​Quotes of the Day:

"We read books to find out who we are. What other people, real or imaginary, do and think and feel – or have done and thought and felt; or might do and think and feel – is an essential guide to our understanding of what we ourselves are and may become… A person who had never listened to nor read a tale or myth or parable or story, would remain ignorant of his own emotional and spiritual heights and depths, would not know quite fully what it is to be human. For the story – from Rumpelstiltskin to War and Peace – is one of the basic tools invented by the mind of man, for the purpose of gaining understanding. There have been great societies that did not use the wheel, but there have been no societies that did not tell stories."

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– James Baldwin

1. CIA playing ‘most important part’ in US strikes in the Caribbean, sources say

2. The Only Security Guarantee Ukraine Can Trust

3. China’s New Strategy for Trump: Punch Hard, Concede Little

4. Why Trump Reached a Breaking Point With Putin

5. Trump-Xi summit, if not canceled like Trump-Putin, will be tepid

6. U.S. Sends B-1 Bombers Near Venezuela, Ramping Up Military Pressure

7. Most-Wanted Fentanyl Producer Is in Cuban Custody After Brazen Escape

8. Vance Says International Security Force Will Take Lead on Disarming Hamas

9. How China Raced Ahead of the U.S. on Nuclear Power

10. Taiwan in the Shadow of War

11. Can America's soft power be saved?

12. ‘Irregular warfare is not going away, however much we’d like it to’

13. Xi Jinping’s Purges Shrink Ranks of China’s Communist Elite—and Boost His Power

14. Hamas Has Calculated It Can Survive in Gaza—and Rule

15. Full Impact of Tariffs on Asia-Pacific Still to Come, IMF Warns

16. Through the Tiger’s Eyes: Enabling the Second American Century

17. The Leak That Targeted the Leakers

18. China Against China – Xi Jinping Confronts the Downsides of Success

19.  Exorbitant Pillage – Can the U.S. Dollar Survive the U.S. Government? (Review Essay)

20. Washington's hard line in South China Sea tests allies, raises risks

21. In China's dangerous interceptions, see the breakdown of peaceful world order

22. The Red Arsenal:​ inside China’s cutting-edge weapon systems

1. CIA playing ‘most important part’ in US strikes in the Caribbean, sources say

​Is this news? Something would be wrong if they were not.

CIA playing ‘most important part’ in US strikes in the Caribbean, sources say

Exclusive: Sources say the agency is providing real-time intelligence collected by satellites and signal intercepts

•  Ecuador releases survivor of US strike on alleged drug-trafficking submarine

The Guardian · Aram Roston · October 21, 2025

The Central Intelligence Agency is providing the bulk of the intelligence used to carry out the controversial lethal air strikes by the Trump administration against small, fast-going boats in the Caribbean Sea suspected of carrying drugs from Venezuela, according to three sources familiar with the operations. Experts say the agency’s central role means much of the evidence used to select which alleged smugglers to kill on the open sea will almost certainly remain secret.

The agency’s central role in the boat strikes has not previously been disclosed. Donald Trump confirmed last Wednesday that he had authorized covert CIA action in Venezuela, but not what the agency would be doing.

The sources say the CIA is providing real-time intelligence collected by satellites and signal intercepts to detect which boats it believes are loaded with drugs, tracking their routes and making the recommendations about which vessels should be hit by missiles.

“They are the most important part of it,” said one of the sources. Two sources said that the drones or other aircraft actually launching the missiles used to sink the boats belong to the US military, not the CIA.

CIA historian Tim Weiner: ‘Trump has put national security in the hands of crackpots and fools’

Read more

Information the agency gathers against any of the alleged smugglers – dead or alive – is likely to remain classified and out of public view. That is in spite of the worldwide public interest and debate over the killing of civilians.

The agency’s intelligence, unlike information gathered by the DEA or the Coast Guard, which used to handle maritime interdiction operations against smugglers, is not designed as legal evidence.

“We do not produce evidence,” Mark Lowenthal, the former assistant director for analysis for the Central Intelligence Agency, explained. “We have intelligence. It is not the same thing as evidence. It’s a different milieu. Sometimes it’s cold hard fact and sometimes lots less.” He emphasized he is speaking generally based on his past experience and has no independent information about the current boat strikes or intelligence.

CIA intelligence is not designed for disclosure, in court or in public hearings – it is designed to “never see the inside of a courtroom”, one source said, because the CIA goes to great lengths to protect its sources and methods.

Lowenthal said he believed it’s unlikely the CIA intel on drug boat targets could ever be released. “They are going to claim it’s classified and they are not going to release it publicly. And they may be right. They have all sorts of exemptions in law.”

So far, the only information released has been snippets of grainy video of boats exploding, posted online by Trump or the Department of Defense.

A spokesperson for the CIA declined to comment on this story and referred any other questions to the Pentagon.

A spokesperson for Southern Command, which oversees military operations in the Caribbean, referred questions to the White House. Pete Hegseth, the secretary of defense, posted on X on Thursday that the commander of Southcom was stepping down.

A Pentagon spokesperson said: “Due to operational security, we do not talk about matters of intelligence.”

In response to questions from the Guardian, Anna Kelly, the White House deputy press secretary, said: “All of these decisive strikes have been against designated narcoterrorists bringing deadly poison to our shores, and the President will continue to use every element of American power to stop drugs from flooding into our country and to bring those responsible to justice.”

On Saturday, Trump alluded to intelligence, rather than the US military, in a posting on the social media he owns about the destruction of a semi-submersible he called a “DRUG-CARRYING SUBMARINE”. “U.S. Intelligence,” he wrote, “confirmed this vessel was loaded up with mostly Fentanyl, and other illegal narcotics.”

Trump announced what appears to have been the first strike on a boat on 3 September, releasing a brief video of the attack. Since then the administration has publicly announced six more without ever disclosing details about the targets other than the number of people killed, and the allegation that the boats carried narcotics.

Several sources say CIA officials have been trying to play a more central role in the foreign policy objectives of the Trump administration in the hemisphere. While the agency has long had a counternarcotics effort, the sources say it is beefing up that capability to maintain relevance.

The White House also hasn’t disclosed details of any legal basis for strikes against civilian targets. Experts in international humanitarian law say it’s a violation to use deadly force against civilians who aren’t engaged in a war, whether or not they are suspected of smuggling drugs.

Harold Koh, a professor of international law at Yale, who worked in the Obama-era state department and defended the 2010 lethal strike against American Anwar Al Awlaki, said last month that the Caribbean strikes are illegal. “There is no authority for the president to commit summary execution on the high seas,” he said, “especially when there is a capture option which they have been using until now.”

Hugo Lowell contributed reporting

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The Guardian · Aram Roston · October 21, 2025

2. The Only Security Guarantee Ukraine Can Trust

​Excerpts:

After more than 11 years of war, the lesson from Ukraine is clear: the security guarantees that matter are the ones that practically shape the battlefield. If the goal is to make Russian aggression futile, then the United States and Europe must channel resources into capabilities that deny, disrupt, and paralyze the Russian military. Nothing less will succeed.

Giving Ukraine what it needs does not only help Kyiv. If Putin’s military is not stopped somewhere in Ukraine, it may march on a NATO member. Putin has made no secret of his desire to reverse the collapse of the Soviet Union and establish Russian dominance over Europe’s east. Over the last several weeks, he has floated drones and fighter jets over NATO’s boundary in a clear test of the alliance’s integrity. At a minimum, more of these provocations are likely to happen unless NATO helps Ukraine neutralize Russia’s military.

The EU seems aware of this. In European Defence—Readiness 2030, a report published in early 2025, the European Commission explicitly framed Ukraine’s survival as central to Europe’s own security. It called for a “steel porcupine” strategy—or fortifying Ukraine so that future Russian offensives fail by design—and investing in Ukraine’s defense industry as part of creating a shared European capacity. But the EU and NATO must do more to help Ukraine firmly prevail over Russia’s technologies and deny Moscow any further battlefield victories. Its members need to plow more resources and in-kind technology contributions into Ukraine’s defense industry. They must help Kyiv quickly develop and massively scale up new systems. Then, and only then, will Europe be able to breathe.

The Only Security Guarantee Ukraine Can Trust

Foreign Affairs · More by Andriy Zagorodnyuk · September 23, 2025

More Drones and Missiles Are All That Can Stop Russia

Andriy Zagorodnyuk

September 23, 2025

Ukrainian soldiers near Kharkiv, Ukraine, September 2025 Reuters

ANDRIY ZAGORODNYUK is Chair of the Centre for Defence Strategies and a Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council and Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. From 2019 to 2020, he served as Ukraine’s Defense Minister.

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Ever since U.S. President Donald Trump returned to the White House, officials across Europe have scrambled to craft a peace deal that could work for Ukraine. They know by now that, at the moment, Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in stopping his offensives, and they fear that shifting American priorities may leave Ukraine without a critical source of support. As a result, they are racing to find a way to provide Kyiv with security guarantees that could deter Russia and allow for an armistice.

In conversations about security guarantees, officials have tended to focus on a handful of measures: placing a small number of European troops in Ukraine to shore up the country’s defense (so-called reassurance forces), levying additional sanctions against Russia, and providing Ukraine with more weapons, including conventional ones. They have also mused about committing themselves, on paper, to Ukraine’s defense. Two of these actions—more weapons and sanctions—could take place before any cease-fire. The rest would go into effect only after the fighting ends.

These proposals have certain virtues. But by themselves, they are not enough to guarantee Ukraine’s security. Since the start of Russia’s invasion in 2022, Putin has been transparent about his objective—the destruction of Ukraine as an independent nation—and has subjected many people to almost unimaginable suffering in order to achieve it. He will not be deterred by words, a smattering of NATO troops, or by more agony (including if it affects Russians). In fact, he will not stop the war unless Russian troops literally cannot advance any further.

Right now, some U.S. and European analysts are pessimistic that Ukraine can completely halt Russia’s aggression, and understandably so. NATO countries, after all, have been arming Kyiv for years, and Moscow keeps making incremental gains. But Ukraine need not destroy every element of the Russian military to achieve strategic neutralization—stripping away the enemy of its ability to achieve its objectives. And the conflict has recently changed in ways that have made it easier to freeze. Today, the war is being fought less with traditional military equipment and more with newer, cheaper technologies that Ukraine helped pioneer. In fact, Ukraine has already done a great deal of what’s needed to deter Russia for good. But Europe must stop focusing on which traditional capabilities it should provide to Ukraine or on establishing written security guarantees. Instead, the continent should get serious about investing more in Ukraine’s war effort by flooding the country with more advanced technologies. It needs to invest heavily in the country’s sophisticated defense industry. It must cooperate more directly with Kyiv on matters of military manufacturing and on air defenses. Such measures will indeed be daunting, but not any more than NATO’s original effort to help Ukraine. And ultimately, Europe has little choice. They are the only way to bring peace.

WORDS FAIL

Throughout the past century, powerful states have sought to provide security guarantees to weaker partners. Those guarantees, however, have only conferred a real benefit when they created tangible shields. During the Cold War, NATO effectively deterred the Soviet Union because the United States situated substantial forces and firepower on the continent, including some nuclear weapons. In Asia, the mutual defense treaty between South Korea and the United States works to deter a North Korean invasion because tens of thousands of American troops remain on the peninsula, where they jointly plan and train with their South Korean partners. In the 1930s, by contrast, the British and the French backed their pledge to defend Poland with nothing but rhetoric; as a result, Nazi Germany felt free to invade the country. Likewise, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which a consortium of states (including Russia) promised to protect Ukraine’s sovereignty if it gave up its nuclear weapons, did nothing to stop Russia from invading its neighbor multiple times because it offered no military resources to Kyiv.

After Russia launched its first invasion of Ukraine, sending troops into Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk in 2014, the United States and Europe did begin supplying Kyiv with defensive and, eventually, offensive assistance. But it was only in late 2021, after it became clear that Russia aimed to invade the entire country, that NATO states got somewhat serious about arming Ukraine. That support, however, proved effective: rather than quickly conquering Ukraine, as much of the world expected, Russia quickly became bogged down.

In fact, in some domains, Ukraine has managed to functionally defeat its enemy. Consider the battle over the Black Sea. From the outset of its full-scale invasion, Russia sought to strangle Ukraine’s economy by cutting off its maritime access. Moscow’s Black Sea Fleet blockaded Ukrainian ports, occupied Snake Island, and threatened Odessa, the country’s main coastal city. Allied attempts to negotiate a partial end to this blockade failed. But by the fall of 2023, the Ukrainian military succeeded in breaking it with naval drones, precision missiles, and air-launched bombs—a substantial portion of which came from the United States. (Ukrainian-made weapons, of course, were also essential to this victory.) Although these strikes only destroyed part of Russia’s fleet, Kyiv made it impossible for Putin’s ships to sail near Ukraine’s main ports, and Moscow was left with no choice but to move most of its fleet to the east.

Ukraine has had success in the air, as well. Russia began its 2022 war confident it could establish air dominance within days, allowing it to quickly march on Kyiv. Instead, Ukraine’s innovative defenses have made it impossible for Russia to achieve superiority. In an air denial operation undertaken in the first days of the invasion, now known as Ghost of Kyiv, Ukraine used its limited air capabilities to intercept many Russian fighter jets and effectively push these planes out of its airspace. During its more complex 2025 “Spiderweb” operations, Ukraine has used innovative uncrewed systems to destroy a substantial portion of Russia’s strategic aviation fleet, or the aircraft Russia uses to launch numerous cruise missiles at all areas of Ukraine. Kyiv has not been able to make its skies safe enough for commercial air-traffic transit, and it experiences constant missile and long-range drone attacks. But it has been able to force Russian manned aircraft to operate tens of kilometers from the frontlines, launching glide bombs rather than conducting close air support operations to help ground forces.

Fully liberating Ukraine would take more than just such measures, at least for now, and it would require considerable additional capabilities. But strategic neutralization is attainable without waging a multidecade war of attrition. To obviate Russia’s threat, Ukraine does not need to kill off every Russian soldier. Instead, it can paralyze the military by targeting essential functions such as logistics, coordination, mobility, and firepower. In this way, it can follow a template pioneered by Israel, which neutralized Egypt’s far larger air force in 1967 not by destroying every aircraft but by taking out many of them and eliminating its runways and command systems. As a result, Israel preserved its existence without annihilating vast opposition forces.

BIGGER AND BETTER

Ukraine is closer to paralyzing Russia than most people think. Russia’s jets do still strike Ukrainian targets, albeit from a great distance, and Russian ground forces continue to seize small chunks of territory. But with drones, remote mines, precision artillery, and constant surveillance, Ukraine has transformed large stretches of the front into persistent kill zones: areas where forces find it nearly impossible to maneuver without being detected and then immediately hit. Only by throwing thousands upon thousands of troops at Ukrainian targets can Russia advance through a few of these regions. If Ukraine can widen these kill zones—by surveilling more territory and striking behind Russia’s current forward lines—and deny Russia the ability to mass men and materiel in its rear, Russian formations will be unable to generate any momentum. Future offensives by Russia would then become strategically futile, and thus not worth attempting.

To succeed, however, Ukraine will need more drones and high-tech weapons. And helping Kyiv get these systems will necessitate that NATO change its presumptions and priorities. When the war broke out, it made sense for the United States and Europe to pump Ukraine full of traditional weapons systems. But as the operational environment has evolved, many legacy systems have become largely obsolete. For instance, some sophisticated assault weapons, such as tanks, are now disabled almost as soon as they enter the kill zone by simpler, cheaper uncrewed aerial vehicles. They therefore do little to help either party.

Ukraine’s allies must refocus their attention on helping Ukraine innovate and integrate new technologies at the scale needed to stop Russia. These allies have what they need. Europe alone has financial resources, scientific capabilities, and an industrial base that Russia cannot match. If the continent uses these capacities alongside Ukraine, it could help the Ukrainian military develop and produce many advanced and affordable precise, long-range systems—including missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles—as well as communications gear, positioning and targeting equipment, air defenses, and electronic warfare systems.

The security guarantees that matter are the ones that practically shape the battlefield.

The continent has already taken meaningful steps in this direction. The European Union has launched several programs designed to channel money into Ukrainian defense-industrial factories. Kyiv has also forged bilateral deals with a variety of countries to scale up its drone and ammunition production. But these partnerships must be expanded dramatically. Europe must, of course, spend more on Ukraine and increase its own production of material. But it must also focus on speeding up design, testing, and scaling.

There are other ways Europe can assist Kyiv. Perhaps the most important is a European Sky Shield for Ukraine: an initiative proposed by a group of international and Ukrainian military experts. In it, a collection of European states would establish a no-fly zone, first over western Ukrainian territory and later over central Ukraine. Participating states would mobilize roughly 120 combat aircraft, which would fly from European bases and shoot down missiles and drones over the covered territory. In addition to safeguarding Ukraine’s infrastructure and economy—by, for example, shielding Ukrainian nuclear plants and export corridors—it would free Ukraine’s own air force to concentrate on the eastern front. The model, which is based on the air policing missions Europe has conducted over the Baltics for 20 years, carries some escalation risks. But Russia is unlikely to interfere, since direct, air-to-air combat would not work to its advantage.

NATO states will also have to continue supplying Kyiv with some traditional weapons. Ukraine will need more F-16 fighter jets to defend its skies. It still requires long-range missiles, like the U.S. Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and British and French Storm Shadow and SCALP missiles, to hit the many Russian logistics hubs, command centers, stockpiles, and troop formations located beyond the battlefield. Ukraine’s allies should also earmark certain stockpiles of ammunition, drones, and spare parts housed in eastern Europe for Ukraine, so that they are never again vulnerable to political delays in Washington or European capitals. And the United States must continue providing Kyiv with military intelligence, which has been indispensable to tracking Russian troop movements and missile strikes. Such high-end enablers will remain cornerstones of any meaningful security guarantees.

But tanks or other legacy equipment would be of little use on their own. Giving Ukraine another paper commitment to its security, even one modeled on NATO’s Article 5, as some European states have discussed, would do nothing. And without tangible support that’s tailored to today’s Ukrainian battlefield, even European reassurance forces would be of dubious value. Unless NATO countries decide to station large numbers of combat-ready troops or send over instructors, these deployments would have the main effect of being expensive and politically risky within their home countries. The troops are unlikely to stop, or be spared from, Russia’s military.

HOLD THE LINE

After more than 11 years of war, the lesson from Ukraine is clear: the security guarantees that matter are the ones that practically shape the battlefield. If the goal is to make Russian aggression futile, then the United States and Europe must channel resources into capabilities that deny, disrupt, and paralyze the Russian military. Nothing less will succeed.

Giving Ukraine what it needs does not only help Kyiv. If Putin’s military is not stopped somewhere in Ukraine, it may march on a NATO member. Putin has made no secret of his desire to reverse the collapse of the Soviet Union and establish Russian dominance over Europe’s east. Over the last several weeks, he has floated drones and fighter jets over NATO’s boundary in a clear test of the alliance’s integrity. At a minimum, more of these provocations are likely to happen unless NATO helps Ukraine neutralize Russia’s military.

The EU seems aware of this. In European Defence—Readiness 2030, a report published in early 2025, the European Commission explicitly framed Ukraine’s survival as central to Europe’s own security. It called for a “steel porcupine” strategy—or fortifying Ukraine so that future Russian offensives fail by design—and investing in Ukraine’s defense industry as part of creating a shared European capacity. But the EU and NATO must do more to help Ukraine firmly prevail over Russia’s technologies and deny Moscow any further battlefield victories. Its members need to plow more resources and in-kind technology contributions into Ukraine’s defense industry. They must help Kyiv quickly develop and massively scale up new systems. Then, and only then, will Europe be able to breathe.

Foreign Affairs · More by Andriy Zagorodnyuk · September 23, 2025

3. China’s New Strategy for Trump: Punch Hard, Concede Little

​Excerpts:

The strategy behind this new assertiveness was born from crisis. After Trump’s presidential victory last year, anxiety rippled through Beijing. According to the people close to policymakers, Xi told his top aides—including chief of staff Cai Qi, economic czar He Lifeng and the Communist Party’s leading ideologue, Wang Huning—to urgently design a new playbook for Trump 2.0, one that would break the constant reactive posture that had defined Beijing’s past approach.

In a statement, China’s Foreign Ministry said both countries “should address mutual concerns through dialogue and consultation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.” 

The new approach is rooted in a core belief in Beijing: that Trump is fundamentally transactional, not ideological. Policymakers believe they can use Trump’s zest for a deal to neutralize the China hawks in his administration. The goal, as Campbell put it, is to create a “soft and hard” approach. Beijing would cater to Trump’s desire for deals while simultaneously applying painful economic pressure.

“Holding Trump close has been central to the Chinese playbook,” said Evan Medeiros, a former senior national-security official in the Obama administration and now a professor at Georgetown University. “They know he is neither a hawk nor ideological and want to play to his instincts to do deals.”

...

Xi’s new playbook is gaining some ground in an administration where cabinet secretaries now carefully curate their advice to Trump, selectively choosing what to present and what to hold back, said people familiar with the White House’s internal dynamics.

Below the cabinet level, these people said, many traditional China hawks have been marginalized, including Peter Navarro, a longtime trade adviser to Trump.

A senior administration official said even though Navarro’s television appearances have declined, he’s still involved in formulating China policies.

In a statement, Navarro said, “Just as in the first Trump term, my job today is to help create jobs, improve wages, and fix supply chain vulnerabilities. The difference this time is that I don’t have to fight the secretaries of Commerce, Treasury, and War to move the Trump agenda. One band, one sound.”

China’s New Strategy for Trump: Punch Hard, Concede Little

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-trump-strategy-06841606

For Xi, rare-earths bombshell signaled a new toughness, while TikTok was ‘spiritual opium’ that could be turned into a low-cost bargaining chip

Chinese President Xi Jinping celebrates the 76th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in Beijing last month. Ng Han Guan/Ap

By Lingling Wei

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Oct. 23, 2025 9:00 pm ET

During his first term, President Trump often frustrated Xi Jinping with his freewheeling mix of threats and bonhomie. This time, the Chinese leader believes he has cracked the code.

Xi has thrown out China’s traditional diplomatic playbook and tailored a new one specifically for Trump, said people close to Chinese policymakers, who describe Xi as appearing confident and emboldened. The new strategy, these people said, embraces Trump’s self-image as a master dealmaker, offering concessions on high-visibility issues he personally cares about, such as the fate of popular video-sharing app TikTok. 

But when the Trump administration hits China, Xi has decided to hit back even harder, in a bid to gain leverage over Trump while projecting strength and unpredictability—qualities he believes the U.S. president admires, the people said. The two leaders are set to meet next Thursday in South Korea.

Xi’s strategic evolution takes a page from Trump’s own “maximum pressure” playbook of using the threat of overwhelming economic sanctions to get his way against adversaries and friends alike. According to those familiar with Beijing’s thinking, while China’s reactions to U.S. trade assaults were often proportional in the past, its countermeasures now are designed to be more severe.

President Trump shakes hands with China's President Xi Jinping during a meeting on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan, in 2019. Susan Walsh/AP

“During Trump’s first term, China was constantly put off balance by his pressure tactics,” said Kurt Campbell, former deputy secretary of state under President Joe Biden and now chairman of the Asia Group, an advisory firm in Washington. “This time, Xi wanted to be prepared. He knows Trump wants a good relationship with him and respects strength, not concessions.”

The most powerful example of the new strategy came early this month when Washington and Beijing were trying to finalize the South Korea summit. Just when relations seemed on the mend, Xi dropped a bombshell: He directed his government to hit back at a recent U.S. export-control action—and do so with unprecedented force, according to the people close to Beijing.

On Oct. 9, China’s Ministry of Commerce unveiled broad restrictions on exports of rare-earth materials that threaten to upend global production of everything from phones, laptops and cars to missiles. China produces around 90% of the world’s refined rare earths.

Publicly, Chinese officials said the move was simply a tit-for-tat response to a new U.S. rule extending restrictions on tech sales to any companies at least half-owned by an already blacklisted Chinese entity. In reality, the people close to Beijing said, it was also Xi’s attempt to gain leverage before meeting Trump, who has shown a desire to strike a broad economic deal with China.

A rare-earth mine in China’s Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Wu Changqing/VCG/Getty Images

Xi’s new doctrine is that the U.S. must adapt to a reality of Chinese power, these people said. In rare earths, they said, Xi is convinced that China holds an undisputed trump card that allows it to demand substantial U.S. concessions. 

“Beijing believes it has maximum leverage and is not afraid of using it,” said Jimmy Goodrich, a China and technology expert at the University of California Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation in San Diego.

Still, Xi risks a strategic backfire. His tactics provide ammunition to hawks in Washington pushing to break America’s economic dependency on China. U.S. allies in Europe and Asia, who rely on these minerals for their own industries, were also unsettled by Beijing’s heavy-handed display, reinforcing worries that China is becoming an increasingly unpredictable actor on the world stage. The U.S. and Australia this week announced plans to invest $3 billion in critical minerals aimed at eroding China’s hegemony. 

A first sign of Xi’s playbook appeared in April, when Trump unleashed his global “Liberation Day” tariffs. China, already weathering Biden-era restrictions, was hit hard, with U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods eventually skyrocketing to 145%. And Beijing’s retaliation was swift: It cut off rare-earth magnets to American companies, temporarily forcing some U.S. automobile factories to shut down. 

President Trump’s announcement of high ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs in April drew a strong response from China. brendan smialowski/AFP/Getty Images

The blowback on Wall Street was immediate. The U.S. bond market went into a tailspin, and Beijing’s counterpunch caused stocks to plummet. Beijing gradually eased exports later, after striking agreements with Washington, but continued to tightly control supply.

For Xi, the market chaos was a signal. According to the people close to Chinese policymakers, he was emboldened to press his advantage, convinced the U.S. lacked the stomach for more economic pain. In recent trade negotiations, the Chinese have demanded a full capitulation: the removal of all U.S. tariffs and export-control measures, though their American counterparts haven’t given any ground.

The art of concession

The strategy behind this new assertiveness was born from crisis. After Trump’s presidential victory last year, anxiety rippled through Beijing. According to the people close to policymakers, Xi told his top aides—including chief of staff Cai Qi, economic czar He Lifeng and the Communist Party’s leading ideologue, Wang Huning—to urgently design a new playbook for Trump 2.0, one that would break the constant reactive posture that had defined Beijing’s past approach.

In a statement, China’s Foreign Ministry said both countries “should address mutual concerns through dialogue and consultation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.” 

The new approach is rooted in a core belief in Beijing: that Trump is fundamentally transactional, not ideological. Policymakers believe they can use Trump’s zest for a deal to neutralize the China hawks in his administration. The goal, as Campbell put it, is to create a “soft and hard” approach. Beijing would cater to Trump’s desire for deals while simultaneously applying painful economic pressure.

“Holding Trump close has been central to the Chinese playbook,” said Evan Medeiros, a former senior national-security official in the Obama administration and now a professor at Georgetown University. “They know he is neither a hawk nor ideological and want to play to his instincts to do deals.”

Nvidia’s Jensen Huang helped persuade President Trump to reverse a ban on selling the company’s H20 chips to China. Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

White House spokesman Kush Desai disputed the characterization of the president’s dealmaking instincts, saying Trump’s promise is to revitalize American industries and communities. “The only deals that President Trump is willing to strike are deals that deliver on this pledge by putting Americans and America First,” Desai said.

Beijing is also trying to go around formal diplomatic and security establishments to get messages straight to Trump through relationships with influential U.S. business titans such as Nvidia’s chief executive, Jensen Huang.

That quiet calculation—balancing pressure with appeasement—now forms the bedrock of China’s strategy. In the tense lead-up to trade talks in Madrid this September, Xi knew he needed to offer a concession to get what he truly wanted: summits with Trump to hash out issues one-on-one.

The concession was TikTok.

For Trump, forcing the sale of the high-profile app was a populist victory framed around national security. For Xi, however, the app was a low-cost bargaining chip. He had privately dismissed it as “spiritual opium,” according to the people close to Beijing, and viewed it as an easy sacrifice to secure the continued dialogue China needed.

As a result, Xi set the stage for a series of summits with Trump. After the meeting next week in South Korea, Beijing hopes to arrange a Trump visit to China early next year, and finally a Xi trip to the U.S. in late 2026.

At the top of Xi’s agenda is the critical issue of Taiwan. With Trump signaling interest in a new economic accord, the Chinese leader plans to use these meetings to press Trump to move beyond the longstanding policy of strategic ambiguity and formally state that the U.S. “opposes” Taiwan’s independence. In another sign of this transactional approach, ahead of the expected leaders’ summit, Beijing is considering a significant purchase of American soybeans, a request put forward by Trump.

The thinking among the Chinese leadership, the people close to Beijing said, is that since the two leaders are going to meet, what’s the problem with buying some soybeans?

Hawks grounded

White House Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing Peter Navarro and other ‘China hawks’ have been partially sidelined. will oliver/epa/shutterstock

Xi’s new playbook is gaining some ground in an administration where cabinet secretaries now carefully curate their advice to Trump, selectively choosing what to present and what to hold back, said people familiar with the White House’s internal dynamics.

Below the cabinet level, these people said, many traditional China hawks have been marginalized, including Peter Navarro, a longtime trade adviser to Trump.

A senior administration official said even though Navarro’s television appearances have declined, he’s still involved in formulating China policies.

In a statement, Navarro said, “Just as in the first Trump term, my job today is to help create jobs, improve wages, and fix supply chain vulnerabilities. The difference this time is that I don’t have to fight the secretaries of Commerce, Treasury, and War to move the Trump agenda. One band, one sound.”

Landon Heid’s nomination to be an assistant secretary of Commerce was pulled earlier this year. kevin mohatt/Reuters

One example of how hawkish voices were checked was the case of Landon Heid, said the people familiar with the White House’s dynamics. His nomination to a crucial post at the Commerce Department—overseeing the very export controls meant to protect American technology—was pulled in September without explanation.

A former diplomat in Beijing and an ex-tech policy expert for the hard-line House Select Committee on China, Heid issued a stark warning during his confirmation hearing in April, calling China’s pursuit of emerging technologies a “profound threat to U.S. economic and national security.”

But his hawkishness was seen as a liability to some officials at the White House, according to the people familiar with the dynamics.

“Landon Heid is a valued voice within the administration and will continue executing the President’s America First Asia policy at the National Security Council,” White House spokeswoman Anna Kelly said. Heid didn’t return a request for comment.

As other officials who pushed for a tougher line on China have left the administration, security and tech experts began to worry that a vacuum had been created—one that could be filled by those more interested in business ties with Beijing than in challenging its ambitions.

That vacuum, these experts said, provided an opening for influential business leaders, most notably Nvidia’s Huang. In an appeal to Trump in the summer, Huang argued that the ban on selling the company’s H20 artificial-intelligence chip to China would only accelerate Beijing’s push for technological self-sufficiency. Trump then decided to reverse the ban.

An Nvidia spokesperson said the company “works with governments across the world. We do not engage in geopolitical or diplomatic discussions between governments.”

Nvidia had developed the H20 to comply with past export restrictions as a less powerful chip specially designed for China. “America wins by promoting U.S. industries worldwide,” the Nvidia spokesperson said.

White House spokesman Desai said, “The era of Washington, D.C. politicians selling out our country and compromising America’s national security at the behest of special interest groups ended the day President Trump took office.” To deliver on his pledge to put America first, Desai said, “President Trump has assembled the best and most experienced economic and national security team in modern history.”

The consequences of the diminished influence of the hawks became clear just weeks before Trump’s Alaska summit with Russian leader Vladimir Putin in August. 

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent meets with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng in Geneva earlier this year. martial trezzini/KEYSTONE/Reuters

According to people with knowledge of the events, the administration had prepared a “decision memo” outlining a package of secondary sanctions against China for its purchases of Russian oil—a move intended to give the U.S. leverage over both China and Russia. The memo was sent to Trump for a final decision. 

However, before his meeting with Putin, Trump decided against the sanctions package, the people said, partly to avoid direct retaliation from Beijing. Specifically, the president worried that China would once again restrict U.S. access to its rare-earth magnets—a critical component in both defense and commercial technology. 

It was Beijing’s playbook in action: Trump’s transactional, personal decision-making overruled a proposed hawkish move, driven by China’s leverage over economic chokepoints.

A high-stakes gamble

That success, however, may have bred the overconfidence behind Beijing’s latest sweeping controls on rare earths. The move enraged the White House, and Trump himself threatened to retaliate with 100% tariffs on Chinese goods and cancel the summit with Xi. The backlash triggered a hasty softening of the tone from Beijing. By Oct. 12, China’s Ministry of Commerce had issued a statement promising to implement the controls in a “prudential and moderate manner.”

Beijing’s quick backtrack underscores that the U.S. continues to hold significant leverage in the relationship. Senior administration officials including Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent have said China remains critically dependent on American products such as jet engines for its burgeoning aviation industry. A loss of access to such high-end products could thwart China’s own technological and strategic ambitions.

Bessent, for his part, has also maneuvered to keep the door open for a resolution between Trump and Xi, even while applying pressure. He recently rebuked a specific Chinese negotiator, a break from diplomatic protocol, in a bid to blame lower-level figures for China’s recent actions and allow the two leaders to eventually work things out without losing face.

Still, the ground beneath the expected summit had shifted. Even as Trump later softened his tone on the tariff threat, Beijing’s new rare-earths move spurred the administration to devise a series of counterattacks should China fail to walk back the rule.

According to the people close to the White House’s dynamics, officials are now using the incident as a clear-cut example of China’s coercive tactics. The proposed secondary sanctions on China for its imports of Russian oil, which Trump initially vetoed, may be back on the table.

Trump said Wednesday he plans to speak to Xi about China’s purchases of Russian oil during their meeting in South Korea next week.

This has created a new, high-stakes test, pitting the president’s “master dealmaker” instincts against the stark warnings of his national-security establishment. For China, the question is whether its playbook has instead provoked the very hard-liners it was meant to circumvent.

The ultimate outcome may hinge on a fundamental mismatch in perspective, one that defines the entire U.S.-China relationship.

“Trump’s focus is short-term and political,” said Campbell, the former deputy secretary of state, “while Xi is focused on sustaining long-term competition with the U.S.”

Write to Lingling Wei at Lingling.Wei@wsj.com

4. Why Trump Reached a Breaking Point With Putin

​Excerpts:

The new sanctions, which specifically target energy companies Lukoil and Rosneft, represent the latest in Trump’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine and cement his long-sought legacy as a global peacemaker. Trump on the presidential campaign trail last year repeatedly boasted he would end the war on “day one” in office, but peace so far has eluded him after months of failed efforts to get Moscow to seriously negotiate peace terms. At times he has sought to pressure Zelensky to make concessions, leading to both public and private arguments.

Rubio said sanctions haven’t changed their overarching goal of pushing Moscow to the negotiating table. “We’d still like to meet with the Russians,” the secretary of state told reporters on Wednesday night. “The president has said repeatedly for months that at some point he’d have to do something if we didn’t make progress on the peace deal. Today was the day he decided to do something.”

The crack with Putin began to emerge publicly in June during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit, when Trump called his Russian counterpart’s refusal to end the war “misguided.” A phone call between them the following month was much shorter than previous chats and lacked the warmth with which they normally spoke to each other, the senior administration official said.

Trump has other tools at his disposal to ratchet up pressure on Putin, but so far hasn’t taken them. That includes sending long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine, imposing new secondary sanctions on any companies that do business with the sanctioned Russian oil giants, or targeting Russia’s vast so-called shadow fleet of illicit oil tankers with new sanctions to bolster European Union sanctions.

“Trump is leaving some things off the table because he still really wants a deal with Putin,” said Kurt Volker, who served as Trump’s envoy for Ukraine during his first administration. “This shows he’s just frustrated Putin hasn’t gone along with his plans yet.”

Volker said getting Putin to commit to serious concessions will take “a lot more than sanctions,” and said sending Tomahawks to Ukraine would be an important next step.

Why Trump Reached a Breaking Point With Putin

U.S. president was given three options for sanctions after running out of patience with the Kremlin over its war in Ukraine

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/trump-putin-breaking-point-e462e86e

By Alex Leary

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, Robbie Gramer

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 and Alexander Ward

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Oct. 23, 2025 9:00 pm ET

The sanctions are the first U.S. measures taken against Russia during President Trump’s second term. Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP/Getty Images

Quick Summary

• President Trump sanctioned Russia’s oil industry, targeting Lukoil and Rosneft, after concluding that President Putin wasn’t serious about peace negotiations.View more

WASHINGTON—President Trump wanted a final gut check before taking his hardest move yet against Russian President Vladimir Putin. “Do you guys agree with me?” he asked top advisers in the Oval Office on Wednesday.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said yes, according to a person familiar with the meeting Wednesday afternoon. Hours earlier Trump had met with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and told him to prepare a slate of sanctions on Russia’s oil industry, marking the first direct U.S. measures on Russia during the second Trump administration.

“I just felt it was time. We waited a long time,” Trump later told reporters. 

For months Trump has been threatening such action, only to allow each threat to fade, as he continued to believe he could negotiate with Putin over the war in Ukraine, a posture that has long frustrated policymakers in the U.S. and Europe.

But the president’s patience finally ran out, officials said, after concluding Putin was dragging him along and after continuing to see footage of Russian strikes in Ukraine. Hours after Trump called off a planned summit with Putin in Budapest, deeming it a waste of time, Russia launched new missile and drone strikes on Ukraine, hitting various buildings including a kindergarten. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said the attack showed Russia hadn’t come under enough outside pressure to negotiate.

Trump didn’t comment directly on the strikes but has been angered with such aggressions, even at times in which he has felt he has made progress with Putin, administration officials said. Trump thinks the Gaza cease-fire he brokered has created momentum to end the war in Ukraine, officials said, but Putin’s stubbornness has persisted.

“Every time I speak with Vladimir, I have good conversations and then they don’t go anywhere,” Trump said Wednesday.

President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin arriving for a joint news conference at their summit in Alaska this past summer. Al Drago/Bloomberg News

U.S. sanctions packages for Russia’s oil industry have been drafted and ready for months in case Trump decided to act, U.S. officials said. Trump was presented with three sanctions plans, the officials said: A severe option that targeted Russian industry and senior Russian leaders directly; a middle option that targeted Russia’s energy industry; and a lighter option that included more limited sanctions. Trump chose the middle option.

A senior White House official said that Trump has been clear that it is time to end the war, adding that he would continue to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

The new sanctions, which specifically target energy companies Lukoil and Rosneft, represent the latest in Trump’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine and cement his long-sought legacy as a global peacemaker. Trump on the presidential campaign trail last year repeatedly boasted he would end the war on “day one” in office, but peace so far has eluded him after months of failed efforts to get Moscow to seriously negotiate peace terms. At times he has sought to pressure Zelensky to make concessions, leading to both public and private arguments.

Rubio said sanctions haven’t changed their overarching goal of pushing Moscow to the negotiating table. “We’d still like to meet with the Russians,” the secretary of state told reporters on Wednesday night. “The president has said repeatedly for months that at some point he’d have to do something if we didn’t make progress on the peace deal. Today was the day he decided to do something.”

The crack with Putin began to emerge publicly in June during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit, when Trump called his Russian counterpart’s refusal to end the war “misguided.” A phone call between them the following month was much shorter than previous chats and lacked the warmth with which they normally spoke to each other, the senior administration official said.

Trump has other tools at his disposal to ratchet up pressure on Putin, but so far hasn’t taken them. That includes sending long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine, imposing new secondary sanctions on any companies that do business with the sanctioned Russian oil giants, or targeting Russia’s vast so-called shadow fleet of illicit oil tankers with new sanctions to bolster European Union sanctions.

“Trump is leaving some things off the table because he still really wants a deal with Putin,” said Kurt Volker, who served as Trump’s envoy for Ukraine during his first administration. “This shows he’s just frustrated Putin hasn’t gone along with his plans yet.”

Volker said getting Putin to commit to serious concessions will take “a lot more than sanctions,” and said sending Tomahawks to Ukraine would be an important next step.

Still, the latest Rosneft and Lukoil sanctions could amount to an economic game-changer, administration officials said, given how reliant Russia’s fragile wartime economy is on oil and gas revenue. Within a day of the announcement, Indian oil refiners had taken steps to cut their country’s oil flows from Russia while Chinese state oil companies had suspended, at least temporarily, the purchase of Russian oil.

Putin conceded the sanctions could cost Russia’s economy, telling reporters on Thursday that “some losses are expected,” but he added that “no self-respecting country ever does anything under pressure.”

Trump hasn’t yet signaled whether he will follow up with additional U.S. sanctions on Russia as he increases pressure on Putin to get a peace deal.

“Now the question is whether we’re seeing a fundamental retooling of Trump’s strategy or just a temporary measure to show displeasure with the fact the Russians have been totally not cooperative on the diplomatic front,” said Andrew Weiss, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace think tank.

Write to Alex Leary at alex.leary@wsj.com, Robbie Gramer at robbie.gramer@wsj.com and Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com

5. Trump-Xi summit, if not canceled like Trump-Putin, will be tepid

​Are we in a Cold War 2.0?

If so, what are the implications for our national security? If not, how do we describe the strategic conditions? Is "strategic competition" or "great power competition" sufficient?

Excerpts:

The US relies heavily on Chinese rare earth elements, so it can only ask for them and offer promises in return. However, in the long run (exact timeframe unknown), the US aims to become independent of Chinese rare earths. This shift would leave China with no leverage, effectively leaving it at the mercy of the US, its primary export market and a leading provider of services ranging from aviation to credit.

Therefore, China needs to buy itself as much time as possible and secure an alternative form of leverage or wean itself off US dependencies in the meantime. Its grip on Russia could be essential.

The US has the opposite necessity: to get out of the Chinese rare earths chokehold ASAP and deprive China of any other leverage.Some billionaires on both sides are floating the idea of rekindling ties with a wave of Chinese investment in the United States. Some estimate it could be $600 billion.

The idea, while promising at first glance, may not gain much support on either side. The US might worry that these investments would give China a greater voice in American society, as has happened with TikTok.

Trump-Xi summit, if not canceled like Trump-Putin, will be tepid - Asia Times

Expectations cannot be high, but it would be a significant achievement to limit escalation of Cold War II

https://asiatimes.com/2025/10/trump-xi-summit-if-not-canceled-like-trump-putin-will-be-tepid/?utm

asiatimes.com · Francesco Sisci · October 22, 2025

The summit between American President Donald Trump and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping could be a meeting between two good, decent people.

Those who know him describe Xi as a kind man who is always attentive to the needs of those around him. Trump himself should be a good man, given all the effort he puts into appearing bad. Evil men usually don’t do that; they want to look good.

However, individual goodness won’t alter the nature of the meeting or the direction it might take.

Two heavy shadows loom over the gathering: the sudden cancellation of the planned meeting between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the very fresh flurry of trade disputes and threats between the US and China.

Trump already questioned the meeting with Xi, then reaffirmed it. But nothing is certain at this point.

The two presidents, in fact, represent two countries with fundamentally and clearly opposing needs. China needs to sustain and even expand its trade surplus, which is currently the primary driver of growth in its otherwise struggling domestic economy.

Conversely, America needs to curb and eliminate China’s trade surplus because it is unsustainable for its finances. For both nations, their conflicting needs are vital, and each believes it has the advantage over the other.

Xi represents 1.4 billion Chinese. Trump speaks for 350 million Americans and, indirectly, the interests of about six billion people worldwide who live within the American socio-economic system.

The needs of the Chinese, if they succeed, could reshape the global structure by reducing or removing American centrality. Some countries might support or even welcome this shift, although a world led by China remains uncertain and unclear. Others may view a Sino-centric world with dread or suspicion.

Furthermore, China and the United States do not place much trust in each other – apart from any good personal rapport between the two leaders. It remains unclear how this lack of confidence, deeply rooted in both systems and beyond personal communication, can be addressed.

Beijing has long relied on American billionaires friendly to China to smooth over issues. However, they no longer hold much weight in Washington or Beijing.

What remains is essential but not existential for either of them. It would be best to have more short-term flexibility.

The US relies heavily on Chinese rare earth elements, so it can only ask for them and offer promises in return. However, in the long run (exact timeframe unknown), the US aims to become independent of Chinese rare earths. This shift would leave China with no leverage, effectively leaving it at the mercy of the US, its primary export market and a leading provider of services ranging from aviation to credit.

Therefore, China needs to buy itself as much time as possible and secure an alternative form of leverage or wean itself off US dependencies in the meantime. Its grip on Russia could be essential.

The US has the opposite necessity: to get out of the Chinese rare earths chokehold ASAP and deprive China of any other leverage.Some billionaires on both sides are floating the idea of rekindling ties with a wave of Chinese investment in the United States. Some estimate it could be $600 billion.

The idea, while promising at first glance, may not gain much support on either side. The US might worry that these investments would give China a greater voice in American society, as has happened with TikTok.

The US could demand that, unlike the case with TikTok, Beijing fully transfer all technology to America. The Chinese might also worry that, if they did that, the US could eventually nationalize those investments.

The game, therefore, is a long one; it won’t be decided in a summit. It’s a Second Cold War, for lack of better terms. It’s a complex framework, but Trump and Xi can set the tone for the future. One key element is ensuring that the confrontation remains within limits and doesn’t spiral out of control. If these two leaders could establish some boundaries on the intensity of the Cold War, it would already be a significant achievement.

As any investor knows, limiting losses sometimes is the only way forward until conditions change.

An Italian analyst and commentator on politics, with over 30 years of experience in China and Asia, Francesco Sisci is director of the Appia Institute. This article, first published by the institute, is republished with permission.

asiatimes.com · Francesco Sisci · October 22, 2025

6. U.S. Sends B-1 Bombers Near Venezuela, Ramping Up Military Pressure

​So how do we think the BONE will be deployed in Venezuela? What targets?

​Excerpts:

After this article was published, President Trump told reporters at the White House it was “not accurate.”

The bomber flights are part of a broad military ramp-up, which includes eight warships, a submarine, a P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, MQ-9 Reaper drones and an F-35 fighter squadron now in the region.

The U.S. has seldom flown bombers near South America in recent decades, usually carrying out just one planned training mission a year. But more missions involving bombers could be carried out soon, according to two defense officials. 

Thursday’s flights signal “seriousness and intent,” said David Deptula, a retired Air Force general and dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, an aerospace think tank. “You’re bringing an enormous set of capabilities…endurance, payload, range and precision,” he said.

The widening of the military campaign has focused on countering alleged drug traffickers from Venezuela and Colombia. After carrying out at least seven strikes on go-fast boats and a submersible in the Caribbean since early September, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said Wednesday that the U.S. had attacked two vessels in the eastern Pacific this week.

U.S. Sends B-1 Bombers Near Venezuela, Ramping Up Military Pressure

The flights signal possible widening of U.S. campaign against cartels and alleged drug traffickers

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/u-s-sends-b-1-bombers-near-venezuela-ramping-up-military-pressure-f9514126

By Shelby Holliday

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 and Lara Seligman

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Updated Oct. 23, 2025 6:26 pm ET

A B-1 bomber Win McNamee/Getty Images

The U.S. flew Air Force B-1 bombers near Venezuela on Thursday, stepping up pressure on President Nicolás Maduro only days after other American warplanes carried out an “attack demonstration” near the South American country.

Two B-1 Lancers took off from Dyess Air Force Base in Texas on Thursday and flew near Venezuela, though they remained in international airspace, according to a U.S. official and flight tracking data.

The B-1 can fly at supersonic speeds and carry 75,000 lbs. of bombs, more than other U.S. bombers. They can also conduct maritime surveillance. The aircraft haven’t been moved to bases in the region, as they have the range to reach anywhere in the Caribbean from the U.S., according to a defense official.

Last week, the Air Force and Marines conducted a similar show of force with B-52 bombers and F-35B jet fighters near an island off the coast of Venezuela where its military held training exercises in September. The bombers circled the area before returning to the U.S., according to flight tracking data. The Pentagon described the flights as an “attack demonstration.”

After this article was published, President Trump told reporters at the White House it was “not accurate.”

The bomber flights are part of a broad military ramp-up, which includes eight warships, a submarine, a P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, MQ-9 Reaper drones and an F-35 fighter squadron now in the region.

The U.S. has seldom flown bombers near South America in recent decades, usually carrying out just one planned training mission a year. But more missions involving bombers could be carried out soon, according to two defense officials. 

Thursday’s flights signal “seriousness and intent,” said David Deptula, a retired Air Force general and dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, an aerospace think tank. “You’re bringing an enormous set of capabilities…endurance, payload, range and precision,” he said.

The widening of the military campaign has focused on countering alleged drug traffickers from Venezuela and Colombia. After carrying out at least seven strikes on go-fast boats and a submersible in the Caribbean since early September, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said Wednesday that the U.S. had attacked two vessels in the eastern Pacific this week.

Trump has suggested that striking targets on land could come next. “There are few boats traveling on the water, so now they’ll come in by land to a lesser extent, and they will be hit on land also,” Trump said Wednesday at the White House. 

Bombers could be used to hit narcotics distribution or production facilities, according to current and former Air Force officials. 

The administration has faced growing bipartisan scrutiny about the legal basis for strikes carried out in recent weeks, though the Republican-controlled Congress has rejected measures to limit the president’s power to continue the attacks.

Asked whether Trump would need authorization from Congress to conduct strikes on land, Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R., S.D.) said Thursday, “I’m not sure I know the answer to that.”

Maduro has accused Trump of seeking regime change and has positioned troops along the coast, bracing for a potential attack. Trump has also accused Colombian President Gustavo Petro of aiding drug smugglers, while Petro has said his American counterpart is committing atrocities by ordering strikes on boats.

Write to Shelby Holliday at shelby.holliday@wsj.com and Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com

Appeared in the October 24, 2025, print edition as 'U.S. Sends B-1 Bombers Near Venezuela'

7. Most-Wanted Fentanyl Producer Is in Cuban Custody After Brazen Escape

​Is this a good thing or a bad thing for us?

In custody is a good thing. But will the Mexicans receive him from Cuban custody? What will Mexico do with him?

Excerpts:

He then hopped on a private jet to Cuba and boarded a flight to Russia, beyond the reach of U.S. and Mexican prosecutors. But authorities in Russia, perhaps not knowing Zhang’s true identity, refused him entry and ordered his immediate return to Cuba, said law-enforcement officials familiar with the case.

Now, Zhang is detained in Cuba, where authorities say they are planning to deport him back to Mexico but haven’t provided a date.

Bringing Zhang to justice would mark a major blow for the global underworld network that links China to Mexico’s most powerful drug-smuggling cartels, and their narcotics distribution and money-laundering networks in the U.S., officials familiar with the case say. The Justice Department considers him one of the world’s most important drug traffickers, on par with Mexico’s most wanted cartel bosses.

Zhang is accused of smuggling tons of chemical precursors to make fentanyl for Mexico’s top two criminal organizations, the Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels. U.S. and Mexican officials consider Zhang a criminal mastermind because of his logistical prowess and expertise in developing new formulas for the addictive opioid. He also brought in Chinese chemists to train the cartels’ own lab operators.

Most-Wanted Fentanyl Producer Is in Cuban Custody After Brazen Escape

Zhi Dong Zhang—one of the Justice Department’s most-wanted men—fled house arrest in Mexico

https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/most-wanted-fentanyl-producer-is-in-cuban-custody-after-brazen-escape-09ce6d7f

By Steve Fisher, Santiago Pérez

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 and José de Córdoba

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Oct. 23, 2025 3:52 pm ET

Mexican authorities have been trying to prove to the U.S. that they are tackling fentanyl trafficking. Yael Martínez for WSJ

Quick Summary

• Zhi Dong Zhang, accused of linking Chinese chemicals to Mexican cartels, escaped house arrest in Mexico in July.View more

MEXICO CITY—The accused Chinese drug boss was this close to the perfect getaway.

In July, Zhi Dong Zhang—whom the Justice Department accuses of being the most important link between Chinese chemicals and Mexican cartels making fentanyl—escaped from house arrest in Mexico, where he was set to be extradited to the U.S. on drug trafficking and money laundering charges. 

He then hopped on a private jet to Cuba and boarded a flight to Russia, beyond the reach of U.S. and Mexican prosecutors. But authorities in Russia, perhaps not knowing Zhang’s true identity, refused him entry and ordered his immediate return to Cuba, said law-enforcement officials familiar with the case.

Now, Zhang is detained in Cuba, where authorities say they are planning to deport him back to Mexico but haven’t provided a date.

Bringing Zhang to justice would mark a major blow for the global underworld network that links China to Mexico’s most powerful drug-smuggling cartels, and their narcotics distribution and money-laundering networks in the U.S., officials familiar with the case say. The Justice Department considers him one of the world’s most important drug traffickers, on par with Mexico’s most wanted cartel bosses.

Zhang is accused of smuggling tons of chemical precursors to make fentanyl for Mexico’s top two criminal organizations, the Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels. U.S. and Mexican officials consider Zhang a criminal mastermind because of his logistical prowess and expertise in developing new formulas for the addictive opioid. He also brought in Chinese chemists to train the cartels’ own lab operators.

A photo of Zhi Dong Zhang released this year by Mexican authorities.

The Mexican Attorney General’s office estimates that Zhang makes more than $150 million a year from his global trafficking network. U.S. prosecutors in Georgia have charged him with laundering millions of dollars through U.S. banks.

Zhang’s bold escape from house arrest in July infuriated Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum. The breakout was an embarrassment for Mexican authorities who were trying to prove to the U.S. that they were tackling fentanyl trafficking and head off unilateral American military action against cartels.

Recapturing Zhang is also vital for Mexican authorities, who see his deportation from Cuba and eventual extradition to the U.S. as a vindication of their efforts. 

The U.S. Justice Department designated Zhang one of the world’s top drug traffickers. Like Jalisco cartel boss Nemesio “El Mencho” Oseguera, Zhang is a Consolidated Priority Organization Target, a Justice Department designation that requires extensive evidence by case officers across agencies to demonstrate the regional reach of their criminal activity.

A U.S. indictment in Georgia charges Zhang with trafficking large amounts of cocaine and fentanyl into the U.S. and making numerous cash deposits to U.S. banks.

Zhang’s U.S. extradition request alleges that he smuggled more than 2,000 pounds of cocaine, almost 4,000 pounds of fentanyl and over 1,300 pounds of methamphetamines to the U.S., according to the attorney general’s report. Officials say he was a top broker of coveted Chinese chemicals needed to manufacture fentanyl, a synthetic opioid that is extremely addictive. Hundreds of thousands have died in the U.S. as a result of fentanyl overdoses. 

Zhang arrived in Mexico from China before the 2020 pandemic, married a Mexican woman and acquired Mexican citizenship. A fluent Spanish speaker, Zhang answers to many names. Among them: El Chino, Brother Wang, Hehe, Haha and Nelson Mandela, according to the attorney general’s report.

Officials familiar with the case believe Cuban authorities are taking their time with the deportation as the island’s vaunted intelligence agents methodically extract information about his vast criminal network in China, Mexico and the U.S. The Cuban Embassy in the U.S. didn’t respond to a request for comment.

“They will squeeze all the information out of him and then give him to Mexico,” said Jorge Castañeda, a former Mexican foreign minister, since the Mexican government has historically had very close relations with Cuba and has often acted as a go-between for Washington and Havana.

The Russian Embassy in Washington didn’t respond to a request for comment. A spokesman for China’s Embassy in Washington said he isn’t familiar with Zhang’s case, but said the government has been striking hard against fentanyl-related crimes.

Mystery still shrouds Zhang’s escape in July, following a late night court hearing in Mexico City when a judge unexpectedly granted him house arrest. At the time, Sheinbaum said the judge should have kept him behind bars.

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum Isaac Esquivel/EPA/Shutterstock

“He was granted house arrest with no grounds for it,” she said during her daily news conference in July. “We’ve been insisting that there is corruption in the judiciary.”

A spokeswoman for the federal body responsible for the administration and discipline of Mexico’s judiciary declined to comment.

Zhang, who had until then been held in a maximum-security prison, left the courtroom in Mexico City and arrived at a house protected by Mexican security officers. The house was next to a residence owned by a criminal organization, said the officials familiar with the case. Investigators later found a hole in the wall linking the two houses. Left behind was Zhang’s court-issued electronic ankle bracelet.

Mexican authorities launched a manhunt. Security officials tracked a vehicle with surveillance cameras as it left the house, believing Zhang was inside. The car headed south toward Guerrero state on Mexico’s Pacific coast, the people familiar with the case said.

Guerrero’s law-enforcement officials stopped the vehicle, these people said. Mexican authorities informed senior U.S. officials that Zhang had been recaptured. Then, minutes later, they said they didn’t have him. 

Within hours, Zhang was on a private jet en route to Cuba.

A spokesperson for the Guerrero state police said there is no record that Zhang was detained. One person familiar with the case said that Zhang wasn’t in the vehicle. 

Mexico put out a global Interpol “red alert” seeking Zhang’s capture. 

From Cuba, Zhang flew to Russia. But authorities there ordered his immediate return to Cuba, the people familiar with the case said. Along with Zhang, Cuba also detained two suspects, one Chinese and one Mexican national, Mexico’s government said Wednesday.

Russian officials seem to have missed the value of a top fugitive wanted by the U.S. with information about the American underworld, probably because Zhang was carrying false identification and the Interpol alert for him had been issued by Mexico, and not the U.S., these people said.

Write to Santiago Pérez at santiago.perez@wsj.com and José de Córdoba at jose.decordoba@wsj.com

Appeared in the October 24, 2025, print edition as 'Accused Drug Boss Held In Cuba After Escape'.

8. Vance Says International Security Force Will Take Lead on Disarming Hamas

​A difficult and complex operation that will be especially complicated by the use of mutli-national forces.

Vance Says International Security Force Will Take Lead on Disarming Hamas

Vice President JD Vance spoke from Israel, as he wrapped up a visit aimed at shoring up a fragile cease-fire between Israel and Hamas.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/23/world/middleeast/rubio-israel-gaza.html

Speaking from Israel, Vice President JD Vance addressed the delicate issues of disarming Hamas and the Israeli Knesset’s recent symbolic vote to annex the West Bank.CreditCredit...Nathan Howard for The New York Times

By Liam Stack and Tyler Pager

Reporting from Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

Oct. 23, 2025

Updated 12:51 p.m. ET

Vice President JD Vance said Thursday that an international security force that has yet to be formed would take the lead on disarming Hamas, which has been one of the thorniest issues when it comes to reaching a lasting peace in Gaza.

The vice president spoke from Israel, at the end of a visit aimed at shoring up a fragile cease-fire between Israel and Hamas. In remarks to reporters, Mr. Vance cautioned that the task of disarming Hamas — which the militant group has long opposed — was “going to take some time and it’s going to depend a lot on the composition of that force.”

The cease-fire deal that came into effect earlier this month was based on a proposal outlined in September by president Trump, which includes a stipulation that a “temporary International Stabilization Force” be deployed in Gaza. But several countries have hesitated to commit troops to such a force because its exact mission in the devastated Palestinian enclave was unclear. The possibility that such a force might be drawn into direct conflict with Hamas fighters has also been a worry.

While Mr. Vance did not address that concern in his brief remarks on Thursday, he reiterated that there would be “no American troops on the ground” in Gaza. Instead, he said, American personnel would be “supervising and mediating the peace.”

The 20-point peace proposal did not specify that the security force would be tasked with disarming Hamas, and a timeline for doing so has not been laid out. The force was originally envisioned as a way to secure areas of Gaza where Israeli troops have withdrawn, prevent munitions from entering the territory, facilitate the distribution of aid and train a Palestinian police force.

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

The deal has come under strain from a recent flare-up of violence in Gaza, and lingering tensions over the exchange of deceased Israelis and Palestinians.

Image

Several countries have been skittish about the idea of contributing troops to a Gaza security force because its exact mission in the devastated Palestinian enclave is unclear.Credit...Saher Alghorra for The New York Times

It faced fresh challenges this week from Israeli lawmakers, who approved a preliminary measure for the annexation of the Israeli-occupied West Bank — a move that is explicitly prohibited under the terms of Mr. Trump’s peace plan.

Mr. Vance said Thursday that the vote was “weird” and leveled sharp criticism at those lawmakers.

“If it was a political stunt, it was a very stupid political stunt, and I personally take some insult to it,” he said. “The West Bank is not going to be annexed by Israel. The policy of the Trump administration is that the West Bank will not be annexed by Israel.”

Mr. Vance also touched on the topic of reconstruction in Gaza, echoing the broad contours of comments made this week in Israel by Jared Kushner, president Trump’s son-in-law, who said efforts to rebuild the enclave could begin in areas still controlled by the Israeli military.

The vice president departed Israel just hours before Secretary of State Marco Rubio arrived in the country. Mr. Rubio met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel in Jerusalem on Thursday night.

On Wednesday, Mr. Rubio addressed the proposed creation of an international force. Speaking to reporters at Joint Base Andrews before he flew to Israel, he said that the Trump administration may seek a United Nations “mandate” for the force.

The back-to-back visits by Mr. Vance and Mr. Rubio underscore the administration’s keen interest in preserving the cease-fire. Steve Witkoff, Mr. Trump’s Middle East envoy, and Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law, have also been in Israel this week.

Mr. Trump visited the country earlier this month to celebrate the cease-fire agreement.

Several Trump administration officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss private conversations, have recently said there was concern within the administration that Mr. Netanyahu might vacate the deal.

Before departing for Israel, Mr. Rubio said that American diplomats will soon be assigned to monitor the fragile cease-fire at a new Civil-Military Coordination Center in southern Israel.

“There’s a lot of work to be done,” said Mr. Rubio. “But we certainly wanted to make sure that we were there and ensuring that we had the right people in place at the coordination center, which is key to holding this all together.”

The cease-fire agreement that went into effect earlier this month led to an Israeli military pullback within Gaza, and saw the last 20 Israeli hostages held in the enclave exchanged for almost 2,000 Palestinian prisoners and detainees.

Liam Stack is a Times reporter who covers the culture and politics of the New York City region.

Tyler Pager is a White House correspondent for The Times, covering President Trump and his administration.

A version of this article appears in print on Oct. 24, 2025, Section A, Page 6 of the New York edition with the headline: Global Force To Take Lead On Disarming Of Hamas. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

See more on: The Israel-Hamas War, Hamas, State Department, United Nations, Marco Rubio

9. How China Raced Ahead of the U.S. on Nuclear Power

How China Raced Ahead of the U.S. on Nuclear Power

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/10/22/climate/china-us-nuclear-energy-race.html

NY Times · Brad Plumer and Harry Stevens ·

In 2013, construction began on the first two new U.S. nuclear reactors in a generation. Atomic energy was back. Or was it?

Seven years late and $17 billion over budget, the reactors became two of the costliest ever built. Once again, nuclear power seemed hopeless, at least in the U.S.

Yet over the same period, China built 13 similar reactors, with 33 more underway. And Beijing’s nuclear ambitions are global.

Oct. 22, 2025

China is quickly becoming the global leader in nuclear power, with nearly as many reactors under construction as the rest of the world combined. While its dominance of solar panels and electric vehicles is well known, China is also building nuclear plants at an extraordinary pace. By 2030, China’s nuclear capacity is set to surpass that of the United States, the first country to split atoms to make electricity.

Many of China’s reactors are derived from American and French designs, yet China has overcome the construction delays and cost overruns that have bogged down Western efforts to expand nuclear power.

At the same time, China is pushing the envelope, making breakthroughs in next-generation nuclear technologies that have eluded the West. The country is also investing heavily in fusion, a potentially limitless source of clean power if anyone can figure out how to tame it.

Beijing’s ultimate objective is to become a supplier of nuclear power to the world, joining the rare few nations — including the United States, Russia, France and South Korea — that can design and export some of the most sophisticated machines ever invented.

A dome being placed on the Unit 1 reactor building of the Zhejiang San’ao nuclear power plant on Zhejiang Province, China, in 2022.

Visual China Group, via Getty Images

“The Chinese are moving very, very fast,” said Mark Hibbs, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace who has written a book on China’s nuclear program. “They are very keen to show the world that their program is unstoppable.”

As the United States and China compete for global supremacy, energy has become a geopolitical battleground. The United States, particularly under President Trump, has positioned itself as the leading supplier of fossil fuels like oil, gas and coal. China, by contrast, dominates the manufacturing of solar panels, wind turbines and batteries, seeing renewable power as the multi-trillion-dollar market of the future.

Nuclear power is enjoying a resurgence of global interest, especially as concerns about climate change mount. That’s because nuclear reactors don’t spew planet-warming emissions, unlike coal and gas plants, and can produce electricity around the clock, unlike wind and solar power.

The Trump administration wants to quadruple U.S. nuclear power capacity by 2050, even as it ignores global warming, and it hopes to develop a new generation of reactor technology to power data centers at home and sell to energy-hungry countries overseas. Officials fear that if China dominates the nuclear export market, it could expand its global influence, since building nuclear plants abroad creates deep, decades-long relationships between countries.

Yet in the race for atomic energy, China has one clear advantage: It has figured out how to produce reactors relatively quickly and cheaply. The country now assembles reactors in just five to six years, twice as fast as Western nations.

While U.S. nuclear construction costs skyrocketed after the 1960s, they fell by half in China during the 2000s and have since stabilized, according to data published recently in Nature. (The only two U.S. reactors built this century, at the Vogtle nuclear plant in Waynesboro, Ga., took 11 years and cost $35 billion.)

Construction costs of nuclear reactors

Hover to explore the data

Note: Reactors are placed according to the date they entered or are expected to enter commercial operation. Chart shows inflation-adjusted overnight costs, which exclude interest payments. Trend lines show linear regression slope.

Source: Liu et al. 2025

“When we first got this data and saw that declining trend in China, it surprised me,” said Shangwei Liu, a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government who led the paper.

The big questions, Mr. Liu said, are how China got so good at nuclear power — and whether the United States can catch up.

How China mastered nuclear power

A modern nuclear power plant is one of the most complex construction projects on Earth.

The reactor vessel, where atoms are split, is made of specialized steel up to 10 inches thick that must withstand bombardment by radiation for decades. That vessel, in turn, is housed in a massive containment dome, often three stories high and about as wide as the U.S. Capitol dome, made of steel-reinforced concrete to prevent dangerous leaks. Thousands of miles of piping and wiring must meet exacting safety standards.

Financing these multibillion-dollar projects is staggeringly difficult. Even minor problems, like needing regulator approval to modify a component midway through, can lead to long delays and can cause borrowing costs to skyrocket.

Over time, China has conquered this process.

Construction on a transmission tower of the Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant in Jiangsu Province in 2023.

Shi Jun/Visual China Group, via Getty Images

It starts with heavy government support. Three state-owned nuclear developers receive cheap government-backed loans to build new reactors, which is valuable since financing can be one-third of costs. The Chinese government also requires electric grid operators to buy some of the power from nuclear plants at favorable rates.

Just as importantly, China’s nuclear companies build only a handful of reactor types and they do it over and over again.

That allows developers to perfect the construction process and is “essential for scaling efficiently,” said Joy Jiang, an energy innovation analyst at the Breakthrough Institute, a pro-nuclear research organization. “It means you can streamline licensing and simplify your supply chain.”

The fact that the Chinese government has a national mandate to expand nuclear power means that companies can confidently invest in domestic factories and a dedicated engineering work force. In a sprawling complex near Shanghai, giant reactor pressure vessels are being continuously forged, ready to be shipped to new projects without delay. Teams of specialized welders move seamlessly from one construction site to the next.

It’s been different in the West.

In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. nuclear construction slowed to a trickle as interest rates rose and regulators frequently tightened safety rules, causing delays. Worries about the disposal of nuclear waste and fears after the 1979 partial meltdown of a reactor at Three Mile Island, in Pennsylvania, didn’t help. At the same time, private developers kept experimenting with new reactor designs that required different components and introduced fresh complications. U.S. nuclear power died from a lack of predictability.

Demonstrators at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pa., in 1979.

Bettmann, via Getty Images

The contrast became glaring in the late 2000s, when U.S. utilities tried to revive nuclear power with a new reactor model called the AP1000, with improved safety features. Developers struggled with the novel technology, leading to repeated delays and soaring costs. By the time the two reactors in Georgia were finished last year, most utilities were hesitant to try again.

As it happened, China built AP1000s at the same time. It, too, faced severe challenges, such as difficulties in obtaining coolant pumps and unpredictable cost spikes. But instead of giving up, Chinese officials studied what went wrong and concluded they needed to tweak the design and develop domestic supply chains.

“What the Chinese did was really smart,” said James Krellenstein, the chief executive of Alva Energy, a nuclear developer. “They said, we’re going to pause for a few years and incorporate every lesson learned.”

China is now building nine more copies of that reactor, known as the CAP1000, all on pace to be completed within five years at a drastically lower cost, an Energy Department report found.

At the Haiyang nuclear power plant, China keeps building

Satellite image from Feb. 15, 2025. Source: Airbus DS via Google

Nuclear proponents in the United States sometimes argue that overly strict safety regulations drive up costs.

China’s safety requirements are similar. But in China the approval process is more predictable, and opponents have fewer ways to challenge a project. Most reactors in China break ground weeks after receiving final approval from the safety regulator, according to research by Ms. Jiang. In the United States, by contrast, projects often need additional permits from state governments that can take months or years.

“China is practiced at building really big things, everything from dams to highways to high speed rail, and those project management skills are transferable,” said David Fishman, a power sector consultant at Lantau Group, a consulting firm.

As China, the world’s biggest emitter of greenhouse gases, seeks to curb pollution, it is counting on nuclear power to play an important role.

Solar and wind power are growing fast and account for most of China’s clean electricity, but the country also burns enormous amounts of coal to supply power when the sun isn’t shining and the wind isn’t blowing. More nuclear power could help backstop renewables and displace coal.

Electricity mix in China

United States

Source: Ember

Note: “Clean” includes low-carbon sources such as wind, solar, hydroelectricity and bioenergy. “Fossil fuels” includes coal, natural gas, and oil.

China’s nuclear expansion still faces hurdles. One of China’s plants suffered a smaller radioactive leak in 2021, and a bigger accident could trigger a public backlash. The country is still figuring out where to bury its nuclear waste, and some cities have seen impassioned protests over plans for waste reprocessing plants. Beijing has also blocked new reactors in much of China’s interior over concerns about their water use. If that moratorium persists, it could limit the industry’s growth.

For now, though, the country is barreling ahead, with plans to build hundreds of reactors by midcentury.

Can the U.S. catch up?

In the United States, nuclear power is one of the rare types of energy that has support from Republican and Democratic politicians alike, especially as demand for electricity rises. Even environmentalists like Al Gore who once fretted about catastrophic accidents and radioactive waste are warming to the technology.

Yet the U.S. is pursuing a starkly different path to nuclear expansion, one that leans more heavily on private innovation than government backing.

Dozens of start-ups are working on a new generation of smaller reactors meant to be cheaper than the hulking plants of old. Tech companies like Google, Amazon and OpenAI are pouring billions into nuclear start-ups like Kairos Power, X-Energy and Oklo to help power their data centers for artificial intelligence. Early projects are underway in Wyoming, Texas and Tennessee, though few, if any, new reactors are expected before the 2030s.

The Trump administration wants to accelerate this work by reducing regulations at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which certifies the safety of reactors before they are built. The agency’s critics say it has become too hidebound to handle advanced reactors that are less prone to meltdowns.

Energy Secretary Chris Wright speaking during the 69th annual International Atomic Energy Agency meeting in Vienna last month.

Thomas Kronsteiner/Getty Images

Energy Secretary Chris Wright said that the administration is betting that the private capital flowing into nuclear projects will spark American ingenuity and catapult the U.S. ahead of China. “Entrepreneurial capitalist competition is where the U.S. thrives, and I think it’s an advantage over China,” he said in an interview.

Yet some worry that the United States is betting too heavily on technological breakthroughs instead of focusing on the financing, skills and infrastructure needed to build plants, as China has. The U.S., for instance, has lost almost all of its heavy forging capacity to make large reactor components. A new generation of advanced reactors could also take years to perfect, leaving America behind.

“You look at the number of designs, particularly in the U.S., you think, Oh, God, help us,” said Philip Andrews-Speed, a senior research fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. “I would think narrowing down is the sensible thing to do.”

While the Trump administration has moved to speed up nuclear permitting and increase domestic supplies of nuclear fuel, some important government tools for advancing new reactors, such as the Energy Department’s loan office, have been hampered by staffing cuts. Efforts to slash safety regulations could be contentious. There is also a risk that interest by tech giants could fizzle if the A.I. boom slows.

“There’s no reason the United States couldn’t expand nuclear power,” said Stephen Ezell, vice president for global innovation policy at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. “But are we just going to see a few small reactors power a few data centers, or are we going to see a serious whole government approach to bring back nuclear power as an essential source of electricity?”

A race to power the world

A core module of a ACP100 multi-purpose, small modular pressurized water reactor — also called the Linglong One — a new nuclear power prototype rolling out facility in Liaoning Province in 2023.

Liu Xuan/Visual China Group, via Getty Images

China’s fast-paced nuclear program is a prelude to a larger goal: dominating the global market. Chinese companies have already built six reactors in Pakistan and plan to export many more.

At the same time, China is working to surpass the United States in technological innovation. China has built what it calls the world’s first “fourth generation” reactor, a gas-cooled model that can provide heat and steam for heavy industry in addition to electricity. The Chinese are also pursuing technologies that use less uranium, such as thorium reactors, or recycle spent nuclear fuel. It’s a recognition that China doesn’t have enough domestic uranium for a massive build-out of traditional reactors.

Even if U.S. companies and labs remain at the forefront of innovation, one recent report warned that China was 10 to 15 years ahead of the United States in its ability to deploy next-generation reactors widely.

It’s a familiar story: The United States invented solar panels and batteries, only to watch as China scaled those technologies and now controls global markets.

“Maybe we can convince some of our allies not to buy Chinese reactors, but there are going to be plenty of other countries out there with growing energy demands,” said Paul Saunders, president of the Center for National Interest, a conservative-leaning think tank. “And if America isn’t ready, we won’t be able to compete.”

NY Times · Brad Plumer and Harry Stevens ·

10. Taiwan in the Shadow of War

​Long read that covers a lot of ground (and water) (to include the loss of US "China hands in the administration).

Oct 23, 2025 7:00 AM ET

Taiwan in the Shadow of War

https://time.com/7327558/taiwan-china-independence-military-war-invasion/

TIME · Charlie Campbell

This is how the war will start.

During a highly charged presidential campaign, a bomb explodes, unleashing panic and a wave of recriminations. Then a Chinese Y-8 reconnaissance aircraft vanishes in Taiwan’s eastern waters. Under the guise of search and rescue, Beijing deploys a massive air and naval force that quarantines the island. Reeling from forced sequestration, Taiwanese society suffers a deluge of propaganda and misinformation, pitting husband against wife, father against son. Political and financial interests foment infighting. By the time the first People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops arrive, the island has defeated itself.

On Aug. 2, people across Taiwan tuned into this dystopian vision, which debuted on Taiwanese TV as the acclaimed drama Zero Day Attack, courtesy of showrunner Cheng Hsin-Mei. Over ten hour-long episodes, Zero Day Attack offers a forensic exploration of how a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could manifest, from the political and religious intrigue to media infiltration and economic manipulation. And while speculative fiction, Zero Day Attack is rooted in events already unfolding.

“If you go to the front lines, you can really feel the tension,” Cheng says in her central Taipei office. “China is getting ready to do something.”

Taiwan politically split from the mainland following China’s 1945-49 civil war and its “reunification” has been dubbed a “historical inevitability” by Chinese strongman Xi Jinping. The PLA regularly dispatches scores of warplanes close to the self-ruling island of 24 million, including a record 153 aircraft in a 25-hour period last October, in what Adm. Sam Paparo, head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told Congress were “dress rehearsals for forced unification.”

“It is becoming more and more difficult to predict the possibility of the PLA turning an exercise into a real invasion,” Taiwan Defense Minister Wellington Koo tells TIME. “This is the threat and challenge Taiwan faces.”

Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te inspects a live-fire exercise featuring US Made M1A2T tanks, in Taiwan on July 10, 2025. Taiwan Defense Ministry/Handout/Anadolu/Getty Images

The specter of war is difficult to reconcile with the carefree bustle of downtown Taipei, where on a cool June evening bickering families and doe-eyed couples throng the city’s night markets as ever before. But the return of Donald Trump to the White House has injected an extra degree of anxiety over the island’s future.

Few places are scrutinizing Trump’s flip flops over U.S. backing for Ukraine with greater apprehension than Taiwan, whose autonomy and cherished democracy have been underwritten by informal American backing. While the U.S. switched diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, Washington maintains a bevy of ties with Taiwan and is obliged by act of Congress to supply weapons needed for its defense. But Taiwan fears that the combination of Trump's diffidence toward alliances and global acclaim as a war-ending “man of peace” may embolden Xi into finally completing the revolution started by the only leader who’s wielded similarly unchecked power, Mao Zedong.

Xi has described bringing Taiwan back into the fold as the “essence” of the country’s “rejuvenation,” which must be achieved by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s five-starred flag first fluttering over Beijing’s Forbidden City. “Taiwan will have to come back,” one senior PLA officer tells TIME. “How can the strongest nation on earth not take back what it claims to be its own territory?”

In a May speech to the Shangri-la Dialogue security forum in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said that Xi had “ordered his military to be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027”—a timeline first proposed by former U.S. Indo-Pacific Command chief Admiral Philip Davidson—though warned that an assault “could be imminent.” In remarks that pointedly failed to dial down the temperature, Beijing responded by warning Washington “must never play with fire on [the Taiwan] question,” which is “entirely China’s internal affair.”

Oriana Skylar Mastro, a professor and expert on China’s military at Stanford University, notes that the tenor of her conversations with CCP and PLA officials have markedly changed in recent months. “Before they would say, ‘we're so patient, there's nothing to worry about, Chinese people don't kill Chinese people,’” says Mastro. She was struck by “more inevitability” in discussions during her last visit to Beijing in May. “They would say, ‘why are you guys obsessed with 2027 when it can happen at any time?’”

If Xi is genuine in his desire to “complete the revolution,” the question is whether he will ever have a better opportunity than before Trump leaves office. He has vowed not to risk American lives in foreign wars, alienated allies with an internecine trade war, and culled the top China experts from policy circles. And for Xi, the clock is ticking. At home, young Chinese care more about scarce college-level jobs than reclaiming a sweet potato-shaped island cast adrift before their parents were even born. Meanwhile in Taiwan, already minuscule support for reunification dwindles with every passing year.

There are impediments, of course. Invading Taiwan would be the most complex military operation in modern history, dwarfing even the D-Day landing of World War II, and must be coordinated by generals who have not waged a major war in over seven decades. Then there is the economic fallout from excising the world’s top exporter of advanced semiconductors from global supply chains, which Bloomberg Economics estimates at $10 trillion. That’s some 10% of global GDP, far more than the shock from the war in Ukraine or the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, Congress is united in firmly backing Taiwan’s de facto independence. However, until recently, the same applied to support for Ukraine, and that sentiment has rapidly shifted among Republicans in thrall to the mercurial commander-in-chief. In July, a scheduled stopover by Taiwan President Lai Ching-te in New York City was canceled by the U.S. reportedly following a request from Beijing.

In his Singapore speech, while reaffirming U.S. support for the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, Hegseth showed his hand when he admitted: “My job is to create and maintain decision space for President Trump, not to purport to make decisions on his behalf.”

Against this backdrop, Taiwan is frantically attempting to raise the cost of conflict. It has purchased billions of dollars of missile systems, fighter jets, and other defensive equipment from the U.S., while ramping up indigenous defense industry with a focus on asymmetric warfare, such as drones and unmanned submersibles.

Compulsory national service has been extended from four months to a year for all young Taiwanese men. In September last year, Lai founded a Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee to advise government departments regarding crisis management while also planning for disruption to critical infrastructure, supply distribution, and information and financial network protection.

“The consensus is that Taiwan is under a bigger threat than ever,” says Tseng Poyu, a Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee member and researcher for the Doublethink Lab NGO, which tracks and fights disinformation. “Tensions right now are at an all-time high.”

What Modern War Would Really Look Like

Things have been heated before, of course, not least on Taiwan’s outlying islands, some of whom sit less than 2 miles from the PRC. As Cold War frontiers go, that’s considerably less than the 90 miles from Cuba to Key West, and even narrower than the 2.5-mile Korean DMZ. Over the decades, the periodic exchange of rockets forced people on both sides to hunker down into deep defensive tunnels hewn from the solid rock. During times of peace, a propaganda battle took over, with gewgaws such as watches and biscuits dispatched by balloon to flaunt each side’s supposed affluence.

Taiwan’s island of Kinmen lies 3 miles from China’s port city of Xiamen, whose glittering skyscrapers loom through the sea fog. Kinmen’s beaches remain studded by rusting defensive spikes and even a half-submerged tank, whose corroded turret forms the backdrop for tourist selfies. Yet there is a reason why Kinmen remains to this day ruled by Taipei—some 140 miles away—despite being encircled on three sides by the PRC. Put simply, it serves to keep the fight alive.

Seizing Kinmen and other outlying islands would be relatively painless for China. Taiwan proper, however, remains another story. While an immediate full-scale invasion remains one option, an amphibious assault would be a far greater challenge than Russia’s land-based gambit in Ukraine, which itself has proven far from straightforward. Although only 90 miles wide, the Taiwan Strait is extremely treacherous, and transporting hundreds of thousands of soldiers across it could take weeks and require thousands of ships, whose slow pace makes them vulnerable to mines and mobile missile launchers. Few of Taiwan’s beaches are suitable for a landing, and these could be well-defended. Moreover, such a brazen attempt is more likely to spur the U.S. or allies to intervene, thus necessitating strikes on American assets and bases, raising a real risk of nuclear conflagration.

Indeed, military analysts agree with Cheng that any Taiwan offensive is likely to begin with a quarantine or blockade, cutting off supplies and attempting to pressure Taiwanese citizens into surrender. “Although the Taiwan Strait increases the difficulty for the PLA to conduct an amphibious assault, it also works as a double-edged sword that the PLA can take advantage of to isolate and blockade Taiwan,” says Koo.

As Sun Tzu wrote in his 5th century BCE military treatise The Art of War, “The greatest victory is that which requires no battle.” Published PLA doctrine details isolating an island before dispatching ground troops. Three scenarios, in ascending orders of magnitude, could be: a quarantine, blockade, or full-scale invasion. It’s possible that any of these could be employed in isolation or incrementally.

Both a quarantine and blockade are similar in essence, though differ in personnel and severity. Rather than sealing off the island, a quarantine would aim to demonstrate China’s sovereignty over Taiwan, severely disrupting trade and life in Taiwan while muddying how the U.S. and allies can effectively respond without being accused of escalation. A key goal would be to compel countries and companies to comply with China’s terms thus turning Beijing’s claims over the territory into reality. It would be a severe dent to Taiwan’s spirit, making the islanders feel the walls closing in, that autonomy was slowly being erased.

A quarantine could begin by Beijing announcing “enhanced customs inspection rules” that require all cargo and tanker vessels to file advance paperwork with Chinese authorities. Noncompliant ships would be subject to on-site inspections, questioning, and possible detention.

The quarantine could target all Taiwan’s ports or even concentrate on just one, such as Taiwan’s biggest trade hub of Kaohsiung in the island’s south, which today handles around half of all goods. In this scenario, 600-odd Chinese coast guard vessels would take the lead, alongside the 3,000 or so armed fishing boats that form China’s maritime militia, although backed up by naval strike groups lurking close by. Chinese-flagged shipping vessels would universally comply and be allowed into Taiwanese ports, presenting a quandary to foreign ships whether to follow suit.

If China’s authority is respected, it will have established a “new normal” regarding its dominion. Were the U.S. or allies to attempt to intervene and breach the quarantine, Beijing could paint them as aggressors. “It's going to be very difficult for the U.S. to break through with any acceptable level of risk,” says Thomas Shugart, a former U.S. Navy officer and expert at the Center for a New American Security.

A significant step up from a quarantine would be a full blockade. Aside from Taiwan’s dependence on trade—exports comprise around 60% of GDP—the island imports 97% of energy and 70% of food, making it extremely vulnerable to a blockade scenario, which could be imposed in response to some perceived (or fabricated) provocation or escalate from noncompliance to a quarantine.

Sources: Center for Strategic & International Studies; Council on Foreign Relations; Getty Images

If Taiwan refuses to capitulate in a quarantine or blockade, an invasion could follow. Under the guise of some perceived affront, such as a move toward formal secession, Beijing could announce live-fire exercises around Taiwan, similar to those which followed former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s protocol-shredding visit in 2022. That visit was “a godsend to us,” says the senior PLA officer, allowing China to rip up decades of established engagement protocol. “From then, there was no median line, no status quo.”

During these drills, Chinese submarines may covertly deploy sea mines at the entrances to Taiwan’s key ports and energy terminals. Beijing announces “special measures” to punish independence elements in Taiwan, warning that unauthorized vessels or aircraft approaching the island will be fired upon. Approved Chinese-owned commercial vessels are permitted to transit the Strait and enter Chinese ports. Food shortages would mean the disappearance of luxuries and the rationing of staples, sapping public morale.

After Beijing announces that major Taiwan ports have been mined, sea traffic to Taiwan nosedives as shipping insurance rates soar. Meanwhile, the PLA cuts Taiwan’s undersea internet cables, strikes Taiwan’s communication satellites, and launches cyberattacks against strategic state and commercial targets. The PLA would likely launch missile strikes against Taiwan’s air force and naval bases and military command and control infrastructure.

China could back up these attacks with naval surface action groups surrounding the island as well as coast guard and other enforcement vessels. Nonlethal measures such as ramming and spraying water cannons are used first with deadly force against those who resist. PLA aircraft enforce a no-fly zone around Taiwan.

Over the last few years, China has been diverting shipbuilding resources from its Navy to Coast Guard, building destroyer and frigate sized coast guard ships on vertically identical hulls but painted white instead of gray. If China’s goal is to project maritime strength, then boosting its navy fleet would presumably take priority. Boosting the coast guard, Shugart postures, indicates preparation for gray zone deployment such as a potential quarantine. “Still, they need a credible threat of invasion for a blockade to be effective,” says Shugart.

China has also been working steadfastly towards this capacity, acquiring advanced weapons platforms and equipment five times faster than the U.S. Taiwan has fewer than 20 beaches on which an amphibious assault could land, and all could be fiercely defended. However, in March photos emerged of a series of new barge-like PLA ships dubbed Shuiqiao that can link together to form a loading dock from over a half-mile out to sea—drastically boosting Beijing’s land invasion potency.

“China has never said we will renounce military means,” says Prof. Da Wei, director of the Center for International Security and Strategy at Beijing’s Tsinghua University. “So China needs to have that capability.”

Were China to launch an all-out invasion, it would undoubtedly start with missile strikes against Taiwan’s air bases to neutralize its fighter jets alongside a cyber blitzkrieg targeting communications and key infrastructure. If the U.S. and allies intervened, or made clear preparations to, Chinese missiles would likely target U.S. bases in South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. At this point, the U.S. could counter with strikes at Chinese bases. However, Beijing’s estimated 300 medium-range ballistic missile launchers—most of whose location is unknown—means they potentially have “the strike capacity to wipe the table clean of U.S. and Japanese bases,” says Shugart.

Inside China's Playbook

That Beijing is honing its ability to mount a blockade isn’t in doubt. Inside Taipei’s red-brick Presidential Office Building, a senior official for its National Security Council (NSC) lays out a map of the South China Sea. Blue circles mark Taiwan’s naval assets, with red denoting China’s. There is a lot of red—99 naval and coast guard vessels, to be precise, completely encircling Taiwan during PLA exercises last December. Among them is the Liaoning aircraft carrier lurking in waters close to the Philippines.

“Looking at where China’s forces are deployed, it's not only geared at Taiwan,” says the senior NSC official. “It feels like a practice attack against Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. It looks like they are trying to practice denying the U.S. access into this region. So this is very alarming.”

Indeed, China’s power projection is getting more brazen. In February, it conducted surprise live-fire naval drills in international waters between Australia and New Zealand, just 340 nautical miles southeast of Sydney, causing dozens of commercial flights to be diverted.

China has also been concocting a pretext for action. Despite being Cold War foes who remain officially at war, relations between the Republic of China, as Taiwan is officially known, and the PRC flourished under prior Nationalist, or KMT, governments due to the so-called “1992 Consensus,” which acknowledged that both sides belong to the same country even if their respective governments bicker over which is the legitimate power. However, Taiwan’s incumbent China-skeptic Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has never accepted the 1992 Consensus, with Lai telling TIME last year, “we are already a sovereign and independent country.”

Beginning in late June, Lai further dialed up the rhetoric. He began a series of ten televised “Talks on the Country” delivered around the island. Far from the constructive ambiguity of the 1992 Consensus, Lai breathlessly argued that Taiwan and China are distinct, autonomous nations, drawing on historical, legal, and identity-based arguments linking the island’s heritage to Austronesian culture, rather than Chinese. Moreover, Lai defined Taiwanese identity as inextricably anti-communist.

Lai’s speeches were timed leading up to July recall votes that could have unseated 24 lawmakers for the pro-China KMT and thus tip the balance of power for his DPP in the Legislative Yuan. Lai himself characterized the recall vote as a popular, civic movement to “prevent annexation by the CCP.”

In the end, all the recall votes failed, which provided grist to arguments amplified on pro-China social media that Lai is both a separatist and, by backing the ouster of elected officials, also undemocratic. And in a worrying echo of Vladimir Putin’s justification for invading Ukraine, PRC propaganda insists it falls to Beijing to fix the resulting instability. “So now they're creating a Crimea-type of logic for an invasion of Taiwan that never existed before,” says Mastro.

In addition to military operations, Beijing would launch a campaign to weaken Taiwan’s internal cohesion and willingness to resist. Chiefly would be a massive disinformation campaign to stir up pro-PRC and other elements to urge negotiating a surrender. China could also offer to evacuate vulnerable groups of Taiwanese to the mainland. Beijing may recognize a particular opposition figure as its preferred negotiation partner, while inciting public unrest and demonstrations against the Taipei government. “The PRC aims to influence the international community to appease PRC’s aggression while inciting conflict and distrust in Taiwan, causing the civilian to question the government’s decisions and the capacity of our armed forces,” says Koo.

Again, such influence campaigns are already in motion. In 2024, 64 people in Taiwan were prosecuted for spying for China—more than the previous two years combined—with principal targets being current or former military personnel. Some cases involve individuals being recruited through online platforms and lured by financial incentives or snared in “honey traps.” In September, four former DPP staffers were jailed for espionage, including a former aide to President Lai, and a senior staffer to Joseph Wu, then foreign minister and now the head of the NSC. “One of the major projects we've been working on is trying to improve our security clearance systems and espionage,” one presidential staffer tells TIME. “Because as we've seen there are a lot of loopholes and problems.”

But while espionage cases focus on political insiders and armed forces personnel, a campaign of engaging Taiwanese civilians is also ramping up. For one thing, the CCP has a long history of recruiting “triad” syndicates to serve as internal operatives, and potentially as a fifth column tasked with coordinating sabotage efforts in the event of an invasion, according to an April report by Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, which serves as the NSC’s intelligence gathering and analysis arm. Similar groups were enlisted to attack Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protesters in 2019. “This is particularly worrisome because some of these criminal gangs are armed and talking about armed revolt,” says the senior NSC official.

Religious organizations are another focus. Taiwan is home to over 15,000 officially registered though generally unregulated temples, representing a blend of Taoist, Buddhist, and other folk religions, occupying both tiny incense-fragranced shophouses in bustling downtown cities as well as sprawling village gardens. Tseng says that problematic temples are usually started by Taiwanese returning from a stint living in China and who then run trips back to “motherland” religious sites to emphasize perceived shared history and values—and thus loyalty to the PRC. “Cultural influence is a lot easier than the actual political influence,” Tseng says. “People who are opening these temples are usually very young, so good at promoting themselves through social media like TikTok.”

Aside from highlighting cultural links with China, a propaganda campaign is underscoring American capriciousness under Trump. The messaging accuses the U.S. of pumping billions in funds and weapons into the Ukraine war to prolong the slaughter without putting troops on the ground—and now Trump is demanding that money back. The inference is that Washington would employ a similar playbook in Taiwan, sending island’s youth to the meat grinder while ratcheting up an unserviceable debt. “The propaganda says the same will happen to Taiwan,” says the senior NSC official. “And so, Taiwan should move closer to China and stay away from the United States.”

How Taiwan Trains Its People to Survive

Taiwan is preparing for the worst. For ten days in July, fighter jets roared, infantry exchanged fire in crowded streets, and mobile missile launchers twirled their payloads from sandy beachheads as part of its annual Han Kuang exercises. The drills were the biggest ever this year, involving more than 20,000 reservists and double the timeline of 2024’s, an extension that corresponds to swelling fears of a Chinese attack. Alongside the drills, at 1:30 p.m. on July 17 deafening sirens wailed across Taipei, sending locals scurrying for evacuation centers, as an SMS flashed on every cellphone warning: “The enemy has launched a missile attack toward northern Taiwan.” While inspecting a field hospital simulation at a local high school, Lai insisted, “In the face of military and political pressure from major powers, preparation is our only option.”

Taiwanese soldiers participate in deep-battle exercises near Taichung on July 16, 2025. Daniel Ceng—Anadolu/Getty Images

Koo says Taiwan’s defensive posture is focused on four aspects: asymmetric warfare capability, defense resilience, building reserve forces, and countering gray zone activity. “We have the faith and capacity to defend our territory, sovereign, and our civilians,” he insists.

At Zhongshan High School in downtown Taipei, an instructor for the Forward Alliance NGO sets a steel pan with gasoline ablaze before asking a dozen volunteers to take turns dousing the flames with CO₂ extinguishers. In the classroom above, more volunteers—teachers from schools across Taiwan—crowd around a desktop map of a disaster scenario, discussing where to block traffic, cordon off the public, and station emergency services to best handle whatever crisis is unfolding. Nearby more volunteers swathe a prone rubber torso in bandages before practicing CPR.

Enoch Wu, who founded Forward Alliance in 2020, says his organization has trained some 25,000 people in disaster response to date and today works with 368 organizations—churches, private companies, community centers—to instill crisis management skills. Courses include basic first aid, emergency-shelter logistics, and how to fly a drone to deliver a vial of insulin or assess and report damage to key infrastructure. The idea is to allow citizens to assuage the burden of Taiwan’s overstretched emergency responders, which number just 180,000 for 24 million people, or one for every 128 citizens. (By comparison, the U.S. is one for every 73 citizens.) “It’s not necessarily ‘how can I help my country?’” says Wu, who previously served in the Taiwanese Army's Special Forces Command as well as the NSC. “But more directly, ‘how can I help my family prepare for the next crisis?’”

In May, Forward Alliance launched an iCanHelp app teeming with information, from the nearest emergency shelter to survival planning and instructions for treating pediatric blast injuries. Developed with Microsoft, the app also includes a reporting feature linked to a national database so civilians can post pictures of blocked roads or collapsed bridges, for example, alongside GPS coordinates. A new campaign urges all Taiwan citizens to stockpile ten days’ worth of food in case of an earthquake, typhoon—or PLA missiles.

Forward Alliance works alongside President Lai’s Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee, which has been charged with making recommendations to instill preparedness across society. Every government ministry consults with the committee regarding steps they can take to build resilience. It then liaises across industries to create a database of potential resources in the event of any calamity. These could be engineers that can help repair infrastructure, religious leaders coached on taking care of displaced families, or IT specialists capable of restoring communications. “Even Uber Eats delivery drivers know every shortcut in a city and could help distribute resources if that place is under attack,” says Tseng.

That Taiwan must look after itself is no secret given the island is only recognized by 12 nations and barred from international forums like the U.N. “We are far less powerful than Ukraine,” says Alexander Huang, international relations adviser for the opposition KMT. “We do not have any treaty allies. We do not have any joint training exercise or doctrine with anyone.”

Moreover, Trump’s recalcitrance regarding support for military action over Taiwan is broadly shared by its allies. Asked by TIME in May whether he would come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a Chinese attack, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung replied cryptically: “I will think about that answer when aliens are about to invade the earth.” Posed with the same question, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong said she “declines to engage on hypotheticals,” while her Canadian counterpart, Anita Anand, replied that her government “adheres to a One China Policy.”

Japan and the Philippines have been the most strident in backing Taiwan’s sovereignty, though both have operational weaknesses and would only engage if called upon by the U.S. Yet the mood is much more forthright among ostensibly neutral nations, especially those of the Global South, where perceived American hypocrisy regarding Ukraine and Israel’s offensive in Gaza has bled into discussions across the gamut of U.S. foreign policy. The fact that the U.S. officially adheres to a “One China Policy” regarding Taiwan yet sells Taipei weaponry has been painted by Beijing as blatant interference in China’s domestic affairs.

The truth is more complex: the U.S. “One China Policy” simply states that it “acknowledges” Beijing’s claim over the island without endorsing it. Still, a growing cohort across the developing world believes the U.S. is provoking Beijing toward a catastrophic conflict. Today, at least 28 nations firmly support China’s push for “reunification.”

“China could have invaded Taiwan long ago but chose not to because Taiwan was useful,” former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad argues in his Kuala Lumpur office. “But the U.S. is not happy because there is no confrontation. You send Pelosi there to do what? To provoke China. So now China wants to show its strength, and Taiwan now has to increase its defense capability, buying weapons from the U.S.”

“The U.S. should not be doing what it is doing,” one former South Asian prime minister told TIME last year, asking to remain anonymous to speak candidly. “China will never allow anybody to interfere in Taiwan. If the U.S. goes to war with China over Taiwan it will be like Ukraine all over again and destabilize the whole world.”

Even staunch human-rights defenders have drunk Beijing’s Kool-Aid. “Taiwan is part of China as Hawaii is part of the United States,” Timor Leste President Jose Ramos Horta, who ironically won a Nobel Peace Prize for advocating for self-determination for his homeland, told TIME last year. “We don’t believe China is a threat to anyone. You [the U.S.] recognize Taiwan as part of China, and yet you continue to pump billions of dollars into that entity that you consider to be part of China.”

The Global Cost of War

One of the strongest arguments against war is the resulting economic devastation it would cause. Taiwan may measure a little less than 14,000 sq mi (or a smidgen larger than Maryland), but it punches far above its weight in global supply chains. Taiwan’s top trading partner is China, with the U.S. in second spot. The U.S., meanwhile, imports about $470 billion worth of goods from China, with some $143 billion flowing the other way. In order to entrench economic interdependence, Taiwanese semiconductor giant TSMC recently agreed to invest $165 billion in American chipmaking, the largest single foreign direct investment in U.S. history.

Any conflict would decimate trade routes, resulting in delays and higher shipping costs, with disruptions cascading through every region and economy. Taiwan produces over 90% of advanced semiconductor chips, which are vital for a broad range of electronics, from AI data centers to smart TVs. China, meanwhile, controls 90% of the world’s rare earth minerals, which are crucial for everything from missiles to wind turbines to automobiles. Already, in October, Beijing restricted rare earth minerals being sent to U.S. semiconductor firms as well as defense industries, which "cripples our capabilities at a time of rising tension particularly in the Indo-Pacific," says Gracelin Baskaran, director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Any hostilities would no doubt lead many Chinese and American factories to splutter and die.

“Taiwan is so important to the world,” says K.S. Pua, founder of $5.5 billion semiconductor firm Phison, who’s credited with inventing the USB flash drive. “There is no alternative that could 100% take Taiwan's role. So if Taiwan shuts down, China is not going to benefit.”

But while these are good reasons for China not to move on Taiwan, they are conversely just as compelling an argument for the U.S. not to be drawn into a bloody quagmire were it to. Moreover, the potential for China to seize control of key assets that the U.S. is restricting Chinese access to via export controls—such as Nvidia’s latest AI-powered chips, which are exclusively made in Taiwan by TSMC—would be a tantalizing prize that could in one fell swoop redefine Great Power competition in Beijing’s favor.

As such, the merits of the U.S. being drawn into a prolonged conflict over Taiwan will be hotly debated. Whereas former President Joe Biden on four occasions vowed to defend the island against Chinese aggression, it’s a subject that Trump has uncharacteristically shied away from. “I never comment on that,” he told reporters in February. Last October, Trump told the Wall Street Journal that he would deter China with tariffs. “I would say: if you go into Taiwan, I’m sorry to do this, I’m going to tax you at 150% to 200%,” he said.

Chinese President Xi Jinping attends The National People's Congress at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on March 11, 2025. Yomiuri Shimbun/AP

But given Trump has already hit China with tariffs of up to 130%, it’s unclear what economic tools he has left to wield, or if Xi would even care. Time and again, Xi has shown a willingness to weather economic blows for state and party security—be it international sanctions over his crackdown on Uyghur Muslims, cutting tycoons like Jack Ma down to size at the cost of $1.5 trillion wiped off Chinese tech stocks, or meeting U.S. import levies in kind. “If Xi thinks he just has to pay a trillion dollars in tariffs for Taiwan, he'll pay it,” says Shugart. “You're not going to stop them with cost. He's willing to take that hit.”

There’s also a question of whether the U.S. even has the wherewithal to spoil Xi’s plans. Although the U.S. boasts the world’s dominant military, its navy’s 299 deployable combat vessels are spread thin across the globe. China, meanwhile, operates the world’s biggest naval fleet, including over 370 battle force ships with seemingly one target in mind. China’s medium-range missile arsenal has swelled from 600 a few years ago to 1,300 today, more than enough to decimate American bases in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

Moreover, doubts over untested Chinese weaponry have evaporated following their successful deployment in Pakistan's confrontation with India in early May, when Chinese J-10C and JF-17 fighter jets shot down up to six Indian jets. “We had full spectrum dominance,” Pakistan four-star General Sahir Shamshad Mirza, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, tells TIME.

Besides, a capacity vacuum is emerging as the U.S. defense posture pivots from counterterrorism back to Great Power competition. True, Trump has proposed America’s largest ever military budget of over $1 trillion for the coming year, much of which would go to asymmetric warfare systems—such as the “Hellscape” program of thousands of unmanned systems able to be launched from submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and land-based vehicles dispersed across the Indo-Pacific—that would give China a big headache.

However, these systems are still several years from fruition. In the meantime, four of the U.S. Navy's Ohio-class guided missile submarines that are capable of sea-launching tomahawk missiles and would be vital in a Taiwan contingency are due to be retired over the next three years. Meanwhile, the asymmetric systems Taiwan has purchased from the U.S. won’t be operational until around 2030.

“Once shooting starts, there is a very, very high probability that Taiwan gets lost,” says Huang. “Because militarily, we can’t win. The war termination phase would be basically on the table, not in the field.”

Taiwan's Saving Grace

Taiwan’s one saving grace may be dysfunction in the PLA top brass, among whom a tectonic power struggle is raging. Since Xi assumed CCP leadership in 2012, more than 48 senior military officers have been prosecuted for corruption. Six are former members of China’s apex Central Military Commission (CMC), the tiny cabal led by Xi who wields the greatest power over the PLA. Two of those purged are former CMC vice-chairmen, including Admiral Miao Hua, who in late June was dismissed following an investigation for “serious violations of discipline.” Miao is one of the highest-ranking CMC officials to be purged since the 1960s and is particularly significant since he was personally elevated to the CMC by Xi.

The second purged vice-chairman is He Weidong, a PLA General who has also reportedly been demobbed amid an investigation. He in particular was the architect of China’s military strategy regarding Taiwan, though was believed to take a judicious and conservative stance on possible kinetic action. It’s unclear whether the ongoing purge is due to factional infighting, genuine graft concerns, or clashes regarding operational matters.

In the past two years, Xi also has dismissed two defence ministers, Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, while the incumbent Dong Jun disappeared last November amid a presumed malfeasance investigation (though has since resurfaced). In addition, two heads of the PLA’s rocket force, which handles China’s missiles and nuclear arsenal, have also been sacked, while senior aerospace and defence business leaders have also been removed from a CCP advisory body. “Even in war China wouldn’t have lost so many generals,” says Huang.

The question is whether turmoil among China’s brass hats signals a military unprepared for a mammoth undertaking like a Taiwan assault. Or, conversely, is Xi putting the pieces in place to ensure only loyal generals who share his conviction for reunification are in place, before pressing the button. “It’s hard to say whether the anti-corruption stuff signals Xi lacks confidence or that he has a lot of confidence,” says Mastro.

Of course, the PLA isn’t the only military gripped by chaos. In February, Trump abruptly fired Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., the head of the Air Force and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, followed by five other senior Pentagon officials. Then, in April, Trump dismissed four-star Air Force General Timothy Haugh from his role as director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and head of U.S. Cyber Command. In August, Hegseth abruptly fired the head of the Pentagon's intelligence agency, the chief of the U.S. Naval reserves, and the commander of Naval Special Warfare Command.

In addition, multiple members of the U.S. National Security Council have been axed, including Brian Walsh, a senior director of intelligence, and Thomas Boodry, the senior director of legislative affairs. In May, Alex Wong lost his position as principal deputy National Security Adviser. “The entire China team is wiped out,” says Huang. “There’s no specific Taiwan or China expertise in Trump 2.0.”

Taiwan’s survival rests on correcting this shortfall—and fast. The island must also ramp up development of sufficient resources such as dispersed smart weapons, including mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, submarines, UAVs, and bombers that can bring in cruise missiles from outside the theater. “Only sustained defense spending and the development of new weapon systems will deter China in the long term,” says Shugart.

For Zero Day Attack’s Cheng, the goal was to at least raise awareness among the island’s population about the stakes. It’s come at some cost; actors and crew have been blacklisted from working on future Chinese productions, she says, meaning many staff chose to stay anonymous, even if that wasn’t an option for the cast. Still, Cheng believes it was a price worth paying.

“If we don't talk about this now, maybe it will soon be too late,” she says. “If China really does control Taiwan, then we can’t talk freely anymore.”

TIME · Charlie Campbell

11. Can America's soft power be saved?

​Yes, but...

We have to want it. The American public must learn about and be convinced of the value of it.

Excerpts:

Soft power ultimately depends on credibility, consistency and institutions that embody enduring values beyond immediate political cycles. USAID has been central to America’s global reputation as a provider of humanitarian aid.

The Voice of America and similar media outlets have long amplified democratic ideals to societies with restricted press freedom. Universities such as Harvard symbolize academic excellence and remain magnets for future global leaders.

Undermining these institutions weakens not only America’s influence abroad but also the legitimacy of its global leadership.

American soft power dominance is in peril. In the past, US influence survived policy missteps and even unilateral actions that defied global opinion. Today, however, the threat is structural, hollowing out the very institutions that sustain US soft power.

While governments may adjust budgets and policy priorities, sacrificing long-term strategic influence for short-term political agendas is profoundly risky. If Washington continues to weaken the institutions that anchor American soft power, it risks presiding over the collapse of America’s dominance in the space.

Should that collapse occur, rebuilding US influence would be not only far more costly but perhaps even impossible.

Can America's soft power be saved? - Asia Times​

Reviving global trust will take more than just new policies—it will require restoring institutions that won’t easily be rebuilt

https://asiatimes.com/2025/10/can-americas-soft-power-be-saved/?utm

asiatimes.com · Seongeun Lee · October 23, 2025

The United States has long been regarded as the world’s leading soft power. During the Cold War, the global appeal of American popular culture served as powerful tools of influence and propaganda.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, American democracy and capitalism emerged as the dominant political and economic models, further legitimizing Washington’s global influence.

Today, Hollywood blockbusters fill theaters worldwide, American music resonates across borders and US universities attract top students from around the globe. Yet this once-unquestioned dominance now shows signs of erosion.

Recent indicators reveal a sharp decline in global favorability toward the United States, and the very institutions that once underpinned its soft power are beginning to weaken.

Soft power refers to a nation’s ability to influence others without relying on military force or economic coercion. Whereas coercion and payment seek to alter behavior through force or incentives, soft power works by shaping the preferences of others.

For the United States, its economic prosperity, cultural appeal and world-class universities have long drawn admiration worldwide. Equally important are the democratic values and human rights it promotes, as well as its foreign assistance programs that reinforce America’s moral authority.

Together, these elements have formed the foundation of US leadership, providing legitimacy to its influence on the global stage.

American soft power, however, has never been static. Although the United States has generally maintained strong influence, its soft power has fluctuated in response to shifts in foreign policy. In particular, when US actions were perceived by the international community as unilateral or illegitimate, America’s soft power suffered.

The Vietnam War was widely condemned and undermined America’s moral authority. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, launched without broad international support, damaged US legitimacy abroad.

More recently, the US withdrawal from multilateral agreements such as the Paris Agreement eroded trust in Washington’s reliability. In each of these cases, however, American soft power eventually rebounded as policies changed and perceptions evolved.

The present moment, however, poses a different kind of challenge. The scale of disruption under President Trump’s second term is unprecedented. He began by freezing foreign aid for 90 days before dismantling the US Agency for International Development (USAID), cutting off programs that had long symbolized America’s commitment to global development.

He slashed budgets for US-funded media outlets, including the Voice of America, weakening platforms that projected Washington’s perspective abroad. He imposed steep tariffs on imports from both allies and rivals, straining relationships critical to global cooperation.

Domestically, he unsettled higher education by suspending federal funding for elite universities such as Harvard, and his sweeping deportation measures sparked widespread controversy. Collectively, these moves have damaged America’s credibility and eroded the institutions that sustain its soft power.

To be sure, some of these policies may prove temporary, and global perceptions can improve with future policy adjustments. But the deeper danger lies in the erosion of institutions that sustain American influence.

Unlike policies, institutions cannot be quickly restored. Once dismantled, they require years of resources and effort to rebuild, and even then, reviving international trust would be a formidable challenge.

Soft power ultimately depends on credibility, consistency and institutions that embody enduring values beyond immediate political cycles. USAID has been central to America’s global reputation as a provider of humanitarian aid.

The Voice of America and similar media outlets have long amplified democratic ideals to societies with restricted press freedom. Universities such as Harvard symbolize academic excellence and remain magnets for future global leaders.

Undermining these institutions weakens not only America’s influence abroad but also the legitimacy of its global leadership.

American soft power dominance is in peril. In the past, US influence survived policy missteps and even unilateral actions that defied global opinion. Today, however, the threat is structural, hollowing out the very institutions that sustain US soft power.

While governments may adjust budgets and policy priorities, sacrificing long-term strategic influence for short-term political agendas is profoundly risky. If Washington continues to weaken the institutions that anchor American soft power, it risks presiding over the collapse of America’s dominance in the space.

Should that collapse occur, rebuilding US influence would be not only far more costly but perhaps even impossible.

Seongeun Lee is a nonresident fellow at the Pacific Forum with more than a decade of experience in public diplomacy and international relations spanning government, think tanks and academic institutions.

asiatimes.com · Seongeun Lee · October 23, 2025

12. ‘Irregular warfare is not going away, however much we’d like it to’

​Again, to "borrow" from Trotsky: "You may not be interested in (irregular) war, but (irregular) war is interested in you."

One point (but it is not only occupations that lead to uprisings and resistance) :

The distinction between regular and irregular warfare is mainly made out of analytical convenience and wishful thinking, he says. ‘In reality, wars are fluid. Successful conquests often result in occupations, and failing occupations lead to uprisings and resistance. This triangle of regular, irregular and occupation often determines how wars develop.’

‘Irregular warfare is not going away, however much we’d like it to’

Inaugural lecture 23 October 2025 image: ANP

The fight against insurgents, guerrillas and resistance movements is an ‘incredibly unpopular’ topic with experts and military personnel, says Professor by Special Appointment of Military History Thijs Brocades Zaalberg in his inaugural lecture. He warns that ignoring these forms of irregular warfare is a mistake.

https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/news/2025/10/irregular-warfare-is-not-going-away-however-much-wed-like-it-to​  universiteitleiden.nl

In recent years, NATO countries have, logically, focused on large-scale, conventional interstate wars, such as the war in Ukraine, and defending NATO territory. But, says Brocades Zaalberg, this regular warfare is nothing new and difficult to separate from irregular warfare. ‘In reality, they are intertwined. In Iraq, it started with an invasion but soon turned into a bloody guerrilla war. Wars are often hybrid, be they the Eighty Years' War, the Napoleonic Wars, the American Civil War or the Vietnam War. But there is a strong tendency to compartmentalise the two forms.’

The distinction between regular and irregular warfare is mainly made out of analytical convenience and wishful thinking, he says. ‘In reality, wars are fluid. Successful conquests often result in occupations, and failing occupations lead to uprisings and resistance. This triangle of regular, irregular and occupation often determines how wars develop.’

Lessons from the past

What can we learn from the long history of irregular warfare? ‘Applied history and recipe books aren’t my thing. What I have noted is that armed forces tend to engage in selective learning, often driven by military-cultural or political preferences. So they either see an offensive “decapitation strategy” as the key to rapid success or a “population-focused approach” with “winning hearts and minds” as the magic solution. That goes back to the colonial wars around 1900. Unpopular wars in distant lands had to be sold to the public at home as a socioeconomic reconstruction project. It’s often glossed over that control, force and extreme violence often prevail.’

He also sees certain patterns: underestimating the opponent, overestimating the value of technology and the superiority of one’s own organisation, and poor preparation for what happens once the regular fighting ceases.

Criticism of ‘hybrid warfare’

Since the invasion of Crimea in 2014, politicians and the media have often used the term ‘hybrid warfare’ to describe various hostile acts. Brocades Zaalberg is not a fan of this concept. ‘The concept once had real substance: it referred to the combination of regular and irregular tactics, as with Hezbollah in Lebanon. But after 2014, NATO started using it for nearly all forms of Russian threats in particular – so subversion, espionage and sabotage. Stripped of meaning, it drifted further and further away from warfare.’

Brocades Zaalberg thinks it is unwise to classify cyber attacks, disinformation or influence tactics as hybrid warfare. ‘I’m not saying the threat is low, but it’s going a bit far to call it warfare. The term is also used because it sounds dramatic, to create a sense of urgency. But it encompasses so much now that it no longer says anything.’

How does he view European rearmament after the Russian invasion? ‘It’s only logical that attention is now being focused on compensating for years of neglecting our defence. But it’s dangerous to think a large-scale conflict is the only threat, and anyway, preparing for irregular warfare is mainly an intellectual exercise rather than one that requires expensive equipment. What is key is education and awareness of the importance of the civil environment.’ So a crucial role for universities and military academies? ‘Military history should have a more prominent role in education at Dutch universities as it is.’

Colonial violence

Another form of rigid categorisation that Brocades Zaalberg problematises is the distinction made between colonial violence and violence in non-colonial contexts. Are the form, scale and motives behind extreme violence in the colonial domain really that different?

‘Colonial violence is regarded as unique because its brutality was frequently intended to serve as a deterrent, and was compounded by a racist element. That is true to a certain extent. Racial stereotypes undoubtedly lowered the threshold for acts of brutality, but religious and political othering – as seen in civil wars in Europe, America or Asia – can have a similar effect, often triggering comparable patterns of escalation, retaliation and brutality. Moreover, is it the irregular nature of the conflict that explains the escalation of violence, or the specific colonial context? And where does the colonial domain end and ‘regular’ foreign domination begin?’

Brocades Zaalberg suspects that colonial violence was less exceptional than is sometimes assumed. He hopes to conduct further research involving more systematic comparisons and exploring war ‘from below’: through ego documents such as diaries and letters. The main aim of such research and teaching is to deepen our understanding of warfare and how military violence can spiral out of control.

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13. Xi Jinping’s Purges Shrink Ranks of China’s Communist Elite—and Boost His Power

​Does this increase or decrease the likelihood of miscalculation? Does this increase or decrease the possibility of conflict?

Xi Jinping’s Purges Shrink Ranks of China’s Communist Elite—and Boost His Power

Nearly one in six officials who had Central Committee seats were absent from a major conclave, many of them now disgraced

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/xi-jinpings-purges-shrink-ranks-of-chinas-communist-elite-0fdd1ca3?mod=Searchresults&pos=1&page=1

By Chun Han Wong

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Oct. 23, 2025 7:42 am ET

Chinese security personnel stand guard at a plenum of the Communist Party's Central Committee in Beijing. Andy Wong/Associated Press

Quick Summary

• Nearly one-sixth of the 376 officials on the Central Committee when its current term started three years ago were absent from a recent four-day plenary meeting.View more

Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s unrelenting purges have thinned out the top echelons of power in Beijing while reinforcing his authority, a new reality reflected in one of the smallest gatherings of the Communist Party elite in decades.

Nearly one-sixth of the 376 officials who held seats on the Central Committee when its current term started three years ago were absent from the elite body’s four-day plenary meeting this week—many of them targeted in Xi’s disciplinary crackdown.

The plenum in Beijing was attended by 168 full members and 147 nonvoting alternates, according to an official communiqué issued after the conclave ended Thursday, marking the lowest participation rate since at least the late 1970s. The Central Committee had 205 full members and 171 alternates when its current five-year term started in 2022.

The reduced ranks in the party elite reflect how Xi has centralized control and emerged as China’s most dominant leader since Mao Zedong. Since taking power in 2012, Xi has packed the leadership with loyalists, sidelined subordinates who owed their rise to predecessors and even cashiered some of his own protégés.

“Xi is purging senior officials at a faster clip this term because he is firmly in control of elite politics and free to push his vision of the party as a self-regulating institution that is capable of disciplining itself without Western-style rule of law,” said Neil Thomas, a fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.

“Xi appears unconcerned about the reputational cost of removing officials he once promoted,” Thomas said. “In any case, after more than a decade in charge, nearly every senior cadre has been promoted at some point on his watch.”

Leader Xi Jinping at a meeting of China’s Central Committee in Beijing on Thursday. Shen Hong/ZUMA Press

More than a dozen of the officials who missed this week’s proceedings had fallen from grace over the past year or so, including senior bureaucrats and military commanders who were expelled from the party or placed under investigation for alleged corruption and other misconduct.

To replace some of these officials, the party promoted 11 alternates to full membership of the Central Committee at this week’s plenum. This was the largest midterm personnel turnover in the Central Committee since 2017, when 11 alternates were also promoted.

Xi’s campaign, first launched in late 2012 to combat rampant corruption, has become a wave of ceaseless purges aimed at keeping officials loyal and on their toes. Party authorities disciplined 889,000 people last year, up roughly 46% from 2023 and the highest annual total since the party started releasing such data about two decades ago.

This week’s plenum was attended by about 84% of the original 376 officials on the current Central Committee. This participation rate had dropped below 90% on just one other occasion since the early 1980s, at a 2017 conclave near the end of Xi’s first term as leader, according to a Wall Street Journal review of plenum attendance data.

Over the past three years, at least two dozen officials with full or alternate Central Committee membership have been formally placed under investigation, removed from office or disappeared from public view, according to a Wall Street Journal review of official disclosures and state-media reports.

At a plenum last year, the party promoted three alternates to full members, replacing a former foreign minister who had resigned from the Central Committee, as well as an ex-defense minister and a former commander of China’s strategic-missile force who had been expelled from the party on corruption and other disciplinary charges.

The 11 alternates promoted to full membership this week replaced officials including the head of China’s customs agency who died in office late last year, as well as a former agriculture minister who in September received a suspended death sentence for corruption charges.

Also replaced were eight disgraced military commanders, whose expulsions from the party over severe disciplinary violations and “duty-related crimes” were announced last week. The eight officers included a vice chairman and an ordinary member of the Central Military Commission, a Xi-chaired council that commands the armed forces.

Analysis: China’s Parade Flex Belies Tension in Xi’s Ranks

Play video: Analysis: China’s Parade Flex Belies Tension in Xi’s Ranks

China’s military parade projects Xi Jinping’s strongman image, but the show of unity could mask tensions from his relentless purges, as analyst Drew Thompson observes. Photo: Photo: KCNA/Reuters

Since the Communist Party won control of mainland China in 1949, only four Central Committee plenums have promoted 10 or more alternates to full membership, including this week’s conclave, according to party records. Some of these conclaves coincided with key transitional moments in the party’s history.

One such plenum took place during Mao Zedong’s 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution, while another occurred in the early post-Mao years, when the party was sidelining Maoist ideologues and reorienting itself toward economic development. The third was convened in 2017, when the Central Committee promoted 11 alternates to replace purged officials, shortly before Xi started his second term as party chief.

Gen. Zhang Shengmin was promoted to vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Florence Lo/Reuters

This week’s plenum also promoted Gen. Zhang Shengmin, an ordinary member of the Central Military Commission, to vice chairman. The commission still only has four members, with Xi as chairman and two deputies, compared with the seven it had at the start of its current term.

Zhang replaced He Weidong, the former vice chairman, whose expulsion from the party was announced last week. Gen. He was also a member of the party’s governing Politburo, which had 24 members before his expulsion. The plenum didn’t name a replacement for He’s Politburo seat.

Some China politics watchers say more Central Committee members and alternates will likely be removed in the future, noting that some officials have been placed under investigation for disciplinary violations, abruptly removed from office or disappeared from public view.

One such official is a senior diplomat, Liu Jianchao, who was recently removed as head of the party’s foreign-relations arm. Liu was taken away for questioning after he returned to Beijing from a work trip overseas in late July, and party authorities have placed him under investigation for alleged corruption and other violations of party discipline, The Wall Street Journal reported previously.

Liu Jianchao was recently removed as head of the Chinese Communist Party’s foreign-relations arm. wang zhao/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Some analysts have counted at least a dozen more military commanders and defense-industry officials who have been absent from major events or abruptly removed from their positions.

In elevating alternates to full membership of the Central Committee this week, the party passed over seven alternates in the order of precedence for promotion—snubs that analysts say could indicate political trouble.

This week’s conclave, known as the Fourth Plenum, is the Central Committee’s fourth plenary meeting in its current term.

Its main agenda—the approval of recommendations for China’s 15th five-year plan—marked a departure from precedent, as past Fourth Plenums have typically focused on party governance. The change stemmed from Xi’s unusual move to push back the previous conclave, the Third Plenum, from its expected date of fall 2023 to the summer of last year.

“These alterations to the political calendar provide yet another marker of how Xi has used his power to reshape the informal rules of Chinese politics,” Jonathan Czin and Allie Matthias, analysts at the Washington-based Brookings Institution, wrote ahead of the plenum.

Write to Chun Han Wong at chunhan.wong@wsj.com

Appeared in the October 24, 2025, print edition as 'Leadership Purges Strengthen Xi'.

14. Hamas Has Calculated It Can Survive in Gaza—and Rule

Hamas Has Calculated It Can Survive in Gaza—and Rule

The militant group is challenging demands that it be dismantled ahead of key talks on Trump’s peace plan

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-has-calculated-it-can-survive-in-gazaand-rule-961adc85

By Dov Lieber

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 and Summer Said

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Oct. 23, 2025 11:00 pm ET

Hamas gunmen in the central Gaza Strip this month. Omar Ashtawy/APAZuma Press

In the two weeks since a U.S.-brokered truce in Gaza, Hamas is making one thing clear: It isn’t going away.

Hamas is pushing for a postwar governance role in negotiations with Arab mediators. That stance is at odds with President Trump’s 20-point peace plan, which calls for the U.S.-designated terrorist group to give up power “in any form.”

Hamas has probed Israeli defenses prompting Israeli airstrikes in response and raising worries about the fragility of the cease-fire. And it has launched a bloody campaign against rival Palestinian groups, a show of force demonstrating that it remains the only power capable of ruling the Gaza Strip.

The group is betting it can assert itself without triggering a return to war. 

“Hamas wants to show that no one can dismantle it and it’s the strongest actor in Gaza,” said Avner Golov, a former Israeli national-security official and now vice president at MIND Israel, an advisory group. 

Leaders of the militant group told Arab mediators in Cairo in recent days that Hamas won’t be erased and that it expects to play a part in the governance of the enclave going forward, the mediators said. The demand comes as negotiations are turning to the second phase of Trump’s plan—crafting Hamas-free alternatives for administering and securing Gaza. 

Trump’s peace plan calls for Hamas to disarm, but the group is wary of giving up any weapons or stepping back from conflict without guarantees that the war will end. Hamas wants mediators to push for a 10-year cease-fire to enable talks on Gaza’s future, the mediators said. 

The diplomatic moves follow a string of attacks by small Hamas cells over the past week and an ongoing campaign against armed families and militias in Gaza. Hamas, meanwhile, argues that Israel has been violating the Trump agreement by carrying out strikes and limiting the entry of construction equipment and personnel needed to search for the bodies of dead hostages that remain in Gaza.

Hamas’s skirmishing is meant to signal to Israel there is a price for failing to deliver, said Hasan Abu Hanieh, an independent expert on Islamist groups based in Amman. 

“For Hamas, the cease-fire is an agreement, not a surrender,” Abu Hanieh said.

A Hamas member watched as released hostages were transported back to Israel this month. bashar taleb/AFP/Getty Images

Hamas didn’t respond to requests for comment. Hamas chief Khalil Al-Hayya struck a diplomatic tone Monday in an interview on an Egyptian state-affiliated channel, saying that the war was over.

“We are determined that this agreement will hold,” Al-Hayya said. “It will last, because we want it to last.”

Trump’s peace process is at a critical juncture now that Hamas has freed the last living hostages it held in Gaza and the cease-fire remains largely intact two weeks on. The administration has sent a string of heavy hitters to Israel this week to make sure the fighting doesn’t resume.

Special envoy Steve Witkoff and Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner arrived early in the week and were joined by Vice President JD Vance. Secretary of State Marco Rubio arrived Thursday evening local time.

“It’s important, particularly in the next couple of weeks, that we keep the cease-fire together,” Rubio said as he traveled to the region.

On Sunday, Israel said Hamas militants carried out attacks, including one that left two soldiers dead near the southern Gaza city of Rafah. Israel launched around 120 munitions at Hamas tunnels, weapons depots and other military infrastructure in response.

Smoke rises in the Rafah area after Israeli strikes on Sunday. Tamer Ibrahim/APA/Zuma Press

Hamas officials denied any knowledge of the attack on the soldiers, saying it had lost contact with fighters in the Rafah area. But Arab mediators and Israeli military officials said the pattern of incidents around the same time didn’t look like an accident and leaned on Hamas leaders to stop the attacks and not risk collapsing the cease-fire.

The fighting shows how both sides are engaging in gray-zone jostling for position and to establish the new rules of the strategic game without tanking Trump’s cease-fire. Some in Israel argue Hamas’s string of attacks is setting the precedent for continued armed struggle against Israel.

“Everybody is now trying to shape the reality on the ground,” Golov said. 

Israel’s response to the killing of its soldiers was limited by pressure from the U.S., which cautioned against any move that would derail talks on the next phase of the deal, Israeli officials and Arab mediators said.

Witkoff and Vance delivered a strong message to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to keep the cease-fire alive by ensuring any responses to perceived violations by Hamas are proportionate, people familiar with the matter said.

Trump has taken swings at the militant group. “We have a little situation with Hamas, and that will be taken care of very quickly if they don’t straighten it out themselves, because they’re in violation of the agreement,” Trump said Monday at the White House.

Israel’s commitment to the Trump plan and Arab governments’ willingness to staff a peacekeeping force and fund reconstruction are premised on Hamas giving up power in Gaza. The risk of delays is that reconstruction could be stalled or take place only in the 53% of Gaza still controlled by Israel.

Kushner has floated a plan that would effectively divide Gaza into two halves until Hamas is eradicated, with reconstruction funds flowing only into the part controlled by Israel while the Hamas side languishes.

Special envoy Steve Witkoff speaking in southern Israel this week as Vice President JD Vance and Jared Kushner look on. nathan howard/AFP/Getty Images

“I think that we could actually have tens of thousands of Gazans moving into southern Gaza, where again you have the Hamas-free zone,” the vice president said as he departed Israel on Thursday. “I think the hope is to rebuild Rafah over the next two to three years, and theoretically you could have half a million people live in a rebuilt Rafah…half a million people living in security, living in comfort and also living in a situation where they’re not threatening their Israeli neighbors.”

Arab governments are sharply opposed to the idea, fearing it could lead to Israeli control of part of Gaza. 

Arab mediators in the talks said they worry the string of attacks shows either that Hamas’s political leadership has only limited influence over fighters in Gaza, or that the group’s military leaders in Gaza don’t have control over all their cells.

Most of Hamas’s prewar senior leadership has been killed by Israel, and heavy fighting had fragmented the group’s lines of command. Arab governments have picked up signs of disagreement about the merits of Trump’s plan among some of the remaining leaders, the mediators said.

Muslim countries considering sending troops to the international force being assembled to stabilize the enclave worry about confrontations with Hamas once they get in.

Hamas’s governing structure

Politburo

Gaza Chief: Khalil Al-Hayya

Yahya Sinwar

(Killed in Gaza);

Ismail Haniyeh

(Killed in Tehran)

Shura Council

Group that elects the Politburo

Delegations

abroad

Imprisoned members’ affairs

Leader: Salameh Katawi

Palestinian diasporic affairs

Leader: Khaled Meshaal

West Bank affairs

Leader: Saleh al-Arouri

(Killed in Beirut)

Gazan affairs

Leader: Yahya Sinwar

(Killed in Gaza)

Social-welfare

system

Hamas government

Leader: Prime Minister

Issam al-Da’alis

Implements policy

Izz ad-Din al-Qassam

Brigades

Commanders: Marwan Issa

(Killed in Gaza)

and Mohammed Deif

(Killed in Gaza)

Security forces

Ministries

Independently

operating cells

Local authorities

Sources: Council on Foreign Relations; Israel Defense Forces (deaths of Marwan Issa, Mohammed Deif and Yahya Sinwar); Hamas (deaths of Ismail Haniyeh and Saleh al-Arouri)

Rosie Ettenheim/WSJ

Talks envision a force led by Egypt with participants from Turkey, Indonesia and Azerbaijan, as well as a few thousand Palestinians now being trained mainly in Egypt and Jordan, the mediators said. Israel has objected to any involvement by Turkey or the Palestinian Authority, which governs much of the West Bank.

Hamas wants the cease-fire to last as long as possible, so it can restore its hold on the Gaza Strip, said Guy Aviad, an Israeli military historian who studies the militant group.

At the same time, he said, Hamas is getting ready to return to fighting by sending fighters beyond the “yellow line” that marks the zone controlled by Israel’s troops to test their response.

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The early return of Hamas police could pose problems for the peace deal between Israel and the militant group, which was orchestrated by President Trump and Arab and Muslim countries. Photo: Reuters

Hamas has been working on reorganizing its militia under the cease-fire by rebuilding brigades, nominating new commanders and moving around its weapons and personnel, said Michael Milshtein, the former head of Palestinian affairs in Israeli military intelligence. Hamas is also concentrating forces near the yellow line, which makes contact with Israeli troops more likely, he said.

“They are not eager to promote an escalation, but all the things they are doing are causing clashes,” Milshtein said. 

Write to Dov Lieber at dov.lieber@wsj.com and Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com

Appeared in the October 24, 2025, print edition as 'Hamas Presses To Hang Onto Power in Gaza'.

15. Full Impact of Tariffs on Asia-Pacific Still to Come, IMF Warns

​Could the tariffs cause a repeat of the 1997 IMF crisis in Asia?

Full Impact of Tariffs on Asia-Pacific Still to Come, IMF Warns

The report comes ahead of a highly anticipated visit by U.S. President Trump in Asia, during which he is expected to meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping

https://www.wsj.com/economy/full-impact-of-tariffs-on-asia-pacific-still-to-come-imf-warns-3bd877b8

By Kimberley Kao

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 and Fabiana Negrin Ochoa

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Oct. 24, 2025 1:27 am ET

The IMF expects Asia’s gross domestic product growth to moderate in the second half, leaving annual growth at 4.5%. That would compare with 4.6% last year. -/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Asia-Pacific economies fared better than expected in the first half of the year but the IMF warns that the full blow of U.S. tariff hikes remains unclear, and growth will slow.

“The intensification of trade tensions continues to be a major downside risk for the region,” the International Monetary Fund said in a report on Friday.

Exports and economic momentum have outperformed expectations across the region, but part of that is likely down to tailwinds that could soon fade. A rush to lock in orders before tariffs rose inflated demand for Asia’s goods, as has the artificial-intelligence boom, which has been a boon for economies across the semiconductor and electronics supply chain.

While policy uncertainty has cleared somewhat as tentative trade deals were struck and U.S. tariffs settled at lower levels than initially announced, the potential for volatility remains high. That could weigh on investment and sentiment more than expected, the IMF said.

The external threat comes at a tough time for the region: Domestic demand, particularly consumption, remains below pre-pandemic levels in many countries, it said.

Weakness in service sectors, property-sector downturns and downbeat consumer sentiment have limited the post-Covid recovery in jobs and income growth, the fund said. Institutional constraints like limited scope for fiscal support due to high debt have hindered consumption too.

The IMF expects Asia’s gross domestic product growth to moderate in the second half, leaving annual growth at 4.5%. That would compare with 4.6% last year.

As the negative effects of U.S. tariffs build, regional growth will slow further to 4.1% next year, the fund projects.

The AI-driven investment boom has supported growth, but it could be a double-edged sword, the IMF said.

Rapid AI adoption could pose new socio-economic challenges, including widening productivity gaps between large and small businesses, and job displacement, the IMF said, calling for structural domestic reforms to spur demand and support income and job growth.

“Targeted fiscal and monetary policy should be used to smooth the impact of trade shocks and provide temporary support,” it added.

The IMF’s report comes ahead of a highly anticipated visit by U.S. President Trump in Asia, during which he is expected to meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Whether tensions between Washington and Beijing escalate or defuse will have implications for the region.

U.S.-China frictions since 2018 have already led to supply-chain changes in Asia-Pacific, the IMF report said. The U.S. is a top export destination for many Asian economies, and China is central to the region’s supply chains to serve overseas markets.

A cooling in tensions would help reduce uncertainty, boosting investment and productivity, while renewed escalation could further weigh on confidence, it said.

Write to Kimberley Kao at kimberley.kao@wsj.com and Fabiana Negrin Ochoa at fabiana.negrinochoa@wsj.com

16. Through the Tiger’s Eyes: Enabling the Second American Century

​Excerpts;

Returning to the Rocky 3 analogy, Rocky’s ability to fight did not deter or impose doubt on Clubber Lang. The U.S. must include a healthy defense industrial base as part of a larger deterrence strategy. To do this, the U.S. must ensure that it maintains long-term core capabilities in manufacturing reshoring and domestic resource development. While collaborations for production with allies and partners have benefits, the U.S. must ensure that these relationships are not exploitable. There are unquestionably hard decisions to enable these conditions, however, these measures will provide the U.S. the flexibility to act if deterrence fails. The U.S. needs to prioritize personnel, platforms, and ammunition to promote a constant state of readiness. 

The DOD must partner with industry and other agencies to determine how pursuits of innovation and research within the DOD can contribute to civilian applications. Such collaboration will clarify to politicians and the general population how DOD investments will have a direct benefit to the entire economy and improve quality-of-life for every citizen. Returning to the analogy, like Rocky improving his training after his loss, Congress must invest accordingly to prevent peer adversarial competition from escalating to the U.S’s Clubber winning. Ensuring core capability and political stability is not achieved by being content with the national equivalency of being a guest on the Muppet Show when the adversary is training to deliver a knock-out. The U.S. must keep the “Eye of the Tiger” focused on threats. 

Through the Tiger’s Eyes: Enabling the Second American Century

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/10/24/through-the-tigers-eyes-enabling-the-second-american-century/

by Joshua Edwards

|

10.24.2025 at 06:00am

Eyeless Tiger

The 1982 American sports drama film, Rocky III is analogous for what happened to the U.S. in a post-Cold War era with an emerging China. Rocky III begins with a recall to the final moments of the previous movie, Rocky II, where the protagonist, Rocky, defeats Apollo Creed for the Boxing Heavyweight Championship. It then transitions to Rocky defeating inferior fighters, while the antagonist, Clubber Lang, is in the crowd analyzing Rocky’s performance. Clubber Lang is shown training and defeating his opponents with vicious efficiency as he moves and improves his rankings. Rocky, oblivious to the challenger, focuses his attention to luxury items, endorsements, and the guest appearances on the Muppet Show. Clubber Lang defeats Rocky early in the movie, which requires Rocky to learn a new way to fight from Apollo Creed to regain his championship. Using this analogy, the U.S. is Rocky, and it must refocus to maintain core capabilities while innovating how it competes to retain its world standing.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States became a unipolar hyperpower. Without a strategic peer competitor to unify national strategy and drive innovation, Pax Americana was assumed to be “the end of history” to the short-sighted. This led to fostered complacency, lethargy, and frankly arrogance. While the U.S. rested on past achievements, China observed and exploited opportunities to gain every strategic advantage while simultaneously presenting themselves as benevolent actors to the rest of the world. China’s relationship with the U.S. shifted from a junior partner to one that is now overtly competing and conducting unrestricted warfare (or executing civil-mil fusion ISO their 3-warfare strategies) within areas like the diplomatic, cyber, economic, and legal arenas against the U.S. This paper outlines how the Department of Defense (DOD) invests in the competitive space to improve the economy and deter direct conflict.

Deterrence and Insulation

The war in Ukraine is a stark reminder that economic deterrence is not assured. George Washington, in his first State of the Union, said, “to be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.” History has shown that the US’s inability to keep a state of military readiness came at considerable cost. These painful lessons eventually led to consistent levels of readiness that featured a historic military capable of protecting national interests. The supercarrier is an example of firm national hard power, to civilian and military audiences alike. Yet, the real value of deterrence resides with the effects that the air wing can deliver. While the aircraft carrier and aircraft are “the arm to deliver the punch”, the weapons are the power behind the knock-out punch. Knowing that the U.S. can deliver this punch has forced several international de-escalations, such as the 1996 Taiwan Straight Crisis. The power of a carrier strike group provided an off-ramp with China, though this may no longer be the case. According to former National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, “A healthy defense industrial base was needed because the U.S. would quickly run out of weapons in a war with a military on par with China”. While the current administration is taking positive actions to improve the defense industrial base, it is critical to ensure that the Armed Services are properly resourced to overcome challenges aligned with our strategic interests. Further, research and manufacturing should be flexible so that once jobs are created in the factory, the workers can shift to support other options to maintain jobs. The industrial expansion will provide employment opportunities to maintain a skilled labor force. Strategic planning could mitigate risks like the Littoral Combat Ship, where job preservation interests were more important than military capability. The Joint Warfighting Concept is the Pentagon’s whole-of-force effort to update the U.S. way of war for the 21st Century battlefield. 

Calls to revitalize the industrial workforce have been met with considerable criticism. There are fair concerns about price increases, however, the country also needs to consider its ability to withstand international sanctions and dubious withholding of critical resources and materials. Corporations are driven by shareholders, who remain driven by quarterly profit reporting. Yet this can come at the cost of strategic capability. For example, if China and the U.S. go to war, aside from military concerns, the inflationary response to a complete trade embargo is massive. The U.S. still sources 97% of its antibiotics from China and relies on China for 95% of key components for generic drugs. The U.S. currently lacks the ability to produce these basic medicinal components domestically. Even non-Chinese drugs are vulnerable, as other countries like India source the majority of their pharmaceutical components from China as well.

The ability to provide medical care for its warfighters and general population is an example of non-combat capabilities that contribute to strategic readiness. The debacle of personal protective equipment (also heavily sourced from China) for medical service providers during the COVID-19 pandemic should have been a larger driver for internal investment. Therefore the U.S. needs to take serious action in ensuring that in competition and conflict, the military and civilian population can adequately operate. The U.S. must be able to provide support to the military while ensuring safety at home. The ability to deter others and prevail if deterrence fails while insulating ourselves from adversary attempts to deter is a foundational pillar to stability.

Enemies Fighting for Votes

Kuijpers reviewed ten countries between 1990 and 2014 and found that political incumbents initially benefited from an increase in military casualties and then were politically punished as time went on. When considering the 1980 election, President Carter was unable to resolve the Iranian hostage crisis and responded with policies that severely damaged the U.S. economy. When comparing the 2000 vs 2004 presidential election, evidence shows that U.S. states with casualties in Iraq had a significant impact in depressing votes for President Bush. The researchers infer that without the casualties, Bush would have enjoyed a much more decisive victory. 

The U.S. and its allies and partners must be able to determine their destiny without the chaos of external interference. The inability to adequately deter adversaries can lead to instability that drastically alters the trajectory of a county’s destiny through influenced elections. Consider Osama bin Laden, whose intent was to turn U.S. citizens against their government to force his objectives into U.S. policy. Bin Laden understood that he needed to weaponize U.S. voters to apply pressure to the White House, Capitol, and Pentagon. He intended to use operations along with intensive messaging through U.S. media outlets to defeat the U.S. Bin Laden said “The US still thinks and brags that it has this kind of power even after all these successive defeats in Vietnam, Beirut … and Somalia.” , demonstrating his perception that the U.S’s lack of political will caused deterrence to fail. The inability for the U.S. and its allies to provide meaningful deterrence costs 20 years of blood and treasure, along with the untold losses of shifted priorities from investing in the U.S. to building up Iraq and Afghanistan. How much costlier would a failed deterrence prove when dealing with a peer-competitor?

Investing in Deterrence

The U.S. has not operated against a peer competitor for over a generation. Competition spending for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defense, as a percent of Gross Domestic Product, shows that the U.S. spending averaged 5.8% from 1980-1984 and 6.3% from 1985 to 1989. While there is an argument for less defense spending, from a historical perspective, how much larger is the cost of national reconstruction after a devastating WWIII, if it’s even possible? Defense spending and NATO were a preventative investment, so that larger investments to rebuild countries analogous to post-World War 2 could be avoided. With the advent of long-range weapons, the importance of the information environment, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the strategic emergence of the cyber domain, the quality of defense through geography is reduced. The DOD, along with other agencies and partners must have the ability to deter aggression through their ability to deliver effects on an adversary while preventing the adversary from delivering effects to the U.S. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz said “It is the function of the Navy to carry the war to the enemy so that it will not be fought on the U.S. soil.” Today’s reality requires other departments, agencies, and partners to provide this function.

To be clear, investing in the military pays dividends to society and the government through advancements in technology and quality-of-life. This is evident in examples like Global Positioning Satellites (GPS), microwave ovens, jet engines, canned food, digital cameras, aerosol bug spray, weather radar, EpiPens, blood transfusion, blood banks, computers, and even the internet itself were all from military innovation. The microwave was released in 1947, by the end of the 1960s over one million microwave ovens were sold every year. How much money has the microwave generated in sales tax since 1947? How much has your life been simplified by quick reheating of lunch? How much money has GPS, canned food, or the internet generated for the economy in terms of jobs and taxes? How many lives have been saved from blood transfusion and blood banks? The importance of investing in military research exists in its ability to secure national objectives across the instruments of national power.

Way Forward

Returning to the Rocky 3 analogy, Rocky’s ability to fight did not deter or impose doubt on Clubber Lang. The U.S. must include a healthy defense industrial base as part of a larger deterrence strategy. To do this, the U.S. must ensure that it maintains long-term core capabilities in manufacturing reshoring and domestic resource development. While collaborations for production with allies and partners have benefits, the U.S. must ensure that these relationships are not exploitable. There are unquestionably hard decisions to enable these conditions, however, these measures will provide the U.S. the flexibility to act if deterrence fails. The U.S. needs to prioritize personnel, platforms, and ammunition to promote a constant state of readiness. 

The DOD must partner with industry and other agencies to determine how pursuits of innovation and research within the DOD can contribute to civilian applications. Such collaboration will clarify to politicians and the general population how DOD investments will have a direct benefit to the entire economy and improve quality-of-life for every citizen. Returning to the analogy, like Rocky improving his training after his loss, Congress must invest accordingly to prevent peer adversarial competition from escalating to the U.S’s Clubber winning. Ensuring core capability and political stability is not achieved by being content with the national equivalency of being a guest on the Muppet Show when the adversary is training to deliver a knock-out. The U.S. must keep the “Eye of the Tiger” focused on threats. 

Tags: Post Cold War, Rocky Movie Franchise, U.S. - China Relations

About The Author

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• Joshua Edwards

17. The Leak That Targeted the Leakers

​north Korea's all purpose sword.

Important insights.

Excerpts:

The recent “APT Down — The North Korea Files” disclosure is significant not only for what it exposes about an adversary’s cyber capability, but for what its packaging reveals about who is manipulating the talent pipeline that turns curious teenage hackers into the technical experts that protect critical infrastructure, design secure systems, and staff cyber commands across the Five Eyes countries.

Unlike China or Russia’s state-directed programs, Western cyber know-how emerges organically from a counterculture that prizes expertise over credentials and creativity over conformity. For trust to be preserved between hackers and intelligence, greater transparency in engagement protocols and congressional oversight are needed to protect the cyber talent ecosystem.

...

The United States and its allies should preserve the spaces where hacker skills mature — vulnerability research, competitions, e-zines, and conferences — and protect freedom to publish, unbreakable encryption, and weaponized exploit code. Cyber defenders should use the leaked data from APT Down to improve Kimsuky detection while treating the narrative with caution.

The Five Eyes intelligence agencies should establish formal liaison protocols for engagement with underground conferences and publications — transparent relationships that preserve trust while enabling information sharing. The National Security Agency and the Australian Signals Directorate have particular responsibility here, given their presence at DEF CON and BSides Canberra, where Phrack issue 72 was distributed. Yet, all Five Eyes countries benefit from the cyber talent pipeline and should coordinate protocols. When intelligence products are placed in cultural venues, disclosure should be standard practice. Oversight bodies in the U.S. Congress — particularly the House and Senate Intelligence Committees — should require regular briefings on any influence operation targeting domestic cultural spaces and establish review mechanisms to ensure such activities, even when intended for defensive purposes, don’t undermine the trust that makes the talent pipeline flow.

The U.S. intelligence community should develop clear doctrine distinguishing legitimate outreach from manipulation. Supporting the hacker community means contributing technical knowledge, creating employment pathways, and respecting community norms. Conversely, exploiting it means covertly placing intelligence products in trusted venues or manipulating community discourse without disclosure. Formal guidelines would clarify which activities require disclosure, protecting both community trust and intelligence equities.

Security researchers, conference organizers, and publication editors — the gatekeepers of hacker culture — should scrutinize anomalous contributions. There is little risk in exposing obvious influence operations — because the next one won’t be so apparent.

If the hacker community loses trust in the venues that teach craft, the talent pipeline that turns curious teenagers into tomorrow’s defenders will corrode. Phrack, DEF CON, and the broader hacker underground aren’t just cultural artifacts — they are strategic assets. Protecting them from manipulation, whether by friend or foe, is a national security imperative.

The Leak That Targeted the Leakers

Andrew Horton

October 24, 2025

warontherocks.com · October 24, 2025

At this year’s DEF CON conference, hackers thumbing through copies of Phrack thought they were reading about a North Korean leak. Few realized they might be the real targets.

The West’s current advantage in cyber operations depends on the level of mutual trust between an underground hacker culture and the Five Eyes intelligence agencies. That trust has been undermined by what appears to be a sloppy influence operation that blurs the line between legitimate outreach and manipulation.

The recent “APT Down — The North Korea Files” disclosure is significant not only for what it exposes about an adversary’s cyber capability, but for what its packaging reveals about who is manipulating the talent pipeline that turns curious teenage hackers into the technical experts that protect critical infrastructure, design secure systems, and staff cyber commands across the Five Eyes countries.

Unlike China or Russia’s state-directed programs, Western cyber know-how emerges organically from a counterculture that prizes expertise over credentials and creativity over conformity. For trust to be preserved between hackers and intelligence, greater transparency in engagement protocols and congressional oversight are needed to protect the cyber talent ecosystem.

BECOME A MEMBER

When a Leak Isn’t Really a Leak

In August 2025, 15,000 glossy hard copies of Phrack issue 72 were distributed to attendees at DEF CON 33 in Las Vegas, featuring a detailed analysis of data allegedly swiped from a workstation of a member of North Korea’s “Kimsuky” cyber-espionage group. Thousands more were also given out at BSides Canberra in September.

Being published in Phrack is like being published in Nature for scientists or Rolling Stone for musicians. It isn’t just an e-zine. It’s a hub of hacker culture that has educated three generations of cyber practitioners.

The online release of nine gigabytes of data, including source code, remote access trojans, phishing kits, and logs tied to South Korean targets, accompanied the disclosure. The data appears genuine and operationally useful. It includes details of Linux backdoors planted on compromised systems to enable ongoing access — sloppy tradecraft that makes detection easier. Cyber defenders can leverage these signatures to hunt for Kimsuky command-and-control infrastructure across the internet. Thus, the data’s technical value is undisputed. But what really matters is the influence operation that may be built around the leak.

Indeed, APT Down immediately raised red flags among hackers, first for its unprecedented insight into North Korean cyber operations. But close reading suggests another operation playing out between the lines. The disclosure exhibited the telltale signs of professional intelligence work: pre-notification of victims, analytical polish that reads like a finished product, and hard-copy distribution at elite cyber social gatherings like DEF CON and BSides.

At Threat Canary and prior roles where my work has ranged from emulating advanced adversaries to investigating attacks on critical infrastructure to threat intelligence services, I’ve developed a forensic sense for distinguishing authentic hacktivism from professional intelligence tradecraft.

The anomalies in APT Down’s presentation, distribution, and authorship point to three possibilities: authentic hacktivism by hackers with an intelligence analyst’s flair, a Five Eyes influence operation gone wrong, or adversary action designed to look like the latter. The evidence increasingly rules out the work of hacktivists.

The Hacktivism That Wasn’t

The APT Down leak is missing core features of a genuine hacktivism piece — from the missing story of how access was gained to the authors’ pseudonyms that cannot be found with search engines. This raises suspicion.

A hacktivist performs computer intrusions, attacks, and leaks for ideological reasons rather than for financial gain or ego.

At first glance, APT Down looks like hacktivism. The authors use Protonmail, a privacy-protecting free email service. They leak data through Distributed Denial of Secrets, a popular site for leaks. They offer an email address from “riseup.net,” a platform that describes itself as “providing communication and computer resources to allies engaged in struggles against capitalism and other forms of oppression.”

But the article doesn’t read like authentic hacktivism. Authentic hacktivist leaks usually provide details about how computer systems were hacked into, as well as personal manifestos. When hacker Phineas Fisher exposed the Italian cyber espionage company HackingTeam in 2015, the leak included a detailed “hack back” how-to guide that name-dropped WhatWeb, a web-fingerprinting tool I co-wrote with Brendan Coles. When Aaron Barr, CEO of the U.S. security firm HBGary Federal, which sold its products to the U.S. government, vowed in 2011 to unmask Anonymous, the response was a sweeping data leak with clear narration of methods and motives.

APT Down, by pseudonymous authors “Saber” and “cyb0rg,” breaks the hacktivist pattern. The names are nearly unsearchable — odd if you’re after the widespread attention of Phrack readers. There is no “intrusion narrative” about how nine gigabytes were taken from the workstation. The authors say they pre-notified victims — a typical government move, not a hacktivist one — and the article is thorough and organized like a professional intelligence assessment, not a chaotic hacker diary. Playful section headers — “Dear Kimsuky, you are no hacker” and “Fun Facts and Laughables” — openly mock North Korea’s cyber capability in a way that can help shape readers’ attitudes.

The content of the leak suggests the ostensible target is North Korea. Analysis of a Beijing-Pyongyang nexus and context clues about Chinese holidays and language patterns read like intelligence conclusions, not raw evidence. As such, the packaging of APT Down may mask a secondary target: Western underground hacker culture. If so, it risks undermining the hacker-to-defender talent pipeline that gives the West an asymmetric cyber advantage.

Layered Deception in Action

APT Down employs three tiers of deception, where each layer of discovery discourages deeper investigation.

In the first layer, North Korean cyber espionage tools are exposed, providing genuine insight and value for Western cyber defenders. Most analysts stop here with their “indicators of compromise.”

The second layer alludes to Chinese-North Korean cooperation. In Section 3.5 of the article, the authors note that the cyber-spy used Google Translate to convert Korean into Simplified Chinese. The spy also didn’t work from May 31 to June 2, corresponding with China’s Dragon Boat Festival in 2025. Additionally, the cyber-spy’s computer was set to Korean Standard Time. The authors suggest a Chinese operator is “fulfilling the agenda of North Korea (targeting South Korea) and China (targeting Taiwan) alike.”

Such cooperation is not unprecedented. Defectors have confirmed that North Korea’s elite Bureau 121 cyber unit has operated from China since 2005, using the Chilbosan Hotel in Shenyang as a staging area for attacks while hiding among the city’s large Korean community.

All these details are context clues, not proof of attribution, physical location, or citizenship. They may indicate a Chinese hacker on a North Korean tasking, shared habits and infrastructure, or deliberate staging. The wise approach is to treat the code as real and the story as contested.

Cybersecurity analyst David Sehyeon Baek notes that APT Down is “notable not only for its technical revelations but also for the ethical debate it prompts,” while “showing hints of tool sharing with Chinese actors.” When asked about the broader implications, Baek warned that “poorly executed psychological operations can alienate the very talent pools governments hope to recruit, eroding trust and creating long-term cultural and operational costs.”

The final layer of deception aims to shape how Western hackers perceive threats and intelligence cooperation. By packaging intelligence as hacktivism, someone could sour the hacker community on government collaboration. It is too early to tell whether APT Down was a Five Eyes misstep or the work of an adversary, but the sophistication of it rules out authentic hacktivism. The missing intrusion narrative could reflect operational security. The unsearchable pseudonyms might be new actors, but together with government-style victim notification and intelligence-grade analysis, they reveal a level of professionalism not typically characteristic of a hacktivist.

A Relationship at Risk

The current cyber talent pipeline that turns curious teen hackers into professional consultants and later into cyber leaders and tech company founders is a strategic advantage of the West over hostile state actors. Today’s rebels are tomorrow’s defenders. Influence operations that erode trust between intelligence agencies and hacker communities risk restricting the flow of the pipeline by diverting hacker talent away from cyber consulting and defense into other parts of the economy or even cybercrime. Without this pipeline, the West loses its advantage.

While Russia and China can train state hackers through academies and conscription, they struggle to replicate the creative problem-solving culture that emerges organically from underground communities. Western cyber advantage doesn’t come from formal education alone. It comes from teenagers teaching themselves to break systems years before they reach university. This early-start, curiosity-driven learning produces practitioners with deeper intuition and more creative approaches than institutional training programs can match. Organizational research suggests that state-directed programs can produce competent technicians but cannot easily replicate the iconoclastic mindset that drives breakthrough security research — one that leads hackers to challenge authority, question assumptions, and find novel attack vectors that no curriculum would teach.

For over a decade, the U.S. government and Five Eyes intelligence agencies have worked to cultivate cyber talent in the spaces where cybersecurity talent congregates and where the norms around responsible disclosure and public service are shaped, such as hacker conferences like DEF CON and underground publications like Phrack. At DEF CON 20 in 2012, Gen. Keith B. Alexander, then head of U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, delivered a keynote emphasizing shared responsibility between the government and the hacker community in defending national security. More recently, former National Security Agency Director Paul Nakasone spoke on stage at DEF CON with founder Jeff Moss. The mutual trust and transparency that exists today took years to build. DEF CON has come a long way since having a “spot the fed” competition at its annual gathering.

If a Five Eyes agency used Phrack to disseminate the APT Down leak, it amounts to self-harm. Conversely, if it was an influence operation by an adversary mimicking a Five Eyes operation, then protection of underground hacker spaces through transparent relationships and disclosure should be formalized in policy.

What to Do Now

The United States and its allies should preserve the spaces where hacker skills mature — vulnerability research, competitions, e-zines, and conferences — and protect freedom to publish, unbreakable encryption, and weaponized exploit code. Cyber defenders should use the leaked data from APT Down to improve Kimsuky detection while treating the narrative with caution.

The Five Eyes intelligence agencies should establish formal liaison protocols for engagement with underground conferences and publications — transparent relationships that preserve trust while enabling information sharing. The National Security Agency and the Australian Signals Directorate have particular responsibility here, given their presence at DEF CON and BSides Canberra, where Phrack issue 72 was distributed. Yet, all Five Eyes countries benefit from the cyber talent pipeline and should coordinate protocols. When intelligence products are placed in cultural venues, disclosure should be standard practice. Oversight bodies in the U.S. Congress — particularly the House and Senate Intelligence Committees — should require regular briefings on any influence operation targeting domestic cultural spaces and establish review mechanisms to ensure such activities, even when intended for defensive purposes, don’t undermine the trust that makes the talent pipeline flow.

The U.S. intelligence community should develop clear doctrine distinguishing legitimate outreach from manipulation. Supporting the hacker community means contributing technical knowledge, creating employment pathways, and respecting community norms. Conversely, exploiting it means covertly placing intelligence products in trusted venues or manipulating community discourse without disclosure. Formal guidelines would clarify which activities require disclosure, protecting both community trust and intelligence equities.

Security researchers, conference organizers, and publication editors — the gatekeepers of hacker culture — should scrutinize anomalous contributions. There is little risk in exposing obvious influence operations — because the next one won’t be so apparent.

If the hacker community loses trust in the venues that teach craft, the talent pipeline that turns curious teenagers into tomorrow’s defenders will corrode. Phrack, DEF CON, and the broader hacker underground aren’t just cultural artifacts — they are strategic assets. Protecting them from manipulation, whether by friend or foe, is a national security imperative.

BECOME A MEMBER

Andrew Horton is the CTO and co-founder of Threat Canary, a next-generation AI-powered cyber platform. He has led security operations transformations for banks and public-sector organizations and authored the open-source tools WhatWeb and URLCrazy (both in Kali Linux). His work has appeared in security methodologies, including the Open Web Application Security Project Testing Guide, the Penetration Testing Execution Standard, security textbooks, academic publications, and he briefs think tanks on cyber strategy and AI, and digital sovereignty.

Image: Midjourney

warontherocks.com · October 24, 2025

18. China Against China – Xi Jinping Confronts the Downsides of Success

​Excerpts:

While strategists in Washington debate whether China has peaked, their counterparts in China are having an analogous debate about the United States—and reaching strikingly similar conclusions. China’s state media has diagnosed the United States with “hegemonic anxiety,” suggesting that Washington cannot cope with the possibility that it must face a multipolar world. And whereas U.S. thinkers such as Hal Brands have argued in their analyses of China that a power that has peaked is likely to lash out in violent ways, Chinese observers independently conclude that it is Washington that is anxious about preserving its position—and is increasingly willing to employ any means necessary to sustain its preeminence.

In the early years of the Cold War, the strategist George Kennan worried that the United States might lose confidence in its own system if the democracies of Europe succumbed to the Soviet Union. Today, the challenge is just the opposite: declining American confidence in its own system could be a cause rather than the result of the United States losing the competition with China. In contrast, Xi’s counterreformation—including the continuous purges and fallout from the property sector’s collapse—has not produced a crisis of confidence in China. Instead, if anything, Xi has gained confidence because he can point to tangible results in the form of technological breakthroughs. And Xi can afford to be patient because his is a long-term project, and he does not face the erratic fluctuations of an unstable political system swinging from one extreme to the other.

Indeed, a growing number of officials in Washington employ Cold War–style rhetoric when discussing China yet demonstrate little appetite to take on the difficult and expensive tasks, such as refurbishing the defense industrial base and shoring up key supply chains, that would help the United States outcompete China. If this dynamic continues, the United States will be left pursuing what might be called a “Reverse Roosevelt” strategy: speaking loudly about American power while wielding an ever-smaller stick. While Xi has been disciplined and methodical in his efforts to bolster China’s strategic position, the United States has been distracted and incoherent. Misreading Xi Jinping is, ultimately, part of the failure to address the problems facing the United States itself.

China Against China

Foreign Affairs · More by Jonathan A. Czin · October 21, 2025

Xi Jinping Confronts the Downsides of Success

Jonathan A. Czin

November/December 2025 Published on October 21, 2025

Joe Gough

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Thirteen years after Xi Jinping ascended to the top of China’s leadership hierarchy, observers in Washington remain deeply confused about how to assess his rule. To some, Xi is the second coming of Mao, having accumulated near-total power and bent the state to his will; to others, Xi’s power is so tenuous that he is perpetually at risk of disgruntled elites ousting him in a coup. Xi’s China is either a formidable competitor with the intent, resources, and technological prowess to surpass the United States or an economic basket case on the verge of implosion. Depending on whom one asks, China’s growth model is either dynamic or moribund, relentlessly innovative or hopelessly stuck in the past.

Attempts to analyze Xi’s project have become even more convoluted in the wake of China’s slow recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. When Xi suddenly ended China’s draconian pandemic controls and reopened the country in late 2022, Wall Street did not debate whether China’s economy would come roaring back, but rather what letter of the alphabet—a V or a W—the graph charting the upward path of the recovery would resemble. When the economy sputtered, some in Washington concluded the opposite extreme: that China had peaked, its governance structure had failed, and that it would start to decline relative to the United States.

This analytic confusion has shaped U.S. policy toward China. At the start of the second Trump administration, officials claimed that China was the greatest threat to the United States yet seemed to believe that China’s economic strains were so severe that it would immediately cave in a trade war—a viewpoint reminiscent of Mao’s famous declaration that the United States was a “paper tiger” that appeared threatening but was in fact weak and brittle. The attempt to pressure China with tariffs failed. Beijing responded to Washington’s trade escalation in April 2025 by imposing retaliatory levies and cutting off the U.S. supply of rare-earth magnets. The Chinese economy’s ability to weather the trade shocks endowed Beijing with newfound confidence.

Since the weight of a closed, illiberal system dragged down the Soviet Union, the United States has attributed much of its own resilience to its political system’s ability to recognize problems, propose solutions, and correct course. The painful irony for the United States is that under Xi, China’s opaque polity, in which officials have every incentive to obfuscate rather than admit mistakes, has proved adept at frankly acknowledging many of its weaknesses and taking steps to remedy them—arguably even more adept than the supposedly supple and adaptive American system. China’s rise under Xi is challenging not just American power, but a foundational tenet of America’s open society—that openness to debate and inquiry is the foundation of a self-correcting system.

For Xi, China’s most glaring weaknesses are the side effects of four decades of economic reform. Rapid growth brought wealth and power but also indecision, corruption, and dependence on other countries. However one assesses his leadership, Xi has identified many of China’s vulnerabilities and marshaled the resources to try to make the country more resilient. Beijing’s success in rebuffing Washington’s trade war suggests that Xi’s strategy is working.

REFORM REVERSED

When Xi took the reins of the Chinese Communist Party, in 2012, many observers inside and outside China were frustrated with the stalled reforms of his predecessor, Hu Jintao. They embraced Xi as a potential savior who could rescue the CCP’s ailing project of “reform and opening up” that Deng Xiaoping began in the late 1970s. These observers, mostly with more liberal instincts, hoped Xi would promulgate market-oriented policies, further reduce state intervention in the economy, and potentially even allow more political contestation. Xi had the makings of a reformer: he had served in leadership positions in three of China’s most prosperous coastal provinces, which were among the primary beneficiaries of the shift toward markets. Many thought that Xi, the scion of a revered revolutionary and proponent of economic reform, would have the clout and the will to effect change, which his predecessor had lacked.

In reality, however, the moment of Xi’s ascension was the beginning of the end of the reform era. What Xi saw when he returned to Beijing in 2007 as Hu’s heir apparent was not endless prosperity and a stable leadership structure but deeply rooted dysfunction. Hu rose to power by deferring to party elders and promoting collective leadership, which prevented him and others from acting decisively. Even if Hu had wanted to assert himself, his predecessor Jiang Zemin had boxed him in by surrounding him with cronies loyal to Jiang. Without full control of many of the party’s key nodes of power, Hu’s attempts to reorient policy—including efforts to address the glaring inequalities he saw emerging from China’s modernization—largely failed to gain traction. Meanwhile, corruption became endemic, pervading even the police and the military, which were supposed to be the bulwark of the party’s grip on power.

Xi has focused his considerable political power on enhancing China’s resilience.

From Xi’s perspective, the rickety collective leadership model that Deng bequeathed was the source of many of the party’s maladies. With power diffused among top leaders and their allies in the bureaucracy, party discipline was slack. Xi seems to have further judged that China’s prosperity had made the party’s cadres soft. Opening to the outside world had propelled China’s economy, but it had also created vulnerabilities in the form of liberal values, which threatened core communist beliefs. China was also increasingly dependent on other economies, especially that of the United States, whose tightening trade restrictions on many Chinese goods since 2018 made clear to Xi the very real risks of economic interdependence.

In response, Xi has not only tried to address the symptoms of the problems that germinated in the era of reform and opening. He has also tried to cure what he sees as the underlying ailment by reversing liberalization altogether. Xi’s tenure can be described as what the scholar Carl Minzner calls a counterreformation—stripping the party down to its Leninist core of political and social control and rewiring it for neither revolution nor reform, but for a disciplined march toward technological-industrial and military might to enhance China’s geopolitical position.

For most outside observers, this counterreformation is dangerous because it shunts aside the tried-and-true playbook that brought China from poverty to power and introduces new political risks from strongman rule. But Xi’s actions are rooted in his recognition of the most pressing weaknesses that party leaders see as threatening China—most notably, internal corruption and the uncomfortable role of China’s chief rival, the United States, in supporting China’s prosperity. Rather than push for more economic opening, Xi has instead focused his considerable political power and resources on enhancing China’s resilience to threats that have emerged in part from past reforms. It is these deeply ingrained problems, not excessive state intervention or authoritarian politics, that Xi sees as stymieing China’s progress in catching up to the United States.

BURST BUBBLES

Many elements of China’s current dysfunction are the pathologies of its own prosperity. After Mao’s death, CCP leaders lacked a road map for how to lead China toward openness without abandoning their commitment to communism. They had made bitter sacrifices in China’s revolution and were still suspicious of capitalism and its depredations. Yet at the same time, they did not want to lead China back to the chaos of the Mao era. Many of these party leaders guiding China in the 1980s, including Xi Zhongxun, Xi Jinping’s father, had themselves been purged in the power struggles that unfolded under Mao.

After more than a decade of toggling between opening and retrenchment, economic reform triumphed. In the aftermath of the 1989 military suppression of protesters in Tiananmen Square, Deng—who had the fortune to outlive other party elders bent on constraining liberalization—set China on a course toward a more open economy. Deng’s so-called Southern Tour, in which he delivered a series of speeches endorsing a greater role for markets, resuscitated economic reform initiatives that had been sidelined after the Tiananmen crackdown. To secure his legacy, Deng handpicked not just his immediate successor, Jiang Zemin, who took control of the party in 1989, but also his heir’s heir, Hu Jintao. In a new political environment in which none of the new leaders could claim to be revolutionary founding fathers, Deng’s blessing hallowed Jiang and Hu and helped ensure that each survived the vicissitudes of succession politics. Both Jiang and Hu stepped aside peacefully, setting a fragile precedent for transferring power.

This leadership stability and the quickening pace of economic reforms produced astounding results. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, China regularly registered double-digit GDP growth, averaging over ten percent per year from 1992 (when Deng launched his Southern Tour) to 2012, the year Xi ascended to power. China’s rapid modernization was palpable everywhere: new high-rises dotted the skylines of cities like Shanghai, and roads penetrated deep into the countryside to connect previously isolated villages to the rest of the country. Deng also promulgated a successful foreign policy that eschewed geopolitical confrontation to give China time to develop its economy, issuing instructions that China should “hide its capabilities and bide its time”—an approach better known as “hide and bide.”

Unfinished buildings in Shijiazhuang, China, February 2024 Tingshu Wang / Reuters

Reform brought economic growth and geopolitical breathing room but also corruption, iniquity, and inequality. No single sector more vividly illustrates China’s interwoven political and economic dysfunction than real estate, in which prices soared to unprecedented heights but have cratered since 2021. In the late 1990s, Chinese leaders began allowing urban residents to secure long-term leases on property that they could sell on the private market as part of liberalizing reforms designed to spur economic growth. This policy change unleashed a torrent of pent-up demand for property and launched a nationwide real estate boom, one of the largest in history. Local governments, which legally own all urban land, sold their land to developers to fill their coffers. When Hu abolished China’s two-thousand-year-old agricultural tax in 2005—a policy that lightened the burden on China’s poor rural farmers but removed a major source of local government revenue—officials relied even more on land sales to balance their budgets, in many cases violently evicting farmers to reap the profits.

In the ensuing years, an enormous housing bubble formed—and with so much of the country’s wealth tied up in it, other leaders hesitated to stop its growth. But in 2020, after halting efforts over much of his first two terms to deflate the market gradually, Xi popped the real estate bubble by imposing restrictions on property developers’ borrowing that undercut the core of their business model. Property sales have fallen from 18 percent of GDP in mid-2021 to seven percent in 2025, and new housing construction has dropped 70 percent. The crash has been a leading cause of China’s sluggish economic growth, wiping out much of the wealth of many Chinese families and dampening consumer sentiment at a time when the economy desperately needs more consumption. Yet Xi, wary of the costs that a bloated housing sector could bring, has remained reluctant to intervene to prop up the market.

The arc of China’s real estate sector illustrates the dynamics at the heart of China’s reform efforts. Even when China’s leaders successfully pass a much-needed reform, such as commercializing the real estate sector or abolishing the oppressive centuries-old agricultural tax, they create nearly as many problems as they solve. The system’s endemic corruption only makes the challenges more difficult because local officials resist reforms or find new opportunities for self-dealing. Since Xi came to power, he has prioritized cleaning up the messes that he inherited from his more liberal predecessors, no matter the cost or potential backlash. These unprecedented moves have generated much grumbling and dismay but no real political fallout for Xi, suggesting the strength of his position.

IN SEARCH OF RESILIENCE

Political analysts as far back as Aristotle have noticed that oligarchies tend to oscillate between the pull of centrifugal forces, in which power is shared and spread widely, and centripetal forces, in which rule is centralized. Indeed, to Xi and many party leaders, the diffusion of power in China’s political system had enervated Hu’s leadership and threatened the party’s ability to effectively govern. Concentrating power in Xi’s hands was the obvious corrective. Xi has used his centralized power to move away from policies that would further liberalize China’s economy and toward efforts to enhance China’s economic and political resilience.

The military and security services have been crucial to Xi’s centralization of power and his counterreformation. Xi has used his aggressive anticorruption campaign, which he launched in 2012, to throttle the military and the security apparatus into submission. Xi has uprooted powerful officials and their networks and, to eliminate any doubt about his total control, has often purged the successors he chose to replace them. This campaign has reduced some of the pervasive corruption in party institutions; even more important, it has kept leaders uncertain and obedient, increasing Xi’s hold over them.

Despite purging the leaders of the military and the domestic security services, Xi, like his predecessors, has continued to fund those institutions handsomely. China supports the police and security forces at nearly the same level as the military. Xi has encouraged them to harness emerging technologies to systematically build out their capacity for surveillance and repression. In his first years in power, Xi circulated “Document 9,” an internal memorandum warning of the dangers of Western values. The leaked document reversed the party’s growing tolerance for outside ideas and ushered in an era of repression of civil society. Xi was clear that he sought to protect China from what he sees as foreign subversion—and thereby remedy one of the problems created by the prior decades of reform.

Xi’s centralized system of control has so far been able to alter course when needed.

Reform and opening also brought dependence on foreign economies, and Xi has made it a priority to insulate China from global economic volatility. In 2020, Xi proposed the idea of a “dual circulation” strategy: China would structure more of its economy around domestic markets—the “internal circulation” of goods, services, and technology—while promoting the “external circulation” of international trade and investment. By taking advantage of China’s colossal domestic market, Xi’s strategy seeks to minimize reliance on the outside world while enhancing international dependence on China’s economy. The brief trade war in April and May 2025, at the beginning of U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term, suggests that China has successfully hardened itself against U.S. tariffs. Xi has been able to refrain from offering costly stimulus packages, instead providing the minimum support needed to stave off the worst effects on the economy and the export-oriented industries that have borne the brunt of the tariffs. Moreover, Beijing has figured out how to weaponize Washington’s dependence on China for important materials, such as rare-earth magnets, which many American manufacturers require for their products.

Xi has also sought to increase resilience by single-mindedly focusing economic policy on building China’s high-tech manufacturing prowess. Xi has pumped up China’s technology and industrial sectors by pouring resources into them while slighting the macroeconomy. The process has not been efficient, but it has been effective. According to a Bloomberg analysis of 13 key technologies, China leads or is globally competitive in 12 of them. If anything, China has been too successful in areas such as green energy, in which the proliferation of Chinese companies harnessing these emerging technologies has led to vicious price wars that have contributed to deflationary pressure on the economy.

Xi has also dispensed with Deng’s low-key foreign policy of “hide and bide” in favor of an approach that could well be called “show and go.” This change, too, stems from the perceived failures of Western-led economic models in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis. With China able to weather the crisis more effectively than Western powers, many CCP leaders believed that China should take on a more prominent global role. Whereas Hu sidestepped calls for a major shift in foreign policy, making only piecemeal concessions such as adding that China should “actively accomplish something” to Deng’s “hide and bide” formulation, Xi harnessed China’s growing self-confidence when he took power. He established his nationalistic bona fides in his first term in office by aggressively asserting China’s territorial claims along its periphery—most conspicuously by reclaiming more than 3,000 acres of land in the South China Sea. This gave him political cover when he purged leaders from the military high command and insulated him from internal criticism when the demands of diplomacy required a more conciliatory approach. But it is also likely that Xi genuinely believed that the time had come for China to embrace its status as a great power. This reflects a natural generational change and a reformulation of what really ails China: Xi is the first Chinese leader whose political career began in the reform era. His career trajectory has coincided with the untrammeled economic growth—and growing pains—of the post-Mao years.

CONFIDENCE IN CONFIDANTS

In the course of remedying the problems he inherited, Xi has created new problems for himself and the party. Most notably, he has undone one of the signature achievements of the post-Mao era: the institutionalization of a process to peacefully transfer power to a successor. Xi abolished term limits on the presidency and transformed the vice presidency from a de facto apprenticeship for the top position into a sinecure for retiring officials. He has also refused to allow any other civilian to serve on the party’s supreme military body. Without the opportunity to cultivate supporters in the military by serving in this body, Xi’s eventual successor will struggle to maintain power, and his tenure is likely to prove short-lived.

Autocratic regimes are especially vulnerable to succession crises. The Soviet Union never solved the succession puzzle: previous Soviet leaders either died in office or were purged, or, in the case of Mikhail Gorbachev, steered the system to its demise. The central challenge for Xi is how to empower a successor enough so that he can survive in office after Xi’s departure without endowing the heir apparent with enough clout to threaten Xi while he remains in charge. Even if Xi designates a potential successor at the next party congress, in 2027, getting the balance right will continue to be a challenge. Nor is it guaranteed that his choice will survive as the leader in waiting. Before Hu, many of the presumptive heirs apparent were purged, arrested, ousted, or wound up dead before they could make it to the top of the CCP.

The succession challenge will be difficult, but it is unlikely to cause the collapse of the CCP, which has survived much more profound crises such as the Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. The real question is whether Xi’s counterreformation has undercut the party’s ability to learn from its errors. The CCP has a sordid history of extravagant, cataclysmic mistakes, such as the Great Leap Forward industrialization campaign, which resulted in widespread famine from 1959 to 1962. But in the post-Mao era, the party has demonstrated itself to be an incredibly effective learning institution. Although it still makes serious mistakes, such as failing to prepare health-care infrastructure to deal with the surge in infections following the widespread rollback of COVID-19 restrictions, it seldom makes the same mistake twice. Party leaders were caught flat-footed when Trump launched his first-term trade war, forcing them to scramble to respond; when Trump unveiled his so-called Liberation Day tariffs at the beginning of his second term, in 2025, however, Beijing was ready with a flurry of countermeasures that it could unleash in response.

Roads near the Temple of Heaven, Beijing, September 2025 Tingshu Wang / Reuters

Although the personalization of power could limit China’s ability to correct its mistakes, Xi’s centralized system of control has so far been able to alter course when needed. Part of Xi’s inheritance as the son of a revolutionary leader seems to be an intuitive understanding that everyone around him has an incentive to tell him what he wants to hear. This may be why he has installed officials he knows and trusts in positions across the top echelon of the party hierarchy: these confidants can tell him the truth in discreet ways that do not challenge his power. Somewhat counterintuitively, the perilous political atmosphere Xi has created offers another potential avenue for soliciting accurate feedback. As other effective authoritarian leaders have done, Xi can use the mistrust he has instilled among subordinates to play aides off one another and triangulate accurate information from otherwise unreliable sources.

Bolstering Xi’s confidence in his counterreformation is the inability of the United States to perform even the most basic governance functions, such as passing a federal budget on time. The Trump administration, similar to Xi, argues that executive power has become too diffuse and has undertaken aggressive efforts to centralize and personalize executive authority in the president. The increasingly unchecked and unbalanced executive power in the United States resembles that of other troubled and polarized republics led by populists that ruled Latin America for much of the twentieth century. But whereas Trump’s project deviates from how the U.S. system is designed to function, Xi’s power consolidation is consistent with the CCP’s operational DNA, which tends to empower rather than constrain the top leader. The result is that Trump is generating policy volatility and political turmoil that undermines U.S. capacity, whereas Xi’s centralization has buttressed Chinese resilience.

These developments are not lost on Xi and his peers, who, channeling Lenin, are already prone to see the United States as decadent and in decline. The party’s chief ideologist for the last quarter century has been Wang Huning, a political theorist whose visit to the United States in the late 1980s inspired him to write a book, titled America Against America, about the contradictions he observed. Wang detected what he called “undercurrents of crisis” in the United States and highlighted the corrosive effects of American individualism and the isolation it produces. Xi shares many of these concerns himself and has described Western countries as suffering from “chronic diseases such as materialism and spiritual poverty.” These worries are at the heart of what Xi sees as the pathologies of reform that he has sought to address.

While Xi has been disciplined and methodical, the United States has been distracted and incoherent.

Chinese officials and analysts also have an increasingly rich trove of evidence to draw on for their assessment of U.S. dysfunction and decline. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has badly mishandled just about every national crisis it has faced. Each of these has diminished public confidence in the United States, both at home and abroad. In response to the 9/11 attacks, the United States launched, on false pretenses, a destructive and costly war in Iraq that sapped the country of the appetite or ability to deal with more formidable future challengers such as China. In its response to the 2008 financial crisis, Washington rescued the financial sector but not its victims, worsening inequality and generating public disillusionment. And in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, despite having some of the most esteemed public health institutions in the world, the U.S. government bungled its response, further feeding suspicion and undermining public trust. Despite its repeated missteps, the United States remains a global superpower. But it is relying on the luxury of its inherited privilege: like a spoiled child, the United States can afford to make epic mistakes without suffering the devastating consequences that other countries would face if they acted similarly.

While strategists in Washington debate whether China has peaked, their counterparts in China are having an analogous debate about the United States—and reaching strikingly similar conclusions. China’s state media has diagnosed the United States with “hegemonic anxiety,” suggesting that Washington cannot cope with the possibility that it must face a multipolar world. And whereas U.S. thinkers such as Hal Brands have argued in their analyses of China that a power that has peaked is likely to lash out in violent ways, Chinese observers independently conclude that it is Washington that is anxious about preserving its position—and is increasingly willing to employ any means necessary to sustain its preeminence.

In the early years of the Cold War, the strategist George Kennan worried that the United States might lose confidence in its own system if the democracies of Europe succumbed to the Soviet Union. Today, the challenge is just the opposite: declining American confidence in its own system could be a cause rather than the result of the United States losing the competition with China. In contrast, Xi’s counterreformation—including the continuous purges and fallout from the property sector’s collapse—has not produced a crisis of confidence in China. Instead, if anything, Xi has gained confidence because he can point to tangible results in the form of technological breakthroughs. And Xi can afford to be patient because his is a long-term project, and he does not face the erratic fluctuations of an unstable political system swinging from one extreme to the other.

Indeed, a growing number of officials in Washington employ Cold War–style rhetoric when discussing China yet demonstrate little appetite to take on the difficult and expensive tasks, such as refurbishing the defense industrial base and shoring up key supply chains, that would help the United States outcompete China. If this dynamic continues, the United States will be left pursuing what might be called a “Reverse Roosevelt” strategy: speaking loudly about American power while wielding an ever-smaller stick. While Xi has been disciplined and methodical in his efforts to bolster China’s strategic position, the United States has been distracted and incoherent. Misreading Xi Jinping is, ultimately, part of the failure to address the problems facing the United States itself.

JONATHAN A. CZIN is Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies and a Fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. He was Director for China at the National Security Council from 2021 to 2023 and previously served as a member of the Senior Analytic Service in the Central Intelligence Agency.

Foreign Affairs · More by Jonathan A. Czin · October 21, 2025

19. Exorbitant Pillage – Can the U.S. Dollar Survive the U.S. Government? (Review Essay)

​I still believe one. of the most important US strategic imperatives is to maintain the dollar as the world's reserve currency. We must not let that slip away.

Excerpts:

The case for maintaining the dollar’s privilege is stronger than ever, as ballooning deficits make it imperative to keep debt service costs low. Washington’s strategy of using sanctions to further its national security interests, moreover, requires access to the financial tools that the dollar’s position affords. If the current administration carries on with its attacks on the independence of the Federal Reserve and official statistical agencies and continues to undermine the credibility of the United States’ international commitments, it could erode the dollar dominance on which so much of U.S. domestic and foreign policy depends. The dollar is not invulnerable, and now is not the time to make bad choices and count on good luck alone. If their currency falls from its pedestal, Americans will pay the price.

Exorbitant Pillage

Foreign Affairs · More by Lael Brainard · October 21, 2025

Review Essay

Can the U.S. Dollar Survive the U.S. Government?

Lael Brainard

November/December 2025 Published on October 21, 2025

U.S. dollar bills, November 2014 Marcelo Del Pozo / Reuters

LAEL BRAINARD is a Distinguished Fellow at the Psaros Center at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Mossavar-Rahmani Center. She has served as Director of the National Economic Council, Vice Chair and Governor on the Federal Reserve Board, and Undersecretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

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The U.S. dollar has dominated the global economy for more than seven decades. Roughly 90 percent of foreign exchange transactions today involve the dollar. The overwhelming share of international trade—including 74 percent in Asia and 96 percent in the Americas—is priced in U.S. dollars. Dollars account for 58 percent of central bank reserves held outside the United States. Around the world, private holdings heavily favor dollar-denominated assets.

Dollar dominance yields important benefits for the United States. It reduces price volatility in U.S. foreign trade, enables Washington to borrow expansively and at relatively low cost, and gives the U.S. government powerful tools for sanctioning its adversaries. And as the renowned economist Kenneth Rogoff convincingly argues in his highly engaging new book, Our Dollar, Your Problem, a dominant currency is incredibly difficult to displace. Inertia is a powerful force keeping the dollar on top; the strength of U.S. political and financial institutions is another. And although numerous countries have chafed against the dollar system, none have offered an alternative strong enough to overcome the dollar’s incumbency advantages. But Rogoff also warns that dollar dominance may have reached its peak, suggesting the United States will need to craft its policies with care if it is to hang on to its privileged position.

Successive U.S. administrations have adopted policies that shored up or at least avoided undermining the dollar’s dominance. They respected the independence of the Federal Reserve and the United States’ international commitments, including its role as steward of the global financial system. The Trump administration, however, is attacking the institutional foundations that underpin the dollar’s status. It is testing the bounds of executive power and receiving little pushback for doing so. It is attempting to weaken the independence of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy authority and of the government’s official statistical agencies. And it is questioning the United States’ commitments to its allies and partners.

The Trump administration is taking these steps at the same time that it is introducing policies whose sustainability depends on maintaining the dollar’s privilege, particularly the massive spending bill President Donald Trump signed in July and which is projected to astronomically increase the U.S. national debt in the next decade. If dollar dominance erodes, Washington’s borrowing power erodes, too, and the cost of servicing its debt rises. And if a spike in interest payments on the federal debt combines with a swoon in the value of the dollar, the U.S. government could find its fiscal options constrained in ways that could inflict lasting damage on the economy.

SAFE AT THE TOP?

Using the U.S. dollar allows foreign countries to conduct business all over the world without maintaining balances of multiple countries’ currencies—a convenience that reinforces the dollar’s position, just as the convenience of using English has made it the common language of global communications. Diversifying away from the dollar could come with considerable costs because it could require holding balances of a large number of currencies and managing the risks of exposure to fluctuations in each.

Still, both allies and adversaries of the United States have tested the dollar’s status. As Rogoff explains, however, none of these challengers have had what it takes to become dominant.

Since the advent of the eurozone in 1999, for example, the dollar’s share of foreign exchange reserves has fallen from 71 percent to 58 percent, and the euro has held on to second place, with a 20 percent share. But Rogoff contends correctly that it will be difficult for the euro to displace the dollar unless foreign investors believe euro-denominated official debt markets provide sufficient liquidity, which would require overcoming political and institutional constraints on greater issuance of jointly backed debt.

China and Russia have also become more motivated to seek alternatives to the dollar as the United States and its allies become increasingly effective at using the dollar-denominated payments system to impose sanctions. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, for instance, Washington and its allies limited the access of Russian banks to international payment systems, placed a price cap on Russian oil exports, and froze Russia’s sovereign assets held abroad. China, in part to reduce its own exposure, is now working with partners including Brazil, India, and Russia to develop an alternative payment system using its renminbi, and working with additional countries to set standards for cross-border digital currency transactions, capitalizing on the United States’ absence from this area.

But Rogoff notes that these efforts to internationalize the renminbi and displace dollar-based systems will fall short unless China institutes reforms. Only by liberalizing its capital markets and taking steps to expand and reduce price fluctuations in renminbi bond markets can Beijing give foreign investors confidence that they can liquidate their renminbi assets whenever they need access to cash.

NET BENEFITS

In the 1960s, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who would later become the president of France, decried the dollar’s dominant status and the benefits it afforded the United States as an “exorbitant privilege.” Rogoff treats those benefits, as well as the burdens of dollar dominance, in an evenhanded way. Because the United States can borrow from foreigners and pay them back in its own currency, others bear the risk of shifting exchange rates. In practice, this means reduced volatility in the prices of many U.S. imports and exports. As the country issuing the dominant currency in the formal international payments system, the United States has significant visibility into cross-border transactions and powerful means to impose sanctions to impede those flows. Washington also has ample influence over the rules of the international financial system; it is the only member with enough voting power to veto decisions at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Dollar dominance enables the United States to borrow expansively and pay considerably lower interest on its debt than many other countries, a privilege that is particularly important today, when U.S. government debt is high and rising. Washington can borrow relatively cheaply because foreign investors are willing to pay a premium for the “convenience yield” of U.S. government bonds. These safe, highly liquid assets have been in strong demand because they can be relied on to hold their value in times of financial stress and are the dominant form of collateral underlying many international financial transactions. Rogoff highlights recent estimates that the U.S. government saves $140 billion each year in international debt service costs as a result of the lower interest it is able to pay on its borrowing—a figure that may be as high as $600 billion per year including payments on debt held by domestic investors.

If the dollar falls from its pedestal, Americans will pay the price.

The dollar’s reputation as a safe asset typically means that demand for the currency surges during times of financial stress. The United States, therefore, can borrow a lot of money even amid an economic crisis. During the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2020 downturn amid the COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, the U.S. government was able to cushion the effect of economic shocks on American businesses, workers, and households and ensure a more rapid recovery compared with other countries.

Yet dollar dominance is not entirely advantageous for the United States. Rogoff notes that historically, countries with dominant currencies have typically been those with leading military power—and being a military superpower is extremely expensive. He also argues that the practice of temporarily swapping dollars in exchange for foreign currency from a few major central banks in moments of financial crisis represents a burden for the United States. But this is not an obligation of dollar dominance; it is a courtesy extended by the Federal Reserve. In the rare instances that these swaps have been used, such as during the 2008 financial crisis and at the start of the pandemic, they have boosted U.S. financial stability without incurring any actual cost.

Perhaps the most politically salient burden has been the competitive disadvantage of American manufacturing businesses and workers during periods when the U.S. dollar was particularly strong. From 2000, the year before China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, to 2005, for instance, China did not allow the renminbi to rise in value against the U.S. dollar in nominal terms, despite a threefold increase in China’s exports to the United States. This combination had devastating, long-lasting effects on jobs and manufacturing in factory towns across the United States. Still, it was not dollar dominance itself that brought about these losses but the combination of Chinese industrial policies, trade policies, and currency intervention and the failure of U.S. officials to effectively counter those practices.

CRACKING THE FOUNDATIONS

On the whole, Americans stand to gain from preserving the dollar dominance that has endured over the past seven decades. Continued dominance requires that U.S. dollar securities remain attractive to foreign investors. Underlying that attractiveness, Rogoff emphasizes, is the strength of U.S. institutions and norms: an independent Federal Reserve, the rule of law, and a record of reliable international engagement. U.S. institutions guard against high inflation, which could reduce the value of claims; protect creditor rights; preserve access to capital markets; and maintain strong creditworthiness. Those foundations have protected the dollar’s status even as U.S. policy has fluctuated and foreign challengers have emerged.

The expectation that dollar dominance will persist is based on assessments of both the advantages of incumbency and the resilience of U.S. institutions. The trouble is that Our Dollar, Your Problem ends with the November 2024 U.S. election, so it does not engage with the steps Trump has taken in his second term that may challenge those assumptions.

For one, the Trump administration has unilaterally raised tariffs on U.S. imports to levels not seen since the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, perhaps to offset some of the tax revenue losses from its July spending bill. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent has promised “several hundred billion dollars a year of revenue, which will correlate to several hundred billion less [in] bonds that the Treasury has to issue.” To date, country-by-country tariffs have risen to an average effective rate of about 17 percent, which amounts to a nearly eightfold increase in tariffs since last year. U.S. allies have not been spared: even the United Kingdom, a close partner with which the United States runs a trade surplus, is facing ten percent tariffs.

The administration’s unilateral action ignores Congress’s constitutional power to set tariffs. Already, a federal appeals court has found Trump’s blanket tariffs to be an overreach of executive authority under the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Because the administration also imposed tariffs without regard for existing U.S. trade agreements, it has raised doubts about the credibility of the U.S. government’s international economic commitments—an important underpinning of faith in the dollar system.

At the National Mall in Washington, D.C., October 2025 Nathan Howard / Reuters

The Trump administration, furthermore, has repeatedly questioned the Federal Reserve’s independence in setting monetary policy. For foreign investors to remain willing to invest heavily in low-yield Treasury securities, they must have confidence that the United States will not inflate away the value of their claims. The independence of the central bank is vital to that confidence. Rogoff makes a compelling case, drawing on his own seminal research, that U.S. Treasuries are considered safe assets in part because the Fed has maintained its political independence and has a record of delivering mostly low and stable inflation since the mid-1980s.

The risk of higher inflation and higher unemployment that accompanies the Trump administration’s tariffs has put the Federal Reserve’s monetary policymaking committee in a tough spot. The president has criticized the Federal Reserve for not lowering rates fast enough and threatened to fire the Federal Reserve chair. He also fired a Federal Reserve governor without due process, although a district court and a federal appeals court have blocked the move, and appointed a new governor who is concurrently a member of the White House staff on leave of absence—both historical firsts. All of this amounts to an unprecedented attack on the independence of the institution. Trump has explained that he believes the Fed must lower rates to cut interest payments on the national debt (which his July spending bill will increase), claiming Powell could deliver “almost a trillion dollars in saving just with a stroke of a pen.” If investors believed the Federal Reserve would prioritize debt management over its statutory mandate to fight inflation, however, they would demand higher yields on Treasury securities to compensate for higher expected inflation, and federal interest payments would go up—not down.

Similarly, after the Bureau of Labor Statistics released a July employment report showing weak job growth, Trump fired the agency’s Senate-confirmed head. Such actions threaten the institutional independence of official statistical agencies and the integrity of the data they produce. Investors’ confidence in the strength and safety of the dollar, meanwhile, depends on their confidence in the quality of U.S. government statistics used to assess the state of the U.S. economy and financial system.

PLAYING WITH FIRE

Worryingly, all of this is happening just when the administration’s new law is adding more than $4 trillion over ten years to the U.S. national debt. U.S. debt is already about 100 percent of GDP, and the costs of interest on the debt are rising each year. As the Trump administration plans to borrow even more, its attacks on the foundations of dollar dominance may jeopardize the advantages that come with ready demand for U.S. Treasury securities, including savings of more than $1 trillion in debt service payments over the course of a decade.

Initially, financial markets reacted sharply to the administration’s aggressive, unconventional moves to raise tariffs or threaten the independence of the Federal Reserve: longer-term U.S. Treasury yields jumped—increasing the cost of borrowing for the U.S. government—and the dollar lost value.

In response, the administration softened its actions. On April 9, just a week after Trump’s so-called Liberation Day announcement of sweeping tariffs saw Treasury yields spike, the dollar weaken, and the stock market sink, the president paused the rollout for 90 days. After Trump posted on social media on April 17 that “Powell’s termination cannot come fast enough!” and Kevin Hassett, the director of the National Economic Council, said publicly the next day that the administration was exploring options to make that happen, the U.S. stock and bond markets reacted in the same way, and the dollar fell again. Trump made another pivot on April 22, stating that he had “no intention of firing” Powell.

Yet it is folly to bet on the alternatives to the dollar being so inadequate that Washington can continue to flout long-established norms and commitments without consequence. Although there may not be a single currency that has all the necessary attributes to displace the dollar, there is still considerable risk that the centrality of the dollar could diminish over time. Already, the dollar’s share of global reserves has fallen by more than ten percentage points since 2000. Innovation in finance and payments is developing rapidly, and challenger countries are working hard to craft alternatives to the dollar-­based system.

The case for maintaining the dollar’s privilege is stronger than ever, as ballooning deficits make it imperative to keep debt service costs low. Washington’s strategy of using sanctions to further its national security interests, moreover, requires access to the financial tools that the dollar’s position affords. If the current administration carries on with its attacks on the independence of the Federal Reserve and official statistical agencies and continues to undermine the credibility of the United States’ international commitments, it could erode the dollar dominance on which so much of U.S. domestic and foreign policy depends. The dollar is not invulnerable, and now is not the time to make bad choices and count on good luck alone. If their currency falls from its pedestal, Americans will pay the price.

In This Review

• Our Dollar, Your Problem: An Insider’s View of Seven Turbulent Decades of Global Finance, and the Road Ahead
• By Kenneth Rogoff
• 
  
• Tertulia
• Bookshop
• Amazon

Foreign Affairs · More by Lael Brainard · October 21, 2025

​20. Washington's hard line in South China Sea tests allies, raises risks

Voices Oct. 23, 2025 / 10:46 AM

Washington's hard line in South China Sea tests allies, raises risks

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/10/23/trump-indo-pacific-region-strategy/5041760994614/

By James Borton

upi.com

Oct. 23 (UPI) -- President Donald Trump's upcoming diplomatic sweep through Asia -- first to Malaysia for the ASEAN Summit and then to South Korea for the APEC leaders' meeting, with a pivotal sideline encounter planned with China's Xi Jinping -- signals that Washington is recalibrating its power projection in the Indo-Pacific.

Far from a routine tour, the itinerary underscores the administration's intent to fuse economic statecraft with strategic deterrence at a time when the region faces mounting tensions over trade, technology and territorial control.

For allies and rivals alike, the message is unmistakable: The United States is reasserting its presence in a region that has become the epicenter of global competition.

From the contested waters of the South China Sea to the boardrooms shaping semiconductor supply chains, Trump's Asia tour is more than symbolic diplomacy -- it's a declaration that economic leverage and military posture now move in tandem. How Beijing, Seoul and the broader ASEAN bloc interpret this choreography may well define the next phase of the Indo-Pacific order.

At the heart of Trump's strategy are three defining pillars: identifying China as the primary rival; projecting overwhelming military strength to deter its moves in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait; and pushing regional partners to shoulder more defense responsibilities.

For conservative thinkers and institutions like the Heritage Foundation, this recalibration is long overdue -- a pivot of U.S. attention and resources toward the region they believe will determine the balance of global power in the 21st century.

But strategy comes with trade-offs. By elevating the Indo-Pacific to the top of America's foreign policy agenda, Washington risks overstretch, transactional strains with allies and escalation with China. For all its clarity, Trump's approach may prove politically, financially and diplomatically unsustainable.

A contest over power and trade routes

No other region carries greater weight in the century ahead. The South China Sea is not just a flashpoint -- it is the artery of global commerce, with one-third of the world's shipping passing through its lanes.

China's military buildup and fortified outposts on disputed islands have jolted Washington into action. Beijing's parallel expansion through the Belt and Road Initiative has deepened U.S. concerns that China is not only asserting regional dominance, but also reshaping the global order.

Trump officials have responded with a harder edge: freedom of navigation operations, expanded deployments under Indo-Pacific Command and intensified pressure on allies to boost defense spending. Japan and South Korea are being pressed to raise military budgets to 3.5% of gross domestic product, deepen interoperability with the United States and collaborate more closely with Australia and India.

Yet, Washington's framing of the Indo-Pacific as a battlefield risks narrowing the region's broader agenda. Southeast Asia is grappling with fragile supply chains, climate vulnerability and economic recovery -- areas in which China has often been more proactive with financing and infrastructure than the United States.

From pivot to power play

The current strategy represents a decisive break from the Obama-era "pivot to Asia." Where Obama emphasized trade through the Trans-Pacific Partnership and multilateral diplomacy, Trump's team sees bilateral leverage and military deterrence as the only realistic tools.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth made this clear at the Shangri-La Dialogue earlier this year, branding China a "real and imminent threat" and pledging that Washington and its allies would erect a "deterrent shield" against Beijing's ambitions.

Aid-heavy engagement has vanished. USAID has been gutted -- folded into the State Department, with a proposed $30 billion cut in foreign assistance. For Trump 2.0, stability is measured in military deployments, not development budgets.

As secretary of state. Marco Rubio has emerged as the chief voice of Trump's "America First" policy in Asia. At the ASEAN meetings in July and other regional forums, he reaffirmed Washington's commitment to a "free, open and secure" Indo-Pacific -- while issuing blunt warnings over Beijing's growing assertiveness.

Rubio cast China's moves in the South China Sea as direct threats to U.S. interests, signaling a harder edge to U.S. diplomacy: strengthening alliances, boosting deterrence and making clear that countering Chinese power now anchors America's regional strategy.

Risks and challenges

The sharpness of Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy is also its greatest vulnerability. Frequent U.S. patrols and exercises in contested waters heighten the risk of accidents at sea or in the air. Without crisis-management mechanisms, even a minor collision could spiral into confrontation with China.

Demands for greater burden-sharing have strained alliances, with Tokyo and Canberra backing a tougher U.S. line, but bristling at threats of troop withdrawals if "payments" fall short, while Southeast Asian states fear being cornered into choosing between Washington and Beijing.

Economically, the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the tariff war have left allies doubting Washington's staying power in trade, especially as China presses ahead with the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

Meanwhile, America's heavy tilt toward the Indo-Pacific raises questions about its ability to manage crises in Europe and the Middle East, underscoring the danger of strategic overstretch.

On top of this, partisan divides and the unpredictability of Trump's "America First" approach fuel uncertainty about whether U.S. commitments will endure beyond the 2026 midterms, pushing allies to hedge against potential policy whiplash.

Regional reactions

Regional responses to Trump's hardline Indo-Pacific push are mixed. Japan and Australia back Washington's show of force, but remain uneasy about its staying power.

Southeast Asia is split. Vietnam quietly welcomes U.S. patrols, while Malaysia and Indonesia steer clear of taking sides, and the Philippines swings between Beijing and Washington.

India stays active in the Quad, but guards its strategic autonomy.

China strikes a defiant tone, branding the United States as a destabilizer, while doubling down on military buildup and trade diplomacy. The upshot is a region that leans on American power, yet doubts its consistency.

Analysts, like Bonnie Glaser, managing director of the Indo-Pacific program at the German Marshall Fund, in an article in Foreign Affairs, argues that a more sustainable U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific will require more than military deterrence.

Reviving or rejoining a regional trade pact would give partners an economic alternative to China. Reaffirming treaty commitments -- without punitive burden-sharing demands -- could restore alliance confidence.

Expanding crisis-management tools, such as hotlines with Beijing, would help prevent accidental escalation, and broadening engagement to include climate, infrastructure and health initiatives could generate goodwill beyond security ties.

Elevating ASEAN forums alongside the Quad would reassure smaller states of their importance, while bipartisan backing in Washington and stable budgets remain essential to anchor U.S. commitments beyond Trump's tenure.

The bottom line

Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy has injected urgency into U.S. engagement with Asia, making clear that Washington sees China not as a competitor, but as its foremost strategic threat. Yet, clarity has come at the cost of balance. For now, the United States projects undeniable strength, but its unpredictability and narrow security focus risk undermining the very alliances it seeks to strengthen.

The South China Sea is now the stage where America's global credibility is being tested. The question is whether Washington can translate deterrence into a durable, comprehensive strategy that reassures allies while managing competition with China.

James Borton is the editor-in-chief of news aggregator South China Sea NewsWire, author of Harvesting the Waves: How Blue Parks Shape Policy, Politics and Peacebuilding in the South China Sea, and a non-resident senior fellow at Johns Hopkins/SAIS Foreign Policy Institute.

upi.com

21. In China's dangerous interceptions, see the breakdown of peaceful world order

​Excerpts:

Trump confidently declared that while AUKUS served as a deterrent to China, ‘we won’t need it’. When asked whether China would invade Taiwan, he replied that it would not, emphasising his ‘good relationship’ with Beijing.

But as Australia learnt on Sunday, the facts in the air over the South China Sea tell a different story. Warnings from Australia’s Defence Department are echoed even more strongly by senior leaders in the US Indo-Pacific Command, including Admiral Samuel Paparo, who earlier this year described China as being on a ‘dangerous course,’ noting that the PLA’s ‘aggressive manoeuvres around Taiwan’ in February were not ‘exercises’ but ‘rehearsals’. His predecessor likewise warned that China’s strategy resembled a ‘boiling frog’, a gradual, deliberate escalation until it is too late to respond.

In this context, Trump’s ringing endorsement of AUKUS, and his personal commitment to sell nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, is significant. Sunday’s unsafe and unprofessional incident by the PLA is yet another clear example of a deteriorating regional environment in which Australia’s national security interests are directly challenged.

While conflict is not inevitable, I don’t share Trump’s rosy outlook on China. Australia must prepare for the possibility of crisis or conflict; not to invite it, but to deter it. And if deterrence fails, we must be ready to respond. Australia cannot afford to become the desensitised boiling frog.

In China's dangerous interceptions, see the breakdown of peaceful world order | The Strategist

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/in-chinas-dangerous-interceptions-see-the-breakdown-of-peaceful-world-order/

aspistrategist.org.au · Jennifer Parker · October 22, 2025

The White House meeting between Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and US President Donald Trump produced a string of positives. Chief among them is Trump’s ringing endorsement of AUKUS and his first public commitment to sell nuclear-powered submarines to Australia under phase two of the deal.

The message was clear: the defence relationship between the United States and Australia remains strong. It was also a message Australia needed to hear after yet another unsafe and unprofessional intercept by a Chinese fighter aircraft, which endangered the crew of a Royal Australian Air Force P-8 maritime patrol aircraft operating lawfully in international airspace over the South China Sea on Sunday.

During recent Senate estimates hearings, senior Defence Department officials again warned that Australia’s strategic circumstances are ‘deteriorating.’ Defence secretary Greg Moriarty cautioned that ‘the risk of an incident has heightened over recent years, and the trends continue to be worrying’. He’s right. Sunday’s events are proof enough: the P-8 was harassed by the Chinese fighter that released flares dangerously close to its flight path, a reckless act that could have caused engine failure and cost Australian lives.

This incident is not an isolated case or the actions of an overly aggressive People’s Liberation Army Air Force pilot who will be reprimanded on return to base. It forms part of a clear pattern of aggressive and reckless behaviour by Chinese pilots and naval commanders toward Australian—and other nations’—ships and aircraft operating in international waters and airspace, regions through which more than two-thirds of Australia’s vital maritime trade flows.

The Australian public was first made aware of such behaviour in early 2022, when an RAAF P-8 operating within Australia’s exclusive economic zone had a military-grade laser directed into its cockpit by a Chinese naval vessel transiting the Arafura Sea.

Since then, several unsafe and unprofessional incidents involving China’s navy and air force have been publicly acknowledged by the Australian government, from Chinese naval units using active sonar against Australian divers from HMAS Toowoomba in the Japanese exclusive economic zone in November 2023, to a Chinese fighter deploying flares in front of an Australian naval helicopter from HMAS Hobart conducting United Nations sanctions enforcement in the Yellow Sea in May 2023.

In total, six incidents have been publicly confirmed, though there are almost certainly more. This pattern of harassment toward Australian ships and aircraft operating to our north extends back more than a decade, something I have witnessed first-hand at sea. But both the nature and intensity of these encounters have escalated in recent years, and while the public may have become accustomed to hearing of them, we cannot lose sight of what they represent: deliberate actions in international airspace and waters that endanger the lives of Australian Defence Force women and men.

These incidents are also the canary in the coal mine for a rapidly changing security environment, driven by four prominent factors. First, the breakdown of the multilateral system that once helped dampen the use of military force by states. Second, the growing willingness of states to use force to settle disputes, from Europe and the Middle East to Asia. Third, the rapid expansion of China’s military capability. And finally, Beijing’s increasingly aggressive use of that capability, from coercive manoeuvres around Taiwan to dangerous incidents in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and beyond.

During my recent visit to Beijing for the Australia-China High Level Dialogue, Chinese officials were explicit: China views the South China Sea as part of its ‘core interests’ and believes that foreign military assets have no right to operate there, despite it being international airspace and waters under international law. Beijing feels justified in using increasingly reckless and dangerous behaviour to assert this claim; a stance that directly undermines the security of a maritime trade-dependent nation like Australia.

Trump confidently declared that while AUKUS served as a deterrent to China, ‘we won’t need it’. When asked whether China would invade Taiwan, he replied that it would not, emphasising his ‘good relationship’ with Beijing.

But as Australia learnt on Sunday, the facts in the air over the South China Sea tell a different story. Warnings from Australia’s Defence Department are echoed even more strongly by senior leaders in the US Indo-Pacific Command, including Admiral Samuel Paparo, who earlier this year described China as being on a ‘dangerous course,’ noting that the PLA’s ‘aggressive manoeuvres around Taiwan’ in February were not ‘exercises’ but ‘rehearsals’. His predecessor likewise warned that China’s strategy resembled a ‘boiling frog’, a gradual, deliberate escalation until it is too late to respond.

In this context, Trump’s ringing endorsement of AUKUS, and his personal commitment to sell nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, is significant. Sunday’s unsafe and unprofessional incident by the PLA is yet another clear example of a deteriorating regional environment in which Australia’s national security interests are directly challenged.

While conflict is not inevitable, I don’t share Trump’s rosy outlook on China. Australia must prepare for the possibility of crisis or conflict; not to invite it, but to deter it. And if deterrence fails, we must be ready to respond. Australia cannot afford to become the desensitised boiling frog.

This article was originally published in the Australian Financial Review.

aspistrategist.org.au · Jennifer Parker · October 22, 2025

​

22. The Red Arsenal:​ inside China’s cutting-edge weapon systems

​Please go to the site to view the interactive web page.

https://multimedia.scmp.com/infographics/news/china/article/3322445/china-weapons/?tpcc=GME-O-enlz-uv&UUID=b6aa9fa1-137f-48da-8e5d-b6a303526224&CMCampaignID=fa1c31a100b462f7c6f05ee8a4c96ece

The Red Arsenal:

inside China’s cutting-edge weapon systems

By SCMP Graphics and SCMP China desk

Last update: October 14, 2025

The People’s Liberation Army is the world’s biggest standing army and has been undergoing a dramatic modernisation programme since President Xi Jinping took power in 2013. With aspirations to become a “world-class military” by 2049, it aims to be on a par with the US Armed Forces. This databank project takes a close look at its cutting-edge weapon systems, which could play a key role in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and other geopolitical hot spots.

PLA Air Force

PLA Navy

PLA Rocket Force

PLA Ground Force

RELATED INFOGRAPHICS

China’s military power

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Compiled by William Zheng

Edited by Jun Mai

Sources: SCMP Archives

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com