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Quotes of the Day:
"We read books to find out who we are. What other people, real or imaginary, do and think and feel – or have done and thought and felt; or might do and think and feel – is an essential guide to our understanding of what we ourselves are and may become… A person who had never listened to nor read a tale or myth or parable or story, would remain ignorant of his own emotional and spiritual heights and depths, would not know quite fully what it is to be human. For the story – from Rumpelstiltskin to War and Peace – is one of the basic tools invented by the mind of man, for the purpose of gaining understanding. There have been great societies that did not use the wheel, but there have been no societies that did not tell stories."
~ Ursula K. Le Guin, The Language of the Night
“My own opinion is that when the whole state is on the right course it is a better thing for each separate individual than when private interests are satisfied but the state as a whole is going downhill.”
– Thucydides
“Not everything that is faced can be changed, but nothing can be changed until it is faced.”
– James Baldwin
1. An Emboldened Kim Nudges Trump for a Sitdown
2. The Division of Korea: a roadmap for the cold war
3. Inchon’s Real Story: A Misalignment of Policy, War Aims, and War Plans
4. Jakarta gambles on embracing North Korea
5. Kim Jong Un says joint war effort with Russia outmatched ‘US and West’
6. Armed North Korean soldiers crossed MDL in pursuit of defector, Seoul confirms
7. Japan’s new prime minister signals openness to meeting Kim Jong Un
8. Book review: An insider’s account of how the US dropped the ball on North Korea
9. Trump, Xi to both pay state visits to S. Korea during APEC gathering
10. The Leak That Targeted the Leakers
11. N. Korea breaks ground on memorial museum for its troops deployed for Russia's war with Ukraine
12. Around 20 N. Korean soldiers briefly cross MDL, retreat after warning shots
13. Unification minister calls on N. Korea's Kim, Trump to meet on occasion of APEC gathering
14. Vice FM highlights S. Korea's role in safeguarding peace on Korean Peninsula on U.N. Day
15. Major protests planned against Trump, Xi in Gyeongju ahead of APEC summit
16. All eyes on Trump's appearance at APEC CEO Summit
1. An Emboldened Kim Nudges Trump for a Sitdown
I have not seen any "nudging" from Kim Jong Un. Of course we do not see what may be happening behind the scenes. But Kim is surely emboldened as a member of the Dark Quad or CRInK.
An Emboldened Kim Nudges Trump for a Sitdown
Trump has repeatedly touted his “very good relationship” with the North Korean leader.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2025-10-23/north-korea-s-kim-jong-un-uses-missiles-to-prod-trump-for-a-meeting?sref=hhjZtX76
By Soo-Hyang Choi
October 23, 2025 at 6:00 AM EDT
Welcome to Balance of Power, bringing you the latest in global politics. If you haven’t yet, sign up here.
As the world’s attention turns to a looming showdown between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in South Korea, across the demarcation line, Kim Jong Un is floating the idea of a meeting with the US leader in his own way.
South Korea, which hosts the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit next week, has downplayed the likelihood of a Trump-Kim encounter.
But there’s a reason for all the chatter about it happening — not least North Korea’s recent missile launches.
In 2019, when Trump and Kim last met in the Demilitarized Zone that separates the two Koreas, it was the US leader’s invitation while in the region that initiated the encounter.
Trump, who prides himself as a peacemaker, has repeatedly touted his “very good relationship” with Kim — the same leader he once mocked as “little rocket man.” Kim reminisced last month over his fond memories of Trump and said he’s open to a meeting.
Trump and Kim walk toward the South Korean border in June 2019.Photographer: Brendan Smialowski/AFP/Getty Images
If it happens, questions linger over whether it would amount to anything more than a glorified photo-op.
In the years since talks to denuclearize the peninsula collapsed, Kim has recast his image from pariah into global player — a transformation underscored when he stood shoulder to shoulder with Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin at a Beijing military parade in September.
Kim then staged his own parade flanked by high-profile guests from China, Russia and Vietnam. There, he showcased his latest Hwasong-20 intercontinental ballistic missile designed to attack the US mainland — signaling his determination to expand and modernize his nuclear arsenal.
Kim has in any case set a condition of dropping denuclearization demands.
It’s unclear how much traction his bid for attention is gaining. There’s little indication either side is seriously preparing a potential summit.
But the message from Pyongyang to Trump is loud and clear.
If he were to revisit the idea of resuming dialogue, he’ll face a far more emboldened Kim than the leader he met six years ago.
Kim and his daughter watch what North Korea says is the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile.Source: Korean Central News Agency/AP Photo
2. The Division of Korea: a roadmap for the cold war
Someexcellent and unique analysis. If only the 39th Parallel - would there have been a Korean War? Would Kim Il Sung have come to power? Would there be unification now. Korean history still has global impact.
The Division of Korea: a roadmap for the cold war
In 1945, the US negotiated with itself to divide a peninsula unnecessarily while knowing the Russians could not be trusted
https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/the-division-of-korea-a-roadmap-for?publication_id=773227&post_id=161372482&isFreemail=false&r=7i07&triedRedirect=true
Matt Armstrong
Oct 23, 2025
Korea is rightly considered to have a pivotal role in the cold war that emerged after the hot war of World War II.1 Well, sort of. It’s common to start such a conversation with the Korean War and its role in the cold war. These narratives often ignore why the peninsula was divided. If the topic is addressed, it’s usually superficially, as if partition was inevitable, comparable to the division of Europe. Sometimes, there is a mention of why the Americans chose a particular dividing line. The truth, however, is more troubling: the United States prioritized what it perceived as Russian interests above its own or Korea’s, even though it recognized Moscow could not be trusted to honor agreements. This is a story of Russian political warfare that not only shaped political outcomes in Korea and Europe but also manipulated contemporary and historical narratives.
A recent example of the superficial analysis comes from the Economist’s “A short history of the Koreas, in eight maps.” Tomas Pueyo, writing at Uncharted Territories, provided a much better and more accurate analysis of the partition than most in “Why Did Korea Split?” Pueyo, however, omitted considerable and relevant details, probably because they aren’t generally known.
As for the Economist, here is what it said about the post-WWII division of Korea:
On August 15th 1945 Japan announced its surrender to the Allies, ending the second world war (and Japan’s occupation of Korea). The Soviet army had already entered Korea; American forces were 600 miles away. To stop the peninsula falling into Russian hands, the Americans proposed dividing it along the 38th parallel. The Soviets, to America’s surprise, agreed.
Korea had been a unified country for almost 1,300 years. Now, at the stroke of a pen, it was divided along a line with no historical, cultural or geographical significance to Koreans.
Neither the Americans nor the Soviets intended the division to last. But as Kim returned home from the Soviet Union and Rhee from lobbying the Americans in Washington, dc, each sought to bring the peninsula under his rule. In 1948 the United Nations (un) called for elections in Korea. The North Koreans objected, so elections were only held in the south. These led to the foundation of the Republic of Korea on August 15th, the third anniversary of Japan’s defeat. The North held elections ten days later, forming the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Soviets and Americans largely withdrew, leaving two Koreas that both claimed the entire peninsula.
The Soviets were happy with the American offer of the 38th parallel. Why not? Moscow had historically asked for a division farther north. There had been no negotiation; it was a unilateral gift to Moscow. The third paragraph is misleading in the absence of detail. In addition to the 38th, the US forces were slow to move to the peninsula because they didn’t care. The north, under Moscow’s guidance, severed transport, electricity, and trade connections with the south, which was just part of a string of violations of agreements regarding Korea. The US just went along because it didn’t care and because Washington was desperate to keep Moscow in the new United Nations. There was no meaningful reciprocation from Russia.
The division was not an accident, nor was it predetermined or unavoidable. It was, throughout, a failure of the US to hold the Soviet Union to agreements it made and for the US to stand by the principles it espoused, worsened by the US ceding, unnecessarily, on several fronts (including allowing the two Soviet Socialist Republics, essentially states within the Soviet Union, to become founding UN members, which was better than Stalin’s request that each SSR be a founding member).
All of the elements of the cold war that would later emerge in Europe were first evident in Korea. We see the use of political warfare, the abrogation of agreements, including the sealing of borders that weren’t supposed to be subject to a barrier, lies and manipulation, and Stalin’s opportunity to leverage his three UN seats.
The Korean War further militarized US foreign policy, reinforcing a focus on military strength-driven diplomacy and a marginalization of the means of defending against Russian political warfare. This militarization resulted in the abandonment of principles the US had previously espoused, notably national determination and the promotion of democratic ideas. The US essentially gave Russian political warfare a free hand as a matter of policy and institutional preferences, marginalizing what proactive efforts and countermeasures there were, and often undermining them.2
As retired Admiral Arleigh A. Burke testified before Congress in 1964, the US government lacked interest, foresight, and training to anticipate and guard against the political, and thus also diplomatic and psychological, manipulation waged by the North Koreans at a meeting shortly after the start of the war to end the conflict.3 He argued that the US government operated reactively, narrowly, and without a long-term strategy.
There has been a cold war ever since World War II. It is unconventional, it is psychological, it is subversive, it is political, and it is propaganda warfare; and we seem never to realize that this is a contentious proposition. We take action when things appear to be bad, and when things appear to slacken off, then we forget all about it. And we don’t take action in all the fields, even when we do take action.
In 1947, American philosopher and political theorist James Burnham suggested that the path toward a cold war may have started in April 1944. Although this event is seen as a key moment, it was not a turning point, and Burnham admitted that choosing it was somewhat arbitrary.
The Third World War began in April 1944. The details of an incident that then took place have not been disclosed… The few ships of the remnant of the Greek Navy, operating as a unit under the British Mediterranean Command, were in the harbor at Alexandria. The Greek sailors, joined by some Greek soldiers stationed nearby, mutinied. It was not a serious revolt in either numbers or spirit. A few shots were fired, a few lives lost. The British rounded up the mutineers and placed them, for a while, in concentration camps. A few leaders were punished, but soon the trouble was patched up and forgotten. It was recalled briefly by some when, later, a short, bitter civil war broke out in Greece proper… The mutiny was led by members of an organization called ELAS…the military arm of a… seemingly heterogeneous alliance of various Greeks with various political and social views…directed by the Greek Communist Party. The Greek Communist Party, like all communist parties, is a section of the international communist movement. International communism is led, in all of its activities, from its supreme headquarters within the Soviet Union.
The significance of the event lay in the British Embassy’s phone call to the US State Department in February 1947, which sparked the Truman Doctrine. If the British had taken a different approach or delayed their successful transition, another early and obscure incident could have been seen as the spark that ignited the fire. When it comes to understanding Russian methods and goals, Alexandria should only get a footnote. The situation in Greece and Turkey in 1947 is important not because of Russia’s actions but because of the US response. A deeper look at the history shows that Russia’s opportunistic imperialism through non-military means started over a year earlier and was mostly unchecked and ignored until February 1947.
Russia refused to honor agreements made at the Yalta Conferences in Russian-occupied Eastern Europe, including the Declaration of Liberated Europe, to allow nations to “create democratic institutions of their own choice.” After Potsdam, it again undermined local will in countries where it installed regimes through its presence. Russia also did the same in Korea, having a significant but often overlooked impact on US policy. The events in Korea during 1945 and 1946 foreshadowed what happened in Europe in 1947, including political warfare, division, the US’s inconsequential response, and eventually, a ripple that became a tsunami as fears about possible events came true in 1950. While some US officials saw Russian actions in Korea, their warnings were mostly ignored, ultimately weakening US policy.
“Korea,” John Lewis Gaddis wrote, “like Germany, had been jointly occupied by Soviet and American forces at the end of World War II.” The division and occupation, he continued, were “more by accident than by design: that probably accounts for the fact that Moscow and Washington were able to agree without difficulty that the 38th parallel, which split the peninsula in half, would serve as a line of demarcation pending the creation of a single Korean government and the subsequent withdrawal of occupation forces.” There was nothing accidental about the division. It was the product of Russian imperialist opportunism that was intentional and mirrored, in principle, Russia’s occupation of Eastern Europe.
As historian Soon Sung Cho wrote, “The almost complete lack of coordination between the local occupation authority in Seoul and the policy planners in Washington” created “a constant source of confusion and inconsistency and thus further hindered the unification of Korea.” Cho also argued, “The basic fault of American Korean policy during this period thus seems to lie in the political indifference, incomprehension, and unpreparedness of American military planners.” However, this was an understatement. The issue was not just with US military planners. Senior US leadership was indifferent to Korea’s impact on US security and how the US viewed the post-war world, and this leadership refused, despite mounting evidence, to understand that Russian intransigence had a specific, deliberate purpose. It was not only the US military planners who were unprepared then and during the subsequent events.
The US squandered opportunities, while Moscow exploited America’s indifference and lack of concern. The events in Korea in 1945 were not predetermined; instead, they were facilitated by US disinterest and complacency, even as US diplomats saw warning signs and cautioned about an inevitable outcome. This passivity toward Russia’s actions resulted in the division of Korea, setting the stage for the 1950 invasion from the north that shaped US foreign policy as reactive and militarily driven.
The 38th parallel was selected for military convenience, similar to the “line of contact” in Europe. Unlike Europe, Korea would be under a trusteeship with a single occupation zone. At the 1943 Cairo conference, “The Three Great Allies,” the joint communiqué from the US, GB, and Russia stated, “are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” Moscow apparently had no intention of honoring the agreement, either in letter or in spirit, just as it failed to uphold the same in Eastern Europe. By the time of the Cairo agreement, Moscow was already training cadres, including Kim Il Sung, to take control of Korea. US officials often referred to this Cairo Declaration as a roadmap in a hopeful gesture while never pressing Moscow to agree to concrete, measurable terms for the unification of the Korean Peninsula. Hope was not a strategy.
The State Department prepared working papers on Korea in preparation for the February 1945 Yalta Conference. The department recommended that “an interim international administration or trusteeship should be established” under the joint control of the US, Great Britain, China, and Russia. China was included not just because of its regional interests but also because Roosevelt believed it would emerge as one of the major powers for postwar peace and stability alongside the United States, Great Britain, and Russia. The State Department advised that joint governance should be carried out as a single unit, “with all of Korea administered as a single unit and not as separate zones.” However, Roosevelt often operated as his own diplomat and didn’t always involve others in the decision-making process before or after meetings. This was one case where he left out his experts. Evidence indicates he didn’t read the State Department’s paper on Korea.
During the Yalta Conference, although Korea was not mentioned in the agreement, Roosevelt discussed the peninsula’s future with Stalin. The US president proposed a trusteeship for Korea to be jointly administered by the US and Russia until a suitable government could be established. There would be no occupation zones, and no foreign troops would be permanently stationed in Korea.
In April, Truman, now President following Roosevelt’s death, appointed James Byrnes as Secretary of State. Like Roosevelt before him, Byrnes often acted independently. However, unlike Roosevelt, Byrnes was not the President, which frustrated Truman over Byrnes’s failure to follow the President’s plans. He was ultimately replaced in January 1947 by George Marshall, the third Secretary of State under Truman and the fourth Secretary in twenty-five months.
The following month, Averill Harriman, then the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, stated that the Yalta Agreement should be “re-examined in the light of the fact that Russia has not observed its part of that contract,” now that the war in Europe had ended. Regarding Roosevelt’s proposal for a Korean trusteeship, Navy Secretary James Forrestal noted that Stalin replied that there would be no need for a trusteeship if the Koreans could establish a satisfactory government. Already concerned about Russian policy, Harriman indicated that Moscow believed such a government “would unquestionably be a Bolshevik or Soviet government.”
Russia raised the issue of Korean trusteeship at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. However, the heads of state did not reach a final decision, so they referred it to the foreign ministers for further discussion. Byrnes showed little interest in Korea and was reluctant to become involved in issues he considered secondary, at best, to his primary focus of Europe, China, and the development of the United Nations. He lacked the enthusiasm to respond to Russia’s division of the peninsula. In contrast, Russia had a strong interest in Korea.
Moscow had sought some control over Korea since 1882 to access ice-free ports. Secret talks with Japan in 1896 and 1903 considered dividing the peninsula along the 38th or 39th parallel, with Russia preferring the latter. Russia would control the north and Pyongyang, while Japan would oversee the south and Seoul.
As Japan sought terms of surrender on August 10, Byrnes instructed the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for a joint Russia-US occupation of the peninsula, with the “line as far north as possible.” The Army’s advisor to the Committee, Brigadier General George Lincoln, “took a guess at how far the Soviets could get, and he decided on the thirty-eighth parallel, although he was not convinced the Soviets would respect any line.” Questioning his own decision, he called Colonel Charles “Tic” Bonesteel and Colonel Dean Rusk for validation. He gave them thirty minutes to do so.
Bonesteel and Rusk knew US forces were six hundred miles away from Korea and that the Soviets were in northern Korea. Bonesteel understood how these sorts of things worked and wanted to leverage existing political boundaries, which often also aligned with geographic features. Making an already bad setup worse, the Colonels only had a 1942 National Geographic map of “Asia and Adjacent Areas” that provided virtually no meaningful detail to work with.
Screenshot from National Geographic’s website, where the 1942 map can be purchased. https://www.natgeomaps.com/hm-1942-asia-and-adjacent-areas
They initially chose the 39th parallel, but their map wasn’t accurate enough to clearly demarcate the boundary, so they ceded more territory and selected the 38th parallel. Moving the line south wasn’t a problem for the Colonels: they figured the 39th was too far north for the Soviets to accept anyway.
Admiral Matthias B. Gardner reviewed Bonesteel and Rusk’s proposal and recommended moving the line of separation north to the 39th parallel, which aligned with Forrestal and Harriman’s views. Lincoln, however, “contended that the Soviets would not accept such a line, nor could the US reasonably hope to reach points further north.” The chairman of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State “for political affairs outside of Latin America,” argued Secretary of State Byrnes would support Lincoln’s assessment.4
The Committee accepted the 38th parallel on August 13 and Truman signed off on August 14. General Douglas MacArthur officially received the decision the next day, and the line of separation was included in General Order No. 1 for the surrender of Japan on August 17.
From a military perspective, the 38th parallel was a nightmare: it sliced through mountains, valleys, provincal boundaries, and rivers. But, the line was supposed to be temporary; it was to have “no political meaning, no place in the history of the country.” In October 1945, the State Department’s Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs reaffirmed the division as temporary and pending elimination to unify the peninsula.
The present division of Korea, north and south of latitude 38, into Russian and American zones of occupation was made for military operational purposes and for purposes of surrender. It is manifestly unsatisfactory from the standpoint of [the] administration of the country, and we hope to work out with our Soviet Allies, who are in the northern half of the country, a liaison and understanding which will solve many administrative problems prior to the establishment of a trusteeship in which we expect the Allies principally interested in Korea to participate.
It is not clear that the Soviets could even get down to the 38th, or even the 40th, parallel in sufficient numbers by the time the US could, but that required interest and action on the part of the US. Moscow’s troops were held up at the Soviet border with Korea.
The US, however, could have arrived earlier and landed farther north, potentially in Pyongyang or even further in Manchuria. The US had the means and logistics for this northerly landing, and the Japanese, like the Germans, expressed a preference to surrender to US troops rather than to the Soviets. But Korea was a non-issue to the Americans: describing the peninsula as a low priority to Byrnes or MacArthur would seem to be generous.
A map showing the 39th parallel as the line of separation on the Korean Peninsula. I asked Gemini, Perplexity, and ChatGPT to generate a map using the 39th parallel. The results were poor, which I’ll share in a later post. I’m thankful for this map, which comes from https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/personal-though-exercise-on-what-if-on-korean-war.530002/. There, the author argues the 39th parallel made more sense militarily.
Harriman’s earlier concern was justified. When the US military finally arrived at the Korean port city of Incheon on September 8, 1945, they were met by a delegation from the Moscow-backed northern government. The Russians had arrived four weeks earlier and made effective use of that time, establishing an interim civil government with Moscow-trained Korean leaders who “came to the capital city of Pyongyang copiously supplied with pictures of Joseph Stalin and Communist flags.” With the help of their Russian advisors, the Koreans seized control of the remaining political levers after decades of Japanese occupation and silenced any opposition.
The Russians swiftly started sealing the border between the industrialized north and the agrarian south, following the line of separation. Electric power lines crossing the border were cut, rail lines were severed, and Russian-trained, equipped, supported, and armed Koreans patrolled the line to limit cross-border activity. Trade dwindled before completely halting. The US military commander in the south protested to his Russian counterpart without results. Without coal, chemicals, and other materials typically shipped from the north to the south, the southern economy began to collapse and faced severe inflation.
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While hope shouldn’t be a strategy, the US continued to believe that Moscow would uphold the Cairo discussions about Korea, even though these were never ratified and despite Moscow’s already established pattern of ignoring its agreements. Truman’s September 1945 statement, “Concerning Independence of Korea,” reads as naïve and out of step with the knowledge of that time, not to mention months or decades later.
The surrender of the Japanese forces in Seoul, [the] ancient Korean capital, heralds the liberation of a freedom-loving and heroic people. Despite their long and cruel subjection under the warlords of Japan, the Koreans have kept alive their devotion to national liberty and to their proud cultural heritage… Such Japanese as may be temporarily retained are being utilized as servants of the Korean people and of our occupying forces only because they are deemed essential by reason of their technical qualifications… The building of a great nation has now begun with the assistance of the United States, China, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, who are agreed that Korea shall become free and independent.
As the Russians further sealed the border and entrenched the northern government, the US remained inexplicably hopeful that Moscow would change its mind. On October 15, Congressman Michael Mansfield, a Democrat from Montana, speaking from the House floor, said, “Korea was promised her eventual independence in the Cairo Declaration, and the one country which I think is in the most advantageous position to help her achieve that status is China.” In a radio broadcast on January 19, 1946, the State Department’s Director of Far Eastern Affairs, John Carter Vincent, told listeners,
At Cairo, President Roosevelt, Premier Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek promised independence to Korea, and the Soviet Union, in adhering to the Potsdam Declaration, is also committed to independence for Korea. These four powers are determined to carry out their commitment and to see to it that Korea has a stable democratic government strong enough to stand on its own feet. Korea must not become an international political football.
The US proposed a Joint American-Soviet Commission to work toward a provisional, unified, democratic government for the Korean Peninsula. China and Great Britain would be consulted in this effort, but the decision-making authority would rest solely with Russia and the United States. A pathway “to provide for the establishment of democracy in both the political and economic fields” failed to gain traction.
A framework for the commission was established during the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. In March 1946, the joint commission convened to eliminate the division and form a provisional Korean government. Unsurprisingly, the Soviets and the Americans could not agree on the definition of “democratic,” and the commission adjourned on May 8, 1946. Although attempts were made to revitalize the body, Russian demands revealed their manipulation of the process. The “democratic and social organizations” in the North, which Moscow controlled completed, were, Moscow insisted, to, along with their southern counterparts, have “equal rights and opportunities in consultation with the Joint Commission.” The Russians systematically excluded from both the northern and southern cohorts groups and individuals from potential consultation with the commission who did not support expanding the Korean-Soviet government to the south.
Moscow dismissed further appeals for a unified and independent Korea. Though the US had been compliant in Europe, it became less so with Korea and raised the issue of unification at the UN in 1947. The UN General Assembly voted for a Korean national election in 1948 and authorized a nine-member UN Commission on Korea to oversee the process. One of these members was Ukraine. Ukraine, along with Belarus, was permitted to join the UN as an “independent state” in a concession to Stalin to secure Moscow’s involvement in the international organization. Ukraine refused to fulfill its duties and did not attend any of its meetings, hampering any potential effectiveness of the commission.
Russia refused to grant the commission access to its northern occupation zone. In response to the successful election in the south, which established Seoul as the capital, North Korea adopted a constitution similar to that of Russian-occupied Bulgaria. Russia withdrew its troops in 1948 only after it “left behind them a well-trained and well-equipped North Korean People’s Army vastly superior to [elected South Korean leader] Syngman Rhee’s forces in the south.” The stage was set for the eventual escalation in Korea that Stalin was unwilling to undertake in Europe.
The State Department had long known about Moscow’s efforts to subvert Korea. Harriman’s comments were likely informed by at least two of the department’s Foreign Service Officers in Europe who were sending cables on the situation in Korea, which they compared to the Russian efforts in Europe and specifically their takeover in Bulgaria.
On January 29, 1946, Joseph E. Jacobs, who led the US legation to Albania in 1945, telegraphed Washington about a “marked increase in Soviet prestige and activity in Albania” and aggression toward the US presence there. While not proof of specific actions, the subsequent exchange was. Jacobs included the US legation in Moscow on these top-secret cables. On February 1, just weeks before he sent the “Long Telegram,” George Kennan responded to Washington and Jacobs. The “Pattern described by Jacobs,” Kennan wrote, “is so familiar from [the US legation in] Moscow standpoint that there can, in our opinion, be little doubt as to who is pulling [the] strings in Albania.” Kennan added that only quick and strong action could stop or even reverse these moves. “If we react quickly and with vigor, these persons may find themselves subject to criticism by their own superiors for having acted impulsively and gone too far… But if we start by acquiescing in petty annoyances, either because they seem too petty to discuss or because we wish to avoid unpleasantness, we may rest assured that the encroachments will be progressive and that [the] final result can only be to render our mission entirely ineffective.”
The conversation between Jacobs and Kennan continued. On February 8, Jacobs cabled that he concurred “heartily” with Kennan’s advice to react with vigor. “If we acquiesce without vigorous protest against conduct [by the] Soviet authorities who within [a] few weeks after recognizing a Balkan state cram[med] their ideology down the throats of the [government] recognized and inaugurated through their puppets, a program of fear and reprisal against all opposition including that [is] obviously incapable of overthrowing [government] and thus nullify every attribute of a truly democratic state, we may expect Soviet authorities to follow exactly [the] same pattern in Rumania and Bulgaria and even Korea once recognition is accorded.”
The US never responded strongly, however. Byrnes showed little interest in Asia and made minimal effort to oppose Moscow’s attempts to divide Korea, setting the stage for war just five years later. In his dealings with Russia, Byrnes acted as an appeaser. Herbert Feis wrote that Truman expressed his dissatisfaction with Byrnes because the Secretary failed “in securing the terms which he, himself, had failed to obtain at Potsdam.” Truman outlined his concerns in a letter he sent to Byrnes.
I do not think we should play compromise any longer. We should refuse to recognize Rumania [sic] and Bulgaria until they comply with our requirements; we should let our position on Iran be known in no uncertain terms… We should rehabilitate China and create a strong central government there. We should do the same for Korea… I’m tired of babying the Soviets.
While the early cold war mainly focused on Europe, Korea played a key role when northern forces invaded the South on June 25, 1950. The acceptad narrative often downplays or ignores how this division happened, and rarely considers the path toward 1950 was laid by the Americans in 1945.
In the end, Moscow found more success in Korea using a strategy similar to the one it used in Eastern Europe. In both cases, the US was hesitant to enforce agreements made by Russia, such as allowing the UN commission access to the North, to avoid risking the international system that Russia seemed intent on disrupting and undermining. The move Moscow made by allowing two of its imperial states to become independent UN members enabled it to push its subversive influence here.
A select bibliography for this post can be found here.
1
Yes, cold war is lowercase because that was the standard practice until the early 1960s, when normalization transformed *a* cold war into *the* Cold War, making the label a proper noun. Despite grand narratives that ignore this transformation, often leading to problematic projections of later interpretations backward, some historians recognized the shift. John Lewis Gaddis, for example, wrote that Russia lost by 1962, while Denna Frank Flemming asserted Russia won in 1960. Anders Stephanson, in 2007, declared “the cold war was really over in 1963” (yes, Stephanson used the lowercase form).
2
The US came to view nationalist movements as products of Russian political warfare, sometimes because they were, but ultimately because the US policy of military-strength diplomacy opposed institutional and policy capacity to proactively inhibit and reactively undermine Russian manipulation. That’s for a different story.
3
“We had about 10 days in which to prepare ourselves to negotiate with the Communists. During those 10 days, we picked up every book that we could get…There was only one good one. I think it was Operations of the Politbureau or something like that. When we started negotiating with the Communists, it became very apparent in the first few minutes that they were taking advantage of us. They were skillful propagandists. They were using the occasion to show the whole world that we had been defeated… [It was determined that negotiations would be held in Kaesong, and our team, five of us, went up to Kaesong in helicopters… We were met by North Korean and Chinese troops, and there was a thick cordon of troops around the landing field, white flags all over it. We were put in jeeps, and the jeep that I was assigned to was a captured American jeep, as they all were; a bullet hole through the windshield, blood on the seat, the name “Lucy” on the jeep. I don’t know whether this was American blood or not, but it was quite obvious that the impression they wanted to give was that they had captured this jeep, killed the driver, and it was their jeep. A great big white flag—no other identification—a great big white flag on the front of the jeep, and we went up with an escort, a military escort of the Communists, through, again, a cordon of troops clear to the negotiating building… we had to walk perhaps a hundred yards, again through a cordon of troops, with submachine guns following each man as we came up, and, for example, one young Korean was standing in front of a bush, and he had to be out in the path a little bit. He was perhaps 15 or 16 years old, and as I was walking up there, he put the machine gun muzzle in my stomach. It was just a little bit more than I could take at that time, because I was fed up with this, and I took the machine gun away from him, which was a foolish thing to do, but fortunately, his finger wasn’t on the trigger or his automatic reaction would have been bad for me. But this was an example of the propaganda—movie cameras grinding all the time, with Americans coming up to surrender at this negotiation.”
4
Dunn’s exact title is unclear (to me, at this time), but it was clear that he had a broad remit. He moved into that role on January 1, 1945. Before then, he had been the Assistant Secretary of State “in charge of European, Near Eastern, African, and Far Eastern Affairs.” In January 1944, his title was “Advisor to the Secretary of State on Political Relations for the European Area,” according to a State Department publication.
Recommend Arming for the War We're In to your readers
Discussing the past and present of political warfare and public diplomacy
3. Inchon’s Real Story: A Misalignment of Policy, War Aims, and War Plans
I recall my operational art lectures at Leavenworth. Still so much to learn from the study of Operations Chromite.
Inchon’s Real Story: A Misalignment of Policy, War Aims, and War Plans - Military Strategy Magazine
Jay Pasquarette - United States Department of the Army, Headquarters
https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/inchons-real-story-a-misalignment-of-policy-war-aims-and-war-plans/
Jay Pasquarette is an active-duty Army officer and Strategic Planner for the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). He is a graduate of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the United States Armed Forces, the Department of the Army, or the U.S. Department of Defense.
militarystrategymagazine.com
The Inchon landing in September 1950 remains a captivating case study of tactical brilliance masking profound strategic incoherence. Although celebrated as a daring and decisive military victory, the Inchon landing ultimately exemplifies an inversion of the policy-strategy-tactics paradigm. The operation’s success, though undeniable from a tactical and operational perspective, occurred within a context of ambiguous war aims and political divisions within the Truman Administration driven by anxieties about provoking intervention by China or the Soviet Union. The lack of a clearly defined strategic framework allowed the triumph at Inchon to dictate subsequent war aims, fueling an overly ambitious expansion of objectives driven by the intoxicating momentum of victory and amplified by domestic political pressures. The result was a weakening of civilian control over the military and the creation of conditions ripe for strategic setbacks later in the war, demonstrating the perilous consequences of allowing tactical victories to drive strategic decision-making. Although Inchon was conceived as a way to shift the war’s momentum, it did not predetermine the subsequent course of action. Other relevant factors, such as misinterpretations of Chinese signals and domestic political pressures, contributed to the decisions which ultimately led to Chinese intervention. Thus, Inchon’s true significance emerges not from its overwhelming tactical victory, but from how that success eventually laid bare critical weaknesses in the overarching strategic framework and policy process, revealing a system that prioritized battlefield success above strategic coherence.
Inchon’s Context
The Korean War, often overlooked in American historical memory, erupted unexpectedly in East Asia, jolting the US foreign policy establishment awake and igniting fears of a global conflict in the nascent nuclear age. North Korea’s invasion forced the United States to confront the complexities of limited warfare. The amphibious landing at Inchon on September 15, 1950, stands as a particularly provocative turning point in the war, a moment scrutinized for its operational brilliance and broader strategic implications. Max Hastings observed that “For all its undisputed Korean provenance, the name Inchon possesses a wonderfully resonant American quality. It summons a vision of military genius undulled by time, undiminished by more recent memories of Asian defeat.”[1] The landing’s impact was dramatic. It relieved the besieged Pusan Perimeter, reclaimed the strategically vital city of Seoul, and drew the attention of both China and the Soviet Union. However, Inchon’s operational success was far from guaranteed, and the interplay of personalities, political pressures, and military considerations surrounding the operation warrants careful examination. The landing itself, the planning process, and the subsequent strategic decisions reveal timeless lessons about the complex relationship between tactics, strategy, and political objectives in wartime. An analysis of these factors illuminates the enduring tension between operational brilliance and strategic coherence, offering crucial insights for policymakers and military leaders navigating contemporary challenges. As one of the first major conflicts of the post-World War II era, the Korean War served as a formative experience in the development of limited war doctrine and challenged previously accepted norms of civil-military relations. Understanding this evolving strategic landscape is therefore crucial to accurately assessing the events surrounding Inchon and the impact of the operation itself.
Operation Chromite, as the Inchon landing was codenamed, involved a daring amphibious assault on a fortified port city considered by many to be unsuitable for such an operation. The challenges were numerous: extreme tidal variations, narrow channels, high seawalls, and surrounding elevated terrain all favored the defenders. Despite these obstacles, General MacArthur pushed for Inchon, believing its strategic location outweighed the tactical risks. The landing force, comprised primarily of US Marines, faced fierce resistance but ultimately overwhelmed the North Korean defenders. The subsequent capture of Seoul, just 26 kilometers inland, delivered a psychological blow to North Korea and boosted morale in the South. While the operation inflicted heavy casualties on the North Korean forces at Inchon, it did not achieve the complete destruction of the North Korean army, a key element of MacArthur’s broader strategic vision. The element of surprise, coupled with the audacity of the operation, contributed significantly to its tactical success, but the long-term strategic consequences remained uncertain and contingent upon subsequent political and military decisions.
Politics, War Aims and War Plans
At the beginning of the Korean War, American objectives were limited, and consisted of ensuring that the North Korean attack would not succeed.[2] However, as the war progressed through the summer of 1950 and planning for Operation Chromite gained momentum, American war aims experienced a mission creep and became simultaneously expansive and muddled.[3] Political support for intervention in Korea, whether it be through Inchon or another location, was a derivative of the Truman Administration’s fear that it would be labeled as the administration that lost Korea while the loss of China to a communist regime was fresh in the minds of the American polity. Initial signals that there was a reluctance to intervene militarily were met with a scathing backlash from Congressional Republicans, and by the American populace who feared the spread of communism.[4] Although these political pressures made MacArthur’s Inchon plan more salient, they did not necessarily translate into clearly defined war aims due to competing considerations and the inherent difficulties in achieving political consensus during wartime. This was partially due to serious divisions within the Truman Administration over policy disagreements about a possible crisis mobilization and how the war would affect the 1951 defense budget.[5] These divisions manifested in the stymying of policy formulation as the military prepared for a risky and bold maneuver. Clearly and publicly defining political objectives for the war prior to the Inchon landing could have drawn the ire of the Soviet Union or China and potentially removed the prospect of greater U.S. strategic gains following the operation. However, it would have also affirmed the supremacy of policy over military strategy, enabling the Truman Administration to more effectively consolidate the gains acquired from a military victory at Inchon. Alternatively, the incoherent and ill-defined approach allowed the victory to result in unconstrained military actions. Instead of clearly defined political goals determining war aims to guide the planning and execution of war plans, the successful execution of war plans determined war aims within a framework of loosely defined political goals. Although Inchon’s success created an environment ripe for mission creep and overconfidence, Chinese intervention was not guaranteed. A strategy focused on consolidating gains south of the 38th parallel and clear communication of limited objectives to China might have averted the escalation that followed. However, Inchon’s role in dramatically altering the strategic landscape magnified the impact of subsequent decisions and created a momentum that proved difficult to resist within the context of unclear strategic and policy goals for the peninsula.
Contradictions of NSC 81/1
In early September, as planning and preparations for the Inchon operation progressed into its final stages, the authorities within the National Security Council (NSC) and those closest to the President concluded that the United States was in no position to commit itself to a single course of action.[6] This is further revealed by of National Security Council Report 81/1, a document titled United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea that was published a mere six days before the Inchon landing. This document was a product of several months of deliberations about the strategic calculus for the war. Its muddled and contradictory verbiage was indicative of the tenuous expansion of war aims.[7] NSC 81/1 stated that military actions north of the 38th parallel were “beyond the accomplishment of this mission.”[8] Alternatively, the document also stated “the U.N. Commander would receive authorization to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations in pursuance of a roll-back in Korea north of the 38th parallel.”[9] Upon its publication, Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) Chairman General Bradley called the document a “masterpiece of obfuscation.”[10] At the core of the NSC’s hesitancy to provide more clarity was the unknown dispositions of the Soviet Union and China towards the war. Policymakers allowed the obscuration of this crucial variable to deter them from differentiating opportunities from risks within the various options in front of them.
Despite NSC 81/1’s ambiguity and confounding language, the Truman Administration demonstrated an increased appetite for an expanded war before Operation Chromite. This included even President Truman himself, who declared during a speech on September 1st, 1950, that “Koreans have a right to be free, independent, and united…Under the direction and guidance of the United Nations, we, with others, will do our part to help them enjoy that right.”[11] Furthermore, although the phraseology of NSC 81/1 was contradictory, a net comparison of the positive and negative language in the document reveals a slight predisposition towards boldness and expanding political objectives. However, the subtle interests in the unification of the peninsula as a policy were never translated into a clear political end state prior to Inchon. The Inchon landing, rather than a means to a defined end, became an end in itself, deciding whether Korean War policy would pursue reunification or remain limited to the 38th parallel.[12] This shift occurred as Inchon’s triumph solidified the view against allowing North Korea to salvage a draw, reversing the previously undecided sentiments about the peninsula’s balance of power. Clausewitz tells us that “The strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose…The aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it.”[13] President Truman and the foreign policy establishment defied Clausewitz when they allowed political disagreements within their ranks and fear of the unknown to prevent them from defining a clear aim.
NSC 81/1’s contradictory language, while frustrating to military leaders, also reflected the inherent challenges of formulating policy in a complex and uncertain environment. The document reflected the inherent tension between the ideal of clearly defined policy goals and the reality of politically expedient ambiguity by balancing competing political demands and strategic coherence. Ultimately, the Truman Administration clearly opted for political expediency to reduce the risk of provoking a wider conflict and of alienating domestic political constituencies.
Catastrophic Victory
Another factor that contributed to the elevation of tactics over strategy was the element of catastrophic victory that Operation Chromite’s overwhelming success produced. Since most policymakers and military leaders likely doubted that the operation would succeed, they did not account for the consequences of a successful tactical outcome. Despite his bullishness on the plan for Inchon, even General MacArthur himself acknowledged the inherent risk in the operation and described it as a “desperate gamble.”[14] The nature of complex amphibious operations, requiring the aggressor to combine surprise, firepower, airpower, combined arms, and joint operations in an often unpredictable environment, makes them dubious tactical and operational tasks in opportune conditions. The immense task of synchronizing these efforts during a condensed operational planning timeline combined with the hydrographical complexities therein pushed Operation Chromite into the threshold of unacceptable risk. Murphy’s law had likely never seemed so inevitable. The pessimistic outlook about Inchon’s prospects for success were likely reinforced by the experience of those who participated in amphibious operations during World War II, when catastrophic failures like Tarawa stimulated doctrinal adjustments that resulted in successful amphibious operations later in the war.[15] Once the results of the Inchon invasion became apparent, members of the JCS were “perhaps somewhat overawed.”[16] In the weeks following the landing, the JCS relinquished their hold on military decision-making as events unfolded rapidly, thus abandoning their mandate to advise policymakers about military decisions. A message from the JCS to MacArthur dated September 29th stated “we are proud of the great successes you have achieved,” and “we remain completely confident in the great task entrusted to you.”[17] The following day, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall sent MacArthur a message stating “We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th parallel.”[18]
The same phenomenon occurred at the political level. Dean Acheson admitted that Inchon “succeeded brilliantly,” and that “there’s no stopping MacArthur now.”[19] The success of the operation combined with the breakout of the Eighth Army from the Pusan perimeter intensified psychological and domestic political pressures on the Truman Administration to move quickly.[20] Truman’s ability to personally exercise control over the war became even more paralyzed, and White House staffers agonized over how to get the President to “be more commander-in-chief and less captive to MacArthur’s reputation.”[21] These dynamics likely contributed to the eventual collapse of relations between Truman and MacArthur, as the latter felt increasingly emboldened to make consequential decisions with political and strategic consequences. This was demonstrated on November 6th, when MacArthur approved the bombing of Yalu River bridges without consulting with Washington or the JCS, which clearly violated the previously agreed-upon principle to steer clear of the Manchurian and Soviet borders.[22] More crucially, the gap in strategic thought defined by an inability to consider the consequences of success prior to Inchon created conditions that supplanted policy goals for military objectives and shackled the Truman Administration’s ability to exercise control over the direction of the war.
The Limits of Operational Success
The Americans badly needed a victory on September 15th, 1950. General MacArthur risked significant political capitol and legendary status acquired over several decades of military service by gambling on Inchon. The military planners, staffs, and leaders who either opposed Inchon or were consigned to its execution likely felt an incredible sense of relief when the operation succeeded after months of intense preparations and personal investment. Inchon provided Truman with a political victory over those who questioned his commitment to checking communism abroad, despite his administration’s incredulousness about Inchon’s prospects for success. The military success resulting from the Inchon landing should be lauded. Its application of surprise, bold action, prudent risk mitigation, and operational art to achieve undisputed victory is a rare occurrence in warfare. Inchon’s tactical and operational success prevented the outright defeat of American and UN forces on the peninsula and reoriented the course of the war.
However, its planning and execution within a broader context of unclear political objectives and a defunct strategy dulled the military victory. It created conditions for strategic pitfalls after Inchon by allowing tactics to reign supreme. In the absence of developed ideas for the United States’ strategic and political objectives for Korea, MacArthur’s restrictions associated with the 38th parallel and subsequent military action were reluctantly removed by policymakers. Consequently, American strategic objectives briefly morphed into infeasible ideas about a forcible unification of the entire peninsula. This contributed to the eventual Chinese intervention and exacerbated existing divisions in civil-military relations to the point of no return. The Korean War, and the Inchon landing within it, serve as a crucial case study in the evolution of limited war doctrine. The challenges faced by the Truman Administration and General MacArthur in navigating the complexities if this conflict helped to shape the development of modern civil-military relations and limited war strategy. By examining the events surrounding Inchon, we can gain a deeper understanding of the enduring challenges of fighting limited wars and the importance of adapting strategic thinking to the unique constraints of each conflict. Inchon’s lessons for those concerned with matters of tactics and operations, strategy and policy, and war and peace are timeless and applicable to the unyielding nature of warfare as a political act.
References
[1] Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 99.
[2] Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969).
[3] Steven Nerheim, "NSC-81/1 and the Evolution of U.S. War Aims in Korea: June – October 1950," Strategy Research Report, U.S. Army War College, 2000, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA378379.
[4] Arthur H. Mitchell, Understanding the Korean War: The Participants, the Tactics, and the Course of Conflict (London: MacFarland and Company, 2013).
[5] Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from the North (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010).
[6] James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, Policy, and Direction: The First Year (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1992).
[7] Nerheim, "NSC-81/1,"
[8] National Security Council, NSC 81/1: United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea, September 9, 1950, 3-4, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/national-security-council-report-nsc-811-united-states-courses-action-respect-korea.
[9] NSC 81/1, 3-4.
[10] Omar Bradley, A General’s Life: An Autobiography by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 559.
[11] James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1950-1951. The Korean War: Part One (Washington D.C.: Office of Joint History, 1998), 98.
[12] Russell H. S. Stolfi, “A Critique of Pure Success: Inchon Revisited, Revised, and Contrasted,” The Journal of Military History 68, no. 2 (April 2004), https://www.jstor.org/stable/3397476.
[13] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 177.
[14] Thomas Ladenburg, From the Hot War to the Cold War (Rockland: Social Science Education Consortium, 2007), 73.
[15] Carter A. Malkasian, Charting the Pathway to OMFTS: A Historical Assessment of Amphibious Operations from 1941 to the Present, CRM D0006297.A2 (Alexandria, VA: CNA, July 2002), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA539339.pdf.
[16] J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 158.
[17] Department of the Army Staff Message Center Joint Chiefs of Staff, Message for MacArthur, Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 29, 1950), 1.
[18] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense Message, Joint Chiefs of Staff Message for MacArthur, Personal Correspondence from George C. Marshall (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 30, 1950), 1.
[19] Michael D. Pearlman, “Truman and MacArthur: The Winding Road to Dismissal,” Army Command and General Staff College Report, Combat Studies Institute, 2006, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA453948, 4.
[20] William Steuck, “American Strategy and the Korean Peninsula, 1945-1953,” International Journal of Korean Studies 5, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2001).
[21] Millett, The War for Korea, 252.
[22] Schnabel and Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff.
militarystrategymagazine.com
4. Jakarta gambles on embracing North Korea
Could we have a "Jakarta Channel?"
Excerpt:
In an era when diplomacy is too often reduced to alignment or containment, Indonesia’s approach is refreshingly defiant. Talking to Pyongyang doesn’t make Indonesia a sympathizer; it makes it a realist. By choosing engagement over avoidance, Jakarta reminds the region that diplomacy remains, at its core, the art of possibility.
Jakarta gambles on embracing North Korea
In an era when diplomacy is too often reduced to alignment or containment, Indonesia’s approach is refreshingly defiant
https://asiatimes.com/2025/10/jakarta-gambles-on-embracing-north-korea/?utm
asiatimes.com · Aniello Iannone
When Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Sugiono landed in Pyongyang in October 2025, the first such visit in more than a decade, it raised eyebrows across Asia’s diplomatic circles.
In a world fractured by sanctions and rivalry, Jakarta’s decision to reopen dialogue with one of the world’s most isolated regimes wasn’t just a courtesy call. It was a quiet assertion of agency, a calculated attempt to redefine Indonesia’s strategic autonomy at a time when middle powers are being forced to choose sides.
Indonesia’s foreign policy has long been guided by the principle of “free and active” diplomacy, formulated during the Cold War to preserve independence in a bipolar world. Yet in today’s multipolar environment, that doctrine must be reimagined in practice, not just rhetoric.
Engaging Pyongyang, a state under heavy UN sanctions and global suspicion, pushes the boundaries of what “free and active” means. The move shows Jakarta’s determination to act as an independent diplomatic player, one that refuses to let external powers decide who it may or may not engage.
The outcome of Sugiono’s visit was modest on paper. He met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui, renewed a memorandum of understanding on regular consultations, and discussed future cooperation in culture and education.
There were no major breakthroughs, no new economic initiatives and no talk of denuclearization. But the symbolism was powerful. Speaking directly with Pyongyang was, in itself, a statement: Indonesia would not be bound by inherited taboos or ideological lines drawn by others.
This kind of performative diplomacy, where the act of engagement carries more weight than its tangible results, is becoming a central feature of Indonesia’s international posture.
Under President Prabowo Subianto, Jakarta has been steadily expanding its portfolio of partnerships, deepening defense ties with the United States and Japan, widening economic relations with China, reopening dialogue with Russia and now extending a hand to Pyongyang.
Rather than inconsistency, this reflects a deliberate diversification strategy. Indonesia seeks to manage risk through redundancy, maintaining ties with all major players without becoming beholden to any.
Sugiono’s offer to facilitate North Korea’s participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) fits this pattern. The ARF remains one of the few regional platforms where North Korea, the United States, Japan and South Korea sit at the same table.
For Jakarta, acting as a bridge is both a diplomatic asset and a way to reinforce ASEAN’s relevance in Northeast Asia, an arena where Southeast Asia’s voice often fades. By reviving these channels, Indonesia signals that it is not merely reacting to external developments but actively shaping its regional environment.
Yet the risks are clear. Engagement with a heavily sanctioned state can easily be perceived as normalization. If Pyongyang fails to reciprocate by taking steps toward transparency or humanitarian openness, Indonesia may appear to be legitimizing a regime that continues to defy international norms.
Even subtle diplomatic gestures can create reputational costs, particularly with partners like Washington and Tokyo, which remain committed to strict enforcement of UN sanctions.
Still, for Jakarta, the potential benefits outweigh the risks. For a middle power, relevance no longer stems from military capacity alone but from the ability to keep multiple channels open when others close theirs. The ability to talk to everyone – friends, rivals, and outcasts alike – has become Indonesia’s diplomatic currency.
By engaging Pyongyang, Jakarta is not endorsing its policies but reinforcing its own sovereignty in foreign policy-making.
This is the logic of strategic autonomy as practiced by emerging middle powers across the Global South. They lack the leverage to dictate the global agenda, yet they wield enough legitimacy to mediate and reframe it.
Indonesia’s outreach to North Korea is less about results than about positioning, an effort to test how much space remains for independent diplomacy in an increasingly polarized world. Whether this gamble pays off will depend on what follows.
If the bilateral consultations become institutionalized, if Pyongyang resumes participation in ASEAN-led forums, or if even small humanitarian initiatives take root, Jakarta will have proven that symbolic diplomacy can open new doors. If none of that happens, the visit will still stand as a reminder that autonomy must be performed before it can be recognized.
In an era when diplomacy is too often reduced to alignment or containment, Indonesia’s approach is refreshingly defiant. Talking to Pyongyang doesn’t make Indonesia a sympathizer; it makes it a realist. By choosing engagement over avoidance, Jakarta reminds the region that diplomacy remains, at its core, the art of possibility.
Aniello Iannone is a lecturer in Southeast Asian Politics, Universitas Diponegoro (UNDIP), Indonesia
asiatimes.com · Aniello Iannone
5. Kim Jong Un says joint war effort with Russia outmatched ‘US and West’
Keep telling yourself that Great Dear Supreme Leader.
Your relationship with Russia and the entire Dark Quad or CRInK is based on fear, weakness, desperation, and envy.
Kim Jong Un says joint war effort with Russia outmatched ‘US and West’
DPRK leader kicks off construction of memorial and cemetery for troops who died fighting Ukraine
https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/kim-jong-un-says-joint-war-effort-with-russia-outmatched-us-and-west/
Colin Zwirko October 24, 2025
An artistic rendering of the neoclassical museum building and cemetery lawns appear behind Kim at the Oct. 23 ceremony | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Oct. 24, 2025)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un kicked off construction of a large cemetery and memorial for soldiers who died in Russia’s war against Ukraine on Thursday, according to state media, where he said the two countries’ “blood ties” outmatched participation in the war by the “U.S. and the West.”
Thousands of military construction workers and troops who fought in Russia — including those who have recovered from injuries — attended the ceremony to build the “Memorial Museum of Combat Feats at Overseas Military Operations.”
Kim gave a blood-themed speech at the event praising the war-forged DPRK-Russia alliance, saying “the solidarity and friendship forged at the cost of their precious blood and lives are really sacred and enduring,” the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Friday.
“Even the transfusion of a huge volume of blood by the United States and its Western bloc” — presumably referring to weapons and other military assistance to Ukraine — “turned out futile in making the righteous blood in the vessels of the two peoples cool, and even the appalling atrocities by fascism could not dampen the phoenix-like fighting spirit and valor,” Kim said.
Russian Ambassador Alexander Matsegora participated in the ceremony, alongside DPRK foreign minister Choe Son Hui, defense minister No Kwang Chol and Vice-Chairman of the CMC Pak Jong Chon | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Oct. 24, 2025)
The grave markers on the lawns surrounding the museum building appear behind Kim’s head on the top-left image. Commanders who led troops in Russia Ri Chang Ho (top left image) and Jon Yong Chan (bottom right) participated in the event as well. | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Oct. 24, 2025)
He added that the alliance’s “militant fraternity … will advance non-stop with the ennobling soul of the great heroes,” and that their joint war effort contributed significantly to “the long-term development of the bilateral friendship at the cost of precious blood.”
The speech comes amid faltering efforts by the U.S. and Ukraine to halt Russia’s invasion, and amid claims by Kyiv that the North Korean military is expanding its assistance in attacks on Ukraine soil.
At a military parade in Pyongyang earlier this month, Kim acknowledged that soldiers are still fighting overseas.
Kim said the Oct. 23 ceremony marked exactly a year since the last of the initial batch of DPRK soldiers departed for Russia.
The two countries denied evidence of DPRK soldiers fighting in Russia, and even Russia using North Korean ballistic missiles on Ukrainian civilian centers, for months until finally admitting their joint war effort in April this year.
State media said Kim “met and hugged combatants in overseas military operations who were present at the ceremony,” while state TV showed him grabbing and hugging every soldier down the line standing on the front row | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Oct. 24, 2025)
After Kim Jong Un left the event, organizers appeared to offer time to troops who fought in the war to interact with families of dead soldiers, perhaps allowing survivors to connect with the families of their fallen comrades | Image: KCTV (Oct .24, 2025)
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Pyongyang and Moscow have not disclosed how many soldiers have been deployed in total, but Seoul and Kyiv have said it is over 10,000.
Kim Jong Un then launched a domestic propaganda campaign to glorify the war in August, showing the portraits of at least 250 dead soldiers in state media and presenting their deaths and even battlefield suicides as heroic and necessary in the fight against “fascism.”
South Korean intelligence has claimed a much higher death toll of around 2,000 soldiers, though the true number remains unknown.
Besides serving as a permanent monument to growing Russia ties, Kim added that the memorial will also serve as an important education tool for North Koreans to learn about sacrifice for the state and gain “spiritual growth” as they carry “forward the bloodline of their strong predecessors.”
THE NEW MEMORIAL
On Thursday, Kim Jong Un said soldiers will build “a cemetery, a memorial hall and a monument” in eastern Pyongyang across from the new “Saebyol Street” skyscraper project under construction, where he plans to move all families of dead soldiers.
The Memorial Museum of Combat Feats at Overseas Military Operations (해외군사작전 전투위훈기념관) will include “a monument with group sculptures” depicting war scenes, “photos and fine art works that will give a truthful portrayal of how our combatants waged bloody battles with ardent patriotism,” and “relics of the hard-fought battles.”
“The exhibits will also include those featuring the words [soldiers] said when facing death — the whistles of their soul and the echoes of their life — as well as the last requests they made in reflection of their lifelong desires,” Kim said, according to KCNA.
The 2.6-hectare (6.4-acre) site appears to feature a lower level at the front with the large statue of soldiers in the center and walls of text on either side, and an upper level in the back with cemetery lawns and the neoclassical memorial building, surrounded by walls featuring war art. Bodyguards appeared to be closely watching attendees while holding bulletproof shields. | Image: KCNA (Oct. 24, 2025)
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The Rodong Sinmun published a close-up artistic rendering of the main neoclassical style memorial building | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Oct. 24, 2025)
Artistic renderings of the project were displayed at the event, showing a large white building in neoclassical architectural style surrounded by cemetery lawns with 240 gravestones and featuring a large statue of soldiers in battle.
NK Pro reported earlier this week that thousands of construction workers started gathering and building a temporary camp to the east of the new Central Cadres Training School between Oct. 18 and 20. The stage structure for Thursday’s groundbreaking ceremony appeared by Oct. 22.
It now appears that the large size of the workers’ camp is mostly related to the memorial project, though new land clearing nearby at the luxurious Kumsusan State Guesthouse for visiting world leaders this week suggests workers will also be assigned to improving guesthouse facilities.
“After the completion of Saeppyol Street, which is now under construction in the vicinity of this museum, the martyrs will always be near their beloved parents, wives, children and siblings, sharing thoughts and kindred feelings with them,” Kim said Thursday.
Aerial view showing possible Saebyol Street apartments in the background, Hwasong area project skyscrapers in the distant background, and the groundbreaking ceremony site in the foreground above Kim Jong Un’s motorcade | Image: KCTV (Oct. 24, 2025)
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This high-resolution satellite image taken last month shows the location of the new war memorial in eastern Pyongyang | Image: Planet Labs (Sept. 21, 2025), edited by NK News | Coordinates: 39.06788° N, 125.80233° E
Photos of the event showed skyscrapers in the background under construction but nearly complete, buildings that NK Pro previously reported were likely part of the Saebyol Street or Hwasong Street projects.
Kim said Thursday that he initially ordered construction of the memorial at a Central Military Commission (CMC) meeting in late May. State media did not mention the project at the time, though Russia disclosed plans for memorials in both countries in June.
DPRK defense chief No Kwang Chol attended a ceremony in Moscow earlier this month celebrating a new monument to North Korea’s military contributions, while Russia has also hosted exhibitions featuring North Korean war-themed art.
Edited by Kristen Talman
Updated on Oct. 24 at 12:27 p.m. KST with additional photos from KCTV
6. Armed North Korean soldiers crossed MDL in pursuit of defector, Seoul confirms
Just like the old days.
Armed North Korean soldiers crossed MDL in pursuit of defector, Seoul confirms
Two DPRK soldiers retreated after South Korean forces fired warning shots following brief crossing along section of DMZ
https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/armed-north-korean-soldiers-crossed-mdl-in-pursuit-of-defector-seoul-confirms/
Joon Ha Park October 24, 2025
ROK Army soldiers inspect barbed wire fencing during a regular patrol near the Military Demarcation Line | Image: ROK Army via Facebook (Jan. 10, 2025)
Two armed North Korean soldiers briefly crossed the inter-Korean border last week while pursuing a defector who had fled south across the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), Seoul’s defense ministry confirmed to NK News on Friday.
The defection occurred on Oct. 19 along the central section of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), where South Korean forces “took custody of a North Korean soldier,” marking the first known military defection since President Lee Jae-myung took office in June.
“The military identified the individual near the MDL and guided him to safety through standard operational procedures,” the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said at the time, adding that authorities are investigating the circumstances surrounding his crossing.
On Friday, Seoul’s defense ministry later corroborated reports that two armed North Korean soldiers — believed to be part of a pursuit unit — advanced about 200 meters south of the MDL toward a South Korean guard post.
South Korean troops issued warning broadcasts and fired warning shots in accordance with procedure, after which the North Korean soldiers retreated.
“Our forces respond firmly and in accordance with established procedures to any violations of the Armistice Agreement within the DMZ,” the ministry told NK News on Thursday.
The new confirmation contrasts with the JCS’s earlier statement on Oct. 19 claiming that “no unusual movements by North Korean forces had been detected.”
Trespassing and warning shots are not a rarity in the DMZ separating the two Koreas, with several such incidents reported in the heavily fortified area this year.
Last week’s incident comes months after a group of North Korean soldiers conducting “fortification work” briefly crossed the MDL, prompting South Korean troops to open warning fire and force them back. Pyongyang later condemned that exchange as a “grave provocation,” accusing the South of using heavy machine guns to fire more than ten warning rounds.
Seoul later confirmed the incident, while the U.N. Command reportedly assessed that some 30 North Korean servicemen had crossed the MDL.
South Korean and U.S. fighter jets conduct formation flight during a joint exercise on April 18, 2025 | Image: ROK Air Force
U.S.-ROK FREEDOM FLAG EXERCISE DELAYED
Meanwhile on Thursday, South Korea’s air force confirmed that the duration of this year’s Freedom Flag joint air exercise with the U.S. has been cut in half due to preparations for next week’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Gyeongju.
The air force said in a statement that the annual drill will begin on Oct. 27, but that the combined phase of the exercise will take place only after the APEC summit concludes.
“To maintain military readiness during the APEC summit, the combined training will be conducted intensively for one week after the event,” the air force explained.
According to the statement, the first week of the Freedom Flag drill will consist of U.S.-only training, followed by combined U.S.-ROK drills from Nov. 3 to 7, excluding the weekend. The air force said it had coordinated with the U.S. side to find a two-week window for the exercise but ultimately agreed to shorten it due to American scheduling constraints.
“The scale of participating assets will be similar to previous years,” the statement said, adding that both air forces “remain committed to enhancing combined operational capabilities.”
During the most recent Freedom Flag exercise from April 17 to May 2, approximately 90 South Korean and U.S. aircraft carried out missions including air interdiction, defensive counterair operations, close air support, and combat search and rescue, aimed at strengthening wartime procedures and sustaining operational readiness.
Edited by Alannah Hill
7. Japan’s new prime minister signals openness to meeting Kim Jong Un
Will Kim talk if abductees are on the agenda? Surely Kim is enjoying the attention. Everyone wants to talk to him. He is feeling important.
Japan’s new prime minister signals openness to meeting Kim Jong Un
Takaichi tells families of Japanese abductees she ‘won’t miss any opportunity’ to resolve long-standing issue with DPRK
https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/japans-new-prime-minister-signals-openness-to-meeting-kim-jong-un/
Jooheon Kim October 24, 2025
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi meets with families of Japanese abducted by North Korea in Tokyo on Oct. 23, 2025. | Image: Prime Minister’s Office of Japan
Japan’s new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has expressed willingness to hold a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to break the impasse over Pyongyang’s abductions of Japanese citizens.
In her first meeting with the victims’ families of the abductees since taking office, Takaichi stressed that she “won’t miss any opportunity” to ensure the early return of the abductees.
Takaichi further noted she aims to find a “breakthrough” on the abduction issue, expressing her intent to engage with Kim through a summit meeting. She expressed her apologies over the lack of progress since the return of five abductees in 2002, and also indicated her intention to seek cooperation from leaders from other countries, including U.S. President Donald Trump.
Takuya Yokota, the younger brother of abductee Megumi Yokota, reportedly urged Takaichi to secure the prompt return of the abductees. The head of the abductees’ families group warned that his organization would take action against the government if efforts to repatriate the victims are not completed during the lifetime of their surviving parents.
Megumi Yokota’s mother, Sakie Yokota, is currently the only surviving parent of an abductee acknowledged by the Japanese government to be in the DPRK. Also present at the meeting were Hitomi Soga, one of the five returnees from North Korea in 2002.
Pyongyang abducted several Japanese nationals during the 1970s and 1980s, with Tokyo officially recognizing 17 victims.
The DPRK formally admitted to the kidnappings during a 2002 bilateral summit, when then-leader Kim Jong Il met with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, and subsequently returned five of the 17 individuals.
However, North Korea has not returned the remaining 12 abductees, claiming some have died and others never entered the country, insisting that the issue has been “resolved.”
A 2014 report by the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea suggested that the number of abductions could be higher than Japan officially recognizes, estimating that the Kim regime may have taken more than 100 Japanese citizens.
Takaichi’s predecessor Shigeru Ishiba also pledged to work toward the return of abductees, but substantive progress on the issue remained limited.
And Jo Yang-hyeon, a professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, was skeptical about whether anything substantive would change under Takaichi.
“Meeting with the families to convey a commitment to resolution and actually producing tangible results are entirely different matters, so I’m not sure this can be evaluated as a truly new policy,” he told NK News.
According to the expert on Japanese politics, the meeting largely reaffirmed the Japanese government’s existing stance. “While such statements are understandable, whether they will lead to actual progress remains to be seen,” Jo added.
Takaichi, who officially became Japan’s first female prime minister on Tuesday, is a hardliner who supports preemptive military action — a position that North Korea, long critical of Japan’s militarization, is unlikely to welcome.
In her first parliamentary speech as the prime minister on Friday, she reiterated that the abduction issue remains the top priority of her Cabinet, and pledged to use every means to ensure the swift return of all abductees.
Takaichi also pointed out that the military activities of North Korea, China and Russia are a matter of serious concern, highlighting Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile development as “absolutely unacceptable.”
On North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, Takaichi has previously echoed Japan’s demand for the “complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement” of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
Updated at 04:52 p.m. KST on Oct. 24th with details of Takaichi’s first parliamentary address. Edited by Alannah Hill
8. Book review: An insider’s account of how the US dropped the ball on North Korea
Two problems with accounts like these:
1) It is always America's fault.
2) The assumption is that conventional international relations theory and negotiating techniques apply to the Kim family regime.
Why international relations theory, negotiations fail with North Korea
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/10/14/perspective-korea-policies-new-strategy/3061760458895/
Book review: An insider’s account of how the US dropped the ball on North Korea
In ‘Fallout,’ Joel Wit documents three decades of diplomacy gone wrong and the failure to stop the DPRK nuclear program
Stephen Mercado October 24, 2025
GIFT THIS ARTICLE PRINT
A collage of U.S. presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Bill Clinton and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un | Images: White House, KCNA, edited by NK News
“Fallout: The Inside Story of America’s Failure to Disarm North Korea” is a book likely to dismay readers.
The author Joel S. Wit, a distinguished fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center and a former State Department official, has written a compelling insider’s history of Washington’s failure to come to grips with Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons.
Exhaustively researched, the book finds fault with George W. Bush’s desertion of the Agreed Framework, with Barack Obama’s “strategic patience” and with Donald Trump’s inability to realize the promise of negotiations.
Along the way, Wit presents engaging portraits of the personalities involved, bringing to life the fraught diplomacy between Washington and Pyongyang.
The cover of “Fallout” | Image: Yale University Press, edited by NK News
GREATEST THREAT
“Fallout” is effectively a sequel to “Going Critical: The First North Korean Crisis,” which he wrote with Daniel B. Poneman, a former National Security Council official responsible for nonproliferation, and Robert L. Gallucci, the diplomatic point man in Washington’s negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework to halt North Korea’s plutonium weapons program.
That book recounted how U.S. diplomats engaged with counterparts from North Korea to defuse the nuclear crisis, sparked in 1993 by Pyongyang’s threat to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and turn its stock of plutonium into nuclear weapons.
Negotiations resulted in the Agreed Framework, whereby Pyongyang agreed to freeze its plutonium facilities and permit inspections in return for the construction of two light-water reactors and other aid. However, the end of the agreement began when U.S. officials confronted DPRK counterparts over Pyongyang’s program to enrich uranium, an alternative path to nuclear weapons.
In his latest book, Wit writes that Washington could have negotiated with Pyongyang to cover the uranium program as an addition to the Agreed Framework. From the start of George W. Bush’s term in 2001, however, “hawks” around the president moved to abandon the previous administration’s diplomatic achievement for a posture of confrontation.
Wit is particularly scathing in “Fallout” about the administrations of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, arguing that the two presidents “bear special responsibility” given developments in Pyongyang’s nuclear program during their years in office.
“Today, because of their failure, Kim Jong Un’s nuclear-armed missiles can reach millions of Americans in 30 minutes,” he writes.
George W. Bush signing the North Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2006 | Image: White House
A GRIM REALITY
The Obama administration’s policy of “strategic patience” earns particular condemnation. According to Wit, “An odd impatience permeated strategic patience: a refusal to accept Pyongyang as it was, and a refusal to take actions to change it.”
He further quotes the dismissive comment of an anonymous ROK official: “Strategic patience was an attitude, not a policy.”
Behind Washington’s attitude was the longstanding expectation among policymakers that North Korea would soon collapse in the Cold War’s receding wake. To push Pyongyang over that imagined edge, Washington repeatedly conducted U.S.-ROK military exercises, including a decapitation scenario; levied countless sanctions to throttle the economy; wielded human rights as a cudgel to bash Pyongyang; and sought to subvert the regime by infiltrating outside information aimed at impressing on the people their poor living standards.
The DPRK, remaining intact under pressure, developed nuclear weapons to counter a hostile U.S.
President Barack Obama speaks on the phone to President Lee Myung-bak of South Korea after North Korea conducted an artillery attack against the island of Yeonpyeong. | Image: White House
Wit faults Trump in his first administration not for refusing to negotiate but for failing in his summits with DPRK leader Kim Jong Un. Part of the problem stemmed from Washington’s longstanding insistence that Pyongyang first abandon nuclear weapons, the basis for its national security, before receiving any possible benefit from the country constituting the foremost threat to its existence.
The author views Trump as having left the negotiating table too soon. At the 2019 summit in Hanoi, he writes, the president “walked out just as Kim Jong Un appeared to be giving ground on a nuclear deal.”
Wit leaves us with a grim reality to contemplate. The 1994 Agreed Framework, negotiated at a time when the DPRK nuclear threat was more potential than actual, could have been the basis for normal diplomatic and economic relations between Washington and Pyongyang.
In the absence of such relations since that time, North Korea has developed nuclear weapons that today pose a real threat to the mainland U.S., to say nothing of American assets and allies in Northeast Asia.
Nothing about this state of affairs was inevitable. Wit argues that Pyongyang has been willing to trade its nuclear weapons for normal relations with Washington.
As Kim Jong Il told Secretary of State Albright in Pyongyang in Oct. 2000, “If there’s no confrontation, there’s no significance to weapons.”
Kim Jong Un with diplomat Kang Sok Ju | Image: KCTV
EXTRAORDINARY RESEARCH
Wit has written a gripping book on a difficult subject that, in the hands of a writer less skilled, would have left many readers with eyes glazed over. His anecdotes and sketches of the players on both sides bring the book to life.
In describing diplomat Kang Sok Ju’s “legendary histrionics” — like his sharp retort to U.S. demands, “Do you think we can take off our pants?” and his unexpected fondness for quoting “Gone With the Wind” — Wit captures the vivid personality behind the headlines.
He does the same for the American side, depicting with deft strokes Joseph “Broadway Joe” DeTrani and other U.S. players. The language is lively throughout, with Wit describing contacts with Pyongyang via intelligence officers as using the “goon channel,” writing of Washington “sanctionistas” and quipping in regard to one failed sanctions ploy that, “The new mousetrap had spawned a better mouse.”
This book is the product of extraordinary research, assembled in part with the help of numerous interns, and built on his own diplomatic experiences, more than 300 interviews and countless media articles.
Featured are memoirs from all the relevant presidents and many of their senior officials, from Madeleine Albright, John Bolton and Mike Pompeo to Susan Rice. Classified documents, some formally declassified, others leaked, contribute details. Washington insiders may wish to read this book by starting with the notes and index sections.
Whatever the order read, those interested in learning about Washington’s failure to develop normal relations with Pyongyang and the dire threat arising from its missteps will find this book well worth reading.
Edited by Alannah Hill
9. Trump, Xi to both pay state visits to S. Korea during APEC gathering
Will we be comparing which leader receives the most lavish treatment? If POTUS receives the highest award from the Korean government for his peace efforts then he will "win."
(2nd LD) Trump, Xi to both pay state visits to S. Korea during APEC gathering | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · October 24, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS details)
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Oct. 24 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping will both pay state visits to South Korea during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering next week, National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac said Friday.
President Lee Jae Myung will hold summit talks with Trump on Oct. 29 and summit talks with Xi on Nov. 1, Wi told reporters, adding that the talks will be held in Gyeongju, the venue for the APEC gathering.
Preparations are also under way for summit talks between Lee and Japan's new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi during the APEC gathering, Wi said.
While Seoul is monitoring the possibility of a meeting between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during Trump's trip to the country, there have been no new developments so far, he added.
Trump met Kim three times during his first term and expressed interest in resuming talks with the North Korean leader, fueling speculation about a possible meeting with Kim during the APEC period.
In an interview with CNN on Thursday, Lee said the likelihood of such a meeting was low but voiced hope that Trump could play the role of a "peacemaker" by helping bridge the gap between the two Koreas through dialogue.
U.S. President Donald Trump (L), South Korean President Lee Jae Myung (C) and Chinese President Xi Jinping are seen in this composite photo from Yonhap News Agency, AP and Reuters. (Yonhap)
The APEC forum will bring together leaders and delegations from 21 member economies, giving Lee a rare opportunity to engage the two most powerful leaders on home turf just four months after taking office.
The main leaders' session will take place from Friday to Saturday, while the APEC CEO Summit and other business forums featuring global corporate leaders will begin on Tuesday.
The stakes are high for Lee's upcoming talks with Trump as Seoul and Washington remain in intense negotiations to narrow differences over South Korea's US$350 billion investment pledge aimed at finalizing a trade deal, which would lower U.S. tariffs on Korean goods from 25 percent to 15 percent.
It will be their second in-person meeting following their White House summit in August.
"(The two sides) are engaged in earnest tariff negotiations," Wi said. "Efforts are being made to achieve progress. While I won't predict the outcome, we're continuing our efforts to produce results."
In his first talks with Xi, who is making his first visit to South Korea in 11 years, Lee is expected to discuss ways to advance bilateral relations and regional security issues.
"There is a need to further develop the relationship as partners and the two sides will discuss a range of topics and the regional security situation, including the Korean Peninsula and North Korea," Wi said.
National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac announces President Lee Jae Myung's plan to have talks with world leaders on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit during a press briefing at the presidential office in Seoul on Oct. 24, 2025. (Yonhap)
On the sidelines of the summit, Lee is also scheduled to hold back-to-back meetings with leaders from Canada, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates to discuss ways to strengthen practical cooperation, according to the office.
Throughout the APEC week, global business leaders are expected to gather in South Korea for economic events, with the government aiming to attract investment through various forums and related programs.
This year's summit will focus on addressing shared challenges for future generations, including artificial intelligence and demographic change, Wi said, adding that efforts are underway to adopt a joint declaration at the conclusion of the meeting.
Ahead of the APEC summit, Lee will embark on a two-day trip to Malaysia on Sunday to attend the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meetings, where he will seek to forge stronger ties with the regional bloc and share Seoul's vision for peace on the Korean Peninsula.
"A super week of multilateral summits is kicking off, starting with the ASEAN summit and continuing into the APEC summit in Gyeongju," Wi said.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · October 24, 2025
10. The Leak That Targeted the Leakers
north Korea's all purpose sword.
Important insights.
Excerpts:
The recent “APT Down — The North Korea Files” disclosure is significant not only for what it exposes about an adversary’s cyber capability, but for what its packaging reveals about who is manipulating the talent pipeline that turns curious teenage hackers into the technical experts that protect critical infrastructure, design secure systems, and staff cyber commands across the Five Eyes countries.
Unlike China or Russia’s state-directed programs, Western cyber know-how emerges organically from a counterculture that prizes expertise over credentials and creativity over conformity. For trust to be preserved between hackers and intelligence, greater transparency in engagement protocols and congressional oversight are needed to protect the cyber talent ecosystem.
...
The United States and its allies should preserve the spaces where hacker skills mature — vulnerability research, competitions, e-zines, and conferences — and protect freedom to publish, unbreakable encryption, and weaponized exploit code. Cyber defenders should use the leaked data from APT Down to improve Kimsuky detection while treating the narrative with caution.
The Five Eyes intelligence agencies should establish formal liaison protocols for engagement with underground conferences and publications — transparent relationships that preserve trust while enabling information sharing. The National Security Agency and the Australian Signals Directorate have particular responsibility here, given their presence at DEF CON and BSides Canberra, where Phrack issue 72 was distributed. Yet, all Five Eyes countries benefit from the cyber talent pipeline and should coordinate protocols. When intelligence products are placed in cultural venues, disclosure should be standard practice. Oversight bodies in the U.S. Congress — particularly the House and Senate Intelligence Committees — should require regular briefings on any influence operation targeting domestic cultural spaces and establish review mechanisms to ensure such activities, even when intended for defensive purposes, don’t undermine the trust that makes the talent pipeline flow.
The U.S. intelligence community should develop clear doctrine distinguishing legitimate outreach from manipulation. Supporting the hacker community means contributing technical knowledge, creating employment pathways, and respecting community norms. Conversely, exploiting it means covertly placing intelligence products in trusted venues or manipulating community discourse without disclosure. Formal guidelines would clarify which activities require disclosure, protecting both community trust and intelligence equities.
Security researchers, conference organizers, and publication editors — the gatekeepers of hacker culture — should scrutinize anomalous contributions. There is little risk in exposing obvious influence operations — because the next one won’t be so apparent.
If the hacker community loses trust in the venues that teach craft, the talent pipeline that turns curious teenagers into tomorrow’s defenders will corrode. Phrack, DEF CON, and the broader hacker underground aren’t just cultural artifacts — they are strategic assets. Protecting them from manipulation, whether by friend or foe, is a national security imperative.
The Leak That Targeted the Leakers
Andrew Horton
October 24, 2025
warontherocks.com · October 24, 2025
At this year’s DEF CON conference, hackers thumbing through copies of Phrack thought they were reading about a North Korean leak. Few realized they might be the real targets.
The West’s current advantage in cyber operations depends on the level of mutual trust between an underground hacker culture and the Five Eyes intelligence agencies. That trust has been undermined by what appears to be a sloppy influence operation that blurs the line between legitimate outreach and manipulation.
The recent “APT Down — The North Korea Files” disclosure is significant not only for what it exposes about an adversary’s cyber capability, but for what its packaging reveals about who is manipulating the talent pipeline that turns curious teenage hackers into the technical experts that protect critical infrastructure, design secure systems, and staff cyber commands across the Five Eyes countries.
Unlike China or Russia’s state-directed programs, Western cyber know-how emerges organically from a counterculture that prizes expertise over credentials and creativity over conformity. For trust to be preserved between hackers and intelligence, greater transparency in engagement protocols and congressional oversight are needed to protect the cyber talent ecosystem.
BECOME A MEMBER
When a Leak Isn’t Really a Leak
In August 2025, 15,000 glossy hard copies of Phrack issue 72 were distributed to attendees at DEF CON 33 in Las Vegas, featuring a detailed analysis of data allegedly swiped from a workstation of a member of North Korea’s “Kimsuky” cyber-espionage group. Thousands more were also given out at BSides Canberra in September.
Being published in Phrack is like being published in Nature for scientists or Rolling Stone for musicians. It isn’t just an e-zine. It’s a hub of hacker culture that has educated three generations of cyber practitioners.
The online release of nine gigabytes of data, including source code, remote access trojans, phishing kits, and logs tied to South Korean targets, accompanied the disclosure. The data appears genuine and operationally useful. It includes details of Linux backdoors planted on compromised systems to enable ongoing access — sloppy tradecraft that makes detection easier. Cyber defenders can leverage these signatures to hunt for Kimsuky command-and-control infrastructure across the internet. Thus, the data’s technical value is undisputed. But what really matters is the influence operation that may be built around the leak.
Indeed, APT Down immediately raised red flags among hackers, first for its unprecedented insight into North Korean cyber operations. But close reading suggests another operation playing out between the lines. The disclosure exhibited the telltale signs of professional intelligence work: pre-notification of victims, analytical polish that reads like a finished product, and hard-copy distribution at elite cyber social gatherings like DEF CON and BSides.
At Threat Canary and prior roles where my work has ranged from emulating advanced adversaries to investigating attacks on critical infrastructure to threat intelligence services, I’ve developed a forensic sense for distinguishing authentic hacktivism from professional intelligence tradecraft.
The anomalies in APT Down’s presentation, distribution, and authorship point to three possibilities: authentic hacktivism by hackers with an intelligence analyst’s flair, a Five Eyes influence operation gone wrong, or adversary action designed to look like the latter. The evidence increasingly rules out the work of hacktivists.
The Hacktivism That Wasn’t
The APT Down leak is missing core features of a genuine hacktivism piece — from the missing story of how access was gained to the authors’ pseudonyms that cannot be found with search engines. This raises suspicion.
A hacktivist performs computer intrusions, attacks, and leaks for ideological reasons rather than for financial gain or ego.
At first glance, APT Down looks like hacktivism. The authors use Protonmail, a privacy-protecting free email service. They leak data through Distributed Denial of Secrets, a popular site for leaks. They offer an email address from “riseup.net,” a platform that describes itself as “providing communication and computer resources to allies engaged in struggles against capitalism and other forms of oppression.”
But the article doesn’t read like authentic hacktivism. Authentic hacktivist leaks usually provide details about how computer systems were hacked into, as well as personal manifestos. When hacker Phineas Fisher exposed the Italian cyber espionage company HackingTeam in 2015, the leak included a detailed “hack back” how-to guide that name-dropped WhatWeb, a web-fingerprinting tool I co-wrote with Brendan Coles. When Aaron Barr, CEO of the U.S. security firm HBGary Federal, which sold its products to the U.S. government, vowed in 2011 to unmask Anonymous, the response was a sweeping data leak with clear narration of methods and motives.
APT Down, by pseudonymous authors “Saber” and “cyb0rg,” breaks the hacktivist pattern. The names are nearly unsearchable — odd if you’re after the widespread attention of Phrack readers. There is no “intrusion narrative” about how nine gigabytes were taken from the workstation. The authors say they pre-notified victims — a typical government move, not a hacktivist one — and the article is thorough and organized like a professional intelligence assessment, not a chaotic hacker diary. Playful section headers — “Dear Kimsuky, you are no hacker” and “Fun Facts and Laughables” — openly mock North Korea’s cyber capability in a way that can help shape readers’ attitudes.
The content of the leak suggests the ostensible target is North Korea. Analysis of a Beijing-Pyongyang nexus and context clues about Chinese holidays and language patterns read like intelligence conclusions, not raw evidence. As such, the packaging of APT Down may mask a secondary target: Western underground hacker culture. If so, it risks undermining the hacker-to-defender talent pipeline that gives the West an asymmetric cyber advantage.
Layered Deception in Action
APT Down employs three tiers of deception, where each layer of discovery discourages deeper investigation.
In the first layer, North Korean cyber espionage tools are exposed, providing genuine insight and value for Western cyber defenders. Most analysts stop here with their “indicators of compromise.”
The second layer alludes to Chinese-North Korean cooperation. In Section 3.5 of the article, the authors note that the cyber-spy used Google Translate to convert Korean into Simplified Chinese. The spy also didn’t work from May 31 to June 2, corresponding with China’s Dragon Boat Festival in 2025. Additionally, the cyber-spy’s computer was set to Korean Standard Time. The authors suggest a Chinese operator is “fulfilling the agenda of North Korea (targeting South Korea) and China (targeting Taiwan) alike.”
Such cooperation is not unprecedented. Defectors have confirmed that North Korea’s elite Bureau 121 cyber unit has operated from China since 2005, using the Chilbosan Hotel in Shenyang as a staging area for attacks while hiding among the city’s large Korean community.
All these details are context clues, not proof of attribution, physical location, or citizenship. They may indicate a Chinese hacker on a North Korean tasking, shared habits and infrastructure, or deliberate staging. The wise approach is to treat the code as real and the story as contested.
Cybersecurity analyst David Sehyeon Baek notes that APT Down is “notable not only for its technical revelations but also for the ethical debate it prompts,” while “showing hints of tool sharing with Chinese actors.” When asked about the broader implications, Baek warned that “poorly executed psychological operations can alienate the very talent pools governments hope to recruit, eroding trust and creating long-term cultural and operational costs.”
The final layer of deception aims to shape how Western hackers perceive threats and intelligence cooperation. By packaging intelligence as hacktivism, someone could sour the hacker community on government collaboration. It is too early to tell whether APT Down was a Five Eyes misstep or the work of an adversary, but the sophistication of it rules out authentic hacktivism. The missing intrusion narrative could reflect operational security. The unsearchable pseudonyms might be new actors, but together with government-style victim notification and intelligence-grade analysis, they reveal a level of professionalism not typically characteristic of a hacktivist.
A Relationship at Risk
The current cyber talent pipeline that turns curious teen hackers into professional consultants and later into cyber leaders and tech company founders is a strategic advantage of the West over hostile state actors. Today’s rebels are tomorrow’s defenders. Influence operations that erode trust between intelligence agencies and hacker communities risk restricting the flow of the pipeline by diverting hacker talent away from cyber consulting and defense into other parts of the economy or even cybercrime. Without this pipeline, the West loses its advantage.
While Russia and China can train state hackers through academies and conscription, they struggle to replicate the creative problem-solving culture that emerges organically from underground communities. Western cyber advantage doesn’t come from formal education alone. It comes from teenagers teaching themselves to break systems years before they reach university. This early-start, curiosity-driven learning produces practitioners with deeper intuition and more creative approaches than institutional training programs can match. Organizational research suggests that state-directed programs can produce competent technicians but cannot easily replicate the iconoclastic mindset that drives breakthrough security research — one that leads hackers to challenge authority, question assumptions, and find novel attack vectors that no curriculum would teach.
For over a decade, the U.S. government and Five Eyes intelligence agencies have worked to cultivate cyber talent in the spaces where cybersecurity talent congregates and where the norms around responsible disclosure and public service are shaped, such as hacker conferences like DEF CON and underground publications like Phrack. At DEF CON 20 in 2012, Gen. Keith B. Alexander, then head of U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, delivered a keynote emphasizing shared responsibility between the government and the hacker community in defending national security. More recently, former National Security Agency Director Paul Nakasone spoke on stage at DEF CON with founder Jeff Moss. The mutual trust and transparency that exists today took years to build. DEF CON has come a long way since having a “spot the fed” competition at its annual gathering.
If a Five Eyes agency used Phrack to disseminate the APT Down leak, it amounts to self-harm. Conversely, if it was an influence operation by an adversary mimicking a Five Eyes operation, then protection of underground hacker spaces through transparent relationships and disclosure should be formalized in policy.
What to Do Now
The United States and its allies should preserve the spaces where hacker skills mature — vulnerability research, competitions, e-zines, and conferences — and protect freedom to publish, unbreakable encryption, and weaponized exploit code. Cyber defenders should use the leaked data from APT Down to improve Kimsuky detection while treating the narrative with caution.
The Five Eyes intelligence agencies should establish formal liaison protocols for engagement with underground conferences and publications — transparent relationships that preserve trust while enabling information sharing. The National Security Agency and the Australian Signals Directorate have particular responsibility here, given their presence at DEF CON and BSides Canberra, where Phrack issue 72 was distributed. Yet, all Five Eyes countries benefit from the cyber talent pipeline and should coordinate protocols. When intelligence products are placed in cultural venues, disclosure should be standard practice. Oversight bodies in the U.S. Congress — particularly the House and Senate Intelligence Committees — should require regular briefings on any influence operation targeting domestic cultural spaces and establish review mechanisms to ensure such activities, even when intended for defensive purposes, don’t undermine the trust that makes the talent pipeline flow.
The U.S. intelligence community should develop clear doctrine distinguishing legitimate outreach from manipulation. Supporting the hacker community means contributing technical knowledge, creating employment pathways, and respecting community norms. Conversely, exploiting it means covertly placing intelligence products in trusted venues or manipulating community discourse without disclosure. Formal guidelines would clarify which activities require disclosure, protecting both community trust and intelligence equities.
Security researchers, conference organizers, and publication editors — the gatekeepers of hacker culture — should scrutinize anomalous contributions. There is little risk in exposing obvious influence operations — because the next one won’t be so apparent.
If the hacker community loses trust in the venues that teach craft, the talent pipeline that turns curious teenagers into tomorrow’s defenders will corrode. Phrack, DEF CON, and the broader hacker underground aren’t just cultural artifacts — they are strategic assets. Protecting them from manipulation, whether by friend or foe, is a national security imperative.
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Andrew Horton is the CTO and co-founder of Threat Canary, a next-generation AI-powered cyber platform. He has led security operations transformations for banks and public-sector organizations and authored the open-source tools WhatWeb and URLCrazy (both in Kali Linux). His work has appeared in security methodologies, including the Open Web Application Security Project Testing Guide, the Penetration Testing Execution Standard, security textbooks, academic publications, and he briefs think tanks on cyber strategy and AI, and digital sovereignty.
Image: Midjourney
warontherocks.com · October 24, 2025
11. N. Korea breaks ground on memorial museum for its troops deployed for Russia's war with Ukraine
But will they ever finish the museum? Will it be built at "Chollima speed?"
N. Korea breaks ground on memorial museum for its troops deployed for Russia's war with Ukraine | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · October 24, 2025
By Kim Soo-yeon
SEOUL, Oct. 24 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has held a groundbreaking ceremony for a memorial museum in Pyongyang to honor its troops who died while fighting alongside Russia in the war with Ukraine, state media reported Friday.
The North held the ceremony for the Memorial Museum of Combat Feats at the Overseas Military Operations the previous day, with leader Kim Jong-un and other key officials present, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
During a speech at the ceremony, the North's leader said, "Pyongyang will always be with Moscow," to reaffirm the development of bilateral ties while highlighting the role of North Korea's "proud war heroes" during combat in Russia's Kursk region.
"Just one year ago from today the last group of the combatants of our expeditionary forces left for Russia... They left expecting no reward or send-off," Kim was quoted as saying by the KCNA.
North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un (C) attends a groundbreaking ceremony on Oct. 23, 2025, for a memorial museum in Pyongyang to honor its troops who died while fighting alongside Russia in the war with Ukraine, in this photo carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Since October last year, North Korea has sent around 15,000 troops to participate in the Russia-Ukraine war. South Korea's spy agency earlier said some 600 North Korean soldiers are believed to have been killed while fighting for Russia, and more than 4,000 North Korean troops have also been injured.
The North's leader said "hegemony-seeking" forces' ambition will inevitably be doomed to failure, demonstrated by the "impregnability" of the North-Russia alliance, the KCNA said.
"The years of militant fraternity, in which a guarantee has been provided for the long-term development of the bilateral friendship at the cost of precious blood, will advance non-stop with the ennobling soul of the great heroes," he said.
Kim shoveled the first scoop of earth to mark the start of the construction. From Russia's side, Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexandr Matsegora attended the ceremony.
At the event, he also encouraged North Korean troops who returned home after combat in Ukraine and consoled bereaved families.
In August, North Korea held a commendation ceremony for the North's troops deployed to the Russia-Ukraine war, with leader Kim calling them "great heroes and patriots."
He disclosed a plan to build a new street in Pyongyang's Taesong district in memory of the fallen troops' exploits, naming it Sappyol Street, which means morning star.
Their remains will be laid to rest in the best place of the arboretum in front of the street, and a monument for "immortal combat feats" will be erected as well, Kim noted.
North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un (4th from L) digs the first shovel of earth during the groundbreaking ceremony on Oct. 23, 2025, for a memorial museum in Pyongyang to honor its troops who died while fighting alongside Russia in the war with Ukraine, in this photo carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · October 24, 2025
12. Around 20 N. Korean soldiers briefly cross MDL, retreat after warning shots
Hot pursuit?
Around 20 N. Korean soldiers briefly cross MDL, retreat after warning shots | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · October 23, 2025
SEOUL, Oct. 23 (Yonhap) -- Around 20 North Korean soldiers briefly crossed the heavily fortified inter-Korean border and retreated after South Korean soldiers fired warning shots earlier this week, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said Thursday.
The soldiers crossed the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) in the border city of Paju, just northwest of Seoul, on Oct. 19, according to the JCS.
South Korean troops monitoring their movement issued several warning broadcasts and fired warning shots when the soldiers continued to move southward, it said. The North Korean soldiers then retreated without showing any particular response.
The JCS said the soldiers, believed to be working near the border, such as clearing land or laying mines in the buffer zone, likely crossed the border temporarily while working. Some of them were armed.
The incident took place on the same day a North Korean soldier defected across the border in Cheorwon, Gangwon Province, the first such case since the Lee Jae Myung government took office.
Military officials, however, said the two incidents appear to be unrelated given the difference in their time and location.
"Our military is closely monitoring the activities of the North Korean military and taking necessary measures in accordance with operational procedures," a military official said.
The Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas and a now-shuttered joint industrial complex are seen in North Korea's border city of Kaesong, in this photo taken from the South Korean border city of Paju, northwest of Seoul, on Oct. 15, 2025. (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · October 23, 2025
13. Unification minister calls on N. Korea's Kim, Trump to meet on occasion of APEC gathering
Do we (and the Unification Minister) want a meeting more than KJU?
(LEAD) Unification minister calls on N. Korea's Kim, Trump to meet on occasion of APEC gathering | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · October 24, 2025
(ATTN: UPDATES with more details throughout)
SEOUL, Oct. 24 (Yonhap) -- Unification Minister Chung Dong-young on Friday called on the leaders of North Korea and the United States not to miss a golden opportunity for having dialogue on the occasion of next week's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering in South Korea.
U.S. President Donald Trump's planned visit to South Korea on Oct. 29-30 for the APEC gathering has spawned speculation that he may seek a meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un though the possibility of such a meeting appears low.
"The leaders of North Korea and the U.S. should not miss this opportunity. They should make a decision," Chung told reporters, noting that if realized, the possible Kim-Trump meeting could pave the way for bringing peace to the Korean Peninsula.
This undated file photo shows Unification Minister Chung Dong-young. (Yonhap)
He said it would be much more difficult for the North and the U.S. to prepare for a meeting between their leaders in terms of logistics if they miss a chance for talks in South Korea.
Trump met with Kim three times during his first term -- two summit talks, in Singapore in June 2018 and in Hanoi in February 2019, and a brief meeting at the inter-Korean border village of Panmunjom in June 2019.
Chung said there has been no confirmed information about contacts underway between the North and the U.S., but claimed there are "signs" of both sides apparently preparing for possible talks.
The minister cited North Koreans detected doing cleanup work near the North's facility inside Panmunjom and the U.N. Command's suspension of trips to the truce village until next week.
"At Panmunjom, signs were detected of North Koreans cleaning at its facility, plucking grass, arranging flowerbeds and shooting photos," Chung said, noting that such signs were spotted within the past seven days.
"It marked the first time that the North has been detected doing cleanup work this year (at the truce village)."
Since returning to the White House, Trump has voiced hope for meeting with Kim "within this year."
At a key parliamentary meeting in September, the North's leader said he has "good memories" of Trump and remains open to talks with the U.S. if Washington drops its demand for the North's denuclearization.
Denuclearization talks have stalled since the Hanoi summit ended without a deal due to disagreements over conditions for Washington's sanctions relief.
U.S. President Donald Trump (L) shakes hands with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at the inter-Korean truce village of Panmunjom in this file photo taken June 30, 2019. (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · October 24, 2025
14. Vice FM highlights S. Korea's role in safeguarding peace on Korean Peninsula on U.N. Day
I recall moderating the very first conference Dr. Kim participated in in DC many years ago.
Vice FM highlights S. Korea's role in safeguarding peace on Korean Peninsula on U.N. Day | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · October 24, 2025
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, Oct. 24 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will continue efforts to safeguard and promote peace on the Korean Peninsula through its peace initiative toward North Korea, stressing that doing so is its responsibility to the international community, a senior Seoul diplomat said Friday.
Second Vice Foreign Minister Kim Jina made the remarks during an event marking U.N. Day, saying the government will work to realize the peace "dreamed of by the veterans" who fought in the 1950-53 Korean War.
"Safeguarding peace on the Korean Peninsula is South Korea's responsibility to the international community," Kim said in her speech at the ceremony held at the U.N. Memorial Cemetery in Korea, in the southeastern city of Busan.
"The Korean government will realize the peace dreamed of by the U.N. veterans and continue its journey toward global peace together with the U.N. through our 'END' initiative," she said.
In his address to the United Nations at the General Assembly in New York last month, President Lee Jae Myung unveiled the initiative as a peace road map for the Korean Peninsula that calls for resuming exchanges (E), normalizing ties with North Korea (N) and denuclearizing the reclusive state (D).
Kim also paid tribute to the Korean War veterans for their noble sacrifices.
U.N. Day commemorates the entry into force of the U.N. Charter in 1945, marking its official establishment. This year's event runs for two days till Friday.
Second Vice Foreign Minister Kim Jina delivers a speech during an event marking U.N. Day in Busan, South Korea, on Oct. 24, 2025, in this photo provided by the foreign ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · October 24, 2025
15. Major protests planned against Trump, Xi in Gyeongju ahead of APEC summit
Major protests planned against Trump, Xi in Gyeongju ahead of APEC summit - The Korea Times
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
As the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit draws near, police and authorities in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, are now on high alert for protests targeting two of the most high-profile guests ― U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
With the leaders of the two largest economies in the world scheduled for a rare in-person meeting on Thursday, tensions have been mounting outside the official summit venues. So far, at least 13 organizations are planning to hold 16 separate rallies throughout the city during APEC week, with more activists anticipated to join as the event approaches, according to police on Friday.
The International People’s Action Committee Against 2025 APEC, which consists of 35 left-leaning political parties and civic groups, plans to mobilize protestors from Seoul to Gyeongju in the coming week, voicing opposition to tariff threats from Trump.
“The whole world is unable to respond to Trump’s ruthless tariff war and is being defeated one by one,” the committee said in statement at its launching ceremony last month. “We will march in an international solidarity demonstration, chanting slogans like “Anti-Trump!” and “Economy for all humanity!” against the meaningless performance of APEC leaders who put on pro-Trump shows for the interests of superpowers and big corporations.”
The protesters will be joined by many others, including the Korea Optical High-Tech branch of the Korean Metal Workers’ Union, which is planning its own anti-U.S. rallies there.
Conservative activists hold an anti-China rally in Seoul, Oct. 3. Newsis
On the other hand, right-leaning groups, led by Liberty University, are organizing their own gatherings near Gyeongju’s Hwangridan-gil, where crowds of up to 2,000 are expected to stage anti-China protests and “China Out” marches during Xi’s visit.
This convergence of rival demonstrations has raised concerns among Korean officials about the potential for violent clashes and the international image of their government as it plays host to dozens of world leaders.
To ensure security, police have issued their highest-level emergency alert. Starting Tuesday, as many as 19,000 officers ― including riot units, SWAT teams and anti-terrorism specialists ― will be deployed throughout the city. Stringent traffic and drone restrictions will also be in place.
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
16. All eyes on Trump's appearance at APEC CEO Summit
We just cannot get it done I suppose.
All eyes on Trump's appearance at APEC CEO Summit - The Korea Times
Korea, US unlikely to clinch final trade deal during APEC
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
The upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CEO Summit will be a pivotal moment for global business leaders, as U.S. President Donald Trump is set to deliver a keynote speech and unveil his updated viewpoint on the investment landscape in the world’s largest economy.
According to the White House, Trump’s keynote address is slated for Oct. 29, during the APEC CEO luncheon in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province. Hundreds of global business leaders will attend the event, paying particular attention to any hints on how to navigate uncertainties in U.S. trade policies.
The specific theme of the speech has yet to be confirmed, but Trump is widely expected to remark on the need for global firms to expand their U.S. investment.
Korea, the host economy for the event, has been engaged in a monthslong trade tug-of-war with the U.S. as the two countries work towards a final tariff agreement.
As Korean business leaders gather for the upcoming meeting, expectations are that Trump will use the speech to justify U.S. trade demands. The U.S. is urging Korea to make direct, up-front investments worth $350 billion (503 trillion won) in the world’s largest economy, part of a broad tariff deal reached in July.
All eyes are also on whether Trump will update or modify his approach on U.S. trade policy during his keynote speech, a topic expected to draw keen attention from the global business leaders gathered in Gyeongju.
Leaders of Korea’s top conglomerates, including Samsung, SK, LG and Hyundai Motor, will pay close attention to Trump’s upcoming remarks, since his words can have a critical impact on their global business strategies.
Past APEC events have concluded with a joint statement underscoring the importance of free trade. In the past four years, all statements have included references to a “rules-based multilateral trading system.” Attention is now focused on what remarks President Trump will make, given his protectionist policies that have caused upheaval in the global economic order.
Kim Yong-beom, left, the presidential chief of staff for policy, speaks at Incheon International Airport after returning home from a trip to the U.S., Friday. Yonhap
Seoul would like to reach a settlement with Washington as soon as possible, and there were hopes that one would be reached before the APEC summit begins next week. However, it now appears that a detailed agreement will require more time, according to a senior official from President Lee’s office.
Korea and the U.S. reached a framework tariff agreement on July 30, but problems have emerged while fine-tuning the details of the deal.
“When it comes to the possibility of a potential Korea-U.S. trade deal during the APEC summit, I would say there is a long way to go,” Kim Yong-beom, presidential chief of staff for policy, told reporters after returning from his latest business trip to the U.S., Friday.
Kim said the countries have narrowed their differences in most areas, but some agenda items remain contentious. He also left open the possibility of a sudden breakthrough resulting in a deal.
“As negotiations often make fast progress at the very last moment, we will continue to do the utmost until the end,” he said.
Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan, who accompanied the presidential chief of staff during his U.S. visit, also spoke with caution.
“Korea still has a few agendas to discuss with the U.S., and we are standing at a very pivotal moment in the ongoing trade talks,” Kim said.
Their latest remarks reduced the possibility of the two countries reaching a final agreement on the sidelines of the upcoming summit between President Lee Jae Myung and Trump on Wednesday.
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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