"You are free to choose, but you are not free from the consequence of your choice."
- A Universal Paradox
"The unselfish effort to bring cheer to others will be the beginning of a happier life for ourselves."
- Helen Keller
"The President must be greater than anyone else, but not better than anyone else. We subject him and his family to close and constant scrutiny and denounce them for things that we ourselves do every day. A Presidential slip of the tongue, a slight error in judgment - social, political, or ethical - can raise a storm of protest. We give the President more work than a man can do, more responsibility than a man should take, more pressure than a man can bear. We abuse him often and rarely praise him. We wear him out, use him up, eat him up. And with all this, Americans have a love for the President that goes beyond loyalty or party nationality; he is ours, and we exercise the right to destroy him."
- John Steinbeck
1. U.S. Foreign Policy Never Recovered From the War on Terror
2. FDD | Amid Political Tensions, NATO Remains a Vital Alliance
3. FDD | The Trump Administration's High-Stakes Gambit to Curtail Rocket Attacks in Iraq
4. SecDef Details Plan to Boost Alliances to Counter China and Russia
5. The 5 Faces Of Chinese Espionage: The World's First 'Digital Authoritarian State'
6. Putin: Russia-China Military Alliance Can't Be Ruled Out
7. Battle Force 2045 could work - if defense leaders show some discipline
8. US and allies prioritize Indonesia as potential counterweight to China
9. Our toxic civil-military relations
10. Exclusive: 'Dumb mistake' exposed Iranian hand behind fake Proud Boys U.S. election emails - sources
11. Our secret Taliban air force - Inside the clandestine U.S. campaign to help our longtime enemy defeat ISIS
12. South Korea deaths 'not linked' to flu vaccination drive
13. FDD | G7 powers must confront the Chinese threat together
14. China, and Xi, commemorate the Korean War as a victory over America
15. In Xi Jinping's China, Nationalism Takes a Dark Turn
16. 'Stunning' Executive Order Would Politicize Civil Service
17. Preserve the Jones Act
18. The New Weapon of Choice: Technology and Information Operations Today
19. In echo of Cold War, the West's 'Five Eyes' spy alliance focuses on China
20. Opinion | Iran's goal is to undermine democracy. Americans shouldn't take the bait.
21. Five key takeaways from Xi Jinping's Korean war anniversary speech
22. Empire of Emperors: What Is China, and Why You Should Worry About It
23. Why the US was so fast to blame Iran for voter intimidation emails in Florida
24. 'I'm here for the money' - My life as a Blackwater mercenary
1. U.S. Foreign Policy Never Recovered From the War on Terror
Conclusion: "A genuine accounting for the war on terror and its unintended consequences should engender a strong sense of humility about the United States' ability to produce grand transformations, especially through military force. The United States has neither the ability nor the right to change other countries' governments, but it can embrace an ethic of solidarity and use its considerable diplomatic and economic power to defend the rights and freedom of people in other countries who are working for positive change. To effectively advance the principles of free and accountable government abroad, however, the United States must practice them at home."
U.S. Foreign Policy Never Recovered From the War on Terror
Only a Reckoning With the Disastrous Legacy of 9/11 Can Heal the United States
In a 1996 essay in Foreign Affairs, the conservative authors William Kristol and Robert Kagan proposed a U.S. foreign policy of "benevolent global hegemony." Scoffing at former President John Quincy Adams's maxim that America "goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy," they asked, "But why not? The alternative is to leave monsters on the loose, ravaging and pillaging to their hearts' content, as Americans stand by and watch." In Kristol and Kagan's view, it was the United States' responsibility to sally forth and slay-an argument they reprised years later as two of the biggest advocates for the Iraq war.
The last two decades have revealed the folly of this hubris. With the declaration of its global "war on terror" after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States went abroad in search of monsters and ended up midwifing new ones-from terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (or ISIS), born in the prisons of U.S.-occupied Iraq; to destabilization and deepening sectarianism across the Middle East; to racist authoritarian movements in Europe and in the United States that feed-and feed off of-the fear of refugees fleeing those regional conflicts. Advocates of the war on terror believed that nationalist chauvinism, which sometimes travels under the name "American exceptionalism," could be stoked at a controlled burn to sustain American hegemony. Instead, and predictably, toxic ultranationalism burned out of control. Today, the greatest security threat to the United States comes not from any terrorist group, or from any great power, but from domestic political dysfunction. The election of Donald Trump as president was a product and accelerant of that dysfunction-but not its cause. The environment for his political rise was prepared over a decade and a half of xenophobic, messianic Washington warmongering, with roots going back into centuries of white supremacist politics.
The United States has an opportunity to change course. But doing so will require honestly accounting for the destruction that the current course has wrought. The United States will have to reckon with the scale of the disaster it has helped inflict on the world-and on itself-through three presidencies. To that end, the next administration should undertake a comprehensive review, along the lines of the 9/11 Commission or the 2006 Iraq Study Group, to explore the consequences of U.S. antiterrorism policy since 9/11: surveillance, detention, torture, extrajudicial killing, the use of manned and unmanned airstrikes, and partnerships with repressive regimes. The review should include perspectives outside of the usual national security circles, such as those of nongovernmental and grassroots advocacy organizations, minority communities that have experienced the most severe domestic effects of U.S. antiterrorism policies, and civilians in countries where the United States has waged war.
The review should aim to assess the actual severity of current terrorist threats and to stimulate vigorous public debate about the conditions and legal authorities under which the United States uses military violence. It should also seek to illuminate the ways in which militarism abroad and racial and economic inequality at home are mutually reinforcing. (The absurdly militarized police response to the recent racial justice protests offers one vivid illustration.)
The review of post-9/11 antiterrorism policy should proceed according to the standards of international humanitarian law that the United States helped to establish after World War II. Those standards obligate the United States to investigate, prosecute, and punish those who committed war crimes. Guided by the findings of the review, the next administration should create avenues for those victimized by the war on terror, both at home and abroad, to seek and receive redress. The United States must own up to the monsters it has created and endeavor not to create any new ones, especially as the Washington herd turns its attention farther east and girds for a new great-power conflict with China.
THE COST OF FOREVER WAR
The United States has been on permanent war footing since September 11, 2001. Its military interventions, most notably the 2003 invasion of Iraq, have killed hundreds of thousands of civilians. The United States has conducted combat operations in 24 different countries since 2001 and remains officially at war in at least seven. It is still fighting the longest war in its history in Afghanistan. Millions have been displaced as a consequence of these interventions. And yet the war on terror has failed even on its own terms: according to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the number of Sunni Islamist militants around the world almost quadrupled between 2001 and 2018.
During the same period, many repressive regimes grew more entrenched. Exploiting the United States' fixation on terrorism and its desire to enlist allies in the fight, authoritarian leaders around the world adopted the antiterrorist rhetoric of the administration of President George W. Bush, using it as an all-purpose excuse to crack down on dissent. Even Chinese President Xi Jinping urged Communist Party officials to "emulate aspects of America's 'war on terror'" in order to justify abusive policies against Uighurs and other ethnic minorities, according to a 2019 New York Timesinvestigation based on internal Chinese government documents. The United States is not responsible for the decisions of all these actors, but its policies helped widen the opportunities for violence and repression.
The United States itself bore enormous costs as a result of its antiterrorism policies. Brown University's Costs of War Project estimates the taxpayer bill for post-9/11 U.S. wars at almost $6 trillion-money not spent on health care, education, infrastructure, clean energy, or public health. The burdens of these wars fell disproportionately on U.S. soldiers and their families. A 2018 RAND study found that 2.77 million service members had served 5.4 million deployments since 9/11. More than 60,000 service members have been killed. Many more have come home with permanent, life-altering injuries. Eighty-three percent of post-9/11 veterans report living with post-traumatic stress disorder. The country thanks its troops for their service but continues to send them on multiple deployments in wars with no clear purpose or strategy for victory.
The United States must own up to the monsters it has created and endeavor not to create any new ones.
The war on terror became a route through which open racism was smuggled back into mainstream U.S. politics. Americans essentially pathologized an entire religion to justify their government's violence against its adherents, presuming to ask, as the Princeton scholar Bernard Lewis did in The Atlantic, "What Went Wrong?" with Arab and Muslim societies-as if Western Christian societies hadn't just produced two world wars and the Holocaust within the span of a century. Republicans in particular treated Islam as a source of conflict, preposterously warning of "creeping sharia" and laying the groundwork for Trump's election on the back of a promise-which he kept-to enact a "Muslim ban." But even Democrats talked about Muslim Americans being a "first line of defense" against terrorism, essentially pressing them into service on the basis of their religion.
On the campaign trail in 2016 and then after his election, Trump exploited the xenophobia that was used to justify the United States' post-9/11 wars, even as he tapped into popular anger over the costs of those wars. The United States had securitized its immigration policy after 9/11, viewing many who came seeking refuge from oppression or simply the opportunity for a better life as potential terrorists. Under the current administration, the United States has denied those who approach its borders their legal right to seek asylum, separating families and imprisoning children in cages.
Nineteen years after 9/11, the state of emergency declared after the attacks remains in place. The enormous powers that Americans handed their government in the name of national security are still being abused. Some of the worst excesses of the war on terror were reined in under U.S. President Barack Obama, but no one was ever held accountable. Today, Guantánamo Bay prison remains open, and the former head of a CIA torture prison heads the CIA.
BLUEPRINT FOR A RECKONING
Because of the enormous strategic, economic, political, and moral consequences of the United States' post-9/11 counterterrorism approach, a commission to investigate the war on terror should not be a typical Washington "blue ribbon" panel. It should command a level of attention and resources commensurate with the war on terror itself, and its remit should reflect the enormous impact of U.S. antiterrorism policies both in the United States and around the world. Ideally, the commission should be created through congressional legislation and comprise not only respected former officials but members of impacted communities and civil society experts in relevant fields, including human rights, international law, and foreign policy. The commission must be independent and free of political pressure and given access to all information, classified and unclassified, relevant to U.S. policies and practices undertaken since 9/11.
The commission should consult a wide range of perspectives, in Congress; in the human rights, national security, intelligence, academic, and legal fields; in nongovernmental and grassroots organizations; and, importantly, among constituencies outside the usual Washington bubble. It should hear from communities in the United States who have experienced firsthand the stigmatization of their faith, the violation of their civil rights, and the militarization of policing. It should hear from communities abroad who have lived amid the chaos and violence of U.S. military interventions. The commission's final report should make recommendations upon which both Congress and the attorney general are prepared to act. Prosecuting those who participated in criminal violations of human rights and other abuses is necessary in order for the United States to move forward as a country.
MORE THAN A WELL-WISHER OF FREEDOM
In the same 1821 speech in which he warned Americans not to go abroad "in search of monsters to destroy," Adams proclaimed the United States "the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all" but "the champion and vindicator only of her own." This is insufficient. While the first and best thing Americans can do for the cause of human freedom, democracy, and dignity is to defend those values at home, they still have considerable tools and influence with which they can support those values around the world. An honest accounting of the war on terror will make the United States far more effective in doing so.
A genuine reckoning with the post-9/11 period would spur not a U.S. withdrawal from the world but rather deeper engagement with it. The main challenges of today-the coronavirus pandemic and climate change foremost among them-are shared. The United States must commit to a sustained multilateral approach to meet these challenges, rather than continuing to unilaterally abrogate and undermine the very norms and conventions that it helped to establish.
A review of post-9/11 antiterrorism policy would help expose the folly of seeking security through repression, whether at home or abroad. The United States sometimes has no choice but to work with imperfect partners to advance short-term security goals, but in the long term this approach is a bad bet. Ultimately, governments that are responsive and accountable to the needs of their people are better partners in the pursuit of security, stability, and prosperity.
A review of post-9/11 antiterrorism policy would help expose the folly of seeking security through repression.
Enduring public skepticism of military interventions is one of the few benefits of the Iraq war. Unfortunately, that skepticism is often accompanied by a reflexive suspicion that any support for human rights is a fig leaf for imperialism. Such concerns are not baseless. George W. Bush declared his "freedom agenda" only after his other justifications for the Iraq war had fallen apart, and Trump has justified his strangulation of Iran and Venezuela with unconvincing appeals to human rights. But not all efforts to promote human rights are cynical, and the people of the Middle East made clear what they want during the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011-12: economic opportunities, governments that work for them instead of small cabals of self-dealing elites, more political freedom. Those uprisings were quelled, both by a counterrevolutionary crackdown led by the United States' Gulf partners and by the rise of ISIS, but they have not disappeared. Late last year there was another wave of uprisings in the region and around the world, a mass global mobilization against corruption, austerity, and repression. Addressing the crisis of legitimacy that is fueling the global authoritarian wave will require heeding the voices in the streets-both at home and abroad.
A genuine accounting for the war on terror and its unintended consequences should engender a strong sense of humility about the United States' ability to produce grand transformations, especially through military force. The United States has neither the ability nor the right to change other countries' governments, but it can embrace an ethic of solidarity and use its considerable diplomatic and economic power to defend the rights and freedom of people in other countries who are working for positive change. To effectively advance the principles of free and accountable government abroad, however, the United States must practice them at home.
2. FDD | Amid Political Tensions,
NATO Remains a Vital Alliance
Our national power rests on the foundation of our alliance structure.
FDD | Amid Political Tensions, NATO Remains a Vital Alliance
fdd.org · by Maj Scott D. Adamson Visiting Military Analyst · October 22, 2020
Turkey's reported live-fire test of its Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile system last week further aggravated political fault lines within NATO. Yet despite this provocation and other wide-ranging tensions, NATO continues to demonstrate - through exercises such as Joint Warrior 20-2 - that it remains a vital and credible military alliance.
Over the past several years, there has been no shortage of friction among the 30 sovereign nations of NATO. From disparate defense spending to territorial disputes involving Turkey and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean to natural gas pipelines between Germany and Russia, the list of quarrels continues to mount. Turkey's escalatory action last Friday will only add fuel to this fire. And rightfully so - NATO should be concerned over a member's drift toward Moscow.
But it would be short-sighted to believe these political differences point to an ineffectual, declining alliance. As General (Ret.) Philip Breedlove, previously the top NATO commander, put it in August, "NATO is more important now than it's ever been since the fall of the [Berlin] wall" in 1989.
NATO's secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, has further stated, "Disagreements will always attract more attention than when we agree." Commensurate with his comments, few seemed to notice the conclusion of Joint Warrior 20-2 last week.
Led by the United Kingdom, the two-week exercise encompassed 13 nations and included a wide array of military assets - 6,000 personnel, 81 aircraft, 28 surface ships, and two submarines. As reported by the U.S. Navy, the engagement boasted "one of the largest concentrations of Allied and partner forces in one integrated training event."
Joint Warrior 20-2 also marked several notable records: the first time American fifth-generation fighter aircraft deployed aboard a British carrier, the first time U.S. and U.K. F-35Bs trained over U.K. shores as a group, and the largest quantity of F-35Bs at sea.
Comprehensively, the exercise bolstered NATO's credible combat capability, readiness, and interoperability across participating nations. Further, it demonstrated three strategic benefits of membership regarding "why" the alliance remains essential.
First, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The United States and its allies are markedly more capable when their respective forces are employed together. The sheer number of personnel, aircraft, and sea vessels that participated in Joint Warrior 20-2 illustrates this basic truth. And the employment of modernized military assets by multiple nations further strengthens it.
Second, collective defense costs less. This is intuitively exhibited by the deployment of U.S. and U.K. F-35Bs aboard the HMS Queen Elizabeth. In this case, the monetary burden of operating and maintaining a formidable airpower capability at sea is split between two countries. While some argue that many allies are not doing enough on this front, the recent trend in defense spending is promising.
Third, and most importantly, NATO membership upholds Article 5. Reaffirmed by NATO last year - and reinforced by recurring participation in exercises such as Joint Warrior 20-2 - Article 5 is a commitment that "an attack against one Ally shall be considered an attack against us all." Nothing does more to deter Moscow than knowing that should it engage any member in armed conflict, it would soon be confronted by another 29 nations.
Certainly, these points are not meant to suggest that one ignore instances where allies act incongruently with NATO's collective interest. Turkey's testing of the S-400 is a prime example of a serious problem, and it should be met with equally serious consequences.
However, Joint Warrior 20-2 and the strategic benefits exhibited through its execution should underscore that working together results in increased capability, reduced financial burden, and less risk. For these reasons, the United States and its allies should continue navigating through their political differences with a focus on improving readiness and deterring Moscow.
Major Scott Adamson is a visiting military analyst with the Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Views expressed or implied in this commentary are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Air Force or any other U.S. government agency. For more analysis from Scott and CMPP, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CMPP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
3. FDD | The Trump Administration's High-Stakes Gambit to Curtail Rocket Attacks in Iraq
fdd.org · by John Hannah Senior Counselor and Behnam Ben Taleblu Senior Fellow· October 22, 2020
In an unexpected announcement on October 10, a group of Iran-backed Shiite militia groups declared their intention to suspend forthwith their attacks on U.S. interests in Iraq, while conditioning the ceasefire's continuance on the Iraqi government's development of a plan for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. This unsolicited declaration followed the Trump administration's equally unexpected threat on September 20 (delivered via a phone call from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to Iraq's President Barham Salih) to shutter the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and launch large-scale military strikes against the militias if Iraq did not do more to prevent attacks on U.S. interests there.
For over a year and half, Iran-backed militias have regularly targeted the U.S. presence in Iraq with rocket and mortar strikes. Washington has absorbed these attacks without retaliating, except when the strikes crossed the red line of taking American life. Indeed, in the face of no fewer than 78 reported instances of indirect fire since May 2019 (as documented by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies), the Trump administration hit back only twice - in both instances after Americans were killed. The only exception to this pattern was the targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani, Iran's terrorist mastermind, as well as his Iraqi counterpart, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, in Baghdad last January, which came in response to a militia-organized assault on the perimeter of the U.S. Embassy.
As the data below indicates, there have been at least 55 reported rocket and/or mortar attacks just this year against U.S. targets attributable to the militias. Just over a third of those attacks occurred in August and September alone - in the period leading up to and following the successful visit to Washington of Iraq's new prime minister, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi. While the frequency of the attacks represented a clear escalation of efforts to harass the United States and embarrass Kadhimi, the vast majority involved low numbers of rockets per volley and the use of lower-end weapons, not the most deadly capabilities believed to be in the militias' arsenals. None, fortunately, resulted in any U.S. casualties - though an errant attack on September 28 killed six members of an Iraqi family, including several children.
While the attacks have long been a source of tension in U.S.-Iraqi relations, the administration's sudden threat to close the embassy and unleash a massive attack against the militias came as something of a shock. During Kadhimi's Washington visit, he held what appeared to be extremely cordial meetings with both President Donald Trump and Secretary Pompeo, in which both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the U.S.-Iraq strategic partnership. In that context, Pompeo's threat to abandon America's diplomatic presence in Baghdad was a bolt from the blue that caught not only Iraqi officials, but many of their U.S. counterparts, by surprise.
The administration's gambit carried significant risks for U.S. interests. U.S. military commanders have made clear that evicting the United States from Iraq has been among Iran's top priorities. Being able to claim that its proxies had put the Great Satan's agents to flight from Baghdad, 17 years after they entered as occupiers, would clearly be a major victory for Tehran. It would also be a massive blow to Kadhimi, who is as pro-Western a prime minister as Iraq has had since 2003, and who has staked his premiership on strengthening relations with America and reining in the militias. A large-scale U.S. assault on militia targets would also almost certainly sound the death knell for the U.S. military presence in Iraq and the viability of its ongoing counterterrorism operations there against the Islamic State (ISIS).
Despite these major risks, the administration's threat may actually be paying off. It certainly triggered a panic amongst Iraq's governing class and generated an unprecedented amount of political pressure aimed at stopping the militia attacks. Kadhimi, Saleh, and Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein repeatedly issued unambiguous public warnings about the potentially catastrophic consequences of an embassy closure on Iraq's precarious political, economic, and security situation. They convened emergency meetings with other Iraqi political leaders. They bolstered the presence of Iraqi security forces in areas near the U.S. Embassy and made clear that units would be held accountable for failing to prevent attacks from their areas of responsibility. They reached out for support to foreign governments in Europe and the Gulf, while Hussein was dispatched to Tehran to convince the Iranians to back off. Powerful political factions and anti-American militias led by leaders such as Moqtada al-Sadr and Hadi al-Ameri felt compelled to issue statements decrying the embassy attacks as harmful to Iraq's interests and demanding that they stop. All of which culminated in the decision by Iran's most hardcore loyalists to issue their October 10 statement, in the name of the "Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee," declaring a suspension of attacks against U.S. interests.
How long the ceasefire lasts, if at all, remains to be seen. In light of the enduring enmity of Iran and its proxies to the U.S. presence in Iraq, not very long is probably the safest bet. To the extent that the administration's precipitous threat was triggered by an immediate concern that Iran might seek to embarrass Trump by staging a major attack on the embassy before the U.S. elections, the calculations of both Washington and Tehran may well change after November 3. The United States should clearly be ready for all eventualities.
What lessons to draw from the high-stakes game of diplomatic poker triggered by the administration's threat are not entirely clear. It may still be too early for any firm conclusions. On the one hand, if the United States were forced to carry out its threat by actually shuttering the embassy under fire, the potential harm to U.S. interests could well be severe - with Iran, the militias, and ISIS likely the only winners. The same can be said if the attacks had escalated and the administration did nothing, exposing its threat as an empty bluff.
On the other hand, it is indisputable that Pompeo's dire warning concentrated the minds of Iraq's elite on the dangers posed by militia attacks like no previous diplomatic overture had ever done. Confronted by what they clearly took to be a plausible U.S. threat not only to abandon Iraq, but possibly to burn it down on the way to the exits, the entire Iraqi political class, both pro- and anti-U.S.; the Iran-backed militias; and, importantly, Iran itself, reportedly including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, saw the better part of wisdom in seeking, at least temporarily, to defuse the situation by taking action to allay U.S. concerns.
Ideally, of course, U.S. policy in Iraq would not be dependent on making threats that, if implemented, would risk doing grievous harm to important American interests. Washington would be better off taking a more balanced approach that sustains badly needed pressure on Iraqi politicians to take U.S. red lines seriously, while also closely coordinating with and supporting Kadhimi in implementing a methodical and comprehensive strategy to erode the power of the Iran-backed militias and the acute threat they pose not only to U.S. interests, but to Iraq's independence and sovereignty as well.
APPENDIX: Documenting and Analyzing Recent Rocket and Mortar Attacks
Iran-backed militias' rationales for rocket and mortar attacks against the U.S. presence in Iraq are diverse and have included: signaling resolve against attempts to deter militia activity; distinguishing themselves using violence to show loyalty to their patron; responding to localized action taken by Baghdad or Washington; and responding to the Trump administration's "maximum pressure" policy against their Iranian patron. However, as has been apparent in 2020, the root cause behind these attacks appears to be a desire to chip away at the American presence in Iraq and use limited force to beget a cycle of violence resulting in the eviction of U.S. forces.
A closer look at the data reveals that escalation does indeed correlate with changing political and military dynamics in Iraq. For the first half of 2020, for instance, attacks using rockets or mortars peaked in response to the U.S. use of force in Iraq in January and March - the latter of which was in response to the loss of American life.
But, more recently, other factors, such as the onset of the U.S-Iraq Strategic Dialogue and the Kadhimi visit to Washington, appear to have been opportune times for the militias to escalate. The second round of that dialogue, which was held in August during Kadhimi's trip to the United States, coincided with the highest monthly total of rocket attacks on record this year - 11. Combining August and September, there have been 19 attacks against U.S. positions in Iraq, amounting to just over a third of the 55 attacks on record this year. What has decreased, however, is the actual number of rockets fired in a single attack, which only once (in September against Erbil International Airport) reached a rate last seen in March, which was six. By comparison, in March, militias once fired 33 Katyusha rockets in a single attack against an Iraqi base known to house U.S. forces.
For counting purposes, we define an attack as rocket or mortar fire toward U.S. facilities, persons, areas known to house them, or entities or areas affiliated with the broader U.S. presence in Iraq. Admittedly, a deeper analysis would require also incorporating the reemergence of roadside bombs, or improvised explosive devices, targeting the United States in Iraq - which took hundreds of American lives during the 2003-2011 Iraq War. Nonetheless, rockets and mortars, which function as part of the lower tier of Iran and its proxies' military capabilities, deserve to be studied on their own and are accordingly recorded in the table and graphs below.
Figure 1 offers a compendium of attacks reported by at least one news source. It builds on previous research by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, which analyzed and aggregated rocket and mortar attacks against U.S. positions in Iraq from May 2019 to April 2020, discovering 43 reported instances. The aim of both efforts is to introduce quantitative data into the conversation about escalation by Iran-backed groups in Iraq. Once that is achieved, members of the public can then draw their own inferences about things such as sourcing, injuries, or non-U.S. fatalities by following up on each documented attack. Figure 2 depicts the number of attacks per site, proving that Baghdad remains a key target for militias. Lastly, Figure 3 shows the distribution of attacks by month thus far in 2020.
Figure 1: Rocket and Mortar Attacks by Shiite Militias on U.S. Positions in Iraq, May 2020-Present
NumberDateWeapon(s)Target/LocationU.S. Fatalities 1 May 6 Katyusha rockets (3X) Military complex near Baghdad International Airport None 2 May 19 Katyusha rocket (1X) Green Zone, Baghdad None 3 June 8 Rocket (2X; later reporting claims 1X) Baghdad International Airport None 4 June 10Katyusha rocket (1X) Green Zone, Baghdad None 5 June 13 Rockets (2X) Camp Taji, Taji None 6 June 15 Rockets (3X) Near Baghdad International Airport None 7 June 18 N/A (3 explosions heard, 4 rockets reported) Green Zone, Baghdad None 8 June 22 Rocket (1X) Baghdad International Airport None 9 July 5Rocket (1X) Green Zone, Baghdad None 10 July 19 Rockets (2X) Green Zone, Baghdad None 11 July 24 Katyusha rocket (4X) Besmaya Base, south of Baghdad None 12 July 27 Katyusha rocket (3X) Camp Taji, Taji None 13 July 27 "Twin blasts" (assumed rocket, mortar, IRAM, or other indiscriminate fire) Speicher Base, Salahaddin Province None 14 July 30 Katyusha rockets (2X) Near Baghdad International Airport None 15 August 3 Rockets (2X) Camp Taji, Taji None 16 August 5 Katyusha rocket (1X) Green Zone, Baghdad None 17 August 11 Katyusha rocket (1X) Green Zone, Baghdad None 18 August 13 Katyusha rockets (3X) Al-Balad Air Base, Salahaddin Province None 19 August 14 Rockets (2X) Camp Taji, Taji None 20 August 15 Katyusha rockets (3X) Near Baghdad International Airport None 21 August 16 Katyusha rocket (1X) Green Zone, Baghdad None 22 August 18 Katyusha rocket (2X) Near Baghdad International Airport None 23 August 27(28) Katyusha rocket (3X) Green Zone, Baghdad None 24 August 29Rocket (1x) Green Zone, Baghdad None 25 August 30 Katyusha rockets (2X) Near Baghdad International Airport None 26 September 6 Katyusha rockets (3X) Near Baghdad International Airport None 27 September 10 Katyusha rocket (1X) Near Baghdad International Airport None 28 September 15 Katyusha rocket (1X) Near Baghdad International Airport None 29 September 16 Katyusha rocket (1X) Green Zone, Baghdad None 30 September 20 Katyusha rocket (1X) Baghdad International Airport None 31 September 22 Mortars (3X) Green Zone, Baghdad None 32 September 28Katyusha rocket (1X) Near Baghdad International Airport None (6 Iraqi civilians killed) 33 September 30 Rockets (6X) Near Erbil International Airport None 34 October 1 Rocket or possibly rocket-propelled grenade (1X) Convoy carrying equipment for the Anti-ISIS Coalition, Babil province None 35 October 5Rockets (2X) Near Baghdad International Airport None
Sources: Hyperlinks to each attack included in table above.
Figure 2: Location of Shiite Militia Attacks on U.S. Positions in Iraq, May 2020-Present Source: May 2020-present: Hyperlinks to each data point in Figure 1.
John Hannah is a senior counselor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Behnam Ben Taleblu is a senior fellow. They both contribute to FDD's Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP) and Iran Program. For more analysis from John, Behnam, CMPP, and the Iran Program, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CMPP and @FDD_Iran. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
4. SecDef Details Plan to Boost Alliances to Counter China and Russia
No matter who wins the election we must continue to continue to develop our alliances. I don't think we can emphasize this statement from the SECDEF enough: "Our global constellation of allies and partners remains an enduring strength that our competitors and adversaries simply cannot match,"
SecDef Details Plan to Boost Alliances to Counter China and Russia
America can't risk alienating allies in the new era of great power competition, which will require strengthening military partnerships in a global defensive chain aimed at maintaining an "asymmetric advantage" over China and Russia, Defense Secretary Mark Esper said Tuesday.
"Our global constellation of allies and partners remains an enduring strength that our competitors and adversaries simply cannot match," he said in remarks to the Atlantic Council that rehashed many of the themes he has stressed in what could be the waning days of his tenure at the Pentagon.
The U.S. can't afford to "take our long-standing network of relationships for granted," including relationships with the often-overlooked smallest partners, such as Malta, Papua New Guinea and Palau, Esper said.
He did not comment upon, and was not asked about, pressing issues on the status of his own relationship with President Donald Trump, security for the Nov. 3 elections and the COVID-19 outbreak that temporarily sidelined top military leaders, who went into isolation.
Esper, who has spent much of his time in recent weeks traveling, said he will be on the road again next week in India with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to bolster alliances in the Indo-Pacific.
Trump's "America First" policy and demands for more defense spending by allies have at times rattled NATO partners and South Korea, but Esper said the new plan, called "Guidance for Development for Alliances and Partnerships," or GDAP, is meant to ease strains with "like-minded democracies."
"America's network of allies and partners provides us an asymmetric advantage our adversaries cannot match," he said.
NATO alone has 30 member states while "in fact, China and Russia probably have fewer than 10 allies," Esper added.
A key factor in shoring up alliances will be boosting foreign military sales while easing restrictions on what can be sold, according to the SecDef.
"In fiscal year 2019, we maintained sales of more than $55 billion for the second consecutive year, which increased our three-year rolling average for sales by 16%," he said. "In the Indo-Pacific alone, there are currently more than $160 billion worth of projects under way, including $22 billion in newly initiated projects in this fiscal year alone."
In implementing the plan, the U.S. must not lose sight of the critical role strategically placed smaller nations will play in strengthening the network of alliances, said Esper, who went on at some length about the contribution Malta could make and the historic debt the U.S. owes to the Maltese.
"Most people are familiar with the critical role that America's oldest ally -- France -- played in our nation's founding, but lesser known is the fact that 1,800 knights and volunteers from Malta enlisted in the French Navy to aid Americans in the cause for freedom," he said. "And in the 20th century, the U.S. answered the call after Axis powers waged a relentless bombing campaign against Malta during World War II." That enabled Malta to become a "launching pad for victory in North Africa."
"Today, our two nations remain steadfast partners, and several weeks ago, I visited Malta to see our cooperation in action at the crossroads of the Mediterranean, and discuss the challenges we jointly face in North Africa," Esper said.
I just ordered it. The reviews are excellent. Here is one:
This scholarly work is a superb compilation and analysis of the public record concerning the Chinese Communist Party's espionage activities against the rest of the world and the United States in particular. Most important it goes well beyond the "what" has happened and provides insight into the how and why of this activity. The reader should be aware that a noted expert in the field has provided a synthesized review of all the available information. It is a glimpse at what is happening around the world. There are more facts understood by those with appropriate security access and much more is known only to the senior levels of the CCP and its operatives. -- Richard Haver, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, former DCI Deputy for Community Affairs, and Chief of Staff, National Intelligence Council.
The 5 Faces Of Chinese Espionage: The World's First 'Digital Authoritarian State'
Chinese spies are different from those of most other wealthy and developed countries where the majority of spies are highly trained, with some serving under diplomatic cover and others operating under what the US Intelligence Community calls Non Official Cover (NOC).
Chinese intelligence operations are the first in modern times to use, as a foundation, the whole of society. Because of this, China's espionage tactics are sometimes artless, operating with little in the way of standard spy-fare, (encrypted communication, dead drops, etc.) instead relying on an overwhelming volume of espionage operations conducted by all manner of citizen and a sort of impunity inherent in the lack of substantive penalty for when a Chinese agent is discovered, a study I recently published analyzing 595 cases of intelligence collection efforts sanctioned and abetted by the Chinese Communist Party.
Nick Eftimiades
Beijing has evolved to become the world's first 'digital authoritarian state'. Its creativity and ability to combine all the elements of 'societal power,' including espionage, information control, industrial policy, political and economic coercion, foreign policy, threat of military force, and technological strength challenges the world's rules-based international order.
Recent Chinese espionage cases such as Kevin Mallory, Edward Peng, Ron Rockwell Hansen, and Dickson Yeo show improvements in the handling 'tradecraft' of intelligence assets.
My study, A Series on Chinese Espionage - Vol. 1Operations and Tactics peels back, layer by layer, the Chinese espionage apparatus at-work in the United States, finding a burgeoning audacity. The willingness to employ average people with little or no training implies a failure of organization and also the same dearth of coordination that's plagued a Chinese intelligence infrastructure that's been purged over and through regime change, this Whole of Society operational strategy marks an emboldened departure for an intelligence community that has historically been a hackneyed doppelgänger of the American CIA, British MI6, and Russian SVR.
Analysis Findings
Patterns emerged from the study indicating which technologies and information are being targeted. They can be grouped into clear categories which incidentally align with the CCP's Made in China 2025 industrial policy, Space Science and Technology Goals to 2050, and Beijing's 13th Five Year Plan.
Major Chinese policy documents outline information objectives based on gaps identified within the Chinese technology, commercial, and military apparatus which become the basis for national strategic technology objectives. National Chinese information objectiveshave a strong correlation to China's espionage activities, reflecting a congruence between China's public and covert operational goals.
Of the 595 cases herein considered, 435 cases targeted technologies or information identified in Chinese policy document information objectives. The analysis further identifies a disproportionate emphasis on Aerospace Technology (116 cases) and information Technology (113 cases).
How China's Legal Framework Supports Espionage
Chinese espionage emphasizes the development of China's industries and the theft of foreign wealth. To that end, the Chinese state employs government agencies, organizations, commercial entities, individual entrepreneurs, Chinese expatriates, Chinese and foreign researchers to attain its espionage goals.
Most Chinese foreign operatives work under one the following:
Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Intelligence Bureau.
The Ministry of State Security, China's pre-eminent civilian intelligence service.
State Owned Enterprises (SOE). About 23 percent of all espionage analyzed in this report is committed by employees of these pseudo-commercial entities.
China compels its citizens to divulge trade secrets and otherwise comply with intelligence-gathering efforts. The Chinese government and party threaten citizens with severe punishment if they do not help with espionage efforts if status and/or money don't convince them to comply. The predominant form of Chinese tradecraft uses company employees to access restricted technology and trade secrets. There are estimated to be at least 500 Chinese talent programs designed to conscript academic and professional expertise from the West into scooping up information and technology to serve China's national development.
Impact Of Chinese Espionage on American Interests
Just how extensive Chinese espionage may be is a near impossible task to estimate without access to more data, but it's crystal clear that China is quickly eroding the US advantage in aerospace technology. Also, Chinese espionage compromises US dependency on space capabilities for communications, economic strength, critical infrastructure safety and resiliency, and our ability to project military power globally.
The financial impact of intellectual property theft is more easily estimated. The annual losses to the US from China's IP theft are estimated to be $360 billion. The director of the FBI has publicly stated that the bureau opens a new counter-intelligence case involving China every 10 hours.
Huawei HQ in Shenzhen, China
America's response to China has become increasingly contentious under the Trump administration, exemplified by the Huawei technology stoppage, and the censuring of the popular Chinese-controlled apps Tik-Tok and WeChat.
The issues I've examined here concern only espionage operations pertaining to the United States. Obviously, America is only one in an international landscape of advanced technologycountries trying to rebuff China's espionage efforts. A major question arises in consideration of this analysis: Do the 595 discovered cases of Chinese espionage represent 90 percent or 10 percent of the total?
6. Putin: Russia-China Military Alliance Can't Be Ruled Out
I am sure this will be panned by some. But whatever happens I agree with our SECDEF, our adversaries will never be able to match our alliance structure.
Putin: Russia-China Military Alliance Can't Be Ruled Out
MOSCOW (AP) - Russian President Vladimir Putin said Thursday there is no need for a Russia-China military alliance now, but noted it could be forged in the future.
Putin's statement signaled deepening ties between Moscow and Beijing amid growing tensions in their relations with the United States. The Russian leader also made a strong call for extending the last remaining arms control pact between Moscow and Washington.
Asked during a video conference with international foreign policy experts Thursday whether a military union between Moscow and Beijing was possible, Putin replied that "we don't need it, but, theoretically, it's quite possible to imagine it."
Russia and China have hailed their "strategic partnership," but so far rejected any talk about the possibility of their forming a military alliance.
Putin pointed to the war games that the armed forces of China and Russia held as a signal of the countries' burgeoning military cooperation.
Putin also noted that Russia has shared sensitive military technologies that helped significantly boost China's military potential, but didn't mention any specifics, saying the information was sensitive.
"Without any doubt, our cooperation with China is bolstering the defense capability of China's army," he said, adding that the future could see even closer military ties between the two countries.
"The time will show how it will develop," the Russian president said, adding that "we won't exclude it."
Russia has sought to develop stronger ties with China as its relations with the West sank to post-Cold War lows over Moscow's annexation of Ukraine's Crimea, accusations of Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and other rifts.
Putin on Thursday emphasized the importance of extending the New START treaty that expires in February, Russia's last arms control pact with the United States.
Earlier this week, the United States and Russia signaled their readiness to accept compromises to salvage the New START treaty just two weeks ahead of the U.S. presidential election in which President Donald Trump faces a strong challenge from former Vice President Joe Biden, whose campaign has accused Trump of being soft on Russia.
New START was signed in 2010 by then-U.S. President Barack Obama and then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. The pact limits each country to no more than 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and 700 deployed missiles and bombers, and envisages sweeping on-site inspections to verify compliance.
Russia had offered to extend the pact without any conditions, while the Trump administration initially insisted that it could only be renewed if China agreed to join. China has refused to consider the idea. The U.S. recently modified its stance and proposed a one-year extension of the treaty, but said it must be coupled with the imposition of a broader cap on nuclear warheads.
The Kremlin initially resisted Washington's demand, but its position shifted this week with the Russian Foreign Ministry stating that Moscow can accept a freeze on warheads if the U.S. agrees to put forward no additional demands.
Putin didn't address the issue of the freeze on warheads, but he emphasized the importance of salvaging New START.
"The question is whether to keep the existing treaty as it is, begin a detailed discussion and try to reach a compromise in a year or lose that treaty altogether, leaving ourselves, Russia and the United States, along with the rest of the world, without any agreement restricting an arms race," he said. "I believe the second option is much worse."
At the same time, he added that Russia "wasn't clinging to the treaty" and will ensure its security without it. He pointed at Russia's perceived edge in hypersonic weapons and indicated a readiness to include them in a future pact.
"If our partners decide that they don't need it, well, so be it, we can't stop them," he said. "Russia'
Despite indications earlier this week that Russia and the U.S. were inching closer to a deal on New START, the top Russian negotiator said that "dramatic" differences still remain and strongly warned Washington against making new demands.
Sergei Ryabkov cautioned the U.S. against pressing its demand for more intrusive control verification measures like those that existed in the 1990s and aren't envisaged by the New START. The diplomat argued that new control mechanisms could be discussed as part of a future deal, saying firmly that Russia will not accept the demand that amounts to "legitimate espionage."
"If it doesn't suit the U.S. for some reason, then there will be no deal," Ryabkov was quoted by the Interfax news agency as saying.
Battle Force 2045 could work - if defense leaders show some discipline
Defense News · by Timothy Walton, Bryan Clark · October 22, 2020
U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper is sprinting. With less than four months left in the administration's term, he unveiled a new vision for the Navy that would grow the fleet to more than 500 manned and unmanned vessels from today's 296 ships. Although some dismiss Esper's Battle Force 2045 concept as a political ploy shortly before an election, it could lead to a more effective and affordable future fleet - as long as Navy and Department of Defense leaders can avoid loading it down with expensive options.
The Navy clearly needs to change its force design and operational approach. Even though naval forces are increasingly important to deter and defeat Chinese aggression, the Navy's previous plan to build a force of 355 ships lacked resilience and firepower, fell short on logistics, and was projected to cost 50 percent more than the current fleet. The Navy tried to adjust that plan with an integrated naval force structure assessment, but Esper rejected it, as it failed to implement new concepts for distributed multidomain operations and would be too expensive to realistically field.
Instead, over the course of nine months, he and Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist led a study taking a fresh look at the Navy's force structure. The Hudson Institute contributed to the project by developing one of three fleet designs that informed the new plan.
Hudson's proposed fleet is affordable to acquire and operate. Even though it consists of 581 vessels, more than 200 are unmanned or have small crews. The Hudson study's conservative estimates suggest it can be acquired for the ship construction funding in the Navy's President's Budget for fiscal 2021, adjusted for inflation, and would only cost moderately more than the current one to operate.
The Hudson proposal becomes more affordable than the Navy's plan by gradually rebalancing the fleet to incorporate more smaller, less-expensive ships and fewer large multimission combatants. The proposed fleet would also constrain the size and cost of some large new ships, such as the future large surface combatant and next-generation attack submarine.
Employing new operational concepts, the proposed fleet would outperform the current Navy in important metrics for future operations. First, the proposed fleet's groups of manned and unmanned vessels would generate more numerous and diverse effects chains compared to today's Navy, improving the force's adaptability and imposing greater complexity on enemy decision-making.
Second, the fleet would deliver more offensive munitions from vessels and aircraft over a protracted period, and defend itself more effectively using distribution, shorter-range interceptors and electric weapons.
Lastly, it enhances the fleet's amphibious, logistics and strategic sealift capacity. Overall, this results in a Navy that can help the joint force prevail across a range of potential scenarios, including the most challenging ones such as an attempted Chinese attack on Taiwan.
The Hudson fleet is also achievable. Its shipbuilding plan relies on mature technologies or allows sufficient time to complete needed engineering and operational concept development before moving ships into serial production. The plan sustains the industrial base through stable ship-construction rates that avoid gaps in production and smoothly transition between ship classes.
Even with this measured approach, however, the fleet can rapidly evolve, reaching more than 355 manned and unmanned vessels by 2030, and 581 by 2045.
Although Battle Force 2045 focuses on ships, the Navy needs to spend more on improving repair yard infrastructure, growing munitions stocks, and providing command-and-control capabilities to the force. As the Hudson study shows, ship construction savings could help fund these and other enablers, but only if the Navy and the DoD have the discipline to avoid expensive new investments, such as building a third attack submarine every year, installing boost-glide hypersonic missiles on old destroyers or pursuing a significantly larger combatant to follow the Arleigh Burke class.
Even if the procurement cost of these programs was funded through budget shifts within the DoD, each will incur a sustainment bill that is not factored into Navy plans and could accelerate the descent toward a hollow force.
The Navy is now developing a new shipbuilding plan as part of its FY22 budget submission. Congress should carefully assess that plan and, in collaboration with the DoD, refine the budget. Esper may depart, but the results of this study can serve as a starting point for an operationally effective and fiscally sustainable fleet for the next administration.
Timothy A. Walton is a fellow at the Hudson Institute's Center for Defense Concepts and Technology, where Bryan Clark is a senior fellow. Along with Seth Cropsey, they recently completed a study of future naval force structure.
8. US and allies prioritize Indonesia as potential counterweight to China
How does Indonesia feel about this? It just recently rejected a US request to base some ISR assets.
US and allies prioritize Indonesia as potential counterweight to China
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will travel to Indonesia next week as U.S. and allied leaders seek to band with other democratic powers to curb China's capacity to dominate the Indo-Pacific region.
"It's in their best interest to ensure that their sovereignty is protected against the continued efforts to encroach upon their basic rights - their maritime rights, their sovereign rights, their ability to conduct business in the way that they want to inside of their country that the Chinese Communist Party continues to threaten," Pompeo told reporters Wednesday.
The trip reflects how competition with China has changed perceptions of the archipelago, long-viewed as a "strategic backwater" despite Indonesia's status as the fourth-most populous country in the world, as one analyst put it. U.S. overtures to Jakarta are hampered by the Indonesian aversion to aligning with any major power, but Washington's efforts are being reinforced by Japan.
"Japan is opposed to any actions that escalate tensions in the South China Sea," Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga said Wednesday during a trip to Indonesia. "Let me stress anew the importance of all the countries concerning the South China Sea issues not resorting to force or coercion but working toward peaceful resolutions of the disputes based on international law."
That's a rebuke of China, which has asserted sovereignty over vast swaths of the South China Sea and attempted to buttress those claims by deploying military assets to artificial islands in the busy waterways. Those claims entail trampling on the sovereignty claims of several other countries in the congested neighborhood, but Indonesia has the greatest potential capacity to resist China's pressure - although Jakarta has hesitated to join any collective efforts to rebuff Beijing.
"We need to strengthen ties with large, like-minded democracies, such as India and Indonesia," Defense Secretary Mark Esper said Tuesday, touting his meeting last week with Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto.
Yet Indonesia's reported desire to purchase F-35 stealth fighter jets from the United States, paired with its reported hesitance to allow American forces to make refueling stops, underscores the impediments fashioned out of Indonesia's traditional of nonalignment and a lack of U.S. focus on the country.
"Both sides misunderstand the limits of what's possible," said Center for Strategic and International Studies analyst Gregory Poling, who added that Indonesia should be regarded as "a partner, a low-level partner, but mainly one that will look out for its own interests."
Pentagon officials have expressed public concern that China will pursue military-basing capabilities in Indonesia, but Poling is confident that Indonesia will not make such a concession.
"Its own interests largely align with ours," he said. "It's OK to leave Indonesia to its own devices and support Indonesia with capacity building, training ... and recognizing that a strong, independent Indonesia is good for the U.S."
Pompeo hinted he'll make that argument in service of multiple priorities. "There are commercial issues, security issues, and diplomatic issues where the United States has already improved the relationship between the countries, but there's more that we can do," he said. "I know the Indonesians share our desire to make sure there's a free and open Indo-Pacific, and we want to make sure they know they have a capable, willing partner in the United States of America."
9. Our toxic civil-military relations
Trust.
Conclusion: "The current state of civil-military relations is toxic. The missing element is trust, the mutual respect and understanding between civilian and military leaders. Both the uniformed military and the president bear responsibility for this situation. But the retired officer community has been particularly irresponsible. It has failed to take into account the public consequences of its statements. It has failed to realize how its public statements also undermine trust between the military and the president. In short, it has failed to exercise prudence."
Civil-military tensions are nothing new in American history. Indeed, they date from the very founding of the republic. Although there are many examples of unhealthy civil-military relations during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, the relationship has become dangerously toxic during the Trump presidency.
President Trump's critics blame him for current tensions, charging him with upending the "norms" of civil-military relations and undermining the dual pillars of military obedience to civilians and civilian respect for military professionals. They accuse him of demanding loyalty for personal or political reasons.
Certainly, his actions have contributed. Yet the military, especially the retired community, has made things worse by forgetting or ignoring the fact that the Constitution authorizes the president to make national policy, whether it approves of that policy or not. The military is obligated to offer its advice to the president. It has no right to demand that its advice be accepted.
Trump entered the White House as an outsider who came under fire from the national security community even before he was elected. Its concern seemed valid. After all, during the 2016 campaign, Trump voiced skepticism about the direction of the foreign and defense policies of his predecessors, arguing against the verities of the post-9/11 "consensus."
There were two versions of this view. One, advanced by the McCain-Romney wing of the Republican Party, held that the United States could remake the world in its own democratic image by military and diplomatic action in Afghanistan and Iraq. Another, embraced by President Barack Obama, held that the U.S. could advance peace and prosperity by deferring to the United Nations and other international organizations. In particular, Trump criticized America's overseas commitments, including the effort in Afghanistan, called into question the value of NATO, and argued the U.S. was being undone by its adherence to free trade.
From the outset, Trump faced not only external but also internal resistance to his national security policies. This resistance was immediate and bipartisan. But originally, his vocal opponents were diplomats, members of the intelligence community, and academics. Largely missing were retired military officers. Indeed, the president brought a number of retired and active generals into his administration.
What has changed, dangerously so, is that Trump is now under attack by not only anonymous active-duty officers but also retired military officers. The latter is more problematic. It has become routine, unfortunately, for retired officers to line up to endorse candidates. But it is unprecedented, and dangerous, for retired officers to attack a sitting president publicly using contemptuous language that, were they still on active duty, would put them in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
As citizens, retired officers have the right to speak out. But they should also be guided by prudence. As the esteemed military historian Richard Kohn has remarked, retired general and flag officers are akin to the cardinals of the Catholic Church. When they speak, they are perceived to speak for the military in general. Their public attacks on Trump have served to undermine his trust in the military.
For example, retired Adm. William McRaven wrote in a recent op-ed, "If this president doesn't demonstrate the leadership that America needs, both domestically and abroad, then it is time for a new person in the Oval Office - Republican, Democrat or independent - the sooner, the better. The fate of our Republic depends upon it."
McRaven here exacerbates tensions by undermining the mutual trust that lies at the heart of healthy civil-military relations. Such rhetoric encourages insubordination within the military, undermining any president's expectation that his lawful policy preferences will be vigorously executed.
Officers, of course, swear an oath to the Constitution, not to an individual. But any president should be able to expect the loyalty of the officer corps to support an administration's policy once a decision has been made; it is the president, not an imaginary "security community," who has the constitutional authority to make national policy. His critics also misconstrue Trump's expectation of loyalty: It is not personal or political but acceptance of his perfectly reasonable goal of ending conflicts such as the one in Afghanistan in order to focus on threats such as China.
Trump's opponents have attempted to drive a wedge between the president and the military. The Atlantic story alleging - anonymously, of course - that he disparaged fallen Americans during a visit to France two years ago is only the most recent example. The attacks by some retired officers on Trump's response to the riots earlier this year are another.
A far more irresponsible example is the "open letter" from two retired Army officers to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conjuring up a nightmare scenario, Trump refusing to leave office after losing the election of 2020, in order to call for the chairman to exercise unconstitutional discretion by using the military to remove him. The Washington Examiner's own Byron York, as sober a journalist as there is, has labeled this an example of "coup porn."
As York notes, Joe Biden has chimed in on the issue. In response to a question about the possibility of Trump losing and refusing to leave office, Biden answered that he had indeed thought about it: "And I was so damn proud - you have four chiefs of staff coming out and ripping the skin off of Trump. And you have so many rank-and-file military personnel saying, 'Whoa, we're not a military state. That is not who we are.' I promise you, I am absolutely convinced they will escort him from the White House with great dispatch."
Calling for the removal of the military from civilian oversight by granting it alone the authority to resolve political disputes smacks of "praetorianism," something usually associated with countries such as Turkey and Egypt. In these countries, the army is the real power behind the government. Nothing can be more dangerous to healthy civil-military relations than normalizing the view that the military is the protector of republican government. Indeed, in today's political climate, such a view could contribute to, if not trigger, a constitutional crisis.
The current state of civil-military relations is toxic. The missing element is trust, the mutual respect and understanding between civilian and military leaders. Both the uniformed military and the president bear responsibility for this situation. But the retired officer community has been particularly irresponsible. It has failed to take into account the public consequences of its statements. It has failed to realize how its public statements also undermine trust between the military and the president. In short, it has failed to exercise prudence.
Mackubin Owens is a senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia and author of U.S. Civil-Military Relations After 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain . He is currently writing a history of U.S. civil-military relations.
10. Exclusive: 'Dumb mistake' exposed Iranian hand behind fake Proud Boys U.S. election emails - sources
Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake (Napoleon). I hope the Iranians make more mistakes.
Exclusive: 'Dumb mistake' exposed Iranian hand behind fake Proud Boys U.S. election emails - sources
Reuters · by Christopher Bing, Jack Stubbs · October 22, 2020
6 Min Read
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Government analysts and private sector investigators were able to rapidly attribute to Iranian hackers a wave of thousands of threatening emails aimed at U.S. voters because of mistakes made in a video attached to some of the messages, according to four people familiar with the matter.
A staff member removes the Iranian flag from the stage after a group picture during the Iran nuclear talks in Vienna, Austria July 2015. REUTERS/Carlos Barria
Those failures provided a rare opportunity for the U.S. government to identify and publicly announce blame for a malicious cyber operation in a matter of days, something that usually requires months of technical analysis and supporting intelligence.
"Either they made a dumb mistake or wanted to get caught," said a senior U.S. government official, who asked not to be identified. "We are not concerned about this activity being some kind of false flag due to other supporting evidence. This was Iran."
Attribution to Iranian hackers does not necessarily mean a group is working at the behest of the government there. Iranian officials denied the U.S. allegations.
"These accusations are nothing more than another scenario to undermine voter confidence in the security of the U.S. election, and are absurd," said Alireza Miryousefi, spokesman for Iran's mission to the United Nations in New York.
On Wednesday, U.S. Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe said Russia and Iran have both tried to interfere in the campaign for the Nov. 3 election. U.S. intelligence agencies are still analyzing exactly who in Iran commanded the operation and its intent, three of the sources said.
Within hours of the video being circulated this week, which purported to come from a American far-right group known as The Proud Boys, intelligence officials and major email platform providers, such as Alphabet Inc's GOOGL.O Google and Microsoft Corp MSFT.O, began closely analyzing computer code that appeared in the hackers' video.
While the emails, which demanded that voters change their party affiliation to the Republican Party and vote for President Donald Trump or "we will come after you," appeared to come from an official-looking Proud Boys email address, the address was inauthentic, security analysts said. The Proud Boys denied they were behind the messages.
How security analysts used intelligence from the video to attribute the email scheme has not been previously reported.
A Microsoft spokesperson declined to comment on the company's collaboration with law enforcement. A Google statement on Wednesday night said the activity was "linked to Iran." A Google spokesperson said on Thursday the company was in contact with the FBI.
ATTEMPTS TO BLUR
Despite attempts to blur aspects of the video to hide their identity, the hackers were unable to obfuscate all of the incriminating information, the sources said.
The video showed the hackers' computer screen as they typed in commands and pretended to hack a voter registration system. Investigators noticed snippets of revealing computer code, including file paths, file names and an internet protocol (IP) address.
Security analysts found that the IP address, hosted through an online service called Worldstream, traced back to previous Iranian hacking activity, the sources said.
Analysts then cross-referenced those clues left in the video with data from other intelligence streams, including communications interceptions, the government official said.
"This public disclosure of attribution to Iran by the government has been done with breakneck speed, compared to the usual process that takes months and often years," said Dmitri Alperovitch, a co-founder and former CTO of cybersecurity company CrowdStrike.
Two cybersecurity experts, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to the press, independently said they had seen Iranian hackers use infrastructure from Dutch-based Worldstream to launch cyberattacks in recent months.
Worldstream's chief legal operations officer Wouter van Zwieten said in a statement that the account associated with the IP in question was suspended after Reuters got in touch and that the Dutch National Cyber Security Center was looking into the matter.
"They've just informed us that the particular IP address is now officially registered by them and ready for investigation under Dutch Law," van Zwieten said. The National Cyber Security Center confirmed that Worldstream had been in touch and that it had logged the case but declined further comment.
Van Zwieten said the server used by the hackers was only commissioned on Oct. 6 and had not drawn any complaints until now. The company said it had no access to the content on its servers.
In addition to sending thousands of emails to voters in states including Florida, the hackers also attempted to share links to the video via fake accounts on Facebook and Twitter.
Social media analytics firm Graphika said two Twitter accounts began posting links to the video on Tuesday evening and attempted to get the attention of some media and political organizations.
One account described itself as "Trump's Soldier" and shared a link to the video with the comment "It seems they hacked voting system."
A Twitter spokeswoman said: "We acted quickly to proactively and permanently suspend a small number of accounts and limit the sharing of media specific to this coordinated campaign."
Facebook said: "We disrupted an attempt by a single fake account to seed information related to what appears to be an influence operation primarily focused on spreading false claims via email."
Reporting by Christopher Bing and Jack Stubbs; Additional reporting by Raphael Satter in WASHINGTON, Joseph Menn in SAN FRANCISCO and Michelle Nichols in NEW YORK; editing by Grant McCool, Cynthia Osterman and Rosalba O'Brien
Army Sgt. 1st Class Steve Frye was stuck on base last summer in Afghanistan, bored and fiddling around on a military network, when he came across live video footage of a battle in the Korengal Valley, where he had first seen combat 13 years earlier. It was infamous terrain, where at least 40 U.S. troops had died over the years, including some of Frye's friends. Watching the Reaper drone footage closely, he saw that no American forces were involved in the fighting, and none from the Afghan government. Instead, the Taliban and the Islamic State were duking it out. Frye looked for confirmation online. Sure enough, America's old enemy and its newer one were posting photos and video to propaganda channels as they tussled for control of the Korengal and its lucrative timber business.
What Frye didn't know was that U.S. Special Operations forces were preparing to intervene in the fighting in Konar province in eastern Afghanistan - not by attacking both sides, but by using strikes from drones and other aircraft to help the Taliban. "What we're doing with the strikes against ISIS is helping the Taliban move," a member of the elite Joint Special Operations Command counterterrorism task force based at Bagram air base explained to me earlier this year, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the assistance was secret. The air power would give them an advantage by keeping the enemy pinned down.
Last fall and winter, as the JSOC task force was conducting the strikes, the Trump administration's public line was that it was hammering the Taliban "harder than they have ever been hit before," as the president put it - trying to force the group back to the negotiating table in Doha, Qatar, after President Trump put peace talks there on hold and canceled a secretly planned summit with Taliban leaders at Camp David. Administration officials signaled that they didn't like or trust the Taliban and that, until it made more concessions, it could expect only blistering bombardment.
In reality, even as its warplanes have struck the Taliban in other parts of Afghanistan, the U.S. military has been quietly helping the Taliban to weaken the Islamic State in its Konar stronghold and keep more of the country from falling into the hands of the group, which - unlike the Taliban - the United States views as an international terrorist organization with aspirations to strike America and Europe. Remarkably, it can do so without needing to communicate with the Taliban, by observing battle conditions and listening in on the group. Two members of the JSOC task force and another defense official described the assistance to me this year in interviews for a book about the war in Konar, all of them speaking on the condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to talk about it. (The U.S. military headquarters in Afghanistan declined to comment for this story.)
Afghan elders in the Korengal Valley listen during a meeting with American and Afghan military officials in 2008. Most of the elders have strong family ties to local Taliban fighters. (John Moore/Getty Images)
With the Taliban fighting the Islamic State in Konar, a peace deal was always going to require at least tacit U.S.-Taliban cooperation against their mutual foe. In March, days after U.S. diplomats and Taliban representatives inked a withdrawal deal in Doha, Gen. Frank McKenzie, the top U.S. commander for Afghanistan and the Middle East, told the House Armed Services Committee that the Taliban had received "very limited support from us." He declined to elaborate, and the form that support took has not been publicly revealed.
But inside JSOC, the team working on this mission is jokingly known as the "Taliban Air Force," one task force member told me. As negotiators closed in on their deal in Doha, officers repurposed tools honed against the Taliban: Reaper drones and an intelligence complex with nearly two decades of practice spying on Afghan guerrillas. Unwilling to communicate directly with Taliban commanders, the task force worked to divine where and how its old foes needed help by listening to their communications.
By using such signals intelligence, members of the task force told me, they could tell when and where in the mountains the Taliban was preparing thrusts against the Islamic State, then plan airstrikes where they would be most useful. Taliban units on the ground appeared willing to take the help, waiting to assault Islamic State positions until they heard and saw the explosions of bombs and Hellfires. "It's easy to capture the Taliban's communications - a lot of it is just push-to-talk radio comms," meaning walkie-talkies that anyone can listen in on, SAID Bill Ostlund, a retired Army colonel who led the JSOC task force in Afghanistan earlier in the war. "Why directly coordinate with them when you can do it that way?"
The Konar operations may offer a glimpse of what lies ahead for the United States in Afghanistan: the outsourcing of what has long been a core U.S. military mission - fighting the Islamic State and al-Qaeda - to the uneasily coordinated forces of the Afghan government and the Taliban, with U.S. counterterrorism forces in some cases helping both. Under the Doha agreement, the Trump administration hopes to remove all U.S. troops from Afghanistan next spring, but a CIA presence reportedly may remain. And if a new U.S. administration halts the military withdrawal, it will have to find ways to hunt the Islamic State and al-Qaeda with just the 4,500 uniformed troops the Pentagon has said will remain by November, or even fewer - a smaller force than the United States has had in the country since the early months of 2002.
The precursor to this strategy has been in place for years. Joseph Votel, a retired Army general who commanded JSOC, told me that during his 2016-2019 tenure heading Central Command, even before the U.S. military provided air support, it "deconflicted" with the Taliban - refraining from bombing Taliban units that seemed to be preparing for attacks against the Islamic State. "I can understand a certain distaste for doing it," Votel said about the new approach. "But if you buy into the overall strategy of bringing the Afghan government and the Taliban into reconciliation while maintaining pressure on international terrorist groups, it's the kind of thing that needs to happen."
It's not clear whether the government in Kabul - which was not a party to the Doha negotiations but is now in its own talks with the Taliban - is aware of the role U.S. airstrikes have played in Konar. (Afghan government officials declined to comment for this story.) But government troops have cooperated with the Taliban there, too, even as they fight bitterly in most other parts of the country. When U.S. soldiers visited the province in 2018 to support an Afghan military offensive against the Islamic State, Afghan troops would sometimes bring in tough-looking, heavily bearded locals from the battlefield for American medics to treat. It was clear, some of the U.S. advisers told me, that the men were Taliban fighters who were collaborating with government troops as guides and scouts, although Afghan officers wouldn't say so explicitly since they knew that the United States considered the Taliban a hostile force. And during Afghanistan's presidential elections in September 2019, Taliban fighters guarded some villages in Konar's Pech Valley against the Islamic State, burning the houses of suspected members of the group and encouraging residents to vote.
American soldiers return to their base, Camp Restrepo, in Kunar Province's Korengal Valley in 2009. (AP Photo/David Guttenfelder)
The silent rapprochement with the Taliban puts the U.S. military in an odd spot. Even though the group is fighting the Islamic State, it remains allied with al-Qaeda, the enemy that brought U.S. troops to Afghanistan in the first place.
Yet Konar veterans I spoke with seemed realistic about the calculus, seeing this as necessary to keeping U.S. troops out of harm's way. "I don't think Americans should be on the ground in firefights with the Taliban, and we need somebody fighting ISIS, so I don't see a problem with it. That doesn't mean I want to break bread with them," said Jason Dempsey, a retired Army lieutenant colonel who fought in Konar in 2009. "Emotionally it's hard partly because we've spent nearly 20 years conflating al-Qaeda with the Taliban, but the Taliban didn't strike the United States on 9/11."
Votel, who spent time in Konar in 2007 and 2008, drew a comparison to the way U.S. forces handled Iranian-backed Shiite militias - including some that had previously fought against U.S. troops - during the campaign to push the Islamic State out of Iraq. "It's not a whole lot different," he said. The Shiite groups "were playing a role against a common enemy, and we tried not to do anything that might make ISIS's job easier fighting them."
Other veterans were less sure that the United States is backing the right horse. The Islamic State's Afghan branch doesn't appear to have plotted any attacks on the West, as its counterparts in Iraq and Syria have; the Taliban, meanwhile, has yet to break its long-standing relationship with al-Qaeda. "Just as an American taxpayer, are we more concerned about ISIS taking over Afghanistan, or the Taliban?" asked Loren Crowe, a two-time Konar veteran who was shot in the leg as an infantry company commander there.
What if the U.S. withdrawal plan has its calculus backward? The Doha agreement requires the Taliban to prevent terrorist groups from using its territory to plan international attacks, but not for the Taliban to break its ties with al-Qaeda - and last summer, a top Taliban spokesman refused to acknowledge that al-Qaeda was responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Although its numbers are always hazy, the U.S. military guessed last year that the Taliban hosts 300 al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan's east and south, more than double its estimate a decade ago, when nearly 100,000 U.S. troops were in the country. And there's no indication yet that the Taliban has any plans to break with its old ally after the U.S. withdrawal, which will take away most of the tools - like aerial surveillance and drone strikes - long used to keep a lid on al-Qaeda.
The Afghan branch of the Islamic State, meanwhile, appears to be composed mostly of local fighters from Konar and surrounding areas, not foreign terrorists. Some have joined for ideological reasons, but many others have done so because the organization offers high wages and the promise of advancement. "We're not seeing foreign fighters up there. These are localized folks," two-time Konar veteran Brig. Gen. Joe Ryan told me of the Islamic State last year in a book interview. "I'm not saying there aren't worrying indicators, but I don't believe that a transnational terrorist attack is going to emanate from Konar anytime soon."
If it's true that the Islamic State doesn't pose much threat to the United States or its allies from Afghanistan, and that the Taliban can keep that group under control or even defeat it with a little help from the U.S. military on its way out, it's a point in favor of the Trump administration's withdrawal plan. But officials expect that al-Qaeda can be finished off in much the same way. Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. envoy who negotiated the withdrawal deal, told an audience in Washington last month that the remaining al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan are on the run. But if U.S. counterterrorism strikes can't defeat them in the coming months, that could scuttle the pullout and force Washington to keep troops in the country after all. In which case, the JSOC task force would keep pursuing al-Qaeda and the Islamic State indefinitely, and weighing what to do about the Taliban day by day and valley by valley - using drone strikes in some provinces to aid the group against the Islamic State and in others to kill off the al-Qaeda operatives who are the Taliban's allies.
That answer is too convoluted for some to stomach. Crowe, the former company commander wounded in Konar, told me that with U.S. drones helping the Taliban fight a group that didn't even exist in Afghanistan during his deployments, he worried that the military was acting like a hammer seeking nails to pound, inflating the threat posed by local and regional militants whose decision to take refuge in inhospitable terrain reflects their weakness and inherently constrains their actions. "How much do we really need to worry about dudes in the back of these valleys, no matter what flag they're flying?" Crowe asked. "If ISIS in the Korengal is mostly a bunch of Korengalis, why do we care?"
As long as the soldiers, intelligence officers and contractors charged with America's counterterrorism mission go looking for people to kill there, that is, they will keep on finding them. "There will always be dragons to slay up there," Crowe said.
12. South Korea deaths 'not linked' to flu vaccination drive
Hopefully this is some good news (except for the deaths of the 32)
South Korea deaths 'not linked' to flu vaccination drive
South Korean authorities say the death of a 17-year old has no links to a flu vaccination he received shortly before.
There has been some alarm after a number of deaths following flu shots in the country. At least 32 people have died after getting the vaccine.
Health officials say there is no link to the state-run vaccinations programme, which will continue. So far, some 13m people have been vaccinated.
They are hoping to prevent a mass flu outbreak as the country battles Covid.
The 17-year old boy was among the first reported to have died after receiving the vaccine. Now, the country's forensic agency says it has found no evidence that the flu shot caused his death.
Prime Minister Chung Sye-kyun expressed condolences to the families of those who died, calling for a thorough investigation into the exact cause of deaths. But he reiterated that the vaccines were unlikely to be the reason.
"So far, experts said there was low possibility that the shots and deaths were related but many citizens remain anxious," he said.
The Korean Vaccine Society has also advised that the flu shots should continue.
However, the Korean Medical Association, a health workers' union, said the government should consider postponing the nationwide program.
"We agree that flu vaccinations should continue," KMA official Min Yang-ki said according to news agency Yonhap. "We are not calling the government to completely halt the vaccination, but to temporarily suspend it for about one week to find out the exact cause [of death]."
South Korea wants its vulnerable population groups like senior citizens vaccinated against seasonal flu this year.
The influenza season usually begins by the end of November and there are fears that if it runs parallel with the coronavirus pandemic, it would increase the risks for those vulnerable groups. According to Yonhap, around 3,000 flu-related deaths are recorded in South Korea each year.
media captionReality Check takes a look at the flu vaccine.
13. FDD | G7 powers must confront the Chinese threat together
Excerpt: "Lastly, G7 leaders should more aggressively confront the regime's attempts to influence the citizens and policies of other countries. These influence operations typically include attempts to censor those who speak out about China's human rights violations, disinformation campaigns intended to shape public perceptions about China and its weaponization of regulatory, legal and lobbying loopholes in other countries to advance its economic interests."
FDD | G7 powers must confront the Chinese threat together
Canada certainly did not pick this fight, but lead it must. The fate of more than just the two Michaels hangs in the balance.
fdd.org · by Craig Singleton Adjunct Fellow · October 21, 2020
China's illegitimate detention of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig has put the limitations of Canada's quiet diplomacy into stark focus. Nearly 700 days have passed since the two men, commonly referred to as the "two Michaels," were arrested by Chinese agents, and neither one of them is any closer to regaining his freedom. Ottawa desperately needs a new strategy for dealing with Beijing's hostage diplomacy, albeit one that stays true to Canada's values and its faith in multilateralism.
The encouraging news, if there is any, is that Canada finds itself in relatively good company with its G7 partners, several of which have citizens who have also been held against their will by China. For that reason, the G7 may hold the answer not only to securing the release of the two Michaels, but also to the West's collective response to Beijing's belligerence.
Since its founding 45 years ago, the G7 has never quite lived up to its vaunted expectations. Despite representing more than half of the world's wealth, the G7 has consistently failed to find a consensus on tackling some of the world's most intractable economic problems. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, China was more than willing to fill the leadership void left by the G7's indecisiveness. In championing China as the world's factory, the G7 also allowed the country to become the world's bully.
Yet global attitudes toward Beijing have changed markedly in recent months. In addition to China's COVID-19 deceptions, startling information about mass human rights atrocities involving Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang province, as well as Beijing's brutal crackdowns in Hong Kong and Tibet, have forced G7 leaders to speak out publicly about the Chinese government's crimes, in some cases for the first time.
What's more, Beijing's unlawful efforts to locate and repatriate alleged fugitives, often referred to as Operation Fox Hunt, as well as its massive theft of intellectual property from Western firms, have laid bare the weaknesses in the very international organizations charged with policing such misconduct, namely the United Nations and the World Trade Organization (WTO).Despite its flaws, the G7 sits perfectly at the intersection of geoeconomics and Western values, which is why it should feature prominently in Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's plans to more aggressively confront China's malign behaviour.Following the presidential election in the United States, regardless of the outcome, Canada should request an urgent, virtual meeting of all G7 leaders to reach a consensus on how to deal with China's blatant human rights violations and its illegal exit bans, which are being used to bar people from leaving the country, even those who have citizenship elsewhere.Regarding the two Michaels, G7 leaders should demand, first in private and perhaps later in public, that Beijing transfer the two men from their prison cells to home confinement, which should allow for increased Canadian consular visits, in keeping with the Vienna convention. While far from a perfect solution, such a move would set the stage for continued negotiations, while also providing China with a face-saving opportunity.
Should China prove unwilling to engage, Canada's next steps should include formally raising the case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). At the same time, other G7 members should request an ICJ advisory opinion on China's atrocities in Xinjiang and Tibet. While China's leadership has shown a propensity to disregard legal opinions with which it disagrees, such rulings can sometimes lead to broader international action, often to China's detriment. If you have any doubts, look no further than the international community's recent willingness to openly defy the Communist regime's unlawful claims in the South China Sea.
Moving forward, G7 leaders must also work to neutralize China's attempts to impose economic punishments on democratic countries that raise legitimate concerns about Beijing's human rights record. These efforts could include co-ordinating market responses to help vulnerable countries, such as Australia, which have found themselves in Beijing's line of fire. G7 leaders should also work together to identify mutually beneficial solutions to their supply chain dependence on China, as well as synchronize efforts to hold China accountable at other international organizations.At the WTO, the G7 must put aside parochial interests to champion a new director general who can bring much-needed reform to the outdated institution. This includes giving the organization the ability, and the will, to crack down on China's flagrant trade and labour violations, as well as its reliance on forced labour and illegal subsidies to prop up its state-owned enterprises. South Korean Trade Minister Yoo Myung-hee is the obvious choice for this position given her track record of engaging constructively with the Chinese government on other sensitive issues.
At the WTO, the G7 must put aside parochial interests to champion a new director general who can bring much-needed reform to the outdated institution. This includes giving the organization the ability, and the will, to crack down on China's flagrant trade and labour violations, as well as its reliance on forced labour and illegal subsidies to prop up its state-owned enterprises. South Korean Trade Minister Yoo Myung-hee is the obvious choice for this position given her track record of engaging constructively with the Chinese government on other sensitive issues.
Lastly, G7 leaders should more aggressively confront the regime's attempts to influence the citizens and policies of other countries. These influence operations typically include attempts to censor those who speak out about China's human rights violations, disinformation campaigns intended to shape public perceptions about China and its weaponization of regulatory, legal and lobbying loopholes in other countries to advance its economic interests.
Canada certainly did not pick this fight, but lead it must. The fate of more than just the two Michaels hangs in the balance.
Craig Singleton, a national security expert and former U.S. diplomat, is an adjunct fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he also contributes to FDD's Center on Military and Political Power. FDD is a Washington, D.C.-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
14. China, and Xi, commemorate the Korean War as a victory over America
And this propaganda is believed by many in China and north Korea.
China, and Xi, commemorate the Korean War as a victory over America
It was a time of Chinese sacrifice and bravery in the face of U.S. aggression. It was a just war in which the hardscrabble, newly established People's Republic reluctantly stood up to American imperialists - and the Americans, richer but hardly tougher, were beaten.
That may not be the complete story of the Korean War, a major 20th century conflict that touched off when North Korea invaded the South in June 1950, drawing in the United States, the United Nations and eventually China.
But this week, that tidy narrative has overwhelmed China' state newspapers, dominated the airwaves and even filled box offices as the Communist Party rolled out an unprecedented week of commemorative events and coverage to mark 70 years since Chairman Mao Zedong sent Chinese forces across the Yalu River and ground the Americans to a stalemate.
With U.S.-China tensions at the highest point in years, Chinese leader Xi Jinping hammered home the message in a blistering televised address about the "magnificent" War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, as the Korean War is commonly referred to in China.
"Seventy years ago, imperialist invaders blazed the flames of war all the way to the doorstep of the New China," Xi told his nation as he recounted how in 1950 the U.S. Navy occupied the Taiwan Strait, and American forces crossed into North Korea and bombed its border region with China. But the Chinese and North Koreans fought back, he said, and "broke the myth of the invincibility of the U.S. military" to force a truce.
"We Chinese know well we must speak to invaders with the language they understand: So we use war to stop war, we use military might to stop hostility, we win peace and respect with victory," Xi said. "In the face of difficulty or danger, our legs do not tremble, our backs do not bend."
Xi's speech was the climax of week that saw a flurry of official publications and media productions that focused not so much on the Koreas at the center of the historical conflict, but on a larger foil - the United States - and above all, China's century-long quest to rebuff foreign invasion and realize its rightful destiny, which has been the overarching theme of Xi's administration.
"There is a strong emphasis this year on the 'resisting America' side of the equation, which makes sense," said John Delury, an expert on modern Chinese history and the Korean Peninsula at Yonsei University. "U.S.-China tensions are rising day to day."
Since the beginning of the Trump administration's trade war, China has bemoaned the growing conflicts over trade, technology and geopolitics as one-sided U.S. bullying and a return to Cold War-era thinking. Although Xi has dialed up nationalist sentiment and urged his countrymen in speeches to brace for hardship, he has generally avoided overt references to war with the United States.
The Korean War from 1950 to 1953 was the last time the two countries fought a large-scale conflict. It was marked by grinding battles over rugged, often frozen mountains, atrocities and a civilian death toll of more than 3 million Koreans. Sometimes called the "Forgotten War" in the United States, the combatant death toll was devastating for the two Koreas and China, which lost 180,000 soldiers, and the United States, which suffered 33,000 deaths.
After Mao reluctantly gave Kim Il Sung, the North Korean leader and Communist ally, a green light to invade the South in June 1950, Kim nearly took the entire Korean Peninsula before United Nations troops led by the United States pushed him back. General Douglas MacArthur drove on past the 38th Parallel that divided the Communist North with the U.S.-backed South, and as his forces drew near the Chinese border, Mao urged his Politburo to respond. On Oct. 19, 1950, China sent troops into Korea, where they would stay for nearly a decade and help cement a Chinese-North Korean alliance that has vexed Washington to this day.
Time and again this week, Chinese leaders pointed to that moment as a juncture when China turned from a victim of bullying by Japan and the West to a respected power under Communist leadership.
On Monday, Xi led the Party's senior leadership, the Politburo Standing Committee, on a trip to a Beijing military museum where he urged them to "carry forward the great spirit" from the war "and strive for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation."
On Wednesday, the People's Liberation Army's official newspaper ran a 10,000-word article recounting how ragged troops, relying on "inadequate weapons and food the U.S. Army wouldn't bother throwing into furnaces or feeding to livestock," held onto strategic hills under U.S. bombardment.
"The Chinese have a red line and a bottom line ... to safeguard the country's core interests," the essay said. "It was so in the past, it is so now, and it will be so in the future."
On Friday, movie theaters released a new film called "Sacrifice," which Chinese analysts predict could be the world's highest-grossing film this year at nearly $800 million because schools and state companies countrywide are expected to organize viewing trips. An animated feature was also released for children on Friday, and authorities are fast-tracking a historical film by celebrity director Zhang Yimou about a young Chinese sharpshooter who sniped 214 Americans.
"With historical facts, the film will make audiences once again realize although the U.S. is strong, it is not unbeatable," Tan Fei, producer of "The Coldest Gun," told state media.
Meanwhile, the Central Military Commission rolled out a slick, six-episode series "For Peace," only to be one-upped by the state broadcaster China Central Television, which dropped a 20-part documentary.
The treatment of history in the productions has been telling, said Delury from Yonsei University. Mao's role in pre-war deliberations is often omitted. The roots of the conflict are condensed into a one line stating simply: "The Korean Civil War erupted on June 25, 1950."
The United States was also characterized as manipulating multilateral bodies like the United Nations to intervene on behalf of South Korea - a resonant point at a time when Washington and Beijing are vying for influence in international bodies. Britain is also portrayed sympathetically as an unwitting accomplice to U.S. scheming, Delury said.
Adam Cathcart, a specialist on Sino-Korean history at the University of Leeds, said China has traditionally paid homage to the war with particular emphasis on veterans. But the focus has been subtly different each decade.
Commemorations were muted in 1990, coming shortly after the killing of student protesters in Tiananmen Square and China's isolation on the world stage. The 2000 event was marked by a domestic emphasis on rehabilitating veterans who were discredited during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution.
China highlighted its closeness with North Korea in 2010 at a moment when the Kim dynasty was preparing for the potentially unpredictable transition of power from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un, Cathcart said.
"In 2020, it's about proto-superpower conflict and less about a move to rescue a beleaguered fellow socialist republic," he said. "It's now about Xi's catchphrases and worldview: This war was part of the great renaissance of the Chinese nation."
15. In Xi Jinping's China, Nationalism Takes a Dark Turn
Excerpt: "The wave of nationalism sweeping through China, amplified by party propaganda, the political ambitions of Xi Jinping and the country's success in containing Covid-19, is taking a darker turn, with echoes of the country's Maoist past."
In Xi Jinping's China, Nationalism Takes a Dark Turn
A wave of patriotic fervor is taking hold in China...
and its spread has echoes of the country's brutal Maoist past.
The wave of nationalism sweeping through China, amplified by party propaganda, the political ambitions of Xi Jinping and the country's success in containing Covid-19, is taking a darker turn, with echoes of the country's Maoist past.
Angry mobs online have swarmed any criticism of China's leaders or a perceived lack of loyalty to the country. Targets are being harassed and silenced. Some have lost their jobs.
Among those who have been attacked this year are public figures who have raised questions about officials' early handling of the coronavirus. They include a writer from Wuhan named Fang Fang, who wrote online about the struggles of local residents and accused government officials of being slow to respond to the outbreak.
Thousands of Chinese internet users called her a traitor. An anonymously written poster hung at a Wuhan bus station told her to "shave your head or kill yourself to atone for your sins against the people"-and a photo of it spread widely online. A famous tai chi master called on allies to assault her, using their "clenched fists of justice."
Fang Fang later issued a plea to her fellow citizens on the Twitter -like platform Weibo: "China cannot return to the Cultural Revolution."
Chinese politics researchers say surging nationalism is in part a natural response to the country's rising stature around the world. Some Chinese people say their feelings are rooted in genuine pride for their country.
The government has also taken a heavy hand in stoking the sentiment. Officials frequently censor critical discussion online and-through internet rules and hundreds of thousands of state-run social media accounts-have built an online ecosystem favoring content promoting the country and the Communist Party.
Mr. Xi, China's strongest leader in decades, is one of its most nationalistic. Vowing to achieve a "China Dream" of national rejuvenation, he has appealed to patriotic pride in all aspects of life, to bolster support for the Party as it confronts slowing economic growth and widening conflict with the U.S.
Xi Jinping spoke at a training session for officials at the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, Oct. 10.
Photo: Ding Lin/Zuma Press
This is the China Mr. Xi is building: a new type of great power that combines autocratic government and high-tech social control with a pervasive hyper-nationalism to drown out dissent.
In the past, China's internet censors allowed for limited debate around social issues. During Mr. Xi's eight years in power, fears among liberal-minded Chinese have grown over a return to the feverish politics of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong 's war on "counterrevolutionary elements" that brought the country's society and economy to the brink of collapse in the 1960s and 1970s.
Back then, more than a million died. While today's dynamics are less desperate, Geremie R. Barmé, a longtime China historian now based in New Zealand, said they combine "the vitriol, hysteria and violent intent of its Mao-era ancestor with the forensic detail afforded by digital surveillance."
Intolerance for opposing views in China often exceeds that in the West, he added. "If America or Europeans think they have 'cancel culture,' they don't have a clue."
Chinese Red Guards in 1966, during the Cultural Revolution.
Photo: Universal Images Group/Getty Images
Virus diary
Fang Fang, whose real name is Wang Fang, started her diary in January, shortly after Chinese authorities put Wuhan on lockdown to stop Covid-19. She is a mainstream literary figure who previously served as president of the government-funded Writers Association for Hubei province, where Wuhan is located.
With Chinese media coverage of the virus tightly controlled, her writings offered another window into the unfolding outbreak. She mostly focused on the everyday experience of being under lockdown, but at times criticized officials, including for obscuring the truth. Her diary entries attracted millions of views.
Wuhan author Fang Fang has come under attack for publishing her diary of Covid-19's early days overseas.
Photo: Fang Fang
Attacks against her multiplied after news circulated in April that an English translation of the diary would be published in the U.S. Internet users questioned Fang Fang's motivations and accused her of "handing a dagger" to foreigners to attack China.
The bus-stop poster that went viral online accused her of "eating steamed buns dipped in human blood"-an allusion used in the past to attack those seen as disloyal to the masses. The author said he was a Chinese farmer.
People lobbed rocks over the wall of her house. Eventually the volume of abuse led her to shut off comments on her Weibo posts. She said that publishers in the Chinese mainland and in Hong Kong have declined to publish her work, including a Chinese version of her diary entries.
The online vitriol drew support from people with ties to the government, including Hu Xijin, editor in chief of the Global Times, a nationalistic Communist Party tabloid, who posted that Fang Fang's fellow Chinese would suffer consequences for her fame in the West. He wrote the Chinese public had a "full moral right" to express dissatisfaction.
In May, Zhang Boli, a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, delivered a live-streamed video lecture questioning the patriotism of Fang Fang and two others critical of the pandemic response.
A small number of "intellectuals" - twisted values amid the pandemic
Where is their patriotism?
Lecture on the politics of fighting the pandemic
Fang Fang
Thank you righteous government for speaking up on behalf of the people We approve
Arrest Fang Fang and sentence her
In a presentation in May, Zhang Boli, a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, called out Fang Fang along with two other critics of the pandemic response.
"To love one's own country, one's own motherland" is fundamental, he said. The video has been viewed more than two million times online.
Segments of the video were circulated by state media and government agencies on Chinese video app Douyin.
Those posts sparked attacks in more comments.
Fang Fang said in an email exchange that she believes Dr. Zhang and Mr. Hu can influence opinions because they're seen as representing the official line.
"Going up against the gangsters alone, especially those backed by the government, is futile," she said.
Global Times' Mr. Hu denied inciting attacks, and said Fang Fang's unwillingness to accept criticism tipped public opinion against her. A spokesman for Dr. Zhang declined to make him available.
In Fang Fang's orbit, Liang Yanping, a professor of Japanese art and culture at Hubei University in Wuhan, fell under attack after praising the writer online for her empathy. Critics dug through Ms. Liang's internet history, with the goal of portraying her as loyal to Japan and a supporter of Hong Kong independence.
In June, Hubei University announced it was suspending her, saying she had made "erroneous remarks" that disturbed the public order.
Ms. Liang denied she was a Japan loyalist and had supported Hong Kong independence, and declined to comment further. A university spokesman said the school was following regulations from China's education authority.
Qin Qianhong, an adviser to Wuhan's government, said that unfettered nationalism is preventing people from reflecting on how China could have handled the coronavirus better.
"Right now the feeling being given is that we're 100% perfect," said Mr. Qin, who was critical of Wuhan officials for playing down the outbreak in the early days. Without reflection, he said, China could repeat its mistakes next time.
Propaganda
Academics focused on Chinese cyberspace estimate there are millions of Chinese internet users posting pro-Beijing content who are hired by the government or are state officials. Government departments and agencies run almost 240,000 social-media accounts, according to 2019 data by the China Internet Network Information Center, part of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.
People's Liberation Army soldiers in Beijing on May 21.
Photo: Nicolas Asfouri/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
The People's Liberation Army, the State Council and the Party's Central Committee all take part in organized information operations on domestic or international platforms, said Alicia Fawcett, a researcher at the Digital Forensic Research Lab at the Atlantic Council, a Washington, D.C. think tank.
While much of that content may be relatively harmless propaganda, it helps whip up nationalistic sentiment that can boil over into harassment campaigns. In some cases, researchers say, government accounts or bots participate in the attacks, though pinpointing their precise involvement is difficult.
When Houston Rockets general manager Daryl Morey tweeted his support for Hong Kong's pro-democracy protesters last year, he was hit with a coordinated harassment campaign. The Wall Street Journal reported a state-affiliated troll operation was likely involved because it involved thousands of users who attacked him using brand-new Twitter accounts.
Protesters in Hong Kong supported Houston Rockets general manager Daryl Morey last year.
Photo: anthony wallace/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Within China, nationalist commenters appear more unified and coordinated than their liberal counterparts, according to Yinxian Zhang, a sociology professor at Queens College, City University of New York. She has observed cliques of nationalists on Weibo working closely together to amplify each other's messages.
Fang Fang's Weibo account was suspended in February, and then brought back. That, plus the scale of online attacks, suggests a government-sanctioned campaign to drown out the writer, without silencing her completely and risking a backlash, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist who studies the Chinese internet at the University of California, Berkeley.
Weibo and the Cyberspace Administration of China, the country's central internet regulator, didn't respond to requests for comment.
On Douyin, an app for short videos, state- and party-linked accounts posted some of the most popular videos criticizing Fang Fang, altogether attracting more than 42 million views. They include a branch of the Communist Youth League of China, state broadcaster China Central Television and local government agencies. Neither CCTV nor the Communist Youth League responded to requests for comment.
Chinese social-media companies, which are expected to conform to government directives around content, intensify the nationalism.
At the end of 2019, China's internet regulator passed new rules that encouraged posts promoting "Xi Jinping Thought" and required platforms to adjust their algorithms to favor party propaganda from state-run media and other government agencies. Some companies push the material to users' home pages or add it to most-popular lists. Content that defames government institutions' reputations must be removed.
Staff at ByteDance Ltd., which runs Douyin, say government officials often request them to play up certain content from politicians or stir up the "right atmosphere" among Chinese citizens ahead of national events. Before China's Oct. 1 National Day, Douyin introduced a sticker pack allowing users to create videos where they lip-sync a patriotic song and superimpose "[Heart] China" on their cheeks. ByteDance didn't respond to a request for comment.
Many people now share nationalistic content in hopes of driving traffic to their accounts, helping them sell advertising or products.
'Positive energy'
The Chinese government and social-media platforms have promoted the idea of "positive energy" in content-a term that includes material that reflects well on the Party's leadership.
Shang Zijian, a 37-year-old theater director in Beijing who goes by "uncontrollable positive energy dude" on his Douyin profile, was among the critics of Fang Fang. "Can you even call yourself human?" he wrote.
Mr. Shang, who has 3.6 million followers on the platform, sees himself as a patriot and not a nationalist. "When other countries were trying to blame China for the coronavirus, she sold this negative impression overseas," he said.
China's Lao Lishi posed on the podium after winning a silver medal at the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens.
An online jewelry shop run by Lao Lishi, who won gold and silver medals for diving at the 2004 Olympics, came under attack by nationalists after she took to Weibo to post a state-media article in May about a Wuhan nurse who had died from Covid-19. She had found it on Fang Fang's feed.
Some accused her of selling counterfeit goods. "How did an Olympics champion rot into a party hater?" read one comment.
Over the summer, Ms. Lao announced that Weibo had suspended her main account for a year because her posts violated unspecified regulations. A private chat group for her supporters fizzled after members worried they could be exposed by nationalist trolls.
Ms. Lao declined an interview request. "To say anything right now wouldn't be right, please understand," she wrote.
Xiong Qingzhen, a 39-year-old drone engineer from Wuhan, became a target himself after he contracted Covid-19 and stayed in a hospital dedicated to traditional Chinese medicine in February.
As he was leaving the hospital, a crew from state broadcaster CCTV asked about his treatment. Authorities have celebrated the purported benefits of traditional medicine, a source of national pride.
"I'm a traditional medicine skeptic," he said in his interview, streamed live online. "I can't accept the principle of it, so I didn't drink it."
Over the next few days, nationalists hounded Mr. Xiong on Weibo, calling him ignorant and thankless. Weeks later, the local television station he worked for called him to say it had received reports he had accepted bribes, which he denied. Mr. Xiong said online attackers had latched onto a video he had posted of himself in front of a large suburban house his family owned. They questioned how he could afford such a place.
Mr. Xiong is a Communist Party member. In an echo of Cultural Revolution practice, when party members were made to confess political sins, the station demanded Mr. Xiong type up two self-criticisms of his behavior. He relented. Mr. Xiong declined to share details of his letters.
He didn't change his opinion of Chinese traditional medicine, however.
"People have lost the ability to think independently," he said in an interview. "If a nobody like me cannot speak up, people like Fang Fang will be fighting alone."
16. 'Stunning' Executive Order Would Politicize Civil Service
On the one hand some will think this will create a true political deep state. On the other hand to improve personnel management others will argue you need better hiring and firing authority and "at will" employment provides that. But I think this will be quite controversial.
'Stunning' Executive Order Would Politicize Civil Service
President Trump's new directive allows thousands of federal jobs now filled through competition to be turned into at-will positions.
President Trump on Wednesday signed an executive order to create a new classification of "policy-making" federal employees that could strip swaths of the federal workforce of civil service protections just before the next president is sworn into office.
The order will create a new Schedule F within the excepted service of the federal government, to be composed of "employees in confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating positions," and instructs agency heads to determine which current employees fit this definition and move them-whether they are members of the competitive service or other schedules within the excepted service-into this new classification. Federal regulations stating that employees hired into the competitive service retain that status even if their position is moved to the excepted service will not apply to Schedule F transfers.
Positions in the new Schedule F would effectively constitute at-will employment, without any of the protections against adverse personnel actions that most federal workers currently enjoy, although individual agencies are tasked with establishing "rules to prohibit the same personnel practices prohibited" by Title 5 of the U.S. Code. The order also instructs the Federal Labor Relations Authority to examine whether Schedule F employees should be removed from their bargaining units, a move that would bar them from being represented by federal employee unions.
"Except as required by statute, the civil service rules and regulations shall not apply to removals from positions listed in Schedules A, C, D, E, or F, or from positions excepted from the competitive service by statute," the order states.
The order sets a swift timetable for implementation: Agencies have 90 days to conduct a "preliminary" review of their workforces to determine who should be moved into the new employee classification-a deadline that coincides with Jan. 19, the day before the next presidential inauguration.
The White House argued that the executive order is a necessary reform to ensure that federal officials can more efficiently remove "poor performers."
"Effective performance management of employees in confidential, policy-determining, policy-making or policy-advocating positions is of the utmost importance," the order states. "Unfortunately, the government's current performance management is inadequate, as recognized by federal workers themselves. For instance, the 2016 Merit Principles Survey reveals that less than a quarter of federal employees believe their agency addresses poor performers effectively."
But federal employee groups and government observers described the executive order as a "stunning" attempt to politicize the civil service and undermine more than a century of laws aimed at preventing corruption and cronyism in the federal government.
"The [1883] Pendleton Act is clearly in the sights of this executive order," said Donald Kettl, the Sid Richardson professor at the University of Texas at Austin's Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs. "It wants to undo what the Pendleton Act and subsequent civil service laws tried to accomplish, which was to create a career civil service with expertise that is both accountable to elected officials but also a repository of expertise in government. The argument here is that anyone involved in policymaking can be swept into this new classification, and once they're in they're subject to political review and dismissal for any reason."
American Federation of Government Employees National President Everett Kelley said in a statement on Thursday that the executive order is "the most profound undermining of the civil service system in our lifetimes."
"This executive order strips due process rights and protections from perhaps hundreds of thousands of federal employees and will enable political appointees and other officials to hire and fire these workers at will," Kelley said. "Through this order, President Trump has declared war on the professional civil service by giving himself the authority to fill the government with his political cronies who will pledge their unwavering loyalty to him-not to America."
Kettl said that the order could be far-reaching in scope. Not only would high-profile employees who publicly disagree with a president be targeted for removal, but lower level employees tasked with collecting the data and evidence underlying much of what the federal government does could be affected.
"If you think about examples of how this could play out, Dr. [Anthony] Fauci could be fired, as well as individuals at the [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] who are producing analysis about the spread of the coronavirus, social distancing and the importance of masks," Kettl said. "You could have people within the State Department raising questions about the administration's expansion of efforts to engage in crackdowns and change other policies who could be fired. The people counting the number of immigrant children who cannot be reunited with their parents could be fired. There's no end to it because the biggest risk is that anyone who says anything that would be in opposition to the administration's policy could be viewed as in a policy-making position, put in Schedule F and fired."
Rep. Gerry Connolly, D-Va., who serves as chairman of the House Oversight and Reform Committee's subcommittee on government operations, blasted the administration's efforts to remove workers' civil service protections.
"This executive order is yet another attack on federal employees that addresses absolutely none of the issues that can hinder effective federal recruitment and hiring," Connolly said. "It's a cheap ploy to let the Trump administration replace talent and acumen with fealty and self-dealing."
17. Preserve the Jones Act
The question is how to sustain (and grow) our merchant shipping capabilities? Merchant shipping is key to our economic instrument of power and national security.
Preserve the Jones Act
China's burgeoning fleets underscore the important of legislation that bolsters our own.
The Kanalao-class "con-ro" ship Matsonia was launched at GD's NASSCO shipyard in July 2020. MATSON
China's burgeoning fleets underscore the important of legislation that bolsters our own.
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As we pass the 100th anniversary of the Jones Act, it is clear the legislation is vital to ensuring the American maritime industry is strong for 100 years more. Officially known as the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, the law requires that ships carrying cargo between two U.S. points fly the U.S. flag, and be owned and built in the U.S., and be crewed by at least 75 percent U.S. citizens. Although many nations have such laws, known as "cabotage" laws, it is true that ours is among the most restrictive. However, this is necessary given the amount of support other maritime nations give to an industry rightly established as vital to their nation's economic security and defense. These are the findings of the Navy League's newest report, "China's Use of Maritime for Global Power Demands a Strong Commitment to American Maritime."
While the heated debate over the policy has traditionally been confined to small circles, it came under the national spotlight after Hurricane Maria devastated the island of Puerto Rico, and the lives of the millions of Americans living there. As relief efforts slowly got underway after the Sept. 20, 2017, storm, critics cited the Jones Act as an impediment to the swift delivery of much-needed supplies to the beleaguered island. (They also trotted out old arguments that the Act constrains shipping and leads to high consumer prices on the island, assertions that the Government Accountability Office has found little evidence to support.) On Sept. 28, the president issued a 10-day waiver to the Act, allowing foreign-flagged ships to carry supplies to Puerto Rico from other U.S. ports. Almost a month later just 11 foreign ships had made the run. Jones Act carriers added nine vessels to their Puerto Rico routes after the hurricane to total 25, with one carrier making nearly daily sailings from the mainland. Indeed, containers arrived faster than Puerto Rico's internal distribution system could handle them, stacking up by the hundreds in port and showing that shipping capacity was not the main problem.
Free-trade purists oppose the Jones Act as government intervention in the free market. However, this critique of shipping rules ignores the heavy intervention of other governments in their domestic maritime industries. The Chinese state spent $132 billion, conservatively, on its shipping and shipbuilding industries between 2010 and 2018, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The only U.S. government agency supporting the maritime industry had less than a $1 billion budget for 2020, with outstanding loans totaled more than twice that amount.
And while critics argue we should take advantage of "savings" their subsidized ships operating with government subsidies would provide, they ignore the devastating damage that the loss of Jones Act shipping and U.S. shipyards would wreak on our national defense and economic security. These critics might instead start by advocating China move first to eliminate its protectionist laws and state intervention. And if critics insist on eliminating our cabotage law, would they advocate for our shipbuilding industry to receive as many billions of dollars in direct and indirect subsidies as the largest shipbuilders in China, Japan, and South Korea?
Then there is the argument that Jones Act shipbuilders do not overlap with Navy shipbuilders. That would be a surprise to San Diego's NASSCO, which has built dozens of Navy Combat Logistics Force ships, as well as Louisiana's Bollinger, Wisconsin's Marinette, and Alabama's Austal USA. In addition to these final assemblers, thousands of second and third tier suppliers contribute to both the military and Jones Act shipbuilding trades. Additionally, MARAD estimates we have a shortage of 1,800 mariners to sustain extended logistics operations. Since Jones Act ships make up 60 percent of the total ocean-going U.S.-flag fleet and employ an equivalent percentage of mariners, how do the law's critics think we will be able to activate and crew the Maritime Administration's and Navy's surge sealift ships if these Jones Act ships disappear?
Yes, the Jones Act may mean slightly higher shipping costs to some major corporations, but it is important to look at the bigger picture. It might cost slightly more, but we pay for the best-run ships, and best mariners in the world working tough jobs.
18. The New Weapon of Choice: Technology and Information Operations Today
In recent years, a growing number of governments, non-state actors, and citizens have rapidly expanded their use of pernicious information operations against other countries and even their fellow citizens. Social media and the internet have become the main tool. The current technological revolution has lowered the cost of entry for those wishing to spread misinformation and disinformation. Some use the internet to propagate an alternative version of the global order they seek to dominate, to damage a regional rival, or to influence their own or others' elections. The players, tactics, tools, and topics will continue to expand in the months and years ahead, and the coronavirus pandemic has only enhanced the salience of these activities.
Information operation campaigns sow confusion, further divide deeply partisan societies, and are an existential threat to democracies around the world. Thus far, governmental, tech sector, and civil society responses have fallen short, although some have fared better than others. In fall 2019 and the spring 2020, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy convened a series of working group meetings that included academics and practitioners, private sector specialists, and representatives from civil society. The attendees mapped out this space and identified the challenges inherent in this new form of incipient and widespread information operations. This group also identified potential areas of further engagement, collaboration, and research within the private sector, academia, and civil society. Ultimately, the group came up with a set of principles and policy recommendations for governments, private sector companies, and civil society to enact in both the near-and-long-term in order to mitigate information operations.
By trying to quickly resolve concerns about an apparent Iranian influence operation and bolster Americans' confidence the country's electoral process, U.S. officials have sparked an entirely new set of questions: Why were they able to connect Iran to the attack so quickly, and how?
During a briefing announced to reporters 10 minutes before it began Wednesday, John Ratcliffe, the director of national intelligence, said the U.S. government had determined Iran was behind an email campaign meant to intimidate American voters. Neither Ratcliffe nor FBI Director Christopher Wray, who was also at the briefing, provided any technical evidence to support the allegation that the emails, purported to be sent by the Proud Boys as threats to Democratic voters in Florida to vote for President Donald Trump, in fact were sent by Iranian attackers.
The disclosure came quickly after Motherboard on Tuesday reported on a surge of suspicious emails that seemed to use technical means to try to hide their sender and origin. Attribution against hackers, particularly those with nation-state backing, has sometimes taken U.S. officials years. This week, the U.S. government announced indictments against alleged Russian hackers working for Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate, or the GRU, in connection with the global NotPetya malware attacks and interference in French elections, each of which took place three years ago, as well as attacks against Ukraine's power grid that began in 2015.
However, intelligence officials assessed with "high confidence" that Iran was behind the threatening emails, according to a U.S. official familiar with the matter.
The urgency to determine and then publicly announce who was behind the apparent spoofing campaign was due to the timing of the campaign, with the election less than two weeks away, as well as the operation's intention to undermine American voters' confidence, another U.S. government official told CyberScoop. The messages targeted registered Democrats in Florida, traditionally a crucial swing state in presidential elections.
"Attribution can take anywhere from years to hours," said the source, who was not authorized to speak to the press. "You have a foreign government attempting intimidation. At this point the only way to head that off is telling the American people this is an external actor."
Google has also, separately, linked the email campaign to Iran, according to CNN.
In a statement, the National Security Agency and Cyber Command, the Pentagon's offensive hacking arm, made it clear that the apparent election interference attempts demanded immediate action.
"These are desperate attempts by our adversaries to intimidate or to undermine voter confidence, but Americans can rest assured: thousands of your fellow citizens stand ready to defend your vote, every single day," said Dave Imbordino, NSA's election security lead, and Brig. Gen. Joe Hartman, Cyber Command's election security lead.
Careful wording around 'obtaining' voter details
Ratcliffe also said that Iran and Russia had obtained voter registration information, but did not clarify how they did so. Many voter registration details are available to the public through legal means. Neither of the officials took questions.
Federal officials are working with states to to determine if the possession of the voter registration data is indicative of a compromise of any type, one U.S. official told CyberScoop.
"What the Iranians did could have been done from 100% public-facing stuff," one U.S. government source said. "No one is aware of any breach at this time."
Meanwhile, Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., who was briefed on the threat, said he thinks that ODNI and FBI should share more details with the American public.
"I am glad that ODNI and the FBI made a statement to alert the public, and I believe that they can and should share more with the American people about the threats we are facing, so that voters can be prepared," Warner, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said in a statement. "The only way to prepare the public to resist these attempts to influence their votes is if they are on ready alert for what's to come."
State officials remain confident
The attribution of the intimidation email campaign came 13 days before Election Day, a key timeframe during which voters are voting early in huge numbers. Inoculating voters against misinformation campaigns in this timeframe is a key prong of any effort to assure Americans that their votes will count and that the integrity of the election is sound.
State election officials were also briefed Wednesday on the email campaign and instructed to patch vulnerabilities in their election-related websites, according to one U.S. government official.
Mac Warner, West Virginia's secretary of state, welcomed the briefing as a sign of progress that federal and state officials had made in threat-sharing since 2016.
"They are preparing us ahead of time that they're seeing activity and we need to be extra vigilant," Warner said in an interview Thursday. "We're 12 days away from an election. This was a very appropriate call by the federal government to get this [information] out" to the public and to state officials.
The intelligence community has previously assessed that Iranian-sponsored hackers aim to undermine U.S. institutions.
Nathaniel Gleicher, head of cybersecurity policy at Facebook, told CyberScoop the Iranian operation has all the hallmarks of what he calls a "perception hack" - when actors "prey on our fears."
"They impersonate a domestic group, they try to convince people that they're going to be threatened or endangered if they vote in a certain way and then they try to play on that fear, and hope that there's a big news story about this happening, and that that spirals," Gleicher said in an interview.
One of the best ways to tackle and neutralize these kinds of online influence operations is to call them out and attribute them so the American public is aware they are being actively targeted with incorrect information, according to Gleicher.
"One of the things that we've seen in the weeks and months are regular warnings from the platforms, from government and from others saying ... we know that they're actors who are willing to try to convince everyone that the election is insecure," Gleicher said.
Jeff Stone contributed reporting.
24. 'I'm here for the money' - My life as a Blackwater mercenary
This article first appeared on The War Horse, an award-winning nonprofit news organization educating the public on military service, war, and its impact
Editor's Note: This is an opinion column. The thoughts expressed are those of the authors.
April 21, 2005. Seven Blackwater contractors die today. This is the day I lose all compassion for Iraq. The day I realize I'm not a soldier in war. I'm a single-serve Starbucks coffee cup, useful for a time and easily discarded with no second thought given to it. I am a soldier for hire, a soldier of fortune, a mercenary. I'm fine with that.
The footage is on repeat on CNN. Six of my Blackwater brethren contractors are on the helicopter going to Tikrit. The news shows the helicopter falling to the ground as it burns. A caption at the bottom of the screen states, "Seven Blackwater security contractors killed in Iraq." My family must be freaking out watching the morning news cycle at home. I send a quick email to eight of them stating I am alive before I am summoned for a meeting.
I drop my Glock 9mm in my Safariland drop-leg holster and walk to the common area of our 500-man camp located outside the U.S. Embassy in the infamous Green Zone of Baghdad. It's hot and I feel sweat roll down my back as I approach a large sand pile. It's silent, which is odd. Blackwater USA is usually filled with former Special Operations members-alpha males-telling stories of their exploits. Not today. Today we wait in silence.
The site leader walks toward the crowd and looks around for a place to speak. He wears a tan polo shirt with the distinctive Blackwater-bear-paw-surrounded-by-a-rifle-sight logo. He has on green 5.11 pants with his pistol strapped to his right hip. We wait. He walks to a pile of sand, used to fill the sandbags that are stacked around housing areas with the hope of shielding us from mortars and rockets that are launched in the Green Zone regularly. The crowd turns toward him.
Blackwater conducts helicopter-and-Humvee training in the Green Zone in Baghdad. Photo courtesy of the author.
(Photo courtesy of the author)
"We had seven of our brothers die today," the leader says. "I'm going to give you the names in a minute."
My heart sinks. I know the names of the six contractors who died on the helicopter, but we had an additional brother die on a run from Ramadi. This is a wild card. My buddy MJ, my roommate back in the United States, the person who talked me into becoming a contractor, is in Ramadi.
"First, no one is to post anything on the internet," he says. "No emails giving out these names. I trust you and I'm going to treat you like men. These are your brothers and you deserve to know."
Tell me names. I need names. Just not MJ's.
"If any of their families finds out before we can contact them through official channels," he says, "I'm going to find out who did it and beat the hell out of you. Then you'll be fired. Do you understand?"
We nod as he reads the names. So slowly. Not MJ. Please not MJ. Once he's done, I take a huge breath. No MJ. Thank God. I say a prayer for the families as we all stand in stunned silence. This hurts. This hurts bad. The site leader tells us we are on 48 hours of stand-down, so there will be no missions for the next two days.
Within hours, there's footage from the perspective of the terrorist who shot it down. He's standing out of view as another filthy terrorist yells "Allah Akbar." I see the rocket-propelled grenade fly through the air and connect with the helicopter. It feels like I'm watching in real time. Now it's personal.
We gather in my friend George's room and watch a just-released video of the crash site on one of those graphic gore websites. One of the pilots survived. He begs for his life as someone shoots him with an AK-47. The video turns to the charred bodies of our friends. We attempt to decipher who is who. We watch it on repeat. This is us coping. We desensitize ourselves to carnage to distance our emotions from the nature of the job. We joke. It's impressive. We all feel the pain but refuse to acknowledge it.
We begin to drink heavily. Patches of contractors throughout the camp congregate to tell stories of the dead. I knew two of them but not as well as others did. I walk to a couple of areas, say very little, and listen to funny stories about the deceased. Each story begins with laughing and ultimately ends with the entire group crying. It's gut-wrenching. Alcohol dulls the pain.
Blackwater contractors practice at a shooting range in the Green Zone in Baghdad.
(Photo courtesy of the author)
I return to my room to check my email. I have one reply to my earlier email telling my family I was alive. It reads: We're doing good here too! It feels like a slap to the face. No one worried that I was one of the dead. I realize no one at home gives a shit as I lie in bed unable to sleep.
Seething.
The next day we walk to the nondenominational U.S. Embassy chapel. It's a double-wide trailer with plastic sheeting for walls. There is an elevated platform and a podium where a pastor can stand and give a jeremiad based on the religious service of the day. My body attempts to sweat out the toxins consumed the night prior. I'm hungover. I take a seat next to George, who is on the Quick Response Force team with me. The pastor leads us in singing "Amazing Grace," and a man dressed in a suit walks to the podium. Who brings a suit to a combat zone?
He's a State Department representative. He speaks in platitudes about how important this mission is and how we are integral to both the State Department and the effort to rebuild Iraq. The people of Iraq are indebted to us. He speaks glowingly of the dead. I doubt he ever met them. I doubt he could name one if he weren't reading off a folded pamphlet showing their names and pictures. I listen to his drivel and feel disdain for him, for the mission, and for the people of Iraq.
As we walk out, I speak with my buddy George.
"Screw that guy," George says. "I'm not here for his mission."
"Agree," I say.
"Promise me if I die," George says, "you won't let that moron talk about how courageous I was. I'm not here for this mission. Screw these people. I'm here for me. For the money."
"Agree," I say. "Same for me."
Morgan Lerette stands in front of the Ishtar Gate in Al Hilla, Iraq.
(Photo courtesy of the author)
A few days after the helicopter was downed, we're on the road again. I'm the gunner behind the driver in the lead Hummer. We're in traffic and making our way over a bridge in north Baghdad near Sadr City. My head's out the window with my rifle 18 inches from the head of a middle-aged lady in the passenger seat of a car. I'm looking forward when shots ring out. They're ours. Fully automatic M240B. I think nothing of it until the lady screams like she's gut shot. She jumps on the lap of the driver. The look in her eyes is abject terror.
Good. I hope she's scarred for life. I take a moment to feel bad. She's scared. Nah. My give-a-damn's busted. Wait. I need to feel bad about this. At least a little bad. Nope. These people don't care about their country. I don't either.
This is my life. I have no ethical obligation to the people of Iraq, this war, this quagmire we created. If I die over here, there will be no military honors given to me. I'm on my own. I'm a number on a government contract. A nearly empty single-serve coffee cup ready to be discarded and sent to a landfill. My life will be forgotten 48 hours after it ends in a fiery blaze. I'm here for me. I'm here for the money. I'm a mercenary and I'm fine with that.
Morgan Lerette worked for Blackwater for 18 months, from 2004 to 2005. Upon his return to the United States, he completed his undergraduate degree at Northern Arizona University and commissioned as a U.S. Army intelligence officer. From 2009 to 2010, Lerette deployed back to Iraq. He left the Army as a captain, moved to Boston, and attended The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He received a master of international business degree in international banking and finance. Lerette wrote the just-released book Welcome to Blackwater. The book is published by a veterans nonprofit, Onward Press, and all sales contribute to its mission to help veterans get their stories published.
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:
"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
