark A. Milley, Trump’s chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has called him “fascist to the core.” Mark T. Esper, Trump’s defense secretary, has called him“a threat to democracy.” Retired Gen. John F. Kelly, Trump’s White House chief of staff, described him as “a person who admires autocrats and murderous dictators.”

Returning Trump to the Oval Office — where this time he would be unlikely to be constrained by “adults” like Milley, Esper and Kelly — would be a recipe for American decline and rising global instability. Trump is a foe of democracy at home and a friend of dictators abroad. He could usher in a world — last seen in the 1930s — where democratic nations are fatally divided and dictators think they can commit aggression with impunity. So vote as if the fate of the world depends on your choice. Because it very well might.

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Opinion by Max Boot

Max Boot is a Washington Post columnist and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. A Pulitzer Prize finalist in biography, he is the author, most recently, of the New York Times bestseller “Reagan: His Life and Legend.”follow on X MaxBoot

7. Israel Killed Sinwar by Forcing Him From the Tunnels

Excerpts:

After Hamas militants killed 1,200 people and kidnapped around 250 others in October last year, there was no longer disagreement.

So began one of Israel’s biggest military and intelligence operations, led by Israel’s internal security agency, Shin Bet, and carried out by the Israeli military with help from U.S. intelligence agencies.

Sinwar for months blunted the technological and intelligence-gathering prowess of Israel and its allies. He used rudimentary, untraceable communications and trusted only people closest to him. Sinwar also commanded miles and miles of subterranean tunnels.

Arab negotiators offered Sinwar an escape in exchange for allowing Egypt to negotiate for the release of the hostages on behalf of Hamas, but he declined. Sinwar clung to the hope that the conflict he ignited might draw in Iran and its proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, setting off a regional war against Israel—a possibility that remains.

Israel Killed Sinwar by Forcing Him From the Tunnels

The Israeli military attacked strategic underground complexes in Gaza, pushing Yahya Sinwar to leave the safety of Hamas’s labyrinth

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-killed-sinwar-forced-from-tunnels-527cc9a9?mod=latest_headlines

By Rory JonesFollow

, Dov LieberFollow

, Summer SaidFollow

and Anat PeledFollow

Oct. 20, 2024 9:00 pm ET

In the hunt for Hamas militants in the tunnels beneath southern Gaza, Israel’s 98th commando division found a compound in February with a kitchen, sleeping quarters and a bathroom with a tiled wall depicting a beach sunset.

Whoever was staying there had recently fled, one of several times Israeli soldiers came in striking distance of Hamas leaders.

For the next nine months, Israel’s number one target, Yahya Sinwar, architect of the Oct. 7 attacks last year, remained elusive, a ghost in the subterranean darkness. “It doesn’t matter how many tunnels there are,” said then-Brig. Gen. Dan Goldfus at the time. Israel would get him, he said.

The Wall Street Journal found that even before the Oct. 7 attacks, Israel considered killing Sinwar, who was seen as a national-security threat, according to people involved in the plans. Israel at turns failed to find the right moment or pulled their operations when officials disagreed on the mission, the people said.

After Hamas militants killed 1,200 people and kidnapped around 250 others in October last year, there was no longer disagreement.

So began one of Israel’s biggest military and intelligence operations, led by Israel’s internal security agency, Shin Bet, and carried out by the Israeli military with help from U.S. intelligence agencies.

Sinwar for months blunted the technological and intelligence-gathering prowess of Israel and its allies. He used rudimentary, untraceable communications and trusted only people closest to him. Sinwar also commanded miles and miles of subterranean tunnels.

Arab negotiators offered Sinwar an escape in exchange for allowing Egypt to negotiate for the release of the hostages on behalf of Hamas, but he declined. Sinwar clung to the hope that the conflict he ignited might draw in Iran and its proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, setting off a regional war against Israel—a possibility that remains.

“I’m not under siege, I’m on Palestinian soil,” Sinwar told Arab mediators in a defiant message, previously unreported, soon after the war began. The conflict has yielded more than 42,000 deaths in Gaza, according to Gazan health authorities, whose figures don’t say how many were combatants.

In the months that followed, Israel’s military closed in on Hamas’s underground labyrinth, destroying strategic tunnel complexes. The Journal found that the tactic forced Sinwar to surface. With ever-fewer places to hide, he spent more time above ground, in the Tel al-Sultan area of Rafah in southern Gaza, according to Israeli officials and Arab mediators communicating with Hamas.

Israel didn’t know Sinwar’s exact location but it deployed forces to hunt him there. On Oct. 16, Israel’s strategy to flush Sinwar out of the tunnels led to his killing, enabled by the skills of war and aided by chance.

This account is based on interviews with Israeli, U.S., Hamas and Arab officials, as well as documents and footage the Israeli military found in Gaza, books written by Sinwar and his communications over a year with Arab mediators and Hamas officials.

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, center, during September 2018 protests in Khan Younis, Gaza. Photo: Ashraf Amra/Zuma Press

Gathering storm

Israel’s leaders for years had viewed Sinwar as a bombastic figure but not an imminent threat. That changed in late May 2021. Hamas had fired missiles at Israel from Gaza for days, and Israel retaliated with airstrikes.

Some Israeli leaders suggested killing Sinwar, who was then-head of Hamas’s Gaza wing, along with his military chief Mohammed Deif, according to Israeli officials familiar with the decision. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu authorized attempts to kill the two men in airstrikes, but the efforts failed.

After a cease-fire in the 2021 conflict, Sinwar was photographed on a sofa in the rubble of his home with a grin, a scene published in Israeli newspapers.

In June that year, Netanyahu’s government collapsed, and Naftali Bennett, a right-wing former Israeli commando, became leader. He, too, was eager to launch an operation against Sinwar, people familiar with the matter said.

But officials were split. Israeli officials largely believed that Hamas was deterred, and Sinwar was focused on governing Gaza.

In April 2022, after clashes between Israeli police forces and Palestinians in Jerusalem, Sinwar called on Arab citizens of Israel to prepare for a religious war and to kill Israeli Jews—with cleavers, axes and knives if necessary.

Again, Bennett proposed killing Sinwar, telling security agencies to plan for an operation that summer, one of the people aware of the discussions said. In June, Bennett’s government collapsed, and many top Israeli leaders concluded that Sinwar could be contained.

Mourners digging a grave at the funeral of David Caroll, who was killed by Hamas militants in Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. Photo: Aris Messinis/Agence France-Presse/Getty Image

Deadly day

On Oct. 7, 2023, nearly 3,000 militants, most of them from Hamas, breached the border fence between Israel and Gaza on paragliders, pickups and motorcycles. Wearing black fatigues and carrying assault rifles, they targeted military facilities and unarmed civilians, killing parents in front of children and gunning down hundreds of young people at a music festival.

The militants returned to Gaza with roughly 250 hostages.

Israel put every available resource into the hunt for Sinwar. Shin Bet worked with the military to try to locate him, and the CIA set up a task force to analyze and share intelligence with Israel, people familiar with the matter said.

Intelligence officers analyzed information gathered from Palestinians interrogated in Gaza, as well as materials seized at Hamas command posts.

Sinwar had moved many of the kidnapped hostages to the subterranean maze beneath Gaza—hundreds of miles of concrete-reinforced tunnels built by Hamas before the war.

Footage released by the Israeli military later showed Sinwar taking his wife, daughter and two boys—both dressed in soccer jerseys—into a tunnel in Khan Younis, Sinwar’s hometown. They carried bedding and bags of food.

Margalit Moses, a 78-year-old hostage who was later released, told the Journal that Sinwar appeared where she was being held underground in Khan Younis during the early days of the war. She recalled him telling captives that he meant them no harm and that they served as his bargaining chips to free Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails.

Above ground, Israeli forces leveled buildings and deployed soldiers to find tunnel entrances. Outside Gaza, the U.S. embedded military and intelligence officials with Israelis, including experts in mapping underground military complexes.

Israeli airstrikes in Gaza on Oct. 9, 2023. Photo: Ahmed Zakot/Sopa images/Zuma Press

In the dark

In December, Israeli soldiers secured the grounds of Sinwar’s home in Khan Younis. Five soldiers, holding rifles, took a picture of themselves on a sofa outside, mocking Sinwar’s 2021 photo. Below ground, Sinwar remained defiant.

“Our fighters have shattered the occupation army,” he said in a message, viewed by the Journal, to Hamas’s political wing in the Qatari capital Doha.

On Jan. 2, Saleh Arouri, the deputy head of Hamas’s political bureau, was killed in an Israeli strike in Beirut. To better cloak his movements, Sinwar began changing the way he communicated. He used aliases and relayed notes only through a handful of aides and via codes, switching between audio messages to intermediaries and written missives.

Shin Bet detained relatives of Hamas commanders in Gaza on suspicion of militant activities, and they provided intelligence about Sinwar. Soon, Israeli forces went below ground in Khan Younis, raiding Hamas’s tunnel network.

Israeli troops battled Hamas soldiers to gain entrance to the tunnels. They sent in dogs with cameras to sniff out humans and to catch sight of bombs or drones operating in the subterranean spaces. Troops arrived at one underground complex moments after Sinwar had fled. He left behind a cup of coffee, still hot. Raids found safes holding the equivalent of $1 million.

“We are learning, feeling our way in the dark,” said Goldfus, the Israeli commander who led the underground offensive in Khan Younis.

“Our enemy is fleeing,” he said at the end of January.

Israeli soldiers entering a Hamas tunnel in Khan Younis, Gaza, on Jan. 27. Photo: sam mcneil/Associated Press

Audacious entry

Israel began to understand that some tunnels were more important to Hamas, Goldfus said, either because they formed crucial links to other parts of the labyrinth or because they held underground compounds.

If soldiers reached those particular tunnels, he said, they would find Sinwar and the hostages. “They thought we wouldn’t have the means, capability or audacity to enter these tunnels,” he said, “but we did.”

As Arab mediators tried to speed up cease-fire talks, Sinwar urged his comrades in Hamas’s political leadership based outside of Gaza to refuse concessions. High civilian casualties would create worldwide pressure on Israel, Sinwar said in a message.

In March, Israeli commandos seized another compound connected to Sinwar. They found uniforms, vests, submachine guns, binoculars and a laptop.

Again, Sinwar messaged Hamas officials, urging them to refuse a hostage deal. Hamas had the upper hand in negotiations, Sinwar said, citing internal political divisions within Israel, cracks in Netanyahu’s wartime coalition and mounting U.S. pressure to alleviate the suffering in Gaza.

“We have to move forward on the same path we started,” Sinwar wrote.

From spring through summer, the hunt for Sinwar appeared to stall.

In July, Israel received intelligence that Deif, the head of Hamas’s armed wing, had emerged from the tunnels. He was killed in an massive airstrike in western Khan Younis that included eight 2,000-pound bombs.

Later that month, Israel killed Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’s political bureau with a bomb at a military-run guesthouse in Tehran.

In August, Sinwar became overall leader of Hamas, a role he had played since Oct. 7. He immediately pointed the group toward a more violent ideology.

Israel Releases Video Said to Show Final Moments of Hamas Leader Sinwar

Chased out

In early September, Israeli soldiers found six dead hostages, including an Israeli-American, in a tunnel in the Tel al-Sultan neighborhood of Rafah. Nearby, the Israeli military said it found traces of Sinwar’s DNA in an underground room with a TV and sofa.

To Israel, that meant Sinwar wasn’t far. Israeli officials believe he had fled Khan Younis after the Israelis destroyed many of the tunnels beneath the city.

Also in September, Israel intensified an air campaign against Hamas’s ally, Hezbollah, mounting an attack with exploding pagers and later launching a strike that killed the Lebanese militia’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah.

Soon after the killing, Sinwar delivered a message to Hamas’s political leadership outside of Gaza. He said the group was likely to now face greater pressure to compromise but shouldn’t, according to Arab mediators.

He also began preparing for his death, advising Hamas members that Israel would likely offer concessions to end the war after he was gone. In negotiations with Israel, he said, Hamas would be in the stronger position, according to Arab mediators familiar with his messages.

He recommended that Hamas appoint a council of leaders to govern and manage the transition following his death, the mediators said.

Funeral prayers for Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on Oct. 18 in Khan Younis, Gaza. Photo: Rizek Abdeljawad/Zuma Press

Endgame

On Oct. 1, Iran launched a ballistic missile assault on Israel in retaliation for the attacks on Hezbollah. Israel promised to respond.

The regional war that Sinwar hoped would ignite when he launched the Oct. 7 attacks appeared closer than ever—if he could stay alive.

Two days after the Iran attack, an Israeli airstrike targeted an underground compound in northern Gaza, killing Rawhi Mushtaha, Sinwar’s closest confidante. The two men had set up Hamas’s internal security force in the 1980s and later shared a cell in an Israeli prison. In 2011, they were released in a prisoner swap and rose together rising through the ranks of the militant group.

Mushtaha’s killing was a sign the Israelis were getting close to Sinwar.

Israel’s continued disruption of Hamas’s tunnel network forced Sinwar to go above ground, according to Israeli and Arab officials, making him more vulnerable to a stroke of bad luck.

On Oct. 16, a group of Israeli soldiers training to be squad leaders spotted three Hamas militants trying to walk without being seen. The soldiers engaged in a firefight with the men, who scattered for cover in bombed-out buildings. The militants fired bullets and grenades, injuring one Israeli soldier.

One militant fled to a building where soldiers sent in a reconnaissance drone. In a scene captured on video, a man sat in a chair for a bit and then threw a block of wood at the drone. A tank accompanying the soldiers fired on the building, and it collapsed.

Other soldiers returned the following morning. They found the man half-buried in rubble, wearing sneakers, civilian clothes and a combat vest. On his neck, he wore a kaffiyeh, the symbol of the Palestinian cause. He looked like Sinwar, and Israel’s top military brass was summoned.

At around 5:30 p.m., Israeli military chief Herzi Halevi visited the site. The body hadn’t been moved, according to an Israeli army reservist who saw it.

By then, it was clear: Israel had killed Sinwar.

Carrie Keller-Lynn, Warren P. Strobel and Nancy A. Youssef contributed to this article.

Write to Rory Jones at Rory.Jones@wsj.com, Dov Lieber at dov.lieber@wsj.com, Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com and Anat Peled at anat.peled@wsj.com

Appeared in the October 21, 2024, print edition as 'Israel Forced Sinwar From His Tunnels'.

8. Sinwar’s fatal mistake: Hamas leader refused Arab offer to escape Gaza- WSJ

Sinwar was no Zelensky (recall the offer from the US to evacuate him in 2022 and his epic refusal: "I need ammunition, not a ride.")

Sinwar’s fatal mistake: Hamas leader refused Arab offer to escape Gaza- WSJ

Yahya Sinwar allegedly denied a deal which would see his escape in exchange for Egypt taking over negotiations for a ceasefire on Hamas's behalf - plotting instead for a regional war.

By JERUSALEM POST STAFF

OCTOBER 21, 2024 08:36

Updated: OCTOBER 21, 2024 10:19

Jerusalem Post

Eliminated Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar rejected an opportunity to survive and leave the Gaza Strip in exchange for allowing Egypt to negotiate a Gaza ceasefire-hostage deal in Hamas’s place, the Wall Street Journal reported on Monday, citing US, Arab and Hamas officials.

Arab negotiators reportedly offered Sinwar the deal, which he refused - despite it leading to a continued war in Gaza, where Hamas-run health authorities claimed a high civilian toll.

Sinwar, according to the journal, had hoped that the war his October 7 attacks had ignited would draw Iran and its proxies into a regional war with the Jewish state.

“I’m not under siege, I’m on Palestinian soil,” Sinwar allegedly told Arab mediators in a defiant message, previously unreported, soon after the war began.

Sinwar had reportedly banked on the high civilian death toll, telling Hamas officials based outside Gaza to deny concessions as global pressure on Israel would force Jerusalem to agree to difficult terms.

Palestinians supporters of Hamas attend an anti-Israel rally in the presence of Yahya Sinwar, leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, in Gaza City, on May 25, 2021 (credit: SHUTTERSTOCK)

In September, after Hamas executed six hostages and Israel's pager attack on Hezbollah, Sinwar had predicted the terror group would be pushed to make concessions for a ceasefire deal, according to the report. He reportedly warned Hamas officials that, despite the pressure they would face for an agreement, they should make no concessions.

Sinwar's post-mortem plans

Sinwar, knowing the IDF was closing in on him and seeing much of Hamas shattered by a year of war, reportedly left a message for his followers after his death. Knowing that his elimination would likely lead to new Israel offering new deals, he allegedly told his officials that Hamas would be in a stronger position to make a deal, according to Arab mediators.

He recommended that following his death, Hamas appoint a council of leaders to govern and manage the transition following his death, the mediators said.

Israel's fatal mistakes

The report also revealed that Israeli leadership had chosen not to eliminate Sinwar before his October 7 attacks despite ample opportunity.

Israeli sources involved in plans to eliminate the terror leader told the journal that officials disagreeing on operations and poor timing had led to Sinwar’s survival.

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Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had reportedly authorized two strikes to eliminate Sinwar and Mohammed Deif - both of which failed.

Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett had also been eager to eliminate the terror leader, sources told the journal. However, officials had denied the plans, claiming Sinwar was focused on governing the Gaza Strip and didn’t pose any real threat to Israel.

In 2022, Bennett attempted again to persuade his cabinet of the necessity to attack Sinwar - and again officials refuted that Hamas could be any real danger to Israel.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorists invaded southern Israel and massacred over 1200 people. During their terror campaign of murder, looting, and sexual violence, terrorists abducted over 250 people. While some of the hostages were freed in a November ceasefire deal, over 100 remain captive in Gaza - some of whom have been killed by their captors.

Jerusalem Post

9. Israel targets Hezbollah's financial arm and begins striking Beirut

Israel targets Hezbollah's financial arm and begins striking Beirut

By WAFAA SHURAFA, KAREEM CHEHAYEB and SAMY MAGDY

Updated 12:47 AM EDT, October 21, 2024

AP · by KAREEM CHEHAYEB · October 20, 2024

WAFAA SHURAFA

KAREEM CHEHAYEB

Chehayeb is an Associated Press reporter in Beirut.

twitter instagram mailto

AP · by KAREEM CHEHAYEB · October 20, 2024

10. Strike on Netanyahu home ‘a signal’ Iran proxies not incapacitated, expert says

Strike on Netanyahu home ‘a signal’ Iran proxies not incapacitated, expert says

by Filip Timotija - 10/19/24 12:43 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/international/4942711-benjamin-netanyahu-home-strike-lebanon-middle-east-conflict/

A recent drone strike targeting the home of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is sending “a signal” that Iran-backed militant groups are not “incapacitated,” despite losing senior leadership in recent weeks, according to a Middle East expert.

Daniel Levy, the president of the U.S./Middle East Project, in an interview with NewsNation Saturday, said he did not think the intention “necessarily was an extrajudicial killing of Netanyahu,” but the drone launch was a warning that Iran’s proxies — including Hamas and Hezbollah — are still formidable.

“It sends an important signal, doesn’t it,” Levy told “Morning in America” host Hena Doba on Saturday morning.

“It sends a signal that any talk that Hezbollah, as this came from Lebanon, has been incapacitated, they are done for. That’s clearly, not only premature, but basically a misreading of that reality,” he added. “I think any talk that Hamas are finished is equally misguided. It doesn’t understand what is the nature of a resistance movement rooted in the objective conditions of a people living without freedom.”

His comments come after a drone was launched from Lebanon toward Netanyahu’s home in Caesarea early Saturday. Neither the Israeli leader nor his wife were at home at the time and no injuries were reported, the prime minister’s office said.

The attack came just days after the Israeli military killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, the mastermind of the Oct. 7, 2023, terrorist attack on Israel — which killed around 1,200 people while some 250 hostages were taken — that sparked the ongoing war in the region.

The targeting of Netanyahu’s residence also came less than a week after a Hezbollah attack on an Israeli military base killed four soldiers. That attack came after an Israeli strike on Beirut killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah late last month — the militant group and Iran have vowed retaliation.

The Middle East expert said the latest attack showcased that the missile defense system cannot offer “full protection” and that “you cannot have 100 percent security.”

“No one can, and unless you have a political solution, you’re not going to see an end to this, and that’s what Netanyahu has avoided and prevented all these years,” Levy, a former Israeli negotiator, said Saturday.

NewsNation is owned by Nexstar Media Group, which also owns The Hill.

11. Ukraine Must Turn the Tide Before It Can Negotiate

Excerpts:

After nearly three full years of war, Ukraine finds itself in a better position than many expected. But a favorable outcome is far from guaranteed, and no time for complacency remains. Despite their potential reluctance to sign on to Zelensky’s victory plan, Western powers must act quickly to secure—and avoid losing—the vital leverage that Ukraine will need to achieve an end to the war that does not empower Russia. Positive signs abound: the Australian government’s announcement that it will provide M1A1 tanks to Ukraine, Sweden’s provision of a large tranche of infantry fighting vehicles, and the United States’ commitment to supply additional equipment before the end of the year.

The security of Europe now depends on significant multilateral cooperation to ensure that any path toward ending the war achieves the best possible result for Ukraine. But as attention shifts to negotiations, U.S. and European military support must not wane, for although a successful outcome can be achieved only through diplomacy, what is diplomatically possible will always depend on the military realities on the ground.

Ukraine Must Turn the Tide Before It Can Negotiate

To Gain Leverage, Kyiv Needs a Stable Front in the Donbas—and Western Security Guarantees

By Jack Watling

October 21, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Jack Watling · October 21, 2024

President Volodymyr Zelensky has spent recent weeks endeavoring to sell his “victory plan,” the core elements of which he unveiled to the Ukrainian parliament on October 16, to Ukraine’s partners. The plan includes expanded military assistance to stabilize the front, security guarantees through membership of NATO, and defense-industrial cooperation. The details of the plan have been met with significant skepticism among Ukraine’s partners, who fear that without reforms to Ukraine’s recruitment and training of military forces, equipment alone will be insufficient to stabilize the front. Nor are they sold on the willingness of the alliance to guarantee Ukraine’s security.

Though the details remain in question, the underlying analysis that shapes Zelensky’s pitch is sound. Russian President Vladimir Putin will negotiate seriously only if he believes he is losing militarily. To conclude the war on favorable terms, Ukraine must first stabilize the front, gain maximum leverage over Russia, and obtain security guarantees to ensure that it can prosper and remain secure after the conflict. To achieve those aims, Kyiv must be clearly aligned with its international partners.

The problem is that Ukraine now faces both a deteriorating battlefield situation and the stagnation of diplomatic efforts among its partners ahead of a U.S. election where the candidates have radically different approaches to the conflict. Over the summer, Russia managed to establish some significant advantages over Ukrainian forces, enabling it to make slow but steady progress through Ukrainian defenses. These Russian advantages can be blunted. But as Ukrainian casualties mount, Kyiv and its partners cannot waste any time. If Ukraine’s international partners wait for changes beyond their direct control to happen before they take action, as they appear to be doing now, they will increase the chance of failure.

RUSSIA’S GRINDING ADVANCE

As things stand now, the Kremlin believes it can achieve its objectives in Ukraine militarily and is therefore not interested in immediate negotiations or withdrawal. Ukrainian forces have become dangerously stretched. They are now spread along a 600-mile frontline, and recruitment and training has failed to make up for the number of casualties in frontline units. Furthermore, Ukraine’s supplies of artillery, ammunition, tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles have been dwindling. The more it lacks these key types of equipment and weaponry, the more it must depend on infantry to hold the front, causing an associated rise in casualties.

Exploiting Ukraine’s manpower challenges along its eastern front, Russia has made gradual gains over the past few months. In the first half of October, Russian forces captured Vuhledar and broke into Toretsk—after two years of largely unsuccessful assaults on Ukraine’s Donbas defenses. Along with the seizure of key towns around the Ukrainian stronghold of Pokrovsk, these gains showed Russia establishing an effective formula for undermining Ukraine’s ability to hold positions. For Ukraine to be able to negotiate from a position of strength, it must end Russia’s advance and stabilize the front. But to do so, Ukraine’s military leadership will have to address several tactical challenges.

Russia’s current battlefield advantages rest on several capabilities. First, the thinning out of Ukraine’s tactical air defenses from late 2023—stocks of interceptors are perilously low, with only periodic resupplies—has allowed Russia to establish continuous and dense drone surveillance over the front. Russia now flies between 1,000 and 1,300 long-range reconnaissance drones over Ukrainian territory every day, providing Russia with valuable targeting data. Russian units use ballistic missiles to strike Ukraine’s air defenses if Ukraine tries to move them forward, as loitering munitions, uncrewed missiles designed to search and strike targets, scour the rear parts of Ukraine’s frontlines to destroy its artillery.

The threat from Russian loitering munitions and glide bombs forces Ukraine to keep its artillery away from the frontline, which in turn allows Russian forces to move their own artillery closer to the front, bringing them into range of Ukrainian logistics units, medics, and troops rotating behind the frontline. This pressure compels Ukrainian troops to remain in prepared fighting positions where they are safe from shrapnel. Meanwhile, Russia sends small groups forward to force the Ukrainians in fighting positions to expend ammunition and prevent them from resting. Once the fighting positions have been identified, the Russian forces call in airstrikes with 500- to 1,500-kilogram glide bombs, which can hit the positions with considerable accuracy. When the Ukrainians try to rotate their units, they are harassed by artillery. Then, when the defensive positions have been thinned out, the Russians attempt rapid assaults on motorbikes, often supported by armored vehicles, to get into the Ukrainian trenches.

This approach comes at a high cost in Russian troops, but for now, Russia has been able to absorb the casualties. Moscow seems to be wagering that it can achieve its objectives in Donbas next year and impose a rate of casualties and material degradation on the Ukrainian military high enough that it will no longer be capable of preventing further advances, giving Russia considerable leverage in negotiations.

SHELLS, SOLDIERS, AND SUPPLY CHAINS

To reverse this dynamic, Ukraine will need to do several things at once. First, it needs to limit Russia’s battlefield surveillance capabilities. Ukraine has developed effective interceptor drones that can knock down Russian Orlan and Zala surveillance drones. But it needs assistance scaling up the production of these interceptors and fielding a sufficient density of radar and other sensor systems to make them effective. Ukraine’s Western partners should augment this effort by expanding support in electronic warfare to interfere with the passage of Russian reconnaissance data. Kyiv’s Western partners can help protect the Ukrainian artillery by working with them to modify heavy machine gun remote weapon stations mounted on vehicles so that they can accurately engage loitering munitions. This would allow Ukraine to bring its artillery farther forward and put Russian guns at risk.

At the same time, Ukraine needs to make that artillery far more effective, and for that, it needs more howitzers and ammunition. Ukrainian forces still need approximately 2.4 million rounds a year to hold the front. With sufficient artillery pieces and the means to protect them, Ukraine would be able to cover gaps in the front with fire, rather than by having to continuously man fighting positions all along the front, with the added cost in Ukrainian losses that entails.

Kyiv also needs to dig new defense lines behind its current positions, with experienced soldiers supervising to make sure that civilian construction workers build the positions properly. Although Kyiv has commissioned the construction of defense lines before, its assembly and siting of fighting positions have often been poor, and the designs have presumed a greater number of troops than are available to man them.

Building more defense lines is of limited value if there are not enough personnel to occupy them. Over the past year, attrition has led to a decline in experienced Ukrainian soldiers in many units, and the training pipeline has failed to provide enough personnel or give those available soldiers sufficient training. In response, the Ukrainian military has cannibalized units, taking groups of more capable soldiers away for particular tasks and rapidly rotating command groups, which has undermined unit cohesion.

For Ukraine to be able to negotiate from a position of strength, it must end Russia’s advance and stabilize the front.

Kyiv needs to fix its dysfunctional recruitment and training system. Training for new troops has been inadequate throughout the war. This is something the Ukrainian military has been slow to acknowledge and slower still in addressing. It is also an area where Ukraine’s partners can do little. Although over fifteen of Ukraine’s partners have provided training to Ukrainian units, the logistical burden of transporting troops out of Ukraine with their equipment makes it impossible to scale up these operations. Kyiv’s willingness to make the hard political decisions to mobilize personnel and extend training times will determine whether Ukraine’s partners see their contribution to Zelensky’s victory plan as part of a viable strategy.

Conversely, Ukraine’s international partners can do much to reduce Russia’s advantage in firepower. To mount a capable defense against Russian artillery and glide bomb attacks, Ukraine needs to be able to strike stockpiles and airfields. Funding for and support of Ukraine’s own long-range strike programs and aggressive targeting of Russia’s supply chains of raw materials, machine tooling, and critical components of weapons production can have a significant effect. Europe and the United Stated should be able to help Ukraine force Russia to burn through more of its munition and to degrade the Russian defense industry’s capacity to replenish its supplies.

In combination, these steps could make further advances prohibitively costly for Russia, but they would need to be applied systematically and at scale. The Kremlin would also need to believe that they can be sustained. If such measures are delayed, the situation at the front risks deteriorating to a point where the Russians can begin to advance with impunity, and where the Ukrainians simply lack the personnel and equipment to block all the axes along which the Russians might push. Preventing that outcome is a prerequisite for Ukraine to be able to embark on successful negotiations.

THE GHOST OF BREST-LITOVSK

Kyiv knows it must have a strong and stabilized front to be able to have any kind of leverage with Moscow. It also knows that Western support for its war is not unlimited and that it will face growing pressure to consider some kind of negotiated solution as the war passes into its fourth year. It would be particularly dangerous, however, if Ukraine were forced into negotiations as the situation at the front continues to unravel in Russia’s favor. This would create a Brest-Litovsk dynamic: in 1918, German forces achieved conditions in which they could advance with impunity against the Red Army, and therefore, when the Soviets entered talks, any attempt to push back on a German demand would cause the German Army to renew offensive operations until the Soviets conceded. In such a scenario, Moscow would effectively force Kyiv to all but concede its sovereignty at gunpoint.

If stabilizing the front is the indispensable precondition for talks, Kyiv also needs points of real leverage. In a surprise move on August 6, Ukrainian forces broke across the border into the Kursk region of Russia, rapidly overpowering lightly held Russian defenses to seize a chunk of Russian territory and trap some Russian forces on the south of the Seym River. The operation had three objectives. Kyiv hoped to show its partners that the trajectory of the war was not predetermined and that it could conduct successful offensive operations; it aimed to draw Russian resources away from Donbas; and it saw holding the territory as a useful bargaining chip if negotiations started. The first objective was largely successful. The second was not. The third will depend on whether Ukraine can hold the territory. Given that it required Ukraine to strip its own forces in Donbas of reserves, the operation involved a high degree of risk, and it is not clear that Kyiv will be able to hold what it has taken. Nevertheless, the need for leverage remains.

A range of issues will prove extremely difficult to settle in talks. Since March 2022, for example, Russian forces have occupied the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, Ukraine’s largest piece of energy-generating infrastructure. Russia has been unable to maintain it safely: it wants to exploit the power station for energy but cannot safely bring the reactors back from cold shutdown. In any settlement, Ukraine will want Russia to end its occupation of the plant and allow its energy workers, who are being held hostage there, to return to operate it. To account for these contentious matters, Ukraine must have in the bank things that Russia wants.

Sanctions are one possible form of leverage. In many cases, Ukraine and its partners will want sanctions to remain in place after the conflict, in order to slow down Russian rearmament and punish Russia for its long list of crimes. But in areas where Kyiv and its partners can agree to put things on the table, they will need to coordinate to give Kyiv collateral with which to trade.

Given the mutually incompatible demands on both sides, the most likely outcome of talks is a cease-fire without a wider peace agreement. Russia, for example, may demand that Ukraine abandon any military agreements with the West; Ukraine is unlikely to recognize Russia’s annexation of its territories. The risk is that Ukraine’s international partners see a cease-fire itself as justification for reducing support to Ukraine. If Ukraine is left with an unaffordable level of mobilization and no prospect of significant foreign direct investment—owing to fears that Russia could restart offensive operations at any point—then Moscow will have a wide array of opportunities to destabilize Kyiv. In any case, the Ukrainian government will find it difficult to persuade its own people that any concessions to Russia are justified unless they come with very substantial security guarantees.

DIPLOMATS IN BOOTS

When Zelensky traveled to Washington in September, he continued to make the case for NATO membership, potentially along the lines of what was agreed with West Germany in 1954, whereby security guarantees applied only to the unoccupied parts of the country. Such a deal, however, is highly implausible. Accession to NATO requires a consensus of its members, and Hungary, for example, likely will not commit to going to war with Russia to defend Ukraine. Although NATO membership may be unrealistic in the medium term, Zelensky remains absolutely correct that a lasting peace can be secured only with ironclad security guarantees to Kyiv.

Satisfying this need will prove a delicate task. For the United States, the prospect of extending new long-term security guarantees to a large territory in Europe is hardly enticing. Amid Washington’s years-long effort to pivot its resources to the Indo-Pacific to deter China, such a step would undoubtedly require it to divert some of those resources to Ukraine to make the guarantee tangible. Understandably, many in Washington also argue that this is the greatest security crisis facing Europe in decades and that Europe should shoulder the burden of addressing it. Nonetheless, for the time being at least, Russia does not consider NATO’s European members to be credible without the United States.

The solution to Ukraine’s security needs therefore will have to involve a coalition of the willing who deploy to Ukraine after a cease-fire is reached, with the United States voicing its support. After the failure of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom pledged to uphold Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty, Kyiv will require a military presence in Ukraine to convince it that its partners will honor their security guarantees. To make such a proposition credible to Russia, however, Europe’s defense industry must be able to show it can equip and sustain deployable formations. With European NATO members’ firepower concentrated in air forces, the credibility of their security guarantees depends on the munitions available to suppress and destroy enemy air defenses. Although European armies will be critical, European nations’ purchase of air-launched stand-off weapons, which can strike targets from beyond the range of defensive systems, along with the ability to produce them in significant numbers, will determine any agreement’s plausibility.

A Ukrainian soldier launching a drone in the Donbas region, Ukraine, May 2024

Oleksandr Ratushniak / Reuters

European powers, therefore, will need to ramp up their investments in European defense industries to credibly backstop any security guarantees offered to Ukraine. European countries must step forward to lead this effort. Several members of the Joint Expeditionary Force, comprised of northern and Baltic members of NATO, share a similar view of the threat posed by Russia and how to confront it, but central and western European states must also commit to guarantees.

After nearly three full years of war, Ukraine finds itself in a better position than many expected. But a favorable outcome is far from guaranteed, and no time for complacency remains. Despite their potential reluctance to sign on to Zelensky’s victory plan, Western powers must act quickly to secure—and avoid losing—the vital leverage that Ukraine will need to achieve an end to the war that does not empower Russia. Positive signs abound: the Australian government’s announcement that it will provide M1A1 tanks to Ukraine, Sweden’s provision of a large tranche of infantry fighting vehicles, and the United States’ commitment to supply additional equipment before the end of the year.

The security of Europe now depends on significant multilateral cooperation to ensure that any path toward ending the war achieves the best possible result for Ukraine. But as attention shifts to negotiations, U.S. and European military support must not wane, for although a successful outcome can be achieved only through diplomacy, what is diplomatically possible will always depend on the military realities on the ground.

JACK WATLING is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based think tank.

Foreign Affairs · by Jack Watling · October 21, 2024

12. A U.S. Reset With Mexico Is Still Possible

Excerpts:

Both countries would also fare better with deepened economic ties. But for Mexico to actually be a viable arena for U.S. commercial interests in the long term, it needs to be a place where the rules are fairly enforced. The United States needs to hold Mexico to account, leaning into the USMCA to enforce market rules and responsibilities by activating formal consultations and dispute settlement panels. And the new U.S. government should raise its voice against other reforms waiting in the wings, in particular the Mexican government’s efforts to gut the autonomy of independent regulatory agencies overseeing telecommunications, energy, and antitrust efforts, as such moves would further undermine the fairness of the economic playing field and potentially violate the USMCA.

In the upcoming USMCA review, the United States, Mexico, and Canada will need to address the influx of Chinese exports, investment, and emerging production in strategic industries including electric vehicles, telecommunications, semiconductors, aerospace, pharmaceuticals, and advanced electronics. By requiring a higher percentage of inputs to be from North American producers for tariff-free access, creating a North America–wide review process for foreign investments in sensitive sectors, and implementing coordinated tariffs on inputs and finished goods, a revised agreement can help North American production and supply chains survive and prosper. Without a resolution in 2026, the USMCA will have to be renewed every year until it ends in 2036, putting its trade benefits and investment protections for all three member countries on shaky ground—and ending the nascent promise of near-shoring.

Sheinbaum will pursue a policy agenda based on her inclinations, her ambitions, and her domestic constraints. But the United States can make it clear that there will be consequences if she continues down a path that is setting Mexico up to be a less reliable economic, commercial, security, and democratic player. Washington should not bemoan its faltering relations with Mexico City just yet; whoever wins November’s election will have opportunities for détente, and even partnership.

A U.S. Reset With Mexico Is Still Possible

Washington Must Cooperate With Sheinbaum on Trade, Security, and Migration

By Shannon K. O’Neil

October 21, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by The Globalization Myth: Why Regions Matter · October 21, 2024

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, who was inaugurated on October 1, has come into office with more political power than any Mexican leader since the country’s transition away from single-party rule in the 1990s. As the protégée of and successor to Andrés Manuel López Obrador (also known as AMLO), she received a record 35.9 million votes—nearly 60 percent of those cast for the top office—and effectively controls a two-thirds supermajority in Congress. Her party, Morena, governs 22 of the country’s 31 states, enough to ratify constitutional reforms. And the recent overhaul of Mexico’s courts, whereby all judges will be elected rather than appointed, will likely consolidate Sheinbaum and her party’s control over the judicial system, as they will choose the vast majority of candidates on the ballot.

Yet economic headwinds will temper this political gift, as expectations for fast and meaningful action on wage increases, a greener energy grid, expanded public benefits, and other issues will likely outpace Sheinbaum’s ability to deliver. Hopes that Mexico could become a hub for U.S. manufacturing and attract more foreign direct investment are diminishing due to a lack of infrastructure, the growing scarcity of energy and water, deteriorating security, and rising uncertainty for businesses given the court overhaul and further plans to do away with independent regulators. Sheinbaum faces a cash squeeze as the economy slows and public coffers empty.

Hanging over these challenges, moreover, is the U.S. election, the outcome of which will determine the future of bilateral cooperation on security, migration, and commerce. No matter who enters the White House in January, there is an opportunity—albeit a narrow one—for a reset with Mexico, one that could make both countries safer and more prosperous, rather than beset with crises and consistently at odds with each other.

ANXIOUS ONLOOKERS

Over the last few years, near-shoring, or efforts to relocate U.S. business operations to neighboring countries, has boosted Mexico’s economy. For U.S. manufacturers in particular, the country’s geographic proximity, free trade access, and a wealth of industrial suppliers make Mexico an attractive location for companies looking for alternatives to China. In 2023, Mexico surpassed both China and Canada to become the United States’ top trading partner, with over $800 billion worth of goods crossing the border. Rising international corporate spending and foreign direct investment pushed growth above three percent for the last three years, raising hopes that Mexico could finally break out of its more than two decades of mediocre economic performance. But Sheinbaum’s political and economic policy proposals, which have come into clearer focus since her inauguration, are threatening to undo that progress.

At first blush, Sheinbaum’s administration does look to be more private-sector friendly than the last. She has filled her cabinet with technical experts and intellectuals. Her public infrastructure plans, laid out in meaty PowerPoint decks shared at international investor conferences, would improve Mexico’s logistics and infrastructure with new roads, rails, ports, and airports. A climate scientist by training, she recognizes the need for a transition toward green energy, an about-face from the previous administration, which doubled down on fossil fuels and refineries.

Economic headwinds will temper Sheinbaum’s political advantages.

Nonetheless, whether due to true beliefs or political necessity, she has pledged to retain elements of the AMLO administration that are not friendly to the private sector, including measures that favor state-owned companies, curb legal guarantees for private companies, and weaken or eliminate many of the independent checks and balances in Mexico’s political system. She is committed to a large and expanding role for the government in the economy. She has vowed to keep the majority of power generation and distribution, even if greener than in the past, in government hands—an endeavor that will cost the state an estimated $40 billion over the next five years. She has promised public support for some two million farmers. She has vowed to continue—and even expand—an array of state programs, including scholarships, internships, and pensions for Mexico’s students, workers, and elderly. And she has fully backed Mexico’s recent judicial reform, which will require all judges—filling nearly 7,000 posts—to be elected by voters rather than appointed by the state, in the name of democratizing the courts. With the long lists of candidates nominated mostly by her office—or her party, which also controls Congress—many in business and across society worry about the neutrality and fairness of verdicts to come.

The vast security challenges that Sheinbaum has inherited have also left investors and policymakers in the United States and elsewhere anxious. Cartel-fueled violence and instability surged under the AMLO administration: over the last six years, murder rates hovered near all-time highs, and extortion rates, forced disappearances, and human trafficking climbed. Organized crime has strengthened its hold on more of the country—and in its politics. Recent elections saw record levels of electoral violence, with over three dozen candidates killed and dozens more bowing out after receiving threats.

Sheinbaum has pledged to take a stronger stance on law enforcement than her predecessor. She has appointed Omar García Harfuch, a career police officer who was credited with nearly halving Mexico City’s homicide rate as the capital’s top law enforcement official, as security minister. In his new position, he has presented a plan to concentrate security forces and step up intelligence efforts to capture and prosecute criminals and dismantle crime rings in Mexico’s most violent cities. Yet Sheinbaum has also supported the recent constitutional change that placed the 130,000 or so members of the National Guard under the army’s control. This militarization of security runs counter to the strategies of civilian policing and community building that not only were successful in Mexico City under García Harfuch but also have also helped reduce crime in other places including Colombia and the United States.

BIG DREAMS, EMPTY COFFERS

Sheinbaum’s early agenda is already facing political and economic difficulties. With the new president having voiced full-throttled support for AMLO’s constitutional and judicial reforms, overseas investors have stopped coming—and domestic investment, too, is running scared. According to The Wall Street Journal, some $35 billion in foreign capital—nearly equal to Mexico’s total 2023 haul—sits waiting on the sidelines as foreign firms pause their investment plans in the country. The peso has slid by around 15 percent since Sheinbaum’s win. And the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development have all downgraded their 2024 and 2025 growth expectations for Mexico as a result.

The shabby state of Mexico’s public finances will put another brake on the president’s ambitions. AMLO’s profligate spending on programs such as cash transfers and pet infrastructure projects has left Sheinbaum little financial wiggle room to address investor and everyday citizen concerns. During the AMLO administration, spending increasingly outpaced revenues, and the fiscal deficit climbed to a 30-year high of nearly six percent. AMLO also emptied Mexico’s stabilization and sovereign wealth funds and numerous other trusts earmarked for the arts, sciences, and public health to pay the country’s bills, leaving Sheinbaum with few rainy-day funds. Adding to Sheinbaum’s financial woes is the pending fiscal bomb posed by Pemex, the state-owned energy company, which is set to cost the Mexican government another $18 billion—three times the state’s health budget—in 2025.

Sheinbaum has tried to reassure domestic and international investors with promises to halve the fiscal deficit—but has failed to lay out how, exactly, she would do so. She has promised not to raise taxes, even as she promotes ambitious infrastructure and energy plans. Sheinbaum also faces the challenge of maintaining a fractious political coalition that has historically been knitted together with patronage spending.

And Mexico’s economic engine is sputtering in ways that go beyond Sheinbaum. Foreign interest in Mexico was already ebbing due to weak public infrastructure, electricity scarcity, bureaucratic red tape, and crime. Of the celebrated tens of billions of dollars coming into Mexico in 2023, very little was new money or from companies not already on the ground and used to operating in the country’s particular environment.

Without economic growth, Sheinbaum’s political strength could turn into a liability. Pressure from within her party to do more and do it fast could further undermine foreign and domestic investment, tanking the peso and the broader economy—and with them, her presidency. And unlike her predecessors, Sheinbaum could face a public reckoning halfway through her tenure, with a new recall referendum, introduced in the country’s 2019 constitutional reform, giving voters the means to kick her out of office before her term is up.

LOOMING CROSS-BORDER DISPUTES

Sheinbaum will also have to navigate politics and policies to the north. Regardless of who takes office in Washington in January, the United States and Mexico will have to engage in difficult discussions and negotiations over commerce, security, migration, and a host of other issues. Any U.S. administration will doubtless harbor concerns over the future of trade, security, Mexico’s political stability, and the specter of China in the bilateral relationship. And with a review of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), the free trade deal reached under the Trump administration, due in 2026, the future of North American economic integration may well be at stake.

Until now, the Biden administration has been fairly forgiving of alleged violations of the USMCA, given the electoral importance of migration and Mexico’s vital role in limiting crossings at the United States’ southern border. But that leniency could end if a new U.S. administration chooses a harder line. Moreover, U.S. businesses and investors are increasingly anxious about the possibility in Mexico of government expropriation, bans on genetically modified corn imports, and politicized court verdicts—concerns that could push the United States and Mexico into trade disputes.

Migration will continue to bedevil the U.S.-Mexican relationship.

Although both Donald Trump and Kamala Harris could, as president, take firmer positions on trade with Mexico, their approaches would differ. Trump sees tariffs as a general fix, promising 60 percent hikes on all Chinese goods and 10 to 20 percent on everything and everyone else, including free trade partners. Mexico should theoretically benefit from the faster and harder U.S.-Chinese trade decoupling that would likely take place under Trump—yet the former U.S. president also repeatedly rails against U.S. companies expanding into Mexico, most recently threatening John Deere with 200 percent tariffs should it move some equipment manufacturing from Iowa south of the border. His punitive, unilateral, and often company-specific policies could limit Mexico’s economic upside.

Given its commercial and trade dependence on the United States, Mexico also remains vulnerable to Trump’s playbook of wielding tariffs as a negotiating chip to extract concessions from other countries. During his first term, Trump’s threats to levy 25 percent tariffs on steel and aluminum led Mexico to agree to receive and hold tens of thousands of migrants awaiting their U.S. asylum hearings in what became known as the Remain in Mexico program. If Trump wins, Sheinbaum will need to prepare for similar escalating demands.

Harris, too, does not seem inclined to enhance U.S.-Mexican trade, having voted against the USMCA as a senator in early 2020. Yet she is more likely to work to improve the agreement than to disregard it. She has said she will focus on strengthening what she sees as weak labor and environmental provisions in the 2026 USMCA review. Harris will also likely continue to enforce the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, which contains, among other things, subsidies for North American electric vehicles, including those produced in Canada and Mexico. This measure has been a boon for Mexico, as nearly one-third of its exports come from automobiles and their parts, and inclusion in U.S. industrial policies ensures that the country will remain an essential part of the North American auto industry.

THE MIGRATION QUESTION

Migration will continue to bedevil the bilateral relationship. Unauthorized arrivals at the U.S.-Mexican border have fallen from record highs in 2023, largely due to steps taken by Mexico after closed-door negotiations in December 2023. In what has become known as the “carousel,” Mexican authorities pick up tens of thousands of migrants in the north of the country and bus them south. This stopgap solution, however, is already overwhelming Mexican migration authorities, who have the capacity to intercept just a small percentage of the hundreds of thousands of migrants who enter the country each month. Both Trump and Harris would likely continue looking to Mexico to help manage the flow of migrants toward the border.

Harris’s approach would entail less pressure on Mexico to enforce U.S. immigration rules, building on the Biden administration’s current mix of tough restrictions at the border and expanding legal pathways to migration. She has promised to revive the bipartisan Senate border security bill—which Trump pressured Republican senators to kill in February—that included billions of dollars for new Border Patrol agents, asylum officers, and expanded detention facilities alongside 250,000 new family- and employment-based visas. And she is likely to keep in place the Temporary Protected Status programs that allow hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans, Salvadorans, Haitians, and others to legally stay in the United States.

Trump would very likely take a much harder line against migrants on their way to or already in the United States, looking to revive the restrictions enacted during his first term. He could reduce the numbers of green cards and high-skilled and temporary visas available, and cap refugee admittances. He could end Temporary Protected Status and other visa programs that legally shelter 2.7 million migrants in the United States today. He would likely go even further than he did in his first term, too, adopting a migration strategy focused on expulsions. On the campaign trail, Trump has repeatedly promised to carry out the “largest deportation effort in American history,” which would involve expelling the 11 million undocumented migrants within the United States by mobilizing local police forces, the National Guard, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents. Experts doubt the U.S. government’s capacity to find and expel such a large number of migrants, many of whom have been living in the United States for decades. But even if just partially successful, Trump’s plans would disrupt the lives of millions, including some of the nearly 5.5 million U.S. citizens under the age of 18 who have an undocumented parent, as well as many in the communities in which they all live and work.

These deportations would affect Mexico, too, as just under half of the undocumented migrants in the United States hail from there. Sheinbaum would have to develop a plan to absorb hundreds of thousands of displaced citizens, many of whom may have not lived in Mexico for decades. In the long term, the influx of people could boost Mexico’s economy. But during Sheinbaum’s presidency, the move would undercut the some $63 billion that migrants in the United States send back to Mexico each year, adding to the country’s financial woes. Moreover, the wave of arrivals would strain Mexico’s already limited social and economic infrastructure—and could animate latent anti-American sentiment in Mexico’s politics, making cooperation on other issues all the more difficult.

CRACKING DOWN ON CRIME?

The United States and Mexico face intertwined security threats, but Sheinbaum and her new counterpart in the White House will lead governments with diminishing capacity to address them cooperatively. During his six-year term, AMLO’s single-minded policy focus on the socioeconomic root causes of crime, along with his general distrust of the United States, led him to undermine or end most formal bilateral security programs. He restricted U.S. law enforcement agent access, disbanded their counterpart police units, ended joint intelligence collection, and replaced the decade-long Mérida Initiative security framework, aimed at cooperating in the fight against organized crime, with a substitute that is poorly funded and less comprehensive. In contrast, Sheinbaum has promised new law enforcement measures alongside expanded violence prevention and other social programs for at-risk youth. This opens space for increasing bilateral cooperation if the next U.S. president is so inclined.

Joint action may be difficult under Trump, who spins out plans to “wage war” on Mexico’s cartels, equating them to the Islamic State (also known as ISIS). He talks of bombing fentanyl labs, sending special forces to assassinate drug kingpins, setting up naval embargoes, and implementing cyber-strikes. Few to no words are given to bilateral cooperation or intelligence gathering. Trump’s go-it-alone approach would likely limit the ability to confront organized crime, given the sophistication of these criminal enterprises and their economic penetration in many parts of Mexico.

Harris’s platform is decidedly less inflammatory and unilateral. Drawing on her experience as California attorney general, she brings a prosecutor’s toolkit of using courts and building legal cases to take down criminals, and she supports cooperation with Mexico on intelligence gathering, wiretapping, asset freezing, prosecution, and other measures that are needed to dismantle expansive criminal networks. She has indicated that she would give the Department of Justice more resources to crack down on Mexican cartels and stem the flow of fentanyl into the United States, and that she would put pressure on China to crack down on the export of precursor chemicals.

A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL PARTNERSHIP

The United States benefits immensely from a safe and prosperous Mexico, given the two countries’ expansive commercial relationship and critical supply chain linkages, the familial and community connections that span the border, and the shared dangers of drugs and crime. The United States also faces significant risks from a less stable, less safe, and slower-growing neighbor, as Mexico’s challenges inevitably reverberate across the border.

Washington can mitigate the worst of these risks for itself and for Mexico by cooperating with Sheinbaum’s government when possible. On the security front, joint efforts should focus on stanching the flow of fentanyl chemical precursors from China and elsewhere as they pass through both Mexican and U.S. ports on their way to clandestine Mexican labs. The two countries should restrict the financial access of the multibillion-dollar criminal businesses that move their money through both U.S. and Mexican banking systems. Reinstating intelligence coordination and joint operations with specialized units would build trust between the two neighbors and lead to better outcomes in the fight against organized crime. And the new administrations should revisit the overarching security framework, expanding the remit and ambition of bilateral programs to help make citizens on both sides of the border safer.

The two countries should also see migration as an opportunity for collaboration rather than a lightning rod for conflict, as both nations struggle to absorb the millions that come to and often stay within their borders. With migration trending upward as the result of political instability, economic uncertainty, and climate change, both countries must make domestic modifications: the United States needs to reform its immigration laws and expand pathways for legal migration, and Mexico needs to invest in the state agencies that engage with migrants and work to integrate them into its economic and social fabrics. To incentivize these moves within Mexico, Washington can funnel resources to help build the capacity of Mexico’s immigration agencies. It can also increase development aid for communities absorbing new residents.

The United States benefits immensely from a safe and prosperous Mexico.

The United States and Mexico would also benefit from a more systematic regional approach to migration—one that would manage the movement of people in humane ways and speed their legal processing in both countries. This could include building processing centers in countries sending migrants—including Mexico—so individuals don’t need to make the dangerous trek to the U.S.-Mexican border to seek asylum or other legal entry. These centers could also adjudicate other legal pathways, including humanitarian parole and agricultural work visas.

Both countries would also fare better with deepened economic ties. But for Mexico to actually be a viable arena for U.S. commercial interests in the long term, it needs to be a place where the rules are fairly enforced. The United States needs to hold Mexico to account, leaning into the USMCA to enforce market rules and responsibilities by activating formal consultations and dispute settlement panels. And the new U.S. government should raise its voice against other reforms waiting in the wings, in particular the Mexican government’s efforts to gut the autonomy of independent regulatory agencies overseeing telecommunications, energy, and antitrust efforts, as such moves would further undermine the fairness of the economic playing field and potentially violate the USMCA.

In the upcoming USMCA review, the United States, Mexico, and Canada will need to address the influx of Chinese exports, investment, and emerging production in strategic industries including electric vehicles, telecommunications, semiconductors, aerospace, pharmaceuticals, and advanced electronics. By requiring a higher percentage of inputs to be from North American producers for tariff-free access, creating a North America–wide review process for foreign investments in sensitive sectors, and implementing coordinated tariffs on inputs and finished goods, a revised agreement can help North American production and supply chains survive and prosper. Without a resolution in 2026, the USMCA will have to be renewed every year until it ends in 2036, putting its trade benefits and investment protections for all three member countries on shaky ground—and ending the nascent promise of near-shoring.

Sheinbaum will pursue a policy agenda based on her inclinations, her ambitions, and her domestic constraints. But the United States can make it clear that there will be consequences if she continues down a path that is setting Mexico up to be a less reliable economic, commercial, security, and democratic player. Washington should not bemoan its faltering relations with Mexico City just yet; whoever wins November’s election will have opportunities for détente, and even partnership.

SHANNON K. O’NEIL is Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of The Globalization Myth: Why Regions Matter.

Foreign Affairs · by The Globalization Myth: Why Regions Matter · October 21, 2024

13. The West Has to Believe that Democracy Will Prevail

Conclusion:

In the face of an ugly, aggressive dictatorship in Europe, we in the democratic world are natural comrades. Our principles and ideals, and the alliances we have built around them, are our most powerful weapons. We must act upon our shared beliefs—that the future can be better; the war can be won; that authoritarianism can be defeated once again; that freedom is possible; and that true peace is possible, on this continent and around the world.

The West Has to Believe that Democracy Will Prevail

The West has to believe that democracy will prevail.

By Anne Applebaum

The Atlantic · by Anne Applebaum · October 20, 2024

This year, the Atlantic staff writer Anne Applebaum was awarded the German Book Trade’s Peace Prize for her “indispensable contribution to the preservation of democracy.” Applebaum is the author of Autocracy, Inc.: The Dictators Who Want to Run the World; Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine; Gulag: A History; and other books about dictatorship and democracy. This article is adapted from the acceptance lecture that she delivered yesterday in Frankfurt.

When I began working on the history of the Soviet Union, in the 1990s, survivors and historians alike were free to speak as they wished. Many of them felt as if a new Russia could be constructed on top of the fundamental, historical truths that were emerging.

That possibility faded. I can even tell you the exact moment when it finally came to an end: the morning of February 20, 2014, when Russian troops illegally marched across the Crimean peninsula, which is part of Ukraine. That was the moment when the work of writing Russian history once again became dangerous. Because that was the moment when the past and present collided—when the past became, once again, a blueprint for the present.

No historian of tragedy ever wants to look up, turn on the television, and find that their work has come to life. When, in the 1990s, I was researching the history of the Gulag in the Soviet archives, I assumed that the story belonged to the distant past. When, a few years later, I wrote about the Soviet assault on Eastern Europe, I also thought that I was describing an era that had ended. And when I studied the history of the Ukrainian famine, the tragedy at the center of Stalin’s attempt to eradicate Ukraine as a nation, I did not imagine that this same kind of story could repeat itself in my lifetime.

Anne Applebaum: The only way the Ukraine war can end

But in 2014, old plans were taken out of the same Soviet archives, dusted off, and put to use once again.

The Russian soldiers who spread out across Crimea traveled in unmarked vehicles, wearing uniforms without insignia. They took over government buildings, removed the local leaders, barred them from their offices. For several days afterward, the world was confused. Were these “separatists” who were staging an uprising? Were they “pro-Russian” Ukrainians?

I was not confused. I knew that this was a Russian invasion of Crimea, because it looked exactly like the Soviet invasion of Poland 70 years earlier. In 1944, the invasion featured Soviet soldiers wearing Polish uniforms, a Soviet-backed Communist Party pretending to speak for all Poles, a manipulated referendum, and other acts of political fakery that were designed to confuse not only the people of Poland but also Poland’s allies in London and Washington.

After 2014, and then again after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, cruelly familiar patterns repeated themselves. Russian soldiers treated ordinary Ukrainians as enemies and spies. They used random violence to terrorize people. They imprisoned civilians for minor offenses—the tying of a ribbon with Ukrainian colors to a bicycle, for example—or sometimes for no reason at all. They built torture chambers as well as filtration camps, which we could also call concentration camps. They transformed cultural institutions, schools, and universities to suit the nationalist, imperialist ideology of the new regime. They kidnapped children, took them to Russia, and changed their identities. They stripped Ukrainians of everything that made them human, that made them vital, that made them unique.

In different languages, at different times, this kind of assault has had different names. We used to talk about Sovietization. Now we speak of Russification. There is a German word too: Gleichschaltung. But whatever word you use, the process is the same. It means the imposition of arbitrary autocratic rule: a state without the rule of law, without guaranteed rights, without accountability, without checks and balances. It means the destruction of all stirrings or survivals or signs of the liberal democratic order. It means the construction of a totalitarian regime: In Mussolini’s famous words, “Everything within the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state.”

In 2014, Russia was already on the way to becoming a totalitarian society, having launched two brutal wars in Chechnya, having murdered journalists and arrested critics. But after 2014, that process accelerated. The Russian experience of occupation in Ukraine paved the way for harsher politics inside Russia itself. In the years after the Crimean invasion, opposition was repressed further; independent institutions were completely banned.

This deep connection between autocracy and imperial wars of conquest has a logic to it. If you truly believe that you and your regime have the right to control all institutions, all information, all organizations—that you can strip people not just of rights but of identity, language, property, life—then of course you also believe that you have the right to inflict violence on whomever you please. Nor will you object to the human costs of such a war: If ordinary people have no rights, no power, no voice, then why should it matter whether they live or die?

Listen: Autocracy in America

Not that this connection is nothing new. Two centuries ago, Immanuel Kant—whose ideas inspired this prize—also described the link between despotism and war. More than two millennia ago, Aristotle wrote that a tyrant is inclined “to foment wars in order to preserve his own monopoly of power.” In the 20th century, Carl Von Ossietzky, the German journalist and activist, became a fierce opponent of war, not least because of what it was doing to the culture of his own country. As he wrote in 1932: “Nowhere is there as much belief in war as in Germany … nowhere are people more inclined to overlook its horrors and disregard its consequences, nowhere is soldiering celebrated more uncritically.”

Since the invasion of Crimea in 2014, this same militarization has gripped Russia too. Russian schools now train small children to be soldiers. Russian television encourages Russians to hate Ukrainians, to consider them subhuman. The Russian economy has been militarized: Some 40 percent of the national budget will now be spent on weapons. To obtain missiles and ammunition, Russia now makes deals with Iran and North Korea, two of the most brutal dictatorships on the planet. The constant talk of war in Ukraine also normalized the idea of war in Russia, making other wars more likely. Russian leaders now speak casually of using nuclear weapons against their other neighbors and regularly threaten to invade them.

As in Von Ossietzky’s Germany, criticism of the war is not merely discouraged in Russia. It is illegal. My friend Vladimir Kara-Murza made the brave decision in 2022 to return to Russia and to speak out against the invasion from there. Why? Because he wanted the history books to record that someone opposed the war. He paid a very high price. He was arrested. His health deteriorated. He was often kept in isolation. When he and others who had been unjustly imprisoned were finally released, in exchange for a group of Russian spies and criminals including a murderer taken from a German prison, his captors hinted that he should be careful, because in the future he might be poisoned. He had reason to believe them: Russian secret policemen had already poisoned him twice.

Kara-Murza was not alone. Since 2018, more than 116,000 Russians have faced criminal or administrative punishment for speaking their mind. Thousands of them have been punished specifically for objecting to the war in Ukraine. Their heroic battle is mostly carried out in silence. Because the regime has imposed total control on information in Russia, their voices cannot be heard.

But what about us in the rest of the democratic world? Our voices are not restrained or restricted. We are not jailed or poisoned for speaking our mind. How should we react to the revival of a form of government that we thought had disappeared from Europe forever? In the early, emotional days of the war in Ukraine, many did join the chorus of support. In 2022, as in 2014, Europeans again turned on their televisions to see scenes of a kind they knew only from history books: women and children huddled at train stations, tanks rolling across fields, bombed-out cities. In that moment, many things suddenly felt clear. Words quickly became actions. More than 50 countries joined a coalition to aid Ukraine, militarily and economically, an alliance built at unprecedented speed. In Kyiv, Odesa, and Kherson, I witnessed the effect of food aid, military aid, and other European support. It felt miraculous.

But as the war has continued, doubt has crept in. Since 2014, faith in democratic institutions and alliances has declined dramatically, in both Europe and America. Maybe our indifference to the invasion of Crimea played a larger role in this decline than we usually think. The decision to accelerate economic cooperation with Russia after the invasion certainly created both moral and financial corruption as well as cynicism. That cynicism was then amplified by a Russian disinformation campaign that we dismissed or ignored.

Now, faced with the greatest challenge to our values and our interests in our time, the democratic world is starting to wobble. Many wish the fighting in Ukraine would somehow, magically, stop. Others want to change the subject to the Middle East—another horrific, tragic conflict, but one where Europeans have almost no ability to shape events. A Hobbesian world makes many claims upon our resources of solidarity. A deeper engagement with one tragedy does not denote indifference to other tragedies. We must do what we can where our actions will make a difference.

Anne Applebaum Eibner-Pressefoto / Florian Wiegan / Reuters

Slowly, another group is gaining traction, too, especially in Germany. These are the people who do not support or condemn Vladimir Putin’s aggression but rather pretend to stand above the argument and declare “I want peace.” Some even call for peace by referring solemnly to the lessons of German history. But “I want peace” is not always a moral argument. This is also the right moment to say that the lesson of German history is not that Germans should be pacifists. On the contrary, we have known for nearly a century that a demand for pacifism in the face of an aggressive, advancing dictatorship can simply represent the appeasement and acceptance of that dictatorship.

Read: The real reason Trump loves Putin

In 1938, the German writer Thomas Mann, then already in exile, horrified by the situation in his country and by the complacency of the liberal democracies, denounced the “pacifism that brings about war instead of banishing it.” During World War II, George Orwell condemned his compatriots who called upon Britain to stop fighting. “Pacifism,” he wrote, “is objectively pro-Fascist. This is elementary common sense. If you hamper the war effort of one side you automatically help that of the other.”

In 1983, Manés Sperber, the recipient of that year’s German Peace Prize, also argued against the false morality of his era’s pacifists, who at that time wanted to disarm Germany and Europe in the face of the Soviet threat: “Anyone,” he declared, “who believes and wants to make others believe that a Europe without weapons, neutral and capitulating, can ensure peace for the foreseeable future is mistaken and is misleading others.”

We can use some of these words once again. Many of those in Germany, and in Europe, who now call for pacifism in the face of the Russian onslaught are indeed “objectively pro-Russian,” to borrow Orwell’s phrase. Their arguments, if followed to the logical conclusion, mean that we should acquiesce to the military conquest of Ukraine, to the cultural destruction of Ukraine, to the construction of concentration camps in Ukraine, to the kidnapping of children in Ukraine. We are nearly three years into this war. What would it have meant to plead for peace in Nazi-dominated Europe in early 1942?

Let me say it more clearly: Those who advocate pacifism, and those who would surrender not just territory but people and principles to Russia, have learned nothing at all from the history of the 20th century.

The magic of the phrase never again has blinded us to reality before. In the weeks before the invasion in February 2022, Germany, like many other European nations, found war so impossible to imagine that the German government refused to supply Ukraine with weapons. And yet here is the irony: Had Germany, and the rest of NATO, supplied Ukraine with those weapons well in advance, maybe we could have deterred the invasion. Maybe it would never have happened. Perhaps the West’s failure was, in Thomas Mann’s words again, “pacifism that brings about war instead of banishing it.“

But let me repeat again: Mann loathed the war, as well as the regime that promoted it. Orwell hated militarism. Sperber and his family were themselves refugees from war. Yet it was because they hated war with such passion, and because they understood the link between war and dictatorship, that they argued in favor of defending the liberal societies they treasured.

We have been here before, which is why the words of our liberal democratic predecessors speak to us. European liberal societies have been confronted by aggressive dictatorships before. We have fought against them before. We can do so again. And this time, Germany is one of the liberal societies that can lead the fight.

To prevent the Russians from spreading their autocratic political system further, we must help the Ukrainians achieve victory, and not only for the sake of Ukraine. If there is even a small chance that military defeat could help end this horrific cult of violence in Russia, just as military defeat once brought an end to the cult of violence in Germany, we should take it. The impact will be felt on our continent and around the world—not just in Ukraine but in Ukraine’s neighbors, in Georgia, in Moldova, in Belarus. And not just in Russia but among Russia’s allies: China, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, North Korea.

The challenge is not only military. This is also a battle against hopelessness, against pessimism, and even against the creeping appeal of autocratic rule, which is also sometimes disguised beneath the false language of “peace.” The idea that autocracy is safe and stable, that democracies cause war; that autocracies protect some form of traditional values while democracies are degenerate—this language is also coming from Russia and the broader autocratic world, as well as from those inside our own societies who are prepared to accept as inevitable the blood and destruction inflicted by the Russian state. Those who accept the erasure of other people’s democracies are less likely to fight against the erasure of their own democracy. Complacency, like a virus, moves quickly across borders.

The temptation of pessimism is real. In the face of what feels like an endless war and an onslaught of propaganda, it is easier just to accept the idea of decline. But let’s remember what’s at stake, what the Ukrainians are fighting for: a society, like ours, where independent courts protect people from arbitrary violence; where the rights to thought, speech, and assembly are guaranteed; where citizens are free to engage in public life and are not frightened of the consequences; where security is guaranteed by a broad alliance of democracies and prosperity is anchored by the European Union.

Autocrats like the Russian president hate all of these principles because they threaten their power. Independent judges can hold rulers to account. A free press can expose high-level corruption. A political system that empowers citizens allows them to change their leaders. International organizations can enforce the rule of law. That is why the propagandists of autocratic regimes will do what they can to undermine the language of liberalism and the institutions that guard our freedoms, to mock them and to belittle them, inside their own countries and in ours as well.

Supporters of Ukraine are now asking Germany to provide weapons to be used against Russia, an aggressive military power. The true lesson of German history is not that Germans should never fight but that Germans have a special responsibility to stand up and take risks for freedom. All of us in the democratic world, not just Germans, have been trained to be critical and skeptical of our own leaders and of our own societies, so it can feel awkward when we are asked to defend our most fundamental principles. But we can’t let skepticism decline into nihilism.

In the face of an ugly, aggressive dictatorship in Europe, we in the democratic world are natural comrades. Our principles and ideals, and the alliances we have built around them, are our most powerful weapons. We must act upon our shared beliefs—that the future can be better; the war can be won; that authoritarianism can be defeated once again; that freedom is possible; and that true peace is possible, on this continent and around the world.

The Atlantic · by Anne Applebaum · October 20, 2024

14. Navy pronounces missing EA-18G Growler jet aviators deceased

Navy pronounces missing EA-18G Growler jet aviators deceased

militarytimes.com · by Diana Correll · October 20, 2024

The two missing EA-18G Growler crew members involved in a crash last week are now pronounced dead, the Navy announced Sunday.

The fighter jet, assigned to Electronic Attack Squadron 130 based out of Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Washington, crashed east of Mount Rainier on Tuesday while conducting a routine training flight, according to the Navy.

“It is with a heavy heart that we share the loss of two beloved Zappers,” Cmdr. Timothy Warburton, commanding officer of Electronic Attack Squadron 130, said in a statement. “Our priority right now is taking care of the families of our fallen aviators, and ensuring the well-being of our Sailors and the Growler community. We are grateful for the ongoing teamwork to safely recover the deceased.”

Two Navy EA-18G Growler crew members missing after crash

The fighter jet, assigned to Electronic Attack Squadron 130, crashed east of Mount Ranier on Tuesday.

The Navy will not disclose the crew members’ identities until 24 hours after next of kin are notified, in accordance with Department of Defense protocol.

The cause of the crash is under investigation, and salvage and recovery efforts continue, the Navy said.

Wreckage was found Wednesday, but the Navy said Thursday night that it “rests at approximately 6,000 feet altitude in a remote, steep and heavily-wooded area east of Mount Rainier.”

Soldiers from the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) based at nearby Joint Base Lewis-McChord were assisting in the search, the Navy said.

Electronic Attack Squadron 130, known as the “Zappers,” wrapped up a deployment to the Middle East with Carrier Air Wing 3 embarked on the aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower in July.

Most EA-18G squadrons are based out of Whidbey Island. The aircraft is a variant of the F/A-18 Super Hornet and features an electronic warfare suite.

15. How one warship thwarting a Houthi attack a year ago changed the Navy

Excerpts:

Questions of sustainability of effort are now arising, he said, noting that the Navy has in some instances used carrier-based fighter jets to shoot down Houthi drones and missiles, an expensive and inefficient approach.

“The challenge going forward will be how to sustain this level of presence in the region,” Clark said. “The Pentagon may need to consider putting missile defense systems on barges or ashore so [destroyers] can deploy elsewhere or return home for maintenance.”

Robertson left the Carney after it returned to Mayport, Florida, in May, and is now the Navy’s Surface Warfare Advanced Tactical Training, or SWATT, director, passing on his hard-earned knowledge.

“It’s certainly surreal,” he said of his time commanding Carney. “I love every one of the sailors and officers and chiefs I worked with. Just a great crew. They’ll remember this for the rest of their lives.”

As the one-year anniversary of Oct. 19 comes and goes with no end in sight for the Navy’s Red Sea fight against the Houthis, Caudle noted that it’s difficult to forecast how the conflict will end.

“While I won’t speculate on how our involvement with the Houthis will culminate, I can tell you that I’m laser-focused on readiness, sustainment and lethality,” he said. “We’re ready for this fight, not matter how long it lasts.”

How one warship thwarting a Houthi attack a year ago changed the Navy

militarytimes.com · by Geoff Ziezulewicz · October 19, 2024

The men and women aboard the Navy destroyer Carney could be forgiven for thinking they were headed toward a quiet cruise on Oct. 7, 2023, as the warship steamed east across the Atlantic Ocean to begin its latest deployment.

But that day heralded the start of a great upending for the U.S. Navy, after Hamas militants streamed into Israel and murdered more than 1,200 people, sparking a war that continues to threaten to engulf the Middle East to this day.

All the Houthi-US Navy incidents in the Middle East (that we know of)

A non-exhaustive, running list of Houthi attacks in the Middle East and the U.S. strikes back at them.

The moment that would change the Navy forever actually took place aboard the Carney 12 days later, on Oct. 19, when it became the first American warship to take out a barrage of Iran-backed Houthi rebel missiles and drones fired from Yemen.

Such intercepts have since become a harrowing, near-daily occurrence for destroyers in those waters, and the year that followed Oct. 19, 2023, has irrevocably changed the Navy for the foreseeable future, Navy leaders and outside analysts say.

On this day one year ago, starting around 4 p.m. local time, Carney took out a Houthi attack the Pentagon later said was headed for Israel, downing 15 drones and four land-attack cruise missiles over 10 hours.

While their pre-deployment training prepared them for anything, the Carney was not expecting to find itself taking on the Houthis in a near-daily battle to keep the claustrophobic Red Sea lanes open for commerce, Cmdr. Jeremy Robertson, the ship’s commanding officer for that cruise, told Navy Times this week.

“None of us really could have known what we were going to get into once Oct. 7 happened,” he said.

Sailors assigned to the Navy destroyer Carney stand watch in the ship’s Combat Information Center as it took out a barrage of Houthi drones and missiles on Oct. 19, 2023, in the Red Sea. (Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Aaron Lau/Navy)

Since those fateful 10 hours a year ago, the Red Sea has become the arena for the longest sustained “direct and deliberate attacks at sea” that the fleet has faced since World War II, Fleet Forces Command head Adm. Daryl Caudle said in a statement to Navy Times.

“While I could not have predicted the complexity and interrelationships of all that has transpired since [Oct. 19, 2023], I am not surprised,” said Caudle, who commands the Navy East Coast-based fleet.

Inside the USS Carney’s harrowing and unprecedented deployment

The warship Carney returned home Sunday from a long and historic deployment fending off Houthi rebel attacks in the Middle East.

“The world is a very tense place right now given the vast range of power-seeking agendas between peer competitors and opportunistic regional proxies. Any small spark can have serious consequences, which is why we take every situation so seriously.”

Since Carney’s first victory, the surface fleet has subsequently honed its tactics and tuned its radars for such a fight, instances when a ship’s Combat Information Center sometimes has mere seconds to ascertain and take out a Houthi attack.

Combat lessons are being routed back to schoolhouses and training centers, giving the Navy real-time knowledge on its combat systems and how to best use them.

Skippers also report that their crews have been galvanized by such experiences, finding meaning to their seemingly endless training in the life-and-death minutes they endure in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

“This really gave our sailors the why,” Robertson said. “Why do we train so hard, why do we do all the reps and sets.”

“The stage was not too big, the lights were not too bright. They were able to draw a connection.”

These successes at sea “validate our readiness to respond, our Sailors’ warfighting spirit and the technological superiority of our exquisite combat systems,” Caudle said.

The Navy destroyer Carney spent an extended deployment fighting off Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. (U.S. Navy)

But despite the tactical successes and demonstrated proficiencies, some question how fast the Navy is burning through munitions, sometimes to take out cheap Houthi drones, and whether a drawdown of missiles could one day impact a long-feared war with China in the West Pacific.

The Houthi menace in the Middle East has also caused the Navy’s aircraft carriers to be run hard, and some have been scrambled to the region when others weren’t ready to go, further raising readiness alarms in some corners.

And while tactical battles have been won, strategic wars have not, according to James Holmes, a retired Navy gunnery officer and professor of maritime strategy at the Naval War College.

“The tacticians have done their work magnificently … and the combination of sensors, fire control and weaponry has performed as advertised against an array of threats similar to what [Iran, Russia and China] field,” Holmes told Navy Times. “Bringing down anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles is no easy feat, but they have done it.”

What the Navy is learning from its fight in the Red Sea

The surface fleet has shot down scores of attack drones and missiles since October, activity without modern precedent in U.S. Navy history.

And while such successes will reverberate on other maritime battlefields, the Navy to date has been unable to stop the Houthis from attacking merchant vessels traveling through the vital economic waterway that is the Red Sea, he said.

“The failure part is that the mission has fallen short of its strategic goal, namely allowing merchant shipping through the Gulf of Aden, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and Red Sea to resume unmolested,” Holmes said. “We can flip strategic failure to success when shipping firms — and the all-important maritime insurance companies — feel comfortable enough to start using that route again.”

A year in, the Navy is getting more judicious about how it fights Houthi attacks, according to Bryan Clark, a retired submarine officer and analyst at the Hudson Institute think tank.

Navy ships threw the “kitchen sink” at incoming drones and missiles after the Carney’s first intercept a year ago, but the fleet is becoming more adept at using electronic warfare, guns and less-expensive interceptors to counter such Houthi attacks, Clark said.

Questions of sustainability of effort are now arising, he said, noting that the Navy has in some instances used carrier-based fighter jets to shoot down Houthi drones and missiles, an expensive and inefficient approach.

“The challenge going forward will be how to sustain this level of presence in the region,” Clark said. “The Pentagon may need to consider putting missile defense systems on barges or ashore so [destroyers] can deploy elsewhere or return home for maintenance.”

Robertson left the Carney after it returned to Mayport, Florida, in May, and is now the Navy’s Surface Warfare Advanced Tactical Training, or SWATT, director, passing on his hard-earned knowledge.

Sailors of the destroyer Carney man the rails as the ship pulled back into Naval Station Mayport, Florida, in May. (Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Steven Khor/Navy)

“It’s certainly surreal,” he said of his time commanding Carney. “I love every one of the sailors and officers and chiefs I worked with. Just a great crew. They’ll remember this for the rest of their lives.”

As the one-year anniversary of Oct. 19 comes and goes with no end in sight for the Navy’s Red Sea fight against the Houthis, Caudle noted that it’s difficult to forecast how the conflict will end.

“While I won’t speculate on how our involvement with the Houthis will culminate, I can tell you that I’m laser-focused on readiness, sustainment and lethality,” he said. “We’re ready for this fight, not matter how long it lasts.”

About Geoff Ziezulewicz

Geoff is the managing editor of Military Times, but he still loves writing stories. He covered Iraq and Afghanistan extensively and was a reporter at the Chicago Tribune. He welcomes any and all kinds of tips at geoffz@militarytimes.com.

16. US, Canada sail through Taiwan Strait days after Chinese exercise

US, Canada sail through Taiwan Strait days after Chinese exercise

Stars and Stripes · by Alex Wilson · October 21, 2024

The guided-missile destroyer USS Higgins travels through the Taiwan Strait with the Canadian frigate HMCS Vancouver, Oct. 20, 2024. (Trevor Hale/U.S. Navy)

A Canadian frigate joined a U.S. Navy warship for a trip through the Taiwan Strait on Sunday, less than a week after China concluded a large-scale military exercise around Taiwan.

The guided-missile destroyer USS Higgins and the frigate HMCS Vancouver cruised southwest through the 110-mile-wide waterway that separates Taiwan from mainland China as part of a routine transit, the U.S. 7th Fleet said in a news release Monday.

“As part of normal operations, the ships were conducting a transit of the Taiwan Strait from the South China Sea to the East China Sea in accordance with international law,” 7th Fleet spokesman Lt. Victor Murkowski told Stars and Stripes by email Monday.

The Navy regularly sends warships and sometimes aircraft through the strait that are occasionally joined by allied vessels. The transits serve as both a means of navigating between the East China Sea and South China Sea and as a protest of Beijing’s claims of jurisdiction over the strait.

“No member of the international community should be intimidated or coerced into giving up their rights and freedoms,” Murkowski said. “U.S. ships and aircraft operate in accordance with international law, often alongside allies and partners, on the sea and in the air, to ensure that all nations can do the same without fear or contest.”

Sailors stand watch in the pilot house as the guided-missile destroyer USS Higgins sails through the Taiwan Strait with a Canadian frigate, Oct. 20, 2024. (Trevor Hale/U.S. Navy)

Beijing, however, routinely labels such trips as provocative. China’s Eastern Theater Command on Monday said it organized ships and aircraft to “monitor and guard” the ships’ passage.

“The actions of the US and Canada are disturbing and disrupting the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait,” Eastern Theater Command spokesman Col. Li Xi said in a post to social media site Weibo. “The theater troops are always on high alert and resolutely defend national sovereignty and security and regional peace and stability.”

Murkowski did say whether the ships encountered Chinese forces but said the U.S. military routinely interacts foreign warships and aircraft when operating in the region.

The transit comes six days after China’s military concluded a series of drills around Taiwan, a democracy that China views as a breakaway province that must be reunified with the mainland, by force if necessary.

The Oct. 14 exercise, Joint Sword 2024B, included more than two dozen ships and a one-day record of 153 warplanes active in the skies around Taiwan.

Beijing billed the exercise as a punishment for Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s recent rhetoric, including an Oct. 10 speech for Taiwan’s National Day in which he promised to defend the island’s sovereignty but also expressed willingness to work with China to maintain regional peace.

“On this land, democracy and freedom are growing and thriving,” Lai said, according to a transcript posted by his office. “The People’s Republic of China has no right to represent Taiwan.”

In late September, a Japanese destroyer accompanied by warships from New Zealand and Australia made the first-ever transit of the strait by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. In mid-September, a German frigate and support ship made the passage together.

Alex Wilson

Alex Wilson covers the U.S. Navy and other services from Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan. Originally from Knoxville, Tenn., he holds a journalism degree from the University of North Florida. He previously covered crime and the military in Key West, Fla., and business in Jacksonville, Fla.

Stars and Stripes · by Alex Wilson · October 21, 2024

17. New cases of political violence roil U.S. ahead of contentious election

New cases of political violence roil U.S. ahead of contentious election

By Ned Parker and Peter Eisler

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/new-cases-political-violence-roil-us-ahead-contentious-election-2024-10-21/?utm

October 21, 20246:05 AM EDTUpdated 31 min ago

A hand-painted sign encouraging citizens to vote, sits with Halloween decorations in the front yard of a home in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, U.S. October 20, 2024. REUTERS/Jonathan Drake/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

Summary

Recent attacks part of biggest rise in U.S. political violence since 1970sExperts warn 2024 election atmosphere highly volatileReuters identified 300 cases since 2021

Oct 21 (Reuters) - - In York, Pennsylvania, a man accosted a group of people rallying for Vice President Kamala Harris’ White House campaign, punching a 74-year-old man in the head and calling another man a “n— supporter” as he fled.

In northern Michigan, an assailant enraged by his hatred of Donald Trump used an all-terrain vehicle to run over and injure an 81-year-old man who was putting up a yard sign for the former president’s reelection bid.

The recent attacks were among at least 300 cases of political violence identified by Reuters since Trump’s supporters stormed the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, including at least 51 incidents this year. With just two weeks to go before the Nov. 5 presidential election, the cases are part of the biggest andmost sustained increase in U.S. political violence since the 1970s.

Some of the violence has been reported widely, most notably two assassination attempts on Trump, a Republican. Other high-profile incidents include three shootings in recent weeks at a Democratic campaign office for Harris in Arizona.

But Reuters documented scores of other cases on contentious political issues – from election disputes to LGBTQ+ rights and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Incidents ranged from small fights over political signs to more violent brawls and property destruction at rallies. Most of this year's violence wasn't fatal with the exception of two deaths: a spectator killed during July’s attempt on Trump’s life and the shooter.

The pace of cases has remained remarkably consistent since beginning to rise in 2016, around the time of Trump’s first presidential run. In 2021, which included the tumult that followed Trump’s efforts to overturn the 2020 election, there were 93 cases of political violence, followed by 79 in 2022, and 76 in 2023.

Political extremism experts warn that the charged atmosphere around the 2024 presidential election has created a highly volatile situation. Trump in particular often uses incendiary rhetoric, threatening to put his political enemies on trial and to deploy the military against the “radical left”, calling them “the enemy within.”

Americans are starting to see violence as “part of the way politics happens,” said Nealin Parker, who heads Common Ground USA, a nonprofit that studies ways to bridge America's political and cultural divides. In the current climate of mistrust, she added, “incidents of violence can metastasize into something bigger.”

Robert Pape, a University of Chicago professor who studies political violence, expressed concern over the prospect of post-election violence in battleground states, where the margin of victory could be a few thousand votes. He likened it to “a wildfire season” with lots of “dry combustible material” and the “potential for lightning strikes.”

Trump himself has declined to rule out the possibility of violence if he loses in November. When asked by Time magazine in April if he expected violence after the election, he said, “If we don’t win, you know, it depends.” He has told supporters that any loss in this year’s race would be due to fraud.

The Harris campaign did not respond to a request for comment. The Trump campaign, when asked about the steady rise of political violence and the recent attacks against Harris and Trump supporters, provided a statement attacking Harris on immigration and criminal justice reform.

“DOING MY PART”

The highest-profile case of recent political violence was the first assassination attempt on Trump at a July 13 campaign rally in Pennsylvania. The shooter, Thomas Crooks, was killed at the scene. He had no “definitive ideology,” federal investigators concluded.

Law enforcement agencies were put on alert for potential retaliatory violence by Trump supporters. There were some concerning incidents, including a man in Florida who told his wife he was “preparing for war” after the shooting and left home with multiple guns, according to police reports. He was found burying a full ammunition box in a public park. Police seized seven rifles and handguns, and had the man hospitalized for a mental health evaluation.

But the anger wasn’t confined to Trump’s supporters.

On the day of the assassination attempt, Joshua Kemppainen, an avowed Trump hater in northern Michigan, raged in a private chat with friends on the Discord messaging app. “Nice aim dickhead,” Kemppainen wrote over a picture of a bleeding Trump. A member of the chat group shared the message with Reuters.

Kemppainen, 22 and unemployed, went on a vandalism spree eight days later in his town of Hancock, population 4,500, which mostly backed Trump in the 2020 election.

On July 21, when President Joe Biden quit the presidential race and endorsed Harris, Kemppainen rode an all-terrain vehicle through the streets and targeted Trump supporters, said Hancock Police Department chief Tami Sleeman in an interview.

Reuters pieced together what happened from police reports obtained in a records request, copies of chat messages provided by Kemppainen’s associates and police, and a video Kemppainen posted on Discord.

He vandalized a pickup truck with a Trump sticker, deflating its tires, tearing off a side mirror and smashing its windows. He also damaged a truck with a pro-police decal. He posted a video of one attack on Discord with the comment “doing my part.” Then he tore up Trump yard signs and threw them into the street.

When an onlooker, Carl Nelson, 81, replanted the signs, Kemppainen ran him over with the ATV and fled, hospitalizing the Vietnam veteran.

The next day, Kemppainen rang Hancock Police: “I am calling to confess to a crime,” he said in a message describing his rampage, according to a recording police shared with Reuters. “So if you could send someone to pick me up. I appreciate it."

When police heard the voicemail two hours later, they worried the caller sounded unbalanced and dispatched six officers, said Sleeman, the chief. By the time they arrived, Kemppainen had fatally shot himself with an assault rifle, a police report said. His father said Kemppainen was on anti-depression medication and also had an autism diagnosis, the report added. In an interview, a family member confirmed that Kemppainen struggled with mental health issues.

Nelson, who Kemppainen attacked, told Reuters he spent several days in the hospital for knee and upper body injuries. “This was such a peaceful area,” said Nelson. He has decided to vote for Trump, he added.

On Sept. 15, a second assassination attempt on Trump refocused attention on the risk of political violence in this year’s election. Suspect Ryan Routh had waited for hours with an assault rifle by Trump’s golf course in West Palm Beach when an agent spotted him in shrubbery and fired. Routh fled and was apprehended quickly.

Eleven days later, in the battleground state of Pennsylvania, Alan Vandersloot, a 74-year-old local borough councilman, stood with a Harris sign among about a dozen of her supporters at a rally in York, a city of nearly 45,000 in a county that broadly backed Trump in 2020.

As the rally was ending, Vandersloot told Reuters, a man grabbed him from behind and slammed him to the pavement, opening a two-inch gash on his forehead. The attacker, Robert Trotta, punched Vandersloot repeatedly before fleeing, two witnesses said in interviews.

When another rallygoer, Dan Almoney, gave chase, Trotta called him “a n—- supporter,” Almoney said. Almoney interpreted the slur as a reference to Harris and her backers, he said. Trotta, Vandersloot and Almoney are white.

Trotta, unable to post bail, has yet to make a plea on assault and harassment charges, court records show. His lawyer declined to comment. Trotta is a registered Republican, according to state records. His social media posts, from an account last active in 2020, supported Trump and criticized Democrats.

A York City Police Department spokesperson, Captain Daniel Lentz, said he didn’t believe Trotta’s attack was “politically motivated” because Trotta previously pleaded guilty to two cases of harassment in which he struck random people. The police report, however, did not include statements from Vandersloot and Almoney, who both said they believed the attack was political. Lentz said he didn’t know why the police didn’t record their accounts.

NEW ISSUES, NEW VIOLENCE

There’s no government data on political violence, though several universities and private research groups track it in various ways, typically using databases built on news accounts. Some include random hate crimes; others, including Reuters, do not. Most have not released comprehensive data since 2020.

The 300 cases identified by Reuters were culled from records on thousands of violent crimes since the 2021 Capitol attack. Most of that data was captured initially by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, a global violence-tracking project run by a nonpartisan research group in Wisconsin. Reporters identified additional cases using news databases, court filings and police reports obtained through public records requests.

Some of the cases don’t break down along traditional partisan lines, including those linked to disputes over the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.

That was the case last month when Caleb Gannon, a pro-Palestinian critic of U.S. government support for Israel, began heckling a pro-Israel rally in Newton, Massachusetts. Cell phone video shows Gannon shouting, “You’re supporting genocide!” before running into the crowd and tackling Scott Hayes, a fervent backer of Israel.

Earlier this year, Hayes, an Iraq War veteran, posted a photo on social media of a handgun with a Star of David pendant and the message “Hey Jew Haters. Bring it.” As they wrestled on the ground, Hayes shot Gannon in the abdomen.

Hayes, 47, is awaiting trial after pleading not guilty to assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. The county prosecutor has said an assault and battery charge also will be pursued against Gannon, 31, who remains hospitalized. Hayes’ lawyer said he will argue self-defense but declined further comment.

Other cases are directly linked to the election.

On Sept. 26, a Michigan man was arrested for assaulting a U.S. Postal Service worker who delivered a Harris campaign mailer to his house. The postal worker was in her truck when Russell Valleau, 61, approached on a bike, yelling that he “did not want that ‘Black bitch’ in his mailbox,” according to police records and a statement from the Oakland County prosecutor.

When the postal worker, who is Black, told Valleau to back away, he called her a “Black bitch” and lunged at her with a knife, according to her account to the Farmington Hills Police Department. She sprayed him with dog repellent, and he retreated. “I just had a man come to me with a knife and try to stab me,” she said moments later in a call to police, according to a recording obtained through a records request. “I sprayed him.”

Police reported finding Valleau lying in a nearby yard, apparently intoxicated and suffering the effects of chemical repellant. He has pleaded not guilty to charges of assault and battery and ethnic intimidation. His lawyer did not respond to a request for comment.

In another case this summer, four white men in a pick-up truck rolled up to a rural home in coastal North Carolina and asked three Black teens in the yard “if they liked Donald Trump,” according to a report from the Pasquotank County Sheriff's Office. When the youths said, “No,” the report said, the men opened fired with a BB gun, hitting one youth in the leg and another in the buttocks. The shots also broke windows on the house, a shed and a car out front.

The truck drove off. Police are investigating the case as an assault with a deadly weapon and have no suspects. The children suffered minor injuries and declined medical treatment.

Christian Gilyard, the youths’ father, said political tensions have become more pronounced since the contested 2020 election, but he never expected problems in his own neighborhood. “It’s shocking,” he said, “that something like this would happen here.”

Get weekly news and analysis on the U.S. elections and how it matters to the world with the newsletter On the Campaign Trail. Sign up here.

Peter Eisler reported from Washington. Ned Parker reported from New York. Editing by Jason Szep

18. Should retired generals and admirals be organizing into partisan groups to influence the election?

Conclusion:

When U.S. military leaders band together as generals and admirals, it should be to accomplish the military mission, not to promote a political party’s candidate. With the election retired GFOs ought to be distancing themselves from partisan political rhetoric, and instead work to calm public’s election anxiety while at the same time encouraging everyone to vote.

And, that is true, no matter what side of the political aisle they stand on.

Should retired generals and admirals be organizing into partisan groups to influence the election?

sites.duke.edu · by Charlie Dunlap, J.D. · October 18, 2024

Not long ago, retired general officers from opposing ends of the ideological and political spectrum separately contacted me with invitations to join other retired general and flag (admiral) officers (GFOs) who are organizing themselves into partisan groups to influence the outcome of the election by collectively endorsing a candidate of a political party. I declined and I encourage other GFOs to do so as well.

Although each of the groups claim to be nonpartisan, their rhetoric is plainly partisan as both of the GFO collectives attacked their opposite’s preferred candidate. They clearly aim to exploit the respect their military rank affords them with the public in an effort to give gravitas to their political endorsement.

I appreciate that retired GFOs want the best for our country, and that they have personal viewpoints about what that may be. In fact, there are plenty of ways they can productively employ their experience and expertise to continue serving the nation.

However, creating combinations of GFOs to use their name and military rank in a bald effort to advance partisan political agendas is not one of them.

I firmly believe these kinds of partisan activities by retired GFOs, even if well-intended, do a disservice to the armed forces and negatively impact our national security. They suggest that a clique of retired GFOs is scheming to impose their will on America’s body politic.

To be clear, I am not talking about civilians (including former political appointees who describe themselves as national security experts), who organize themselves into partisan political entities to endorse favored candidates.

That’s what politicos do in a democracy. Among other things, it establishes their partisan bona fides that can help them obtain a political appointment if their candidate wins. And civilian political appointees—especially in the defense sector—are essential elements of the American concept of civilian control of the military.

But it is not what retired generals and admirals should do, and it is especially troubling when they form groups to advance a partisan agenda publicly. In my view, no democracy is served well when senior military officers, even “retired” ones, organize themselves into partisan groups to influence elections.

I’ve said some of what you see below in previous posts, but I thought now would be a good time to consolidate a few ideas into a discussion for your consideration.

A politically neutral military

Let’s begin by reminding ourselves that the U.S. military has a long tradition of political neutrality. In Greer v. Spock, the Supreme Court explicitly approved a policy aimed at keeping the military “insulated from both the reality and the appearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan political causes or candidates.” It added:

“Such a policy is wholly consistent with the American constitutional tradition of a politically neutral military establishment under civilian control. It is a policy that has been reflected in numerous laws and military regulations throughout our history.” (Emphasis added)

There is good reason for insisting upon political neutrality of the military—even to the point of infringing upon the First Amendment rights civilians enjoy. In Parker v. Levy, a case wherein the Court found that the First Amendment applied differently to the military, the Court noted:

“This Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society. We have also recognized that the military has, again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its own during its long history. The differences between the military and civilian communities result from the fact that it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise’.” (Emphasis added).

This unique “primary business” has First Amendment implications. For example, the Court points out that the military “is not a deliberative body. It is the executive arm. Its law is that of obedience.”

Further, the Court freely acknowledges that “the rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty.” It also conceded that “there is simply not the same autonomy as there is in the larger civilian community.”

Historically, to maintain the fact and perception of a politiically-neutral military, retired GFOs have mostly (albeit not completely) observed the norm of not endorsing candidates or otherwise involving themselves in partisan political campaigns.

What is the legal status of retired officers?

Retired officers are part of the military. A 2023 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report relates that the Supreme Court has that [retired officers] remain part of the Armed Forces” and subject to the CRS goes on to say:

The U.S. Court of Military Appeals (now the CAAF) articulated a widely adopted position in 1958 in United States v. Hooper [26 C.M.R. 417 (C.M.A 1958)]:

[Those] on the retired list are not mere pensioners in any sense of the word. They form a vital segment of our national defense for their experience and mature judgment are relied upon heavily in times of emergency. The salaries they receive are not solely recompense for past services, but a means devised by Congress to assure their availability and preparedness in future contingencies. This preparedness depends as much upon their continued responsiveness to discipline as upon their continued state of physical health. Certainly, one who is authorized to wear the uniform of his country, to use the title of his grade, who is looked upon as a model of the military way of life, and who receives a salary to assure his availability, is a part of the land or naval forces. (Emphasis added.)

If the officers are retired, do their partisan activities matter?

Absolutely. Civil-military relations researcher Michael Robinson observes:

Senior retired military officials can have a significant effect on how the public receives and interprets information on pressing issues. Being out of uniform has little bearing on their influence, as their credibility as a speaker comes from their erstwhile career: Like princes of the church,” historian and civil-military scholar Richard Kohn remarks, “They represent the culture and the profession just as authoritatively as their counterparts on active duty.” (Emphasis added).

The damage to trust and confidence

In 2023, the Gallup Poll found that trust in the military, though still significant, fell to the “lowest in over two decades.” In a 2024 report, Gallup shows that as recently as 2020, 72% of Americans had a “great deal/quite a lot” of confidence in the military. Today, that figure has declined to 61%.

Furthermore, in 2022, Gallup reported: “While the majority of Americans continue to believe military officers have high ethics (61%), the score is down 10 percentage points since it was last measured in 2017.”

What could explain all this? In 2023, the Reagan Institute concluded that its polling reveals the reason “behind the decline in confidence [is] a growing politicization of military leaders.”

This decline in trust and confidence is not just a statistic; it threatens our national security. Among other things, it’s a major factor in the ongoing recruiting difficulties that are dangerously eroding our military’s ability to “provide for the common defense.” The stakes are stark, as a recent report headlined,

Let’s consider this: are the partisan activities of retired officers contributing to the problem?

Civil-military relations scholars Risa Brooks, Michael Robinson, and Heidi Urben surveyed “retired general and flag officers, over half of whom were three and four stars.” Though I can’t entirely agree with everything in it, the article they produced from the survey discussing their findings deserves a full read.

This part is especially relevant.

“Some respondents in our survey indicated that recent events required them to speak out publicly on political matters, suggesting a one-time deviation from norm adherence for them, while other respondents reflected a greater fluidity in their normative interpretations.

Regardless of their individual motivations, however, repeated norm violations in the aggregate combined with minimal social disapprobation in response to those violations move a norm from robust to contested and raise the possibility of further deterioration toward the norm becoming defunct.” (Emphasis added)

What about veterans who run for office and/or endorse candidates as individuals?

Of course, I do not mean that veterans—including GFOs—should never engage in the political process. Obviously, when a veteran chooses to run for office they will need to speak out on partisan political matters. And running for office is a good thing: polls show that “Americans believe that Americans who have experience in the U.S. military make the best elected officials.”

This is different, however, from the issue of collective action by GFOs that ought to concern us.

How? Those who choose to run for election subject themselves, their personal qualifications, and the rational for their positions to the kind of relentless scrutiny few GFO letter-signers undergo. Moreover, they rarely use their rank, and their military experience is examined in excruciating detail. That is not the case with retired GFO collectives whose members’ background and qualifications can often be opaque to the public.

Consequently, if GFOs feel compelled to endorse a political candidate (or attack one), they should do so not as names on a letter, but as individuals, so that they, their qualifications, and the rationale for their positions can be easily scrutinized by the media and the public.

Additionally, if they feel speaking out in a partisan way is imperative, GFOs can become fully civilian and remove this issue.

They can sever their connection with the military by resigning their commissions. While it would allow them to become fully politicized, they would have to cease using their military titles, and forgo their military retirement pay. I’ve never seen any retired GFO do this, so there may be limits to their partisan ardor.

All of that said, veterans—including retired general and flag officers—can significantly contribute to the public dialogue, especially when they share their unique expertise on particular issues, and do so in a way mindful of the imperative to avoid partisanship.

In other words, I agree with those who say that while Can it be done given that almost everything these days has some political dimension? It isn’t easy, but I believe the answer is “yes.” (As a potential example, consider this).

Concluding thoughts:

In short, the public ought to be particularly wary of collective actions by partisan groups of retired senior officers who are trying to influence the election outcome.

Ask yourself: does it help democracies flourish when groups of generals and admirals from the most powerful military on the planet organize themselves for a partisan political purposes? Is this the example we want to show countries around the world? Aren’t we trying to promote the ethic of nonpartisanship to militaries across the globe? Of civilian control of the armed forces?

Moreover, while one may favor the candidate a group of GFOs is currently promoting, you have to wonder what partisan political activity will the GFO groups decide to pursue next? What happens if their candidate falls short? What is their agenda over the longer term?

It’s a short trip from seeking to collectively shake up the political landscape to creating a mudslide that has repercussions far beyond what were initially considered.

Source: Shutterstock

It saddens me that the retired GFOs endorsing candidates seem to believe that absent their intervention, the American people won’t – or can’t – make the right decisions at the polls. Shouldn’t we have more faith in our fellow citizens and our democracy?

At the same time the GFOs seem oblivious to the risks to the military as an institution they create when they engage in partisan collective actions.

Shouldn’t we be concerned about the erosion of the public’s trust and confidence in the armed forces attributable to a “growing politicization of military leaders”? In a polarized nation isn’t it vitally important that the military not become perceived as yet another politicized entity?

Fortunately, the names of the vast majority of the 7,500 retired GFOs will not be found on letters endorsing candidates or otherwise engaging in partisan political activity.

In today’s hyperpartisan environment the American people ought to be able to rely upon the military’s traditional nonpartisan ethic. No citizen should be left to wonder how the military might react if one of GFO’s preferred candidates isn’t elected.

When U.S. military leaders band together as generals and admirals, it should be to accomplish the military mission, not to promote a political party’s candidate. With the election retired GFOs ought to be distancing themselves from partisan political rhetoric, and instead work to calm public’s election anxiety while at the same time encouraging everyone to vote.

And, that is true, no matter what side of the political aisle they stand on.

Remember what we like to say on Lawfire®: gather the facts, examine the law, evaluate the arguments – and then decide for yourself!

sites.duke.edu · by Charlie Dunlap, J.D. · October 18, 2024

19. Future of US defense depends on culture shift prioritizing innovation

Congressmen, heal thyselves.

Excerpts:

Finally, Congress itself is part of the problem. Parochialism, overly restrictive and inflexible appropriations, risk aversion and an unfortunate habit of killing messengers — to say nothing of the corrosive and wasteful use of continuing resolutions — create dangerous barriers to agility and innovation. The final report of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform Commission lays out many of these issues in more detail.

We cannot legislate cultural change, nor can the Defense Department implement it by policy. But we can adjust the incentives, behaviors and signals that drive cultural change over time and our ability to do so is unparalleled.

We have the most innovative economy in the world. We have the best universities, capital markets and entrepreneurial spirit. It is our duty to make sure the government can access that unmatched advantage in an effective way to give our military what it needs to meet our national security needs.

Future of US defense depends on culture shift prioritizing innovation

Defense News · by Reps. Mike Rogers, Adam Smith, Don Bacon and Ro Khanna · October 18, 2024

To get our national security right and to ensure that we maintain a strong national defense, we must figure out how the Defense Department can innovate quickly enough to keep pace with potential adversaries. Though increasing authorities have been given to DOD, it continues to struggle to adapt and pivot at the same rate as some competitors.

As senior members of the House Armed Services Committee, we are concerned that unless we recalibrate our approach to defense technology acquisition, we will continue on the slow, costly and unsustainable path that threatens our national defense and the rules-based international order.

Over the last 10 years, through numerous National Defense Authorization Acts, Congress has passed a variety of authorities to help streamline research and development and acquisition. These include more flexible other transaction authorities, mid-tier acquisition authorities, the Accelerate the Procurement and Fielding of Innovative Technologies program and protections for commercial technology to help better attract nontraditional companies to the defense sector.

Similarly, DOD has taken some steps of its own. The efforts of the late Defense Secretary Ash Carter, continued and expanded by leaders in subsequent administrations on a bipartisan basis, led to the creation of the Defense Innovation Unit, the Strategic Capabilities Office and the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office. Current efforts — such as Replicator and the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve — show promise in accelerating acquisition and development for certain capabilities.

These legislative and policy efforts intended to streamline, enhance and wring efficiencies from the acquisition system have left a dizzying array of authorities available to program managers and procurement officials. However, rather than fully utilizing these authorities, DOD still largely follows a slow and costly acquisition process hamstrung by a focus on the process and rigid requirements rather than fielding a capability and achieving results.

Furthermore, officials are more reliably punished for failures than rewarded for creativity and adaptability. Worse yet, they are incentivized to make decisions that may look good during their tenure but create unacceptable risks, cost growth or program management problems for successors. Cultural risk aversion drives a dangerous and costly tendency — one that too often results in cutting-edge technology becoming stale and outdated by the time it is put into play, if not earlier.

We also need to change how DOD interacts with Congress. Bold ideas require early collaboration which does not fit into the model where nothing can be disclosed or discussed with Congress until the president’s budget is released. Surprising Congress with new ideas historically has not benefited any part of the government. No one should be surprised when those ideas go unsupported.

Even when empowered offices overcome these structural disincentives, the efforts tend to be narrowly scoped. Large programs of record for complex systems or large services contracts are built around onerous requirements or meaningless metrics rather than problem-solving ideas or desired outcomes. Narrow technical requirements need to change to broad capability requirements.

The fiscal 2024 NDAA tasks DOD with modernizing the requirements process by avoiding prescriptive language, focusing on mission outcomes and assessed threats, enabling a more iterative and collaborative approach with the services and maximizing the use of commercial products. We expect to be briefed on an interim implementation report in the coming weeks. Getting this right is an absolute imperative.

We are likewise concerned that our research and development proving grounds are dangerously overtaxed. Years of chronic underinvestment have created unacceptable delays in test schedules. Rigorous exercise and experimentation, vital to transitioning technologies into capabilities, are hamstrung by the lack of facilities needed to develop disruptive technologies.

Finally, Congress itself is part of the problem. Parochialism, overly restrictive and inflexible appropriations, risk aversion and an unfortunate habit of killing messengers — to say nothing of the corrosive and wasteful use of continuing resolutions — create dangerous barriers to agility and innovation. The final report of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform Commission lays out many of these issues in more detail.

We cannot legislate cultural change, nor can the Defense Department implement it by policy. But we can adjust the incentives, behaviors and signals that drive cultural change over time and our ability to do so is unparalleled.

We have the most innovative economy in the world. We have the best universities, capital markets and entrepreneurial spirit. It is our duty to make sure the government can access that unmatched advantage in an effective way to give our military what it needs to meet our national security needs.

U.S. Rep. Mike Rogers, D-Ala., is chairman of the House Armed Services Committee; Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., is ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee; Rep. Don Bacon, R-Neb., is chairman of the Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technologies and Innovation; and Rep. Ro Khanna, D-Calif., is ranking member of the Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technologies and Innovation.

20. How Climate Change Is Reshaping Global Security And The Military

Excerpts:

Goodman argues that climate security cooperation can be integrated into existing defense partnerships with allies and partners, especially in regions where rising sea levels and extreme weather events threaten sheer livability. This is what she called “environmental peacebuilding,” which is partnering to address shared climate challenges, such as “to build more sustainable water and energy infrastructure across regions.”

She also believes there are critical opportunities: “I think we can move from threat multiplier to an opportunity multiplier using the need to accelerate into the energy transition and decarbonize our economy as a way to forge and accelerate into a better future.” That can be done by expanding the “predictive capability or climate intelligence” that the DOD and private sector are developing now. By “accelerating the transition to clean energy and investing in resilient infrastructure, the U.S. military can not only mitigate the risks of climate change but also enhance its mission readiness,” Goodman insisted, adding, “All of this leads to greater military effectiveness,” too.

By embracing a holistic approach to climate security — one that includes resilience, mitigation, and international collaboration — Goodman argues that the military can help build a more secure, sustainable and, hopefully, peaceful future for us all.

How Climate Change Is Reshaping Global Security And The Military

Forbes · by Joan Michelson · October 21, 2024

... [+]Getty Images

Climate change has fundamentally reshaped global security from the types of threats, to how and where military forces operate, to how we fuel and protect our defense infrastructure, military personnel and installations, to geopolitical alliances, according to Sherri Goodman, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security, author of a new book, “Threat Multiplier: Climate, Military Leadership & Global Security.”

Sherri Goodman book - Threat Multiplier

Sherri Goodman

“I coined the phrase ‘threat multiplier,’ which has come to really stand for the connection between climate change and national security,” Goodman explained in an exclusive interview on Electric Ladies Podcast recently about it. “Threat multiplier conveys that climate acts on every other threat we face, whether it's strategic competition with Russia and China, or terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, biological threats, and other threats around the world,” she added, “because it's destabilizing our natural systems, and the whole goal of security is stability.” Goodman has been working on these issues for 30 years and is credited with showing how environmental and climate-related security issues can have a profound effect on global military and security strategies.

The concept of a threat multiplier is derived from the military term “force multiplier,” which refers to technologies or systems that increase the effectiveness of military operations. Climate change compounds global instability in much the same way.

Climate change in military terms

... [+]

“No nation can find lasting security without addressing the climate crisis. We face all kinds of threats in our line of work, but few of them truly deserve to be called existential. The climate crisis does.” Those are the words of Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, a retired four-star general in the Army and how Goodman opens her book. Their point is that climate change fuels resource scarcity, exacerbates political unrest, and creates conditions in which conflicts could ignite and/or escalate.

New Geopolitical Landscapes Due To Climate Change: The Arctic and Beyond

Goodman wrote in “Threat Multiplier” that, “Climate change would fundamentally shift the world's geopolitics, demanding new diplomatic strategies, new energy strategies for powering the forces and new approaches to protecting bases from natural disasters.”

Photo, Thawing-permafrost_Noatak-Alaska - The Arctic Institute 2020

The Arctic Institute

One of the most striking examples of how climate change is reshaping military strategy is the Arctic, Goodman said. Previously a frozen and largely inaccessible region, the Arctic is rapidly becoming a geopolitical, energy and economic “hotspot” due to retreating sea ice and thawing permafrost. Russia views the Northern Sea Route as a toll road for shipping between Asia and Europe, while China has declared itself a “near-Arctic state” to gain access to the region’s minerals, energy, and fisheries.

Climate change is driving strategic shifts in other regions, for example, through prolonged droughts in Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia, forcing populations to migrate, and/or igniting conflict over scarce water and food resources.

Sherri Goodman

In these regions, Goodman said, “Farmers and herders find themselves in conflict over access to food and water, driving populations either to migrate or move to cities, which can lead to civil unrest.” These destabilizing forces, combined with the pressure of weak governance and authoritarian regimes, can create a perfect storm for conflict, as witnessed in Syria, she added.

Impact on Military Installations and Personnel

As climate change drives more extreme weather events, military installations are increasingly at risk from hurricanes, floods, wildfires, and rising sea levels. For example, Hurricane Michael in 2018 devastated Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida, causing significant damage to vital infrastructure. In response, the military is now rebuilding Tyndall as a climate-resilient base of the future, designed to withstand higher winds, floods, and other extreme weather events. Servicemembers are also sitting ducks, transporting fuel trucks in war zones, so reducing fuel needs could save their lives.

... [+]AFP via Getty Images

Goodman said, “One of the ways our bases, which are highly vulnerable in certain areas to climate risk from sea level rise to wildfires, and also loss of energy if the grid goes down or is attacked and they need to be able to operate 24 7, (because) our sailors, airmen and Marines can't afford to lose power. So, to ensure both energy resilience and to address the climate crisis, military bases today are installing microgrids at most of our major bases.” She pointed out that Marine Corps Base Albany is the first military base to be fully net zero.

The DOD is also exploring using small modular reactors (SMRs) to provide clean, reliable power for remote bases, such as those in Alaska. “The next generation of clean power is coming to remote base power operations,” Goodman said, which ensures they have a continuous and resilient energy supply.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response

... [+]Getty Images

The military is now having to adjust its budget and resource allocation to account for more and more troops being called to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in more and more natural disasters, because climate change is increasing the frequency and severity of these events. We see them stepping up on all kinds of disasters from the hurricanes in North Carolina and Florida, to typhoons in Southeast Asia, and during the covid pandemic.

Military personnel need to be prepared and equipped to operate in extreme hot and cold without compromising their safety or effectiveness, due to climate change. This requires new, specially-designed uniforms, equipment, training programs and strategies.

“Environmental Peacebuilding” and “Opportunity Multiplier”

Goodman argues that climate security cooperation can be integrated into existing defense partnerships with allies and partners, especially in regions where rising sea levels and extreme weather events threaten sheer livability. This is what she called “environmental peacebuilding,” which is partnering to address shared climate challenges, such as “to build more sustainable water and energy infrastructure across regions.”

U.S. Defense Dept. Climate Adaptation Plan graphic, 2021

U.S. Defense Department

She also believes there are critical opportunities: “I think we can move from threat multiplier to an opportunity multiplier using the need to accelerate into the energy transition and decarbonize our economy as a way to forge and accelerate into a better future.” That can be done by expanding the “predictive capability or climate intelligence” that the DOD and private sector are developing now. By “accelerating the transition to clean energy and investing in resilient infrastructure, the U.S. military can not only mitigate the risks of climate change but also enhance its mission readiness,” Goodman insisted, adding, “All of this leads to greater military effectiveness,” too.

By embracing a holistic approach to climate security — one that includes resilience, mitigation, and international collaboration — Goodman argues that the military can help build a more secure, sustainable and, hopefully, peaceful future for us all.

###

Forbes · by Joan Michelson · October 21, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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