Quotes of the Day:

"The argument from Intimidation is a confession of intellectual impotence." 

– Ayn Rand

"Everything that irritates us about others can lead us to an understanding of ourselves." 

– Carl Jung

"The most powerful weapon on earth is the human soul on fire." 

– Ferdinand Foch

1. Price-Tagging the Alliance: Seoul’s APEC Stress Test

2. Two states versus unification: Issue continues to divide in the South

3. U.S., South Korea work to address visa issues after Georgia raid

4. Sohae Satellite Launching Station: Signs of Engine Testing

5. North Korea claims it successfully test launched new ‘hypersonic’ missiles

6. North Korea’s cyber army funds nuclear arms with $2.8B in stolen crypto: MSMT

7. ROK launches 3600-ton submarine with more missiles for countering North Korea

8. Lee welcomes Trump's role as 'peacemaker,' brushes aside U.S. trade concerns: CNN

9. U.S. recognizes S. Korea's need for revision in nuclear energy pact: FM Cho

10. Lee vows all-out response to transnational crimes involving scams, drugs, gambling

11. Air Force chief says raid on Osan Air Base had 'no procedural issues'

12. Editorial: Don't Politicize Security and Sovereignty

13. Desperate North Koreans sell blood for food as hunger crisis deepens

14. North Korea touts diplomatic wins with Russia, but citizens see no improvement in daily life

15. North Korean forest rangers fired for using tree nurseries as personal vegetable gardens

16. Presidential office relocation blamed for police failures in Itaewon crowd crush

17. Lee says he trusts US 'rationality' amid final push for tariff deal

18. From safety to strategic resilience: Korea's next national advantage

1. Price-Tagging the Alliance: Seoul’s APEC Stress Test

​Excerpts:

As APEC approaches, Seoul’s test is structural—an examination of how much agency and autonomy a middle power can retain amid great-power compression. The convergence of US transactionalism, Chinese economic coercion, North Korea’s bloc choreography, and now swirling rumors of a possible Trump–Kim meeting exposes the limits of middle-power flexibility in a period defined more by leverage than traditional partnership-style relations—raising the risk that Seoul loses control of the summit narrative before it even begins.

Seoul’s traditional great-power playbook of quiet coordination and behind-the-scenes policy sequencing now competes with a self-interested marketplace of demands, where economic diplomacy must adjust at the speed of breaking headlines. Managing the tariff impasse will require more than technical compromise; it will demand a strategic recalibration that links economic resilience to alliance sustainability. The same transactional world that constrains Seoul also rewards clarity—defining not only what South Korea can contribute, but what it must preserve.

As the Gyeongju summit opens, Seoul’s ultimate success will not be measured by the number of photo ops or joint statements, but by its capacity to transform reactive balancing into purposeful strategy. South Korea must demonstrate that it can move beyond adaptive responses toward a more deliberate form of strategic agency—signaling that even amid great-power compression, it retains the initiative to define its own course.

Price-Tagging the Alliance: Seoul’s APEC Stress Test

• By: George Hutchinson
• October 22, 2025

https://www.38north.org/2025/10/price-tagging-the-alliance-seouls-apec-stress-test/

(Source: “Woljeonggyo Bridge, Gyeongju, South Korea, Republic of Korea, ROK, Daehan Minguk” by bryan…, CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)

As South Korea prepares to host the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit from October 31 to November 1 in the historic city of Gyeongju, it finds itself caught in the middle of escalating US–China trade tensions and intensifying pressure from its US ally—managing not only the choreography of a forum representing 60 percent of global GDP, but the crosscurrents of great power rivalry shaping its agenda. The 25 percent reciprocal tariff on South Korean exports under President Trump’s “Liberation Day” executive order has evolved into a far more complex negotiation linking tariff relief to a $350 billion up-front industrial investment. Washington’s insistence thus far on up-front capital flows as the price of tariff reduction has been strained by the eye-wincing aftermath of a US ICE raid on the Georgia-based Hyundai Metaplant, opening an additional can of policy complications now entering the picture and shaping the alliance dynamic.

At the same time, Beijing’s rare earth export curbs and port-fee retaliation have added new pressure, forcing Seoul to adjust its diplomatic posture amid intensifying great-power trade tensions. The on-again, off-again prospect of a Trump–Xi meeting over disputed trade issues has created a moving target for APEC preparation, forcing Seoul to maintain planning equilibrium while managing summit optics and diplomacy. At the same time, recent engagement among Pyongyang, Beijing, and Moscow—culminating in events surrounding the 80th Workers’ Party anniversary—has projected an image of bloc confidence just as Seoul’s diplomatic circuitry shows signs of overload. Together, these pressures have turned APEC from a multilateral platform for regional economic coordination into a stress test of South Korea’s middle-power agency. To avoid being trapped by US–China great-power compression as its maneuvering space narrows, Seoul will need to move beyond adaptive responses and reinforce its autonomy by establishing clearer economic red lines.

Economic Transactionalism—Tariffs, Visas, and Price

What began for Seoul as a 25 percent tariff under President Trump’s “Liberation Day” executive order last April has evolved into a process of attaching a price tag to the US-ROK alliance. Weeks of negotiation ensued, culminating in Washington framing the deal as a $350 billion up-front investment in exchange for resetting the tariff to 15 percent, a proposal Seoul interpreted as politically unworkable and fiscally destabilizing. When Seoul countered with phased payments, dollar swap safeguards, and foreign exchange reforms, Washington acknowledged the proposals but showed little sign of easing its preference for a full up-front commitment.

To salvage tariff negotiations and avert a diplomatic breakdown before the APEC summit, the Lee administration sent a “Hail Mary” mission comprised of senior trade and policy officials to meet with US counterparts during the October 13-18 International Monetary Fund-World Bank week in Washington. According to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, a resolution is expected within “the next 10 days.” Yet, this flicker of light at the end of the tariff tunnel dims against the backdrop of recent US policy interventions. The ICE raid on Hyundai’s Georgia Metaplant underscored how competing domestic US considerations can collide with broader trade negotiations. In the same week that more than 300 South Korean engineers and technicians were detained, Washington signaled that the 25 percent tariff could remain in place indefinitely absent sufficient concessions from Seoul.

The shift is unmistakable—the alliance’s economic dimension, long sustained by mutual interdependence and strategic alignment despite periodic friction, is now being reshaped by transactional leverage and dollar-based diplomacy. Seoul is quickly adapting to the reality that cooperation is no longer framed by stable continuity and balanced interest but by bargaining position and leverage—creating an imbalance where Washington’s asks get bigger and Seoul’s ability to maneuver shrinks. As APEC approaches, that imbalance is tested by a transactional approach that puts pressure on a US–ROK alliance that is increasingly viewed through a lens of immediate utility.

Middle-Power Compression

The US-ROK alliance notwithstanding, US–China bilateral dynamics are placing Seoul in the middle of a great-power squeeze, rather than at the center of multilateral coordination as APEC nears. Any plans for a tightly scripted summit calendar have turned fluid as President Trump’s wavering plans to meet—or not meet—China’s Xi Jinping inject uncertainty into the agenda. Although he is not expected to attend the leaders’ summit, Trump is expected to meet with President Lee and possibly Xi Jinping. Each adjustment to Trump’s schedule—and each new rumor of a Xi–Trump encounter—reshapes expectations for outcomes, forcing Seoul to manage optics and messaging on shifting terrain. The result is choreographic triage rather than orchestrated control, as South Korea works to sustain diplomatic balance while the two largest economies treat the summit as another venue for leverage and signaling. In this environment, transactional behavior, not multilateral consensus, sets the tempo, and Seoul’s role has shifted from empowered host to pressured intermediary.

Tension deepened as Beijing announced rare earth export curbs on October 9, a move widely seen as a negotiating tactic in its trade dispute with Washington. Within twenty-four hours, the US responded with a threat to impose 100 percent tariffs on all Chinese imports beginning in November. China then countered on October 10 by imposing reciprocal port fees on US shipping, which, along with Washington’s earlier fee hikes effective October 14, left Seoul facing cascading economic risks on both fronts. What has traditionally been a venue for multilateral coordination was instead becoming a live demonstration of how a regional middle power must absorb the stray voltage of tariff brinkmanship.

As APEC nears, the convergence of these dynamics has turned the summit into a live stress test of Seoul’s diplomatic circuitry with each surge in US–China tension triggering reactive adjustments calibrated to keep planning on track while avoiding the appearance of taking sides. To keep APEC from shorting out entirely, Seoul mounted its own form of great power surge protection—dispatching the “Hail Mary” tariff mission composed of Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol, Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo, presidential chief of staff for policy Kim Yong-beom, and Minister of Industry and Trade Kim Jung-kwan to Washington for what officials describe as an “all-out” drive to finalize terms of the $350 billion investment and tariff-relief framework, while simultaneously opening discussions with Beijing to manage fallout from China’s sanctions on Hanwha Ocean’s US-linked subsidiaries.

Bloc Choreography—Pyongyang Exploits the Optics

The 80th anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea—attended by senior envoys from China, Russia, Vietnam, and Laos—was a carefully staged display of bloc solidarity that signaled the failure of years of targeted sanctions and the end of North Korea’s diplomatic isolation—a dismaying spectacle for the democracies committed to the rules-based order. The pageantry was deliberate, blending imagery of unity and defiance to reinforce the perception of a regime securely anchored within the China–Russia alignment and shielded by its patrons from Western pressure.

By staging an event that visually affirmed its integration into alignment with Beijing and Moscow, Pyongyang was able to spotlight contrast with the asphyxiating squeeze Seoul is currently experiencing—caught between an unpredictable Washington and an increasingly assertive Beijing. The dialogue and choreographed imagery coming out of the 80th anniversary events serve as a counter-narrative to the transactional uncertainty surrounding South Korea’s diplomacy—an ironic reversal, given that before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Beijing and Moscow were enforcing UN nuclear sanctions on Pyongyang in alignment with Washington—leaving order and alignment on one side of the Peninsula; strain and discombobulation on the other.

This misalignment was mirrored in recent remarks on mutual security from Washington and Seoul. During a US Senate confirmation hearing, a nominee for a senior defense post alluded to South Korea’s potential role in a China-related contingency—comments that contrasted with Seoul’s defense minister, who emphasized that South Korea’s military focus remains on North Korea. The exchange underscored how Seoul’s caution toward Beijing sits uneasily beside Washington’s widening Indo-Pacific expectations, revealing the narrow margin within which the alliance now operates.

As Seoul navigates these external pressures, its ability to project steadiness has been tested at home as well. After the NIRS data-center fire, which severely disrupted government operations and erased 858 terabytes of critical data, recovery operations have been launched but system recovery is slow. At the current pace, it is unlikely that all networks will be fully restored by the time APEC convenes, leaving the government still managing the digital fallout as it prepares to showcase its tech innovation and competence on a global stage.

Strategic Outlook—Seoul’s Tightrope Ahead

As APEC approaches, Seoul’s test is structural—an examination of how much agency and autonomy a middle power can retain amid great-power compression. The convergence of US transactionalism, Chinese economic coercion, North Korea’s bloc choreography, and now swirling rumors of a possible Trump–Kim meeting exposes the limits of middle-power flexibility in a period defined more by leverage than traditional partnership-style relations—raising the risk that Seoul loses control of the summit narrative before it even begins.

Seoul’s traditional great-power playbook of quiet coordination and behind-the-scenes policy sequencing now competes with a self-interested marketplace of demands, where economic diplomacy must adjust at the speed of breaking headlines. Managing the tariff impasse will require more than technical compromise; it will demand a strategic recalibration that links economic resilience to alliance sustainability. The same transactional world that constrains Seoul also rewards clarity—defining not only what South Korea can contribute, but what it must preserve.

As the Gyeongju summit opens, Seoul’s ultimate success will not be measured by the number of photo ops or joint statements, but by its capacity to transform reactive balancing into purposeful strategy. South Korea must demonstrate that it can move beyond adaptive responses toward a more deliberate form of strategic agency—signaling that even amid great-power compression, it retains the initiative to define its own course.

2. Two states versus unification: Issue continues to divide in the South

​Accepting the two state concept means abandoning the 26 million Koreans in the north to a life of suffering, torture, and certain death.

Coexistence is not peace. It is the normalization of evil.

World News Oct. 21, 2025 / 9:37 AM

Two states versus unification: Issue continues to divide in the South

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/10/21/perspective-two-states-unification-korea/9571760989785/

By Do-hak Hur

upi.com

SEOUL, Oct. 21 (UPI) -- Has the word unification ever been this frozen? There was a time when politicians, citizens and students spoke it without hesitation. Today, however, unification has become an uncomfortable word.

The North proclaims itself to be a complete and sovereign state, while the South, in response, speaks of a "de facto two-state" reality. The Korean Peninsula remains divided, but in the realm of language, a deeper fracture has already set in -- the hardening of a divided spirit.

At this frozen linguistic frontier, two men stand face to face. One declared that unification is unnecessary; the other cried out that without unification there can be no peace. They are Unification Minister Chung Dong-young and Hyun Jin Preston Moon.

The two-state debate: Chung's conviction

On Aug. 14, at Seoul's Lotte Hotel, a civic organization hosted a banquet commemorating the eve of National Liberation Day. In his congratulatory address, Chung spoke boldly of what he called the "irrelevance of unification."

He argued that the South and North should recognize each other's systems and refrain from interference in domestic affairs -- remarks that effectively echoed North Korea's "two-state theory."

Yet, South Korea's Constitution is unequivocal. Article 3 states: "The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands." Chung's words directly contradicted that constitutional spirit -- normalizing division and portraying unification as an anachronism.

From a sitting unification minister, such remarks are not a mere opinion; they verge on a violation of constitutional principle.

What is more serious is that this was not an isolated slip, but the continuation of Chung's consistent political conviction. He has repeatedly spoken of the "co-existence of two states" as a realistic premise.

Outwardly, he emphasizes the need for a "peace regime," yet beneath that rhetoric lies not a philosophy of unification, but a logic of management. In his vocabulary, "peace" is merely a technique for easing tension, not a vision for knitting the nation into one. His language hints at an intent to codify division -- to accept separation at a technical level and fix it as the framework of reality.

In a recent parliamentary audit, he went further, effectively adopting North Korea's two-state theory as a practical basis and even stating that "this will soon become the official position of the Lee Jae Myung administration."

If this course becomes the ruling party's line, scholars and citizens who speak of unification could be branded as anti-government forces. The word "unification" itself would vanish from public discourse, leaving politics awash in the sterile language of "status quo" and "mutual respect of systems."

Hyun Jin Preston Moon and the Korean Dream: the philosophy of unification

The host of that very banquet in the grand convention hall of the Lotte Hotel was none other than Action for Korea United, a civic movement led by Hyun Jin Preston Moon, international chairman of the Global Peace Foundation.

That night, Moon and Chung stood on the same stage as host and guest, presenting a vivid contrast in the language of unification.

Year after year, Moon has invested significant resources to organize the Aug. 15 commemorations, inviting former and current heads of state and global activists to place Korean unification at the heart of a worldwide citizens' movement.

This year was no exception. Former presidents of Guatemala and Ecuador, along with prime ministers, cabinet ministers and international NGO leaders traveled to Seoul at his invitation.

That evening, Moon delivered an address that felt less like a speech than a declaration -- a rallying call that filled the hall with energy. With charisma reminiscent of a Hollywood star, he captivated the audience, speaking in a language utterly opposite to Chung's. "There is no peace without unification," he declared. "The Korean Dream is the gateway to world peace."

For Moon, unification is not an outpouring of ethnic sentiment, but a moral undertaking for humanity. His Korean Dream reinterprets the peninsula's division as a new starting point for a global order of peace extending far beyond Korea's borders.

He emphasizes that even within the North, civic consciousness and voluntary participation must mature -- that the goal is not merely the construction of a "peace regime," but ultimately a unification founded on freedom and human rights. At the core of Moon's thought lies the idea of a free unification -- an unwavering philosophy of unification for the cause of freedom.

When his speech concluded, more than 1,000 attendees rose to their feet in applause. A shared conviction spread through the hall: "The Korean Dream is the key to opening the gate of world peace." From that stage, his language had already transcended Korea, expanding into a platform for the human community.

Contrast and conclusion: cynicism and conviction

Chung's "two-state theory" is a doctrine of system preservation that seeks to perpetuate division, while Moon's "Korean Dream" is a vital idealism that strives to transcend it.

If Chung seeks to render unification a language of irrelevance, Moon is reviving it as a language of necessity. One is the politics of cynicism; the other, the politics of conviction.

Chung invokes the "mutual recognition of systems" as a banner of political realism, yet his logic inevitably turns unification into an impossible dream. The moment the two Koreas recognize each other's statehood, the constitutional clause defining the Republic's territory becomes a dead letter, and unification ceases to be a goal -- it becomes a choice. That, in essence, is an act of hollowing out the very identity of the Republic of Korea.

In contrast, Moon's "Korean Dream" elevates unification from a national ideal to a mission for humanity. For him, unification is not confined to the reunion of a people; it is a path of spiritual integration -- healing the divisions within humanity and transcending the walls of ideology and hatred.

His language is not that of politics, but of civilizational ethics, animated by a moral vision to make unification the cornerstone of world peace.

Today, Korea's discourse on unification stands at a crossroads. If the "unification-is-unnecessary" view represented by Chung is institutionalized as policy under the Lee Jae Myung administration, the nation's will for unity will wither. But if Moon's Korean Dream spreads through the solidarity of civil society and global citizen movements, the flame of unification will burn again.

The revival of language, the name of the future

History remembers not those who sought to erase unification, but those who strove to revive it. The colder the age of cynicism and resignation becomes, the more clearly the language of unification must be spoken. Moon's Korean Dream is precisely that revival -- a word of hope reconnecting a divided world.

Unification is not a relic of the past. It remains, even now, the name of a future our generation cannot afford to abandon -- an enduring expression of the human will for freedom and peace.

Do-hak Hur has served as political editor and editorial writer at the Seoul Bureau of the Gyeongnam Shinmun newspaper. He has also worked as a lecturer at Dongguk University's Graduate School of Education and as a writer for KBS Educational Broadcasting. He currently heads the GH Institute for Humanities and Politics. His major works include Theory of Unification Culture Education and Laozi's Concept of Unification.

upi.com

3. U.S., South Korea work to address visa issues after Georgia raid

​We must get this right. Koreans are not sneaking into our country trying to illegally immigrate. They are actually supporting America with Korean investment (as the country with the largest foreign direct investment in the US) and these workers are necessary to support those investments because there is not (yet) a qualified American workforce to do the necessary jobs. In fact the ICE raid debacle in Georgia is turning young people in Korea away from America. They not think that America is not only unwelcoming but dangerous to Koreans. The strategic effects of the ICE raid debacle in Georgia could be significant for the alliance and for the U.S.

U.S. News Oct. 22, 2025 / 2:44 PM / Updated Oct. 22, 2025 at 2:57 PM

U.S., South Korea work to address visa issues after Georgia raid

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2025/10/22/us-south-korea-visa-summit/5531761156623/

By Mike Heuer

1 of 3 | U.S. and South Korean officials met virtually on Tuesday to discuss ways to prevent further events like the immigration raid at the Hyundai Motor Group's electric vehicle plant in Ellabell, Ga., on September 4. File Photo by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement | License Photo

Oct. 22 (UPI) -- Leaders of the U.S.-Republic of Korea Business Travel and Visa Working Group met virtually on Tuesday to discuss ways to ensure continued investment in the United States.

The key meeting comes after hundreds of Koreans were detained at a Georgia Hyundai factory during a U.S. immigration raid in September. That incident was viewed by many Koreans as culturally embarrassing and one that could threaten future South Korean investments in the United States.

The Trump administration favors enabling South Korean firms to invest in the United States to spur domestic manufacturing and provide jobs for American workers, according to a State Department news release.

"The United States strongly supports investment that drives American re-industrialization, strengthens the U.S.-ROK alliance and enhances our shared prosperity," the State Department's office of the spokesperson said on Wednesday.

Related

• South Korea's CJ ENM and Warner Bros. Discovery ink K-content partnership
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• Seoul's ambiguous approach to Pyongyang meets a harsher reality

"The U.S. government continues to work closely with its ally to advance the U.S.-ROK trade and investment partnership, including by processing visas for eligible ROK visitors to continue investing in America in compliance with U.S. laws."

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Jonathan Fritz co-chaired the virtual event on behalf of the United States.

Ambassador and Government Representative for Korean Nationals Overseas Protection and Consular Affairs Jung Kihong co-chaired the virtual meeting on behalf of South Korea.

The virtual meeting occurred a month after the September immigration raid of a Georgia Hyundai battery plant that resulted in hundreds of South Koreans who were not authorized to work in the United States being detained and flown back to South Korea.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung on Sept. 11 said the raid that was carried out by Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers could jeopardize future South Korean investments in the United States.

"Companies will have to worry about whether establishing a local factory in the United States will be subject to all sorts of disadvantages or difficulties," Lee told media.

The immigration raid raised concerns in South Korea and the United States regarding the viability of South Korean companies supporting U.S.-based manufacturing. However, diplomats from both nations are working to resolve any issues that led to the immigration raid and prevent future occurrences.

Among those issues is the need to reform the U.S. visa process for foreign workers, which South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun discussed with U.S. officials during a Sept. 12 visit to Washington.

Cho met with U.S. Sens. Bill Hagerty, Andy Kim and Todd Young over two days to discuss concerns that 475 South Korean professionals and others were arrested during the Sept. 4 immigration raid on the Hyundai-LG Energy Solutions battery plant near Savannah.

The results of Tuesday's virtual meeting are yet to be announced.

4. Sohae Satellite Launching Station: Signs of Engine Testing

​Any Russian support?

Images at the link.

Sohae Satellite Launching Station: Signs of Engine Testing

• By: Peter Makowsky, Jack Liu and Iliana Ragnone
• October 21, 2025

https://www.38north.org/2025/10/sohae-satellite-launching-station-signs-of-engine-testing/

Recent commercial satellite imagery shows uneven progress in the expansion and modernization of North Korea’s Sohae Satellite Launching Station. Since our last full site report in March 2025, work has continued on finishing the seaport and connecting it to the main Sohae complex. Activity around the vertical engine test stand indicates a small engine test was conducted recently, although none have been reported in North Korean state media to date. Progress on other areas, such as the new assembly building and the old launch pad area, appears to have slowed.

North Korea has not reported a reconnaissance satellite launch attempt since the failed launch of the Malligyong-1-1 in May 2024, and no signs of an imminent launch have been observed.

Kim Jong Un had once announced a goal of launching three additional reconnaissance satellites by the end of 2024. That deadline passed without success. It is worth noting that in September 2023, during the Putin-Kim summit at the Vostochny Cosmodrome, Russia expressed a willingness to help North Korea’s satellite program. This long delay in further launches may be a sign that cooperation is underway.

Vertical Engine Test Stand (VETS)

Imagery from September 27 and 29 revealed that a rocket engine test had taken place at the VETS.

On September 27, the mobile shelter was seen pulled back from the stand and a truck and mobile crane were seen parked on the pad. An unidentified object was observed in the truck bed. Several service carts with hoses or possible cabling were seen lying on the nearby tarmac.

Figure 1. Imagery from September 27 indicates the mobile shelter at the VETS was pulled back from the stand. A truck and mobile crane were also observed nearby. Image © 2025 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

By September 29, the shelter had been returned to its typical position and there were no signs of vehicle traffic.

Figure 2. Imagery from September 29 shows the shelter was returned to its initial position and vehicles were no longer seen in the area. Satellite image ©2025 Vantor.

Imagery from October 4 revealed limited burn marks in the exhaust bucket, suggesting a test of a smaller, upper stage rocket engine had occurred. The orange residue suggests that the engine uses fuel and nitric acid or nitrogen tetroxide oxidizer. China and Russia, along with North Korea, extensively use UDMH fuel in their launch vehicles. Visible orange stain streaks from fuel and oxidizer, along with streaks from cooling the engine exhaust, are observed in the flame bucket.

Figure 3. Imagery from October 4 reveals burn marks in the VETS exhaust bucket, suggesting a small, upper stage rocket engine test had occurred. Satellite image ©2025 Vantor.

Other Developments

Construction activity first reported in March 2025 continues to progress, but at a slower pace than previously observed. The docking slip at the seaport to accommodate large vessels appears to be complete, reaching into the sea to avoid impacts of severe tides. Rails located along either side of the slip will likely support an overhead, traveling gantry crane. A. This may be to support a heavier crane base on the north side to better support the crane in moving loads from vessels onto trucks. In addition, five lattice masts have been erected along either side of the pier, likely to support flood lights. The coastal road leading from the port to the launching station is now completely paved.

Figure 4. The seaport docking slip appears to be completed on imagery from October 4, 2025. Satellite image ©2025 Vantor.

Imagery from March 2025 indicated a new section of road was being excavated to join the east tunnel entrance to the coastal road, though as of early October 2025, it has yet to be completed. The slow progress may be due to the amount of earth needing to be removed to join the two points because of the mountainous terrain. It also remains to be seen whether this passage will just be a road or if it will also support a rail spur. has been prepared closer to the coastal launch pad, similar in width to the existing road. The purpose of this is unclear.

An approximately 2,400 square-meter area has been built up along the west side of the road, which may serve as a convenient location for depositing the rubble from the cut through, or serve as the foundation for a support structure.

Figure 5. Overview of construction activity near east tunnel entrance. Satellite image ©2025 Vantor.

Figure 6. Close up of new parallel road or rail bed and built-up area alongside coastal road. Satellite image ©2025 Vantor.

In addition, a loop road has been added immediately north of the east tunnel entrance. There is unidentified construction at its mid-point along the hillside.

Slowed Activity

Construction progress on the new receipt and assembly building, the west tunnel entrance, and the new rail spur that will connect both to the main rail line coming into the site has changed little since March. The side rooms lining the new receipt assembly building were left uncovered in the spring, and many have yet to be roofed. In addition, both the rail bed supporting the new spur and west tunnel entrance have seen little change. It is unclear why progress on these projects has slowed.

Figure 7. Overview of rail spur activity at the new assembly building on imagery from October 4, 2025. Satellite image ©2025 Vantor.

No Movement

No activity at the original launch pad or the nearby fuel/oxidizer bunkers and support buildings have been observed in recent months.

Likewise, at the original horizontal assembly and storage building, the 12 cylindrical storage tanks that were first observed in July 2023 have yet to be moved. The rail spur which previously serviced the main launch pad, has been truncated and the remaining portion falling into disrepair. This means for now, the only way to move rocket stages from the site’s rail transfer station to the pad is by road.

5. North Korea claims it successfully test launched new ‘hypersonic’ missiles

​north Korea is a very real threat. We ignore its advances at our peril. Unfortunately there are those who think we should "run away" and abandon the peninsula in order to protect America. Such a course of action only invites conflict that will have catastrophic effects from America.

North Korea claims it successfully test launched new ‘hypersonic’ missiles

State media hides photos of missiles as experts say no clear evidence test involved new Hwasong-11E seen at parade

https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/north-korea-says-it-successfully-test-launched-new-hypersonic-missiles/

Colin Zwirko October 23, 2025

North Korea did not release any photos of the missile launch, instead only offering images of the reported "hypersonic glide vehicle" in the sky and striking targets | Image: KCNA (Oct. 23, 2025)

North Korea “successfully” test launched “two hypersonic projectiles” on Wednesday, state media reported the following day, without offering more technical details on the test.

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said the missiles were “launched northeastward from Ryokpho District in Pyongyang” and “struck their intended targets in the tableland of Kwesang Peak of Orang County, North Hamgyong Province.”

DPRK leader Kim Jong Un was not mentioned in the report, with top military officials Pak Jong Chon, Kim Jong Sik and Jang Chang Ha overseeing the test by the Missile Administration instead.

KCNA called the “test of the new weapons system” a “part of the defense capability development program to enhance the sustainability and effectiveness of strategic deterrence against potential enemies” — implying it was a nuclear-capable system.

“The new cutting-edge weapon system is clear proof of the steadily upgrading self-defensive technical capabilities of the DPRK,” Pak Jong Chon declared after the test, according to KCNA.

Photos show missiles striking targets in the snowy mountains | Image: KCNA (Oct. 23, 2025)

Pak “emphasized that our efforts are clearly focused on continuously advancing our war deterrent power, and that the purpose of this is to strengthen our self-defense,” and praised missile scientists for “achieving rapid progress in the development of weapons systems possessing new strategic value.”

State media only released two photos Thursday morning — one showing a missile high in the sky and one a collage of strikes on an inland target in the mountains — making it difficult to determine what exactly was tested.

KCNA appears to be implying it was the new Hwasong-11E short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), which Pyongyang showed off at a weapons expo and military parade earlier this month.

However, experts told NK News that the KCNA photos do not clearly show a Hwasong-11E and that it could have been a variant of the Hwasong-11C SRBM, which North Korea launched at the same inland target range in Sept. 2024.

Sam Lair, research associate with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Open Source Team, said the “lack of launch pictures is suspicious,” with KCNA offering no clear images of the missile or its launcher.

When comparing photos of the Hwasong-11C in its terminal phase before striking the target, the missile in the newer photos “doesn’t look super different to me … or at least not different enough to say anything definitive,” he said.

“I have yet to see evidence this is a test of the glider, though when they say hypersonic they usually mean a glider or some maneuvering,” Lair added.

Photos showing the unidentified missile launched Wednesday (left) and a Hwasong-11C SRBM last year (right) in terminal phase before striking the ground. The photos are not matched to scale. | Images: KCNA (Oct. 23, 2025 and Sept. 19, 2024)

Hwasong-11E SRBMs equipped with HGVs at the Oct. 10 military parade | Image: KCNA (Oct. 11, 2025)

Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, also told NK News that the missile tested Wednesday was “unlikely to my eye [to be the Hwasong-11E with HGV], and doesn’t seem supported by available evidence.”

It may have been “a new variant of the Hwasong-11C with a heavier payload.”

“The test came quickly after Ahn Gyu-back’s comments on [South Korea’s] Hyunmoo-5 deployments,” Panda said, pointing out that the Hwasong-11C “was initially linked to the Hyunmoo-5 by North Korea back in the day.”

He added that the test appeared to be intended as “a demonstration of precision,” which is “important for Kim Jong Un’s conventional modernization goals as well as fielding more effective tactical nuclear weapons.”

The KCNA photos suggested precision by showing missiles striking a circular target in the sights of an aerial recording device, possibly a military drone.

NK Pro previously identified the location of inland missile strikes at Kwesam Peak last year, just a few kilometers to the north of Kwesang Peak where North Korea claims its missiles struck on Wednesday.

North Korea’s report comes after the South Korean military announced detection of a DPRK missile test in real time around 8:10 a.m. KST on Wednesday morning.

The ROK said it detected “several” missiles, without specifying a number, and that they reached a maximum distance of “around 350 km” (217 miles). If North Korea’s claimed launch and target locations are accurate, the distance could have been closer to 380 or 390 km.

North Korea recently built a new missile base in Ryokpho where KCNA said the launch took place, and conducted Hwasong-11A SRBM and 600mm rocket tests from a highway outside the Majang-ri missile base nearby in March 2023 and Sept. 2024.

It’s unknown why Seoul made the unspecific claim of tracking “several” missiles while Pyongyang only claimed to launch two missiles, but irregular or maneuvering flights involving hypersonic missiles have caused discrepancies in the past.

The missile test was North Korea’s first since May, which also involved SRBMs. North Korea has additionally been sending SRBMs to Russia for use in the war against Ukraine, where Pyongyang is likely to be gathering valuable technical data on the missiles.

Meanwhile, top domestic-facing outlets Rodong Sinmun and Voice of Korea did not carry the report Thursday morning, suggesting propaganda officials sought to release details of the test only for international audiences.

Edited by Kristen Talman

Updated on Oct. 23 at 9:11 a.m. KST with expert comments

6. North Korea’s cyber army funds nuclear arms with $2.8B in stolen crypto: MSMT

​We must attack and defeat the regime's all purpose sword. Do we have anyone orchestrating a global counter-north Korea campaign to attack it in all domains, especially the cyber soaring?

North Korea’s cyber army funds nuclear arms with $2.8B in stolen crypto: MSMT

11 countries accuse DPRK cyber ops of ‘systematically’ violating sanctions, stating program rivals China and Russia

https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/north-koreas-cyber-army-funds-nuclear-arms-with-2-8b-in-stolen-crypto-msmt/

Jooheon Kim October 23, 2025

North Korean university students using computers | Image: KCTV (March 12, 2025)

North Korea is “systematically” violating international sanctions by stealing cryptocurrency and using the proceeds to purchase weapons, according to sanctions monitors from 11 countries, finding that Pyongyang’s “full-spectrum” cyber program rivals those of China and Russia.

The Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), envisioned as a replacement for the disbanded U.N. Panel of Experts, released its second report on Wednesday documenting the DPRK’s efforts to raise revenue for its nuclear and missile programs through illicit cyber operations and IT worker deployments.

The report states that North Korea stole a total of $2.84 billion in virtual assets from between Jan. 2024 to Sept. 2025, using a variety of cryptocurrency services to launder its ill-gotten gains and convert it to cash. The estimate broadly aligns with figures provided by other blockchain analysts. 

The DPRK relies on globally dispersed networks of North Koreans and “foreign-based facilitators” to carry out these cyber operations, according to the report, particularly in China but also Russia, Argentina, Cambodia, Vietnam and the UAE.

MSMT states that DPRK uses the proceeds to trade for weapons, gold, copper and other raw materials prohibited under U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. 

Kwak Jin, a cybersecurity professor at Ajou University, told NK News that cryptocurrency theft is key to Pongyang’s strategy to generate revenue through “high‑risk, high‑return operations.”

“Since North Korea is heavily restricted by economic sanctions, cybercrime has now become a central source of income for the country,” the expert said, noting that stolen cryptocurrency accounted for roughly one-third of the country’s total foreign currency earnings last year.

An organization chart showing connections between North Korean cyber actors, IT personnel and U.S.-designated entities | Image: Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team

Beyond cryptocurrency theft, the report drew attention to North Korea’s strategy of deploying IT workers to work remotely at foreign firms to earn money for the regime. 

Some 1,000 to 2,000 DPRK IT workers live in countries including China, Russia and Laos, according to MNMT. They earned an estimated $350 million to $800 million last year by taking on projects in AI, website development and other fields, with half sent back to the DPRK.

These workers belong to subunits of U.N.-sanctioned entities such as the Reconnaissance General Bureau and the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry, according to the report.

“Following the recent U.S. government-led crackdown of DPRK IT workers operating in U.S. jurisdictions, 220 these workers have expanded the scope of their operations globally, with a particular focus on seeking employment at small- and medium-sized European IT firms,” the report stated. 

A satellite image of North Korea’s Ministry of State Security, to which several cyber units and IT worker delegations are subordinate. | Image: MSMT

It added that facilitators in third countries such as China, Russia, Pakistan and Vietnam help these IT workers with identity falsification and money laundering. 

In particular, MSMT member states reported that North Korea plans to send 40,000 laborers to Russia, including “several delegations of IT workers.” The report emphasized that this violates UNSC sanctions that require U.N. member states to repatriate all DPRK nationals earning income overseas.

Beyond financial crimes, North Korean cyber actors have also continued to steal sensitive data in attacks on defense companies, seeking information that can support its weapons development, according to the report.

With respect to tactics, the report states that DPRK operatives have posed as investors, businesspeople and recruiters to contact victims and trick them into downloading malicious software. 

It also notes that North Korean hacking groups are using more advanced strategies, such as dangling fake job interviews and AI tools like ChatGPT and DeepSeek, to target professionals and jobseekers. 

“Existing records, education and even personal background details can be analyzed against the target company’s requirements,” the expert Kwak explained.

To combat DPRK cybercrime, the MSMT laid out 11 recommendations for U.N. member states and the international community, ranging from repatriating North Korean workers to improving oversight of cryptocurrency exchanges.

“We encourage all U.N. member states to raise awareness about the DPRK’s malicious cyber activities and hold responsible parties accountable for UNSCR violations, including through sanctions,” the MSMT said in a joint statement. 

Photos of Chinese nationals Wu Huihui (left) and Ye Dinrong, who collaborated with North Korean cyber actors. | Image: MSMT

It also urged companies to verify IT personnel, limit access to sensitive data and refrain from paying employees in cryptocurrency. 

“When you look at how Southeast Asian companies are used for money‑laundering, you can see the problem is global,” the expert Kwak said. “Virtual‑asset exchanges have been hacked in the United Arab Emirates, Japan, India and Singapore, and for those funds to be laundered they inevitably have to move between wallets.”

Launched in October last year, the MSMT is a sanctions monitoring body formed by U.N. member states — including the U.S. and South Korea — in an effort to fill the gap left by the dissolution of the U.N. Panel of Experts on North Korea.

The panel formerly monitored DPRK sanctions enforcement and documented violations in biannual reports, but Russia vetoed the panel’s mandate last year amid its escalating military cooperation with Pyongyang over the war in Ukraine.

MSMT released its first report in May, focusing on North Korea-Russia military cooperation. North Korea’s foreign ministry slammed the report as a “provocative act.” 

The 11 MSMT member states are the U.S., South Korea, the U.K. Japan, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and New Zealand.

Edited by Bryan Betts

7. ROK launches 3600-ton submarine with more missiles for countering North Korea

​Again, the north cannot compete with South KOrean shipbuilding and naval capabilities.

ROK launches 3600-ton submarine with more missiles for countering North Korea

Jang Yeong-sil features 10 vertical launch tubes, enhancing its ability to carry out preemptive and retaliatory strikes

https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/rok-launches-3600-ton-submarine-with-more-missiles-for-countering-north-korea/

Joon Ha Park October 23, 2025

The 3,600-ton ROKS Jang Yeong-sil, the first of South Korea’s Jangbogo-III class Batch II SLBM-capable diesel attack submarines, at Hanwha Ocean’s Geoje shipyard ahead of its launch on Oct. 22, 2025 | Image: ROK Navy

South Korea launched a new 3,600-ton submarine on Wednesday featuring improved stealth capabilities and the ability to carry more ballistic missiles, marking a major upgrade to the country’s ability to carry out strikes against North Korea.

The navy and the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) said in a joint press release that it held a launching ceremony for the ROKS Jang Yeong-sil (SS-087) at Hanwha Ocean’s shipyard in Geoje. 

The vessel, named after a 15th-century Korean inventor, is the first of the KSS-III Batch-II series and the successor to the three 3,000-ton Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class submarines developed under Batch-I, the navy-DAPA joint press release said.

At about 89 meters long and displacing roughly 3,600 tons, the diesel-electric submarine features multiple upgrades over its predecessor, including enhanced sonar and combat management systems, target tracking and strike precision, and operational endurance. 

Emphasizing its capacity to deploy both cruise and ballistic missiles, South Korean media has reported that its vertical launch system has been expanded to 10 tubes from six on the earlier Batch-I vessels.

South Korea completed development of an indigenous submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability in Sept. 2021, when it successfully test-fired the Hyunmoo 4-4 from the ROKS Dosan Ahn Chang-ho.

ROK Navy Lt. Shin Hong-jung, a research assistant at Seoul National University’s Center for International Security and former submarine officer, told NK News that the expanded SLBM capacity significantly strengthens South Korea’s ability to retaliate in response to a North Korean attack. 

“The fact that the number of SLBM launch tubes has increased to 10 is crucial,” he said. “Even if North Korea were to carry out a preemptive strike, South Korea’s submarines now have a much stronger ability to conduct a second strike.”

The new vessel’s SLBM capabilities also allow it to carry out preemptive strikes on North Korean command centers and missile bases as part of Seoul’s underwater “Kill Chain” strategy. 

The navy and DAPA also noted that the submarine adopts lithium-ion batteries in place of lead-acid ones, allowing for longer underwater endurance and higher speeds while reducing detection risks. Additionally, it incorporates noise- and vibration-reduction technologies to enhance stealth and features an auxiliary propulsion system for emergency maneuvering.

The new submarine will undergo extensive sea trials and evaluations before delivery to the navy at the end of 2027, after which it is expected to enter active service under South Korea’s Submarine Force Command.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and military officials in front of the “Hero Kim Kun Ok” submarine at the Shinpho shipyard on Sept. 6, 2023 | Image: KCNA (Sept. 8, 2023)

Seoul’s launch of the Jang Yeong-sil comes as North Korean leader Kim Jong Un pushes to modernize his navy and build a blue water fleet, seeking to expand beyond the DPRK military’s long-standing focus on coastal defense.

Pyongyang has declared its intent to construct a nuclear-powered submarine and recently offered a first glimpse of one under development, signaling plans to arm it with cruise missiles. 

Although the North has developed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and incorporated some into the Hero Kim Kun Ok attack submarine launched in Sept. 2023, its fleet still largely depends on outdated Cold War-era platforms.

Comparing the two Koreas’ underwater fleets, Lt. Shin noted that South Korea’s submarine technology “is incomparably superior” to the North’s aging Romeo-, Sang-O- and Yono-class underwater assets.

But he cautioned that Pyongyang’s numerical advantage remains a concern. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimated in 2021 that North Korea operates about 70 submarines, a figure echoed by South Korea’s defense ministry the following year. 

“If they deploy them en masse in the East Sea, detecting them would be like finding a needle in a haystack. Oceanographic conditions make submarine detection inherently difficult,” he said.

Shin warned that Jang Yeong-sil is “not enough to enhance the country’s ability to hunt enemy submarines,” stressing the need to strengthen maritime patrols by acquiring more anti-submarine aircraft like P-8A Poseidon.

Edited by Bryan Betts

8. Lee welcomes Trump's role as 'peacemaker,' brushes aside U.S. trade concerns: CNN

​Practical and deft diplomacy by President Lee?

(LEAD) Lee welcomes Trump's role as 'peacemaker,' brushes aside U.S. trade concerns: CNN | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · October 23, 2025

(ATTN: CHANGES headline; RESTRUCTURES; UPDATES throughout with more details)

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, Oct. 23 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung expressed hope that U.S. President Donald Trump would serve as a "peacemaker" during his upcoming trip to Asia, while brushing aside concerns about trade talks with Washington, in an interview with CNN published Thursday.

In the interview, Lee underscored the need to pursue peace and dialogue with North Korea to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula, suggesting that Trump could play a role in bridging the gap between the two Koreas during his visit to the region.

Trump is expected to embark on a three-nation trip to Asia, including stops in Malaysia for a regional summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Japan and South Korea to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering next week.

"I hope that (Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un) will be able to engage in dialogue," Lee said in the interview. "I also believe that President Trump wants to achieve world peace, and that is why I have made the recommendation for him to take on the role of a peacemaker."

President Lee Jae Myung (L) speaks during an interview with CNN at the presidential office in Seoul in this photo provided by Lee's office on Oct. 23, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

The interview was conducted several hours after North Korea test-fired short-range ballistic missiles on Wednesday, which marked its first such military show of force since Lee took office in June.

While noting the chances of Trump meeting with Kim during the tour is low, Lee said it would be "a good thing" if the "leaders of the United States and North Korea could suddenly get together."

Trump met Kim three times during his first term and expressed interest in resuming talks with the North Korean leader during his summit with Lee in August, fueling speculation about a possible meeting with Kim during the APEC period.

Seoul officials have said there is no indication yet of such a meeting, but they have not ruled out the possibility, considering Trump's unconventional approach to diplomacy.

On trade, Lee acknowledged there are "differences in opinion" in the ongoing talks, but said he believed Seoul and Washington can reach an agreement because the U.S. is "the leading country when it comes to the values of democracy and the free market system."

"I believe that we will, in the end, be able to reach a rational result that can be acceptable," he said.

Seoul and Washington held their latest round of trade negotiations in Washington on Wednesday (U.S. time), amid rising expectations that they could finalize a trade deal on the occasion of the APEC summit.

The talks were widely expected to focus on details of the financial package for Seoul's US$350 billion investment pledge, which is tied to an initial deal reached in July to lower U.S. tariffs on Korean products from 25 percent to 15 percent.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · October 23, 2025

9. U.S. recognizes S. Korea's need for revision in nuclear energy pact: FM Cho

​For latent nuclear capability? Yes this is energy focused but could it contribute to deterrence?

(LEAD) U.S. recognizes S. Korea's need for revision in nuclear energy pact: FM Cho | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · October 23, 2025

(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; ADDS details in paras 9-10)

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, Oct. 23 (Yonhap) -- The United States understands South Korea's need to revise a bilateral nuclear energy pact to be allowed to reprocess spent fuel and enrich uranium for civilian energy use, Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said Thursday, adding that the two sides will soon begin talks on ways to make changes.

Cho made the remarks in a radio interview, referring to the "123 Agreement," under which South Korea is allowed very limited spent fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment below 20 percent, only with U.S. consent.

Seoul has been seeking to renegotiate the agreement with Washington to gain greater flexibility in the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and enrichment of uranium so that it can produce its own nuclear fuel for civilian energy purposes.

"We operate 26 commercial nuclear reactors. There's no other country with this level of nuclear energy capacity that relies entirely on imported fuel," Cho said during the interview with MBC Radio.

Foreign Minister Cho Hyun speaks during a forum at the National Assembly in Seoul in this Oct. 15, 2025, file photo. (Yonhap)

Cho said Seoul has "strongly" called for the need to enrich uranium and reprocess spent nuclear fuel based on the industrial standpoint.

"That has been accepted, and we plan to begin negotiations soon," he said.

The U.S. has maintained a cautious stance on lifting restrictions in the pact due largely to nuclear proliferation concerns, as a reprocessing facility can be utilized to extract plutonium used to build nuclear weapons.

The last revision of the pact in 2015 opened the way for the allies to conduct joint research on the "pyroprocessing" technology for spent nuclear fuel recycling, considered to pose fewer proliferation risks, but questions have remained over its economic feasibility.

Regarding Cho's remarks, a foreign ministry official said no specific timeline has been set yet for a renegotiation.

"Working-level talks are ongoing. But no concrete goals have been set yet, such as a date for starting negotiations," the official said.

Asked about whether Seoul and Washington will announce their final agreement on the terms of South Korea's US$350 billion investment package at next week's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Korea, Cho said there is no fixed timeline for the talks to conclude.

"It's not that we should set a strict deadline for this," he said. "As President Lee Jae Myung has stated, our approach should prioritize the national interest and be based on commercial rationality."

"If those conditions are not fully met, we can take more time to continue the negotiations," Cho said.

South Korea has committed to making the investment in return for the U.S. lowering the reciprocal tariff on Korean products and sectoral duty on autos to 15 percent from 25 percent.

Kim Yong-beom, the presidential chief of staff for policy visiting Washington, said Wednesday (U.S. time) the two sides made "partial progress" in the negotiations on narrowing the gap over how to implement the investment package.

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · October 23, 2025

10. Lee vows all-out response to transnational crimes involving scams, drugs, gambling

​The challenge of a global pivotal state.

(LEAD) Lee vows all-out response to transnational crimes involving scams, drugs, gambling | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · October 23, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES paras 1-4 as meeting ends; RECASTS headline; ADDS photo)

SEOUL, Oct. 23 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung on Thursday instructed government agencies to mobilize all resources to tackle transnational crimes, such as scams, drug trafficking and online gambling, the presidential office said.

Lee made the call as he convened an interagency meeting to discuss coordinated responses with officials from the National Intelligence Service, law enforcement agencies, the ministries of foreign affairs and justice, as well as financial and customs authorities.

"As seen in the recent Cambodia repatriation case, transnational crimes are destroying people's lives, and the social costs will rapidly increase if left neglected," Lee was quoted as saying.

In a written briefing after the meeting, presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung said the government also decided to establish an integrated consultative body involving intelligence authorities and key agencies, including the foreign and justice ministries, and to launch a special unit to respond to transnational crimes.

South Korea has recently intensified efforts to combat crimes targeting its citizens in Southeast Asia, following reports of South Koreans being abducted and confined in Cambodia in connection with online scam operations.

Lee has vowed to strengthen international cooperation to combat transnational crimes following the torture and death of a South Korean college student who was lured into a scam center in Cambodia, which has sparked widespread public outrage.

President Lee Jae Myung holds a meeting with senior aides at the presidential office in Seoul on Oct. 23, 2025. (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · October 23, 2025

11. Air Force chief says raid on Osan Air Base had 'no procedural issues'

​We must not let this fester.

Air Force chief says raid on Osan Air Base had 'no procedural issues' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · October 23, 2025

SEOUL, Oct. 23 (Yonhap) -- A special counsel team's raid on Osan Air Base, which hosts both South Korean and U.S. forces, in July had "no procedural issues," Air Force chief Gen. Son Sug-rag said Thursday, refuting controversy over the raid.

In July, special counsel Cho Eun-suk's team carried out a search and seizure on the air base in Pyeongtaek, south of Seoul, as part of its investigation into allegations that drones were sent to Pyongyang ahead of former President Yoon Suk Yeol's martial law imposition last year.

U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. David Iverson has reportedly lodged a complaint to Seoul's foreign ministry, expressing concerns over the search conducted without prior consultations with the U.S. side.

"I admit the situation could have been misleading, but as far as I know, (the USFK) is currently resolving its misunderstanding," the Air Force chief said during a parliamentary audit session. "Procedurally, there were no problems."

Lawmakers of the main opposition People Power Party claimed the raid should have been conducted after consultations with the U.S. side, saying it has "damaged" the alliance between the countries and blaming the ruling Democratic Party (DP) for launching a "deformed" special counsel investigation.

DP lawmakers protested vehemently, leading to a temporary suspension of the audit session.

Kim Hyung-soo, head of the Air Force Operations Command, explained that the search was conducted in accordance with due procedure under a memorandum of understanding between the allies governing the raided facility, saying it did not require prior consultation with the United States.

Air Force chief Gen. Son Sug-rag attends a plenary session of the Air Force at the headquarters in Gyeryong, some 145 kilometers south of Seoul, on Oct. 23, 2025. (Yonhap)

Meanwhile, the Air Force aims to secure sixth-generation fighter jets designed for future warfare by the mid-to-late 2040s, according to a report submitted to the parliamentary audit session Thursday.

Under the plan, the Air Force will also develop collaborative combat aircraft designed to operate in conjunction with existing FA-50 light attack fighters and KF-21 fighter jets by the 2030s.

The envisioned sixth-generation fighter project is intended to secure complete technology ranging from stealth mode, light armed aircraft, engines and quantum communication mode in order to make up for the antiquated F-16 fighter jets.

sookim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · October 23, 2025

12. Editorial: Don't Politicize Security and Sovereignty

Editorial: Don't Politicize Security and Sovereignty

Author warns political considerations undermine defense as regional threats escalate and budget cuts hinder responses

https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/10/23/RPLKAOCWABH2JIOTUCJ7TZX6LA/

By The Chosunilbo

Published 2025.10.23. 00:20

During the launch ceremony of the 3,600-ton submarine Jang Young-sil held at Hanwha Ocean in Geoje-si, South Gyeongsang Province on the afternoon of the 22nd, Admiral Kang Dong-gil, Chief of Naval Operations, and foreign military officials pose for a commemorative photo with the submarine in the background. /Kim Dong-hwan

Japan’s new Prime Minister Takaichi stated, “We will pursue the acquisition of submarines equipped with next-generation propulsion capabilities,” hinting at the introduction of nuclear-powered submarines. This move aims to counter threats from China and North Korea, despite controversies over Japan’s military expansion. The U.S. has already agreed to provide nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, while North Korea is reportedly seeking to acquire nuclear submarine technology from Russia in exchange for troop deployments.

On the 22nd, the launch ceremony for the ‘Jang Yeong-sil,’ the first of a new 3,600-ton-class diesel submarine project, was held in Geoje. Since President Roh Tae-woo, presidents have consistently attended the launch ceremonies of lead ships, as submarines are national strategic weapons. However, this time, President Lee Jae-myung, Prime Minister Kim Min-seok, and Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back all did not attend. The event concluded as a Navy Chief of Staff-level ceremony, likely influenced by concerns over a potential Trump-Kim meeting.

Recently, the Unification Minister made remarks seemingly endorsing Kim Jong-un’s “two-state theory” and tolerating North Korea’s nuclear program. Loudspeaker broadcasts toward North Korea and live-fire drills have been suspended or scaled back. President Lee’s absence from the submarine launch may reflect this context. On the same day, North Korea fired multiple short-range missiles for the first time since the president’s inauguration.

Photos revealing submarine activities at structures illegally installed by China in the West Sea (Yellow Sea) were also released. Democratic Party lawmaker Lee Byung-jin expressed concern, stating, “These are not aquaculture facilities but could serve military purposes,” warning that China might turn the West Sea (Yellow Sea) into an inland sea. To prevent territorial loss, as seen in the South China Sea, proportional responses—such as deploying identical structures—are necessary.

However, the 60.5 billion Korean won allocated in this year’s supplementary budget for proportional responses in the West Sea (Yellow Sea) was entirely cut during the National Assembly’s budget deliberations. This suggests preparations for our own structures remain insufficient, implying responses have been limited to rhetoric. This could also reflect sensitivity to Chinese reactions ahead of Xi Jinping’s visit to South Korea.

Nuclear-powered submarines are more urgently needed by South Korea than Japan. Even Democratic Party lawmakers have warned, “We must not miss the golden time to defend the West Sea (Yellow Sea).” If political considerations overshadow security and sovereignty, adversaries will exploit them. Security and sovereignty must be treated as non-negotiable, separate from political agendas.

· This article has been translated by Upstage Solar AI.

13. Desperate North Koreans sell blood for food as hunger crisis deepens

​This is what you accept if you advocate a two state Korea.

Can you live with the suffering of 26 million Koreans in the north?

Desperate North Koreans sell blood for food as hunger crisis deepens

In a typical blood donation, North Koreans give 400 milliliters of blood in exchange for 2 kilograms of cooking oil or 3 kilograms of rice

https://www.dailynk.com/english/desperate-north-koreans-sell-blood-for-food-as-hunger-crisis-deepens/

By Lee Chae Eun - October 23, 2025

dailynk.com · October 23, 2025

FILE PHOTO: North Korean sellers peddle goods on the fringes of a market in Sunchon, South Pyongan Province, in October 2018. (The Daily NK)

As North Korea endures a severe food shortage, desperate North Koreans have been selling their blood, a practice that has surged recently after the fall harvest failed to improve the food supply.

“In Hamhung, the number of hungry families has increased sharply, so more people are selling their blood just to afford at least one meal a day,” a source in South Hamgyong province told Daily NK recently.

The source said that if one out of every 20 people used to sell their blood to cover their expenses, that number has recently increased tenfold.

“The fall harvest is typically a time when more food is available. But this year, public access to food has not improved at all,” the source said.

All this suggests that North Korea’s food crisis is severe enough to endanger people’s survival.

In a typical blood donation, North Koreans give 400 milliliters of blood in exchange for 2 kilograms of cooking oil or 3 kilograms of rice—barely enough to feed a family of three for two or three days.

“Considering that people are selling their own blood for a few kilograms of rice, you can more or less guess what North Koreans’ living conditions are like right now,” the source said.

Health risks mount amid unsanitary conditions

Another serious issue is that blood donations pose health risks for many North Koreans. Blood is collected not only at ordinary hospitals but at tuberculosis and hepatitis clinics. In most cases, the medical examination is perfunctory, if one is conducted at all.

“Good health is essential for making a quick recovery from a blood donation. But most people selling blood are on the verge of malnutrition. There’s supposed to be a six-month interval between blood donations, but some people give blood every two or three months, leading to serious health problems,” the source said.

For example, one Hamhung woman in her 40s is currently bedridden as a result of frequent blood donations.

When business at the market slowed, the woman sold her stall to cover expenses and then scraped by as a street vendor. But as sales tapered off, she ultimately had no choice but to sell her blood to support her family.

She gave blood every other month until her body weakened and she showed signs of severe anemia, eventually losing consciousness altogether.

“Women are often responsible for supporting their families, and they will do whatever it takes to keep their family members fed. This woman is just one of many who have wrecked their health through repeated blood donations,” the source said.

“Poverty-motivated blood sales are occurring not only in Hamhung but in other parts of North Korea, including Ryanggang and North Hamgyong provinces. Rumors going around about people starving to death are creating extreme anxiety.”

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · October 23, 2025

14. North Korea touts diplomatic wins with Russia, but citizens see no improvement in daily life

​Only the regime benefits from these diplomatic "wins."

North Korea touts diplomatic wins with Russia, but citizens see no improvement in daily life

North Koreans acknowledge that Kim has been more diplomatically active than his father or grandfather but attribute that to geopolitical changes

By Eun Seol - October 23, 2025

https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-touts-diplomatic-wins-with-russia-but-citizens-see-no-improvement-in-daily-life/

dailynk.com · October 23, 2025

Rodong Sinmun reported on Sept. 4, 2025, that "Comrade Kim Jong Un met and held talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who participated in the 80th anniversary commemoration of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan and the World Anti-Fascist War Victory, at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing on the afternoon of the Sept. 3." (Rodong Sinmun·News1)

Following a lavish celebration of the 80th anniversary of the ruling party’s establishment, North Korea has been vigorously promoting the diplomatic activities of leader Kim Jong Un, with study sessions touting improved relations with Russia as one of Kim’s signature achievements.

A source in North Korea told Daily NK recently that the Central Committee’s publicity and information department distributed material for the October study session titled “a great victory on the diplomatic front” to party committees at all levels.

“Today’s victory on the diplomatic front resulted from the Workers’ Party of Korea showcasing the legitimacy of its ideology and policy line. Under the leadership of Comrade Kim Jong Un, Socialist North Korea has in only a brief time become a powerful country that’s getting noticed by the international community,” the study material said.

The study material went on to make the self-congratulatory claim that North Korea is gaining international recognition as a military power and that its expanded diplomatic relations have boosted its national prestige.

The material quoted the text of a joint statement between the Workers’ Party of Korea and United Russia (Russia’s ruling party) to stress that “the unshakable friendship of United Russia is the basis of our development into an autonomous power.”

“The United Russia Party expressed firm support for the measures taken by the leadership of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to bolster the country’s defense capabilities,” the state-run Korean Central News Agency said while reporting on the joint statement on Oct. 9.

This remark is widely understood to mean that Russia condones North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons.

“Through the spirit of putting the state first, we’re on the verge of becoming a socialist power that the world will look up to. All officials, party members and workers must treat the party’s plan to strengthen national defense as the guiding light of their life and struggle so that we can become an unrivaled and invincible power,” the study material urged.

“We must proactively accept the leadership of Kim Jong Un on the fronts of national defense, economy and ideology,” the material declared, while calling on “the entire nation to step forward in unity to join the great march toward building a powerful country.”

Some citizens skeptical despite regime propaganda

But some North Koreans have mixed feelings about the regime’s recent diplomatic actions.

“Television footage of Kim Jong Un meeting officials from China and Russia has made some people take pride in the growing strength of our Republic. But others point out that his actions haven’t brought meaningful change to our lives,” the source said.

Some North Koreans acknowledge that Kim has been more diplomatically active than his father or grandfather but attribute that to geopolitical changes rather than to North Korea’s rising stature.

“Given frequent coverage of the China-U.S. conflict and Russia’s war on television and in newspapers, many people think North Korea has benefited from recent turmoil in the world. But the main complaint is that people’s lives haven’t changed,” the source added.

Some citizens darkly point to the national sacrifices behind the diplomatic achievements touted by the regime.

“Some comment that this flurry of diplomatic activity wouldn’t be possible without somebody’s sacrifice. Others say these are at best pyrrhic victories when we consider all the Korean soldiers who lost their lives in Russia,” the source remarked.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · October 23, 2025

15. North Korean forest rangers fired for using tree nurseries as personal vegetable gardens

​Unless you are a member of the regime elite you must take any and all necessary actions to survive.

North Korean forest rangers fired for using tree nurseries as personal vegetable gardens

A recent probe found that forest rangers were also harvesting pine nuts from immature trees and then storing them in the ground or selling them to friends and relatives

By Jeong Seo-yeong - October 23, 2025

https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korean-forest-rangers-fired-for-using-tree-nurseries-as-personal-vegetable-gardens/

dailynk.com · October 22, 2025

FILE PHOTO: A woman in Wonsan, Kangwon province, rides her bike past propaganda signs promoting the protection of forests. (The Daily NK)

Daily NK recently learned that the North Korean Cabinet conducted a thorough investigation of nationwide forestry service branches in September.

A source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK recently that provincial forest rangers implicated in wrongdoing during the monthlong probe were dismissed from their posts.

Inspectors found various irregularities when they looked into the management of saplings at tree nurseries.

Most seriously, forest rangers were planting crops such as cabbages, radishes and chili peppers for kimchi making on plots reserved for saplings—essentially treating the nurseries as their own personal gardens.

The probe also found that forest rangers were harvesting pine nuts from immature trees and then either storing them in the ground or selling them to friends and relatives.

“In North Hamgyong province, the worst issues were found in Myongchon county. Provincial officials presented the probe’s findings in a struggle session that included harsh criticism of rule-breaking in the forestry service,” the source said.

Forest rangers were taken to task for their irresponsible and corrupt behavior, with officials angrily declaring that “forestry resources are not private property, but the indisputable property of the state.”

Forest rangers whose improprieties were identified in the probe were fired, and civilians implicated in the schemes are to be investigated by public prosecutors.

After the punishments were announced, forestry service members complained that such probes are held too often and the consequences are too harsh. They say it’s not right to fire rangers for simply planting cabbages or radishes on idle land without any saplings to care for.

Forest rangers also complained that when the government criticized them for selling pine nuts to earn foreign currency, it conveniently ignored the fact that it wasn’t giving them decent rations.

“After this probe, many forest rangers say the job isn’t worth doing anymore,” the source said.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · October 22, 2025

16. Presidential office relocation blamed for police failures in Itaewon crowd crush

I did not expect this lind of blame.

Presidential office relocation blamed for police failures in Itaewon crowd crush - The Korea Times

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

The government said Thursday that the relocation of former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s office to Yongsan District was a key factor in the police shortage during the 2022 Itaewon crowd crush, which claimed 159 lives.

The new presidential office, relocated during Yoon's 2022-25 term, is roughly 1.5 kilometers from the disaster site in Itaewon.

Announcing the results of a joint audit into the tragedy, officials concluded that the move had significantly increased demand for police services around the new presidential compound, diverting crowd control forces away from the busy streets of Itaewon on the night of the disaster.

Despite advance warnings of large Halloween crowds, only a limited police presence was dispatched to Itaewon that evening.

The audit — carried out by the Office for Government Policy Coordination (OPC), the National Police Agency and the Ministry of the Interior and Safety — marked the first formal inquiry into the tragedy under the Lee Jae Myung administration.

Over a three-month period beginning in July, the team examined police headquarters, the Seoul Metropolitan Government and Yongsan District Office.

Investigators found that Yongsan Police Station had failed to draw up a crowd control plan for the Halloween weekend in 2022, despite having prepared similar plans in 2020 and 2021. The report said that officers ignored at least 11 emergency calls reporting crowding risks in the hours before the disaster and falsely logged response records.

A person pays tribute at the site of the Itaewon crowd crush in Seoul, Oct. 29, 2024, marking the second anniversary of the tragedy. Korea Times photo by Park Si-mon

Senior commanders, including the Yongsan police chief and the Seoul police commissioner, were faulted for their slow response.

Local officials came under fire as well, with the audit finding that Yongsan District Office failed to activate its disaster response center or issue early warnings.

At a press briefing held at Government Complex Seoul, OPC Vice Minister Kim Young-su said the police had concentrated crowd control forces near the presidential office in response to ongoing demonstrations, leaving Itaewon without sufficient personnel.

“The relocation of the presidential office to Yongsan increased the demand for police deployment in the area, which was a key factor behind the lack of crowd control officers in Itaewon,” he explained.

According to the government, the number of rallies and demonstrations within Yongsan Police Station’s jurisdiction rose roughly 27-fold — from 34 in 2021 to 921 between May and October 2022.

Police resources were diverted to the Samgakji area next to the presidential office where there are frequent political rallies — leaving Itaewon with only a minimal police presence that night.

Kim Young-su, vice minister of the Office for Government Policy Coordination, announces the results of a joint government audit into the 2022 Itaewon tragedy during a press briefing at Government Complex Seoul, Thursday. Yonhap

The audit confirmed that Yongsan Police Station and the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency failed to communicate effectively, and that the station’s internal handover procedures were insufficient. Some officials retired before any disciplinary measures could be enforced, leaving gaps in accountability.

The interior ministry’s investigation also found that the on-duty personnel at Yongsan District Office were slow to respond. Some officials were reportedly deployed to remove protest flyers near the War Memorial across the street from the presidential office when the crush occurred. Others delayed reporting the situation for over 30 minutes.

The chief of the district’s health center, who was responsible for emergency medical coordination, did not assign clear roles to medical workers, adding to the confusion at the scene, according to the investigation.

A total of 62 public officials — 51 from the police and 11 from Seoul Metropolitan Government and Yongsan District Office — will face disciplinary action.

However, officials explained that retired personnel are exempt from administrative sanctions, although several of them have already been charged and are currently on trial.

The joint audit was launched in July after the president accepted a request from the bereaved families of the victims, who asked that those responsible be held accountable before the statute of limitations for disciplinary action expires. This was the first government-led audit to cover the tragedy's entire chain of events, from prevention and response to post-incident handling.

Families of the victims called the audit a meaningful step but “far too late,” urging the government to expand the investigation to cover gaps in rescue and recovery efforts.

“It’s far too late,” they wrote. “Still, it matters that the government has finally carried out an audit to identify what went wrong and set things right.”

The government said the investigation aimed to provide closure for the bereaved families and to “clarify the institutional failures” that allowed the tragedy to unfold.

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

​17. Lee says he trusts US 'rationality' amid final push for tariff deal

​The US must be sensitive to preventing another 1997 IMF crisis in Korea. That will only hurt everyone.

Lee says he trusts US 'rationality' amid final push for tariff deal

koreaherald.com · Park Han-na, Son Ji-hyoung · October 23, 2025

Seoul seeks gradual rollout of $350b investment plan to ease pressure on won

President Lee Jae Myung takes part in an interview with CNN at the presidential office in Yongsan-gu, Seoul, on Wednesday. (Yonhap)

President Lee Jae Myung said he trusts in the “rationality” of the United States as South Korea and Washington seek to wrap up months of negotiations over a $350 billion investment package and related tariff talks before next week’s APEC summit in Korea.

“I believe it is taking some time,” Lee said in an interview with CNN aired Thursday. “I also believe in the rationality of the United States, and so I believe that we will be able to reach a rational agreement.”

Lee expressed confidence that the decades-old alliance between the two nations would guide them toward compromise. “We are an alliance, and we both have common sense and rationality,” he said.

His remarks came as both governments intensified last-minute discussions in Washington, seen as the final hurdle before a deal that could lower US tariffs on most imported Korean goods -- including autos -- from 25 percent to 15 percent.

Presidential policy chief Kim Yong-beom and Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan met with US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick at the Commerce Department on Wednesday (local time) for a two-hour session, according to officials in Seoul.

“We had extensive discussions on a few remaining issues,” Kim told reporters afterward. “There has been some progress.”

It was the second meeting in less than a week. The Korean delegation last met Lutnick on Oct. 16 for more than four hours, when both sides reached a broad framework but left key points unresolved.

Before the latest talks, Kim said Seoul’s approach to extending the investment period “must proceed within a range we can manage, and the shock to our foreign-exchange market must not be excessive -- all of these are interconnected.”

At the center of the negotiations are the composition and timing of Seoul’s commitment. Korea wants to reduce the portion of direct investment and spread out the payments over time through loans and guarantees, while Washington has pushed for a larger up-front cash injection within President Trump’s second term.

According to sources, the two governments are discussing a plan under which South Korea would invest $25 billion annually over eight years, totaling $200 billion, as part of its $350 billion commitment to the US, while converting the remaining $150 billion into guarantees.

The scale of the pledge is immense -- equivalent to about 84 percent of Korea’s foreign-exchange reserves, 330 percent of its annual current account surplus and nearly one-fifth of its nominal GDP.

Seoul worries that such a large and rapid rollout could drain liquidity and pressure the won, which earlier this year hit its weakest level since 2009.

Referring to the Bank of Korea’s estimate that annual outflows of $15 billion to $20 billion are the most the country can sustain without FX instability, Kim added, “Both sides, along with relevant institutions, are reviewing their analyses and continuing discussions.”

Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol said in a separate Bloomberg TV interview that “South Korea and the US are focusing on the structure of the investment rather than a currency swap.”

“Whether a currency swap is needed -- and to what extent -- will depend entirely on how the deal is structured,” he said. “It may not be necessary at all, or it could be arranged on a smaller scale.”

Koo added that “much of the recent depreciation reflects market concern that the deal hasn’t been finalized. Once the tariff issue is resolved, that uncertainty will likely fade.” The won weakened to around 1,440 per dollar, its lowest in nearly six months, reflecting market jitters over the unresolved US tariff talks.

In preparation for the investment program, the government said on Wednesday that it has begun issuing foreign-exchange stabilization bonds denominated in dollars and yen. The Finance Ministry said it issued $1 billion in five-year US dollar bonds and yen-denominated bonds worth $700 million.

Officials noted that such bonds are one of the few available tools for securing dollar liquidity, though each sale adds to the national debt, which already stands at nearly half of GDP.

Negotiators aim to complete the agreement before the APEC summit in Gyeongju next week, where Lee and Trump are expected to hold bilateral talks. The meeting could shape Korea-US trade relations for years and signal Seoul’s role in stabilizing regional supply chains amid rising protectionism.

Lee last met Trump in the Oval Office in August and again with US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent in September on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York.

hnpark@heraldcorp.com

consnow@heraldcorp.com

koreaherald.com · Park Han-na, Son Ji-hyoung · October 23, 2025

​18. From safety to strategic resilience: Korea's next national advantage

From safety to strategic resilience: Korea's next national advantage - The Korea Times

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

Charles Chang

South Korea is rightly proud of its reputation as a low-crime nation. Streets are walkable at night, violent incidents are rare and public order ranks among the highest in the world. But the belief that low crime equals low risk has created a new vulnerability — one that recent events have made impossible to ignore. The real challenge facing Korea is not the absence of safety, but the need to build a culture of national preparedness that matches the complexity of modern threats.

The Korean security paradox is not a criticism of the country’s achievements but a recognition that safety built on perception is no longer enough. Korea’s rapid digitalization, global economic integration, population density and strategic industrial assets place it in a new era where disruption is more likely to come from systemic failures, cyber breaches, industrial espionage or infrastructure breakdown than from traditional crime.

The Itaewon crowd disaster in 2022 remains the clearest example of what happens when safety is assumed rather than designed. The deaths of 159 people were not the result of violence but rather of uncoordinated responsibility, insufficient real-time monitoring and a lack of predictive planning around high-density gatherings. Public grief and political fallout were driven not by malice, but by preventable oversight.

Cyber vulnerabilities demonstrate a similar pattern. The April 2025 SK Telecom breach, which compromised the data of 23 million users, went undetected for nearly three months. In a society where identity, mobility, finance and communication depend on digital systems, cyberattacks are no longer an IT inconvenience — they are a public safety issue.

Industrial espionage targeting national technologies is another wake-up call. In a recent case, authorities investigated a leak of Hyundai’s proprietary hydrogen fuel cell system information to foreign actors. Unlike traditional threats, espionage in strategic sectors undermines national innovation, export competitiveness and technological sovereignty.

The Daejeon data center fire in September 2025 further revealed how fragile critical infrastructure can be. Essential platforms from banking and logistics to e-commerce and government portals were disrupted for hours. While the incident did not stem from crime or foreign interference, the consequences showed how deeply risk now lives in systems rather than on streets.

These cases are not isolated — they expose the structural gap between feeling secure and being prepared. Korea does not face a crime problem; it faces a resilience problem. The question now is how to evolve from a mindset of safety maintenance to one of preparedness, anticipation and verification.

To make that shift, the country does not need another checklist of actions; it needs a change in how risk is understood across institutions. Three mindset transformations stand out as foundational:

1. From “We’re Safe” to “We Must Be Ready”

A low incidence of crime should no longer be treated as evidence of resilience. Government, academia and corporations must recognize that modern risk comes in the form of infrastructure failures, AI-driven cyberattacks, data disruption and operational paralysis. Preparedness — not perception — must define readiness. National foresight units and sector-based risk scenario planning should become the default practice.

2. From siloed responsibility to shared national resilience

The Itaewon and Daejeon incidents made clear that fragmented authority invites failure. Resilience requires collaboration across government ministries, municipal agencies, academia and corporate sectors. Universities should train leaders in resilience science, not just disaster management. Industry should embed resilience into ESG governance and board strategies. Preparedness must be national, not departmental.

3. From compliance to capability maturity

Meeting regulations is not the same as being ready. Many institutions pass audits but remain vulnerable to disruption. Korea would benefit from a National Resilience Maturity Assessment Program that evaluates readiness in cyber defense, crisis coordination, supply chain continuity, insider risk management and public event safety.

Rather than wait for failure, institutions should verify capability through structured assessments.

This evolution is not about discarding past strengths but building on them. Korea already leads the world in semiconductors, smart mobility, logistics, and hydrogen innovation. It can do the same in resilience. The goal is not to portray the nation as unprepared, but to ensure that its global success is matched by its ability to withstand shocks.

The aspiration should be clear: Korea can turn its reputation for safety into a new platform of strategic strength. That means investing not only in devices, systems and standards, but also in the shared mindset that risk is evolving faster than perception.

Resilience is not a loss of confidence; it is a declaration of national maturity. It is the recognition that complexity — not crime — is the defining challenge of advanced societies. A prepared culture would allow Korea to stay ahead not because it is afraid, but because it aims to lead. In a region defined by competition, interdependence and rapid technological adoption, resilience is now a strategy.

The Korean security paradox is not a weakness to defend against — it is a moment to redefine national strength. If Korea evolves from feeling secure to proving ready, it will not only protect its people and industries, it will set a new global benchmark for what 21st-century safety really means.

Charles Chang is a security resilience consultant based in Seoul with extensive experience spanning government and corporate leadership. Any views, thoughts, and opinions expressed in this article are solely the author's own.

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com