Quotes of the Day:

 "There are only two ways to approach planning for the collapse of North Korea: to be ill-prepared or to be really ill-prepared."

--Dr. Kurt Campbell, DASD, 1 May 1998

"If you concentrate exclusively on victory, while no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war."

--B.H. Liddel-Hart

"If in taking a native den one thinks chiefly of the market that he will establish there on the morrow, one does not take it in the ordinary way."

--Lyautey: The Colonial Role of the Army,

Revue Des Deux Mondes, 15 February 1900

1. How Biden Pushed Israel to Limit Its Iran Attack and Still Inflict a Heavy Blow

2. How Israel Pulled Off Its Largest-Ever Strike on Iran

3. A Million People Play This Video Wargame. So Does the Pentagon.

4. Israel strike on Iran actually de-escalates Mideast tensions, for now

5. What to Know About the Chinese Hackers Who Targeted the 2024 Campaigns

6. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, October 26, 2024

7. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 26, 2024

8. The Big Five - 27 October edition by Mick Ryan

9. U.S. Military Makes First Confirmed OpenAI Purchase for War-fighting Forces

10. US needs more AI investment, not just guardrails, defense experts say

11. Putin's 'hybrid warfare' pressures neighbors at a crossroads to turn away from the West

12. Taiwan reports Chinese 'combat patrol' after Beijing slams US arms deal

13. This Eras Great Power Competition: America With No Understanding of Red Lines and Rivals That Do

14. Patriotism: A Vital National Security Interest – The Link Between Democratic Values and Patriotism

15. Special Report: Pro-Russia Georgian Dream Party Likely Wins Parliamentary Elections

16. MAJ Badger Gives Life and Earns Soldier's Medal (27 OCT 1995)

17. The State-Owned Company at the Center of Taliban Plans for Self-Sufficiency

18. 'Backbone of Iran's missile industry' destroyed by IAF strikes on Islamic Republic

19. A Short History of the U.S. Army's Dictionary

20. Niall Ferguson: Israel’s Iran Strike—and America’s Strategic Weakness

21. Gad Saad Survived War in Lebanon. He’s Warning About One in the West

22. Pentagon Watchdog Questions Navy SEAL Training Program's Use of Sleep Deprivation

1. How Biden Pushed Israel to Limit Its Iran Attack and Still Inflict a Heavy Blow

Excerpts:

His call with Netanyahu on Oct. 9, which he made along with Vice President Kamala Harris, proved to be a breakthrough, according to U.S. officials. 

Reassured that Israel was listening to U.S. advice to direct its airstrikes at military sites, Biden agreed to bolster Israel’s defenses by sending a Thaad antimissile system and nearly 100 American soldiers to operate it to Israel, a decision he formally signed off several days later.  

As Israel continued to refine its plan, U.S. officials took other steps to cement the understanding about the narrowed scope of Israel’s retaliation. 

In addition to sending the Thaad system, the White House announced on Oct. 11 that it was tightening oil sanctions against Iran, including measures against the “ghost fleet” shipping companies that were helping Iran smuggle oil. The clampdown on Iran’s oil smuggling was aimed at showing Israel it didn’t need to use military action to interrupt Tehran’s oil trade. 

On Oct. 17, U.S. B-2 bombers carried out airstrikes in Yemen against underground bunkers used by Houthi militants to store missiles and other weapons. The Houthis have been attacking shipping in the Red Sea and conducting sporadic attacks on Israel. Use of the bombers signaled the White House was willing to escalate its use of force when necessary, a cautionary message for Iran and a reassuring one for Israel, officials said.

In the attack Saturday morning, more than 100 Israeli planes struck 23 sites in Iran, confining their attacks to targets that demonstrated the understanding reached between Biden and Netanyahu had held. 

An Israeli official said that Iran had four batteries of S-300 antimissile batteries, the most advanced in Tehran’s air-defense arsenal, before Israel’s recent strike and that all of them were destroyed.

How Biden Pushed Israel to Limit Its Iran Attack and Still Inflict a Heavy Blow

Israeli strikes pummeled Iran’s air-defense systems and missile production, U.S. officials say

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/how-biden-pushed-israel-to-limit-its-iran-attack-and-still-inflict-a-heavy-blow-10a8c00a?mod=latest_headlines

By Michael R. Gordon

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, Lara Seligman

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, and Nancy A. Youssef

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Oct. 26, 2024 8:03 pm ET

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Israel launched a retaliatory strike against Iran, responding to the Oct. 1 missile barrage that Tehran sent across Israel. WSJ’s Sune Engel Rasmussen breaks down how the conflict escalated and what’s next. Photo: Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images

WASHINGTON—Two weeks before Israeli warplanes struck Iran Saturday morning, President Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed on the parameters of the attack in a half-hour phone call, their first in almost two months. 

After mounting worry that Israel might strike Iran’s oil infrastructure or even nuclear installations, the Israeli leader set his sights on military targets—to the relief of American officials.

The airstrikes that unfolded met Washington’s expectations while dealing Iran a punishing blow. 

The attack destroyed Iran’s most advanced air-defense systems, while delivering a setback to the country’s ballistic missile program, U.S. and Israeli officials said Saturday.

While Iran is still considering its response, U.S. officials hope the severe damage inflicted on Iran’s air defenses will discourage Tehran from striking back as Washington renews diplomacy aimed at quelling the fighting in Gaza and Lebanon. 

“It looks like [Israel] didn’t hit anything other than military targets,” Biden told reporters Saturday. “I hope that this is the end.”

Nearly a month ago, the prospects of escalation seemed more ominous. Iran had carried out an Oct. 1 attack on Israel that involved about 180 ballistic missiles, some that reached their targets causing minimal damage and some that U.S. officials say could have led to substantial casualties had they not been intercepted. 

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Biden in July. Photo: Susan Walsh/Associated Press

After Israeli and U.S. forces successfully blocked a similar Iranian attack against Israel in April, Biden urged Netanyahu to temper his response. Israel confined its retaliation to striking the radar for an S-300 air-defense system, reducing the risk of escalation. 

But with Iran launching even more ballistic missiles in October, it was clear to Biden that there was no dissuading Israel from striking back hard. The goal instead was to shape Israel’s response.

To many in the administration, the looming Israeli strikes risked an all-out conflict that might lead to Iranian counterattacks against Saudi oil installations, disruptions in the energy markets and a spike in oil prices less than a month before the U.S. presidential election.

“If I were in their shoes, I’d be thinking about other alternatives than striking oil fields,” Biden said on Oct. 4, referring to the Israelis. 

When Israeli officials indicated they were eyeing potential sites in Tehran, American officials pushed back, concerned that attacks against the Iranian capital could cause civilian casualties.

His call with Netanyahu on Oct. 9, which he made along with Vice President Kamala Harris, proved to be a breakthrough, according to U.S. officials. 

Reassured that Israel was listening to U.S. advice to direct its airstrikes at military sites, Biden agreed to bolster Israel’s defenses by sending a Thaad antimissile system and nearly 100 American soldiers to operate it to Israel, a decision he formally signed off several days later.  

As Israel continued to refine its plan, U.S. officials took other steps to cement the understanding about the narrowed scope of Israel’s retaliation. 

In addition to sending the Thaad system, the White House announced on Oct. 11 that it was tightening oil sanctions against Iran, including measures against the “ghost fleet” shipping companies that were helping Iran smuggle oil. The clampdown on Iran’s oil smuggling was aimed at showing Israel it didn’t need to use military action to interrupt Tehran’s oil trade. 

On Oct. 17, U.S. B-2 bombers carried out airstrikes in Yemen against underground bunkers used by Houthi militants to store missiles and other weapons. The Houthis have been attacking shipping in the Red Sea and conducting sporadic attacks on Israel. Use of the bombers signaled the White House was willing to escalate its use of force when necessary, a cautionary message for Iran and a reassuring one for Israel, officials said.

In the attack Saturday morning, more than 100 Israeli planes struck 23 sites in Iran, confining their attacks to targets that demonstrated the understanding reached between Biden and Netanyahu had held. 

An Israeli official said that Iran had four batteries of S-300 antimissile batteries, the most advanced in Tehran’s air-defense arsenal, before Israel’s recent strike and that all of them were destroyed.

“Israel’s strikes were designed to show Iranians how much more it could do if Iran retaliated,” Dennis Ross, a former U.S. official on Middle East issues in Republican and Democratic administrations, wrote in a social-media post. “By taking out air defenses the Israelis showed the Iranians their vulnerability.”

U.S. officials said that the strikes on Iran’s ballistic missile program damaged some production capabilities that could take Iran years to recover from.

Satellite imagery of Iran’s Parchin military complex in 2022. Photo: Maxar Technologies/Getty Images

Among the locations struck was Parchin, where a plant is located that makes solid rocket fuel, according to Fabian Hinz, research fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think tank.

“If you look at missile production processes, they are very complex, they have complex supply chains and they have critical bottlenecks that can be surprisingly narrow,” said Hinz. Israel “might have been able to cause quite a bit of disruption without the strike appearing too major.” 

Iran still has missiles in its inventory. U.S. officials estimated in 2022 that Iran had over 3,000 ballistic missiles of all ranges in its stockpile.  

Iran denied that its military capabilities had been extensively damaged and sought to show life in Tehran had resumed to normal. At least four Iranian soldiers were killed and three sites suffered minor damage, according to Iranian officials. 

“Iran’s nuclear facilities haven’t been impacted,” Rafael Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, wrote in a social-media post. At the White House, Biden and Harris received a briefing Saturday from their national-security team on the Israeli attack.

“President Biden directed that every effort be taken to protect our forces and help defend Israel against any potential responses from Iran and its proxies,” the White House said in a statement.

Alexander Ward and Laurence Norman contributed to this article.

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com, Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com and Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com

2.  How Israel Pulled Off Its Largest-Ever Strike on Iran

How Israel Pulled Off Its Largest-Ever Strike on Iran

Attack unfolded in waves and struck missile-manufacturing and surface-to-air missile-defense sites across Iran

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/how-israel-pulled-off-its-largest-ever-strike-on-iran-689022ca?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Carrie Keller-Lynn, Rory Jones

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 and Dov Lieber

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Oct. 26, 2024 5:30 pm ET

A view of Tehran after several explosions were heard early Saturday. Photo: Atta Kenare/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

TEL AVIV—Shortly before 2 a.m. on Saturday in Israel, airmen and women wearing bomber jackets bearing the Star of David climbed into the cockpits of about 100 jet fighters, spy planes and refueling aircraft at an Israeli military base. They were following commands from an underground bunker known as the pit.

Israel’s wartime leaders, who were gathered in the bowels of the military headquarters in Tel Aviv, had just given the green light for the largest attack against Iran in Israel’s history—and its most politically perilous. They called the operation “Days of Repentance.”

The assault was calibrated to punish Iran for an attack on Israel but aimed to avoid setting off a full-scale war between the two foes involving American forces and other countries in the region. The attack steered clear of the oil and nuclear facilities that Iran had warned would prompt a retaliation, and appeared to heed the caution urged by U.S. officials.

Provinces struck by Israel

turkmenistan

Tehran

Iran

Ilam

Khuzestan

Iraq

250 miles

250 km

Note: The map may not be an exhaustive list of all targeted provinces.

Source: Iran Air Defense Force

James Benedict/WSJ

The attack, however, marked a dangerous new phase of confrontation between Israel and Iran, which began striking each other directly earlier this year. It left Iran even more exposed to further air attacks, with Israel destroying several of the country’s Russian-made S-300 batteries, according to an Israeli official. 

“The message is that we don’t want an escalation but if Iran decides to escalate and attack Israel again, this means that we have increased our range of freedom of movement in the Iranian skies,” an Israeli official said.

For weeks, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had signaled that Israel would hit back over Iran’s ballistic-missile assault on Israeli territory on Oct. 1. Pulling it off required weeks of planning and delicate diplomacy.

Iran “knew that Israel was coming, and still they couldn’t prevent anything,” said Assaf Orion, a retired Israeli brigadier general.

The U.S.—sensing an opening after Israel killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar—has been pushing for a cease-fire in Gaza. Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Israel and other Middle East capitals this week in an effort to reach a deal that has eluded negotiators for months. The calibrated nature of the attack appeared to leave room for those talks to continue, with negotiators set to meet in the Qatari capital, Doha, on Sunday.

But even as Israel worked diplomatic channels that could end the war in Gaza and cool tensions with Tehran, Israeli officials were completing details of the retaliatory attack.

On Friday evening, as the sun set marking the start of Shabbat, the Jewish day of rest, Israel’s cabinet in a phone conversation led by Netanyahu agreed to move ahead with an attack that night, according to an Israeli official.

Hours before the attack began, Israel alerted the U.S. and several Arab-world and European capitals about the nature and scope of the attack, according to people familiar with the matter. Officials in some of those countries then alerted Iran.

Israel’s prime minister’s office later said the idea that it informed Iran about the nature or timing of the attack was “false and absurd.” 

An anti-Israel billboard in Tehran’s Enghelab Square on Saturday depicted Iran’s missile attack on Israel earlier this month and the sentiment, ‘If you want war, we are the master of war.’ Photo: Abedin Taherkenareh/Shutterstock

When they finally began, the Israeli strikes unfurled in waves. The attack involved Israel’s most-advanced aerial weapon, F-35 jet fighters, which are adept at evading radar, people familiar with the mission said.

As the jet fighters were airborne, Israeli officials—conscious that their U.S. counterparts were frustrated that Israel hadn’t forewarned last month that it would kill Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah—also made a point of actively briefing their U.S. counterparts about their attack. 

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant called his U.S. counterpart, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who assured him of America’s readiness to defend Israel against backlash from Iran and aligned militant groups.

The first crop of jet fighters destroyed air-defense batteries in Syria and Iraq, clearing the flight path for the second and third sorties to funnel through to Iran.

Their exact route, which hasn’t been shared by Israel, appeared to dodge airspace in Jordan after the Arab nation said it wouldn’t be part of an attack on Iran. Most of the attacks were launched from outside Iranian airspace, said Amir Aviv, a former senior Israeli military official who is often briefed by the defense establishment. Iran said Israeli planes attacked from within Iraqi airspace, around 70 miles from its border.

At around 3.30 a.m. in Israel, the country’s military launched the second of at least three waves of attacks, according to people familiar with the matter. 

Israel’s strikes targeted Iranian facilities involved in the production of missiles like the cruise and ballistic missiles that targeted Israel twice this year. 

Satellite image of the military complex in Parchin, Iran, in 2022. Photo: Maxar Technologies/Getty Images

One of Israel’s hits was at the sprawling Parchin military site, where Iran once worked on nuclear weapons capabilities, according to the U.N. atomic agency. Four buildings were hit there, including three solid-propellant facilities for missiles, said Fabian Hinz, research fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies focused on Iran’s missile program.

Just before sunrise, Israel’s military said its attack and retaliation were complete. The planes returned at the end of the four-hour assault with no losses.

Soon after, Iranian officials began privately telling Arab nations that the attack hit sites with great accuracy. In public, the regime said it led to “limited damage” and that Iran reserved the right to carry out a response at a time of its choosing. Four Iranian soldiers were killed in the attacks, Iran said. 

Israeli officials said they hope that the attack would end a tit-for-tat exchange of fire with Iran and Israel’s military could now focus on its war goals fighting Hamas in Gaza and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iranian allies. 

Orion, the retired brigadier general, said the attack was calibrated but doesn’t mean the end of tensions with Iran. “It allows both sides to finish for now until the U.S. elections, and then see where it goes,” he added.

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Israel launched a retaliatory strike against Iran, responding to the Oct. 1 missile barrage that Tehran sent across Israel. WSJ’s Sune Engel Rasmussen breaks down how the conflict escalated and what’s next. Photo: Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images

Anat Peled, Summer Said, Aresu Eqbali and Laurence Norman contributed to this article.

Write to Rory Jones at Rory.Jones@wsj.com and Dov Lieber at dov.lieber@wsj.com

3. A Million People Play This Video Wargame. So Does the Pentagon.

Please go to the link to view the interactive web site with graphics.

A Million People Play This Video Wargame. So Does the Pentagon.

Militaries worldwide run battle scenarios using one family-run British company’s software, rooted in Tom Clancy novels. Watch a video simulation to see how.

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/a-million-people-play-this-video-wargame-so-does-the-pentagon-e6388f50?mod=latest_headlines

By Daniel MichaelsFollow

 and Juanje GómezFollow

Oct. 26, 2024 11:00 pm ET

Warfare is changing at a pace unseen in almost a century, as fighting in Ukraine and the Middle East shows. For military commanders, tackling that upheaval demands fast and constant adaptation. 

Increasingly, that entails playing games.

Wargames—long the realm of top brass and classified plans—let strategists test varying scenarios, using different tactics and equipment. Now they are filtering down the ranks and out among analysts. Digitization, boosted by artificial intelligence, helps yield practical lessons in greater safety and at lower cost than staging military maneuvers would. Wargames can also explore hypotheticals that no exercise could address, such as nuclear warfare.

Proponents of wargames include Tim Barrick, a retired Marine colonel who is now wargaming director at Marine Corps University. He drills students using board games and computers. In one online exercise, he pushed eight Marine majors repeatedly through the same Pacific military engagement, using a program called Command: Professional Edition.

This software is unusual because it didn’t originate with a defense contractor or institute, as most wargames do. It is a simulation program built and marketed by gamers with almost no military background—and rooted in Tom Clancy novels. Users of all stripes have made it a surprise hit.

Over the two months that Barrick’s Marine majors played Command PE, as it’s known, their creativity grew. 

“These are not simple problems,” said Barrick, who previously ran the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab’s wargaming division. “It’s not like we’re asking them to play checkers.”

The game has become a surprise hit, for users of all stripes. The Air Force recently approved Command PE to run on its secure networks. Britain’s Strategic Command just signed up to use it in training, education and analysis, calling it a tool “to test ideas.” And Taiwanese defense analysts tap Command PE to analyze responses to hostility from mainland China.

Command’s British publisher, Slitherine Software, stumbled into popularity. The family business got started around 2000 selling retail CD-ROM games like Legion, involving ancient Roman military campaigns. 

When Defense Department officials in 2016 first contacted Slitherine, which is based in an old house in a leafy London suburb, its father-and-son managers were so stunned they thought the call might be a prank. 

“Are you taking the piss?” J.D. McNeil, the father, recalled asking near the end of the conversation. 

What drew Pentagon attention was the software’s vast, precise database of planes, ships, missiles and other military equipment from around the world, which allows exceptionally accurate modeling.

Former Air Force Air Mobility Command analyst Pete Szabo started using Command around 2017 to model military planes’ fuel consumption in battle scenarios. 

“It’s been a very powerful tool for us,” said the retired Air Force lieutenant colonel. Convincing his superiors to employ commercial, off-the-shelf gaming software, though, took some work, he recalled. “At first it was like, ‘Nooooo.’ ”

Some officers have long derided wargames as entertainment, navel-gazing or “bogsats,” short for “bunch of guys standing around talking.” But the simulations—especially digital ones—can hone decision-making, spatial awareness and maneuvering abilities, say advocates.

“There’s no doubt that skills in a game matter on the battlefield,” said Arnel David, a U.S. Army colonel who advises the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s top general and helps lead an informal organization to promote wargaming of all sorts, called Fight Club International. 

Wargaming, which first took its modern form in Prussia about 200 years ago, got a boost in the U.S. in 2015 when then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work warned that the Pentagon’s wargaming skills had “atrophied.” The military services scrambled to up their game.

Traditionally conducted using maps, grids and dice—essentially sophisticated cousins of familiar board games like Risk and Stratego—some wargames entail tabletop models that resemble electric-train sets or require an entire room. 

Computer wargames still generally resemble complex maps more than first-person shooter games such as Call of Duty. But their speed and processing power allow operators to run and rerun scenarios at a tempo never before possible, and to generate scads of data for analysis. 

In a project called Gamebreak for the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in 2020, scientists at military contractor Northrop Grumman developed AI models to essentially play Command PE, processing more than 200 quadrillion options—or 2 followed by 17 zeros. 

AI is increasingly helping users create scenarios, run games and sift through results for trends and surprises. French wargame maker MASA Group boasts that AI allows its Sword program to be run more easily than rivals’ systems.

Whether AI and advanced software actually improve wargaming and preparations for war is a question sparking battles of its own. Warfare is so complex—buffeted by factors ranging from equipment and strategy to politics, weather and corruption—that modeling all the inputs entails parsing an almost infinite number of variables. Quantifying unquantifiables such as military morale requires arbitrary decisions.

“If all your data for a simulation is garbage, it’s garbage out too,” said Anna Knack, who leads research on AI and security at Britain’s Alan Turing Institute, a government-funded research center. 

U.S. Marines and others participated in a simulated wargame during a convention in Washington earlier this year. Photo: Kevin Ray J. Salvador/U.S. Marine Corps

Skeptics say digital wargaming, in an unintended twist, may actually reduce understanding of scenarios because software’s underlying algorithms aren’t accessible to users.

“It takes some of the human decision-making element away,” said Becca Wasser, who leads the Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security, a think tank in Washington.

Advocates say computerization expands enormously both the usefulness of wargames and their range of potential users, often complementing manual games. 

“It’s a tool in a toolkit,” said David, who served in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Not all wargames involve combat. NATO, which in 2021 adopted warfighting guidelines that call for “audacious wargaming,” also runs crisis-management simulations. U.S. Transportation Command runs wargames involving shipments and logistics, its area of responsibility. 

Wargames that focus on a specific field, such as logistics, are relatively straightforward to design, while modeling big conflicts is vexing. 

To simulate a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in a tabletop game played between teams of specialists in 2022, modelers hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank in Washington spent more than a year designing and preparing the project. Each of 22 iterations took a full day, between which the designers adapted the game to address new issues from each running.

It was a simple battle simulation that Navy Lt. Larry Bond wanted to create in 1980, after using the service’s complex training game, Navtag, onboard his destroyer. 

Bond created Harpoon, published as a paper-and-dice game that drew a big following thanks to its extensive technical data on military systems. One fan was insurance-agent-turned-author Tom Clancy.

Clancy tapped Harpoon as a source for his first novel, “The Hunt for Red October,” and used it so extensively in writing his 1986 follow-up, “Red Storm Rising,” that he called himself and Bond “co-authors.”

A wargame player assessing the outcome of a simulated U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Photo: Elizabeth Frantz for WSJ

A home-computer version of Harpoon flourished and then faded early this century. Frustrated fan Dimitris Dranidis sought to replace it. The result, Command: Modern Operations, released in 2013, took off as users—many in the military—added and corrected its open-source database.

The database now includes tens of thousands of items, from bullets to bombers, covering almost every front-line piece of equipment used by all the world’s militaries since 1946. Users keep parameters like fuel capacity and operating range accurate.

After Work’s 2015 Pentagon memo sent the services scurrying to rediscover wargaming, an Air Force official stumbled on Harpoon and contacted Slitherine, which held the publishing rights. The McNeils introduced him to Command, which they were also publishing as a consumer game.

“It never even occurred to me that we’d work with militaries,” said Chief Executive Iain McNeil, whose father, J.D., had previously owned a scaffolding business. 

The Air Force sent two retired generals to assess the company, seeking to better understand its operations and Command’s database. They invited the McNeils and Dranidis for meetings at the Pentagon, where the newbies shot selfies standing behind the briefing-room lectern.

Slitherine created a version of Command for military and intelligence-agency needs, Professional Edition, addressing their security requirements and allowing them to upload classified data without giving access to programmers or other users, Iain McNeil said.

In the military world, most acquisitions undergo more rigorous testing than consumer products for battle-readiness, but Command flips that paradigm thanks to its evolution. With roughly one million commercial users, Command “gets beat up by the community to a degree that the defense industry just can’t do,” said Barrick, the Marines instructor.

Command focuses on battles and engagements, not campaigns or wars. “It’s really useful if you want a very close look—almost through a soda straw,” said Wasser at CNAS, who sees it as an excellent tool for training and education.

Education was one of the top uses cited at a conference of Command military users in Rome hosted by the Italian Air Force last year, attended by civilian and uniformed defense professionals from the U.S., the U.K., Taiwan and beyond.

German Air Force Lt. Col. Thomas Silier explained how Command offered a way to teach mission planning that mixed classroom theory and real-world experience.

In his seminars, a group of around 20 pilots would face an emergency, like defending a target from an incoming attack. They planned mission timelines and assessed factors such as flying time with a given fuel load. Their proposals were fed into Command, and the simulation played out on a big screen in the classroom.

“It’s a stadium-like atmosphere,” with students cheering when missiles hit the enemy, said Silier. “One student told me it’s more exciting than a Champions League football match.”

Write to Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com and Juanje Gómez at juanje.gomez@wsj.com

4. Israel strike on Iran actually de-escalates Mideast tensions, for now

Escalate to de-escalate?

Excerpts:

Predicting what will happen next in the Middle East has escaped the most seasoned analysts.

It may take days, weeks or even months to assess whether this latest airstrike by Israel will lead to a further escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel – or whether a more de-escalatory dynamic settles over the region.

But there are good reasons to believe that decision-makers in Iran, Israel and the US know that more escalation is in no one’s interests. And the latest salvo may have just done enough to satisfy Israel, while providing cover for Tehran to say that there is no need to return fire in kind.

Israel strike on Iran actually de-escalates Mideast tensions, for now - Asia Times

There are good reasons to believe leaders in Iran, Israel and US know greater escalation is in no one’s interests

asiatimes.com · by Javed Ali · October 27, 2024

Israel’s airstrikes of October 26, 2024 – which hit around 20 military targets in Iran, Iraq and Syria – had been anticipated for weeks. Indeed, the operation followed a promise from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to retaliate for an earlier ballistic missile attack by Tehran in early October.

The move also follows a pattern that has seen Iran and Israel take turns to up the ante in what was for a long time a “shadow war,” but which has has now developed into direct confrontation.

These tit-for-tat attacks prompted widespread fears that the whole region was poised to enter a more escalatory phase.

But, counterintuitive though it may seem, I believe that the latest Israeli strikes may actually have defused tensions. To understand why, it is worth analyzing the nature and scale of the Israeli operation, as well as the likely stance of decision-makers in Israel, Iran and the United States in the aftermath of the attack.

A calibrated attack by Israel

The October air assault by Iran was itself retaliation for a series of Israeli operations against Iran’s proxy group Hezbollah. These included the assassination of a high-ranking Hamas official in Tehran on the eve of the inauguration of Iran’s new president in July and the killing of Hezbollah’s leader in late September.

Similarly, an earlier air assault on Israeli targets in April by Tehran was in response to Israeli provocations this spring – including a strike against the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria, on April 1 that killed two senior military officers.

Many observers anticipated, or feared, an Israeli response to Iran’s October missile and drone attack to be heavy, and punishing – Israel certainly has the military capability to do so.

But rather than target vital infrastructure in Iran or the country’s nuclear facilities, Israel instead opted for “precise and targeted” strikes on the Islamic Republic’s air defense and missile capabilities.

A view of Iran’s capital, Tehran, following the Israeli army’s announcement of strikes on October 26, 2024. Photo: Fatemeh Bahrami / Anadolu via Getty Images / The Conversation

The somewhat limited scope of the Israeli operations suggests that the strike was designed to send a strong message to Iran’s supreme leader and Iranian military commanders. In essence, Israel was signaling that it has the capability to strike at the heart of Iran, while holding back from a full-throttled attack that would have had further damaged Iran’s fragile economy.

While it will take time for a full assessment of the effectiveness of Israel’s strikes to emerge, early indications suggest that they succeeded in revealing weaknesses in Iran’s overall security.

These weaknesses that could be further exploited against other more important targets, such as oil and gas production facilities or even nuclear power sites, should Iran or its partners in the so-called “axis of resistance” choose to retaliate.

A cautious response in Iran

Despite the apparent success of Israel’s attacks against a wide range of targets, statements from Iranian leaders suggest the operational impact was limited. An Iranian Foreign Ministry statement condemned the attack, noting that Iran “had a right to self-defense.” But at the same it added that Iran would “uphold its commitments for regional peace and stability.”

Reading into those words, it suggests to me that Iran is not immediately seeking to retaliate and escalate tensions further.

Of course, that could change. Further messages by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khameini or Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani may give a clearer indication whether Iran will seek to retaliate, and how.

But with Iran well aware of the impact that escalation – and the potential for more US-led sanctions and heightened support for Israel – would have on its ailing economy, it may well calculate that a return to the pre-escalation status quo with Israel is in its interests.

In Washington, a wary White House

A return to the shadow war between Israel and Iran – as opposed to open warfare – would no doubt be welcomed in Washington.

Since the horrific Hamas attacks in Israel on October 7, 2023, the Biden administration has been caught between competing obligations and concerns. This has included supporting longstanding ally Israel while not alienating friendly Arab governments and trying to avoid conflict creep into all out war in the region.

Meanwhile, in an election year, the Democratic ticket in particular is trying to balance its support for a largely pro-Israel Jewish voting block with a need not to offend potentially important Muslim votes in key states, nor a more pro-Palestinian youth vote.

Escalation of conflict in the region does nothing to help the White House in these respects. Yet President Joe Biden’s decades-long relationship with Netanyahu has not led to outcomes that the administration has sought. Washington has not succeeded in pushing its ally toward a ceasefire in Gaza, nor a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon.

And with the US election looming on November 5, elevated tensions in the Middle East on various fronts could impact how voters perceive Vice President Kamala Harris or former President Donald Trump — especially in the battleground state of Michigan, where the Democratic ticket may lose votes among Arab and Muslim Americans angered over the Biden administration’s perceived pro-Israel stance.

Threading the needle?

Predicting what will happen next in the Middle East has escaped the most seasoned analysts.

It may take days, weeks or even months to assess whether this latest airstrike by Israel will lead to a further escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel – or whether a more de-escalatory dynamic settles over the region.

But there are good reasons to believe that decision-makers in Iran, Israel and the US know that more escalation is in no one’s interests. And the latest salvo may have just done enough to satisfy Israel, while providing cover for Tehran to say that there is no need to return fire in kind.

Javed Ali is associate professor of practice of public policy, University of Michigan

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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asiatimes.com · by Javed Ali · October 27, 2024

5. What to Know About the Chinese Hackers Who Targeted the 2024 Campaigns

​Unrestricted Warfare.

What to Know About the Chinese Hackers Who Targeted the 2024 Campaigns

A group that experts call Salt Typhoon is believed to be behind a sophisticated breach of major telecommunication companies that has taken aim at American leaders.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/26/us/politics/salt-typhoon-hack-what-we-know.html

Former President Donald J. Trump is seen on the phone inside his S.U.V. in West Palm Beach, Fla., in July.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

By Devlin Barrett

Oct. 26, 2024

Updated 5:04 p.m. ET

A sophisticated breach of American telecommunications systems has extended to the presidential campaigns, raising questions about the group behind the attack and the extent of its efforts at collecting intelligence.

It was unclear what data was taken in the attack. The far-reaching operation has been linked to the Chinese government and attributed to a group experts call Salt Typhoon. Investigators believe hackers took aim at a host of well-connected Americans, including the presidential candidates — reflecting the scope and potential severity of the hack.

Here’s what to know.

What is Salt Typhoon?

Salt Typhoon is the name Microsoft cybersecurity experts have given to a Chinese group suspected of using sophisticated techniques to hack into major systems — most recently, American telecommunication companies. The moniker is based on Microsoft’s practice of naming hacking groups after types of weather — “typhoon” for hackers based in China, “sandstorm” for efforts by Iran and “blizzard” for operations mounted by Russia. A second term, in this case “salt,” is used to denote the type of hacking. Experts say Salt Typhoon seems to be focused primarily on counterintelligence targets, unlike other hacking groups that may try to steal corporate data, money or other secrets.

What do U.S. officials think Salt Typhoon has done?

National security officials have gathered evidence indicating the hackers were able to infiltrate major telecom companies, including but not limited to Verizon.

The New York Times reported Friday that among the phones targeted were devices used by former President Donald J. Trump and his running mate, Senator JD Vance of Ohio. The effort is believed to be part of a wide-ranging intelligence-collection effort that also took aim at Democrats, including staff members of both Vice President Kamala Harris’s campaign and Senator Chuck Schumer of New York, the majority leader.

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How serious is this hacking?

National security officials are still scrambling to understand the severity of the breach, but they are greatly concerned if, as it appears, hackers linked to Chinese intelligence were able to access American cellphone and data networks. Such information can provide a wealth of useful intelligence to a foreign adversary like China.

To some degree, the breach represents a continuation of data collection on the types of targets that spies have been gathering for decades. In this instance, however, the sheer quantity and quality of the information Salt Typhoon may have gained access to could put the intrusion into its own category, and suggests that American data networks are more vulnerable than officials realized.

What did the hackers get?

At this stage, that is still unclear. One major concern among government officials is whether the group was able to observe any court-ordered investigative work, such as Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act collection — a highly secretive part of American efforts to root out spies and terrorists.

No one has suggested yet that the hackers were able to essentially operate inside individual targets’ phones. The more immediate concern would be if they were able to see who was in contact with candidates and elected officials, and how often they spoke and for how long. That kind of information could help any intelligence agency understand who is close to senior decision makers in the government.

People familiar with the investigation say it is not yet known if the hackers were able to gain access to that kind of information; investigators are reasonably confident that the perpetrators were focused on specific phone numbers associated with presidential campaigns, senior government leaders, their staff members and others.

Like the weather, hacking is never really over, and the Salt Typhoon breach may not be over either. It is also possible that the United States may never learn precisely what the hackers got.

6. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, October 26, 2024

Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, October 26, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-26-2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted three waves of strikes into Iran on October 25.The strikes were in response to the large-scale ballistic missile attack that Iran launched against Israel on October 1. The IDF targeted around 20 locations around Tehran and western Iran, including vital air defense assets and facilities tied to the Iranian drone and missile programs. The IDF in particular struck four S-300 air defense batteries, which are Russian-made and the most advanced air defense system that Iran operates. That the IDF hit these batteries highlights the relative vulnerabilities of the S-300, especially against advanced platforms like the F-35 fighter jet. The IDF separately struck prominent defense industrial sites, such as the Parchin and Khojir complexes outside Tehran. These complexes are managed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry. The regime uses these facilities to develop and manufacture advanced weapons systems, including solid-propellant ballistic missiles. Iran has used the Parchin complex previously for high explosives testing in support of its nuclear weapons program. International inspectors found traces of uranium there in 2015, indicating that a larger quantity of uranium was there at some point, despite Iranian officials denying that the complex was involved in nuclear activities. Although there are no known nuclear activities currently at the Parchin and Khojir complexes, the IDF strikes could impede Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon, given the role that these complexes could play in building a delivery system.

The IDF strikes could also disrupt the Iranian ability to build missiles and send some to its partners, such as Russia, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Three unspecified Israeli sources told Axios that the IDF targeted sophisticated mixing equipment used to make solid fuel for advanced ballistic missiles, such as those that Tehran has used to attack Israel directly. Commercially available satellite imagery confirmed that the IDF destroyed several buildings at the Parchin and Khojir complexes. The imagery shows no signs of secondary explosions, which is consistent with the IDF targeting industrial mixers rather than weapons storage facilities. The IDF strike on the Khojir complex comes after the regime began expanding the facilities there in August 2023 in order to increase the Iranian capacity to build missiles. The Israeli sources speaking to Axios said that Iran will need to buy new mixers from China. Doing so could take months or possibly a year or more, hampering the Iranian ability to replenish its missile stockpiles and those of its allies in the Axis of Resistance.

The IDF struck several locations in Iraq and Syria immediately before launching strikes into Iran. The IDF was likely targeting early warning radars and sensors that would have given Iran advanced notice of the incoming Israeli attack. Iran has in recent years worked to build an early detection network across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon in order to better defend against Israeli airstrikes.

Iranian officials and state media have downplayed the amount of damage that the IDF inflicted. The regime boasted that it prevented IDF aircraft from entering Iranian airspace and that the strikes caused only limited damage. The strikes did kill four Artesh officers, however, presumably at the air defense sites that the IDF struck. The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry responded to the IDF strikes saying that Iran has the ”right and duty to defend itself against foreign acts of aggression.”

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The IDF conducted three waves of strikes in Iran targeting air defenses and facilities tied to the Iranian drone and missile programs. These strikes could disrupt the Iranian ability to build missiles and send some to its partners, such as Russia, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis.

• Saudi Arabia: A new Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia announced its existence. The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques claimed that it fired a drone toward Israel.

• Lebanon: The IDF destroyed a large underground Lebanese Hezbollah complex in southeastern Lebanon. The location, size, sophistication, and structure of the complex suggested that it was meant for offensive operations against Israel. 

7. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 26, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 26, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2024

The October 26, 2024 Georgian parliamentary election will be covered in a separate special edition.

Bloomberg reported on October 25, citing South Korean intelligence documents, that a second group of North Korean soldiers will soon deploy to Russia. Bloomberg reported that it viewed South Korean intelligence documents from an unspecified date that assessed that the first group of 1,500 North Korean "elite special forces" had arrived in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai between October 8 and 13 and that this first group was part of a planned deployment of roughly 10,000 North Korean soldiers in total. Bloomberg also reported that the documents assessed that North Korea has sent roughly 8 million rounds of 122mm and 152mm shells to Russia since August 2023, roughly 100 KN-23 Hwasong-11 ballistic missiles, and an unspecified number of Bulsae-4 anti-tank weapons. Bloomberg, citing two people familiar with the matter, stated that South Korean officials will share South Korea's assessments about North Korean-Russian cooperation with NATO officials at an October 28 NATO meeting. The New York Times (NYT), citing one unnamed Ukrainian official and two unnamed US officials, reported on October 25 that "several thousand" North Korean soldiers arrived at Kursk Oblast to participate in an upcoming Russian counteroffensive operation to push Ukrainian forces from their salient in Kursk Oblast. The officials stated that North Korean forces have not engaged in combat operations yet and that the North Korean forces' task in Kursk oblast is unclear. The officials noted that a significant contingent of North Korean forces would help the Russian military to avoid pulling additional forces from eastern Ukraine to participate in counteroffensive operations in Kursk Oblast. A senior Ukrainian official told the NYT that a maximum number of 5,000 elite North Korean troops had likely arrived in Russia by October 21. The participation of North Korean troops in combat operations in Kursk Oblast or frontline areas in Ukraine would make North Korea an active combatant and belligerent in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced preparations to open additional defense industrial plants in Ukraine. Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger announced on October 26 that Rheinmetall already opened one plant in Ukraine that serves as a maintenance and production facility for infantry fighting vehicles and main battle tanks and is on track to build a powder factory and a munitions manufacturing plant in Ukraine. Papperger added that Rheinmetall expects to begin the production of the Lynx infantry fighting vehicles at the recently operational plant in Ukraine by the end of 2024. Rheinmetall also reportedly plans to open a joint production facility for air defense systems in Ukraine. Rheinmetall announced in March 2024 that it plans to open at least four weapons manufacturing plants in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Bloomberg reported on October 25, citing South Korean intelligence documents, that a second group of North Korean soldiers will soon deploy to Russia.
• German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced preparations to open additional defense industrial plants in Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast and near Pokrovsk and Vuhledar.
• Russian military command is reportedly continuing to commit military specialists to assault operations and incurring unnecessary losses, likely in an effort to centralize control over Russian forces and maintain the tempo of Russian offensive operations throughout the theater. 

8. The Big Five - 27 October edition by Mick Ryan

The big five:

1. Precision + Mass in Modern War

2. Breaking China’s Kill Chains

3. Russia’s Systemic Executions of PoWs

4. Drones in Modern War

5. Amphibious Operations and Europe

The Big Five

The Big Five - 27 October edition

My regular update on conflict and confrontation in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Pacific, accompanied by recommended readings on the character of modern war and planning for future conflict.

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/the-big-five-27-october-edition?utm

Mick Ryan

Oct 26, 2024

Image: @DefenceU and 22nd Mech Brigade

Ukraine will be forced to actually fight against North Korea in Europe. President Zelenskyy, 26 October 2024

Another hectic week as the confrontation between the authoritian powers and Western nations continues. This week, updates from the three key theatres: Ukraine; the Middle East; and, the Pacific as well as my Big Five reading recommendations.

Ukraine

The major news this week has been the deployment of North Korean forces to Russia for likely employment against Ukraine. They are likely to be a logistical burden for the Russians and there will be cultural, doctrinal and tactical tensions with the integration of the North Koreans into Russian forces. Given the size of the North Korean contingent, they are unlikely to have a decisive impact on the war in Ukraine. Russia is currently suffering around 1200 casualties a day in Ukraine. The North Koreans represent about a week’s human expenditure by Russia.

However, if these deployments are conducted more regularly, they could be a way for Russia to sustain the current offensive in the east of Ukraine AND sustain high numbers of casualties without having to undertake another mobilisation in 2025.

North Korea, which already supplies rockets and artillery munitions to the Russian war effort, has much to gain from becoming a co-belligerent in the war against Ukraine. Politically, it ensures it has a grateful “fellow traveller” in Russia. Additionally, Russia may provide an array of financial incentives for North Korea’s troop deployment. It is likely to share with North Korea many of the new tactics and technologies developed for the war, as well as intelligence on captured Western equipment. Less likely, but still possible, the Russians could share technology to enhance the capacity of North Korea’s nuclear weapon delivery systems.

As I wrote in my Sydney Morning Herald article this week, there is a geopolitical aspect to the North Korean deployment:

There is also a significant geostrategic impact from the North Korean deployment. The authoritarian quad of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea has been waging an information, influence and economic war on Western nations, and the post-World War II international system, for some time. The speeches of Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are replete with references to their war against NATO and the West. But this North Korean deployment to Ukraine is an escalation in the confrontation between the forces of authoritarianism and the democracies of Europe, Asia and North America.

Besides quasi-strong words (“very, very serious” from the U.S. SecDef), political leaders in Europe and America are yet to act decisively to punish North Korea or deter future deployments. I am not holding my breath that they will. And as I write this, around 5000 North Korean soldiers appear to be in the course of deploying to Kursk to assist Russia in fighting Ukrainian forces lodged there.

In Kursk, Ukrainian forces continue to hold onto a significant salient inside Russia. While President Putin has made claims about Ukrainian forces there being surrounded, these were quickly refuted with the facts. The frontline in this campaign remainded largely unchanged over the past week.

While we may see North Korean soldiers arrive in this part of the theatre over the coming weeks, it is hard to imagine they will make a significant difference in Russia’s campaign to push the Ukrainians back across the border.

Image: Institute for the Study of War

On the eastern front, and despite the arrival of some rain and muddy conditions, the Russians are sustaining their eastern offensive. They have continued to eke out small gains on multiple fronts despite their losses now apparently hitting a record average daily high for the war so far. The UK defence intelligence staff reported in September that Russian casualties were averaging 1000 per day in September. The Ukrainian general staff released figures stating that Russia had lost 1600 soldiers in just one day this week. This is unverified.

This eastern campaign, according to the Centre for Defence Strategies, aims for the following in the short term:

The enemy's military command in the theater of operations within the following 2-3 months will concentrate its efforts on achieving the military-political goal of the Special Military Operation: reaching the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. For this purpose, they will maximize their advance towards Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad, in the direction of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, and aiming to reach the junction of Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk Oblasts near the village of Temyrivka.

Interestingly, the Russians are reported to be deploying reserves to the Zaporizhzhia region, and intensifying their attacks on that axis of advance. According to the Centre for Defence Strategies, the Russian reconnaissance and sabotage groups are increasing their probing of Ukrainian defenses there for vulnerabilities.

Overall, the eastern offensive continues to be Russia’s main effort in their war against Ukraine. Their efforts are designed to gain territory, wear down Ukrainian forces, place them in a dilemma about the deployent of reserves (Kursk, the east or the south?) and to project a strategic narrative of hopelessness of the Ukrainian cause for whomever wins the coming U.S. presidential election.

While much attention focussed on the North Korean issue this week, Russia continued its drone and missile attacks against Ukraine. In its latest attacks, Russia targeted Dnipro, Kyiv and the town of Kostyantynivka in the Donetsk region. More than two dozen people were injured and five killed.

This week, the Center for Strategic and International Studies launched an interactive site that examines the daily and cumulative trends of Russian missile attacks on Ukraine. This includes the number of missiles launched, types of missiles used, and the success of Ukrainian intercepts. You can see the dashboard at this link.

Russian Firepower Tracker. Image: CSIS

This week, the White House announced that G7 countries would provide Ukraine with $50 billion covered by the proceeds of frozen Russian assets. These funds will be used to provide financial and military assistance to Ukraine. Known as Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) Loans, can read all about it here.

Also this week, Rheinmetall opened the first of several factories it is developing in Ukraine. The first plant, designed for the production of armoured vehicles, was opened this week. Subsequent production facilities being developed in Ukraine by Rheinmettal include munitions and explosive content. Given the shortfalls in Western production capacity, and the uncertainty about future military aid from abroad, indigenous production of large quantities of defence materiel is a necessary pathway for Ukraine.

Middle East

The big news this week was the Israeli strike on targets in Iran. Conducted across three successive waves, the Israeli’s struck Iranian air defence targets initially, including tagets in Iraq and Syria. Sources such as Critical Threats and The New York Times describe the Israeli raid being comprised of over 100 crewed and unrewed aircraft.

The second and third waves of the Israeli attack then proceeded to hit multiple targets associated with Iran’s various missile programs. One of the key targets was the Parchin military complex, located to the east of Tehran. It is one of Iran’s most sensitive defense production locations. Parchin has been used to research and build explosive materials and advanced munitions, including drones and missiles. The Parchin site has also played an important part in the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

The Israeli’s also struck the Khojir military complex, which is used in the development and manufacture of ballistic missiles. The site was expanded in 2023 by Iran, with many of the buildings protected by high earthen berms. The expanded capacity, according to a July 2024 Reuters report, would have permitted the Iranians to increase the export of weapons to Hezbollah, the Houthis and Russia.

Images: @dex_eve on Twitter / X

Overall this was a proportionate Israeli response to Iran's previous attack on Israel. It was also a pragmatic response: the attacks degrade Iran's capacity to make missiles for its own purposes or send them to the Russians, Hezbollah and the Houthis. This is a good outcome, although one that Iran will be able to remediate within a year or two.

The Friday night attack by the Israeli also sent a message to Iran's leaders. By avoiding energy, nuclear and leadership targets, Israel is telegraphing the following to the Iranian regime: "If you don't attack us again, we won't need to target your senior leadership. If you do, we might."

The Iranian response was telling - "limited damage" and "missiles were intercepted" gives them plausible cause to not retaliate against this Israeli strike. The Iranian response so far could be code for "we see this as the end of the matter - at least for now". Although, in the Middle East, nothing is ever “the end of the matter”.

The Pacific

This week, the U.S. approved a $2 billion arms sale to Taiwan. The package included three new and sophistocated National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) medium-range air defense systems.

The Chinese Coast Guard this week harassed Indonesian survey vessels inside Indonesia’s EEZ. This comes just a few days after the inauguration of the new Indonesian President, Prabowo Subianto. The Indonesian Navy replenishment vessel KRI Bontang was dispatched to assist the Indonesia Maritime Security Agency patrol ship KN Pulau in shadowing the China Coast Guard 5402, which was harassing Indonesia's survey activities.

Recently, Joel Wuthnow published an excellent analysis of what might happen should the PLA attempt to invade Taiwan and fail. Called China’s Forever War: What If a Taiwan Invasion Fails? this is another in a long series of excellent analyses from the author. In his report, Wuthnow notes that “a failed People’s Republic of China (PRC) attempt to seize Taiwan would only be one step in a much longer conflict. Beijing will learn, rebuild, and may try again.” He describes four different scenarios that military and policy experts should consider:

1. Prolonged Blockade. The CCP elite has been humiliated and its top leader—reeling from the setback and on shaky political ground at home—decides that there is a political necessity to inflict further punishment on Taiwan.
2. Return to the Gray Zone. Understanding that another invasion would likely fail and judging that continued major combat operations would extend an international sanctions regime, the PLA shifts back to coercive but nonkinetic operations.
3. Crisis Instability. The CCP leadership fractures over the leader’s decision to launch the invasion, with some expressing support despite the results and others harboring grievances. They look for game-changing moves that would send a strong signal of resolve, but not invite a preemptive or retaliatory strike against the mainland, including a reversible antisatellite attack, a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse, or launching a theater-range nuclear weapon into the open ocean as a demonstration.
4. Recapitalization. Despite, or perhaps because of, heavy casualties, the CCP remains highly unified, and there is no risk of removal for the top leader. The overriding goal for the regime is to reconstitute a credible warfighting capability.

You can read this excellent report here.

Images from Autonomous Warrior 2024. Source: Australian DoD

Finally, this week Australia, the U.S. and the U.K. wrapped up a three-week-long tri-lateral exercise to test an array of autonomous martime capabilities in Jervis Bay on the Australian east coast. Called Exercise Autonomous Warrior 2024 by Australia, and the Maritime Big Play (MBP) initiative by the Pentagon, the exercise was designed to improve the capability for AUKUS nations to jointly operate uncrewed maritime systems, share and process maritime data and employ real-time maritime domain awareness in decision-making.

*******

This week I travelled to Canberra for a book event for The War for Ukraine, to give a presentation at the National Security College, as well as to attend a couple of activities related to the Australian Army’s employment of drones. Part of that was an event for the release of Oleksandra Molly’s excellent new report on drones in Ukraine, which was published by the Australian Army Research Centre (see link to the report below).

Image: Keirin Joyce LinkedIn page

I also did two podcasts: one for Times Radio and one with Eric Edelman and Eliot Cohen on their Shield of the Republic podcast. You can listen to it here. I also published an article here on the North Korean deployment to Ukraine, as well as an article in the Sydney Morning Herald.

So, to this week’s best articles.

A few different subjects are covered in this week’s recommendations. There are two on the employment of drones in modern war, as well as an article on the potential for amphibious operations in Europe. There is a good piece that explores how the Chinese PLA’s kill chain might be degraded, and finally, an article on Russia’s systemic execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (PoW).

As always, if you only have time to read a single article, the first one is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. Precision + Mass in Modern War

This week, Michael Horowitz’s new article on drones in modern war was published in Foreign Affairs. Horowitz, a long-time expert on new technologies who also worked in the Pentagon this issue, writes that “the current age of warfare is collapsing the binary between mass and precision, scale and sophistication. Call it the age of “precise mass.” It is a great article, and can be read here.

2. Breaking China’s Kill Chains

This article explores how the U.S. Space Force is study methods to break the kill chains of the People’s Liberation Army. Kill Chains are the contemporary term for how military institutions close the gap between detection and destruction of a target. A kill chain includes sensors (including people), communications, target analysis, human-decision-making and prioritizing targets, weaponeering, strike operations and post-strike assessment. There are lots of potential vulnerabilities to attack. You can read the full piece here.

3. Russia’s Systemic Executions of PoWs

The growing number of cases of Russian executions of Ukrainian PoWs, which is explicitly forbidden under the Geneva Conventions, indicates either a systemic approach by Russian leaders or their total disinterest in the conduct of their soldiers. Either way, General Gerasimov and his subordinate commanders are responsible. You can read the most recent piece on this here.

4. Drones in Modern War

This week, the Australian Army Research Centre released a new report on drones in modern war, particularly with regard to the lessons from the war in Ukraine. With deep research by Australian-Ukrainian researcher Oleksandra Molloy, this report provides many useful insights into drone employment, operator training and adaptation in Ukraine. You can read the report at this link.

5. Amphibious Operations and Europe

An interesting article from the Wavell Room that explores the following question: What can you do with amphibious forces given current area denial, especially sea denial, measures; particularly in Europe? You can read the full article here.

9. U.S. Military Makes First Confirmed OpenAI Purchase for War-fighting Forces

Pretty sensational headline and report (from the Intercept so that is to be expected). It is amazing how an innocuous purchase of some cloud computing capability can be spun into this sensational report.

Excerpts:

Although U.S. military activity in Africa receives relatively little attention in comparison to U.S. Central Command, which oversees American forces in the Middle East, AFRICOM’s presence is both significant and the subject of frequent controversy. Despite claims of a “light footprint” on the continent, The Intercept reported in 2020 a formerly secret AFRICOM map showing “a network of 29 U.S. military bases that stretch from one side of Africa to another.” Much of AFRICOM’s purpose since its establishment in 2007 entails training and advising African troops, low-profile missions by Special Operations forces, and operating drone bases to counter militant groups in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, and the Horn of Africa in efforts to bring security and stability to the continent. The results have been dismal. Throughout all of Africa, the State Department counted a total of just nine terrorist attacks in 2002 and 2003, the first years of U.S. counterterrorism assistance on the continent. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a Pentagon research institution, the annual number of attacks by militant Islamist groups in Africa now tops 6,700 — a 74,344 percent increase.

As violence has spiraled, at least 15 officers who benefited from U.S. security assistance have been involved in 12 coups in West Africa and the greater Sahel during the war on terror, including in Niger last year. (At least five leaders of that July 2023 coup received American assistance, according to a U.S. official.) U.S. allies have also been implicated in a raft of alleged human rights abuses. In 2017, The Intercept reported a Cameroonian military base used by AFRICOM to stage surveillance drone flights had been used to torture military prisoners.

Dealing with data has long been a challenge for AFRICOM. After The Intercept put together a count of U.S.-trained coup leaders on the continent, for example, the command admitted it did not know how many coups its charges have conducted, nor did the command even keep a list of how many times such takeovers have happened. “AFRICOM does not maintain a database with this information,” spokesperson Kelly Cahalan told The Intercept last year.

AFRICOM’s mismanagement of information has also been lethal. Following a 2018 drone strike in Somalia, AFRICOM announced it had killed “five terrorists” and destroyed one vehicle, and that “no civilians were killed in this airstrike.” A secret U.S. military investigation, obtained by The Intercept via the Freedom of Information Act, showed that despite months of “target development,” the attack on a pickup truck killed at least three, and possibly five, civilians, including Luul Dahir Mohamed and her 4-year-old daughter, Mariam Shilow Muse.

U.S. Military Makes First Confirmed OpenAI Purchase for War-fighting Forces

The Pentagon explored the AI software for research, but the new deal is the first by a combatant command whose mission is one of killing.

Sam Biddle

October 25 2024, 5:49 p.m.

By Sam Biddle The Intercept7 min

October 25, 2024

View Original

Less than a year after OpenAI quietly signaled it wanted to do business with the Pentagon, a procurement document obtained by The Intercept shows U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM, believes access to OpenAI’s technology is “essential” for its mission.

The September 30 document lays out AFRICOM’s rationale for buying cloud computing services directly from Microsoft as part of its $9 billion Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability contract, rather than seeking another provider on the open market. “The USAFRICOM operates in a dynamic and evolving environment where IT plays a critical role in achieving mission objectives,” the document reads, including “its vital mission in support of our African Mission Partners [and] USAFRICOM joint exercises.”

The document, labeled Controlled Unclassified Information, is marked as FEDCON, indicating it is not meant to be distributed beyond government or contractors. It shows AFRICOM’s request was approved by the Defense Information Systems Agency. While the price of the purchase is redacted, the approval document notes its value is less than $15 million.

Like the rest of the Department of Defense, AFRICOM — which oversees the Pentagon’s operations across Africa, including local military cooperation with U.S. allies there — has an increasing appetite for cloud computing. The Defense Department already purchases cloud computing access from Microsoft via the Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability project. This new document reflects AFRICOM’s desire to bypass contracting red tape and buy immediately Microsoft Azure cloud services, including OpenAI software, without considering other vendors. AFRICOM states that the “ability to support advanced AI/ML workloads is crucial. This includes services for search, natural language processing, [machine learning], and unified analytics for data processing.” And according to AFRICOM, Microsoft’s Azure cloud platform, which includes a suite of tools provided by OpenAI, is the only cloud provider capable of meeting its needs.

Microsoft began selling OpenAI’s GPT-4 large language model to defense customers in June 2023. Earlier this year, following the revelation that OpenAI had changed its mind on military work, the company announced a cybersecurity collaboration with DARPA in January and said its tools would be used for an unspecified veteran suicide prevention initiative. In April, Microsoft pitched the Pentagon on using DALL-E, OpenAI’s image generation tool, for command and control software. But the AFRICOM document marks the first confirmed purchase of OpenAI’s products by a U.S. combatant command whose mission is one of killing.

OpenAI’s stated corporate mission remains “to ensure that artificial general intelligence benefits all of humanity.”

The document states that “OpenAI tools” are among the “unique features” offered by Microsoft “essential to ensure the cloud services provided align with USAFRICOM’s mission and operational needs. … Without access to Microsoft’s integrated suite of AI tools and services, USAFRICOM would face significant challenges in analyzing and extracting actionable insights from vast amounts of data. … This could lead to delays in decision-making, compromised situational awareness, and decreased agility in responding to dynamic and evolving threats across the African continent.” Defense and intelligence agencies around the world have expressed a keen interest in using large language models to sift through troves of intelligence, or rapidly transcribe and analyze interrogation audio data.

Microsoft invested $10 billion in OpenAI last year and now exercises a great deal of influence over the company, in addition to reselling its technology. In February, The Intercept and other digital news outlets sued Microsoft and OpenAI for using their journalism without permission or credit.

An OpenAI spokesperson told The Intercept, “OpenAI does not have a partnership with US Africa Command” and referred questions to Microsoft. Microsoft did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Nor did a spokesperson for AFRICOM.

“It is extremely alarming that they’re explicit in OpenAI tool use for ‘unified analytics for data processing’ to align with USAFRICOM’s mission objectives,” said Heidy Khlaaf, chief AI scientist at the AI Now Institute, who has previously conducted safety evaluations for OpenAI. “Especially in stating that they believe these tools enhance efficiency, accuracy, and scalability, when in fact it has been demonstrated that these tools are highly inaccurate and consistently fabricate outputs. These claims show a concerning lack of awareness by those procuring for these technologies of the high risks these tools pose in mission-critical environments.”

Since OpenAI quietly deleted the portion of its terms of service that prohibited military work in January, the company has steadily ingratiated itself with the U.S. national security establishment, which is eager to integrate impressive but frequently inaccurate tools like ChatGPT. In June, OpenAI added to its board the Trump-appointed former head of the National Security Agency, Paul Nakasone; the company’s current head of national security partnerships is Katrina Mulligan, a Pentagon alum who previously worked in “Special Operations and Irregular Warfare,” according to her LinkedIn profile.

On Thursday, following a White House directive ordering the Pentagon to accelerate adoption of tools like those made by OpenAI, the company published an article outlining its “approach to AI and national security.” According to the post, “The values that guide our work on national security” include “democratic values,” “human rights,” and “accountability,” explaining, “We believe that all AI applications, especially those involving government and national security, should be subject to oversight, clear usage guidelines, and ethical standards.” OpenAI’s language is a clear reflection of the White House order, which forbade security and intelligence entities from using artificial intelligence in ways that “do not align with democratic values,” the Washington Post reported.

While the AFRICOM document contains little detail about how exactly it might use OpenAI tools, the command’s regular implications in African coup d’états, civilian killings, torture, and covert warfare would seem incompatible with OpenAI’s professed national security framework. Last year, AFRICOM chief Gen. Michael Langley told the House Armed Services Committee that his command shares “core values” with Col. Mamady Doumbouya, an AFRICOM trainee who overthrew the government of Guinea and declared himself its leader in 2021.

Although U.S. military activity in Africa receives relatively little attention in comparison to U.S. Central Command, which oversees American forces in the Middle East, AFRICOM’s presence is both significant and the subject of frequent controversy. Despite claims of a “light footprint” on the continent, The Intercept reported in 2020 a formerly secret AFRICOM map showing “a network of 29 U.S. military bases that stretch from one side of Africa to another.” Much of AFRICOM’s purpose since its establishment in 2007 entails training and advising African troops, low-profile missions by Special Operations forces, and operating drone bases to counter militant groups in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, and the Horn of Africa in efforts to bring security and stability to the continent. The results have been dismal. Throughout all of Africa, the State Department counted a total of just nine terrorist attacks in 2002 and 2003, the first years of U.S. counterterrorism assistance on the continent. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a Pentagon research institution, the annual number of attacks by militant Islamist groups in Africa now tops 6,700 — a 74,344 percent increase.

As violence has spiraled, at least 15 officers who benefited from U.S. security assistance have been involved in 12 coups in West Africa and the greater Sahel during the war on terror, including in Niger last year. (At least five leaders of that July 2023 coup received American assistance, according to a U.S. official.) U.S. allies have also been implicated in a raft of alleged human rights abuses. In 2017, The Intercept reported a Cameroonian military base used by AFRICOM to stage surveillance drone flights had been used to torture military prisoners.

Dealing with data has long been a challenge for AFRICOM. After The Intercept put together a count of U.S.-trained coup leaders on the continent, for example, the command admitted it did not know how many coups its charges have conducted, nor did the command even keep a list of how many times such takeovers have happened. “AFRICOM does not maintain a database with this information,” spokesperson Kelly Cahalan told The Intercept last year.

AFRICOM’s mismanagement of information has also been lethal. Following a 2018 drone strike in Somalia, AFRICOM announced it had killed “five terrorists” and destroyed one vehicle, and that “no civilians were killed in this airstrike.” A secret U.S. military investigation, obtained by The Intercept via the Freedom of Information Act, showed that despite months of “target development,” the attack on a pickup truck killed at least three, and possibly five, civilians, including Luul Dahir Mohamed and her 4-year-old daughter, Mariam Shilow Muse.

10. US needs more AI investment, not just guardrails, defense experts say

US needs more AI investment, not just guardrails, defense experts say

https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/10/25/us-needs-more-ai-investment-not-just-guardrails-defense-experts-say/

By Courtney Albon and Riley Ceder

 Oct 25, 2024, 02:00 PM

A White House memo released this week seeks to define how artificial intelligence will be handled in the national security realm. (Getty Images)

New White House AI guidance offers a solid framework for safely using the technology, but there needs to be more investment in the enabling infrastructure to better harness AI’s national security potential, Defense Department and industry leaders said this week.

President Biden issued a first-of-its kind memorandum Thursday meant to provide guidance for national security and intelligence agencies on how to effectively and responsibly use AI to further American interests.

“If the United States Government does not act with responsible speed and in partnership with industry, civil society, and academia to make use of AI capabilities in service of the national security mission — and to ensure the safety, security, and trustworthiness of American AI innovation writ large — it risks losing ground to strategic competitors,” the document states.

Alex Miller, chief technology officer for the Army’s chief of staff, said he appreciates the White House’s leadership on the issue, but he’s concerned a lack of access to and funding for core, enabling technologies like cloud storage and computing power is slowing down the Defense Department’s integration of AI tools.

“We haven’t done all the infrastructure work to set up the core technologies to do AI at scale,” Miller said at the Military Reporters and Editors conference. “If we’re really serious about it, there is a lot more investment we should be making at a national level.”

Matt Steckman, chief revenue officer at Anduril, advocated for a more robust national push to make sure the U.S. leads competitors like China on AI adoption.

“We need a national-level response,” said Steckman, who spoke on a panel with Miller. “I’m hoping this memo is the start of it, but I would go way, way further in order to get ahead of everybody else as fast as we probably can.”

In a briefing Thursday, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan acknowledged “critical gaps” in AI research and development funding. He said the Biden administration will work closely with Congress to increase funding for innovation along with the other requirements in the memo.

“We’ve received strong bipartisan signals of support for this from the Hill,” he said. “It’s time for us to collectively roll up our sleeves on a bicameral, bipartisan basis and get this done.”

Building trust

Throughout the document, the White House stresses the importance of building a level of trust in artificial intelligence and calls on national security agencies to implement guardrails to ensure it upholds laws regarding civil rights, human rights, privacy, and safety.

Organizations that leverage AI must use it in a way that aligns with “democratic values,” the document states.

That means designating trusted sources that government agencies can rely on for AI-related inquiries, investing in workforce training, creating standards for evaluating the safety of AI tools and ensuring systems adhere to federal laws around equity, civil rights and consumer protection.

“Artificial intelligence holds extraordinary potential for both promise and peril,” the memo states. “Responsible AI use has the potential to help solve urgent challenges while making our world more prosperous, productive, innovative, and secure. At the same time, irresponsible use could exacerbate societal harms such as fraud, discrimination, bias, and disinformation.”

The document calls for extensive analysis related to fostering a robust AI talent pool, assessing the competitiveness of private sector AI firms in the U.S. and understanding existing barriers to establishing key AI infrastructure.

It directs the Director of National Intelligence to work with DOD and other federal agencies to identify “critical nodes” in the AI supply chain and craft a regularly updated plan for mitigating risk to those areas.

DOD and the intelligence community should also establish a working group with a wide range of responsibilities — from establishing metrics for assessing AI safety and effectiveness to accelerating AI acquisition efforts to ensuring the U.S. has a competitive AI industrial base.

About Courtney Albon and Riley Ceder

Courtney Albon is C4ISRNET’s space and emerging technology reporter. She has covered the U.S. military since 2012, with a focus on the Air Force and Space Force. She has reported on some of the Defense Department’s most significant acquisition, budget and policy challenges.

Riley Ceder is an editorial fellow at Military Times, where he covers breaking news, criminal justice and human interest stories. He previously worked as an investigative practicum student at The Washington Post, where he contributed to the ongoing Abused by the Badge investigation.

11. Putin's 'hybrid warfare' pressures neighbors at a crossroads to turn away from the West

Excerpts:

The elephant in the voting booth in both countries is Russian President Vladimir Putin's war in Ukraine.

“Russia has built up an enormous arsenal of election and political interference mechanisms, which it deployed very heavily in both Moldova and Georgia recently,” said Heather Grabbe, a senior fellow at Brussels-based think tank Bruegel.

“This is clearly something that’s going to be an ongoing part of the strategy of hybrid warfare, whereby it’s fighting militarily to try to take over Ukraine and then not militarily in Georgia,” she said in a phone interview.

Moldova shares its largest land border with Ukraine, whereas Georgia is just across the Black Sea from the crucial Ukrainian port city Odessa.

All three countries are former Soviet states and ones where Russian roots run deep: A quarter of Moldova’s population is ethnically Russian, and a separatist government in the Transnistria region, which is internationally recognized as being part of its borders, is backed by the Kremlin.

Putin's 'hybrid warfare' pressures neighbors at a crossroads to turn away from the West

Key votes in Georgia and Moldova this week have drawn accusations of Russian meddling.

NBC News · by David Hodari · October 26, 2024

The American presidential election isn’t the only vote that the Kremlin has its eyes on — and, arguably, is seeking to get its hands in.

Two of Russia’s neighbors find themselves at a crossroads, with Moscow hoping to steer them toward its orbit rather than greater engagement with Europe. The key votes in Georgia and Moldova this week are therefore being closely watched across the West.

In Georgia, the very possibility of future free and fair elections may be on the ballot.

That’s if the country’s party of power, Georgian Dream, either wins a parliamentary election Saturday or refuses to leave office if it doesn't. Opposition lawmakers and analysts told NBC News that the party's scare tactics and attempts to subvert the vote stand to benefit Russia, as would the alleged schemes hatched in the run-up to votes in Moldova this week if they had carried the day.

“This is probably the most defining moment in Georgia’s modern history,” Salome Samadashvili, liberal opposition lawmaker and the country's former head of mission to the European Union, told NBC News in an interview. “Since we regained independence in the '90s, at no point have we had a government that questions its future in Europe.”

Georgian Dream did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

For Moscow’s part, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told NBC News on Friday that “we are in no way attempting and hardly have an opportunity to influence the situation and electoral processes in these countries.”

Supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party attend the party's final campaign rally in Tbilisi on Wednesday.Giorgi Arjevanidze / AFP via Getty Images

'Hybrid warfare'

Moldova on Sunday voted by a razor-thin majority to continue its progress toward joining the E.U., despite accusations from Moldovan authorities that pro-Russian operatives engaged in vote-buying among tactics aimed at undermining the vote.

The country will hold run-off parliamentary elections early next month, after a surprisingly strong showing from the pro-Moscow candidate in the first round.

The elephant in the voting booth in both countries is Russian President Vladimir Putin's war in Ukraine.

“Russia has built up an enormous arsenal of election and political interference mechanisms, which it deployed very heavily in both Moldova and Georgia recently,” said Heather Grabbe, a senior fellow at Brussels-based think tank Bruegel.

“This is clearly something that’s going to be an ongoing part of the strategy of hybrid warfare, whereby it’s fighting militarily to try to take over Ukraine and then not militarily in Georgia,” she said in a phone interview.

Moldova shares its largest land border with Ukraine, whereas Georgia is just across the Black Sea from the crucial Ukrainian port city Odessa.

All three countries are former Soviet states and ones where Russian roots run deep: A quarter of Moldova’s population is ethnically Russian, and a separatist government in the Transnistria region, which is internationally recognized as being part of its borders, is backed by the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and still controls the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has since tried to “borderize” parts of the country — slowly and piecemeal shifting the boundaries between countries.

A monument to Red Army Russian Gen. Grigory Kotovsky in Chisinau, Moldova, on Tuesday.Pierre Crom / Getty Images

Even so, attempts to bring the three nations into the European Union had stalled in the years prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The beginning of that war “really created this sense of urgency and also really led the E.U. to extend the membership prospect to these three new countries in the East: Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova,” said Marta Mucznik, a senior E.U. analyst at international peace-advocacy nonprofit Crisis Group.

Since then, the E.U. has moved to accelerate the membership processes of all three countries.

Ukraine began talks this summer, while Brussels granted Georgia candidate status last year but froze that process in May after leaders in Tbilisi cracked down on protests against a bill seen as authoritarian and Russian-inspired by critics. Moldova, meanwhile, voted narrowly to join the bloc on Sunday.

The pro-E.U. camp won 50.46% of the vote despite police there saying that pro-Russian fugitive businessman Ilan Shor had channeled $39 million to voters in September and October.

Moldovan President Maia Sandu, who topped the first round of presidential voting the same day, posted on X that “without the buying of votes, the outcome today would have been different. We would have had a convincing victory in the presidential election and the referendum!”

The Kremlin saw things differently. “You could see with a naked eye the changes in the dynamics of the vote count during the referendum that were hard to explain,” Peskov said. “Moldova’s leadership does not bother to explain these anomalies.”

Moldova has moved to ban Russian media outlets operating in the country, and the million or so citizens working and living in the E.U. have also had a crucial influence, said Grabbe, from the Bruegel think tank. But there have been fewer moves to counter a more subtle Russian influence in Georgia, she added.

Election posters in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi on Tuesday.Giorgi Arjevanidze / AFP via Getty Images

Reliable polling out of Georgia is hard to come by, but according to figures released in December by the nonprofits National Democratic Institute and Caucasus Research Resource Center, 79% of Georgians then wanted to proceed toward E.U. membership.

Despite this, the incumbent Georgian Dream appears to have a strong chance of winning this weekend’s elections against a fragmented opposition.

Party leader Bidzina Ivanishvili, the country's richest man, has vowed to outlaw all opposition parties if Georgian Dream wins, but experts say the party’s messaging on other issues is well-supported in rural regions and towns outside of the capital, Tbilisi.

Georgian Dream has used the specter of being dragged into the Ukraine war to controversial effect in its campaign material. Recent leaflets showed the image of a bombed-out church in Ukraine with the caption "No To War," opposite one of Tbilisi’s more famous churches and the message "Vote for Georgian Dream."

“That caused quite a lot of tension within the public,” said Natia Seskuria, founder and executive director of the Regional Institute for Security Studies, a Tbilisi-based think tank that is partnered with the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based think tank. “It’s an emotional issue and it was very frustrating for people to see these tacky banners all around the city.”

The Kremlin has echoed the ruling party's efforts to accuse the West of meddling. “It is hard to imagine how a proud nation like the Georgians is putting up with such ultimatums pouring onto them every day,” Peskov said.

Even so, analysts contend that calling Ivanishvili pro-Russian would be an oversimplification.

Bidzina Ivanishvili, founder and honorary president of the Georgian Dream party, during a rally at the Freedom Square in Tbilisi on Wednesday.Davit Kachkachishvili / Anadolu via Getty Images

Georgia has historically been a strategically important but ideologically ambiguous power able to court Europe, Russia, Iran and China via the Silk Road, a vast network of trade routes that spanned from China to the Mediterranean. And Georgian Dream has pursued a transactional relationship with regional superpowers similar to the strategy of its Caucasus neighbor Azerbaijan, analysts say.

“The Georgian Dream is pro-itself. Ivanishvili wants to stay in power,” Eurasia Group analyst Tinatin Japaridze said. Ivanishvili “wants to have access to his wealth, a lot of which is, of course, attached to Moscow so they have reached the sort of a transactional understanding that has absolutely nothing to do with ideology.”

While Georgian Dream has muddied the waters by featuring the iconography of the E.U. in its campaigning materials and claims it still wants Georgia to join the bloc, the country’s opposition parties are in no doubt about the risks posed by a victory for the party this weekend.

“Ivanishvili thinks he needs to be in power forever and democracy doesn’t allow for that,” opposition lawmaker Salome Samadashvili said. “So that’s why he gave up on democracy.”

David Hodari

David Hodari is a London-based editor.

Hannah Peart and Reuters contributed.

NBC News · by David Hodari · October 26, 2024

12. Taiwan reports Chinese 'combat patrol' after Beijing slams US arms deal

Excerpts:

The Pentagon said on Friday the United States had approved a potential $2 billion arms sale package to Taiwan, including the delivery for the first time to the island of an advanced air defence missile system battle-tested in Ukraine.

Taiwan's defence ministry said it had detected 19 Chinese military aircraft, including Su-30 fighter jets, carrying out a "joint combat readiness patrol" around Taiwan in conjunction with Chinese warships starting on Sunday morning.

It said the Chinese aircraft flew in airspace to the north, centre, southwest and east of Taiwan, and that Taiwanese forces were dispatched to keep watch.

China's defence ministry did not answer calls seeking comment outside normal office hours.

China stages such patrols around Taiwan several times a month, but this was the first since Beijing held a new round of full-blown war games near the island this month.

In a statement late on Saturday, China's foreign ministry said it strongly condemned and firmly opposed the latest U.S. weapons sales and had lodged "solemn representations" with Washington.

China urges the United States to immediately stop arming Taiwan and stop its dangerous moves that undermine peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, it added.

Taiwan reports Chinese 'combat patrol' after Beijing slams US arms deal

By Ben Blanchard and Ryan Woo

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-vows-countermeasures-after-2-bln-us-arms-sale-taiwan-2024-10-27/

October 27, 20243:22 AM EDTUpdated 4 hours ago

Chinese and Taiwanese flags are seen through broken glass in this illustration taken, April 11, 2023. REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

SummaryCompanies

• Taiwan reports Chinese warplanes and warships around islandChina angered by $2 bln US arms package for TaiwanChina views Taiwan as its own territory

TAIPEI/BEIJING, Oct 27 (Reuters) - Taiwan's defence ministry said on Sunday that Chinese warplanes and warships had carried out another "combat patrol" near the island, after Beijing threatened to take countermeasures in response to a $2 billion arms sale package by the United States.

The United States is bound by law to provide Chinese-claimed Taiwan with the means to defend itself despite the lack of formal diplomatic ties, to the constant anger of Beijing.

The Pentagon said on Friday the United States had approved a potential $2 billion arms sale package to Taiwan, including the delivery for the first time to the island of an advanced air defence missile system battle-tested in Ukraine.

Taiwan's defence ministry said it had detected 19 Chinese military aircraft, including Su-30 fighter jets, carrying out a "joint combat readiness patrol" around Taiwan in conjunction with Chinese warships starting on Sunday morning.

It said the Chinese aircraft flew in airspace to the north, centre, southwest and east of Taiwan, and that Taiwanese forces were dispatched to keep watch.

China's defence ministry did not answer calls seeking comment outside normal office hours.

China stages such patrols around Taiwan several times a month, but this was the first since Beijing held a new round of full-blown war games near the island this month.

In a statement late on Saturday, China's foreign ministry said it strongly condemned and firmly opposed the latest U.S. weapons sales and had lodged "solemn representations" with Washington.

China urges the United States to immediately stop arming Taiwan and stop its dangerous moves that undermine peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, it added.

"China will take resolute countermeasures and take all measures necessary to firmly defend national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity," the ministry said, without elaborating.

China has over the past five years stepped up its military activities around democratically governed Taiwan, whose government rejects Beijing's sovereignty claims.

Taiwan's government has welcomed the new arms sale, the 17th to the island under U.S. President Joe Biden's administration.

"In the face of China's threats, Taiwan is duty-bound to protect its homeland, and will continue to demonstrate its determination to defend itself," Taiwan's foreign ministry said on Saturday, responding to the arms sale.

The Reuters Daily Briefing newsletter provides all the news you need to start your day. Sign up here.

Reporting by Ben Blanchard and Ryan Woo; Editing by Andrea Ricci and Jamie Freed

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

13. This Eras Great Power Competition: America With No Understanding of Red Lines and Rivals That Do

Excerpts:

 Conclusion: Scientific Red Lines and the Need for Decisive Action

The United States' historical reluctance to engage assertively, often due to misjudging adversaries' red lines, has created a pattern of inaction that now threatens American security interests. The assumption that certain actions would automatically trigger an unacceptable response from rivals has repeatedly proven inaccurate, as Iran, Russia, and their allies have demonstrated a far greater tolerance for risk than the U.S. anticipated.⁷ This misperception has only fueled adversaries' confidence, encouraging them to push boundaries without fear of meaningful retaliation.

To remedy this, the U.S. must adopt a scientific approach to defining and enforcing red lines. Rather than relying on vague, speculative assessments, the NDS should be informed by data-driven analyses that accurately gauge rivals' tolerance levels and identify actionable boundaries. Implementing clear, enforceable thresholds for adversarial actions would strengthen deterrence, moving the U.S. away from a defensive stance and toward a proactive policy that addresses the unified front posed by these adversarial states.

This is not a call for aggressive action; rather, it is a call to bridge the gap between our cautious stance and a more assertive approach that stops just short of crossing red lines. Integrating data, modeling, AI, and other predictive tools could replace the current reactive, opinion-based responses that have defined U.S. foreign policy decisions. The need for such an evolution is clear, especially given recent events (misjudging Hezbollah and Iran’s red lines) and the failure of deterrence to prevent Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. With all four of our main rivals collaborating to undermine U.S. interests, our approach to deterrence must become more decisive, moving beyond the timidity of the past two decades.

By committing to a strategy that combines realistic deterrence measures with a scientific approach to understanding red lines, the U.S. can regain its footing in the global arena. This recalibrated strategy would not only prevent paralysis in decision-making but also signal to adversaries that the United States is prepared to act decisively when its interests are threatened. If Washington hopes to maintain its strategic advantage, it must evolve beyond the constraints of Integrated Deterrence and forge a new path grounded in actionable intelligence and fortified alliances.

This Eras Great Power Competition

America With No Understanding of Red Lines and Rivals That Do

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/this-eras-great-power-competition?postId=55626e6d-c53f-497b-9a3c-253382c05443&utm

Strategy Central

By and For Practitioners

By Monte Erfourth, October 26, 2024

Introduction

The conflicts between Israel and Iran and Russia and Ukraine reveal the most intense form of Great Power Competition today. With an emerging coalition of adversarial autocracies—Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—the stakes have risen for the U.S. and its allies. Each of these rivals is supporting the others through strategic cooperation, undermining U.S. interests across multiple regions. This concerted challenge demands that the United States not only reconsider its National Defense Strategy (NDS) but also adopt a scientific approach to understanding and responding to adversaries' red lines. The hesitation in Washington to act with conviction, often stemming from flawed assumptions about rivals' boundaries, has emboldened these alliances and risks undermining American security.

 An Axis of Autocratic Partners

The cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea is strategic and deliberate, with each nation bringing its unique assets to bear against Western interests. Russia, once a global power in its own right, is increasingly relying on China for technological and manufacturing capabilities as it becomes ever more dependent on Beijing. Russia also provides intelligence and resources to Iranian proxies such as the Houthis, even as it taps Iranian drones for its war in Ukraine.¹ This dynamic is pushing Moscow into a client-state relationship with China, a development that has significant implications for the U.S. and its allies.

China’s alliance with Iran also underscores the growing complexities of Great Power Competition. Although limited by China's strategic caution in the Middle East, Beijing's support for Tehran remains strong enough to disrupt U.S. influence in the region. In recent diplomatic events, China has asserted itself as an anti-Western ally, promoting Iran’s membership in the BRICS coalition while taking advantage of Iranian oil under sanction. Despite the limits on China’s influence in Iran, Beijing's posture as a diplomatic and economic partner remains a crucial factor in the cohesion of the anti-U.S. bloc.²

Meanwhile, North Korea’s contribution to Russia’s war efforts is another component of this collective threat. Pyongyang has reportedly dispatched thousands of troops and is providing munitions to aid Moscow in Ukraine, with geolocated footage showing North Korean soldiers in Russian uniforms at training facilities in Russia’s Far East.³ This military cooperation provides North Korea with valuable combat experience and, critically, deepens its strategic ties with Russia and Iran. Such interactions are not merely transactional; they signify an ideological and strategic alignment against U.S. hegemony.

 Challenging the Concept of Integrated Deterrence

The current U.S. defense posture relies on Integrated Deterrence, an ambitious approach that seeks to achieve a unified, global deterrence model. While theoretically comprehensive, Integrated Deterrence falls short in practice, attempting to address diverse threats “everywhere, all the time, perfectly coordinated.”⁴ This idealistic goal has proven unfeasible, creating gaps that embolden adversaries. The coordination between U.S. rivals exemplifies this, as they increasingly act in concert across multiple theaters, defying isolated U.S. deterrent measures.

The lack of clear, enforceable red lines has only exacerbated this issue. The recent attacks from Hezbollah and Iran suggest that the U.S. has overestimated these adversaries' boundaries, assuming they would avoid actions that might provoke a Western response. This miscalculation, based on flawed intelligence and speculative analysis, has led to what can be described as a “paralysis of deterrence.” The U.S. hesitates to act decisively, fearing escalation without properly understanding rivals' tolerance levels. This caution often results in emboldening those very adversaries, as seen with Iran's expanding influence in the Middle East and Russia’s sustained aggression in Ukraine.⁵

 Revising the National Defense Strategy

To effectively counter these combined threats, the U.S. must reconsider its approach and focus on a collective, rather than isolated, strategy for its National Defense Strategy. A focus on addressing threats from one rival at a time will not suffice against an axis of autocratic states that operate in tandem. The NDS must evolve to encompass a multidimensional approach that does not only focus on China or Russia independently but recognizes the interconnectedness of these global threats.

A potential model can be seen in the proposed U.S.-Saudi defense treaty, which aims to integrate U.S. allies into a broader security network that requires less direct intervention from Washington.⁶ By building a framework of regional security partnerships, the U.S. could limit China’s influence and redirect Saudi and other Gulf state resources toward mutual interests. The alliance system needs to move beyond transactional, issue-specific deals and foster more durable, comprehensive partnerships. This shift in strategy would enhance the U.S.'s ability to counterbalance the autocratic coalition with a network of committed allies.

 Conclusion: Scientific Red Lines and the Need for Decisive Action

The United States' historical reluctance to engage assertively, often due to misjudging adversaries' red lines, has created a pattern of inaction that now threatens American security interests. The assumption that certain actions would automatically trigger an unacceptable response from rivals has repeatedly proven inaccurate, as Iran, Russia, and their allies have demonstrated a far greater tolerance for risk than the U.S. anticipated.⁷ This misperception has only fueled adversaries' confidence, encouraging them to push boundaries without fear of meaningful retaliation.

To remedy this, the U.S. must adopt a scientific approach to defining and enforcing red lines. Rather than relying on vague, speculative assessments, the NDS should be informed by data-driven analyses that accurately gauge rivals' tolerance levels and identify actionable boundaries. Implementing clear, enforceable thresholds for adversarial actions would strengthen deterrence, moving the U.S. away from a defensive stance and toward a proactive policy that addresses the unified front posed by these adversarial states.

This is not a call for aggressive action; rather, it is a call to bridge the gap between our cautious stance and a more assertive approach that stops just short of crossing red lines. Integrating data, modeling, AI, and other predictive tools could replace the current reactive, opinion-based responses that have defined U.S. foreign policy decisions. The need for such an evolution is clear, especially given recent events (misjudging Hezbollah and Iran’s red lines) and the failure of deterrence to prevent Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. With all four of our main rivals collaborating to undermine U.S. interests, our approach to deterrence must become more decisive, moving beyond the timidity of the past two decades.

By committing to a strategy that combines realistic deterrence measures with a scientific approach to understanding red lines, the U.S. can regain its footing in the global arena. This recalibrated strategy would not only prevent paralysis in decision-making but also signal to adversaries that the United States is prepared to act decisively when its interests are threatened. If Washington hopes to maintain its strategic advantage, it must evolve beyond the constraints of Integrated Deterrence and forge a new path grounded in actionable intelligence and fortified alliances.

 Footnotes

1. Katrina Northrop, "China’s Influence on Iran in Mideast Conflict is Limited, Analysts Say," Washington Post, October 25, 2024.

2. Ibid.

3. Choe Sang-Hun et al., "Videos Appear to Show North Korean Troops in Russia Amid Ukraine War," New York Times, October 25, 2024.

4. Michael Singh, "The Real Purpose of a U.S.-Saudi Security Agreement," Foreign Affairs, October 17, 2024.

5. Northrop, "China’s Influence on Iran in Mideast Conflict is Limited."

6. Singh, "The Real Purpose of a U.S.-Saudi Security Agreement."

7. Ibid.

 Bibliography

Northrop, Katrina. "China’s Influence on Iran in Mideast Conflict is Limited, Analysts Say." Washington Post, October 25, 2024.

Sang-Hun, Choe, Arijeta Lajka, Christoph Koettl, and Shawn Paik. "Videos Appear to Show North Korean Troops in Russia Amid Ukraine War." New York Times, October 25, 2024.

Singh, Michael. "The Real Purpose of a U.S.-Saudi Security Agreement." Foreign Affairs, October 17, 2024.

14. Patriotism: A Vital National Security Interest – The Link Between Democratic Values and Patriotism

Excerpts:

American patriotism is inextricably tied to democratic values such as individual liberty, equality, political pluralism, and the rule of law. These principles, rooted in foundational documents like the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, form the essence of the American identity. Unlike nations that define patriotism through cultural or ethnic homogeneity, the United States relies on a shared commitment to democratic ideals. This unique form of patriotism means that loyalty to the country is loyalty to a set of principles that support an inclusive and just society. While often acting exclusive and unjust, the arc of American commitment to democratic principles has bent towards attaining the democratic ideal, not away from it.

...

 Conclusion: Patriotism as a Strategic Asset for National Security

In a world where both authoritarian and digital threats are on the rise, American patriotism must be recognized as a crucial national security interest. A strong, unified sense of identity rooted in democratic values equips the nation to resist foreign interference and domestic instability. Without patriotism, America’s unique social order—based on principles of freedom and equality—is at risk of erosion, weakening the very foundation of national security.

To ensure that patriotism remains a robust and resilient force, the United States must invest in civic education, promote democratic engagement, and address internal inequalities that fuel division. By strengthening patriotism through these measures, the U.S. can fortify itself against both the external pressures of a turbulent world and the internal challenges of a diverse and dynamic society.

Ultimately, patriotism is more than an emotional response; it is a strategic asset that underpins national security by promoting unity, resilience, and commitment to the values that define America. The task ahead is to cultivate a patriotism that endures—one that empowers citizens to safeguard not only their rights but also the democratic institutions that make those rights possible.

Patriotism: A Vital National Security Interest

The Link Between Democratic Values and Patriotism

Strategy Central

By and For Practitioners

By Monte Erfourth, October 27, 2024

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/patriotism-a-vital-national-security-interest?postId=52454e98-9ab0-463e-a0ce-356d8701f503&utm

The Hammer Metaphor

Two Americans, one from the Purple Party (PP) and the other from the Orange Party (OP), approach a bus—the bus symbolizing the U.S. government. The OP citizen gestures toward it and remarks, "Look at that bus. I bet it doesn’t work well, won’t take us where we need to go, and certainly won’t lead to a stronger democracy." The PP member replies, "It may not be perfect—sure, it lacks luxuries like heat and A/C—but we just gave it a tune-up. It’ll get us all to a better place."

As they draw closer, the OP member grabs a two-pound hammer, pops the hood, and starts bashing the engine. "Let’s see if this thing still works," he says, while the PP member watches in horror. They board the bus, now crowded with other hopeful travelers. After a few sputters and groans, the engine coughs to life, and the bus lurches down the road. But just a mile along, the bus stalls, coasting to a stop.

The OP member smugly declares, "See? I told you this bus couldn’t take us to a better democracy." Then, as if it were planned, he steps off the bus, pulls out a satellite phone, and calls in a private helicopter. Moments later, the OP member flies away, leaving everyone else stranded, staring at each other, wondering how they’ll ever reach their destination together. In the distance, a truck full of men paid by the OP member approaches the bus load of Americans. They check their weapons and smile at the easy task they are prepared to undertake.

Introduction

American patriotism is inextricably tied to democratic values such as individual liberty, equality, political pluralism, and the rule of law. These principles, rooted in foundational documents like the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, form the essence of the American identity. Unlike nations that define patriotism through cultural or ethnic homogeneity, the United States relies on a shared commitment to democratic ideals. This unique form of patriotism means that loyalty to the country is loyalty to a set of principles that support an inclusive and just society. While often acting exclusive and unjust, the arc of American commitment to democratic principles has bent towards attaining the democratic ideal, not away from it.

For American democracy to function, citizens must trust in these democratic values and in the institutions that uphold them. A decline in patriotic commitment to these principles erodes this trust, destabilizing the country from within. This weakening of unity is particularly risky in the current global climate, where adversaries exploit any signs of discord to diminish U.S. influence and promote alternative authoritarian models.

 External Threats: How Foreign Influence Exploits a Lack of Patriotism

The rise of digital tools has granted foreign adversaries access to American audiences in ways previously unimaginable. By targeting social media, these actors—most notably Russia and China—have initiated information warfare campaigns to sow division, undermine democratic institutions, and erode public confidence in American governance. These campaigns often amplify divisive issues, creating an illusion of widespread dissent, which can ultimately fracture public unity.

The intelligence community has documented foreign attempts to interfere in American elections as a direct method to exploit weakened national cohesion. For example, in the 2016, 2020, and now in 2024 foreign actors aimed to influence public opinion, not by presenting alternative viewpoints but by deepening societal rifts through disinformation. This tactic aims to weaken the national will and capacity to counter external threats by creating an atmosphere of mistrust and division. Without a renewed sense of patriotism grounded in shared values, these foreign efforts find fertile ground in an already divided society.

Internal Threats: How Domestic Divisions Weaken National Security

Internal divisions also pose significant risks to American security by eroding the collective resilience needed to uphold national values. Increasing political polarization and growing distrust in institutions create an environment where citizens are more susceptible to misinformation and less likely to engage constructively with democratic processes. As faith in democracy weakens, the risk of authoritarian tendencies rising domestically becomes more pronounced. Such trends can lead to an erosion of civil liberties, suppression of political opposition, and manipulation of electoral processes.

Authoritarian elements, whether foreign or domestic, utilize similar tactics to destabilize democratic societies: misinformation, control of media, and undermining of institutions that serve to protect democratic freedoms. In the U.S., these threats manifest through actions such as voter suppression and gerrymandering, both of which distort representation and reduce public trust in the democratic process. Additionally, economic inequality and restricted access to opportunities exacerbate social tensions, weakening the fabric of unity that is essential for a stable society.

A growing number of Americans are quick to brand U.S. institutions as corrupt or oppressive, overlooking a vital truth: these institutions are the backbone of our democracy, providing stability and safeguarding our freedoms. Without effective government structures, we face two grim alternatives: chaos or authoritarianism. Constructive criticism, rooted in facts and accompanied by practical solutions, is essential to strengthening our democracy. True patriotism demands not a reckless dismantling of our institutions but a commitment to their improvement, ensuring they serve all citizens effectively. Baseless attacks weaken our system, empowering would-be dictators and external adversaries who seek to undermine our democratic foundations.

 Patriotism as a Counter to Authoritarianism and a Foundation for Unity

A robust sense of patriotism can serve as a defense against both internal and external attempts to destabilize democracy. By fostering loyalty to shared democratic principles rather than to specific political leaders or parties, patriotism builds resilience against authoritarianism. Citizens who are committed to the democratic ideals of equality, transparency, and accountability are more likely to reject undemocratic influences and to support the institutions that safeguard freedom.

Moreover, patriotism reinforces national unity by promoting a collective sense of purpose. When citizens share a commitment to the democratic process, they are more inclined to engage in civil discourse, even when they disagree. This unity strengthens the nation's ability to resist external manipulation and internal division, creating a society that can adapt and thrive in the face of challenges. Without a strong sense of patriotism, however, these defenses weaken, leaving the nation vulnerable to both domestic instability and foreign influence.

 The Role of Civic Education in Building Patriotism and National Security

Revitalizing patriotism requires a renewed focus on civic education that emphasizes democratic values, critical thinking, and media literacy. Schools and communities play a vital role in instilling these principles, helping citizens to understand not only their rights but also their responsibilities within a democratic society. By fostering a deeper understanding of American history and civic duty, education can counteract the spread of misinformation and reinforce the importance of democratic engagement.

In addition to formal education, public awareness campaigns that highlight the impact of patriotism on national security can help build a more informed and resilient citizenry. These initiatives should aim to connect individual civic responsibility with broader national interests, emphasizing that a healthy democracy requires active participation and a commitment to shared values. Patriotism, when nurtured through education, becomes a unifying force that bolsters the nation's defenses against both internal and external threats.

 Patriotism and the Economy: Supporting a Strong and Secure Society

American capitalism, when aligned with democratic values, has historically contributed to national security by promoting economic freedom, innovation, and individual responsibility. The pursuit of economic success within a free-market system encourages self-reliance and the pursuit of personal goals, both of which support democratic ideals. By fostering a sense of ownership and participation, economic freedom strengthens patriotism, as citizens recognize that they have a stake in the nation’s prosperity.

However, unchecked economic inequality can undermine this connection, leading to resentment and division. Addressing these disparities requires policies that promote economic opportunity for all citizens, ensuring that the benefits of capitalism are widely accessible. When economic policies align with democratic values, they reinforce patriotism by demonstrating that the nation values and invests in all its people. This economic inclusivity strengthens national unity and security by fostering a sense of shared prosperity and mutual commitment.

 Conclusion: Patriotism as a Strategic Asset for National Security

In a world where both authoritarian and digital threats are on the rise, American patriotism must be recognized as a crucial national security interest. A strong, unified sense of identity rooted in democratic values equips the nation to resist foreign interference and domestic instability. Without patriotism, America’s unique social order—based on principles of freedom and equality—is at risk of erosion, weakening the very foundation of national security.

To ensure that patriotism remains a robust and resilient force, the United States must invest in civic education, promote democratic engagement, and address internal inequalities that fuel division. By strengthening patriotism through these measures, the U.S. can fortify itself against both the external pressures of a turbulent world and the internal challenges of a diverse and dynamic society.

Ultimately, patriotism is more than an emotional response; it is a strategic asset that underpins national security by promoting unity, resilience, and commitment to the values that define America. The task ahead is to cultivate a patriotism that endures—one that empowers citizens to safeguard not only their rights but also the democratic institutions that make those rights possible.

Bibliography

ACLU. "Block the Vote: Voter Suppression in 2020." ACLU News. Accessed January 18, 2024. https://www.aclu.org/news/civil-liberties/block-the-vote-voter-suppression-in-2020.

Brenan, Megan. "Extreme Pride in Being American Remains Near Record Low." Gallup News, June 29, 2023.

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. "Rumor vs. Reality." CISA. Accessed January 18, 2024. https://www.cisa.gov/topics/election-security/rumor-vs-reality.

Foreign Threats to the 2020 U.S. Federal Elections. Intelligence Community Assessment, March 10, 2020.

Rakich, Nathaniel, and Dhrumil Mehta. "We’re Divided on Patriotism Too." FiveThirtyEight, July 26, 2018. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/were-divided-on-patriotism-too/.

The Hill. "FBI Analysis from 2020 Warned Extremists ‘Very Willing’ to Take Action over Disputed Election: Report." Accessed January 18, 2024. https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/4222330-fbi-analysis-from-2020-warned-extremists-very-willing-to-take-action-over-disputed-election-report/.

Zitner, Aaron. "America Pulls Back From Values That Once Defined It, WSJ-NORC Poll Finds." *Wall Street Journal*, March 27, 2023.

​15. Special Report: Pro-Russia Georgian Dream Party Likely Wins Parliamentary Elections

Special Report: Pro-Russia Georgian Dream Party Likely Wins Parliamentary Elections

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/pro-russia-georgian-dream-party-likely-wins-parliamentary-elections

Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party has likely won a simple majority in the Georgian parliamentary election held on October 26, 2024, according to preliminary results. Partial preliminary results released by the Georgian Central Election Committee (CEC) on October 26 indicate that the Georgian Dream party will likely win the majority of seats in parliament, but the results are neither complete nor final. The results suggest that Georgian Dream will form the new Georgian government, but that it will not have the 113 seats required to obtain the “constitutional majority” it needs to pursue some of the goals it has outlined, including outlawing nearly all opposition parties. The CEC reported that voter turnout was nearly 59 percent- the highest since 2012 when Georgian Dream first came to power.

Various opposition party officials and Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili declared an early victory citing various polls suggesting results in which pro-Western opposition parties would hold a majority in the Georgian Parliament. The results are subject to change as the CEC is expected to announce the final results on October 27 after ballots in both electronic and non-electronic precincts-including precincts abroad- have been counted.

Key Takeaways:

• Georgian Dream has adopted a very strongly pro-Russian platform.

• A number of incidents have marred the elections suggesting a thus far undetermined magnitude of election fraud pending reports from election observers.

• The election results are likely to lead to opposition mobilization and protests given initial reactions from opposition parties claiming that the elections were fraudulent.

• The Russian information space is already celebrating a Georgian Dream victory, further demonstrating that Georgian Dream is the Kremlin’s favored party in the Georgian parliamentary elections.

• ISW recently assessed that the Kremlin will likely leverage a Georgian Dream parliamentary victory to enhance its influence in Georgia and the South Caucasus while also derailing the Georgian people’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

16. MAJ Badger Gives Life and Earns Soldier's Medal (27 OCT 1995)

Sadly, one in a long line of shootings that happened sporadically from the 1960s through 1990s and which then unfortunately skyrocketed after Columbine in 1999.

MAJ Badger Gives Life and Earns Soldier's Medal (27 OCT 1995)

By Erin Thompson dvidshub.net2 min

October 27, 1995

View Original

by Erin E. Thompson, USAICoE Staff Historian

MAJ BADGER GIVES LIFE AND EARNS SOLDIER'S MEDAL

On 27 October 1995, a sergeant from the 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, opened fire on a training field at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, killing intelligence officer Maj. Stephen M. Badger and wounding eighteen others.

Stephen Mark Badger was born on 13 December 1957 in Salt Lake City, Utah. While attending high school, Badger joined the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC). Prior to attending university, Badger, who was a member of the Church of Latter-Day Saints (LDS), embarked on a traditional LDS mission to Milan, Italy, from 1977–1979. After returning to the United States, Badger attended Thatcher Eastern Arizona College for a year before transferring to Brigham Young University. He graduated with a degree in psychology in 1985. Having resumed training with the university’s ROTC program, he was commissioned a second lieutenant and assigned to the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg (Fort Liberty since 2023). He was stationed in Italy for three years and, in 1995, was assigned to the 2d Brigade Task Force, 325th Infantry, as the regimental S-2.

The brigade had planned a four-mile run on the morning of 27 October 1995. One day earlier, the assailant, a 26-year-old infantry squad leader with the 325th Infantry, told another squad member he was “going to shoot the run the following day.” The sergeant had a history of mental health problems and had been referred to a military psychiatrist the previous year. Ultimately cleared for duty, he was promoted to sergeant in March 1995. His squad member reported the comment to his commander, but the threat was not deemed serious.

In the early morning of 27 October, hundreds of soldiers assembled on the fort’s athletic field when the assailant opened fire from his position in the nearby tree line. Major Badger was struck in the head and killed. He was thirty-six years old. Eighteen other soldiers were wounded, including CWO2 Abraham Castillo, who was paralyzed from the waist down. Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Guy LoFaro was shot in the stomach and spent several weeks in a coma. Four U.S. Special Forces soldiers who were exercising near the stadium rushed to the trees to stop the attack. One of these soldiers was shot in the foot while another, S. Sgt. Anthony Minor, suffered a broken hand trying to subdue the assailant. Minor later stated: “It was a fight for his life and it was a fight for our lives…We did what we were trained to do.” Several Special Forces soldiers, as well as Majors Badger and LoFaro, were awarded the Army’s Soldier’s Medal for heroism. Sfc. Matt Lewis also received a Soldier’s Medal for performing emergency first aid on Castillo. The sniper was sentenced to death in 1996, commuted to life in prison in 2004.

Major Badger was survived by his wife and eight children, and his body is interred in his hometown of Holden, Utah. He is honored on the MI Corps Memorial Wall at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

New issues of This Week in MI History are published each week. To report story errors, ask questions, request back issues, or be added to our distribution list, please contact: TR-ICoE-Command-Historian@army.mil.

17. The State-Owned Company at the Center of Taliban Plans for Self-Sufficiency

The State-Owned Company at the Center of Taliban Plans for Self-Sufficiency

thediplomat.com

The National Development Corporation (NDC), though established under the previous government, has become a key instrument for the Taliban’s economic planning.

By Patrick Yeager

October 26, 2024

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Initially an inherited afterthought from the days of the Islamic Republic, the National Development Corporation (NDC) has risen to new prominence under the Taliban government in Afghanistan. As the regime improves Afghanistan’s irrigation, digs more mines, and constructs new infrastructure, the state-owned enterprise will play a key role in the years to come.

The Islamic Emirate has limited options to bring in new equipment and sign infrastructure deals, with much of the regime’s leadership still under sanctions from the days of the insurgency. Further, many of the regime’s key water projects come at the cost of Afghanistan’s neighbors. While these countries collaborate with the Taliban on other projects, the Afghan government needs a dependable construction manager of its own for many critical initiatives. The NDC has filled this gap, enabling the Taliban regime to pursue its goal of self-sufficiency, and limiting dependence on outside aid for the projects most important to the emirate.

Then-President Ashraf Ghani established the NDC in 2020 to consolidate eight state-owned construction, food, agricultural, and housing enterprises. Ghani named Abdul Rahman Attash, a veteran of the Ministry of the Rural Rehabilitation and Development who had ties to Hekmatyar Gulbuddin’s Hizb-e-Islami party, to run the NDC. Reportedly, Ghani even gave Attash nearly $750,000 to support internally displaced persons the day before the Republic collapsed.

As the Taliban consolidated power over the government and adapted the remnants of the Republic to its needs, the group shut down several state-owned enterprises and regulatory authorities. The National Development Corporation might seem an odd choice to survive the government overhaul. However, Attash has successfully transitioned from the Republic to the Emirate, keeping his role as leader of the NDC and sustaining the support of Taliban senior leaders.

The transition between governments has not come without problems. In 2022, the NDC claimed that work stopped on more than 600 projects as a result of the change in governments. Later the same year, a lack of reliable, domestic coal to power the plants temporarily disrupted cement production and halted the few remaining projects.

Further, there have been concerns about the quality of the NDC’s work on its crown jewel project, the Qosh Tepa Canal. Experts have decried the NDC’s design and construction practices for the 285-kilometer canal. While the NDC has mustered 5,500 people and 3,300 pieces of equipment for the project, there are concerns the canal’s design will lose large amounts of water to evaporation and seepage. Further, water overran the canal’s banks in November 2023 and created a 20 square kilometer lake. While the NDC claimed it was a planned release to compensate for an unexpected inflow of groundwater, regional NGOs have expressed skepticism.

This year, there have been accusations that the Taliban confiscated and redirected assets from the NDC to support other activities across 19 provinces. It is unknown if the NDC successfully regained its assets.

However, the NDC persisted through the turmoil, steadily growing in prominence. In the Taliban’s 2022-23 budget, the government restarted many of the previous canceled projects, with $16 million going to the NDC for the work. Business has picked up from there. From March 2023 to March 2024, the government allocated $23 million for the NDC to conduct projects across the country including canals, mines, dams, industrial parks, and hospitals. The Afghan government announced that the NDC will upgrade the Kajaki Dam in Helmand Province, the Kamal Khan Dam in Nimruz Province, and several hydroelectric projects around Kabul.

Details on the 2024-2025 budget are sparse, so it is unclear the extent to which the Taliban will employ the NDC in the coming year. It seems likely the corporation will be busy, however.

The NDC has secured several agreements to ensure it has access to the human and physical resources it needs to secure additional government projects. The Ministry of Higher Education signed an agreement to recruit graduates from Afghanistan’s higher education institutions directly into the NDC.

The NDC has also worked to secure its own construction supplies. Nearly all of Afghanistan’s domestically produced cement comes from the NDC. The corporation owns both the Jabal Siraj Cement Factory, north of Kabul, and the Ghori Cement Factory in Baghlan Province. The NDC has upgraded both facilities, with Ghori finishing a notable upgrade in 2022. In October 2023, the interim government secured a $220 million investment from a Qatari firm to upgrade the Jabal Siraj Cement plant, while the Ghori Cement Factory received a second upgrade in July.

Further, the Taliban government provided the NDC with exclusive control over 21 coal mines in Sar-e Pol Province which will both power the corporation’s cement plant and provide much needed revenue to finance further work on the Qosh Tepa Canal.

As business booms, regular visits from Taliban interim ministers and deputy prime ministers to NDC headquarters further affirm the corporation’s importance and staying power.

As with many of Afghanistan’s improvement efforts, the interim Taliban government remains extraordinarily far from its publicly proclaimed goal of self-sufficiency. For example, even with the upgrades the NDC produces only one-tenth of Afghanistan’s cement needs, according an Afghan expert. However, the Taliban’s use of a Ghani-era state-owned enterprise to conduct internal development projects is a prime example of how the group has adapted its governance to meet new challenges.

The ability of the NDC to provide durable and effective infrastructure projects will be a key measure of the Taliban’s governing effectiveness over the next two to three years. If the Taliban can retain sufficient public and business human capital to complete its development plans, the regime can buy time to protect itself from international pressure and further cement its complete control over the populace of Afghanistan.

Authors

Guest Author

Patrick Yeager

Patrick Yeager is a writer and researcher focusing on South Asia issues. He has written for The Diplomat, The Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International, and The China Global South Project. He is an employee of the U.S. Department of Defense. However, the views expressed here are his own and do not represent the views of the U.S. government.

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18. 'Backbone of Iran's missile industry' destroyed by IAF strikes on Islamic Republic

I hope this assessment is accurate. Will it be a game changer? (we are using those tow words a lot lately - properly well overused).

I am always curious to know how this may affect internal stability within Iran. Will these actions weaken the regime and will the people begin to seek change?

If instability is possible what do we do?  But like the collapse of north Korea, are we prepared for the potential catastrophic collapse of Iran? I am not optimistic that we are.  

Of course north Korea and Iran are very different situations and collapse of either would require different US responses both directly and indirectly. But instability within and collapse of both would be catestopic in their own ways.

'Backbone of Iran's missile industry' destroyed by IAF strikes on Islamic Republic

The targets struck were sophisticated equipment that Iran could not produce on its own.

By JERUSALEM POST STAFF, REUTERS

OCTOBER 26, 2024 22:15

Updated: OCTOBER 27, 2024 12:40

Jerusalem Post

The Israel Air Force struck a dozen targets in Iran that were used to produce solid fuel for long-range ballistic missiles as part of its retaliatory military action against the Islamic Republic, severely harming Tehran's ability to replenish its inventory, it was reported on Saturday night.

The targets struck were sophisticated equipment that Iran could not produce on its own and had to be purchased from China, Walla reported. The targets were a critical component of Iran's ballistic missile program, Walla cited three anonymous Israeli sources as saying.

An American researcher said an Israeli airstrike on Saturday hit a building that was part of Iran's defunct nuclear weapons development program, and he and another researcher said facilities used to mix solid fuel for missiles also were struck.

The assessments based on commercial satellite imagery were reached separately by David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector, and Decker Eveleth, an associate research analyst at CNA, a Washington think tank.

They told Reuters that Israel struck buildings in Parchin, a massive military complex near Tehran. Israel also hit Khojir, according to Eveleth, a sprawling missile production site near Tehran.

A screengrab shows an Israeli Air Force plane, which the Israeli army says is departing to carry out strikes on Iran, from a handout video released on October 26, 2024 (credit: IDF)

Iran's military said the Israeli warplanes used "very light warheads" to strike border radar systems in the provinces of Ilam, Khuzestan and around Tehran.

In posts on X, Albright said commercial satellite imagery showed that Israel hit a building in Parchin called Taleghan 2 that was used for testing activities during the Amad Plan, Iran's defunct nuclear weapons development program.

The U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and US intelligence say Iran shuttered the program in 2003. Iran denies pursuing nuclear weapons.

Albright, head of the Institute for Science and International Security research group, was given access to the program's files for a book after they were stolen from Tehran by Israel's Mossad intelligence agency in 2018.

On X, he said the archives revealed that Iran kept important test equipment in Taleghan 2.

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Iran may have removed key materials before the airstrike, he said, but "even if no equipment remained inside" the building would have provided "intrinsic value" for future nuclear weapons-related activities.

Albright told Reuters that commercial satellite imagery of Parchin showed Israel damaged three buildings about 350 yards (320 m) from Taleghan 2, including two in which solid fuel for ballistic missiles was mixed.

He did not identify the commercial firm from which he obtained the images.

Eveleth said an image of Parchin from Planet Labs, a commercial satellite firm, showed that Israel destroyed three ballistic missile solid fuel mixing buildings and a warehouse in the sprawling complex.

Planet Labs imagery also showed that an Israeli strike destroyed two buildings in the Khojir complex where solid fuel for ballistic missiles was mixed, he said.

The buildings were enclosed by high dirt berms, according to the image reviewed by Reuters. Such structures are associated with missile production and are designed to stop a blast in one building from detonating combustible materials in nearby structures.

"Israel says they targeted buildings housing solid-fuel mixers," Eveleth said. "These industrial mixers are hard to make and export-controlled. Iran imported many over the years at great expense, and will likely have a hard time replacing them."

With a limited operation, he said, Israel may have struck a significant blow against Iran's ability to mass-produce missiles and made it more difficult for any future Iranian missile attack to pierce Israel's missile defenses.

"The strikes appear to be highly accurate," he said.

Axios reported that Israel destroyed hit 12 "planetary mixers" used to produce solid fuel for long-range ballistic missiles, quoting three unnamed Israeli sources as saying this severely damages Iran's ability to renew its missile stockpile and could deter Iran from further massive missile strikes against Israel.

Israeli sources also stated that four S-300 air defense batteries attacked that were in strategic locations that protected nuclear and energy facilities in Tehran during the operation. A factory for the production of drones and a facility in the Parchin military complex were also attacked, the latter of which saw in the past research and development activities for nuclear weapons.

Additional reports of attacks

The Arabic independent online newspaper Elaph reported Israel targeted a secret ballistic missile factory in Iran, destroying a large number of heavy fuel mixers used to power Kheibar and Haj Qasem missiles - both of which were fired by Iran at Israel at the beginning of the month. The report also claimed that the S-300 air defense batteries that were attacked were Russian-made and destroyed radars that feed these systems and others in Syria and Iraq.

The report said that the ballistic missile factory was completely destroyed. One source told Elaph that it was the "backbone of Iran's missile industry" and that Israel had "put it out of service," also reporting that each heavy fuel mixer destroyed was estimated to be at least two million dollars and about twenty mixers of this type were destroyed.

While Walla reported that production to restore such equipment would reportedly take at least one year, informed sources on the Iranian missile industry told Elaph that it would take at least two years to return the destroyed factory to service.

Iranian and Israeli officials confirmed to the New York Times that Israel had targeted the defenses at the Bandar Imam Khomeini petrochemical complex, in Khuzestan Province; at the major economic port Bandar Imam Khomeini, adjacent to it; and at the Abadan oil refinery.

“Israel is sending a clear message to us,” Hamid Hosseini, an expert on Iran’s oil and gas industry and a member of the Iran-Iraq Chamber of Commerce, told the Times. “This can have very serious economic consequences for Iran, and now that we understand the stakes we need to act wise and not continue the tensions.”

Sources told The Jerusalem Post that the estimated projection was six months to a year.

Overall, more than 100 Israeli aircraft participated in the attack on Iranian targets, stating that their mission was to hit the most advanced anti-aircraft systems of the Islamic Republic and develop air superiority there for any possible upcoming IAF operations - in such a way that Israeli fighter jets would be able to fly even at a relatively low altitude in the skies of Tehran itself in the future.

Estimates say it will still take many more days to assess the damage caused by the attacks.

Jerusalem Post

19. A Short History of the U.S. Army's Dictionary

I enjoyed this as I am one who follows terms and definitions closely (words have meaning as they say).

Dr. Wicker is the expert. She wrote a whole PhD dissertation on military words (and jargon).

My thoughts from long ago are here:

Threats and the Words We Use: A Thought Experiment - War on the Rocks

https://warontherocks.com/2013/11/threats-and-the-words-we-use-a-thought-experiment/

A Short History of the U.S. Army's Dictionary​

How a blunder at Dunkirk turned into a near-annual publication

By Zachary Griffiths open.substack.com6 min

https://www.hardingproject.com/p/a-short-history-of-the-us-armys-dictionary?r=7i07&utm

October 22, 2024

View Original

Figure 1: New York Times Headline from August 25th, 1942

In 1940, as forces were being evacuated off the beaches at Dunkirk, a command was allegedly mistranslated from French to English. Troops were sent to the wrong location, becoming casualties instead of evacuees. This was one of several communication breakdowns that inspired the U.S. Army to stand up a terminology program. This year is the 80th anniversary of the U.S. Army dictionary – a manual designed to capture one of the Army’s most underestimated institutional and operational enablers: its professional language.

In 1942, one of the Army’s lexicographers wrote in their notes “the real horror is modern military words.” Military words are often denigrated for causing confusion, but professional language exists for a reason. There are activities, roles, and objects that must be described, for which no standard English word exists. To fill these gaps, the U.S. Army has developed thousands of uniquely Army words. Professional jargon and terminology are the building blocks of military communication, enabling writing, training, command, and dozens of other functions.

Army language is not the uncontrollable morass that it is often perceived to be. Buzzwords and confusing documents do exist, but the Army has been successfully standardizing its professional language for over eighty years. The Army lexicon means little to outsiders but communicates a great deal to others in the profession. This is the (extremely) brief history of the Army’s professional vocabulary.

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The Roots of Army Jargon

           The language of warfare has existed for as long as elements of combat have required names. We think of the Army as having an abundance of terms and acronyms, but professional warfighting language is not new, not actually that large, and the Army is far from the most prolific jargon generator. (The medical profession has hundreds of times more terms, and the U.S. Navy has far more acronyms than the Army.) Centuries before the founding of the United States, there were dictionaries of fortification and weaponry, multilingual lexicons of “warr and soldiery,” and records of soldier slang from as far back as the 1400s.

           In 1776, the U.S. Army inherited its starting vocabulary from the British. In 1810, William Duane published the first American military dictionary in Philadelphia. This dictionary was essentially a British military dictionary with Americanized spelling. A smattering of dictionaries would be compiled through the 1800s by civilians and soldiers alike. Anyone could compile a dictionary or coin a military word.

In the early 1900s, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point became a hub of Army professional language. There, instructors were creating glossaries for their students, who then applied and spread that language across the Army. Instructors benefited from the large library, the educated officer corps, supportive leadership, and a mission to educate the next generation of Army officers. Even then, there was a great deal of variation between dictionaries – there was no single organization or actor responsible for managing Army language. It wasn’t until World War II that the Army would stand up its professional terminology standardization enterprise.

The Military Dictionary Project

World War II was raging and the Allies were cooperating… with some difficulty. There was little language standardization and no military translation guidance, so accurate communication was never guaranteed. In response to several mistranslated commands, in 1940, Army intelligence partnered with the Works Progress Administration to stand up the Military Dictionary Project. Under President Roosevelt’s New Deal, the Federal Writers Project had created several dictionary efforts. Among these, the Military Dictionary Project was tasked with producing bilingual military translation dictionaries in French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, and Russian.

Soon, however, they realized that the Army’s language was not even consistent in English. They needed an Army English dictionary to inform the translation dictionaries. As one example, the acronym SNAFU at the time could mean either “situation normal all fouled up” or “situation now all fixed up.” Two expansions of the same acronym with opposite meanings. The Military Dictionary Project began collecting words from doctrine, regulations, memos, white papers, histories, and the public. In newspapers across the United States, notices appeared, stating “Army Dictionary Wants Words.” The public was asked to send in any military terms that they knew of.

Figure 2: Evening Star, Washington D.C. August 20th, 1942

The Military Dictionary Project received over 20,000 words and definitions from the American public. Drawing from this pool, in 1944, the U.S. Army published its first official dictionary of Army terms. Technical Manual 20-205 was a restricted dictionary, laying out over 7,000 professional Army words and their definitions (but no slang or acronyms). This first dictionary was intended for training, describing itself as “a working dictionary for a working Army.” The Military Dictionary Project was dissolved after the end of World War II, but the Army continues to manage its professional terminology to this day.

Field Manual 1-02.1 Today

           From 1944 to 2024, the Army has published a new dictionary about every two years. Over the decades, the Army’s dictionary has been a technical manual, a special regulation, an Army doctrinal reference publication, and a field manual. The Army has the largest doctrine team across the services. Among these professionals, there is an Army Terminologist. These individuals support doctrine writers in every specialty – helping them refine language, develop clear instructions, and capture best practices for the rest of the Army.

           Today, you can find the U.S. Army’s codified doctrinal language in Field Manual 1-02.1 Operational Terms. This manual contains the Army’s officially sanctioned doctrinal language. The most shocking statistic about Army doctrinal terminology is the fact that it is shrinking. Today, there is one eighth the number of official terms as were listed in 1944. The Army’s standardization efforts have successfully screened out a great deal of variation in its professional language, in pursuit of the goal of never again having a mistranslation undermine an operation.

Finding Balance with Professional Language

           The United States Army has the longest and strongest record of terminology standards. Despite these standards, some topics – particularly more specialized activities – require more technical language than others. It is easy to use too much. Even Carl von Clausewitz’ On War includes a warning about professional language. Clausewitz wrote that a “far more serious menace” exists than narrow law-like systems for understanding war – that menace is the “retinue of jargon, technicalities, and metaphors that attend these systems.” Professional language serves an important function, but as writers, we must learn how to recognize the professional vocabulary and wield it selectively and intentionally.

Internal to the Army, professional language creates common references for soldiers, naming those activities for which no word exists in standard English. To be fluent in the language of the Army, one must be able to use the jargon and terms accurately, switching structures and styles as context requires. However, for external readers, jargon use limits the readability and reach of military writing. Professional writing is a craft unique from academic or public-facing writing – many professional journals discuss topics most relevant to Army communities, not the public. To discuss the most pressing issues facing the U.S. Army today, professional terms are required. Rather than simply aiming to kill all jargon, understanding the long legacy of the Army’s professional language allows us to recognize its functions and ultimately seek balance in our own vocabularies.

Dr. Elena Wicker researches military jargon, terminology, and buzzwords and the lives of military documents. Her forthcoming book documents how the services, the U.S. Department of Defense, and international alliances have each standardized their professional military language. Her collection of over two hundred historical American military dictionaries recently won the 2024 Honey & Wax Book Collecting Prize.

​20. Niall Ferguson: Israel’s Iran Strike—and America’s Strategic Weakness

Based on other reporting we have seen I am not sure that Israel totally ignored Washignton's advice.

But Ferguson provides some thought provoking views:

Excerpts:

The key question now is whether Israel will be satisfied with proving it can hit Iranian military assets within the country, or whether this attack represents the first step in a plan to neutralize Iran’s nuclear program. I would bet on the latter.

Those who have characterized the war that began on October 7, 2023, as a war against Hamas misunderstand the nature of this conflict. It is a war with Iran’s proxies—and has been since the start. In Gaza, the work of destroying Hamas goes on, with a few lingering hopes that some hostages may still be alive. In Lebanon, Israel seeks to crush Hezbollah’s political and economic infrastructure and, with American diplomatic support, to end its role as the key player in Lebanese politics. But both terrorist organizations are merely the tentacles of an octopus whose head resides in Tehran. That is why direct strikes against Iran’s military defenses are best understood as part of a more ambitious strategy of phased escalation.

Netanyahu has taken to calling this the “Resurrection War.” Israel, rising from the horrors inflicted a year ago, is now at war with the Islamic Republic that for so long has threatened its very existence. Its ultimate goals may include not only the destruction of Iran’s nuclear program but also that of the theocratic regime itself. 

Israel’s resurrection has also been the resurrection of a core strategic principle familiar to game theorists: When you are attacked, always strike back with greater force than the attacker could muster. At every stage of Israel’s retaliation, the Biden-Harris administration has urged de-escalation. Netanyahu has rightly ignored this foolish advice.

Not only in Jerusalem, but in much of the Arab world too, people quietly hope for a change of government in the United States, and a return to the path that led to the Abraham Accords. Meanwhile, in Tehran, the mullahs tremble. Good.

Niall Ferguson: Israel’s Iran Strike—and America’s Strategic Weakness

Once again, Israel appears to have ignored Washington’s advice. Once again, that decision has paid off.

https://www.thefp.com/p/niall-ferguson-israels-iran-strikeand

By Niall Ferguson

October 26, 2024

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“Although the Middle East remains beset with perennial challenges, the region is quieter than it has been for decades.” That was the confident declaration made by Joe Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, in a 7,000-word essay published in Foreign Affairs one year ago.

Unfortunately for Sullivan, the article was sent to the printer on October 2, 2023. Five days later, Hamas demolished Sullivan’s assertion that “we have de-escalated crises in Gaza” when the terrorist group massacred some 1,200 Israelis and kidnapped more than 200. 

Since then, the region has been in a state of upheaval not seen in half a century—since the last surprise attack on Israel almost exactly 50 years previously, on Yom Kippur 1973. And at every single major hinge point of Israel’s war with Iran’s proxies, the U.S. has been as wrong as Sullivan was in that essay.

The White House said don’t go into Gaza. Israel did, and in a sustained campaign killed a high proportion of Hamas fighters. Team Biden-Harris said don’t go into Rafah. Israel ignored those warnings, too, and in February liberated two hostages there. Ten days ago, a routine Israeli patrol in Rafah spotted the mastermind of the massacre, Yahya Sinwar, who was killed soon after. Washington said don’t send troops into Lebanon. Israel sent them anyway and in a matter of weeks has inflicted severe damage on Hezbollah’s positions there. 

Biden and Harris said “Ceasefire now!” but Israel had no interest in a ceasefire that gave Hamas breathing space to regroup. Finally, the U.S. warned against Israel directly attacking Iran. An as yet unidentified U.S. government official even appears to have leaked Israel’s plans to Tehran—a scandal that ought to be front-page news. You know what happened next.

The past year has revealed many things—not least the moral confusion of many young Americans—but two major points stand out. First, Israel has pursued a strategy of targeted retaliation of impressive precision and effectiveness. Second, the United States has lost all but a shred of the influence it once had over Israeli policy. Fact: As a share of Israeli national income, U.S. aid peaked at 22 percent in 1979. It’s now down to 0.6 percent.

The political consequences are twofold. First, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has successfully outmaneuvered his critics at home and abroad, who wrongly assumed that, by relentlessly exaggerating the collateral damage of Israel’s campaign against Hamas, they would prevent Israel from exacting vengeance—and from reestablishing deterrence. 

Second, the Biden-Harris administration has been left looking even more hapless in its national security strategy than Jimmy Carter’s did in 1980, when Ronald Reagan swept to victory with a promise to achieve “peace through strength.” The Iranian revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis, combined with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, had made 1979 an annus horribilis for Carter. 

The difference is that Carter was undone by the downfall of an American ally, the Shah of Iran. By contrast, Joe Biden and Kamala Harris are being humiliated by an American ally’s triumph—a triumph that confirms what I have long suspected, namely that Israel has reduced its dependence on American support to the point of effective strategic autonomy. That’s a term Europeans like to use. It means doing what the hell you like, whatever the U.S. government says. Europeans lack it. Israelis seem to have it.

Last night, the Israel Defense Forces launched the long-awaited retaliation for the Islamic Republic’s October 1 aerial attack on Israel. Netanyahu waited more than three weeks to make his move. The moment he chose was symbolic: the end of the festival of the Simchat Torah—the Hebrew calendar anniversary of October 7 last year. 

For four hours between Friday night and early Saturday morning, over 100 aircraft struck military targets—ballistic missile production facilities and air defense systems.

The U.S. government has stated that it was notified by Israel ahead of the strikes. American officials are framing the strike as a success for U.S. mediation, arguing that it successfully lobbied Israel to direct its strikes away from oil facilities and nuclear sites. The administration is also briefing that there was no American involvement in the Israeli strikes. It is not clear to me where Washington got the leverage to determine the targets of an attack it was not involved in.

Iranian state media channels have also downplayed the attacks, saying that the Tehran airport is fully operational and that most images of smoke and bombs circulating on social media were “old and untrustworthy.” However, unconfirmed reports state that Israel hit the headquarters of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as part of the attack. 

Yet the reality is, as Mark Dubowitz put it on X: “Over 100 Israeli jets flew through three hostile countries, striking 20+ targets in Iran—all returned safely. The IAF has proven it can operate at will. No future target is off-limits: leadership, nuclear, economic, or military.”

The key question now is whether Israel will be satisfied with proving it can hit Iranian military assets within the country, or whether this attack represents the first step in a plan to neutralize Iran’s nuclear program. I would bet on the latter.

Those who have characterized the war that began on October 7, 2023, as a war against Hamas misunderstand the nature of this conflict. It is a war with Iran’s proxies—and has been since the start. In Gaza, the work of destroying Hamas goes on, with a few lingering hopes that some hostages may still be alive. In Lebanon, Israel seeks to crush Hezbollah’s political and economic infrastructure and, with American diplomatic support, to end its role as the key player in Lebanese politics. But both terrorist organizations are merely the tentacles of an octopus whose head resides in Tehran. That is why direct strikes against Iran’s military defenses are best understood as part of a more ambitious strategy of phased escalation.

Netanyahu has taken to calling this the “Resurrection War.” Israel, rising from the horrors inflicted a year ago, is now at war with the Islamic Republic that for so long has threatened its very existence. Its ultimate goals may include not only the destruction of Iran’s nuclear program but also that of the theocratic regime itself. 

Israel’s resurrection has also been the resurrection of a core strategic principle familiar to game theorists: When you are attacked, always strike back with greater force than the attacker could muster. At every stage of Israel’s retaliation, the Biden-Harris administration has urged de-escalation. Netanyahu has rightly ignored this foolish advice.

Not only in Jerusalem, but in much of the Arab world too, people quietly hope for a change of government in the United States, and a return to the path that led to the Abraham Accords. Meanwhile, in Tehran, the mullahs tremble. Good.

Niall Ferguson is a columnist for The Free Press. His latest book is Doom: The Politics of Catastrophe. Read his piece “The Treason of the Intellectuals,” and follow him on X @nfergus.

The Free Press earns a commission from any purchases made through all book links in this article.

21. Gad Saad Survived War in Lebanon. He’s Warning About One in the West

Thought provoking.

Excerpts:

Why Lebanon’s identity politics should be a warning to America:

BW: For the listener who is only paying attention to Lebanon now because it’s in the news, can you briefly explain to us the nature of the civil war so that people don’t have to go running to Wikipedia, which is now overtaken by propagandists? 

GS: So the Lebanese Civil War was from 1975 to 1990, officially. And during that time there are different estimates. But the most common estimate that I’ve seen is that roughly 150,000 people were killed. Now, in a country of, say, 3 million people, that gives you a sense that it’s pretty sizable. Now, different people will argue that, no, it was a political war. It wasn’t. The reality is that it had a clear religious timbre to it. There were several Christian militias that were fighting several Muslim militias. Now, the Muslim militias, when they’re not fighting against the Christians, could turn the guns against each other and fight one another. So it was complete chaos. The reality is that everything in Lebanon is viewed through the prism of religion. Who could be prime minister or who could be president? How many seats you get in the parliament is all based on your religion. 

BW: I want you to explain the connection between the ideology that you began to encounter in the mid-1970s in Lebanon and the identity politics that has subsumed so much of our culture here in the West. 

GS: Well, Lebanon is the perfect exemplar of what happens when identity politics are taken to their nefarious limits. Everything is viewed through the lens of which religion you belong to. So it really is identity politics on steroids. And so I see certain political movements, whether it be in the United States or in Canada or in the West in general, that are very much wedded to that idea. One of the parasitic ideas that I speak about in the book is precisely linked, as you said, to identity politics. And I tell people, hey, watch out, because if you want that perfect example of what identity politics is in terms of how you organize society, Lebanon is the place. Syria is the place. Iraq is the place. Rwanda is the place. So it’s never a good idea when people who live under a supposedly unified nation are more tied to whatever identity marker first defines them more so than the country. What made the United States great is that I could be anything, but nothing was superseded by my commitment to American values. Once you erase that, once you eradicate that foundational value, you’re going to run into problems. It might take 100 years, it might take 500 years, but you will get the exact same final outcome. 

On brain worms and political pathology:

BW: So if we were having this conversation, let’s say, 50 years ago, there are a lot of things that would have seemed completely benign to anyone at that time living in North America. The idea that men and women are different. The idea that capitalism is better than communism; the idea that demanding equality of outcome will lead to tyranny. I could list 10 other things. All of those commonsensical statements have now become, if not dangerous to talk about, absolutely provocative. And I think the question a lot of people have is how did that happen? And your answer is captured in The Parasitic Mind. For the sake of this conversation, can you explain what the parasitic mind is, what you’re describing? 

GS: I used the term parasitic, rather than, say, woke mind virus or mimetic because there is something unique about parasitic rapture. Now, let me step back and give you the background to how I developed that framework. In the animal kingdom, there is a study of parasitology. Parasitology is the interaction between a host and a parasite in many different ways. So, for example, a tapeworm is a parasite that goes into your intestinal tract. A neural parasite wants to get to your brain. Literally, a brain worm. I argue in this book that human beings can also be parasitized by actual physical brain worms. For example, Toxoplasma gondii is one such example. But human beings, regrettably, can also be parasitized by a second class of brain worms. Those are called ideological brain worms. I call them parasitic ideas or idea pathogens. For the rest of the book, I explain what these ideological brain worms are. And then toward the end of the book, I offer a mind vaccine to hopefully inoculate you against that imbecility. 

Gad Saad Survived War in Lebanon. He’s Warning About One in the West

The professor reveals how universities turned into hotbeds of ‘parasitic ideas’—and why we must fight against becoming ‘fully zombified.’

https://www.thefp.com/p/gad-saad-lebanon-war-antisemitism-trump

By Bari Weiss

October 27, 2024

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In the 1940s, there were around 20,000 Jews still living in Lebanon. Just 20 years later, in the span of one generation, that number dropped to around 3,000. Gad Saad is among those statistics—born in Lebanon in 1964 into one of the last Jewish families to remain in the country. 

But the nation that was once called the Paris of the Middle East began to turn when he was a child. He remembers being at school one day when a fellow student told the class he wanted to be a Jew killer when he grew up. The rest of the kids laughed. By 1975, Lebanon had descended into a brutal civil war, and Gad remembers death awaiting him every millisecond of the day. He spent his childhood years mindful of which streets had snipers when he went outside to play. But even then his family thought, This will pass. That is until someone showed up at their home to kill them—at which point the Saad family fled to rebuild their life in Canada. Gad went on to become a professor of marketing and evolutionary behavioral sciences at Concordia University in Montreal.

Many of us in Western democracies find ourselves saying the exact same things: This will pass over, everything will be fine. We say that even as Hamas flags and “I love Hezbollah” posters fly in cosmopolitan capitals across the West. I’ve been asking myself a lot over the past year: How worried should we be? Am I being hysterical? And is there a way to roll back this anti-civilizational impulse that has been let loose? 

Those are just some of the questions I put to Gad Saad in our conversation. Gad says that witnessing the Lebanese Civil War gave him a crash course in the extremes of identity politics, tribalism, and illiberalism. And he says that immigrants like himself, who have lived without the virtues of the West—virtues like freedom of speech and thought, reason and liberalism—uniquely understand what’s at stake now in Western cultural and political life. 

If you’re on X, I suspect you know Gad’s name. Unlike most professors, he has a million followers and a knack for satire, so much so that Elon Musk seems to be one of his biggest fans. He has become one of the most insightful and provocative thinkers on the risks of mob rule and extremism on the left. 

Meanwhile, he is now having second thoughts about the university where he has worked for the past 30 years. That’s because Concordia is now widely regarded as one of the most antisemitic universities in North America. As a result, Gad is currently a visiting professor and global ambassador at Northwood University in Michigan, and he says he can’t face returning to Concordia and maybe even Canada, given the antisemitism that’s run rampant there. All of this, he argues, constitutes another war, different but related to the one he witnessed in Lebanon as a child. This one is a war on logic, science, common sense, and reality, here in the West. 

These are ideas he explains in his important book, The Parasitic Mind: How Infectious Ideas Are Killing Common Sense. In our wide-ranging conversation, I asked Gad where these parasitic ideas came from and why they’re encouraged in the West. And importantly, I ask if these trends are reversible. 

To listen to the podcast, click below, or scroll down for an edited transcript of our conversation.

On the ever-present threat of violence in Lebanon and his family’s decision to flee:

Bari Weiss: I wonder if you could take us back in time to the 1960s, to Lebanon before the war. You’re one of the last of a very small Jewish community living there. Take us back to the world you were born into. 

Gad Saad: So I was born in 1964. We were steadfastly, doggedly refusing to leave Lebanon, despite the fact that, yes, you’re right, that there was a time when Lebanon was considered progressive, certainly by Middle Eastern standards. But much of my extended family had read the writing on the wall and had left earlier, prior to the civil war, many of whom left for Israel. And one maternal aunt left for Montreal. That’s one of the reasons why we ended up immigrating to Canada. Bit by bit, each of my siblings had left Lebanon, but I remained because I was a young kid. 

And so, just to give your audience a feel of what it was like growing up Jewish in Lebanon: When I was a child, I was in a class where the teacher asked us to get up and tell what we’d like to be when we grew up. And so you get the typical professions. “I’d like to be a doctor. I’d like to be a police officer. I’d like to be a soccer player.” And one kid, who is a kid that knew that I was Jewish, got up and said, “When I grow up, I want to be a Jew killer,” to raucous applause and laughter. And that’s just the typical thing that you would see in the Middle East. 

BW: You’re 10 or 11 years old, the war breaks out, and, of course, your family is forced to flee. Was there a particular moment that you remember? Knowing that we were going to have to get out of here to save our lives? 

GS: There are many, many such moments, because death awaited you at every millisecond of the day. For example, my parents would tell me, “You can go out and play outside, but don’t pass this particular line, because that would open you up to the eyesight of the snipers that are on this building.” And I’m actually getting goosebumps saying this. 

Why Lebanon’s identity politics should be a warning to America:

BW: For the listener who is only paying attention to Lebanon now because it’s in the news, can you briefly explain to us the nature of the civil war so that people don’t have to go running to Wikipedia, which is now overtaken by propagandists? 

GS: So the Lebanese Civil War was from 1975 to 1990, officially. And during that time there are different estimates. But the most common estimate that I’ve seen is that roughly 150,000 people were killed. Now, in a country of, say, 3 million people, that gives you a sense that it’s pretty sizable. Now, different people will argue that, no, it was a political war. It wasn’t. The reality is that it had a clear religious timbre to it. There were several Christian militias that were fighting several Muslim militias. Now, the Muslim militias, when they’re not fighting against the Christians, could turn the guns against each other and fight one another. So it was complete chaos. The reality is that everything in Lebanon is viewed through the prism of religion. Who could be prime minister or who could be president? How many seats you get in the parliament is all based on your religion. 

BW: I want you to explain the connection between the ideology that you began to encounter in the mid-1970s in Lebanon and the identity politics that has subsumed so much of our culture here in the West. 

GS: Well, Lebanon is the perfect exemplar of what happens when identity politics are taken to their nefarious limits. Everything is viewed through the lens of which religion you belong to. So it really is identity politics on steroids. And so I see certain political movements, whether it be in the United States or in Canada or in the West in general, that are very much wedded to that idea. One of the parasitic ideas that I speak about in the book is precisely linked, as you said, to identity politics. And I tell people, hey, watch out, because if you want that perfect example of what identity politics is in terms of how you organize society, Lebanon is the place. Syria is the place. Iraq is the place. Rwanda is the place. So it’s never a good idea when people who live under a supposedly unified nation are more tied to whatever identity marker first defines them more so than the country. What made the United States great is that I could be anything, but nothing was superseded by my commitment to American values. Once you erase that, once you eradicate that foundational value, you’re going to run into problems. It might take 100 years, it might take 500 years, but you will get the exact same final outcome. 

On brain worms and political pathology:

BW: So if we were having this conversation, let’s say, 50 years ago, there are a lot of things that would have seemed completely benign to anyone at that time living in North America. The idea that men and women are different. The idea that capitalism is better than communism; the idea that demanding equality of outcome will lead to tyranny. I could list 10 other things. All of those commonsensical statements have now become, if not dangerous to talk about, absolutely provocative. And I think the question a lot of people have is how did that happen? And your answer is captured in The Parasitic Mind. For the sake of this conversation, can you explain what the parasitic mind is, what you’re describing? 

GS: I used the term parasitic, rather than, say, woke mind virus or mimetic because there is something unique about parasitic rapture. Now, let me step back and give you the background to how I developed that framework. In the animal kingdom, there is a study of parasitology. Parasitology is the interaction between a host and a parasite in many different ways. So, for example, a tapeworm is a parasite that goes into your intestinal tract. A neural parasite wants to get to your brain. Literally, a brain worm. I argue in this book that human beings can also be parasitized by actual physical brain worms. For example, Toxoplasma gondii is one such example. But human beings, regrettably, can also be parasitized by a second class of brain worms. Those are called ideological brain worms. I call them parasitic ideas or idea pathogens. For the rest of the book, I explain what these ideological brain worms are. And then toward the end of the book, I offer a mind vaccine to hopefully inoculate you against that imbecility. 

BW: What is the difference between just a plain old bad idea and a parasitic idea? 

GS: A bad idea could be thinking that having indiscriminate sex will bring me happiness, whereas in reality, I might be a lot happier if I were to find the loving arms of one good woman. Parasitic is a lot worse. It’s me slowly walking to the abyss of infinite lunacy, fully zombified. And as I walk off the cliff, I am proud of whatever ideological position I’m holding. So it’s the Jewish woman proudly walking on campus tearing down the posters of Jewish infants that have been taken as hostages. Because she’s simply more progressive and enlightened than, you know, nasty Middle Eastern Jews like me who don’t understand the nuance of how progressive she is. 

Why postmodernism is dangerous, and not just a fancy academic word:

BW: So there are several parasitic ideas that you describe in the book, among them the culture of perpetual offense and victimhood. The idea that criticizing the West is a progressive virtue, the kind of radical feminism that I began to encounter in college that said genital mutilation is just cultural difference. You argue, I think, very convincingly, that the root of all of these parasitic ideas is postmodernism. What is postmodernism? And second, why is it so sticky to people? 

GS: Yes. So postmodernism at its root simply says that there are no objective truths other than the one objective truth, and that’s the idea there are no objective truths. You have an exhibition of invisible art. I mean, that’s, by the way, literally true. I cited in the book, right, where you just walk in and you just literally infuse into the empty canvas whatever you want, because who are we to judge what is beautiful, and why do we simply say that Rembrandt and Chagall are beautiful? You know, art is in the eye of the beholder. There are no objective, aesthetic truths. I think it’s nonsensical, but at least it doesn’t have catastrophic consequences. When you apply postmodernism to the philosophy of knowledge, if there’s no objective truth, who are you to say that cutting off the clitoris of little girls is a bad thing, right? And so it becomes a complete free-for-all. Now, why is it so sticky, as you said? Why is it something so alluring? Because, remember, earlier I said that all of these idea pathogens free us from the pesky shackles of reality. There you go. Postmodernism frees me from this really shackling and constraining thing. I’m not defined by my genitalia. I could be anything. How freeing is that? It’s so great to be able to navigate the world completely unencumbered by any constraints of reality. 

BW: The difference between being a gay mom in L.A. and a gay mom in Beirut or Tehran or Gaza, you know, obviously those are very different contexts, like a universe apart. And 100 percent of the time, everyone would choose America. Why is that not enough to defeat the parasite, pop the bubble of unreality? 

GS: Imagine if I tell you that there is no singular worse thing than to be judgmental against another culture, nothing worse. The idea that I would pass a value-laden judgment on another people, especially if I define them as being brown people. By the way, not all Muslims are brown. Albanian Muslims are a lot whiter than you are. But somehow it has been co-opted into Islam as a religion of brown people. Then there is nothing worse that I can do, if I’m speaking as a progressive, than to cast judgment on them. So, yes, in the deep recesses of my mind, I know that as a gay woman, I would have a much different trajectory in my life if I’m in Yemen than if I am in New York. But it just feels icky. It feels gauche to me to criticize the cultural values and religious values in Yemen. And therefore, since there’s nothing worse than being judgmental in a bigoted way, that’s the hill I’m going to die on. 

BW: How did universities become such hotbeds for these parasitic ideas? How did that happen? 

GS: In the most mundane way, it happens when you have hiring committees that only wish to have lunch with people who share their values. If I am a Trump hater, I simply can’t stomach the possibility that a rational human being might have very compelling reasons why they wish to vote for Donald Trump. Because I attribute that difference in political orientation to that person being irrational, being bigoted. And so there are several mechanisms that result in the echo chamber, but in the most fundamental earthly manner, you just end up closing the doors to anyone who is not exactly like you. The heartbreaking stories that I receive from people: “Dear Professor Saad, my supervisor found out that I said something kind or complimentary about Donald Trump, and he’s now taken off my name from a paper that I’ve worked on for the past year. I don’t think I’ve got a future in that lab. Are you taking on any doctoral students?” What I just said didn’t happen in North Korea. It didn’t happen in the struggle sessions of Mao Tse-Tung. It happened on a North American campus. 

On leaving his longtime campus because of antisemitism:

BW: Your book came out at the end of 2020. We’re now four years since then, and there has been an explosion of antisemitism everywhere, but most intensely on college campuses. I think, given your particular instinct for danger, how do you see where we are right now? How do you diagnose it? 

GS: The writing on the wall is not a good one. Now there are several reasons for that. One of them is ideological—the parasitic idea allowed to flourish on campuses that Jews are white colonialists engaging in the daily genocide of noble brown people.

But there’s also a demographic one. In the United States and Canada, historically, certainly in the last 40, 50, 60 years, it was viewed as inappropriate to openly and brazenly engage in Jew hatred. Things have changed now. I’ve seen it. The reason I’m a visiting professor at Northwood University is because I couldn’t bear the possibility of returning to my home university, Concordia University, which has been referred to colloquially as Gaza University for over 20 years. You can’t begin to imagine what it’s like for the typical Jewish student or faculty to go to Concordia now. So now imagine someone with my profile walking into campus. And so I decided that it was time for me to take a leave of absence. What could be more of a canary in the coal mine? 

BW: You’re saying that you’re leaving Montreal or leaving your campus Concordia in Montreal because of antisemitism? 

GS: One-hundred percent. Now, there are other reasons why. Look, it’s invigorating to go somewhere else. Even if there wasn’t any of that antisemitism, it’s nice to try a new trajectory. It invigorates you. But overwhelmingly, the main reason why I did not go back is because I don’t really like the idea of being potentially knifed. I think the canaries are singing really loudly, and it takes an imbecile to ignore those signs.

The psychology of Jew hatred: 

BW: Explain to me how antisemitism, a topic I thought a lot about, is often the expression of these parasitic ideas. In other words, why is it that it’s coming first, or maybe primarily, for Jews? 

GS: So there are several mechanisms, some of which, you’re right, are due to parasitic ideas. But let me start with a different explanation for why antisemitism is so alluring to so many people. In psychology, there is something called the fundamental attribution error. So, for example, do you attribute successes or failures internally or externally? Now, for most people, they attribute successes internally. I did well on the exam because I’m very smart. And they attribute the failures externally. I did poorly on the exam because Professor Saad is a Jew asshole. And for most people, that’s a very comforting way to navigate through the world. It protects my ego. Now, imagine if I can find an external culprit for all of my failures. It’s the diabolical Jew. You just got diabetes; it’s because Jews are holding on to the cure for diabetes, they’re greedy, they’re not distributing it. So I think beyond these parasitic ideas that we’ve been talking about, it’s something that is innately part of the architecture of the human mind. I need to protect my ego. What better way to attribute all of my failures to some cause? And in this case, it’s the Jew. 

For better or worse, Jews end up dominating in many places in philosophy and music, in academia and medicine and law. So imagine from the perspective of the non-Jew in those societies, there are these few assholes. Every time I go to my lawyer, he’s a Jew and the physician is a Jew. And the professor in the classroom is a Jew. I’m not successful. There must be some grand machination that causes these people to lead. Yes, we could talk about theological reasons why Islam hates the Jews and why Christians hate the Jews. But from a deep psychological level, I think that that’s the primary reason. 

Making the case for Trump:

BW: I want to explain how someone like you, who’s committed their life, as you write about, to reason and the pursuit of truth, prefers Donald Trump, someone with such a history of lying and such a compromised character, if I can put it diplomatically. Why do you prefer him to Kamala Harris? What’s your decision-making framework? 

GS: It would be immigration policy. It would be economic policies that are consistent with capitalism. And another one I didn’t mention. Earlier, you referred to equality of outcomes, which of course Kamala Harris is into, which is the antithesis of a meritocracy, which is the opposite of individual dignity. Well, I believe that the ethos of meritocracy is foundational to the United States. The ethos of equality of outcomes is a cancer to individual dignity. So it would probably be those three things.

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22.  Pentagon Watchdog Questions Navy SEAL Training Program's Use of Sleep Deprivation

While the SEALs may take this to extreme in training, all soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines experience sleep deprivation as part of most military operations throughout their career. Yes, pilots work hard to ensure crew rest for obvious reasons, but everyone experiences sleep deprivation on some scale.

Pentagon Watchdog Questions Navy SEAL Training Program's Use of Sleep Deprivation

military.com · by Konstantin Toropin · October 25, 2024

More than two years after the death of recruit Kyle Mullen during the grueling Hell Week portion of Navy SEAL training, the Defense Department's watchdog says the service has made some changes to improve medical care and safety in the program but that more changes are needed.

The DoD inspector general report released Thursday found that the Navy "lacks a policy on the intentional use of sleep deprivation practices" and should beef up the number of medical professionals it has on staff to help with the demand placed on the medical department during Hell Week.

The Navy determined that Mullen died of acute pneumonia shortly after completing Hell Week on Feb. 4, 2022. An investigation into his death, however, also found evidence that SEAL recruits are not given adequate care and the BUD/s course, the official name for the elite training program, had fostered a culture in which seeking help in emergency situations was all but prohibited.

One new concern that IG investigators found was over the number of doctors that the Navy's Special Warfare Command actually employed.

They recommended that the service "reassess" its medical capabilities and, "at a minimum," determine whether they are able to provide the appropriate standard of care for candidates and that staffing meets "clinical demand."

A senior official from the command's medical department told investigators that they need "additional corpsmen to mitigate the staff's potential for burnout, as well as specialized medical equipment to improve the health and safety of Navy SEAL candidates."

The report also encouraged the Navy to better codify how it uses sleep deprivation as part of the training.

While the report concedes that the practice is "operationally relevant" and there are safety procedures in place to mitigate the risk to candidates, its application is mostly based on tradition and some science that dates back to the 1980s.

Investigators found that, while Navy officials told them "that sleep deprivation has been part of Hell Week training curriculum since its inception," they "were unable to provide specific rationale for the timing, length, or number of sleep periods candidates receive in Hell Week."

Meanwhile, in August, Navy officials told Military.com that since the service's investigations into Mullen's death and the culture at the SEAL schoolhouse, they have made some significant policy changes to prevent another death, including 14 changes to BUD/s that range from prophylactic antibiotics to prevent pneumonia to more robust health screenings for Hell Week.

The investigation found that many of these changes have, indeed, been put into place.

After Mullen's death, investigators also found a stash of performance-enhancing drugs in his car, including testosterone and human growth hormone, and text messages on his phone that included a conversation in which he discussed using a bad vial of drugs that left swelling at an injection site.

However, that same investigation failed to definitively conclude that Mullen used the drugs, noting that neither his blood nor urine was able to be tested.

Included among the changes was the Navy's announcement that it would start to regularly test SEALs for performance-enhancing drugs.

The investigation noted that those tests are now ongoing and between March 2023 and January 2024, "of the 1,817 candidates [the Navy] tested for PEDs, three SEAL and three [combat craft crewmen] candidates had confirmed positive urinalysis tests."

However, they also noted that "the DoD drug testing policy related to PEDs needs review and revision"-- namely because it "does not define PEDs or state whether steroids are considered PEDs."

Following Mullen's death, the Navy also took action against three top officers who were in charge at the time.

In September 2023, the Navy confirmed that Capt. Brian Drechsler, Capt. Bradley Geary and Cmdr. Erik Ramey all received nonpunitive letters of reprimand and leaders were planning to take the three men to admiral's mast -- a nonjudicial form of punishment -- over their roles in the death.

Rolling Stone also reported that a fourth person, to whom the Navy hoped to issue a disciplinary letter, was the medical duty officer the night Mullen died.

Geary was in charge of the Basic Training Command, which ran BUD/s, and Ramey was the command's top medical official. Drechsler oversaw them both as the Naval Special Warfare Center's commanding officer.

However, it's not clear how much impact the Navy's actions had.

In June, Drechsler announced his honorable retirement from the service in a social media post. The medical duty officer has also since retired.

Geary refused the mast and seems to be heading to a Board of Inquiry instead. That is a more formal proceeding than an admiral's mast but not as serious as a court-martial. He's also fighting his case in public and trying to gather support from lawmakers.

In an interview with Military.com, Geary largely defended the BUD/s process, saying that the arduous, if not brutal, training regimen is necessary to produce the kinds of sailors who can survive and win on the battlefield.

"We have refined the idea of what it means to be a warfighter, and we've been very, very successful," Geary said in August.

However, he did concede that the SEALs have made mistakes and "we're not perfect."

military.com · by Konstantin Toropin · October 25, 2024

23.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com