Quotes of the Day:
“The person who agrees with you 80 percent of the time is a friend and an ally – not a 20 percent traitor.”
- Ronald Reagan
"They always say that time changes things, but you actually have to change them yourself."
- Andy Warhol
"We must either learn to live together as brothers, or we are all going to perish together as fools."
- Martin Luther King, Jr.
1. U.S. supports humanitarian aid for N. Korea, but sanctions must remain in place: State Dept.
2. North Korea threatens families of publicly active defectors living in South Korea
3. N. Korea bolsters efforts to prevent workers in China from running away
4. North Korea’s sub missiles put a target on Kim’s back
5. N. Korean delegation to attend U.N. climate conference in Glasgow
6. Ex-USFK chief stresses solidarity in S. Korea-U.S. alliance amid lingering N.K. threats
7. U.S. envoy on N. Korea eyes 'productive' consultations in S. Korea on ways to revitalize peace process
8. China's Xi vows to bolster ties with N. Korea in letter to Kim
9. NKorea slams US for supporting Taiwan in nod to ally China
10. North Korea sends farmers to labor camps for hiding corn amid food shortages
11. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ North Korea's financial crisis has made it impossible to print banknotes. Efforts to issue temporary money coupons "Tongpyo" have been made to replace them, but distrust is growing.
12. North Koreans facing food shortages, collapses in livelihoods: UN investigator
13. North Korea Sanctions Should Be Eased During Covid, UN Says
14. The sun is setting on Moon Jae-in’s promise of inter-Korean peace, and Biden isn’t budging
15. Why South Korea’s Liberals Are Defense Hawks
16. KAI unveils electric basic trainer
17. In Defense of a Bold U.S. Approach Toward North Korea
1. U.S. supports humanitarian aid for N. Korea, but sanctions must remain in place: State Dept.
The headline says it all. An important statement from State. The biggest mistake we could make is to lift sanctions without the regime complying with them. And it is not the sanctions that are causing the humanitarian suffering in the north. It is Kim's deliberate policy decisions. And the ROK and US care more for the welfare of the Korean people in the north than Kim Jong-un.
U.S. supports humanitarian aid for N. Korea, but sanctions must remain in place: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Oct. 22 (Yonhap) -- The United States supports providing humanitarian assistance to the vulnerable people of North Korea, a State Department spokesperson said Friday, however, suggesting U.S. opposition to easing U.N. sanctions on the recalcitrant country.
"When we think about and assess the humanitarian suffering of the people of the DPRK, the simple truth is that the DPRK regime itself is responsible for the humanitarian situation in the country," Ned Price said in a telephonic press briefing, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding the DPRK remain in effect and all UN member states are bound by their obligations under those resolutions," he added.
The remarks came shortly after U.N. Special Rapporteur on North Korean Human Rights Tomas Ojea Quintana argued U.N. sanctions on the impoverished North should be eased during the COVID-19 pandemic.
"As long as the borders continue to be closed, we may be facing risk of starvation among some segments of the population in the country," Quintana said in a press conference in New York.
Price insisted the U.S. was already doing all it can to help ease the suffering of North Korean people.
"We are involved in efforts to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid to the neediest in the DPRK. This is evidenced in a number of areas, including in our ongoing work to expedite approvals in the U.N. 1718 committee for organizations from around the world to deliver life saving aid to the DPRK," he said, referring to the U.N. Security Council sanctions committee on North Korea.
"The bottom line is this. Even when we disagree with a government or a regime like the DPRK, we must work to the best of our ability to alleviate the suffering of that country, people. That is why we continue to support international efforts aimed at the provision of critical humanitarian aid to the DPRK," he added.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. North Korea threatens families of publicly active defectors living in South Korea
These escapees/refugees are a threat to the regime because of the information they provide to Koreans in the north.
North Korea threatens families of publicly active defectors living in South Korea - Daily NK
The authorities appear to be trying to control and restrict the activities of defectors in South Korea
By Ha Yoon Ah - 2021.10.22 5:09pm
A sentry post on the Sino-North Korean border in Sakju County, North Pyongan Province. / Image: Daily NK
The Ministry of State Security appears to be trying to control the public activities of North Korean defectors settled in South Korea by threatening their families still in the North.
A source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Wednesday that a three person team from the Ministry of State Security’s headquarters in Pyongyang have been making rounds in Chongjin, Onsong, Musan, Saebyol, and Hoeryong since Oct. 15. He said the team has been handing over documents pertaining to North Korean defectors in the South to local Ministry of State Security officials, instructing them to “inform the defectors’ families of party policy.”
The three team members come from the ministry’s overseas counterespionage bureau, general bureau and political bureau.
According to the source, the trio have been driving a truck laden with documents all around North Hamgyong Province, giving instructions to local ministry officials.
The documents are reportedly materials on defectors who are publicly active in South Korea, containing detailed individual accounts of their activities, including which TV programs or YouTube shows they have appeared on.
The source said the team from Pyongyang has been handing their monitoring materials to local Ministry of State Security officials, instructing them to tell the families of defectors that it is party policy to “unconditionally exclude” the relatives of defectors “who openly engage in malicious propaganda against the Motherland” from entry into the ruling party, school recommendations, cadre recruitment and residence in Pyongyang “down to second cousins.”
The trio is reportedly urging local ministry officials to closely watch the families of defectors, telling them they would continuously provide them with comprehensive materials once a year based on investigations into the activities of defectors on a so-called “blacklist.”
“Based on the orders from the agents from Pyongyang, the local agents in charge have been visiting the families of defectors on the list, showing them the documents with when, where and how many times their relatives in South Korea engaged in malicious propaganda and telling them that all their relatives need to do is stop openly engaging in malicious propaganda,” the source said.
In fact, the local agents are reportedly saying it is party policy not to impugn the families of defectors with crimes or charge them with guilt-by-association as long as the defectors refrain from public activities. They are also saying that they will “execute party policy” based on how many times the defectors engage in public activities.
The Ministry of State Security is aware that defectors continue to contact their families in North Korea, and are basically trying to get the families to tell defectors what kind of harm their public activities in the South will bring their relatives in the North. This indirect warning to defectors who expose the realities of North Korea on the public stage suggests the authorities are trying to control and restrict the activities of those defectors.
Moreover, the agents are also reportedly working to prevent the families of defectors from defecting to the South as well, telling them “not to believe everything people who went to the South say when they say they are living well,” and that “those people are being treated like trash in a trash heap in North Korea.”
Meanwhile, the source said the agents from Pyongyang are scheduled to go to Yanggang Province to do the same thing when they are done in North Hamgyong Province. They plan to tour other provinces along the Sino-North Korean border as well, he added.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
3. N. Korea bolsters efforts to prevent workers in China from running away
Excerpts:
Workers and even their supervising cadres are reportedly greeting the order with disapproval.
This is because North Korean workers in restaurants often went to different regions to earn money doing temporary work when their own workplaces ran into difficulties.
“Now that I can’t send the kids [workers] to other regions, now I even have thoughts of running off,” said one cadre in charge of workers. “They don’t reduce the party funds we must contribute, but they don’t let us make money. So isn’t escaping this situation the only way to survive?”
“Even here in China, it’s not easy to make money,” he added. “The situation is similar both in[North Korea] and here.”
N. Korea bolsters efforts to prevent workers in China from running away - Daily NK
The North Korean embassy in Beijing recently instructed consulates throughout the country to ban North Korean workers from traveling long distances or from being dispatched to other regions
North Korean authorities have been bolstering their recent efforts to prevent North Korean workers in China from running away amid protracted stays overseas.
According to multiple Daily NK sources in China on Thursday, there are about 30,000 North Korean workers in Liaoning Province, including Dandong, and about 20,000 in Jilin Province, including Hunchun.
As there are North Korean workers residing outside those regions as well, there appears to be over 50,000 North Korean workers in China overall.
North Korean authorities are having increasing difficulty managing workers overseas due to their protracted sojourns overseas following Pyongyang’s closure of the border in the wake of COVID-19. The authorities have reportedly moved most North Korean nationals, once dispersed throughout China, to Liaoning and Jilin provinces.
As both provinces were already home to many North Korean nationals, it appears the authorities congregated workers there to more efficiently control their large numbers.
In fact, North Korean authorities sent new workers to Mongolia, Russia, and China this year as well. As no North Korean workers have been repatriated, the number of North Korean workers overseas has actually increased since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Moreover, with the ratio of workers increasing vis-à-vis management personnel, including Ministry of State Security agents and cadres, there has reportedly been a noticeable increase in attempted defections.
North Korean workers at a clothing factory in China’s Jilin Province. / Image: Daily NK
According to a source, a North Korean attempted to escape from his compound in Shenyang, Liaoning Province last month, too.
Moreover, in addition to solo attempts to escape, there are also attempts at mass breakouts, and even cadres tasked with overseeing laborers are reportedly disappearing.
North Korean authorities are responding by tightening the reins on North Korean workers in China.
The North Korean embassy in Beijing recently instructed consulates throughout the country to ban North Korean workers from traveling long distances or from being dispatched to other regions.
Many of the companies and factories that employed North Korean workers have taken major hits since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. Accordingly, some North Korean workers have changed industries and moved to different regions. However, North Korean authorities have ordered that workers are “not to be arbitrarily moved under any circumstances.”
Workers and even their supervising cadres are reportedly greeting the order with disapproval.
This is because North Korean workers in restaurants often went to different regions to earn money doing temporary work when their own workplaces ran into difficulties.
“Now that I can’t send the kids [workers] to other regions, now I even have thoughts of running off,” said one cadre in charge of workers. “They don’t reduce the party funds we must contribute, but they don’t let us make money. So isn’t escaping this situation the only way to survive?”
“Even here in China, it’s not easy to make money,” he added. “The situation is similar both in[North Korea] and here.”
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
4. North Korea’s sub missiles put a target on Kim’s back
Interesting analysis. Somehow I do not think any north Korean submarines should be compared to "boomers." (yet)
When will this really be a second strike capability and if they are capable of fielding a credible one how will that impact strategic planning and decision making?
Excerpts:
Some pundits comfort themselves in the belief that North Korea’s navy is an enfeebled resource. Even so, their addition to Kim Jong Un’s naval-strategic threat matrix presents yet another challenge for defense planners in off-peninsula locations such as Japan, Guam, Hawaii and even the continental United States.
But in a duo of ironies, tactical and strategic, ownership and deployment of these weapons represent a risk for North Korea, too.
Tactically, while a submarine is by nature stealthy and survivable, experts tell Asia Times that the threat represented by a potentially nuclear-armed North Korean boomer elevates it to a top-tier target.
And strategically, they represent a risk to the North Korean state that created them. The very existence of this “second strike” capability could, in times of tension, trigger a pre-emptive strike by a jittery US or even Japan, analysts say.
North Korea’s sub missiles put a target on Kim’s back
While threat analyses focus on US vulnerabilities, experts say SLBMs are a perilous asset for North Korea to develop
SEOUL – The de facto missile race accelerating on both sides of the Korean peninsula’s Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is expanding in multiple directions.
On Thursday, South Korea launched a rocket whose launch vehicle provides the basis of an intermediate-range ballistic missile. North and South Korea have both recently tested submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or SLBMs.
On the face of it, North Korea’s missile boats – “boomers” in US naval parlance – represent stealthy, survivable, roving assets that could feasibly add range and mount nuclear weapons to deter the US.
Typically, opacity hangs over actual North Korean capabilities. For example, it has not been confirmed whether North Korea’s SLBMs were fired from an actual submarine, or from an underwater barge. Claims in state media, as ever, need to be taken with large grains of salt.
“North Korea appears to have tested a new mini-SLBM, but its propaganda about military capabilities should not be taken at face value,” said Leif-Eric Easley, associate professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul.
“Further analysis is needed to avoid underestimating or exaggerating Pyongyang’s ability to launch missiles from a submarine, miniaturize warheads and accurately guide them to a target.”
Some pundits comfort themselves in the belief that North Korea’s navy is an enfeebled resource. Even so, their addition to Kim Jong Un’s naval-strategic threat matrix presents yet another challenge for defense planners in off-peninsula locations such as Japan, Guam, Hawaii and even the continental United States.
But in a duo of ironies, tactical and strategic, ownership and deployment of these weapons represent a risk for North Korea, too.
Tactically, while a submarine is by nature stealthy and survivable, experts tell Asia Times that the threat represented by a potentially nuclear-armed North Korean boomer elevates it to a top-tier target.
And strategically, they represent a risk to the North Korean state that created them. The very existence of this “second strike” capability could, in times of tension, trigger a pre-emptive strike by a jittery US or even Japan, analysts say.
Kim’s underwater warriors
While there have been years of skepticism about North Korean rocket and nuclear capabilities, that skepticism has necessarily evaporated as Pyongyang pressed onward, successfully testing missiles with ever-longer ranges and nuclear devices with ever-greater kilo-tonnages.
Though North Korea has invested the bulk of its hardware resources in missiles and fissile materials, it has extensive experience with submarines and a large fleet of undersea assets. For a country that aims to punch above its weight, it is an asset class that makes doctrinal sense.
Due to decades of economic decline, North Korea has lost the ability to keep its massive armed forces fully equipped – or even fully fed. Triaging defense spend, Pyongyang, paranoid about US aggression, has focused on assets that offer maximum threat value: nuclear and missile programs and elite/special forces units.
With state founder Kim Il Sung having fought as an anti-Japanese guerilla and subsequently serving as a reconnaissance major in the USSR’s Red Army, North Korean forces have doctrinally favored asymmetric warfare.
In the naval space, this finds substance in commando-manned submersible powerboats and a wide range of submarines.
Just as the Korean People’s Army is believed to field the world’s largest special forces units – some 200,000 men, both Tier-1 special operations troops and Tier 2 light infantry units – the Korea Peoples’ Navy is believed to field one of the world’s largest submarine fleets.
A North Korean infiltration submarine captured in 1996, stands in stark contrast to the bunker in the background – an active duty east coast fortification manned by South Korean troops. Photo: Andrew Salmon/Asia Times
While this fleet is likely affected by the general decrepitude affecting North Korean forces and fuel shortages which limit training, it remains credibly dangerous.
“North Korean submarine technology is crude, but their submarines are aggressively employed and have proven to be a credible threat,” writes HI Sutton, a writer for naval publications who specializes in submarines and naval special forces.
In 1996, a “Sango” (“Shark”) class coastal submarine ran aground off South Korea’s northeast coast. The crew abandoned ship. Ashore, many were apparently killed by the amphibious commandos on board, who then sought to escape back to North Korea, prompting a weeks-long manhunt by South Korean troops.
In 1998, a similar vessel in a nearby locality became entangled in fishing nets. When it was hauled to the surface, its crew was found dead by suicide. Both captured boats are now on display in South Korea.
In 2010, the Cheonan, a South Korean corvette, sank with the loss of 46 lives in the Yellow Sea close to North Korea. Seoul insisted that the vessel was sunk by a torpedo fired by a North Korean mini-submarine in an unprovoked attack. North Korea denies responsibility.
Since these operations, North Korea has been working up a far more strategic asset: missile-carrying boats.
South Korean relatives visit a mourning altar at a naval base in Pyeongtaek in 2010 as they pay tribute to sailors killed in the sinking of the warship Cheonan, near the disputed border with North Korea. Photo: AFP / Korea pool
Suicide mission?
North Korea’s largest missile-armed submarine is believed to be the experimental “Gorae” (“Whale”) class boat, a diesel-electric vessel based on Russian designs.
Information is scant – it is not known if this week’s launch took place from this boat, from a moored underwater platform or from a converted, Chinese “Romeo” class boat, of which North Korea possesses some 20. Still, analysts have pieced together a jigsaw of data to map out capabilities.
A Gorae-class submarine can operate on electric engines for a maximum of five days submerged, during which it is “quiet, stealthy and to all intents and purposes, silent,” a person familiar with naval operations told Asia Times.
To operate with low noise underwater, its speed cannot exceed five knots (5.7 miles per hour), the source said. That means over the course of five days of 24-hour, underwater cruising, the boat would only cover 684 miles.
After that time, it needs to resurface – almost certainly at night – to recharge batteries. During those (approximate) eight hours, the boat is vulnerable to identification and attack.
The distance between the Korean peninsula and the US coast is 6,690 miles. Given limitations on the amount of fuel and rations that can be carried, the patrol duration of a “Gorae” class boat maxes out at 30 days, the source said.
Half of that, naturally, must be spent on the homeward voyage. Or must it? Could, the North’s leadership extend that range past the point of no return?
Japan deployed kamikaze submarines during World War II, and experience from the 1990s proves that North Korean crews are willing to die for their mission. This raises the question of whether Pyongyang, in dire straits, might deploy the boat on a one-way mission, doubling its range.
But even then, a Gorae would only be able to cross 4000-4,500 miles of ocean.
The range of North Korea’s SLBMs is unknown, but is certainly shorter than its gargantuan land-launched ICBMs. The missile tested this week appears to be smaller than that of North Korea’s prior SLBM test, in 2019.
In sum, the estimated patrol and missile ranges look insufficient to reach the continental US. But US Pacific territories lie within reach.
“I am cautious to suggest that it will be conducting deterrence patrols off the US West Coast any time soon, but it does represent a launch platform which is not restricted to Korea’s landmass,” was the assessment of submarine expert Sutton. “Regional targets such as Japan, Guam and even Hawaii get a bit closer.”
In addition to stealth, range and firepower, another key submarine patrol metric is survivability.
A South Korean Navy team prepares to move a North Korean mini-submarine which ran aground in September 1996. Photo: AFP
Underwater gauntlet
Any North Korean missile-armed boat is likely to be under intense satellite and electronic surveillance at/around its east coat base. “There are ways to keep any eye on this kind of gear from very far away,” the naval source confided.
To break into the open Pacific, it would have to evade South Korea’s anti-submarine assets, which include a force of 50 UK and US-built anti-submarine helicopters. “Since the sinking of the Cheonan, the South Koreans have taken anti-submarine warfare very, very seriously,” said the source.
Those helicopters are necessarily divided between the peninsula’s east and west coasts, but for the North Korean boat, any Southern patrol cordon would be merely the beginning of a long, dangerous gauntlet.
Beyond the Korean littoral, the US Navy maintains major assets in the Western Pacific. Moreover, Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force is considered to be a highly capable submarine-hunting force.
Yet in the cat-and-mouse game of anti-submarine warfare, there is no guarantee the cat will win.
“If it can get out of the harbor into the open Pacific, it would be a real pain in the ass to find,” Chun In-bum, a retired general who formerly commanded South Korea’s Special Warfare Command, told Asia Times.
What appears to be new North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles during a military parade in Pyongyang on October 10, 2020. Photo: screen grab / AFP / KCNA
Pre-deployments vs pre-emptions
Paradoxically, the potential of their new weapon generates a huge risk for Pyongyang’s military brain trust to mull.
For most of the decades since the US and South Korea signed their mutual defense treaty at the conclusion of the Korean War in 1953, the defense of South Korea was paramount: It was within reach of North Korea, the US was not.
But with Kim now wielding both ICBMs and nuclear weapons, the strategic calculus has shifted. US defense planners must prioritize the national interest.
Submarines are “second strike” deterrents – meaning that if a nation’s land-based systems are taken out by an enemy’s first strike, surviving submerged assets can retaliate. If North Korea follows this doctrine in times of tension, Pyongyang might pre-deploy boomers into open water.
And if actual hostilities appeared imminent – which, given the likelihood of troop movements and increased signal traffic, would become known – the US might be tempted to obviate Pyongyang’s “second strike” capability by preventing an SLBM-armed vessel from slipping its moorings.
“North Korea, in getting this capability, is inviting an attack,” said Chun. “There are US military and security professionals who would advocate to attack first.”
That pre-emption of a pre-deployment could be apocalyptic. However deeply dug in a submarine pen might be, the US B61 nuclear weapon “is capable of destroying a target that is up to 300 meters underground,” Chun said.
While that scenario is vexed – any White House decision to commence hostilities against North Korea, let alone with atomic weapons, would be politically agonizing – the ripples of Pyongyang’s missile programs are already causing waves around the region.
Since the cancelation of Japan’s Aegis Ashore missile defense program in 2020, hawks have been agitating for their nation to acquire a first-strike capability. Although newly minted Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is seen as dovish on defense, North Korean developments are offering those hawks an increasingly open door to push on.
“Amid this situation, I’ve already given instructions to revise our country’s national security strategy, including considering the option of acquiring the so-called capability to strike enemy bases.”
5. N. Korean delegation to attend U.N. climate conference in Glasgow
Perhaps this could be a target of opportunity for engagement but I am sure the delegates from north Korea will not have the authority to discuss any other issue than a threat to the regime by climate. With almost any other country this would likely be an opportunity but north Korea. But I would still try to engage anyone from north Korea just to plant seeds. They will report any contact and the messages we send.
N. Korean delegation to attend U.N. climate conference in Glasgow | Yonhap News Agency
By Kim Eun-jung and Choi Soo-hyang
SEOUL, Oct. 22 (Yonhap) -- A North Korean delegation is expected to attend a U.N. climate conference slated to kick off in Britain later this month, a Seoul official said Friday.
Officials at the North Korean Embassy in London will participate in the 2021 U.N. Climate Change Conference, known as COP26, which will run from Oct. 31 to Nov. 12 in Glasgow.
"As far as I know, the North Korean mission in Britain is sending a delegation," a foreign ministry official said.
According to a recent U.S. intelligence report, North Korea was listed as one of 11 countries most vulnerable to climate change due to its inability to adapt to such changes.
The North's planned participation is one of a series of diplomatic activities Pyongyang has recently resumed after they were hampered due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Since the outbreak of the coronavirus in China, North Korea has imposed highly restrictive virus control measures, leading many countries operating missions in the North to pull out their diplomats.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. Ex-USFK chief stresses solidarity in S. Korea-U.S. alliance amid lingering N.K. threats
General Scaparroitti's recent talk is getting a lot of press. Yonhap seems to be emphasizing each key point with an article on its own. He is exactly right here - there will be no success for either the ROK or the US regarding the Korean peninsula without a strong ROK/US alliance.
Ex-USFK chief stresses solidarity in S. Korea-U.S. alliance amid lingering N.K. threats | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Oct. 23 (Yonhap) -- Former U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) chief Curtis Scaparrotti has stressed the importance of solidarity between the militaries of South Korea and the United States in the face of continued North Korean threats, an organization dedicated to promoting the alliance said Saturday.
Scaparrotti, who led the USFK from 2013-2016, delivered a lecture on the long-standing alliance Friday, according to the Korea Chapter of the Korea Defense Veterans Association, as tensions resurfaced following the North's recent test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile.
"The former commander said the South Korea-U.S. alliance is a linchpin for security and prosperity in Northeast Asia, and that it is very crucial to solidify the bond between the militaries of South Korea and the U.S. in order to strengthen the alliance," the association said in a press release.
Scaparrotti also underscored that the defense posture of the allied forces should remain firm under any circumstances to deter war and safeguard peace on the Korean Peninsula, it added.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. U.S. envoy on N. Korea eyes 'productive' consultations in S. Korea on ways to revitalize peace process
I expect that these consultations will be productive. The problem is Kim Jong-un is unwilling to have any kind of productive talks (unless his demands for appeasement are met).
U.S. envoy on N. Korea eyes 'productive' consultations in S. Korea on ways to revitalize peace process | Yonhap News Agency
By Chae Yun-hwan
INCHEON, Oct. 23 (Yonhap) -- The top U.S. envoy on North Korea said Saturday he expects "productive" consultations with South Korea as he arrived here for a two-day visit.
Sung Kim, special representative for North Korea policy, plans to meet with his South Korean counterpart, Noh Kyu-duk, Sunday. The two had discussions in Washington D.C., followed by a trilateral session involving Japan's top nuclear envoy, Takehiro Funakoshi, earlier this week.
"I look forward to having productive follow-up discussions tomorrow here in Seoul," Kim said in a brief statement upon arriving at Incheon International Airport, just west of Seoul.
He did not take any question from reporters. "Sorry, I have to run," he just said and left the airport.
Kim and Noh are expected to discuss how to revive long-stalled talks with Pyongyang, including a proposed end-of-war declaration.
Last month, South Korean President Moon Jae-in used his U.N. National Assembly speech to again propose declaring a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War. Moon and his aides hope it will serve as a catalyst to resume talks with North Korea and reinvigorate the long-stalled Korea peace process.
The U.S. envoy is scheduled to depart Seoul later Sunday for Jakarta, where he doubles as ambassador, according to an informed source.
Denuclearization talks between Washington and Pyongyang remain stalled since the no-deal Hanoi summit in 2019.
South and North Korea technically remain at war, as the war finished with an armistice, not a peace treaty.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
8. China's Xi vows to bolster ties with N. Korea in letter to Kim
Sigh... the PRC/DPRK alliance - closethan lips and teeth.
(LEAD) China's Xi vows to bolster ties with N. Korea in letter to Kim | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS KCNA's English-language report in paras 5-6)
SEOUL, Oct. 23 (Yonhap) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping has reaffirmed efforts to strengthen bilateral relations with North Korea, Pyongyang's state media reported Saturday.
Xi made the remarks in a reply to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's earlier letter to mark the 72nd Chinese National Day, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
In the reply, Xi said he has highly taken note of relations between North Korea and China, and expressed his willingness to raise bilateral ties to a "new level."
North Korea and China have emphasized their close relations amid stalemated nuclear talks between Pyongyang and Washington, and an escalating Sino-U.S. rivalry.
Xi expressed "intent to steadily propel the relations to a new stage by strengthening strategic communications, deepening the friendship and cooperation and leading them to be conducive to mutual support through joint endeavors with Kim Jong Un," according to the KCNA report.
Xi also noted that North Korea and China "are linked by the same mountain and rivers, and the traditional friendship between the two countries is getting more solid over time," the report said.
Previously, Kim vowed to raise the Pyongyang-Beijing "friendship to a new strategic point as required by the times and as desired by the peoples of the two countries."
China fought alongside the North against South Korean, U.S. and United Nations troops during the Korean War that ended in an armistice on July 27, 1953. Sunday marks the 70th anniversary of China's entry into the war.
North Korea has been seeking to maintain closer ties with its traditional ally amid an impasse in nuclear negotiations with the United States.
(END)
9. NKorea slams US for supporting Taiwan in nod to ally China
Indiscreet meddling? Linkage between the Taiwan and north Korea issues?
Excerpt:
The United States’ “indiscreet meddling” in issues regarding Taiwan, which the North sees as entirely a Chinese internal affair, threatens to touch off a “delicate situation on the Korean Peninsula.”
NKorea slams US for supporting Taiwan in nod to ally China
AP · by KIM TONG-HYUNG · October 23, 2021
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korea on Saturday accused the Biden administration of raising military tensions with China through its “reckless” backing of Taiwan, and said that the growing U.S. military presence in the region constitutes a potential threat to the North.
In comments carried by state media, North Korea Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong Ho criticized the United States for sending warships through the Taiwan Strait and providing Taiwan with upgraded weapons systems and military training.
The United States’ “indiscreet meddling” in issues regarding Taiwan, which the North sees as entirely a Chinese internal affair, threatens to touch off a “delicate situation on the Korean Peninsula.”
Pak’s statement came a day after President Joe Biden told a CNN townhall event that the United States was committed to coming to Taiwan’s defense if it comes under attack from China. While that seemed to blur Washington’s long-held stance of maintaining “strategic ambiguity” on whether it would intervene if China were to attack Taiwan, White House spokeswoman Jen Psaki said Biden had no intent to convey a change in policy.
ADVERTISEMENT
China and Taiwan split amid civil war in 1949, and although it maintains formal diplomatic relations only with Beijing, the U.S. remains committed by law to ensure Taiwan can defend itself from outside threats.
North Korea has increasingly criticized the United States’ broader security role in the Asia Pacific amid an intensifying competition with China, Pyongyang’s major ally and economic lifeline. Last month, the North threatened unspecified countermeasures following the Biden administration’s decision to provide nuclear-powered submarines to Australia.
“It is a well-known fact that the U.S. troops and its military bases in (South Korea) are in use to put pressure on China and that the huge forces of the U.S. and its satellite states, which are being concentrated near Taiwan, can be committed to a military operation targeting the DPRK at any time,” Pak said, using an abbreviation of the North’s formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
He said the increasing military presence of U.S.-led “hostile forces” in the region was based on a “lame assertion” that North Korea and China would cause trouble in Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula.
“This reality proves that the U.S. is in its bid to stifle our country and China, both socialist countries, in order to hold on to its supremacy,” Pak said.
Nuclear negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang have stalled for more than two years over the issue of relaxing crippling U.S.-led sanctions against North Korea in return for steps by the North to wind-down its nuclear weapons program.
Pyongyang sees the possession of nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of the survival of the Kim family regime that has run the country with an iron fist since the 1940s.
ADVERTISEMENT
Ending a months-long lull in September, North Korea has been ramping up its missile tests while making conditional peace offers to Seoul, reviving a pattern of pressuring South Korea to try to get what it wants from the United States.
Sung Kim, Biden’s special envoy for North Korea, was expected to arrive in South Korea later on Saturday for talks with allies on reviving negotiations with the North.
The Biden administration’s pullout from Afghanistan underscored a broader shift in U.S. focus away from counterterrorism and so-called rogue states like North Korea and Iran. That is putting the focus on confronting a near-peer adversary in China, and part of that apparent strategy appear to be offering the North a resumption of talks without preconditions.
But the North has so far rejected the idea of open-ended talks, saying that Washington must abandon its “hostile policy,” a term North Korea mainly refers to sanctions and U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises.
AP · by KIM TONG-HYUNG · October 23, 2021
10. North Korea sends farmers to labor camps for hiding corn amid food shortages
They griew it but they do not own it. So who will work these farmers next year if these farmers go to the gulags?
North Korea sends farmers to labor camps for hiding corn amid food shortages
The government is entitled to 60 percent of the harvest, but yields were lower this year.
Authorities in North Korea have sentenced five farmers to disciplinary labor for hiding corn meant for redistribution to state supplies, sources in the country told RFA.
With an expected meager autumn harvest looming, farmers are nervous about the annual grain redistribution this year. The government takes 60 percent of the harvest from every farmer, leaving them with the remaining 40 percent.
In most years, their share is not enough to live on, but with yields about 20 percent smaller than expected in some areas, this year could be worse. For this reason, many farmers are looking to cheat the system, a resident of the northern province of Ryanggang told RFA’s Korean Service.
“A few days ago, five farmers were caught hiding corn during an unexpected inspection. Each of them was sentenced to five months in a disciplinary labor center,” said the source, who requested anonymity to speak freely.
“Since each farm receives distribution based on yield, the amount of distribution for farmers will inevitably be reduced,” said the source.
The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization predicted in June that North Korea would be short about 860,000 tons of food this year, or about two months’ supply.
The smaller yield this year could mean that farmers will only get five- or six-months’ of food for next year, a source in the agricultural industry in the country’s northeastern province of North Hamgyong told RFA.
“Since the beginning of October, farms nationwide have been estimating how much of the harvest the farmers are going to get. They expect their distribution will be smaller than usual, and they are worried about how they will live next year with very little food,” said the second source, who requested anonymity for security reasons.
“The farmers’ livelihood is intimately tied to the redistribution, because they are working on the farm all year,” said the second source.
In North Korea’s nascent market economy, most people have secondary jobs because a government salary is not enough to live on. Farmers, however, do not have the time to work anywhere else, so they live or die by the harvest.
Plans by the government to take more of the crop this year could potentially leave the farmers with only two months’ worth of food, while soldiers and other grain recipients will get their full distribution.
“Grain silos and outdoor warehouses are already empty… so the situation is frustrating, it’s eating them inside,” said the second source.
The coronavirus pandemic has had profound negative effects on the agriculture industry and the food situation in North Korea, according to the second source.
When Beijing and Pyongyang closed off the Sino-Korean border and suspended all trade at the beginning of the pandemic in January 2020, North Korea was left to its own devices to produce enough food, without Chinese imports to cover shortfalls and with no access to imported fertilizer or farming equipment.
The shortage of farming materials increased prices and farmers went into debt, agreeing to pay back their creditors with food from the fall harvest, the second source said.
“This is going to reduce the redistribution to the farmers even more. They worked hard all year to produce as much grain as possible, but what they are going to get back this fall is going to be a trivial amount, so they are beyond frustrated.”
The food situation in North Korea is dire.
UN Special Rapporteur on North Korean Human Rights Tomás Ojea Quintana warned in a report in March that the closure of the border and restrictions on the movement of people could bring on a “serious food crisis.”
“Deaths by starvation have been reported, as has an increase in the number of children and elderly people who have resorted to begging as families are unable to support them,” said the report.
RFA reported in April that authorities were warning residents to prepare for economic difficulties as bad as the 1994-1998 famine which killed millions, as much as 10 percent of the population by some estimates.
Reported by Myung Chul Lee for RFA’s Korean Service. Translated by Claire Lee and Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
11. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ North Korea's financial crisis has made it impossible to print banknotes. Efforts to issue temporary money coupons "Tongpyo" have been made to replace them, but distrust is growing.
A country that cannot manage its currency and money supply will have a hard time surviving. We should consider flooding the north with dollars as part of an information and influence campaign.
＜Inside N. Korea＞ North Korea's financial crisis has made it impossible to print banknotes. Efforts to issue temporary money coupons "Tongpyo" have been made to replace them, but distrust is growing.
A building of an abandoned chemical factory in Sakju County, North Pyongan Province. Photographed from the Chinese side in October 2021 by ASIAPRESS.
North Korea's financial woes have worsened, with state agencies and state-run companies running out of cash and unable to pay for goods or salaries. With the inability to print banknotes, the government is trying to replace them by issuing "Tongpyo," or gold certificates, but the phenomenon of evasion is quickly spreading and causing confusion. This article reports on the latest internal developments (Kang Ji-won / Jiro ISHIMARU).
◆Issuing temporary money coupons as a desperate measure
"It seems that our country is finally running out of cash."
This information began to be reported frequently from all over North Korea around the end of August. As a result, the cash flow of government and party agencies, state-owned enterprises, and factories have deteriorated to the point where payments are overdue, and banks are no longer accepting cash payments or remittances.
In response to the financial difficulties, the Kim Jong-un regime introduced a temporary Central Bank of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea gold certificate (Tongpyo) with a face value of 5,000 won. In early September, the South Korean media obtained a photo of the "Tongpyo" and reported it.
※5,000 won is about 1.09 USD at the prevailing exchange rate on October 21.
Many Korean experts analysed the sudden issuance of the "Tongpyo" to absorb foreign currency from the market. This is because, in the past, there have been issues of money coupons exclusively for the exchange of foreign currencies. There was also speculation that the "Tongpyo" was issued to support the impoverished people's livelihood.
However, as we conducted our research in North Korea, we discovered that, in reality, the issue was more about rescuing cash-strapped state institutions, state-owned enterprises, factories, and banks. Mr A, a reporting partner who lives in the northern region, explained as follows.
"Although rumours began to spread in mid-September that 'Tongpyo' was circulating in and around Pyongyang, I didn't see it in person until early October. Then, as companies and factories began to make payments and settlements using "Tongpyo," it appeared in the market. However, merchants are wary and try not to accept them. Even though the government says, it is the same as regular money, who would believe them? We've been fooled too many times before. I'd rather barter."
Another reporting partner, Mr B, who lives in another city, commented as follows.
"There are no instructions to exchange your foreign currency for Tongpyo, and no one is going to exchange foreign currency for Tongpyo when they might lose it. There is also no mention of giving money to 'desperate households' (households that have run out of food and money)."
We asked two other reporting partners to look into the issue, and they assured us that the " Tongpyo" has no function to exchange for foreign currency and that there is no evidence that it was given to the poor.
So why did Kim Jong-un's regime issue the temporary "Tongpyo" instead of supplying currency? "An official explained to me that paper and ink were no longer coming in from China, so they were temporarily printing with domestic products," said Mr A, our reporting partner.
"I wonder how much money the country has if it can't even import paper and ink for banknotes. The authorities claim that 'Tongpyo' is 100% domestically produced, but the quality is poor, and it looks like ordinary paper," said another reporting partner, Mr C.
Foreign currency difficulties have made imports from China difficult, and it is believed that paper and ink for printing banknotes have dried up.
This is the newly issued temporary money coupon "Tongpyo." The photo was provided by a North Korean defector who obtained it.
◆Enterprises in a slump
The leading cause of the slump in state-owned enterprises is, after all, the significant drop in trade due to the blockade of the border with China in response to the coronavirus. Companies that had depended on China for raw materials saw their operations decline or suspended. Exports to China, mainly of consignment-processed products and minerals, have also come to a near halt.
In addition, due to excessive anti-corruption measures, the movement and distribution of people and goods within the country were strongly restricted. Hence, people had less cash income and less purchasing power. The functioning of the market has shrunk drastically due to the inability to produce and sell goods. The distribution of goods among businesses is sluggish, and settlements are not being made properly.
Our reporting partner explained the current situation as follows.
"Exports to China have stopped, and much of the business-to-business trade has disappeared. The only factories operating at a snail's pace are those that sell their products to merchants in the market. You must buy what you need for production in cash at the market. But neither the companies nor the government has money. I think that's why they printed 'Tompyo'." (Mr A)
"I talked to the accountants of some companies, such as steel mills, and they said that they have been using banks to handle accounting transactions, but they can no longer send money because they don't have enough money in the bank." (Mr C)
"The existing won bills are circulating among individuals. Since people don't trust the state-run financial institutions, the money is only going to the 'Tongchu' (emerging rich), and the banks are not functioning." (Mr B)
◆Growing Distrust of the "Tongpyo"
The city has already begun to consider "Tongpyo" as a cheap golden ticket and avoid it. Mr B described the current situation as follows:
"People laugh at 'Tongpyo,' so there are money changers who buy 5,000 won tickets at a discount of 4,000 won in cash or 3,800 won. They bring it to companies and institutions that still have cash and use their connections to exchange it for cash and make a profit. Since the release of 'Tongpyo' and the realization that there is no money in the country, more and more people think that they must have Chinese yuan or US dollars at all costs."
The authorities became panicked and started flirting with punishment, and according to Mr A, the official who came to the people's group meeting made the following announcement.
"Although the 'Tongpyo' is being issued temporarily due to the current difficulties, it is guaranteed by the government to have the same value as cash. When the COVID-19 pandemic is over, the borders will be opened, and money production will be normalized, the 'Tompyo' will be collected. Those who spread rumours that it is of poor quality or that it will be turned into scrap paper in the future, or those who exchange it at a discount, will be caught and punished."
There is no doubt that the Kim Jong-un regime's finances are deteriorating to the point that it is having trouble issuing currency. Moreover, the side effects of the excessive coronavirus measures are intensely apparent.
ASIAPRESS has obtained a document issued by the Workers' Party in October designating "absolute secrecy" regarding the "Tongpyo," and will report on its details within October.
※ASIAPRESS contacts its reporting partners in North Korea through smuggled Chinese mobile phones.
12. North Koreans facing food shortages, collapses in livelihoods: UN investigator
But it is the responsibility of Kim Jong-un to prioritize the welfare of his people over his nuclear and missile programs, moderninging his military and providing support to the elite. Lifting sanctions will only help these categories and people and not the Korean people who are the rank and file.
North Koreans facing food shortages, collapses in livelihoods: UN investigator
The United Nations' independent investigator on human rights in North Korea has found that the Asian country has never been more isolated from the international community than it is today due to its drastic steps to prevent Covid-19. He also noted this is having “a dramatic impact on the human rights of the people inside the country", reported AP.
North Koreans are facing food shortages and collapses in their livelihoods with the most vulnerable lot being children and elderly people who are at risk of starvation, Tomás Ojea Quintana told the General Assembly's human rights committee. He also highlighted the extent of hunger in political prison camps.
For the unversed, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea -- the North's official name -- has closed its borders to prevent the pandemic. Other draconian steps taken by the government to prevent the spread of the viral disease in the nation include a policy of shooting individuals who attempt to enter or leave the country, Quintana said.
The UN investigator further noted the closing of borders would have “a devastating impact” on the people's right to health as DPRK's health infrastructure suffers from underinvestment and a critical shortage of supplies caused by underlying human rights issues, according to the AP report.
In his final report to the General Assembly after six years as the UN special investigator on human rights in the DPRK, Ojea Quintana added that “increased restrictions on freedom of movement and the shutting of national borders has choked market activity that has become essential for people's access to basic necessities, including food.”
Even though North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has recognized the “grim” food situation and is investing in efforts to prevent starvation in the country, the border closure has put the lifesaving humanitarian work of the United Nations and other international actors on halt. The UN investigator said there are no United Nations international staff currently in the country and diplomats are continuing to leave.
The UN investigator, in his report to the General Assembly, has recommended that in light of the pandemic, the Security Council committee monitoring sanctions against the DPRK over its nuclear program “should re-evaluate the sanctions regime under these circumstances, and when necessary ease those sanctions.” While humanitarian aid to the DPRK is exempt from sanctions, Ojea Quintana said sanctions have had unintended consequences on ordinary people.
As one example, he said, UN sanctions against the export of textiles and seafood -- industries where women are the predominant workers -- have resulted in women who are family bread-winners losing their jobs.
In his report, Ojea Quintana also recognised the paradox of deteriorating social and economic rights in the DPRK while the government continues to test missiles, “probably diverting resources that should be allocated in those areas.”
(With PTI, AP inputs)
SHARE THIS ARTICLE ON
13. North Korea Sanctions Should Be Eased During Covid, UN Says
We must not fall for this "logic" and lift sanctions.
North Korea Sanctions Should Be Eased During Covid, UN Says
October 22, 2021, 12:52 PM EDT
- Official cites the ‘risk of starvation’ amid drastic measures
- Kim Jong Un’s regime claims it has no coronvirus cases
World powers should consider easing some sanctions on North Korea as the risk of starvation due to Covid-19 restrictions increases, a United Nations official said.
Drastic containment measures taken by Kim Jong Un’s regime have left the country completely isolated from the world and its people deprived of the most basic necessities, Tomas Ojea Quintana, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in North Korea, told reporters Friday.
Tomas Ojea QuintanaPhotographer: Fabrice Coffrini/AFP/Getty Images
“As long as the borders continue to be closed, we may be facing risk of starvation among some segments of the population in the country,” he said, citing a report his team submitted to the UN General Assembly.
People’s access to food is a serious concern and the most vulnerable children and elderly are at risk of starvation, he said.
Even though North Korea says it has no coronavirus cases -- a claim doubted by U.S. and Japanese officials -- it has taken drastic containment measures that have worsened the regime’s economic woes, including closing the border with its biggest trading partner, China.
While Quintana criticized the regime for continuing to develop nuclear weapons, he urged the Security Council to review and ease some sanctions to facilitate humanitarian and life-saving assistance. He argued that in practice the sanctions hurt average citizens as Kim’s nuclear weapons program continues unabated.
After a series of missile launches and nuclear weapons tests by North Korea in 2017, the UN Security Council imposed three rounds of sanctions on Pyongyang, including bans on exports of iron, coal, lead, seafood and textiles as well as some oil-import restrictions. While China and Russia have since called for easing some sanctions, the U.S. and its Western allies have rejected the notion as long as North Korea spurns talks and continues developing its nuclear arsenal.
Employees spray disinfectant as part of preventative measures against the Covid-19 inside a department store in Pyongyang on Oct. 20.Photographer: Kim Won Jin/AFP/Getty Images
Foreign aid organizations have had trouble getting into North Korea to deliver humanitarian assistance, with the World Food Program saying in late 2020 that it would be “critical” for the country to ease restrictions “on the entry of international personnel.” With harvests falling short and imports curtailed, North Korea this year is facing a shortage of about 860,000 metric tons, equivalent to about 2.3 months of food use for the entire country, according to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization.
North Korea is struggling to inoculate its population, which means it risks remaining closed for longer. The country was offered about 1.7 million doses of vaccines in July through the Covax vaccine-sharing program, but shipments were delayed due to the lack of technical preparedness and global vaccine shortages, according to the UN rapporteur’s report.
14. The sun is setting on Moon Jae-in’s promise of inter-Korean peace, and Biden isn’t budging
I think that the Moon administration will be focusing on the peace agenda from now through next May when the South Korean administration will change.
The sun is setting on Moon Jae-in’s promise of inter-Korean peace, and Biden isn’t budging
By John Power South China Morning Post7 min
A television broadcast in Seoul of a North Korean missile test. Photo: AFP
When Moon Jae-in gave his first address as the president of South Korea, he promised not to rest until he had secured a permanent peace between the divided Koreas.
“I will fly to Washington, Beijing and Tokyo, if needed, and I will also go to Pyongyang, if conditions are met,” Moon said during his 2017 inaugural speech. “I will do everything in my power to bring peace to the peninsula.”
Nearly five years on, the South Korean leader is in a race against time to make good on his word and leave behind a lasting legacy before the end of his single five-year term in May.
Moon, a former human rights lawyer and son of North Korean refugees, faces an array of obstacles to realising his vision, which sees a declaration to officially end the Korean war as a pathway to the North’s denuclearisation, inter-Korean reconciliation and eventual reunification. Divided in the aftermath of World War II, North and South Korea technically remain in a state of war after the 1950-53 conflict ended with an armistice, not a peace treaty.
To succeed, Moon, who is constitutionally barred from running for re-election in March’s presidential vote, will have to bridge yawning differences between Washington and Pyongyang, and fend off growing disillusionment toward his rapprochement efforts at home.
“He is committed to achieving peace not only because of legacy politics, but also because of his personal background as a son of North Korean refugees,” said Moon Chung-in, a former adviser to the president who is no relation.
Moon Chung-in said the South Korean leader was focused on persuading the US administration of Joe Biden to ease sanctions on the North, agree to a peace treaty and endorse inter-Korean projects such as a closed industrial park near the inter-Korean border.
“I do not know whether such efforts will be successful or not,” said Moon, who advised the president on national security and foreign affairs until February of this year. “However, if the Biden administration shows a more practical and flexible response, such a move will facilitate negotiations on denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula as well as a virtuous cycle of bilateral relations among North Korea, South Korea, and the US.”
The presidential office, Cheong Wae Dae, did not respond to a request for comment.
For the South Korean president, bringing the Biden administration on board with an agenda of inter-Korean reconciliation is likely to be a struggle as long as Washington and Pyongyang remain far apart on denuclearisation.
Seoul hosts almost 30,000 US troops on its soil – a legacy of the conflict between the US-backed South and Soviet-backed North – making Washington a key voice in the management of inter-Korean ties.
Although Biden has expressed openness to dialogue with the North, his administration has displayed little urgency about coaxing the isolated state back to denuclearisation talks under a “calibrated practical approach” that critics say is vaguely-defined.
The Democratic president has also criticised his predecessor Donald Trump for granting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un legitimacy and allowing him to appear “more serious about what he wasn’t at all serious about”.
Trump held two face-to-face summits with Kim in 2018 and 2019 that failed to result in concrete steps toward denuclearisation. Trump said their final meeting in Hanoi collapsed after the North demanded sanctions be “lifted in their entirety” in exchange for only partial disarmament, an account later denied by Pyongyang.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, a Trump-era official who worked on North Korea issues said he expected the Moon administration to be lobbying hard to take charge of managing relations with Pyongyang.
“I am confident Moon’s opening pitch to the Biden administration was ‘we can handle this if you will just let us’,” the former official said. “That sounds good, but it isn’t true and it creates seams in the alliance. Moon clearly wants all the security and defence benefits the alliance with the United States provides, but he also believes Seoul should be leading those efforts. When the US would raise its strategic objectives or interests, Moon’s people would often hand wave them away.”
Pyongyang has spurned repeated offers by Seoul to resume dialogue and inter-Korean cooperation, although its officials this month restored a cross-border hotline that was severed in August in protest against joint US-South Korea military exercises.
The North has also carried out numerous weapons tests in recent months, including the firing on Tuesday of a submarine-launched ballistic missile into the Sea of Japan, or East Sea.
“The Biden administration’s phased, controlled North Korea policy and the Moon administration’s North Korea policy should be in harmony,” said Yang Seung-ham, a politics and diplomacy professor at Yonsei University in Seoul. “What’s disappointing is that because of the US’s domestic problems and South Korea’s election next year, there’s no unanimity on it being a policy priority.”
Yang said Moon needed to take a more forceful line in his diplomacy with both North Korea and the US.
“It needs to use the carrot and stick with the North and convince the US of the unique character of the relationship between the Koreas,” he said.
China, North Korea’s biggest ally and a signatory to the 1953 armistice, also has the potential to make or break Moon’s plans. Calling on Washington to move beyond “empty slogans”, the Chinese Foreign Ministry this month said the US should seriously consider Pyongyang’s “justified and reasonable concerns” and revise its sanctions.
01:38
North and South Korea restore communication and military hotline after 2 months of silence
Tong Zhao, a senior fellow at the Carnegie‑Tsinghua Centre in Beijing, said China would be supportive of Moon’s efforts to bring about a resolution of the stalemate on the Korean peninsula.
“The current cycle of inter-Korean missile testing competition must be of concern to Beijing and the fast and open-ended strategic capability development by North Korea cannot be good news to China’s desire to maintain regional stability,” Zhao said.
“China also has a strong interest to keep South Korea close to itself, not least because Seoul is viewed as the weakest link in the US-led alliance network in the region and a cooperative relationship with Seoul would increase China’s leverage against perceived US efforts to build anti-China alliances.”
Some observers believe Moon’s last-ditch outreach efforts could include a final summit with Kim Jong-un, following three such meetings in 2018. Moon’s political mentor Roh Moo-hyun – who continued the pro-rapprochement “sunshine” policy of South Korea’s first left-leaning president Kim Dae-jung – held a summit with late North Korean leader Kim Jong-il as he faced lame duck status on the domestic front during the final months of his presidency.
After the enthusiasm that greeted Moon’s rapprochement efforts early in his tenure, any such gesture would be greeted by a South Korean public increasingly apathetic toward the North.
In an opinion survey released by the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies this month, just over 44 per cent of South Koreans said they believed reunification was necessary – the lowest figure since the launch of the poll in 2007.
Shin Kwang-yeong, a sociology professor at Chung-Ang University in Seoul, said younger South Koreans did not have memories of an undivided Korea like their parents and grandparents and increasingly viewed the prospect of reunification as “chaotic and costly”.
“They are more interested in their jobs and well-being,” Shin said.
Hong Deuk-pyo, professor emeritus at Inha University, said South Koreans widely expected Moon to push for a summit with Kim to counter his lame duck status.
“The bus has already left the station, but President Moon is morbidly obsessed with the North,” he said.
Chung Min Lee, who worked on national security issues under two conservative South Korean presidents, predicted Moon’s efforts would do little to change the North and he would go down as the last South Korean leader to put “almost all of his eggs in the ‘sunshine basket’.”
“Whoever succeeds him is going to face an onslaught of unparalleled global challenges and massive economic, financial, and technological disruptions,” Lee said.
Moon Chung-in, the former presidential adviser, suggested South Korea’s 19th president would in fact leave behind a notable legacy.
“His commitment to peace, no nukes, and South Korea’s proactive role in shaping the destiny of the Korean peninsula will be positively remembered,” he said.
“He was the leader who persuaded Chairman Kim Jong-un to verbally declare his intention for denuclearisation. He was also the South Korean president who mediated the first US-North Korea summit. While pursuing peacemaking efforts, he was also devoted to building formidable national defence capabilities. He had an ideal goal and vision, yet he was a realist who wanted to safeguard national interests.”
John Power joined the Post in 2018 after nearly a decade as a journalist in the Asia region. He is a reporter for Asia Desk and This Week in Asia, with a special focus on Korean affairs.
15. Why South Korea’s Liberals Are Defense Hawks
A little too much subtle support of the north's position. (reading between the lines) Mr. Park makes an important point that Korean conservative and liberals are not a mirage image of US conservatives and liberals in terms of national security and military policies.
Why South Korea’s Liberals Are Defense Hawks
Seoul’s new missile technologies have both Pyongyang and Beijing in mind.
If it were happening in the other Korea, the manic pace of weapons development in South Korea would have caused global alarm. On Sept. 15, just hours after North Korea’s test of two short-range ballistic missiles, South Korea unveiled at least five different missile technologies: a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), a bunker-busting ballistic missile, a supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, a long-range air-to-surface missile, and a solid-fuel engine for space rockets. South Korean President Moon Jae-in was in attendance for these tests, immediately after Moon welcomed Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who was visiting Seoul.
This round of testing put South Korea in a small elite group when it comes to missile technology. South Korea’s SLBM was fired by the ROKS Dosan Ahn Changho, a domestically produced attack submarine that became the first air independent power (AIP) submarine to fire an underwater ballistic missile. Because AIP submarines are virtually silent, the ability to fire an SLBM out of an AIP submarine is considered a “game changer.” South Korea is just the eighth country in the world to develop an SLBM; the other seven—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, India, China, and North Korea—all have nuclear weapons. It’s not unimaginable that South Korea could follow suit.
It shouldn’t be surprising that all this is happening during a liberal South Korean presidency. Peace through strength and autonomous self-defense have been consistent themes in South Korean liberals’ defense policy, despite the caricatures painted by conservatives. Yet in foreign-policy circles outside South Korea, confusion persists as to why a supposedly dovish Moon is engaged in a furious arms race—in part because right-wing narratives crafted in Seoul are often picked up in Washington.
If it were happening in the other Korea, the manic pace of weapons development in South Korea would have caused global alarm. On Sept. 15, just hours after North Korea’s test of two short-range ballistic missiles, South Korea unveiled at least five different missile technologies: a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), a bunker-busting ballistic missile, a supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, a long-range air-to-surface missile, and a solid-fuel engine for space rockets. South Korean President Moon Jae-in was in attendance for these tests, immediately after Moon welcomed Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who was visiting Seoul.
This round of testing put South Korea in a small elite group when it comes to missile technology. South Korea’s SLBM was fired by the ROKS Dosan Ahn Changho, a domestically produced attack submarine that became the first air independent power (AIP) submarine to fire an underwater ballistic missile. Because AIP submarines are virtually silent, the ability to fire an SLBM out of an AIP submarine is considered a “game changer.” South Korea is just the eighth country in the world to develop an SLBM; the other seven—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, India, China, and North Korea—all have nuclear weapons. It’s not unimaginable that South Korea could follow suit.
It shouldn’t be surprising that all this is happening during a liberal South Korean presidency. Peace through strength and autonomous self-defense have been consistent themes in South Korean liberals’ defense policy, despite the caricatures painted by conservatives. Yet in foreign-policy circles outside South Korea, confusion persists as to why a supposedly dovish Moon is engaged in a furious arms race—in part because right-wing narratives crafted in Seoul are often picked up in Washington.
An important strain in South Korea’s liberal politics is an emphasis on national autonomy. The South Korean left understands the late 19th and 20th centuries as a period of deep humiliation, as the country underwent a series of subjugations—first by imperial Japan’s colonial rule and then by the division overseen by the United States and Soviet Union. To avoid repeating that fate, they argue, Koreans must strive for self-determination. An important component of that self-determination is jaju gukbang, i.e., autonomous national defense.
In addition, South Korean liberals have had political reasons to take a strong tone on national defense, in order to dispel the public image that they were soft on North Korea. Even as South Korean liberal administrations sought dialogue with North Korea, they always backstopped that dialogue with a show of force that discouraged Pyongyang from attempting a destabilizing military venture.
Former President Kim Dae-jung, for example, is remembered for his Sunshine Policy, in which South Korea pursued reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea. But often forgotten is the fact that among the three principles of inter-Korean relations that Kim presented in his 1998 inauguration speech—which formed the foundation of the Sunshine Policy—the first principle was “zero tolerance of North Korean military provocation.” In June 1999, the South Korean navy scored a decisive victory by sinking an invading North Korean torpedo boat and severely damaging three patrol boats in the disputed waters off the western coast of the Korean Peninsula, even as the Kim Dae-jung administration was continuing its attempt at dialogue with North Korea’s Kim Jong Il.
Roh Moo-hyun’s presidency from 2003 to 2008, which followed Kim Dae-jung’s, was a pivotal moment in the South Korean military’s modernization. The firebrand liberal’s administration was “the only time Seoul came close to truly pursuing autonomy” in international affairs, according to Scott Snyder, a Korea expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, as Roh envisioned South Korea as serving as a “balancer” of Northeast Asia. Jokingly nicknamed “the militarist of hopes and dreams” by his admiring supporters, Roh was obsessed with building autonomous defense capacity.
The Roh administration’s military modernization plan introduced in 2005, titled Defense Reform Plan 2020, serves as the blueprint for the South Korean military to this day. During Roh’s presidency, South Korea became the world’s fifth operator of the Aegis Combat System with its Sejong the Great-class destroyer and earnestly began producing domestic jet fighters and attack submarines—whose scale models decorated Roh’s office desk. South Korea’s national defense budget increased by an average of 8.9 percent annually in the five years of Roh administration, a growth rate that has been unmatched since.
After nine years of conservative administrations under Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, Moon picked up in 2017 where Roh left off. Criticizing the conservative administrations’ commitment to national defense, Moon has averaged 6.5 percent average growth in the defense budget in his nearly five years as president, outpacing his predecessor’s 4.2 percent. Under purchasing power parity terms, South Korea’s defense budget surpassed that of Japan (which has 2.5 times the population of South Korea) in 2018, and it is expected to surpass in nominal dollars in 2023. The Moon administration’s drive to increase defense spending was such that Kim Jung-sup, a senior research fellow at the Sejong Institute and former official at South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense, said: “The Blue House wanted to spend more than what the Defense Ministry or the Joint Chiefs could realistically procure.”
Moon lobbied the United States to lift the missile guidelines that limited the range of South Korea’s missiles and convinced the Biden administration to abolish the guidelines following a summit meeting this May. Only four months later, in September, South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development announced that it had successfully tested a short-range-in-name-only ballistic missile with a massive 6-ton warhead. Reacting to the test, Ankit Panda, a weapons expert and senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, described the situation as “reaching arms-racing levels that shouldn’t be possible.” In addition, South Korea under the Moon administration purchased a fleet of F-35 stealth fighter jets and midair refueling aircraft and began building its own supersonic fighter jets and a light aircraft carrier. The 2021 edition of the Global Firepower index ranks South Korea as sixth in the world in conventional military strength, ahead of all of Europe.
Within South Korea, this history is well established. Yet in foreign-policy circles outside South Korea, the fact that a supposedly dovish liberal such as Moon was engaged in a mad dash for an arms race has caused confusion for some. One analyst, for example, conjectured that Moon’s weapons development hinted that the South Korean left might be reconsidering unification with North Korea. Another offered that the military buildup was in order to take back the wartime operational control (OPCON), which currently belongs to the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command. But these analyses do not account for the consistent policy direction of South Korea’s liberal administrations. As discussed above, South Korea’s liberal presidents have always pursued a dual-track policy of inter-Korean dialogue and military enhancement, and the OPCON transfer issue has been tangential to South Korea’s weapons program.
The inability to recognize the history and significance of South Korea’s military buildup misses a key dynamic in inter-Korean relations. North Korea has repeatedly made it known that it feels threatened by South Korea’s conventional capabilities. Pyongyang bitterly complained of “double standards” after South Korea’s latest missile tests and allegedly paid spies within South Korea to foment a protest against importing F-35 jets. Although sharper analysts such as Ian Bowers and Henrik Hiim recognized the importance of South Korea’s military program and the complication it introduces in the effort to denuclearize North Korea, in general, the missiles program in the northern half of the Korean Peninsula has been the only one generating international headlines.
This lacuna is problematic because the implications of South Korea’s military program go beyond the Korean Peninsula. One of them is nuclear proliferation. Seoul is at least thinking about nuclear armament: South Korea is the only country with an SLBM without a nuclear weapon, and nearly 70 percent of the public is in support of acquiring nukes. South Korea has secretly enriched uranium several times, and in 2003, the Roh administration quietly pursued a plan to construct a nuclear submarine before abandoning the plan due to heightened international attention on South Korea’s uranium enrichment activities. Since his inauguration in 2017, Moon has asked the U.S. government to provide technical support and fissile material for nuclear submarines. With Australia set to receive the nuclear submarine technology through the new AUKUS deal, the next South Korean administration is likely to push for weaponized nuclear technology in some form or another.
The upcoming presidential election in South Korea makes an objective assessment of Seoul’s military program even more urgent. Plainly, South Korea’s blue-water navy plan is not directed at North Korea but at power projection in the South China Sea, a critical shipping lane for petroleum from the Middle East to East Asia that China may attempt to blockade in a potential embargo against South Korea and Japan. The conservative opposition in South Korea has objected to the navy’s light aircraft carrier plan, with Assembly Member Shin Won-sik claiming: “If we introduce the carrier, all it will do is assist the U.S. Pacific Fleet.” Although the navy stressed the need to respond to China’s increasing number of aircraft carriers, Shin dismissed such concerns: “China’s carriers are not aimed at us; they are for the United States.”
Yet many articles in prominent English-language outlets continue to promote the idea that a potential conservative administration in South Korea will be tougher on China, based on the reflexive assumption that conservatives will be stronger on national defense. But such assumption is ahistorical. After all, it was only six years ago, in 2015, that conservative President Park Geun-hye was the only leader of a major democracy to attend China’s World War II victory parade, applauding the People’s Liberation Army next to Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. In the strategic competition between the United States and China, South Korea is among the most critical players. An evidence-based assessment of South Korea’s defense policy is more necessary today than ever.
16. KAI unveils electric basic trainer
A fascinating concept.
it will be kind of a challenge for air to air refueling (er... I mean recharging)
KAI unveils electric basic trainer
SEOUL — Korea Aerospace Industries, or KAI, showcased this week a concept model of an electrically powered basic trainer aircraft during the Seoul International Aerospace and Defense Exhibition 2021 at an airbase in Seongnam, just south of Seoul.
Nicknamed “Black Kite,” the twin-seat concept aircraft features an electric propulsion system powering a total of four propellers mounted on the wings. It is expected to replace the KT-1 basic trainer in service with the South Korean Air Force.
“The output of engine power for the next-generation basic trainer is to be increased to at least 1,600 horsepower, and the aircraft is to be equipped with a digital cockpit and pressurization system, which will result in greater operational convenience for the pilot,” the aerospace company said in a press release.
The low-emission aircraft is expected to be 4.7 meters (15.4 feet) high and 11.6 meters long with a wingspan of 11.2 meters. The aircraft is also to leverage augmented reality and virtual reality to enhance the pilot’s training experience.
KAI officials anticipate the fleet of KT-1 basic trainer aircraft will be replaced by newer models in the mid-2030s, as the South Korean Air Force has been flying the KT-1 for primary and basic training and forward air control missions since 2000.
KAI also developed the T-50 supersonic trainer jet, with some 80 T-50 variants being delivered to the South Korean Air Force and 20 more on order for pilot training, acrobatic and combat support missions.
17. In Defense of a Bold U.S. Approach Toward North Korea
I have had the honor to work with Professor Yoon many times over the years. While you may not agree with all his policy proposals he always provides thoughtful analysis and innovative and sometimes provocative recommendations.
Conclusion:
After all, a thorough review of the conventional approach and a cool-headed calculation of the U.S. interest from a broader geostrategic perspective requires a bold new approach toward North Korea. In this way, the United States will be able to move a step closer to curing the root cause of the North Korea problem and strengthening its strategic position in the region surrounding the Korean Peninsula.
In Defense of a Bold U.S. Approach Toward North Korea
A bold new strategy toward North Korea means engaging North Korea politically in order to fundamentally change the nature of the bilateral relationship.
Adjustments to the U.S. global strategy in accordance with the tectonic shift in global geopolitics are well underway. However, it is unclear whether similar adjustments are occurring to U.S. strategies at the regional level. It does not seem to be the case regarding the U.S. policy toward North Korea. The details of the Biden administration’s North Korea policy review have not been fully disclosed. However, comments by policy-makers and in media reports on the review do not indicate that the Biden team’s approach to North Korea reflects the fundamentally new reality of intense competition between the United States and China.
Though each U.S. administration in the last three decades tried various forms of North Korea policy, they could not achieve the goal of denuclearization. Actually, as time went by, the situation got worse and worse. Thirty years ago, North Korea was at an embryonic stage in terms of nuclear development. Regional countries now view it as a de facto nuclear state with thirty to sixty nuclear warheads and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capabilities that could threaten the security of the United States. What then are the reasons for this failure? Will there be any alternative approach left to address the current, much worse situation?
Though diverse in form, most approaches of the different U.S. administrations in the last three decades were not much different in substance. These conventional approaches shared three common characteristics.
Failure to Question China’s Full Cooperation
First, they were mostly based on the assumption that China shared a common interest with the United States in denuclearizing North Korea and would fully cooperate. U.S. policy-makers tried to utilize China’s full cooperation in pressuring North Korea to denuclearize.
Contrary to the expectations of U.S. policy-makers, however, China did not cooperate much. In the initial stage of North Korea’s nuclear development in the 1990s, China mostly took a lukewarm attitude on the North Korea nuclear issue. Chinese policy-makers regarded it as a bilateral issue solely between the United States and North Korea. In the 2000s, Beijing became a little more active mainly due to the George W. Bush administration’s pressure and hosted the Six-Party Talks. Even then, Beijing limited its role to that of a third-party mediator between the United States and North Korea. Chinese policy-makers tended to underestimate North Korea’s capability to develop nuclear weapons.
As North Korea increased its nuclear stockpiles in the 2010s, China seemed to accept North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons as a fait accompli rather quickly. There was one unusual exception when Beijing responded positively to former President Donald Trump’s request to apply harsh economic sanctions against North Korea from 2017 to mid-2018. Witnessing President Trump’s strong rhetoric and threat to use force in 2017, Chinese leaders seemed to have really worried about the possibility of a war on the Korean Peninsula and felt the necessity to push North Korea harder. War on the Korean Peninsula would be the last thing that Chinese president Xi Jinping might want. However, following the Singapore summit between the United States and North Korea, Beijing began to quietly loosen its economic sanctions on North Korea.
In this way, even during the period of U.S. engagement with China, China’s cooperation with the United States on North Korean issues was very limited. It was mainly because of the consistent Chinese geopolitical strategy toward the Korean Peninsula. As Mao did at the time of his decision to intervene in the Korean War in late 1950, his successors, including President Xi, have sought to maintain a buffer state in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula against the United States and its ally South Korea. So, they placed a higher priority on the stability of North Korea’s regime than its denuclearization. To avoid jeopardizing the Kim regime’s stability, they refrained from sanctioning it too hard.
The North Korean leaders, on the other hand, have recognized China’s strategic calculation and turned it to their own advantage. They pursued their nuclear program as freely as they wished with impunity. Though China participated in producing various UN Security Council resolutions sanctioning North Korea economically for its nuclear and missile programs, its implementation of those sanctions was nominal except in the period of 2017 to mid-2018.
The Korean Peninsula has uniquely experienced the geopolitical struggles among big powers in the last century and a half. The Sino-Japanese War (1894), Russo-Japanese War (1904), colonization of Korea by Japan (1910), division into two Koreas (1945), and Korean War (1950) are examples of struggle among neighboring powers that took place on the Korean Peninsula. Considering that South Korea and four important neighboring countries—the United States, China, Japan, and Russia—all have interrelated vital interests, achieving a peaceful settlement of the North Korean nuclear problem through multilateral cooperation is particularly desirable. However, China’s consistent geopolitical strategy of trying to maintain a buffer state in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula has been making multilateral cooperation with a closely coordinated action plan difficult.
China may want the United States to pay a very high price for its full cooperation on North Korea. It may wish the United States to make important concessions on some international issues such as the U.S.-ROK alliance, Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the East China Sea. If the United States does not wish to make that kind of Machiavellian deal with China, it may be natural for Washington to depart from the old policy assumption that China would fully cooperate. However, the U.S. government still seems to cling to that assumption instead of trying to explore a new bold approach.
Failure to Address North Korea’s Security Concerns
Second, the conventional U.S. approaches in the last three decades have tended to focus mostly on the moral aspects of North Korea’s violations of international norms and rules. As a result, they tended to minimize or disregard the ‘security dilemma’ aspect of the conundrum. By developing nuclear weapons, North Korea violated international law, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and various UN Security Council Resolutions. As a result, the United States had no other way to achieve desired behavioral changes than to apply as much pressure as possible in areas North Korea cares about more strongly, like the economy. Some even argued that regime change would be the only solution.
This view has been very powerful because it matched the moralistic and legalistic standards of the policy community and public opinion in the United States. However, the approach based on this interpretation neglected the dualistic nature of the problem. Simply put, North Korea’s nuclear problem not only has a moral dimension but also an amoral dimension of real politics. Most U.S. administrations, probably with the one exception being the Clinton administration around 2000, have focused mainly on the former aspect and adopted a coercive approach. It tended to neglect the important policy implications of the ‘security dilemma’ problem embedded in the North Korean nuclear issue.
There is a long list of historical examples showing the security dilemma aspect of North Korean provocations. Being deeply concerned about its own security, North Korea often tried to mitigate insecurity by improving its relationship with the United States before it fully developed its nuclear weapons. Each time, however, U.S. policy-makers largely discounted and disregarded North Korean leaders’ appeal to improve bilateral relations.
For instance, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the situation in North Korea was desperate. It suffered the triple shocks of an economic crisis, the weakening of its conventional military forces, and diplomatic isolation. In September 1990, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Eduard Shevardnadze visited Pyongyang to inform North Korean leaders of his government’s decision to open diplomatic relations with South Korea. Shevardnadze witnessed his North Korean counterpart, Kim Yong Nam, retort angrily that if that happened, North Korea would develop nuclear weapons.
In New York, in the first meeting of high-level U.S. and North Korean officials that took place in January 1992, the North Korean representative Kim Yong-sun delivered the message that Kim Il-sung wanted to improve North Korea’s relations with the United States and to establish diplomatic relations. However, the United States declined North Korea’s offer. The leaders of the United States and South Korea were not ready or imaginative enough to embrace North Korea diplomatically and totally redraw the security map of the Korean Peninsula while rooting out the seeds of its nuclear program early on.
In October 1994, the United States and North Korea concluded the Geneva Agreed Framework, with North Korea agreeing to freeze the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. In the negotiation process, the North Korean side pushed the U.S. representative hard to include clauses on improving political relations between the two countries. However, this agreement could not be fully implemented due to the opposition of the conventional approach’s strong supporters in Washington, especially in Congress.
President Clinton’s policy was an exception to the conventional moralistic-coercive approach. He tried to engage North Korea diplomatically in 2000 through exchange visits of high-level officials. When Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok visited Washington in October 2000, the United States and North Korea endorsed a communiqué and promised to end their hostile relationship. However, President George W. Bush abrogated this communiqué unilaterally and declared North Korea as one of three ‘axis of evil’ states in his 2002 State of the Union Address.
The United States launched the Six-Party Talks mechanism in 2003 to deal with the nuclear issue multilaterally. However, the United States used this mechanism mainly as an instrument for multilaterally pressuring North Korea rather than as a venue for a pragmatic, give-and-take kind of negotiation. Even the hard-won September 19th Agreement of 2005 did not have a chance to be implemented mainly due to the opposition of U.S. hard-liners who produced a financial sanctions law against North Korea almost simultaneously. The cost of having no real negotiation during 2003-2006 turned out to be quite detrimental. North Korea kept producing significant stockpiles of fissile materials and finally conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006.
President Trump’s meeting with Chairman Kim Jong-un was unprecedented, opening a direct communications channel between the two highly hostile leaders. This might have helped to mitigate unbridled distrust and suspicion, the biggest obstacles to a successful negotiated solution to the nuclear dilemma. However, Trump’s diplomacy was not much different in substance from the conventional U.S. approach in the sense that it neglected the security dilemma problem. Throughout the whole diplomatic process from 2018-19, Washington consistently demanded that Pyongyang denuclearize first before the United States moved. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Pyongyang May 8-9, 2018, and told Kim Jong-un that the United States needed North Korea to provide a list of sites for developing and testing nuclear weapons.
When Secretary Pompeo again demanded that North Korea produce a full declaration of its nuclear program at his meeting with Kim Yong Chol in July 2018, Kim responded angrily. He was reported to have said that the U.S. demand was nothing less than asking for the target list for an American attack on North Korea.
In this way, North Korea’s security concern has been regarded mostly as a disguise or pretext for their aggressive nuclear ambition. U.S. policy-makers, therefore, focused on applying military, economic, and diplomatic pressure on North Korea. Policy-makers and experts tended to assume that a small country like North Korea would not capitulate and denuclearize unless the United States strengthened its pressure tactics. In addition, Washington’s expectation of Beijing’s full cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue contributed significantly to this kind of sanguine moralistic perspective. So there is a hidden linkage between the first characteristic and the second characteristic of the conventional U.S. approach. Of course, China, the most important patron of North Korea, did not help the United States. And North Korea, facing those pressures, became even more desperate and accelerated its nuclear development. This vicious circle repeated itself over the past three decades.
Supporters of the moralistic coercion approach tended to overestimate the power of U.S. policy tools. The two pillars of the U.S. pressure campaign against North Korea were military and economic. However, the utility of U.S. military pressure on North Korea was quite limited. The effectiveness of military pressure was high only when the threat to use military force was credible. But it was usually not very credible because North Korea knew the United States would not be able to strike North Korea for fear of a retaliatory attack on South Korea, which might escalate into a total war.
The second pillar of U.S. pressure is the policy tool of economic sanctions. This can work only when there is a strong international coalition. However, the United States had only the illusion of China’s full cooperation in applying harsh enough sanctions against North Korea. It took a long time for U.S. policy-makers to recognize that China would not help much. China never wanted to take any serious measures that could destabilize the North Korean regime. Thus, China’s unwillingness to fully cooperate seriously weakened the effectiveness of U.S. pressure tactics.
By neglecting the security dilemma aspect of the North Korean predicament, U.S. policy-makers encountered the challenge of discerning between perception and misperception in dealing with North Korea. How will the North Korean leaders perceive U.S. intentions and respond to them? In the history of international relations, misperception has often led to disasters. Professor Robert Jervis highlighted the importance of this issue in his essay in the May/June 2018 issue of Foreign Affairs.
‘Whether the U.S. can actually persuade Pyongyang depends not just on which tools it chooses to use, but also, more fundamentally, on how it is viewed by North Korea. How do North Korean leaders interpret the signals Washington sends?
The promoters of the moralistic approach tended to view past U.S.-North Korea relations not as an “action-reaction” process but from a morally charged “bad guy, good guy” perspective. In their eyes, North Korea always reneged on agreements while the United States always kept its promises. However, the reality has been more complicated than that. For example, it was the United States that did not implement its promise to improve political relations with North Korea as laid out in the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework. Instead, many U.S. government insiders were just expecting North Korea to collapse soon. The George W. Bush administration also unilaterally scrapped the U.S.-North Korea communiqué of 2000, which had promised to end the hostile relationship between the two countries. Frequent talks on the regime change option among policy-makers and opinion leaders in the United States aggravated North Korea’s paranoia about its own security.
Paying serious attention to the other side’s perception of U.S. intentions, rather than focusing solely on punitive counter-measures, has led to successful crisis resolution in the past. One example is the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. President John F. Kennedy, despite pressure to strike Cuban missile sites from U.S. military leaders, tried hard to discern what the Soviet leaders’ perception of the U.S. intention would be. The recommendation of the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson II, to make a deal with the Soviet Union was criticized by hardliners as cowardly. But President Kennedy took it, and his prudent decision contributed to a peaceful resolution of the crisis that might have escalated into World War III.
A similar attentiveness was never applied to North Korea. This discrepancy was certainly because of the much larger asymmetry of power between the United States and North Korea. North Korea was simply not the Soviet Union. In retrospect and ironically, this asymmetry of power worked against not the small country, North Korea, but the big country, the United States. After all, the small country of North Korea’s resolute stance to assure its own security against big powers through nuclear weapons development has always been much stronger than the U.S. will and commitment to denuclearize North Korea.
My intention here is never to defend North Korea’s position. From the beginning, North Korea’s original sin was trying to woo the United States with its nuclear weapons program, a deadly wrong policy tool, out of desperation. I am just emphasizing that, once confronted by this kind of undesirable situation, U.S. policy-makers needed to observe the situation from a somewhat disinterested, amoralistic, third-person angle in order to find clues to a solution. The moralistic coercion approach of punishing a ‘bad guy’ may sound just and politically correct but may not be based on a thoroughly cool-headed calculation of the U.S. national interest. That approach has actually deprived U.S. policy-makers of the incentive to search for a more fundamental and realistic solution and to break the vicious cycle in which U.S. pressure leads to the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. In other words, instead of trying to cure the disease, the moralistic coercion approach just tried to palliate the symptoms each time. This was how we arrived at the current dangerous situation.
Failure to be Comprehensive
The third characteristic of the conventional U.S. policy toward North Korea is the lack of a comprehensive approach. As a result of focusing solely on security issues, policy-makers tended to disregard the interconnectedness among North Korea’s nuclear, economic, and diplomatic policies. As Shevardnadze’s encounter with the North Koreans in 1990 has shown earlier, the diplomatic isolation of North Korea aggravated their sense of insecurity, which motivated them in the early stage to develop nuclear weapons. Economic difficulties led them to pursue nuclear armament since it would cost much less than trying to strengthen their conventional military forces, which was the essence of North Korea’s Byungjin policy (parallel development of economy and nuclear weapons).
So from a policy-making perspective, it is almost impossible to separate the nuclear issue from the diplomatic and economic issues and then expect successful denuclearization. However, most U.S. policy-makers narrowly focused on the nuclear issue only. Addressing issues like diplomatic opening or economic assistance to North Korea has been regarded not as a necessary condition but as a quid pro quo for making progress in denuclearization.
For example, among other reasons, I suspect, the root cause of the collapse of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework was the failure to improve political relations between the United States and North Korea. Even President Trump’s unconventional approach of meeting the North Korean leader person-to-person could not make any meaningful progress because he did not prepare a concrete big picture, which covered the economic and diplomatic dimensions. Even his promise to provide North Korea with a “very bright future” in return for denuclearization was nothing but mere talk. Thus, any agreement on denuclearization that may be produced in the future will not last long without diplomatic normalization between the United States and North Korea and some international assistance for developing the North Korean economy. This is why we need a comprehensive approach from the United States.
welcomable.”
World of the Worsts
The result of the conventional U.S. policy of expecting China’s full cooperation, relying mainly on pressure tactics without political engagement, and having no comprehensive plan (in other words, the absence of a strategy) has been the ever-worsening strategic position of the United States in the region surrounding the Korean Peninsula. The United States has been pushed gradually and unnoticeably to the “world of the worsts.” The United States not only failed in denuclearizing North Korea but also pushed Pyongyang further into the orbit of China, leading to ever-increasing Chinese influence over North Korea.
This occurred even though most North Koreans, including their top leader, Kim Jong-un, deeply resent China. ‘Juche’ (self-reliance) has long been the leading national ideology for North Korea, and Kim Jong-un may have been very worried deep in his mind about his country’s heavy economic dependence on China with over ninety percent of North Korea’s trade with China—until North Korea’s self-quarantine measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19. The United States could have utilized Kim Jong-un’s concern in one way or another, but instead squandered the opportunity.
World of the Bests
In contrast, China was appreciating the “world of the bests,” enjoying the benefit of the status quo with no complete denuclearization, no war, no collapse of the North Korean regime, and ever-increasing influence over both Koreas.
The fact that North Korea has been pushed into the arms of China also has an important implication for South Korea’s foreign policy. In addition to China’s strong economic influence over South Korea, North Korea’s heavy dependence on China has made South Korea and its policy-makers very conscious of China’s influence over North Korea in the process of South Korea’s foreign policy-making. This is simply because of South Koreans’ cherished desire for a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. In my view, the Korean people’s desire to build a permanent peace should not be dismissed simply as a matter of partisan politics in South Korea. Progressive political leaders and even conservatives such as former president Park Geun-hye tried hard to nurture close ties with Xi because of her wish for China’s help in settling the North Korea problem and building a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. In this sense, U.S. policy toward North Korea, which pushed it toward China, has significantly constrained South Korea’s foreign policy-making.
This means that as long as the conventional U.S. policy continues, U.S. influence on the Korean Peninsula will be likely to recede compared to the Chinese influence in this age of intensifying competition. The United States is already far behind China in terms of building an economic base in North Korea. In the case of a contingency in North Korea, which some hardline supporters of regime change might want, not U.S. but Chinese influence will dominate the Korean Peninsula. This is why the United States needs to be more realistic and adjust its strategy toward North Korea. What the United States needs is neither a wait-and-see nor a piecemeal tactical adjustment based on the ineffective conventional approach. It needs a bold strategic shift of its North Korea policy in accordance with the new reality.
A Bold New Strategy
Most of all, a bold new strategy toward North Korea means engaging North Korea politically in order to fundamentally change the nature of the bilateral relationship. In other words, the United States needs to consider a détente with North Korea as it did with China in the early 1970s and Vietnam in the mid-1990s. The purpose of this new policy would be communicating more closely with its top leader, getting North Korea out of its diplomatic isolation, accomplishing the goal of complete denuclearization, and inducing North Korea to become not just a normal state but a partner of the United States.
In order to achieve these goals, the Biden team needs to adopt a two-track approach at the current stage. On the one hand, it needs to begin by taking some bold initiatives in order to engage North Korea politically. Measures that could be considered include offering to establish liaison offices in Washington and Pyongyang; beginning confidence-building measures like military-to-military exchange programs; declaring the end of the Korean War; inviting North Korean bureaucrats, students, sports and performance teams to the United States; and establishing a U.S.-DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) or a U.S.-DPRK-ROK (Republic of Korea) Track-1.5 commission for planning to help North Korea’s economic reconstruction.
In particular, establishing liaison offices in Pyongyang and Washington should be the first measure considered for political engagement. We need to recognize that North Korea’s nuclear program has already advanced too far. It will take a long time and be all but technically impossible to denuclearize that country without mobilizing their voluntary cooperation. A New York Times article on May 6, 2018 pointed out that even if the International Atomic Energy Agency brought all of its inspectors into North Korea, it would be impossible to inspect all of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. There are simply too many facilities, and nobody knows where North Korea is hiding its weapons and fissile materials. In order to mobilize North Korea’s voluntary cooperation, there should be a fundamental change in political relations between the two countries, which would begin with establishing liaison offices.
The United States and North Korea were almost at the stage of completing the deal on establishing liaison offices through five meetings of negotiating teams from September 1994 to mid-1995. However, the North Korean side canceled the exchange of liaison offices at the final stage. It was likely due to the strong tension between the military and the foreign ministry over which side would take initiative on the U.S.-North Korea communication. However, the situation now is quite different from then. Chairman Kim Jong-un’s attitude at the summit meetings with President Trump showed his seriousness about improving relations with the United States. When asked by an American reporter during the Hanoi summit about establishing a liaison office, Kim said “I think that is something which is welcomable.”
According to the conventional approach, all these measures might be considered as a quid pro quo for North Korea’s cooperation in denuclearization. The new approach should regard all these measures as an early unilateral gesture to increase communications, build mutual trust, and improve political relations. All measures for political engagement should be de-linked from the negotiation process for denuclearization on the other track. For instance, the Biden team may pursue a gradual phased approach to denuclearization, which would be a realistic approach. However, they need to take additional measures for political engagement in parallel to negotiations for denuclearization. Though these two-track negotiations would be delinked, talks on political engagement will significantly provide incentives and facilitate talks on denuclearization.
Considering North Korea’s past behavior, some may worry that North Korea will simply “pocket” unilateral gestures without making any corresponding concessions. However, here we are talking about changing the nature of the bilateral relationship fundamentally after which both countries will play a very different game. If North Korea takes the U.S. offer of détente seriously, that means North Korea will be entering the international community where reciprocity is the rule of the game. North Korean behavior will then have to change qualitatively. For example, Vietnam, once a deadly enemy of the United States, has become a close partner of the United States through the strategic decision of U.S. political leaders for détente in the early 1990s. Thereafter, the United States was able to induce significant changes in Vietnamese behavior with its much superior resources and leverage. It could effectively mobilize Vietnam’s full cooperation on the POW/MIA issue, withdrawal from Cambodia, and even human rights issues.
The Catch
There is one caveat. Though measures for political engagement should be taken on one track, pressuring North Korea with economic sanctions would still be necessary on the other track of negotiating denuclearization. This is because North Korea’s intention regarding its nuclear program may have shifted from defensive to offensive. Rapid growth of its nuclear capability might have caused that kind of shift despite North Korea’s public announcement that its nuclear weapons are only for defensive purposes. For example, North Korea may not only be able to attack any city in the U.S. mainland through its growing ICBM capabilities but also to weaken the U.S. commitment to provide extended nuclear deterrence to its allies, South Korea and Japan. In this way, North Korea may try to weaken the U.S.-ROK alliance through its nuclear and missile capabilities and strive for a more favorable political-military environment for unifying the Korean Peninsula on their own terms.
North Korea may argue that economic sanctions are evidence of U.S. hostility. However, they need to recognize the hostility and the threat at the current stage are not one-sided but mutual. Their nuclear development is a grave threat to the United States. North Korea has already threatened a few times that they could strike U.S. territory with their nuclear ICBM. Thus, the principle of exchanging sanctions with denuclearization should be maintained.
In Defense of a Bold U.S. Approach Toward North Korea
Even in that kind of undesirable scenario of North Korea having an offensive goal, the United States will lose nothing much by offering North Korea a détente. At least, through political engagement, the United States will be able to discern North Korea’s true intention, which will help identify the next steps to take in close coordination with South Korea. Most of all, the United States will be able to confirm whether North Korea truly wants the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South in return for its denuclearization. North Korea has been publicly demanding it, but it is quite likely that North Korea may not want it out of concern that Chinese influence would fill the vacuum on the Korean Peninsula. In the past two inter-Korean summits in 2000 and 2018, the North Korean leaders indicated flexibility on this matter. Through political engagement and candid dialogues, the possibility of an optimal solution satisfying the demands of three major stakeholders, the United States, South Korea, and North Korea could be explored.
The Cure
After all, a thorough review of the conventional approach and a cool-headed calculation of the U.S. interest from a broader geostrategic perspective requires a bold new approach toward North Korea. In this way, the United States will be able to move a step closer to curing the root cause of the North Korea problem and strengthening its strategic position in the region surrounding the Korean Peninsula.
Dr. Yoon Young-kwan was recently the inaugural Senior Visiting Scholar with the Korea Project at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. He served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea from 2003 to 2004. He is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. The author acknowledges the generous support of the Korea Foundation.
Image: Reuters
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
