Quotes of the Day:

"They always say that time changes things, but you actually have to change them yourself." 

- Andy Warhol

“When we are no longer able to change a situation, we are challenged to change ourselves.” 

- Viktor Frankl

"Writing is done by writing and the way to begin to write is to begin to write. Lousy writing is better than no writing because the one can be improved but the other does not exist. Of course it is your privilege, if you wish, to become a fourth-rate premature has-been, looking no man in the eye and creeping shame-faced about the academic gutter, ridden by guilt and perfectionism, humiliating your old parents, disappointing your supporters, embarrassing your friends, a once promising scholar now gutless and defeated. However, do not let me pressure you." 

- John King Fairbank in a letter to his doctoral students, 1970s

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 22 (Putin's War)

2. CDS Daily brief (22.10.22) CDS comments on key events

3. COMMENTARY: NatSec Warnings Are Wearing Thin on Public Ears

4. China's Xi expands powers, promotes allies

5. Iran protests trigger solidarity rallies in US, Europe

6.  CNN Exclusive: After Ukraine, Biden administration turns to Musk's satellite internet for Iran

7. Starlink signals can be reverse-engineered to work like GPS—whether SpaceX likes it or not

8. Fears over Russian threat to Norway's energy infrastructure

9. Forgotten U-2 pilots helped end the Cuban Missile Crisis 60 years ago

10. "Frustrated and powerless": In fight with China for global influence, diplomacy is America’s biggest weakness

11. Follow up to "You’ve told us why the Voice, but you haven’t told us what it is"

12. Who's who: The seven most powerful men in China

13. Helium shortage: Doctors are worried that running out of the element could threaten MRIs

14. Putin Has a New Ukraine Problem: His Forces Can't Retreat?

15. Military think tank: Russia withdraws officers from Kherson

16. Biden’s Security Strategy Shows Foreign Policy As A Distraction – Analysis

17. The Words About Ukraine That Americans Need to Hear

18. The U.S. Military and Russian Military Are Talking Ukraine

19. OPINION: The IMF and the World Bank are hurting, not helping developing countries

20. When 'The Boys' Are Back In Town: A Special Ops Vet Explains Why Elite Units Train In US Cities

21. Unclear Data Could Hinder Special Opps

22. V-22 Osprey: The U.S. Military's Biggest Mistake?

23. Defecting Cuban pilot lands Soviet-era plane in the Everglades

​24. ​Hu Jintao’s Exit Was Mysterious. Xi Jinping’s Power Play Is Not.

25. How To Save the U.S. From A Second Civil War

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 22 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces continued large-scale strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure. Ongoing strikes are unlikely to erode Ukrainian will to fight but will pose economic and humanitarian challenges throughout the winter.
• Russian forces continued to withdraw from western Kherson Oblast while preparing for delaying actions that will likely be only partially effective.
• Occupation authorities in Kherson Oblast ordered civilians to evacuate east on October 21. Evacuations from Kherson City will support likely Russian plans to blow up the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Plant (HPP) dam to cover their withdrawal.
• Prigozhin-led efforts to build a “Wagner Line” of defensive fortifications extend through central Luhansk Oblast and in limited capacity into Belgorod.
• Prigozhin’s efforts and messaging, including the creation of the “Wagner Line,” are increasingly out of line with Kremlin rhetoric and are critical of what Prigozhin claims are slow-moving “bureaucrat-enemies.” Such activism endears Prigozhin to Russian nationalists, who are dissatisfied with limited Kremlin escalation and MoD disorganization.
• Russian sources reported Ukrainian counteroffensives in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove on October 22.
• Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks with no confirmed advances to regain lost territory in Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts on October 22.
• Crimean occupation authorities banned filming of infrastructure and military logistics likely due to continued Ukrainian strikes targeting Russian supply hubs and lines.
• ISW identified additional reports on October 22 that Russian mobilization has not met force generation goals and will likely continue in alternative forms.
• Russian and occupation administration officials continued to forcibly relocate residents in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine as of October 22.
• Russian and occupation officials continued to restrict the movement of residents living in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine and increase the checkpoint controls as of October 22.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 22

Oct 22, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Katherine Lawlor, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Angela Howard, and Mason Clark

October 22, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian forces continued to withdraw from western Kherson Oblast while preparing to conduct delaying actions that will likely be only partially effective. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have completely abandoned their positions in Charivne and Chkalove (both approximately 33km northwest of Nova Kakhovka), and Russian officers and medics have reportedly evacuated from Beryslav.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Russian forces are also removing patients from the Kakhovka Hospital on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River, likely to free up hospital beds for Russian military casualties that may result from the withdrawal across the river.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that some Russian elements are preparing Kherson City for urban combat, while other servicemembers continue to flee the city via the ferry operating in the vicinity of the Antonivsky Bridge.[3] The UK Ministry of Defense reported on October 22 that Russian forces completed construction of a barge bridge alongside the damaged bridge and forecasted that the barge bridge would become a critical crossing point for Russian forces as Ukrainian forces advance toward Kherson City.[4] A large part of the Kherson City population has also reportedly left the city.[5]

Russian forces are preparing a series of delaying actions with mixed efficacy. Russian forces are likely preparing to destroy the dam at the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP), flooding and widening the Dnipro River to delay any Ukrainian advances.[6] Russian occupation authorities in Nova Kakhovka are likely attempting to moderate the resultant flooding; Nova Kakhovka Occupation head Vladimir Leontyev said on October 22 that Russian authorities are lowering the volume of water from the reservoir behind the dam to minimize damage in case the KHPP is destroyed but stayed true to the false narrative that Ukraine, not Russia, would blow the dam.[7] Ukraine has no interest destroying the dam and every interest in preserving the energy supply in newly-liberated parts of Kherson Oblast. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reiterated that Russian military leadership has moved their officer corps across the river but left newly-mobilized men on the western bank of the Dnipro River as a detachment left in contact.[8] Using such inexperienced forces to conduct a delaying action could prompt a Russian rout if Ukrainian forces choose to press the attack, as ISW previously assessed.[9] One Russian milblogger noted that the situation in Kherson Oblast is dire for Russian troops, noting that it is ”virtually impossible” for Russia to evacuate troops from the first lines of defense and that only two questions remain: how to withdraw the final front line of forces, and how to explain the withdrawal to the Russian population.[10]

Russian occupation authorities ordered the forcible “evacuation” of civilians from Kherson City on October 22. The Russian Kherson Occupation Administration announced that “all citizens of Kherson must immediately leave the city” and said that all civilians and “all departments and ministries of civil administration must now cross over to the [east] bank of the [Dnipro River].”[11] The occupation administration cited the “tense” situation at the front, “increased danger of massive shelling of the city and the threat of terrorist attacks” and provided instructions for where evacuees can find boats to take them across the river. The occupation administration encouraged evacuees to bring clothes, valuables, and documents, indicating that they do not expect a rapid Russian or civilian return to western Kherson. Russian forces expect to leave the city and are therefore likely trying to depopulate parts of the oblast that Ukraine will recapture, damaging the long-term social and economic viability of southern Ukraine. Russian authorities are likely also making initial efforts to evacuate at least those civilians who are willing to cooperate with Russian occupation authorities and would otherwise be in the path of flooding resulting from the blown Kakhovka dam.

Russian forces conducted massive missile and drone attacks to degrade Ukrainian energy infrastructure in nine oblasts on October 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 22 that Russian forces launched 40 missile strikes and 16 Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones at Ukrainian infrastructure and that Ukrainian forces shot down 20 Russian cruise missiles and 11 Russian drones.[12] Russian strikes hit Ukrainian energy infrastructure in Volyn, Rivne, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Zaporizhia, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts. Ukrenergo, the Ukrainian state energy company, announced on October 22 that the scale of Russian strikes on October 22 met or exceeded the scale and effect of Russian strikes on October 10-12, which Russian President Vladimir Putin had falsely implied were a discrete response to Ukraine’s October 8 attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge.[13] Instead, Russian forces are likely attempting to degrade Ukraine’s will to fight and to force the Ukrainian government to apply additional resources to protecting civilians and energy infrastructure in lieu of channeling those resources toward Ukraine’s counteroffensives in the east and south.

Ongoing Russian strikes on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure are extraordinarily unlikely to erode the Ukrainian will to fight but will increasingly pose an economic and humanitarian challenge for Ukraine as temperatures drop. Russian shelling and strikes have damaged approximately 30% of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in recent weeks, prompting rolling blackouts across the country, not just along the front lines.[14] Blackouts combined with cold winter weather and damaged civilian buildings will likely increase the suffering of Ukraine’s civilian population this winter. Russia’s campaign of targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure is creating a humanitarian tragedy without meaningfully altering the battlefield situation, and Russian excuses for such strikes are wearing increasingly thin. The Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Vasily Nevenzya, claimed on October 22 that Russian drones are only hitting civilian targets in Ukraine because Ukrainian defensive fire requires the drones to change course, a bizarre admission of culpability.[15]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to create rifts within the Russian government by publicizing the so-called “Wagner line” of fortifications in northeastern Ukraine, which appears misaligned with Kremlin-led narratives on the course of the war. Prigozhin and Wagner-affiliated Telegram channels announced that Russian regional officials paused the extension of the Wagner Line fortifications that run behind the line of contact in Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts and into Russia’s Belgorod Oblast.[16] Prigozhin accused the Russian bureaucracy—which he characterized as ”bureaucrat-enemies”—of ”directly opposing the interests of the population” and not protecting the Russian population by supporting the construction of the line. The Russian nationalist community has repeatedly accused the Kremlin of failing to defend the Belgorod Oblast border, and Prigozhin may be attempting to amplify their demands. The Kremlin is likely attempting to maintain its limited framing of the war, which will likely continue to upset the nationalist community that is seemingly concerned by the lack of defenses around Belgorod Oblast. Prigozhin and Wagner-affiliated Telegram channels previously indicated that there is an ongoing schism within the Kremlin’s power circles between officials that are hesitant to continue the war due to personal interest and those in favor of Russian total victory.[17]

Russian maps show that Prigozhin’s proposed Wagner Line extension would defend the border between Belgorod Oblast and Ukraine’s Sumy, Kharkiv, and Luhansk oblasts, but notably would not cover northern Luhansk Oblast up to the line of contact, placing it at odds with Kremlin promises to defend all of Luhansk.[18] Other maps show that the Luhansk-Donetsk Wagner Line segment will largely only defend the territory of Luhansk Oblast that Russian proxy forces controlled prior to their February 24 full-scale invasion. The line covers some newly occupied settlements like Lysychansk, Zolote, and Popasna, but excludes Kreminna and Severodonetsk.[19] Prigozhin and Wagner commanders are likely preparing to defend the positions they think they can realistically hold, not the present extent of Russian lines or all of the territory the Kremlin claims to have annexed, and are likely not confident in Russia’s ability to defend settlements north of Lysychansk such as Kreminna and Svatove.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces continued large-scale strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure. Ongoing strikes are unlikely to erode Ukrainian will to fight but will pose economic and humanitarian challenges throughout the winter.
• Russian forces continued to withdraw from western Kherson Oblast while preparing for delaying actions that will likely be only partially effective.
• Occupation authorities in Kherson Oblast ordered civilians to evacuate east on October 21. Evacuations from Kherson City will support likely Russian plans to blow up the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Plant (HPP) dam to cover their withdrawal.
• Prigozhin-led efforts to build a “Wagner Line” of defensive fortifications extend through central Luhansk Oblast and in limited capacity into Belgorod.
• Prigozhin’s efforts and messaging, including the creation of the “Wagner Line,” are increasingly out of line with Kremlin rhetoric and are critical of what Prigozhin claims are slow-moving “bureaucrat-enemies.” Such activism endears Prigozhin to Russian nationalists, who are dissatisfied with limited Kremlin escalation and MoD disorganization.
• Russian sources reported Ukrainian counteroffensives in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove on October 22.
• Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks with no confirmed advances to regain lost territory in Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts on October 22.
• Crimean occupation authorities banned filming of infrastructure and military logistics likely due to continued Ukrainian strikes targeting Russian supply hubs and lines.
• ISW identified additional reports on October 22 that Russian mobilization has not met force generation goals and will likely continue in alternative forms.
• Russian and occupation administration officials continued to forcibly relocate residents in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine as of October 22.
• Russian and occupation officials continued to restrict the movement of residents living in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine and increase the checkpoint controls as of October 22.

Correction: in our October 21 update, ISW initially misquoted the deputy chief of the Main Operational Department of the Ukrainian General Staff, Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov. Hromov assessed on October 20 that Russian military leadership may withdraw “the most combat-capable units” from the right bank part of the region to the left bank of the Dnipro river and leave mobilized soldiers in contact to cover the withdrawal. We have updated the text to use cardinal directions and apologize for the error.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Oskil River-Kreminna Line)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove on October 22. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian assault in the direction of Kuzymivka (13km northwest of Svatove) near the N26 highway that leads into Svatove from the north.[20] The Russian MoD also claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks northwest of Kreminna near Novovodiane (24km northwest of Kreminna) and Chervonopopivka (6km northwest of Kreminna).[21] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian assault west of Kreminna near Terny.[22] A Russian Combat Reserve BARS-13 affiliated Telegram channel claimed that BARS-13 artillery units repelled an attempted Ukrainian advance north of Kreminna.[23] The BARS-13 affiliated Telegram channel also claimed that Ukrainian maneuvers near Terny and Novosadove (17km northwest of Kreminna) suggested that Russian forces lack continuous defensive positions along the R66 Svatove-Kreminna highway, despite previous claims from Russian sources to the contrary.[24] ISW cannot independently verify Russian claims about Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the Kreminna and Svatove directions on October 22.

Russian forces conducted unsuccessful limited counterattacks to regain lost territory in Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk Oblasts on October 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground attack near Ternova (20km southwest of Vovchansk) in Kharkiv Oblast.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks in the vicinity of Bilohorivka (15km west of Severodonetsk) and Zolotarivka (14km southwest of Severodonetsk) in Luhansk Oblast and in the direction of Lyman in Donetsk Oblast.[26] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the Oskil River-Kreminna line on October 22.[27]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Russian forces continued to withdraw from northwestern Kherson Oblast on October 22. See topline text.

Russian forces are likely conducting a fighting withdrawal and are continuing to strike Ukrainian positions in northwestern Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces shelled settlements near the Inhulets River and northwest of Kherson City and condcuted an airstrike against Novovoskresenske (about 66km northeast of Nova Kakhovka).[28] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russian helicopters attacked Ukrainian forces in Nova Kamianka and Tryfonivka (about 55km northeast of Nova Kakhovka) three times.[29] Ukraine‘s Southern Operational Command added that Russian forces also attacked Novovoskresenske and settlements in its vicinity with Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones and S-300 systems attacking ground targets.[30] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled several Ukrainian attacks in northwestern Kherson Oblast.[31] Russian proxy officials claimed that Russian paratroopers (VDV units) are continuing to operate in northern Kherson Oblast.[32] Geolocated footage showed Russian artillery targeting Ukrainian forces in Bezimenne, about 15km southeast of Inhulets River.[33]

Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian logistics, military equipment, and positions in central Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian repair base in Nova Kakhovka on October 20, and geolocated footage published on October 22 showed the aftermath of the Ukrainian strike on a Russian surface-to-air missile system in the city.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces shelled the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant.[35] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian attack helicopter and destroyed three ammunition depots in the Beryslav Raion.[36]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on October 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Bakhmut, northeast of Bakhmut near Soledar, and south of Bakhmut near Ozaryanivka, Odradivka, and Ivanhrad.[37] A Russian source claimed that fighting is ongoing in the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut and that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions in Bilohorivka, Donetsk Oblast, 11km northeast of Soledar on the T1302 highway.[38] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized an unspecified key street in the Soledar direction and continued house-to-house fighting in the area.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks north of Avdiivka near Novokalynove and west of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske.[40] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian “company tactical group” ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast, but ISW cannot confirm the veracity of the Russian MoD’s claims.[41] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces conducted a ground attack towards Pobieda in western Donetsk Oblast.[42] Geolocated footage posted on October 22 shows Ukrainian forces patrolling southeast of Bakhmut in Zaitseve, suggesting that Ukrainian forces may have regained positions southeast of Bakhmut within the past few days.[43]

Russian forces continue to ineffectively allocate military assets to gaining territory in Donetsk Oblast rather than defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Luhansk Oblast. Geolocated footage published by the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) People’s Militia on October 22 shows LNR forces conducting artillery strikes against Ukrainian forces north of Bakhmut in Bakhmutske rather than defending Luhansk Oblast from the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[44] Russian force allocation to ineffective attacks around Bakhmut rather than areas to the north threatened by Ukrainian forces likely contributed to Russian forces’ struggle to defend against Ukraine’s counteroffensive, as ISW has previously assessed.[45] Russian military leadership’s prioritization of capturing Donetsk Oblast over defending Luhansk Oblast is also likely contributing to LNR forces’ diminished morale and diminished investment in the war to support Russian attempts to gain new territory, as ISW has previously reported.[46]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts.[47] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces shelled Berenezhuvate, Halytsynove, Pervomaisk, Inhulske, and Shyroke hromadas in Mykolaiv Oblast.[48] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 10 Russian drones over Mykolaiv Oblast.[49] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces used heavy artillery, MLRS, and S-300 missiles to strike Nikopol and Marhanets.[50] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian soldiers are looting their prior residences in apartments and hotels in Enerhodar, which is consistent with earlier Ukrainian reports of a partial withdrawal of Russian combat forces from Enerhodar.[51]

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation authorities compiled mobilization lists of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) personnel who signed contracts with Russian state nuclear energy agency Rosatom.[52] The Resistance Center noted that Russian state agencies like Rosatom in occupied Ukraine must prepare mobilization lists to comply with the Russian declaration of martial law.[53]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities likely seek to impose greater secrecy surrounding force generation logistics due to the impact of continued Ukrainian strikes against Russian supply hubs and supply lines. A prominent Russian milblogger stated on October 22 that occupation authorities in Crimea banned the filming of vehicles, engineering structures, railways, communications infrastructure, and information relevant to the navigation and location of Russian forces. The milblogger praised the initiative as “long overdue” and called for Russian federal subjects to similarly limit reporting on force generation efforts.[54] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Belarusian security officials are enforcing similar restrictions in Pinsk and Stolinsk Raions in Belarus, likely to prevent Belarusians from recording the movement of Russian troops into training grounds.[55]

Reports of Russian volunteer and mobilized soldiers facing debt and new difficulties upon their return from fighting in Ukraine have exacerbated domestic dissatisfaction with the implementation of Russian mobilization.[56] The Russian government likely responded to this dissatisfaction by approving a deferment of tax and insurance premium payments for mobilized personnel and business leaders who are the sole owners of their companies on October 22.[57] However, this deferment does not address all cases in which soldiers face punitive measures upon their return. Russian Telegram channels criticized a judge in Nizhny Novogorod on October 22 who sentenced a BARS (Russian Combat Reserve) volunteer soldier to three months imprisonment for failing to perform court-ordered punitive labor while fighting in Ukraine.[58] The channels also claimed the Russian National Bolsheviks Party hung a banner condemning the judge for this and other decisions against the “patriotic public.”[59]

ISW identified additional reports on October 22 that Russian mobilization did not meet the Kremlin’s initial force generation goals and will likely continue mobilization in alternative forms.[60] ISW reported on October 21 that varying regional commitments to mobilization, covert and illegal mobilization, and preparation for further mobilization will likely increase fissures between Russian officials, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and military commissariats, and the Russian civilian population over the coming months.[61] Idel.Realii reported on October 21 that military commissar Dmitriy Kileev announced that Orenburg authorities completed only 60% of planned mobilization before officials announced the end of the partial mobilization period and that mobilization should continue until October 28.[62] Another source similarly stated that military registration and enlistment officials in Krasnodar are gathering information from residents to create a list of men eligible for future mobilization.[63] Several Telegram channels claimed that mobilization officials in Moscow and Saint Petersburg are illegally changing the qualification and experience records of citizens to ensure their mobilization.[64] Russian and Belarusian border guards continue to remove Russian men fleeing mobilization from flights out of Russia and Belarus.[65] The Ukrainian General Staff stated on October 22 that Russian military leadership is trying to attract foreign mercenaries from an unspecified country in the Middle East, but ISW cannot independently confirm this report.[66] A prominent Russian Telegram channel shared unverified rumors on October 21 that two Iranian cargo planes arrived in Moscow carrying unspecified and unconfirmed weapons and UAVs. [67] A Belarusian opposition channel reported that Belarus provided more than 24 T-27A tanks to Russian forces heading in the Donetsk direction.[68]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian and occupation administration officials continued to forcibly relocate residents in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine as of October 22. Kherson City Council member Gayane Oganesyan claimed on October 22 that Russian and occupation administration officials are relocating detainees and prisoners from detention centers in Kherson Oblast to undisclosed locations under the guise of ongoing evacuation efforts in Kherson Oblast.[69] Russian officials continued to lay the administrative framework for the forcible relocation of residents from Kherson Oblast. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a resolution on October 22 that defined the rules under which Kherson residents that permanently resettle in other Russian territories may receive housing subsidy payments totaling 100,000 rubles (about $1,622).[70] A Russian source reported that residents who fled or were forcibly relocated from Kherson Oblast have begun to receive housing certificates in Krasnodar Krai.[71] The head of Russian-occupied Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, stated that his administration would extend housing certificates and subsidies to all Russian citizens relocating from Kherson City and settlements west of the Dnipro River.[72] Russian and occupation administration officials will likely continue to accelerate efforts to forcibly relocate residents in Kherson Oblast in the coming days as Ukraine’s southern counteroffensive progresses.

Russian and occupation administration officials continued to restrict the movement of residents living in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on October 21 that Russian forces are increasing the number of checkpoints and strengthening controls at existing ones throughout the Russian-occupied territories.[73] The Resistance Center also reported on October 22 that the temporary travel permit regime introduced by occupation administrations on October 1 has reduced the number of residents travelling to Ukrainian-held territory by a factor of ten in the last month.[74] The Resistance Center reported that Russian forces also collect the fingerprints, addresses, and destinations of all men under 35 years of age who pass through the Vasylivka checkpoint in Zaporizhia Oblast, likely to prepare for the future forcible mobilization of those Ukrainian civilians.[75] Russian and occupation administration officials are likely to increase restrictions on movement as Ukrainian counteroffensive operations progress.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[7] https://t.me/kommunist/12022; https://t.me/epoddubny/13260 ; https://... ru/20221022/vodokhranilische-1825876381.html

[16] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/1861; https://riafan dot ru/23710558-voenkori_fan_pobivali_na_meste_sozdaniya_linii_vagnera_v_belgorodskoi_oblasti

[18] https://riafan dot ru/23710558-voenkori_fan_pobivali_na_meste_sozdaniya_linii_vagnera_v_belgorodskoi_oblasti

[52] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/10/21/zaporizka-aes-okupanty-planuyut-mobilizuvaty-praczivnykiv-yaki-ukladut-kontrakt-z-rosatomom/

[53] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/10/21/zaporizka-aes-okupanty-planuyut-mobilizuvaty-praczivnykiv-yaki-ukladut-kontrakt-z-rosatomom/

[57] https://t.me/mod_russia/21096; http://government dot ru/docs/46859/

[62] https://t.me/idelrealii/21400; https://d2lj5af5hfc6vs(dot)cloudfront.net/a/32094674.html; https://t.me/CITeam/2823

[65] https://t.me/moscowtimes_ru/8520; https://newizv dot ru/news/society/22-10-2022/pogranichniki-v-peterburge-snyali-s-samoletov-30-chelovek-i-otpravili-v-voenkomat?amp=1; https://news dot google.com/articles/CAIiEBx9TUxBXP1ZNroMh1NvRJ4qGQgEKhAIACoHCAowp4GbCzDri7MDMKqq3AY?uo=CAUie2h0dHBzOi8vbmV3aXp2LnJ1L25ld3Mvc29jaWV0eS8yMi0xMC0yMDIyL3BvZ3JhbmljaG5pa2ktdi1wZXRlcmJ1cmdlLXNueWFsaS1zLXNhbW9sZXRvdi0zMC1jaGVsb3Zlay1pLW90cHJhdmlsaS12LXZvZW5rb21hdNIBAA&hl=ru&gl=RU&ceid=RU%3Aru

[70] https://aif dot ru/society/kabmin_opredelil_pravila_subsidirovaniya_pereezda_zhiteley_hersonskoy_oblasti

[73] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/10/21/rosiyany-planuyut-vykorystovuvaty-zhytlo-evakujovanyh-u-vlasnyh-czilyah/

[74] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/10/22/okupanty-blokuyut-vyyizd-ukrayincziv-na-vilni-terytoriyi/

[75] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/10/22/okupanty-blokuyut-vyyizd-ukrayincziv-na-vilni-terytoriyi/

understandingwar.org

2.  Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (22.10.22) CDS comments on key events

CDS Daily brief (22.10.22) CDS comments on key events

Humanitarian aspect:

As of the morning of October 22, 2022, more than 1,248 Ukrainian children are victims of full- scale armed aggression by the Russian Federation, Prosecutor General's Office reports. The official number of children who died and were wounded during the Russian aggression is 430, and more than 818 children, respectively. However, the data is not conclusive since data collection continues in the areas of active hostilities, temporarily occupied areas, and liberated territories.

During the day, the Russians launched 40 missile strikes and 16 kamikaze drones at the civilian infrastructure of Ukraine. 20 cruise missiles and 11 UAVs were shot down, Ukraine's General Staff reported.

The Russian invaders continue to deprive Ukrainians of energy infrastructure. As a result of the morning enemy shelling, almost one and a half million Ukrainians were left without electricity, the Office of the President stated.

Today's attack is comparable to or may exceed the consequences of the attack on October 10- 12, "Ukrenergo" [Ukraine's energy company] stated. "Ukrenergo" experts are restoring the electricity supply as soon as possible in the Ukrainian regions that are currently without electricity. [Energy supply] restrictions were applied in Kyiv, Kyiv Oblast, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kirovohrad Oblasts.

The Volyn Oblast (Northwest of Ukraine) energy infrastructure object was destroyed by the impact of three Russian Kh-101 missiles this morning. [Ukrainian utility services] are currently not able to restore it, the Lutsk mayor, Ihor Polishchuk said. In Lutsk [Volyn Oblast's capital] 12 houses were damaged during the morning rocket attack by the Russians, and all boiler houses temporarily stopped working. According to "Lutskteplo" [energy company], the supply of hot water to the city has been suspended.

A critical infrastructure object in Rivne was hit, Mayor Oleksandr Tretyak reported during the first wave of the Russin morning attack on Ukraine. A large part of the city remains without an energy supply. The air attack sirens did not work due to the lack of electricity and the city switched to the State Emergency Service and patrol police cars moving around the city [with alarm sirens].

Kyiv Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko said air defense forces shot down several missiles in the Kyiv Oblast, heading toward Kyiv.

Uman region in Cherkasy Oblast was without electricity due to a missile hitting an energy facility in the neighboring Oblast, Ihor Taburets, head of the Cherkasy Oblast Military Administration reported.

The Russians launched rocket attacks on important energy facilities in the Kropyvnytskyi and Golovanivsky districts of Kirovograd Oblast, the head of Kirovohrad Oblast Military Administration, Andriy Raikovych, reported.

The enemy made two missile strikes on the object of the energy infrastructure of the Odesa Oblast, disrupting electricity in several communities, the head of Odesa Military Administration Maksym Marchenko reported. 3 injured civilians were reported due to the strikes. The State Emergency Service is now dealing with the elimination of the consequences of the strikes to resume the operation of the power grids as soon as possible.

More than 20 houses and several gas pipelines were damaged in Nikopol during the past night, the head of Dnipropetrovsk Regional Military Administration, Valentyn Reznichenko, said. According to him, the Russian forces shelled Marganets and Nikopol communities, and Nikopol suffered the most. The enemy hit Nikopol with MLRS and heavy artillery, leaving almost 1,000 families without electricity. Power engineers are already repairing the networks.

Russian troops fired at a playground and a school in Zaporizhzhia Oblast at night, the Head of the Oblast Military Administration reported. As Alexander Starukh noted, the Russians launched two missile strikes on the village of Zarichne.

Occupied territories:

Russian occupiers kidnapped 46 children from the Kherson Oblast orphanage and moved them to the temporarily occupied Simferopol. "These are children under five years old. The invaders call the kidnapping of children an 'evacuation," Yaroslav Yanushevich, [Ukranian] head of the Kherson Oblast Military Administration, wrote in his Telegram.

According to available information, the invaders are taking prisoners out of temporarily captured Kherson under the guise of "evacuation," the director of the media and public relations department of the Kherson City Council, Gayane Oganesyan published on Facebook. "There are both women and men among the prisoners," the official said. According to her, the people of Kherson were kept in inhumane conditions: without normal food and treatment. 10 or more people were held for months in cells designed for three people and stayed for several days. Gayane Oganesyan noted that with a high probability, [Ukrainian] Kherson Mayor Ihor Kolykhaev could be among them.

The head of the [legaly-elected Ukrainain] Kherson city military administration, Galina Luhova, advised the Kherson residents on how to act in the event of Russian forces blowing up the Kakhovska HPP dam. "In the event of a breakthrough of the Kakhovska HPP dam, the territory of the Kherson urban territorial community will experience catastrophic flooding in 2 hours. The water level in the Dnipro River after the breakthrough may rise to 5 [meters.] The maximum water level will be reached in 13 hours and 48 minutes. The time of the peak of the flood - 3 hours 30 minutes", - emphasized the department for civil protection of the city of Kherson. Therefore, in case of danger, citizens are urged to turn off electrical appliances, gas stoves, take documents, necessary things, a supply of food and drinking water, and go to safe areas.

Spanish volunteer Mariano Garcia Calatayud - known as Mario - who disappeared at the beginning of the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, is in the Simferopol pre-trial detention center of the temporarily occupied Crimea, reported the human rights organization KrymSOS. Mariano García Calatayud is a Spanish citizen who lived in Ukraine for eight years and was involved in volunteer activities. On March 19, he went to a pro-Ukrainian rally in temporarily occupied [by Russia] Kherson; after which he disappeared. Local activists reported that he was being held in Kherson.

Operational situation

(please note that this part of the report is mainly on the previous day's (October 21) developments)

It is the 241st day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to defend Donbas"). The enemy tries to maintain control over the temporarily captured territories. It concentrates its efforts on disrupting the counteroffensive actions of the Ukrainian troops, and at the same time does not give up attempts to conduct the offensive in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions.

The Russian military shells the positions of the Ukrainian troops along the entire contact line and conducts aerial reconnaissance. In violation of the norms of international humanitarian law, the laws, and customs of war, it continues to strike critical infrastructure. Over the past day, the Russian forces have launched 5 missile and 19 air strikes and fired over 94 MLRS rounds.

About 20 Ukrainian towns and villages were hit by enemy strikes, including Kharkiv, Kupyansk; Bakhmut, Odradivka, Maryinka, Zelenopilya in the Donetsk Oblast; Zaporizhzhia; and Novovoskresenske in the Kherson Oblast. In the border areas, the enemy shelled Ukrainka, Mykolaivka, Krasny Khutir, and Hay in Chernihiv Oblast, Pokrovka in Sumy Oblast, Vovchansk, Gatyshche, Hlyboke, Milove, Ohirtseve, Neskuchne, Starytsa, Ternova, Strilecha and Chugunivka in Kharkiv Oblast. The enemy used aviation, anti-aircraft guided missiles, and "Shahed-136" UAVs.

The deployment of the joint regional grouping of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus troops continues. During the day, enemy aircraft made training flights in the airspace of the Republic of Belarus. According to available information, there are cases of conflicts between the Russian and Belarusian military on the national affiliation background and the impudent attitude of Russians towards Belarusians.

Russian military leadership does not stop the search for weapons supplies and trying to attract foreign mercenaries to the war in Ukraine. According to available information, [Russians] continue the recruitment of militants in one of the Middle East countries.

The problems of providing the Russian group with ammunition are increasing. The total share of ammunition of the main calibers that were recovered [from the long-term storage] and are now

supplied for the needs of Russian troops units in Ukraine, reached 65-67%; and 82-mm and 120- mm mines - 30-40%. In fact, two-thirds of the 152-mm, 122-mm (including rockets for MLRS), and 125-mm tank shells supplied to the front are repaired after long-term storage.

The level of the civilian population's dissatisfaction with the actions of the military leadership of the Russian Federation is increasing, in particular, because of the mobilization that is still ongoing in remote regions [of RF], despite the official announcement of its end.

Ukrainian Defense Forces aircraft carried out 16 strikes during the past day. The impact on three enemy strongholds and ten areas of concentration of weapons and military equipment, and three positions of the enemy's anti-aircraft missile systems, was confirmed. Ukrainian air defense units shot down an enemy Su-25 aircraft and an Orlan-10 UAV.

Over the past day, Ukraine's missile forces and artillery hit 2 enemy command and control points, 14 areas of concentration of manpower, weapons, and military equipment, an ammunition warehouse, the enemy's S-300 anti-aircraft missile complex, enemy artillery at firing positions and 5 more important targets.

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low.

The newly mobilized Russians, captured as POWs [by Ukrainian Forses], [confirmed] the continued poor combat results. A captured mercenary from the "Wagner" PMC, who was recruited in the Ryazan penal colony, said that three-quarters of his unit died in the battles near Bakhmut and that the Russian troops shot his comrades who refused to fight, ordered them to commit suicide rather than go POW. They were not paid and treated like cannon fodder.

Another "mobilized" POW stated that Russian mobilization officials forced Russian prisoners [from Russian penal faciities] to mobilize, did not provide them with any training, and did not provide enough food; the soldiers only ate once a day.

Kharkiv direction

• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.

The enemy fired at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces with mortars and jet artillery in the areas of Kolodyazne, Dvorichna, Bohdanivka, Berestove, and Kyslivka. Russian troops launched a missile attack on industrial infrastructure in the Kyivsky district of the city of Kharkiv.

Units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled the enemy attacks in the areas of Ternova.

Kramatorsk direction

● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

●  252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th, and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.

Russian troops fired with tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery at Karmazynivka, Zarichne, Shyykivka, and Terny.

The BTG from the 254th motorized rifle regiment of the 144th motorized rifle division of the 20th Army, the (incomplete composition) of PMC "Wagner" assault detachment, and the BARS company tried to knock out the advanced units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from Bilogorivka. They also tried to advance from the Lysychansk oil refinery to the west. The Ukrainian Defense Forces repulsed all the attacks of the occupiers.

The area near Svatove remains the most active, as Russian troops continue to try to regain lost positions around it.

The Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled the Russian assault on Lyman, tried to advance in the Terny area, and reach the P66 Kreminna-Svatov highway; the fighting continues.

Donetsk direction

● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;

●  Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The enemy fired at the Ukrainian Defense Forces from tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery in the areas of Andriivka, Soledar, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Bilohorivka, Verkhnyokamianske, Spirne, Ivanhrad, Rozdolivka, Zelenopillia, Klishchiivka, Opytne, Avdiivka, Vesele, Krasnohorivka, Maryinka, Novomykhailivka, Vodiane, and Pervomaiske.

Ukrainian Defense Forces units repelled the enemy attacks in the areas of Lyman, Ivanhrad, Soledar, Novokalynove, Ozaryanivka, Odradivka, and Pervomaiske.

Zaporizhzhia direction

●  Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

●  Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military did not conduct active offensive actions. They shelled the areas of Vuhledar, Prechystivka, Vremivka, Velyka Novosilka, Biloghirya, Zeleny Gay, and Mala Tokmachka.

In Energodar, Russian soldiers are looting abandoned apartments [of civilins] and hotels.

Tavriysk direction

-    Vasylivka – Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 42, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7 km;

-   Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd, and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 37th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 10th, 16th, 346th separate SOF brigades, 239th air assault regiment of the 76th Air assault division, 217th and 331st parachute airborne regiments of the 98th airborne division, 108 air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault battalion of the 7th Air assault division, 11th and 83rd separate airborne assault brigade, 4th military base of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 7 military base 49 Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 126th separate coastal defence brigades, 127th separate ranger brigade, 1st and 3rd Army Corps, PMCs.

Russian troops began to withdraw from the western part of the Kherson region.

A large part of the population left the city of Kherson. The Russian occupiers, who remained in the city, change into civilian clothes and move into the abandoned apartments. The enemy is

preparing Kherson for street battles. The Russian occupiers are "clearing" the premises of the Kakhovka Hospital, removing patients and medical staff.

The Ukrainian Defense Forces [fire] impact at the enemy repair base in the area of Novaya Kakhovka has been confirmed.

Ukrainian Defense forces struck the Russian pontoon crossing under the Antoniv bridge and continued to strike Russian positions and ammunition depots in the northern and central part of the Kherson region.

Russian troops use Ukrainian civilians as human shields while transporting military equipment across the Dnipro.

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and to maintain control over the captured territories.

In the open sea, the Russian naval group is comprised of 12 ships and boats located along the southwestern coast of Crimea. Due to the mass launches of Kalibr missiles, the number of carriers is constantly changing, at least 16 Kalibr missiles are constantly in the sea ready for use.

In the waters of the Sea of Azov, enemy patrol ships and boats are on the approach to the Mariupol and Berdyansk seaports to block the Azov coast.

Russian aviation continues to fly from the Crimean airfields of Belbek and Gvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 14 aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were deployed.

The enemy continues its missile attacks on Ukraine and its coastal areas. On the morning of October 22, the enemy fired more than 30 cruise missiles at Ukraine: 17 X-101/X-555 missiles from Tu-95/Tu-160 aircraft and 15 Kalibr missiles from ships in the Black Sea. Aircraft, anti-aircraft missile units, and mobile fire groups of the Air Force of Ukraine destroyed 18 enemy cruise missiles (13 Kh-101/Kh-555 missiles and five Calibers). Two enemy missile strikes damaged infrastructure facilities in the Odesa region, and four of the six cruise missiles over Odesa were destroyed. The enemy continues to use kamikaze drones. 10 Shahed-136 kamikaze drones were shot down on the morning of October 22 over Mykolaiv.

Due to the repair of the Crimean bridge, the accumulation of cargo was waiting for crossing/moving through the Kerch Strait. The Russians are studying alternative logistic ways supplying of its grouping of troops in the Kherson Oblast through the occupied Azov region with the main hub in Melitopol. Meanwhile, since October 20, Russians [occuping forces] have been carrying out evacuation measures for the collaborators and the most capable military units from the right bank of the Dnieper, mainly on pontoons and barges.

"Grain initiative". Ukraine remains committed to the implementation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative and supports its continuation after its expiration on November 22. This was stated by the permanent representative of Ukraine to the UN, Serhii Kyslytsia, at the meeting of the UN Security Council on Friday. He reminded that since the agreement came into force, 362 ships with 8 million tons of food left Ukrainian ports for the countries of Asia, Europe, and Africa. Ukraine continues to cooperate with the UN World Food Program on increasing the amount of food that is sent to the most vulnerable countries. "Ukrainian grain exports have already had an impact on stabilizing the world market, lowering prices, and reducing the chaos caused by food shortages around the world. That's why we support its extension after November 22, when the 120-day deadline expires," he emphasized.

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 22.10

Personnel - almost 67,070 people (+320);

Tanks - 2,579 (+6);

Armored combat vehicles – 5,266 (+8);

Artillery systems – 1,653 (+5);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 373 (+1); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 189 (0); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 4,021 (+15); Aircraft - 270 (+1);

Helicopters – 243 (0);

UAV operational and tactical level – 1,341 (+16); Intercepted cruise missiles - 329 (0);

Boats / ships - 16 (0).

Ukraine, general news

In Ukraine, the activities of 12 pro-Russian parties were finally banned. The Administrative Court of Cassation rejected the appeal of the "Socialist Party of Ukraine" and, thus, finally banned its activities.

Denys Shmygal, the prime minister of Ukraine, asked Germany to urgently supply additional ammunition for IRIS-T air defense systems. The IRIS-T SLM is now in use and has already saved a huge number of lives, but due to constant Russian attacks, ammunition is quickly running out. Russia wants Ukraine to have a “cold winter where many people can literally freeze to death,” the Ukrainian prime minister said in an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine. And if there is no electricity, heating, or water in Ukraine, it could “result in a planned humanitarian catastrophe such as Europe has not seen since World War II.”

Macro-financial assistance of 1.5 billion euros per month, which Ukraine will receive from the European Union next year, will be directed to social payments and support of the energy sector, announced the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Olga

Stefanishyna, Ukrinform reports. Stefanishyna noted that by the end of the year, together with the EU, it is planned to provide all energy facilities with the necessary materials for quick recovery. According to her, the monthly tranche of €1.5 billion is the result of more than six months of negotiations, and this is already the sixth program of macro-financial assistance to Ukraine from the EU.

International diplomatic aspect

Russians keep their veto power in the UN Security Council and are angry about any reform of the body. At the same time, the very legitimacy of Russia's setting in the chair of a permanent member of the UN Security Council is doubtful. "According to the documents, it is still not the Russian Federation, but… the Soviet Union that is a permanent member of the Security Council (namely, this status gives the right to veto). However, in 1991, in an attempt to secure Russia's nuclear and military capabilities, the UNSC decided to turn a blind eye to the organization's violation of its charter and allow Russia to sit at the table — which, however, has not yet made its membership legal," stated the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN in New York. The Soviet Union was one of the founders of the UN. At the same time, none of the UN members voted for the Russian Federation's membership in general and its permanent seat at the UN Security Council, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the UN Charter doesn't envisage any "succession" of the permanent member's seat at all.

It is worth noting that the Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations, a predecessor of the UN, following the pact with Germany and aggression against Finland. The Ribbentrop Molotov Pact was about dividing Europe between the Nazi and communist allies, triggering the bloodiest conflict in Europe.

In 2014 Russia illegally annexed Crimea, which was the first illegal, forceful annexation of territory since the end of the Second World War. In 2022 Russia launched the largest military conflict on the European continent since the Second World War.

Iranian foreign ministry strongly condemned a call by France, Germany, and the UK for the UN's investigation of the Iranian origin of drones that Russia used to hit Ukrainian civilian and critical infrastructure. President Ebrahim Raisi denied it [playing the fool], saying that all the concerns were based on Iran's enemies who "do not want us to grow ... to conquer markets". He hinted that many countries are interested in buying Iranian weapons because they are better. "Let the enemy get angry and die of anger," he concluded.

There's a role of the Mullah regime in this as well in what UN Resident Coordinator in Ukraine Denise Brown described as "The sheer depth of the humanitarian catastrophe [in Ukraine] is staggering." Denise Brown has warned that more than 40 percent of the Ukrainian population (some 18 million) is now in need of emergency aid due to Russia's war of aggression. She added that according to UNICEF, "some 5.7 million school children have been affected" since Russia's all-out invasion, including some 3.6 million school children who have had their educational facilities closed. There have been over 630 verified attacks on healthcare. Fourteen million fled their homes, including 6.2 million internally displaced and nearly 7.7 million refugees.

Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS) is a Ukrainian security think tank. We operate since 2020

We publish this brief daily. If you would like to subscribe, please send us an email at cds.dailybrief@gmail.com

Please note, that we subscribe only verified persons and can decline or cancel the subscription at our own discretion

We are an independent, non-government, non-partisan, and non-profit organisation. More at www.defence.org.ua

Our Twitter (in English) - https://twitter.com/defence_centre

Our Facebook (in Ukrainian) - https://www.facebook.com/cds.UA

Our brief is for information only and we verify our information to the best possible extent

3. COMMENTARY: NatSec Warnings Are Wearing Thin on Public Ears

Excerpt:

The survey results showed that U.S. and UK voters are not buying all of what their political and security leaders are telling them. The panels aboard the HMS Queen Elizabeth showed that even some top military, university, and tech leaders don’t buy the threat warnings, either. And the Army leaders at AUSA showed they’re not buying what partisan extremists are selling.

Sensible Talk Aboard a UK Aircraft Carrier. But Does It Come Too Late?

New poll shows US, UK publics aren’t buying what national-security experts have been selling.

defenseone.com · by Kevin Baron

ABOARD THE HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH IN NEW YORK HARBOR — It was unusual fare for a defense conference. First, Britain’s armed forces chief calmly counseled Western allies and their defense industries not to overhype enemies. Rather, after clear successes against a surprisingly poor Russian military in Ukraine, they should be “confident” in the West’s capabilities and prepare for future threats in “a sober way,” said Adm. Sir Tony Radakin.

Later, technology executives cautioned fearful political leaders not to block foreign workers from their sectors. They urged Western governments to resist cutting off even suspicious countries in Asia or the Middle East from sharing in new tech capabilities and connectivity. Bring them closer, don’t push them away, they argued.

Even a panel of academics in advanced fields of quantum computing and artificial intelligence scoffed at warnings about Chinese espionage because, they argued, “open science is good.”

And they said it all aboard the British government’s most advanced aircraft carrier, anchored within sight of New York City’s ground zero.

Squeezed into the hangar deck of the HMS Queen Elizabeth, this year’s edition of the Atlantic Future Forum offered glimpses of U.S.-UK defense-tech partnerships and unexpected dollops of British stoicism.

Usually, arms expos and military conferences are hype-fests with doomsday warnings, billion-dollar weapons bazaars punctuated by scareful speeches about the enemies that will kill us and the defense products that will stop them. Generals, politicians, executives, salesmen, and their associations thump their chests, give each other “peace through strength” awards, and declare that more is needed. It’s never subtle.

Take, for example, this month’s AUSA 2022 convention. The first big post-lockdown gathering of the Association of the U.S. Army drew 35,000 people to the gigantic Washington Convention Center, where glitzy corporate exhibit spaces filled several city blocks with everything from counter-drone kits to the new Abrams tank, sniper rifles, and satellites. Generals on stages sounded tough on Russia and China, and anything else that may come their way.

But even during AUSA, more nuanced messages emerged. From the White House, Biden officials released their first National Security Strategy, which offered tempered descriptions of China as a “competitor.” On AUSA stages, Army leaders sounded as committed to social-justice efforts as to opposing Russia, pushing back on bow-tie-wearing TV talkers who allege the American military is getting soft because soldiers are learning to not be racists, extremists, or science deniers. The top general for Army recruitment rejected partisan-fueled allegations that “wokeism” is keeping America’s youth from enlisting.

Meanwhile, defense industry giants like General Motors were highlighting greener—and tactically smarter—electric vehicles. While right-wing politicians were slamming military attention to climate change, Stephen duMont, president of GM Defense and a former attack helicopter pilot, was boasting that his EVs are harder to spot than the fossil-fueled vehicles that used to light up his Apache’s targeting screens.

“All five companies bidding to replace the four-decade-old Bradley fighting vehicle have proposed new troop carriers with hybrid electric engines, according to Army officials,” reported Defense One global business editor Marcus Weisgerber.

Two weeks earlier on the Queen Elizabeth, organizers played a taped speech by BP’s CEO Bernard Looney, who touts his company’s pursuit of renewable energy.

What I took away from these two conferences—staged after 20 years of counterterrorism wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, amid a nuclear-shadowed war in Europe and a menacing standoff around Taiwan—is that a growing number of leaders in defense, technology, and academia are openly defying political leaders in new ways. They are saying out loud that the future is complicated and the threats to our societies are not as clear as the many leading politicians want voters to believe.

Angela McLean—chief scientific adviser to the British defense ministry—described how colleagues at a recent dinner of synthetic biology leaders in Boston scoffed at warnings about Chinese espionage: “The academics around the room thought the whole thing was incredibly funny. They said, ‘Oh, the government keeps coming to my lab and all they ever say is “China is bad, China is bad”’—and they were laughing.” McLean said her work in the government has given her a new perspective: “Gosh, these people have no idea,” she said aboard the Queen Elizabeth. “There is an enormous education job to be done.”

I asked McLean why she thinks her colleagues don’t fear China as they’re told. She said, “That’s very straightforward. It’s because open science has been such an enormous force for good.” Scientists, she said, have always valued open information-sharing and distrusted government secrecy, citing the international effort to decode human DNA by sharing data across borders. “Data is incredibly valuable…but it’s way, way more valuable if it is shared. I think that’s really where it comes from.”

She said most scientists outside of security fields “have lived a working life in which open science was the way forward,” so when security experts warn them suddenly that another group of people are coming to steal their ideas, “that just goes counter to a lifetime of experience.”

Two seats down on the panel, QinetiQ CEO Steve Wadey put in, with some worry, “It’s a good question.”

Current events are turning some skeptics into believers. Radakin, the UK defense chief of staff, said the Ukraine war has upended assumptions about Russia’s military strength and the West’s diplomatic weakness. The allies’ quick and coordinated reactions have demonstrated something “very powerful” that should reshape their approach to planning, he said.

While the West should remain “very cautious” so “we don’t magnify the weaknesses in our potential enemies,” Radakin said, “one of the other lessons is that we tend to underplay our own strengths, and these extraordinary democracies, and the extraordinary power that we have with our militaries, and the breadth of the ingenuity that we can bring to bear.” As the international order faces threats inside and out, in other words, the West should keep calm and carry on.

Radakin’s statement was not far off from Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s monotone declaration last year that “China’s not 10 feet tall.” But it is still jarring to hear a senior admiral tell a roomful of defense conference-goers to temper their fears and weapons-buying impulses. If he had tweeted it, imagine the wave of angry right-wing hawks replying about another military officer gone soft.

The aircraft carrier’s thick hangar bay doors blocked the outside world from listening in, but it’s a shame there were so few American military leaders and no members of Congress aboard to hear the message. National security leaders have a credibility problem, and the British brought recent polls to prove it. Organizers handed out hard copies of an August survey of the American and British public which indicates that voters will follow partisan fearmongers if sensible national security professionals don’t try harder to reach them.

Half of Americans, or 49 percent, do not “think NATO is a good thing,” despite Russia’s nuclear threats and invasion into Ukraine, according to the poll, conducted by J.L. Partners. Just 59 percent support the same NATO expansion that national security professionals nearly unanimously celebrate. Most Americans do not think the top threat to Western democracy is China or Russia; they are more afraid of themselves. Forty-three percent said the top threat was either Democrats, Republicans, or political polarization. Only 15 percent said “Putin and Russia.” Only 10 percent said “China.” Fewer than 6 percent identified the top threat as climate change, high immigration, radical Islamists, North Korea, or Iran.

In the UK, twice as many respondents picked “Putin and Russia” as tops, but the rest nearly matched up with the Americans.

The survey results showed that U.S. and UK voters are not buying all of what their political and security leaders are telling them. The panels aboard the HMS Queen Elizabeth showed that even some top military, university, and tech leaders don’t buy the threat warnings, either. And the Army leaders at AUSA showed they’re not buying what partisan extremists are selling.

The Brits came to New York with a political message about 2022: chill out, take the win, and focus on the reality of the world as it is. It was reassuring to hear amid a sea of others chanting “China, China, China.” But when Americans and Brits fear their countrymen more than they do Beijing, there is no weapon for sale at any arms expo that can change that. To keep their citizens safe and protected, more U.S. and UK security leaders may need to be willing to shoot down political speech as quickly as they can a Russian cruise missile.

defenseone.com · by Kevin Baron

4. China's Xi expands powers, promotes allies

Obviously there is a lot of reporting on this today and will be for days to come.

China's Xi expands powers, promotes allies

AP · by JOE McDONALD · October 23, 2022

BEIJING (AP) — President Xi Jinping, China’s most powerful leader in decades, increased his dominance Sunday when he was named to another term as head of the ruling Communist Party in a break with tradition and promoted allies who support his vision of tighter control over society and the struggling economy.

Xi, who took power in 2012, was awarded a third five-year term as general secretary, discarding a custom under which his predecessor left after 10 years. The 69-year-old leader is expected by some to try to stay in power for life.

The party also named a seven-member Standing Committee, its inner circle of power, dominated by Xi allies after Premier Li Keqiang, the No. 2 leader and an advocate of market-style reform and private enterprise, was dropped from the leadership Saturday. That was despite Li being a year younger than the party’s informal retirement age of 68.

“Power will be even more concentrated in the hands of Xi Jinping,” said Jean-Pierre Cabestan, a Chinese politics expert at Hong Kong Baptist University. The new appointees are “all loyal to Xi,” he said. “There is no counterweight or checks and balances in the system at all.”

ADVERTISEMENT

On Saturday, Xi’s predecessor, 79-year-old Hu Jintao, abruptly left a meeting of the party Central Committee with an aide holding his arm. That prompted questions about whether Xi was flexing his powers by expelling other leaders. The official Xinhua News Agency later reported Hu was in poor health and needed to rest.

Business

• GOP campaigns against the IRS, vowing to slash its funding
• Republican committee sues Google over email spam filters
• Inflation protests across Europe threaten political turmoil
• Social media platforms brace for midterm elections mayhem

Xi and other Standing Committee members — none of them women — appeared for the first time as a group before reporters in the Great Hall of the People, the seat of China’s ceremonial legislature in central Beijing.

The No. 2 leader was Li Qiang, the Shanghai party secretary. That puts Li Qiang, who is no relation to Li Keqiang, in line to become premier, the top economic official. Zhao Leji, already a member, was promoted to No. 3, likely to head the legislature. Those posts are to be assigned when the legislature meets next year.

Leadership changes were announced as the party wrapped up a twice-a-decade congress that was closely watched for initiatives to reverse an economic slump or changes in a severe “zero-COVID” strategy that has shut down cities and disrupted business. Officials disappointed investors and the Chinese public by announcing no changes.

ADVERTISEMENT

The lineup appeared to reflect what some commentators called “Maximum Xi,” valuing loyalty over ability. Some new leaders lack national-level experience as vice premier or Cabinet minister that typically is seen as a requirement for the post.

Li Qiang’s promotion served as apparent confirmation, as it puts him in line to be premier with no background in national government. Li Qiang is seen as close to Xi after they worked together in Zhejiang province in the southeast in the early 2000s.

Li Keqiang was sidelined over the past decade by Xi, who put himself in charge of policymaking bodies. Li Keqiang was excluded Saturday from the list of the party’s new 205-member Central Committee, from which the Standing Committee is picked.

ADVERTISEMENT

Another departure from the Standing Committee was Wang Yang, a reform advocate suggested by some as a possible premier. Wang, 67, is below retirement age.

Other new Standing Committee members include Cai Qi, the Beijing party secretary, and Ding Xuexiang, a career party functionary who is regarded as Xi’s “alter ego” or chief of staff. Wang Huning, a former law school dean who is chief of ideology, stayed on the committee. The No. 7 member is Li Xi, the party secretary of Guangdong province in the southeast, the center of China’s export-oriented manufacturing industry.

The Central Committee has 11 women, or 5% of the total. Its 24-member Politburo, which has had only four female members since the 1990s, has none following the departure of Vice Premier Sun Chunlan.

Party plans call for creating a prosperous society by mid-century and restoring China to its historic role as a political, economic and cultural leader.

ADVERTISEMENT

Those ambitions face challenges from security-related curbs on access to Western technology, an aging workforce, and tensions with Washington, Europe and Asian neighbors over trade, security, human rights and territorial disputes.

Xi has called for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and a revival of the party’s “original mission” as social, economic and culture leader in a throwback to what he sees as a golden age after it took power in 1949.

During the congress, Xi called for faster military development, “self-reliance and strength” in technology and defense of China’s interests abroad, which raises the likelihood of further conflict.

The party has tightened control over entrepreneurs who generate jobs and wealth, prompting warnings that rolling back market-oriented reforms will weigh on economic growth that sank to 2.2% in the first half of this year — less than half the official 5.5% target.

“Clearly, it’s a return to a much more state-controlled type of economy,” said Cabestan. “This means, for private business, they will be on an even shorter leash, with party committees everywhere.”

ADVERTISEMENT

Under a revived 1950s propaganda slogan, “common prosperity,” Xi is pressing entrepreneurs to help narrow China’s wealth gap by raising wages and paying for rural job creation and other initiatives.

Xi, in a report to the congress last week, called for “regulating the mechanism of wealth accumulation,” suggesting entrepreneurs might face still more political pressure, but gave no details.

“I would worry if I were a very wealthy individual in China,” said economist Alicia Garcia Herrero of Natixis.

In his report, Xi stressed the importance of national security and control over China’s supplies of food, energy and industrial goods. He gave no indication of possible changes in policies that prompted then-President Donald Trump to launch a tariff war with Beijing in 2018 over its technology ambitions.

The party is trying to nurture Chinese creators of renewable energy, electric car, computer chip, aerospace and other technologies. Its trading partners complain Beijing improperly subsidizes and shields its suppliers from competition.

Trump’s successor, Joe Biden, has kept punitive tariff hikes on Chinese goods and this month increased restrictions on China’s access to U.S. chip technology.

The party has tightened control over private sector leaders, including e-commerce giant Alibaba Group. Under political pressure, they are diverting billions of dollars into chip development and other party initiatives. Their share prices on foreign exchanges have plunged due to uncertainty about their future.

The party will “step up its industrial policy” to close the “wide gap” between what Chinese tech suppliers can make and what is needed by smartphone, computer and other manufacturers, said Garcia Herrero and Gary Ng of Natixis in a report.

Abroad, Chinese efforts to assert leadership will lead to “more tension and difficulty,” because “countries are not just going to follow the Chinese model,” said Steve Tsang, director of the University of London’s China Institute.

With potential dissenters forced out, “there is nobody in Beijing who can advise Xi Jinping that this is not the way to go,” Tsang said.

Xi gave no indication Beijing will change its “zero-COVID” strategy despite public frustration with repeated city closures that has boiled over into protests in Shanghai and other areas.

Xi’s priorities of security and self-sufficiency will “drag on China’s productivity growth,” said Julian Evans-Pritchard, Sheana Yue and Mark Williams of Capital Economics in a report. “His determination to stay in power makes a course correction unlikely.”

The central bank governor, Yi Gang, and bank regulator, Guo Shuqing, also were missing from Saturday’s Central Committee list, indicating they will retire next year, as expected.

Xi suspended retirement rules to keep Gen. Zhang Youxia, 72, on the Central Committee. That allows Zhang, a veteran of China’s 1979 war with Vietnam, to stay as Xi’s deputy chairman on the commission that controls the party’s military wing, the People’s Liberation Army.

The party elite agreed in the 1990s to limit the general secretary to two five-year terms in hopes of avoiding a repeat of power struggles in previous decades. That leader also becomes chairman of the military commission and takes the ceremonial title of president.

Xi has led an anti-corruption crackdown that snared thousands of officials, including a retired Standing Committee member and deputy Cabinet ministers. That broke up party factions and weakened potential challengers.

Xi is on track to become the first leader in a generation to pick his own successor but has yet to indicate possible candidates. Hu Jintao and his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, both were picked in the 1980s by then-supreme leader Deng Xiaoping.

Ahead of the congress, banners criticizing Xi and “zero COVID” were hung above a major Beijing thoroughfare in a rare protest. Photos of the event were deleted from social media. The popular WeChat messaging app shut down accounts that forwarded them.

Xi’s government also faces criticism over mass detentions and other abuses against mostly Muslim ethnic groups and the jailing of government critics.

___

AP video producer Caroline Chen contributed.

AP · by JOE McDONALD · October 23, 2022

5. Iran protests trigger solidarity rallies in US, Europe

How will this turn out? Will the Iranian people free themselves from their oppression? What is the assessment of the resistance?

Iran protests trigger solidarity rallies in US, Europe

AP · by FARNOUSH AMIRI and MICHAEL BLOOD · October 22, 2022

WASHINGTON (AP) — Chanting crowds marched in the streets of Berlin, Washington DC and Los Angeles on Saturday in a show of international support for demonstrators facing a violent government crackdown in Iran, sparked by the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in the custody of that country’s morality police.

On the U.S. National Mall, thousands of women and men of all ages — wearing green, white and red, the colors of the Iran flag — shouted in rhythm. “Be scared. Be scared. We are one in this,” demonstrators yelled, before marching to the White House. “Say her name! Mahsa!”

The demonstrations, put together by grassroots organizers from around the United States, drew Iranians from across the Washington D.C. area, with some travelling down from Toronto to join the crowd.

In Los Angeles, home to the biggest population of Iranians outside of Iran, a throng of protesters formed a slow-moving procession along blocks of a closed downtown street. They chanted for the fall of Iran’s government and waved hundreds of Iranian flags that turned the horizon into a undulating wave of red, white and green.

ADVERTISEMENT

“We want freedom,” they thundered.

Shooka Scharm, an attorney who was born in the U.S. after her parents fled the Iranian revolution, was wearing a T-shirt with the slogan “Women, Life, Freedom” in English and Farsi. In Iran “women are like a second-class citizen and they are sick of it,” Scharm said.

Iran

• Hackers breach Iran's atomic energy agency, protests persist
• East Iran city, scene of bloody crackdown, sees new protests
• Protest against Iranian regime draws thousands in Berlin
• Yemeni rebel drones target Greek ship in government-run port

Iran’s nationwide antigovernment protest movement first focused on the country’s mandatory hijab covering for women following Amiri’s death on Sept. 16. The demonstrations there have since transformed into the greatest challenge to the Islamic Republic since the 2009 Green Movement over disputed elections. In Tehran on Saturday, more antigovernment protests took place at several universities.

Iran’s security forces have dispersed gatherings in that country with live ammunition and tear gas, killing over 200 people, including teenage girls, according to rights groups.

The Biden administration has said it condemns the brutality and repression against the citizens of Iran and that it will look for ways to impose more sanctions against the Iranian government if the violence continues.

Between chants, protesters in D.C. broke into song, singing traditional Persian music about life and freedom — all written after the revolution in 1979 brought religious fundamentalists to power in Iran. They sang one in particular in unison — “Baraye,” meaning because of, which has become the unofficial anthem of the Iran protests. The artist of that song, Shervin Hajipour, was arrested shortly after posting the song to his Instagram in late September. It accrued more than 40 million views.

ADVERTISEMENT

“Because of women, life, freedom,” protesters sang, echoing a popular protest chant: “Azadi” — Freedom.

The movement in Iran is rooted in the same issues as in the U.S. and around the globe, said protester Samin Aayanifard, 28, who left Iran three years ago. “It’s forced hijab in Iran and here in America, after 50 years, women’s bodies are under control,” said Aayanifard, who drove from East Lansing, Michigan to join the D.C. march. She referred to rollbacks of abortion laws in the United States. “It’s about control over women’s bodies.”

ADVERTISEMENT

Several weeks of Saturday solidarity rallies in the U.S. capital have drawn growing crowds.

In Berlin, a crowd estimated by German police at several tens of thousands turned out to show solidarity for the women and activists leading the movement for the past few weeks in Iran. The protests in Germany’s capital, organized by the Woman(asterisk) Life Freedom Collective, began at the Victory Column in Berlin’s Tiergarten park and continued as a march through central Berlin.

Some demonstrators there said they had come from elsewhere in Germany and other European countries to show their support.

“It is so important for us to be here, to be the voice of the people of Iran, who are killed on the streets,” said Shakib Lolo, who is from Iran but lives in the Netherlands. “And this is not a protest anymore, this is a revolution, in Iran. And the people of the world have to see it.”

___

Blood reported from Los Angeles.

Follow AP’s coverage of Iran at: https://apnews.com/hub/iran

AP · by FARNOUSH AMIRI and MICHAEL BLOOD · October 22, 2022

6.  CNN Exclusive: After Ukraine, Biden administration turns to Musk's satellite internet for Iran

Okay, good. What if we had done something like this years ago?

Why do we wait until something happens? What about anticipating the resistance?

Why don't we do this in north Korea? (10 years ago I was approached by some Google reps about flying drones over north Korea to provide access to the internet but it never went anywhere - I was skeptical as to how the regime would react to drones overflying their territory. But a Starlink capability might be effective).

CNN Exclusive: After Ukraine, Biden administration turns to Musk's satellite internet for Iran | CNN Politics

CNN · by Natasha Bertrand,Alex Marquardt · October 21, 2022

Washington CNN —

The White House has engaged in talks with Elon Musk about the possibility of setting up SpaceX’s satellite internet service Starlink inside Iran, multiple officials familiar with the discussions told CNN.

The conversations, which have not been previously reported, come as the Biden administration searches for ways to support the Iranian protest movement that exploded just over a month ago after 22-year-old Mahsa Amini died under suspicious circumstances after being detained by the country’s morality police.

The White House sees Starlink’s compact, easy-to-use technology as a potential solution to the Iranian regime’s aggressive efforts to restrict activists’ internet access and communications.

“We have our foot on the gas to do everything we possibly can to support the aspirations of the Iranian people,” a senior administration official told CNN. “That is our policy, period. At the same time, it is truly an Iranian movement led by young girls and spreading to other aspects of society. And we do not want to in any way eclipse their movement.”

If a plan is enacted, it would be the second major theater this year — along with Ukraine — where the US government has turned to Starlink to help provide crucial telecommunication services, even as questions swirl around Musk’s reliability in his dealings with the US government.

“He’s a loose cannon we can never predict,” said a senior US defense official familiar with the government’s discussions with Musk and SpaceX about Ukraine.

SpaceX owner and Tesla CEO Elon Musk, June 13, 2019.

Mike Blake/Reuters/FILE

Concerns over Musk’s unpredictable tendencies intensified after CNN first reported last week that Musk’s company, SpaceX, had been quietly asking the Pentagon to pay tens of millions of dollars per month to fund Starlink in Ukraine and take the burden off SpaceX. In response to that reporting, Musk then abruptly announced on Twitter that he had withdrawn the funding request.

The Pentagon has said this week that talks with SpaceX about Ukraine are ongoing, after documents obtained by CNN showed SpaceX warning the Pentagon last month it could no longer fund or service Starlink in Ukraine “for an indefinite period of time.”

SpaceX claims that providing Starlink services in Ukraine have cost it $80 million so far and that by the end of the year costs will exceed $100 million. SpaceX did not respond to CNN’s request for comment.

A solution or a risk for Iranian activists?

The needs of Iranian protesters and Ukrainian soldiers, and how they would use Starlink, are wildly different. And experts warn that while Starlink in Ukraine has been critical to battlefield successes, getting Starlink into Iran would be a much bigger and potentially more dangerous challenge.

A picture obtained by AFP outside Iran on September 21, 2022, shows Iranian demonstrators in the streets of Tehran during a protest for Mahsa Amini, days after she died in police custody.

Stringer/AFP/Getty Images

The situation with Starlink and Ukraine does not seem to have deterred the White House from pursuing Starlink, which uses satellites to beam internet service to compact terminals on the ground. SpaceX has around 3,000 such satellites currently in orbit and roughly 20,000 terminals on the ground in Ukraine.

President Joe Biden has wanted to be more bullish and openly supportive of the Iranian protesters than his former boss, President Barack Obama, who opted to largely stay out of an Iranian protest movement that erupted in 2009. Biden said in a statement on October 3 that his administration “stands with Iranian women and all the citizens of Iran who are inspiring the world with their bravery” and is trying to make it easier for Iranians to access the internet.

“We are interested in finding ways to ensure that the Iranian people can have access to the internet on their phones and everywhere else,” said the senior administration official. “And so Starlink is one option, but it is not the only option.”

It is not clear whether the administration has offered to pay for the Starlink terminals to be set up in Iran. In its letter to the Pentagon in September, SpaceX said it could no longer donate Starlink terminals to Ukraine or pay for its ongoing service and requested that the Pentagon take over funding for Ukraine’s government and military use of Starlink, which SpaceX claims would cost more than $120 million for the rest of the year and could cost close to $400 million for the next 12 months.

Some US officials hope that Starlink’s on-the-ground terminals will one day become as prevalent in Iran as satellite TV dishes. That technology is also technically outlawed by the regime, but is nevertheless abundant across the country, the sources noted. Currently, there are “very few” Starlink terminals already operating in Iran, Musk said in a tweet last week.

But there are several glaring issues with that plan. Chief among them is that Starlink’s satellites require physical terminals on the ground to connect to, and their signals could be easy to detect. Smuggling the units across the border into Iran is just the first challenge, before they would then hypothetically be used by undisciplined protesters under the harsh gaze of Iran’s security services.

“I’m really concerned that there is a lack of knowledge about the security or even training how people can hide those signals,” said Amir Rashidi, the director of internet security and digital rights at Miaan Group, who was forced to flee Iran after the 2009 protests. “It’s going to be really risky for people in Iran to use it in a massive scale.”

Rashidi said more instruction materials are needed, in Farsi, to help protesters understand how to better cover their tracks and use equipment safely. He argues more investment is needed on circumvention tools and work by the UN’s International Telecommunication Union.

US-backed efforts, he said, carry significant risk.

“As soon as we get arrested, the first charge is you’re a spy, you’re working for CIA, you’re working for a British intelligence service,” he said. “If the US government is involved in distribution then that would be another crime in the eyes of the Iranian Government and people might be charged with it, really difficult and hard charges.”

‘Why haven’t we figured this out sooner?’

While support for protesters’ means of communication is an area where the administration feels it can take concrete action, a criticism of the administration is that it’s only being seriously addressed now.

“Why haven’t we figured this out sooner?” one person involved in the discussions told CNN. “We’re putting so much effort into the JCPOA [nuclear deal]. It’s an ongoing national security interest to get rid of this regime. Here’s how: empower those democrats on the ground in Iran and the number one way to do it is to find ways to support tech like that in the country, and we haven’t, we’ve failed.”

The senior administration official told CNN that right now, the JCPOA is “not on the agenda.” National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications John Kirby echoed that on Thursday, telling reporters that “we are way far apart with the Iranians in terms of a return to the deal.”

“What we are focused on is making sure we are holding the regime accountable for the way they are treating protesters in the country,” he said.

The White House, government technologists and Musk and his team are still working, though, to address the biggest challenges with Starlink and other communications technologies, officials said.

“When it comes to more active USG involvement, without getting into specific technologies, we’re always considering whether a technology would put those who use it at risk of being identified and harmed by their government in some way,” the senior administration official said. “All elements of the Biden administration are in lockstep on that.”

The official also touted the benefits of a policy change the Biden administration made last month in an effort to expand internet services to Iranians. The license issued by the Treasury Department would give US technology companies greater freedom to operate in highly-sanctioned Iran.

“The beauty of General License D-2 is that it allows private companies to decide for themselves what products and services to offer inside Iran,” the official said.

Musk’s unpredictability over Ukraine raises concern

Musk has said that if the terminals can get into Iran, SpaceX has already activated the signal. But the way he has acted in the discussions around Ukraine have only added to concerns about the considerable influence the world’s richest man may now have over some of the world’s biggest conflicts.

SpaceX Starlink internet terminal installed in Odesa, southern Ukraine, March 15, 2022.

Nina Lyashonok/Ukrinform/Abaca/Sipa USA/FILE

Last weekend, Musk tweeted: “To hell with it…even though Starlink is still losing money & other companies are getting billions of taxpayer $, we’ll just keep funding the Ukraine govt for free,” he wrote on Saturday. Then on Monday he unequivocally stated: “SpaceX has already withdrawn its request for funding.”

Earlier this week, Pentagon Press Secretary Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder told reporters that the department “does continue to discuss various matters with SpaceX, to include Starlink,” adding that the Pentagon had not yet paid anything for Starlink.

At the same time, there have been numerous reports of Starlink outages along the frontline as Ukraine has pushed into Russian-occupied areas. A person familiar with the discussions with SpaceX told CNN that Ukraine had to proactively make a request for service to be turned on when an area is taken back.

On Thursday, Ukraine’s defense minister Oleksiy Reznikov expressed confidence that funding for Starlink would continue, telling Politico: “I know we that we will not have a problem.” If the funding doesn’t come from SpaceX, he said, he expects the Pentagon, Europe and private donors to step up.

Musk has pointed to Ukrainian officials’ public praise of SpaceX and Starlink—one senior Ukrainian official, Mykhailo Fedorov, called Musk “among the world’s top private donors supporting Ukraine”—as evidence that he is not trying to undermine the Ukrainians’ fight.

When someone tweeted on Tuesday that Musk is “trying to bring both sides of the conflict to the same level as possible, so as to avoid a one-sided situation,” calling it “Peace at the least cost,” Musk responded: “Exactly.”

Still, there remain concerns about how dependent Ukraine is on Starlink.

“Ukraine needs Musk’s technology, but they don’t know if he will continue to support them,” a person familiar with the discussions between Ukraine and SpaceX said.

John Scott-Railton, a researcher and expert on connectivity in conflicts, called the success of Starlink in Ukraine “great marketing,” but the question of how to ultimately support Iran’s protesters’ means of communication “is a huge challenge, and it’s a lot harder to see how it could be addressed by Starlink devices.”

“Efforts to help should be grounded in understanding how Iranians communicate, the risks they face, and the censorship-circumvention technologies they have experience using. We should be engaged, but wary of silver bullet ideas.”

CNN · by Natasha Bertrand,Alex Marquardt · October 21, 2022

7. Starlink signals can be reverse-engineered to work like GPS—whether SpaceX likes it or not

Excerpts:

Starlink reportedly suffered a catastrophic loss of communications in late September in Ukraine, where it is being widely used for voice and electronic communications, to help fly drones, and even to correct artillery fire. Although it is unclear whether the outages were due to jamming by Russian forces, Musk tweeted last week: “Russia is actively trying to kill Starlink. To safeguard, SpaceX has diverted massive resources towards defense.”

Starlink has unquestionably been a lifesaver for Ukraine. However, reports of the outages and continued confusion about who will be paying for Starlink services there raise concerns over its future.

“As time goes on and their dependence on Starlink deepens, Ukraine and its allies in the West are coming to appreciate that they have little control over Starlink and know little about it,” says Humphreys. “But now many millions have a vested interest in Starlink security, including its resilience to jamming. Assessing that security starts with a clear understanding of the signal structure.”

Starlink signals can be reverse-engineered to work like GPS—whether SpaceX likes it or not

Elon said no thanks to using his mega-constellation for navigation. Researchers went ahead anyway.

By Mark Harrisarchive page

October 21, 2022

Technology Review · by Mark Harrisarchive page

Todd Humphreys’s offer to SpaceX was simple. With a few software tweaks, its rapidly growing Starlink constellation could also offer ultra-precise position, navigation, and timing. The US Army, which funds Humphreys’s work at the University of Texas at Austin, wanted a backup to its venerable, and vulnerable, GPS system. Could Starlink fill that role?

When the idea was first proposed in 2020, executives at SpaceX were open to the idea, says Humphreys. Then word came from on high. “Elon told the leaders we spoke to: every other LEO [low Earth orbit] communications network has gone into bankruptcy,” Humphreys told MIT Technology Review. “And so we [SpaceX] have to focus completely on staying out of bankruptcy. We cannot afford any distractions.”

But Humphreys wouldn’t take no for an answer. For the past two years, his team at UT Austin’s Radionavigation Lab has been reverse-engineering signals sent from thousands of Starlink internet satellites in low Earth orbit to ground-based receivers. Now Humphreys says his team has cracked the problem, and he believes that regular beacon signals from the constellation, designed to help receivers connect with the satellites, could form the basis of a useful navigation system. Crucially, this could be done without any help from SpaceX at all.

Related Story

SpaceX’s Starlink satellites could make US Army navigation hard to jam

New research shows Elon Musk’s broadband network could work as an alternative to GPS

In a non peer-reviewed paper that he has posted on his lab's website, Humphreys claims to have provided the most complete characterization of Starlink’s signals to date. This information, he says, is the first step toward developing a new global navigation technology that would operate independently of GPS or its European, Russian, and Chinese equivalents.

“The Starlink system signal is a closely guarded secret,” says Humphreys. “Even in our early discussions, when SpaceX was being more cooperative, they didn’t reveal any of the signal structure to us. We had to start from scratch, building basically a little radio telescope to eavesdrop on their signals.”

To get the project started, UT Austin acquired a Starlink terminal and used it to stream high-definition tennis videos of Rafael Nadal from YouTube, 24/7. This provided a constant source of Starlink signals that a separate nearby antenna could listen in on.

Humphreys quickly realized that Starlink relies on a technology called orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM). OFDM is an efficient method of encoding digital transmissions, originally developed at Bell Labs in the 1960s and now used in Wi-Fi and 5G. “OFDM is all the rage,” says Mark Psiaki, a GPS expert and aerospace professor at Virginia Tech. “It’s a way to pack the most bits per second into a given bandwidth.”

The UT Austin researchers did not try to break Starlink’s encryption or access any user data coming down from satellites. Instead, they sought out synchronization sequences—predictable, repeating signals beamed down by the satellites in orbit to help receivers coordinate with them. Not only did Humphreys find such sequences, but “we were pleasantly surprised to find that they [had] more synchronization sequences than is strictly required,” he says.

Each sequence also contains clues to the satellite’s distance and velocity. With the Starlink satellites transmitting about four sequences every millisecond “that’s just wonderful for dual use of their system for positioning,” says Humphreys.

If the terrestrial receiver has a good idea of the satellites’ movements—which SpaceX shares online to reduce the risk of orbital collisions—it can use the sequences’ regularity to work out which satellite they came from, and then calculate the distance to that satellite. By repeating this process for multiple satellites, a receiver can locate itself to within about 30 meters, says Humphreys.

If SpaceX later decided to cooperate by including additional data on each satellite’s exact position in its downlinks, that accuracy could theoretically improve to less than a meter—making it competitive with GPS. SpaceX did not respond to requests for comment.

Other researchers have been treading a similar path. Zak Kassas is a professor in the department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Ohio State University and the director of a US Department of Transportation center focusing on navigation resiliency. Last year, his team was the first to demonstrate that Starlink signals could be used for positioning, in part using machine learning.

Kassas’s approach, which he calls cognitive opportunistic navigation, analyzes the period and changing frequencies of signals from a satellite as it travels overhead. The receiver also uses the synchronization sequences, learns the satellite’s orbit, and tracks it. With multiple satellite passes, the receiver ultimately calculates its own location. At a recent conference, Kassas claimed his system had now achieved accuracies of less than 10 meters with Starlink. “It’s a framework that is so general we can apply it to any terrestrial or extraterrestrial signal,” he says. “It will learn on the fly, tell you what is being transmitted, and tell you where you are.”

Related Story

Who is Starlink really for?

The boom in LEO satellites will probably change the lives of customers who’ve struggled for high-speed internet—but only if they can afford it.

A fuller understanding of Starlink’s signals has implications beyond navigation. For instance, the Starlink satellites currently don’t seem to be using two of the eight channels that SpaceX is licensed for. Humphreys speculates that this could be because Musk is keen not to interfere with radio telescopes operating at neighboring frequencies. The bright streaks of orbiting Starlink satellites have already been accused of disrupting optical astronomy.

UT Austin’s findings also highlight the possibility of deliberate interference with Starlink itself. Humphreys notes that while the synchronization sequences hold promise for navigation, the fact that they are utterly predictable and are used across the whole constellation is a security vulnerability. “Humphreys has done a big service to the navigation community identifying these sequences,” says Psiaki. “But any navigation system working on open-source sequences could definitely be spoofed, because everyone will know how to spot those signals and create fake ones.”

Starlink reportedly suffered a catastrophic loss of communications in late September in Ukraine, where it is being widely used for voice and electronic communications, to help fly drones, and even to correct artillery fire. Although it is unclear whether the outages were due to jamming by Russian forces, Musk tweeted last week: “Russia is actively trying to kill Starlink. To safeguard, SpaceX has diverted massive resources towards defense.”

Starlink has unquestionably been a lifesaver for Ukraine. However, reports of the outages and continued confusion about who will be paying for Starlink services there raise concerns over its future.

“As time goes on and their dependence on Starlink deepens, Ukraine and its allies in the West are coming to appreciate that they have little control over Starlink and know little about it,” says Humphreys. “But now many millions have a vested interest in Starlink security, including its resilience to jamming. Assessing that security starts with a clear understanding of the signal structure.”

Technology Review · by Mark Harrisarchive page

8. Fears over Russian threat to Norway's energy infrastructure

Fears over Russian threat to Norway's energy infrastructure

AP · by MARK LEWIS · October 23, 2022

STAVANGER, Norway (AP) — Norwegian oil and gas workers normally don’t see anything more threatening than North Sea waves crashing against the steel legs of their offshore platforms. But lately they have noticed a more troubling sight: unidentified drones buzzing in the skies overhead.

With Norway replacing Russia as Europe’s main source of natural gas, military experts suspect the unmanned aircraft are Moscow’s doings. They list espionage, sabotage and intimidation as possible motives for the drone flights.

The Norwegian government has sent warships, coastguard vessels and fighter jets to patrol around the offshore facilities. Norway’s national guard stationed soldiers around onshore refineries that also were buzzed by drones.

Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre has invited the navies of NATO allies Britain, France and Germany to help address what could be more than a Norwegian problem.

ADVERTISEMENT

Precious little of the offshore oil that provides vast income for Norway is used by the country’s 5.4 million inhabitants. Instead, it powers much of Europe. Natural gas is another commodity of continental significance.

“The value of Norwegian gas to Europe has never been higher,” Ståle Ulriksen, a researcher at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, said. “As a strategic target for sabotage, Norwegian gas pipelines are probably the highest value target in Europe.”

Russia-Ukraine war

• Russian warplane falls on building in Siberia; 2 pilots die
• Orban lashes out at EU as he marks 1956 anti-Soviet revolt
• Military think tank: Russia withdraws officers from Kherson
• Ukrainian woman's quest to retrieve body of prisoner of war

Closures of airports, and evacuations of an oil refinery and a gas terminal last week due to drone sightings caused huge disruptions. But with winter approaching in Europe, there is worry the drones may portend a bigger threat to the 9,000 kilometers (5,600 miles) of gas pipelines that spider from Norway’s sea platforms to terminals in Britain and mainland Europe.

Since the start of the war in Ukraine in late February, European Union countries have scrambled to replace their Russian gas imports with shipments from Norway. The suspected sabotage of the Nordstream I and II pipelines in the Baltic Sea last month happened a day before Norway opened a new Baltic pipeline to Poland.

Amund Revheim, who heads the North Sea and environment group for Norway’s South West Police force, said his team interviewed more than 70 offshore workers who have spotted drones near their facilities.

ADVERTISEMENT

“The working thesis is that they are controlled from vessels or submarines nearby,” Revheim said.

Winged drones have a longer range, but investigators considered credible a sighting of a helicopter-style bladed model near the Sleipner platform, located in a North Sea gas field 250 kilometers (150 miles) from the coast.

Norwegian police have worked closely with military investigators who are analyzing marine traffic. Some platform operators have reported seeing Russian-flagged research vessels in close vicinity. Revheim said no pattern has been established from legal marine traffic and he is concerned about causing unnecessary, disruptive worry for workers.

But Ulriksen, of the naval academy, said the distinction between Russian civilian and military ships is narrow and the reported research vessels could fairly be described as “spy ships.”

ADVERTISEMENT

The arrest of at least seven Russian nationals caught either carrying or illegally flying drones over Norwegian territory has raised tensions. On Wednesday, the same day a drone sighting grounded planes in Bergen, Norway’s second-biggest city, the Norwegian Police Security Service took over the case from local officers.

“We have taken over the investigation because it is our job to investigate espionage and enforce sanction rules against Russia,” Martin Bernsen, an official with the service known by the Norwegian acronym PST. He said the “sabotage or possible mapping” of energy infrastructure was an ongoing concern.

Støre, the prime minister, warned that Norway would take action against foreign intelligence agencies. “It is not acceptable for foreign intelligence to fly drones over Norwegian airports. Russians are not allowed to fly drones in Norway,” he said.

Russia’s Embassy in Oslo hit back Thursday, claiming that Norway was experiencing a form of “psychosis” causing “paranoia.”

ADVERTISEMENT

Naval academy researcher thinks that is probably part of the plan.

“Several of the drones have been flown with their lights on,” he said. “They are supposed to be observed. I think it is an attempt to intimidate Norway and the West.”

The wider concern is that they are part of a hybrid strategy to both intimidate and gather information on vital infrastructure, which could later be targeted for sabotage in a potential strike against the West.

“I do not believe we are heading for a conventional war with Russia,” Ulriksen said. “But a hybrid war … I think we are already in it.”

___

Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

AP · by MARK LEWIS · October 23, 2022

9. Forgotten U-2 pilots helped end the Cuban Missile Crisis 60 years ago

At my dinner table last evening at the Donovan Award Dinner of the OSS Society was a former U2 squadron commander. He confirmed for me what I have long wondered about: driving the Camaro (which is what his squadron used to help the U2 land) was more fun than flying the plane. I recalled that they used to use Mustangs and he told us they also used to use El Caminos in the early years as well.

Forgotten U-2 pilots helped end the Cuban Missile Crisis 60 years ago

The Washington Post · by Dave Kindy · October 23, 2022

Gerald McIlmoyle had an incredible view of the world and no time to enjoy it. Some 13 miles below him, the green island of Cuba stood out against the blue waters of the Caribbean Sea, but he was focused on his perilous mission.

It was Oct. 25, 1962, and the U.S. Air Force captain was piloting a U-2 spy plane on the edge of Earth’s atmosphere, taking high-resolution images of nuclear missile sites on the island nation about 100 miles from Florida. The world teetered toward total destruction as tensions escalated between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis 60 years ago this week.

As McIlmoyle snapped photos, a flash of light caught his eye. The Soviet and Cuban militaries had launched a pair of surface-to-air missiles. Thankfully, a course correction he’d made moments earlier caused the missiles to miss his plane.

The Cold War had suddenly heated up, and America’s U-2 pilots were on the front lines of a dangerous game of brinkmanship between two heavily armed superpowers. Their bravery gave U.S. President John F. Kennedy the proof he needed to confront Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and find a way to avoid a nuclear nightmare.

“These men risked their lives in an effort to save mankind, and I’m not being hyperbolic when I say that,” said Casey Sherman, co-author of the 2018 book “Above & Beyond: John F. Kennedy and America’s Most Dangerous Cold War Spy Mission.” “During those 13 days in October 1962, we came the closest in history to thermonuclear war.”

The Cuban missile crisis began on Oct. 14, when Maj. Steve Heyser snapped the first shots of the missile sites, triggering a series of missions by 11 U-2 pilots to learn exactly what was happening on the ground in Cuba. Largely forgotten today, their actions probably prevented nuclear war. One of those spy-plane pilots would make the ultimate sacrifice for his country, while another barely escaped being shot down by Soviet jets.

“These pilots were completely unarmed,” Sherman said. “They were flying in defenseless aircraft. Even though they were 13 miles high, they were still susceptible to airstrikes from the ground, which ultimately led to the death of one of the pilots. Nobody remembers there was a KIA [killed in action] during the Cuban missile crisis.”

The lone casualty by enemy fire during that tumultuous two-week period was Maj. Rudy Anderson. The Air Force pilot, who jumped at every chance to fly U-2 missions over Cuba, was not scheduled to be in the air on Oct. 27, 1962. In fact, no one was. However, military planners changed their minds at the last minute, and Anderson volunteered.

The veteran pilot was used to dangerous missions. Anderson had earned two Distinguished Flying Crosses for reconnaissance flights over North Korea in 1953. He joined the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing in 1957 and soon became the top U-2 pilot, with more than 1,000 hours of flying time.

On that fateful day, Anderson climbed into his spy plane and took off for Cuba. The Lockheed U-2, still in use today, first entered service in 1955. Though equipped with sophisticated technology, the plane itself is simply constructed — mostly an airframe and engine. Its main purpose is taking photographs of objects on Earth from the edge of space. It features no armor or weapons.

“You can’t even fight back in a U-2,” said Mike Tougias, who co-wrote “Above & Beyond” with Sherman. “You’re basically a sitting duck.”

Flying the U-2 at such high altitudes required a pressurized suit and helmet similar to those donned by astronauts in the Mercury space program. They protected pilots from the thin air and cold temperatures 72,000 feet above the earth — but not from weapons fired at them.

As Anderson soared through the stratosphere, Soviet and Cuban troops launched two surface-to-air missiles. Both exploded too far away to cause serious damage to the aircraft. However, a tiny piece of shrapnel pierced the jet’s fuselage and penetrated Anderson’s suit, causing it to depressurize. He probably lost consciousness almost immediately and died in seconds. His pilotless plane then spun out of control and fell 13 miles to Earth, crashing near the Cuban village of Veguitas.

“It didn’t take much to bring a U-2 down,” Tougias said. “There are photos of the fuselage on the ground with cockpit intact. I remember McIlmoyle telling me, ‘All it takes is one little piece of shrapnel and the U-2 will come spiraling down like a leaf from a tree.’ ”

Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union further escalated during another U-2 mission that occurred about the time Anderson was shot down. Thousands of miles away, Capt. Chuck Maultsby was flying a spy plane over Alaska toward the North Pole to take radiation readings of Soviet nuclear tests on an island off Siberia.

Unknowingly, the Air Force pilot had drifted of course, his compass rendered useless by the magnetic north pole and interference from an active aurora borealis display. By the time he discovered his error, he was being chased by six Soviet MiG interceptor jets.

He flew as high he could — higher than the Soviet jets could reach — but he was low on fuel, so he attempted to glide back to safety. Meanwhile, the U.S. Strategic Air Command launched F-102 fighter jets armed with tactical nuclear missiles. If those American pilots fired on the enemy planes, it could trigger the war both superpowers were trying to avoid in the Caribbean.

Fortunately, Maultsby was able to avoid the Soviets and land safely on a remote airstrip in Alaska.

Soon after these events, the world stepped back from the precipice of nuclear war. Kennedy and Khrushchev — concerned that an event like the downing of a spy plane could escalate into a conflagration — negotiated a deal to end the crisis. The Soviets agreed to remove the nuclear missiles from Cuba; the Americans later dismantled similar sites in Turkey.

About a week after the crisis cooled, McIlmoyle shook hands with Kennedy when the president met with the U-2 pilots to acknowledge their heroic efforts. “I’ll never be able to thank you men enough for bringing back those pictures which allowed me to peacefully end this crisis,” he told McIlmoyle, who died last year.

Anderson was posthumously presented with the Air Force Cross — the first airman to receive this award for heroism in military operations against an armed enemy.

Today, Anderson is remembered with a small plaque at Laughlin Air Force Base in Texas. There are no other memorials or statues honoring the men who flew U-2 missions with the future of humanity on their wings.

“The heroism of the U-2 pilots has been lost to history,” Sherman said. “They should be recognized and honored for what they did. These men were heroes. Rudy Anderson’s name should be on the tip of everyone’s tongue, but people don’t remember him.”

The Washington Post · by Dave Kindy · October 23, 2022

10. "Frustrated and powerless": In fight with China for global influence, diplomacy is America’s biggest weakness

A lot to consider here.

Excerpts:

“I felt frustrated and powerless,” Feeley recalled. “I rang every bell in Washington that I could to try to drum up U.S. private sector interest. I asked for a commercial delegation to come down, and I got nothing.”

Such scenes have been playing out from Kenya to the Solomon Islands as the United States and China engage in a growing contest for international influence that could heavily shape geopolitics in the decades ahead. Beijing’s success in bolstering its presence in the Americas attests to the scope of its ambitions and the extent of the United States’ challenge in answering them. President Joe Biden and his aides recognize the stakes involved, and they argue that to compete with China, the United States must, above all, invest in its physical, technological and even sociological infrastructure at home.

But when it comes to the global faceoff, America’s approach to diplomacy could prove its biggest weakness, according to conversations POLITICO held with more than 50 former and current U.S. and foreign officials, diplomats, analysts and others who follow international affairs, as well as reviews of an array of congressional, think tank and other studies. Some of the people interviewed were granted anonymity to more candidly discuss a sensitive issue.

...

When asked if the Cortizo administration’s wariness of increasing Chinese influence in Panama was one reason the bridge plans were on hold, Mouynes insisted the reasons were technical and financial.

“We do want to start that project as soon as possible,” the now-former foreign minister said.

So does the Chinese government.

In fact, Chinese state media already are touting the fourth bridge as a prime example of Beijing’s growing influence in Latin America. The United States is trying to catch up, Chinese outlets gloat. In June, China’s “Global Times,” one of Beijing’s most unabashed mouthpieces, cited analysts as saying that if the United States “attempts to force [other] countries to choose sides, it is doomed to hit the wall as countries are fed up with attempts to politicize economic matters and to stir up ideological confrontations.”

As China eyes a bigger role in Panama and beyond, confrontation of many kinds seems inevitable.

"Frustrated and powerless": In fight with China for global influence, diplomacy is America’s biggest weakness

Politico

"Frustrated and powerless": In fight with China for global influence, diplomacy is America’s biggest weakness

In Panama, a bridge to connect the country highlights China’s growing diplomatic presence and sway, while the U.S. goes four-and-a-half years without an ambassador.

Illustration by Pablo Delcan for POLITICO

10/23/2022 07:00 AM EDT

PANAMA CITY — On the Pacific side of the Panama Canal, a massive gray convention center built largely by Chinese contractors gleams in the sun, eagerly hosting visitors from a world emerging from the Covid-19 pandemic. A few miles north, colorful shipping containers lay stacked under the stern gaze of quay cranes at the Port of Balboa, a facility run by a Chinese-linked firm.

A new bridge is supposed to rise in the same area. Various plans have called for it to have six lanes, two soaring towers and even a high-end restaurant. To the delight of Panamanians, the span would ease the traffic clogging other bridges connecting this Central American country’s east and west, the kind that leads to two- or even three-hour commutes. To the annoyance of U.S. diplomats, the contract to build the bridge has been given to a consortium controlled by the Chinese government.

It didn’t have to be this way.

In late 2017, the then-U.S. ambassador to Panama, John Feeley, urged American firms to compete to build what’s called the “fourth bridge.” It was a sensitive time. Earlier that year, Panama had switched its diplomatic relations from Taiwan to Beijing, blindsiding Washington. A bid for the $1.5 billion project could have signaled America’s enduring interest in this country in its own hemisphere, home to a canal whose U.S.-led construction transformed global trade over a century ago. But U.S. firms, for various reasons, declined to bid. And unlike his counterparts from China, with their communist rule and state-owned enterprises, Feeley, a mere U.S. diplomat, held little sway over American companies.

“I felt frustrated and powerless,” Feeley recalled. “I rang every bell in Washington that I could to try to drum up U.S. private sector interest. I asked for a commercial delegation to come down, and I got nothing.”

Such scenes have been playing out from Kenya to the Solomon Islands as the United States and China engage in a growing contest for international influence that could heavily shape geopolitics in the decades ahead. Beijing’s success in bolstering its presence in the Americas attests to the scope of its ambitions and the extent of the United States’ challenge in answering them. President Joe Biden and his aides recognize the stakes involved, and they argue that to compete with China, the United States must, above all, invest in its physical, technological and even sociological infrastructure at home.

But when it comes to the global faceoff, America’s approach to diplomacy could prove its biggest weakness, according to conversations POLITICO held with more than 50 former and current U.S. and foreign officials, diplomats, analysts and others who follow international affairs, as well as reviews of an array of congressional, think tank and other studies. Some of the people interviewed were granted anonymity to more candidly discuss a sensitive issue.

Over the past decade, China has increased its spending on diplomacy and even surpassed the United States in the number of diplomatic posts it has worldwide. It appears to have grown its number of diplomats, and they are far better trained and more assertive than their predecessors, including at multilateral organizations like the United Nations. U.S. spending on diplomacy, meanwhile, has stayed effectively flat, as has the size of the U.S. Foreign Service, while funding, security and other factors have limited America’s diplomatic footprint abroad.

“Once upon a time, it was a given that the American embassy in a given country, in most countries, was the biggest embassy, the most visible embassy, the most influential embassy,” said Eric Rubin, the president of the American Foreign Service Association, the diplomats’ union, and a former U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria. “That is not the case now in many parts of the world. In much of the developing world, it’s China.”

China’s intense focus on “commercial diplomacy,” which includes promoting trade deals and infrastructure projects, gives its envoys an edge, especially in Latin American and African countries that feel neglected by Washington. U.S. government initiatives to counter China’s infrastructure programs are not easily accessed or as well-funded. The U.S. diplomatic tradition, meanwhile, has de-emphasized the commercial element. The relatively few U.S. diplomats who specialize in it rely heavily on a private sector that, unlike Chinese state-run firms, often won’t come through, especially in certain parts of the world.

“The Chinese are not in Africa to teach rice paper painting,” said Patricia Moller, a former U.S. ambassador to Guinea and Burundi who now does private sector work on the continent. “They’re in Africa to support the business undertakings of Chinese investment. That’s why they’re there. And it’s a very pointy spear that the Chinese have.”

Growing political partisanship is another factor harming America’s ability to conduct basic diplomacy. Republicans and Democrats in Congress agree that China poses a long-term challenge to the United States, and they’ve spiked military spending and devoted new resources to taking on Beijing economically and technologically. But legislation boosting U.S. diplomacy frequently gets delayed or derailed amid partisan sniping, and U.S. diplomats cannot guarantee that Congress will fund an administration’s initiatives past the next election.

The partisanship problem is most visible in U.S. senators’ willingness to block ambassador nominees, often for reasons unrelated to their postings. Some ambassadorships have sat empty for years. It wasn’t until just weeks ago, for instance, that the Senate confirmed an ambassador to replace Feeley, who left his position four-and-a-half years ago. The absence was in part due to a Republican senator’s desire to pressure Biden on Cuba policy. It upset Panamanians and gave an opening to China’s suave Spanish-speaking ambassador here.

The U.S. confirmation paralysis “creates opportunities for our adversaries to talk to the countries involved and say ‘You matter to us because we have an ambassador here. You don’t matter to the United States because they don’t have one,’” said Harry Harris, a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea.

China’s diplomatic ascent is not without flaws. Its envoys and their staff are sometimes so aggressive they inspire backlash; some recently were filmed attacking pro-democracy protesters in Britain. The Chinese government’s overseas economic projects — from building ports to railways, in particular under the Belt and Road Initiative — have often been of low quality, environmentally unsound and a strain on host country budgets. There are reports Beijing is overhauling Belt and Road as partners struggle to repay debts.

Still, many countries find that China is a willing partner when the United States is not. China appears intent on winning hearts and minds while the United States comes across as arrogant. Here again, Panama is an example: The country’s current government is wary of Beijing and has held up or nixed some Chinese projects, but Washington hasn’t taken advantage of the moment, Panamanian leaders privately say. When U.S. diplomats stop by, they typically come with lectures about cleaning up Panamanian corruption and warnings about China, while U.S. military leaders publicly raise security concerns about Chinese projects along the canal. But the Americans offer few, if any, tangible alternatives to the trade, infrastructure projects and other assistance Beijing is willing to offer this country of 4.3 million.

U.S. officials are “basically telling us, the region, ‘Be careful with China, be careful with this or that,’” said Nicole Wong, a former senior Panamanian foreign ministry official who helped oversee the switch in diplomatic ties from Taiwan to Beijing. “But the agenda, the bilateral agenda, the building of a really good bilateral agenda is set aside, because they forget to talk about building things together.”

The Biden administration is well aware of many of the vulnerabilities in America’s diplomatic playbook, but its solutions so far are limited, heavily domestically focused, and could take years to implement — time in which Beijing could strengthen its position, another presidential administration could change course, or Congress could resist the need for funding. And to a degree, the Biden administration is still trying to undo the damage wrought on the State Department by former President Donald Trump, who tried to slash its budget by a third. Congress thwarted that attempt, but it hurt U.S. diplomatic prestige and morale. Trump’s heavy-handed approach to foreign policy also drove many experienced U.S. diplomats, such as Feeley, to quit.

“We had dug a quite deep hole for ourselves over the last several years, and the world was not going to wait for the United States to sort out itself while China was evolving,” said State Department Counselor Derek Chollet, one of the top officials whom the department designated to speak on the broad issue of U.S. diplomacy and the Chinese challenge. “There’s no silver bullet.”

The Chinese communist system may be repressive and rigid, but it is more steady than the trajectory of the United States, with long-term plans that can run decades. U.S. diplomacy, on the other hand, has become too capricious, unreliable and exposed to partisan deadlock, officials and analysts say.

On ambassadorships and more, “domestic politics in the U.S. is undermining U.S. national interests throughout the world,” warned Samuel Lewis Navarro, a former first vice president and foreign minister of Panama.

The everywhere strategy

Three years ago, Washington was startled to learn that China had established a bigger network of diplomatic facilities than the United States, topping one ranking of countries. “With 276 posts globally, China has for the first time surpassed the United States’ network by three posts,” reported the Lowy Institute, a think tank in Australia. It helped that China had successfully pushed governments in places like Panama to drop Taiwan in favor of Beijing.

It’s unclear how the think tank’s rankings have changed since 2019, although a top Chinese official recently said the country now has more than 280 diplomatic outposts, while recent State Department statistics say the U.S. has 275. In any case, the message was unmistakable: In diplomacy, China intends to be everywhere. In particular, Chinese diplomats lavish attention on two regions that are often afterthoughts in U.S. policy — Africa and Latin America — while devoting significant resources to their Asian neighbors. This can mean building big embassies or simply having a small outpost with a few diplomats, just to mark a presence. That includes places right on America’s doorstep, like the Caribbean.

For the Chinese, “it’s all about geography,” said Matt Pottinger, a former deputy national security adviser under Trump. “They’ve consciously studied imperial Japan’s strategy right before World War II, and they’ve consciously studied … European colonial powers in the 18th and 19th centuries to emulate the geographic distribution of key possessions and bases and treaty ports, because they’re actually trying to replicate, in particular, the 19th century British model.”

In this century, China’s multifaceted approach to diplomacy includes trying to dominate the digital and information space, especially via state media, while also promoting infrastructure projects and trade. It further involves symbolic gestures that nonetheless resonate abroad: For instance, for more than three decades, the Chinese foreign minister’s first annual overseas trip has been to Africa.

It’s tough to pin down the exact number of Chinese diplomats. A Chinese official said “thousands” after looking into the topic. Research by POLITICO and Sydney Tucker and Yun Sun of the Stimson Center, a security-focused think tank, turned up essays that said Chinese diplomatic personnel numbered at least 5,000, but it’s not clear how updated that number is or how “diplomat” is defined.

The State Department has around 13,500 Foreign Service employees — the traditional U.S. diplomats who rotate through embassies — and 11,000 Civil Service employees. Those figures have barely budged in about a decade. The department also has around 50,000 locally hired staffers around the world.

Meanwhile, the U.S. also faces questions about the shape of its global diplomatic footprint, with decisions from decades past now looking unwise.

Take the Solomon Islands, a nation in the Pacific where the United States fought the Japanese in the Battle of Guadalcanal, a turning point favoring the Allies in World War II. In 1988, amid tussles over fishing rights and the brewing Bougainville conflict, the United States opened an embassy in the islands’ capital, Honiara, according to the State Department historian’s office. (That decade also saw some U.S. worries about Soviet Union influence in the Pacific.) Still, the U.S. ambassador to the islands was co-credentialed as envoy to Papua New Guinea and based in that country’s capital, Port Moresby, according to the historian’s office.

But five years later, the U.S. shut down the Solomon Islands embassy, one of around 20 diplomatic facilities — most of them consulates — to be closed. U.S. officials at the time called it a “reorganization” and indicated it was necessary because America had to open missions in newly independent post-Soviet states, according to media reports at the time. The U.S. government apparently took this route instead of growing the diplomatic budget to add new posts.

Jump ahead nearly three decades. In February of this year, Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed that the United States would once again establish an embassy in the Solomon Islands. The main reason? To counter China’s intense courting of Pacific island countries. The Solomon Islands, it was soon revealed, signed a security pact with China that the U.S. and its allies, including Australia, worry gives Beijing too much control and a future military base. It’s not clear that having a U.S. embassy in the Solomon Islands would have prevented the security pact, but it might have led to earlier intervention by U.S. officials.

The Biden administration has sent representatives to urge Honiara to reconsider, part of a scramble to show that the United States still cares about the region. The administration has said it would also open embassies in the Pacific island countriesof Kiribati and Tonga and launch other programs to prove America’s devotion. In late September, the United States held a summit for Pacific island leaders and unveiled a “Pacific Partnership Strategy.”

Pivoting beyond Asia

Despite having to deal with Russia’s war in Ukraine, Biden and his aides have long made clear that Asia is the region the U.S. must prioritize in the long term precisely because of the challenges posed by China. Aside from the focus on the islands, the Biden team has launched an array of other initiatives for what it calls the “Indo-Pacific.” That includes a special security pact with Australia and the United Kingdom.

Few foreign policy specialists say Washington should focus less on Asia. But many warn that America also must have a much higher minimum level of engagement — substantive, funded engagement with tangible results in reasonable timeframes — throughout the rest of the world, because Beijing sees the whole globe as the arena of competition. Otherwise, the United States risks making the same error it made decades back by retrenching from the Pacific islands, except on a larger scale — in Africa, the Middle East and America’s southern neighborhood.

In the latter, longstanding feelings of neglect seem to be morphing into outright anger, especially after what many Latin American leaders saw as a lackluster U.S. performance during the Summit of the Americas this year, when the U.S. set forth proposals that some leaders felt lacked substance.

Latin American leaders are not arguing for the type of past U.S. involvement that has included backing coups, deploying troops and supporting deeply repressive governments. When Trump aides praised the Monroe Doctrine — the notion set forth in 1823 by President James Monroe that other world powers should not interfere in America’s hemisphere — that stirred ugly memories in the region. (Biden administration officials have avoided such language, even as they question China’s motives.) Many Latin American leaders do, however, want new or renewed trade deals with Washington, they want infrastructure projects, and they want more than what Francisco Santos Calderón, a former Colombian ambassador to the United States, described as U.S. “blah blah blah.”

When it comes to China, “there’s no rivalry, because the U.S. isn’t present in that rivalry here in Latin America,” the former envoy said. He noted that China is now the top trading partner for several Latin American countries. “There’s no real evidence that there’s a U.S. policy toward Latin America,” he said. “There’s pronouncements, there’s communiques, but a policy? None whatsoever.”

When pressed on their diplomatic priorities, Biden aides mention the challenges they face as well as efforts they’re undertaking. They note that the Ukraine war has grabbed much of their attention, and that, following the Trump years, they’ve had to spend significant time rebuilding relationships with U.S. allies. But they also mention State Department reshaping and modernization plans that, among other things, call for a more tech-savvy diplomatic crew and the creation of a “China House” to focus on Beijing. Interagency “deal teams” that support U.S. businesses abroad predate Biden, but his aides view them as important mechanisms, too. They further stress that top State Department officials are constantly visiting countries all over the world, not just those in Asia.

Above all, Biden administration officials say the best thing the United States can do to project strength abroad is to rebuild at home, so they point to recent infrastructure and other bills focused on the domestic front. A more vibrant United States can offer more to other countries and steer them away from what can be predatory Chinese influence, U.S. officials argue.

“We know that this is the decisive geopolitical challenge of this decade, and we need to get organized for it,” a senior State Department official said. When asked whether such a long-term approach is vulnerable to future U.S. political stalemates and quicker Chinese moves, the official acknowledged the risk. “I’m not going to contest we would like to always move faster, offer more and better,” the official said, “but we’ve got to do it in a way that is ultimately held to high standards.”

‘It all comes down to budget’

Some analysts worry that by emphasizing that the Chinese Communist Party is a threat to U.S. dominance (a belief with broad bipartisan backing in Washington), the United States could provoke an unnecessary and possibly violent confrontation, and some argue China’s rise is overstated given its demographic trends and pandemic struggles. But there also is a widespread sense that, China or no China, America has for too long let its diplomatic muscles atrophy while increasing reliance on its military might as leverage.

Over the past 10 years, U.S. annual funding for the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development and related functions has, for all intents and purposes, stayed the same — floating around $55 billion. (This does not include emergency funding driven partly by the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, but it does include the now phased-out budget category called “Overseas Contingency Operations.”) By contrast, the U.S. national defense budget, which hovered around $650 billion five years ago, could approach $850 billion in the coming year.

China’s funding for foreign affairs is less transparent, but the numbers available show that, although much less than the American budget, the Asian giant has raised its spending on diplomacy by roughly 50 percent over the past decade and more than doubled it over the past 15 years, coming out to roughly $7 billion in the 2022 budget. The figures, published by China’s National Bureau of Statistics, include some cuts in funding during the pandemic years.

Current and former U.S. diplomats sound beaten down when asked why congressional spending on their work has been flat. Some argue that the State Department and USAID could do more with existing funds if they were more efficient. Others say more resources are needed, but that it’s hard to sell the importance of diplomacy, which often involves behind-the-scenes work where the key weapons are words and trust, not fighter jets or tanks, to the U.S. public. Lawmakers eager to keep arms manufacturers in their districts don’t have similar motivators for diplomacy, even though plenty of U.S. defense officials have urged Congress to devote more resources to diplomacy. Trump’s denigration of U.S. diplomats, casting them as a “Deep State Department” thwarting his agenda, has left a mark. Some U.S. diplomats fear future GOP presidents will try to cut the department’s budget or avoid increasing it to appease the Republican base.

Leading lawmakers from both parties bristle at the idea that they don’t care, but their actions, or lack thereof, underscore that diplomacy isn’t a high priority. Congressional aides point to legislation designed to boost U.S. diplomacy, but they also have many stories about how such bills have fallen victim to partisan objections, foot-dragging or sheer neglect by legislators facing numerous demands on their time. Predictably, Republicans blame Democrats, and Democrats blame Republicans. But both sides acknowledge that the old adage that America’s partisan fights should be set aside at “the water’s edge” is in tatters.

“Diplomacy is too important for politics,” said Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.), chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. “I want to be able to say that we can then work together to find that middle ground, so that we can put forward a real diplomatic policy and be an example to our friends and our allies.”

Last year was the first time in nearly two decades that Congress passed a comprehensive bill authorizing State Department spending and setting policy priorities. To get it through, however, lawmakers included it as part of the must-pass National Defense Authorization Act, a move with symbolism not lost on American diplomats.

“Yes, please call your congressperson and advise that we need a greater budget for foreign policy,” a second senior State Department official said. “It all comes down to budget, whether it’s macroeconomic access to lending or if it’s ability to open embassies. It all comes down to money.”

‘Be happy with everyone’

At the luxurious Central Hotel in Panama City’s Casco Viejo neighborhood, a mix of narrow roads, artsy coffee shops and historic buildings, Wei Qiang sips a cappuccino and expresses disbelief at the notion that his embassy, or his country, is a threat of any kind to the United States.

The Chinese ambassador is easy to track down here, amiably texting with a reporter on WhatsApp and sharing photos of his younger self with Cuba’s late revolutionary leader, Fidel Castro. Dressed in a short-sleeved light blue dress shirt, the gray-haired Wei subs in Spanish words in the occasional moments he can’t recall English ones. He’s well-schooled in Chinese diplomatic talking points, but he’s also relatively frank compared to many of his colleagues.

Wei expresses perplexity over a U.S. military commander’s recent warnings about Chinese projects along the canal. He notes that one firm that’s drawn scrutiny, the one that runs ports on both the Atlantic and Pacific sides of the canal, is a Hong Kong-based private company that’s operated the facilities for many years. He dismisses arguments that Hong Kong is now firmly under Beijing’s control, that even private firms are not free from the Chinese Communist Party’s grip, and that China weaponizes its businesses to aid its geostrategic aims.

In Panama, at least, the U.S. diplomatic presence is stronger than China’s, Wei insists, laughing politely when the long absence of an American ambassador is mentioned. The American embassy has hundreds of staffers; the Chinese embassy, for now, usually has fewer than 20, according to Wei. China merely wants to establish ties with countries like Panama in ways that help everyone involved, especially economically, Wei says, insisting that it’s U.S. officials who seem bent on creating a conflict with Beijing.

“We don’t understand why they worry so much,” Wei said of U.S. officials. “From my point of view, it is unfortunate that the U.S. is practicing, or is exerting, anti-China policies in the region.”

Wei’s assertions about U.S. influence here are not without basis. Panama has long been a cultural crossroads, not least because of the canal. But whether it’s along the country’s palm tree-lined shores or in Panama City’s funky skyscrapers, U.S. influence far outpaces China’s. The U.S. dollar is accepted here, many Panamanians speak at least some English, and the United States is the top source of foreign direct investment in Panama, despite corruption problems that have landed Panama on the Financial Action Task Force’s “gray list” and were highlighted in the “Panama Papers” investigation. U.S.-Panama relations have not always been smooth; the U.S. briefly invaded Panama 33 years ago to overthrow a military ruler, but America’s democratic ideals resonate among Panamanians.

In the aggregate, Panama is considered relatively well off, but it is one of Latin America’s worst performers on income distribution, with wealthy urban centers and poorer rural areas. Its leaders stress that the United States remains Panama’s most important partner and that they’d like to enhance that partnership.

“We are always hopeful and want to engage more with the U.S. and try to get more investment from the U.S. and everywhere else,” Erika Mouynes, who until recently was Panama’s foreign minister, told POLITICO in a September interview. “We’re coming out of the pandemic, so we’re all striving to get foreign investment.” When asked if she could request something specific from Biden, Mouynes said an “investment plan regarding infrastructure.”

That said, Panamanian leaders are unwilling to ignore China’s potential as a partner. Although Panamanian President Laurentino Cortizo, who took office in 2019, has been far more cautious than his predecessor, Juan Carlos Varela, in dealing with Beijing, Cortizo said in May of this year that he wanted to restart free trade talks with China.

And many of this country’s residents see value in not picking sides between the United States and China. “We are a small country,” said Raul Mitchell, 56, who works in tourism. “We have to be peaceful, neutral, no problems with no one, be happy with everyone.”

From ‘wolf warriors’ to ‘lovable’

Chinese diplomats in Panama want to increase their influence beyond just business. One of their targets is the significant number of Panamanians of Chinese heritage. Many of these Panamanians’ ancestors arrived in Panama in the 1800s to help build a railroad that preceded the canal. U.S. diplomats say with envy that Beijing is making inroads with that diaspora, whose prominent members include Wong, the former foreign ministry official.

China reaches Panamanians of all backgrounds through places like the Confucius Institute it opened at the University of Panama, one of numerous such centers it has launched worldwide. It reaches them by promoting books that trash American actions during the U.S.-led creation of the 50-mile canal from 1904 to 1914. It reaches them by spending significant amounts on Chinese state-controlled media in the Spanish language. It reaches them through scholarships and other means that expose young Panamanians to China as a country and culture — a “people-to-people” effort Wei is keen to highlight. (The United States has many similar outreach programs, including an “American Space” that it recently opened in Panama, one of around 600 worldwide.)

In many ways, Wei embodies the growing sophistication of Chinese diplomacy.

Whereas once Chinese diplomats didn’t speak the local languages well, dressed unfashionably and were content to observe proceedings, now they are stylish, linguistically fluent and assertive participants in debates, several former U.S. ambassadors told POLITICO. The Chinese also will engage whomever is in charge, no matter how they got there.

In Myanmar, also known as Burma, Chinese diplomats have barely missed a beat as the country has swung from a military dictatorship to partial civilian rule to once again a military dictatorship. Scot Marciel, a former U.S. ambassador to Myanmar, said that in 2017, when Myanmar’s military forces carried out a vicious crackdown on Rohingya Muslims that much of the world calls a genocide, China saw it as “an opportunity.” The Chinese, now accused of their own genocide against Uyghur Muslims, redoubled their visits to Myanmar and invited its leaders to Beijing.

“They don’t have to worry about getting criticized by their human rights groups or anything,” Marciel said. Instead, he said, the Chinese essentially told Myanmar, “‘We’ll protect you in the U.N. Security Council,’ that sort of thing. ‘We’re your friends. And oh, by the way, we’ve got all these projects we want to do.’”

Marciel said he and China’s ambassador to Myanmar had good relations but some surprising interactions. For instance, the Chinese ambassador suggested strongly that Marciel not visit Kachin state, a restive Myanmar region that borders China. Marciel replied that he was accredited to the whole country and would travel where he pleased. Once, after Marciel visited Kachin, the Chinese ambassador traveled there and told local groups not to engage with Westerners. That upset some local leaders, who publicly complained.

Some Chinese diplomats, inspired by their leaders’ calls for a “fighting spirit,” have adopted such aggressive attitudes that they’ve been dubbed “wolf warriors,” a reference to a Chinese film. They include Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian and the now-departed Chinese ambassador to Sweden. The latter picked so many fights he was reportedly summoned to the Swedish Foreign Ministry more than 40 times.

Wei is not seen as a “wolf warrior,” but he defended his colleagues who were, saying they were reflecting the feelings of the Chinese people. Still, the “wolf warrior” stance has often backfired internationally, and Chinese officials seem to realize it. Last year, Chinese leader Xi Jinping called for an image of a “credible, lovable and respectable China” so it could expand its “circle of friends.” Other Chinese officials have since indicated their diplomats won’t back down.

Xi has been consolidating his rule in China, where he’s become the most powerful leader since Mao Zedong, thanks in part to crackdowns on dissidents. Xi’s desire to make China a global rival to the United States has both emboldened Chinese diplomats but also limited them, forcing them to watch their back in a system where colleagues are expected to tattle on each other.

Daniel Russel, a top Asia aide to then-President Barack Obama, recalled one encounter in Beijing with a highly experienced Chinese counterpart during the Xi years. The Chinese official was intimately familiar with his country’s talking points on numerous issues he and Russel had previously discussed.

This time, when they reached a sensitive topic, “I looked across and saw my Chinese interlocutor do something that I had absolutely never seen him do,” Russel said. “He cracked open their notebook, flipped through their table of contents and found the topic, identified the page number, opened the book to that page, and began to read from the text, and to read in Chinese the position paper from start to finish. What it told me was he was not talking to me. He was performing for the benefit of the people sitting behind him taking notes, any one of whom would have happily ratted him out, since attrition at the top is the best strategy for advancement in a highly competitive system.”

The downsides of China’s promises

The U.S. Embassy in Panama sits well away from the bustling center of the capital, nestled on a hill along a wooded area. Its main building glints in the sun after one of the many storms during Panama’s wet season. Entering the structure involves crossing multiple security gates and heading up a twisting road.

The U.S. embassy’s staffers include at least one “regional China officer,” a category established in the Trump era. These officers, along with the State Department’s so-called “China watchers,” another fairly new formal category, keep tabs on Chinese government activity in a host country or an entire region, sharing that information with others in the U.S. government. Some of the exchanges happen in what are called “China conferences.” One such gathering is set for December in Hawaii, according to a person familiar with the issue, and one of its goals is to increase collaboration with the Department of Defense, according to text of an agenda the person shared. (The State Department declined to delve into many details about the China-focused diplomats or the China conferences.)

Embassy officials have paid close attention to China’s forays here, and they admit that the Chinese government’s ability to direct companies to take on overseas infrastructure projects is an advantage for Beijing. But the U.S. officials also emphasized the wariness of China among current Panamanian leaders, alluding to reports of problems with the Chinese-built convention center and changes to the original designs for the fourth bridge. The officials implied that U.S. pressure is one reason Cortizo’s government is more skeptical of China.

“There are things that we’ve done to help them understand the risks and the opportunities to rethink and to go with more trusted vendors,” one senior U.S. embassy official said of Panamanians. “But a lot of that is just sort of learning the hard way.”

Panama is one of many places where Chinese projects have prompted controversy. A Chinese-built railway in Kenya has become the target of lawsuits and corruption investigations. A Chinese-built port in Pakistan has prompted protests among Pakistanis upset about the increased securitization of the area, the damage caused to fishermen’s livelihoods and reports that China, not Pakistan, would reap most of the riches the port does produce. In Sri Lanka and other countries, China has been blamed, in part if not in full, for debt crises. China also has drawn criticism in some countries for importing Chinese labor instead of hiring locals.

Still, even as foreign governments grow more cautious, China’s allure is hard to resist. That’s especially the case if there’s little U.S. or other Western interest or resources for development projects. And for many unscrupulous foreign leaders, China’s willingness to ignore issues like human rights and corruption is a plus.

There’s also the reality that the Chinese have lifted hundreds of millions of their own people out of poverty in recent decades. For political leaders trying to keep their population’s allegiance, especially in poorer nations, that is a powerful thing, said W. Gyude Moore, a former Liberian minister of public works now with the Center for Global Development.

“I can have freedom of speech and be hungry, I can have minority rights and be hungry,” Moore said. “Whereas true human rights, the Chinese will argue, is about providing economic opportunities for people and taking people out of poverty.”

Chinese officials like Wei are not concerned about setbacks. The ambassador said he’s confident that, whether in Panama or elsewhere, China will remain an appealing partner. He also said China will learn from its mistakes and adapt. “China has been making progress, little by little, step by step … in the quality of their projects, work, in terms of corporate governance, social responsibility, environment-friendliness, that type of thing,” Wei said.

Initiatives come, initiatives go

U.S. leaders have recognized the power of China’s infrastructure-focused initiatives, especially Belt and Road. Those initiatives have grown as traditional U.S. development arms, like USAID, have increasingly focused on less visible projects, such as providing technical assistance to governments on everything from education to fighting corruption. As critical as that work is, it doesn’t often get the United States the credit that, say, building a sports stadium gets China.

One key American response to the Chinese initiatives has been the 2019 establishment of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, a government body that helps finance overseas infrastructure and other projects. But the DFC has a financing limit of $60 billion, far below the hundreds of billions of dollars China has been willing to commit to overseas development. (Some reports say China has devoted $1 trillion for Belt and Road.)

The DFC is supposed to target poorer nations, leaving a country like Panama largely ineligible. It also has what many officials describe as a nightmarish amount of bureaucratic hurdles. “I tried to get money from the DFC for a port in Colombia in the Urabá en Antioquia region. It was impossible,” said Santos, the former Colombian envoy.

There are efforts in Congress to improve the DFC, but it’s not clear how far they will get. A spokesperson defended the DFC, saying it “has ramped up operations and worked to increase its portfolio, maximize impact, and advance international development and U.S. foreign policy priorities.”

The growing populism and deepening partisanship in the United States has made it increasingly difficult for a president to pursue trade deals with other countries. The Biden administration has instead promoted economic “frameworks.” Such arrangements are packages that touch on topics like supply chains and sustainability but which are often vague and don’t necessarily involve lowering tariffs or opening up markets. Countries are willing to sign up, but privately their representatives roll their eyes about the frameworks, deriding them as full of promises as opposed to substantive agreements. They similarly shrug at the recently unveiled Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, a project led by the United States and other G-7 countries that pledges to “mobilize $600 billion by 2027” for infrastructure projects around the world. That “mobilization” includes leveraging private sector investments.

Again, it’s theoretical, and no one can say for certain if the money will come through, but Biden administration officials are urging foreign leaders to be patient and to weigh the negatives of striking quick deals with the Chinese.

“We don’t tell our companies to steal intellectual property,” a third senior State Department official said. The official added that the U.S. is unlikely to establish state-owned enterprises like China, but organizations like the DFC and other initiatives may help offer more incentives for the American private sector to invest in certain regions. “We do have tools,” the official said. “We just have to get better at them.”

Never far from foreign officials’ minds is the fact that U.S. presidents serve at most eight years and are subject to the whims of a Congress that is parsimonious even when controlled by the president’s party. Plus, new presidents often want to abandon old plans, so initiatives come and go.

Under Trump, for example, the United States launched the America Crece (Growth in the Americas) program in 2019. According to a press release at the time, the program was “an innovative, whole-of-government approach to support economic development by catalyzing private sector investment in energy and other infrastructure projects across Latin America and the Caribbean.” Today, Latin American — not to mention U.S. — officials have only a vague memory of that plan, and the Biden administration appears to have ditched it as it tried to shed vestiges of Trump.

In mid-August, a State Department spokesperson said America Crece had been “superseded” by Biden plans like the PGII. When asked if the department could point to any examples of infrastructure projects launched under America Crece, the department waited more than a week to refer POLITICO to the Treasury Department for an answer. After two weeks, the Treasury Department declined to comment.

When Mouynes was asked about the economic frameworks and other U.S. proposals, she noted that they have yet to be implemented. “We’re eager to get started and actually see how that will translate into actual projects in each one of our countries,” she said, adding, “Of course, I’m hopeful.”

Chollet, the State Department counselor, acknowledged that the U.S. political system often encourages a “presentism” view when it comes to crafting foreign policy. “We’re trying to build structures that are going to outlast us,” he said of the Biden administration.

The weakest diplomatic muscle

The U.S. Embassy in Panama has diplomats focused on commerce, which is unsurprising given the importance of the canal to global trade. (By key measures, the United States is the top user of the canal, with China second. The canal is so important to Washington that although the U.S. transferred control of the passage to Panama more than two decades ago, it retains the right to take military action to secure it if needed — an arrangement well known to Beijing.)

Still, U.S. diplomats in Panama and well beyond say that if any part of America’s diplomatic infrastructure needs help, it’s the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service.

The Commercial Service is part of the Department of Commerce, not State. Its responsibilities include helping increase U.S. exports and cutting through trade barriers, with the goal of leveling the playing field for U.S. companies who must abide by American laws such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. It is present in U.S. diplomatic missions in around 78 countries, including Panama. That’s fewer than half of the world’s countries, but the Commercial Service stresses that it’s in the places that account for most U.S. exports.

In 2014, the Commercial Service had around 1,750 employees. In the years since, it lost hundreds of employees due to attrition, stagnant budgets and other reasons. With some fluctuations, the staff numbers have come down to around 1,430, of which 250 are Foreign Service officers. Under Biden, it is trying to recover those losses, according to a Commerce Department official who laid out the numbers to POLITICO.

The Biden team is looking at other ways to emphasize such diplomacy; as part of the modernization plans for the State Department, Blinken has pledged to increase the number of diplomats focused on topics like trade, including “economic officers” whose responsibilities include reporting on business and related activities in other countries.

During Tibor Nagy’s stint as assistant secretary of State for African affairs under Trump, he surveyed the embassies under his purview to learn how many diplomats focused on commercial issues. “I said, ‘Tell me, how many positions does the Chinese embassy have to promote trade and investment, as opposed to the U.S. embassy?’ And, overwhelmingly, it was like three or four positions for the Chinese to an American one,” Nagy recalled. “And then, in Africa, we have some embassies that … their staffing is so small, that we have somebody who might be, say, responsible for commercial advocacy, commercial diplomacy, but they do visas in the morning. It was absolutely ridiculous.”

Wei readily acknowledges that while U.S. diplomats focus on promoting issues like good governance, democracy and human rights, Chinese envoys are more keen to promote economic ties. “A good trade relationship is one of the foundations, or the most important foundations, for a bilateral relationship,” Wei said. He marveled at how often U.S. private sector firms skip bidding opportunities in Panama — “They’re not interested,” Wei said. “They never come.”

U.S. private businesses consider many factors when weighing overseas projects. Corruption is among them, but it’s a problem worldwide, not just in Panama. The FCPA bars such firms from engaging in bribery abroad. In a sense, the law offers companies a protective cover when approached for such schemes, but it also can frustrate U.S. efforts to compete with firms from places without such rules.

Other factors include the size of the market, whether the project is big enough to return a profit, as well the costs of labor. Many countries in Latin America in particular struggle to make the case that they are worth the risk and time as compared to more populous ones in Asia, where labor costs may be lower.

“Especially in the smaller countries, right, even sort of the Perus and the Ecuadors, but especially in the Caribbean and in Central America, countless government officials told us we simply don’t have any interest from American companies,” said Roberta Jacobson, a former top State Department official who dealt with Latin America and was U.S. ambassador to Mexico. Even when U.S. firms were interested, Jacobson added, they risk being under-bid by Chinese or other companies whose governments subsidize their work.

Among the U.S.-based companies Feeley said he approached about bidding to build the “fourth bridge” in Panama was Bechtel, the construction and engineering giant. A Bechtel spokesperson said that, in passing on the fourth bridge project, “we had to prioritize key resources and where we had a higher likelihood of winning and executing successfully.” The spokesperson also suggested that, in the long run, Bechtel was serving U.S. interests abroad by doing high-quality work.

“Bechtel competes for and frequently wins major projects abroad—but competition to win is intense, including against state-backed enterprises from other countries, and the risks can be significant,” the spokesperson said in a statement.

Some foreign diplomats say the U.S. needs to offer more incentives for private firms to take on projects in regions like Latin America or Africa. But sometimes, U.S. diplomats and American analysts say, the best approach is not to rely on the U.S. private sector. Instead, it’s better to nudge a foreign government to turn to companies from American allies, such as Japan or South Korea or any number of European nations, instead of China. That’s one reason the Biden administration, which has worked hard to repair relationships with allied countries frayed by Trump, is pushing multilateral economic initiatives like the PGII. But such efforts, too, require more U.S. diplomatic focus on the commercial space.

Where are the ambassadors?

For most of the past five years, the U.S. Embassy in Panama has been led by a “chargé d’affaires.” That person, typically a career diplomat, may get more attention from Panamanians than diplomats from many other countries, and some in the position are considered highly effective. But none has the status or sway of a Senate-confirmed ambassador, U.S. officials concede. In a small country like Panama, where the entire government seems to run on WhatsApp, an ambassador can make a big difference. And in many countries, diplomatic protocol is very important, so a chargé d’affaires cannot get as easy access to a president, or even a foreign minister, as an actual ambassador.

Feeley ended his 28-year diplomatic career in March 2018, blasting Trump as he bid farewell. In April 2020, Trump announced his nominee to replace Feeley would be Erik Bethel, a financial professional who speaks Spanish and Mandarin. He never got confirmed. Nearly nine months into his presidency, Biden announced his pick for the Panama job: Mari Carmen Aponte, a lawyer and former ambassador to El Salvador. She was confirmed in late September. The delay in her case was in part due to Republican Sen. Rick Scott of Florida, a person familiar with the issue said. Scott has blocked some nominees to object to Biden’s policies toward Cuba, an important issue in his state.

A Scott spokesperson blamed confirmation delays on Democrats’ poor use of Senate floor time. Other Republicans point out that although some individual senators use the nomination process to score political points, the White House also can be slow to vet and nominate people. Whatever the reason, according to the Partnership for Public Service, the past 15 years have seen a serious slowdown in confirmation of ambassadors. Under Biden, as of this past Tuesday, it has taken an average of 145.7 days. Under Trump it also was 145.7 days, while Obama ran at 121.1 days. Previous presidents going to back to Ronald Reagan didn’t break triple digits. As of Oct. 7, nearly 40 ambassadorships were unfilled, according to the American Foreign Service Association. They include posts in India, Italy and Colombia.

“It’s no way to run a country,” said Max Stier, the chief executive officer of the Partnership for Public Service, a non-profit whose activities include tracking presidential nominees. “We compete on the quality of our government against our primary competitors, so China is obviously concern No. 1. China doesn’t have this problem.”

Like Trump, Biden has frequently named “special envoys” for some positions, avoiding the confirmation logjam, although administration officials deny that’s the reason. The extensive use of special envoys has, however, annoyed lawmakers. So, they enhanced the Senate’s power to confirm such roles in the authorization bill that passed last year, an invitation for more partisan gridlock.

Chinese diplomats seem to spend more time in a country, and in some cases appear to get more training, than their U.S. counterparts. Four told POLITICO that their typical tour of duty in a foreign posting lasts four years, compared to three for U.S. diplomats from the State Department. Senior Chinese diplomats at times stay longer than four years. Many top Chinese diplomats have attended U.S. universities or send their children to such schools.

Foreign affairs specialists differ on whether having U.S. diplomats stay longer at a post would help promote American interests, but they generally agree that more U.S. diplomats should be abroad instead of in Washington. “We should be pushing our diplomats out to the edge, to the point of friction, as it were, and that doesn’t mean bigger embassies, what it means is more points of presence,” said Pottinger, who now chairs the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Chinese diplomats have another advantage over their U.S. counterparts: They don’t have to worry as much about security. America’s status as the dominant global power means U.S. diplomats often have targets on their backs. As a result, security rules make it tough for them to move around a country or to even open diplomatic facilities, and U.S. embassies are at times fortified zones far from capital city centers. Chinese envoys generally have more freedom of movement.

The Biden team has moved to ease such restrictions on U.S. diplomats, making high-profile moves such as reopening its embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine, despite the ongoing war. But it’s a gamble. The fallout from the 2012 attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi, Libya — which killed four Americans, including an ambassador, and led to repeated Republican political attacks on Democrats — casts a partisan shadow that analysts say has handcuffed American diplomacy.

China also is paying heightened attention to multilateral organizations like the United Nations and trying to place its citizens in top spots at such institutions. China skeptics say Beijing wants to rewrite international rules on everything from trade to human rights in its favor, and that’s one reason it is showering diplomatic attention on even the smallest countries. Those countries, after all, get votes in international bodies. A top Chinese official recently explained that a key concept of “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” is that China would “lead the reform of the global governance system with the concept of fairness and justice.”

Jeff Feltman, a former top United Nations official, noted that China often pushes for U.N. documents to reflect its views, emphasizing the rights of states above individuals and economic rights as more important than political rights. In documents about the rule of law, he said, “the Chinese would always add ‘between states’ after the expression ‘rule of law’ so that instead of being a discussion about how do governments treat their citizens, it becomes a discussion of how do states interact with each other.” It’s natural for a rising power like China to demand a bigger say, Feltman said, but it means the United States must improve its multilateral diplomatic tradecraft and give such diplomacy more prestige.

In a nod to such concerns, Blinken has created a State Department office focused on ensuring the U.S. and its allies get more top seats in multilateral bodies.

Needing a bridge

As dusk approaches in Panama City, a slew of car headlights sparkle from one of the existing spans over the canal, the Bridge of the Americas. Once again, the traffic on the bridge is backed up, delaying people eager to get home.

The fourth bridge would, in theory, be built close to the Bridge of the Americas, taking on much of its existing vehicular load. The bridge has been talked about, in some form or another, for at least a decade, and its absence so far is somewhat ironic. This is a country, after all, famed for its ability to ease transit.

“Yes, we need the fourth bridge,” said Yanina Campbell, 55, an artisan who sells specially crafted purses. “There’s a lot of traffic, and let’s understand, trade takes place in both the capital and the outlying areas.”

The bridge construction has been delayed for various reasons, including concerns about a linked metro project that was eventually separated from the bridge plans. Financing the project also was a challenge, which the pandemic didn’t help. The contract, however, appears solid, former Panamanian officials say, making it legally perilous for Panama to cancel on the Chinese companies.

When asked if the Cortizo administration’s wariness of increasing Chinese influence in Panama was one reason the bridge plans were on hold, Mouynes insisted the reasons were technical and financial.

“We do want to start that project as soon as possible,” the now-former foreign minister said.

So does the Chinese government.

In fact, Chinese state media already are touting the fourth bridge as a prime example of Beijing’s growing influence in Latin America. The United States is trying to catch up, Chinese outlets gloat. In June, China’s “Global Times,” one of Beijing’s most unabashed mouthpieces, cited analysts as saying that if the United States “attempts to force [other] countries to choose sides, it is doomed to hit the wall as countries are fed up with attempts to politicize economic matters and to stir up ideological confrontations.”

As China eyes a bigger role in Panama and beyond, confrontation of many kinds seems inevitable.

Nahal Toosi is POLITICO’s senior foreign affairs correspondent. Nicolle Liu contributed to this report.

POLITICO

Politico

11. Follow up to "You’ve told us why the Voice, but you haven’t told us what it is"

Again, Matt Armstrong is one of our nation's foremost authorities on Smith-Mundt and all things related to public diplomacy and psychological warfare.

This is a very important discussion given the recent "failures" and "exposures" of alleged psychological operations (which were likely conducted by contractors and not psychological operations professionals (but I digress)).

The issue of scope is both much broader and granular than what I described above. If one posits the difference is the intent to “influence,” first consider what communication is not about influence. Some do believe they have a magical ability to “inform without influence,” but that is not reality. Second, the original legislative purpose was to counter (proactively and reactively) disinformation, correct misinformation, and fill in the gaps when there was a lack of information. Reviewers’ use of “propaganda” seemingly absolves them of the need to distinguish the why and how and leave it to the reader. However, by using “propaganda,” they attempt to influence the reader in a certain way to decide whether the material is malign or otherwise.

To me, these are glaring defects of the legal reviews that reveal the lack of attention to detail by the authors, a gross failure of the editorial review process their papers were subject to, and a clear adherence to an accepted narrative rather than exploring the facts.

That’s it for now, and probably a while as I bury myself again. Eventually, after this immediate writing is done, you’ll eventually get to read something that has the “receipts” (i.e., the citations) to every point made above and earlier along with expanded discussions on the history and evolution of the ideas that became the Smith-Mundt Act and later amended the legislation.

I will say we need to get back to basics and first principles of information: Massive amounts of information that provide practical knowledge to the target audiences, so they know the truth about the world and their situation, and understand what is happening around the world.

And we need to get over our fear of using information for influence - OVERT influence - and leave covert influence to the very small group of professionals operating with approvals from the highest level (e.g.,presidential finding).

Follow up to "You’ve told us why the Voice, but you haven’t told us what it is"

A brief discussion on the third defect of law review articles on the Smith-Mundt Act

mountainrunner.substack.com · by Matt Armstrong

Two days ago, I shared an article showing that in 1949, the State Department acknowledged the Smith-Mundt Act did not intend to nor did prevent Americans from seeing what was said in their name and with their tax dollars. The “preface” to that article turned into a long rant on the glaring defects of most legal review articles on the Smith-Mundt Act. In trying to keep that discussion “brief,” I intentionally focused on only two issue areas. The first was failing to provide context to Fulbright’s 1972 amendment to the Smith-Mundt Act, the absence of which conveys the impression Congress was merely righting a perceived wrong. The second was failing to distinguish between dissemination and access. That discussion went quite long, so I left out an equally if not more important third point.

Share

This third area is scope. The Smith-Mundt Act has a very explicit and defined scope regarding its applicability to programs and organizations. The scope may sometimes be inferred, at best, by law review authors, more commonly, it is ignored by reviewers. This is yet another point that confounds me when considering these articles went through a peer review process. Any inference to the scope is often found in the recitation of select arguments, such as the 1967 discussion between Fulbright and US Advisory Commission on Information Chairman Frank Stanton or the 1972 discussion involving Acting Attorney General Kleindienst about Buckley's use of a USIA movie, but that’s typically the extent of it. Authors may mention something outside this scope, like Armstrong Williams and No Child Left Behind, as Carter and Palmer did. Still, such references fail to delineate examples like the Williams case was completely outside the Smith-Mundt framework. The inclusion is about broad intent, but the intent is unrelated to the Smith-Mundt discussion regarding statutory authorities, intentions, and organizations. Here, authors generally ignore or are unfamiliar with existing restrictions, such as the no publicity riders typical in many appropriations and even authorizations and other restrictions or prohibitions.

Following the above point, authors generally (I'm hedging again as I think “always” fits here) fail to discuss why the specific scope spelled out in the Smith-Mundt legislation and reinforced by the relevant discussions extends beyond the agencies and agency functions mentioned or deduced through statutory authorities. To put it plainly, how does legislative text that specifically names the State Department, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and the US Information Agency (the legislative text is a mess) somehow apply to all Title 22 activities (Foreign Affairs) but beyond? If the authors dug, they would find that, with regards to the State Department, the Smith-Mundt Act was not applied to the entirety of the department. Notable examples of the exceptions are the former Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and the mechanical point that for information produced for or by public affairs sections at US posts abroad (i.e., public diplomacy sections at embassies and consulates) must be “scrubbed” (reviewed and cleared) by the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs office in Washington before being shared in the US.

It seems that, in general, legal analyses around Smith-Mundt try to conform to a narrative rather than the legislative realities and history, which typically matter but not here. For example, the Defense Department’s high-level legal review of Smith-Mundt’s applicability to the department in 2009 was based on the argument that since DOD was doing stuff similar to State’s public diplomacy functions authorized by the Smith-Mundt Act, the same specific Title 22 restrictions that intentionally and willfully applied to USIA in 1972 and 1985, and then applied to part of the State Department after 1999 (not the entire department, see above) when USIA was abolished and most of it merged into the State Department, and the formerly named Broadcasting Board of Governors (now the US Agency for Global Media) must also apply to the Defense Department until Congress directs otherwise. This magical (and absurd) reasoning was a direct cause of the Modernization Act of 2012, an amendment to the Smith-Mundt Act that had the primary interest of telling the Defense Department that no, in fact, this piece of Title 22 does not apply to your Title 10 or other activities. The “scrubbing” emphasized that even though the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs was nominally subordinate to and, therefore, within the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs structure, it was not subject to the Smith-Mundt Act. (How the department perceives any Smith-Mundt issue on the restructured Assistant Secretary for Global Affairs is unknown to me.)

Note: any person you hear that says the Smith-Mundt Act was “repealed” by this 2012 legislation has no idea what they are speaking of, full stop.

Other notable examples in creating information for audiences abroad include almost every executive department and agency, not to mention the White House Press Secretary. NASA is another example: many years ago, an NBC radio producer asked on Twitter whether a then-new NASA TV channel was a violation of Smith-Mundt. Spoiler: no, Smith-Mundt has nothing to do with NASA. The question reflects the defectiveness of the legal scholarship and damage from the popular mythology around legislation crafted and passed to address the disinformation and misinformation that harmed our national security.

The issue of scope is both much broader and granular than what I described above. If one posits the difference is the intent to “influence,” first consider what communication is not about influence. Some do believe they have a magical ability to “inform without influence,” but that is not reality. Second, the original legislative purpose was to counter (proactively and reactively) disinformation, correct misinformation, and fill in the gaps when there was a lack of information. Reviewers’ use of “propaganda” seemingly absolves them of the need to distinguish the why and how and leave it to the reader. However, by using “propaganda,” they attempt to influence the reader in a certain way to decide whether the material is malign or otherwise.

To me, these are glaring defects of the legal reviews that reveal the lack of attention to detail by the authors, a gross failure of the editorial review process their papers were subject to, and a clear adherence to an accepted narrative rather than exploring the facts.

That’s it for now, and probably a while as I bury myself again. Eventually, after this immediate writing is done, you’ll eventually get to read something that has the “receipts” (i.e., the citations) to every point made above and earlier along with expanded discussions on the history and evolution of the ideas that became the Smith-Mundt Act and later amended the legislation.

mountainrunner.substack.com · by Matt Armstrong

12. Who's who: The seven most powerful men in China

For those up need to update their scorecards.

A lot more information at the link below.

Who's who: The seven most powerful men in China

https://edition.cnn.com/asia/live-news/china-party-congress-10-23-22-intl-hnk#h_64a3f7d9129ccad17966fb8bad8cda23

New members of the Politburo Standing Committee are introduced at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Sunday.

(Martha Zhou/CNN)

Xi Jinping has unveiled China’s new top leaders in the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee — with himself at the helm, surrounded by allies and loyalists.

Here are the Standing Committee members, in order of rank — the same order in which they walked out on stage.

• Xi Jinping, 69: China’s supreme leader is beginning a third term as chief of the Communist Party, breaking with recent precedent as he secures another five years in power.
• Li Qiang, 63: Shanghai’s party chief is expected to become China’s next premier in March after the incumbent Li Keqiang steps down. It is the highest-ranking position after Xi Jinping. Unlike current Premier Li Keqiang and his predecessors, Li has not served as a vice-premier or worked in the central government in any capacity.
• Zhao Leji, 65: Hailing from Xi’s ancestral home province, Zhao is currently head of the Communist Party’s anti-corruption body.
• Wang Huning, 67: Wang is a hugely influential Party theorist who has written policies for Xi and his predecessors Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin.
• Cai Qi, 66: Cai is the party boss of Beijing and one of Xi’s most-trusted confidants, with their ties dating back to Xi’s time in southern Fujian province. Cai oversaw the Beijing Winter Olympics.
• Li Xi, 66: Li is the current party chief of China’s southern economic engine Guangdong province. A trusted Xi ally, he is expected to oversee the anti-corruption organization.
• Ding Xuexiang, 60: Xi’s chief of staff and close aide had been widely seen as a leading candidate despite lacking experience as a provincial-level party chief or governor.

Of these members, Li Qiang, Cai Qi, Li Xi and Ding Xuexiang are newly appointed; the rest are incumbents.

Previous Standing Committee lineups have included younger members and potential successors — but with the youngest member at 60 years old this time, there’s no clear successor in the mix, a potential sign Xi is not stepping down anytime soon.

13.  Helium shortage: Doctors are worried that running out of the element could threaten MRIs

Helium shortage: Doctors are worried that running out of the element could threaten MRIs

Caroline Hopkins

Sat, October 22, 2022 at 6:00 AM·5 min read

news.yahoo.com · by Caroline Hopkins

A global helium shortage has doctors worried about one of the natural gas’s most essential, and perhaps unexpected, uses: MRIs.

Strange as it sounds, the lighter-than-air element that gives balloons their buoyancy also powers the vital medical diagnostic machines. An MRI can’t function without some 2,000 liters of ultra-cold liquid helium keeping its magnets cool enough to work. But helium — a nonrenewable element found deep within the Earth’s crust — is running low, leaving hospitals wondering how to plan for a future with a much scarcer supply.

“Helium has become a big concern,” said Mahadevappa Mahesh, professor of radiology at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine Baltimore. “Especially now with the geopolitical situation.”

Helium has been a volatile commodity for years. This is especially true in the U.S., where a Texas-based federal helium reserve is dwindling as the government tries transferring ownership to private markets.

Until this year, the U.S. was counting on Russia to ease the tight supply. An enormous new facility in eastern Russia was supposed to supply nearly one-third of the world’s helium, but a fire last January derailed the timeline. Although the facility could resume operations any day, the war in Ukraine has, for the most part, stopped trade between the two countries.

Now, four of five major U.S. helium suppliers are rationing the element, said Phil Kornbluth, president of Kornbluth Helium Consulting. These suppliers are prioritizing the health care industry by reducing helium allotments to less essential customers.

Related video: U.S. companies race to mine lithium while protecting environment

“Helium is on allocation for sure,” said Donna Craft, a regional construction manager for Premier Health who contracts with helium suppliers for some 4,000 hospitals. “We’re probably not blowing up balloons in the gift shop anymore.”

Hospitals haven’t canceled patients’ MRIs or shut down machines yet. They have seen helium costs rise at an alarming rate, though — possibly up to 30%, Kornbluth guessed. But without an end in sight for the helium shortage, the future of MRI remains uncertain.

‘An essential commodity’

MRI, short for magnetic resonance imaging, has been a staple of health care since the 1980s. The massive machines provide high-resolution images that allow doctors to see details in organs, bones and tissue that may not show up on X-rays.

“You get these sharp images, and you can distinguish soft tissues,” said Dr. Scott Reeder, chief of MRI at the University of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health. “It’s central to many things we do in modern medicine.” MRIs help doctors diagnose brain tumors, strokes, spinal cord injuries, liver diseases and cancer. The 3D images, experts say, are irreplaceable.

Instead of relying on X-rays, which emit trace amounts of radiation to peer inside the body, MRIs use magnetic fields and radio waves. When someone lies stock-still inside the tube-shaped magnetic field, their body’s atoms align with strong magnetic currents. Pulses of radio waves then tell the machine’s sensors which tissues are where, and the machine renders its image.

MRI scanner at Altona Children's Hospital in Hamberg, Germany, Au,. 2022. (Marcus Brandt / dpa/picture alliance via Getty Images file)

Keeping an MRI’s magnetic current superconductive requires extreme cold. That’s where helium comes in: With a boiling point of minus 452 degrees Fahrenheit, liquid helium is the coldest element on Earth. Pumped inside an MRI magnet, helium lets the current travel resistance-free.

“Helium is how the magnet continuously exists,” Mahesh said. “It’s an essential commodity.”

At any point, an MRI machine contains about 2,000 liters of liquid helium, though suppliers need to replenish any helium that boils off. Mahesh estimates that an MRI machine uses 10,000 liters of liquid helium over its life span. (According to GE Healthcare, a manufacturer of the machines, that life span is 12.8 years.) In 2015, there were roughly 12,000 machines in the U.S., making MRIs one of the biggest helium consumers in the world, far above balloon stores.

In contrast, spectators have an estimated 400,000 cubic feet of helium to thank for suspending all of the tractor-trailer-size balloons in Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Parade. Converted to liquid form, that helium would only keep about two MRIs operational for their life span.

No quick fix

The problem is that no other element is cold enough for the MRI. “There’s no alternative,” Craft, of Premier Health, said. “Without helium, MRIs would have to shut down.”

Manufacturers like GE Healthcare and Siemens Healthineers recognize this vulnerability. “We are concerned about shortages in the helium market,” said Ioannis Panagiotelis, chief marketing officer of MRI at GE. “Every industry and hospital with an MR system has been affected.”

GE and Siemens are both developing MRIs requiring less liquid helium. Siemens recently introduced one requiring just 0.7 liters, and, according to Panagiotelis, GE rolled out a machine that’s “1.4 times more efficient than previous models.” These technologies aren’t widely available, though, and replacing the country’s 12,000 MRI machines — each weighing up to 50,000 pounds — is anything but a quick fix. Meanwhile, hospitals keep installing additional conventional MRI machines to meet demand for diagnostic scans.

“The concern is the shortage becomes so acute we can’t set up new scanners,” Reeder said. The University of Wisconsin, he said, has plans to open a new cancer center with two MRIs. “When we install those systems, what’s going to happen if there’s no helium?”

Mahesh said Johns Hopkins is also adding another MRI to its fleet, and it’ll be the same “workhorse scanner” as its 22 other machines.

As doctors dread possible worst-case scenarios, scientists who use liquid helium for research are already there. When suppliers began rationing this summer, Harvard University physicists Amir Yacoby and Philip Kim shut down around half of their labs’ projects. On the opposite side of the country, the University of California, Davis reported that one of its helium suppliers cut allocations by half, including for medical use.

“The shortage is motivating us to figure out ways of doing the same experiments without the liquid helium,” Yacoby said. The forced innovation may preview what’s to come for MRIs, and it may be necessary, shortage or no shortage.

“There’s only a finite amount of helium in the Earth’s crust,” Kim said. “Once it evaporates off, it’s completely lost into outer space.”

Follow NBC HEALTH on Twitter & Facebook.

This article was originally published on NBCNews.com

news.yahoo.com · by Caroline Hopkins

14.  Putin Has a New Ukraine Problem: His Forces Can't Retreat?

Excerpt:

But the Ukrainian forces have already targeted and attacked the Russian makeshift pontoon bridge (essentially a series of barges strewn together). The fact that the pontoon bridge is right next to the Antonovsky Bridge makes targeting that much harder, even if the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) or M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) are used.

Putin Has a New Ukraine Problem: His Forces Can't Retreat?

19fortyfive.com · by Stavros Atlamazoglou · October 23, 2022

The Russian military is pulling out from many parts of Kherson province on day 242 of the war in Ukraine.

A Pontoon Bridge too Far?

Russian forces are withdrawing from the western bank of the Dnipro River in the Kherson province. Their positions have been come unattainable under the constant pressure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

But to get across the Dnipro, which is about one kilometer wide, the Russian forces need bridges. Antonovsky Bridge, the major vehicular bridge in the region, has been partially destroyed by the Ukrainian long-range fires interdiction campaign.

To bypass that restriction of movement, the Russian military has built a pontoon bridge adjacent to the severely damaged Antonovsky Bridge. But that doesn’t necessarily ensure that the Russian forces on the western bank will be able to evacuate in time and in good order with all of the weapon systems.

“Although the use of heavy barge bridges was almost certainly included in Soviet-era planning for operations in Europe, it is likely this is the first time the Russian military have [sic] needed to utilise this type of bridge for decades,” the British Military Intelligence assessed in its latest estimate of the war.

“Using civilian barges likely provides Russia additional material and logistics benefits, having lost significant quantities of military bridging equipment and engineering personnel during its invasion,” the British Military Intelligence added.

“If the barge bridge sustains damage, it is almost certain Russia will seek to repair or replace damaged sections quickly, as their forces and crossing points over the Dnipro river come under increasing pressure in Kherson,” the British Military Intelligence assessed.

But the Ukrainian forces have already targeted and attacked the Russian makeshift pontoon bridge (essentially a series of barges strewn together). The fact that the pontoon bridge is right next to the Antonovsky Bridge makes targeting that much harder, even if the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) or M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) are used.

Russian Casualties in Ukraine

Overall, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense claimed that as of Saturday, Ukrainian forces have killed approximately 67,070 Russian troops (and wounded approximately thrice that number), destroyed 270 fighter, attack, and transport jets, 243 attack and transport helicopters, 2,579 tanks, 1,653 artillery pieces, 5,266 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, 373 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), 16 boats and cutters, 4,021 vehicles and fuel tanks, 189 anti-aircraft batteries, 1,341 tactical unmanned aerial systems, 148 special equipment platforms, such as bridging vehicles, and four mobile Iskander ballistic missile systems, and 329 cruise missiles shot down by the Ukrainian air defenses.

Russia and Iran: An Alliance of Pariahs?

There has been a lot of talk about the military assistance that Iran has been providing to Russia. In the past few days, Iranian drones have made their presence known all across Ukraine after the Russian military used them, especially the Shahed-136 loitering munition, to attack Ukrainian urban centers and critical infrastructure.

The cooperation with Tehran is another sign of Moscow’s increasing international marginalization.

The fact that Iran is supplying Moscow with weapon systems is “another sign of how isolated both Russia and Iran are, and they have to rely on each other,” National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby said to Politico.

Image of Ukraine attacking Russian tank. Image Credit: Twitter Screenshot.

Soldiers serving with Alpha Battery, 2nd Battalion, 77th Field Artillery Regiment, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 4th Inf. Division, shoot a round down range from their M777A2 howitzer on Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, Aug. 22, 2014. The round was part of a shoot to register, or zero, the howitzers, which had just arrived on KAF from Forward Operating Base Pasab. The shoot also provided training for a fire support team from 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th IBCT, 4th Inf. Div. This is similar to artillery now engaged in Ukraine. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Ariel Solomon/Released)

“They continue to lie to the world but the facts are clear. The Supreme Leader should answer why he has Iran directly engaged on the ground and through the provision of weapons that enable Russia to kill civilians and damage civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. It’s just another example of Iran’s desire to export violence, and both Iran and Russia need to be held accountable for it,” Kirby added.

Expert Biography: A 19FortyFive Defense and National Security Columnist, Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate. His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

19fortyfive.com · by Stavros Atlamazoglou · October 23, 2022

15. Military think tank: Russia withdraws officers from Kherson

Extracted from the Institute for the Study of War's daily report on the Russian campaign plan.

Military think tank: Russia withdraws officers from Kherson

AP · by ANDREW MELDRUM · October 23, 2022

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Russia’s military leadership has withdrawn its officers in the Russian-annexed city of Kherson across the Dnieper River in anticipation of an advance of Ukrainian troops, the Institute for the Study of War think tank said Sunday.

To delay the Ukrainian counteroffensive as the Russians complete their retreat, Moscow has left newly mobilized, inexperienced forces on the other side of the wide river, it added.

The troop movements come as the Ukrainian military said its forces have continued their counteroffensives in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions.

On Saturday, Russian-installed authorities in Ukraine told all Kherson residents to leave immediately ahead of the expected action by Ukrainian troops to take back the city. Kirill Stremousov, deputy head of the Russian-backed regional administration in Kherson, said Sunday that over 20,000 civilians had evacuated to the left bank of the Dnieper River.

ADVERTISEMENT

He said that while Ukrainian forces were trying to push their offensive on the right bank, Russian defensive lines “have been reinforced and the situation has remained stable.”

Kherson has been in Russian hands since the early days of the eight-month-long war in Ukraine. The city is the capital of a region of the same name, one of four that Russian President Vladimir Putin illegally annexed last month and put under Russian martial law on Thursday.

Russia-Ukraine war

• Russian warplane falls on building in Siberia; 2 pilots die
• Orban lashes out at EU as he marks 1956 anti-Soviet revolt
• Fears over Russian threat to Norway's energy infrastructure
• Ukrainian woman's quest to retrieve body of prisoner of war

On Friday, Ukrainian forces bombarded Russian positions across the province, targeting pro-Kremlin forces’ resupply routes across the river and preparing for a final push to reclaim the city.

The ISW think tank also said Sunday that Russia’s latest war strategy of targeting power plants in recent days appears to be aimed at diminishing Ukrainians’ will to fight and forcing Ukraine’s government to spend additional resources to protect civilians and energy infrastructure. It said the effort was unlikely to damage Ukrainian morale but would have significant economic impact.

The Russian attacks on power supplies forced the emergency suspension of fertilizer production at a major chemical plant, Rivneazot, in northwestern Ukraine. The company said Sunday the suspension is not posing an environmental risk.

The mayor of Enerhodar, home to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, reported an attack on a hotel used by Russian occupying forces and those who collaborate with them. It’s unclear if anyone was hurt.

ADVERTISEMENT

The Ukrainian military said Sunday that Russian forces are now mostly on the defensive, but are keeping up offensive attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and on several towns in the eastern Donbas area.

Nine regions across Ukraine, from Odesa in the southwest to Kharkiv in the northeast, saw attacks again targeting energy and other critical infrastructure over the past day, the Ukrainian general staff said. It reported a total of 25 Russian air strikes and more than 100 missile and artillery strikes around Ukraine.

Ukrainian counteroffensive forces in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, meanwhile, targeted Russian-held facilities, notably in the town of Nova Kakhovka, and carried out 17 air strikes in the overall campaign, according to the Ukrainian general staff.

ADVERTISEMENT

In a Telegram post Sunday, the Ukrainian military claimed to have destroyed 14 Iranian-made Russian drones over the past day.

Russian S-300 missile strikes overnight hit a residential neighborhood in the city of Mykolaiv, injuring three people, according to the Ukrainian military’s southern command. Two apartment buildings, a playground and a warehouse were damaged or destroyed, it said in a Facebook post. Images posted on Telegram by local media and officials showed an apartment building with one side sheared off, and piles of rubble amid puddles on the adjacent ground.

Governors of two Russian regions that border northeastern Ukraine said defensive lines are being built, apparently in anticipation of cross-border attacks as Ukrainian troops advance.

Kursk Gov. Roman Starovoit said Sunday that two defensive lines in the region already have been built and a third one will be finished by Nov. 5.

ADVERTISEMENT

Belgorod Gov. Vyacheslav Gladkov said that defensive lines were also built in his region. On Saturday, he posted pictures of lines of pyramid-shaped concrete blocks intended to block the movement of armored vehicles.

Elsewhere, Ukraine’s security service said Sunday it has detained the longtime chief of a major aircraft engine factory, accusing him of collaborating with Russia by supplying military equipment for Russian attack aircraft.

Viacheslav Bohuslaiev, president of the Motor Sich plant in Zaporizhzhia, and another top factory official were charged with collaboration and “assisting the aggressor state.”

The Ukrainian security service SBU said in a statement that the two are accused of colluding with a Russian arms maker close to the Kremlin to supply Ukrainian-made engines and spare parts to Russian forces. The SBU described a complex scheme using intermediaries in three countries to evade sanctions against Russia.

ADVERTISEMENT

Motor Sich is one of Ukraine’s leading manufacturers and has been a key maker of aircraft engines since Soviet times. Its facilities have been repeatedly targeted by Russian strikes during the war.

___

Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

AP · by ANDREW MELDRUM · October 23, 2022

16. Biden’s Security Strategy Shows Foreign Policy As A Distraction – Analysis

Strong criticism.

The Biden administration has shown an unwillingness to pursue a proactive foreign policy. This was evident in the debacle in Afghanistan last year and the dithering over providing Ukraine with all the weapons it needs.

The main focus of the Biden administration is on pushing an increasingly controversial domestic agenda at home. Foreign policy is considered a distraction. The National Security Strategy is yet another example of this.

Biden’s Security Strategy Shows Foreign Policy As A Distraction – Analysis

eurasiareview.com · by Arab News · October 23, 2022

By Luke Coffey*

Advertisement

Last week the Biden administration finally released its long-awaited National Security Strategy. It took the White House 21 months — nearly half of President Joe Biden’s first term in office — to publish the document. In this dangerous world, it beggars belief that the administration was able to publish a “National Gender Strategy” in half the time.

The security strategy runs to 47 pages but only four of them are devoted to Russia or China. Only one page is devoted to the role of the US military in dealing with these threats. Much of the document is dedicated the political causes of the American left, such as climate change and “social justice” issues.

Even less attention is given to the Middle East. Out of the 23,000 words in the document only 870 are devoted to the region — less than 4 percent of the total.

To be fair, this lack of focus on the Middle East in the strategy follows a similar situation over the summer with NATO. There was barely any attention of the Middle East in the alliance’s new Strategic Concept, which was published in June. In fact, in a document that is just over 4,200 words long, only one paragraph of about 80 words was devoted to the region.

Furthermore, NATO’s two main platforms on which it engages with the Middle East and North Africa region, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, were not mentioned at all.

Advertisement

It is almost as if there is a collective case of geopolitical denial of the importance of the Middle East when it comes to the stability and security of the trans-Atlantic community.

The title of the Middle East section in the US National Security Strategy is “Support De-escalation and Integration in the Middle East.” It talks about “building partnerships, coalitions and alliances” in the region, deepening “Israel’s growing ties to its neighbors” and “fostering greater economic integration.” However, there have been no policies pursued, and there are no forthcoming initiatives, that address any of these issues in any meaningful sense.

One of the best ways to promote peace and prosperity in the region is to find ways to expand diplomatic relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Not only will this help bring new economic opportunities to the region but it will also help unify the Middle East against the ever looming Iranian threat.

Here, the White House has come up short. The 2020 Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and some of its Arab neighbors, was perhaps the greatest achievement of the Trump administration. Biden’s National Security Strategy barely gives them lip service and there has been no meaningful effort to expand the accords by the president’s team. In fact, it took several months in the White House before Biden administration officials would even acknowledge the success of the Abraham Accords.

When Biden finally visited the Middle East last summer, after waiting 18 months before doing so, there was no genuine push to promote the accords.

Regarding the strategy’s call to “foster greater economic integration” in the Middle East, the Biden administration has done nothing. The president has not promoted any semblance of a free-trade agenda, whether for the Middle East or any other region of the world. In fact, Biden has decided to keep the pointless steel and aluminum tariffs on Gulf countries that were put in place by the Trump administration.

Over the years, countries such as Bahrain, Oman and Qatar have done much to diversify their economies and the steel and aluminum sectors have played a key role. Not only are these tariffs bad for the American consumer, they also needlessly complicate America’s bilateral relationships in the region.

To truly “foster greater economic integration” in the Middle East, the US must pursue a pragmatic, region-wide trade agenda that will remove barriers to flows of goods and services.

Over the past few decades, the US has established a network of trade pacts in the region through bilateral free-trade agreements with Israel, Bahrain, Oman and Jordan. In addition to making strategic efforts to better utilize these existing deals, Washington should consider pursuing additional trade agreements that can not only lower the costs of imported goods for consumers in the region, but also expand exports to the US market.

Considering the National Security Strategy was published so far into the president’s term, it is unlikely to serve as a practical road map for US foreign policy. It is simply too late for that.

The Biden administration has shown an unwillingness to pursue a proactive foreign policy. This was evident in the debacle in Afghanistan last year and the dithering over providing Ukraine with all the weapons it needs.

The main focus of the Biden administration is on pushing an increasingly controversial domestic agenda at home. Foreign policy is considered a distraction. The National Security Strategy is yet another example of this.

• Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. Twitter: @LukeDCoffey

eurasiareview.com · by Arab News · October 23, 2022

17. The Words About Ukraine That Americans Need to Hear

A moral argument is an information and influence activity. Can we learn to lead with influence?

Conclusion:

Ukraine’s struggle for freedom and for its very existence is the struggle of a much larger order, not just in Europe but globally, and indeed of the human spirit. It needs to be understood not only in the somnolent rhythms of bureaucratic choice or academic analysis, but in language that sings. The situation calls for sound policy, no doubt; it also calls for eloquence that soars. There is an epic speech to be delivered here; let us hope that there is someone who can deliver it.

The Words About Ukraine That Americans Need to Hear

Wars are won by deeds—but also by persuasive moral arguments.

By Eliot A. Cohen

The Atlantic · by Eliot A. Cohen · October 22, 2022

“Deeds, not words,” is the motto of the 22nd Infantry Regiment, a credo that befits a fighting unit that has seen service from the Civil War to Iraq. But wars are won by words as well as deeds, which is one of the reasons why President John F. Kennedy said of Winston Churchill that he “mobilized the English language and sent it into battle.” And now, in Ukraine, the United States and the West in general need much better words to put into the fight in addition to the long-range artillery and guided missiles, air defense systems and drones, accurate artillery shells and bullets that they are shipping—belatedly, insufficiently, occasionally hesitantly—into battle.

President Volodymyr Zelensky, the most inspiring Western war leader since Churchill, knows the power of language. “I need ammunition, not a ride,” will make the history books. His speeches to Congress, the U.K. Parliament, and the Bundestag were outstanding examples of impassioned persuasive speech. But something more is needed from the president and prime ministers of his friends and allies.

From the October 2022 issue: Ukrainians are defending the values Americans claim to hold

The United States and its allies have had a remarkably, perhaps perilously easy time in persuading their people to go along with extensive aid to Ukraine, despite high inflation and energy shortages. To some extent this is the result of the West’s muscle memory from the Cold War, when Soviet ideology was relentlessly hostile and Soviet internal practice stunningly brutal. Soviet external behavior, from the subjugation of the Baltic states and Eastern Europe to the invasion of Afghanistan, was menacing as well as repellant. And even though the Cold War is more than a generation behind us, when the Russians behave like brutes—“orcs,” as the Ukrainians refer to them—that muscle memory is triggered.

Americans are used to seeing the Russians as the bad guys, and thus our institutions, including the armed forces and the CIA and its foreign counterparts, have a deep repertoire of actions ready in response. The Russians launched an unprovoked war against Ukraine, committed atrocities on a massive scale, and have daily compounded their crimes by attacking civilian infrastructure abroad and brutalizing their own people at home. It is easy (and correct) to conclude that they remain the bad guys today. That we can see the bombed playgrounds and hospitals and the tortured bodies of their victims on Twitter makes it so much easier to mobilize against them.

The tests are coming, however, particularly if Europe has a cold winter that makes Russian cutoffs of energy supplies bite. In the United States, the likely next speaker of the House of Representatives, Kevin McCarthy, in a gesture to the neo-isolationist wing of the Republican Party, has indicated that it is time to curtail aid to Ukraine. The motley collection of so-called realists (who think that Russia’s crimes are irrelevant), isolationists, admirers or tools of Russia, and America-Firsters have kept up a running if muted line of criticism, not so much of the Zelensky government as of the American burden in supporting him.

McCarthy’s views have nothing to do with principle, because he has none. Rather, he is a weather vane, acutely sensitive to the winds that blow from Mar-a-Lago and the wing of his party that has always resented America’s presence in the outside world. The isolationist and even xenophobic traditions of one faction in the Republican Party run deep. Suppressing them for the past several generations was the great achievement of politicians like Dwight D. Eisenhower and intellectuals like William F. Buckley. But they are back, and need to be addressed, as do comparable movements on the left of the Democratic Party.

Even more important, average Americans, properly worried about inflation, recession, and a bitterly divided political class, need to hear why it is important to weigh in, wholeheartedly and with vigor, on Kyiv’s side.

Phillips Payson O’Brien: Russia just showed why it’s floundering in Ukraine

Two kinds of words are needed: those explaining why the fight for Ukraine is important to American security and welfare, and those making the case on moral grounds. No American policy can succeed in the long run without addressing both our interests and our values. When the two coincide, as they did during World War II and the Cold War, the United States can show remarkable perseverance. When they diverge or are weak, as became the case in America’s interventions in Afghanistan and the Middle East, policies collapse.

A good speech on Ukraine will not invoke the phrase “rules-based international order,” which might resonate in a freshman introduction to international relations, but not with an audience of normal people. Rather, Americans and Europeans need to hear about the consequences if Russia were to crush Ukraine; about the invasions and depredations that would surely come next in the Baltic states, and quite likely beyond; about the conclusions a no less ruthless Chinese government would draw; and about how a failure to take a stand here would mean something much bigger and more dangerous in a few years’ time. They need to hear how staunchness now, even in the face of nuclear threats, is infinitely better than a large-scale, possibly global war in a decade. They need to hear that world war is not just the stuff of history books or their grandparents’ or great-grandparents’ lives, but a possibility for us if we are not prudent now.

They also need to hear about the semi-genocidal nature of the Russian attack on Ukraine—not just the extensive torture, murder, and rape of the civilian population, but the kidnapping of thousands of children, and the attempt to wipe out Ukrainian language and culture.

Americans also need to hear a celebration not only of Ukrainian courage and tenacity, but of their skill. On January 20, 1940, Churchill gave a speech in which, among other things, he reflected on Finland’s astonishing early defeats of the Soviet armies that had attacked it a few months before.

Only Finland—superb, nay sublime—in the jaws of peril—Finland shows what free men can do.

And he issued a warning:

If the light of freedom which still burns so brightly in the frozen North should be finally quenched, it might well herald a return to the Dark Ages, when every vestige of human progress during two thousand years would be engulfed.

Now is a moment for Churchillian rhetoric and insight, suitably modified to the limitations of those who may share his instincts but lack his brilliance.

Listen: Zelensky is everywhere

Modern politicians very rarely speak this way, but they need to try, and they will be heard if they do so. They do not have to reach the Churchillian heights. The opposition to aid to Ukraine is still divided, hampered by its own crankiness and embittered introversion, and undermined daily by Russian barbarity, and no less, the astonishing Julius Streicher–like candor with which its propagandists howl for the blood of innocents.

Ukraine’s struggle for freedom and for its very existence is the struggle of a much larger order, not just in Europe but globally, and indeed of the human spirit. It needs to be understood not only in the somnolent rhythms of bureaucratic choice or academic analysis, but in language that sings. The situation calls for sound policy, no doubt; it also calls for eloquence that soars. There is an epic speech to be delivered here; let us hope that there is someone who can deliver it.

The Atlantic · by Eliot A. Cohen · October 22, 2022

18. The U.S. Military and Russian Military Are Talking Ukraine

The U.S. Military and Russian Military Are Talking Ukraine

19fortyfive.com · by Jack Buckby · October 22, 2022

What Did Lloyd Austin Say to the Russian Defense Minister On Friday?: United States Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin spoke with Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu via telephone on Friday morning, the second such call understood to have taken place since the outbreak of the Russian invasion.

The news was revealed by Pentagon press secretary Air Force Brig. Gen Pat Ryder in a press conference on Friday, and the call was also confirmed by the Kremlin.

Austin also reportedly spoke to Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov that morning in a separate call about providing more air defense systems to Ukraine.

What Did They Discuss?

While all the details of the call were not confirmed by the Department of Defense, the Pentagon did confirm that Austin “emphasized the importance of maintaining lines of communication amid the ongoing war against Ukraine.”

Given the infrequency of these calls, and the fact that both the Kremlin and the White House have stressed the importance of bringing the conflict to an end as soon as possible, the matter of peace negotiations may also have been discussed on Friday morning.

If Austin and Shoygu did talk about a peace settlement, we might not hear about it from the Kremlin.

Just last week, the Kremlin’s press secretary denied that the Russian president had discussed a settlement with the Turkish president during a recent meeting in Kazakhstan. Dmitry Peskov told RIA Novosti that the discussion, which lasted 90 minutes, did not involve any discussion of what it would take to agree with Ukraine.

It’s possible that the topic didn’t come up of course, but that seems unlikely given President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s continued efforts to negotiate a peace agreement and his vocal support for bringing the war to an end through diplomatic means. The denial is also curious, given that the Kremlin has recently pushed the idea of initiating a new round of negotiations involving Western countries.

The call also came when Russian forces encouraged Kherson residents to evacuate the region ahead of an expected counter-offensive from Ukrainian forces. The topic of discussion, therefore, may have been related to the heightened conflict in the region and the reports that Russia is preparing to launch a false flag attack on the Nova Kahkhovka dam, endangering the lives of tens of thousands or more civilians in southern Ukraine.

Did Shoygu Go Hard?

If the topic of peace negotiations didn’t come up, it might be because the Kremlin is now threatening the destruction of Ukraine if the West continues to supply arms to Kyiv.

Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova told Sputnik Radio on Wednesday that the United States is supplying weapons to “destroy the country that they have taken care of for many years.”

“This is such a vital contradiction. They seem to want to strengthen and strengthen, but everything leads to the opposite result,” Zakharova said. “Washington’s position, which relies on inflating the conflict, leads to the destruction of Ukraine.”

The comments come as the United States and NATO allies commit to strengthening Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, providing more surface-to-air missile systems and rockets designed to protect against new bombardments from the Russian military.

Jack Buckby is a British author, counter-extremism researcher, and journalist based in New York. Reporting on the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., he works to analyze and understand left-wing and right-wing radicalization, and reports on Western governments’ approaches to the pressing issues of today. His books and research papers explore these themes and propose pragmatic solutions to our increasingly polarized society.

19fortyfive.com · by Jack Buckby · October 22, 2022

19. OPINION: The IMF and the World Bank are hurting, not helping developing countries

Elements of the rules based international order.

But it is very hard to take this seriously when the author includes this paragraph. But many in the target audience for this author will take this seriously because of this paragraph.

Wikileaks published a classified US Army Field Manual called US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare. It describes how the United States government uses institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, Bank for International Settlements, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the World Bank as financial weapons. The ARSOF mentions how the “manipulation of U.S. financial strength can leverage the policies and cooperation of state governments.” This financial strength that the United States government has can also be used to apply “indirect financial power through persuasive influence to international and domestic financial institutions,” and thus control the “availability and terms of loans, grants, or other financial assistance to foreign state and nonstate actors.” The Army Special Operations Forces manual also tells how the United States government “can use financial power as a weapon in times of conflict up to and including large-scale general war.”

This paragraph is a good example of how adversaries can use US doctrine to spin their agenda (even obsolete and superseded manuals). This is why the Joint Staff made the only UW manual ever published by USSOCOM For Official Use Only (FOUO). It is also likely why the Joint Staff has restricted the dissemination of the new Joint Pub 3-04 - Information in Joint Operations.

OPINION: The IMF and the World Bank are hurting, not helping developing countries

yjpaper.org · by Spencer Vida

• Opinion

Photo by Ehud Neuhaus on Unsplash

Spencer Vida, Opinions Editor

October 21, 2022

The International Monetary Fund and World Bank are Washington-based, international financial institutions which engage in economic neo-colonialism that unlike the colonization of the past is done with debt and economic supremacy instead of through military occupation. These child organizations of the United Nations are just like the UN itself pretending to support world peace and global equality while in reality only supporting the interests of rich, western countries and multi-national corporations.

Both financial institutions provide loans to developing countries as well as advocate and force these countries to work toward what they call “structural adjustment”. They do this by making countries transition toward austerity, mass privatization, corporatization, and other economic policies without protecting local companies and governments’ sovereignty over their country. This gives power to foreign countries and multinational companies rather than the government and companies of that country. This lack of sovereignty leads to developing countries not being financially strong enough to fight back against foreign exploit. This exploitation creates underpaid labor, the overharvesting of resources including oil and lithium, and the destruction of local environments. These policies can be done willingly by the countries, but it common for the countries to be forced into it in order to get loans, grants, or bailouts from debt, even if said debt was originally caused by previous IMF and World Bank loans and policies. The charity Oxfarm reports that “over 80 percent of IMF Covid-19 loans will push austerity on poor countries,” (ReliefWeb).

Economic change is not always the requirement of such loans, as the Daily Mail says that global financial institutions including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have given Ecuador $10.2 billion in rescue loans just weeks before the Ecuador embassy kicked Julian Assange out of it. This has led some people to question if the financial institutions bribed the Ecuador president into removing Julian Assange from their embassy.

Critics of these organizations such as the Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt have said “The WB and the IMF have systematically made loans to [countries] as a means of influencing their policies.” Also, their policies themselves have led to both organizations drawing much criticism as the policies end up being more profitable for multinational companies than to the countries themselves. Not to mention, they do not have a very good track record. The IMF has helped create and worsen the Asian financial crisis by using a “shock therapy” approach caused hyperinflation and mass poverty in 1990s while Russia was under the rule of pro-Western Boris Yeltsin. The World Bank themselves have created policies to build dams and other major infrastructure projects which have displaced millions of people and removed dozens of communities. Both groups together have increased worldwide poverty, contributed to environmentally destructive projects, and have a history of bankrolling dictators, oligarchs, and trans-national corporations while leaving the people and countries they were supposed to bring out of poverty usually in worse shape than they started with.

These institutions are not elected by people, but by countries, especially rich countries. In fact, voting power in the World Bank comes from a country’s financial shares, and vote share in the IMF is derived from countries’ GDPs. In the World Bank, a country can also increase voting power by contributing capital to the International Development Association (IDA), which is a part of the World Bank. The IMF also requires countries to contributed money based on their economic size which also leads the richer countries having more influence over the organization. This has resulted in the World Bank almost always being run by Americans except for the Bulgarian, Kristalina Georgieva and the IMF always being run by Western Europeans again except for Kristalina Georgieva. Also, as you can image the United States itself holds the most voting power of both organizations and has such a solid hold over the institutions that can veto decisions by themselves.

Wikileaks published a classified US Army Field Manual called US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare. It describes how the United States government uses institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, Bank for International Settlements, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the World Bank as financial weapons. The ARSOF mentions how the “manipulation of U.S. financial strength can leverage the policies and cooperation of state governments.” This financial strength that the United States government has can also be used to apply “indirect financial power through persuasive influence to international and domestic financial institutions,” and thus control the “availability and terms of loans, grants, or other financial assistance to foreign state and nonstate actors.” The Army Special Operations Forces manual also tells how the United States government “can use financial power as a weapon in times of conflict up to and including large-scale general war.”

The threat of groups like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank used to be an issue, but the idea faded somewhere in the 2010s. Before, such financial institutions were met with more pressure like during the 1988 IMF/World Bank protests, the 2002 World Bank Oslo protests, the October Rebellion, and the 1999 Seattle WTO protests. They protested globalization and financial groups which has become tools for the wealthy elites and rich countries which oppress the developed world. The best thing for the develop world would be to abolish these financial groups and find better ways to help them.

References:

Blomberg, Brock, and J. Lawrence Broz. “The Political Economy of IMF Voting Power.” Niehaus Center for Globalization & Governance, Princeton University, 2006, https://web.archive.org/web/20120710215927/http://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/IPES/papers/broz_blomberg_F1030_1.pdf.

Boston University Global Development Policy Center. “Poverty, Inequality and the IMF: How Austerity Hurts the Poor and Widens Inequality: Global Development Policy Center.” Global Development Policy Center Poverty Inequality and the IMF How Austerity Hurts the Poor and Widens Inequality Comments, 2 Apr. 2021, https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2021/04/02/poverty-inequality-and-the-imf-how-austerity-hurts-the-poor-and-widens-inequality/.

Chen, Joyce. “Neocolonialism and the IMF.” Harvard Political Review, 21 Oct. 2021, https://harvardpolitics.com/neocolonialism-imf/.

Chambers, Francesca. “How Years of US Pressure Got Ecuador to Hand over Julian Assange.” Daily Mail Online, Associated Newspapers, 16 Sept. 2020, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6911925/U-S-pressure-Ecuador-yields-Assange-arrest-bond-deal-help-struggling-economy.html.

Elliott, Larry. “The World Bank and the IMF Won’t Admit Their Policies Are the Problem.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 9 Oct. 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/oct/09/the-world-bank-and-the-imf-wont-admit-their-policies-are-the-problem.

Hickel, Jason. “Apartheid in the World Bank and the IMF.” World Bank | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 30 Nov. 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/11/26/it-is-time-to-decolonise-the-world-bank-and-the-imf.

Hirsh, Michael. “They’Ve Got a Secret.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 19 July 2013, https://web.archive.org/web/20220616152441/https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/books/review/tower-of-basel-by-adam-lebor.html.

IMF. “Membership.” About the IMF: Overview: Membership, https://www.imf.org/external/about/members.htm#function.

IMF. “The IMF and the World Bank.” IMF, 3 Mar. 2021, https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/07/27/15/31/IMF-World-Bank.

Kawsachun News. “U.S. SOUTHCOM Commander:‘This Region Is so Rich in Resources.. It’s off the Charts Rich.”‘60% of the World’s Lithium Is in the Region; You Have Heavy Crude, You Have Light Sweet Crude, You Have Rare Earth Elements, You Have the Amazon..” Pic.twitter.com/33dq6exkao.” Twitter, Twitter, 20 July 2022, https://twitter.com/KawsachunNews/status/1549834456353185797?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1549834456353185797%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsputniknews.com%2F20220722%2Fits-off-the-charts-rich-us-general-caught-pining-for-latin-americas-resources-in-viral-video-1097679610.html.

Mokhiber, Russell, and Robert Weissman. “The IMF’s Dirty Dozen.” Mother Jones, 6 Apr. 2000, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2000/04/imfs-dirty-dozen/.

Oxfam. “Over 80 per Cent of IMF Covid-19 Loans Will Push Austerity on Poor Countries – World.” ReliefWeb, 12 Oct. 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/over-80-cent-imf-covid-19-loans-will-push-austerity-poor-countries.

Pettinger, Tejvan. “Criticisms of WTO.” Economics Help, 10 Mar. 2020, https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/4/trade/criticisms-of-wto/.

Senate of Canada. “IMF INVOLVEMENT IN ASIA: AN INSTITUTION IN NEED OF MAJOR REFORM OR A STABILIZING FORCE?” Chapter 3 : IMF Involvement in Asia, Senate of Canada, https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/361/fore/rep/rep08dec98part3-e.htm.

Stevenson, Richard W. “Outspoken Chief Economist Leaving World Bank.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 25 Nov. 1999, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/25/business/outspoken-chief-economist-leaving-world-bank.html.

Stumm, Mario. “How Voice Reform Came about at the World Bank.” D+C Development and Cooperation, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 3 Apr. 2011, https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/how-voice-reform-came-about-world-bank.

Toussaint, Eric. “The World Bank and the Philippines.” CADTM, Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt, 22 Sept. 2020, https://www.cadtm.org/The-World-Bank-and-the-Philippines.

Valencia, Alexandra. “Ecuador Inks $4.2 Billion Financing Deal with IMF: Moreno.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 21 Feb. 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecuador-imf/ecuador-inks-4-2-billion-financing-deal-with-imf-moreno-idUSKCN1QA05Z.

Weisbrot, Mark. “The IMF Is Hurting Countries It Claims to Help.” The Guardian, The Guardian, 9 Sept. 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20220115211541/https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/aug/27/imf-economics-inequality-trump-ecuador.

Wikileaks. “US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare.” Wikileaks, 2019, https://file.wikileaks.cloud/file/us-fm3-05-130.pdf.

WikiLeaks. “What’s Happening with Venezuela? @Wikileaks’ Publication of US Coup Manual FM3-05.130, Unconventional Warfare [UW], Provides Insightdos=Department of Stateic=Intelligence CommunityUWOA=UW Operations AreaARSOF=US Army Special Operations FORCESHTTPS://T.CO/8q4oqfsmzy Pic.twitter.com/ez0tgqhesw.” Twitter, Twitter, 28 Jan. 2019, https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/1089985249034027009.

WorldBank. “IBRD 2010 Voting Power Realignment.” WorldBank, https://web.archive.org/web/20111229201102/http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/IBRD2010VotingPowerRealignmentFINAL.pdf.

Donate to The Yellow Jacket

$0

$500

Contributed

Our Goal

Your contribution will support the student journalists of Randolph-Macon College. Your contribution will allow us to purchase equipment and cover our annual website hosting costs. This donation on this site is not tax-deductible. If you would like to support the Yellow Jacket Newspaper at a higher level, please visit www.rmc.edu/givenow. We appreciate any support given to help us grow the student newspaper and uplift student voices!

About the Contributor

Spencer Vida, Opinions Editor

yjpaper.org · by Spencer Vida

20. When 'The Boys' Are Back In Town: A Special Ops Vet Explains Why Elite Units Train In US Cities

Yep. RUT.

Photos and video at the link: https://www.coffeeordie.com/boys-are-back-in-town

Not a big deal for those in the military. But it is a big deal for the civilians impacted whether we like it or not and not amount of downplaying it as routine and necessary training will satisfy some of the civilians who are affected.

When 'The Boys' Are Back In Town: A Special Ops Vet Explains Why Elite Units Train In US Cities

coffeeordie.com · by Joshua Skovlund · October 22, 2022

Throughout the late summer and early fall, news reports emerged from two US cities of clandestine special operations soldiers flying among skyscrapers and “raiding” local buildings.

In August, black helicopters dove amid the buildings in downtown San Antonio, Texas, as soldiers ran through parking lots wearing quad-tube night vision goggles.

In September, police in Phoenix warned the public that the city and nearby Peoria, Arizona, would be the scene of “air and ground operations” for “essential military training.”

Green Berets with 5th Special Forces Group land prior to overtaking a vehicle at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, on August 23, 2017. Army photo by Sergeant 1st Class Iman Broady-Chin.

Though the Army would not confirm what unit was involved, a soldier who spent two decades in the Army’s most secretive Special Missions Unit confirmed to Coffee or Die Magazine a suspicion widely reported in several media outlets — that the exercises were run by his former unit and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

But why would two of the Army’s premier counterterrorism and flying units need to train in American cities?

The former operator told Coffee or Die it’s all about the training. It grants a chance for elite soldiers to practice their skills in a real city in the US so they’ll be prepared to use those skills in cities elsewhere. It’s referred to as Realistic Urban Training, or RUT. But sometimes, this style of training alarms residents, leading to outlandish rumors about nefarious military operations.’

“It’s just the people that do bad things on their behalf to protect them, just running through the motions,” the soldier said. “It’s not like — no one’s coming for you. It’s not a bunch of fucking boogeymen out of Area 51. The boys are just doing some training.”

US Army's elite units conducting a night training exercise in downtown Los Angeles pic.twitter.com/7f8U7iGqTS

— Сеня Лютый (@WONDERWERK22) June 26, 2022

The training events in San Antonio in August and in Phoenix in September were not unprecedented or even terribly unusual for the two units involved. Similar exercises took place in Los Angeles in 2019 and 2020 and in Phoenix in 2015, among other times and places. Elvia Kelly, a US Army Special Operations Command spokesperson, said units training in “real world” locations like cities provide invaluable experience.

“Training off of a military installation allows an exceptional level of realism while enhancing training value. It is meant to enhance soldiers’ skills by operating in an unfamiliar and realistic environment,” Kelly said. “Training in unfamiliar environments provides Army special operations forces new and different training experiences that help ensure they remain at the highest state of readiness.”

When the two units were in San Antonio in August, social media was full of descriptions and witnesses of the exercises, as were local news reports. So far, no photos or videos have surfaced of the Phoenix training, though there was a warning from local police departments.

Video posted to Twitter of special operations units training in San Antonio.

pic.twitter.com/XwnXZpKFKb

— Travis (@GWOT5822) August 11, 2022

That’s a sign of success, according to the former operator who spoke to Coffee or Die. It means that the Phoenix exercises went off with a lower public profile, which is always a goal.

For several weeks following the end of the training, the SMU’s planners will scour local news and social media to see how big of an imprint was left on the public, in addition to reviewing the overall exercise. They will then apply the lessons learned to their next training event or deployment.

Every training exercise is different, and depending on the soldiers’ leadership, the lessons learned and takeaways will be different. The unit will drill skills such as hostage rescues, high-value target takedowns, and various other scenarios. Only those in the squad doing the exercise know the details of the training.

US army Delta Force & USAF 24th STS in San Antonio Texas. pic.twitter.com/NHTKBk41bo

— Mupper2 (@Mupper41) August 12, 2022

The squad leadership designs each training scenario to be extremely difficult so that, if they fail, they can learn from it. Failures in training help soldiers avoid the same mistakes on the battlefield, the NCO said.

“Let’s put the guys in the worst situation possible, knowing they might not get this done, but we can learn a whole lot from it,” the NCO said. “So the next five times we do it, if we do it for real, they will get it done.”

The training is well underway before the black helicopters and small-unit operators land in parking lots in the middle of the night. Troops surveil areas ahead of time and plan the direct-action raids, just as they would while deployed.

The units coordinate with local law enforcement and set up a perimeter to keep people away from active “raids.”

“Their job is to keep people out, to keep them safe, and then to keep the boys in and to keep them safe as well,” the soldier said.

During dynamic portions of the training where explosions take place or helicopters are landing, the NCO said there’s “absolutely no chance” someone could walk into the training area.

The secretive units’ exposure isn’t always controllable because the soldiers play it the way they would on a battlefield. As an example, the soldier said, he would rather take his squad through a lit alleyway than lead them through a dark ambush choke point — meaning civilians who happen to be nearby might see them.

And when things blow up on social media, conspiracy theories quickly follow. But the former operator said this wasn’t the first time the soldiers had been seen training in US cities and it wouldn’t be the last.

“It’s just motherfuckers doing a fucking training exercise,” the NCO said. “That’s literally all it is.”

coffeeordie.com · by Joshua Skovlund · October 22, 2022

21. Unclear Data Could Hinder Special Opps

Standardized terminology. After spending the last few weeks "discussing" terminology, specifically "irregular warfare," I think I long for the days of "low intensity conflict" (LIC) and "military operations other than war" (MOOTW).

Excerpt:

GAO recommended that leadership from USSOCOM and the Pentagon’s office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict develop and use standardized and consistent terminology. The agency also advised the command, its service components, and the DoD low-intensity conflict office to “establish a centralized data collection mechanism or process.”

​

Unclear Data Could Hinder Special Opps

fedweek.com · by kevin couch · October 20, 2022

Image: Terry Sze/Shutterstock.com

Special operations troops could be hindered by unclear data from their command and control structures, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Remediating this situation is more important than ever, GAO stated in a report published this month, because U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has both increased in strength and has assumed a larger role in addressing “the nation’s most complex and sensitive security challenges.”

While the Defense Department collects and distributes significant amounts of relevant data for special-operations missions, GAO said that the information does not use standard terminology. Nor is it “complete and readily available” for those who are deployed.

ADVERTISEMENT

The government’s top watchdog agency did credit USSOCOM for the way it addressed sizing needs, training and preparedness, and staffing, but added it is too early to tell how effective these changes have been.

Oversight of command and control (C2) structures, however, could be strengthened by incorporating more standard terminology, GAO said.

“There is not a consistent way to determine if the composition of SOF C2 structures across the enterprise and maintain accountability of personnel,” the report said. “Additionally, the decentralized data collected by the SOF C2 structures may not be maintained.”

GAO recommended that leadership from USSOCOM and the Pentagon’s office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict develop and use standardized and consistent terminology. The agency also advised the command, its service components, and the DoD low-intensity conflict office to “establish a centralized data collection mechanism or process.”

fedweek.com · by kevin couch · October 20, 2022

22. V-22 Osprey: The U.S. Military's Biggest Mistake?

​This article does not really answer the mail on the V-22 (at least for me).​ Is ending production a signal that it was a mistake and still dangerous?

V-22 Osprey: The U.S. Military's Biggest Mistake?

19fortyfive.com · by Harrison Kass · October 22, 2022

Of all the unique, advanced airframes in the US military’s expansive inventory, the V-22 Osprey may be the most easily identifiable. Using tilt-rotors – rotors that can pivot between about 90 degrees mid-flight – the V-22 is basically an amalgamation of a prop plane and a helicopter. Uniquely versatile, the V-22 can perform both vertical and conventional takeoff/landings. The result is a single airframe that combines the utility of a helicopter with the velocity and range of a turboprop.

In most circumstances, the V-22 takes off and lands in “helicopter mode,” with its nacelles positioned vertically and its rotors moving horizontally. Then, once the V-22 is airborne, having achieved flight like a helicopter would, the nacelles are pushed forward 90 degrees until they are positioned like a traditional prop aircraft (the nacelle reconfiguration takes about 12 seconds).

The V-22’s origins lie in one of modern America’s most haunting political and military embarrassments: Operation Eagle Claw.

In 1980, President Jimmy Carter greenlit Operation Eagle Claw to extract the US hostages being held captive at the US Embassy in Iran. Famously, the operation was aborted – because of helicopter malfunction. It wasn’t just one helicopter that malfunctioned – like in the raid to assassinate Osama bin Laden; during Eagle Claw, three of eight helicopters malfunctioned – indicating decisively that the US was operating with deficient technologies.

While only four helicopters were needed to complete Operation Eagle Claw, mission procedures held that the mission would be aborted if less than six helicopters were available. The mission procedures accommodated the failure of twenty-five percent of the mission’s fleet. Still, the buffer wasn’t enough. Three helicopters failed – for one reason or another – and the mission was aborted.

The scope of the failure was expansive. Not only were US hostages left in Iran, consigned to wait until 1981 for release, but the botched operation contributed to Jimmy Carter’s political ruin. During the 1980 campaign, Carter was hounded for the failure of Operation Eagle Claw; GOP nominee Ronald Reagan cited Eagle Claw as a primary source of evidence to demonstrate Carter’s general weakness and inability to lead. The message stuck and Carter was routed in the election. Carter, now an old man, well into his 90s, acknowledges that failing to send additional helicopters on Eagle Claw was one of the biggest mistakes of his presidency.

War planners regretted Eagle Claw, too. But lessons were learned. In the 1980s, the Department of Defense founded the JVX aircraft program. Essentially, the JVX program was meant to result in an aircraft that could have pulled Eagle Claw off.

Bell and Boeing teamed up to fulfill the new JVX program. Bell, a helicopter manufacturer, worked on the wing, nacelles, rotors, drive system, tail surfaces, and aft ramp. Boeing, who has some helicopter making credentials but is mostly known for their fixed-wing aircraft, took care of the fuselage, cockpit, avionics, and flight controls.

As you might imagine, designing the V-22 – a novel piece of technology – was not always a smooth process. Decades were spent finagling over the details and the funding and the responsibilities. One Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, spent years trying to kill the program – only to have it revived when the Clinton administration took office. Yet despite the turmoil, the V-22 program persisted, through the 80s and through the 90s – behind schedule but moving forward. As flight testing began other problems, mechanical rather than political, began to emerge.

A CV-22 Osprey assigned to Air Force Special Operations Command prepares to land during an aerial demonstration at Wittman Regional Airport, Wis., July 30, 2021. With the various Air Force Special Operations Command aircraft and personnel in attendance, AFSOC brings specialized airpower and competitive advantage to the future warfighting environment. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Miranda Mahoney)

The V-22 was dangerous to operate. And it was expensive to produce; after two decades of costly development, the V-22 finally went operational in the twenty-first century. More concerningly, the tilt rotor craft kept crashing. In 2000, a total of 23 US Marines were killed when two V-22s went down in separate incidents. Redesigns were incorporated but the reputation followed: The V-22 was an aircraft that pilots had to be especially careful in. The hassle and investment of designing the V-22 was probably not worth it; the Pentagon recently announced that V-22 production is coming to an end.

Harrison Kass is the Senior Defense Editor at 19FortyFive. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, he joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. He lives in Oregon and listens to Dokken. Follow him on Twitter @harrison_kass.

19fortyfive.com · by Harrison Kass · October 22, 2022

23.  Defecting Cuban pilot lands Soviet-era plane in the Everglades

The venerable AN-2 Colt. The pride of north Korean special operations forces too! A canvas skinned bi-plane useful for SOF infiltration.

Photos at the link. https://nypost.com/2022/10/22/defecting-cuban-pilot-lands-soviet-era-plane-in-florida/?utm_source=flipboard&utm_medium=syndicated&utm_campaign=partnerfeed

Maybe we should adopt the AN -2 instead of theV-22? How many AN-2s could we buy for one V-22? (note tongue in cheek)

Defecting Cuban pilot lands Soviet-era plane in the Everglades

New York Post · by Dana Kennedy · October 22, 2022

More On: cuba

Pompeo slams Biden’s ‘Armageddon’ comments on Russia nuke threat as ‘reckless’

Coast Guard finds 55 Cuban migrants off Fla. coast, sends them back

Furious Cubans protest in streets as Hurricane Ian blackouts continue

Cuba begins to turn on lights after Ian blacks out island

A 29-year-old Cuban pilot flew a Soviet-era biplane to freedom in Florida Friday — and promptly took a selfie when he landed.

Miami International Airport officials said the single-engine Antonov An-2 plane touched down at Dade-Collier Training and Transition Airport around 11:30 a.m., NBC 6 reported.

The pilot had radioed that he was running low on fuel before landing on the strip near Tamiami Trail in the middle of the Florida Everglades, according to 7 News Miami.

His first act on American soil was to take a selfie with the plane in the background.

Family members identified the pilot as Ruben Martinez, according to NBC 6.

Martinez said he’d flown from Sancti Spiritus, Cuba, officials said.

Friends told NBC 6 that he used the plane for work, mainly for crop dusting.

Martinez was taken in for questioning by Customs and Border Patrol officers.

Ruben Martinez previously used his old plane for crop dusting in Cuba.

Facebook/The Latin American Aviaters

Cubans have been leaving the island in droves in recent months, but most flee by boat. Many have been suffering as a result of food and medicine shortages and constant power outages, which persist following a serious blow from Hurricane Ian in late September.

Martinez’s mother told the station from Cuba that she didn’t know her son planned to leave the Communist-controlled island. Authorities came to her home when the news broke, but she wasn’t detained, she said.

“Those are decisions he made,” she said. “I do not agree with them. I am from this country, I am an old lady set in my ways, but the youth make their own decisions and follow their path.”

Ruben Martinez’s mother was completely unaware he defected from Cuba.

Ruben Martinez flew a single-engine Antonov An-2 plane to defect from Cuba.

Since the beginning of October, the Border Patrol has taken almost 500 people from Cuba into custody, most of whom arrived in the Florida Keys, sailing on homemade, unseaworthy boats. The U.S. Coast Guard said it has intercepted 748 Cuban migrants along the Florida Straits, the Miami Herald reported.

New York Post · by Dana Kennedy · October 22, 2022

24. Hu Jintao’s Exit Was Mysterious. Xi Jinping’s Power Play Is Not.

Excerpts:

The more important piece of information that has emerged from the congress has to do with personnel—the shuffling of party leaders into the elite decision-making bodies: the party’s Central Committee, Politburo, and Politburo Standing Committee. Here, the story is much clearer: Xi Jinping is stacking these bodies with loyalists. Today key leaders close to Hu—the Politburo Standing Committee members Li Keqiang and Wang Yang—were left off the party’s Central Committee, which means they are set to retire. As of this writing, all signs suggest the party leadership will be completely dominated by Xi, in a way it hasn’t been in the first 10 years of his rule.

Hu’s 10-year tenure has previously been described in the West as a “lost decade” for China, a period in which both and economic and political reform largely stalled. Many now look back at his tenure with some fondness, as a time when the Chinese government was more predictable, more capable of cooperation, and gentler with its own people. With Hu now firmly sidelined, Xi’s voice resonates louder still.

Hu Jintao’s Exit Was Mysterious. Xi Jinping’s Power Play Is Not.

The most surprising moment at the Communist Party Congress only reinforced its larger theme.

By Rory Truex

The Atlantic · by Rory Truex · October 23, 2022

Because the Chinese Communist Party is among the world’s most secretive political organizations, China watchers jump on any new piece of information that might imply something about the country’s direction. Today, we were given an unexpected detail. In the middle of today’s session of the 20th Communist Party Congress, former General Secretary Hu Jintao was abruptly escorted off stage. Hu initially appeared to resist being moved, and two men pulled him up rather gruffly. China’s current leader, Xi Jinping, was sitting next to him and did not look surprised. The two exchanged some brief words before Hu’s exit.

Social media were soon abuzz with rumors based on little more than the body language in the video. In China, the public can discern very little about how senior leaders interact with each other, where they stand on policies, and how the decisions that matter are actually made. Outside observers have no clue—and likely never will—what really happened to Hu in that moment.

Read: Behold, Emperor Xi

This dramatic, mysterious bit of theater only underscored the general theme of the congress—Xi’s ultimate consolidation of power. Hu’s feeble exit from stage is a sad symbol of the current trajectory of Chinese politics. Hu, and his allies and protégés, represent a more technocratic, moderate arm of the party—one decidedly less repressive, and more open to the outside world. Xi and his camp have been gaining momentum for a decade but at least had to share some power with Hu’s faction. This arrangement has been put to rest. In its place China has a single dominant leader, surrounded solely by people who enable him, not restrain him.

The most benign explanation for what happened to Hu today is the party’s current line: He was sick and needed to be helped offstage. The nature of his purported illness is unknown. Hu is now 79 years old, has been largely out of the public view for some time, and appears to have aged considerably. His movements are slow, and earlier in the congress he had apparently needed some help in walking. But something still seemed off today, because Hu seemed visibly upset and reluctant to leave. The other senior party leaders showed little concern for him and largely avoided eye contact—not quite what you would expect if your comrade had fallen ill.

A juicier interpretation is that Xi Jinping somehow orchestrated the incident to publicly embarrass his predecessor. The party congress is a highly scripted event, and even this awkward moment must have occurred with Xi’s approval. During the remainder of the congress, Xi will install loyalists at the top levels of the party and claim a third term as general secretary. These moves come at the expense of Hu’s network. Having Hu literally pulled away could be a way for Xi to signal his dominance and send a message to other elites and the public. This is something dictators do, after all. Still, as James Palmer of Foreign Policy noted earlier today, Hu Jintao poses little threat to Xi at this point, given his age and declining stature in the system.

Read: Xi Jinping’s Radical Secrecy

I have seen juicier interpretations still—such as that Hu was actively being purged at that very moment and would soon be charged with corruption and formally investigated by the party’s disciplinary apparatus. This would be dramatic indeed, but making such a gesture at the congress itself would be cruel and unnecessary. The party line about Hu being ill does not fit this narrative.

In the end, how you interpret that moment depends partly on how you interpret China’s political system. When outsiders analyze elite Chinese politics, we must be careful not to project our own biases or speak with more confidence than is warranted. Unfortunately, the speculation and rumormongering about Hu are a product of the secrecy of the party itself. This week is yet another reminder of the absurdity of the way China selects its rulers.

The more important piece of information that has emerged from the congress has to do with personnel—the shuffling of party leaders into the elite decision-making bodies: the party’s Central Committee, Politburo, and Politburo Standing Committee. Here, the story is much clearer: Xi Jinping is stacking these bodies with loyalists. Today key leaders close to Hu—the Politburo Standing Committee members Li Keqiang and Wang Yang—were left off the party’s Central Committee, which means they are set to retire. As of this writing, all signs suggest the party leadership will be completely dominated by Xi, in a way it hasn’t been in the first 10 years of his rule.

Hu’s 10-year tenure has previously been described in the West as a “lost decade” for China, a period in which both and economic and political reform largely stalled. Many now look back at his tenure with some fondness, as a time when the Chinese government was more predictable, more capable of cooperation, and gentler with its own people. With Hu now firmly sidelined, Xi’s voice resonates louder still.

The Atlantic · by Rory Truex · October 23, 2022

25.  How To Save the U.S. From A Second Civil War

​Chart of micro drivers and macro drivers at the link: https://time.com/6222633/second-civil-war-us-how-to-avoid/?utm_source=pocket_mylist​

How To Save the U.S. From A Second Civil War

BY PETER T. COLEMAN OCTOBER 20, 2022 10:40 AM EDTColeman is a professor of psychology and education at Columbia University. He is the founding partner of Starts With Us, a movement to overcome extreme cultural and political divisions in America, and his latest book is The Way Out: How to Overcome Toxic Polarization

TIME · by Peter T. Coleman

Early this summer, I emailed a neighbor of mine, whom we’ll call David, and asked him to go for a walk with me in the park. Although we had lived in the same building on the Upper West Side of Manhattan for more than a decade, we had previously only shared pleasantries with one another in the elevator. But this neighbor’s political views diametrically opposed my own. Given the dire, toxic, runaway path to civil war our nation is currently on, and as a professed conflict mediator, bipartisan bridge builder, and depolarization pundit, I felt it incumbent on me to reach out and try my best to walk my talk. My spouse also talked me into doing it.

I thought my decades of training as a conflict resolution scholar and mediator of difficult moral disputes prepared me for just such encounters. But I spent most of the hour before our date in distress in my bathroom.

When I greeted David in front of our building, he also appeared ill-at-ease. Nevertheless, we headed toward the park for a brief jaunt, anxiety in tow.

On our way, we chit-chatted about our families, and then I explained to him my reason for reaching out. I said that I was increasingly worried about the political divisions in our country and the growing odds of extreme political violence. I was doing my utmost to better understand different perspectives on the situation. He replied, “You mean, you don’t know any Republicans you can talk to.” When I hesitated, he added, “Any Republicans that like Trump, that is.”

“That’s about right,” I admitted.

Then he told me about his upbringing. He explained that he is a devout Orthodox Jew, born in Northeastern France to Talmudic nobility. His grandfather was a village physician and founder of a temple in the Alsace region. He was raised in the U.K., and holds deep conservative values emanating from his religious convictions and his success in global business.

I, then, offered a bit of my own background—a Catholic-born, Irish and French-Huguenot with Chicago, Democratic working-class roots, who, much to his astonishment, married a one-half Jew. David inquired whether my wife’s mother was Jewish and he exclaimed, “So, your children are Jewish!”

“They are,” I replied. This fact seemed to register.

Soon after, we turned to politics. I asked him if he would tell me how he came to support Trump. He said he’d be happy to.

My neighbor then told me his thoughts on the under appreciated accomplishments of Donald Trump, and of the relentless trials and tribulations he had suffered from the main-stream media and other Liberal hacks. He said he had great respect for Trump’s business acumen and executive approach to governing, and that Trump’s attitudes on cultural issues were very much aligned with the Orthodox conservatism of his particular branch of Judaism. As he spoke, David became increasingly animated and agitated, picking up the pace of our walk. He said he believed Obama had dangerously deteriorated America’s standing in the world, until Trump put a stop to it. He thought that George Soros was individually responsible for the extreme levels of violent crime and discrimination against minorities in our society.

I had tried to prepare for our walk. Anticipating an awkward and potentially volatile visit, I did a reflection exercise on my intentions for our time together, which prioritized the goals “listen openly and learn from him” and “avoid becoming too defensive and reactive.” I had also reviewed a chart on the critical differences between debate and dialogue, the latter being more a process of discovery than a win-lose game—a vital ingredient for initiating constructive political conversations today.

I listened during David’s speech. Occasionally, I would ask clarifying questions about points he made, or I would point out when we actually shared common concerns on issues such as gun control. But I also had to actively and repeatedly restrain myself from jumping in to counter points I viewed as misinformation or hyperbole. Instead, I found myself saying, “I see…” a lot.

Then, towards the end of our walk, something remarkable happened. David’s lecture, which had begun with an unadulterated celebration and defense of all things Donald Trump, somehow lost steam. He seemed to have ridden a tidal wave of his enthusiasm to a place where he had talked himself out.

Eventually, he concluded, “Should Trump run for president again in 2024? Probably not. With the stupid moves he made like going after a dead war hero Senator [John McCain] in Arizona and saying those ridiculous things to suburban women about COVID, he should probably just step back and make room for better GOP candidates to step up. Will he? I doubt it. But maybe he should.” About this time, I reminded David that he might want to get back and check in on his wife, to which he stated, “Well, we can go for a few more blocks.”

By the time we got back to our building, my anxiety seemed to have dissipated. I thanked David for his time and willingness to speak, and told him I had a parting gift for him. I had left a copy of a book I’d published recently on overcoming toxic polarization in our front lobby, and handed it to him, saying, “Now, you definitely do not have to read this book. But it explains why I reached out to you in the first place, and I’m glad I did.”

As we stepped into the elevator together, he glanced at the back cover of the book and then said, “Yes, I don’t know what we are going to do about all this polarization. It seems to get worse and worse. But when you feel so passionate about what’s going on, it’s hard to stop or know what to do.”

I said, “I think what we need to try to do is what you and I just did. Meet, as often as possible, with people who see the world differently from us, and just try to keep the conversation going.” He smiled and nodded as the door opened to his floor. I thanked him again, and that was that. For the moment.

OK, so what, right? Big deal. So, I took a walk in a park and talked politics with a neighbor for an hour. Is this what it will take to help our nation avert another civil war? To heal our furious, heavily-armed society?

No. Not a chance.

My walk in the park with David was a warm-up exercise—a slight adjustment, hopefully for us both. It was just one aspect of a month-long experiment that a small group of worried, well-intentioned Americans piloted together this past summer. I am a researcher who studies what it takes for deeply-divided societies like ours to change course for the better. A group of my former students and colleagues came together virtually over four weeks in July to try out a series of exercises and activities gleaned from this research, aimed at breaking out of our toxic patterns. This “Challenge” as we called it, was our attempt to answer David’s quandary about what to do to escape the allure of the vortex of our political passion and blame. We sought to workshop a series of actionable steps that similarly-concerned Americans might take up in their homes, workplaces, and communities to find a way to loosen the grip our current climate of contempt has on us.

Our cloudy, highly-attractive problem

The conversation over why, how, and how much we are polarized in America today is complicated and, of course, contested. However, recent statistics on our state of polarization tell a sobering tale. A national survey published in July 2022 found that one-in-five Americans believed that “in general,” political violence was at least sometimes justified. It also found 42.4% agreed with the statement that “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy” and that “in America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants.”

Perhaps most concerning, a survey published last fall found that 80% of Biden voters and 84% of Trump voters view elected officials from the other party as “presenting a clear and present danger to American Democracy.” It also reported that 41% of Biden voters and 52% of Trump voters favor red or blue states seceding from the Union to form their own separate country, with 30% Republicans and 11% of Democrats ready to resort to violence to save the country. That is approximately 20 million Americans ready to fight in a country with 400-plus million guns. And this data was collected before the overturning of Roe v. Wade and the recent FBI raid on Mar-a-Lago, both of which are currently being weaponized by political pundits.

In fact, this “season” has persisted for over half a century, with spikes in trends of various aspects of political polarization increasing for decades. The list includes surges in our citizens’ affective polarization (hating them and loving us), belief polarization (disagreements over perceptions of truth and fact), ideological consistency (collapse of attitudes across distinct policies into one tribal dimension), geographical and neighborhood segregation (physical sorting of red and blue voters into more homogenous communities), congressional legislative obstructionism (the demise of bipartisanship and functional problem solving in Washington D.C.), political hate speech including on social media, perceptual distortion (viewing them as more extreme than they objectively are), combined with decreases in the presence of cross-cutting structures in communities (found to mitigate civil wars) such as mixed-political families, schools, and playgrounds. These trends are culminating in a stark rise in political violence.

How did we get here? A host of scholars and pundits have weighed in. Most focus in on specific causes in an attempt to identify the main drivers of division within ourselves, within our groups, or within our societal structures—which I list in the table below.

Courtesy of Peter T. Coleman

Of course, they are all right to some extent. Studies have shown that all of these factors explain some small but not insignificant piece of the variance that contributes to the depth and persistence of our divisions. But none of them alone can account for the extraordinary 50-plus-year pattern of escalation in political intolerance we are experiencing.

What does account for this runaway calamity is most likely located in the space between these and other drivers. That is, in how they have come to combine together and feed off each other in complex ways to create dynamics—vicious cycles—that are both hard to understand and harder to change. This is similar to how the different elements of a hurricane—low air pressure, warm temperatures, moist ocean air, and tropical winds—can come together to form a powerfully destructive dynamic. Of course, some of the drivers of our divisions are more influential than others, and there are also a variety of bad actors intentionally pulling on some of these levers to make matters worse for us (better for themselves). But, again, they are only part of the problem in a dynamic like this.

What makes matters worse is that across some threshold, this constellation of forces can take on a life of their own. This happens through a process called self-organization when some form of overall order arises from local interactions of parts of the system, which can result in what are known as attractor dynamics. These are essentially strong coherent patterns—of thinking, feeling, acting, and organizing our lives—that draw us in repeatedly and resist change. Attractor patterns are increasingly evident today in Americans’ attitude clustering in partisan terms on a disparate set of 10 distinct policy issues. We are physically relocating and clustering into partisan groups, and we do (and don’t) speak to one another about moral issues in our social networks, mostly within partisan groups.

In America today, our sense of the complex bio-psycho-social-structural factors that are pitting half the country against the other half is really quite simple—it’s us versus them.

Finding a way out

The bad news is that there are no quick, magic-bullet fixes for addressing them. Altering their course often requires a qualitatively different theory of change and a distinct set of skills, including the ability to take a longer-term approach, enact multiple change initiatives simultaneously, track and read feedback, and ultimately get comfortable with failing, learning, and adapting. And a bit of luck. This is essentially how the FDR Administration sought to change the trajectory of the Great Depression in 1933—by shepherding the passage of New Deal banking reform laws, emergency relief programs, work relief programs, and agricultural programs, before moving on to later initiate the multiple programs of the Second New Deal.

However, another bit of bad news is that our government and politicians sit at the epicenter of the problems of political enmity, and institutional and electoral distrust—and in fact are often incentivized to act in ways that exacerbate our divisions—so they are constrained in their ability to address the issues directly.

The good news is that we can. As witnessed most recently with the #BlackLivesMatter and #MeToo social movements, and the Civil Rights, Equal Rights, Gay Rights, and Anti-war movements before them, American citizens come together and mobilize for causes that we feel deeply concerned about. When we do so, legislators and business interests often follow. Might stemming the flow of political violence and authoritarianism in our nation and preventing the collapse of our democracy through a second bloody U.S. Civil War be just such a cause?

If so, there is more good news. Three conditions significantly increase the odds of societies like ours pivoting in a healthier direction: First, when major societal shocks—like COVID-19—destabilize us to the degree that we begin to reconsider some of our most basic decision-making assumptions. Second, when enough of us are sufficiently miserable and fed up with the status quo, a state of affairs clearly evident in recent polling. And third, a clear sense of a way out—an alternative way forward that is not too costly and attractive enough to most of us. This, we are finding, is the rub.

Fortunately, today there are thousands of groups and organizations across the U.S. that are working tirelessly to provide a sense of a way out. The majority of these are local, community-based bridge-building groups seeking to bring red and blue Americans together across their differences to talk respectfully.

Read More: 5 Way to Fix America Today

Unfortunately, several key conditions are often missing in the design of most political bridge-building encounters today, including the need for “equal-status contact” between participants—something extremely hard to do in a nation with such profound wealth, income, and educational disparities. It’s an even harder condition to provide in a nation where so many of our leaders, friends, and community members disparage contact with them, so participants often risk being ostracized by their own.

Another significant challenge to political bridge-building today is the lopsided (blue) type of participation they attract. As April Lawson, a bridge builder herself, points out in an essay in Comment magazine last Jan., “Blues assume that if Reds could just be taught what is true, they would be enlightened into Blueness… Reds…smell this train and dislike the tracks.” As David Blankenhorn, one of the founders of the group Braver Angels suggested to me, even the basic terminology used by these groups such as, “dialogue,” “empathy,” and even “bridge building” are early-warning signs for many on the right. As a result, many of these programs face a steep challenge in recruiting this half of our citizenry.

But, perhaps the most significant short-coming of many of these depolarization initiatives is that they are often “one-offs” or short-term encounters. This is where the exposure effect—the more the better—comes in. Take my walk, for example. It’s absurd to think that my stroll in the park with David, by itself, will change anything meaningfully. Time and repetition with these experiences are key. In fact, related research on the effects of cross-cutting structures—local places like playgrounds, schools, sports fields, workplaces, and places of worship that bring people together in contact across their group differences in an ongoing manner—show more robust effects of reducing intergroup intolerance and violence. Similarly, having good friendships across group differences has also been found to have positive effects on intergroup attitudes. Unfortunately, the spaces that provide opportunities for ongoing cross-partisan contact and relationship building seem to be in decline in American communities, both a cause and consequence of our divisions.

The Challenge

In response to the limitations of many current approaches to depolarization, we began to design and test an alternative approach, which recognizes the importance of time and diversity of interventions for sustained behavioral and cultural change. It is grounded in an evidence base that offers us five distinct levers for promoting change with complex problems:

• Stop to Reset: Destabilizing times like ours can be fertile ground for changing our more entrenched patterns—but only if we take advantage of them by committing to a significant reset. That is, by pausing sufficiently to be reflective and intentional about the next path we choose.
• Spot Positive Deviance: When we find ourselves trapped in the riptide dynamics of a deeply polarized community, it is best to figure out how to work with what is already working in the situation to find a way out. Rather than trying to fix the problem with some new idea or program, first find the bright spots—the people or programs that are already working effectively to mend the divide.
• Complicate to Simplify: When humans face challenging conflicts, we often tend to prematurely simplify them and close ranks into us versus them. However, there is much that we can do to become less susceptible to the seduction of certainty, oversimplification, and vilification of those on the other side. It involves intentionally complicating life by developing new habits of thinking, feeling, acting, and living that allow us to tolerate and learn from contradiction, nuance, and opposition.
• Move to Synchronize: When agonizing conflicts leave us feeling trapped and confined in an us-versus-them world, consider movement as a salve. Neuroscience research has found that physical movement can help us break free of engrained patterns of thinking, feeling, and reacting. And moving together—side-by-side and ideally outside—has shown great promise for connecting disputants and helping to synchronize them in ways that promote empathy, rapport, and flexibility.
• Adapt to Setbacks: The way out of our political quagmire will inevitably include pitfalls and failures. The key here is to expect and learn from setbacks by taking a long view towards a North-Star goal and proceeding in ways informed by sound research on effective decision-making in complex environments.

The first iteration of the Challenge was designed around a sequence of activities based on the above principles, which shift the focus each week from your role in the divisions, to your politically-challenged relationships, to your political in-group, to political issues at the community or national levels. It asked participants to commit to spending at least 15 minutes a day—options varied from low to moderate to high effort—for five days a week over a month to do this work, in order to kickstart the much longer journey toward new habit and norm formation and group mobilization. Think of the Challenge as an initial boot camp for participation in our besieged democracy. It included a “Community Dashboard,” which allowed the participants to share their experiences of the activities with others in the pilot, as well as weekly zoom sessions to debrief their involvement.

The upshot: Did it work?

I learned a great deal from this experiment. I learned that despite my considerable training and experience as a conflict-resolution professional, and my genuine desire to lower the odds of political violence, I am a much bigger part of the problem than I imagined. I discovered that I have more extreme progressive views on most political issues than I thought, feel a lot more negative about Republicans and alienated from Democrats than I wish I did, hold significant misperceptions about where Republicans actually stand on issues (between 15-30% gap depending on the issue), and, in turn, have very few (or no) real relationships with Republicans. Oh, and I am much less courageous about confronting members of my own tribe when they misstep or break the rules. This was the story the assessments told me, and I already knew what they were measuring when I completed them! Ouch.

It also turned out that most of the cohort had similarly surprising self-revelations. One member shared how attempting to listen to the radical opinions of her step-daughter resulted in her screaming to herself in her own head and completely derailing her ability to listen.

Another said, “My initial thought was that I would be irritated as it is an individual that typically gets on my nerves. Instead, I discovered we have so much in common. Many of the same fears. Unfortunately, too many of the same wounds and scars. Some of the same hopes and dreams.”

Despite—or perhaps because of—these uncomfortable moments of self-discovery, the overall experience was promising. On our final zoom call, one participant concluded, “I just want to say the whole arc of this experience of having to prioritize thinking maybe a little bit on a higher plain, thinking about how to connect better with people, and definitely, the biggest take-away for me was learning about myself.”

I also learned about the kinds of support we, Americans, will need to escape our mass addiction to outrage. The community aspect of the pilot experiment was a game changer. The activities the group participated in together—the Community Dashboard confessions, weekly zoom dialogues, joint-creation of a Spotify playlist of songs that characterized the Challenge, and so on felt resonant and reparative.

The flexible, “accountability-lite,” format of the Challenge worked well. I encouraged the group early on to share their difficulties, missteps, and disasters with us, establishing a learning orientation within the group—one that leans into and benefits from failure. This opened us up. I also found that some of the most popular activities were invented by participants themselves who “went rogue” and devised their own. The grounding of the scientific principles seemed to provide a platform on which they could innovate and thrive—a gold mine.

I saw how burdensome it can be for Americans today to find the time to complete even brief activities every day, which highlighted the need for some type of “subtraction” for the Challenge, a clear sense of what we could stop doing each day to make time for the activities. Fortunately, one of the activities, “Stop the World and Get Off! Unplug from your devices for a day,” offered a possible solution. One participant reflected that doing so not only afforded her time for the exercises, but it allowed her to be fully present for the day.

I also found that toxic polarization, although increasingly worrisome, is akin to problems like climate change—more distal nightmares that, lacking immediacy, can be easy to put out of our minds. One implication for version 2.0 of the Challenge would be to encourage participants to begin with an inventory of specifically how political polarization is currently damaging their life and relationships, their role in it, and perhaps partners they may wish to reach out to.

I was somewhat surprised to discover that, for many, the pilot was emotionally taxing. One said, “It doesn’t help to take another’s POV when inside I’m screaming at myself [for doing so].” Another commented, “I almost had an existential crisis. I realized that I’m almost too agreeable and depolarized.” This highlighted the vital importance of support to this work. To invite people into this experience comes with a responsibility that must be warranted.

Walking the walk

The summer of 2022 began with the leaked SCOTUS memo on the abortion rights case in May, the formal decision to overturn Roe v. Wade in June, the continuation of the Congressional hearings on the Jan. 6 Capitol insurgency in July, the FBI raid on Donald Trump’s residence at Mar-a-Lago in August, and the seemingly never-ending sagas surrounding new COVID variants and deaths, extreme weather events, and Russia’s now six-month war in Ukraine. These and countless other events provided ample fuel for political weaponization by the news media, social media zealots, and foreign trolls, all while we voted in our contested primaries and consumed the latest propaganda ahead of the midterms. It has been grueling.

At this same time, our small group began work to prepare the ground for opening up more spaces to have these hard conversations. For four weeks, we scrutinized ourselves, reached out our hands to wary others, found the courage to challenge our own groups to be better, and joined local and national chapters of organizations working to hold our democracy together. We struggled, complained, laughed, walked, danced, discovered, were moved, and began to feel a renewed sense of promise. We also came to know that our time together was only one small step on a long road. There will be no quick fixes to the dark storms surrounding us. But today there is more hope and clarity about how to get started.

About a week after my walk with my neighbor, my 25-year-old son, Adlai, got on the elevator in our building with him. My son claims that David had never before spoken to him or acknowledged him in all the years we have lived in the building together. But on this day, David took Adlai in and addressed him. He said, “Please tell your father that I’m reading his book. I’m already several chapters into it. Tell him I’m quite impressed.” My son was flabbergasted.

David and I have now made plans for another walk early this fall.

More Must-Read Stories From TIME

• Everything You Need to Know About Voting in the 2022 Midterm Elections
• How Liz Truss's Successor Will Be Chosen
• Behind TikTok’s Boom: A Legion of Traumatized, $10-A-Day Content Moderators
• Inside a Groundbreaking Anthology That Sheds Light on 18 Queer Arab Voices
• What I’ve Learned From a Life Filled With Hurricanes
• All Your Questions About Applying for Student Loan Forgiveness Answered
• Column: Our Third COVID Winter Is Coming. America Isn't Ready.

Contact us at letters@time.com.

TIME Ideas hosts the world's leading voices, providing commentary on events in news, society, and culture. We welcome outside contributions. Opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of TIME editors.

TIME · by Peter T. Coleman

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com