Quotes of the Day:

"All of the great leaders have had one characteristic in common: it was the willingness to confront unequivocally the major anxiety of their people in their time. This, and not much else, is the essence of leadership." 

– John Kenneth Galbraith

"We believe in ordinary acts of bravery, in the courage that drives one person to stand up for another." 

–Veronica Roth

"Between stimulus and response there is a space. In that space is our power to choose our response. In our response lies our growth and our freedom." 

– Dr. Viktor E. Frankl

1. Arizona State University selected to support DOD Irregular Warfare Center

2. TEACHING FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE COMPETENCIES

3. Russia Provided Targeting Data for Houthi Assault on Global Shipping

4. Oversight Committee Releases Report Exposing the CCP’s Destructive Political Warfare and Influence Operations

5. Biden Agencies Ignoring ‘Political Warfare’ Threat from China, House Oversight Probe Finds

6. TSMC’s Arizona Chip Production Yields Surpass Taiwan’s in Win for US Push

7. Is the Free World Already at War with Russia? - NEIL BARNETT: We're already at war with Russia

8. Trilateral Korea-Japan-U.S. Cooperation: Dealing with #NorthKorea-#China Challenges,' edited by @RalphCossa , President Emeritus #PacificForum.

9. Biden-Harris Admin Promotes Pentagon Employee Tied to Iranian Influence Network

10. Israel’s Endgame in Gaza: Finish Off Hamas Where the War Started

11.. 7 Israelis charged with spying for Iran allegedly carried out 600 missions collecting intel on bases, sensitive sites, individuals

12. Elon Musk’s Secret Conversations With Vladimir Putin

13. Soldiers in Army basic training now knocking down drones

14. India, China begin implementing new border pact, ending Himalayan face-off

15. L3Harris and Palantir Announce Strategic Partnership

16. Inspector general slams Pentagon for lacking paperwork on $1.1 billion in Ukraine spending

17. How America Must Stand Up to Putin’s ‘Axis of Evil’

18. Trump says he has ‘4 or 5 good choices’ for potential Defense secretary

19. Montana Senate candidate says he was 'medically discharged' from the Navy. Records say otherwise.

20. Open questions | Chad Sbragia on why a breakdown of US-China defence links could be ‘really dangerous’

21. Palawan ‘key terrain’ to defend and operate from, says Marine commander in the Philippines

22. Fighting underground: The US military must learn from Israel's experience

23. The Biggest Foreign Policy Challenges Facing Harris and Trump

24. Pentagon Investigation into Navy SEAL Medical Care

25. My War, Our War: The Unfinished Business of Afghanistan

26. DEI Is Crushing Military Recruitment

27. On Victory and the Search for a Status Quo Ante Bellum

1. Arizona State University selected to support DOD Irregular Warfare Center

Excellent news. A world class academic institution that is well suited academically to contribute to the study and practice of irregular warfare.

Excerpt:

“The ways in which nations wage war are changing well beyond how armies face each other on a battlefield. Irregular warfare takes into account all the instruments available to governments to shape the world’s balance of power,” said Chris Howard, ASU executive vice president and chief operating officer, and a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy who served as a helicopter pilot and then became an intelligence officer for the elite Joint Special Operations Command. “This new activity takes to heart the adage ‘war is too important for just soldiers’ and will bring to bear cutting-edge research forged by experts across multiple disciplines.”

ASU selected to support DOD Irregular Warfare Center

https://news.asu.edu/20241024-local-national-and-global-affairs-asu-selected-support-dod-irregular-warfare-center?utm

October 24, 2024

Arizona State University has been selected to work closely with the U.S. Department of Defense to provide reputable academic research support to deepen the understanding of current and emerging global trends in nontraditional warfare. ASU will lead a national consortium supporting the DOD’s Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) in the National Capital Region.

The consortium will help the IWC accelerate the ability to understand and respond to changing trends in irregular warfare, forecast and track shifts in tactics, and assess the effectiveness of such approaches. The goal is to create a pool of national experts who can help the United States, through research, develop effective irregular warfare solutions and tactics.

“Arizona State University has been disciplined about developing expertise in this area and we are committed to being of service at the highest level for this important national security assignment,” ASU President Michael Crow said. “Being selected to lead this work is a responsibility that we take very seriously, and we are grateful to the entire Arizona congressional delegation for its support and confidence in us, and particularly for the leadership of Sens. Kyrsten Sinema and Mark Kelly.”

Irregular warfare refers to a broad spectrum of missions and activities that are often indirect and non-attributable, including unconventional warfare. The U.S. invests a great deal of money in maintaining its conventional and nuclear edge; the IWC-led and ASU-support effort represents an intellectual investment to ensure America can compete effectively in irregular warfare, as well.

“The ways in which nations wage war are changing well beyond how armies face each other on a battlefield. Irregular warfare takes into account all the instruments available to governments to shape the world’s balance of power,” said Chris Howard, ASU executive vice president and chief operating officer, and a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy who served as a helicopter pilot and then became an intelligence officer for the elite Joint Special Operations Command. “This new activity takes to heart the adage ‘war is too important for just soldiers’ and will bring to bear cutting-edge research forged by experts across multiple disciplines.”

The ASU-led consortium will include technologists, social scientists, educators, legal experts, historians and more from universities around the country with established irregular warfare programs and deep connections to units within the U.S. Department of Defense.

Projects will be conducted in areas such as information operations, emerging technologies (virtual reality, artificial intelligence), economic statecraft, and military assistance and cooperation.

“This effort demonstrates ASU’s capacity to contribute to the national security mission by leveraging our innovative organizational strengths, interdisciplinary research expertise and established record on national security research priorities,” ASU Executive Vice President Sally Morton said.

ASU, an R1 institution with over $900 million in research expenditures in FY23, is still finalizing agreements with prospective consortium partners. Each university, think tank and small business that will join the consortium will bring unique expertise to the study of irregular warfare.

"This work will advance not only our understanding of the evolving irregular warfare landscape, but how emerging technologies can help shape that landscape. There will be great depth of expertise within this consortium,” said Nadya Bliss, executive director of ASU’s Global Security Initiative. “ASU brings with it a range of disciplines and strengths — from cybersecurity, AI and microelectronics to social sciences and international law and more — that we can now bridge to new areas.”

ASU’s universitywide effort to advance national security priorities builds on a long history of successful collaboration with the DOD and military service branches, national networks of academic institutions and federal research labs, policymakers and leading defense contractors. ASU has more than $55 million in DOD-sponsored project expenditures over more than 250 projects, with more than 200 faculty experts engaged in defense programs.

2. TEACHING FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE COMPETENCIES

It is good to see a Foreign Service Officer talking about warfare. I hear comments (often and mostly from inside the Pentagon) that we cannot talk about political or irregular or unconventional warfare because the use of "warfare" offends our interagency partners. Nothing could be further from the truth. I have known so many Foreign Service Officers and interagency partners who were not afraid to talk about the importance of understanding "warfare." It is not just for the military anymore. (it actually never has been just for the military).

We need sufficient emphasis on IW in all PME (and national security studies programs in grad schools).

We need this to be able to man well trained IW proficient campaign headquarters just as we need to have well trained LSCO proficient campaign headquarters.

TEACHING FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE COMPETENCIES

warroom.armywarcollege.edu · by Todd Greentree · October 25, 2024

In a world of evolving warfare, professional military education (PME) needs to adapt as well. While the current focus is on great power conflict, the importance of irregular warfare (IW) education cannot be overlooked. Characterized by its non-linear and multifaceted nature, IW strategy demands a deep understanding of culture, local power structures and politics, and historical contexts. Todd Greentree and Craig Whiteside advocate for increased IW education in PME--a traditionally underserved topic--to better equip military leaders with essential skills for navigating this complex landscape.

EDITOR’S NOTE: This is the fourth installment in a multi-part series that examines how professional military education should be designed. This and subsequent articles will look through the lens of the competencies required of officers as the global security environment changes once again. The collection of articles can be found in a collection here once they have been published.

In a strategic environment that rightly emphasizes preparing for great power war, what use is education for irregular warfare?

The purpose of professional military education (PME) is to prepare military leaders for an unknown future, to imbue them with intellectual tools for solving problems we can’t imagine today. Education must be broad enough to apply to the entirety of possibilities and can be thought of as the flip side of training—the exercising of specific skills to execute commonly known tasks at high levels of competence. In PME we do both, despite debates arguing in favor of one or the other, but our narrow focus here is on education. In a strategic environment that rightly emphasizes preparing for great power war, what use is education for irregular warfare (IW)?

We offer three reasons why we should educate officers in irregular warfare in this “decisive decade” of strategic competition. First, the U.S. military has fought more irregular conflicts than conventional ones in the past, with a rich history to draw from that fits our strategic and national culture and not others. In more recent times, the military has forsaken lessons observed in these irregular conflicts to privilege training in conventional style warfare only to be forced by adversaries to fight another way. Second, the advent of nuclear weapons has not stopped wars, but certainly limited conflict between nuclear powers. Hostile great powers find ways to inhibit the others’ national interests and through acts below the threshold of war, but also by fueling proxy conflicts against the other. Third, the rise of capable non-state actors in the age of globalization will require all great powers to fight in multiple directions, and asymmetric conflict between non-states and states (or small states and large states) usually takes the form of irregular warfare. In short, irregular warfare is ever-present, exists along the entire spectrum of conflict, and allied militaries will continue to be called on to achieve political objectives in this environment.

Understanding this, we proceed to identify the intellectual competencies we believe military leaders require to operate in the irregular warfare spectrum. Our chosen competencies are based on our experiences practicing irregular warfare in El Salvador, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, which we further refined educating students at the U.S. Naval War College with deep IW engagement in the wars after 2001.

Contextualizing IW on the spectrum of conflict and IRT national interest

Allied doctrine’s spectrum of conflict is non-linear, a recognition that warfare proceeds in multiple forms and on several dimensions simultaneously. Irregular warfare practitioners must develop a sophisticated understanding of the complex strategic dynamics and principles of IW, distinguishing between what is common in the nature of war and different in the character of the many forms of IW: insurgency/counterinsurgency, terrorism/counterterrorism, special operations, civil war, revolutionary war. They must understand the purposes and utility of military force alongside other instruments of power (diplomatic, information, economic) and in different domains (air, land, maritime, cyber and space), and be familiar with IW strategies: cost-imposing, denial, decapitation, punitive, “hearts and minds,” foreign assistance, proxy war.

The curriculum would introduce students to the classical and contemporary IW strategists (Thucydides, Clausewitz, Corbett, TE Lawrence, Mao, Fall, Kalyvas) and cover the arc of IW doctrine (Marine Small Wars Manual, Internal Defense and Development/Foreign Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare, Counterinsurgency). The value of relying on pertinent historical case studies with aspects of IW is a proven pedagogical tool at places like the U.S. Naval War College.

Understanding local history, culture, ethnic, and ideological influences, along with inter-linked global, regional, national, and internal dimensions.

Recent irregular warfare experiences highlight collective failures to understand the causes/aims of IW protagonists, particularly in relation to Allied policy, strategy, and perspective. Ideologies (such as Salafi-jihadi and Marxist-Leninist), the role of religion, and cultural belief systems all fuel local, regional, and transnational politico-military and violent extremist movements. Practitioners must be able to discern these different strands to leverage power and coercion in IW environments.

If IW practitioners cannot identify key parties, tribes, actors, and institutions (never mind enemies, illicit actors, and their motives), ignorance of local politics serves as a portent of inevitable strategic failure.

Understanding local power structures and politics

Theorists and those with experience stress the primacy of politics in IW, but our study of local politics has too often taken a back seat to tactical proficiency, while cultural and historical preparation for deployments has been rudimentary. Our sub-optimal strategic outcomes reflect these misplaced priorities. PME graduates must quickly grasp the relationship of IW forces to national and local governments, the impact of foreign intervention on host nation authority and legitimacy, interaction between belief systems and politics that shapes local narratives and propaganda, and the impact of local politics on resource competition and scarcities. If IW practitioners cannot identify key parties, tribes, actors, and institutions (never mind enemies, illicit actors, and their motives), ignorance of local politics serves as a portent of inevitable strategic failure.

Understanding norms of local conflict

Wars like Iraq (2003-2011) and Afghanistan (2001-21) were multi-faceted conflicts inspired by distinct yet overlapping causes: resistance to occupation, Salafi-jihadi ideology, historic sectarian/ethnic rivalries, the corrosive effects of violence, and criminal profit-seeking. Efforts to simplify these threads of conflict make strategic success less likely. What is the “local way of war?” Can IW practitioners differentiate between insurgent goals and endemic tribal warfare? Where are the natural cleavages between foreign fighters/travelers to the conflict and local populations that can be leveraged by IW practitioners? What are the possibilities for conflict termination between warring parties in a civil war?

Understanding local political economy

Because economic activity is not always violent or illicit, it often falls outside of IW study. Recent experience demonstrates that violent non-state actors spend significant effort generating funds for operations, payroll, and bribes that sustain these movements and disrupt IW efforts to stabilize, to the point where they can be confused as criminal groups. For example, RAND documentation of Islamic State’s massive economic bureaucracy as early as 2005 correlates to their rise and establishment of territorial control of large areas of Iraq and Syria, which then fueled more income capture for the group. At one point the group had a GDP larger than some states in the international system. Failure to appreciate the role local political economies have in fueling violence in the future will have similar outcomes to the establishment of an extremist state project, with echoes that ripple long into the future.

Appreciating the moral and ethical challenges unique to IW

Ethical and moral challenges are inherent to all warfare, but IW has unique aspects that make this topic essential for practitioners. War among the people puts a premium on ethical decision making; the presence of irregular/unlawful combatants, high levels of media coverage, and competing legal and cultural norms place immense stress on IW practitioners. Ironically, while the need for ethical education is critical, it is often missing due to the complexities mentioned above and the lack of qualified educators to facilitate tough but necessary conversations. As we see in the current conflict in Gaza, lapses in ethical attitudes by Allied forces have immediate political and international impacts that complicate operations and can compromise strategic success, regardless of reputation and skill.

Appreciating the impact of changing technology on IW

Technology intended to enhance the capabilities of Allied IW practitioners also has pitfalls our students need to be aware of. First, technology will never itself be a solution to highly politicized IW conflicts. Second, over-reliance on technology that incentivizes killing —particularly precise lethal weapons— can provoke rather than reduce opposition and override efforts to achieve political goals. Third, while asymmetries are common in IW, the democratization of technology has given antagonists unprecedented ability to achieve strategic effects through non-state special operations, information operations, improvised explosive devices, drones, and, in the worst case, weapons of mass destructions. This realization is not lost on many IW veteran practitioners who privilege people and ideas over technology in their operational and strategic practice.

Appreciating the civil-military relations and institutional influences on IW

Organizations, bureaucracies, and relations among military and civilian leaders, policy makers, and executors are as critical to IW as they are to all aspects of national security and foreign policy. Our students need to understand how the peculiar problem sets and often ad-hoc nature of IW efforts lead to additional complexity and friction in a combined, joint, and interagency environment that features conflicting organizational interests along with charged political and strategic imperatives. Navigating these complexities, understanding who we are, and appreciating that these same issues apply to our adversaries, is a key competency for achieving success in IW contests.

Conclusion

This list of competencies for IW education is a starting point, and just presenting this short list of competencies elicits more questions that are difficult to answer. What type of forces should be the target for this type of education (e.g., SOF, pilots—manned and unmanned systems, other government agencies)? How would institutions differ mid-level professionals from more senior students? How would joint staffs create an IW expertise in staff colleges and centers to educate the force? However we answer these questions, identifying discrete competencies for irregular warfare is an important step forward in recognizing both the uniqueness of this form of war and the need for a tailored education to develop better IW practitioners.

Todd Greentree, a former Foreign Service Officer, served in five wars, beginning with El Salvador in the early 1980s and mostly recently in Afghanistan. He was on the Strategy and Policy faculty at the U.S. Naval War College, a visiting scholar at the Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins SAIS, and currently is a member of the Changing Character of War Centre at Oxford University, where he received his PhD.

Craig Whiteside is Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College resident program at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He recently co-authored The ISIS Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement (Hurst Publishers/Oxford University Press, 2020). His current book project is on the logic of non-state special operations. He is the 2022 winner of the U.S. Naval War College Excellence in Research Award. A West Point graduate, Whiteside earned a doctorate in Political Science from Washington State University and is a former U.S. Army officer with combat experience in Iraq.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.

Photo Description: A Commando from the Mozambique Defense Armed Forces receives a ranger tab from a member of the U.S. Army 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) during the closing ceremony of a Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET), near Moamba, Mozambique, August 30, 2024. JCETs enhance U.S. relationships with partner nations by developing and maintaining critical military-to-military connections and improving joint and allied readiness and interoperability.

Photo Credit: U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Christopher Dyer

warroom.armywarcollege.edu · by Todd Greentree · October 25, 2024

3. Russia Provided Targeting Data for Houthi Assault on Global Shipping

It sure seems like Russia has a lot of freedom of action due to our national security prime directive to prevent escalation at all costs (well we are seeing the costs here).

Russia Provided Targeting Data for Houthi Assault on Global Shipping

Moscow’s assistance in attacks that are disrupting trade shows how the Kremlin is seeking to tie up the U.S. in the Middle East

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-provided-targeting-data-for-houthi-assault-on-global-shipping-eabc2c2b?st=Hnu5Uk&utm

By Benoit FauconFollow

 and Thomas GroveFollow

Oct. 24, 2024 3:12 pm ET

Russia provided targeting data for Yemen’s Houthi rebels as they attacked Western ships in the Red Sea with missiles and drones earlier this year, helping the Iranian-backed group assault a major artery for global trade and further destabilizing the region.

The Houthis, which began their attacks late last year over the Gaza war, eventually began using Russian satellite data as they expanded their strikes, said a person familiar with the matter and two European defense officials. The data was passed through members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who were embedded with the Houthis in Yemen, one of the people said.

The assistance, which hasn’t been previously reported, shows how far Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to go to undermine the U.S.-led Western economic and political order. Russia, in this case, supported the Iran-backed Houthis, which the U.S. designates as a terrorist group, as they carried out a series of attacks in one of the world’s most heavily traveled shipping routes.

More broadly, Russia has sought to stoke instability from the Middle East to Asia to create problems for the U.S., analysts say. The widening conflict in the Middle East, triggered by last year’s Oct. 7 attack on Israel, has absorbed resources and attention at a time when Washington has sought to focus on the threats from Russia and China.

A Houthi drone threatening commercial navigation in the Red Sea, left. Israeli airstrikes in Hodeidah, Yemen, a Houthi stronghold.

“For Russia, any flare up anywhere is good news, because it takes the world’s attention further away from Ukraine and the U.S. needs to commit resources—Patriot systems or artillery shells—and with the Middle East in play, it’s clear where the U.S. will choose,” said Alexander Gabuev, director of Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, a think tank based in Berlin.

A spokesman for the Russian government didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment. A Houthi spokesman declined to comment.

Moscow has sought to build tighter military partnerships with autocracies, pulling Iran and North Korea deeper into its Ukraine war effort. The countries have provided ammunition, drones and missiles, and North Korea sent 3,000 troops to train in Russia in recent weeks, according to U.S. and South Korean officials.

The assistance gives battlefield help to Russia, which is running short on manpower and materiel, but it also serves Moscow’s strategic aims by destabilizing two regions where its partners are facing off against the U.S. and its allies.

Attacks in the Red Sea

Confirmed Houthi attacks

(Nov. 19, 2023-Oct. 9, 2024)

saudi Arabia

Red Sea

Oman

Yemen

eritrea

Sanaa

Houthi-controlled

territory

Gulf of Aden

ethiopia

dji.

Djibouti

200 miles

Note: Houthi territory is as of Nov. 27, 2023.

Sources: Acaps (Houthi territory); The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (attacks)

Emma Brown/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

South Korea, a top U.S. ally in East Asia, has expressed increasing concern at the prospect that North Koreans could gain battlefield experience through their exposure to the Ukraine war. South Korea is one of the world’s fastest-growing weapons manufacturers, and Seoul has warned it would take measures in response, including potentially sending lethal aid to Ukraine. While South Korea has sent weapons to countries supporting Ukraine, it has declined to send arms directly.

In the Middle East, the Russian assistance underscores a tectonic shift in its strategy. Putin has strengthened ties with Iran, while turning a cold shoulder to his longstanding relationship with Israel and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Israel has engaged in a growing conflict with Iran and the militias it backs in the region, such as Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. Putin has criticized the U.S. and Israel over the Gaza conflict. On Thursday, he said the region was on the brink of a full-scale war.

The Houthis began launching their attacks in the Red Sea, where ships travel to and from the Suez Canal, late last year in protest against Israel’s ground invasion of Gaza, and continued them through the first months of this year. In total, the militants have attacked more than 100 ships since November 2023, sinking two and hijacking another.

The USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier is helping to protect Red Sea shipping lanes. Photo: Bernat Armangue/Associated Press

The attacks caused major disruptions to global trade, as shippers diverted vessels for a period south around the Cape of Good Hope, a longer and more expensive voyage. Almost 1-in-10 barrels of oil shipped every day worldwide transit through Bab al-Mandab, the strait that separates the Red Sea from the Indian Ocean. The tanker traffic through that route was 77% lower in August 2024 compared with October 2023, according to Windward, a maritime-intelligence company.

The U.S. vowed to protect the international shipping lanes, and in December of last year launched a multinational naval coalition to escort ships traveling through the strait. By April, the U.S. had spent some $1 billion on munitions to knock out Houthi drones and missiles and protect shipping in the Red Sea. The U.S. has since gone further and earlier this month sent B-2 Spirit bombers to strike Houthi arsenals.

The U.S. has been concerned that Russia could escalate the situation further by providing the Houthis with Russian antiship or antiair missiles that could threaten the U.S. military’s efforts to protect ships in the region, but there is so far no evidence that Russia has done so.

Earlier this month, Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout, who had recently been released from a U.S. prison in a prisoner swap with Moscow, was trying to broker the sale of about $10 million worth of automatic small arms to the Houthis, The Wall Street Journal has reported. It was unclear whether the sale had been initiated or blessed by the Kremlin.

Since the Houthis started attacking vessels connected to Israel and its allies almost a year ago, most vessels undertaking the dangerous crossing near their territories have started switching off their radio signals, complicating efforts to track them. Once a vessel goes dark, its live movements can only be continuously accessed through high-quality satellite imaging. Commercially available satellite services tend to suffer gaps in coverage and delays in transmission.

Tankers carrying Russian oil cargoes, including by Kremlin-connected Rosneft, have been attacked by the Houthis on several occasions. But these shipments are carried out through a so-called ghost fleet owned by shell companies to evade sanctions whose Russian connection is only known by a close circle of Russian oil officials and market players.

Saleh al-Batati contributed to this article.

Write to Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com and Thomas Grove at thomas.grove@wsj.com

Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the October 25, 2024, print edition as 'Russia Provided Data for Houthi Assault'.

4. Oversight Committee Releases Report Exposing the CCP’s Destructive Political Warfare and Influence Operations

Someone in the US government is not afraid to use "political warfare." We should know that the best counter to our enemies' political warfare strategy is to execute our own superior political warfare strategy.

There is a 300 page report from the committee at this link: https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/CCP-Report-10.24.24.pdf

It is going to take me some time to wade through it. I hope there is some useful information in it. This is a majority staff report so it compliments Trump though I do not think he really understood this problem and it was his national security team (Pottinger and McMaster and Schadlow) who really understood the issues. But this should in no way be a partisan issue.

Excerpts from the EXSUM of the report.

The CCP’s fight against the United States relies on its deployment of unrestricted warfare and political warfare.3 In many ways, unrestricted warfare—and political warfare, a component thereof—is a prelude to larger, more direct conflicts, which the CCP anticipates. Through political warfare, the CCP seeks to establish footholds, dependencies, and both willing and unwitting allies that further its larger effort to weaken the United States. Myopic business decisions capitalizing on cheap labor sourced from the PRC, rosy narratives promulgated by government officials in exchange for PRC special treatment, and social tensions the CCP exploits are all CCP tools that make any U.S. effort to excise dependence on the PRC difficult and politically delicate.  

Former President Trump and administration officials spoke in a unified voice on the dangers posed by CCP infiltration and influence operations to show the American people the threat the CCP poses to every aspect of American life.4 For example, former Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe warned the American public in an op-ed entitled “China Is National Security Threat No. 1” that “the [PRC] poses the greatest threat to America today, and the greatest threat to democracy and freedom world-wide since World War II.”5 These public statements and speeches were marked by strong action in the Trump Administration. However, the Oversight Committee’s investigation has revealed that too many of these efforts—especially transparent communication about the CCP threat—were not built upon by the Biden-Harris Administration.  

While CCP infiltration and influence operations target every sector and community in America, much of the federal government under the Biden-Harris Administration has failed to understand, acknowledge, and strategically combat CCP political warfare. Not one federal agency in this government-wide investigation demonstrated a sufficient strategy to confront CCP unrestricted warfare. Of the twenty-five agencies the Committee surveyed in this investigation, one transparently acknowledged CCP infiltration operations, elucidated a strategy to combat a piece of the Party’s campaign, and engaged in outreach to the American people about it. Unfortunately, this single example—the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), seeking to defeat CCP-backed chemical and drug warfare that fuels the fentanyl crisis6—is hindered in its efforts to protect Americans due to the failure of the Biden-Harris Administration to adopt any government-wide strategy.  

Published: Oct 24, 2024

Oversight Committee Releases Report Exposing the CCP’s Destructive Political Warfare and Influence Operations

https://oversight.house.gov/release/oversight-committee-releases-report-exposing-the-ccps-destructive-political-warfare-and-influence-operation/?utm

Staff report finds that the Biden-Harris Administration lacks a government-wide strategy to counter China’s tactics and provides recommendations to help federal agencies secure America

WASHINGTON—House Committee on Oversight and Accountability Chairman James Comer (R-Ky.) released a staff report today titled “CCP Political Warfare: Federal Agencies Urgently Need a Government-Wide Strategy.” The report, which includes information obtained during the Committee’s government-wide investigation into 25 federal sectors, details how the Biden-Harris Administration is dangerously behind in implementing measures to combat the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) influence and infiltration campaign. The Oversight Committee conducted multiple hearings, held dozens of briefings, and found that most agencies’ solutions and policies either ignore, placate, or only weakly address the CCP’s efforts to influence and infiltrate the United States. To counter CCP political warfare, the report offers recommendations for federal agencies to use existing resources to defend America and critical U.S. industries.

“The House Oversight Committee has exposed the CCP’s political warfare and is working to ensure the federal government formulates a cohesive strategy to combat CCP threats and protect all Americans. The CCP is successfully infiltrating and influencing communities and critical sectors across this nation and the Biden-Harris Administration is asleep at the wheel. Today’s report details how federal agencies have failed to understand, acknowledge, or develop a plan to combat CCP political warfare and Americans are left to fend for themselves. It is past time for federal agencies to take this threat seriously and fulfill their responsibilities to the American people. Our report offers several solutions federal agencies can implement now with existing resources to address the CCP threat and protect the American people,” said Chairman James Comer (R-Ky.).

Below are some key findings from the report:

• The report exposes the CCP for what it is—a totalitarian force that enslaves its own people, surveils and harasses critics of the Party and people of Chinese descent around the world, poisons tens of thousands of Americans every year with fentanyl, and actively seeks to destroy America. It seeks the downfall of the United States because the CCP views the American way of life as a threat to the authoritarian grip it desperately seeks to maintain.
• The CCP has identified America as its main enemy—against which it has waged infiltration and influence operations for decades. Unlike the first Cold War, the adversary is already within, having entrenched itself within U.S. borders, institutions, businesses, universities, and cultural centers by capturing elites in influential circles. 
• The report details what federal agencies, who work for the American people, are doing and failing to do to defend against CCP unrestricted warfare. While CCP infiltration and influence operations target every sector and community in America, much of the federal government under the Biden-Harris Administration has failed to understand, acknowledge, and strategically combat CCP political warfare.
• It is wholly unacceptable that federal agencies have failed to deter CCP unrestricted warfare, let alone to establish a cohesive government-wide strategy to do so, when the CCP has waged this war without weapons for decades. 
• To assess how each agency is fulfilling its duties to the American people, the Committee has scored each agency on key metrics—including strategy, knowledge and expertise, transparency and outreach to the American people, and collaboration with relevant partners and stakeholders. 

Below are some recommendations from the report:

• Federal agencies should use existing resources to defend America from CCP unrestricted warfare. A successful government-wide strategy must include four components: (1) acknowledgment of and transparent communication about CCP political warfare; (2) rejection of country agnostic and foreign malign influence-focused approaches and embracing of targeted strategies; (3) fostering the depth of knowledge needed to defeat unrestricted warfare; and (4) engaging the American people about the CCP threat and providing resources when appropriate that thwart CCP ambitions.
• Principled leaders who are willing to speak candidly about CCP infiltration of influential circles, communities, and businesses across the United States can turn the tide in America’s favor.

Read the report, including all key findings and recommendations, here.

5. Biden Agencies Ignoring ‘Political Warfare’ Threat from China, House Oversight Probe Finds

Our Pentagon and civilian agencies refuse to even use the term political warfare. But this must not devolve into a partisan issue.

We must understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the CCP. We must acknowledge that it is conducting political warfare which is the essence of unrestricted warfare and the Chinese "three warriors."

This is political warfare: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions. It takes a long term approach, employing unrestricted warfare and its three warfare to set conditions and achieve objectives.

Beware "elite capture"

Excerpts:

“There is a dangerous inconsistency between what DOJ says about the CCP threat and the actions DOJ takes to curtail CCP unrestricted warfare,” the report reads. “The resulting morass of mixed signals regarding the threat posed by the CCP leaves DOJ attorneys withoutt he requisite knowledge and agency to enforce federal national security laws to combat CCP political warfare.”  

“This reality appears, in part, to be the result of united front influence operations seeking to compromise DOJ itself through elite capture,” it adds.

...

The report raises concerns that stretch far beyond just the DOJ.

“The CCP is successfully infiltrating and influencing communities and critical sectors across this nation and the Biden-Harris Administration is asleep at the wheel,” committee chairman James Comer said in a statement to National Review. “It is past time for federal agencies to take this threat seriously and fulfill their responsibilities to the American people.”

Hmmm.. but I do like this conclusion as it seems similar to my 4 recommended steps: Recognize the enemy's strategy (in this case its political warfare strategy), Understand the strategy. EXPOSE the strategy to inoculate the American people against it) and then attack the strategy with a superior political warfare strategy to defeat it. Recognize. Understand . EXPOSE. Attack.

Excerpts:

According to the committee, a successful strategy would feature four components: acknowledgment of and transparent communication about CCP political warfare; rejection of country agnostic and foreign malign influence- focused approaches and embracing of targeted strategies; fostering the depth of knowledge needed to defeat unrestricted warfare; and engaging the American people about the CCP threat and providing resources when appropriate that thwart CCP ambitions.

“The foundational step federal officials must take to implement this shift is simple but powerful: honestly acknowledge the nature of this communist regime and the cold war it is waging against the United States,” the report concludes.

​Again, the 300 page report from the committee at this link: ​https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/CCP-Report-10.24.24.pdf

Biden Agencies Ignoring ‘Political Warfare’ Threat from China, House Oversight Probe Finds

https://www.nationalreview.com/news/biden-agencies-ignoring-political-warfare-threat-from-china-house-gop-probe-finds/?utm

President Joe Biden is flanked by Vice President Kamala Harris and Attorney General Merrick Garland in Washington, D.C., July 14, 2024.(Nathan Howard/Reuters)

By Brittany Bernstein

October 24, 2024 8:00 AM

48 CommentsListen

Numerous federal agencies have failed to understand, acknowledge, or develop a plan to combat the Chinese Community Party’s “political warfare,” according to a new report from the House Oversight Committee.

The committee released a 300-page report on Thursday, obtained exclusively by National Review, detailing the findings of its months-long investigation into how 25 sectors of the federal government have – or have not – worked to push back on China’s political warfare. As part of its investigation, the committee received briefings from 23 federal agencies and held three separate hearings on “Defending America from the Chinese Communist Party’s Political Warfare.” 

The Committee scored each agency on several metrics, including strategy, knowledge and expertise; transparency and outreach to the American people; and collaboration with relevant partners and stakeholders. 

The investigation found that no whole-of-government strategy existed to address the CCP’s threat and that most agencies’ solutions and policies either “ignored, placated, or only weakly addressed the PRC’s political warfare.”

Among the most poorly-rated agencies was the Department of Justice, which the report claims has “insufficient expertise, initiative and rigor” to address the CCP’s threat to America. 

“There is a dangerous inconsistency between what DOJ says about the CCP threat and the actions DOJ takes to curtail CCP unrestricted warfare,” the report reads. “The resulting morass of mixed signals regarding the threat posed by the CCP leaves DOJ attorneys without the requisite knowledge and agency to enforce federal national security laws to combat CCP political warfare.” 

“This reality appears, in part, to be the result of united front influence operations seeking to compromise DOJ itself through elite capture,” it adds.

The committee received a briefing from the DOJ on April 22, during which the National Security Division (NSD) categorized the threat from the PRC as “increasingly brazen and damaging,” and said DOJ has no higher priority than opposing this threat. Yet the briefing revealed that the DOJ lacks CCP-centric trainings and expertise.

Instead, the DOJ takes a learn-on-the-job approach to training personnel how to recognize, investigate, and prosecute illicit actions tied to the CCP warfare tactics. The committee argues that approach “lacks both the requisite urgency and necessary expertise to confront what DOJ itself characterizes as a serious threat.” 

The committee notes that the Biden administration shuttered the only federal program designed to enforce U.S. laws to hold the CCP accountable for its political warfare tactics. 

The Trump administration launched the China Initiative in 2018 to address national-security priorities including identifying trade secret theft, applying national-security laws to agents advancing the CCP’s agenda, and evaluating whether additional authorities were required to protect national assets from CCP economic aggression.

But in February 2022, the Biden administration ended the program “after receiving uncorroborated claims of racial bias,” the report says. 

“Despite finding no evidence of racial motivation in a single prosecution brought under the initiative, DOJ was persuaded by these unsubstantiated allegations and ceased prosecutions under it, resulting in a ‘wholesale abandonment of a national security initiative,’” the committee writes.

Asked by the committee, the DOJ would not say whether it had investigated the origins of the unverified claims of racial bias. The report notes that the CCP and its proxies have sought to advance the idea that criticizing the CCP is racist; General Rob Spalding, former Senior Director for Strategic Planning at the National Security Council told the committee that social issues surrounding race are “precisely the type of American vulnerability that [the CCP] is eager to exploit.”

Meanwhile, the committee raises concerns that the program that replaced the China Initiative, “Strategy for Countering Nation-State Threats,” distributes resources across several foreign threats — China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea — rather than focusing specifically on the unique threats posed by the CCP. 

The report raises concerns that stretch far beyond just the DOJ.

“The CCP is successfully infiltrating and influencing communities and critical sectors across this nation and the Biden-Harris Administration is asleep at the wheel,” committee chairman James Comer said in a statement to National Review. “It is past time for federal agencies to take this threat seriously and fulfill their responsibilities to the American people.”

The committee argues the Department of Transportation has “demonstrated limited appreciation for the threat the CCP poses to critical infrastructure.” For example, when the committee asked the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) about Chinese-manufactured container cranes in U.S. ports, MARAD said there is no such thing as a spy crane. MARAD told the committee that it is normal for modems and other equipment installed in Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. (ZPMC) container cranes in the United States to transmit data back to China because the equipment was made in China, raising a point of concern for the committee.

Additionally, the report found the U.S. Department of Education “does not understand or have a strategy to protect American and Chinese students on U.S. campuses from CCP proxy group harassment and stifling of free speech,” including from groups such as Confucius Institutes and Chinese Students and Scholars Associations. It also argues the department’s “limited knowledge cannot adequately monitor CCP funding of higher institutions.”

It finds the National Science Foundation (NSF) has refused to categorize China as a unique threat despite acknowledging that the CCP is responsible for the majority of all research security issues involving federally funded research.

The committee also sounded alarm that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration recently congratulated the CCP for obtaining the first samples of lunar rocks from the far side of the moon. While the agency said the discovery was “an important step in humanity’s work to understand and explore the lunar surface,” Oversight questions why NASA would not instead be “openly and consistently acknowledging that the United States is in a space race with the PRC.

The USDA allegedly fails to adequately monitor the CCP’s strategic purchasing of U.S. farmland near U.S. military bases, according to the report, while the EPA “is pushing a green energy agenda, which the CCP influences and exploits through trade associations, nonprofits, and non-governmental organizations while EPA does nothing to stop such influence operations.”

The Consumer Product Safety Commission “does not fulfill its duty to inform and educate Americans of the risks associated with products made in China, which are disproportionately harmful to American consumers.”

Meanwhile, the Department of the Treasury is “dangerously reticent to confront or even acknowledge the CCP’s economic warfare.”

The report lays out a set of recommendations for federal agencies, including the implementation of a government-wide strategy to defend America from China’s “unrestricted warfare.”

According to the committee, a successful strategy would feature four components: acknowledgment of and transparent communication about CCP political warfare; rejection of country agnostic and foreign malign influence- focused approaches and embracing of targeted strategies; fostering the depth of knowledge needed to defeat unrestricted warfare; and engaging the American people about the CCP threat and providing resources when appropriate that thwart CCP ambitions.

“The foundational step federal officials must take to implement this shift is simple but powerful: honestly acknowledge the nature of this communist regime and the cold war it is waging against the United States,” the report concludes.

6. TSMC’s Arizona Chip Production Yields Surpass Taiwan’s in Win for US Push

Seems like some good news. So if we can ot produc e Taiwan in chips in the US does that mean we no longer need to worry about defending Taiwan? (note that is sarcasm on my part).

TSMC’s Arizona Chip Production Yields Surpass Taiwan’s in Win for US Push

• Production yields in Arizona are 4 percentage points higher
• The Phoenix plant began trial production earlier this year
• https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-10-24/tsmc-s-arizona-chip-production-yields-surpass-taiwan-s-a-win-for-us-push?utm

By Mackenzie Hawkins

October 24, 2024 at 3:23 PM EDT

Updated on October 24, 2024 at 5:42 PM EDT

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. has achieved early production yields at its first plant in Arizona that surpass similar factories back home, a significant breakthrough for a US expansion project initially dogged by delays and worker strife.

The share of chips manufactured at TSMC’s facility in Phoenix that are usable is about 4 percentage points higher than comparable facilities in Taiwan, Rick Cassidy, president of TSMC’s US division, told listeners on a webinar Wednesday, according to a person who participated. The success rate, or yield, is a critical measure in the semiconductor industry because it determines whether companies will be able to cover the enormous costs of a chip plant.

The accomplishment is a sign of progress for Washington’s efforts to revitalize American semiconductor manufacturing. TSMC, the main chip manufacturing partner for Nvidia Corp. and Apple Inc., is in line to win $6.6 billion in government grants and $5 billion in loans — plus 25% tax credits — to build three fabrication facilities, or fabs, in Arizona. The award, like almost all others from the 2022 Chips and Science Act, isn’t yet finalized.

A TSMC spokesperson declined to comment directly on Cassidy’s event and referred to remarks from Chief Executive Officer C.C. Wei on a call with investors last week.

“Our first fab entered engineering wafer production in April with 4-nanometer process technology, and the result is highly satisfactory, with a very good yield,” he said at the time. “This is an important operational milestone for TSMC and our customers, demonstrating TSMC’s strong manufacturing capability and execution.”

Chip Industry DramaTSMC Cuts Off Client After Discovering Chips Sent to HuaweiIntel’s Money Woes Throw Biden Team’s Chip Strategy Into TurmoilIntel Has No Easy Options After Long, Stinging Fall From GraceTSMC’s Arizona Trials Put Plant Productivity on Par with TaiwanTSMC Gets $11.6 Billion in US Grants, Loans for Chip Plants

The two other chipmakers at the heart of the Biden administration’s tech strategy, Intel Corp. and Samsung Electronics Co., have struggled in recent months. Intel, slated to be the biggest beneficiary of the Chips Act, is under such severe financial pressure that it’s delaying global projects and considering selling off assets.

TSMC, meanwhile, has been on a roll. Its shares reached a record high this month after the chipmaker topped quarterly estimates and raised its target for 2024 revenue growth.

The latest yield advancement is notable for TSMC because it has historically kept the most advanced and efficient plants in its home island of Taiwan. Its Arizona site got off to a rocky start, as the company couldn’t find enough skilled staff to install advanced equipment and workers struggled with safety and management issues. TSMC reached an accord with construction labor unions late last year.

The chipmaker originally planned to have its first Arizona plant start full production in 2024, but pushed back the target to 2025 over the labor issues. It later delayed the start date for its second fab to 2027 or 2028, from an initial target of 2026. That fueled concerns that the company might not be able to make chips in the US as efficiently as in Taiwan.

TSMC could now be keen to expand its US presence further, depending in part on the possibility of more government backing, Cassidy added, citing early conversations in Washington about a second Chips Act. There is room for at least six total fabs at the Phoenix complex.

Wei conveyed optimism about the US push during the call last week.

“We now expect volume production of our first fab to start in the beginning of 2025, and are confident to deliver the same level of manufacturing quality and reliability from our fab in Arizona as from our fabs in Taiwan,” he said.

(Updates with earnings information in seventh paragraph. A previous version of this story was corrected to remove an inaccurate summary.)

7. Is the Free World Already at War with Russia? - NEIL BARNETT: We're already at war with Russia

I have pasted Neil Barnett's Daily Mail article below this one.

Excerpts:

Neil Barnett’s assertion that we are already at war with Russia is a sobering wake-up call. This is not a war fought with traditional means, but it is no less dangerous. Russia’s strategy of hybrid warfare has allowed it to weaken its adversaries from within, attacking the very institutions that define Western democracies.

The West must recognise the reality of this conflict and respond accordingly, or risk being continually undermined by a rival that is playing by an entirely different set of rules.

The first step in combating this threat is acknowledging its existence. Only by understanding the nature of Russia’s tactics can the West hope to defend itself and preserve the values and institutions that have defined it for generations. The time to wake up is now.

Again: Recognize the enemy's strategy (in this case its political warfare strategy), Understand the strategy. EXPOSE the strategy (to inoculate the American people against it) and then attack the strategy with a superior political warfare strategy to defeat it. Recognize. Understand . EXPOSE. Attack.

Is the Free World Already at War with Russia? - https://eutoday.net

eutoday.net · by gary cartwright · October 24, 2024

53

In the wake of global political shifts, economic turmoil, and the rise of hybrid warfare, it is becoming increasingly clear that the free world – the West in particular – is in a state of conflict with Russia, according to expert Neil Barnett, writing in the Daily Mail.

However, the nature of this war is so unconventional that many haven’t yet fully grasped the reality of it. The battlefields are not defined by soldiers clashing in open fields, but rather by cyberattacks, misinformation campaigns, energy dependency, and geopolitical chess games that stretch across borders.

This isn’t a new revelation. For years, experts like Neil Barnett have argued that the West, particularly Europe and the United States, are engaged in an undeclared war with Russia—a conflict that has unfolded through covert operations, political subversion, and strategic alliances.

The title of Barnett’s piece, “We’re already at war with Russia… we just haven’t woken up to it yet,” captures the essence of this slow realisation.

The Shadow War

What Barnett and many other geopolitical commentators are referring to is often called “hybrid warfare,” a concept that Russia has mastered under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin.

Unlike conventional warfare, hybrid warfare blends military force with non-military tactics, including cyberattacks, economic warfare, and information manipulation. These methods allow Russia to exert influence and destabilise adversaries without officially declaring war.

One clear example of Russia’s hybrid warfare is its involvement in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

U.S. intelligence agencies have confirmed that Russian operatives were behind a sophisticated misinformation campaign aimed at manipulating public opinion and sowing division among Americans. Social media platforms were flooded with false information, polarising topics, and fake accounts, all designed to erode trust in the democratic process.

This tactic wasn’t new; it was an extension of Russia’s decades-long use of “active measures,” a Soviet-era strategy to influence the politics of rival nations without engaging in direct combat.

In Europe, similar tactics have been deployed. Russia has been accused of backing extremist political parties, stoking tensions in countries such as Hungary, France, and Germany. Its cyberattacks on critical infrastructure in Ukraine, as well as interference in elections across Europe, have furthered the notion that Russia is waging an unconventional war against the West.

Energy as a Weapon

Another front in this war is energy. Russia’s vast reserves of natural gas and oil give it enormous power over Europe, which relies heavily on these resources for heating and electricity.

The Nord Stream pipelines, which carry gas from Russia to Germany, have been at the centre of this geopolitical struggle. By controlling the flow of energy, Russia can manipulate the economies of European nations and punish those that oppose its political agenda.

In the winter of 2009, for example, Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine in the midst of a pricing dispute, leaving much of Eastern Europe in the cold.

It was a stark reminder of the Kremlin’s willingness to use energy as a geopolitical weapon. As tensions between Russia and the West continue to escalate, concerns about energy security have only grown.

The invasion of Ukraine in 2022 intensified these concerns, with Europe scrambling to reduce its dependency on Russian energy supplies in response to Moscow’s aggression.

The Importance of Cyberwarfare

Perhaps the most underappreciated aspect of Russia’s strategy is its use of cyberwarfare. As Barnett suggests, Russia is engaged in constant cyberattacks against Western nations, attacking financial institutions, government systems, and critical infrastructure.

In 2020, Russia was accused of orchestrating the SolarWinds hack, a massive cyber espionage campaign that targeted U.S. federal agencies and major corporations. The hack was one of the most significant cyberattacks in history, compromising sensitive data and raising alarms about the vulnerability of Western cyber defences.

Cyberattacks have the unique advantage of being difficult to attribute and often operate in the shadows, making retaliation more complex. By attacking through digital means, Russia can inflict significant damage on its adversaries without risking direct military confrontation. This form of warfare blurs the lines between peace and war, creating a murky battlefield where both sides are constantly on edge but reluctant to escalate to open conflict.

Western Naivety

A central theme of Barnett’s argument is the West’s failure to fully acknowledge the extent of this conflict. Western nations, particularly in Europe, have been slow to respond to Russia’s aggression, often underestimating the threat posed by hybrid warfare.

Part of this reluctance comes from a desire to maintain economic and political stability, especially in regions that are heavily dependent on Russian energy or have significant trade relationships with the Kremlin.

However, as Barnett points out, this complacency has only emboldened Russia. By not recognising the true nature of the conflict, the West has allowed Russia to operate in a grey zone, where it can continue its campaigns of disinformation, cyberattacks, and political manipulation without facing significant consequences.

The lack of a coordinated and robust response has left Western democracies vulnerable, allowing Russia to expand its influence and undermine the political and economic foundations of its rivals.

Waking Up to Reality

Neil Barnett’s assertion that we are already at war with Russia is a sobering wake-up call. This is not a war fought with traditional means, but it is no less dangerous. Russia’s strategy of hybrid warfare has allowed it to weaken its adversaries from within, attacking the very institutions that define Western democracies.

The West must recognise the reality of this conflict and respond accordingly, or risk being continually undermined by a rival that is playing by an entirely different set of rules.

The first step in combating this threat is acknowledging its existence. Only by understanding the nature of Russia’s tactics can the West hope to defend itself and preserve the values and institutions that have defined it for generations. The time to wake up is now.

Click here for more News & Current Affairs at EU Today

cyberattacksDaily Mailgeopolitical instabilityNeil BarnettPutin's WarRussia

eutoday.net · by gary cartwright · October 24, 2024

NEIL BARNETT: We're already at war with Russia

Daily Mail · by Neil Barnett For The Daily Mail · October 23, 2024

We're at war with Russia – we just haven't woken up to it yet.

Enraged by the West's support for Ukraine in its struggle against Moscow's invasion, the Kremlin has embarked on a campaign of sabotage and disruption against Kyiv's European allies. And that includes us.

Only last week it emerged that a fire at a Birmingham warehouse in July is believed to have been caused by an incendiary device planted by Russian spies.

This revelation came just days after the head of MI5, Ken McCullum, warned that Russia's intelligence agency has been on a mission to generate 'sustained mayhem on British and European streets'.

Delivering his annual update on security threats faced by the UK, Mr McCallum said GRU agents had carried out 'arson, sabotage and more dangerous actions conducted with increasing recklessness' in Britain.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin is using its extensive repertoire of dirty tricks to further its imperial ambitions in eastern Europe by interfering in this month's elections in Moldova and Georgia, and calling on its allies to help out in Ukraine.

You might think that our Government would respond to Putin's increasingly bellicose actions with some sabre-rattling of its own. Far from it.

The Kremlin is using its repertoire of dirty tricks to further its imperial ambitions in eastern Europe by interfering in elections. Pictured, Vladmir Putin and long-time ally Dmitry Medvedev

The UK is spending the same proportion of its national income on defence as it was in the early 1930s, while the Army is smaller than it has been at any time in the last 200 years.

With the Budget coming up on October 30, the Government should declare defence its number-one priority and drastically ramp up spending on security.

But we have not heard anything from the Chancellor Rachel Reeves to indicate that she will do such a thing.

While Russia wouldn't be foolish enough to mount a military assault on Britain, or so naive as to think a nuclear strike would lead to anything but mutual destruction, it is quite prepared to carry out undercover operations on British soil.

And we have never been more vulnerable.

At the turn of the millennium, MI5 spent 20 per cent of its budget tackling what is known as 'hostile state activity' by countries such as Russia.

By 2009 that number was a miserly 3 per cent, as resources were diverted to fighting the so-called 'war on terror' against the Islamist threat.

Today it is likely to have returned to 20 per cent or more but the Security Service is still desperately trying to make up for lost time.

So just what are the myriad ways Russia is waging its hybrid war on Britain and our European allies – and what does the Kremlin hope to gain from such a prolonged proxy campaign?

One of Russia's most effective and dangerous assets is their network of sleeper agents around the world. These are Russian intelligence operatives deeply embedded in foreign countries, living under false identities.

Without a doubt, there are Russian sleeper agents - known as 'illegals' within the intelligence network - working in the UK, possibly in universities, laboratories and Government institutions.

A 2018 study by security think-tank the Henry Jackson Society, entitled 'Putin Sees and Hears it All: How Russia's Intelligence Agencies Menace the UK', claimed that the Russian dictator had bolstered the number of Russian spies operating in the UK five-fold over the previous eight years.

Russian sleeper agent Mikhail Valeryevich Mikushin, who posed as Brazilian academic José Assis Giammaria at the University of Tromso in Norway

At the time, the report's author Dr Andrew Foxall said 'Russia has as many as 200 case officers in the UK, handling upwards of 500 agents'.

(It's worth pointing out that, as the headcount at the Russian Embassy has been greatly reduced since 2022, the number of intelligence officers will have fallen too.)

Exactly two years ago, in October 2022, there was a rare arrest of an illegal in Norway.

José Assis Giammaria, apparently a Brazilian academic at the University of Tromso, was unmasked as a Russian called Mikhail Valeryevich Mikushin.

One of the projects he was working on involved collaborating with the Norwegian government on security threats in 'Arctic Norway', primarily from Russia.

Illegals are typically engaged in espionage but some are also trained for sabotage and assassination.

As we saw with the murder of British citizen Alexander Litvinenko in 2006 and the more recent Salisbury poisonings in 2018, Russia is not afraid to commit murder on British territory.

And there have been attempts in Europe, too. In July it was reported that US intelligence had foiled a Russian plot to assassinate Armin Papperger, the chief executive of the German arms maker Rheinmetall, who was producing artillery shells and military vehicles for Ukraine.

A number of the most serious crimes perpetrated on foreign soil have been carried out by Russia's infamous GRU Unit 29155. It is believed to have been responsible for the poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury, an attempted coup in Montenegro in 2016, cyber attacks against British institutions and a major explosion at a Czech munitions depot in 2014.

Russia's infamous GRU Unit 29155 is believed to have been responsible for the 2018 poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia, both pictured, in Salisbury

The poising of UK citizen Alexander Litvinenko, pictured shortly before his death in 2006, shows Russia is not afraid to commit murder on British territory

However, due to the advent of biometric passports, it is increasingly difficult to move fresh Russian operatives into the UK, which is why Russia has a new trick: hiring mercenaries from third countries to operate on their behalf. Six Bulgarian nationals - who as EU citizens have the right to free movement within the bloc - are currently awaiting trial in the UK accused of spying for Russia, for example.

One of the GRU's targets is believed to have been a warehouse in east London belonging to a company linked to Ukraine which caught fire in March as a result of a suspected arson attack. Seven men have been charged in connection with the incident.

But perhaps the greatest potential threat posed by Russia's shadow war is an attack on Europe's undersea cables.

These fibre-optic cables are responsible for transmitting the vast majority of modern-day digital communications, as well as an estimated $10trillion (£7.7trillion) in daily financial transactions.

In 2023 Putin's long-term ally, former Russian president and prime minister Dmitry Medvedev, announced that there was no longer anything 'to prevent us from destroying the ocean floor cable communications of our enemies'.

So great is the perceived threat to this undersea network that earlier this year six countries - including the UK and Germany - signed an agreement on further cooperation to protect infrastructure under the North Sea.

But not all of Moscow's targets are physical. Democracy, tolerance and the rule of law pose a far greater threat to Putin's dictatorship than guns or missiles.

Ahead of Sunday's presidential election in Europe's poorest country, Moldova, there were reports it was being plagued by Russian sabotage.

Sure enough, its pro-Western incumbent Maia Sandu blamed an 'unprecedented assault on our country's freedom and democracy' by 'foreign forces' as the results came in.

In July it was reported that the US had foiled a Russian plot to assassinate Armin Papperger, boss of the German arms maker Rheinmetall, who was producing artillery shells for Ukraine

She failed to win an outright majority and now faces a run-off vote for the presidency on November 3, while a pivotal referendum on EU membership held the same day resulted in a victory by the slimmest of margins.

It is alleged that Russia spent hundreds of millions of dollars buying votes in Moldova, while also supporting the campaigns of pro-Kremlin candidates and even producing AI-generated deepfake videos that slandered their opponents.

Read More

Kremlin tries to discredit Moldova's referendum to join EU amid pro-West result

The fear now is that Moldova was a testing ground for Russian tactics and similar attempts will be made to sabotage other elections across the continent, including Saturday's poll in Georgia.

But no country is under greater threat than Ukraine. Russia's allies are becoming increasingly involved in the conflict, either by supplying munitions or cannon fodder.

The Kremlin is already understood to have deployed Chinese and Iranian drones in its offensive and, earlier this month, Ukraine's president Volodomyr Zelensky claimed that North Korea is preparing to send 10,000 troops to fight alongside Russians on the frontline.

Perhaps the biggest question now is: Why? From the annexation of Crimea to the invasion of Ukraine and now a hybrid war against the whole of Europe – what does the Kremlin really hope to achieve?

Russia talks about its fear of being encircled by Nato. But I don't believe this is their true concern. Moscow is more worried about the Russian masses being led astray by Western liberal ideas.

And every act of sabotage on British soil must be viewed as an attempt to divide and disorientate the British public and the institutions we believe in. Putin must never be allowed to succeed.

• Neil Barnett is the co-author of Russia's Hybrid War Against the UK: Time to Fight Back Against the Kremlin, published by the Henry Jackson Society

Daily Mail · by Neil Barnett For The Daily Mail · October 23, 2024

8. Trilateral Korea-Japan-U.S. Cooperation: Dealing with #NorthKorea-#China Challenges,' edited by @RalphCossa , President Emeritus #PacificForum.

Read the full e-book at this link: https://t.co/CV6YyZKigG

Pacific Forum

@PacificForum

·

13m

1/Strengthening Ties for a Safer Future!

Proud to share 'Trilateral Korea-Japan-U.S. Cooperation: Dealing with #NorthKorea-#China Challenges,' edited by @RalphCossa

, President Emeritus #PacificForum.

Featuring insights from top experts, this book delves into regional security.

2/ Read the full e-book: https://online.flipbuilder.com/KCPAC-OKN/pebo/

Hanbyeol Sohn

@NewshamGrant

@NaruMichishita

@DavidMaxwell161

Shin-Wha Lee

Morse Tan

Fumiaki Yamada

@GregScarlatoiu

Han Kwon Kim

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Nobumasa Akiyama

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#TrilateralCooperation #KoreaJapanUS #Geopolitics

10:20 PM · Oct 24, 2024

9. Biden-Harris Admin Promotes Pentagon Employee Tied to Iranian Influence Network

Interesting. I actually think what she may be "guilty" of is being part of the political faction that is led by Jake Sullivan and include Colin Kahl and Robert Malley and a number of others in the national security community (mostly academics) who believe that we should engage Iran to try to change it and its relationship with the US.

Biden-Harris Admin Promotes Pentagon Employee Tied to Iranian Influence Network

Ariane Tabatabai, outed as a member of the Iran Experts Initiative, will now lead DoD's 'force and education training'

https://freebeacon.com/biden-harris-administration/biden-harris-admin-promotes-pentagon-employee-tied-to-iranian-influence-network/

Adam Kredo

October 24, 2024

The Biden-Harris administration has promoted the senior Pentagon employee who was outed as a member of an Iranian government-run influence operation, Politico reported.

Ariane Tabatabai is now a deputy assistant secretary of defense within Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin's office, where she will lead its force education and training division. Tabatabai, according to Politico, was offered the promotion last month. She previously served as chief of staff for the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict.

Tabatabai became a public commodity after a 2023 Semafor report outed her as a member of an Iranian government propaganda group known as the Iran Experts Initiative. The affiliation saw Tabatabai report back to Iran’s foreign ministry and communicate with senior officials in the hardline regime.

Tabatabai's promotion comes at a curious time for the Biden-Harris administration. Over the weekend, classified U.S. intelligence on Israel's military preparations for a strike on Iran leaked in a "deadly serious breach," which the administration is investigating. While the leaker has not been publicly identified, the situation has raised concerns about a host of Biden-Harris administration officials, including Tabatabai, who want to increase diplomacy with Iran at the cost of the historically close U.S. alliance with Israel.

News of Tabatabai's affiliation with the Iran Experts Initiative sparked multiple congressional investigations, with Republicans raising concerns about Tabatabai’s ability to obtain a top-secret security clearance. The Pentagon and State Department, where Tabatabai formerly worked, have vocally defended her, saying there was nothing in her background that would have disqualified her from accessing classified information.

"Dr. Tabatabai was thoroughly and properly vetted as a condition of her employment with the Department of Defense," a Pentagon spokesman told the Washington Free Beacon in September 2023, after lawmakers raised concerns about her connections to Iran. "We are honored to have her serve." One month later, the Pentagon confirmed to lawmakers that Tabatabai would keep her security clearance.

Tabatabai and two others affiliated with the pro-Tehran group served as aides to former Biden-Harris administration Iran envoy Robert Malley, who was suspended from his post amid an ongoing FBI investigation into his alleged mishandling of classified information.

An inspector general report released last month skewered the State Department for its handling of the suspension. The agency, according to the report, allowed Malley to continue accessing classified information and sensitive data after he was disciplined.

"The Department deviated from the way that suspensions are typically delivered by delaying notification to Mr. Malley until senior Department officials were apprised of his suspension," the report stated. "The delay allowed him the opportunity to participate in a classified conference call after the suspension was approved, but before he was notified."

10. Israel’s Endgame in Gaza: Finish Off Hamas Where the War Started

Israel’s Endgame in Gaza: Finish Off Hamas Where the War Started

Israel’s military remains engaged in a ferocious campaign in the Palestinian enclave while it fights its other war in Lebanon

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israels-endgame-in-gaza-finish-off-hamas-where-the-war-started-5e37807c?mod=latest_headlines

By Omar Abdel-Baqui

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, Saleh al-Batati and Suha Ma’ayeh

Updated Oct. 25, 2024 12:07 am ET

A year into the war in Gaza, Israel is back at the site of its first battles and engaged in one of the most ferocious campaigns of the conflict, a do-over that offers a cautionary tale for its other war in Lebanon.

Homed in on northern Gaza, Israel has issued evacuation orders for every town north of Gaza City and dispatched two new brigades, in what the military says is its latest attempt to eradicate Hamas from the enclave. It is the third major offensive in the area since the start of the war.

“Jabalia is falling,” Israel’s Chief of the General Staff Herzi Halevi told troops on a visit this week to the northern area that was the initial focus of Israel’s invasion of the enclave. 

After killing Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar last week, Israeli troops now needed to take out Hamas’s last remaining brigade in the north, Halevi said. 

The air-and-ground offensive, which began at the start of the month, has been among the worst few weeks of the war, people living in the north say.

Amneh Tarboush, a 20-year-old mother of two, says her family is trapped in Jabalia, a northern town with a labyrinthine refugee camp, running between damaged houses as fighting boxes them in.

People injured during an Israeli operation in the Jabalia refugee camp waited for treatment at a Gaza City hospital on Monday.

OMAR AL-QATTAA/AFP/ GETTY IMAGES

“They are bombing us from the air and snipers shoot at anyone who steps outside,” Tarboush said of the Israeli military. “We are living in constant fear.”

Israel says it provides civilians with evacuation routes and doesn’t target them. 

The fact that Israeli troops are still embroiled in areas of Gaza where they have fought before demonstrates how stubborn a task dismantling Hamas is proving to be for Israel. The experience against the Palestinian militants also offers sobering lessons for Israel’s military as it expands its war in Lebanon against Hezbollah, the larger and more formidable of the two U.S.-designated terrorist groups. 

On Thursday, Israel said the campaign in the northern Gaza Strip had led to the arrest of more than 200 militants. Earlier in the week, it also cost the life of Israeli Col. Ahsan Daksa, who oversaw the operation that led to Sinwar’s killing. 

Satellite images of Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on Aug. 23, left, and on Oct. 23.

Maxar Technologies

Accounts from residents, health responders and aid groups in the north paint a grisly scene as Israel pursues the operation: Bodies on the street for days and the cries of trapped people emanating from rubble, paramedics unable to reach them because of the risks involved. Footage from Jabalia—verified by Storyful, which is owned by The Wall Street Journal’s parent company News Corp—shows Palestinians carrying limp bodies, some with missing limbs, and covering corpses on the street with blankets. 

More than 550 people have died in the operation, according to Gaza health authorities whose figures don’t say how many were combatants. Aid has slowed to a trickle. 

Conditions for aid workers and first responders have become untenable, they say. North Gaza’s civil-defense team ceased operations this week after saying that it was targeted by Israel and that several of its members were detained. Israel’s military didn’t respond to requests for comment.

The entirety of the strip north of Gaza City is currently under evacuation order as Israel carries out its offensive there.

Western Erez

Closed Oct. 2-13

Re-opened Oct. 14

Erez crossing

Closed Sept. 30

Monthly number of aid trucks entering Gaza, by crossing

2 miles

Erez

Kerem Shalom

2 km

Beit

Hanoun

Western Erez

Rafah

Beit Lahia

Gate 96

JLOTS

Kamal Adwan

Al-Awda

6,000

Jabalia

5,000

Gaza

City

Partially functioning

hospitals

Mediterranean Sea

Access prohibited

4,000

Military zone

3,000

GAZA STRIP

ISRAEL

2,000

Netzarim

corridor

1,000

Gate 96

Re-opened Oct. 8

0

Oct. 2023

’24

Oct.

Note: Hospitals as of Oct 21. Satellite image from Sept. 20.

Sources: World Health Organization (hospitals); U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (military zone); Planet Images (satellite image); Unwra (aid trucks)

Emma Brown/WSJ

In Beit Lahia, one of the towns in Gaza’s north, an Israeli air raid killed at least 80 people on Sunday, according to health authorities, who still haven’t been able to count how many are trapped under the rubble.

Israel disputed the death toll, without providing its own estimate or the nature of the intended target. “We emphasize that the area in question is an active war zone,” the Israeli military said. 

As the campaign in the north has taken shape, U.S. and Israeli officials have been pressed about reports in the Israeli and international news media of a plan calling for forced civilian displacement in northern Gaza. A population transfer would allow the Israeli military to regard those remaining as combatants and to impose a complete siege to flush out Hamas, according to the reported proposal. Brig. Gen. Elad Goren, who heads the Israeli Defense Ministry’s aid coordination in Gaza, said the plan wasn’t Israeli policy.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the U.S. rejected “any effort to create a siege, to starve people [or] hive off northern Gaza from the rest of Gaza.”

The World Health Organization this week suspended its polio vaccination campaign in the north because of the danger in the region, and the United Nations said its teams couldn’t find food, water or medicine there.

Israeli soldiers face Jordanian aid trucks arriving at a Gaza border crossing on Monday. After two weeks of no aid entering the Gaza Strip, the Israeli military authorized a restart. Photo: Abir Sultan/Shutterstock

Israel barred aid trucks from entering the north at the start of October to make way for the two advancing Israeli brigades. Those troops are now operating in Beit Lahia, Beit Hanoun and Jabalia, where Israel says Hamas militants have resurfaced.

After two weeks of zero aid entering the Gaza Strip through northern crossings, the Israeli military body in charge of aid delivery, known as Cogat, authorized a restart under pressure from the U.S., Israeli officials said.

Cogat’s Goren said on Wednesday that no people were left in Beit Lahia or Beit Hanoun. He didn’t elaborate. Cogat didn’t respond to requests for comment. 

As of Wednesday, a senior U.N. official said the organization estimated there were 35,000 people still in Beit Lahia and 5,000 in Beit Hanoun. 

Before the war, the two towns collectively housed more than 160,000 people, who mainly farmed the surrounding borderlands or commuted to work in Gaza City. 

The U.N. official said roughly 50,000 people remain in and around Jabalia. Goren said there was enough food in Jabalia for those there, after 90% of the population evacuated. 

Palestinians making their way past the rubble of houses destroyed in Israel’s military offensive against Hamas in the northern Gaza Strip last month. Photo: Mahmoud Issa/Reuters

Mahmoud Madhoun, a resident in Beit Lahia this week, said Sunday’s strikes left people including women and children to bleed out on the streets because communication blackouts meant first responders couldn’t coordinate to reach them. “People were in pieces,” Madhoun said. “I saw people with their heads split open, and severed limbs.”

The Israeli military said it targeted precisely and did everything it could to limit civilian harm. 

Israel’s ground invasion, which began in northern Gaza about a year ago, was triggered by the Hamas-led attacks in southern Israel on Oct. 7 last year, which authorities there say killed 1,200 people and left 250 held hostage. Some 42,000 people have died in the war in Gaza since then, according to health authorities in the enclave. 

Israeli forces conducted major offensives against Hamas in Jabalia last winter and again in May. Their third attempt to stamp out the militants demonstrates Hamas’s ability to resurrect itself despite being outgunned and taking heavy casualties.

Three of the five hospitals in the district north of Gaza City have closed, according to the WHO, with the others only partially functional. “We have lost some people due to the lack of resources,” said Hussam Abu Safiya, director at Kamal Adwan Hospital in Beit Lahia, which is under an evacuation order.

One severely injured girl was rushed there this week after being pulled from the rubble, said Karim Alhassani, a civil-defense first responder. “In front of my eyes, a doctor simply said, ‘Let her die, this case is hopeless,’ ” Alhassani recalls. “She died 15 minutes later.” 

Alexander Ward contributed to this article.

Write to Omar Abdel-Baqui at omar.abdel-baqui@wsj.com

11. 7 Israelis charged with spying for Iran allegedly carried out 600 missions collecting intel on bases, sensitive sites, individuals

Wow.

1hr ago

7 Israelis charged with spying for Iran allegedly carried out 600 missions collecting intel on bases, sensitive sites, individuals

https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-october-25-2024/

A crater is seen near a taxiway at the Nevatim Airbase, following an Iranian ballistic missile strike, April 14, 2024. (Israel Defense Forces)

Seven Jewish Israeli citizens are charged after they were arrested last month on suspicion of spying for Iran for as long as two years, carrying out some 600 at the behest of the Islamic Republic.

The seven are accused of the security offenses of aiding the enemy during wartime, and providing information to the enemy.

The suspects, all residents of Haifa and the north, include a soldier who deserted the military, as well as two unnamed minors aged 16-17.

Prosecutors say Azis Nisanov was recruited by Iran as the head of the spy ring, with his deputy Alexander Sadykov managing the other agents.

The third defendant is an unnamed minor who was the main agent for tasks involving photography and sending images to the Iranian contacts, and the fourth was a second minor who was engaged in photography tasks, sending content, and receiving money from an Iranian agent.

Vyacheslav Gushchin, Yevgeny Yoffe and Yigal Nissan are named by prosecutors as the final three defendants.

If caught, Nisanov had created a cover story in which the spies were tour guides, prosecutors said.

Prosecutors say the suspects collected information on sensitive sites in Israel, military bases and human targets.

The defendants carried out hundreds of missions to photograph air bases at Nevatim, Ramat David, Tel Nof and Palmachim, as well as bases in Beer Tuvia, Kiryat Gat, Emek Hefer and the Glilot complex north of Tel Aviv.

In addition, the defendants photographed the Iron Dome missile defense systems in the Haifa area, government buildings in Haifa, the ports of Haifa, Ashdod and Eilat, the Hadera power plant, and the IDF observation balloon in the Golani Junction area.

The Iranian operators also sent one of the suspects information on military bases and strategic sites, for the purpose of carrying out future photography missions, including the dining hall of the Golani training base targeted in a drone attack earlier this month, and a site belonging to the Rafael defense firm.

Prosecutors say the suspects were also sent to photograph the Nevatim air base on April 14, the day after Iran’s ballistic missile and drone attack.

Additionally, Nisanov was asked to find details on the car, relatives and schedule of an expert in gas engineering at the University of Haifa who had lectured on Iran.

The suspects received payment and reimbursement of expenses that ranged from $500 to $1,200 per task.

The total payment received by the spy ring was $300,000, divided between the members.

12. Elon Musk’s Secret Conversations With Vladimir Putin

This guy is a piece of work. It is interesting to see the Wall Street Journal exposing this.

Elon Musk’s Secret Conversations With Vladimir Putin

Regular contacts between world’s richest man and America’s chief antagonist raise security concerns; topics include geopolitics, business and personal matters

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/musk-putin-secret-conversations-37e1c187?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

By Thomas Grove

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, Warren P. Strobel

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, Aruna Viswanatha

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, Gordon Lubold

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 and Sam Schechner

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Oct. 24, 2024 9:00 pm ET

Elon Musk, the world’s richest man and a linchpin of U.S. space efforts, has been in regular contact with Russian President Vladimir Putin since late 2022.

The discussions, confirmed by several current and former U.S., European and Russian officials, touch on personal topics, business and geopolitical tensions.

At one point, Putin asked the billionaire to avoid activating his Starlink satellite internet service over Taiwan as a favor to Chinese leader Xi Jinping, said two people briefed on the request.

Musk has emerged this year as a crucial supporter of Donald Trump’s election campaign, and could find a role in a Trump administration should he win. While the U.S. and its allies have isolated Putin in recent years, Musk’s dialogue could signal re-engagement with the Russian leader, and reinforce Trump’s expressed desire to cut a deal over major fault lines such as the war in Ukraine. 

At the same time, the contacts also raise potential national-security concerns among some in the current administration, given Putin’s role as one of America’s chief adversaries. 

Musk has forged deep business ties with U.S. military and intelligence agencies, giving him unique visibility into some of America’s most sensitive space programs. SpaceX, which operates the Starlink service, won a $1.8 billion classified contract in 2021 and is the primary rocket launcher for the Pentagon and NASA. Musk has a security clearance that allows him access to certain classified information.

Elon Musk visits Capitol Hill in July. Photo: Samuel Corum/Bloomberg News

Knowledge of Musk’s Kremlin contacts appears to be a closely held secret in government. Several White House officials said they weren’t aware of them. The topic is highly sensitive, given Musk’s increasing involvement in the Trump campaign and the approaching U.S. presidential election, less than two weeks away. 

Musk didn’t respond to requests for comment. The billionaire has called criticism from some quarters that he has become an apologist for Putin “absurd” and has said his companies “have done more to undermine Russia than anything.”

During his campaign swing through Pennsylvania last week, Musk talked about the importance of government transparency and noted his own access to government secrets. “I do have a top-secret clearance, but, I’d have to say, like most of the stuff that I’m aware of…the reason they keep it top secret is because it’s so boring.”

A Pentagon spokesman said: “We do not comment on any individual’s security clearance, review or status, or about personnel security policy matters in the context of reports about any individual’s actions.”

One person aware of the conversations said the government faces a dilemma because it is so dependent on the billionaire’s technologies. SpaceX launches vital national security satellites into orbit and is the company NASA relies on to transport astronauts to and from the International Space Station. 

“They don’t love it,” the person said, referring to the Musk-Putin contacts. The person, however, said no alerts have been raised by the administration over possible security breaches by Musk.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the only communication the Kremlin has had with Musk was over one telephone call in which he and Putin discussed “space as well as current and future technologies.” 

Apart from that, he said neither Putin nor Kremlin officials were holding regular conversations with Musk.

A spokeswoman for Trump’s campaign called Musk “a once-in-a-generation industry leader” and said “our broken federal bureaucracy could certainly benefit from his ideas and efficiency.”

“As for Putin,” the spokeswoman continued, “there’s only one candidate in the race that he did not invade another country under, and it’s President Trump. President Trump has long said that he will re-establish his peace through strength foreign policy to deter Russia’s aggression and end the war in Ukraine.”

A SpaceX Falcon Heavy rocket with the Europa Clipper spacecraft aboard launches from NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral earlier this month. Photo: chandan khanna/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

A bottle of vodka

Musk has long had a fascination with Russia and its space and rocket programs. Walter Isaacson’s biography of Musk said the businessman traveled to Moscow in 2002 to negotiate the purchase of rockets for his fledgling space program, but passed out during a vodka-heavy lunch. The sale ultimately failed, though his Russian hosts gave Musk a bottle of vodka with his likeness superimposed on a drawing of Mars.

The billionaire’s conversations with Putin and Kremlin officials highlight his increasing inclination to stretch beyond business and into geopolitics. He has met several times and talked business with Javier Milei of Argentina, as well as former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, whom he defended in an acrimonious online debate. 

Putin is on a different order of magnitude. The Russian leader has created an authoritarian system that oversees fraudulent elections and the assassinations of political opponents, for which President Biden called him a “killer.” With keys to one of the world’s most powerful nuclear arsenals and growing territorial ambitions in Europe, Putin has become the U.S.’s chief antagonist.

Labeling him a “despot,” the Treasury Department took the unusual step in 2022 of blacklisting him for invading Ukraine, putting him in the same company with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus. 

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with U.S. President Donald Trump during a meeting on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan, in 2019. Photo: sputnik/Reuters

In October 2022, Musk said publicly that he had spoken only once to Putin. He said on X that the conversation was about space, and that it occurred around April 2021. 

But more conversations have followed, including dialogues with other high-ranking Russian officials past 2022 and into this year. One of the officials was Sergei Kiriyenko, Putin’s first deputy chief of staff, two of the officials said. What the two talked about isn’t clear.

Last month, the U.S. Justice Department said in an affidavit that Kiriyenko had created some 30 internet domains to spread Russian disinformation, including on Musk’s X, where it was meant to erode support for Ukraine and manipulate American voters ahead of the presidential election. 

After the Russian invasion in February 2022, Musk at first made strong public statements of support for Kyiv. He posted “Hold Strong Ukraine,” flanked by Ukrainian flags on what was then still known as Twitter. Shortly after, he jokingly challenged Putin to one-on-one combat over “Україна,” the Ukrainian language name for the country.

He followed up by donating several hundred Starlink terminals to Ukraine. By July some 15,000 terminals were providing free internet access to broad swaths of the country destroyed by the Russian attacks.

Later that year, Musk’s view of the conflict appeared to change. In September, Ukrainian military operatives weren’t able to use Starlink terminals to guide sea drones to attack a Russian naval base in Crimea, the Black Sea peninsula Moscow had occupied since 2014. Ukraine tried to persuade Musk to activate the Starlink service in the area, but that didn’t happen, the Journal has reported.

His space company extended restrictions on the use of Starlink in offensive operations by Ukraine. Musk said later that he made the move because Starlink is meant for civilian uses and that he believed any Ukrainian attack on Crimea could spark a nuclear war.

A Starlink unit on the front lines in Ukraine in 2023. Photo: Reuters

His moves coincided with public and private pressure from the Kremlin. In May 2022, Russia’s space chief said in a post on Telegram that Musk would “answer like an adult” for supplying Starlink to Ukraine’s Azov battalion, which the Kremlin had singled out for the ultraright ideology espoused by some members.

Later in 2022, Musk was having regular conversations with “high-level Russians,” according to a person familiar with the interactions. At the time, there was pressure from the Kremlin on Musk’s businesses and “implicit threats against him,” the person said. 

At the same time, Musk increasingly took to Twitter, for which he was completing the purchase, to say SpaceX was losing money by funding the operation of the terminals.  

In October 2022, he asked his tens of millions of followers on X to vote on a pathway to peace that mirrored some aspects of the Kremlin’s offer to Ukraine at the time.

Those conditions included continued Russian occupation of Crimea and Ukrainian neutrality outside of NATO. He also specified that Ukraine should continue allowing the supply of water to Crimea, an issue that had been an important concern of the Kremlin before the war.

One current and one former intelligence source said that Musk and Putin have continued to have contact since then and into this year as Musk began stepping up his criticism of the U.S. military aid to Ukraine and became involved in Trump’s election campaign.

Musk and Trump attend a campaign event in Butler, Pa., this month. Photo: Alex Brandon/Associated Press

‘Red lines’

In the fall of 2022, political scientist Ian Bremmer, founder of New York-based consulting firm Eurasia Group, wrote on Twitter that Musk had told him he had spoken with Putin and Kremlin officials about Ukraine. “He also told me what the Kremlin’s red lines were,” he wrote.

Bremmer wrote in a newsletter to subscribers that Musk had relayed to him a message from Putin that Russia would secure Crimea and Ukrainian neutrality “no matter what,” and that it would respond to a Ukrainian invasion of Crimea with a nuclear strike. Musk said that “everything needed to be done to avoid that outcome,” Bremmer wrote.

Musk has publicly denied he said any of those things to Bremmer.

In the past year, Musk and Russia’s interests have increasingly overlapped. Apart from Russia’s use of X for disinformation and Musk’s outspoken opposition to aid to Kyiv, Ukrainian officials said earlier this year that Russian forces occupying the country’s eastern and southern swaths had started using Starlink to enable secure communications and extend the range of their drones. 

Russian troops also began using Starlink terminals, brought in through third countries, at a massive scale, undermining one of Ukraine’s few battlefield advantages. Musk has said on X that to the best of his knowledge, no terminals had been sold directly or indirectly to Russia, and that the terminals wouldn’t work inside Russia. 

Pentagon officials have said the military was working with Ukraine and Starlink to address the issue, and described SpaceX as a great partner in those efforts. People familiar with the situation have said controlling who is using Starlink in Ukraine is difficult. 

Starlink has said on X that when SpaceX learns of claims that unauthorized parties are using the service, it investigates and can cut off access.

Earlier this year, Musk gave airtime to Putin and his views on the U.S. and Ukraine when X carried Tucker Carlson’s two-hour interview with the Russian leader inside the Kremlin. In that interview, Putin said he was sure Musk “was a smart person.”

Musk speaks at a town hall in Pittsburgh. Photo: Michael Swensen/Getty Images

“There’s no stopping Elon Musk, he’s going to do what he thinks he needs to do,” Putin said. “You need to find some common ground with him, you need to search for some ways to persuade him.”

Late last year, the Kremlin first made the request of Musk to not activate Starlink over Taiwan, said a former Russian intelligence officer briefed on the situation. The request was done as a favor to China, he said, whom Russia was increasingly relying on for trade and to get around sanctions. A representative of the Chinese embassy in Washington said they weren’t aware of the specifics and couldn’t comment. 

Starlink has never secured permission to offer internet service in Taiwan, whose government places restrictions on non-Taiwanese satellite operators. 

Taiwan is currently listed as “coming soon” on a Starlink map of where it provides service. 

As the year progressed, Musk became more preoccupied with the presidential election.

Through the first months of the year, Musk said he would refrain from backing any presidential candidate while at the same time holding private conversations discussing how he could get Trump elected. Musk publicly endorsed him in July. The businessman said he planned to commit as much as $45 million a month to a new super political-action committee in part to get it done, according to people familiar with the matter. The effort included hiring armies of canvassers to scour battleground states for voters.

Since then, Trump has said he intends to make Musk the head of a “government efficiency commission.” The two speak often.

Micah Maidenberg and Tim Higgins contributed to this article.

Write to Thomas Grove at thomas.grove@wsj.com, Warren P. Strobel at Warren.Strobel@wsj.com, Aruna Viswanatha at aruna.viswanatha@wsj.com, Gordon Lubold at gordon.lubold@wsj.com and Sam Schechner at Sam.Schechner@wsj.com

13. Soldiers in Army basic training now knocking down drones

It strikes me that if our soldiers are learning how to fight the drone fight in basic training and as part of the fundamental skills a soldier must have, that we have recognized that the character of war has significantly changed. 

Will "knocking down drones" be as important as individual marksmanship for the soldier? I tend to think so.

Excerpts:

The live counter-drone scenarios inside of a larger field exercise give soldiers a more realistic experience beyond a classroom, simulator or range.

“Introducing counter-UAS and drone operations at the basic training level gives our Soldiers a taste of what they will face in the future,” said 1st Sgt. Daniel Campbell, with 434th Field Artillery. “Even for cadre members, gaining this experience makes us more effective when we return to our units.”

The Army announced in late 2023 that it would add such skills at entry-level training, Army Times reported.

“It’s going to become a basic soldier requirement to identify, report and in some cases react to the threat,” Sgt. Maj. Demetrius Johnson, senior enlisted advisor for the joint counter-small unmanned aerial systems office said in 2023. “It’s MOS [military occupational speciality] agnostic; it’s not specific to an air defender to be able to employ these handheld systems.”

Soldiers in Army basic training now knocking down drones

militarytimes.com · by Todd South · October 24, 2024

Brand-new recruits are now training how to counter enemy drones as they learn how to march and fire their rifles.

New soldiers at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, are conducting counter-drone drills during “The Forge,” the capstone field exercise in basic training, according to an Army release.

The post houses the service’s Fires Center of Excellence, Air Defense Artillery School and the Joint Counter small-Unmanned Aerial Systems University.

The move mirrors wide-ranging efforts in all the military services to beat back the aerial threat by adding counter-drone training, manning and equipment to troops’ arsenal.

RELATED

From CamoGPT to life skills, the Army is changing how it trains troops

Gen. Gary Brito, head of Army Training and Doctrine Command, discusses what training updates mean for new and career soldiers.

The Forge, which has been part of Army basic training for several years, puts new soldiers through a three-day field training exercise that concludes with a 10-mile ruck march.

“What’s different this year is the inclusion of live [drone] assets, something these trainees will encounter in future conflicts,” said Capt. Malachi Leece, commander of Alpha Battery, 1st Battalion, 40th Field Artillery. “It improves their reaction time, and that could save lives in a real combat scenario.”

The live counter-drone scenarios inside of a larger field exercise give soldiers a more realistic experience beyond a classroom, simulator or range.

“Introducing counter-UAS and drone operations at the basic training level gives our Soldiers a taste of what they will face in the future,” said 1st Sgt. Daniel Campbell, with 434th Field Artillery. “Even for cadre members, gaining this experience makes us more effective when we return to our units.”

The Army announced in late 2023 that it would add such skills at entry-level training, Army Times reported.

“It’s going to become a basic soldier requirement to identify, report and in some cases react to the threat,” Sgt. Maj. Demetrius Johnson, senior enlisted advisor for the joint counter-small unmanned aerial systems office said in 2023. “It’s MOS [military occupational speciality] agnostic; it’s not specific to an air defender to be able to employ these handheld systems.”

To that end, Gen. Gary Brito, head of Training and Doctrine Command told Army Times recently that the service has revised training publications to include the offensive use of small drones and counter-drone practices into courses at the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Moore, Georgia, which trains infantry and armor soldiers.

Maj. Gen. Scott Naumann, commander of 10th Mountain Division, highlighted the measures his soldiers are taking to bring down drones and how it must be a routine part of soldiering.

“Training [counter-drone] should be as routine as drawing our rifles, going to the range and honing our marksmanship skills,” Naumann said at the Maneuver Warfighter Conference at Fort Moore in September.

The division’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team experienced 170 one-way drone attacks during a nine-month deployment to U.S. Central Command that concluded in April, according to Naumann.

Some of the division’s soldiers had a little help with their counter-drone preparation. Two officers, 1st Lt. Samuel Strobel and 1st Lt. Mitchell Crowley, developed software called the Randomized Enemy Action Contact Trainer, or REACT, system, following their own CENTCOM deployment in 2022.

The REACT system “generates essentially combat information about an incoming drone or rocket attack that helps simulate battle drills for an operations center,” according to an Army release.

Users can adjust the application to change the type or frequency of attacks.

About Todd South

Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.

14. India, China begin implementing new border pact, ending Himalayan face-off

A strategic game changer for the relationship?

India, China begin implementing new border pact, ending Himalayan face-off

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/india-china-start-pulling-back-troops-border-face-off-points-source-says-2024-10-25/?utm

By Krishn Kaushik and Mei Mei Chu

October 25, 20246:35 AM EDTUpdated 13 min ago

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend a meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia October 23, 2024. India's Press Information Bureau/Handout via REUTERS Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

NEW DELHI/BEIJING Oct 25 (Reuters) - India and China have begun implementing an agreement to end a military standoff on their disputed Himalayan border, the two sides said on Friday, in the biggest thaw between the Asian giants since deadly clashes between their armies four years ago.

Troops who were eyeball-to-eyeball at two points on the frontier in the western Himalayas had begun pulling back, an Indian government source said, heralding an end to a the standoff​.

The nuclear-armed neighbours struck a deal earlier this week on patrolling the frontier, which then paved the way for the first formal talks in five years between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of a regional summit in Russia.

"According to the recently agreed solution between India and China ... their frontline armies are implementing relevant work, with smooth progress so far," Lin Jian, a spokesperson for China's foreign ministry, said on Friday.

In New Delhi, a government official aware of the details said troops on both sides had started withdrawing from the areas of Depsang and Demchok, the last remaining points where they had stood face-to-face.

The source spoke on condition of anonymity as he was not authorised to speak to the media on the issue.

India's foreign ministry did not immediately respond to a Reuters request for comment.

Neither side has provided details of the new pact, which is expected to help improve political and business ties damaged by a deadly military clash in 2020, when 20 Indian and four Chinese troops died in clashes in the Galwan Valley.

The two sides had earlier pulled back troops from five other face-off points, but the last withdrawal of troops took place over two years ago.

CAUTIOUS BUSINESS EASING

On Wednesday, Xi and Modi agreed to boost communication and co-operation in a bid to help resolve conflict.

But officials in India said that New Delhi would still be cautious and is ready to only take baby steps towards building economic ties with Beijing, given the trust deficit of the last four years.

India had blocked direct flights with China, banned hundreds of Chinese mobile applications, and added layers of vetting on Chinese investments, virtually blocking all major proposals from the likes of BYD and Great Wall Motors.

Two Indian government sources said that India would now consider opening up the skies and fast tracking visa approvals to complement the recent easing of tensions, but New Delhi is not yet ready to reverse all the steps it took against Beijing any time soon.

The Asian giants went to war in 1962 over their undemarcated border, which has been a constant irritant in ties.

Get the latest news and expert analysis about the state of the global economy with the Reuters Econ World newsletter. Sign up here.

Reporting by Krishn Kaushik; Additional reporting by Mei Mei Chu in Beijing, Aftab Ahmed in New Delhi; Writing by Tanvi Mehta; Editing by Muralikumar Anantharaman and Clarence Fernandez

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Krishn Kaushik

Thomson Reuters

Krishn reports on politics and strategic affairs from the Indian subcontinent. He has previously worked at the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, an international investigative consortium; The Indian Express; and The Caravan magazine, writing about defence, politics, law, conglomerates, media, elections and investigative projects. A graduate of Columbia University's journalism school, Krishn has won multiple awards for his work.

​15. L3Harris and Palantir Announce Strategic Partnership

L3Harris and Palantir Announce Strategic Partnership

finance.yahoo.com · by Business Wire Wed, Oct 23, 2024, 1:01 PM 4 min read

MELBOURNE, Fla., October 23, 2024--(BUSINESS WIRE)--L3Harris Technologies (NYSE: LHX) and Palantir Technologies Inc. (NYSE: PLTR) today announced a strategic partnership to propel advanced technology development and accelerate L3Harris’ digital transformation.

The companies’ complementary capabilities – including L3Harris’ sensors and software-defined systems and Palantir’s Artificial Intelligence Platform (AIP) – will together enable new levels of capability and resilient connectivity across the joint-all-domain network, ensuring warfighters can make more informed decisions faster to protect our nation’s security and that of our allies.

"As the industry’s Trusted Disruptor, we are committed to collaborating with innovative partners to deliver unmatched value to our global customers," said Christopher E. Kubasik, Chair and CEO, L3Harris. "Our work to date has demonstrated the meaningful impact of integrating our capabilities, and we will build upon these efforts to enhance performance across domains."

"Palantir exists to support the West's most important institutions," said Alex Karp, co-founder and chief executive officer of Palantir. "We're partnering with L3Harris to ensure that the U.S. and its allies combine the West's two greatest assets — AI dominance and cutting-edge hardware — on the battlefield."

L3Harris and Palantir’s strategic partnership encompasses a variety of ongoing initiatives, including collaboration on U.S. Army programs like TITAN and efforts aligned with the U.S. Army’s Unified Network Strategy; leveraging Palantir AIP internally at L3Harris for enterprise-wide digital transformation initiatives; and development and demonstration efforts with sensors, radios and other advanced technologies. Together, Palantir and L3Harris are investing in novel solutions that will push computing to the far edge, from radios as sensors to orbital processing on satellites that will help lead the future of communication and tactical decision-making.

The companies most recently integrated L3Harris’ WESCAM MX-20 EO/IR system with Palantir’s Sensor Inference Platform (SIP), which provided edge AI for improved target detection and delineation during a live fly test. Having SIP integrated onto the MX-20 provided increased situational awareness, automatic target identification, and communication, resulting in reduced operator workload with increased effectiveness.

About L3Harris Technologies

L3Harris Technologies is the Trusted Disruptor in the defense industry. With customers’ mission-critical needs always in mind, our employees deliver end-to-end technology solutions connecting the space, air, land, sea and cyber domains in the interest of national security. Visit L3Harris.com for more information.

About Palantir Technologies Inc.

Foundational software of tomorrow. Delivered today. Additional information is available at https://www.palantir.com.

Forward-Looking Statements

This press release may contain forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. These statements may relate to, but are not limited to, Palantir’s and L3Harris’ expectations regarding the amount and the terms of their cooperation and the expected benefits of Palantir’s software platforms and L3Harris’ systems and digital transformation. Forward-looking statements are inherently subject to risks and uncertainties, some of which cannot be predicted or quantified. Forward-looking statements are based on information available at the time those statements are made and based on current expectations as well as the beliefs and assumptions of management as of that time with respect to future events. These statements are subject to risks and uncertainties, many of which involve factors or circumstances that are beyond either company’s control. These risks and uncertainties include Palantir’s and L3Harris’ ability to meet the unique needs of our customers; the failure of our platforms or systems to satisfy our customers or perform as desired; the frequency or severity of any software and implementation errors; our platforms’ or systems’ reliability; and our customers’ ability to modify or terminate contracts. Additional information regarding these and other risks and uncertainties is included in the filings Palantir and L3Harris make with the Securities and Exchange Commission from time to time. Except as required by law, neither Palantir nor L3Harris undertakes any obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statement, whether as a result of new information, future developments, or otherwise.

View source version on businesswire.com: https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20241023671112/en/

Contacts

Media Contacts:

Sara Banda

L3Harris

Media@L3Harris.com

321-306-8927

Morgan Gress

Palantir

Media@Palantir.com

716-445-1509

finance.yahoo.com · by Business Wire Wed, Oct 23, 2024, 1:01 PM 4 min read

16. Inspector general slams Pentagon for lacking paperwork on $1.1 billion in Ukraine spending

Inspector general slams Pentagon for lacking paperwork on $1.1 billion in Ukraine spending

Stars and Stripes · by Phillip Walter Wellman · October 24, 2024

A U.S. airman observes while tactical vehicles, bound for Ukraine, are secured inside a commercial aircraft at Dover Air Force Base, Del., Jan. 20, 2023. A recent Defense Department Inspector General report found that at least $1.1 billion in Ukraine aid lacked adequate documentation. (Marco Gomez/U.S. Air Force)

A Defense Department audit has found that $1.1 billion in payments meant to support Ukraine in the months following Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country lacked proper documentation, raising concerns over financial accountability and transparency in U.S. military aid.

However, the DOD Inspector General also found that service members were largely untrained to do the paperwork and the Pentagon response to the report indicated it wasn’t particularly interested in more training.

The audit by the IG reviewed $2.1 billion in approved funds for Kyiv in 2022. It found that 323 payments, or 67% of the total, either lacked paperwork or were improperly recorded, leaving officials unable to confirm whether the funds were used for their intended purposes.

The unsupported payments included $17 million the Navy spent on fuel and other expenses in Europe unrelated to Ukraine, the IG said in a report of its findings released Tuesday.

The findings have raised concerns of potential violations of the Antideficiency Act, which prohibits spending unauthorized by Congress.

Due to the urgency in distributing funds intended to bolster Ukraine’s defense following Moscow’s invasion in February 2022, DOD personnel faced pressure to execute payments quickly.

“This quick reaction led to a breakdown in internal controls,” the report said.

The DOD’s Financial Management Regulation and Joint Travel Regulations both require a lot of paperwork to support government payments.

Each payment must be accompanied by disbursement vouchers, invoices and details that outline the purpose and accuracy of the spending. The IG found that these requirements were often ignored or incomplete.

For 264 payments, or 82% of the unsupported transactions, the DOD failed to properly justify the use of supplemental funds for Ukraine.

Bradley Fighting Vehicles maneuver through muddy terrain in Ukraine in an undated photo shared by the Ukrainian Defense Ministry on X. U.S.-supplied equipment is part of the more than $1 billion in aid under scrutiny for lacking documentation in a recent Pentagon audit. (Ukrainian Ministry of Defense)

Communication challenges contributed to the issues, the report said.

Personnel didn’t receive clear or detailed guidance on how to document the purpose of funds, the IG found, adding that in some cases, DOD personnel interpreted high-level directives and laws on their own.

In June, defense officials provided the IG with additional documents for 27 of the 323 unsupported transactions.

Of those, only 12 were deemed properly executed, while the remaining 15 were said to be inadequate or unrelated to Ukraine’s defense.

Some of the deficiencies identified underscored how confusing the rules might be to the untrained.

For example, the IG report stated that $2 million spent by the Air Force on the European Deterrence Initiative was “unrelated to the Ukraine mission,” even though the initiative was created because of Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine.

As the audit examined only a portion of all Ukraine-related transactions, the IG warned that similar issues could affect the remaining $76.3 billion in additional appropriations approved through April 2024.

Defense officials agreed to review documentation to determine whether the $1 billion in questioned costs supported the Ukraine assistance mission and were accurate, and to take appropriate action if not.

However, the Pentagon’s comptroller mostly disagreed with the IG’s recommendations, which included more training on documentation procedures and clearer guidance.

Calls by the IG for Navy and Air Force officials to review potential violations of the Antideficiency Act also remain unresolved.

The IG said it will track its recommendations until “management has agreed to take actions that we determine to be sufficient.”

Stars and Stripes · by Phillip Walter Wellman · October 24, 2024

17. How America Must Stand Up to Putin’s ‘Axis of Evil’

Conclusion:

Collective action across world leaders has never been more urgently needed to counter the spreading evil of Putin’s agenda.

How America Must Stand Up to Putin’s ‘Axis of Evil’

TIME · by Jeffrey Sonnenfeld

By Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Barry McCaffrey, James Clapper and Stephen HenriquesUpdated: December 31, 1969 7:00 PM EST | Originally published: October 24, 2024 1:00 PM EDT

Jeffrey Sonnenfeld is the Lester Crown Professor of Leadership Practice and President of the Yale Chief Executive Leadership Institute. He has created the world’s first school for incumbent CEOs and has been an informal advisor to five U.S. Presidents, as well as studied top leadership across sectors for over 40 years. Among his seven books and hundreds of articles is The Hero’s Farewell (Oxford University Press). He worked with Jared Kushner on presenting the 2019 Prosperity through Peace Conference in Bahrain with launched the Abraham Accords.

Barry McCaffrey is a retired Four-Star General for the U.S. Army and former chief of U.S. Southern Command. He led the 24th Infantry Division in Operation Desert Storm and is a recipient of two Silver Stars and two Distinguished Service Crosses. He is also an NBC News military analyst.

James Clapper is a retired lieutenant general in the United States Air Force and served as Director of National Intelligence, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and first director of defense intelligence. He is presently a National Security Analyst for CNN.

Stephen Henriques is a senior research fellow at the Yale Chief Executive Leadership Institute and a former consultant to McKinsey & Co with expertise in the Aerospace & Defense industry.

There is something especially disconcerting seeing Vladimir Putin smiling like the cat who ate the canary at this week’s BRICs Summit. Could it be more than coincidence that the coordinated Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthi attacks on Israel, with Iranian support, were not just coincidental distractions from Russia’s stalemate in his invasion of Ukraine? Yesterday, Putin’s continued efforts to influence the U.S. elections to favor Donald Trump in concert with interference from China and Iran was documented by Microsoft and other cybersecurity experts. As President George W. Bush warned in 2002, there truly is an “axis of evil” still, Vladimir Putin at its hub.

It is bewildering that the failed aggressor Putin has killed hundreds of thousands of his own people and destroyed his own economy but continues to hold influence over other leaders around the world. More than bravado, that influence extends through manipulation, sparking diversionary fires with and between nations, despite his own limited means as a failed superpower. As a KGB veteran, Putin has extended his tentacles, subverting democracy and undermining global harmony through propaganda and intrigue to compensate for lost industrial might.

Russia’s national income statistics have been suppressed from the IMF since 2022 because Putin is afraid to show the world how bad his economy is crumbling across every sector. Russia has become increasingly irrelevant to global commerce and diplomacy as major sources of revenue evaporate from collapsed energy and other raw material exports and reserves dwindle from a stalemate in the hapless war against Ukraine.

U.S. domestic tensions have flared with Trump’s resurgence. Divisive political extremism in France and Germany is on the rise. Ukraine faces massive suffering as threats to European safety escalate. Mideast instability has reignited amid brazen attacks on Israel and E.U. vessels by Iran and its proxies, the Houthis, Hamas, and Hezbollah.

Putin’s imperialistic invasion of Ukraine has resulted in over half a million deaths, including 120,000 Russian soldiers, 70,000 Ukrainian soldiers, and 12,000 innocent civilians, in addition to the reported kidnapping of 10,000 children. Russia has been set back decades, no longer a global superpower or even a significant economic force.

Putin has become more than just an aggressor engaged in a pursuit of empire building. He is the engineer behind the rise of a new, more powerful “axis of evil.” The “axis of evil” was a term initially coined by President George W. Bush during his 2002 State of the Union address. Then, Bush was speaking to a nation – and a world – looking for moral leadership after the horrific terrorist attacks on September 11. The axis members of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea were the perceived bad state actors responsible for collectively organizing attacks meant to “threaten the peace of the world.”

Hostile states have only expanded the use of terrorist proxies to advance their end game. Those actors continue to coordinate behind closed doors to expand their knowledge, resources, and capabilities, and pose a greater threat as a result. Trump does not seem to appreciate, or understand, these invaluable lessons from history.

Energizing Putin’s Partners in China, Iran, and North Korea

Today, political leaders and national security experts have recast the axis of evil to feature Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Despite historically fraught relationships and renewed skepticism between members of the new axis, the four states and their proxies have boosted trade, enhanced diplomacy, and expanded military cooperation over the last decade.

Russia is giving away highly sensitive advanced military technology, information, and equipment, including nuclear weapons, ballistic missile and missile defense programs, and space satellites to axis members in an attempt to maintain its war against Ukraine. In exchange, Iran provides drones and ballistic missiles; North Korea supplies ammunition, ballistic and tactical missiles as well as thousands of fresh recent troops; and China now smuggles 90% of controlled dual-use goods imported by Russia for manufacturing missiles, tanks, planes, and drones. All actors benefit from the technical learnings of live weapons testing on the battlefield.

Iran and Russia export hydrocarbons to China, while the duo serve as an additional source of demand for Chinese goods – an attempt to replace trade lost from recent EU and U.S. restrictions. Meanwhile, China props up North Korea providing oil, critical consumer goods, and cross-border labor opportunities. Hamas and Hezbollah have also benefited, using new weapons from Russia, China, and North Korea to attack Israel.

Diplomacy, too, has improved. Russia has renewed partnership agreements with China and North Korea in May and June, respectively, and expects to sign a new agreement with Iran after a BRICS Summit this week, deepening relations in each case. China and Russia welcomed Iran to BRICS this year and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization last year, reintroducing the Middle Eastern country to a new group of possible partners and trade potential. China and North Korea have had a long-standing relationship dating back decades and will continue to remain connected as long as it serves China’s interests.

Efforts to Erode European Solidarity

Soft diplomacy has also been a frequent tool deployed by Putin to forge new covert inroads with Western proxies. The documented ties between Putin and Marine Le Pen, former president of the strengthening French National Rally party, are long. Pro-Russian political parties in multiple German states notched substantial gains in the September regional elections. Similarly, Austria saw their far-right, pro-Russian Freedom Party capture the largest share of voters in the August national election. And to the consternation of Western allies, Serbia, Hungary, and Turkey have maintained close ties to the Putin regime, with the latter two nations often holding NATO votes hostage to assist the Kremlin.

Military engagement has steadily escalated and reached new highs recently when China and Russia held major multi-ocean joint naval exercises for “friendly states” to observe. Iran joined the two in a previous exercise. In support of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) led trainings for Russian troops in Syria to operate Iranian drones. Now, North Korea is sending special forces to Eastern Russia to prepare for fighting in Russia’s war with Ukraine.

Mischief in the Mideast

Syria has played a crucial role in extending the reach of Putin’s military complex over the past decade and has continued to in the present moment with Ukraine. In 2015, Putin came to the defense of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in his civil war against Islamic State rebel forces. While the move provided a lifeline for Assad, whose military received equipment, troops, training, and technology, Russia came out on top. Putin would receive control of western and central Syrian airspace and access to a port in the Mediterranean. Moscow was also presented an opportunity to reconstruct relations with Iran, which was already supporting Assad through the IRGC and Quds forces as well as Hezbollah.

Those gains have proved invaluable for Russia over time. The Syrian outpost bolstered its presence in the Black Sea, expanding commercial trade, and has served as key tool for its military power projection. The position has been used to facilitate military and covert operations, including the war with Ukraine, and to train thousands of military personnel from Russia, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis over the years. Putin has even recruited Syrian mercenaries to support the Ukraine war.

A Shared Bond but Divergent Interests

What brings the axis of evil together is not a common belief in a particular form of government or system of values but disdain for the current global, Western-led order and a reaction to Western-imposed sanctions. More notably, the bond is motivated by economic opportunism for China but encouraged by economic necessity for Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Therefore, it is incumbent upon the U.S. and its allies to squeeze the three weaker states. The U.S. must more strictly enforce the current sanctions on Russia as well as secondary sanctions on entities supporting Russian aggression. Sanctions should be reinstated on Iranian oil exports, most of which go to China. New targeted sanctions should be readied when Russia, Iran, or North Korea overstep.

China has more to lose than its peers demanding a more nuanced approach. Total trade with its three peers represents less than a quarter of trade with just the U.S. and E.U., both of which represent critical consumer markets for the Chinese economy. The erratic behavior by Iran and North Korea and the embarrassing execution of the invasion of Ukraine does not give President Xi Jinping confidence. The U.S. and its allies then must provide Xi with a viable alternative, convincing him that the benefit of the current opportunistic policy is outweighed by the cost.

The timing may prove favorable for the West considering China’s current economic malaise. In fact, Xi recently signaled an interest to increase engagement with the U.S., saying: "China is willing to be a partner and friend with the United States. This will benefit not only the two countries, but the world.”

In each approach, a realistic strategic response will require more than tariffs and bluster. Instead, the West needs to develop a coordinated response that is firm but fair, tailored to China’s current economic and geopolitical situation.

Trump as the Useful Tool to Degrade Allies' Strength

This month, Bob Woodward revealed private conversations between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin continued after the former left office. Trump refused to deny these charges. The Woodward revelations of Trump’s affection for Putin following Russia’s unprovoked invasion of a peaceful sovereign neighbor is even more alarming given Trump’s prospective return to office. Trump’s continued sympathy towards Putin must be examined on the eve of the U.S. elections.

Western leaders must start by building a more unified front. Success will necessitate a degree of trust in each leader’s commitment to defend democracy, pledge to protect their allies, and respect for the rule of law as well as in their personal character. Those same attributes are also essential to strengthening emerging regional alliances in Asia Pacific and the Middle East and to establish new partnerships in other geo-strategic regions. Unfortunately, not a single trait could be used to define Trump’s leadership.

Nor did the Trump Administration leave America strengthened on the global stage once the Biden-Harris Administration took over. Trump’s tough-man act did more harm than good degrading relations with key allies in the West and East and diminished U.S. standing in the world. Trump diplomacy did nothing to limit North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Iran cut the time required to produce a nuclear bomb in half after Trump exited the Iran nuclear deal.

Decisions by the Trump Administration to exit or diminish partnerships and alliances left a void in global leadership, long filled by the U.S., allowing China to quickly step in. For example, Chinese foreign direct investment, via the Belt and Road Initiative, accelerated allowing the country to construct dual-use commercial-military capabilities in geostrategic locations and develop favorable trade relations with recipient countries.

Closer to home, Trump did not rebuild the military or improve preparedness as promised during his campaign. The ever-mentioned trade imbalances actually grew by more than 20% from the time Trump took and left office, nor did the trade imbalance with China decrease.

A Leadership Agenda to Unmask the Evil and Fortify Collection Defense

It will be incumbent upon next leader of the U.S., and its Western allies, to improve diplomacy, trade partnerships, and military preparedness. Blunt force tactics, broad-based tariffs and all, surely will not prove effective, nor will appeasement that is based on an obsession with strongmen regimes.

A singular focus on Russia will not deliver peace to the Middle East or ease tensions in Asia Pacific. Driving a wedge between the new axis of evil will require a foreign policy employing precision, tact, trust, stability, and cooperation. The U.S. cannot do this alone and needs a president who humbly but confidently recognizes that reality.

Collective action across world leaders has never been more urgently needed to counter the spreading evil of Putin’s agenda.

TIME · by Jeffrey Sonnenfeld

18. Trump says he has ‘4 or 5 good choices’ for potential Defense secretary

I question the experience levels of at least two (Cotton and Waltz). However, Pompeo has proven himself in a number of ways obviously as SECSTATE but also in his ability to work for the former president.  

I wonder who VP Harris is considering?

Trump says he has ‘4 or 5 good choices’ for potential Defense secretary

https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/4951071-trump-potential-defense-nominees/?utm

by Brett Samuels - 10/24/24 10:56 AM ET

Former President Trump signaled Thursday that he has a list of potential nominees to serve as Defense secretary if he wins November’s election, hinting at the future of a Cabinet position likely to come under additional scrutiny due to some of Trump’s recent comments.

Trump phoned into conservative radio host Hugh Hewitt’s show, where Hewitt rattled off a list of potential nominees, including Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), Rep. Mike Waltz (R-Fla.) and former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

Hewitt, who said he has voted for Trump, noted his son works for Waltz.

“I have many good choices. I have four or five good choices. You named a couple of them. And they’re very good. A lot of really very good choices,” Trump said.

The former president has spoken on the campaign trail about firing military leaders associated with the chaotic withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan.

Defense secretary proved to be one of Trump’s more volatile Cabinet posts during his first term in office. Jim Mattis resigned after Trump said he was withdrawing troops from Syria, and his replacement, Mark Esper, was fired days after the 2020 election and has since been critical of Trump.

A potential Trump Defense secretary is certain to face tough questions from Democrats in particular after the former president suggested in a recent interview that he could use the military to quell protests from his critics.

Trump, in an interview with on “Sunday Morning Futures” on Fox News earlier this month, referred to his opponents as the “enemy within” and said any unrest from his critics after the election “should be very easily handled by, if necessary, by National Guard, or if really necessary, by the military, because they can’t let that happen.”

The former president has also faced criticism from former military leaders.

Former chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley called Trump a “fascist to the core” and “the most dangerous person to this country” in a new Bob Woodward book.

John Kelly, Trump’s former White House chief of staff, made headlines this week by alleging the 45th president praised the loyalty of Adolf Hitler’s generals while in office and said, “I need the kind of generals that Hitler had.”

Esper, who served as Trump’s secretary of Defense for 16 months, has spoken out in recent weeks about how Trump might use the military for political purposes in a second term.

18. Montana Senate candidate says he was 'medically discharged' from the Navy. Records say otherwise.

You know the old saying:. "When you find yourself in a hole the first thing to do is stop digging." This candidate seems to be continuing to dig.

Montana Senate candidate says he was 'medically discharged' from the Navy. Records say otherwise.

The disclosure comes as Tim Sheehy was already facing scrutiny for questionable claims he has made about his military career.

NBC News · by Courtney Kube · October 24, 2024

Tim Sheehy, a former Navy SEAL running for the Senate in Montana, has said he was discharged from the military for medical reasons because of injuries he sustained on duty, but his discharge paperwork tells a different story.

The heavily redacted, two-page document obtained by NBC News indicates that Sheehy voluntarily resigned his commission and does not list any medical condition that forced him out of uniform, according to a review of the document and a current and former U.S. official familiar with the details of his separation.

Sheehy said as much in his memoir last year, noting that he did develop a health issue but it was not the reason he left the Navy.

In the book, “Mudslingers: A True Story of Aerial Firefighting,” Sheehy wrote that he suffered a bad case of decompression sickness, commonly known as the bends, while he was riding in a mini-submarine during a training exercise in Hawaii. It caused a "tiny hole in my heart.”

“There would be a period of recovery and evaluation, I was told, before I could return to active duty,” he wrote.

He ultimately decided to resign instead. “If I couldn’t be out in the field, leading from the front, then it was time to consider doing something else,” he wrote. “I had put in my time; I was free to go if that was what I wanted.”

In a statement to NBC News, a spokesperson for the Sheehy campaign offered a more nuanced explanation.

“Tim Sheehy was honorably discharged from the Navy after being declared medically unfit to continue to serve as a Navy SEAL in 2014,” the spokesperson said. “After Tim left active duty in 2014, he was then in the Navy Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)” — a section of the Navy Reserve — “until his honorable discharge in 2019.”

The spokesperson did not directly address why Sheehy’s discharge paperwork contradicts his claims that he was discharged for medical reasons.

A decorated military career

What’s beyond dispute is that Sheehy had a decorated military career. He was awarded a Purple Heart for wounds sustained in battle in one of the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan, as well as a Bronze Star for valor.

Sheehy’s apparently false claims of being medically discharged add to the number of statements he has made about his military record that have been questioned. He was already facing scrutiny for his claim that he was shot in Afghanistan, which has been contradicted by a National Park Service ranger who has told reporters that Sheehy shot himself in an accident at Glacier National Park in 2015.

Sheehy’s showdown with Democratic incumbent Jon Tester is one of the most closely watched Senate races in the country. Sheehy, a Republican who operates an aerial firefighting company, is leading Tester in the polls. With the Democrats holding a razor-thin majority, the outcome could determine which party controls the Senate.

Sheehy has made his military service a core part of his campaign. In interviews with conservative podcast hosts, he has said he was forced out of the military because of injury.

"So finally, they said, ‘Hey, you’re at the end of the road, you know, you’ve got shrapnel in you, you’ve got a bullet in you, you’ve had a head injury, you know, you’re out of here,'" Sheehy said on the “First Class Fatherhood” podcast in November.

In March, he said on “The Victor Davis Hanson Show” podcast that he served multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and “got wounded and injured a handful of times."

“Eventually, I was medically discharged from the military,” he added.

Sheehy also submitted a résumé to the Montana Legislature in 2021 that claims he was “medically separated from active duty due to wounds received in Afghanistan.”

He graduated from the Naval Academy in 2008 and left the military six years later after fulfilling his mandatory service requirement, records show.

Sheehy earned a Bronze Star for his actions on April 9, 2012, when his patrol came under fire in the Arghandab River Valley in Afghanistan. After a member of his unit was wounded, Sheehy ran 50 meters through enemy fire and shielded the service member from incoming fire, according to the Navy citation. As the firefight continued, Sheehy helped set up a landing area for the medevac helicopter and carried the wounded man 200 meters for evacuation.

Sheehy received the Purple Heart for an incident on April 25, 2012. The circumstances are unclear. His campaign did not release the citation, which would provide a narrative of what happened, and instead referred NBC News to a local news article published on the day of the 2015 award ceremony. The article in the Independent Record of Helena says he was knocked unconscious by an improvised explosive device.

Sheehy has remained ahead of Tester in the polls despite questions about how and where he sustained a gunshot wound.

Sheehy has recounted in his book and said on the campaign trail that he was shot in the right arm during a battle in Afghanistan in the spring of 2012. But The Washington Post and The New York Times have reported that Sheehy told a National Park Service ranger that he sustained a bullet wound to his arm in 2015 when his Colt .45 fell and discharged in a parking lot at Glacier National Park in Montana.

Sheehy was cited for the incident by the ranger and fined over $500 for illegally discharging a weapon in a national park. He told the Post that he lied to the ranger to protect himself and his fellow SEALs from a possible investigation related to the alleged incident in Afghanistan.

The spokesperson for the Sheehy campaign said that “the bullet in Tim’s arm was a result of his service in Afghanistan.”

“Tim never reported it because he didn’t want to trigger an investigation of his team, be pulled from the battlefield, and see a fellow teammate be punished,” the spokesperson said. “It was always about protecting a fellow team member of his unit he thought could have been responsible due to friendly fire ricochet in the heat of an engagement with the enemy.”

NBC News · by Courtney Kube · October 24, 2024

20. Open questions | Chad Sbragia on why a breakdown of US-China defence links could be ‘really dangerous’

Open questions | Chad Sbragia on why a breakdown of US-China defence links could be ‘really dangerous’

The former senior Pentagon official discusses the past and present state of relations between the two countries’ militaries

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3283086/chad-sbragia-why-breakdown-us-china-defence-links-could-be-really-dangerous?tpcc=GME-O-enlz-uv&utm

Hayley Wongin BeijingandAmber Wangin Beijing

Published: 6:00am, 21 Oct 2024Updated: 4:01pm, 21 Oct 2024

Chad Sbragia was the first US deputy assistant secretary of defence for China set up during Donald Trump’s administration. He held policy research leadership roles in the US Marine Corps and Indo-Pacific Command and is a research analyst at the Institute for Defence Analyses, a Virginia-based think tank. He spoke to the Post on the sidelines of the Xiangshan defence forum in Beijing. This interview first appeared in SCMP Plus. For other interviews in the Open Questions series, click here.

How would you evaluate the progress of the resumption of US-China defence contacts and exchanges so far?

The re-establishment of defence contacts and exchanges, I do think is important. They were on a good footing, [with] a good plan in place and how that fell off the cliff early in the Biden administration was really kind of remarkable. It takes away opportunities to correct the record, to communicate clearly. It takes away opportunities to perhaps find some common ground in areas of cooperation.

We have several hundred US service members that are still missing someplace in China, [a reference to troops killed in the second world war] and that was an area of cooperation that lasted for a long period of time. That’s an area of cooperation that’s now two years behind for no reason.

Now that they’ve restarted [defence contacts], the way I would characterise it, is the defence relationship has partially restarted.

Neither defence establishment restarted any of the senior dialogues. The most senior dialogue they restarted was the deputy assistant secretary-level dialogue, the defence policy coordination talks. But the other higher level dialogues, at the assistant secretary level or the undersecretary level or higher, none of those were restarted. That’s an anomaly in a relationship, and it’s also confusing about why.

I think that’s a great deal of risk when you have no mechanism to resolve larger strategic policy disagreements in place. It raises questions: does either side expect to resolve large policy disagreements? Or is there no interest on either side in resolving those disagreements?

There are a lot of questions that bring out about what was restored, and why things were not restored. It’s good the [defence] secretary [Lloyd Austin] set up a call.

I don’t know who his counterparts are now. [Chinese Defence Minister] Dong Jun is not even on the CMC [Central Military Commission] so technically, the secretary has several counterparts, but Dong Jun isn’t one of them now. So that’s going to be a problem.

With the theatre command talks resuming recently, how would you compare the effectiveness of command-level exchanges between now and the time when you were in service?

The types of questions that they could or should work on now are a little bit harder. [It] looks like they were kind of just passing talking points, which is not bad. You need to hear where they’re at at any given moment, changes of lexicon. Those things are important.

You need to have the opportunity to very clearly articulate and communicate what the US position is. But ideally you’re also having an opportunity to deepen your understanding of the other side, not just what their talking points are, but to see and to get a feel for what it looks like.

PLA launches blockade drills around Taiwan, days after speech by island’s leader

What’s their readiness state, what’s their professionalism like? What’s their political control and authority? What’s their discipline over their forces at a strategic, operational, tactical level? I want to see their equipment, right? Is it a threat or not? Do they know how to fly things or drive things or sail things? Those things are all manifestations of confidence for the measures that really do matter.

The Indo-Pacific commander hadn’t talked to any counterparts in China for quite a while. I remember back in the 2000s that the Indo-Pacific commander would come to China multiple times a year, three, sometimes four times a year, and talk to very senior leaders.

Having these visits helps reduce security dilemma anxiety. When they come to visit, I’m going to poke my nose around, I’m going to look around, I’m going to assess, and I’m going to understand you better. And you’re gonna do the same thing and I’m gonna try to be pretty transparent with you. I’m certainly gonna be frank and honest with you, because the jobs of both sides are to avert conflict, not to generate conflict. So the way we did that was by talking to each other and visiting.

Do you see these visits resuming any time soon?

It’s a different time, and the dynamics have changed. [We’re] not going to go back to that.

But I think on the Chinese side, they started to downplay their desire to talk to him, because the Indo-Pacific commander is a war-fighting commander. He’s an obstacle. It’s much easier to go back to Washington DC and talk to folks who were more receptive to the Chinese than the Indo-Pacific commander. He’s the principal kind of warfighter that they would confront.

But in that light, I think that’s why both sides actually need to be talking at that level. He’s not just a theatre commander. He’s bigger than that. He’s responsible for half the planet. He has more strategic span of capacity than the entire PLA [People’s Liberation Army] has. So he has a role in having a relationship, and traditionally has had with military region commanders and now theatre commanders.

The Indo-Pacific commander also has to have a point of contact that he can have as an interlocutor in Beijing on the senior staff here, ideally with the Joint Staff Department, and he needs to maintain both of those.

The United States is having its election very soon. If Donald Trump wins, do you think the resumption of the military dialogue will be reversed?

I think in the US, they often say that personnel is policy, meaning what personnel you bring on is often a reflection of what policies are enacted. That’s the case of any administration. Who he brings on in key billets will probably be a better determinant of the restoration or the expansion of current defence relations with China.

One thing that I think, at least for a Trump administration, is that I think he’s got a track record that he does not fear to talk to anybody. He talked to Kim Jong-un. Nobody in the past would do that. People would always say that’s crazy. So I don’t think instinctually that Donald Trump would say that talking between the two militaries or the two defence establishments is a bad thing. I think he’s just the opposite. In fact, he’s eager to prove that the United States shouldn’t be and isn’t scared of talking to anybody.

During 2018, 2019, 2020, beginning of 2021, the defence relationship had extremely robust and constant communications with each other through multiple pathways from the secretary level down, and it hadn’t been like that for a decade.

So we really emphasised that a lot, and the PLA side was very receptive to that. I talked to my counterpart constantly. I talked to their representative in Washington constantly. Our embassy folks here were constantly talking to their counterparts, feeding that back in kind of a big loop as it’s supposed to. There were more backchannel communication paths to more non-official sources that were occurring. It was heavy, and often.

Trump vows high tariffs on China-made cars in his first speech after assassination attempt

During those years, the Chinese side actually initiated calls to what we call the DTL, the defence telephone. The Chinese senior leaders had never initiated a call to the United States since the DTL was started in 2008. The US was always the one asking for the call, and finally they started asking, but I think that’s a reflection of that there was value to calls. And they weren’t always pleasant, but they were extremely frank and actually very productive calls to include during Covid periods.

Would there be statements and reports about the calls every time?

Not always. But the Chinese are usually pretty good about doing [this]. A good case in point is the whole, you’ve probably heard about the issue, like the October surprise issue. That was a good case of [when] we saw the Chinese had a misperception [about a possible drone attack on Chinese-held islands in the South China Sea ahead of the 2020 presidential election].

It was a gross misperception, gross miscalculation. And Secretary [Mark] Esper directed calls to PLA counterparts on his behalf. And the [defence] department did. We explained to the Chinese that there is what we saw as a bad miscalculation. They accepted it. They reflected it in their media the next day.

At the end of the administration, when I talked to my counterpart, he said [Central Military Commission] chairman Xi [Jinping] had accepted that and paused military escalation because of those calls. That’s a great example of how having steady, routinised forms of communication can really avert a crisis that might emerge otherwise. Perfect example.

Now with less direct communication between the two militaries, is the US facing more difficulties in understanding the PLA, such as the anti-corruption saga? What is the US assessment of Beijing’s anti-corruption efforts on its Rocket Force?

I don’t know what the cumulative US government assessment is.

But this is what is a little bit confusing to me: how much anxiety and concern China continues to have, and the utter lack of desire to have a defence relationship of any substance. [And that] is a little bit unnerving to me. You feel like you don’t need a defence relationship if you don’t think that there’s anything that’s solvable from having one.

That’s really dangerous, particularly if they don’t understand how quickly poor assumptions or assessments might arise if you don’t have conversations with each other. So that’s a big concern of mine.

Chad Sbragia attends the Xiangshan Forum in Beijing last month. Photo: AFP

Certainly for the United States, there’s a lot going on in China that is increasingly opaque, not increasingly transparent. And one of them is that, what is going on with the senior political military leadership? It is not clear to me, and I do not fully understand the changes. Those changes have not been articulated very well from China. Why is Dong Jun not on the CMC? Can you explain that to us? Why is he not a state councillor? Are you changing? Is that a new pattern? Who’s the manager of the international portfolio now within the PLA? Who would be our interlocutor if there was a crisis that you would pick? I mean, there are a thousand questions.

Could the US find out more about these questions in the past trips?

Yeah, you could at least ask. I’ve always found that if you ask them questions, the Chinese are very frank and open. They must be appropriate questions, not questions that won’t or can’t be answered. How many bombers are going to strike me on day one? – neither side can answer that question.

But can you explain to me, do you have political control in the military? That’s a legitimate question. Do you have confidence? Because that tells me a lot. Are you fully in control of them? Are they doing what you want? They don’t seem to be doing what Xi Jinping is directing them to do. They are acting still with a tremendous amount of corruption, not following orders, and not showing that they’re ensuring discipline in new recruits, in units, and in organisations below them. I mean, that’s frankly unnerving. That’s terrifying.

We’re talking about rocket forces, right? Rocket forces control nuclear weapons. Those forces? Reports of corruption are a bit concerning. No answers on anything? Catastrophic failures and oversight of equipment development? We’re not talking about small things. It’s about long-range missile systems, missile systems that are being tested and going haywire in China. They shoot missiles over Taiwan at times, if they fall short … I mean, there are a thousand reasons that you know, you start to manifest mistrust.

Defence departments do one thing, they plan to defend the national interests of the political leadership, and they’re always going to look at what’s the worst plausible case that could happen. And if you’re not transparent and open and explain those things, it’s the obligation of the other side to plan for the worst case. I think that’s what’s, in part, what we’re looking at.

Have you observed a stepping up of military and defence engagement by China with Indo-Pacific countries, especially the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) states?

Last year at Xiangshan, Zhang Youxia [CMC vice-chairman] talked about the need to improve military diplomacy and increase its activity with other nations. He prioritised the EU nations, but I think it certainly applies also to the Asean nations. Have you seen that more over the last year? I think that’s true.

How is Washington reacting to this?

I don’t think that there’s much that is not already public. You know, increased investment, greater collaboration. Certainly, there’s been a pretty significant uptake of bringing powers that reside outside the region, or only incidentally out, inside the region. More in, right?

So, Germans, Canadians, French, the UK coming in, sending warships through, doing more, participating in more multilateral events, even on the ground [with] greater collaboration by partners and allies within the region itself, and more kind of fulsome exercises, real exercises, certainly the US and Japan, certainly the United States and Australia. Aukus is a good example. Yeah, it’s intensifying.

And for China-Russia, do you find their stepping up of joint drills alarming?

My personal opinion is it’s not that big a deal at this point. It’s a big deal in the United States, there’s always this concern that they’re going to partner up. I mean, I think the Chinese and the Russians dislike each other quite a bit.

In fact, one of the reasons that they work so hard on their relationship is to ensure that their relationship doesn’t fall apart. It turns out, certainly, the most important contribution to the relationship is the mutual hatred of the United States. They’re very aligned in what their preferred world view is, and they have a common competitor, a common enemy, which is the United States.

I think the Chinese and the Russians dislike each other quite a bit

Chad Sbragia

China, Russian military collaboration is pretty minimal, more symbolic strategically, less important, tactically or operationally. They’re just really operating next to each other. They’re really not doing a lot of combined command stuff, [but] a little bit of ballistic missile defence, some of these long-range air patrols or maritime excursions. That’s interesting. They are flying next to each other but not really doing major air combat practice.

In June, Admiral [Samuel] Paparo introduced the hellscape plan. [The head of the Indo-Pacific Command had said the US military planned to create an “unmanned hellscape” in the event of a PLA attack on Taiwan.]

It aims to use a variety of drones to buy time for the US military in Taiwan. Given that China is the biggest producer of drones in the world, while the plan would involve a lot of low-cost drones, do you think it’s a feasible plan?

You know, he didn’t provide enough fidelity for the PLA to assess the veracity of that concept, but it’s very clear that that’s the trajectory of where everything’s going. The PLA writes constantly about different versions of networked and autonomous weapon systems, including drones of all sorts: air, space, sea, surface, subsurface and even deep sea, so that’s a different aspect.

And that’s where everything is going. Stuff that can be launched from the shoreline, from deep inland, from a boat, from a submarine, from an aircraft … There are not just drones, but all autonomous weapons systems that are going to be coming from every part of every domain.

I mean, it’s incredible, and that’s just the trajectory. So as a hellscape, it hasn’t manifested as a specific detailed plan backed up by capabilities. It’s a conceptual intent, but as such, it’s common, right, from the Chinese side too.

Many of the PLA drills around Taiwan are believed to be practising some sort of naval blockade. Do you think it’s probably a way for the PLA to use a naval blockade in the event that it really needs to resort to armed reunification?

Is a naval blockade a plausible option? I don’t think it’s as plausible as a lot of other experts do, because I think there’s a lot of significant strategic downside to that. It’s certainly plausible. And even an invasion campaign kind of starts off with a blockade function. So you’re always going to do a blockade. It’s just whether you add an invasion. So that’s good for the Chinese flexibility.

But it’s ugly; a blockade is a bad strategic condition. I don’t think China would choose that for a variety of reasons, but maybe there are reasons why. They will determine what their priorities and options are.

What would be the reason they would opt for it?

One of the reasons you choose blockade, as opposed to an invasion, is always, in the end, you can say, I’m done with the blockade, and de-escalate. I’ve taught a lesson. I can go home, and I can at least characterise it as not being a loss.

It doesn’t invest you totally or cement you into a permanent course of action. If you try an invasion and it fails, you can’t hide that you failed if you didn’t take it. That’s not the end either but if it’s a blockade, say “OK if this works, it’s great”.

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If it doesn’t manifest quickly enough or the United States comes too fast – if they come or the Taiwanese hold out, or somebody else comes, I mean – it does give the political leadership a way to say “I’m not going to jump all the way into the pool, but I’m getting in halfway. If I need to, I’ll go even further but I can get out and still have my hair dry.”

As a last question, as this is the third time you’ve attended the Xiangshan Forum in Beijing, do you think face-to-face events and visits are helpful for people to better understand China, as people from China and the US are having less interaction than in previous years?

Absolutely, there is something you could interact and see first hand. It develops a lasting influence and that’s good.

There’s a risk sometimes of people taking the anecdotal pieces that they see from visiting or even living here, and not contextualising it within a broader evidentiary base.

Here is the analogy that I use back in the United States. Nasa needs astronauts who’ve been up in space. They know what weightlessness feels like, they’ve run across the moon and bounced on it … But you can’t run Nasa just off of the astronauts. You need astronomers who are deeply studied in astrophysics and orbital dynamics and geometry. Those people are really important.

Ideally you have somebody who can do both, spend some time in China but also study China independently and don’t let their time in China shape entirely their understanding of China.

I was stunned [by] how just completely wrong they were

Chad Sbragia

The United States used to have this cadre of younger people [and] they’re really good, solid folks. They’re astronauts and astronomers; now that’s all you get: astronomers. They’ve looked at it from afar, not up close, and are not as experienced. The same applies to the PRC side.

I was stunned last year when I came here. I sat and talked with some Chinese officials and some of the think tanks, who are famous folks here, and they discussed their perception of the United States, United States policy or activities. And I was stunned [by] how just completely wrong they were. These are people who are America watchers, people supposedly the experts in China to watch the United States and feed that into leadership decision making. They just had some horrible assumptions or assessments.

The point being is when you don’t have those times to interact, one of the manifestations of that is that people could start to form poor assumptions, and those flawed assessments feed on each other … There’s a great danger in that. So once folks for both sides come together, even if they don’t like to talk to each other, one of the things it does is [that] it makes both sides confront their assumption that may be wrong, and they have to question them, at least they have to defend them.

Hayley Wong

FOLLOW

Hayley joined the Post as a reporter on the China Desk in 2022. She graduated from the Chinese University of Hong Kong and previously wrote for Bloomberg News.

Amber Wang

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Amber Wang is a reporter for the China desk, and focuses on Chinese politics and diplomacy. She joined the Post in 2021, and previously worked for The New York Times and Southern

21. Palawan ‘key terrain’ to defend and operate from, says Marine commander in the Philippines

​I remember when General Juancho Sabban was the Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps he thumbed his nose at China from Palawan at a time when US support under the Mutual Defense Treaty for defense of the disputed territories was ambiguous at best. How times have changed.

And let's not forget this warning:

“The West Philippine Sea, not Taiwan, is the real flashpoint for an armed conflict,”

 – Ambassador Jose Manuel Romualdez February 28, 2024

Palawan ‘key terrain’ to defend and operate from, says Marine commander in the Philippines

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · October 24, 2024

A Philippine marine stands on Palawan's western coast, facing the South China Sea, during live-fire training with U.S. Marines in the Philippines, Oct. 22, 2024. (Seth Robson/Stars and Stripes)

PUERTO PRINCESA, Philippines — U.S. Marines are strengthening ties with their Philippine counterparts on an island that borders the South China Sea as the U.S. ally faces an ever-assertive Beijing.

The strategic importance of Palawan, a narrow, 280-mile-long island where Marines have been training this month with the Philippine 3rd Marine Brigade, is “obvious,” said 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit commander Col. Sean Dynan.

“It controls the straights into the Sulu Sea and into the South China Sea and West Philippine Sea,” he told Stars and Stripes while standing on Palawan’s western shore Tuesday.

American and Filipino marines spent that morning on live-fire coastal defense training there as part of the annual Kamandag exercise.

This year’s training involves more than 1,000 Marines and sailors of Marine Rotational Force-Southeast Asia and the 15th MEU from Camp Pendleton, Calif. Kamandag began Oct. 15 and concludes Friday.

The live-fire training on Palawan took place in Aborlan, a municipality facing the South China Sea that’s about 125 miles east of Sabina Shoal, where Philippine and Chinese coast guard vessels collided Aug. 31.

Philippine authorities allege a Chinese vessel rammed a Philippine ship three times; China claims the Philippine ship instigated the clash. It was the latest in a series of incidents involving the two nations’ vessels in or near the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.

“It’s key terrain to defend from and key terrain to operate from,” Dynan said of Palawan, noting that the island hosts two sites approved for use by American forces.

U.S. and Philippine marines carry out live-fire defense drills facing the South China Sea in Palawan, Philippines, Oct. 22, 2024. (Seth Robson/Stars and Stripes)

Antonio Bautista Air Base in Puerto Princesa, the provincial capital, and Naval Station Narciso Del Rosario, on Balabac Island in the southern part of the province, are two of nine sites identified for U.S. use under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.

U.S. Marine units have been on Palawan often in recent years, while the 3rd Marine Brigade, based on the island, has grown in capabilities, Dynan said.

“The majority of countries around this area recognize that amphibious capability is a requirement in this environment,” he said. “The U.S. has the longest-standing amphibious force, so this is our time to shine and help.”

Philippine forces on Palawan have asked for help building skills to coordinate fires, counter-drone training, nonlethal training and establishing ranges, Dynan said.

Those forces are also focused on Palawan, said Vice Adm. Alfonso Torres, head of the Western Command at Puerto Princesa, which oversees operations on the island and in the disputed bits of territory in South China Sea.

U.S. and Filipino marine commanders attend a briefing ahead of defense drills facing the South China Sea in Palawan, Philippines, Oct. 22, 2024. (Seth Robson/Stars and Stripes)

“We are not just monitoring (the disputed waters),” he said at the coastal defense training event. “We are operating also.”

Palawan’s strategic importance is growing as the Philippine armed forces shift focus from internal to external security, Torres said.

Western Command is at the forefront of that shift, he added.

“We are slowly shifting our forces from the south to the west because of the declining issues with insurgency,” he said.

The Philippine forces on Palawan will receive new equipment, not only to conduct operations, but also for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, Torres said.

The Philippines plans to spend $35 billion over a decade modernizing its military, with most of that going to the navy to strengthen the country’s capabilities in western waters, the Philippine Star reported May 2, quoting Philippine navy spokesman Commodore Roy Vincent Trinidad.

“This is the west side of the Philippines,” Torres said of Palawan. “We are protecting the peace and security of the West Philippine Sea.”

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · October 24, 2024

22. Fighting underground: The US military must learn from Israel's experience

I would like our leaders to recognize the importance for South Korean and US forces to fight in tunnels and recognize that it is north Korea that has provided advice and assistance to Hamas and Hezbollah and other malign actors in their use of tunnels.  It is north Korea that is the center of gravity for tunnelling expertise. north Korea should be mentioned more than just in passing.

Excerpt:

Building on the decades of US experience in subterranean warfare in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam, examining Israel’s underground warfare could help the US and partner militaries prepare for operations against adversaries like Iran, Russia, China, and North Korea, who are growing increasingly close and learning from one another. As a senior Pentagon special operations official put it, it would be “foolish” to assume future fights won’t consist of a similar operational environment.

Fighting underground: The US military must learn from Israel's experience - Breaking Defense

In this op-ed, US Army retired Gen. David Perkins and Ari Cicurel of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America say Israel has adapted to fighting in tunnel systems — and the US must follow suit.

breakingdefense.com · by David Perkins, Ari Cicurel · October 24, 2024

A photograph, taken during an embed with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and reviewed by the IDF censorship office prior to publication, shows Israeli soldiers guarding the entrance of a tunnel. (Photo by Ilia Yefimovich/picture alliance via Getty Images)

As Israel conducts limited ground operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon, it already has encountered tunnels similar to the dangerous unseen combat it has fought for a year beneath Gaza.

Not for the first time, Israel is engaged in a new kind of fight that the United States will face in its future conflicts.

Just as the United States has learned from Israel’s wars in the past, the risks of tunnel warfare and how Israel is overcoming those challenges through coordinated troop maneuvers and technological adaptations should drive a shift in the US approach to subterranean combat.

The United States has a long history of learning from Israel’s wars. The 1973 Yom Kippur War had such a transformational effect that the US Army made the largest change to its doctrine since World War II. The Egyptian and Syrian armies’ use of new Soviet weapons and tactics that were more lethal and rapid, the ability of anti-tank weapons to neutralize more tanks in the first six days of the war than the United States had deployed throughout all of Europe, and tank battles occurring at much greater ranges than ever before shocked American defense planners preparing for a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.

After the war, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) sent a team to Israel, whose findings led to the adoption of the AirLand Battle doctrine that would guide decades of thinking about winning a conventional war in Europe through close coordination between ground forces and aircraft.

Similarly, the wars under Gaza and southern Lebanon have shown how the subterranean environment poses challenges that US troops must be better prepared to fight. Tunnels will be a growing problem for Western-style militaries because they provide physical protection and create challenges for differentiating and isolating fighters from civilians.

Recognizing those advantages, Hamas spent nearly two decades fortifying Gaza with more than 350 miles of interconnected underground tunnels. They intentionally designed the urban landscape to enable attacks, protect Hamas fighters, and thwart IDF advances. Hezbollah built similar underground fortifications in southern Lebanon but over a much larger expanse of land.

Indeed, searching Hamas’s vast, subterranean labyrinth for terrorist fighters and hostages has been among the most difficult aspects of the war and has already proved a time-consuming process in southern Lebanon. Fighters have appeared suddenly from tunnels to quickly target Israeli soldiers before escaping through hidden passageways. Deep and fortified tunnels also held command-and-control centers, weapons production facilities, storage depots, and hostages.

Hamas and Hezbollah also constructed tunnels for strategic purposes as well. Building tunnels inside and below residential buildings, hospitals, schools, mosques, and United Nations facilities leveraged civilians as human shields to discourage Israeli operations. Despite Israel’s pledge to use precise military efforts to minimize collateral damage by distinguishing between terrorists and civilians, hiding fighters beneath civilian sites enabled the willful blindness about who Israeli strikes had targeted that fueled Hamas’s disinformation campaign, contributing to international pressure for Israel to stop the war prematurely.

Early in the war, Israel adapted after it became evident that its initial plan to collapse the tunnels with airstrikes or destroy the entry points would not be widely effective because of how expansive and deep the tunnels were and because such operations could be dangerous to the hostages. Instead, Israel utilized cameras mounted on drones or dogs and AI technology to detect threats so that Israeli forces could analyze the best means of responding.

In Gaza, the IDF quickly transformed its approach to subterranean operations while in contact with enemy fighters. A key adaptation was its implementation of new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for its troops to maneuver underground simultaneously with those moving above ground to use explosives that either completely destroy or render tunnels impassable.

After isolating the area around a tunnel entrance and establishing a secure perimeter to ensure there were no hidden entrances that terrorists could use to mount a surprise attack or escape, the IDF then sent in ground troops to defeat any threats, including with a liquid emulsion explosive that avoided the risk of inadvertent detonation on the surface.

Building on the decades of US experience in subterranean warfare in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam, examining Israel’s underground warfare could help the US and partner militaries prepare for operations against adversaries like Iran, Russia, China, and North Korea, who are growing increasingly close and learning from one another. As a senior Pentagon special operations official put it, it would be “foolish” to assume future fights won’t consist of a similar operational environment.

Borrowing from the IDF’s efforts to coordinate ground troops above and below ground as well as air assets, US doctrine and TTPs for subterranean warfare should emphasize the necessity to detect, analyze, differentiate, isolate, and defeat threats.

With the US military also seeking to transform while in contact with an enemy, just as the IDF continues to do, the US Defense Department should emphasize subterranean combat during collaborations with Israel about the future of warfare, expand the US-Israel anti-tunnel cooperation program to fund technologies that explore or collapse tunnels, and conduct regular subterranean warfare exercises with Israeli forces. Joint drills that focus on maneuvering troops simultaneously above and below ground and utilizing emergent technologies would have immense value to US missions from counterterrorism to hostage rescue.

Fighting underground is challenging in any scenario. Yet, Israel’s successful adaptations have once again provided a transformational model for the US military to study.

General David Perkins, USA (ret.) was the former Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and a participant on the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (JINSA) 2019 Generals and Admirals Program. Ari Cicurel is the assistant director of foreign policy at JINSA.

23. The Biggest Foreign Policy Challenges Facing Harris and Trump

The Biggest Foreign Policy Challenges Facing Harris and Trump

Military.com | By Stephen J. Cimbala and Lawrence J. Korb

Published October 24, 2024 at 3:14pm ET

military.com · October 24, 2024

The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Military.com. If you would like to submit your own commentary, please send your article to opinions@military.com for consideration.

As the U.S. presidential election looms, many questions still remain about how either Democratic nominee Vice President Kamala Harris or Republican nominee and former President Donald Trump will handle issues related to national security or foreign policy. The following discussion outlines some of the issues that the new president and her or his administration will have to grapple with in order to establish clearer understandings of America's role in the world and its connection to U.S. domestic politics.

First, there is much discussion among political office holders, media commentators and others about the return of a new Cold War resembling the geopolitical rivalries among the U.S., the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China from the end of World War II until the collapse of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, a more complicated picture looms ahead than a retro Cold War. We are heading into a post-post Cold War system that is partly reminiscent of the past but partakes of a new economic, technological and military constellation of factors influencing policy and strategy.

The present global geopolitical system is a work in progress involving at least two different ad hoc coalitions of states. The first is a collaborative coalition of countries working to resolve international problems through transnational cooperation in areas such as climate change, pandemics, international peace and security, failed states and human trafficking. This coalition has some fluidity in its membership, depending on the issues involved, but it includes most of the world's larger democracies and wealthier states, as well as selected other actors in the Global South. We can think of this grouping as the "Problem Solvers" coalition.

The second coalition consists of those states that object to most of the structure of the present rules-based international order centered on the U.S. and its Western allies. Some of the leaders in this "Dissatisfied Doubters" coalition want to return to the days of imperialism, autocracy and ideologically driven foreign policy characteristic of the previous two centuries. Leaders of this coalition include Russia, North Korea and Iran. Others in this coalition feel that the present international system has too many structural inequalities, including in wealth and military power.

This sub-grouping also includes a number of states whose leaders feel that they are insufficiently respected despite their rising regional political and cultural influence. For example, Russia has tried to reach out to countries in the Global South that might be interested in joining the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) coalition, which -- despite some disagreements on other issues -- share a sense of malaise and resentment about the present international system.

Some leading powers want to maintain influence in both of these camps; China and India are two examples. China's Belt and Road initiative is among its economic efforts to dominate global infrastructure and thereby increase its international influence without resort to war or imperialism. At the same time, China is also building up its conventional and nuclear military power in order to rival the security status of the U.S. and Russia.

China supports Russia's war against Ukraine but also seeks to engage with the collaborative coalition of Problem Solvers on trade, finance and other issues. India is the world's largest democracy and prizes its role of nonalignment with bloc politics. But India also lives in a dangerous neighborhood and cannot ignore its rivalries with Pakistan and China. India is one of the cornerstone members of BRICS but also has considerable diplomatic influence on transnational economic, political and social policies.

The Nuclear Threat

The second set of foreign policy issues related to the 2024 election is the potential for nuclear proliferation and the possibility of nuclear first use. In the case of nuclear first use, Russian President Vladimir Putin has irresponsibly interjected this threat into public statements since the beginning of his war against Ukraine in February 2022. Putin has been pushed into this cul-de-sac by the failure of his military campaign to defeat Ukraine and impose regime change despite Russia's overwhelming superiority relative to Ukraine in manpower and military-industrial resources.

As well, Putin's war of aggression has revived and solidified NATO, adding to its membership the formerly nonaligned states of Finland and Sweden. With respect to nuclear nonproliferation, this has been a relative success story from the onset of the nuclear age to the present. However, the near-term possibility of an Iranian bomb hangs over the Middle East, and is especially troublesome, given the already roiling regional war between Israel and Iranian proxies such as Hamas and Hezbollah. The possible spread of nuclear weapons in Asia cannot be ruled out, either, especially if U.S. allies' faith in American extended nuclear deterrence is subjected to doubt.

The Fate of Democracy

Another set of foreign and security policy issues related to the 2024 election might be entitled "Democracy at Bay." It seems that lessons learned in the 20th century about the fragility of democracy when it is threatened by forces within states or by outside aggressors have been forgotten in too many quarters. Obviously, states with little historical experience in political democracy must always be on guard against domestic or foreign influences that would subvert democratic procedures and safeguards. But even states with considerable experience in democratic governance are not immune from the dangers that undermine political stability.

The list of democracies under siege includes the U.S. and Western Europe. What was learned by means of hard experience and education during the Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment, with respect to the foundations and purposes of government, has now been pushed aside by some elites in supposedly advanced democracies. Instead, citizens are subjected to an unrelenting diatribe of psychobabble substituting for analysis, creating an information space of self-imposed political defeatism. For example, with respect to the U.S. role in the world, no longer are we the "shining city on a hill"; now we are just another country. Instead, American international leadership is derided by some as "globalism," and national security is thought to be based on splendid isolationism.

Human Rights and Migration

A fourth set of issues for the U.S. presidential election related to foreign policy is human rights. Simply put: The world's leading democracies have a responsibility for leadership in this regard, both within their national boundaries but also in the global commons. The issue of mass migration is an example of how states must cooperate to resolve the problems that otherwise drive economically disadvantaged and politically persecuted people across state boundaries.

Even the U.S., with its tradition of welcoming the dispossessed and distressed from abroad, found itself unable to cope with the numbers of migrants crossing its borders between 2020 and 2024. Major cities such as New York and Chicago were inundated with new arrivals that strained their budgets, and many critics of U.S. immigration policy charged that the wave of migrants increased crime rates and siphoned economic resources from other needs. Border controls became a contentious issue in the 2024 presidential campaigns, as Republicans charged Democrats with deliberate attempts to redefine the demography of the U.S. and to increase the numbers of potentially Democratic voters. But the U.S. was not alone in facing challenges caused by international migration: Since 2014, countries in Western Europe have also experienced rising numbers of challenges to their social and economic fabrics posed by growing numbers of immigrants.

The challenge of mass migration in the 21st century is not going away, and it cannot be resolved by any single country's draconian border controls. People who live in failed states where governments are hopelessly inefficient or corrupt, and where economic opportunities for them and their children are dead ends, will not simply sit down and die. They will move or revolt.

Failing these people is not only unjust, it is also self-defeating for advanced democracies. Democracy, in order to last across generations, must assimilate both native-born and immigrant contributors to a body politic that rewards compromise among competing interests within a shared framework of expectations about public policy. The U.S. has succeeded at this in the past, and it can continue to do so in the future with courageous leadership, educated voters and continuing recognition that persons with different political views are not enemies but friends with different opinions.

-- Stephen Cimbala is a distinguished professor of political science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous books and articles on international security issues.

-- Lawrence Korb, a retired Navy captain, has held national security positions at several think tanks, and served in the Pentagon in the Reagan administration.

military.com · October 24, 2024

24. Pentagon Investigation into Navy SEAL Medical Care

Download the 82 page document here: https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/25249963/dodig-2025-008_redacted-secure.pdf

Pentagon Investigation into Navy SEAL Medical Care - USNI News

news.usni.org · by U.S. Naval Institute Staff · October 24, 2024

The following is the Oct. 24, 2024, Department of Defense Inspector General report, Evaluation of Medical Care Provided to Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) Candidates.

From the report

Objective

Consistent with the FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, the objective of this evaluation was to conduct a comprehensive review of the health care provided to individuals undergoing Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) training to determine whether professionals providing health care to SEAL candidates are properly trained, quality assurance mechanisms with respect to this care are sufficient, and appropriate efforts to mitigate the health stress to individuals undergoing this training are in place.

Background

Established in January 1962, Navy SEALs are considered by the Navy to be an elite maritime military force suited for all aspects of unconventional warfare. Navy SEAL training consists of Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) and SEAL Q qualification Training. One of the defining events during BUD/S is known as “ Hell Week.” Hell Week occurs during the fourth week of BUD/S and is meant to test candidates’ grit and resilience. It consists of 108.5 consecutive hours of training spanning 6 calendar days.

Finding

From February 2022 through January 2024, the Navy and U.S. Special Operations Command made policy and procedure changes that improved the medical care and safety for Navy SEAL candidates. We observed the implementation of the changes to policies and procedures during Hell Week of Class 362 in September 2023.

However, the DoD and Navy could improve their policies and ensure that the Naval Special Warfare Center (NSWCEN) has sufficient resources. For example, DoD Instruction (DoDI) 1010.16, “Technical Procedures for the Military Personnel Drug Abuse Testing Program,” regarding performance‑enhancing drug (PED) policy, does not define PEDs to align with language in a January 2023 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD[P&R]) memorandum.

Additionally, to alleviate burnout, NSWCEN Medical uses staff from other phases of training to support Hell Week. An assessment of NSWCEN’s medical capabilities may provide opportunities to address NSWCEN’s medical manpower requirements to ensure that staffing meets clinical demand and possibly reduce the potential for staff burnout. Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) should reassess NSWCEN’s medical and communication equipment and medical manpower.

Furthermore, although safety procedures are in place to mitigate risk to candidates, NAVSPECWARCOM lacks a policy on the intentional use of sleep deprivation practices. The practice of sleep deprivation during Hell Week is operationally relevant, and NSWCEN has safety procedures in place to mitigate the risk to candidates. However, Navy officials were unable to provide specific rationale for the timing, length, or number of sleep periods, and we were unable to identify DoD policies providing purpose, applicability, and guidance for intentionally depriving candidates of sleep.

Download the document here.

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news.usni.org · by U.S. Naval Institute Staff · October 24, 2024

25. My War, Our War: The Unfinished Business of Afghanistan

Conclusion:

The conversation around the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, and consequently around the entirety of our experience within that country, is not yet over. Not only does the American citizenry deserve an accounting of its expenditures in human and financial capital, but we owe it to ourselves as service members to make sense of our experiences and hold ourselves responsible for our rights and our wrongs. We must write, we must read, we must share, we must listen.

My War, Our War: The Unfinished Business of Afghanistan - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Calvin Richards · October 25, 2024

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It took me a few seconds to understand that the object falling from the plane was a person. By the time the second body fell I had a reasonable grasp of what I was witnessing and was subsequently prepared for the third and final falling man. I later saw pictures of the young man whose mangled body landed on a residential rooftop. I was one among the many thousands who observed these acts of desperation at the climax of the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Like many other Americans at Hamid Karzai International Airport that day, I had stayed up all night after thousands of Afghan civilians swarmed the airfield with clamoring hopes to escape the Taliban’s final advance. But my firsthand experience in Afghanistan began many years earlier.

By the time I participated in the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan I needed more than two hands to count the number of my combat deployments in support of America’s post-9/11 wars and global counterterrorism operations. While certainly not the oldest nor most experienced soldier on the battlefield, I counted myself lucky to have personal context and history to help in my understanding and execution of this final mission. Connecting the threads of my own history in this war has become the greatest challenge of my military career.

Like many other service members, my relationship with the war in Afghanistan is complex. The breadth and longevity of the war created a tapestry of experiences across the American military. Very few individuals, if any, have experienced enough of the conflict to shape anything more than a snapshot, or series of snapshots, frozen in time. My relationship with Afghanistan started out simpler than it eventually became—a development that arguably mirrors the trajectory of our national attitude. I joined the military prior to the Afghanistan surge during President Barack Obama’s first term, and my deployments have always been characterized by short, rapid forays into different battlefields. This gave me a unique perspective that is oftentimes at odds with the experiences of other service members. Combat deployments were windows on a fast-moving train, offering brief glimpses of a vast nation without meaningful context of the land or people.

After my experience during the withdrawal from Kabul, I was driven to consume. I read as much as I could about Afghanistan, its people, and our war, adding context to my involvement with the words and experiences of others. I had been processing my unique place within this conflict for as long as I had been participating in it. The withdrawal from Kabul had been the closing of a book, but my concluding chapter was missing, and my final scene a fever dream. My reflection over the past three years has been an effort to write that final chapter, a task many individual service members are similarly engaged in. It is a necessary task for each of us as individuals. But it is equally necessary for the US military as a body and for the nation.

The evacuation was at that point the greatest crisis of my military career. And if nothing else it stands as a testament to the American military’s logistical capability. While many stateside service members watching through media channels back home might have had thoughts of their past experiences in Afghanistan, perhaps remembering the names of partners they have worked with or teammates they have lost, I had little time to focus on anything other than the calamity at hand.

Once the American embassy relocated to the airport and the emergency withdrawal began in earnest, I was contacted by an Afghan man to help get the rest of his family out of the country. He worked at high levels between the American and Afghan government apparatus. Despite this, his last recourse was to contact not his countrymen nor his powerful political contacts, but rather me, a foreigner, and as unfolding events would prove, his only hope. I can no more reconcile this turn of events than I can reconcile the death of a partner Afghan soldier more than a decade earlier—he was shot in the head in the first room into which his squad had made entry during a clearance operation. I had met him a few days prior and marveled at his fluency in the English language and his motivation to improve his country. No Americans were harmed during the mission. So it goes.

There is much to say about the lack of a whole-of-government continuity throughout the conflict or the feasibility of an effective nation-building strategy enacted by an occupying force that never fully understood the land it was occupying or the people within it. But the long, slow deflagration of the Afghanistan war ended in an explosion, the pieces of which have embedded themselves in anyone who has served in the conflict. The completion of the withdrawal itself, like the bulk of the war, was planned by senior leaders with expansive staffs, but relied on lower enlisted service members, noncommissioned officers, and junior officers. It was young specialists, sergeants, lieutenants, and captains who bore witness to the last dying gasp of the war at their feet. In some ways, this faceless sea of interchangeable American patriots, the middle management of the military, will retain culture and ideas for far longer than its constituent members retain their positions within it.

Telling our stories is a necessary means of processing the Afghanistan conflict, both as a nation and as a military. What institutional mechanisms do we have to enable our collective reckoning with the end of such a protracted conflict? How do we encourage and grow a civil-military relationship that can bridge this discourse? Do the answers to these questions matter in how we process this event and contend with its legacy? I believe that they do. In the telling of our stories, we are contributing the individual bricks with which to build a monument of truthful remembrance—a vital act if this war is to be placed properly in our national conscience and collective memory.

In our stories, there are the both the broad contours and the fine details of moral injury—and moral repair. Much has been written about moral injury in the wake of the Afghanistan withdrawal, but the discussion began even before the fateful summer of 2021. David Wood’s significant What Have We Done, for example, was published nearly five years prior. Wood’s work recognizes that the length of the Afghanistan war is fundamentally disorienting. It should go without question that war causes moral injury within the armies that wage it. The difficulty lies in identifying the source of the moral injury and in dealing with it appropriately. Not all wars are created equal, and we must create anew and psychological frameworks within our ranks to reconcile our experiences. T. R. Fehrenbach’s eponymous quote from his classic work on the Korean War remains true: “This kind of war, however necessary, is dirty business, first to last.”

We, the rank and file of the American military, cannot afford the discussion of this conflict and its conclusion to take place without us. Nor can the nation. The experiences of those who participated throughout its long duration must be accounted for, all the way through to those of the young Marines and soldiers who did phenomenal jobs in a dynamic and kinetic environment in the summer of 2021, whose work resulted in tens of thousands of Afghans retrieved through the various gates of Hamid Karzai International Airport.

War is messy and unclean in a variety of ways, but there is at least one clarity in death—it is a bow shock that polarizes as it passes through you. It crystallizes complex uncertainties into a grief both shared and personal. In previous deployments I have been impacted in such ways by the deaths of both compatriots and the enemy. But what clarity is there in the yawning chasm of desperation that characterized the overrunning of the Kabul airport by its citizens and their families? There is no crystallization of purpose in such an event. After the withdrawal, I felt myself adrift. Like many others, I was able to regather myself through reflection, conversations with longtime peers and friends, and occasional therapy.

Like most things in war, the accounting of this conflict and its finale will probably not resolve in the way that we hope. We, as both a civilian society and a military culture, must be proactive in shaping the internal legacy that we leave within ourselves and our nation. It won’t suffice to await a satisfying reckoning from those at the national policymaking level or from the top ranks of the armed services. In the military we have a confounding habit of demanding accountability at all levels of our operations while wringing our hands and blaming ephemeral constructs for frustrating results. A commander might argue that his or her brief stint in a combat tour was a notable contribution, while simultaneously lamenting being hamstrung by a lack of strategic coherence in long-term planning. It allows us to play the part of demanding responsibility while simultaneously relinquishing it to the ethereal realm of higher powers, thus safeguarding our individual morality.

Of course, this is not to argue that such attempts at accountability or reconciliation at the higher levels of government are not warranted or appropriate. The office of the Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) published a variety of reports and lessons learned to document both American and Afghan shortcomings throughout the course of the war. The SIGAR report from November 2022, examining “why the Afghan government collapsed,” is especially thought provoking. It is a document best viewed through the lens of the complicated, unique relationship between the United States and Afghanistan, with special consideration given to the conditions that arose as a consequence of this relationship, ultimately enabling the Taliban’s success and precipitating the chaos of the withdrawal.

In fairness, if war is indeed an extension of policy by other means, then any proper conversation on the war in Afghanistan is incomplete without the inclusion of diplomatic efforts and the contributions of the Department of State. Perhaps uncharacteristically scathing, the State Department’s “After Action Review on Afghanistan” delineates a number a significant failures or shortcomings during the process of the withdrawal, while also speaking truth to the herculean effort otherwise undertaken by its members on the ground. For those who participated directly in the evacuation of Kabul, findings such as this are both revelatory and achingly self-evident: “U.S. military planning for a possible NEO [noncombatant evacuation operation] had been underway with post for some time, but the Department’s participation in the NEO planning process was hindered by the fact that it was unclear who in the Department had the lead. Coordination with DoD worked better on the ground in Kabul.”

I am at least capable, in my own small way and to my own small benefit and detriment, of taking some measure of responsibility. Like so many others who, when acting as the extension of America’s foreign policy, have accumulated a list of lives lost and lives gained, I step backward through time and into flawed memories to recall the deeds of the dead and the faces of the affected, and experience a turmoil of thought trying to connect it all together. Like many others I have met and worked with throughout the years, and soldiers of all types before and after me, I leave the light on at my campsite so that others may come and together we can extract a bartered peace within ourselves through a pulling of threads and a sharing of experience. This internal peace is necessary for warfighters as individuals. After all, I will have another objective tomorrow, and there is always another raid or ambush or killing field on the horizon, and these thoughts won’t be on my mind or the mind of other service members quietly continuing their warfighting. But it is equally necessary for us as a collective.

The conversation around the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, and consequently around the entirety of our experience within that country, is not yet over. Not only does the American citizenry deserve an accounting of its expenditures in human and financial capital, but we owe it to ourselves as service members to make sense of our experiences and hold ourselves responsible for our rights and our wrongs. We must write, we must read, we must share, we must listen.

Calvin Richards is a master sergeant in the US Army. A veteran of more than a dozen combat deployments, he was a senior noncommissioned officer during the American withdrawal from Kabul and was present on the ground prior to and during its execution.

Editor’s note: Due to operational security and the sensitivity of the author’s work in the special operations community, MWI has elected to publish this article under pseudonyms rather than their true names.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. Andrea Salgado Rivera, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Calvin Richards · October 25, 2024

26. DEI Is Crushing Military Recruitment

Is it DEI or is it the extreme arguments on both sides of the issue that are having a negative impact? The extremes for and against DEI are likely creating negative feelings among potential recruits.

Excerpts:

The focus on DEI is driving an especially profound disillusionment among conservative veterans, the military’s longstanding support bedrock. Between 2019 and 2024, the percentage of conservative veterans who would advise a young family member to join the military declined from 88% to 53%. That almost entirely explains the shift in the broader veteran population. Far more conservative veterans cited the “military’s DEI and other social policies” as a “major factor” (85%) in withholding their endorsement than the “possibility of physical injury or death” (33%) or the “possibility of psychological problems” (27%). The military is heading in the wrong direction, say 90% of conservative veterans.

The recruiting crisis is a symptom of the leadership crisis. Recent presidents haven’t heartily encouraged military service. Defense funding is near a record low as a percentage of gross domestic product. Rather than advocating for a stronger defense, retired generals alienate the force by weighing in on bitter political campaigns. The military’s current leaders nervously balance racial head counts as they prepare for major war.

The values of a liberal democracy are different than those required to protect it. DEI has done more harm than good to the military. A refocus on war fighting will help restore the trust of our veterans.

DEI Is Crushing Military Recruitment

Veterans worried about the quality of leadership are counseling young family members not to join up.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/dei-is-crushing-military-recruitment-family-recommendations-diversity-equity-inclusion-7be6240c?mc_cid=abcc09f1c6&mc_eid=70bf478f36

By Kevin Wallsten and Owen West

Oct. 24, 2024 3:43 pm ET

Military veterans march at the Veterans Day parade in New York, November 2023. Photo: EPA/Shutterstock

The veteran community has lost faith in the country’s national-security leadership. The military is a family business—80% of volunteers have a family member who served. Three years into a recruiting crisis, however, the Pentagon hasn’t specifically surveyed this core constituency to determine what’s going wrong.

Pew surveys in 2011 and again in 2019 found approximately 80% of veterans would advise young people to join the military. We recently commissioned a demographically representative YouGov survey of 2,100 veterans. Our data show the share of veterans recommending military service plunged 20 percentage points in five years, to just 62%.

After watching four presidents lose two wars, buffeted by polarizing policy changes from one administration to another, veterans are no longer confident that their children and grandchildren will enjoy proper leadership. When asked to grade performance in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, veterans gave presidents a C-minus. More than 80% of veterans who wouldn’t recommend service cited “mistrust of political leadership” as a “major factor.” Generals didn’t fare much better, receiving a C-plus for their performance in recent wars.

More generally, a large section of the veteran community believes the military has lost mission focus. In 2017, then-Defense Secretary James Mattis declared that lethality was the military’s lodestar. In our survey seven years later, only 18% of veterans say lethality has more focus. Lethality now competes with a fixation on the internal composition of the force. “We are going to make sure,” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said in 2021, “that our military looks like America and that our leadership looks like what’s in the ranks of the military.”

Over the past three years, the Pentagon steadily erected a diversity, equity and inclusion bureaucracy. Diversity officers were installed throughout the ranks, systematically replacing Colin Powell’s “colorblind” philosophy with identity reporting up the chain of command. The Air Force issued a memorandum in 2022 setting specific race and sex quotas for officers. In 2023 President Biden stated diversity was necessary for “all successful military operations,” ordering DEI to be embedded throughout the ranks.

Our survey underscores the unpopularity of these moves among veterans. Contrary to President Biden’s claim, 57% say that diversity is “not essential” for military success, and 94% oppose race and sex preferences in military promotions. Only 14% of veterans want the military to pay more attention to DEI.

The focus on DEI is driving an especially profound disillusionment among conservative veterans, the military’s longstanding support bedrock. Between 2019 and 2024, the percentage of conservative veterans who would advise a young family member to join the military declined from 88% to 53%. That almost entirely explains the shift in the broader veteran population. Far more conservative veterans cited the “military’s DEI and other social policies” as a “major factor” (85%) in withholding their endorsement than the “possibility of physical injury or death” (33%) or the “possibility of psychological problems” (27%). The military is heading in the wrong direction, say 90% of conservative veterans.

The recruiting crisis is a symptom of the leadership crisis. Recent presidents haven’t heartily encouraged military service. Defense funding is near a record low as a percentage of gross domestic product. Rather than advocating for a stronger defense, retired generals alienate the force by weighing in on bitter political campaigns. The military’s current leaders nervously balance racial head counts as they prepare for major war.

The values of a liberal democracy are different than those required to protect it. DEI has done more harm than good to the military. A refocus on war fighting will help restore the trust of our veterans.

Mr. Wallsten is a professor of political science at California State University, Long Beach State. Mr. West, a former Marine, served as an assistant secretary of defense for special operations, 2017-19.

WSJ Opinion: Wokeism in the Military

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WSJ Opinion: Wokeism in the Military

Play video: WSJ Opinion: Wokeism in the Military

With recruitment rates to the U.S. military falling, attention is turning to the rise of woke politics, which is undermining public confidence in America's military leaders. Images: Department of Defense/YouTube/Go Army Composite: Mark Kelly

Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the October 25, 2024, print edition as 'DEI Is Crushing Military Recruitment'.

​27. On Victory and the Search for a Status Quo Ante Bellum

Admiral Charles Richard, USN (Ret.) and Robert Peters, On Victory and the Search for a Status Quo Ante Bellum, No. 603, October 24, 2024

On Victory and the Search for a Status Quo Ante Bellum

https://nipp.org/information_series/admiral-charles-richard-usn-ret-and-robert-peters-on-victory-and-the-search-for-a-status-quo-ante-bellum-no-603-october-24-2024/

Admiral Charles Richard, USN (Ret.)

ADM Charles Richard, USN (Ret.) is a former Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, and the University of Virginia Miller Center’s James R. Schlesinger Distinguished Professor.

Robert Peters

Robert Peters is the Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.

In a recent publication, the authors—a former senior military commander and a defense policy civilian—argued that America’s national security professionals are far too quick to dismiss escalation as a tool of statecraft—a position that undercuts America’s ability to deter its adversaries.[1]

Another consequence of a hesitancy to consider escalation by America’s national security practitioners—particularly military officers—is a loss of focus on the goal they ostensibly should be most focused upon: victory. In the authors’ experience, very often during a conflict (real or simulated) American national security professionals do not think in terms of achieving a victory that can lead to a newer, potentially better status quo. Instead, the current generation of national security professionals focuses on reestablishing the status quo ante bellum, or the situation as it existed before the war.

Status Quo Powers and the Dangers of Mirror Imaging

As established in the authors’ earlier article, “Escalation: A Tool to be Considered, Not Dismissed,” the United States is a status quo power that seeks to defend the existing global status quo from Europe to the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific. Consequently, American national security professionals are inclined to want to reestablish the status quo ante bellum as the desired end state of a conflict with a revisionist power. This inclination, however, often creates a number of problems.

Adversaries seek to overturn the status quo which American national security professionals want to preserve. To think otherwise is to mistake adversary goals for our own goals—to mirror image. In fact, U.S. adversaries are almost always revisionist powers for the very reason that the status quo we seek to preserve is intolerable for them. That is why revisionist powers—be they Russia with Ukraine, Iran with its proxies, or possibly China with Taiwan—initiate conflicts in the first place. They ultimately seek a new status quo that better aligns with their broader strategic objectives.

Indeed, seeking an end to conflict only to re-establish the “status quo” is another way of returning to the conditions in which deterrence already failed. Therefore, entreaties by American national security professionals which seek to convince a revisionist power to return to the status quo ante bellum will likely be opposed because revisionist powers: 1) find the status quo intolerable; and, therefore, 2) are willing to accept risk, employ force, and accept cost to achieve victory.

Moreover, once a conflict begins, revisionist powers will continue to employ force so long as they: 1) are able to sustain force; 2) see a pathway to victory; and, 3) do not pay costs that outweigh the benefits of the objective they seek once they create a new status quo. Attempts by national security professionals to convince themselves that a pathway exists to conflict termination that ends with a status quo ante bellum that is appealing to a revisionist power is one that is almost assuredly doomed to failure, or worse. If the revisionist power sees the status quo as intolerable, it has no reason to accept conflict termination short of a new status quo post bellum so long as the revisionist power has some hope that conflict protraction will serve its interest. That adversary will neither seek nor accept conflict termination so long as it can sustain the conflict or until it can achieve its revisionist goals.

U.S. national security professionals are mistaken when they expect that their opponents value a return to the status quo ante bellum as much as they themselves do. This form of mirror imaging does not take into account the actual desires and objectives of their opponents. Such mirror imaging makes it virtually impossible to craft a conflict termination strategy that will be enduring or even acceptable to the adversary.

Better Pathways to Conflict Termination and Decisive Victory

If not seeking to convince the revisionist power to return to the status quo ante bellum, what then should American national security professionals do when formulating conflict termination pathways? Put simply, they should seek pathways to achieve a better, new status quo that can be implemented after a decisive military victory.

Indeed, overly focusing on a return to status quo ante bellum, while desirable from an American point of view in many ways, also presents real dangers for the United States. To begin with, by focusing on non-escalatory pathways that are characterized by restraint for the restoration of status quo, national security professionals may end up not deterring the opponent and prolonging a conflict, and therefore increasing the numbers of civilian and military casualties in a conflict.

Even if a U.S.-led coalition “wins” a conflict with a revisionist aggressor, a failure to achieve a meaningful “victory” (however defined within a particular context, but one that very often is a decisive victory on the part of a U.S. or U.S.-led coalition that can dictate a new post-conflict status quo that benefits the existing system and U.S. interests), but instead reinstates the previous status quo ante bellum, leaves in place the reasons that the conflict began in the first place. That is, the revisionist state that initiated the conflict because it found the status quo intolerable, unless defeated decisively, will simply seek to change the status quo when conditions are (for them) more favorable.

Put another way, the goal of returning to the status quo ante bellum may sow the seeds for another future conflict over the same fundamental issues. Such was the case with the 1801 Peace of Amiens between the British Empire and Napolean Bonaparte, when the underlying causes of the first half of the Napoleonic Wars were unaddressed—but neither side was defeated—thus setting the stage for the second half of the Napoleonic Wars. Or, it may hold the seeds for a future conflict, because the new post-conflict status quo actually incentivizes a future conflict by creating animosity among the vanquished without substantially increasing the victor’s benefits or expanding the coalition of the victors. For example, consider the post-World War I settlement in Europe, when the German Empire was defeated, but retained revanchist goals and the basic elements of power needed to dominate Europe given the disestablishment and break-ups of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires. Decisive victory attained on the field of battle is the necessary condition by which a new status quo can be established that can prevent a follow-on conflict from unfolding.

Decisive victory ultimately deters a future war by changing the conditions that allowed a revisionist power to pursue conflict in the first place. This decisive victory could take a number of forms. It could be a victory in which the victors lead the vanquished to change their behavior by offering them a new role in a different post bellum security environment (as was the case with Germany and Japan after World War II). Decisive victory could also create the conditions for a more stable and therefore enduring peace by seeking accommodation with the vanquished (as was the case at the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, when both sides of the Napoleonic Wars, to include the successor regimes to the Bonapartist coalition, cooperated for almost a century to defuse most foreign policy or security disputes in Europe and beyond). Finally, decisive victory could include an expansion of the coalition of the victors (such as occurred following the Cold War, when NATO expanded to include most of the former members of the Warsaw Pact). In almost all cases, decisive victory takes the form of a new, better status quo post bellum that is based on a new power and political relationship between the victor and the vanquished.

A new, better status quo could take many forms. It could result in a weakened adversary that has fewer instruments of national power and thus is unable to present a significant threat to U.S. or allied interests (such was the case after the first Gulf War). It could result in a strengthened alliance system that is better able to contain, deter, and ultimately defeat future aggression (as was the case after World War II). It could result in a better correlation of forces or some other basic change in the allocation of power. However, in almost all cases, a new status quo post bellum requires a decisive prior victory of some kind.

However the conflict ends, the military should focus on achieving decisive victory that leaves adversaries in a weaker position than before, in order to make them pay a price that demonstrates that their initial decision for conflict was a grave mistake and undermines their ability to initiate future conflicts. This new condition also serves as a warning to other actors who may seek to initiate conflict as a means to change the status quo.

Without a decisive victory that fundamentally changes the security environment into an enduring, stable, and therefore peaceful status quo post bellum, security challenges persist because the fundamental challenges that existed before the conflict erupted remain. In addition to the examples listed above, history offers many examples of post-conflict settlements that failed to address the fundamental tensions or security challenges that triggered the conflict in the first place. Whether it is the Arab-Israeli conflict, Kashmiri border disputes between India and China, or between China and Taiwan, cease-fires or peace treaties that fail to address the fundamental point of disagreement between two parties—and which therefore make a status quo intolerable for one or more parties—simply set the stage for a future conflict at a later date.

Conclusion

Our nation’s military officers and civilian policymakers need to get back to basics. They must think deeply and critically about risk acceptance—and how avoiding operational risk and showing “restraint” may put the United States at greater strategic risk. In the final analysis, they need to think hard about victory and how to set the conditions for a successful conflict termination that improves America’s position in a new status quo post bellum and ends an adversary’s desire and power to challenge the status quo. This must be done in concert between uniformed military professionals and civilian policymakers. It must be done with a deep understanding of history, why an adversary found the existing status quo intolerable in the first place, the reasons that a conflict began, and a plausible path to a new status quo post bellum that will set the conditions for a new, enduring and stable peace.

If America’s national security professionals do not do these things, our nation runs the risk of winning a war, only to refight it years later, due to a failure to focus on a decisive victory that enables an enduring peace.

[1] See Admiral Charles Richard, USN (Ret.) and Robert Peters, “Escalation: A Tool to be Considered, Not Dismissed,” Information Series, No. 600, National Institute for Public Policy, October 2, 2024, available at https://nipp.org/information_series/admiral-charles-richard-usn-ret-and-robert-peters-escalation-a-tool-to-be-considered-not-dismissed-no-600-october-2-2024/.

The National Institute for Public Policy’s Information Series is a periodic publication focusing on contemporary strategic issues affecting U.S. foreign and defense policy. It is a forum for promoting critical thinking on the evolving international security environment and how the dynamic geostrategic landscape affects U.S. national security. Contributors are recognized experts in the field of national security. National Institute for Public Policy would like to thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation for the generous support that made this Information Series possible.

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

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