Apologies for my tardiness. Morning meetings and phone calls! :-) 

Quotes of the Day:

"Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world." 

- Nelson Mandela

"Life is ten percent what happens to you and ninety percent how you respond to it." 

- Lou Holtz

"To be well informed, one must read quickly a great number of merely instructive books. To be cultivated, one must read slowly and with a lingering appreciation the comparatively few books that have been written by men who lived, thought, and felt with style." 

- Aldous Huxley

1. Israeli poll finds 49% support for holding off on Gaza invasion

2. U.S. Strikes Iranian-Linked Targets in Syria

3. Ukraine hints Putin contriving second front as Hamas visits Moscow

4. After Biden meeting, new Speaker Johnson says GOP won't abandon Ukraine but will aid Israel first

5. Israel’s Army Is Ready to Invade Gaza. Its Divided Government May Not Be.

6. What helped change the US Army counterinsurgency doctrine? » Wavell Room

7. Lessons from the Chinese Conquest of Taiwan More than Three Centuries Ago

8. Release of hostages requires ceasefire, Hamas official says

9. ‘Everything is destroyed’: Civilians trickle out of Avdiivka as Russian assault leaves Ukrainian town in ruins

10. Ukraine war orders starting to boost revenues for big US defense contractors

11. Mideast in focus as US, China meet to pave way for Biden-Xi summit

12. China's Wang tells Blinken 'in-depth' dialogue can steady ties

13. China and the US appear to restart military talks

14. ‘Viet Cong times 10’: underground warfare awaits Israeli troops in Gaza

15. White House says Russia is executing its own soldiers for not following orders

16.  US Scrambled to Assign Intel Analysts to Hamas After Attack

17. Iran Threatens US With 'Fire' if Israel Doesn’t Stop Attacks on Gaza

18. Most Popular Cryptocurrency Keeps Showing Up in Illicit Finance

19. Israel’s Laws of War

20. The Meaning of Terrorism: When tragedy strikes, we should be careful about how we describe it.

21. Joint Press Statement for Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III's Call With Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro Jr.

1. Israeli poll finds 49% support for holding off on Gaza invasion

That seems higher than I would have guessed.

Israeli poll finds 49% support for holding off on Gaza invasion

Reuters

JERUSALEM, Oct 27 (Reuters) - Almost half of Israelis want to hold off on any invasion of Gaza, according to a poll published on Friday, in what may indicate a dip in support for the planned next stage of the counter-offensive against Hamas militants holding some 200 hostages.

Israel vowed to annihilate Hamas in response to the Palestinian Islamists' killing and kidnapping spree in its southern communities on Oct. 7, and has been stepping up tank and infantry raids in concert with heavy shelling of the enclave.

Asked if the military should immediately escalate to a large-scale ground offensive, 29% of Israelis agreed while 49% said "it would be better to wait" and 22% were undecided, the poll published in the Maariv newspaper said.

The daily said the results contrasted with its Oct. 19 poll that found 65% support for a major ground offensive.

"From a breakdown of the answers, it emerges that there is no division in accordance with political camp or demographics, and that it is almost certain that the developments on the matter of the hostages, which is now topping the agenda, have had a great impact on this shift (in opinion)," Maariv wrote.

Hamas freed four hostages over the last week amid efforts by regional mediator countries to arrange a larger-scale release.

Hamas says around 50 hostages have been killed in Israeli strikes on Gaza. One ex-hostage said she had been held, along with at least two dozen others, in an underground Hamas tunnel and bunker complex that is a focus of Israel's offensive.

Maariv polled a representative sample of 522 adult Israelis. The margin of error was 4.3%, the newspaper said.

Writing by Dan Williams; Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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Reuters

2. U.S. Strikes Iranian-Linked Targets in Syria

U.S. Strikes Iranian-Linked Targets in Syria

The Pentagon said the airstrikes against facilities used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and its proxies were in retaliation for recent rocket and drone attacks on American forces.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/26/us/politics/us-strikes-iran-syria-iraq.html

• Share full article

Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder, the Pentagon spokesman, said attacks last week by Iranian-backed militants had left 19 U.S. service members in Iraq and Syria suffering from traumatic brain injuries.Credit...Kevin Wolf/Associated Press

By Eric Schmitt

• Published Oct. 26, 2023Updated Oct. 27, 2023, 7:12 a.m. ET

The United States carried out two airstrikes against facilities used by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and its proxies in eastern Syria early Friday in retaliation for a flurry of recent rocket and drone attacks against American forces in Iraq and Syria.

The strikes by Air Force F-16 jets, against a weapons storage facility and an ammunition storage facility, were intended to send a strong signal to Iran to rein in the attacks the Biden administration has blamed on Tehran’s proxies in Syria and Iraq without escalating the conflict in the Middle East, U.S. officials said. The targets, while limited in number, represent an escalation in striking facilities used by Iran’s own forces in the region, not just the militias in Iraq and Syria that Tehran helps to arm, train and equip.

“These precision self-defense strikes are a response to a series of ongoing and mostly unsuccessful attacks against U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria by Iranian-backed militia groups,” Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III said in a statement.

“The United States does not seek conflict and has no intention nor desire to engage in further hostilities, but these Iranian-backed attacks against U.S. forces are unacceptable and must stop,” Mr. Austin said.

Since Hamas’s surprise attack against Israel on Oct. 7, President Biden and his aides have sought to contain the war between Israel and Hamas, and prevent it from spilling over into a regional conflict with Iran and its proxies in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.

To that end, the United States has deployed two aircraft carriers to the eastern Mediterranean near Israel and dozens of additional warplanes to the Persian Gulf region to deter Iran and its proxies in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq from engaging in a regional war. The Pentagon has also rushed additional Patriot antimissile batteries and other air defenses to several Gulf nations to protect U.S. troops and bases in the region.

But with the near daily attacks against U.S. forces over the past 10 days — the Pentagon’s tally climbed to at least 19 by late Thursday — pressure had been mounting on the United States to respond militarily.

Image

The aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower deployed to the eastern Mediterranean.Credit...Anderson W. Branch/U.S. Department of Defense, via Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

“These narrowly tailored strikes in self-defense were intended solely to protect and defend U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria,” Mr. Austin said. “They are separate and distinct from the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, and do not constitute a shift in our approach to the Israel-Hamas conflict.”

Reactions to the Conflict in the U.S.

• Jewish Americans: For many American Jews, there have been too many emotions to process. Young people spoke of fear, shock, solidarity and helplessness, while some progressives said they were feeling abandoned by their left-wing allies.
• Palestinian Americans: Palestinians in the United States are dismayed by the violence, but some said that politicians and news outlets were overlooking historical context.
• A Family’s Pain: From his Los Angeles home, Mohammed Abujayyab has sought to help his grandmother and other relatives survive Israeli airstrikes. Memories and fears of displacement loom large.
• A Polarizing Debate: As tensions over the war mount on U.S. college campuses, some Republican presidential candidates are wading into the emotional debate that is playing out among students and faculty members.

He added: “If attacks by Iran’s proxies against U.S. forces continue, we will not hesitate to take further necessary measures to protect our people.”

A senior Defense Department official told reporters in a briefing late Thursday that the airstrikes were not coordinated with Israel’s military.

Pentagon officials offered few details about the strikes themselves, how much damage they caused and what kind of response they might draw from Iran and its allies. They gave the following account:

Two Air Force F-16 strike aircraft based in the region, accompanied by MQ-9 drones, dropped more than 30 precision-guided bombs on a weapons storage facility and an ammunition storage facility near Abu Kamal, Syria. While rockets or drones had not been launched from the site, officials said munitions stored at the facilities were used in the recent attacks against U.S. forces.

Pentagon officials said there were people at the site during the day on Thursday, but it was unclear whether any Iranian or militia personnel were injured or killed in the strikes.

As in the past, the United States opted to strike Iran-backed targets based in eastern Syria, not southern Iraq, where the groups operate with wide latitude. Administration officials have urged Iraqi officials to crack down on the groups in that area with little success. Still, conducting American airstrikes could have a destabilizing effect on the Iraqi government, which works closely with the U.S. government.

“The U.S. sent a message tonight,” Mick Mulroy, a former defense official and retired C.I.A. officer, said in a statement late Thursday. “We will directly respond against Iran, and specifically the I.R.G.C., if they continue to attack our military positions and personnel in Iraq and Syria.”

Mr. Biden, asked on Wednesday about drone strikes against U.S. military personnel in Iraq and Syria in recent days, said he had warned Iran “that if they continue to move against those troops, we will respond.”

The predawn U.S. retaliatory strikes on Friday came just hours after the Pentagon announced that 19 U.S. military members based in Iraq and Syria had suffered traumatic brain injuries after rocket and drone attacks from Iran-backed militants last week.

The Defense Department had previously said that 21 service members had suffered minor injuries but returned to duty after the attacks on Oct. 17 and 18 at Al Asad Air Base in western Iraq and al-Tanf garrison in southern Syria.

Image

The al-Tanf military outpost in southern Syria in 2018.Credit...Lolita Baldor/Associated Press

Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder, the Pentagon spokesman, said on Thursday that 15 of the 17 service members injured at al-Tanf and all four of the troops hurt at Al Asad had subsequently been diagnosed with traumatic brain injuries.

“As we’ve seen in the past, there are situations where several days after an attack, a member may self-report ringing in the ears, headaches,” said General Ryder, who said there had been no other diagnoses of traumatic brain injury since then.

There are 2,500 U.S. troops in Iraq and 900 in Syria, mainly helping local allies conduct counterterrorism missions against the Islamic State.

The airstrikes Friday follow a pattern set early in the Biden administration of retaliation against Iranian-linked groups for attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria.

Shortly after taking office, the president ordered the bombing of buildings in eastern Syria belonging to what the Pentagon said were Iran-backed militias responsible for a Feb. 15, 2021, rocket attack on an Iraq airport. That attack killed a Filipino contractor with the American-led military coalition and wounded six other people, including five Americans.

In June 2021, the United States carried out airstrikes in Iraq and Syria against two Iranian-backed militias that the Pentagon said had conducted drone strikes against American personnel in Iraq.

In August 2022, the United States struck militant groups linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in northeastern Syria, killing at least two fighters. Those strikes followed rocket attacks from the Iranian-backed forces, one of which wounded three U.S. service members.

This March, U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that a self-destructing drone of “Iranian origin” had killed a U.S. contractor and injured another contractor and five U.S. service members in an attack on a maintenance facility on a coalition base in northeast Syria.

Mr. Biden retaliated by ordering the Pentagon to carry out airstrikes against facilities in eastern Syria used by groups affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, but not the Iranian forces themselves.

Asked by reporters on Thursday when the administration would retaliate for the latest spate of attacks against American troops, General Ryder said the United States always reserves the right to self-defense. “If and when we decide to respond,” General Ryder said, “we would do so at a time and place of our choosing.”

That time came early Friday morning in eastern Syria.

John Ismay contributed reporting.

Eric Schmitt is a senior writer who has traveled the world covering terrorism and national security. He was also the Pentagon correspondent. A member of the Times staff since 1983, he has shared four Pulitzer Prizes. More about Eric Schmitt

3. Ukraine hints Putin contriving second front as Hamas visits Moscow

Excerpts:

Addressing EU leaders meeting for a summit in Brussels, Zelenskyy said by video link: “We must do everything to prevent an even larger international fire from breaking out in the Middle East. The enemies of freedom are very interested in bringing the free world to the second front.”

He added: “We must clearly see this scenario and counter it — together, of course. The sooner security prevails in the Middle East, the sooner we will restore security here — in Europe.”

Zelenskyy spoke as a delegation from Hamas visited Moscow for talks on the release of the foreign hostages, including Russians, that the group is holding in Gaza, Russian news agencies reported.

Ukraine hints Putin contriving second front as Hamas visits Moscow

BY PAUL DALLISON

OCTOBER 26, 2023 9:35 PM CET

2 MINUTES READ

Politico · by Paul Dallison · October 26, 2023

Zelenskyy speaks to EU leaders while Hamas officials travel to Moscow to discuss hostages.

Anatolii Stepaniv/AFP via Getty Images

October 26, 2023 9:35 pm CET

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy suggested that Russia is benefitting from war in the Middle East as senior officials from Hamas arrived in Moscow for talks.

Addressing EU leaders meeting for a summit in Brussels, Zelenskyy said by video link: “We must do everything to prevent an even larger international fire from breaking out in the Middle East. The enemies of freedom are very interested in bringing the free world to the second front.”

He added: “We must clearly see this scenario and counter it — together, of course. The sooner security prevails in the Middle East, the sooner we will restore security here — in Europe.”

Zelenskyy spoke as a delegation from Hamas visited Moscow for talks on the release of the foreign hostages, including Russians, that the group is holding in Gaza, Russian news agencies reported.

Mousa Abu Marzook, a founder and political leader of Hamas who now lives in Qatar, led the delegation that met with the Russian deputy foreign minister, Mikhail Bogdanov.

Earlier this week, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that an Israeli ground invasion of Gaza could lead to a broader regional conflict. “Our main task is to stop the bloodshed and violence,” he said, “otherwise, further escalation of the crisis is fraught with grave and extremely dangerous and destructive consequences. And not only for the Middle East region. It could spill over far beyond the borders of the Middle East.”

Russia launched its war on Ukraine in February 2022, resulting in the deaths of thousands of civilians and creating millions of Ukrainian refugees who have spread across Europe and further afield.

At their Brussels summit, EU leaders are discussing the twin wars in Ukraine and in the Middle East. The conflicts are testing the limits of the bloc’s foreign policy reach, especially given the problems European leaders are experiencing in aligning their positions on Israel.

“It’s clear that the conflict in the Middle East is casting a bit of a shadow over what’s going on in Ukraine,” Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo said a day before the summit.

4. After Biden meeting, new Speaker Johnson says GOP won't abandon Ukraine but will aid Israel first

Excerpts:

Later, the new Republican speaker insisted Congress is “not going to abandon” Ukraine.

Instead, Johnson said House Republicans would first bring a separate bill to provide $14.5 billion in aid to Israel, but they need more information about the Biden administration’s Ukraine strategy.

“We can’t allow Vladimir Putin to prevail in Ukraine because I don’t believe it would stop there,” Johnson said on Fox News’ “Hannity,” referring to the Russian president. But he said, “We must stand with our important ally in the Middle East and that’s Israel.”

After Biden meeting, new Speaker Johnson says GOP won't abandon Ukraine but will aid Israel first

AP · by FARNOUSH AMIRI · October 26, 2023

WASHINGTON (AP) — President Joe Biden met with new House Speaker Mike Johnson and Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries at the White House on Thursday to discuss his request for nearly $106 billion for Israel, Ukraine and other national security needs.

Johnson, a staunch conservative allied with Donald Trump, has shown little interest in providing additional money from Congress to support Ukraine in its war against Russia.

Later, the new Republican speaker insisted Congress is “not going to abandon” Ukraine.

Instead, Johnson said House Republicans would first bring a separate bill to provide $14.5 billion in aid to Israel, but they need more information about the Biden administration’s Ukraine strategy.

“We can’t allow Vladimir Putin to prevail in Ukraine because I don’t believe it would stop there,” Johnson said on Fox News’ “Hannity,” referring to the Russian president. But he said, “We must stand with our important ally in the Middle East and that’s Israel.”

The new Republican leader who swept into office nearly a month after the ouster of Rep. Kevin McCarthy as speaker had a busy first full day in office, having inherited many of the same political problems that tormented past GOP leaders and challenged their tenure as speaker.

In the morning, Johnson said “prayer is appropriate” as a response to the mass shootings in Maine.

Johnson, an evangelical Christian from Louisiana, declined to take questions, including about the possibility of any gun violence legislation from Congress.

“Prayer is appropriate at a time like this, that the evil can end and the senseless violence can stop,” he said.

The House convened with a bustle of activity, making up for lost time during the weeks of chaos since McCarthy’s ouster as speaker. But the initial goodwill toward Johnson blurs the political fault lines challenging his ability to lead the GOP majority in the face of daunting issues ahead.

By Nov. 17, the Congress must fund the government again or risk a federal shutdown. Biden wants nearly $106 billion in military and humanitarian aid for Israel and Ukraine. And Republicans are eager to resume their impeachment inquiry into Biden over his son Hunter’s business dealings.

“Enough of the chaos, enough of the dysfunction,” said Jeffries, D-N.Y., adding it was time for Congress to get back to business.

Jeffries said Democrats were “heartbroken” over the latest shootings and stand with the people of Maine in every way possible, including discussing how Congress can address gun violence.

Johnson said he and Biden met together for more than 15 minutes before the other party arrived.

“It was a productive meeting,” Johnson told reporters back at the Capitol. “I enjoyed my visit with the president.”

Biden met with Johnson and Jeffries before the House leaders joined a classified briefing with other congressional lawmakers on the assistance package, according to a White House official.

The briefing in the Situation Room for Johnson and other House leaders on the emergency funding request was the first time the new speaker, who opposes the aid to Ukraine, was getting a close airing from White House officials about Biden’s case for the money. The White House has conducted similar briefings in recent weeks.

Biden had called Johnson to congratulate him after his election Wednesday and said it was “time for all of us to act responsibly” to fund the government and provide that foreign aid. “We need to move swiftly,” the president said in a statement.

Johnson, 51, swept through on the first ballot with support from all Republicans anxious to put weeks of tumult behind and get on with the business of governing. He was quickly sworn as speaker and is now second in line to the presidency, after the vice president.

While not the Republicans’ top choice, Johnson had few foes and an important backer in Donald Trump.

At the Capitol on Thursday, Johnson sat down with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, who told reporters afterward that he had a “very good” meeting with the new speaker.

Johnson met later with Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell, who said on social media they had a “great meeting.” He has also heard from Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., who told the new speaker in a Wednesday call that a bipartisan agreement with Democrats is the only way to avoid a shutdown.

In winning the gavel, Johnson, who has been in the House for less than a decade, drew together fellow Republicans through his faith, conservative roots and Trump’s nod after more seasoned leaders had failed.

“I’m a Bible-believing Christian,” Johnson told Fox’s Sean Hannity.

The speaker said when he’s asked his views on the issues, he advises: “Well, go pick up a Bible off your shelf and read it, that’s my worldview. That’s what I believe.”

Democrats said Johnson, a lawyer specializing in constitutional issues, was an extreme conservative, a strict opponent of abortion access and an architect of Trump’s legal effort to overturn the 2020 presidential election he lost to Democrat Biden.

After Johnson’s election, lawmakers approved a resolution Wednesday saying the House “stands with Israel” and “condemns Hamas’ brutal war.” They next turned to a stalled government funding bill.

Rather than take a scheduled work period at home, Republicans rearranged the House calendar to return to Washington next week and keep pushing through the various government funding bills before the Nov. 17 deadline.

In a letter to colleagues, Johnson outlined priorities that include providing a short-term funding bill, into next year, to prevent a November shutdown — almost the same move that led to McCarthy’s ouster.

“Speaker Johnson has been very clear that we’ve got to secure America’s border, we want to support Israel,” said Majority Leader Steve Scalise, who conferred with Johnson ahead of the White House meeting. “But all of the other items that the President is talking about run secondary.”

Republican Rep. Michael McCaul of Texas, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said Johnson is thoughtful and smart, and understands that aid for Ukraine is a national security issue, despite opposition from other Republicans in their majority.

“And what I saw in the Situation Room was I thought he was very open to the idea,” said McCaul.

To avoid a shutdown, Johnson will need to balance far-right demands with the realities of keeping the government functioning. Most Republicans voted against the budget deal McCarthy, R-Calif., struck with Biden earlier this year, demanding steeper spending cuts.

Similar Republican infighting has chased three other GOP speakers to early departures. The difference now is that Republican rules allow any single lawmaker to force a vote to remove the speaker from office.

___

Associated Press writers Jill Colvin in New York, Darlene Superville and Mary Clare Jalonick contributed to this report.

AP · by FARNOUSH AMIRI · October 26, 2023

5. Israel’s Army Is Ready to Invade Gaza. Its Divided Government May Not Be.

Excerpts:

The shock of the attack has shaken Israelis’ sense of invincibility and raised doubts and debate about how their country should best respond.

Immediately afterward, the government called up around 360,000 reservists and deployed many of them at the border with Gaza. Senior officials soon spoke of removing Hamas from power in the enclave, raising expectations of an imminent ground operation there.

But nearly three weeks later, the Netanyahu government has yet to give the go-ahead, though the military says that it has made a few brief incursions over the border and that it will make still more in the days ahead.

The United States has urged Israel not to rush into a ground invasion, even as it pledges full support for its ally, but domestic considerations have also played a role in the delay. Beyond the hostages, there is concern about the toll of the operation and uncertainty about what exactly it might mean to destroy Hamas, a social movement as well as a military force that is deeply embedded in Gazan society.

When asked what the military objectives of the operation are, an Israeli military spokesman said the goal was to “dismantle Hamas.” How would the army know it had achieved that goal? “That’s a big question, and I don’t think I have the capability right now to answer that one,” the spokesman, Lt. Col. Richard Hecht, said at news briefing a week after the attack.

Israel’s Army Is Ready to Invade Gaza. Its Divided Government May Not Be.

In the 20 days since Hamas attacked, Israel’s Air Force has pounded Gaza and its troops have gotten into position. But its leaders disagree about what to do next.

By Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman

To understand the reasons for the delay to Israel’s invasion, the reporters spoke to 13 Israeli officials, military officers and foreign diplomats.

Published Oct. 26, 2023

Updated Oct. 27, 2023, 5:19 a.m. ET

nytimes.com · by Ronen Bergman · October 26, 2023

Israeli military vehicles near the Gaza Strip this week.Credit...Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times

Its troops are massed on the Gaza border and described as ready to move, but Israel’s political and military leaders are divided about how, when and even whether to invade, according to seven senior military officers and three Israeli officials.

In part, they say, the delay is intended to give negotiators more time to try to secure the release of some of the more than 200 hostages captured by Hamas and other armed Palestinian groups when they raided Israel three weeks ago.

But Israeli leaders, who have vowed to retaliate against Hamas for its brutal massacre of civilians, have yet to agree on how to do so, though the military could move as soon as Friday.

Some of them worry that an invasion might suck the Israeli Army into an intractable urban battle inside Gaza. Others fear a broader conflict, with a Lebanese militia allied to Hamas, Hezbollah, firing long-range missiles toward Israeli cities.

There is also debate over whether to conduct the invasion through one large operation or a series of smaller ones. And then there are questions about who would govern Gaza if Israel captured it.

“You have a cabinet with different opinions,” said Danny Danon, a senior lawmaker from Likud, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing party.

“Some would say that we have to start — then we can think about the next stage,” said Mr. Danon, a member of the foreign affairs and defense committee in the Israeli Parliament. “But we as the leadership, as statesmen, we have to set the goals, and the goals should be very clear,” he said. “It shouldn’t be vague.”

Disarray has swept Israel since terrorists from Gaza overran a swath of southern Israel, killing roughly 1,400 people, briefly capturing more than 20 villages and army bases and outmaneuvering the most powerful military in the Middle East.

The shock of the attack has shaken Israelis’ sense of invincibility and raised doubts and debate about how their country should best respond.

Immediately afterward, the government called up around 360,000 reservists and deployed many of them at the border with Gaza. Senior officials soon spoke of removing Hamas from power in the enclave, raising expectations of an imminent ground operation there.

But nearly three weeks later, the Netanyahu government has yet to give the go-ahead, though the military says that it has made a few brief incursions over the border and that it will make still more in the days ahead.

The United States has urged Israel not to rush into a ground invasion, even as it pledges full support for its ally, but domestic considerations have also played a role in the delay. Beyond the hostages, there is concern about the toll of the operation and uncertainty about what exactly it might mean to destroy Hamas, a social movement as well as a military force that is deeply embedded in Gazan society.

When asked what the military objectives of the operation are, an Israeli military spokesman said the goal was to “dismantle Hamas.” How would the army know it had achieved that goal? “That’s a big question, and I don’t think I have the capability right now to answer that one,” the spokesman, Lt. Col. Richard Hecht, said at news briefing a week after the attack.

One immediate concern is the fate of the hostages, and the negotiations, mediated by Qatar, to secure the release of at least some of them, according to an Israeli official, three senior military officers and a senior foreign diplomat familiar with the talks. The Israeli government wants to allow more time for those talks to make headway, perhaps to secure the release of captured women and children.

While there is little internal disagreement about allowing a small window of time for further negotiation, there is a dispute between the military establishment and parts of Mr. Netanyahu’s government about what to do if the negotiations fail, according to the officials and officers.

The military leadership has already finalized an invasion plan, but Mr. Netanyahu has angered senior officers by refusing to sign off on it — in part because he wants unanimous approval from members of the war cabinet he formed after the Oct. 7 attack, according to two people present at cabinet meetings, who spoke on the condition of anonymity in order to discuss sensitive matters.

Analysts believe that Mr. Netanyahu is wary about unilaterally giving the go-ahead because, with public confidence in his leadership already decreasing, he fears being blamed if the operation fails.

“All indication is that he’s going to try and stay on,” said Yohanan Plesner, the president of the Israel Democracy Institute, a Jerusalem-based research group.

Mr. Netanyahu’s office declined to comment for this article, referring a reporter instead to a speech the prime minister made Wednesday night in which he promised to destroy Hamas, without describing the method or timing of such an operation.

“We have set two goals for this war: To eliminate Hamas by destroying its military and governing abilities, and to do everything possible to bring our captives home,” Mr. Netanyahu said.

He added: “We are preparing for a ground incursion. I will not detail when, how or how many, or the overall considerations that we are taking into account, most of which are unknown to the public.”

The ambiguity appears to reflect divisions in the cabinet about whether to permit a full invasion of Gaza, which might plunge ground troops into daunting urban battle against thousands of Hamas fighters hiding within a network of tunnels, hundreds of miles long, dug deep beneath Gaza City.

Instead, ministers are also considering a less ambitious plan involving several more limited incursions that target one small part of the enclave at a time.

Within the military establishment, there is concern that Israel’s goals will be blurred if Mr. Netanyahu follows through on his promise on Wednesday to simultaneously seek the liberation of all the hostages while also attempting to destroy Hamas. The first goal requires negotiation and accommodation with Hamas’s leadership, while the second requires its annihilation — a difficult balance to strike, two senior military officials said.

In a sign of internal division, the defense minister, Yoav Gallant, pointedly did not describe rescuing the hostages in a speech on Thursday evening as one of Israel’s military objectives.

The mutual suspicion between the military and the prime minister runs so deep that civil servants have barred the military from bringing recording equipment into cabinet meetings, according to two people present. They interpreted the move as an attempt to limit the amount of evidence that could be presented to a national inquiry after the war.

Mr. Netanyahu has appeared unusually isolated since the Hamas attack, amid cratering poll numbers and accusations that his chaotic leadership over the past year had set the stage for the catastrophic security failure on Oct 7.

Few members of his government have given him their unqualified backing since the day, with many simply saying that scrutiny of the government’s mistakes should wait until the war ends.

“I’m saying in the clearest way possible: It is clear to me that Netanyahu and the entire government of Israel and everyone on whose watch this happened bears responsibility for what happened,” one government minister from Mr. Netanyahu’s party, Miki Zohar, told a radio station on Thursday. “That is also clear to Netanyahu. That he also bears responsibility.”

As recriminations begin, some allies have tried to deflect blame from the prime minister.

A former Netanyahu aide began a social media campaign to prolong Israel’s airstrikes on Gaza before any ground operation begins. And Aryeh Deri, a lawmaker and longtime supporter of the prime minister, told an interviewer on Monday that the army had only recently readied a plan to invade Gaza.

The Israeli news media interpreted the assertion as an attempt to suggest that it was the army — not the prime minister — that needed more time to prepare.

But the ramifications of the Oct. 7 attack and its aftermath extend far beyond Mr. Netanyahu’s personal fate, said Mr. Plesner, the analyst.

The shock of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when Arab armies briefly overran Israeli defenses before being rebuffed, “changed Israeli society and the trajectory of the Israeli state,” he said.

“This event will probably be even more consequential,” he said.

Our Coverage of the Israel-Hamas War

• A Delayed Invasion: Almost immediately after Israel was attacked on Oct. 7, it began preparing for a ground invasion of Gaza. More than two weeks later, the invasion has yet to happen. Here is why.
• In Besieged Gaza: Israel imposed a siege on Gaza on Oct. 9 — cutting off water, food, electricity and fuel. Survival in the enclave now means not only escaping death from intense airstrikes, but also finding enough to eat and drink.
• Urban Combat: As the Israeli Army gathers at the Gaza border for a threatened invasion, experts are warning that the country’s troops could face some of the fiercest street-to-street combat since World War II.
• A Political Conundrum: Israel has set itself a stiff challenge in aiming to vanquish Hamas. But a bigger question awaits after the war ends: Who will govern Gaza?
• Hostages: Hamas and other Palestinian groups are believed to be holding more than 200 hostages. An American mother and daughter and two elderly Israeli women have been released.

The Conflict’s Global Reach

• Fury in the Middle East: Amid widespread protests in the region, the carnage in Gaza has unified the Arab world and brought a new outpouring of support for the Palestinian quest for a state.
• Climate Change: The war between Israel and Hamas in the middle of an energy-rich region could imperil action against global warming.
• A Threat for Global Growth: As the conflict roils the markets, worries are growing about how much the turmoil could cost the global economy.
• Culture: Multiple events highlighting Palestinian culture, society and politics, including at the Frankfurt Book Fair, have been called off or put on hold since the war began.

nytimes.com · by Ronen Bergman · October 26, 2023

6. What helped change the US Army counterinsurgency doctrine?

Interesting analysis worth discussing and considering. Two points. One is that there was little if any significant input from SOF in the development of the 2006 COIN doctrine, take that for what it is worth. Second, the author might benefit from some input from SOF, and in particular Special Forces as well. The foundational SF missions of unconventional warfare and Foreign Internal Defense are by definition population centric and not enemy forces centric. If anyone thinks FID is simply about training foreign militaries to be enemy centric demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of the FID mission.

I would also ask the rhetorical question of if DOD had an Irregular Warfare Center to fill the existing IW gap in 2006 in U.S. national security with the right leadership, and enduring senior sponsorship and Congressional patronage, and that actively garnered interagency and civil sector participation would we have been better off? Will the new IW Center be able to fill the IW gap in US national security that remains today?

I would urge the new IW Center to conduct analysis similar to this but instead of COIN focus on the IW gap. (But the real question to answer is when will Nunn-Cohen (of Goldwater-Nichols) be fully realized? That is the intent to have a full low intensity conflict (LIC) capability within a single organization with overarching responsibility for LIC for our nation. LIC is today's political and irregular warfare.)

Excerpt:

According to Downie, the prerequisite for change is identifying a performance gap. Regarding the above case study, this performance gap was soon identified after the primary combat operations when the security situation quickly deteriorated. The US government had to admit that an insurgency was happening in Iraq. Using conventional methods, coalition forces could not defeat the insurgents and establish a safe and secure environment. After having identified a performance gap, the next step, according to Downie’s model of organizational learning, is to identify alternative actions. Two alternative organizational actions in the US Army emerged to overcome the performance gap. The first was to continue applying a mainly enemy-centric approach focused on deploying Special Forces and advisors. Within this approach, adaptation took place as actions were modified to adjust the outcomes. However, existing norms, namely how the Army approached counterinsurgency, remained unchanged. The other option called for a change of existing norms by focusing on a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency that involved large numbers of troops necessary to establish the required control over the population. In line with the military innovation theory, the US Army proved inflexible and reluctant to initiate change. It continued applying the enemy-centric approach to counterinsurgency operations, which was more in line with its existing approach.

What helped change the US Army counterinsurgency doctrine? » Wavell Room

wavellroom.com · by Christopher Goed · October 27, 2023

Experimental Feature: Audio Read Version

This article argues that the innovation of the US Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine between 2000 and 2008 was enabled by three factors. The first factor was that the relevant actors needed to have a common understanding of the need for change. Second, a consensus had to be achieved on which organizational actions should be undertaken. Last, external pressure was necessary to overcome the US Army’s inflexibility.

To demonstrate the above, this article will use a twofold approach. First, a framework will be identified to explain why and how militaries change. This will be done by providing an overview of the different theories on military innovation. It will be shown that there is no consensus on why armed forces innovate. Therefore, this article will use organizational learning theory and, within it, a model developed by Richard Downie. It provides a framework to track change and identifies factors influencing change. In the second step, this article will outline how the US Army counterinsurgency doctrine changed from 2000 to 2008. It will then use Downie’s model to identify the factors influencing innovation.

US Marines Corps Marines enter one of Saddam Hussein’s palaces in Baghdad during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

The timeframe from 2000 to 2008 was chosen because it encompasses the period from the start of the Global War on Terror to the implementation of the new counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq. Although the analysis is limited to the US Army, as it was the service mainly concerned with conducting counterinsurgency operations, documents from the Department of Defence and other US government agencies are considered where necessary.

As this article is purely interested in identifying factors that influence innovation, this article will not try to answer the question of whether counterinsurgency is a viable concept or not.

Finally, regarding methodology, the article uses a deductive approach. It will first outline a model of organizational learning and then apply this model when analysing the development of the US Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine.

Overview of military innovation theories

This section will argue that although various explanations for innovation exist, no consensus on why armed forces change has been established. Before this statement is proven, we must first define how change or innovation is understood.

According to Farrell and Teriff, change can occur in three different ways; innovation, adaptation, and emulation. Innovation occurs through developing new technologies, tactics, or structures, while adaptation is made by adjusting existing military methods and means. Adaptation can lead to innovation if it leads to the development of new methods. On the other hand, adaptation can also hinder innovation by leading to success and reducing the incentive to innovate. Emulation means the adoption of existing structures and methods of other armed forces. However, Farrell and Terriff later concluded that a clear-cut distinction between innovation and adaptation might not be feasible, and the meanings might vary. The first one, civil-military relations, was developed by Barry Posen, who argued that military and civilian leadership dynamics determined if militaries would innovate. The second school of thought, inter-Service rivalry, argues that the competition between the Services leads to innovation.

The only common point all these schools of thought have is that they see militaries as inflexible organizations that have difficulties introducing change. They, therefore, need an incentive to change. Consequently, Grissom assesses that military innovation is top-down driven. Thus, besides these points, no consensus exists on why armed forces change.

This was the reason why John Nagl used the theory of organizational learning to explain why armed forces innovate. He assessed that by tracing the learning process within an organization, he could identify factors that enabled or hindered change. The following section, therefore, will explain the organizational learning theory and assess its usefulness within the context of this article.

Organizational learning with armed forces

The theory of organizational learning is useful for analyzing change within military organizations. By using doctrine as a manifestation of institutional knowledge, change can be traced. In addition, it provides a framework for explaining the different forms of change, namely innovation and adaptation.

This article uses Richard Downie’s definition of organizational learning as: „A process by which an organization (…) uses new knowledge or understanding gained from experience or study to adjust institutional norms, doctrine, and procedures in ways designed to minimize previous gaps in performance and maximize future successes.“ This definition provides us with answers to two essential questions. First, how do we learn, and second, how do we know that we have learned something?

By Kpalion, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=232096

Regarding the question of how we learn, this definition refers to two schools of learning, namely the cognitive and the behavioral school. The cognitive school assumes one can grasp and interpret situations and events through mental models, schemata, and structures. The behavioral school assumes that people learn through experience, observing, and analyzing the results of actions. By applying one or both of these schools, one learns.

In regards to the second question, Downie’s definition points us to the need to implement what has been learned, in other words, to institutionalize it. This institutionalization can take place in two ways. The first is the behavioral perspective, which sees learning as a systematic change of structures, rules, and standard operating procedures (SOPs). The second way is the cognitive perspective, which understands learning as a systematic change of standard models and the common understanding of members of an organization. If one follows the behavioral perspective of learning, then learning manifests itself in an organization’s structures, rules, and SOPs. Military doctrine, therefore, can be described as a manifestation of institutional knowledge. In a way, these products represent the memory of an organization. Consequently, doctrine can prove an armed force’s ability to learn. At the same time, the knowledge reflected in regulations represents the memory of the force concerned and is thus protected from oblivion. Therefore, regulations and their changes are suitable for demonstrating the extent to which armed forces can change.

After having established an understanding of organizational learning, we will now look in more detail into this theory. According to Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schön, there are three different forms of organizational learning: single-loop learning, double-loop learning, and deutero-learning. Single-loop learning is when “(…) members of the organization respond to changes in the internal and external environments of the organization by detecting errors which they then correct to maintain the central features of organizational theory-in-use.” This form thus adapts the existing theory to the prevailing conditions without fundamentally changing the theory. The focus is, therefore, on the adaptation of the existing system. The term single-loop learning results from the fact that there is only one feedback loop. This links the outcome of the organization’s actions to its procedures and assumptions. The feedback aims to increase the organization’s effectiveness within its goals and norms. However, the objectives and standards remain unchanged. Double-loop learning refers to how an organization changes its norms and standards with its associated strategies and assumptions. It thereby not only tries to improve the actions themselves but also the norms and goals of the organization are reviewed and changed if necessary. In this form, there is not only the feedback loop, which connects the result with the procedure but also another loop, which connects the result with the norms and goals of the organization. This process aims to adapt the organization’s goals to the needs. The final form is deutero-learning, which aims to improve the learning ability of the organization itself. Figure 1 illustrates the different forms of organizational learning according to Argyris and Schön.

Figure 1: Forms of Organizational Learning

Linking the forms of organizational learning back to the definitions of adaptation and innovation, we can conclude that single-loop learning falls under adaptation, as it adjusts existing methods and means. Double-loop learning, on the other hand, is a form of innovation as it changes the central features of an organization, such as doctrine or structures.

Using doctrine as an indicator for learning, organizational learning theory provides a useful model to track change within an organization such as the armed forces. In addition, the single and double-loop learning framework presents a valuable concept to discriminate between innovation and adaptation.

Critics of the organizational learning theory as a tool to assess change within an organization argue that it necessitates a deep understanding of that organization to comprehend the processes that led to change. Such an understanding often requires access to internal documents, which are often in the case of the military classified. Therefore, the analysis results might not reflect the real reasons for change within that particular organization. In the case of this article, the author assesses that the information provided by Conrad Crane’s, Traver McLeod’s, and David Ucko’s books on the development of the Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency and US approach to counterinsurgency, in general, provide sufficient detail to apply the theory of organizational learning successfully.

So far, we have established that organizational learning theory is a useful framework for analyzing change within military organizations. It enables us to identify and track the different forms of change. However, so far, it lacks the ability to identify which factors led to or prevented change. To do so, we have to identify a process of how change occurs within the armed forces. Consequently, the following chapter will look into a specific model within the organizational learning theory, which will provide us with such a process.

Downie’s model of organization learning

Richard Downie’s model provides a process of how organizations learn and thereby allows the identification of factors that enable or hinder change. Accepting various sources of change, as Downie’s model does, integrates multiple theories and does not exclude them from the analysis. In his analysis, Downie came up with two prerequisites for successful change: the consensus that there is a need for change and the agreement on how this change should occur. To achieve such a consensus, he concluded that it needs both external pressure and the implementation of an organizational learning process.

Downie’s double-loop learning model is based on his analysis of US counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam and El Salvador. He points out that change is only necessary when existing methods are insufficient to meet existing challenges successfully. However, only if the armed forces have identified such a performance gap can they respond by looking for alternative ways to overcome the challenges. Identification of a performance gap, therefore, is the first factor that influences change. The second obstacle to change lies in developing alternative actions to overcome the performance gap because if no alternative is developed, agreed upon, or implemented, no change occurs. These two necessary conditions for change, namely, identifying a performance gap and agreeing upon an alternative action, can be influenced by external pressure because if the unaddressed challenge poses a significant threat to the state, the civilian leadership of the state will exert pressure on the armed forces. This pressure aims to initiate changes to meet the identified challenges. Once these obstacles are overcome, Downie’s process will lead to change. In line with Ucko’s and de Holan’s findings on institutional forgetting , Downie’s model underlines the importance of doctrine as it manifests change. However, the existence of a new doctrine does not mean change has occurred. To bridge the performance gap, organizational behavior must change. That need is reflected in the last step of Downie’s model.

Figure 2: Downie’s integrative model

However, Downie’s model does not provide a predictive explanation of why certain factors influence change; it instead acknowledges that change can occur for many reasons. The model, therefore, merges the various sources of change into an integrative approach. As this article tries to answer which factors enabled change rather than the sources of change, Downie’s model is assessed as an appropriate framework for answering the research question.

After having explained why the organizational learning theory and within it Downie’s model were chosen to identify the factors that influenced change, the following section will provide a descriptive overview of the evolution of US counterinsurgency doctrine between 2000 and 2008.

The US counterinsurgency doctrine from 2000-2008

After the end of the Vietnam War, the US Army shifted its focus from conducting counterinsurgency operations towards conventional warfare against Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. Counterinsurgency became less of a priority and was seen more as a distraction.[mote] Cassidy, Robert M., Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006.), 100-101[/note] In line with the so-called Nixon Doctrine, the US Army only planned to participate in a supporting role in counterinsurgency operations. Such a role, also called the advisory approach, included using advisors and providing resources but excluded the actual employment of combat forces. According to Ucko, this focus on the advisory approach prevented the Army from thoroughly engaging with counterinsurgency theories. This approach did not change after the end of the Cold War despite the Army’s involvement in various stabilization operations (Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo).

Major. General DavidPetraeus, as Commander, 101st Airborne Division, Photo by Pfc. Joshua Hutcheson, 101st journalist.

When George W. Bush became the US President in 2000, one of his foreign policy goals was to withdraw the USA from nation-building campaigns. The lengthy and challenging peacekeeping and nation-building operations undertaken by the Clinton administration in the 1990s were considered a waste of resources. Therefore, Bush and his Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, wanted to transform the US military into a lighter, more mobile force focused on winning wars. It was assumed that allies would take over nation-building once these wars were won. With the attack of Al-Qaeda on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001, and the subsequently proclaimed Global War on Terror (GWOT), which led to the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the orientation of the US armed forces did not change. The rapid success in Afghanistan by Special Operations Forces supported by precision strikes seemed to confirm the theories of transformation. It soon became apparent that “an institutional resistance to irregular missions” prevailed within the US Army. It was recognized that sustained and long-lasting measures by ground forces were needed to win the battle of ideas and thus eliminate the ideological basis of the enemy. On the other hand, it was also soon apparent that a purely kinetic approach to destroying the enemy forces alone, as in the so-called enemy-centric approach to counterinsurgency operations, would not be enough to defeat them.

Iraq did not come to rest despite US President George W. Bush’s declaration of victory on May 1, 2003. Although the US administration initially refused to admit it, it eventually concluded that there had been an uprising in Iraq against the coalition forces and the provisional government. In October 2004, the continued inability of the coalition forces to stabilize Iraq led to the publication of the Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-7.22 Counterinsurgency Operations. This provision was intended to fill a gap in the regulatory landscape until a detailed regulation on the subject of counterinsurgency could be issued. The FMI 3-7.22 recognized that the population is the key to success and already showed approaches of the clear-hold principle. That principle stressed the importance of defending cleared areas against a reemergence of insurgents. Yet, the clear-hold principle was missing the build phase, in which governmental structures would be rebuilt. The FMI 3-7.22 and the general understanding of the US Army were based on the erroneous assumption that civilian agencies would take over the stabilizing tasks immediately after the end of hostilities. Accordingly, FMI 3-7.22 focused exclusively on the tactical procedures of the clear and hold phases rather than the stabilizing tasks armed forces can be forced to undertake in the build phase.

However, the belief that counterinsurgency was a high priority within the US armed forces still needed to prevail. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff’s National Military Strategy (NMS) 2004 implied that counterinsurgency was a temporary distraction from the main task of fighting and winning conventional wars. Thus, the Joint Chiefs of Staff intended “winning the war on terrorism, enhancing joint warfighting and transforming for the future.” Rather than accepting the emerging new character of warfare and changing the procedures accordingly, the US forces tried to apply methods and procedures of conventional warfare. Counterinsurgency was therefore conducted in an enemy-centric and combat-oriented manner, despite regulations to the contrary.

H R McMaster

Despite a generally deteriorating security situation in Iraq, there were commanders whose area of responsibility remained relatively secure. These commanders emphasized cultural awareness and pursued a population-centric approach. The population-centric approach assumes that the essential task of counterinsurgency is to establish control over the population and the environment in which it lives. It consists of the above-described clear-hold-build phases and recognizes the requirement for military forces to provide stabilization tasks in case other organizations cannot do so. This was in stark contrast to the above-mentioned enemy-centric approach. The successful commanders were primarily so-called soldier scholars, i.e., academically educated officers. These were, among other things, the then Colonel H.R. McMaster and the then Major General Petraeus. These officers had been previously conducting research at civilian educational institutions on issues related to counterinsurgency. Building on this experience and knowledge, they formed a group with other soldiers and scholars to advocate a change in counterinsurgency methods. Together with increased publications on counterinsurgency operations in military journals, this led to a broad discussion. In these discussions, the counterinsurgency community propagated the need to change to a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency. Simultaneously, the Department of Defence also recognized the increasing importance of stabilization operations, which included counterinsurgency. This was decreed at the end of 2005 by the Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, which directed that stabilization operations should be prioritized and integrated along all Defense lines of Development. Both the counterinsurgency community’s efforts and Directive 3000.05 seemed to generate momentum for a change of mind within the Department of Defense.

However, this change was not reflected in the Quadrennial Defense Review 2006. Admittedly, it emphasized the importance of irregular warfare, but the measures derived from this statement showed that counterinsurgency was given only a low priority. In line with the thinking after the Vietnam War, the Army’s role in counterinsurgency operations remained limited. Advising and assisting local security forces was seen as a task for Special Operations Forces. As a result, the number of such forces was massively increased. Furthermore, civilian organizations were still assumed to lead stabilization operations, while the military only had to provide security. However, this failed to recognize that the respective civilian organizations, such as other government departments or development agencies, did not have such capacity. Other priorities also emerged concerning the procurement processes. Investments were made primarily in capabilities that were mainly suitable for conventional warfare. Finally, the overall strength of the US Army and US Marine Corps was reduced, despite counterinsurgency operations being very labor-intensive. The QDR 2006 was thus in stark contrast to the experiences from Iraq. There the advisory approach had so far not led to success.

In 2006 the White House finally realized that the deteriorating security situation in Iraq required a change in the approach towards combating the insurgency. Referring to McMaster’s achievements, President Bush initiated the shift from an enemy-centric approach to a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency in a speech. The change was also apparent in the increased promotion of officers competent in counterinsurgency operations. An example of this alteration was the appointment of Lieutenant General David Petraeus as Commander of the US Army Combined Arms Center, which was responsible for doctrine development within the US Army, in 2005. Petraeus intended to develop a new comprehensive doctrine for counterinsurgency within a short time. He emphasized that the US Army and the US Marine Corps should develop a common counterinsurgency doctrine to facilitate practical implementation. In addition, many domestic and foreign experts, some of them outspoken critics of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, from various fields of expertise (e.g., human rights experts, historians, social scientists, etc.) were involved in the preparation of the field manual. Within just 13 months, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency was written and published in December 2006. Excerpts from the doctrine had already been published in scientific journals in advance to stimulate discussions on this topic. The fact that the manual had already been downloaded two million times only two months after its publication indicates its importance. The manual was twice as extensive as FMI 3-7.22 and focused on the battalion level and above. It was written in the sense of the population-centric approach and thus clearly was a sign of the departure from the enemy-centric approach. In contrast to previous field manuals, making incorrect assumptions was avoided. It was explained that civilian organizations are often unable to act quickly and with sufficient strength in crisis areas. The implication was that US forces must be able to perform stabilizing tasks in operations and followed the clear-hold-build principle. It also abandoned the advisory approach by stating that counterinsurgency requires deploying a significant number of land forces. However, FM 3-24 also made the difference between theory and practice visible because the change in the understanding of counterinsurgency that had been emerging since 2004 still needed to arrive in Iraq, with some exceptions.

US soldiers on Operation Fardh al-Qanoon, Baghdad.

The defeat of the Republicans in the congressional elections at the end of 2006 further incited the Bush administration to change its approach to the GWOT. As one of the first measures, the former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was replaced by Robert Gates. In his State of the Union address of 10 January 2007, President Bush finally announced the reorientation towards a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency in Iraq, combined with an increase in troops, the so-called surge. Petraeus was tasked to implement the new approach when he took command of the Multinational Force Iraq at the beginning of 2007. Immediately after he took command, Operation Fardh al-Qanoon was launched. The operation, which proceeded according to the principles of the population-centric approach, was seen as a test for the new understanding of counterinsurgency. Security in the Baghdad area was to be restored using the additional troops made available during the surge. Although the number of engagements and losses of the US troops increased, the first successes were soon achieved. The number of attacks and civilian deaths fell noticeably over the next few months, resulting in a visible improvement in security. In the eyes of the counterinsurgency community, the surge was perceived as a success, and the new population-centric approach to counterinsurgency was therefore seen as validated.

However, not everyone linked the increased security situation to the surge and the population-centric approach to counterinsurgency. Some scholars, such as Austin Long, argued that the Sunni Tribal rising was the main reason for the decline in violence. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the security situation of 2007 concluded that the surge combined with the Sunni tribal rising is the most likely reason for the enhanced security situation. To other critics, the validity of the population-centric approach was of minor importance; they instead criticized the focus on counterinsurgency per se. It was argued that the US Army had become a “counterinsurgency-only force” due to its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As was the case after the Vietnam War and in the 1990s, it was argued that the US Army would lose its ability to wage a conventional war by focusing on counterinsurgency. From the critics’ point of view, this was fatal because the next war in which the US Army would be deployed would be a conventional one. The danger of focusing solely on counterinsurgency was also expressed in the National Defence Strategy (NDS) 2008. The discussion on which role counterinsurgency should have within the US Army and if counterinsurgency per se is a viable concept is still ongoing. However, this did not stop the population-centric approach from becoming and still being the cornerstone of the US and allied counterinsurgency doctrine.

The following section will use Downie’s model to explain the factors that influenced the innovation of the US Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine within the above-described setting.

Enabling factors for innovation

In line with Downie’s model, this section will show that the main factors for change were the consensus on identifying a performance gap and a common understanding of how this gap should be overcome. Pressure from external actors proved essential to achieving such a consensus.

According to Downie, the prerequisite for change is identifying a performance gap. Regarding the above case study, this performance gap was soon identified after the primary combat operations when the security situation quickly deteriorated. The US government had to admit that an insurgency was happening in Iraq. Using conventional methods, coalition forces could not defeat the insurgents and establish a safe and secure environment. After having identified a performance gap, the next step, according to Downie’s model of organizational learning, is to identify alternative actions. Two alternative organizational actions in the US Army emerged to overcome the performance gap. The first was to continue applying a mainly enemy-centric approach focused on deploying Special Forces and advisors. Within this approach, adaptation took place as actions were modified to adjust the outcomes. However, existing norms, namely how the Army approached counterinsurgency, remained unchanged. The other option called for a change of existing norms by focusing on a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency that involved large numbers of troops necessary to establish the required control over the population. In line with the military innovation theory, the US Army proved inflexible and reluctant to initiate change. It continued applying the enemy-centric approach to counterinsurgency operations, which was more in line with its existing approach.

However, the further deteriorating security situation in Iraq and domestic political pressure led in 2006 to an intervention by the US civilian leadership. The Bush administration supported and promoted members of the counterinsurgency community, who were supporters of the population-centric approach. This correlates with Downie’s model, which sees external influence as a decisive factor in overcoming internal differences. Consequently, this led to an accepted consensus within the US Army and US Marine Corps on how to overcome the performance gap, namely how to defeat insurgencies. The outcome of this consensus was the development of FM 3-24 and later the appointment of General Petraeus as commander of Multinational Force Iraq. In line with Downie’s model, this appointment enabled him to transform the newly developed doctrine into changed organizational behavior, which again is instrumental for change. During Operation Fardh al-Qanoon, the new approach to counterinsurgency operations was successfully applied and led, together with other factors, to improve the security situation in Iraq.

Conclusion

This article has identified three factors that enabled innovation.

First, all relevant military and political actors must understand the requirement for change. This is only possible if the necessary information is available to all actors, political and military. Therefore, a culture of information exchange between military and political institutions, such as parliamentary hearings, must exist or be established.

Second, discussion on alternative organizational actions must be allowed and promoted. This requires a culture of open discussion within military organizations, expressed, for example, in military journals, conferences, or lessons learned/ lessons identified processes.

Third, external pressure was necessary to overcome institutional inflexibility and achieve consensus. This third factor must be seen in conjunction with the others. Only if all actors agree on the existence of a performance gap and decide on coordinated actions to overcome this gap can change occur.

Before coming to the above conclusions, this article had to prove that the organizational learning theory is a valid alternative to other military innovation studies. This is the case as organizational learning theory allows us to identify and track the different forms of change. However, it was also stated that using this theory is only possible if a deep understanding of that organization is given. This article used the theory as the existing literature provided such an understanding.

Yet, to identify factors that influence change, it was necessary to identify a process for how change occurs. Downie’s model provided such a process. It not only enables the identification of factors but also merges the various sources of change into an integrative approach, enabling a comprehensive analysis. So by using an integrated approach to analyze the evolution of the US Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine, this article was able to identify factors that enabled innovation without excluding any specific sources of change.

As a limiting factor, it must be acknowledged that only one case study verified the above findings in this article. Although Downie and Nagl also used the model with similar conclusions, additional case studies are necessary to prove that these findings apply more broadly.

About the author Related Posts

Christopher Goed

Christopher Goed is a lieutenant colonel in the Austrian Army currently working in the Austrian MOD. His international experience includes tours in Syria, Kosovo and Afghanistan as well as being a graduate of ACSC 26. I hold a PhD in interdisciplinary legal studies, where I looked at the role of legitimacy in counterinsurgency operations.

• This author does not have any more posts.

Footnotes

1. Farrell, Theo, and Terry Terriff. The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology. Boulder, (Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.), 6.
2. Sergio Catignani. “Coping with Knowledge: Organizational Learning in the British Army?” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 1 (February 1, 2014): 38. doi:10.1080/01402390.2013.776958.
3. Farrell, Theo, and Terry Terriff. The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology. Boulder, (Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.), 6.
4. Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, and James A. Russell. Military Adaptation in Afghanistan. (Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, 2013.) 7. https://discovery.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=5c01def8-dfe2-31ff-8349-e872e34a973a.[/note] By defining innovation as having a “greater degree of novelty and disruptive organizational change than adaptation”, this article follows Farrell’s and Terriff’s understanding.
5. Coming back to the statement at the beginning of the chapter, four schools of thought have, according to Adam Grissom, emerged within the field of military innovation studies. These are civil-military relations, inter-Service rivalry, intra-Service rivalry, and cultural factors.Adam Grissom. “The Future of Military Innovation Studies.” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 (October 1, 2006): 908–919. doi:10.1080/01402390600901067.
6. Barry R. Posen. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.), 232-235.
7. Adam Grissom. “The Future of Military Innovation Studies.” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 (October 1, 2006): 910–913. doi:10.1080/01402390600901067.[/note[ The intra-Service rivalry school of thought does not see the military as a unitary body; instead, it consists of various actors and groups such as branches. The competition between these branches leads to innovation. The fourth school of thought is based on Farrell’s argument that culture is a primary factor for innovation.Farrell, Theo, and Terry Terriff. The Sources of Military Change : Culture, Politics, Technology. Boulder, (Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.), 7-8.
8. Adam Grissom. “The Future of Military Innovation Studies.” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 (October 1, 2006): 919–925. doi:10.1080/01402390600901067.
9. John A Nagl. “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife(N1).” World Affairs 161, no. 4 (March 1, 1999): 194- 195
10. Richard D. Downie, Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War. (Westport: Praeger, 1998.), 22.
11. Carol C Leavitt. Running Head: Three Organizational Learning Theories. https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED523990.pdf (accessed January 30, 2023)
12. Sergio Catignani. “Coping with Knowledge: Organizational Learning in the British Army?” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 1 (February 1, 2014): 34. doi:10.1080/01402390.2013.776958.
13. Chris Argyris, Schön, Donald A. Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective. (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978.), 18-28.
14. John A Nagl. “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife(N1).” World Affairs 161, no. 4 (March 1, 1999): 195
15. Conrad C Crane. Cassandra in Oz, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2016.)
16. Travers McLeod. Rule of Law in War: International Law and United States Counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. (Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2014.)
17. David H. Ucko. The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.)
18. Richard D. Downie, Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War. (Westport: Praeger, 1998.), 5-10.
19. David H. Ucko. The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.), 16-17.
20. Pablo Martin de Holan, and Nelson Phillips. “Remembrance of Things Past? The Dynamics of Organizational Forgetting.” Management Science 50, no. 11 (November 1, 2004): 1607. doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0273.
21. David H. Ucko. The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.), 15-16.
22. Thompson, Sue. “The Nixon Doctrine and U.S. Policy on Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia after the Second World War.” Journal of Cold War Studies 23, no. 1 (January 1, 2021): 126–27. doi:10.1162/jcws_a_00965.
23. David H. Ucko. The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.), 37-41.
24. The White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-25, (Washington, 1994.), 1. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-25.pdf (accessed January 25, 2023)
25. Michael Gordon, and Bernard Trainor, Cobra II, The inside story of the invasion and occupation of Iraq. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006.), 5.
26. David H. Ucko. The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.), 57.
27. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR2001.pdf?ver=AFts7axkH2zWUHncRd8yUg%3d%3d (accessed January 23, 2023) V.
28. Conrad C Crane. Cassandra in Oz, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2016.), 17.
29. Ibib. 13-14
30. David H. Ucko. The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.), 38
31. Ibid. 66-70.
32. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, DC. 2004.), VIII.
33. David H. Ucko. The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.), 70-71.
34. David Galula. Counterinsurgency Warfare. (London: Praeger Security International, 2006.), 51.
35. Britannica, David Petraeus, https://www.britannica.com/biography/David-Petraeus (accessed February 7, 2023) and Hoover Institution, H.R. McMaster, https://www.hoover.org/profiles/h-r-mcmaster (accessed February 7, 2023)
36. David H. Ucko. The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.), 75-77.
37. Department of Defense, Directive 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, 2005, 2. https://policy.defense.gov/portals/11/Documents/solic/DoDD%203000.05%20SSTR%20(SIGNED)%2028NOV05.pdf (accessed January 28, 2023)
38. David H. Ucko. The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.), 80.
39. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, v-viii https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR2006.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-111017-150 (accessed February 2, 2023)
40. David H. Ucko. The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.), 100-102.
41. George W. Bush. President Discusses War on Terror and Operation Iraqi Freedom. (Clevland, Ohio, 20.3.2006) https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060320-7.html (accessed January 25, 2023)
42. David H. Ucko. The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.), 75.
43. Conrad C Crane. Cassandra in Oz, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2016.), 50
44. Ibid., 103
45. David H. Ucko. The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.), 105.
46. Ibid., 109
47. George W. Bush. President’s Address to the Nation, 10.01.2007. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html (accessed January 27, 2023)
48. David H. Ucko. The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.), 119-120.
49. Austin Long. “The Anbar Awakening.” Survival (00396338) 50, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 67–94. doi:10.1080/00396330802034283.
50. Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro. “Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?” International Security 37, no. 1 (July 7, 2012): 36–40.
51. Guy Raz, Army Focus on Counterinsurgency Debated Within, 2008: https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90200038&sc=emaf?storyId=90200038&sc=emaf&t=1537900773475 (accessed February 15, 2023)
52. Department of Defense. National Defense Strategy. (Washington, DC. 2008.), 8-13. https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nds/2008_NDS.pdf?ver=WEYyBjnf6UkNioPqfkSr3Q%3d%3d (accessed February 17, 2023)
53. Etienne de Durand, “France” in Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, operations, and challenges, eds. Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (New York: Routledge, 2010.) 13.

wavellroom.com · by Christopher Goed · October 27, 2023

7. Lessons from the Chinese Conquest of Taiwan More than Three Centuries Ago

Excerpts:

Naturally, much has changed since 1683. Military and civilian technology have advanced dramatically. Where Taiwan’s 17th-century defenders had no allies, Taiwan may be supported by the United States and others in a future fight. But the geography remains the same, as does the nature of the conflict: a mainland Chinese government would be seeking to eliminate the last vestige of its predecessor on Taiwan for various strategic and ideological reasons.

Deriving lessons from the prior conquest of Taiwan—lessons which Chinese strategists are likely also learning—can contribute to anticipation of possible threats and effective responses to them.

Lessons from the Chinese Conquest of Taiwan More than Three Centuries Ago

https://defenseopinion.com/lessons-from-the-chinese-conquest-of-taiwan-more-than-three-centuries-ago/464/

• PUBLISHED OCTOBER 26, 2023
• @ 11:18 AM

• By Scott Savitz

In China, history matters. China’s rulers, including its Communist ones, have been keenly engaged with the history of their nation and its implications for the present. Even Mao Zedong, who sought to expunge many aspects of China’s past, did so in emulation of a history-erasing emperor who had lived over 2,000 years earlier.

For this reason, it is critical to learn from mainland China’s previous conquest of Taiwan as a guide to how China may seek to seize that island again. That struggle is strikingly similar to the present one: in both cases, a Taiwan-based government, ruling in the name of one that had once ruled all of China, was holding out against a mainland regime that sought to extinguish it.

The mainland regime (the Qing dynasty) hungered to take the island for decades but was frustrated by its limited naval capabilities. It belatedly built a formidable fleet, while intermittently applying economic pressure against the island.

As Chinese political and military leaders envision conquering Taiwan, their predecessors’ earlier seizure of the island is likely to inform their thoughts, whether consciously or unconsciously. It is useful for outsiders to analyze it and to better understand what lessons Beijing may be deriving from Taiwan’s surrender 340 years ago, in October 1683.

How China did it before

Several evident points from that conflict are relevant today.

First, as a prelude to the conquest China seized the last few Taiwanese-held outposts along the mainland. Conquering both coastal cities and nearby islands (some of which Taiwan holds today) was a way of circumscribing the illicit trade that sustained Taiwan’s economy and applying pressure on Taiwan’s government. It also helped to encourage defections from Taiwan-based forces, who feared that their side was about to lose. These defectors provided valuable intelligence and skills to their new commanders.

Similarly, today’s China could seek to seize Taiwanese-controlled islands near the mainland to demonstrate Taiwan’s vulnerability, particularly if it anticipated that Taiwan would receive minimal international support. Seizing those islands—some of which are within swimming distance of the mainland—would have powerful psychological and political effects in Taiwan, while damaging its economy by reducing its desirability for investment. The elimination of those outposts would also hinder Taiwan’s collection of intelligence.

Second, China took advantage of internal disorder on the island to launch its attack. A disputed succession, including fratricidal murder, created turmoil that contributed to Taiwan’s weakness. It also increased the pace of defections to the mainland. Likewise, today’s China can instigate or take advantage of political turbulence within Taiwan to seize the island.

Third, Taiwan’s fate was not actually decided by an invasion, but by a decisive naval battle west of Taiwan, amidst the Penghu Islands. After Taiwan’s leadership learned of the defeat from the escaped remnant of their fleet, different factions debated the relative merits of surrender versus continuing to fight. They ultimately decided to surrender before the first mainland forces came ashore.

Along the same lines, today’s China may aim to achieve a victory without mounting a potentially costly invasion. Some combination of bombardment, assassinations of key leaders, disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, severing of communications and other measures could potentially induce rapid surrender. The destruction of highly visible military capabilities, such as ships, planes, and headquarters, could induce despair. In the face of such attacks, an overwhelmed and manipulated population, bereft of leadership, might be tempted to meekly accept mainland rule.

Naturally, much has changed since 1683. Military and civilian technology have advanced dramatically. Where Taiwan’s 17th-century defenders had no allies, Taiwan may be supported by the United States and others in a future fight. But the geography remains the same, as does the nature of the conflict: a mainland Chinese government would be seeking to eliminate the last vestige of its predecessor on Taiwan for various strategic and ideological reasons.

Deriving lessons from the prior conquest of Taiwan—lessons which Chinese strategists are likely also learning—can contribute to anticipation of possible threats and effective responses to them.

8. Release of hostages requires ceasefire, Hamas official says

Is Hamas "negotiating" from a position of strength or desperation for fear of being "eliminated?"

Release of hostages requires ceasefire, Hamas official says

By Nidal Al-Mughrabi

October 27, 20238:29 AM EDTUpdated 38 min ago

Reuters · by Nidal Al-Mughrabi

• Summary
• Companies
• LATEST DEVELOPMENTS:
• Hamas official says ceasefire needed for release of hostages
• Residents say Israeli planes pound eastern Gaza
• Gaza media say Israeli troops staged incursions
• Israel said its jets struck three senior Hamas operatives

GAZA/MOSCOW, Oct 27 (Reuters) - A Hamas official tied the release of hostages held in Gaza to a ceasefire in Israel's punishing air war in the enclave, launched after a deadly rampage by Hamas militants into southern Israel nearly three weeks ago.

Israel says it is preparing a ground invasion, but has been urged by the U.S. and Arab countries to delay an operation that would multiply the number of civilian casualties in the densely populated coastal strip and might ignite a wider conflict.

Two U.S. fighter jets struck weapons and ammunition facilities in Syria on Friday in retaliation for attacks on U.S. forces by Iranian-backed militias since the Gaza conflict erupted.

An opinion poll published on Friday suggested almost half of Israelis now wanted to hold off on a ground invasion out of fears for at least 224 hostages reported to be held there.

The Russian newspaper Kommersant quoted a member of a Hamas delegation visiting Moscow as saying time was needed to locate all those who had been taken from Israel by various Palestinian factions in the Hamas attack on Oct. 7 that sparked the crisis.

"They seized dozens of people, most of them civilians, and we need time to find them in the Gaza Strip and then release them," Abu Hamid said.

He said Hamas, which has freed four hostages so far, had made clear since the first days of the war that it intended to release "civilian prisoners".

But he said a "calm environment" was needed to complete this task, repeating an assertion - which Reuters could not verify - that Israeli bombing had already killed 50 of the prisoners.

Palestinian militants clashed with Israeli troops in at least two areas inside the Gaza Strip, the latest of several small-scale incursions, Hamas-affiliated media reported, though the Israeli military did not immediately confirm the sortie.

Residents of central Gaza said they had heard what sounded like an exchange of fire as well as heavy shelling and air strikes along the border, with Israeli planes dropping flares and bombs.

Israel said its fighter jets had struck three senior Hamas operatives who played significant roles in the Oct. 7 attack, all commanders in the Daraj Tuffah Battalion. There was no official announcement by Hamas.

In the Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza, an air strike killed the pregnant wife of a Palestinian lawyer, Jehad Al-Kafarnah.

"My life, my heart, I love you," Kafarnah wrote, weeping, on the white sheeting wrapped around his wife's body. He held the body of her 8-month-old stillborn child, also wrapped in white, in his arms.

GAZA CIVILIANS GROW MORE DESPERATE

As Gaza's 2.3 million civilians grow more desperate under an Israeli siege that has cut power and water as well as supplies of food, fuel and medicine, the issue of how to help them comes before the 193-member U.N. General Assembly in New York on Friday.

Unlike in the U.N. Security Council, where resolutions on getting aid to Gaza failed this week, no country will be able to veto the resolution submitted by Arab states calling for a ceasefire, which will not be binding but carry political weight.

The United Nations agency for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA, says more than 600,000 Gazans have been made homeless by Israeli bombardment, at least three times more than its shelters can hold.

Ten more trucks food and medical supplies arrived in the enclave, along with 10 foreign doctors, on Friday, the first to enter since Israel tightened its blockade on Gaza nearly three weeks ago, a Palestinian official at Gaza's Rafah border crossing with Egypt said.

A U.N. official said earlier that around 74 trucks had crossed since the start of the conflict, making some 84 altogether. The U.N. says Gaza needs around 100 trucks every day to meet essential needs and the official said negotiations were taking place with Israel, which wants to prevent resources reaching Hamas, to find a faster mechanism.

U.S. STRIKES SYRIAN BASES USED BY IRANIAN PROXIES

Calls for restraint have been driven not only by concern for Gaza's civilians and Israeli hostages, but also by fears that the crisis could ignite conflict across the Middle East.

U.S. President Joe Biden ordered overnight strikes on two Syrian facilities used by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and militias that it backs, the Pentagon said. He earlier issued a rare direct warning to Iran on Thursday against targeting U.S. troops in the Middle East.

U.S. and coalition troops have been attacked at least 19 times in Iraq and in Syria by Iranian-backed forces in the past week.

The United States has sent warships and fighter aircraft to the region over the last three weeks and on Thursday the Pentagon said about 900 more U.S. troops were en route or in the Middle East to bolster air defences for U.S. personnel.

Israel says Hamas killed some 1,400 people including children in its Oct. 7 rampage.

The Hamas-controlled Gaza health ministry said on Thursday that 7,028 Palestinians had been killed in the retaliatory air strikes, including 2,913 children. Reuters could not independently verify the tolls.

A poll published in the Israeli daily Maariv newspaper found that 49% said "it would be better to wait" before beginning a large-scale ground offensive, while 29% disagreed. A poll a week earlier had found 65% support for a ground invasion.

"It is almost certain that the developments on the matter of the hostages, which is now topping the agenda, have had a great impact on this shift," Maariv said.

Reporting by Nidal al-Mughrabi, Ahmed Mohamed Hassan, Tala Ramadan, Emily Rose, Adam Makary, Jeff Mason, Phil Stewart, Michelle Nichols, Gabriela Baczynska and Andrew Gray; Writing by Grant McCool, Michael Perry and Kevin Liffey; Editing by Cynthia Osterman, Simon Cameron-Moore and Raju Gopalakrishnan and Philippa Fletcher

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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Nidal Al-Mughrabi

Thomson Reuters

A senior correspondent with nearly 25 years’ experience covering the Palestinian-Israeli conflict including several wars and the signing of the first historic peace accord between the two sides.

Reuters · by Nidal Al-Mughrabi

9. ‘Everything is destroyed’: Civilians trickle out of Avdiivka as Russian assault leaves Ukrainian town in ruins

Let us not forget what is happening in Ukraine.

‘Everything is destroyed’: Civilians trickle out of Avdiivka as Russian assault leaves Ukrainian town in ruins

https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/26/europe/ukraine-avdiivka-civilians-intl/index.html?utm

By Vasco Cotovio and Maria Kostenko, CNN

 5 minute read 

Updated 2:42 AM EDT, Fri October 27, 2023

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Russia's latest offensive 'is failing,' says Ukrainian government adviser

09:50 - Source: CNN

CNN — 

A Ukrainian police officer inspects a half-destroyed building when, suddenly, he rushes to the ground, ducking for cover.

“Incoming,” he shouts to his partner, in body camera video seen by CNN, as a shell lands nearby. “There will be more.”

There’s little to police these days in Avdiivka as most of the people who used to live in this frontline city are gone. But some 1,600 have remained, and this unit — the White Angels — are there to evacuate them to safety.

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“On average, we evacuate four people from Avdiivka per day,” Lieutenant Dmytro Soloviy, a member of the unit told CNN in a phone interview.

The city had been left on the frontline when pro-Moscow separatists seized large portion of the Donbas region, including the nearby city of Donetsk, in 2014, and has been under fire since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.

But on October 10, Moscow began a concentrated push, sending waves of soldiers and armoured vehicles while also intensifying shelling of the city. The attack on Avdiivka comes as the front lines of the war remain relatively static, with Ukraine’s counteroffensive continuing to move much more slowly than initially anticipated.

Some analysts had initially suggested the Russian move was designed to force Kyiv to divert some of the forces it had been using for its attacks along the southern and eastern front lines, but Ukrainian officials say the goal is actually to make advances while Kyiv is focused elsewhere.

“The situation is tense,” Soloviy said, explaining people can no longer leave on their own, they have to wait to be evacuated. “Because of the increased shelling, people have started to sign up more often (for evacuation).”

Lt. Dmytro Soloviy.

Ukraine National Police

Many of Avdiivka’s residents had already fled before the full-scale invasion, leaving the city with a pre-war population of around 30,000.

“Most of the people remaining in the city are elderly, mostly men. They [stayed because] did not want to leave their homes,” Soloviy explained. “Now the situation is grim. Just so you understand, 10-15 bombs are dropped every day.”

Between airstrikes and artillery, supply lines into the city have also slowed down and so Solviy’s unit has had to step in.

“At the moment, we are the only ones bringing in the aid. We bring in humanitarian aid, bread, medicines,” he said. “We go every day, there are no days off.”

“There used to be three grocery stores operating in Avdiivka. Two of them were destroyed by missiles. Now only one sad little grocery store is open,” he added. “There is nowhere to buy bread so once a week, we bring some so people can get bread.”

A battle-hardened city

When people began leaving Avdiivka in 2014, the Ukrainian military moved in, fortifying the city and building up its defenses, turning it into a stronghold.  Nine years and a full-scale invasion later and the frontline near Avdiivka has barely shifted.

Video of the White Angels unit driving into the city shows a city covered in yellow and blue. Dozens of Ukrainian flags dot the route, but so do crumbling walls and shattered windows - entire buildings, some several stories high, razed to the ground.

“The situation has not changed radically - it is tough,” the head of the Avdiivka city military administration Vitalii Barabash said in daily update on Wednesday. “The defense line around the city and in the city itself is constantly under fire. (The Russians) are firing with everything they have.”

Airstrikes, missiles and artillery, constantly pointed at the city and its surroundings. Russia has been able to make small gains west of Krasnohorivka, to the north of Aviidvka, but those marginal advances have come with a heavy price tag and Moscow’s still a long way off from its objective.

“Russian troops continue to try to encircle Avdiivka, making numerous attempts to storm it,” the Ukrainian National Guard said in an update Wednesday. “Our soldiers are steadfastly holding the line, inflicting significant losses in manpower and equipment on the enemy.”

On the ground, the fighting constant and fierce.

“Small arms battles and artillery duels continue around the clock,” Barabash explained. “The assault continues 24/7.”

And after losing a large chunk of military equipment, including tanks and armoured personnel carriers, in the first few days of the offensive, Russia seems to have shifted to a tactic it knows well, the same it used on Ukrainian forces defending the city of Bakhmut.

“The enemy is assaulting, throwing more and more flesh,” Barabash explained. “The Russians decided to push on, they keep going despite the losses.”

But for those who go to Avdiivka day in and day out, that’s where the comparisons end.

“I don’t think it’s the same as Bakhmut. Avdiivka is a battle-hardened town, it’s been through a lot,” Solviy said. “People there are used to it.”

No building left intact

While Moscow’s strategy has failed to play out as intended, it has still exacted a toll on Avdiivka. The city’s sole hospital is still functional but unable to provide advanced care.

“The hospital operates as a stabilization point. Here patients are stabilized and we further transfer them to other cities, where people are provided with more professional help,” Solviy explained, adding there’s not enough staff for the demand. “There is a chief physician Vitalii Sytnik and up to 10 nurses.”

Here’s what to know about the latest in Ukraine

Aside from the hospital, Avdiivka’s civilian infrastructure is all but gone.

“There is not a single building left intact,” Barabash said on Wednesday, while Solviy shared a similar view.

“Everything is destroyed,” the officer said. “Back in the summer, there were hopes that we might come back. There had not yet been heavy destruction.”

“Now it is an irreversible process. The city is a ruin,” he added.

But while some people remain, Solviy will continue his daily trips to Avdiivka, hoping to ease the suffering and provide some comfort.

“I could have been a regular cop, shuffling papers in my office. I chose to be a White Angel,” he said. “It can be scary. Sometimes the fear just takes over, but then it goes away and I keep going.”

10. Ukraine war orders starting to boost revenues for big US defense contractors

US taxpayer money at work. (apologies for my cynicism)

Ukraine war orders starting to boost revenues for big US defense contractors

Reuters · by Mike Stone

WASHINGTON, Oct 27 (Reuters) - The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is starting to boost defense contractors' revenues, as customers such as the U.S. government restock supplies shipped to Ukraine and countries around Europe arm themselves with an eye on Moscow's aggressions.

U.S. defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin (LMT.N), General Dynamics (GD.N) and others expect that existing orders for hundreds of thousands of artillery rounds, hundreds of Patriot missile interceptors and a surge in orders for armored vehicles expected in the months ahead will underpin their results in coming quarters.

New contracts to supply Ukraine directly - or backfill U.S. weapons sent to Ukraine - were signed late last year, and now revenue is flowing to the big defense contractors. Lockheed, General Dynamics and RTX (RTX.N) all reported better than expected results over the past several days, and executives expect both the conflict in Ukraine and Israel's war with Palestinian militant group Hamas to drive up near-term demand.

"We've gone from 14,000 (artillery) rounds per month to 20,000 very quickly. We're working ahead of schedule to accelerate that production capacity up to 85,000, even as high as 100,000 rounds per month," Jason Aiken, General Dynamics' chief financial officer, said on a call with Wall Street analysts on Wednesday.

"And I think the Israel situation is only going to put upward pressure on that demand."

The General Dynamics' Combat Systems unit, which makes armored vehicles, tanks and the artillery Ukraine uses, saw its revenue rise almost 25% versus the same period a year ago.

RTX, which makes AMRAAM rockets used in Ukraine, said on Tuesday's earnings call with Wall Street analysts it has received $3 billion of orders since Russia's February 2022 invasion that are related to replenishing Ukraine and U.S. war stocks, and the company expects more.

Third-quarter sales for Northrop Grumman's (NOC.N) Defense Systems segment rose 6% on high demand for ammunition and rocket motors used in guided multiple-launch rocket systems (GMLRS), which play a crucial role in supporting Ukraine's defense efforts against Russian forces.

This is part of a global trend. Sweden's Saab (SAABb.ST) raised its full-year sales outlook on Thursday on the back of strong defense demand and Germany's Rheinmetall (RHMG.DE) said third-quarter profit jumped on strong demand for weapons and ammunition.

During his latest request for $106 billion in new funds for Ukraine, Israel, the Indo-Pacific region and border enforcement, U.S. President Joe Biden on Oct. 20 said some of the supplemental request would go to companies that backfill production of U.S. weapons sent abroad. Biden mentioned Patriot missiles made in Arizona, and "artillery shells manufactured in 12 states across the country," naming Pennsylvania, Ohio and Texas.

To be sure, executives from several defense firms at a recent trade show cautioned that a lack of skilled labor and supply chain issues continue to hamper companies' capacity to fill orders.

"The supply chain, to be completely candid with you, remains, and I think we expect to remain what I call fragile," General Dynamics's Aiken said on the earnings call, as the company said it was cutting its forecast for 2023 business jet deliveries. "I don't think that's going to get back to what we saw pre-pandemic for the foreseeable future."

Lockheed on Oct. 17 said supply and labor disruptions are affecting divisions like aeronautics, which makes the advanced F-35 fighter jet, due to the need for processor assemblies, solid-rocket motors, castings and forgings.

Reporting by Mike Stone in Washington; Editing by Rod Nickel

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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Reuters · by Mike Stone

11. Mideast in focus as US, China meet to pave way for Biden-Xi summit

Mideast in focus as US, China meet to pave way for Biden-Xi summit

Reuters · by Humeyra Pamuk

WASHINGTON/BEIJING, Oct 26 (Reuters) - Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi begins a long-anticipated visit to Washington on Thursday, as the U.S. and China seek to manage deep strategic differences and pave the way for an expected summit between presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping.

The Middle East war has added a fresh dynamic to the testy relationship between the superpowers and Washington is hoping Beijing could use its influence with Iran to help ensure the Israel-Hamas conflict does not spread to the wider region.

However, while both Beijing and Washington have spoken of looking for areas where they can work together, and Xi on Wednesday said China was willing to cooperate on global challenges, experts do not expect immediate progress.

The Biden administration's priority with Beijing has been to prevent intense competition between the world's two largest economies and disagreements on a host of issues from trade to Taiwan and the South China Sea veering into conflict.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken will welcome Wang at the State Department on Thursday, and he told the U.N. Security Council on Tuesday he would work with him to prevent the Middle East conflict from spreading.

Policy analysts in China and the U.S. say both sides share an interest in averting a wider war and that China, as a major oil purchaser, has considerable influence it could exert on Iran.

But whether Beijing will use it remains to be seen and experts say China may instead watch from the sidelines for a while longer.

"The Chinese certainly have an interest in preventing a direct U.S.-Iranian confrontation, as they are major oil consumers and that would spike prices," said Jon Alterman, head of the Middle East program at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

"Still, the Chinese are unlikely to do any heavy lifting here. I expect they'll want a seat at the table when the Israel-Gaza struggle gets resolved, but they don't feel much need or ability to hasten resolution."

WANG, BIDEN

Shi Yinhong, professor of international relations at Renmin University of China, said Beijing exerting its influence over Iran was "almost the only serious and practical U.S. expectation of China on the Middle East situation."

However Shi added: "The U.S. position on Iran is far from acceptable to China and vice versa. Mutual compromise on this issue could be too limited and small to be of any significance."

Washington has stressed the importance of China's ability to influence Iran. Blinken, during a whirlwind Middle East trip last week, spoke by phone to Wang and asked him to use Beijing's clout to ensure the conflict does not widen.

China has called for restraint and a ceasefire in response to Israel's bombardment of Gaza in retaliation for an Oct. 7 attack by Hamas that Israel says killed 1,400 people. Retaliatory Israeli airstrikes have killed over 6,500 people, the health ministry in Hamas-ruled Gaza said on Wednesday. Reuters has not been able to independently verify the casualty figures of either side.

"China has been working tirelessly to promote the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of peace. We have been maintaining close communication with the parties concerned," China's U.N. Ambassador Zhang Jun said on Tuesday.

Wang's visit to Washington comes after several top U.S. officials, including Blinken, visited Beijing in the past several months.

The veteran Chinese diplomat is expected to meet Biden's national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, on Friday. He is also expected to speak with Biden during his visit to the White House, according to two U.S. officials, although it is unclear how substantial their interaction will be.

PATH TO BIDEN-XI MEETING

Analysts expect the discussions to focus on preparations for an anticipated meeting between Biden and Xi on the sidelines of the summit of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries in San Francisco from Nov. 11 to 17. It would be Biden and Xi's first in-person meeting since a summit in Bali last November.

"There are substantive things to be ironed out and finalized," said Yun Sun, director of the China Program at Washington's Stimson Center. "(Wang) will be here for the negotiations only - the big deliverables will be reserved for the top leaders to announce."

On Wednesday, Xi said whether Washington and Beijing could establish the "right" way of getting along and managing their differences would be crucial to the world.

The two sides go into APEC from different economic perspectives, with economic policy analysts saying the U.S. has weathered challenging global conditions after the COVID-19 pandemic somewhat better than China.

U.S. and Chinese officials held a virtual meeting on Monday on macroeconomic developments, talks the U.S. called "productive and substantive" and China called "in-depth, frank and constructive."

U.S. officials said Taiwan and the South and East China Seas, where they accused Beijing of "destabilizing and dangerous actions" against rival territorial claimants, would also be on the agenda.

They said re-establishing military-to-military ties with China remained a top U.S. priority to avoid unintended conflict.

China's Global Times tabloid highlighted contradictions in relations.

"Although Sino-U.S. interactions have seen a rapid recovery in different fields," the U.S. policy of attempting to "contain" China had not changed, it said, accusing Washington of "two-faced tactics" in which it "frequently takes various opportunities to discredit China and create friction."

Reporting by Humeyra Pamuk and David Brunnstrom in Washington and Laurie Chen in Beijing; Additional reporting by Trevor Hunnicutt Editing by Josie Kao

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Acquire Licensing Rights, opens new tab

Humeyra Pamuk

Thomson Reuters

Humeyra Pamuk is a senior foreign policy correspondent based in Washington DC. She covers the U.S. State Department, regularly traveling with U.S. Secretary of State. During her 20 years with Reuters, she has had postings in London, Dubai, Cairo and Turkey, covering everything from the Arab Spring and Syria's civil war to numerous Turkish elections and the Kurdish insurgency in the southeast. In 2017, she won the Knight-Bagehot fellowship program at Columbia University’s School of Journalism. She holds a BA in International Relations and an MA on European Union studies.

Laurie Chen

Thomson Reuters

Laurie Chen is a China Correspondent at Reuters' Beijing bureau, covering politics and general news. Before joining Reuters, she reported on China for six years at Agence France-Presse and the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong. She speaks fluent Mandarin.

Reuters · by Humeyra Pamuk

12. China's Wang tells Blinken 'in-depth' dialogue can steady ties

The key point (from the Chinese perspective): 

 The United States and China have disagreements and need "in-depth" and "comprehensive" dialogue to reduce misunderstandings and stabilize ties, China's foreign minister, Wang Yi, said on Thursday, kicking off a long-anticipated visit to Washington.

China's Wang tells Blinken 'in-depth' dialogue can steady ties

By Humeyra Pamuk, David Brunnstrom and Laurie Chen

October 27, 20232:31 AM EDTUpdated 7 hours ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/mideast-focus-us-china-meet-pave-way-biden-xi-summit-2023-10-26/

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WASHINGTON/BEIJING, Oct 26 (Reuters) - The United States and China have disagreements and need "in-depth" and "comprehensive" dialogue to reduce misunderstandings and stabilize ties, China's foreign minister, Wang Yi, said on Thursday, kicking off a long-anticipated visit to Washington.

Standing next to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Wang said the two countries share important common interests and challenges that they need to resolve together.

"Therefore, China and the United States need to have dialogue. Not only should we resume dialogue, the dialogue should be in-depth and comprehensive," Wang said, speaking through an interpreter.

Dialogue would help reduce misunderstandings, help stabilize the relationship and "return it to the track of healthy, stable and sustainable development," he said.

Blinken responded: "I agree with what the foreign minister said."

Before Wang spoke, Blinken had said he looked forward to constructive talks with his Chinese counterpart. During the meeting, Blinken expressed his condolences on the passing of China's former premier, Li Keqiang.

Wang's three-day visit is the latest in a flurry of diplomatic engagements between the two strategic rivals as they seek to manage their differences to avoid conflict. The trip primarily is to prepare for an expected summit between President Joe Biden and President Xi Jinping in November.

Blinken and Wang will continue their discussions on Friday.

The Israel-Hamas conflict has added a fresh dynamic to the testy relationship of the superpowers, and Washington is hoping Beijing can use its influence with Iran to prevent an escalation into a wider war in the Middle East.

Wang is expected to meet U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan on Friday. He is also expected to speak with Biden during his visit to the White House, although it is unclear how substantial their interaction will be.

The Biden administration's priority with Beijing has been to prevent intense competition between the two largest economies and disagreements on a host of issues - including trade, Taiwan and the South China Sea - from veering into conflict.

[1/5]U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken shakes hands with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi as they meet at the State Department in Washington, U.S., October 26, 2023. REUTERS/Sarah Silbiger Acquire Licensing Rights

However, while both Beijing and Washington have spoken of looking for areas where they can work together, and Xi said on Wednesday China was willing to cooperate on global challenges, experts do not expect immediate progress.

PATH TO BIDEN-XI MEETING

Policy analysts in China and the U.S. say both sides share an interest in averting a wider war in the Middle East and that China, as a major oil purchaser, could exert considerable influence on Iran. Whether it will remains to be seen.

"The Chinese certainly have an interest in preventing a direct U.S.-Iranian confrontation, as they are major oil consumers and that would spike prices," said Jon Alterman, head of the Middle East program at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

"Still, the Chinese are unlikely to do any heavy lifting here. I expect they'll want a seat at the table when the Israel-Gaza struggle gets resolved, but they don't feel much need or ability to hasten resolution."

Shi Yinhong, professor of international relations at Renmin University of China, said Beijing exerting its influence over Iran was "almost the only serious and practical U.S. expectation of China on the Middle East situation."

However Shi added: "The U.S. position on Iran is far from acceptable to China and vice versa. Mutual compromise on this issue could be too limited and small to be of any significance."

Wang's visit to Washington comes after several top U.S. officials, including Blinken, visited Beijing in the past several months.

Analysts expect Wang's talks to focus on preparations for an anticipated meeting between Biden and Xi on the sidelines of the summit of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries in San Francisco from Nov. 11 to 17. It would be Biden and Xi's first in-person meeting since a summit in Bali last November.

The two sides go into APEC from different economic perspectives, with economic policy analysts saying the U.S. has weathered challenging global conditions after the COVID-19 pandemic somewhat better than China.

U.S. and Chinese officials held a virtual meeting on Monday on macroeconomic developments.

U.S. officials said Taiwan and the South and East China Seas, where they accused Beijing of "destabilizing and dangerous actions" against rival territorial claimants, would also be on the agenda. Re-establishing military-to-military ties with China remains a top priority to avoid unintended conflict, they said.

Reporting by Humeyra Pamuk and David Brunnstrom in Washington, and Laurie Chen in Beijing; Additional reporting by Simon Lewis, Michael Martina, Trevor Hunnicutt and Gursimran Kaur; Editing by Josie Kao, Tom Hogue and Raju Gopalakrishnan

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Humeyra Pamuk

Thomson Reuters

Humeyra Pamuk is a senior foreign policy correspondent based in Washington DC. She covers the U.S. State Department, regularly traveling with U.S. Secretary of State. During her 20 years with Reuters, she has had postings in London, Dubai, Cairo and Turkey, covering everything from the Arab Spring and Syria's civil war to numerous Turkish elections and the Kurdish insurgency in the southeast. In 2017, she won the Knight-Bagehot fellowship program at Columbia University’s School of Journalism. She holds a BA in International Relations and an MA on European Union studies.

Laurie Chen

Thomson Reuters

Laurie Chen is a China Correspondent at Reuters' Beijing bureau, covering politics and general news. Before joining Reuters, she reported on China for six years at Agence France-Presse and the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong. She speaks fluent Mandarin.

13. China and the US appear to restart military talks

Excerpts:

China’s highly opaque political system lends itself to heavy speculation around the reasons why officials are removed, mostly focusing on possible corruption, political differences or violations of an unwritten code of personal conduct.

China on Thursday also released video it said showed a close encounter between the Chinese navy and the USS Ralph Johnson, claiming the American destroyer harassed the navy’s latest-generation type 052 destroyer Guilin while it was undergoing routine training in the South China Sea on Aug. 19.

China claimed the USS Ralph Johnson took a sharp turn and accelerated, crossing the bow of the Chinese ship near the disputed Paracel Islands, which China calls Xisha.

“What the US side wants is to threaten China’s national security with unrestricted provocation and nuisance against China,” Wu said, adding that the “Chinese military is always on high alert and will take all necessary measure to firmly safeguard the sovereignty, security and maritime rights of the nation.”

China claims almost all of the strategically vital South China Sea as its own territory. Neighboring countries, including U.S. ally the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan also claim territory in the region.

China and the US appear to restart military talks

militarytimes.com · by The Associated Press · October 26, 2023

BEIJING — China and the United States appear to be restarting dialogue between their militaries, despite continuing disputes over Beijing’s claims to Taiwan and the South China Sea.

The U.S. confirmed on Thursday that it plans to send Cynthia Carras, principal director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, to represent the U.S. Defense Department at the Xiangshan Forum in Beijing this month.

The international gathering hosted by the Chinese Defense Ministry aims to discuss security cooperation and raise China’s status as a global power and rival to the U.S. and its Asian allies, including Japan and South Korea.

China froze military exchanges after then-Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi last August visited self-governing Taiwan, which China claims as its own territory.

In one of the most notable incidents, Chinese defense officials refused to answer a call in February from U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin following the shooting-down of a suspected Chinese spy balloon that had flown across North America, sparking a major diplomatic crisis between the sides that have already seen ties plummet to a historical low.

In a statement, the Pentagon said it “welcomes the opportunity to engage with (People’s Liberation Army) representatives at the Xiangshan Forum on ensuring open and reliable lines of communication, ensuring crisis communications channels, reducing strategic and operational risk, and avoiding misperceptions.”

Earlier on Thursday, Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson Col. Wu Qian told reporters that “China attaches great importance to the development of military-to-military relations between China and the United States.

The annual Xiangshan Forum is scheduled for Oct. 29-31.

“As we see it, the ranks of the personnel taking part in the exchanges are not the most important. What is more important are the contents of the exchanges,” Wu said.

The comments came as China’s top diplomat Wang Yi departed for Washington to meet with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. That follows a series of high-level visits from the United States to China in recent months. In the latest sign of thawing ties, Blinken met Chinese President Xi Jinping, the leader of the ruling Communist Party, in Beijing in June.

China had attributed its refusal to restart military communications to sanctions imposed by Washington, including a refusal to allow former Defense Minister Li Shangfu to visit the U.S.

However, on Tuesday China announced the removal of Li as defense minister without giving any explanation or naming a replacement.

In answer to a reporter’s question on Li’s removal, Wu said: “I suggest you pay attention to the release of authoritative information.”

Former Foreign Minister Qin Gang was also removed from office this year under circumstances that the government has yet to explain.

China’s highly opaque political system lends itself to heavy speculation around the reasons why officials are removed, mostly focusing on possible corruption, political differences or violations of an unwritten code of personal conduct.

China on Thursday also released video it said showed a close encounter between the Chinese navy and the USS Ralph Johnson, claiming the American destroyer harassed the navy’s latest-generation type 052 destroyer Guilin while it was undergoing routine training in the South China Sea on Aug. 19.

China claimed the USS Ralph Johnson took a sharp turn and accelerated, crossing the bow of the Chinese ship near the disputed Paracel Islands, which China calls Xisha.

“What the US side wants is to threaten China’s national security with unrestricted provocation and nuisance against China,” Wu said, adding that the “Chinese military is always on high alert and will take all necessary measure to firmly safeguard the sovereignty, security and maritime rights of the nation.”

China claims almost all of the strategically vital South China Sea as its own territory. Neighboring countries, including U.S. ally the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan also claim territory in the region.

Associated Press defense correspondent Lolita Baldor contributed to this report from Washington, D.C.

14. ‘Viet Cong times 10’: underground warfare awaits Israeli troops in Gaza

Think this is bad? Imagine clearing the some 5000 underground facilities in north Korea? It will be VC and Hamas times 1000.

‘Viet Cong times 10’: underground warfare awaits Israeli troops in Gaza

• Hamas tunnels for attack, smuggling and storage stretch for hundreds of kilometres
• Freed Israeli hostage described the Gaza tunnel network being like ‘a spider’s web’

Reuters

+ FOLLOWPublished: 1:27pm, 27 Oct, 2023

By Reuters South China Morning Post5 min

October 27, 2023

View Original

What lies in wait for Israeli ground troops in Gaza, security sources say, is a Hamas tunnel network hundreds of kilometres long and up to 80 metres deep, described by one freed hostage as “a spider’s web” and by one expert as the “Viet Cong times 10”.

The Palestinian Islamist group has different kinds of tunnels running beneath the sandy 360-sq-km coastal strip and its borders - including attack, smuggling, storage and operational burrows, Western and Middle East sources familiar with the matter said.

The United States believes Israel’s special forces will face an unprecedented challenge having to battle Hamas militants while trying to avoid killing hostages held below ground, a US official said.

US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin noted that Iraq’s nine-month-long battle to retake the city of Mosul from Islamic State might prove to have been easier than what awaits the Israelis - likely to be “a lot of IEDs (improvised explosive devices), a lot of booby traps, and just a really grinding activity”.

Even though Israel has invested heavily in tunnel detection - including a sensor-equipped underground barrier it called an “iron wall” - Hamas is still thought to have working tunnels to the outside world.

After the last round of hostilities in 2021, Hamas’s leader in Gaza, Yehya Al-Sinwar, said: “They started saying they destroyed 100kms of Hamas tunnels. I am telling you, the tunnels we have in the Gaza Strip exceed 500kms. Even if their narrative is true, they only destroyed 20 per cent of the tunnels”.

How does Gaza’s Ministry of Health calculate war death toll?

There has been no corroboration of the comment by Sinwar, who is thought to be hiding underground ahead of an expected Israeli ground offensive.

But the estimate of hundreds of kilometres is widely accepted by security analysts, even though the blockaded coastal strip is only 40km (25 miles) long.

With Israel in full control of Gaza’s air and sea access and 59km of its 72km land borders - with Egypt 13km to the south - tunnels provide one of the few ways for Hamas to bring in weapons, equipment and people.

While it and other Palestinian groups are secretive about their networks, recently released Israeli hostage, 85-year-old Yocheved Lifshitz, said: “It looked like a spider’s web, many, many tunnels,” adding: “We walked kilometres under the ground.”

Hamas believes that with Israel’s overwhelming aerial and armoured military superiority, tunnels are a way to cut some of those advantages by forcing Israel’s soldiers to move underground in cramped spaces the Hamas fighters know well.

An Israeli military spokesperson said on Thursday: “I won’t elaborate on the number of kilometres of tunnels but it is a high number, built under schools and residential areas”.

An opening to a tunnel dug from Gaza to Israel, on the Israeli side near Kissufim. File photo: Reuters

Urging the United Nations Security Council to intervene, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has called for an immediate cessation of “aggression” on Gaza and moves toward “a political solution instead of military and security solutions”.

Israeli security sources say Israel’s heavy aerial bombardments have caused little damage to the tunnel infrastructure with Hamas naval commandos able to launch a seaborne attack targeting coastal communities near Gaza this week.

“Although we have been attacking massively for days and days, the (Hamas) leadership is pretty much intact, as is the ability to command and control, the ability even to try and launch counter attacks,” said Amir Avivi, a former brigadier general whose senior positions in the Israeli military included deputy commander of the Gaza division, tasked with tackling tunnels.

Hamas says Israeli strikes on Gaza killed ‘almost 50’ hostages

“There is a whole city all over Gaza underneath with depths of 40-50 metres. There are bunkers and headquarters and storage and of course they are connected to more than a thousand rocket launching positions.”

Other sources estimated depths of up to 80 metres.

One Western security source said: “They run for miles. They are made of concrete and very well made. Think of the Viet Cong times 10. They have had years and lots of money with which to work with”.

Israeli soldiers patrol along the border with southern Gaza, in Israel. Photo: EPA-EFE

Another security source, from one of Israel’s neighbouring countries, said Hamas’ tunnels from Egypt remain active.

“The supply chain is still intact these days. The network involved in facilitating co-ordination are some Egyptian military officers. It is unclear if there is knowledge of this by the Egyptian army,” he said.

Hamas was created in Gaza in 1987 and is thought to have begun digging tunnels in the mid-1990s, when Israel granted Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization some degree of self-rule in Gaza.

Israeli tanks and troops launch Gaza raid ahead of ‘next stage’

The tunnel network is a key reason why Hamas is stronger in Gaza than in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, where Israel’s settlements, military bases and monitoring devices make it harder to get anything in from Jordan.

Tunneling became easier in 2005 when Israel pulled its soldiers and settlers out of Gaza, and when Hamas won power in a 2006 election.

‘There is a whole city all over Gaza underneath with depths of 40-50 metres’. Photo: AFP

Professor Joel Roskin, a geomorphologist and geologist with Israel’s Bar-Ilan University said it was difficult to map the tunnel network accurately from the surface or space, adding highly classified information was essential for 3D mapping and imagery visualisation.

Among the elite units tasked with going underground is Yahalom, specialist commandos from Israel’s Combat Engineering Corps known as the “weasels”, who specialise in finding, clearing and destroying the tunnels.

Earlier this week Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Yahalom fighters, telling them: “I rely on you, the people of Israel rely on you”.

Israeli sources said what awaits them is formidable and they faced an enemy that has regrouped and learned from previous Israeli operations in 2014 and 2021.

“There are going to be a lot of booby traps. They have thermobaric weapons that they didn’t have in 2021, which are more lethal. And I believe they acquired a lot of anti-tank weapon systems that are going to try to hit our APCs (armoured personnel carriers), tanks,” said Amnon Sofrin, a former brigadier general and former commander of the Combat Intelligence Corps.

Sofrin, who was also previously head of the intelligence directorate with Israel’s Mossad spy agency, said Hamas would also be trying to kidnap soldiers.

Daphne Richemond-Barak, professor at Israel’s Reichman University and author of the book Underground Warfare, said the conflicts in Syria and Iraq had changed the situation.

“What the IDF (Israeli military) is likely to face inside the tunnels is also all of the experience and all of the knowledge that has been gained by groups like ISIS (Islamic State) and has been ... passed on to Hamas.”

15. White House says Russia is executing its own soldiers for not following orders

I am reminded of the quote about Stalin's Army: "It takes a brave man to be a coward in the Red Army."

White House says Russia is executing its own soldiers for not following orders

AP · by COLLEEN LONG · October 26, 2023

By AAMER MADHANII and

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WASHINGTON (AP) — The White House on Thursday said Russia is executing soldiers who have failed to follow orders and threatening entire units with death if they retreat from Ukrainian artillery fire.

It’s a development that U.S. national security officials believe reflects Russia’s morale problems 20 months into its grinding invasion of Ukraine, said White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby.

“It’s reprehensible to think about that you would execute your own soldiers because they didn’t want to follow orders and now threatening to execute entire units, it’s barbaric,” Kirby told reporters. “But I think it’s a symptom of how poorly Russia’s military leaders know they’re doing and how bad they have handled this from a military perspective.”

The White House has downgraded and released intelligence findings about Russian action over the course of the war. In the past, the administration has said it has acted to disclose the intelligence to highlight plans for Russian misinformation and other activity so allies remain clear-eyed about Moscow’s intent and Russia thinks twice before carrying out an operation.

This latest unveiling of intelligence about Russia’s struggles comes as President Joe Biden is pressing the Republican-controlled House to go along with providing more funding for Ukraine as Kyiv tries to repel Russia in a war that has no end in sight.

Kirby pointed to the information as he renewed a plea for Congress to pass a nearly $106 billion supplemental funding request that Biden unveiled last week. The funding request includes more than $61 billion for Ukraine.

“President Putin is not giving up on his aspirations to take all of Ukraine and as long as Russia continues its brutal assault we have to continue to support the Ukrainian people and their self defense, because his intentions are clear,” Kirby said. Putin ”basically said that if Western weapons to Ukraine stop, Ukraine would have a week to live. So to ensure that we can continue to do that it’s critical that Congress step up and pass the supplemental requests that the president put forward last week.”

Kirby did not provide any details on how many Russian troops have been executed for failing to follow orders or any specific examples of units threatened with execution for retreating from Ukrainian fire.

The Wagner Group military contractor was reported to have had a practice of executing those who fled. The contract soldiers were pulled out of Ukraine after their leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, mounted an armed rebellion in June. There also have been reports, including from the British Defense Ministry, that the regular Russian military has deployed “barrier troops” that threaten to shoot any deserters.

“They are in such desperate need to make some kind of progress, particularly in the Donbas, the Donetsk areas, that they are literally throwing young men into the fight who haven’t been properly trained, haven’t been properly equipped, and certainly are not being properly led,” Kirby said.

COLLEEN LONG

The White House, law enforcement and legal affairs

twittermailto

AP · by COLLEEN LONG · October 26, 2023

16. US Scrambled to Assign Intel Analysts to Hamas After Attack

Cohen and Gooch in Military Misfortune: Failure to learn, failure to adapt, and failure to anticipate. It is always the failure to anticipate that hurts us, but we continue to learn and adapt as we are doing now.

The question we should ask now is in what other theaters and potential conflict zones are we short analysts? And can we "surge" analysts is thay have no experience and provide effective intelligence support? And the bigger question is do we have a sufficiently resourced and properly allocated intelligence structure to prevent future "failures to anticipate?" Where are the new shortfalls being caused by the surge to the Middle East? And the even bigger question is : did our intelligence analysts correctly anticipate and their analysis was not heeded?

US Scrambled to Assign Intel Analysts to Hamas After Attack

TIME

The U.S. military has scrambled to add more intelligence analysts to cover Israeli and Palestinian issues since Hamas launched its gruesome killing spree in southern Israel on Oct. 7, according to two people familiar with the changes.

Analysts at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters near Tampa, Fla., who had been following Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and other militant groups were reassigned to also start tracking developments and information related to the emerging war between Israel and Hamas, said the people, who were granted anonymity because they were not authorized publicly to discuss the matter.

The shift in resources was needed because leaders at CENTCOM, which oversees the U.S. war machine in the Middle East and Central Asia, had reduced the number of billets for civilian intelligence analysts tasked with keeping track of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the previous three years, said a person familiar with the changes. Those analysts that remained on the issue had focused their analysis less on Gaza and more on the West Bank and understanding internal Israeli politics, the person said.

Collecting and reviewing information about Hamas and other militant groups in Gaza has taken on new urgency for CENTCOM because Hamas is holding more than 200 hostages and some 10 Americans taken during the deadly rampage, and Iranian-backed militias have stepped up attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria. President Biden has also directed two powerful carrier strike groups to sail closer to Israel. All three situations require CENTCOM’s attention.

The reshuffle reflects how the Oct. 7 attacks sent shockwaves through the U.S. national security apparatus, upending its priorities in the region. It also raises questions about how the broader U.S. intelligence community allocated its resources in the months and years preceding Hamas’ surprise offensive.

Officials at CENTCOM did not offer an explanation for why intelligence analysts needed to be reassigned. “At this time, we are focused on providing our support to the people of Israel. We have a close partnership with Israel and always share timely intelligence about threats in the region with our partners,” said Michael Lawhorn, a spokesperson for CENTCOM, in a statement. “Our intelligence community is working hard to gain as much fidelity as possible. Will not comment further on the specifics of our intelligence sharing,” Lawhorn said. Officials at the CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which oversees the entire U.S. intelligence community, declined to comment.

During the Trump and Biden administrations, the U.S. government had focused diplomatic efforts in the region on trying to help normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia and countering Iranian influence in conflicts from Yemen to Syria. The Biden administration was caught by surprise by Hamas’ surprise attacks.

“They didn’t see it coming. It’s not that they did a bad job. It’s just a reminder of the unpredictability of international relations,” says Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow and director of research in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. “The Israelis watch Gaza every day and they missed it.”

Earlier this year, CIA director William Burns suggested the situation in the region could soon turn more volatile. “Conversations I had with Israeli and Palestinian leaders, you know, I think it left me quite concerned about the prospects for even greater fragility and even greater violence between Israelis and Palestinians as well,” Burns said during a public discussion at Georgetown University in February. He added that he and others in the intelligence community were seeing similarities to a leading up to the Second Intifada uprising that lasted more than four years after former President Bill Clinton’s Camp David Summit failed to deliver a two-state solution in 2000.

In recent years, U.S. intelligence officials haven’t focused many resources on Hamas and the Gaza Strip because it wasn’t seen as presenting a threat to the U.S. homeland, said a U.S. official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to speak about closed-door discussions. "Israel is responsible for their own backyard. We cannot keep close tabs on Gaza the way they do,” the official says.

A decision by intelligence leaders to reallocate resources now, the official adds, “does not mean they were improperly allocated before” but that intelligence leaders are responding to new developments. "Given the outbreak in Israel, there is a larger risk, not so much of Hamas striking our homeland, as turning into a larger regional conflict that endangers US troops in the region,” the official says.

In recent days, Iran-backed proxy forces have launched drone attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria, injuring U.S. service members, and a U.S. Naval ship shot down a rocket fired by Iran-backed Houthi forces in Yemen that was heading toward Israel.

TIME

17. Iran Threatens US With 'Fire' if Israel Doesn’t Stop Attacks on Gaza

Iran is really asking for it. ( note sarcasm). Note that this was spoken at the UN.

Iran Threatens US With 'Fire' if Israel Doesn’t Stop Attacks on Gaza

Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian delivered the warning in a speech at the United Nations

Published 10/26/23 01:30 PM ET|Updated 20 hr ago

Bruce Golding

themessenger.com · October 26, 2023

A top Iranian official warned the United Nations that the U.S. won't be "spared from this fire" if Israel doesn't stop its bombardment of the Gaza Strip, according to a report Thursday.

Iran's foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, delivered the threat during a speech to the UN General Assembly in New York City, Al Arabiya reported.

“I say frankly to the American statesmen, who are now managing the genocide in Palestine, that we do not welcome expansion of the war in the region," he said.

"But if the genocide in Gaza continues, they will not be spared from this fire."

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian attends a press conference on Oct. 27, 2021. in Tehran, Iran.Meghdad Madadi/ATPImages/Getty Images

His comments marked the latest threat from Tehran to the U.S. since Israel declared war after Hamas launched a surprise attack from the Gaza Strip on Oct. 7, killing more than 1,400 people and seizing more than 200 hostages.

Amir-Abdollahian said Hamas has told Iran that it was ready to release its civilian hostages and that the world should pressure Israel to free its 6,000 Palestinian prisoners, according to Al Arabiya.

“The Islamic Republic of Iran stands ready to play its part in this very important humanitarian endeavor, along with Qatar and Turkey," he said.

"Naturally, the release of the 6,000 Palestinian prisoners is another necessity and responsibility of the global community."

themessenger.com · October 26, 2023

18. Most Popular Cryptocurrency Keeps Showing Up in Illicit Finance

We probably need a specific threat finance task force focusing on illicit cryptocurrency.

Most Popular Cryptocurrency Keeps Showing Up in Illicit Finance

Tether has allegedly been used by Hamas, drug dealers, North Korea and sanctioned Russians

https://www.wsj.com/finance/currencies/most-popular-cryptocurrency-keeps-showing-up-in-illicit-finance-71d32e5e?mod=hp_lead_pos10

By Ben Foldy

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Oct. 27, 2023 9:02 am ET

Tether, the $84 billion so-called stablecoin bridging the worlds of cryptocurrencies and the dollar, is increasingly showing up in investigations tied to money laundering, terror financing and sanctions evasion.

Tether is now the world’s most heavily traded cryptocurrency by volume. The stablecoin, also known as USDT, maintains a 1:1 exchange ratio with the dollar. Traders use it to stash their cash, easily invest in other cryptocurrencies or swap it into traditional currencies such as the dollar. 

Another use for tether seems to be in illicit finance, according to indictments, blockchain analysis and sanctions notices. In the past year, the cryptocurrency appears to have been used in financing Hamas, paying Chinese fentanyl suppliers, funding the North Korean nuclear program and helping buy sanctioned Venezuelan oil for sanctioned Russian oligarchs.

Tether has $84 billion in circulation. It has maintained its value and trading volume despite two cryptocurrency headwinds. During a “crypto winter,” when some of crypto’s biggest players collapsed, the total global market cap for cryptocurrencies has fallen today to about $1.3 trillion from more than $2.1 trillion in April 2022.

At the same time, interest rates have soared, making safe investments lucrative again. Tether pays no interest, but yields on the assets it owns have risen sharply. So the opportunity cost of holding it has gone up. 

Tether’s eponymous parent company, Tether Holdings, is getting all of the benefits of the higher rates. The company generates billions of dollars of cash as one of the 22 largest buyers of U.S. Treasury debt, holding more than countries like Mexico and Spain, according to the company.

Tether, the world’s most heavily traded cryptocurrency, has maintained its value and trading volume despite two cryptocurrency headwinds. PHOTO: TIFFANY HAGLER-GEARD/BLOOMBERG NEWS

Cryptocurrencies including tether came under scrutiny following the Hamas attack on Israel. 

Blockchain analysis shows that wallets seized by the Israeli government for being connected to Hamas received some $41 million in cryptocurrency between 2020 and 2023, according to Israeli blockchain firm Bitok. More than 99% of that came in tether, Bitok said. 

After high-profile seizures earlier this year, Hamas’s military military wing Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades asked supporters to no longer send bitcoin to protect themselves. 

Tether has appeared repeatedly in recent high-profile sanctions, seizures and indictments. One case involved the use of tether to purchase 500,000 barrels of oil from Venezuela’s sanctioned national oil company in 2021. “Everyone does it now. It’s convenient, it’s quick,” wrote Yury Orekhov, a Russian who lived in Dubai, to someone involved in the transaction.

The message was part of Orekhov’s U.S. indictment last year on several counts of fraud, money laundering and sanctions evasion, including operating fronts for a sanctioned Russian oligarch and Russian arms manufacturers.

Orekhov was arrested in Germany, where the U.S. attempted to extradite him. Orekhov opposed the extradition and was released by German authorities after a German court ruled that the Venezuela-related allegations weren’t illegal in Germany. Orekhov didn’t respond to a request for comment. 

Recent moves by the U.S. government targeting a transnational fentanyl supplier network and North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program have also highlighted the use of tether, in addition to traditional financial networks and laundering techniques. 

After The Wall Street Journal sent Tether questions for this article, it published a blog post “reinforcing its stance against crypto’s terrorist utilization.”

The blog said Tether has aided governments worldwide with criminal investigations, helping freeze a total of $835 million in assets it said were mostly tied to theft. Tether said it had frozen 32 addresses with around $873,000 linked to illicit activity relating to Israel and Ukraine.

“There is simply no evidence that Tether has violated sanctions laws or the Bank Secrecy Act through inadequate customer due diligence or screening practices,” the company wrote. 

The attacks on Israel have spurred bipartisan calls in Washington to subject cryptocurrency companies to the Bank Secrecy Act and other oversight aimed at deterring money laundering and illicit finance. 

Sen. Cynthia Lummis has urged the Justice Department to accelerate a probe into Tether. PHOTO: MARCO BELLO/REUTERS

Sen. Cynthia Lummis (R., Wyo.), who has been a crypto-industry supporter, and Rep. French Hill (R., Ark.), chair of the digital assets subcommittee on the House Financial Services Committee, sent a letter to Attorney General Merrick Garland imploring the Justice Department to accelerate a long-running investigation into Tether. The Justice Department should act against Tether “to choke off sources of funding to the terrorists currently targeting Israel,” the legislators wrote. 

Tether’s owner is under pressure because tether is a centralized token. That means tether can be frozen by the company that generates it, even in privately held wallets. Bitcoin was also used in several of these cases. But bitcoin is decentralized, meaning it can’t be frozen unless it is stored in an account at an exchange or institution.

Earlier this month, the Justice Department charged eight Chinese companies and 12 employees and officers with crimes related to fentanyl trafficking. Several of those charged maintained cryptocurrency wallets to handle the transactions related to the drug shipments that were also sanctioned by the Treasury Department. The designated wallets received more than $1.2 million in tether over hundreds of transactions, as well as additional transactions in bitcoin, according to data provided by ChainArgos, a blockchain data platform.

The North Korean nuclear-weapons program has also used tether, according to a U.S. indictment from earlier this year. 

In an effort to fund the nuclear program despite sanctions, employees of the North Korean Munitions Industry Department would use fake documents to get themselves hired at companies—including several cryptocurrency exchanges—that were hiring remote IT workers. 

At their request, the workers were paid in cryptocurrency. The payments, if not already in tether, would often be swapped into tether, which would be sent back to North Korea through accounts controlled by the country’s sanctioned Foreign Trade Bank. According to an indictment, $7.2 million in tether was sent to an account controlled by a Foreign Trade Bank employee funding the nuclear program. 

The Treasury Department also sanctioned Russian cryptocurrency exchange Garantex last year, citing its usage by Russian cybercriminals and willful disregard of anti-laundering policies. Despite the sanctions, around 80% of the exchange’s trading still involves tether, according to a leading blockchain analytics company.

Angus Berwick and Konrad Putzier contributed to this article.

Write to Ben Foldy at ben.foldy@wsj.com

19. Israel’s Laws of War

Excerpts:

In its advanced versions, just war doctrine includes norms and principles governing conduct not only during war but also once the fighting ends, under what is known as jus post bellum. According to the latter principles, reoccupation or annexation of Gaza by Israel is utterly unacceptable. Instead, what needs to take place is restoring security in the areas of Israel adjacent to Gaza; and then establishing peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians based on some agreement with respect to temporary borders. Any policies that involve population transfer, long-term occupation, or bringing the territory directly under Israeli rule would be incompatible with either of these goals.

To build a new peace in Gaza, creative alternatives must be sought, perhaps even some first steps toward a solution of the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the near term, the only plausible option would be the introduction of some multinational military and governmental authority, international or regional, which could be created by a UN Security Council resolution and that would act in cooperation with the Palestinian Authority and in coordination with Israel.

Whatever arrangements are made, they should not be taken as an ultimate solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The spirit of the two-state solution will need to be revived and allowed to prevail, through the introduction and implementation of confidence-building measures over a longer timeline. But the full elimination of the terrorist threat from Hamas and affiliated groups could do much to set this process in motion. Policies of pursuing lasting peace, all the more so policies in the spirit of the two-state solution, must rest on the practical assumption that the dangers to Israel and its citizens, as nurtured and practiced by terrorist organizations, have been permanently eliminated.

Israel’s Laws of War

How IDF Doctrine Shapes the Campaign Against Hamas in Gaza

By Asa Kasher

October 27, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Asa Kasher · October 27, 2023

As Israel begins the first stages of Operation Swords of Iron in response to Hamas’s October 7 terrorist attacks, many questions have been raised about the moral and legal aspects of the war. In Gaza, units of the Israel Defense Forces will confront tens of thousands of heavily armed Hamas fighters deeply embedded in a large noncombatant population. Given this highly challenging setting, a core concern is how the IDF can effectively protect Israel, its citizens, and Israel’s own soldiers while adhering to moral principles, military ethical norms, and international law.

Some have argued that Israel is not adhering to international laws of war. They assert that, in seeking to destroy Hamas’s military and political infrastructure, Israeli forces have disregarded the civilian populations in Gaza and are causing excessive collateral damage. In such a difficult war environment, some collateral damage is, unfortunately, unavoidable. But it is crucial to understand that Israel has a legal, moral, and ethical framework for approaching questions about conduct in war. This approach derives from basic principles of Israeli law, namely the obligation to respect and protect human dignity, international laws of war, and the IDF Code of Ethics, which has guided the conduct of Israeli commanders over the past three decades.

By setting down distinct parameters within which Israeli forces must operate—after the war as well as during it—Israeli war doctrine has significant implications for the operation against Hamas. Indeed, contrary to what some international commentators have claimed, Israel’s military response to the attacks so far has followed these standards, and the IDF has taken multiple steps to minimize collateral damage. Although the following should not be taken as the formal position of the Israeli government in the current crisis, it is an attempt to shed light on the major issues and the general way that Israel views them.

A DIFFERENT KIND OF CONFLICT

On October 7, 2023, the last day of the annual Jewish high holidays, hundreds of Hamas fighters, along with members of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a smaller terrorist organization, invaded Israel, attacked more than 20 villages and towns, as well as IDF military bases, and committed horrendous atrocities. More than 1,500 noncombatants were brutally massacred, and some 220 Israelis—even babies and sick and elderly people—were abducted and taken hostage in Gaza. In addition, Hamas launched thousands of rockets at Israel, including at densely populated civilian areas in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. There is not a shred of doubt that these blatant acts of aggression fit the legal criteria of war crimes. Given the stated goal of destroying Israel, set forth in Hamas’s charter, it should come as no surprise that some observers have described the attacks as having genocidal intent.

In view of demonstrations in some Western cities and statements in the Western media calling for an immediate cease-fire, the nature of Hamas needs to be made clear. Hamas is a Palestinian militia that governs the Gaza Strip, between Israel and Egypt. Much of the West, including Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union, have designated Hamas as a terrorist organization. This designation is based on the methods Hamas employs in pursuit of its goals. Some may regard those goals as justified, and others as immoral and unjustifiable, but those assessments are not relevant to the terrorist designation. Only the group’s methods count.

Historical parallels do not adequately fit the present situation.

In the days since the attacks, many have searched for historical parallels to try to make sense of the fathomless violence. Because Israel has witnessed no comparable act of terrorism in its 75-year history, some have looked back further in time or have tried to set aside the terrorist or anti-Semitic aspects of the attacks, viewing them instead as an extreme case of military aggression. Hence, commentators have variously invoked the anti-Jewish pogroms of eastern Europe more than a century ago, the Holocaust, and the surprise attack that began the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Such parallels, however, do not adequately fit the present situation. The pogroms and the Holocaust took place at a time when Jews did not have their own nation-state, and the Yom Kippur War was launched by a state military rather than by a terrorist militia. The distinction between combatants and noncombatants, which can be easily maintained when a national military such as Egypt fights against Israel, is not maintained when a terrorist militia tries to use urban populations as a human shield. To understand the specific values and ethical norms that apply in Israeli actions against Hamas, then, these historical comparisons must be discarded.

The opening phase of Operation Swords of Iron is now unfolding. Israel’s war cabinet, which now consists of some government ministers and several opposition leaders, including some with significant military experience, has set and made public the broad goals of the war. The government has not offered many details about the kinds of force to be used, except for the high number of reservists—well over 350,000—who have been ordered to serve in a variety of military units. Nonetheless, it is possible to assess Israel’s overall approach by examining the general principles that will govern its conduct.

A DUTY TO FIGHT

The state of Israel, including its courts and military commanders, has, over the course of its history, based military conduct on several kinds of values and ensuing norms. Some values stem from Israel’s status as a democratic country and as the nation-state of the Jewish people. The values of the IDF are expressed in its code of ethics. And some values come from international law, as interpreted by the Israeli legal system, led by the Supreme Court of Israel. Although these values derive from different moral, ethical, and legal sources, they combine to form two important general principles in the Israeli approach to combat operations.

The first principle is that any action taken on behalf of the Israeli state, including by its military and security forces, must be compatible with the universal obligation to respect and protect human dignity. A simple example is the requirement to treat captured enemy combatants humanely in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. This principle thus provides a moral, ethical, and legal constraint on military conduct.

The second principle, which can be called the self-defense principle, has two parts. First, it encompasses the right to self-defense if the state or any of its inhabitants is subject to armed attack; second, it provides that the state has a duty to defend its citizens when they are under direct attack.

Israel has a duty to defend its citizens against potential future attacks.

Indeed, Israel and other countries have interpreted the duty to defend citizens enshrined in the second part of this principle to hold not only for current or imminent attacks, but also for potential future attacks, even if they are not expected soon. The time for a state to create means of defense is not when its citizens already face danger, but much earlier—an imperative generally recognized by governments everywhere. In turn, how this defense is carried out when the danger is neither present nor imminent depends on the nature of the future danger.

The Hamas attacks have triggered both parts of the self-defense principle. Israel’s military operation in Gaza stems from what it views as the state’s right to take necessary action to defend itself and its inhabitants, and its duty to protect the latter against not only the present attack but also continuing threats from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken underscored this point during his visit to Tel Aviv on October 16, when he said, “Israel has the right and indeed the duty to defend its people from Hamas and other terrorists and to prevent future attacks.”

Thus, the answer to the “why” question of Israel’s military response is now clear: to satisfy the self-defense principle, Israel needs to go beyond the reestablishment of security on its border with Gaza and eliminate the possibility of any future such attacks. But the “how” question—how Israeli forces will carry out this task—is more difficult. Israel’s war cabinet has instructed the IDF to destroy the military and governmental abilities of Hamas in Gaza. But what does that mean in practice?

PREVENTIVE ACTION

To understand the major goal the IDF has set for Operation Swords of Iron according to Israeli principles of war, it is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of self-defense. Examples of the first kind are familiar since we encounter them in ordinary, everyday circumstances. Say, for example, you are crossing a park, and someone approaches you and tries to snatch your wallet. You forcefully resist the person, who then runs away. In this case, the structure of the encounter is clear: the would-be thief created a problem, you used some force, and the problem was solved.

A military attack, however, often takes on a different cast. The use of defensive force may stop the attack, thus ending the immediate danger, but the problem has not been fully solved. The unit that launched the attack may have pulled back, but it can regroup and launch another one later. Under such a continuing threat, self-defense must have a wider scope. In the event of a terrorist attack sponsored by a de-facto governing authority, as was the case with Hamas’s murderous rampage, the attacked state may need to broaden that scope further.

The Israeli war cabinet has instructed the IDF to dismantle both the military and the governmental capabilities of Hamas. In taking on such a goal, Israel is performing self-defense in a broader sense. The problem Israel faces now is continued exposure to a terrorist threat. Hamas’s attack on Israel and its citizens clearly shows the gravity of this danger: it will persist as long as Hamas’s organization in Gaza, run by Yahya Sinwar, is extant. Thus, Israel has concluded that the only viable solution to the problem is the complete elimination of Hamas’s political and military wings.

Israeli soldiers training for urban warfare, Golan Heights, October 2023

Gil Eliyahu / Reuters

The spokesperson for the IDF has explained the general goals of this eradication operation. In its attack on Israel, Hamas killed more than 1,500 Israeli citizens, injured more than 5,400, and abducted some 220 of them, including numerous foreign nationals; every building or site that Hamas used in those attacks, or in support of those attacks, must be destroyed. In other words, Hamas facilities that ostensibly serve other governmental functions in Gaza may be assumed to provide infrastructure for planning and launching future attacks. Effectively solving the Hamas problem therefore includes the eradication of its political offices as well.

The IDF spokesperson has also stated that every member of Hamas who was involved in planning or carrying out the October 7 attack must be killed. Israel’s Supreme Court assessed the legality of targeted killing operations in a 2006 decision, which in turn was based on international law considerations, as well as the ethical doctrine developed within the framework of the IDF. (I am one of the doctrine’s co-authors.) The court found targeted killing to be lawful under certain strict conditions, including considerations of proportionality. In the case of the October 7 attacks, however, more than 1,000 perpetrators managed to escape back into Gaza, and an Israeli operation aimed at eliminating all of them, or even many of them, in targeted killing missions is impractical, given the strict requirement to avoid or minimize collateral damage set by the Israeli Supreme Court, the IDF Code of Ethics, and the basic Israeli principle to protect human dignity.

Given this reality, the IDF’s declared intent to kill all perpetrators means in practice that it will pursue the leading figures, because they continue to pose grave danger to Israel and its citizens. All other perpetrators will be designated as threats, as well, based on their affiliation with Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad and their participation in the attacks. They will not enjoy a life of tranquility. But Israel may need to address the danger they pose to its citizens later, not necessarily during the present war. Strictly speaking, the goal of the present operation is to destroy Hamas’s ability to launch military attacks against Israel and its ability to control Gaza; the goal is not to kill every member of Hamas.

SELF DEFENSE, NOT REVENGE

Israel’s operation in Gaza should not be depicted as, or justified on the grounds of, revenge. No principle of “an eye for an eye” should guide Israel’s pursuit of Hamas and its members. The major principle at issue, according to Israel’s own conception of war conduct, is self-defense. In particular, the civilian population of Gaza should not be subject to acts of revenge, which are clearly immoral and, as a form of collective punishment, also illegal.

Nonetheless, a large-scale operation to dismantle the terrorist organization that controls Gaza is bound to involve numerous interactions with inhabitants who are not involved in the hostilities. Such interactions must be guided by three principles, the first of which also underlies the second and third. The first is that the IDF must continually try to minimize collateral damage. Obviously, this imperative applies to the Israeli population as well, but in the present operation, its primary application concerns the issue of collateral damage in the Gaza Strip, and the obligation to protect the life, health and property of noncombatants who live there under Hamas control. Here, two further principles come into play: the principle of distinction and the principle of proportionality. Both are well established as components of historical “just war” doctrine (jus ad bellum) and, since the twentieth century, have been inscribed in international law, as well.

One way the IDF has long sought to minimize collateral harm is by warning civilians of imminent military attacks. In previous operations in Gaza, for example, the IDF alerted inhabitants to evacuate areas by employing “knocking on the roof” warnings shortly before it attacked: with this method and others, including phone calls, inhabitants would be given multiple warnings of an attack, the more the better. But under the present circumstances, this approach is no longer possible, given the scale of the operation and the number of Hamas targets involved.

IDF units must continue to try to prevent harm to noncombatants who have not evacuated.

Instead, on October 13, the IDF issued a general order to noncombatant inhabitants who live in the northern part of Gaza to move to the southern part, since the next stage of hostilities will take place in the north. Such a large-scale evacuation is required because Hamas has embedded itself and its operations in residential areas, and it would be impossible for the IDF to act effectively, systematically and forcefully against Hamas without harming noncombatants there.

In this situation, the general evacuation order can serve the purpose of the roof-knocking warnings. Given the magnitude of Hamas’s October 7 attacks and Israel’s clear announcement that it is compelled to make a devastating military response, it is reasonable to assume that all inhabitants of Gaza are aware of the situation. In addition to Israeli and international media, Palestinian radio and TV stations have extensively covered these events. Often the IDF breaks into their programs to warn the population. Residents thus understand the need to evacuate. Nonetheless, the IDF has followed the evacuation order with other forms of warning.

Moreover, the IDF’s guidelines require that its forces must distinguish between terrorist combatants and noncombatants who have not yet evacuated. Israeli units must continue to try to prevent harm to the latter. By and large, the presence of such noncombatants should be known to the IDF and, to the extent possible, should be taken into account when it plans and carries out military activity.

THE DAMAGE THRESHHOLD

Which brings us to the principle of proportionality. Since it is Hamas policy to blur all distinctions between its members and the general population of Gaza, an Israeli attack on a Hamas military target often risks causing collateral damage, even when extensive precautions are taken. The international press and Western commentators often assume that if any noncombatants are killed in such operations, then excessive force has been used. That assumption is flawed.

Of course, all noncombatant casualties are regrettable, and every effort should be made to minimize them. According to the principle of proportionality as elaborated in just war doctrine, however, the crucial issue is whether the value of the military advantage gained is greater than the cost of the expected collateral damage. If it is, then the act in question can be justified. This holds important implications for the present war against Hamas. Israel must seek to minimize collateral damage as much as is reasonably possible. But according to Israel’s own self-defense principle, given the kind of threat that Hamas poses—and given Israel’s resulting need to eliminate the political and military infrastructure of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad—it is necessary to establish a clear limit for collateral damage. How should this determination be made?

Such proportionality considerations can be complicated, but the IDF has used a specific process for making them for the past three decades. Finding the correct balance involves deep and intricate moral, ethical, and legal analysis. To grasp the underlying principles that determine what level of collateral damage is acceptable, it is useful to first consider extreme cases. Take, for example, an enemy site that is being used to prepare an imminent attack that would kill hundreds of people. Destroying the site would likely cause the death of a few noncombatants who are not involved in terror activities, but any reasonable analysis would conclude that the destruction of the site is warranted. For an example on the other extreme, consider a situation in which defense forces are targeting a facility containing enemy rockets that are not being used in a current attack but could be used in the future. Let’s say a pilot approaches the site to destroy it but sees a bus, full of children, in the vicinity. Since there is no urgent need to destroy the magazine and the mission can be carried out later, it is clear that the strike should be called off.

An IDF soldier near Israel's border with Lebanon, October 2023

Lisi Niesner / Reuters

To acquire a fuller understanding of how proportionality is calculated, however, it is necessary to move from these clear-cut cases at each extreme toward the center, where enlarging the military advantage of a given action may also require greater collateral damage. There is no quantitative formula for making such determinations. But qualitative considerations are critical, including the extent and immediacy of the threat that is being acted against and the orders of magnitude of potential casualties if that threat is carried out, as well as the expected collateral damage if the threat is neutralized.

It is also important to stress that the IDF does not base its determination of the legitimacy of a given action solely on proportionality considerations. According to Israeli principles of conduct, the IDF is obliged to minimize collateral damage, even if causing such damage is permissible under the principle of proportionality. Hence, the IDF aborts a large percentage of its sorties because it determines that it can cause less collateral damage by carrying out the mission under different circumstances.

Finally, bringing troops back home is an advantage that should never be disregarded or undervalued in proportionality considerations. The principle of upholding human dignity must also apply to people in military uniform. According to Israeli doctrine, part of the military advantage of a given action must include the extent to which that action minimizes IDF casualties.

RULES AFTER ENGAGEMENT

Much discussion has centered on how Israel should treat the population of Gaza in relation to the major goal of eradicating Hamas. Immediately following the attack, the Israeli government announced that it was cutting off electricity, water, food, and fuel to Gaza. It is true that the enemy can use fuel and electricity for both civil and military purposes, but cutting off food and water is wrong, because it is incompatible with established ethical principles.

Adding to the complexity of the operation is the issue of the more than 200 people that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad abducted and took to Gaza. This problem demands further analysis of its own, but it is worth underscoring the prime importance of securing the release of these hostages, both on ethical and political-military grounds.

Another key aspect of the conduct of Israel’s war against Hamas has been largely neglected. When Hamas is destroyed and Palestinian Islamic Jihad is eliminated, what then?

Israeli reoccupation or annexation of Gaza is utterly unacceptable.

In its advanced versions, just war doctrine includes norms and principles governing conduct not only during war but also once the fighting ends, under what is known as jus post bellum. According to the latter principles, reoccupation or annexation of Gaza by Israel is utterly unacceptable. Instead, what needs to take place is restoring security in the areas of Israel adjacent to Gaza; and then establishing peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians based on some agreement with respect to temporary borders. Any policies that involve population transfer, long-term occupation, or bringing the territory directly under Israeli rule would be incompatible with either of these goals.

To build a new peace in Gaza, creative alternatives must be sought, perhaps even some first steps toward a solution of the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the near term, the only plausible option would be the introduction of some multinational military and governmental authority, international or regional, which could be created by a UN Security Council resolution and that would act in cooperation with the Palestinian Authority and in coordination with Israel.

Whatever arrangements are made, they should not be taken as an ultimate solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The spirit of the two-state solution will need to be revived and allowed to prevail, through the introduction and implementation of confidence-building measures over a longer timeline. But the full elimination of the terrorist threat from Hamas and affiliated groups could do much to set this process in motion. Policies of pursuing lasting peace, all the more so policies in the spirit of the two-state solution, must rest on the practical assumption that the dangers to Israel and its citizens, as nurtured and practiced by terrorist organizations, have been permanently eliminated.

• ASA KASHER is Professor Emeritus of Professional Ethics and Philosophy at Tel Aviv University and a Senior Researcher at the Institute of National Security Studies. He is a recipient of the Israel Prize for his work in philosophy and was a lead author of the Israel Defense Forces Code of Ethics.
• MORE BY ASA KASHER

Foreign Affairs · by Asa Kasher · October 27, 2023

20. The Meaning of Terrorism: When tragedy strikes, we should be careful about how we describe it.

Excerpts:

I will be honest here and tell you that I considered leaving this subject for another day. We’re all scared, shocked, and angry. But times like this, when our fears are so sharp, are exactly when we need to think more calmly about the nature of the threat we’re facing. When we rush to apply words because they seem right to us in the heat of the moment, we run the risk of making mistakes that will reverberate throughout our later discussions and influence the policy choices we eventually make.

The U.S. government has its own definition of terrorism, and it is fairly loose—not least because after 9/11, the government wanted more flexibility in charging people for terroristic acts. But let’s start with something very important that almost all governments agree on: Terrorism is a political act intentionally aimed at civilians in order to produce fear and subsequent changes in government policy (or even the destruction of the targeted regime).

I still believe Bruce Hoffman has the best definition of terrorism:

We may therefore now attempt to define terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider `target audience' that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale.

Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism

The Meaning of Terrorism

When tragedy strikes, we should be careful about how we describe it.

By Tom Nichols

The Atlantic · by Tom Nichols · October 26, 2023

This is an edition of The Atlantic Daily, a newsletter that guides you through the biggest stories of the day, helps you discover new ideas, and recommends the best in culture. Sign up for it here.

Terrorism, like war, is a word we tend to use almost as a reflex to describe anything that horrifies us. But words can lead us to choose policies, and we should be aware of how we use them.

First, here are three new stories from The Atlantic:

• “Why I own guns and why I’m part of the problem.”
• Hurricane Otis was too fast for the forecasters.
• Will Republicans pay a price for extremism?
• The hero Gen Z needs

Another Terrifying Day

As I write this, a mass shooter is loose in Maine. I have close family members who live not far from the scene of the massacre, and, like all Americans, I am praying that his rampage is stopped before he kills again.

I do not know why someone in Maine engaged in a mass slaughter yesterday. (Authorities have identified a suspect, but I see no point in naming him here.) The alleged shooter was reportedly committed to a mental-health facility this past summer, but I do not know what condition led to his stay. I do not know if there was some precipitating event, or whether he was under the influence of drugs, or if he is just an evil human being.

I also do not know if he is a terrorist. At this moment, no one does. But on social media, especially, the word terrorist is being thrown about with great confidence, especially now that we have some evidence that the suspect’s social-media feed was heavy with likes of right-wing accounts. This may not mean much; the alleged shooter also seemed to like Jim Cramer and other finance-related accounts. We can’t really ascribe motive out of any of that; sometimes, people are radicalized and become dangerous, but other times, dangerous people seek out causes as a rationalization for violence.

I will be honest here and tell you that I considered leaving this subject for another day. We’re all scared, shocked, and angry. But times like this, when our fears are so sharp, are exactly when we need to think more calmly about the nature of the threat we’re facing. When we rush to apply words because they seem right to us in the heat of the moment, we run the risk of making mistakes that will reverberate throughout our later discussions and influence the policy choices we eventually make.

The U.S. government has its own definition of terrorism, and it is fairly loose—not least because after 9/11, the government wanted more flexibility in charging people for terroristic acts. But let’s start with something very important that almost all governments agree on: Terrorism is a political act intentionally aimed at civilians in order to produce fear and subsequent changes in government policy (or even the destruction of the targeted regime).

Usually, definitions of terrorism emphasize that the perpetrators are nongovernmental actors, because we already have terms for when states engage in the intentional murder of civilians: crimes against humanity and, in some cases, war crimes. (Intention is important: Civilians are always killed in wartime, but specifically targeting them is a crime.)

Counterterrorism operations also look for networks, planning, and cooperation among the killers. These networks have goals: Sometimes, the goal is relatively achievable (“release our comrades from prison”), sometimes it is huge (“give us autonomy” or “remove your forces from this area”), and sometimes it is nearly impossible (“overthrow your government and adopt our religion”). But there is always a goal.

Terrorism without a political motive isn’t terrorism. Not everything that terrifies people is terrorism, either, as counterintuitive as that may seem. After all, if it’s terrifying, it’s terrorism, right? Nevertheless, although many things scare (and kill) large numbers of people—gang wars, serial killers, arson—those that lack a coherent political character fall outside the legal, and sensible, definition of terrorism. They are crimes against other human beings, but they are not an attack on the entire political order.

Why does any of this matter? Above all, we need clarity on the nature of the crime so that we can choose the right response. Ever since 9/11, invoking terrorism in America has carried the possibility of setting in motion the immense machinery of government, regardless of the actual threat. But if we more carefully define terrorism to mean non-state actors attacking civilians to produce a political outcome, it gets a lot easier to think about how to react.

For example, Son of Sam killing six people, wounding seven others, and scaring the hell out of New York in 1976 and 1977 is ghastly, but it is not terrorism. But a car bomb in front of a mall—or a jetliner aimed at a building—attached to a political or social cause is terrorism. Son of Sam requires a manhunt by local and regional law enforcement. The car bomb requires a significant governmental response—and perhaps even military mobilization.

The shooting in Maine is not the only event spurring the daily deployment of terrorism as a term. The Hamas attack on Israel is now “Israel’s 9/11,” and the United States is reportedly advising the Israeli government not to make some of the same mistakes America made in its own War on Terror. (War is another term thrown about too easily, but that’s a subject for another day.) I know the old saw “one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist,” but I believe that the Hamas invasion was terrorism: Non-state actors intentionally targeted civilians to effect a political goal.

You can argue over justice and morality—some people have made the despicable argument that Israel brought this nightmare on itself, similar to arguments made about America deserving what happened on 9/11—but there can be no argument that rape, infanticide, and butchery in service of a political goal are terrorism. (Russia has done the same in Ukraine—but as a state actor, the Kremlin and its high command should be charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes.)

In Maine, the situation is far less clear. It might make us feel better, and give more meaning to the heartbreaking deaths, to believe that we’re fighting terrorism; the alternative is to wrestle with the even more frightening and desolating possibility that the Maine shooter may (like the Las Vegas killer in 2017) have had no real reason to kill beyond his own unknowable inner torment.

When we use a word such as terrorism promiscuously, we risk turning it into little more than shorthand for our fear and anger. The term not only invites a massive government reaction but could also lead to misallocation of resources in our responses, especially if we conflate mental illness, the obvious problem of guns, and “terrorism.”

To take but one example: In late 2021, a mentally disturbed 15-year-old named Ethan Crumbley killed four people at his school. He was convicted of murder—and of terrorism, under a state law enacted after 9/11. (The prosecutor’s argument was essentially that Crumbley’s act had terrified people, and so: terrorism.) If a teenage school shooter who was hallucinating about demons and sending messages pleading for help is a terrorist, then the word has virtually no meaning.

Sanctifying the word terrorism as an obvious motive for every mass killing was a significant mistake made by Americans and their government after 9/11. The world is crawling with plenty of real terrorists, but we should pause before we reach for a word whose incantation can summon powerful and illiberal forces from within our institutions—and ourselves.

Related:

• The narcissism of the angry young men
• A lone-wolf shooter has an online pack.

Today’s News

1. Israel sent armored tanks into northern Gaza overnight following remarks from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about a likely ground invasion.
2. Representative Jamaal Bowman pleaded guilty to setting off a false fire alarm in a House office building.
3. The Texas House of Representatives passed a bill that would make it a state crime to cross illegally into Texas, and enable officers to arrest and deport undocumented immigrants.

More From The Atlantic

• Dobbs’s confounding effect on abortion rates
• Biden says goodbye to tweezer economics.
• “I love candy. But does it make me happy?”
• We’ve never seen anything like the Menendez indictment.

Culture Break

Read. They Called Us Exceptional: And Other Lies That Raised Us, a memoir by Prachi Gupta, delves into the grief of cutting off family, and argues that estrangement can be a tool of self-love.

Listen. In the latest episode of Radio Atlantic, host Hanna Rosin speaks with Jordan Peele and N. K. Jemisin about their new anthology, Out There Screaming, and the subversive goals of Black horror.

Play our daily crossword.

P.S.

I am a traditionalist who dislikes much about modern music. (I think Auto-Tune is a crime against God and man.) So I cringed when I saw in The Guardian that Paul McCartney and Ringo Starr are going to use AI to resurrect John Lennon for one more Beatles tune, with a guitar part recorded in the 1990s by George Harrison, who died in 2001.

When I learned more, I was heartened. I liked the use of John’s voice in later Beatle releases, especially the song “Free As a Bird.” Apparently, John’s widow, Yoko Ono, had some of these materials on a cassette John had marked “For Paul,” and the three surviving Beatles at the time used modern studio magic to clean up the tapes. But technological limitations prevented them from using all of John’s singing and playing. AI allowed Paul and Ringo to restore his parts in the new single, titled “Now and Then.”

George reportedly didn’t like “Now and Then,” but his widow and his son think that with the restored quality, he’d have approved. It wouldn’t be the first time the Beatles disagreed on a song. But I’m glad we’re going to get one more single from them before they finally close their legendary catalog.

— Tom

Katherine Hu contributed to this newsletter.

When you buy a book using a link in this newsletter, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic.

The Atlantic · by Tom Nichols · October 26, 2023

21. Joint Press Statement for Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III's Call With Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro Jr.

Excerpt:

The Secretaries reaffirmed that the Mutual Defense Treaty extends to both countries' public vessels, aircraft, and armed forces—to include the Coast Guard—anywhere in the Pacific, to include the South China Sea. Both Secretaries committed to redouble efforts to strengthen bilateral coordination, interoperability, and support for the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Secretary Austin reiterated the ironclad U.S. commitment to the Philippines and our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.

Joint Press Statement for Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III's Call With Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro Jr.

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U.S. Department of Defense and Philippine Department of National Defense spokespersons provide the following readout:

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro Jr spoke by phone yesterday. Secretary Austin reinforced U.S. support for the Philippines following the PRC Coast Guard and maritime militia's dangerous obstruction of a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on October 22.

The Secretaries discussed the incident on October 22, particularly the PRC's dangerous and unlawful maneuvers that caused collisions with Philippine resupply and Coast Guard ships, putting the safety of Philippine vessels and crew at risk.

The Secretaries reaffirmed that the Mutual Defense Treaty extends to both countries' public vessels, aircraft, and armed forces—to include the Coast Guard—anywhere in the Pacific, to include the South China Sea. Both Secretaries committed to redouble efforts to strengthen bilateral coordination, interoperability, and support for the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Secretary Austin reiterated the ironclad U.S. commitment to the Philippines and our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.

The Secretaries commended recent bilateral military cooperation, including the bilateral sail last month off the coast of Palawan, and committed to increase the pace and scope of U.S.-Philippines engagements. The Secretaries look forward to meeting in person in Jakarta on the margins of the upcoming ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM)-Plus.

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com