|
Quotes of the Day:
"We are all born ignorant, but one must work hard to remain stupid."
- Benjamin Franklin
"The rain will stop, the night will end, the hurt will fade. Hope is never so lost that it can't be found."
- Ernest Hemingway
"In dangerous times wise men say nothing."
- Aesop
1. N. Korea's cybertheft last year estimated at $1.7 billion: U.N. panel report
2. N. Korean FM slams trilateral statement on arms transfer to Russia
3. Key developments on North Korea this week
4. North Korea orders citizens to make nail boards as escape deterrent
5. North Korean Forced Labor in the U.S. Seafood Supply Chain
6. Bin Salman asks Yoon for Korean companies' participation in Neom City
7. Can the innovation committee succeed?
8. Can Yoon Suk-yeol Break South Korea’s Decades-Old Political Curse?
9. How Do South Koreans View Gender Discrimination?
10. South Korea's reserve forces need to emulate the US
11. [Expert Survey] ① Biden North Korea Policy Rating ‘C’
1. N. Korea's cybertheft last year estimated at $1.7 billion: U.N. panel report
The all purpose sword. Are we effectively fighting north Korea in the Cyber warfare domain?
N. Korea's cybertheft last year estimated at $1.7 billion: U.N. panel report | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · October 28, 2023
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON/NEW YORK, Oct. 27 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's state-sponsored hackers were responsible for cryptocurrency theft worth nearly $1.7 billion last year, the U.N. Panel of Experts on U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against Pyongyang said Friday.
Citing a cybersecurity firm's report, the panel said that North Korean cybertheft last year was about three times the amount in 2021, while noting that the North is prioritizing cryptocurrency hacks to bankroll its nuclear weapons program.
"Actors working for the Reconnaissance General Bureau continued to use increasingly sophisticated cybertechniques to steal funds and information," the report said, referring to North Korea's military intelligence agency.
It added that companies in the cryptocurrency, defense, energy and health sectors were particularly targeted.
The panel pointed to overseas North Korean workers, including some on student visas, as another source of revenue. The UNSC has imposed a ban on North Koreans working overseas on concerns that their income would contribute to the North's weapons programs.
The panel also reported continuous activities at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site although no nuclear test has been detected since September 2017.
Touching on the North's ballistic missile launches, the panel said that those tests contribute towards fulfilling two goals under the North's five-year road map announced in January 2021 -- the acquisition of a "ground-based solid propellant" intercontinental ballistic missile and "tactical nuclear weapons" capabilities.
Noting the North's drive to bolster its war deterrence and "nuclear counterattack" capabilities, the panel said that these developments point to a strategy of deterrence akin to "second strike" capability -- a term referring to a nuclear retaliatory strike capability.
The report, in addition, indicated that the North might have imported refined petroleum products beyond the permitted annual cap of 500,000 barrels.
From Jan. 1 through May 1 this year, 25 North Korean-flagged tankers, including nine designated by the UN Security Council, made 46 deliveries of refined oil products.
To circumvent sanctions, the North was seen using various measures, that included deactivating a vessel's automatic identification system during shipments and conducting such shipments under the cover of darkness usually at before dawn or dusk, according to the panel.
This undated file graphic depicts a North Korean during a hacking attempt. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · October 28, 2023
2. N. Korean FM slams trilateral statement on arms transfer to Russia
We should keep in mind that the South Korean Defense industry is so far superior to the north's and as a partner in the Arsenal of democracy is providing effective military support around the world to increase defense capabilities of like minded democracy and to help bring stability to regions. The north's global illicit activities are designed to bring hard currency to the regime for its nuclear and missile programs (and the comfort of Kim Jong Un) and help malign actors destabilize regions.
N. Korean FM slams trilateral statement on arms transfer to Russia | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Yoon-seung · October 28, 2023
SEOUL, Oct. 28 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's top diplomat on Saturday criticized a trilateral statement released by Seoul, Washington and Tokyo earlier this week condemning the reclusive regime's arms transfer to Russia, calling it a "groundless criticism and defamation."
North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui issued the statement via Pyongyang's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), saying that others have "no right to interfere in the issues belonging to the national sovereignty of states."
Earlier this week, South Korea, the United States and Japan issued a joint statement condemning North Korea's provision of military equipment and munitions to Russia, saying they have confirmed some weapons deliveries.
The three countries "strongly condemn the provision of military equipment and munitions by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the Russian Federation for use against the government and people of Ukraine," said the statement issued under the names of their top diplomats, referring to the North by its official name.
"If they have no malice toward the DPRK and Russia, there will be no reason to strain every nerve and feel uneasy about the development of equal and normal relations between the two countries," Choe added.
Washington earlier revealed that Pyongyang had sent over 1,000 containers of military equipment and munitions to Moscow for use in its war in Ukraine, as the North's leader Kim Jong-un held a rare summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin last month.
North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui delivers a welcome speech during a reception for her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, on Oct. 18, 2023, in this photo provided by the North's Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Yoon-seung · October 28, 2023
3. Key developments on North Korea this week
Key developments on North Korea this week | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · October 27, 2023
SEOUL, Oct. 27 (Yonhap) -- The following are key developments regarding North Korea this week.
------------
Oct. 23 -- N. Korea blames U.S. for instigating Israel-Hamas conflict
24 -- 4 N. Koreans cross eastern sea border in apparent defection bid
EU preparing U.N. draft resolution on N.K. human rights
25 -- N. Korea to close its embassy in Uganda: report
26 -- No imminent sign of N. Korea's spy satellite launch: unification ministry
N. Korea blames Israel over Gaza hospital blast
S. Korea, U.S., Japan jointly condemn N. Korea's arms transfers to Russia
27 -- Defense chief says N. Korea keeps violating 2018 military agreement near maritime buffer zone
S. Korea warned Russia it will not sit idly by if Moscow hands over missile technology to N. Korea: FM
S. Korea, U.S. to stage joint large-scale air drills next week
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · October 27, 2023
4. North Korea orders citizens to make nail boards as escape deterrent
Some things just make you shake your head in wonder.
But you have to admire and respect the Korean people in the north. They will find their way to freedom, some outside the north, and eventually all within the north.
Excerpts:
Additionally, few feel that nail boards are enough to stop people who dream of freedom, the resident said.
“No matter how sharp the nail board is, the people will still find ways to escape,” she said. “So many people cross the river even though there are security guards with guns and border barriers.”
North Korea orders citizens to make nail boards as escape deterrent
Residents complain that the boards will be ineffective at stopping escape.
By Ahn Chang Gyu for RFA Korean
2023.10.27
rfa.org
North Korea is ordering each household in an area near the border with China to pound nails in wooden boards that will be used along the border to prevent people from escaping the country, residents told Radio Free Asia.
Sources said each family in a border-adjacent city of Hyesan in Ryanggang province must make two nail boards by hammering several long nails into boards that will line the Chinese side of a recently installed border fence.
People have been able to climb over the fences and jump down to the other side, residents say. Now they will have to avoid the nail boards on their way down.
“A nail board task was assigned to each neighborhood-watch unit in Hyesan,” a resident of Ryanggang told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons. “It is part of a border blocking project to prevent residents from escaping.”
The nail board assignment marks the latest type of unmanned deterrent along the 1,415-kilometer (880-mile) border with China. Others have included razor wire, electric fences, and even landmines.
The resident said his household was part of a neighborhood watch unit of 24 homes, and the unit was assigned to make 50 of the 2-meter boards.
Most of the border fence in Hyesan is lined with razor wire, so the nail boards will go in the most sparsely populated areas of the border, where escape is much easier, the resident said.
Private complaints
The citizens are complaining that the government is passing its work onto them, another Ryanggang resident told RFA, on condition of anonymity to speak freely.
“Our neighborhood-watch unit debated whether to make the ‘nail boards’ collectively or for each household to make them on their own, and decided to make them collectively, so each household has to pay 20,000 won (US$2.35).” she said.
The residents feel the additional cost is not fair, because they were tapped to pay for fence repairs over the summer.
“They are unhappy because they don’t have enough money to spend on food, kimchi, and firewood to prepare for the winter,” she said.
Additionally, few feel that nail boards are enough to stop people who dream of freedom, the resident said.
“No matter how sharp the nail board is, the people will still find ways to escape,” she said. “So many people cross the river even though there are security guards with guns and border barriers.”
Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong.
rfa.org
5. North Korean Forced Labor in the U.S. Seafood Supply Chain
Human rights impacts all areas of life from economics to security.
North Korean Forced Labor in the U.S. Seafood Supply Chain
hrnkinsider.org · by Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
By Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director
October 27, 2023
Note: On October 24, 2023, HRNK Executive Director Greg Scarlatoiu was invited to testify before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) for a hearing on the subject of forced labor in the U.S. seafood supply chain. The following text reflects his remarks during the hearing, as prepared for delivery. The full text of his written submission to the CECC can be viewed at this link.
Chairman Smith, Chairman Merkley, distinguished Commissioners, I wish to begin by thanking you for inviting me to testify today. The official dispatch of North Korean workers to China’s seafood processing plants is a breach of applicable UN Security Council Sanctions, international human rights instruments, and most importantly of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
Mindful of CAATSA provisions relating to Sanctions for Forced Labor and Slavery Overseas of North Koreans, HRNK has made a preliminary determination as to whether the working conditions these workers face are subject to Section 302(b) of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9241 (b)). We further endeavored to identify Chinese entities that employ North Korean laborers, with the aim of determining if such entities and individuals in charge meet the criteria under Section 111 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7108).
Until their repatriation began on August 23 or August 29, there were thousands of North Korean workers officially dispatched to Chinese seafood processing factories. In many cases, these workers processed seafood imported from North Korea. The importation of seafood processed by North Korean workers in China, seafood exported from North Korea to China, or a combination of both, into the United States would constitute a blatant violation of CAATSA.
Three major seafood processing companies have historically employed North Korean labor and have exported their products to the United States.[1] Witnesses mentioned the presence of at least three seafood processing factories that employ North Korean workers in Donggang (東港), Dandong City.
Have Chinese Factories Processed Seafood Imported from North Korea?
North Korean seafood exported to China from Najin Port is primarily transported overland by vehicles, through Chinese customs.[2] It is then distributed and sold in China's Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Liaoning Province, or flown to inland cities including Beijing. Seafood processed in Hunchun is exported as frozen or dried seafood to the United States, Europe, Japan, and other countries.[3] The main North Korean seafood products transported inland in this manner include various species of squid, croaker, snow crab, hair crab, and blue crab.[4]
North Korean workers process fish caught seasonally, such as cod and pollock as well as clam during clam season. They also process octopus and shellfish, packaged as Chinese export products. There are reported instances of processed seafood marked “Made in China” being shipped out to Vladivostok, where labels are switched to “Made in Russia” and exported to third countries.
North Korean Workers in Chinese Seafood Processing Plants:
International Legal Implications
The employment of North Korean workers in Chinese seafood processing plants and labor standards violations may contravene the ILO’s Forced Labor Convention (No. 29) and the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (No. 105), other ILO conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (also known as the Palermo Protocol).
The North Korean seafood processing workers face:
1. Inhumane Working Conditions: Long working hours, denial of proper rest and breaks, harsh treatment, and minimal safety measures, posing a risk to their physical and mental well-being.
2. Lack of Freedom and Communication: They are often isolated, facing limited contact with the outside world and their families. They are unable to exercise their right to freedom of movement and communication.
3. Absence of Labor Rights: Such rights, including the right to unionize and engage in collective bargaining, are nonexistent.
Living and Working Conditions for North Korean Overseas Workers
North Korean workers covet overseas positions, as the average monthly remittance of $70 (500 Chinese yuan) is dramatically higher than the $3-dollar average monthly industrial wage in North Korea.[5] The average bribe paid to be dispatched overseas is $2,000 - $3,000. The workers must borrow the funds from money lenders and pay it back with interest.[6] The workers are lured with false promises and subsequently entrapped under abysmal working conditions.
Wage violations through compulsory “contributions” extracted by the North Korean authorities, unpaid overtime, precarious safety, and health conditions are widespread.
The workers must moonlight for other companies to pay back their loans, with the approval of three site supervisors (party, security agency, technical manager), who must also be bribed. Including moonlighting, a North Korean seafood processing worker in China may make up to about $210 a month. (1,500 Chinese yuan).
The North Korean workers' monthly wages are paid upon their repatriation, in North Korean currency, at the official exchange rate.
During the COVID-19 quarantine, the workers received no wages, and the interest on loans increased, reportedly leading to about thirty suicides, most of them women.
The Chinese companies pay the North Korean regime mostly based on production volume. The payment is made in Chinese currency.
Men mainly carry frozen fish blocks, and women sit down and peel fish or squid or sort clams and crabs by size. Most of the North Koreans work the whole day in cold storage. Additionally, the pungent smell inside is unbearable.
North Korean workers at the Chinese seafood processing plants usually work about 10 hours a day. If production targets are not met, the workday can extend to over 12 hours.
Recommendations
The witness respectfully recommends the following:
Continue to encourage civil society groups with relevant networks to continue investigating conditions of work at Chinese seafood processing factories and whether products processed by North Koreans may end up on the U.S. market.
Propose that new findings on violations affecting North Koreans at such factories be included in the Annual Report on Trafficking in Persons, required under Section 110(B) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 707(B)).
Seek to determine whether the government of China has made any serious and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons, as they relate to the official dispatching of North Korean workers to Chinese seafood processing plants.
Seek to confirm whether seafood exported from China to the United States contains North Korean seafood products, and whether North Korean workers officially dispatched to China processed seafood exported from China to the United States. If confirmed, such products would have to be denied entry at any of the U.S. ports, pursuant to a prohibition under Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307).The witness wishes to thank HRNK team members Ingyu Choe, Mohona Ganguly, Doohyun (Jake) Kim, and Damian Reddy, as well as Jung Gwang-il, Ko Young-hwan, Lee Hyun-seung and Ri Jong-ho for their invaluable contributions to research, translation, direct testimony, and securing testimony by key witnesses in China and North Korea.
[1] Tim Sullivan, Martha Mendoza, and Hyung-Jin Kim, “NKorean Workers Prep Seafood Going to US Stores, Restaurants,” AP News, August 21,
2021. https://apnews.com/article/sports-middle-east-canada-europe-global-trade-8b493b7df6e147e98d19f3abb5ca090a.
[2] Baek Seong-ho, “North Korea’s Seafood Production and Exports” [in Korean], KITA Inter-Korean Trade Report vol. 7 (2020). https://www.kita.net/cmmrcInfo/internationalTradeStudies/researchReport/northKoreaTradeReportDetail.do?pageIndex=1&no=13&classification=19&searchReqType=detail&pcRadio=19&searchClassification=19&searchStartDate=&searchEndDate=&searchCondition=CONTENT&searchKeyword=&continent_nm=&continent_cd=&country_nm=&country_cd=§or_nm=§or_cd=&itemCd_nm=&itemCd_cd=&searchOpenYn=.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Interview with North Korean escapee, October 8, 2023.
[6] Interview with North Korean escapee, October 9, 2023.
Categories: China, Forced Labor, Human Rights, North Korea, Seafood, United States
hrnkinsider.org · by Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
6. Bin Salman asks Yoon for Korean companies' participation in Neom City
Bin Salman asks Yoon for Korean companies' participation in Neom City
donga.com
Posted October. 28, 2023 08:46,
Updated October. 28, 2023 08:46
Bin Salman asks Yoon for Korean companies' participation in Neom City. October. 28, 2023 08:46. by Kwan-Seok Jang jks@donga.com.
During his state visit on Friday, President Yoon Suk Yeol held several meetings with Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, where the Prince expressed a keen interest in the involvement of Korean companies in Saudi Arabia's ambitious 'Neom City' project and other expansive 'giga projects,' as confirmed by government sources. Considering the colossal scale of the 'Neom City' initiative, a groundbreaking $500 billion smart city venture, the Crown Prince's intent appears to capitalize on the advanced technological prowess of Korean industries. In a dialogue with President Yoon, the Crown Prince said, "Our cooperation with Korea, especially in the defense sector, is crucial. We are looking for robust collaboration." An insider noted that during a meeting on Monday with the Saudi Defense Minister and the Minister of National Defense, the rapport was exceptionally warm.
This collaborative overture aligns with the Prince's vision of fortifying Saudi Arabia's manufacturing prowess with the Korean partnership. As a forward-thinking monarch, Crown Prince Mohammad unveiled 'Vision 2030', marking a strategic pivot away from oil dependency and towards an advanced industrial framework. Cho Tae-yeong, chief of South Korea’s National Security Office, opined, "Crown Prince Mohammad, a visionary born in 1985, seems determined to lay a solid manufacturing foundation over the next several decades of his leadership." A notable gesture was observed on Tuesday when the Prince, in an unplanned visit, dropped by the State Guest House to engage with President Yoon. The cordial encounter culminated in the Prince personally driving Yoon to the Future Investment Initiative (FII) forum in a Mercedes.
Reflecting on these developments, a spokesperson from the presidential office remarked, "Saudi Arabia is captivated by Korea's rapid industrial evolution." The official further acknowledged the positive influence of Korea's vibrant culture, exemplified by global phenomena including K-pop, on strengthening bilateral ties. This sentiment is reinforced by the recent visit of the Saudi Minister of Culture to Korea, where prominent entertainment hubs, including CJ ENM, were on the agenda.
한국어
donga.com
7. Can the innovation committee succeed?
Thursday
October 26, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Published: 26 Oct. 2023, 20:17
Can the innovation committee succeed?
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2023-10-26/opinion/editorials/Can-the-innovation-committee-succeed/1899648
The People Power Party (PPP) has finished making its 13-member innovation committee, led by Ihn Yo-han. Seven are women and eight are in their 20s to 40s, making up the majority. The committee chair, a former professor at Yonsei University College of Medicine, said, “Our committee is mostly comprised of young members. I will prescribe a bitter medicine to make the people think it’s refreshing.” But if you take a deeper look into its constituents, it is quite disappointing. People inside and outside the party criticize its “revolving-door appointments.” Could such a committee innovate the lethargic party?
The members include Rep. Park Sung-joon and two former lawmakers, Kim Kyung-jin and Oh Shin-hwan. Park served as a senior member of the transition committee of President Yoon Suk Yeol last year, while Kim and Oh are pro-Yoon and pro-Oh Se-hoon (Seoul mayor) politicians. Female members include Chung Seon-hwa, the head of a Jeonju constituency; Lee So-hee, a member of the Sejong city council; Lee Gemma, a professor at the department of international studies at Kyung Hee University; Lim Jang-mee, CEO of Mypetplus; Choi Anna, a professor of public administration at Sejong University; and Song Hee, a former MBC anchor.
But the chairman could not draw any of the lawmakers close to either former PPP head Lee Jun-seok or former lawmaker Yoo Seong-min, both notorious for bluntly opposing the president. Three other energetic politicians also refused to join the committee. Could it match the committee chair’s emphasis on integration? Instead, the committee included some who had stirred controversy. A PPP insider sarcastically said, “Once you start to wonder why the person became a member, the recruitment is a failure.”
The committee must first address the disappointment the voters showed in the recent by-election in Seoul. If it fails to recover public confidence and cannot secure a majority in the legislature in the next parliamentary election, the government cannot do anything. The innovation committee must change the vertical relationship between the president and the party into a horizontal one. Otherwise, the PPP cannot help the president change his high-handed approach to politics.
To achieve the goal, the committee must have a clear role and power. The chairman vowed to speak up to the president, but what matters is whether his innovation can be put into action. If he fails to persuade lawmakers to give up their vested interest, including a promise to not run in the next election, the party will be headed to another failure.
8. Can Yoon Suk-yeol Break South Korea’s Decades-Old Political Curse?
I have been told by a Korean friend that if (when) the Democratic party decisively defeats the PPP next April, it will seek the impeachment of President Yoon.
Excerpts:
Yoon’s beleaguered PPP is facing a critical general election next April. If the party fails to secure enough seats, and the opposition Democratic Party keeps its majority, that could utterly fracture an already polarized conservative base. And if push comes to shove, Yoon and his circle may all the more seek to crack down on the conservative’s archnemesis: Moon Jae-in.
But the tit-for-tat style of demonizing and prosecuting one’s political opponents has largely run its course in South Korea. Pursuing Moon – whose presidency received a 45 percent approval rate, higher than Yoon’s current numbers – could backfire by ginning up sympathy for the opposition.
Whether Yoon can finally break the age-old curse comes down to his political will and courage. First, Yoon will have to convince his constituents. Then he needs to refocus on communicating with and improving the livelihood of the people, as he promised in a recent closed-door meeting. This is a tall order, and it’s not yet clear whether Yoon, who made a career as a prosecutorial technocrat, is up to the task. Nevertheless, this may be the only recourse for him to dodge an early lame-duck status and reinstate himself as a true unifying leader, which he aspired to since his inauguration.
Can Yoon Suk-yeol Break South Korea’s Decades-Old Political Curse?
Will the prosecutor-turned-president resist the temptation to target his predecessor with legal investigations in a bid to shore up his political base?
By Jason Morgan and Kenji Yoshida
October 26, 2023
thediplomat.com · by Jason Morgan · October 26, 2023
Advertisement
There is an old, unwritten law in South Korea’s political circles: Whenever a president approaches the end of their term or returns to civilian life, they almost always face an ignominious end. Some have even labeled this seemingly inevitable downfall a curse.
Curse or not, the phenomenon is readily observable in South Korean history.
Syngman Rhee, the nation’s first president, was forced to step down in 1960 after student protesters revolted against his authoritarian rule. Escaping judicial scrutiny, Rhee fled into exile in Hawai’i where he later passed away.
Park Chung-hee, who ascended to power via a military coup in 1961, was brutally assassinated by his confidante Kim Jae-kyu in 1979. By then, Park had maintained his iron grip on power for 18 years.
Diplomat Brief
Weekly Newsletter
Get briefed on the story of the week, and developing stories to watch across the Asia-Pacific.
Get the Newsletter
The vacuum Park’s assassination left was filled by two army veterans, Chun Doo-hwan (in elected office from 1980-1987) and later Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993). After leaving office, the two were indicted for, among other things, masterminding a coup and treason. Chun was sentenced to life in prison and Noh to 17 years imprisonment. They were released only after being pardoned by the same president, Kim Young-sam, who investigated them and directed their arrests.
Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access.
This trend continued into the 2000s. Roh Moo-hyun (in office 2003-2008), a civil rights attorney who rose to prominence through a grass-roots political movement, died by suicide in 2009 while being investigated on bribery charges post-presidency.
Lee Myung-bak (in office 2008-2013), who succeeded Roh, was arrested after leaving the Blue House for commissioning crimes of embezzlement and tax evasion.
In 2017, Park Chung-hee’s eldest daughter, Park Geun-hye, became the first sitting leader to be impeached in South Korea. Park (in office 2013-2017) was later sentenced to 24 years in prison (afterward bumped up to 25 years) for bribery and abuse of power.
Advertisement
Both Lee and Park spent nearly five years behind bars before being pardoned.
The “curse,” however, appears to be nearing its expiration as former President Moon Jae-in (in office 2017-2022) has avoided the misfortunes of his predecessors – at least for now. Moon completed his five-year term last May and has since returned to his home base of Yangsan, South Gyeongsang province. He now runs a small independent bookstore and stays largely out of the public eye.
With Moon’s uneventful departure from high office, has the “curse” that has plagued South Korean leaders for so long been lifted? Unfortunately, it’s too early to tell.
While the current Yoon Suk-yeol administration has shown little interest in investigating Moon, it is fully committed to arresting Lee Jae-myung, Moon’s closest confidant and political heir. While an arrest warrant for for Lee tied to corruption and abuse of power charges was recently denied by a South Korean court, the Yoon administration remains adamant about pursuing the high-handed investigation. And there is a clear reason for this.
Yoon first climbed to prominence by spearheading the investigations against Lee Myung-bak and Moon’s predecessor, Park Geun-hye. Yoon, who became a prosecutor general under the auspices of the liberal Moon regime, ran for and won the presidency from the then-opposition conservative People Power Party (PPP). He did so by confronting Moon’s bid to weaken the prosecutorial authorities mid-way through his term. The tension reached a boiling point when Yoon successfully prosecuted Cho Kuk, a close ally of Moon’s and former minister of justice under the Moon administration.
For Moon, Yoon might have been a traitor, but by turning against Moon while heading the prosecutors’ office, Yoon became an overnight celebrity among the conservative crowd. The prospect that Yoon would similarly indict Moon and his allies if elected president was part of the reason right-wingers rooted for a political outsider with no former ties to the conservative party. In that sense, Yoon owes a great debt to his constituents, which he has yet to repay.
Put differently, it also means that Yoon’s political base is as fragile as his allegiance to the party. And this fragility is beginning to manifest itself in real life. Yoon’s approval rating has plunged since he took office in May 2022 and now hovers around the mid-30 percent range at best. Adding to the woes, the PPP, headed by Yoon, recently suffered a major defeat in a crucial by-election in the Gangseo District of South Korea’s capital city, Seoul.
Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access.
With two and a half years still left in his term, there are already reports suggesting Yoon may experience an early-onset lame-duck presidency. The recent rumors that Yoon may be forming a new political party are, therefore, not entirely unfounded.
Historically, South Korean leaders have utilized anti-Japan nationalist sentiments to resuscitate their approval ratings and divert voters’ attention from domestic failures. Moon Jae-in deployed this strategy while in office, for example, nosediving Japan-South Korea ties to their lowest point in decades. But for Yoon, who is deeply committed to reinvigorating bilateral ties vis-à-vis Tokyo, this is not a viable option.
Likewise, Yoon’s attempts to mobilize his conservative base through the recent ideological war, primarily by ginning up opposition to communism, have largely been fruitless. What little boost it brought him seems to be wearing off.
Advertisement
Yoon’s beleaguered PPP is facing a critical general election next April. If the party fails to secure enough seats, and the opposition Democratic Party keeps its majority, that could utterly fracture an already polarized conservative base. And if push comes to shove, Yoon and his circle may all the more seek to crack down on the conservative’s archnemesis: Moon Jae-in.
But the tit-for-tat style of demonizing and prosecuting one’s political opponents has largely run its course in South Korea. Pursuing Moon – whose presidency received a 45 percent approval rate, higher than Yoon’s current numbers – could backfire by ginning up sympathy for the opposition.
Whether Yoon can finally break the age-old curse comes down to his political will and courage. First, Yoon will have to convince his constituents. Then he needs to refocus on communicating with and improving the livelihood of the people, as he promised in a recent closed-door meeting. This is a tall order, and it’s not yet clear whether Yoon, who made a career as a prosecutorial technocrat, is up to the task. Nevertheless, this may be the only recourse for him to dodge an early lame-duck status and reinstate himself as a true unifying leader, which he aspired to since his inauguration.
GUEST AUTHOR
Jason Morgan
Jason Morgan is an associate professor at Reitaku University.
GUEST AUTHOR
Kenji Yoshida
Kenji Yoshida is an associate correspondent with JAPAN Forward.
TAGS
thediplomat.com · by Jason Morgan · October 26, 2023
9. How Do South Koreans View Gender Discrimination?
Excerpts:
Whether gender discrimination has changed substantively under the Yoon administration is unlikely to be evident in the short term. Moreover, with declining approval ratings and conflicts within his own party, addressing discrimination perceptions may not be the priority that the election campaigning suggested.
However, perceptions of discrimination may create additional challenges. For example, according to the World Economic Forum, South Korea saw one of the largest regressions in the region in terms of gender parity in political engagement from 2022-2023 in East Asia.
How Do South Koreans View Gender Discrimination?
The topic was a focal point of the 2022 presidential campaign. What do South Koreans think of the issue now, especially under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration?
By Timothy S. Rich, Serena White, and Josie Coyle
October 27, 2023
thediplomat.com · by Timothy S. Rich · October 27, 2023
Advertisement
South Korea’s “Me Too” movement sparked discussion on gender equality issues and discrimination, laying the groundwork for a new wave of feminism to take root, and even challenging those previously considered untouchable, like former presidential candidate Ahn Hee-Jung. By 2017, then-presidential candidate Moon Jae-in campaigned with promises of gender equality efforts within the government, and in 2019 the Moon administration enacted legislation attempted to address workplace harassment.
Still, the country maintains one of the largest gender pay gaps in developed economies. According to OECD data in 2022, men made 31.2 percent more than women, the highest wage gap among OECD members. The second-highest wage gap is in Israel, at 25.4 percent.
Despite hopes for a broader feminist movement and attention to claims of discrimination against women, such efforts sparked pushback among young Korean men. This gave rise to the phenomenon of 이대남 or “idaenam,” which literally translates to “men in their 20s” but figuratively also conveys a sense of anger and discontent.
Leading into the 2022 presidential election, anti-feminist backlash took center stage, potentially aiding in the victory of the People Power Party’s candidate, Yoon Suk-yeol. Yoon directly appealed toward the so-called idaenam, playing into anti-feminist ideology. On the campaign trail, Yoon denied that gender inequality existed and suggested abolishing the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, claiming that its continuation would only treat men as “potential sex criminals.” He even implied that South Korea’s dwindling birth rate is a result of feminism.
Some defended Yoon’s comments, suggesting he was simply uninformed or a “late learner.” However, Yoon’s position was neither an uncommon nor an unpopular one. In 2021, the chairman of the PPP, Lee Jun-seok, lambasted Moon’s equality measures, also stating that the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family should be abolished. Even presidential candidate of Moon’s Democratic Party, Lee Jae-myung, also attempted to appeal to anti-feminist sentiment.
Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access.
Largely missing in these discussions of gender discrimination is whether the public views discrimination as commonplace and to what extent South Koreans have personally experienced gender discrimination. Survey work over the past four years similarly suggests a growing view, especially among younger men, who believe that they are the targets of discrimination and that equality efforts exacerbate this.
While assessing South Korea’s status on gender equality remains complicated, we focus on one aspect: perceptions of discrimination and perceived changes since Yoon’s inauguration. We surveyed 1,300 South Korean citizens in a national web survey from September 27 to October 11, implemented by Macromill Embrain, with quota sampling based on gender, age, and region. In this, we asked several general questions related to gender discrimination and discrimination seen under Yoon’s presidency.
First, we asked respondents, “Do you believe that gender discrimination is commonplace in South Korea?” Overall, we find the public nearly evenly split, with 51 percent believing it is commonplace, with women far more likely to answer in the affirmative (60 percent vs. 42 percent). These numbers suggest a marked decrease in rates by about 20 percent among both men and women compared to a year ago; however, this may be a function of increased attention to gender issues during the campaign cycle.
Advertisement
In addition, we see little difference among age cohorts 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50-59, with majorities between 50.6 percent and 55.9 percent stating gender discrimination is commonplace. Only the 60+ cohort was more likely to say that it is not (55.9 percent).
However, when broken down by cohort and gender, a few noticeable distinctions emerge. First, among men, belief that gender discrimination is common peaks among those 18-29 (45.9 percent), dropping to 37.7 percent among those 60+. In contrast, among women, over two-thirds of all cohorts under 50 stated discrimination was commonplace, with the lowest rates overall among the 60+ group at 49.5 percent.
Next, we asked, “Have you been the victim of gender discrimination?” A minority answered yes (42.6 percent), but with much higher rates among women (61.6 percent vs. 23.8 percent). Broken down by age, we see claims from men are highest in the 18-29 cohort (36.1 percent), with similar rates among those 40-49 (33.1 percent). Among women, all cohorts under 60 had roughly two-thirds of respondents or more claim they had been a victim, the highest rates among those aged 30-39 (76.6 percent). In addition, having been a victim strongly corresponds with believing discrimination is commonplace, even after controlling for gender, age, income, education, and political ideology.
Taken together, these findings suggest that younger South Korean men are more likely to believe gender discrimination exists – but that is likely because more men in this age group believe that they themselves have experienced discrimination, not because they believe women face structural barriers to equality.
Finally, we asked, “Do you think gender discrimination has increased, decreased, or stayed about the same since the election of President Yoon?” Here, we see clear majorities believe it has stayed about the same (63.9 percent), with women only slightly more likely to give this answer compared to men (65.4 percent vs. 62.4 percent).
However, a clear divergence emerges when separated by views on discrimination as commonplace. Among those who disagreed that gender discrimination is common in South Korea, 71.1 percent saw no change under Yoon, and 17.4 percent indicated an increase. However, those who said yes to the first question were nearly twice as likely to say discrimination increased (34.4 percent), although a majority still saw no change (57 percent). Broken down by gender, this pattern endures; those who believe gender discrimination is commonplace were about twice as likely to say discrimination increased under Yoon.
Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access.
One interpretation for these patterns may be that those who already believed discrimination to be commonplace were more likely to be primed to see discrimination. Among women in this group, the rhetoric of the election cycle may have also led to assumptions that opposition to gender equality efforts would exacerbate discrimination. This speaks more broadly to the challenge of measuring views on discrimination beyond one’s personal experiences.
The role of discrimination in election rhetoric may have also heightened perceptions in 2022. Looking back at survey data from 2022 shortly after Yoon’s victory, 83.8 percent of women believed that gender discrimination was commonplace in South Korea and among men in 2022, 36 percent responded in the affirmative. This further suggests that rhetoric surrounding election cycles may have an impact on these results.
Whether gender discrimination has changed substantively under the Yoon administration is unlikely to be evident in the short term. Moreover, with declining approval ratings and conflicts within his own party, addressing discrimination perceptions may not be the priority that the election campaigning suggested.
However, perceptions of discrimination may create additional challenges. For example, according to the World Economic Forum, South Korea saw one of the largest regressions in the region in terms of gender parity in political engagement from 2022-2023 in East Asia.
Funding for this survey was provided by the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS) as well as the Mahurin Honors College at Western Kentucky University.
GUEST AUTHOR
Timothy S. Rich
Timothy S. Rich is a professor of Political Science and director of the International Public Opinion Lab at Western Kentucky University. His research focuses on public opinion and electoral politics, emphasizing Taiwan and South Korea.
GUEST AUTHOR
Serena White
Serena White is an honors undergraduate researcher at Western Kentucky University, majoring in Chinese and International Affairs.
GUEST AUTHOR
Josie Coyle
Josie Coyle is a recent alumna from Western Kentucky University, majoring in International Affairs and Chinese.
thediplomat.com · by Timothy S. Rich · October 27, 2023
10. South Korea's reserve forces need to emulate the US
Yes, (but with South Korean characteristics). I have been advocating this for years.
I hope to meet the author. I will be lecturing at Columbia the evening of Nov 6th and hopefully will be able to discuss this with him.
Excerpts:
Some might propose a mass-manufacturing of drones and robots, but once (and if) both sides’ drones face attrition, traditional infantry urban warfare would most definitely ensue. The presence of numerous cities with millions of citizens and critical infrastructure and buildings acts as a multi-layered defense north and around Seoul.
Furthermore, North Korea’s significant special warfare forces, expected to be deployed to the rear areas south of Seoul and Camp Humphreys, necessitate a bolstered reserve force to counter them. This underscores the justification for maintaining a robust reserve force to secure the rear areas.
The state of affairs in East Asia is tempestuous. The ROK armed forces have been serving as the aegis of Korean citizens. However, ROK military brass may soon have to deploy its force overseas to defend other democracies.
In such scenarios, the dwindling active force cannot be deemed sufficient. To face these evolving challenges, strengthening and utilizing the reserve is imperative.
South Korea's reserve forces need to emulate the US
South Korea’s low birthrate is undercutting its combat-readiness vis-a-vis North Korea’s 1.2 million active personnel
By JAMES JB PARK
OCTOBER 28, 2023
asiatimes.com · by James JB Park · October 28, 2023
Under the existing Republic of Korea-United States defense arrangement, in the event of war in the Korean theater of operations, combined component commands – air, naval, ground and marine corps – under the Korea-US Combined Forces Command play vital roles in maintaining the rock-solid combined defense posture that defends the lives of innocent citizens in Korea.
One exceptional element within such commands is the Combined Ground Component Command, led solely by the four-star ROK ground operations commander – unlike other component commands that are mostly commanded by US generals.
The CGCC, comprised of about 350,000 ROK soldiers and a couple of war-time augmented US divisions, is a striking exception to the Pershing Principle, which states that no US troops are commanded by any foreign military power and therefore it epitomizes the US commitment to defending democracy in Korea.
However, the CGCC is at a critical juncture – not due to external aggression but because of Korea’s extremely low birthrate of 0.7 per woman. In 2023, personnel who previously would have been exempted from military service – such as cancer patients and others with incurable diseases – are exponentially being assigned to active service or at least supplementary service.
At the current rate, the number of conscripts available in any given year in the 2030s is projected to be around 180,000. This falls short of what is needed to maintain a combat-ready posture, especially when considering the “3-1 rule (ratio) of land combat” against the 1.2 million North Korean active personnel.
South Korean and US Marines in a joint training exercise. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Kim Jae-Hwan
Hence, Korea must beef up its reserve force, estimated at 2.7 million, to strive to maintain the readiness posture. This is in stark contrast to a decade ago when the number of new conscripts exceeded the established annual threshold of 300,000.
Back then, the military also adhered to an unspoken rule that reserve training should not be challenging. However, times have changed.
Thank you for registering!
An account was already registered with this email. Please check your inbox for an authentication link.
As part of the recent Ministry of National Defense’s (MND) re-enlistment pilot program, personnel including discharged reserve soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers are increasingly answering the call.
While the current registered number brought in under the pilot program (only a few hundred) is not substantial, what is truly problematic is that those few reserve forces cannot completely assume active duties. They can only conduct reserve tasks, which hinders the integration of the active and reserve forces.
Moreover, due to the MND pushing for more demanding reserve training, the on-site commanders increasingly rely on symbolic incentives such as dismissing the top-performing squads early or presenting awards.
This has generated resentment among young servicemen who feel they have legally fulfilled their obligations during their active service, but are, all of a sudden, forced to do more without any tangible benefits.
Meanwhile, those who are not eager to be dismissed early have no motivation to train hard.
The rigid separation between the active and reserve components (and between peacetime and war) inhibits the overall enhancement of the ROK armed forces’ capabilities and defense readiness posture.
As in the case of the US reserve force system, facilitating re-enlistment into active positions and establishing a standing reserve force even during peacetime for integrated training of active and reserve servicemen is crucial. This approach enhances interoperability between the active and the reserve and independent mission capabilities of the reserve force in the absence of an active force – as seen in Ukraine’s war against Russia, driven by reserve forces.
The Yoon Suk Yeol administration has been gung-ho about ROK’s prospects as a “global pivotal state.” Regarding many areas of governance and statecraft, Yoon’s determination seems well-received, both domestically and internationally.
A consequence, though, is that the ROK armed forces must take on more significant roles in the region as per the raised expectations of the West. However, achieving this goal is unattainable without the ROK Army, which is not only the largest standing army in East Asia’s democratic countries but also the first responder against authoritarianism in the region, adeptly utilizing both its active and reserve forces as the situation demands.
A new reserve system must then prioritize material incentives over symbolic ones, as many younger servicemen are no longer solely motivated by patriotism and camaraderie. The aforesaid approach of assigning extra duties to young soldiers without offering tangible rewards would backfire. Implementing a legislative framework for an institutionalized reserve system, supported by monetary compensations and other benefits, is essential.
Ensuing financial challenges are a concern. However, while such apprehensions related to maintaining a standing reserve force during peacetime are valid, neglecting to enhance the capabilities of the reserve component would incur greater costs at the onset of war.
The sheer number, 2.7 million, may appear substantial, but the overwhelming majority of these 2.7 million ROK reserve servicemen primarily serve as riflemen and have limited access to the latest weaponry and advanced systems – communication, fires, administrative and so on – that the active component operates. This significant disparity in capabilities and expertise could lead to catastrophic consequences when the active force is absent.
South Korean army commandos smash a pile of stone plates in a show of force at the National War Museum in Seoul. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Park Ji-hwan
Sign up for one of our free newsletters
Some might propose a mass-manufacturing of drones and robots, but once (and if) both sides’ drones face attrition, traditional infantry urban warfare would most definitely ensue. The presence of numerous cities with millions of citizens and critical infrastructure and buildings acts as a multi-layered defense north and around Seoul.
Furthermore, North Korea’s significant special warfare forces, expected to be deployed to the rear areas south of Seoul and Camp Humphreys, necessitate a bolstered reserve force to counter them. This underscores the justification for maintaining a robust reserve force to secure the rear areas.
The state of affairs in East Asia is tempestuous. The ROK armed forces have been serving as the aegis of Korean citizens. However, ROK military brass may soon have to deploy its force overseas to defend other democracies.
In such scenarios, the dwindling active force cannot be deemed sufficient. To face these evolving challenges, strengthening and utilizing the reserve is imperative.
James JB Park (jp4340@columbia.edu / jamesfulbrightjb@gmail.com) is a former staffer of the South Korean Blue House and former member of the National Security Council staff, as well as a reserve captain in the ROK Army. He is currently on deferment for his MA at Columbia.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the ROK government, the presidential Blue House or the ROK military.
This article was originally published by Pacific Forum. It is republished here with permission.
asiatimes.com · by James JB Park · October 28, 2023
11. [Expert Survey] ① Biden North Korea Policy Rating ‘C’
The following is a four part report from Radio Free Asia on the US Korea policy. It is provided in English through Google Translate.
Here are the respondents to the RFA survey questions. Since much of my response was not included I have included the entire nearly 2000 word response I provided to RFA at the end of the parts.
The four parts:
[Expert Survey] ① Biden North Korea Policy Rating ‘C’
[Expert Survey] ② “If Trump is elected, I will contact Kim Jong-un”
[Expert Survey] ③ Negotiations with North Korea during Biden’s term are virtually ‘over’
[Expert Survey] ④ ‘Disappointed’ by North Korea’s ambiguous human rights policy
Here are the respondents to the RFA survey questions. Since much of my response was not included I have included the entire nearly 2000 word response I provided to RFA at the end of the parts.
Joseph DeTrani, former U.S. Deputy Ambassador to the Six-Party Talks
Robert King, former U.S. State Department special envoy for North Korean human rights
Anthony Ruggiero, former director of North Korea affairs at the White House National Security Council
Andrew Yeo Korea Chair at the Brookings Institution
Francesca Giovannini, former Director of Policy and Strategy at the United Nations' Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
Hanbeom Cho , Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification
Park Won-gon , Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University, Korea
Harry Kazianis, Senior National Security Director, Center for the National Interest
Bruce Bennett, Senior Researcher, RAND Research Institute, USA
David Maxwell, Vice President, Asia-Pacific Strategic Center
[Expert Survey] ① Biden North Korea Policy Rating ‘C’
https://www.rfa.org/korean/news_indepth/bidennkpolicy-10102023110025.html
Washington - In-Depth Reporting Team nohj@rfa.org
2023.10.10
U.S. President Joe Biden (left) and North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong-un (right)
/ Graphics – Kim Tae-i
00:00 / 11:04
Anchor : Although the U.S. Joe Biden administration is continuing its North Korea policy of a ' carefully coordinated and pragmatic approach ' , there has been no substantive contact or dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea for nearly three years .
Rather, North Korea is advancing its nuclear missile program through the largest number of missile provocations in history, and is moving further away from the path of denuclearization by legislating its nuclear force policy and specifying ' advancement of nuclear force ' in its constitution .
Radio Free Asia (RFA) looked at mid-term evaluations and prospects for the Biden administration's North Korea policy in a survey of prominent Korean Peninsula experts in the United States and South Korea . The majority of experts who responded to the survey expressed disappointment with the United States' North Korea policy, rating it a 'C', or 70 points .
[ Expert Survey ] First up is reporter Noh Jeong-min .
7 out of 10 responding experts said “ US North Korea policy is ‘C’ or lower ”
“ North Korea ranks 5th or 6th behind in U.S. foreign policy . This alone is enough to get an ‘F’ .”
“ We were unable to even attempt dialogue between the United States and North Korea , and ultimately failed to bring North Korea to the negotiating table .”
“ There are many unresolved problems, such as North Korea’s active production of nuclear weapons .”
“ The Biden administration did not show activeness in its policy toward North Korea .”
From October 2 to 6 , Radio Free Asia (RFA) interviewed former U.S. and South Korean officials and experts on the Korean Peninsula to provide an interim assessment of the U.S. Joe Biden administration's policy toward North Korea and the possibility of a breakthrough in the deadlocked U.S.-North Korea relationship . We conducted a survey on the new Cold War structure in Northeast Asia and the impact that next year's U.S. presidential election will have on North Korea policy .
Joseph DeTrani, former U.S. Deputy Representative for the Six-Party Talks , Anthony Ruggiero, former Director of North Korean Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC) at the White House , Robert King, former U.S. Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights at the U.S. State Department , Andrew Yeo, Korea Distinguished Chair at the Brookings Institution , Park Won-gon, Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University in Korea , The majority of the 10 Korean Peninsula experts who responded to the survey, including Cho Han-beom , senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, and Bruce Bennett, senior researcher at the Rand Institute in the United States, gave the Biden administration's North Korea policy an average of 'C' .
They generally explained the reason for their low scores by saying that the Biden administration paid little attention to North Korea and did not pursue an active policy toward North Korea .
In particular, former Director Ruggiero said that the United States' strengthened military and security cooperation with Korea and Japan was the only factor that helped it avoid a failing grade (F), and gave it a 'D' ( out of 60 ) , while Harry Kazianis, senior director of national security at the Center for the American National Interest, said that Biden I threw an ‘F’, saying that the administration did not pay any attention to North Korea .
[ Harry Kazianis ] President Joe Biden has never given a speech about North Korea policy . This shows where North Korea ranks in America's foreign policy rankings , and I think it deserves an 'F' in itself . Judging from how far North Korea's nuclear and missile program has progressed over the past two years, North Korea is becoming a global military power , and this would not have happened if the Biden administration had paid any attention .
North Korea launches ‘Chollima Type 1’, a satellite-carrying rocket, on May 31 / Yonhap News
The evaluations of Andrew Yeo, Korea Chair, Senior Research Fellow Bruce Bennett, Research Fellow Han-Beom Cho, and Professor Won-Gon Park also failed to exceed 'C' .
The biggest reason was the lack of effort to initiate dialogue with North Korea and the failure to create a new approach to North Korea .
[ Andrew Yeo ] If I were to evaluate this year alone, the third year of the Biden administration , I would give it a 'C' . Because there wasn't much progress . The United States also failed to come up with a new approach . When we first reviewed our North Korea policy early this year, we could have given it a 'B' as there were much more efforts to dialogue and contact North Korea , but as North Korea stopped responding, there was no room for significant development, so we dropped it to a 'C'. You can do it .
[ Jo Han-beom ] I think it’s about ‘C~D’ . More than half of the time has already passed since the inauguration of the Biden administration , and only talk of unconditional dialogue has occurred , and no meaningful working-level contact has been achieved with North Korea . We should have attempted dialogue between the United States and North Korea based on the lessons learned from the Trump administration , but we have not even attempted it now . Ultimately , this is because we failed to bring North Korea to the negotiating table .
[ Wongon Park ] I rate it ‘C-’ . First , it doesn't seem proactive . North Korea continues to advance its nuclear weapons , but the United States always repeats the same phrase, ' unconditional dialogue . ' Another one is Seong Kim, Special Representative for North Korea Policy, who holds two positions . I believe this proves that North Korea policy is not a high priority in overall diplomacy .
On the other hand, there are experts who highly evaluated the Biden administration's North Korea policy .
Former Deputy Ambassador Joseph DeTrani gave it an 'A', saying that strengthening alliances with South Korea and Japan and strengthening nuclear deterrence through the ' Washington Declaration ' and ' Camp David Spirit ' were very important , while former Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Robert King gave it an 'A'. He also responded that he would like to give the Biden administration's policy toward North Korea an 'A' or 'B' , saying, " The United States tried to engage in dialogue with North Korea , but North Korea did not respond . "
In addition , Dr. Francesca Giovannini, who served as Director of Policy and Strategy at the UN's Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), said, “ The Biden administration has adopted a pragmatic approach without excessive goals regarding nuclear non-proliferation and normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations . ” “ The fact that the U.S.-North Korea relationship has been managed stably and cooperation with South Korea and Japan has been strengthened can be viewed positively, ” he said, giving it a ‘B-’ .
Lastly, David Maxwell, Vice President of the U.S. Center for Asia-Pacific Strategy, said that he would like to give an 'A' for ' deterrence of war ' and ' strengthening alliances ' , and an 'F' for efforts to ' denuclearize ' and ' improve human rights in North Korea ' .
Another characteristic of the survey results was that the majority of experts who responded to the survey gave high scores to the Biden administration's strengthening of security cooperation with Korea and Japan .
Graphics – Kim Tae-i
The biggest cause of the deadlock in U.S.-North Korea relations is ‘ North Korea ’
While there has not been a single contact or dialogue between the United States and North Korea since the inauguration of the Joe Biden administration, Radio Free Asia asked , “ Who do you think is the biggest cause of the deadlocked U.S.-North Korea relationship ? ”
Seven out of 10 experts who responded to the survey answered, “ The fault clearly lies with North Korea . ”
The United States has continued to offer dialogue to North Korea, but North Korea, which does not give up on ' complete denuclearization , ' is not responding .
[ Robert King ] The Biden administration seeks to engage in dialogue with North Korea on security issues and also engage in dialogue on human rights issues . But North Korea is not interested and does not want to talk . In particular, due to the coronavirus pandemic, North Korea has isolated itself from the world , making it impossible to cooperate or work with North Korea .
[ Park Won-gon ] ( The cause is ) 100% North Korea . The primary responsibility for this standoff lies with North Korea . They are declaring that they will participate in meaningful dialogue only if they first take unilateral measures that the international community, including Korea and the United States, cannot accept, and this has not changed . One of the unilateral measures is the lifting of sanctions and the permanent suspension of ROK-US joint exercises . South Korea and the United States are imposing measures that cannot be accepted, and in the meantime, they are planning to upgrade their nuclear weapons as much as possible .
[ Andrew Yeo ] North Korea could at least take a look at what the Biden administration could offer . However, North Korea's complete refusal to engage in any form of dialogue with the United States makes us think that the problem lies primarily with North Korea .
On July 27, North Korea held a military parade at Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang to commemorate the 70th anniversary of Victory Day. / yunhap news
On the other hand, senior researcher Bruce Bennett and senior director Harry Kazianis emphasize that both the United States and North Korea are responsible .
In particular, Senior Researcher Bennett pointed out that “ the United States has no realistic goals in its North Korea policy and does not acknowledge that North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons . ”
Senior Director Kazianis also said, “ Both the U.S. and North Korea do not seem to see the value of diplomacy and compromise, ” adding, “ Particularly from the Biden administration’s perspective, it is not possible to devote much attention and time to North Korea because there are many more serious problems than North Korea.” “It is becoming the reason, ” he said .
[ Harry Kazianis ] The Biden administration has a clear intention to sit down and discuss with North Korea . This would mean North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons and missile programs in exchange for some concessions from the United States , but North Korea no longer needs relief from U.S. sanctions . Also, it seems that Washington is currently facing a much bigger problem than North Korea . The war in Ukraine is the top foreign policy priority for the United States , followed by China . We don't really spend a lot of time on North Korea because it's probably fifth or sixth .
Meanwhile, former Director Anthony Ruggiero criticized the U.S. attitude, saying , “ There is a perception that the U.S. essentially does not have to do anything if there are no U.S.-North Korea negotiations, ” and “ The logic that the sole purpose of sanctions against North Korea is North Korea’s denuclearization is unfortunately unrealistic. ” I did it .
Lastly, when asked, “ Do you expect a breakthrough in U.S.-North Korea relations during the remaining year of President Biden’s term?” 7 out of 10 experts predicted, “ It will be difficult unless North Korea’s attitude changes . ”
Meanwhile, Ambassador DeTrani predicted, “ A breakthrough is still possible on the condition of easing U.S. sanctions and halting North Korea’s nuclear tests , missile test launches , and production of nuclear materials, ” and senior researcher Bennett also said , “ The Biden administration will He stated that there is room for improvement in North Korea policy if we recognize it as a big problem rather than a big deal and respond to it .
However, with the recent North Korea-Russia summit, the new Cold War structure between Korea, the United States, and Japan versus North Korea, China, and Russia has intensified, and with the war in Ukraine and armed conflict between Israel and Hamas, America's diplomatic power is focused on this area , and the U.S. presidential election phase is entering full swing from next year. As time goes on , speculation is growing that it will be more difficult for the United States and North Korea to actually find an opportunity to sit face to face and have a conversation .
This is Noh Jeong-min from RFA Free Asia Broadcasting .
[ Former officials and Korean Peninsula experts who responded to the survey ]
Joseph DeTrani, former U.S. Deputy Ambassador to the Six-Party Talks
Robert King, former U.S. State Department special envoy for North Korean human rights
Anthony Ruggiero, former director of North Korea affairs at the White House National Security Council
Andrew Yeo Korea Chair at the Brookings Institution
Francesca Giovannini, former Director of Policy and Strategy at the United Nations' Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
Hanbeom Cho , Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification
Park Won-gon , Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University, Korea
Harry Kazianis, Senior National Security Director, Center for the National Interest
Bruce Bennett, Senior Researcher, RAND Research Institute, USA
David Maxwell, Vice President, Asia-Pacific Strategic Center
Editor Bonghyeon Park, Web Team Kyungha Lee
[Expert Survey] ② “If Trump is elected, I will contact Kim Jong-un”
https://www.rfa.org/korean/news_indepth/nksurvey-10162023161006.html
Washington - In-Depth Reporting Team hand@rfa.org
2023.10.16
Former U.S. President Donald Trump (left), who is expected to face a rematch with President Joe Biden (right) in next year's U.S. presidential election. Two candidates are debating at the last presidential candidate debate held in Nashville, Tennessee on October 22, 2020.
/yunhap news
00:00 / 08:17
Anchor : There is a high possibility of a rematch between President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump in the U.S. presidential election held in November next year , and major changes are expected in U.S. policy toward North Korea depending on who wins .
In a survey of prominent Korean Peninsula experts in the U.S. and South Korea, Radio Free Asia (RFA) asked about the impact next year's U.S. presidential election will have on North Korea policy in an increasingly complex international environment .
Experts who responded to the survey predicted that if former President Trump wins, a groundbreaking change in North Korea policy is expected, but ultimately resolving the North Korean nuclear issue will not be easy .
[ Expert Survey ] Second in line is reporter Han Deok-in .
“No matter who wins the next US presidential election , a solution to North Korea’s nuclear program will be difficult. ”
With the 2024 U.S. presidential election approaching a year away, attention is focused on whether a rematch between current U.S. President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump will take place .
In a recent survey conducted by Radio Free Asia (RFA) from October 2 to 6 of former U.S. and South Korean officials and Korean Peninsula experts, all 10 experts said that the next U.S. presidential election will have an impact on the situation on the Korean Peninsula . Although it is clear that this is a problem , he predicted that it will not be a decisive opportunity in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue .
In particular, many experts predicted that there would be much more variables in the U.S.-North Korea relationship if President Trump was re-elected.
In particular, President Trump could send a personal letter to North Korean Secretary General Kim Jong-un or suggest top - down dialogue again .
Andrew Yeo, Korea Distinguished Service Chair at the Brookings Institution, said that it is difficult to promote U.S.-North Korea dialogue because the current Biden administration cannot give up its goal of North Korea's denuclearization, but that major changes are expected when the Trump administration takes office again .
[ Andrew Yeo ] It could be an interesting situation if President Trump comes back . The chemistry between former President Trump and General Secretary Kim Jong-un was quite good . Sure , 2019 didn't end well for Hanoi , but former President Trump loves the spotlight and strong leaders . So what he couldn't achieve in his first term, he can try to achieve this time . So, you can again contact Secretary General Kim personally . Therefore, the possibility of dialogue with North Korea under the Trump administration will be better than under the Biden administration's second term . But I'm not sure it will bring us closer to denuclearization .
Harry Kazianis, senior director for national security at the Center for National Interest, also predicted that if President Trump is elected again, there is a possibility that he will send a ' personal letter ' to Secretary General Kim .
[ Harry Kazianis ] If the Biden administration is reappointed, there will be no significant changes . The situation will be somewhat stable , but there will not be much change in the way the North Korean issue is handled . In his second term, the Biden administration will offer North Korea talks on denuclearization , but North Korea will scoff . On the other hand , I think the possibilities are endless under the new Trump administration . I will probably try to write a letter to Secretary General Kim again . However , since North Korea is benefiting greatly from cooperation with China and Russia, it may react a little coldly .
U.S. President Donald Trump (right) and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un met on Sentosa Island in Singapore on June 12, 2018. /yunhap news
Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University in Korea, also answered that if President Biden is re-elected, there will not be much difference from the current North Korea policy, but if President Trump comes back to power, he may meet Secretary General Kim in person again .
Meanwhile, experts expressed mixed views when asked whether they thought North Korea would prefer former President Trump's victory over President Biden 's .
Senior Director Kaizanis analyzed that from North Korea's perspective, former President Trump's victory in the presidential election is the only hope for getting what it wants, while former U.S. State Department Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Robert King said North Korea does not have high expectations for former President Trump's possibility of being re-elected . We observed that this would not be the case .
[ Harry Kazianis ] North Korea has always been very good at balancing between all the powers and getting the concessions they deserve . Therefore, I think North Korea will be open to dialogue . Progress may be slow , but if the Trump administration takes office again, I think it will be their last best chance to gain as much as possible while having a somewhat normal relationship with the United States, and it would be a wise choice for North Korea to seize that opportunity. I do .
[ Robert King ] I don't think North Korea will expect much progress even if the Trump administration comes in . Even though there was a 10- month gap between the first and second U.S.-North Korea summits during the Trump administration , both sides only said nice things to each other and nothing came out of it . I think General Secretary Kim, who was expecting a favorable response from President Trump at the time, suffered a significant blow at the US-North Korea summit held in Hanoi, Vietnam ( Vietnam ) .
In particular, former Special Envoy King added that there has yet to be any indication that North Korea would welcome former President Trump's re-election.
Some experts have expressed concern about what will happen if former President Trump wins the next presidential election.
Dr. Francesca Giovannini, who served as director of policy and strategy at the UN's Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), said , “ If former President Trump is re-elected, the alliance structure established by President Biden could be greatly damaged , and Korea's own “The desire to possess nuclear weapons could further accelerate, ” he predicted .
In addition, David Maxwell, Vice President of the Asia-Pacific Strategy Center, said that if former President Trump is re-elected, he will try to change some of the Biden administration's policies, which will have a serious impact on the ROK-US alliance as well as US interests and national security in the Northeast Asia region. ” he pointed out .
News about cooperation between Korea, the United States, and Japan is being broadcast on the TV in the waiting room of Seoul Station, Korea. /AP
All experts say, “ The new Cold War structure makes it more difficult to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. ”
All Korean Peninsula experts who responded to Radio Free Asia's survey had no significant disagreement that resolving the North Korean nuclear issue has become more difficult in the recent new Cold War between Korea, the United States, and Japan versus North Korea, China, and Russia.
Former U.S. Deputy Ambassador to the Six-Party Talks Joseph DeTrani pointed out , “ North Korea is posing a bigger challenge as it joins forces with Russia , China , and Iran, ” and South Korea’s Andrew Yeo said , “ Due to the Ukraine war and the strengthening of the alliance between Korea, the United States, and Japan, Secretary General Kim “The willingness to give up nuclear weapons is much lower . ”
Cho Han-beom, senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification , also predicted that the situation would be more difficult even if former President Trump is elected because North Korea actually possessed nuclear weapons and had them written into the constitution , and Professor Park Won-gon also predicted that if the Trump administration reappears, North Korea's denuclearization will be possible. We observed that it may become more difficult .
Meanwhile, voices are growing that no matter who wins the next U.S. presidential election, the North Korean issue must be focused on denuclearization.
Dr. Francesca Giovannini repeatedly emphasized predictable diplomatic efforts, saying, “While acknowledging the difficulties of U.S.-North Korea dialogue, a sustained and firm diplomatic approach is essential to avoid escalating tensions . ”
With North Korea recently specifying nuclear weapons in its constitution and the international situation making it more difficult to resolve North Korea's denuclearization , how will the U.S. presidential election, which is a little over a year away, affect U.S. policy toward North Korea , and what variables will affect its approach toward North Korea? There is growing interest in whether this will happen .
This is Han Deok-in from RFA Free Asia Broadcasting .
[ Former officials and Korean Peninsula experts who responded to the survey ]
Joseph DeTrani, former U.S. Deputy Ambassador to the Six- Party Talks
Robert King, former U.S. State Department special envoy for North Korean human rights
Anthony Ruggiero, former director of North Korea affairs at the White House National Security Council
Andrew Yeo Korea Chair at the Brookings Institution
Francesca Giovannini, former Director of Policy and Strategy at the United Nations' Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
Hanbeom Cho , Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification
Park Won-gon , Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University, Korea
Harry Kazianis, Senior National Security Director, Center for the National Interest
Bruce Bennett, Senior Researcher, RAND Research Institute, USA
David Maxwell, Vice President, Asia-Pacific Strategic Center
Editor Jeong-min Noh, Web Team Kyeong-ha Lee
[Expert Survey] ③ Negotiations with North Korea during Biden’s term are virtually ‘over’
https://www.rfa.org/korean/news_indepth/nksurvey-10172023085952.html
Washington - In-Depth Reporting Team cheons@rfa.org
2023.10.17
In a photo released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on September 8, 2023, North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un is attending the launch ceremony of North Korea's new tactical nuclear attack submarine.
/Reuters
00:00 / 09:55
Anchor : With a little over a year left in the term of office of the U.S. Joe Biden administration , many Korean Peninsula experts predicted that “ there is little chance that U.S.-North Korea relations will improve in the meantime . ”
In a survey conducted by Radio Free Asia on the Biden administration's North Korea policy, more than half of experts responded, “ I do not believe there will be any change in North Korea policy during the remainder of the term . ” In fact, it is expected that there will be little chance of the United States and North Korea sitting face to face under the Biden administration, so it has become inevitable to point out that this is a repetition of ' strategic patience ' .
[ Expert Survey ], which looked at mid-term evaluations and prospects for the Biden administration's North Korea policy among prominent Korean Peninsula experts in the United States and South Korea, the third participant is reporter So-Ram Cheon .
6 out of 10 experts say, “ There is no room for improvement in Biden’s North Korea policy . ”
“ The Biden administration, ahead of the presidential election, does not have the capacity to focus on the unpopular North Korean issue .”
“ The Biden administration will make choices that do not make the current situation worse .”
“ Denuclearization negotiations have become more difficult as North Korea has written nuclear weapons into its constitution .”
Radio Free Asia (RFA) recently conducted a mid-term evaluation of the U.S. Joe Biden administration's North Korea policy targeting former U.S. and South Korean officials and experts on the Korean Peninsula. Six out of 10 experts who responded to the survey said, “The remainder of the Biden administration is “There will be no room for changes in North Korea policy during his term, ” he predicted .
Experts say that North Korea is a low priority in U.S. diplomacy, that the Biden administration, which is facing a presidential election next year, does not have the capacity to focus on North Korea issues that are difficult to resolve immediately, and that it will choose to maintain the current situation. We analyzed that the policy will continue .
Andrew Yeo, Korea Distinguished Service Chair at the Brookings Institution, predicted that unless there is a significant change within North Korea, the Biden administration will maintain its current North Korea policy and choose not to worsen the current situation.
[ Andrew Yeo ] ( US-North Korea relations ) are on hold . This doesn't mean the Biden administration is doing nothing . We're keeping an eye on everything, including human rights issues and tracking North Korea's missile activities . However, from a diplomatic perspective, we do not expect any major changes in the Biden administration's strategy and approach to North Korea .
Harry Kazianis, senior director for national security at the U.S. Center for National Interest, also predicted that the standoff between the U.S. and North Korea will continue unless there is a significant change in the international environment.
[ Harry Kazianis ] I don't think either side will be able to make major concessions unless major changes occur in the international environment, such as the end of the war in Ukraine or improvement in U.S.-China relations . Now the US and North Korea are ignoring each other , and I think this is a big reason why no change has occurred over the past few years .
On September 13, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) and North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un shake hands during a meeting at Vostochny Cosmodrome on the outskirts of Tsiolkovsky City. /AP
Cho Han-beom, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, and Park Won-gon, a professor at Korea's Ewha Womans University, also expressed skeptical views on the prospects for the Biden administration's North Korea policy.
Negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea have become more difficult as North Korea has sought a breakthrough through Russia in the wake of the Ukraine war , and with the U.S. presidential election just around the corner, it is unlikely that the Biden administration will make political efforts on the most unpopular agenda, " North Korea . " . _
[ Cho Han-beom ] Looking at the current situation, there is not much room for improvement in North Korea policy . Since North Korea has written nuclear weapons into its constitution, denuclearization negotiations have become more difficult . Additionally, it is expected that it will not be easy for the Biden administration to achieve a breakthrough in the North Korean nuclear issue as the domestic political situation becomes increasingly difficult .
[ Park Won-gon ] There is about a year left in my term , but I don’t think there is much room for improvement . Overall, domestic politics in the United States is complex , and in particular, we are starting to enter the presidential election phase . In this situation, we do not believe that the Biden administration is likely to use political efforts and assets to address North Korea, which is difficult to reach agreement within the United States .
In addition, Francesca Giovannini, former director of policy and strategy at the UN’s Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, also responded, “ There is currently no room for change in the Biden administration’s North Korea policy . ”
In this regard, some experts agree that the Biden administration must recognize the seriousness of the North Korean problem during its remaining term.
Anthony Ruggiero, a senior director at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and former director of North Korea affairs at the White House National Security Council, also said, “There is no space for President Biden to improve North Korea policy during the remainder of his term , but he has the ability to change the situation. ” Transition was emphasized .
Bruce Bennett, a senior researcher at the Rand Institute in the United States, also urged the Biden administration to recognize the seriousness of the current situation over the next year or so and change its policy toward North Korea accordingly, as North Korea further strengthens its nuclear weapons .
[ Bruce Bennett ] The Biden administration appears to have chosen not to spend much time on North Korea issues because it does not view North Korea as a potential target of political victory . However, the problem is that North Korea is strengthening its nuclear forces in order to possess nuclear weapons . The United States must change its policies . The Biden administration must recognize that this is not a ' no big deal ' situation, but a ' big problem ' .
On January 4, 2022, destination signs heading to North Korea's capital Pyongyang and the United States are visible from Imjingak near the ceasefire line in Paju, South Korea. /AP
Radio Free Asia asked the experts who responded to the survey, “ What policies would you like to suggest to the Biden administration for a breakthrough in the deadlocked relationship between the United States and North Korea ? ”
The policies proposed by experts were divided into ' strong-to-strong response ', ' starting dialogue and negotiations ', and ' conditional sanctions relief ' .
- We must respond to North Korean provocations with hard-line measures.
Former Director Anthony Ruggiero and senior researcher Bruce Bennett suggested that pressure on North Korea should be continued.
What we are saying is that we should no longer just wait and see North Korea's provocations, but respond in a variety of strong ways, such as missile or nuclear tests .
[ Anthony Ruggiero ] The U.S. administration has revealed that the North Korean regime is earning hundreds of millions of dollars every year through overseas workers . There is more work to be done on cyber activity , which generates at least hundreds of millions of dollars each year . There are many things the administration can , should , and is not doing regarding North Korea .
[ Bruce Bennett ] I think we should say that when North Korea starts launching missiles into the Pacific, the United States is justified in intercepting them . I also think that if North Korea launches a nuclear weapon over the East Sea , the United States should say what kind of response it will take . This includes intercepting all missiles launched over the East Sea .
Senior researcher Bennett also added that since North Korea reacts sensitively to external information, there is a need to put pressure on North Korea through the inflow of information.
- North Korea policy must be balanced through dialogue and negotiation
There were also opinions that the U.S. policy toward North Korea should be balanced through a more active resumption of dialogue.
Professor Park Won-gon and Senior Research Fellow Cho Han-beom said that the Biden administration's current North Korea policy focuses only on ' deterrence ' and suggested that it is important to stop the advancement of nuclear capabilities through ' dialogue ' and ' negotiations ' that can lure North Korea out. I did it .
[ Park Won-gon ] If I were to make a suggestion, I think we need to put a little more emphasis on ' dialogue ' and ' suppression ' together , especially on dialogue . Currently, the focus is on ' suppression ' , with the ratio between ' dialogue ' and ' suppression ' being about 8 to 2 or 7 to 3 . Currently, North Korea is continuing to engage in provocations and is upgrading its nuclear weapons , so it is right to focus on deterrence , but I still think there is a need to place a little more emphasis on dialogue than now .
[ Cho Han-beom ] Chairman Kim Jong-un said at this Supreme People's Assembly that he would exponentially increase the quantity and quality of nuclear weapons . The most urgent thing is to freeze and stabilize this situation and enter into negotiations . If the situation continues to be neglected and the situation progresses into a ‘ river vs. river ’ confrontation, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities will continue to advance . Therefore, we believe that urgent measures to stabilize this situation must be found as quickly as possible .
On December 2, 2022, a photo showing North Korea's missile launch is displayed at the Unification Observatory near the ceasefire line in Paju, South Korea. /AP
- Conditional sanctions relief
South Korea Chair Andrew Yeo and Ambassador DeTrani suggested that conditional sanctions relief could improve the stalled U.S.-North Korea relationship.
Chairwoman Yeo of South Korea responded, “ A breakthrough in U.S.-North Korea relations can be achieved by easing or lifting sanctions in return for North Korea stopping its nuclear tests , missile launches, and production of nuclear materials, ” and Ambassador DeTrani also said , “ North Korea will return to dialogue.” It was predicted that an improvement in the U.S.-North Korea relationship would be possible under the premise that “there is a willingness to do so, and the U.S. can ease sanctions in return for a moratorium on missile launches, nuclear tests , and nuclear material production . ”
While many Korean Peninsula experts expressed skepticism about the possibility of groundbreaking changes in North Korea policy or improvement in U.S.-North Korea relations during the remainder of the Biden administration's term, North Korea's nuclear capabilities are becoming increasingly sophisticated , ultimately leading to the Obama administration's North Korea policy of ' strategic patience '. It is expected that it will be inevitable to point out that it has returned to ' .
This is So-Ram Cheon from RFA Radio Free Asia .
[ Former officials and Korean Peninsula experts who responded to the survey ]
Joseph DeTrani, former U.S. Deputy Ambassador to the Six-Party Talks
Robert King, former U.S. State Department special envoy for North Korean human rights
Anthony Ruggiero, former director of North Korea affairs at the White House National Security Council
Andrew Yeo Korea Chair at the Brookings Institution
Francesca Giovannini, former Director of Policy and Strategy at the United Nations Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
Hanbeom Cho , Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification
Park Won-gon , Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University, Korea
Harry Kazianis, Senior National Security Director, Center for the National Interest
Bruce Bennett, Senior Researcher, RAND Research Institute, USA
David Maxwell, Vice President, Asia-Pacific Strategic Center
Editor Jeong-min Noh, Web Team Kyeong-ha Lee
[Expert Survey] ④ ‘Disappointed’ by North Korea’s ambiguous human rights policy
https://www.rfa.org/korean/news_indepth/nksurvey-10182023151845.html
Washington – In-Depth Reporting Team seoh@rfa.org
2023.10.18
Julie Turner, U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights, is holding a press conference at the American Diplomacy House in Yongsan-gu, Seoul on the 18th.
/ Union
00:00 / 09:16
Anchor : Julie Turner, Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights, took the oath of office on the 13th and began official work starting with a visit to South Korea. Experts on the Korean Peninsula expressed expectations about the role of Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights.
However, the majority of experts who responded to Radio Free Asia's survey said it was encouraging that the Joe Biden administration appointed a special envoy for North Korean human rights, a position that had been vacant for about six years, but had a negative evaluation of the issue in that its approach to North Korean human rights issues was vague and lacked practical action. released.
[Expert Survey] In the final order, reporter Seo Hye-jun summarized experts' answers about the Joe Biden administration's North Korean human rights policy.
“ There is no real effort other than appointing a special envoy for North Korean human rights ”… mostly negative
In a survey on U.S. North Korea policy conducted by Radio Free Asia (RFA) recently (October 2-6), less than half of respondents had a positive evaluation of the Biden administration's North Korean human rights policy.
From the perspective of the U.S. and South Korean Korean Peninsula experts who responded to the survey, the U.S. approach to human rights in North Korea is “ambiguous.”
The only positive evaluation of the Biden administration's North Korean human rights policy among experts was the appointment of Julie Turner as the U.S. State Department's special envoy for North Korean human rights, a position that had been vacant for about six years.
Joseph DeTrani, former special envoy for North Korea at the State Department, positively evaluated the current U.S. government's human rights policy for appointing a special envoy for North Korean human rights, and Anthony Ruggiero, senior director at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, who served as director of North Korea affairs at the National Security Council in the U.S. White House, also said, "In the past, “It was a ‘strategic error’ on the U.S. side that the former Donald Trump administration did not appoint a special envoy for North Korean human rights, and it is fortunate that the Biden administration has corrected this,” he said, giving the North Korean human rights policy a ‘B’ grade.
However, the evaluation of experts pointing out the Biden administration's North Korean human rights policy was cold. In particular, there was a lot of criticism about the United States' silence on the issue of North Korean people starving due to food shortages.
Andrew Yeo, the Korea Distinguished Service Chair at the Brookings Institution, said that the appointment of a special envoy for North Korean human rights and the creation of a 'North Korean human rights representative' in the United States can be seen as progress, but compared to the U.S. government's focus on human rights and democracy, the U.S. government has raised its voice on North Korean human rights. It was assessed that it was not working.
[ Andrew Yeo ] Although the U.S. State Department has spoken out against the forcible repatriation of North Korean defectors in China , I am a little disappointed that the Biden administration has not taken a stronger stance on human rights issues . I hope the Biden administration will raise its voice on human rights in North Korea and pay more attention to issues such as food shortages .
Bruce Bennett, a senior researcher at the Rand Institute in the United States, also pointed out that the Biden administration is consistently pointing out human rights issues in North Korea, but is not addressing them seriously, and pointed out that the United States is showing a muted response to North Korea's food shortage issue.
[ Bruce Bennett ] North Korea's Kim Jong-un regime is taking abuses to another level by starving people . They have the ability to ration food , but they are wasting money on other things . The U.S. government could be much more aggressive about this , but they don't seem to be doing so out of concern that North Korea might strike back in some way .
Graphics – Seo Hyejun
Harry Kazianis, senior director for national security at the U.S. Center for the National Interest, also assessed that the Biden administration appears to have devoted more time and effort to North Korean human rights issues than the former Donald Trump administration, which withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council, but lacked practical action.
[ Harry Kazianis ] A few years ago, during former President Trump's speech to the Congress, there was a famous North Korean defector raising his crutches . However, after diplomacy began, such scenes could no longer be seen . On the other hand , the Biden administration appointed a new special envoy for North Korean human rights , but other than that, no other activities were seen . Of course, if you press them to address human rights issues, they will address them , but beyond that, you won't see them taking any real action . That's the sad reality .
There were also experts who openly criticized the Biden administration for not actively addressing North Korean human rights issues.
Francesca Giovannini, former director of policy and strategy at the UN’s Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, said, “The Biden administration did not attach importance to North Korea policy,” and added, “In particular, North Korea’s human rights policy is negligible.”
Meanwhile, Julie Turner, special envoy for North Korean human rights, was officially appointed with the oath of office at the U.S. State Department on the 13th, but prior to this, criticism from experts in the U.S. continued.
It was pointed out that the federal Senate approval bill was passed only in July, six months after President Biden's nomination in January of this year, and that the inauguration was delayed for more than 70 days.
Many experts who responded to the survey, including former U.S. State Department special envoy for North Korean human rights Robert King and David Maxwell, deputy director of the U.S. Center for Asia-Pacific Strategy, expressed negative views on Special Envoy Turner's delayed inauguration.
In a low-priority policy toward North Korea , expectations and regrets about human rights intersect.
Experts on the Korean Peninsula were divided in their opinions regarding North Korea's 'denuclearization' and 'human rights', with those saying the two issues should be linked and those saying they should be separated.
There was a difference in approach to human rights in North Korea due to the strong argument that “North Korea’s denuclearization and human rights in North Korea should be viewed as separate issues” and the view that “the two issues are two sides of the same coin.”
People passing by Suseo Station in Seoul stop in front of the TV to watch a news program about North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Joe Biden. /AP
Cho Han-beom, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said that ‘denuclearization’ and ‘human rights’ should be separated. “Because human rights are a universal value, they should proceed regardless of the denuclearization negotiations between the United States and North Korea, but the Biden administration is using it as a means to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.” “There is a tendency to use human rights issues,” he pointed out.
[ Cho Han-beom ] ( Human rights ) should not be a means of pressuring the nuclear issue, but should embody universal human values that alleviate the suffering of North Korean people . If you link it to denuclearization negotiations , it actually goes against the basic spirit of humanism . Denuclearization and human rights must be dealt with independently .
Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University in Korea, also commented, “Human rights should be consistently raised as an issue independent of the political situation, but the U.S. government has failed to do so.”
[ Park Won-gon ] The Biden administration's approach to North Korean human rights is ambiguous . It was too late to appoint a special envoy for human rights , and there is no sign of active action on human rights . In particular , the North Korean human rights issue is not being actively presented at a high level, such as by President Biden, Secretary of State Tony Blinken , or National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan .
Professor Park also said that the reason the United States independently imposed sanctions against North Korea included North Korea's human rights violations, and that when the United States brought up human rights issues, "If there is progress on the human rights situation in North Korea, we will dismantle or suspend some of the sanctions." He argued that active measures are needed, such as setting forth the precondition:
Deputy Representative David Maxwell emphasized that the United States should not ignore human rights in exchange for something in denuclearization negotiations, and emphasized the importance of information as a link between denuclearization and human rights.
He recommended, “The United States and the international community must weed out the mistaken idea that human rights must be ignored in order to negotiate denuclearization.”
He continued, “The only way to end the human rights violations suffered by the North Korean people and achieve denuclearization is unification, so the focus on human rights must lead to unification, and once unification is achieved, denuclearization can be achieved,” emphasizing that the link is ‘information.’ I did.
Senior Director Anthony Ruggiero said that, at the request of the United States, a public meeting on North Korean human rights was held at the UN Security Council, but that alone had its limits, adding that the United States was asking the question, 'What is being done to support the North Korean people?' I ordered it to be done constantly.
Julie Turner, the State Department's special envoy for North Korean human rights, being interviewed by Radio Free Asia (RFA) at the U.S. Embassy in Korea on the 18th. /RFA Photo
As Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Julie Turner begins her official duties with a visit to South Korea immediately after her appointment, attention is focused on what efforts the U.S. government will make to address human rights issues in North Korea, including the forced repatriation of North Korean defectors.
However, there are many negative evaluations that North Korea is a low priority in the Biden administration's foreign policy, which has about a year left, and that there is a lack of concrete and practical implementation measures as well as recognition of North Korean human rights, so there is a mixture of disappointment and expectation.
This is Seo Hye-jun from RFA Free Asia Broadcasting.
[ Former officials and Korean Peninsula experts who responded to the survey ]
Joseph DeTrani, former U.S. Deputy Ambassador to the Six-Party Talks
Robert King, former U.S. State Department special envoy for North Korean human rights
Anthony Ruggiero, former director of North Korea affairs at the White House National Security Council
Andrew Yeo Korea Chair at the Brookings Institution
Francesca Giovannini, former Director of Policy and Strategy at the United Nations' Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
Hanbeom Cho , Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification
Park Won-gon , Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University, Korea
Harry Kazianis, Senior National Security Director, Center for the National Interest
Bruce Bennett, Senior Researcher, RAND Research Institute, USA
David Maxwell, Vice President, Asia-Pacific Strategic Center
Editor Jeong-min Noh, Web Team Kyeong-ha Lee
The following are the survey topics/questions and my complete input.
A. Evaluation of Biden's 3rd-Year North Korea Policy
A. Please provide a grade from A to F to assess the Biden administration's North Korea policy in its third year and why?
I think grading is not useful. There are no effective measures of effective criteria to determine a grade. If denuclearization is the criteria for grading then the grade is obviously an F. If the criteria is the prevention of war and the use of WMD then the grade is an A. If the criteria is the strength of US alliances in the region which are critical to defending US interests then the grade is an A. If the criteria is the relief of suffering and the protection of the human rights of the Korean people int e north then grade is F.
So the grade is undeterminable but the prevention of war of the use of WMD is a very positive outcome so far. But again, assigning a grade is not useful and does not help in assessing the efficacy of US national security.
One of the major successes of the Biden administration policy is the trilateral cooperation of “JAROKU” (Japan- ROK-US) although President Yoon deserves the bulk of the credit due to his leadership in improving ROK-Japan relations. In the White House’s Indo Pacific Strategy the 7th line of effort is improving trilateral cooperation and this is among one of the most important accomplishments because it not only contributes to deterrence of north Korean attack such cooperation will support a resolution of the Korean question (the unnatural division of the peninsula, para 60 of the Armistice. The Administration deserve an A for alliance relations.
B. Stalemate in U.S.-North Korea Relations:
A. What are the major issues causing the deadlock in U.S.-North Korea relations? Do you believe the issues primarily stem from the U.S. or North Korea?
The root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the most evil mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. The answers to the following two questions indicate that the responsibility for the threats in Northeast Asia lies with Kim Jong Un.
The answer is determined by understanding the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
1. Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?
2. In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?
The answer is determined by understanding the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
The regime accuses the US and ROK/US Alliance of a “hostile policy” that causes the “deadlock.” The regime repeatedly uses this “hostile policy” accusation in nearly every verbal attack on the ROK and US. Pro-regime spokespeople and useful idiots repeat this talking point and use it to justify recommending sanctions relief (even US withdrawal).
The truth is the north’s revolutionary ideology is the real hostile policy. The regime seeks to dominate the peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State and rid it of all foreign influence.
The alliance must call out the regime for its actual hostile policy – this must be an integral theme and message for a comprehensive information campaign.
C. Potential for Improvement in Biden's Remaining Term
A. Do you see room for improvement in the Biden administration's North Korea policy during its remaining term? (Yes/No)
It is time for the ROK/US alliance to flip the conventional wisdom on its head and stop the primary focus on denuclearization. Rather than that denuclearization first then denuclearization we need to shift focus to solving the “Korea question” which is derived fropm paragraph 60 of the Armistice and says that nations must solve the unnatural division of the Korean peninsula.
D. Policy Proposals for Breaking the U.S.-North Korea Deadlock
A. Are there any policy proposals you can suggest for finding a breakthrough in U.S.-North Korea relations in Biden’s remaining term?
Although denuclearization of the north remains a worthy goal, it must be viewed as aspirational as long as the Kim family regime remains in power. The conventional wisdom has always been that denuclearization must come first and then unification will follow and that there should be no discussion of human rights out of fear that it would prevent Kim Jong Un from making a denuclearization agreement. Today even a blind man can read the tea leaves and know that Kim Jong Un will not denuclearize despite the fact that his policies have been an abject failure. His political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies completely failed in 2022 because Presidents Yoon and Biden, like their predecessors, refused to make the political and economic concessions he demanded just to come to the negotiating table: namely to remove sanctions. It is time for the U.S and the ROK/U.S. alliance to execute a political warfare strategy that flips the conventional wisdom and seeks unification first and then denuclearization. Everyone must come to the understanding that the only way to end the nuclear program and the human rights abuses is through unification of the Korean peninsula. The ROK and U.S. must continue to maintain the highest state of military readiness to deter war and then adopt a human rights upfront approach, a comprehensive and sophisticated information and influence activities campaign, and focus all efforts on the pursuit of a free and unified Korea- ultimately a United Republic of Korea (UROK).
The Yoon and Biden administrations, along with Prime Minister Kishida following the camp David Summit, have an opportunity for a new approach to the Korean security challenge. The Alliance way ahead is an integrated deterrence strategy as part of the broader strategic competition that is taking place in the region. There is a need for a Korean “Plan B” strategy that rests on the foundation of combined ROK/U.S. defensive capabilities and includes political warfare, aggressive diplomacy, sanctions, cyber operations, and information and influence activities, with a goal of denuclearization but ultimately the objective must be to solve the “Korea question” (e.g., the unnatural division of the peninsula) with the understanding that denuclearization of the north and an end to human rights abuses and crimes against humanity will only happen when the Korea question is resolved that leads to a free and unified Korea, otherwise known as a United Republic of Korea (UROK).
I am going to stress this over and over again: Deterrence, defense, denuclearization, the Korea question (unification), using a superior form of political warfare based on a rock-solid ROK/US alliance with trilateral cooperation – “JAROKUS” (Japan-ROK-US) and realistic assumptions of the nature of the Kim family regime and its strategy and objectives.
The Camp David Summit (along with the Yoon-Biden Summit of April 26) provided the solution to the problem. The media has totally ignored these statements:
– "The two presidents are committed to build a better future for all Korean people and support a unified Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace." (April 26)
– Spirit of Camp David: “We express support for the goal of the ROK’s Audacious Initiative and support a unified Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace.”
– Camp David Principles: “We support a unified Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace
This provides the future path to peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula. A new approach must be based on a human rights upfront approach, a comprehensive information campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.
Please reference these documents:
“National Strategy for Countering North Korea”
https://nipp.org/information_series/robert-joseph-robert-collins-joseph-detrani-nicholas-eberstadt-olivia-enos-david-maxwell-and-greg-scarlatoiu-national-strategy-for-countering-north-korea-no-545-january-23-2023/
“The Historic Camp David Summit – Overlooked Again: “JAROKUS” Seeks A Free And Unified Korea”
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/08/the-historic-camp-david-summit-overlooked-again-jarokus-seeks-a-free-and-unified-korea/
“From Provocations And Deterrence To Preparing For Unification: Why An Information Campaign Is Vital To Political Warfare In Korea” https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/06/from-provocations-and-deterrence-to-preparing-for-unification-why-an-information-campaign-is-vital-to-political-warfare-in-korea/
“Sometimes less is more: The most important 26 words of ROK-US summit”
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2023/08/137_350494.html
E. Assessment of Biden Administration's Approach to North Korean Human Rights
A. How do you evaluate the Biden administration's approach to North Korean human rights?
The Biden administration has finally confirmed a new Special Envoy for north Korean Human Rights, Ambassador Julie Turner, which had been unfilled since 2017. However, she apparently still has not been worn in and assumed her duties. The Yoon administration has taken the lead in human rights, as it has in trilateral cooperation, and appears to be implementing a human rights upfront approach and demonstrating genuine concern for the human rights of the Korean people in the north. However, the US and the international community must disregard the advice of the pundits that says that human rights should be ignored in order to get a denuclearization deal. This is wrong. Human rights must be pursed in support of the path to a free and unified Korea.
There is a unique relationship among denuclearization, human rights, and unification. The only way to achieve denuclearization and end the human rights abuses being committed against the Korean people in the north is by achieving unification. Perhaps counterintuitively it is the focus on human rights that must lead to unification and only when unification is achieved there can be denuclearization. And the connective tissue among the two is information.
Human rights are a moral imperative. However, they are also a national security issue because Kim Jong Un must deny the human rights of the Korean people in the north in order to remain in power. Dr. Jung Pak often asks who does Kim Jong Un fear the most: the ROK and US military or the Korean people? It is the Korean people especially when they are armed with information and knowledge of their universal human rights. Therefore, Kim Jong Un creates the perception of external threats in order to justify the suffering and sacrifice of the Korean people.
The US, ROK, and Japan must pursue a human rights upfront approach, an information campaign, and a free and unified Korea.
F. Outlook for North Korea Issue in the Evolving International Landscape (North Korea Nuclear Issue):
A. What is your perspective on the future of the North Korea issue within the context of the evolving international landscape, especially concerning North Korea-China-Russia vs. U.S.-Japan-South Korea dynamics? Do you foresee it becoming more challenging? (Yes/No)
Certainly, a new axis of authoritarians or a threesome of convenience has evolved among the PRC, north Korea, and Russia. While troubling, it will never be an equal to JAROKUS (Japan- ROK-US) because theirs is a transactional one and most importantly not built on trust of shard values except for their common belief in authoritarian rule byt those that are currently in power. Most importantly, it is in Kim Jong Un’s “DNA” to play China and Russia off against each other just as his grandfather did with Mao and Stalin during the Korean War. But together the three will seek to thwart JAROKUS efforts.
G. Impact of Next Year's U.S. Presidential Election on North Korea Policy
A. If Joe Biden is re-elected or if Donald Trump wins the next U.S. presidential election, how do you anticipate it will affect U.S. North Korea policy?
If there is a change in administration, I expect that the new administration might seek to implement some of the policies it described in the previous administration which will have severe effects on the ROK/US alliance and US interests in Northeast Asia as well as national security. If the current administration remains in office, it must shift its polices to a human rights upfront approach, a comprehensive information campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea as the only path to denuclearization and peace and prosperity.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
