Quotes of the Day:

"They always say that time changes things, but you actually have to change them yourself." 

- Andy Warhol

“When we are no longer able to change a situation, we are challenged to change ourselves.” 

- Viktor Frankl

​

"Writing is done by writing and the way to begin to write is to begin to write. Lousy writing is better than no writing because the one can be improved but the other does not exist. Of course it is your privilege, if you wish, to become a fourth-rate premature has-been, looking no man in the eye and creeping shame-faced about the academic gutter, ridden by guilt and perfectionism, humiliating your old parents, disappointing your supporters, embarrassing your friends, a once promising scholar now gutless and defeated. However, do not let me pressure you." 

- John King Fairbank in a letter to his doctoral students, 1970s

1. N.Korean Leader Congratulates Xi's Reelection With Hopes for 'More Beautiful' Ties

2. North Korea’s Missile Activity: Japan’s Response

3. The Case for South Korea to Go Nuclear

4.  Air Force B-1B bombers just rolled up in Guam in a message to US adversaries

5. Lawmaker Kim Byung-joo, Democratic Party of Korea, Retired ROK Military 4 Star General, Criticizes Korea-U.S.-Japan Military Exercise

6. New logo of S. Korea's presidential office unveiled

7. Korea caught in the superpower squeeze

8. On the offense in defense exports

9. Travel expert shares what having a mobile phone is like in North Korea

10. US bombers likely to participate in combined exercise

11. Korea Times forum to examine new challenges for Korea-US alliance

12. Korea's debt-to-GDP ratio grows 2.5 times faster than advanced economies'

13. North Korea may carry out more than one nuclear test, experts say

1. N.Korean Leader Congratulates Xi's Reelection With Hopes for 'More Beautiful' Ties

Closer than lips and teeth.

N.Korean Leader Congratulates Xi's Reelection With Hopes for 'More Beautiful' Ties

By U.S. News Staff U.S. News & World Report2 min

View Original

FILE PHOTO: North Korean leader Kim Jong-un speaks during a visit to the Central Officers School of the ruling Workers' Party in Pyongyang, North Korea, in this undated photo released on October 18, 2022 by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). KCNA via REUTERSReuters

SEOUL (Reuters) -North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un sent a congratulatory letter to Xi Jinping on his reelection as China's leader, saying he hoped to further develop their ties, state news agency KCNA reported on Sunday.

"The 20th Congress of the CPC offered a significant landmark for the Chinese party and people in propelling the historic process of the Chinese nation's great prosperity under the banner of the socialist idea with the Chinese characteristics in the new era," Kim said in the letter.

"I, together with you, will shape more a beautiful future of the DPRK-China relations meeting the demand of the times and lead the endeavours for its realisation so as to continue to powerfully propel the socialist cause in the two countries."

DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name.

China's Xi Jinping secured a precedent-breaking third leadership term on Sunday and introduced a new top governing body stacked with loyalists, cementing his place as the country's most powerful ruler since Mao Zedong.

(Reporting by Jihoon Lee; Editing by William Mallard and Alex Richardson)

Copyright 2022 Thomson Reuters.

Tags: North Korea, Asia

2. North Korea’s Missile Activity: Japan’s Response

Excerpts;

North Korea’s IRBM flight over northern Japan was not an unprecedented event. The first time the North lobbed a missile over Japan was in 1998, during President Bill Clinton’s second term in office, and several more tests like this were conducted in 2017. It also was not much of a direct threat to Japanese citizens on the ground since the IRBM (perhaps a modified version of the Hwasong-12) flew higher than the International Space Station.

Nevertheless, none of these specifics mattered for Japan’s defense hawks. North Korea’s testing activity is ammunition for those in and outside of the Japanese government who strongly believe more military spending is a baseline necessity. Kim Jong Un is, therefore, inadvertently accelerating an existing trend toward ever-increasing Japanese military expenditures. However, as to how quickly Tokyo can accomplish such a feat currently remains questionable.

North Korea’s Missile Activity: Japan’s Response

• https://www.38north.org/2022/10/north-koreas-missile-activity-japans-response/?utm_source=pocket_mylist
• BY: DANIEL R. DEPETRIS
• OCTOBER 21, 2022

This year has proven to be an especially busy time for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his country’s defense industrial base. North Korea has launched more than 40 missiles of various types and ranges in 2022. Six of those tests occurred this month, including an October 12 launch of two cruise missiles that traveled more than 1,200 miles before landing in the East Sea (Sea of Japan). North Korea’s decision to resume intercontinental ballistic missile tests in March, which broke a nearly four-year unilateral moratorium of such activities, was not only the beginning of a more aggressive testing schedule, but was a direct repudiation of the benign atmosphere that has existed since 2018.

It’s becoming increasingly clear that Kim is neither interested in nor eager to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States. As such, additional North Korean missile tests are assured. Kim’s January 2021 guidance to transform the country’s missile inventory into a lighter, faster and more lethal force, thereby enhancing its second-strike capabilities in the process, will proceed based on the North’s own schedule.

This poses a unique problem for Japan, a country that, over the last decade, has largely prioritized China over every other security issue, including North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. The October 4 test of an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) over Japan’s northernmost islands, the first in five years, caused a mini-crisis for the young tenure of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and a stark reminder of how the North’s advancing capabilities. It brought the issue of North Korea back to the forefront of Japanese foreign and defense policy and is now driving efforts to increase Japan’s defenses.

Japan’s North Korea Policy: Lean on Washington

Successive Japanese governments have largely been content with outsourcing North Korea policy to their most important ally­­—the United States. Tokyo and Washington’s objectives pertaining to Pyongyang are virtually indistinguishable from one another. These include placing and upholding a permanent halt to nuclear and ballistic missile tests in accordance with various United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions, penalizing Pyongyang in the event of further violations and working toward the complete denuclearization of North Korea. On the missile issue specifically, Japan has arguably been tougher than the US, which remains most concerned with the North’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) rather than those with shorter-range capabilities. This distinction was particularly acute during the Trump administration when then-President Donald Trump threatened “fire and fury” in response to the North’s ICBM launches in 2017 but was willing to dismiss its short-range missile launches after the breakdown in diplomacy in 2019. This essentially normalized SRBM testing over time. Given its geographical location, Japan took a different view. For Tokyo, denuclearization, as monumental of an accomplishment as this would be, isn’t enough if the North keeps its arsenal of short- and medium-range missiles that can reach Japan. This type of scenario would remain a constant worry for Japanese defense planners.

Traditionally, Japan reacts to North Korean missile launches as predictably as the US does. National security meetings are quickly called to discuss the latest developments, a senior Japanese national security official (oftentimes the Japanese Prime Minister himself) issues a strongly worded denunciation of the action during a live press conference, and Tokyo urges the UN Security Council to increase the pressure on Pyongyang for its flagrant breach of international law. This is precisely what the Kishida administration did this month when Japan’s UN ambassador, Kimihiro Ishikane, excoriated the Security Council for its lack of urgency on the North Korea issue and advocated for stringent enforcement of the sanctions currently on the books.

Yet, those calls have fallen on deaf ears at the Security Council, where relations between the permanent members have frayed in large measure over the war in Ukraine. Russia and China, who frequently collaborated with the US, the United Kingdom and France on North Korea in the past, are now content with using the North’s continued WMD developments as a wedge issue to frustrate the US. For the first time on record, Russia and China both vetoed a US-drafted resolution in June that would have penalized Pyongyang for this year’s litany of ballistic missile tests. With Moscow and Beijing blocking any additional action at the multilateral level, Kim may feel reasonably comfortable to proceed with his military modernization campaign without much blowback from the international community.

Japan’s Slow Defense Buildup Could Accelerate

Even before the October 4 IRBM test, the mood within the Japanese government was one of gradual rearmament. In a June speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue, Prime Minister Kishida was unequivocal in his intentions: “I am determined to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defence capabilities within the next five years and secure a substantial increase of Japan’s defence budget needed to effect such reinforcement.” Kishida’s remarks were virtually identical to those a month earlier, when he pledged to “fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities” during his May 2022 summit with President Biden at the White House. Such sentiments aren’t relegated to Kishida or his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). A May poll from Asahi Shimbun found that 64 percent of Japanese citizens believe Japan should strengthen its defenses, overshadowing the 10 percent who opposed it.

Support for boosting Japan’s defense spending and devoting a growing share of its public budget toward procurement of military hardware like the F-35, F-16, space-based systems, cyber warfare tools, and development of a new submarine class is a direct reflection of how Japan interprets the security environment in East Asia. The region’s security and stability are becoming more precarious in the eyes of the wider cross-section of Japan’s defense establishment, with China’s military modernization and North Korea’s ballistic missile advancements being the two greatest concerns.

Strengthening deterrence, bolstering the US-Japan security alliance and contributing to what the US refers to as a “free and open Indo-Pacific” are the three pillars that the Japanese Defense Ministry stands on. Therefore, it’s not a surprise that Kishida’s LDP is advocating for steep hikes to Japan’s defense budget, with the goal of bringing it in line with NATO standards. Kishida has apparently taken those recommendations to heart as Japan is considering spending nearly $280 billion USD on its military over the next five years, where much of this budget will be earmarked for anti-missile defense, cruise missiles, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Establishing fully equipped and resourced independent counterstrike capabilities, which would allow Japan to launch attacks against enemy bases and missile silos 900 miles away, will take special priority.

North Korea’s Actions Help Japan’s Defense Hawks

North Korea’s IRBM flight over northern Japan was not an unprecedented event. The first time the North lobbed a missile over Japan was in 1998, during President Bill Clinton’s second term in office, and several more tests like this were conducted in 2017. It also was not much of a direct threat to Japanese citizens on the ground since the IRBM (perhaps a modified version of the Hwasong-12) flew higher than the International Space Station.

Nevertheless, none of these specifics mattered for Japan’s defense hawks. North Korea’s testing activity is ammunition for those in and outside of the Japanese government who strongly believe more military spending is a baseline necessity. Kim Jong Un is, therefore, inadvertently accelerating an existing trend toward ever-increasing Japanese military expenditures. However, as to how quickly Tokyo can accomplish such a feat currently remains questionable.

3. The Case for South Korea to Go Nuclear

Again I reprise my previous comments about the US re-deployment of nuclear weapons and the development of ROK tactical nuclear weapons.. Dr. Cheong thinks he answers the deterrence question. Does it?

Most people talking about redeployment cannot answer the basic questions such as what is the concept of employment in war, will the US change the policy of not confirming or denying the presence of nuclear weapons (how would it contribute to deterrence if we do not acknowledge their presence), are we prepared for and willing to accept the inevitable sustained protests at the US basees where such weapons would likely be stored? And much more, including how do we think KJU will be deterred by tactical nuclear weapons? Aren't we mirror imaging our nuclear taboo and projecting that on Kim? Will our tactical nuclear weapons really make him fear our capabilities any more than he already does? And will KJU be able to exploit the redeployment to support his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy (as counterintuitive that may seem for some).

What is the concept for employment of ROK (or US) tactical nuclear weapons in wartime? How is that concept transmitted to Kim Jong Un so it can possibly have a deterrence effect? And of course will it have a deterrent effect.? How will tactical nuclear weapons effectively deter Kim Jong Un and more specifically what actions or activities will tactical nuclear weapons actually deter?

Excerpts:

To sum up, Seoul’s nuclearization will benefit both South Korea and the United States by lowering the possibility of North Korea’s use of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and sparing the U.S. from a nuclear war with North Korea. Nevertheless, the South Korean administration has failed to seriously consider the option of nuclearization, fearing the possible strong opposition and severe sanctions imposed by Washington. It is thus recommended that the U.S. administration suggest closed-door talks through bilateral high-level meetings to discuss this issue for mutual benefit.

The “South Korean nuclearization card” will deter North Korea’s nuclear threats; it will also encourage China to engage itself more actively in resolving North Korea-related issues. Therefore, it is very irrational for South Korea-U.S. alliance not to play with this card. If South Korea declares that “we have no choice but to withdraw from the NPT in case of North Korea’s seventh nuclear test,” the North will be more strained since the South has the raw materials to produce more than 4,000 nuclear warheads. In this case, China will also pressure North Korea not to carry out the seventh nuclear test because China does not want a worst-case scenario in which Seoul’s nuclearization leads Tokyo and Taipei to also develop nuclear weapons.

​Conclusion:

​If North Korea still conducts a nuclear test, the South Korean government needs to declare, along with its withdrawal from the NPT, that “we will execute our plans for nuclear armament unless North Korea returns to the table of negotiation to discuss the denuclearization with South Korea, the U.S., and China within a six-month period.” Such a declaration of “conditional nuclear armament” by South Korea will stop Pyongyang from ignoring non-nuclear South Korea, and the North will start considering seriously returning to the negotiation table. Beijing will also urge Pyongyang to return to the denuclearization talks, applying maximum leverage, to prevent a nuclear domino effect that Seoul’s nuclearization may trigger in Japan and Taiwan.

Washington and Seoul can discuss the actual nuclearization of South Korea should these two steps to put pressure on North Korea and China fail. However, now is the time for the South Korea-U.S. alliance to play with the card of “Seoul’s nuclearization” to disturb Kim Jong Un. Otherwise, we will all regret it.

The Case for South Korea to Go Nuclear

It may be the best option for the South Korea-U.S. alliance to deter a nuclear war with North Korea.

thediplomat.com · by Seong-Chang Cheong · October 22, 2022

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North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats against South Korea and the United States have continued to escalate significantly. Against the backdrop of these serious nuclear threats, both Seoul and Washington should be prepared for the worst-case scenario, which is a nuclear war with North Korea.

In April, North Korea announced its intention to forward-deploy tactical nuclear weapons, and in September Pyongyang adopted a new nuclear policy law, which allows the country to carry out a preemptive nuclear strike against South Korea. From the end of September to early October, North Korea’s “tactical nuclear operation units” conducted launching drills of missiles designed to strike potential South Korean targets such as airfields, ports, and command facilities. Additionally, on October 4, North Korea fired an intermediate-range ballistic missile at a normal angle – not a high angle – so that the missile overflew Japan into the Pacific Ocean. The test once again demonstrated North Korea’s capability to reach the U.S. territory of Guam in case of U.S. intervention in inter-Korean military clashes.

With North Korea’s nuclear capability to reach U.S. territory, most South Korean and American experts have questioned if the United States would actually provide nuclear retaliation against the North should South Korea be attacked by North Korea’s tactical nuclear weapons. It would be difficult for the United States to retaliate with nuclear weapons against North Korea when Pyongyang will also launch nuclear attacks on the U.S. homeland – probably Washington, D.C. or New York City – in retaliation. No American president would be able to make such a decision, which will claim hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Americans’ lives. Even if the future brings a scenario of nuclear sharing or redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, it will be the U.S. president who has the authority to press the nuclear button. That means deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons to South Korea will not entail major difference from the current extended deterrence system.

This is also what Pyongyang thinks: North Korea does not expect the U.S. to unfold its nuclear umbrella, taking a risk of a nuclear war with North Korea. It is why the North made a bold action by launching a short-range ballistic missile as a response to the redeployment of a U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to the Korean Peninsula’s east coast.

It is anticipated that in the future, North Korea will launch an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at a normal angle into the Pacific Ocean to show off its capability to re-enter the atmosphere and to reach the U.S. homeland. It is also expected that North Korea will build nuclear-powered submarines, as presented during the Eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in 2021, to display its second-strike capability.

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As North Korea’s nuclear arsenal has grown rapidly, the threat it poses to South Korea and the U.S. also grows significantly. However, successive administrations of both countries have been chasing the mirage of “North Korean denuclearization,” without coming up with realistic solutions to the North Korean nuclear issue. Recently, Jeffery Lewis, an expert on nuclear nonproliferation at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, claimed in an article for the New York Times that it’s time for the United States to admit the fact that its efforts to denuclearize North Korea have failed, and to accept that North Korea has nuclear weapons. If North Korean nuclear weapons were threats only to the United States, it would be reasonable for the U.S. administration to recognize North Korea as a de facto nuclear state. However, in a situation where North Korean nuclear weapons are a more direct threat to South Korea, a U.S. acknowledgement of North Korean nuclear weapons will cause a sense of betrayal among South Koreans.

In order to de-escalate tensions and to prevent nuclear war with North Korea, American policy decision-makers and academics need to consider the nuclear armament of South Korea as an option. A nuclear-armed South Korea will be able to start negotiations for nuclear arms reduction with the North. According to various polls conducted in 2021 and 2022, more than 70 percent of South Koreans – 74.9 percent, according to the SAND research institute’s figures released last June – support the country’s indigenous nuclearization out of the fear of North Korean nuclear bombs. That figure may exceed 80 percent if North Korea carries out a seventh nuclear test.

While some Korean right-wing politicians demand redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to address the North Korean nuclear threat, the South Korean public prefers developing their country’s own nuclear weapons. Last December, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs conducted a survey of 1,500 South Koreans and 67 percent of them replied that they prefer “indigenous nuclear weapons development” to “deployment of American nuclear weapons.” Only 9 percent of the respondents prefer the latter.

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Some American experts are concerned that South Korea’s nuclear weapons development would lead to a weakened South Korea-U.S. alliance and bring South Korea closer to China. However, that scenario is not likely to be realized. According to the “Unification consciousness survey 2022” published on September 22 by the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS) at Seoul National University, when asked the question “Which country do you feel the closest to?” 80.6 percent of the respondents chose the U.S., while 9.7 percent replied North Korea, followed by Japan (5.1 percent), China (3.9 percent), and Russia (0.5 percent). The absolute majority, which accounts for the four-fifths of the respondents, feel close ties to the United States while South Koreans’ affinity for China is very low. It is hard to expect that South Korea’s nuclear armament will reverse these sentiments, either toward the United States or China.

Rather, South Koreans’ confidence in the alliance will collapse if the U.S. exhibits a reluctance to retaliate with nuclear weapons against North Korean nuclear attacks on the South. On the contrary, if South Korea pursues nuclearization, the country can respond to the North’s nuclear attacks with its own nuclear arsenal. This will free the United States from the conundrum of whether to use nuclear weapons to defend its East Asian ally. In the end, the U.S. homeland and its citizens’ lives will be also free from the threat of North Korea’s nuclear bombs. Additionally, a nuclear-armed South Korea will make North Korea approach using its nuclear weapons with more prudence, raising the threshold for using nuclear weapons.

To sum up, Seoul’s nuclearization will benefit both South Korea and the United States by lowering the possibility of North Korea’s use of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and sparing the U.S. from a nuclear war with North Korea. Nevertheless, the South Korean administration has failed to seriously consider the option of nuclearization, fearing the possible strong opposition and severe sanctions imposed by Washington. It is thus recommended that the U.S. administration suggest closed-door talks through bilateral high-level meetings to discuss this issue for mutual benefit.

The “South Korean nuclearization card” will deter North Korea’s nuclear threats; it will also encourage China to engage itself more actively in resolving North Korea-related issues. Therefore, it is very irrational for South Korea-U.S. alliance not to play with this card. If South Korea declares that “we have no choice but to withdraw from the NPT in case of North Korea’s seventh nuclear test,” the North will be more strained since the South has the raw materials to produce more than 4,000 nuclear warheads. In this case, China will also pressure North Korea not to carry out the seventh nuclear test because China does not want a worst-case scenario in which Seoul’s nuclearization leads Tokyo and Taipei to also develop nuclear weapons.

If North Korea still conducts a nuclear test, the South Korean government needs to declare, along with its withdrawal from the NPT, that “we will execute our plans for nuclear armament unless North Korea returns to the table of negotiation to discuss the denuclearization with South Korea, the U.S., and China within a six-month period.” Such a declaration of “conditional nuclear armament” by South Korea will stop Pyongyang from ignoring non-nuclear South Korea, and the North will start considering seriously returning to the negotiation table. Beijing will also urge Pyongyang to return to the denuclearization talks, applying maximum leverage, to prevent a nuclear domino effect that Seoul’s nuclearization may trigger in Japan and Taiwan.

Washington and Seoul can discuss the actual nuclearization of South Korea should these two steps to put pressure on North Korea and China fail. However, now is the time for the South Korea-U.S. alliance to play with the card of “Seoul’s nuclearization” to disturb Kim Jong Un. Otherwise, we will all regret it.

Seong-Chang Cheong

Seong-Chang Cheong is the director of the Center for North Korean Studies at the Sejong Institute.

thediplomat.com · by Seong-Chang Cheong · October 22, 2022

4. Air Force B-1B bombers just rolled up in Guam in a message to US adversaries

Strategic reassurance and strategic resolve.

“Moving forward, we will continue to consult closely with our allies and partners and stand ready to respond appropriately to any potential future provocative acts by North Korea,” Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder said at the time. “As always, we remain committed to preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific and peace and stability throughout the region.”

When asked on Friday whether the deployment of Lancers to Guam was a “warning” to North Korea, Ryder demurred.

“It’s not uncommon for us to have bomber task forces, which conduct operations around the world … for two reasons,” Ryder said. “One, to send a very clear message that we will support our partners and allies around the world. And two, that we do have the capability to conduct global operations on any given day.”

“So … it is meant to send a message — meant to send a message that the United States stands closely with its allies and partners to deter potential provocation,” he added.

Air Force B-1B bombers just rolled up in Guam in a message to US adversaries

“Not only does it provide our B-1 aircrew invaluable training opportunities with important Allies and partners, but it also signals our nation’s unwavering support to them.” 

BY JARED KELLER | PUBLISHED OCT 22, 2022 8:44 PM

taskandpurpose.com · by Jared Keller · October 23, 2022

America’s premier long-range heavy bombers are back in Guarm, and they mean business.

Air Force B-1B Lancer bombers from the 28th Bomb Wing at Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota arrived at Andersen Air Force Base in Guam on Thursday as part of a mission with the core goal of “deterring potential adversaries and challenging their decision calculus,” the service announced in a press release.

The arrival of the undisclosed number of Lancers marks the second rotation to Guam this year following a Bomber Task Force (BTF) mission in June that saw four aircraft integrate with Japan Air Self-Defense Force and Royal Australian Air Force for multilateral training operations.

The new rotation will see the Lancers join “with more Allies” for several additional Indo-Pacific training missions to “provide key assurances and cooperation with joint and partner Allies in the region,” as 37th Bomb Squadron operations director Lt. Col. Daniel Mount put it in a statement.

Indeed, the BTF mission to Guam “demonstrates continued U.S. commitment to the Pacific,” said 28th Bomb Wing commander Col. Joseph Sheffield. “Not only does it provide our B-1 aircrew invaluable training opportunities with important Allies and partners, but it also signals our nation’s unwavering support to them.”

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With a payload capacity of 75,000 pounds and the ability to fly between continents without refueling, the B-1B can carry the largest conventional payload of both guided and unguided weapons in the Air Force inventory, making it “the backbone of America’s long-range bomber force” alongside the B-52 Stratofortress and B-2 Spirit bombers, according to the Air Force.

The show of force the B-1B rotation represents probably couldn’t come soon enough for some allies. Recent weeks have seen renewed regional tensions between the U.S. and China over Taiwan’s sovereignty and an alarming uptick in missile tests from North Korea that suggest a potential nuclear test might be on the horizon for the regime.

Following months of bellicose behavior towards Taiwan — including a ‘simulated attack’ in the Taiwan Strait and launching a ballistic missile over the island nation — Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday on Wednesday indicated that China could possibly invade the U.S. ally as soon as this year.

“When we talk about the 2027 window, in my mind that has to be a 2022 window or a potentially a 2023 window. I can’t rule that out,” Gilday said during an event hosted by the Atlantic Council. “I don’t mean at all to be alarmist by saying that, it’s just that we can’t wish that away.”

In September, President Joe Biden stated unequivocally that the U.S. military would defend Taiwan from a Chinese invasion during an interview with the CBS News show “60 Minutes.”

The escalating Sino-American tensions come amid a flurry of increased military activity from North Korea, which, according to Military Times, has fired the most missiles in a single year since current dictator Kim Jong Un took power more than a decade ago, culminating with the launch of a ballistic missile over Japan in early October.

The Japanese missile scare, the first since 2017, prompted the Defense Department to send the USS Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group to the Sea of Japan for trilateral missile defense exercises with a pair of Japanese destroyers and a South Korean destroyer.

“Moving forward, we will continue to consult closely with our allies and partners and stand ready to respond appropriately to any potential future provocative acts by North Korea,” Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder said at the time. “As always, we remain committed to preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific and peace and stability throughout the region.”

When asked on Friday whether the deployment of Lancers to Guam was a “warning” to North Korea, Ryder demurred.

“It’s not uncommon for us to have bomber task forces, which conduct operations around the world … for two reasons,” Ryder said. “One, to send a very clear message that we will support our partners and allies around the world. And two, that we do have the capability to conduct global operations on any given day.”

“So … it is meant to send a message — meant to send a message that the United States stands closely with its allies and partners to deter potential provocation,” he added.

taskandpurpose.com · by Jared Keller · October 23, 2022

5. Lawmaker Kim Byung-joo, Democratic Party of Korea, Retired ROK Military 4 Star General, Criticizes Korea-U.S.-Japan Military Exercise

This is disappointing and troubling.

I find this to be an incredible statement from a former ROK/US Combined Forces Command Deputy Commander.

He also stated the strengthening of the ROK-U.S.-Japan military exercise will offend China and Russia. He further said, “There is no real benefit to be gained from joining hands with Japan,” which is very different from reality.

Lawmaker Kim Byung-joo, Democratic Party of Korea, Retired ROK Military 4 Star General, Criticizes Korea-U.S.-Japan Military Exercise - East Asia Research Center

eastasiaresearch.org · by _ · October 23, 2022

Published date October 23, 2022

Last modified date October 23, 2022

Author

2022-10-23, Tara O

Kim Byung-joo

Kim Byung-joo in the middle standing next to then-Democratic Party leader Lee Hae-chan (on the left)

National Assemblyman Kim Byung-joo (김병주), Democratic Party of Korea, criticized the recent Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S.-Japan military exercise. On October 12, 2022, he said, “It’s the same as dragging a tiger cub into a home, thinking it is not a threat.” He also said, “at this rate, it will be forced into a ROK-U.S.-Japan military alliance” and “like the U.S. military, the Japanese Self Defense Force can also come to Korea.”

He also stated the strengthening of the ROK-U.S.-Japan military exercise will offend China and Russia. He further said, “There is no real benefit to be gained from joining hands with Japan,” which is very different from reality.

General Kim Byung-joo, former ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command Deputy Commander

Surprisingly, he was the Deputy Commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) from August 11, 2017 to April 17, 2019, appointed soon after Moon Jae-in became president in spring 2017. While he was the Deputy CFC Commander, the controversial Inter-Korea Military Agreement of 2018 (referred to as the “9.19 Military Agreement” in Korea) was signed by then ROK Minister of Defense Song Young-moo, and North Korea’s Minister of People’s Armed Forces No Kwang-chol, as Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un stood behind them. The agreement hampered ROK-U.S. CFC military readiness with various training and other restrictions. See here for a detailed analysis. The agreement also had significant differences in context and details between the English version (17 pages) and the Korean language version (56 pages). See here (English) and here (Korean).

Kim Byung-joo then became appointed by the then-ruling Democratic Party of Korea (Deobureo Minjoo Party) as a Proportional Representative (appointed by the party, not elected by the people), becoming a National Assemblyman starting May 30, 2020.

Note: The election of April 15, 2020 that preceded the 21st National Assembly was mired in election fraud controversies, with a shocking 3/5 majority (or 180 seats of combined elected and appointed lawmakers) for Democratic Party of Korea, which allowed the Party to pass any law it wanted, except to change the Constitution, which requires a 2/3 majority. With such power, the Democratic Party passed various laws that suppressed freedom of speech as well as ones favorable to North Korea, such as the anti-leaflet law.

From left: Kim Hong-gul, Lee Jae-myung (current Democratic Party leader), and Kim Byung-joo

Kim Byung-joo loyally follows the Party line (anti-Japan, among others). Lee Jae-myung, who became the Democratic Party (Deobureo Minjoo) leader, despite numerous corruption and bribery scandals, has presidential ambitions, and appears to see Kim Byung-joo as someone who could faithfully carry out Lee’s policies in the national security arena. For Lee Jae-myung’s positions on national security and other issues, see here.

Categories:Alliance​Defense​Military​Moon Jae-in​National Security

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eastasiaresearch.org · by _ · October 23, 2022

6. New logo of S. Korea's presidential office unveiled

Image at the link: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20221023002551325?section=news

​Good luck with this. I will know that "reasonable criticism" when I see it.

Meanwhile, Yoon's office is ramping up efforts to counter what it views as negative or false news on his policy and job performance, as his approval ratings hover around 30 percent.

It has launched a "fact-checking" section on the website of the presidential office that is meant to counter fake news spreading through media reports and postings on online communities. The new page is titled "The fact is this."

"There have been a lot of cases of information that is not true at all going on for months or spreading on social media," a presidential official said, stressing the need to draw a line between fake and true news, while accepting "reasonable criticism."

​

(LEAD) New logo of S. Korea's presidential office unveiled | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이치동 · October 23, 2022

(ATTN: ADDS creation of fact-checking site; RECASTS 3rd clarification)

SEOUL, Oct. 23 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's presidential office made public its new emblem Sunday, more than five months after Yoon Suk-yeol began his term at the Yongsan office in central Seoul.

He moved the country's presidential office to the Yongsan compound from Cheong Wa Dae in a northern part of the capital.

The new logo features two phoenixes symbolizing the nation's president and its national flower, the Rose of Sharon, against the backdrop of the building that contains the presidential office in Yongsan. The shape of a house with blue-tile roof, which was symbolic of Cheong Wa Dae, has been removed.

It "symbolizes freedom, peace, and prosperity in the Republic of Korea," Yoon's office said.

The emblem reflects a wish for peace and freedom based on stability and harmony, the office added.

It will be used in earnest starting in November, appearing on the official website of the presidential office as well as on various goods and PR materials.

Meanwhile, Yoon's office is ramping up efforts to counter what it views as negative or false news on his policy and job performance, as his approval ratings hover around 30 percent.

It has launched a "fact-checking" section on the website of the presidential office that is meant to counter fake news spreading through media reports and postings on online communities. The new page is titled "The fact is this."

"There have been a lot of cases of information that is not true at all going on for months or spreading on social media," a presidential official said, stressing the need to draw a line between fake and true news, while accepting "reasonable criticism."

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이치동 · October 23, 2022

7. Korea caught in the superpower squeeze

The worn out adage: a shrimp among whales. we need to understand and pay attention to korean concerns.

Excerpts:

“Korea has no choice but to follow the same path in the current U.S.-led supply chain reorganization in high-tech industries such as semiconductors,” said Cha. “Our priority now is that in important fields, we have to take the basic direction of strategic clarity, not strategic ambiguity. In terms of tensions between the U.S. and China, we need to convey our opinion to the United States that there is a need to slow down the speed a bit and also try to limit scope of the decoupling.” 

When expanding the scope of strategic clarity, Korea needs to pay heed to the fact that despite being a middle-power country and having the world's 10th largest economy and sixth largest military power, it is still relatively weak compared to the four neighboring powers, said Kim. 

“Korea has entered a phase where it is necessary to expand our strategic clarity by breaking away from strategic ambiguity,” said Kim. “In this process, Korea, which has relatively weak national power compared to the United States and China, has strategic flexibility to respond issue by issue, and we need to convey to both countries that the response to each issue does not mean we chose one side or the other.”

Sunday

October 23, 2022

 dictionary + A - A 

Korea caught in the superpower squeeze

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/10/23/national/diplomacy/anniversary-special-USChina-Korea/20221023170607426.html

Security from U.S., trade with China is a dying paradigm

22nd ANNIVERSARY SERIES: PART 2  

The Korea JoongAng Daily examines the economic, political and military challenges facing Korea as the United States makes big moves to protect its economic interests. Caught between the United States and China, the country is seeking to maintain a balance without being locked out of either economy. This is the second in a three-part series.

Seoul wants to avoid a future in which intensifying tensions between Washington and Beijing spiral into regional catastrophe. 

But gone are the days where South Korea could depend on its traditional ally, the United States, for security and China, its largest trading partner, for economy. 

The rising military and technology rivalry between the United States and China is putting to test South Korea’s balancing ability.

Both Washington and Beijing, in light of a shifting world order, expect Seoul to take a clearer stance.

The Joe Biden administration is pushing policies that exert U.S. influence over global technology and supply chains in an attempt to choke off China’s access to advanced microchips and production technologies. 

The United States is urging its allies to take its side in its efforts to finding alternative supply chains, pushing regional groupings bound to alienate China like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). It has also been urging allies to unite over values, such as safeguarding human rights and promoting democracy.

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration has made clear its intentions to strengthen the Korea-U.S. alliance, which it says was weakened by the previous government. 

However, the Biden administration is playing off of the Donald Trump government’s “America First” policies with its “Made in America” measures, which don't necessarily favor its allies abroad. 

This was acutely demonstrated through U.S. President Joe Biden’s signing of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in August, putting Korean electric vehicles makers at a disadvantage. Biden's government is expected to continue to push out such hard-line measures, especially with the U.S. midterm elections coming up in November and the campaign for the 2024 presidential election following. 

Seoul is learning it will have to fight for its own interests and carefully weigh the costs and benefits of aligning with Washington.

Analysts say they don’t see Sino-U.S. relations improving in the near future, or in the next decades or even century.  

In the best-case scenarios, the two superpowers will maintain the current rivalry. In the worst-case scenario, escalated confrontation and even regional military conflict can’t be ruled out.  

To avoid a situation like a century ago, when its sovereignty was taken away by foreign powers, Korea must make key strategic decisions now to dictate its own future and survive the shifting global order. 

Experts in Sino-U.S. relations generally agree that South Korea will have to take clearer stances on issues dividing the two rivals. But they point out that there is a window of time to utilize strategic flexibility to make sure Seoul’s interests are heard by both sides.

“Korea needs to break away from the existing framework of ‘the United States for security, China for economy’ and its strategic ambiguity and find consensus with the people on where Korea's values, identity and national interests lie,” said Kim Han-kwon, a professor at the Center for Chinese Studies at the state-run Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS). “And based on this public consensus, it is necessary to outline Korea's position on each major issue between the U.S. and China and clarify its foreign policy direction.” 

In times of better Sino-U.S. relations, Korea didn't have to make stark choices. But that is not the case anymore. 

“With the shifting U.S.-China strategic competition, the areas in which Korea must demonstrate strategic ambiguity, strategic clarity and strategic flexibility have changed,” said Kim. “As U.S.-China strategic competition is gradually intensifying and unfolding around rules and norms in relation to technological hegemony and high-tech industries, the realm where strategic ambiguity is allowed is decreasing and the area where strategic clarity is required is increasing.”

Blurred lines

President Yoon Suk-yeol, right, and U.S. President Joe Biden hold a joint press conference after their first bilateral summit at the presidential office in Yongsan, central Seoul, on May 21. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

On May 21, President Yoon and Biden held their first bilateral summit in Seoul and agreed to expand relations to a "global comprehensive strategic alliance," broadening coordination in security affairs to shared values and economic and technological cooperation.

Yoon told Biden at the beginning of the summit, "Today we're living in the era of economic security, where economy is security and security is economy.”

The Yoon administration has just started its five-year term but faces major diplomatic hurdles. 

The Yoon government has heralded that the Korea-U.S. alliance is stronger than ever, shifting from the Moon Jae-in administration’s focus on patching up relations with China with its Korean Peninsula peace initiative. 

The United States has been pushing policies that attempt to exclude China from global supply chains.

In 2019, the Trump administration set the tone for the Sino-U.S. tech war by enacting sanctions and export bans on Huawei to cut off the Chinese telecommunications giant from the critical chips it required. 

Earlier this month, the Biden administration enacted wide-sweeping export curbs aimed at cutting off key software, chips and machinery that could help China develop semiconductors, artificial intelligence and supercomputers, in what is seen as an escalation in tensions between Beijing and Washington in technology. Washington argues that such advanced semiconductors can be used by Beijing for advanced military capabilities.

In May, South Korea joined 13 other countries in the U.S.-led IPEF, which aims to set the rules for economics and trade in the region and is seen as an initiative to help members decouple from the Chinese market by finding alternative supply chains, offsetting Beijing’s influence. 

Seoul has pushed to mend relations with Tokyo, frayed by pending historical issues, as Washington pushes to strengthen trilateral security cooperation with its East Asian allies. 

However, the results of trying to strengthen the alliance with Washington both on the security and economic cooperation front are not always as expected, as seen with the IRA law, which came as a slap in the face to Korean automakers. 

Korea’s IRA concerns were raised in Yoon’s brief encounter with Biden on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York last month. Seoul had been hoping for a second Korea-U.S. summit, but Yoon only got 48 seconds with Biden. Seoul’s frustrations with the IRA were raised during Yoon’s talks with U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris in Korea on Sept. 29 and recognized in Biden’s recent letter to Yoon.

“Most of U.S. foreign policy seems to be stemming from its domestic politics,” said Lee Hee-ok, a professor of political science and diplomacy at Sungkyunkwan University and director of the university’s Sungkyun Institute of China Studies. 

“Although America First is Trump's brand, Biden seems to have maintained it and just upgraded it. It seems highly likely that similar bills such as the IRA and the semiconductor and chips and science law will continue to be passed, and Korea is likely to be trapped in the process of a decoupling of the U.S. and China.”

He warned that Seoul shouldn’t expect to be guaranteed any perks or advantages just for taking part in such U.S.-led networks.

“In regard to foreign and technology policies that Washington is currently pursuing, it is unlikely that the United States will provide economic incentives just because Korea is an ally,” added Lee. “U.S. foreign policy is now closer to mercantilism rather than liberalism, so it is highly likely that the diplomatic burden on Korea will increase as the United States implements foreign policies that prioritize U.S. domestic politics as seen through the IPEF or IRA.” 

Korea needs to “find a balance of benefits that can be received for following the requests of the United States,” Lee added.  

“Rather than immediately reducing dependence on China, there inevitably needs to be attempts at diversifying the market, including in trade and technology, while hedging some of the pressure from the United States.”

Other analysts point out that Seoul needs to be prepared to make sacrifices in the process of aligning with the United States on key issues, even if it means drastically reducing dependence on China. 

“At the end of the day, the reality is that relying on the United States for security and China for economy has been a very comfortable stance for Korea to take up,” said Korea-U.S. relations expert Cha Du-hyeogn, a principal fellow at the Seoul-based think tank Asan Institute for Policy Studies. “Looking back, this was bound to become a very vulnerable structure as the United States had already begun to no longer view China as a competitor that it can coexist with.

“Frankly speaking, it was a policy that expected to get benefits and gain from both sides without making any sacrifices,” said Cha. “But that's impossible. Now, we have to be prepared to make sacrifices for taking an overall similar stance with the United States, to manage the benefits of a security guarantee without sacrificing too much.”

He noted that a Korea-U.S. comprehensive alliance “ultimately means we have no choice but to follow the same path as the United States when it comes to major economic policies” which “means in large a decoupling in high-tech industries and technology fields.” 

But Cha acknowledged Korea “can't completely decouple from China” yet. 

“That's also the case for the United States in regard to the general economy, especially in consumer goods, not the high-tech economy,” he added. “There must be a role that Korea can play in the middle so that the strategic competition between the U.S. and China does not intensify further and become too extreme. However, I think that our basic stance in the competition will inevitably lean in the direction of the United States.”

Thaad and beyond

Foreign Minister Park Jin, Chinese Ambassador to Korea Xing Haiming and other dignitaries commemorate the 30th anniversary of diplomatic ties between Korea and China at a hotel in central Seoul on Aug. 24. [YONHAP]

Seoul has yet to recover fully from the fallout with Beijing over its decision to deploy the U.S.-led Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (Thaad) to Korea in 2016. 

Korea would like to avoid a repeat of a similar situation where it got crushed in the Sino-U.S. rivalry. 

Chinese President Xi Jinping formally secured a third term as head of China’s Communist Party Sunday after the conclusion of the 20th national congress in Beijing. This would make him the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong.

“I expect China to reinforce its politics of identity,” said Sungkyunkwan’s Prof. Lee. “If its politics of identity is strengthened, it seems that an ideological decoupling in Chinese diplomacy will be inevitable between Korea and China. But currently, in order for China to disperse the pressure from the United States, there will also be a need to develop a strategic relationship between Korea and China.”

Seoul and Washington's joint decision in 2016 to deploy the Thaad battery and its installation in Seongju, North Gyeongsang, in 2017 resulted in strong protests from Beijing and economic retaliation against Korean businesses. 

Contrary to expectations that relations would eventually return to normal, the Korean economy has experienced stagnant exports to China and a decreased trade surplus. Likewise, competition between Korea and China is intensifying in many industries. China, in turn, is also preparing for semiconductor self-reliance. 

Beijing has urged Seoul to uphold the so-called "Three Nos" pledge made by the Moon administration in October 2017. Korea said it would not make additional Thaad deployments, not participate in an American missile defense network and not establish a U.S.-Korea-Japan military alliance.

But the Yoon government’s Foreign Ministry stressed that the Three Nos policy was not an official pledge or agreement. 

In August, simultaneous events were held in Seoul and Beijing to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the establishment of bilateral ties, and Yoon and Xi exchanged personal letters.

In his letter, Yoon wrote that he hoped that the two countries "seek new directions for cooperation over the next 30 years" and "quantitatively develop ties" based on a "spirit of mutual respect and reciprocity."  

In September, Yoon met with China’s No. 3 official, Li Zhanshu, chairman of China's Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

Despite indications that the Yoon government was tilting toward Washington, experts say there is no need to rush to decouple from Beijing at the moment because Korea is still reliant on China for production and trade. 

“Korea currently emphasizes that the goal of diplomatic relations with China is mutual respect, while China's perspective is that we can pursue the same things even though our positions are different,” said Sungkyunkwan’s Prof. Lee. “Korea's view is different from the past, in that it has a strong notion that Korea-China relations should be positioned on an equal footing, while in China's perspective, mutual respect is about guaranteeing core interests. The two are talking about the same thing but are giving different interpretations.” 

Koreans have especially been wary that a second Thaad situation could be reprised.  

“I believe that a Thaad situation can recur at any time,” said Lee. “At that time, the reality is that it is difficult for the Korea-U.S. alliance to solve these problems. When Thaad was deployed, there was nothing the United States could do when China retaliated economically against Korea.”

He said that in the process of strengthening the Korea-U.S. alliance, Seoul should formulate a list of possible Chinese retaliations and a portfolio of how the alliance will respond. 

“It is necessary for Korea to review the basic framework of strengthening cooperation with China on the basis of the solid Korea-U.S. alliance, which has been the basic framework of its China's policy since the establishment of diplomatic ties between Korea and China,” said IFANS Prof. Kim. 

Kim called for a “China plus one” strategy to manage supply chain disruptions and seek economic diversification, including efforts to follow-up negotiations on a Korea-China free trade agreement to provide an institutional framework for cooperation between the two countries. 

“Korea shouldn’t rush too much when it comes to the U.S.-led economic policies to exclude China from some high-tech industries,” said Kim. “It is still not easy for Korea to find a country that can replace a market or a production base of the same size as China.”

Through a China plus one strategy, he said Korea will be able to continue to utilize China's low-cost production capacity and huge market while finding alternative solutions “in order to respond to the possibility that the confrontation will grow bigger and that Beijing will use this economic advantage as leverage and apply pressure on Seoul.”

Preventing a New Cold War

China's President Xi Jinping waves during an introduction of members of the Chinese Communist Party's new Politburo Standing Committee, the nation's top decision-making body, in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing Sunday. [AFP/YONHAP]

Sino-U.S. tensions will continue for the time being and possibly extend for decades to come, according to the experts. And that could be the best-case scenario. 

A worst-case scenario could include conflict in the region, or military clashes reminiscent of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In such a case, South Korea, as a U.S. ally, would have no choice but to get involved. 

There are many security variables in the Indo-Pacific region, including tensions in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea and North Korea’s continued nuclear and missile threats. Last month, Pyongyang adopted a new nuclear strike law, amid a series of back-to-back missile launches and a possible seventh nuclear test in the works. 

As with other times of tension on the Korean Peninsula, there are growing calls in South Korea for the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or the development of the country’s own nuclear armaments.

“There are many different sensitive issues across the Indo-Pacific region,” said IFANS Prof. Kim. “That means there can be a variety of scenarios, from long-term confrontation to even military conflict. This includes disputes in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea and the escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. It is time for Korea to prepare specific countermeasures for each pending issue and scenario that can be predicted as sensitive and important between the United States and China.”

“I think it is necessary to take a very cautious stance on the Taiwan issue, and to actively cooperate with like-minded countries on the multilateral stage on China policy,” said Sungkyunkwan Prof. Lee. “On the other hand, in regard to bilateral relations, I think a two-track approach that does not touch on sensitive issues about China on the bilateral stage is needed.”

However, North Korea is an issue that the South can and should deal with now, he pointed out, noting that China and the United States have no interest in changing their roles. 

“Even if North Korea conducts a nuclear test, it is unlikely that there will be a fundamental crack in the relationship between North Korea and China,” said Lee. “Relations between North Korea and China are strategically advanced, and there are likely to be attempts by Beijing to stably manage its relations with Pyongyang regardless of its nuclear and missile tests.” 

China and Russia, traditional allies of North Korea, have been reluctant to support stronger sanctions or even joint statements condemning Pyongyang for its nuclear and missile provocations in the UN Security Council. 

“In that sense, I think South Korea must find a role now,” said Lee. “We are very reactive. If the United States doesn't move, China doesn't move, and we don't move, then the situation on the Korean Peninsula will escalate.” 

However, the general geopolitical trend is inevitably tilting toward another Cold War structure pitting North Korea, China and Russia against South Korea, the United States and Japan. 

“Overall, it will be difficult for us to stop the trend itself called the new Cold War,” said Asan Institute’s Cha. “Korea can play a role in slowing the trend toward a so-called new Cold War, but it will be difficult to stop the trend itself.”

How Russia’s invasion of Ukraine unfolds could serve as a lesson for North Korea. 

“The Ukraine situation still has a long way to go, but if Russia moves toward accepting an armistice agreement, it will show that the U.S. has blocked Russia from carrying out nuclear blackmailing,” said Cha. “This will teach a huge lesson to North Korea. North Korea's nuclear power is no match for Russia’s, even if it develops its nuclear program for another five to six years. If Russia is stopped, this will show North Korea that nuclear blackmail is becoming less and less effective.”

However, he pointed out that the United States and China will be likely to avoid military conflict in the region because they are both aware there is too much at stake. 

While Seoul’s diplomatic strategy is heavily reliant on geopolitical factors beyond its control, South Korea still has leverage and should be using its voice. 

“Korea has no choice but to follow the same path in the current U.S.-led supply chain reorganization in high-tech industries such as semiconductors,” said Cha. “Our priority now is that in important fields, we have to take the basic direction of strategic clarity, not strategic ambiguity. In terms of tensions between the U.S. and China, we need to convey our opinion to the United States that there is a need to slow down the speed a bit and also try to limit scope of the decoupling.” 

When expanding the scope of strategic clarity, Korea needs to pay heed to the fact that despite being a middle-power country and having the world's 10th largest economy and sixth largest military power, it is still relatively weak compared to the four neighboring powers, said Kim. 

“Korea has entered a phase where it is necessary to expand our strategic clarity by breaking away from strategic ambiguity,” said Kim. “In this process, Korea, which has relatively weak national power compared to the United States and China, has strategic flexibility to respond issue by issue, and we need to convey to both countries that the response to each issue does not mean we chose one side or the other.”

BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]

8.On the offense in defense exports

Excerpts:

What defense area does Korea need to develop for the future on top of the tanks, self-propelled guns and FA-50 light attack aircraft? Three fields await.

First is the development of submarines powered by lithium-ion batteries, which can operate for up to a month without recharging. Conventional diesel submarines have trouble carrying out military operations as they cannot operate for more than a week without refueling. Nuclear-powered submarines can run for years without refueling, but most countries using diesel submarines are expected to replace them with lithium battery submarines soon. Japan is changing its 24 diesel subs to battery-based subs. Korea too prepares for the dramatic transition.

Australia’s negotiation to purchase lithium ion-battery submarines from Japan failed because of Canberra’s demand for local production. Given Korea’s strength in shipbuilding, including warships and subs, the country can emerge as a leading producer of lithium battery-based submarines if it can manufacture them to meet the demand from clients for local production.

Second is the cyber defense industry. Israel earned $6.75 billion from exporting its cyber technology in 2020 alone. The field demands sophistication of cyber security capabilities impregnable to hacking from outside to steal information about national security matters and business. The area also calls for technology that can neutralize cyber systems of enemies.

Korea won at DEF CON — the equivalent of a hackers Olympics — on its own in 2015 and 2018 and in a joint team with the U.S. in 2022. The competitiveness can lift Korea to a frontrunner in the cyber defense sector in the future.

Third is short-range tactical missiles with high accuracy. Korea shipped 2.6 trillion won short-range missiles — Cheongung-2s — to the United Arab Emirates earlier this year. The UAE chose them as they are of better quality — and are cheaper — than those of the U.S. The Cheongung-2 was developed by LIG Nex1, Hanwha Systems and Hanwha Defense with the sponsorship of the Agency for Defense Development (ADD). Known as “Korean Patriot missiles,” they are interceptors.

Sunday

October 23, 2022

 dictionary + A - A 

On the offense in defense exports

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/10/23/opinion/columns/defense-industry-Korea-Hanwha-Defense/20221023194919495.html

Kim Kyung-min

The author is an honorary professor ofpolitical science and diplomacy at Hanyang University.

On July 27, Poland’s Ministry of National Defense announced a bold plan to buy 980 K2 Black Panther tanks, 672 K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers and 48 FA-50 light attack aircraft from South Korea. If you include ammunition, armored vehicles and other defense-related equipment, the total cost exceeds 40 trillion won ($27.9 billion).

The impressive achievements were made possible by the three leaders of Korea’s defense industry: Hanwha Defense, the producer of the K9 self-propelled howitzers; Hyundai Rotem, the manufacturer of K2 tanks; and Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI), maker of the FA-50 attack aircraft. LIG Nex1, which has been supplying short-range missiles, also helped strengthen Korea’s defense industry.

K9 Thunders currently occupy 50 percent of the market. (Over 700 of them have been exported to eight countries, including Turkey, India, Australia and Finland.) They have a shooting range of up to 40 kilometers (25 miles) and are highly accurate, making the self-propelled howitzers popular in the global defense market. Due to its domestic situation, Poland advanced its import schedule to August 26 for 212 K9 howitzers from Hanwha Defense costing 3.2 trillion won. A contract for a second batch of 460 howitzers is being negotiated.

Hyundai Rotem signed a formal contract with Poland, on August 29, for its first shipment of 180 K2 tanks, costing 4.5 trillion won, to be followed by another contract for a second shipment this year. After United States and Germany discussed ending production of their once-powerful tanks, K2s emerged as a quality replacement. The summit between President Yoon Suk-yeol and his Polish counterpart in June at the NATO Summit in Madrid, as well as back-to-back meetings between the defense ministers of the two countries, also contributed to the exports.

Impressed by Poland’s purchase of hundreds of K2 tanks, Norway began to show interest in placing a $1.7 billion order due to the need to defend itself against Russia. Given the apparent impact on other NATO member countries — particularly in Eastern Europe — the exports to Poland mark a watershed moment for Korea’s defense industry. The Voice of America has noticed Korea’s effort to find a niche market based on a value-for-money strategy.

Value for money means that made-in-Korea weapons are of a quality comparable with products from traditional defense juggernauts and yet the prices are lower. But value for money is not the only strength, because Korea also has advantages of fast supply, timely funding by the Export-Import Bank and a generous attitude toward local production of weapons. Few countries can match Korea on these terms.

Korea can satisfy clients in various areas, including cultural exchanges. Korea is emerging as a key state in the global defense markets. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri), Korea’s share in the global defense export market ranked 8th (2.8 percent) between 2017 and 2021.

In addition to Eastern European countries, Australia has considered introducing next-generation armored vehicles in a $7.5 billion contract with Hanwha Defense for its AS21 Redback infantry fighting vehicles possibly together with K239 Chunmoo multiple-rocket launchers developed by the same company. If the contract is signed, Korea can become a top-5 defense leader globally.

Noticeable in the exports to Poland is the first entry of the FA-50 light attack aircraft into the European market. FA-50 fighter jets are an advanced versions of KTX-2 supersonic jet trainers. Due to the need for a supersonic trainer in order to train pilots for supersonic fighter jets, Korea had to borrow these aircraft from advanced countries, including the UK, in the past. So the country drew up a plan to produce a supersonic trainer on its own, but the project was budgeted at 1.4 trillion won and went off track due to the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis.

A strong determination to make a supersonic trainer on its own for the ultimate goal of domestic production of fighter jets allowed Korea to develop the FA-50 light attack aircraft armed with air-to-surface missiles. The stunning development of KF-21 advanced supersonic fighter jets followed the same path as the FA-50 light attack aircraft.

The single-engine FA-50 attack aircraft and the twin-engine F-21 fighter jets both carry engines developed by General Electric. It takes at least 20 years to develop aircraft engines as it requires cutting-edge technology. Massive funding needed for the development forced Korea to suspend engine production efforts. The challenge should be addressed in the future.

What defense area does Korea need to develop for the future on top of the tanks, self-propelled guns and FA-50 light attack aircraft? Three fields await.

First is the development of submarines powered by lithium-ion batteries, which can operate for up to a month without recharging. Conventional diesel submarines have trouble carrying out military operations as they cannot operate for more than a week without refueling. Nuclear-powered submarines can run for years without refueling, but most countries using diesel submarines are expected to replace them with lithium battery submarines soon. Japan is changing its 24 diesel subs to battery-based subs. Korea too prepares for the dramatic transition.

Australia’s negotiation to purchase lithium ion-battery submarines from Japan failed because of Canberra’s demand for local production. Given Korea’s strength in shipbuilding, including warships and subs, the country can emerge as a leading producer of lithium battery-based submarines if it can manufacture them to meet the demand from clients for local production.

Second is the cyber defense industry. Israel earned $6.75 billion from exporting its cyber technology in 2020 alone. The field demands sophistication of cyber security capabilities impregnable to hacking from outside to steal information about national security matters and business. The area also calls for technology that can neutralize cyber systems of enemies.

Korea won at DEF CON — the equivalent of a hackers Olympics — on its own in 2015 and 2018 and in a joint team with the U.S. in 2022. The competitiveness can lift Korea to a frontrunner in the cyber defense sector in the future.

Third is short-range tactical missiles with high accuracy. Korea shipped 2.6 trillion won short-range missiles — Cheongung-2s — to the United Arab Emirates earlier this year. The UAE chose them as they are of better quality — and are cheaper — than those of the U.S. The Cheongung-2 was developed by LIG Nex1, Hanwha Systems and Hanwha Defense with the sponsorship of the Agency for Defense Development (ADD). Known as “Korean Patriot missiles,” they are interceptors.

After anti-tank Hyeongung missiles were exported to Saudi Arabia and other Middle East countries, Eastern European countries are showing a keen interest in the missiles following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February. Russia must stop the war. But since Korea’s defense industry drew much attention from Europe, it can expand the market to the rest of the world.

Korea’s largest-ever export to Poland has marked a milestone for its defense industry. That achievement is the result of quality at a good price. Besides, there is no delay in delivering weapons, not to mention a smooth supply of parts.

Hanwha Defense has challenged the self-propelled howitzer market with its newly developed K9A2s that can load shells automatically. Technology advances always. If Korea continues upgrading the weaponry it exports, it can top the world at least in the categories of tanks and self-propelled guns one day. In the submarines and cyber defense field in particular, the government and the private sector must invest heavily. Otherwise, Korea can hardly become a top defense industry country. 

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.  

9. Travel expert shares what having a mobile phone is like in North Korea

Hmmm... accurate information?  Can this information be exploited?

Travel expert shares what having a mobile phone is like in North Korea

https://www.unilad.com/news/north-korea-smartphones-apps-20221023

Dominic Smithers

Published 15:43, 23 October 2022 BST

| Last updated 15:43, 23 October 2022 BST

Featured Image Credit: @titsandtraveltips / robertharding / Alamy

Ever wondered what it would be like to have a smartphone under a dictatorship? Well, you're in luck. Here's what it's like for people in North Korea:

A travel expert has offered an insight to how technology is used in every day life for people in the country.

In a video posted to her TikTok channel, Yasmeen explained that less than half the people the country actually have a smartphone.

Though they are still able to download apps for their device, it's not quite as easy as it is for people living in the majority of other countries.

Discussing tech life under Kim Jong-un, Yasmeen said: "In North Korea, the App Store is a physical store and you can't delete your browsing history. Let's talk about phones in North Korea, around 40 percent of the country has a smartphone.

"So if you are a North Korean with a smartphone, it's probably going to be some sort of Android device that was developed in the country.

"To download apps, you'll have to go to a physical store and a technician will download apps for you whatever you want that are government approved.

Around 40 percent of people in North Korea have smartphones. Credit: Oleg Znamenskiy/Alamy

"The most popular app is called My companion and it's basically like Netflix on X Games mode. You can watch TV. Well, like you can stream shows you can watch sports, you can learn a new language, they have some educational material, and then they have like e-reader function so you can read a book, you won't have access to the global Internet and you won't be able to delete your browsing history."

Adding: "Samsung phones are the most popular phones you can get on the black market but a lot of elite members have Samsung and Apple products."

In another video, Yasmeen expands on the topic of apps and how people in the country actually go about downloading them onto their phones.

While people in the US and other countries in the West just search for the app they're looking for, like YouTube or whatever, in North Korea they have to go to an actual shop where 'technicians' download the apps for them, as long as they're government approved.

Despite what appears to be an odd process for us, Yasmeen says there are still loads of apps to choose from.

"They have all sorts of apps just like we do health apps, cooking apps, karaoke is really popular and one of their most popular apps is called my companion," she explains.

Samsung phones are the most popular in the country. Credit: Sipa US/Alamy

"You can look at my last tech talk if you want to know more about that, but it also has a language learning platform. The most popular language to learn is Chinese and English is also popular as well.

"There's also an app called unit VOCA and this app was made for North Korean defectors if they defect to South Korea and it helps them learn South Korean slang.

"A lot of times, North Korean defectors have a really hard time understanding people in South Korea because they are so far cut off from them.

"One of the most popular apps last year was called my travelling companion and it's almost like Google Maps."

Adding: "Samsung phones are the most popular phones you can get on the black market but a lot of elite members have Samsung and Apple products."

If you have a story you want to tell, send it to UNILAD via story@unilad.com

10. US bombers likely to participate in combined exercise

Yes. Bring the Bone to the peninsula.

US bombers likely to participate in combined exercise

The Korea Times · October 23, 2022

A U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancer, assigned to 34th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron, deploys flares during a Bomber Task Force mission over the Pacific Ocean in this June 25 photo. UPI-Yonhap

By Kang Seung-woo

U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancer aircraft are highly anticipated to fly over the Korean Peninsula as part of a planned combined air exercise with the South Korean Air Force ― a decision that can serve as a strong message to deter North Korea's belligerence.

Last week, four B-1Bs arrived in the U.S. territory of Guam for a Bomber Task Force mission amid concerns that Pyongyang's seventh nuclear test might be imminent. In June, four Lancers traveled to Andersen Air Force Base there for a similar reason.

As for their arrival, the U.S. Seventh Air Force said the Lancers will partner with more allies for several training missions in the Indo-Pacific region this time, raising conjectures that they might take part in the joint drills.

Starting Oct. 31, South Korea and the United States plan to carry out a large-scale aerial exercise, formerly known as Vigilant Ace, for a five-day run, and it will feature some 250 aircraft, including the F-35A and F-35B stealth jets, according to the South Korean military.

The B-1B is one of three nuclear-capable strategic bombers of the U.S. Air Force alongside the B-2 Spirit and B-52 Stratofortress, and it has often flown to the Korean Peninsula in order to show off the U.S.' extended deterrence when North Korea has stoked tensions.

North Korea is believed to be have been preparing for another nuclear test since the first half of the year. In addition, its closest ally, China, finished its National Congress of the Communist Party, Saturday, at which President Xi Jinping was re-elected for an unprecedented third five-year term.

As some had pointed out that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un would refrain from detonating another nuclear device so as not to disrupt Beijing's important political event, expectations are now running high over the possibility of the nuclear test and thus, the U.S. may send the bombers to the peninsula to deter any envisaged provocation.

"It is not appropriate to comment on whether the B-1Bs will participate because the detailed plans are not yet finalized," a military officer said.

However, the military are said to be considering the current situation on the peninsula to be as serious as it was in 2017, when North Korea threatened to test a hydrogen bomb in September 2017 and the B-1Bs flew off the North's eastern coast to send a strong warning to the country ― a mission that marked the farthest north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) any U.S. fighter or bomber aircraft had flown off North Korea's coast during the 21st century.

In December 2017, one Lancer participated in the Vigilant Ace exercise as well.

The Korea Times · October 23, 2022

11. Korea Times forum to examine new challenges for Korea-US alliance

A who's who of Korea experts.

Korea Times forum to examine new challenges for Korea-US alliance

The Korea Times · by 2022-10-23 16:52 | Foreign Affairs · October 23, 2022

From left are Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance Choo Kyung-ho; Kim Tae-hyo, first deputy director of the National Security Office; Joel Wit, founder of 38 North; Soo Kim, policy analyst at RAND Corporation; Joseph DeTrani, former US chief negotiator to the Six Party Talks; Wi Sung-lac, former South Korean chief negotiator to the Six Party Talks and ambassador to Russia; and James Kim, president of the American Chamber of Commerce Korea. By Kang Hyun-kyung

The Korea Times will host a Korea-U.S. alliance forum on Oct. 26 at the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) building in Seoul.

Under the topic of "New Challenges for Korea-U.S. Alliance," leading experts in the areas of economic security and Korea-U.S. alliance in the Indo-Pacific region will present their ideas about global supply chain disruptions after Russia's invasion of Ukraine and escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the wake of North Korea's test-firings of nuclear-capable missiles and other military provocations.

Kim Tae-hyo, first deputy director of the National Security Office, will read President Yoon Suk-yeol's congratulatory message on behalf of the president.

2022 Korea Times Forum

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance Choo Kyung-ho will deliver a keynote speech on the latest economic security issues, including the Inflation Reduction Act and its impact on Korean automakers, as well as the Korea-U.S. tech alliance, and South Korea's policy responses to them.

Joel Wit, founder of 38 North, a program currently run by the Stimson Center to provide analysis of events in and around North Korea, will delve into North Korea's nuclear-capable missile technology, hacking efforts and use of cryptocurrency as a means to finance the country's weapons of mass destruction. Based on his own analysis, Wit will propose possible policy options to help policymakers of the allies effectively respond to the growing, complex threats from the North.

In Session 1, four experts will discuss economic security and global supply chain disruptions after Russia's invasion of Ukraine and their impact on Korea. They will assess current Korea-U.S. tech cooperation efforts and how they can adjust to benefit both nations. James Kim, president of the American Chamber of Commerce Korea, will moderate the session. Lee Seung-joo, a professor of political science and international relations at ChungAng University, Lee Hyo-young, an assistant professor of international economy, trade and development studies at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, and Shin Tong-chan, an attorney at Yulchon LLC, will join the session as discussants.

Moderated by Soo Kim, a policy analyst at RAND Corporation, Session 2 endeavors to untangle the complex, growing threats from North Korea and how the allies should respond to them. Joseph DeTrani, the former U.S. chief negotiator for the Six Party Talks to end North Korea's nuclear program, Wi Sung-lac, former South Korean chief negotiator to the Six Party talks and former South Korean ambassador to Russia, and Robert Kelly, a professor of political science at Pusan National University, will share their thoughts about escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

Lawmakers, foreign diplomats, Korean and international business people based in Korea, policymakers, think tank experts and leaders of Seoul-based international NGOs will participate in the event as audience members.

The Korea Times · by 2022-10-23 16:52 | Foreign Affairs · October 23, 2022

12. Korea's debt-to-GDP ratio grows 2.5 times faster than advanced economies'

Korea's debt-to-GDP ratio grows 2.5 times faster than advanced economies'

The Korea Times · October 23, 2022

By Yi Whan-woo

The ratio of national debt to gross domestic product (GDP) in Korea is rising fast, and it will grow more than 2.5 times as much as the combined average of the ratios of the world's 35 advanced economies between 2017 and 2022, a government source said Sunday on condition of anonymity.

Citing data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the source said that the national debt-to-GDP ratio of Korea will increase from 40.1 percent to 54.1 percent during the 2017-2022 period.

The 14-percent increase is comparable to a 5.5-percent increase among the world's 35 richest countries ― from 71.6 percent to 77.1 percent ― in terms of the combined average national debt-to-GDP ratio for the cited period.

"The ratio of Korea is still lower than that of the advanced economies, but it is accelerating at much faster level," the source said.

The source noted that the ratio curve for the 35 advanced countries has been flattening after peaking in 2020 at 82.8 percent, whereas the curve for Korea on the other hand has been on an upward trajectory.

The government source attributed the sharp rise in Korea's national debt to the pandemic stimulus policy embraced by the previous Moon Jae-in administration.

In July, the current Yoon Suk-yeol administration announced a plan to shift to a belt-tightening mode in an attempt to reduce the national debt to pre-pandemic levels.

Correspondingly, the IMF expects the national debt of Asia's fourth-largest economy will be worth 57.7 percent of its GDP in 2027, slightly down from its previous forecast of 59.8 percent.

But it appears that the Yoon administration's belt-tightening policy will fall short of curbing the increase in the national debt-to-GDP ratio in the longer term, as this increase is also driven by Korea having the world's lowest fertility rate and being a rapidly-aging society.

The IMF defines the magnitude of the national debt as the sum of debt securities and loans from central and regional governments, plus those from public organizations.

Under the same definition, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) forecast Korea's national debt-to-GDP ratio to reach 150.1 percent in 2060.

The Korea Development Institute (KDI), a state-run think tank, and the National Assembly Budget Office each view the scope of national debt to include more narrowly only debt securities and loans from central and regional governments.

Nevertheless, the ratio is expected to be 144.8 percent in KDI's forecast and 161 percent in the National Assembly Budget Office's projection for 2060.

"The numbers suggest Korea's burden from debt will become about three times larger from 2022," another government source, said, also on condition of anonymity.

The Korea Times · October 23, 2022

13. North Korea may carry out more than one nuclear test, experts say

North Korea may carry out more than one nuclear test, experts say

koreaherald.com · by Jo He-rim · October 23, 2022

North Korea could carry out consecutive nuclear weapons tests, experts say, as intelligence authorities warn of the rising possibility of Pyongyang conducting the first test of its kind in five years.

“It is likely that they need several tests to meet the requirements of their ambitious nuclear weapons program, which has tactical nuclear weapons, intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic missiles," Olli Heinonen, former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, told Voice of America, in an article released on Saturday.

"They have probably more than one type of nuclear warhead, which all need to be tested,” Heinonen added.

Predicting Pyongyang's nuclear provocation is imminent, Seoul and Washington are gearing up for response measures. Last week, a high-ranking official at Seoul's presidential office said the office is "in 24-hour standby mode," and that it is preparing a detailed plan to handle the potential test.

South Korea’s spy agency had said in late September that North Korea may conduct a seventh nuclear test after China’s party congress ends in October and before the US midterm elections in November.

In a closed-door briefing to the parliamentary intelligence committee, South Korea's National Intelligence Service delivered its forecast that Pyongyang is likely to carry out the nuclear test between Oct. 16 to Nov. 7 -- a period that encompasses the start of the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th congress and before the US midterm elections slated for Nov. 8.

David Albright, the founder and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, also agreed with South Korean and American intelligence agencies’ assessments that North Korea is "ready to test" its nuclear weapons.

“It’s consistent with what the South Korean and US intelligences are saying that North Korea is ready to test," Albright was quoted as saying by VOA.

“If it's a high yield test, like 100, 150 kilotons or more, then they're working on developing to stage thermonuclear weapons that can be delivered by a missile. And they're probably need multiple tests that reach that point where they could actually put it on a ballistic missile," Albright said.

If it is a lower yield of some 10, 20, 30 or 40 kilotons, the purpose could either be for tactical weapons or for strategic weapons, he added.

In the last nuclear test carried out by Pyongyang in 2017, the explosion at the Punggye-ri test site had a force observed between 100 to 370 kilotons. A 100-kiloton bomb is six times more powerful than the one the US dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.

While these kinds of meetings could have led to negotiations or concessions in the old days, it's now leading to stronger military alliances against North Korea, Albright said, citing how South Korea and the US have expressed their commitment for a strong alliance.

The North Korean regime has been ratcheting up its nuclear rhetoric in recent months, introducing a new law to renew its nuclear doctrine and declaring itself as a nuclear-armed state.

On Sept. 9, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un announced that the North’s status as a nuclear weapons state “has now become irreversible,” and that it would never give up its nukes. The regime has also been boasting its advancement in operating tactical nuclear weapons.

In a report by Beyond Parallel on Oct. 20, no new activity was observed at Tunnel No. 3 of the North's Punggye-ri nuclear test site, confirming the US’ and South Korea’s assessment that Pyongyang is finished with all of the preparations needed at the tunnel. Beyond Parallel is an analytic project under the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a nonprofit think tank.

The institute said that the tunnel No. 3 is where the envisioned nuclear test would take place.

By Jo He-rim (herim@heraldcorp.com)

koreaherald.com · by Jo He-rim · October 23, 2022

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com