Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"We are all born ignorant, but one must work hard to remain stupid."

- Benjamin Franklin

"The rain will stop, the night will end, the hurt will fade. Hope is never so lost that it can't be found."

- Ernest Hemingway

"In dangerous times wise men say nothing."

- Aesop

1. Where do US Army special operations fit in a world of strategic competition?

2. Hamas Puts Its Pogrom on Video

3. Assault into Gaza – The Challenges of Israel’s Expanded Ground Operation by Mick Ryan

4. Israel’s Military Tech Fetish Is a Failed Strategy

5. China passes new law to promote ‘love of motherland’ in schools

6. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 27, 2023

7. Iran Update, October 27, 2023

8. Opinion | The U.S. is walking a familiar tightrope on Israel

9. Female-led IDF combat squad eliminates nearly 100 Hamas terrorists in firefights along border, report says

10. Ex-Pentagon Adviser: US, Israel Special Forces tried to enter Gaza but were 'shot to pieces'

11. U.S. Quietly Expands Secret Military Base in Israel

12. How Many Wars Can America Fight at the Same Time?

13. US ‘forced to EVACUATE Syria bases after huge wave of Iran-backed attacks’ as region set to blow amid Israel-Gaza war

14. The 'SPONGE bomb' Israel are hoping to use to disable Hamas tunnels: New gadget expands and hardens, filling underground passageways

15. Wartime Deepfakes Really Are Blurring Reality, First Major Study Finds

16. Do deepfake videos undermine our epistemic trust? A thematic analysis of tweets that discuss deepfakes in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

17. Covert CCP social media accounts bolster China’s united front work in Canada

18. U.S. Tries New Tack on Russian Disinformation: Pre-Empting It

19. Urban Warfare, Sieges, and Israel’s Looming Invasion of Gaza

20. 'No more sticky notes': Army consolidating 43 incompatible data systems to just 2

21. Romania Is at a Dangerous Tipping Point

22. T-AOS: A New Model for Competition (AFSOC)

23. Meet Nightshade, the new tool allowing artists to ‘poison’ AI models with corrupted training data

24. Watchdog files complaint over photo revealing identities of Delta Force soldiers

25. Philippines Drops China Railway Deals, Seeks Other Funders

26. A Plan for Peace in Gaza

27. The Decolonization Narrative Is Dangerous and False

28. Tell Me How This Ends (Gaza)

1. Where do US Army special operations fit in a world of strategic competition?

I missed this article earlier this month.

Excerpt:

Making adjustments for the emerging era of strategic competition has been challenging due to the deep impact the global war on terror has had on the US military in general, and the special operations community in particular. This impact was driven by the specific conditions that characterized the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, the United States and its allies enjoyed overwhelming technological superiority. This resulted in little impetus for significant technological innovation, but rather a focus on linear improvements of legacy systems and approaches. Further, these wars were largely restricted to specific “war zones” that were constrained by scope and geography. This limitation in scope drove US military forces to emphasize tactical prowess to drive battlefield victories. Finally, the violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in Iraq and Afghanistan were seen as illegitimate entities that needed to be destroyed outright (not bargained with). This lack of legitimacy removed the need to synchronize diplomatic bargaining with the use of force, as the primary military objective of these conflicts was the utter defeat of these VEOs to achieve larger strategic goals such as preventing terrorist attacks on the US homeland.

If all you read was the above you would think that all that SOF did for the past 20 years was operate in Afghanistan And Iraq. Of course those were the dominant conflict areas but SOF did not solely operate there and they are certainly not representative of all SOF operations. This contributes to the idea that SOF is unprepared for strategic competition. Fortunately the authors go on to discuss operations in Ukraine and Asia (though they left out Colombia and operations throughout Latin America)

The three conditions outlined above did not apply to Columbia and the rest of Latin America, or the Philippines and the rest of Asia, to Ukraine (SOF/SOCEUR operations beginning in 2014), or such places as Mali or Niger in Africa. or Yemen in the Middle East. SOF, in particular SF, SPYOP, and CA, operating in those areas sustained the necessary skills for application in the era of strategic competition. We must counter the false narrative that all SOF did was conduct operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The emphasis on campaigning is important. SOF led campaigns were very effectives in Colombia and the Philippines. And it is imperative that the US military develop and employ irregular warfare proficient campaign headquarters. Such headquarters should come from the SOF community and be based out of the TSOCs.

And then we can talk about Bob Jones' concept of unconventional deterrence.

The authors conclude with one of the most important (but intangible and unquantifiable) contributions of SOF, particularly SF, CA, and PSYOP. Sure, military personnel from outside of SOF develop relationships but in SOF there are relationships that last for decades due to sustained engagements over time. NCOs in the first SFG knew many of the General Officers in the Armed Forces of the Philippines because they had been working with them since they were 2d LTs. I watched them gravitate to those NCOs while ignoring senior officers from the PACOM staff.

Excerpts:

Relationships matter. This point seems obvious, but it often runs the risk of being lost in the broader push to reorient the American national security establishment toward peer competition. There are monumental challenges of force restructuring and global posturing in order to deter adversaries and prepare to win in conflict—all being conducted while technology is changing at an unprecedented pace. Given this, more traditional necessities such as building and maintaining relationships may be neglected.

We have made the case here that succeeding in strategic competition will be a team sport. It will require persistent and purposeful collaboration with allies and partners in the steady state because you “cannot surge trust.” Building and maintaining such relationships is the true comparative advantage of ARSOF, as these military professionals are just as focused on building relationships as they are at competing directly with adversaries. These partnering skills serve to complement and amplify other efforts in strategic competition, as a small ARSOF mission can exert an outsized effect in deterrence, campaigning, and innovation by identifying and enabling the right collaborative team. It is these skills, coupled with persistent global access and placement, that make ARSOF a low-cost, low-risk, precise, and highly effective instrument in an era of strategic competition.

Where do US Army special operations fit in a world of strategic competition?

atlanticcouncil.org · by Holly · October 13, 2023

Issue Brief

October 13, 2023

By Richard Angle, Leo Blanken, and Philip Swintek

The United States is still adjusting to an era of strategic competition with adversarial nations. Successful adaptation to this new strategic landscape will require the capacity to do several things well: deterring rivals, integrating rapidly changing technology, and actively accumulating strategic advantage around the globe. As a consequence, the entirety of the US military is seeking to update capabilities to meet these challenges. For the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) community, such adaptation will require the development of some new capabilities while other skills will simply need to be revived from previous eras of great power competition. US Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) can play an important role in the era of strategic competition, but it will largely do so through its long-standing “superpower” of building networks and fostering relationships. More directly, ARSOF’s regional alignment creates cultural expertise and generational relationships in critical locations around the world. Further, small and agile ARSOF units provide increased options and positional advantage in today’s strategic competition with China and Russia. They do so by leveraging their globally distributed access, placement, and influence to achieve effects in collaboration with allies and partners.

Transitioning from the global war on terror

Making adjustments for the emerging era of strategic competition has been challenging due to the deep impact the global war on terror has had on the US military in general, and the special operations community in particular. This impact was driven by the specific conditions that characterized the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, the United States and its allies enjoyed overwhelming technological superiority. This resulted in little impetus for significant technological innovation, but rather a focus on linear improvements of legacy systems and approaches. Further, these wars were largely restricted to specific “war zones” that were constrained by scope and geography. This limitation in scope drove US military forces to emphasize tactical prowess to drive battlefield victories. Finally, the violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in Iraq and Afghanistan were seen as illegitimate entities that needed to be destroyed outright (not bargained with). This lack of legitimacy removed the need to synchronize diplomatic bargaining with the use of force, as the primary military objective of these conflicts was the utter defeat of these VEOs to achieve larger strategic goals such as preventing terrorist attacks on the US homeland.

US Army Special Operations forces in Shok Valley of Nuristan Province, Afghanistan. (US Army photo by Sgt. David N. Gunn)

The transition to an era of strategic competition has upended all three of these conditions, which necessitates significant adjustment for the US military. Today’s competitors are true peers across a range of strategically relevant technologies (and are leading in many), which puts the United States in the uncomfortable position of playing catch up. Additionally, today’s strategic competitors, China and Russia, are not limited to any geographic war zones: they enjoy reach across the globe and can synchronize their strategies across all domains of competition. Finally, since China and Russia are legitimate (if sometimes adversarial) nation-states, strategic competition requires the seamless weaving together of calculated diplomacy, active contestation, and even cooperation across a range of domains.

These changing conditions, in turn, pose serious challenges for US security. The first is the challenge of deterrence. Unlike the Cold War, in which the task was to shape Soviet behavior under the shadow of catastrophic war, the task is now to shape Chinese behavior under the shadow of the cataclysmic disruption of our interdependent economies as well as catastrophic war. Tools are required, therefore, that are capable of communicating credibility in bargaining while avoiding inadvertent escalation in both of these realms (economic and military). Another challenge is the need for agile innovation and technology adoption in an era of unprecedented technological change. Forces are thus needed that could serve as a test bed for the rapid prototyping of cutting-edge capabilities. Finally, rather than simply considering a binary of “war versus peace,” competition may be considered a persistent and natural state of affairs. This requires forces that can engage in globally synchronized, active measures to accumulate strategic advantage in the enduring, competitive “steady state.” As these changing conditions impact US national security, each element of the SOF community—as well as the broader joint force—should ascertain and develop its comparative advantage moving forward.

The Army SOF community offers a way forward

The ARSOF community has important contributions to make in this challenging environment. This community of military units includes the Rangers, special operations aviators, special forces (Green Berets), civil affairs, and psychological operations, along with a host of logistics, communications, and intelligence teammates. These forces offer a myriad of capabilities in crisis, conflict, and competition in all five domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace) and within the information environment. They are characterized by rigorous selection processes that are based as much on maturity and cognitive flexibility as physical toughness. This results in a force deeply imbued with the capacity for critical thinking and providing creative solutions for novel challenges.

More than 200 noncommissioned officers stood before their families, friends, and leaders during a promotion ceremony larger than any other in Army Special Operations history. (US Army courtesy photo)

But these facts hold true for all special operations units across the four military services, so what distinguishes Army SOF (ARSOF)? It can be argued that ARSOF has a particular advantage building relationships with allies and partners around the world. This is due to the selection and professional development efforts within ARSOF that emphasize understanding the human dimension of conflict, empathizing with local cultures, and maintaining language skills. ARSOF is doubling down on these attributes, while other special operations component commands seem to be moving toward other niches within the strategic competition mission space. ARSOF’s emphasis on people skills will continue to be its superpower; further, it will pay dividends in strategic competition by both preparing for conflict “by, with, and through” collaborative partners as well as in the broader relationship building that engenders trust and access across a global network of friendly nations.

Flexibility in deterrence efforts

Consider the challenge of deterrence in strategic competition. Effective bargaining in deterrence necessitates the sending of credible signals to an opponent for the purpose of dissuasion. The central conundrum of deterrence is that “a rational state may choose to run a real risk of . . . war in order to signal that it will fight if not given a good deal in bargaining.” The key, then, is having military capabilities that can serve as highly refined and careful tools of signaling—to achieve the best bargain while not inadvertently escalating to catastrophe. ARSOF elements can serve this function with more flexibility than larger units of the conventional military (which may be more robust in terms of combat power but less manipulable) through their efforts with allies and partners.

There are numerous instances of ARSOF creating deterrent effects through access, placement, and influence. Consider the war in Ukraine today. While US forces left Ukraine at the outset of the Russian invasion, ARSOF left behind robustly trained Ukrainian Special Operations and Information Operations Forces with whom they have partnered since 2014. Eight years of investment by US Army Green Berets, psychological operations, and civil affairs professionals have enabled a lethal and capable Ukrainian SOF vastly superior to its former Cold War Spetsnaz self. It has doubled in size and is now modeled on NATO SOF best practices. These forces have since proved vital on the battlefields of Ukraine, imposing outsized costs on Russian invaders through the “Resistance Operating Concept” imparted by ARSOF efforts, leading in part to a whole of nation resistance in Ukraine. While Russia was not deterred from initially invading Ukraine, these battlefield successes have created a resounding endorsement of the impact of ARSOF’s investment prior to the conflict. The success of Ukraine, due in part to these enablement efforts, is likely tempering the ambitions of further territorial grabs in Eastern Europe—or in the Pacific . However, Ukraine also provides an example of the value of generations of investment by US ARSOF throughout the entire region. The same NATO SOF allies with whom the United States has been training since the end of the Cold War have since taken the lead in continuing to train Ukrainian SOF after the departure of US troops, taking the lessons taught by years of investment by US Green Berets and imparting them to their Ukrainian partners. This is a powerful example of ARSOF having outsized deterrent effects by, with, and through allies and partners.

Collaborative innovation

Consider the challenge of innovation. Radical changes in technology continue to play a pivotal role on the modern battlefield and this ensures that agile innovation will play a critical role in strategic competition. The Department of Defense’s Defense Innovation Board (DIB) recommends how to achieve such innovation: “[Be] rapid, iterative, and risk-tolerant. Instead of giving processes pride of place . . . focus on outcomes, and how to get there most efficiently.” SOF can play a significant role here. As Eliot Cohen observed as far back as 1978, elite units can serve as laboratories to “try out new doctrines, test their validity, and then spread them to the rest of the force.” The track record of ARSOF being such an engine of innovation is well-established and is only picking up steam, from the integration of Global Positioning System (GPS) technology into military operations during the Gulf War, to the recent development of technology to remotely advise and assist partner forces in combat, to current innovation around secure, cloud-enabled data sharing at the tactical edge. Looking forward, an emerging vision for the intimate relationship among a triad of SOF, cyber operations, and space capabilities promises significant potential for increased impact of ARSOF through technologically enabled innovation.

Soldiers partake in Exercise Combined Resolve in Hohenfels, Germany in December 2021. (US Army Photo by Sergeant Patrik Orcutt).

Allies and partners can play a powerful role in enabling such innovation—to the benefit of all parties involved. This partner-driven innovation can occur in active operations. The battlefield impact of Ukrainian SOF discussed above, for example, is punishing Russian invaders today, but will also provide value to US and allied SOF organizations in the future as lessons are culled from their experience. Innovation also occurs in peacetime, and such side-by-side efforts can generate huge benefit. Such partnered innovation can enable the development of home-grown solutions for partner force needs and allow for the invaluable testing of emerging technology in a variety of contexts and conditions, all while building deeper relationships. ARSOF is perfectly postured to take the lead in this type of innovation, which is as much about people as it is about technology.

Leading the way in campaigning

Finally, consider the challenge of active contestation in strategic competition. The term “campaigning” has recently been coined to capture this type of activity; it refers to active efforts to change the relative position of the United States and its adversaries through the steady accrual of advantage while undermining opponents’ efforts to do the same. ARSOF thrives in this space: globally distributed forces can serve as sensors, problem solvers, and executors in the game of steady contestation and have been doing so long before the term was in vogue. Doing so with partners has always been the key to success for such efforts, and ARSOF contributions in this arena will become even more critical in the next few years.

High altitude low opening (HALO) parachute jumpers from 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and soldiers from the Canadian Special Operations Regiment descend to the ground in a joint exercise. (US Army photo by Spc. Steven Young)

Working with partners is a necessary condition for success in any such campaigning activities. Consider Army SOF efforts in Latin America during the 1980s, in which Soviet and Cuban influence was contained through deft application of hard and soft tools in close conjunction with conventional forces, interagency partners and, most importantly, local actors. This represented an effort to synchronize low intensity activities to contest rival influence in a region of high importance to American security. Today, the Indo-Pacific is a region that is ripe for an updated version of such efforts, which would require the careful orchestration of soft and hard elements of power to deter and compete with adversaries. While the Indo-Pacific region is unquestionably dominated by sea power, forward forces with access, placement, cultural expertise, and generational relationships with allies and partners will be vital for the United States before, during, and after any conflict.

Consider the Philippines, where ARSOF has maintained deep ties with Filipino SOF partners since 2002. Though much of this effort has been focused on counterterrorism efforts—as evidenced by US support during the bitter siege of Marawi—it extends to softer efforts as well. In 2013, Super Typhoon Haiyan battered the Philippines. Elements of the Army’s 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) were some of the only elements in the remote areas impacted most heavily by the storm, and their fortuitous presence enabled them to rapidly open airfields, provide aid, and assist in the overall disaster relief efforts. While disaster response was not the purpose of their deployment, it was the forward access and placement already at the point of need that allowed this force to provide such assistance and respond to the crisis. This display of basic human empathy and the readiness to help those in need is a powerful reflection of American values on the world stage.

The results of these generational relationships even reveal themselves at the highest levels. The recent move by the Philippines to prioritize its relationship with the United States over its association with China provides another example of the value of years of investment by ARSOF. When Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte was looking to pivot toward China a few years ago, it was then-Secretary of Defense of the Philippines Delfin Lorenzano who strongly advocated for the value of US partnership over China, which is the direction the Philippines ultimately chose. Lorenzano had previously served as the head of Filipino Special Operations and worked side-by-side with US Army SOF for decades, surely shaping his understanding of the value of the longstanding relationship with the United States. In sum, these successes at active shaping of the strategic landscape are due to the forward placement of ARSOF and the longstanding relationships that emerge.

Conclusion

Relationships matter. This point seems obvious, but it often runs the risk of being lost in the broader push to reorient the American national security establishment toward peer competition. There are monumental challenges of force restructuring and global posturing in order to deter adversaries and prepare to win in conflict—all being conducted while technology is changing at an unprecedented pace. Given this, more traditional necessities such as building and maintaining relationships may be neglected.

We have made the case here that succeeding in strategic competition will be a team sport. It will require persistent and purposeful collaboration with allies and partners in the steady state because you “cannot surge trust.” Building and maintaining such relationships is the true comparative advantage of ARSOF, as these military professionals are just as focused on building relationships as they are at competing directly with adversaries. These partnering skills serve to complement and amplify other efforts in strategic competition, as a small ARSOF mission can exert an outsized effect in deterrence, campaigning, and innovation by identifying and enabling the right collaborative team. It is these skills, coupled with persistent global access and placement, that make ARSOF a low-cost, low-risk, precise, and highly effective instrument in an era of strategic competition.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

About the authors

Major General Richard Angle is a graduate of the US Military Academy and holds advanced degrees from Webster University and the National Defense University’s Eisenhower School. His most recent assignments include the commanding general of 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), the deputy commanding general of Joint Special Operations Command, and the deputy commanding general for operations of US Army Cyber Command.

Leo Blanken is an associate professor in the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, where he is the academic lead for the Applied Design for Innovation graduate curriculum. He has written on irregular warfare, strategic competition, and defense economics. He is the author of Rational Empires: Institutional incentives and Imperial Expansion (University of Chicago Press) and co-editor of Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success and Failure (Georgetown University Press).

Lieutenant Colonel Philip Swintek is a Special Forces officer in the United States Army. He is a graduate of Fordham University and holds masters of science degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School in both defense analysis and space systems operations.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

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Image: U.S. Soldiers with Special Operations Command, Europe, 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Detachment Alpha 0114 participate in heavy weapons train with their Hungarian counterparts at Szolnok Air Base, Hungary, July 10, 2012. This partnership development program in various locations in Hungary is designed to foster good communication and relationships in preparation for upcoming joint deployments to Afghanistan. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Tyler Placie)

atlanticcouncil.org · by Holly · October 13, 2023

2. Hamas Puts Its Pogrom on Video

Excerpts:

The point of the screening, explained Tsach Saar, Israel’s acting consul general, was to show that “this isn’t more of the same.” If you followed previous Gaza wars, you know what he means. Already Israel’s response has been subject to the same cries of moral equivalence, the same demands for a premature cease-fire, the same perversion of international law from its post-Holocaust purpose.

But there’s a difference this time. “There is no political solution with Hamas,” Mr. Saar said, not after Oct. 7. Hamas in Gaza now “threatens the basic contract between Israel’s government and its citizens,” the never-again clause that Israel is a safe haven for the Jews.

As Israel continues its just and necessary defense against Hamas in Gaza and around the world, its citizens will not forget the Hamas-recorded images of Oct. 7. Neither should the rest of us.

Hamas Puts Its Pogrom on Video

The scenes of Oct. 7 explain why this Israeli defensive war is different: It’s about Jewish survival.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/israel-hamas-video-screening-gaza-tsach-saar-31ed88ab?mod=opinion_lead_pos2

By The Editorial Board

Oct. 27, 2023 6:34 pm ET

This image made from video footage taken by a downed Hamas militant and released by Israel Defense Forces shows a Hamas militant walking around a residential Israeli neighborhood on Oct. 7. PHOTO: /ASSOCIATED PRESS

No one at Friday’s screening in New York of the raw footage of Hamas’s atrocities during its Oct. 7 invasion of Israel will forget what they saw. The journalist next to us, at the Israeli consulate in New York, was crying. Mouths seemed to hang open, even after the rampage recorded by jubilant Hamas terrorists on their GoPros had ended, and Israeli officials tried to make sense of what we saw.

Why did the Hamas men, upon confronting the dead body of a teenage girl, start cheering? Why did they argue over who would get to decapitate a Thai guest worker they had shot, then proclaim “Allahu akbar” with every swing at his neck?

“Allahu akbar,” meaning “God is most great,” was on their lips over and over as they shot defenseless civilians, dragged corpses and pumped round after round into the dead. There it was again on the terrorists’ return to Gaza, “Allahu akbar” coming from crowds as a Hamas man pulled by the hair a battered hostage with pants bloodied around her groin.

This isn’t Palestinian nationalism, or a proper understanding of Islam. This is nihilistic jihad. “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it,” Hamas’s founding covenant declares. “The Day of Judgement will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him.”

One of the Hamas men called his parents using the phone of a murdered Israeli woman, unable to contain his pride. “Put Mom on the phone,” he said. “Your son is a hero. . . . I killed 10 Jews with my own hands!” The phone recorded the call, so we can know his goal: “victory or martyrdom.”

Some Hamas men took their time to execute a terrified woman after cornering her and shining a flashlight on her face. One raided the fridge in front of the young children he had just wounded with a grenade that killed their father and brother. During the music-festival massacre, a terrorist paused to put a bullet through each of the porta-potties, one by one, lest a single girl escape.

There were also the shell-shocked faces, heavy breathing and stopped cries of young women hiding in bunkers and dumpsters, knowing they weren’t going to survive. Then came the photos: piles of bodies, bloodied and mutilated, babies burned, families burned together, some with hands tied.

The point of the screening, explained Tsach Saar, Israel’s acting consul general, was to show that “this isn’t more of the same.” If you followed previous Gaza wars, you know what he means. Already Israel’s response has been subject to the same cries of moral equivalence, the same demands for a premature cease-fire, the same perversion of international law from its post-Holocaust purpose.

But there’s a difference this time. “There is no political solution with Hamas,” Mr. Saar said, not after Oct. 7. Hamas in Gaza now “threatens the basic contract between Israel’s government and its citizens,” the never-again clause that Israel is a safe haven for the Jews.

As Israel continues its just and necessary defense against Hamas in Gaza and around the world, its citizens will not forget the Hamas-recorded images of Oct. 7. Neither should the rest of us.

Futura Doctrina

Upgrade to founding

Assault into Gaza

The Challenges of Israel’s Expanded Ground Operation

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/assault-into-gaza?utm

MICK RYAN

OCT 27, 2023

IDF Armoured Bulldozers lead the attack into Gaza. (Image: Twitter / X)

Ground forces are expanding their operations tonight.

Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, Israel Defense Forces spokesman

(This is an update to my 20 October article, Advance into Gaza)

A stepped-up operation by Israel, to advance into Gaza and destroy Hamas, commenced in the past few hours, with armoured bulldozers, tanks and heavy infantry fighting vehicles in the vanguard.

Israeli ground forces have been occupying assembly areas for nearly three weeks, and while there have been small scale raids into Gaza, this expansion of ground operations is the most significant ground incursion into Gaza in recent years. It is likely the size of the Israeli forces involved in the current operation will be larger than those employed in Operation Cast Lead (2008-09) and Operation Protective Edge (2014).

The recent raids into Gaza will have had several objectives. First, they will have been used to gather intelligence on the impact of Israel’s air raids, on the number of civilians remaining in the areas where Israel might stage larger scale attacks, and the responses from Hamas. These small-scale raids will also have been employed to convince any remaining civilians that Israel was serious about its warnings to evacuate. The Israeli’s will have been using these raids to calibrate the responses of its neighbours and its US and European supporters to attacks into Gaza by IDF ground forces.

The Israeli’s will have used the raids to hone their tactics for the days and weeks ahead. At the macro level today’s attacks might seem significant in scale. However, the reality is that what we are seeing – on multiple axes – is the Israelis moving fast with many concurrent raids. Not only will this aim to confuse Hamas commanders about what is happening and why, but it will aim to get inside the decision cycle of the Hamas leadership and ensure their responses are always just a little too late to matter.

Finally, by generating a lot of activity, the Israeli’s will be prompting Hamas fighters to come out and fight, so they can be detected and destroyed.

Today’s ground operation was preceded by air attacks and ‘taking down’ the internet in Gaza. And while no one has accepted responsibility for the internet outage, it will assist Israel in breaking down the command-and-control networks used by Hamas and have an impact on the spread of misinformation in Gaza and beyond.

This attack into Gaza, while having a major ground component, will be a more than just a land combat operation. It will be supported by the Israeli Air Force and Israel’s Navy. Concurrently, the different intelligence services of Israel will be collecting sensitive and open-source information in a meshed civil-military approach, analysing that information and disseminating this intelligence it to tactical leaders in Gaza as well as strategic and political decision makers in Israel.

Israel will also be posturing its forces to deter the development of a second or even third front in northern Israel and the West Bank. Israeli diplomats will be working to gain support for Israel from its friends and partners, while also seeking to mitigate the impact of ground operations with countries in the Middle East and beyond. Israel will also continue its strategic influence campaign to inform and influence many different regional and global audiences, which is part of a wider information war.

As such, this will not be just a ground campaign – it will be a national, multi-dimensional war effort. And in the conduct of this national war effort, there is likely to be multiple challenges for Israel. There are six main challenges for Israel in the days and weeks ahead as it progresses its attack into Gaza to destroy Hamas.

Challenge 1: Aligning Political Purpose and Military Objectives.

The most important element of any military operation is purpose. The ‘why’ of military endeavours is orders of magnitude more crucial than the ‘how’, ‘who’, ‘when’ or ‘where’. This is because people respond to and are inspired by purpose. It is purpose that binds units together and sees soldiers willing to risk their lives in the service of their nation and their fellow citizens.

This purpose must ultimately be derived from political, not military, objectives. It is the most fundamental rule of warfare. As Clausewitz wrote two centuries ago: The political view is the object, war is the means. Thus, the impending military operation that will be executed by the Israelis in and around Gaza must have clear political objectives.

Alignment between political and military actions will be vital in the weeks ahead. Ultimately, the outcome of Israel achieving its political objectives must be a reset in the Israel – Gaza relationship. The strategy employed by Israel in recent years – Mowing the Grass – has failed and a new approach is needed. As RAND expert Raphael Cohen has written:

“Mowing the grass” embodies more than just strategic fatalism; it also reflects a large measure of hubris. At its core lies the assumption that Israel can control the rheostat in Gaza, hitting Hamas just hard enough to deter it from attacking Israel but not so hard that Gaza implodes into chaos or explodes into a regional war. Israel's mowing-the-grass strategy finally failed spectacularly on October 7.

Challenge 2: The Challenge of Imperfect Awareness.

Everything, regardless of whether it is close combat or policy making, is impeded by the impact of imperfect awareness of the tactical, strategic and political environments. Modern technology may provide more visibility of events, but it does not always improve our wisdom about the background of those events, or the array of motivations of the people and organisations involved.

This will be the situation for IDF operations being conducted in Gaza. Despite the very impressive advances in the collection of information, and the use of advanced digital battle command and control systems by the Israelis, uncertainty in combat will still be a significant factor. This uncertainty is magnified by the physical environment. Urban operations, with limited sight lines, the presence of civilians, the uncertainty about the locations of civilian hostages, and the multi-level buildings and subterranean infrastructure (including the Hamas tunnel network), absorb large numbers of troops while at the same time restricting their movements and situational awareness.

Consequently, with a multitude of overhead sensors and even squad-level drones and reconnaissance systems, seeing around the corner or into the next building is a perilous undertaking. It is for this reason that Israel’s heavy main battle tanks, supported by armoured bulldozers, will be a vital element of the infantry-tank-engineer combined arms teams that will provide the vanguard of ground operations. In an environment where surprise is very likely, it is always preferrable to put lots of armour between soldiers and the sources of surprise.

Maintaining awareness is no easier at the political level. Despite Israel’s very fine intelligence services, there will be much scepticism about their insights over the coming weeks because of the massive intelligence failure in the lead up to the 7 October attacks. There are a variety of good articles on this topic if you wish to dig deeper. But, more than ever, Israeli leaders will need good strategic and political intelligence.

Israel will want to understand how its key security partners in Europe and the United States are thinking about the Gaza operations, and how strong their political and diplomatic support might be and how long it might last. The Israeli government will also be watching its regional neighbours – Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar among others – for their reactions to Gaza combat operations. And Israel will be desperate to ascertain information on Iranian, Syrian and Hezbollah intentions for the coming weeks. These unknowns will inform intelligence collection but will also shape and influence the pace and quality of Israeli government decision-making in the period ahead.

Challenge 3: A Changed Military Environment.

While the Israeli military has always been excellent at learning, and remaining at the forefront of tactical and operational theory, even it was surprised by the multidomain assaults conducted by Hamas on 7 October. The simultaneous, large-scale air, sea, ground and information operations executed by Hamas that day imposed tactical and operational shock on the Israelis. This was a deliberate outcome of the Hamas operations to blind border fence sensors and to infiltrate border posts and destroy their communications networks.

Even though it is likely to have been degraded in its capabilities since Israel commenced its aerial bombardment of targets in Gaza nearly three weeks ago, Hamas will seek to use similar measures to deceive, counter and break down Israeli command and control networks during any attack on Gaza. Operating in the urban environment is always tenuous for awareness and communications.

At the same time, the Cambrian Explosion in autonomous systems – driven by the war in Ukraine – has also been exploited by Hamas. Israeli troops will be expecting a battlefield environment where enemy drones will be ubiquitous. Not only will this enhance the situational awareness of Hamas commanders and fighters, it means that Hamas can more effectively exploit its subterranean network to move fighters to the right place at the right time – or to move them away from threats they cannot handle effectively.

The threat from uncrewed aerial systems has already been anticipated by the Israeli’s, who have begun installing protective cages on the roof of tank turrets in the lead up to their Gaza operations. They will also be likely to be issued with array of electronic countermeasures to degrade the threat from Hamas drones. Active protection systems on armoured vehicles will also help improve survivability. But it impossible to remove all threats. As a result, the closing of the ‘detection to destruction’ gap observed during the war in Ukraine is highly likely to feature in any assault into Gaza by the IDF. It will necessitate rapid tactical learning and adaptation, just as the Ukrainians have since February 2022.

Because of the degraded situational awareness in urban environments and the speed at which threats can appear, quick thinking and decisive leadership is required. These leaders, who may only have sporadic contact with their superior headquarters due to jamming or the challenges that urban canyons pose for tactical communications, must exercise good judgement and appreciate that their actions might appear on international news media within minutes of occurrence. This places significant pressure on leaders at all levels. Their understanding of purpose, strategic context and the ethical application of violence to guide their actions will be crucial.

Challenge 4: Civilians and Hostages.

One of the most obvious and difficult challenges for an Israeli assault into Gaza will be the presence of civilians. Gaza is one of the most densely populated locations on earth. As we have witnessed over the last few days, even with warnings from Israel, many citizens of Gaza have either been unable to move to safer locations, have been impeded from doing so, or as is always the case in urban operations, are unwilling to leave.

The IDF ensures that legal advisers review military targets and make recommendations to military commanders on the ramifications under international law of engaging or destroying targets. However, this process is made much more difficult because Hamas often hides in civilian structures and stores munitions in civilian buildings such as schools in the Gaza strip. And, further complicating things, the scale of likely combat in a ground assault means that commanders will rarely have the time or resources to constantly consult with legal officers. While this might be a useful solution during airstrikes, close combat operations have different time pressures.

Therefore, the challenge of civilians in urban areas that are contested is a significant one. In every previous Israeli incursion into Gaza, there have been civilian casualties. This time will be no different. And all those tunnels built under Gaza by Hamas are very unlikely to be used to protect civilians.

Killing and wounding civilians is not only a moral and legal issue. It is a strategic one.

Every report of civilian casualties, rapidly reported by traditional and social media, further engages and enrages interested audiences in the Middle East region and beyond. The recent allegations of an Israeli bombing of a hospital in Gaza, since disproved, is but one example (and the BBC has already apologised for its initial coverage). Such reports result in protests and social unrest – something that no regional country wants (besides Iran, of course). And, as the Gaza hospital issue demonstrates, such civilian casualty events – regardless of who is to blame - can compromise strategic dialog between leaders who are desperate to find solutions to the violence.

The final element of this challenge will be the presence of hostages. Over 200 Israeli citizens and soldiers (as well as some foreign citizens) were abducted by Hamas on 7 October and spirited across the border into Gaza. The hostages are likely to have been separated and dispersed across multiple locations in Gaza. Not only is this a political challenge for the Israeli government, but every soldier also who enters Gaza will have this issue in the back of their mind.

Overall, the challenge of the pervasive presence of civilians in Gaza operations will be extraordinarily difficult for the Israelis to manage.

Challenge 5: Balancing Different Fronts.

While most attention at the moment is being paid to Israel’s preparations for a likely assault into Gaza, this will not be the only front that is concerning Israeli leaders.

The most obvious other contemporary threat is that posed by Hezbollah in the north. Hezbollah is thought to possess upwards of 150 thousand rockets of varying ranges and quality. It is a threat that is an order of magnitude beyond that posed by Hamas.

Hezbollah has a large ground force, with somewhere between 50 and 100 thousand fighters organised mainly into light infantry units. While this is not a force that might be used in an attack into northern Israel, it has been very effective previously in defensive operations. Given the recent innovations in digitised battle command, meshed civil-military sensors and autonomous systems, they are sure to leverage these to maximum advantage.

And, while there have been small scale skirmishes in the past couple of weeks on the northern Israel border, Hezbollah has yet to reveal its intentions. A primary decision point for the Hezbollah leadership will have been the commitment of a large part of the Israeli army into Gaza. Once it has been committed, which it appears is either now underway or about to occur, Hezbollah will assess the opportunities for attacking Israel in the north.

As large and as capable as the IDF is, the Israeli government will not want to be fighting on this second front if it is decisively engaged in Gaza combat operations. But, if Hezbollah and its supporters in Iran see an opportunity to open a second front against Israel, they might do so. Israel’s political and military leaders will be ensuring that they have sufficient forces in northern Israel to deter such an attack.

At the same time, the West Bank is hardly a quiet and calm area. There has been a recent surge in violence on the West Bank, from protests and settler violence. A range of other actors, including the Syrians and Iranians, also pose a threat to Israel.

An important other ‘front’ is the global fight for influence. Information warfare has already been a key element of the current Hamas-Israel War. Hamas began its attacks by livestreaming its barbaric murders and kidnapping of civilians. It has used information warfare to attribute the deaths of all people in Gaza directly to Israel, even when faulty rockets were the reason. In an era where speed of reporting counts, verification can often take second place to getting a story broadcast. As an MIT study found, false news travels faster that factual reports. Therefore, the information battle to combat the surge in misinformation operations and cyber-attacks that accompanied Hamas’ assault into southern Israel will be a key fight in this war.

Challenge 6: The Clock is Ticking.

While the lack of internet services in Gaza will impede transparency for what is occurring in Gaza, information and misinformation will still get out. And as with every previous Israeli operation conducted in Gaza, there will come a point when diplomatic pressure from America and Europe may force a pause in Israeli operation in Gaza.

In the 2021 Israel-Gaza crisis, after nine days of war, President Biden apparently informed the Israeli Prime Minister that: “Hey, man, we are out of runway here.” After Netanyahu insisted on continuing the war, Biden then informed him, “It’s over.” A ceasefire followed two days later.

In the larger 2014 conflict, Israel conducted an eight-day aerial bombardment followed by ground combat over a period of nearly three weeks. Three more weeks of sporadic fighting, rocket fire from Gaza, Israeli airstrikes and the withdrawal of Israel’s ground forces, the 2014 conflict ended. The 2008-2009 Israel-Gaza conflict lasted about three weeks.

All these conflicts featured support but also pressure from the United States and Europe to limit civilian casualties and to end the war as quickly as possible. While the situation this time, in the wake of the 7 October atrocities committed by Hamas is different, Israel will still be under pressure to end the war from many directions.

Israel may have ‘more runway’ in this situation because of the attacks it suffered, but that runway is not infinite. It will need to achieve its military objectives, and set the foundations for longer term political goals before the strategic clock runs out.

Ground Combat Begins

The Gaza operation will tax the Israeli Defence Force, and pose physical, moral and intellectual challenges to the Israeli military and their wider society. Given the magnitude of the recent military mobilization, this is a fight in which every Israeli family has a direct stake.

The coming days and weeks will feature bitter combat on the ground, rocket attacks from Hamas and more airstrikes from Israel. Casualties among Israeli troops, Hamas and Gaza civilians are likely to be high. There will be pulses of combat, and some pauses, as well as many surprises. Both the IDF and Hamas will be learning and adapting in combat as the war continues.

And while Israel has vowed to destroy Hamas, it must also ensure that nothing worse follows in its wake. These military operations, which might continue for some time, should also set the conditions for an eventual ceasefire and transition of authority to the Palestinian Authority – or other entity – that can provide security and governance in Gaza. But that seems a long way away at the moment.

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4. Israel’s Military Tech Fetish Is a Failed Strategy

Excerpts:

At the tactical level, the IDF never had the illusion that emerging technologies will make military conflict any less bloody or combat-intensive. As the IDF has acknowledged, casualties on both sides could be severe and the campaign protracted, despite the IDF’s preference for short and decisive operations. This could be compounded by the lack of combined arms training of both active and reserve units, with the exception of a number of elite formations.

Even if the IDF has shown itself to be highly adaptable to swiftly changing tactical situations in the past, going into battle right now could still prove risky. Its forces are in the middle of doctrinal and technological adaptation, premised on the belief of emerging technological capabilities such as AI. In practice, the half-abandonment of existing doctrine combined with only a rudimentary understanding of the new operating concept could lead to a marked increase in friction during IDF operations. This could degrade the impending offensive to little more than the familiar “mowing the grass” tactic but on a larger and more protracted scale. An overall victory could prove illusory.

At the political and more strategic level, the continued belief in qualitative military superiority based on superior technology could lead Israelis to be overly optimistic compared with the reality of the war. This could allow the Netanyahu government to muddle through despite the likely failure—at least for a while.

Israel’s Military Tech Fetish Is a Failed Strategy

A fixation on technology created an illusion of safety—and an excuse to avoid hard choices.

By Franz-Stefan Gady, a senior fellow for cyber power and future conflict at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Foreign Policy · by Franz-Stefan Gady · October 26, 2023

We are still in the early phase of Operation Swords of Iron, the name of the Israeli military response to the horrific Hamas-led massacre of more than 1,400 Israelis on Oct. 7. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has predicted a “long war.” Amid an intensifying aerial bombing campaign, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are gearing up for a large-scale ground invasion of densely populated Gaza. The IDF is expected to face stiff resistance on the ground by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other groups, which will try to leverage the urban terrain, civilian population, and vast labyrinth of underground tunnels—dubbed the Gaza metro—for asymmetric advantages in this fight.

The IDF, built around a system of universal conscription and reserve service, is considered one of the best militaries in the world. Its air force and special operations units are the envy of many a NATO general. A key element that makes the IDF a potent force is the United States’ long-standing commitment to maintaining the Israelis’ qualitative military superiority over potential adversaries by providing roughly $3.8 billion a year in military assistance. Coupled with the IDF’s lavish use of Israel’s thriving tech sector, this allows the IDF to field an expensive, high-tech military, including cutting-edge air and missile defense systems, stealth fighters, as well as advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

Yet it may be exactly this IDF quest for high-tech superiority over low-tech adversaries, such as Hamas, that has clouded its vision. Not only did the IDF’s sense of technological superiority contribute to its failure to anticipate a sophisticated combined arms attack on Oct. 7, but it may also be a tactical disadvantage in the expected ground campaign in Gaza. This wouldn’t be the first time it has been a problem: Analysts have pointed out that a “cult of technology” contributed to the IDF’s poor performance in the 2006 Lebanon War.

The reasons the IDF’s high-tech focus can backfire are interrelated. First, at the level of strategy and politics, Israel’s trust in technological superiority helped policymakers and senior military officers fall victim to the illusion that there were no hard choices to be made in Israel’s military strategy. Second, overreliance on such technology at the tactical level contributed to a defensive mindset within the IDF that may have allowed important skills, such as the ability to conduct complex combined arms operations when attacking, to atrophy. These weaknesses in the IDF’s ability to attack have been identified by Israel’s defense community as an issue for many years, and the IDF is currently in the middle of a process of doctrinal and structural adaptation as it experiments with a new warfighting concept. This incomplete process makes the timing of the impending land campaign suboptimal, to say the least.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s strategic myopia and hubris that led him to be blindsided on Oct. 7 was enabled by the trust that the IDF and Israel’s other security services had in their technological sophistication. It did so by creating the sense that Israel could have its cake and eat it, too, without the need to make any trade-offs: It could strive for better relations with its Arab neighbors while convincing itself that it was managing and containing Hamas and its allies—avoiding any need to deal with the immediate military threats posed by highly motivated, disciplined, and increasingly technologically sophisticated nonstate adversaries in Gaza and southern Lebanon.

The best symbol of this attitude is the “smart” border fence, a barricade along the Gaza Strip 20 feet high, 40 miles long, and fitted with sophisticated sensors and remote-operated machine guns. The fence, also called the Iron Wall, led to the tragically mistaken belief that there was no need for large numbers of IDF boots on the ground to guard against intrusions, which permitted more IDF ground forces to be deployed to the West Bank and elsewhere—or not to be raised at all. This false sense of security was compounded by the belief that Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system, first introduced in 2011 and designed to intercept short-range rockets and artillery, would offer adequate protection against rocket and artillery attacks from Gaza and southern Lebanon in the event of a larger-scale conflict. Further cementing the belief that there were no longer hard strategic choices to make were Israel’s sophisticated ISR capabilities, which make Gaza, southern Lebanon, and the West Bank some of the most surveilled and watched swaths of lands in the world. This, the Israelis believed, would provide ample warning time to respond to any emerging military threat.

At the strategic level of political and military decision-making, the fixation on high tech had direct consequences for the character of IDF operations. For one thing, it helped shape a more defense-oriented tactical doctrine relying on firepower (primarily missile strikes from the air) rather than maneuvering ground forces to achieve military objectives. This doctrine is best expressed by the IDF’s strategy of “mowing the grass”—attacking the Hamas leadership and some of its militaryinfrastructure to manage rather than eradicate the group. This strategy required only limited ground incursions into Gaza, the last of which took place in 2014.

One consequence of the “mowing the grass” strategy was that the IDF saw even less need to be ready for large-scale ground operations. As a result, the combined arms skills of its line units on the ground have declined in recent years. Instead of preparing for future wars, these units were busy policing the West Bank and protecting settlers.

In trying to remedy its overreliance on defensive tactics and limited attacks, the IDF is currently developing a new operating concept called Decisive Victory—which risks falling into the technological trap once again. Decisive Victory is built on the same sorts of premises as many new operational concepts of NATO militaries: multidomain, combined arms operations supported by artificial intelligence, where dispersed and more autonomous forces apply precision firepower to quickly defeat an adversary. This involves a combination of precision strikes from the air; smaller, more agile, and more rapidly deployable ground units; and the use of machine learning to help identify, track, and engage targets.

Decisive Victory, in short, is built on the premise that superior ISR capabilities paired with AI and smart munitions will increase the IDF’s combat effectiveness while reducing the size of the forces needed to effectively conduct military operations. As the Oct. 7 attack showed, however, if the technologies underlying your conception of warfare are destroyed or overwhelmed and you lack boots on the ground, overreliance on technology creates a single point of failure. Without traditional military assets such as larger-scale, rapidly deployable forces, the IDF risks having no Plan B to quickly respond to a dynamic attack or other fast-evolving military situations.

To be clear, the IDF has not yet implemented the new operating concept, in part because of delays in the five-year Tnufa program of military reforms initiated in 2020. Another reason is that the IDF is still testing and experimenting with its new operating concept.

For example, the IDF set up an experimental unit of special operations forces called Ghost to test some of the core tenets of Decisive Victory. (The unit’s commander was killed in combat on Oct. 7.) Elements of Decisive Victory can also be found across many other units within the IDF, and its tenets are certainly impacting operational planning for the upcoming ground invasion of Gaza.

What does the IDF’s continued fixation on high-tech solutions mean for an invasion of Gaza and beyond?

At the tactical level, the IDF never had the illusion that emerging technologies will make military conflict any less bloody or combat-intensive. As the IDF has acknowledged, casualties on both sides could be severe and the campaign protracted, despite the IDF’s preference for short and decisive operations. This could be compounded by the lack of combined arms training of both active and reserve units, with the exception of a number of elite formations.

Even if the IDF has shown itself to be highly adaptable to swiftly changing tactical situations in the past, going into battle right now could still prove risky. Its forces are in the middle of doctrinal and technological adaptation, premised on the belief of emerging technological capabilities such as AI. In practice, the half-abandonment of existing doctrine combined with only a rudimentary understanding of the new operating concept could lead to a marked increase in friction during IDF operations. This could degrade the impending offensive to little more than the familiar “mowing the grass” tactic but on a larger and more protracted scale. An overall victory could prove illusory.

At the political and more strategic level, the continued belief in qualitative military superiority based on superior technology could lead Israelis to be overly optimistic compared with the reality of the war. This could allow the Netanyahu government to muddle through despite the likely failure—at least for a while.

Foreign Policy · by Franz-Stefan Gady · October 26, 2023

5. China passes new law to promote ‘love of motherland’ in schools

I know we have some politicians who think like this, e.g., that you can legislate loyalty.

China passes new law to promote ‘love of motherland’ in schools

The Times · by Richard Lloyd Parry, Asia Editor · October 27, 2023

China has passed a new law imposing “patriotic education” on the country’s schools, making it mandatory for teachers to promote “love of the motherland” and illegal for them question the version of history propagated by the Chinese Communist Party.

The Patriotic Education Law, which comes into force next year, was passed on Tuesday by the National People’s Congress in Beijing. It will provoke resentment among many Hongkongers, some of whom are moving abroad because of the propagandistic tone of the territory’s formerly liberal education system, following Beijing’s crackdown on protests in 2019.

“The legislation was carried out amid public expectations to promote patriotic education, which is facing challenges including the influences of some social thoughts, such as historical nihilism, in recent years,” the Xinhua state news agency wrote. “Some people are at a loss about what is patriotism.”

Historical nihilism is a term applied by the Chinese Communist Party to opinions and interpretations that challenge or contradict the official version of history. According to the new law: “Schools of all levels and types should integrate patriotic education throughout the entire process of school education, deliver high-quality ideological and political theory courses.”

Patriotic education is not confined to the classroom. “The parents or other guardians of minors should integrate a love for the motherland into family education, support and co-operate with schools in carrying out patriotic education and teaching activities, and guide and encourage minors to participate in patriotic education social activities,” the law says.

It also includes a list of offences subject to punishment, from “damaging the dignity” of the national flag and national anthem, “denying the deeds” of those designated by the government as “heroes and martyrs”, and “denying aggressive wars, aggression, and acts of massacre”.

The concept of patriotic education is not new to China — the new law is part of the effort by President Xi to codify in law existing common practice in Chinese society.

President Xi is overseeing the new law coming into force, as China aims to enforce patriotic behaviour

NOEL CELIS/AFP VIA GETTY

The new law will be used to promote the development of “patriotic education sites” celebrating personalities and key moments in party history at museums, libraries and memorial halls. As the education law was being passed in Beijing, John Lee, the chief executive, gave a speech in Hong Kong in which he outlined changes to the territory’s schools.

The huge pro-democracy demonstrations of 2019 were dominated by young Hongkongers, born after the territory was returned to China in 1997 following a century of British colonial rule. The existence of a generation, entirely educated under Chinese rule but who vehemently opposed the Chinese Communist Party, was a shock to the Beijing authorities.

In 2020, Lee, a hardline supporter of China, said that reforming education would be a priority. “The main task is to cleanse it of ‘bad apples’ to save the students from being poisoned,” he said, when he was serving as Hong Kong’s chief secretary.

General studies, a curriculum which was used to promote critical thinking, will be abolished in Hong Kong primary schools and replaced by teaching about Chinese history and culture.

A Chinese culture promotion office will be established as well as a new museum dedicated to China’s “development and achievements”. A Museum of Coastal Defence will highlight Chinese resistance during the Second World War.

Lee also said that Hong Kong will enact its own version of the Chinese national security law, which has been successfully used to suppress political opposition in the territory since it came into force in 2020.

“We must guard against those seeking to provoke conflict, misinform or spread rumours through different channels, and remain alert to acts of ‘soft resistance’ in different forms that can undermine the governance of our country,” he said.

The Times · by Richard Lloyd Parry, Asia Editor · October 27, 2023

6. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 27, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2023

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 27.
Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 26 to 27
Unspecified actors attempted to assassinate Russian-backed former separatist Ukrainian politician Oleg Tsaryov on October 27.
Russian authorities reportedly arrested Russian citizens who allegedly used Telegram channels, including some that identify themselves as insider sources, to extort money from Russian officials.
Russian authorities have likely coerced Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) into joining a “volunteer” formation that will fight in Ukraine, which would constitute an apparent violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War.
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on October 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on October 26 that Russian forces have suffered thousands of casualties and have lost at least 125 armored vehicles in recent offensive operations near Avdiivka.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, southwest of Donetsk City, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia and advanced near Bakhmut.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov announced the formation of a second Chechen volunteer formation named for a second Chechen figure who fought against imperial Russian rule.
Russian occupation authorities cracked down against pro-Ukrainian Telegram channels operating in occupied Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 27, 2023

Oct 27, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 27, 2023

Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 27, 2023, 5:45pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on October 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on October 27 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced further south under the Antonivsky road bridge north of Oleshky (7km south of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River).[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[2]

Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Voronezh Oblast and six Shahed-131/136 drones from the near Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and that Ukrainian forces destroyed five Shaheds over Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts.[3] Ukrainian Air Force Command Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on October 27 that Russian forces launched over 500 Shaheds targeting critical infrastructure and military facilities in Ukraine in September 2023.[4] Ihnat also stated that the composite materials for the fuselage of modernized Shaheds make them harder to detect and that weather conditions do not affect Russian Shahed operations.[5]

Germany and Denmark announced new military aid packages to Ukraine on October 27. The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced a package of military materiel support for Ukraine valued at 3.7 billion kroner (about $520 million) that includes T-72 tanks, BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, artillery ammunition, and drones.[6] The German government announced a military aid package valued at around 5.4 billion euros (about $5.7 billion) that includes MARS II anti-aircraft missiles and an additional IRIS-T SLM air defense system.[7]

Unspecified actors attempted to assassinate Russian-backed former separatist Ukrainian politician Oleg Tsaryov on October 27. Tsaryov’s Telegram channel reported that unspecified actors shot Tsaryov twice at his home in occupied Yalta, Crimea.[8] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) opened an investigation into the assassination attempt against Tsaryov.[9] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Tsaryov is in intensive care.[10] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Kremlin did not have information on the assassination attempt against Tsaryov.[11]

Russian authorities reportedly arrested Russian citizens who allegedly used Telegram channels, including some that identify themselves as insider sources, to extort money from Russian officials. Russian state media outlet TASS reported on October 27 that the Tverskoy Court of Moscow arrested Anton Safonov and detained Stanislav Daineko, both of whom work in public relations, for extorting more than 2 million rubles (about $21,200) from Rostec Director for Special Assignments Vasily Brovko in exchange for not publishing potentially compromising information on the “Nebrekhnya” Telegram channel.[12] The ”Provisional Government” Telegram channel, which stated that it has previously published allegations about Brovko’s involvement in corruption schemes, claimed that Brovko has close ties to the well-connected Rostec Director, Sergei Chemezov.[13] Another Russian insider source claimed on October 26 and 27 that Brovko initiated searches of the administrators of the ”Nebrekhnya“ and ”Provisional Government” channels, but the ”Provisional Government” Telegram channel denied claims on October 27 that authorities searched and detained its own administrators.[14] A Russian insider source claimed that the case concerns events from April to August 2022 that involved more than 20 Telegram channels, including some insider sources and the ”Nebrekhnya” and ”Provisional Government” channels.[15] Russian authorities have previously detained reported administrators of popular Telegram insider source channels that possibly used secret information to extort Russian officials.[16]

Russian authorities have likely coerced Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) into joining a “volunteer” formation that will fight in Ukraine, which would constitute an apparent violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. Russian state media reported on October 27 that the “Bogdan Khmelnitsky” volunteer battalion “recruited” roughly 70 Ukrainian POWs from various Russian penal colonies, has begun training, and will deploy to an unspecified area of the front line upon completion of training.[17] Coercing POWs into combat would be a violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, which stipulates that “no prisoner of war may at any time be sent to or detained in areas where he may be exposed to the fire of the combat zone” and shall not “be employed on labor which is of an unhealthy or dangerous nature,” as ISW has previously reported.[18]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 27.
Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 26 to 27
Unspecified actors attempted to assassinate Russian-backed former separatist Ukrainian politician Oleg Tsaryov on October 27.
Russian authorities reportedly arrested Russian citizens who allegedly used Telegram channels, including some that identify themselves as insider sources, to extort money from Russian officials.
Russian authorities have likely coerced Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) into joining a “volunteer” formation that will fight in Ukraine, which would constitute an apparent violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War.
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on October 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on October 26 that Russian forces have suffered thousands of casualties and have lost at least 125 armored vehicles in recent offensive operations near Avdiivka.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, southwest of Donetsk City, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia and advanced near Bakhmut.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov announced the formation of a second Chechen volunteer formation named for a second Chechen figure who fought against imperial Russian rule.
Russian occupation authorities cracked down against pro-Ukrainian Telegram channels operating in occupied Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 27 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed on October 26 and 27 that Russian forces advanced near Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk) and captured unspecified positions south of Torske (15km west of Kreminna), although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces captured unspecified positions in the Kupyansk direction over the past week.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk), Petropavlivka (6km east of Kupyansk), Ivanivka, Nadiya (15km southwest of Svatove), Makiivka (21km southwest of Svatove), and Kreminna.[21] Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated on October 27 that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction have been operating fewer loitering munitions and have decreased the rate of shelling by half due to rain.[22] Geolocated footage published on October 27 shows elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) operating near Kreminna.[23]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 27. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka, Tymkivka (18km east of Kupyansk), and Serhiivka (12km southwest of Svatove).[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Petropavlivka.[25]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations near Bakhmut on October 27 but did not make any confirmed or claimed gains. Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated that Ukrainian forces are conducting an “active defense” in the Bakhmut direction and conduct offensive actions to improve their tactical positions when they have the opportunity to do so.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction.[27] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[28]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations near Bakhmut on October 27 and made confirmed gains. Geolocated footage published on October 26 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of the Berkhivka reservoir (6km north of Bakhmut).[29] Additional geolocated footage published on October 27 indicates that Russian forces made marginal gains west of Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled five Russian assaults near Bohdanivka and Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut) and over 10 Russian assaults near Klishchiivka and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[31] Fityo stated on October 27 that 20 combat engagements occurred over the past day.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked near Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) and described Russian forces as trying to seize the initiative in the Bakhmut direction.[33] A Russian media aggregator claimed that Russian forces advanced at heights northeast of Khromove and recaptured positions near the railway line east of Klishchiivka on October 26.[34]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on October 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled more than 20 Russian assaults near Stepove (3km north of Avdiivka), Avdiivka, Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Tonenke (5km west of Avdiivka), and Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[35] Russian milbloggers claimed on October 26 and 27 that Russian forces advanced north from Opytne (4km south of Avdiivka) and established control over positions 1.5km southwest of Avdiivka near the T0505 (Spartak-Avdiivka) highway, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed on October 26 and 27 that Russian forces bypassed Ukrainian fortified positions near the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant on Avdiivka’s southern outskirts.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed on October 26 and 27 that Russian forces advanced closer to the Avdiivka Coke Plant and consolidated further control over positions at the Avdiivka waste heap north of Avdiivka.[38] Russian sources claimed on October 26 and 27 that Russian forces continued to advance near the railway line north of Avdiivka and towards Stepove, although ISW has not seen visual confirmation of these claims.[39] A Ukrainian military observer stated on October 27 that Russian forces have captured the Avdiivka waste heap and have made unspecified advances near the railway line north of Avdiivka.[40] The Ukrainian military observer stated that Russian forces are achieving unspecified successes in the Vodyane-Tonenke (7km southwest to 5km west of Avdiivka) direction, and a Russian milblogger claimed on October 26 that Russian forces advanced from Vodyane to the outskirts of Pervomaiske.[41] The Ukrainian military observer claimed that the command of Russia’s 8th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) has changed tactics in the Avdiivka area and is now instructing tactical groups on Avdiivka’s northern and southern flanks to alternate assaults.[42] Russian forces are conducting regular assaults north and south of Avdiivka but have only made some gains on Avdiivka’s northern flank and only a few marginal gains on the southern flank since starting larger offensive efforts on October 10.

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets offered new information about the deployment of Russian units and formations participating in the Russian effort to encircle Avdiivka as of October 27. Mashovets stated that elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 1st Army Corps (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District) are responsible for Avdiivka’s southern flank and that elements of the DNR 1st Army Corps, the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps, Western Military District) and the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army) are responsible for the section of the front immediately south of Avdiivka.[43] Mashovets stated that elements of the 115th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the DNR 1st Army Corps), the 1140th Territorial Defense Motorized Rifle Regiment, the 109th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the mobilization reserves, and the 277th Motorized Rifle Battalion (likely of the DNR 1st Army Corps) are operating on Avdiivka’s northern flank.[44] Mashovets also added that the Russian command has deployed elements of the 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District) as an operational reserve for Russian operations south of Avdiivka and elements of the 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade and two motorized rifle regiments and a regiment of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division to act as an operational reserve for operations north of Avdiivka.[45]

Western and Russian sources continue to report that Russian forces have suffered heavy losses and are experiencing pronounced morale issues near Avdiivka. US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on October 26 that Russian forces have suffered thousands of casualties and have lost at least 125 armored vehicles in recent offensive operations near Avdiivka.[46] Kirby also stated that the US has observed Russian forces executing those who refuse to follow orders in the Avdiivka direction as well as Russian commanders threatening to shoot entire units if they retreat from Ukrainian artillery fire in the area.[47] Russian sources described Russian morale near Avdiivka as incredibly poor, with one Russian milblogger claiming that morale was a determining factor in Russian failures at the start of the renewed offensive effort near Avdiivka.[48]

Ukrainian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed counterattacks near Avdiivka on October 27.

Russian forces continued offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City on October 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled over 19 Russian assaults near Marinka (immediately southwest of Donetsk City) and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[49]

The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Marinka.[50]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on October 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Vodyane (6km northeast of Vuhledar).[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults near Mykilske (4km southeast of Vuhledar).[52]

The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Vuhledar between October 21 and October 27.[53]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted limited offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on October 27. The Russian “Vostok” Battalion, which operates southeast of Velyka Novosilka, claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near the battalion’s positions, possibly along the Novodonetske-Novomayorske (12km to 18m southeast of Velyka Novosilka) line.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on October 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Zolota Nyva (11km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in the direction of Staromayorske and from Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[56] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) are consolidating control over recently captured positions northeast of Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of recent Russian advances in this area.[57] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces improved their positions in the south Donetsk direction (western Donetsk Oblast and Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) in the past week.[58]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances on October 27. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in the direction of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces withdrew from positions near Nesteryanka (12 km northwest of Robotyne) following a Ukrainian counterattack in the area.[60] Russian sources claimed on October 26 and 27 that Ukrainian forces attacked northwest of Verbove (9km east of Robotyne) and near Nesteryanka, Kopani (6km northwest of Robotyne), Rivne (8km west of Robotyne), Robotyne, and Novoprokopivka (3km south of Robotyne).[61] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted 19 unsuccessful attacks near Robotyne and Verbove in the past week.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on October 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked northwest of Verbove.[63] Another Russian milblogger claimed on October 26 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of positions near Verbove and conducted a series of counterattacks along the Kopani-Robotyne-Novoprokopivka-Verbove line (6km northwest to 9km east of Robotyne).[64]

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 27. Geolocated footage published on October 27 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced further south under the Antonivsky road bridge north of Oleshky (7km south of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River).[65] A prominent Russian milblogger, who previously claimed on October 25 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson Oblast and 2km from the Dnipro River), claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Krynky as of October 26 despite Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of the settlement.[66] The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Pishchanivka (14km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River) and continue to operate along the road near Pidstepne (18km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River) and Kozachi Laheri (22km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River).[67] The Russian milblogger claimed that seven Ukrainian “assault groups” are operating on the east bank of Kherson Oblast but has yet to describe the size of these groups.[68]

Russian forces are likely worried about future Ukrainian strikes targeting Russian airfields in Russian rear areas. Satellite imagery dated October 26 indicates that Russian forces have likely painted four outlines of MiG-31 aircraft on the flight line at Belbek airfield near occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, likely intended to draw Ukrainian targeting from the four real MiG-31 remaining at the airfield.[69] ISW previously assessed that the Ukrainian ATACMS strikes on operationally significant Russian airfields in Ukraine on October 17 will likely prompt the Russian command to disperse aviation assets and withdraw some aircraft to airfields further from the frontline.[70]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov announced the formation of a second Chechen volunteer formation named after a Chechen figure who fought against imperial Russian rule. Kadyrov announced the creation of the “Baysangur Benoyevsky” volunteer battalion, named after a deputy of 19th-century Chechen insurgent leader Imam Shamil.[71] ISW assessed on October 24 that Kadyrov appears to be struggling to balance appealing to his Chechen Muslim constituencies while maintaining the support of the Kremlin due to the Kremlin’s support for Russian ultranationalism and Orthodoxy.[72]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities cracked down against pro-Ukrainian Telegram channels operating in occupied Ukraine. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reported on October 27 that it arrested the administrators of two pro-Ukrainian channels that encouraged users to collect data on Russian military assets and movements in August 2023.[73] The FSB also claimed that the FSB killed an allegedly armed intelligence agent who resisted arrest during the detentions.[74] The FSB likely publicized these arrests now to deter further security risks in occupied Ukraine.

Russian occupation authorities continue to struggle to compensate employees of Russian state enterprises in occupied Kherson Oblast. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported that employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in occupied Skadovsk, Kherson Oblast, the “Khersonoblenergo” State Unitary Enterprise, a kindergarten in Novotroitske, and a forestry enterprise in Hola Prystan Raion reported receiving one or no salary payments since summer 2023.[75] Vazhnye Istorii reported that the Kherson Oblast occupation authorities also struggle to pay pensions and other social benefits.[76]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated boilerplate Kremlin rhetoric about Ukrainian weapons during a Russian Security Council meeting on October 27 intended to undermine Western support for Ukraine. Putin reiterated claims that illegal weapons enter Russia through Ukraine and undermine Russian security.[77] Ukrainian and Western officials have repeatedly denied these claims, and ISW has observed no evidence supporting the Kremlin’s claims.[78]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continued to indicate his unwillingness to involve the Belarusian military in the war in Ukraine. Lukashenko stated on October 26 that Belarus is committed to peace with its neighbors and does not want to fight because “it would cost [Belarus] dearly.”[79] ISW continues to assess that Belarus is a co-belligerent in the Russian war in Ukraine, is involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children, and may be facilitating sanctions evasion schemes for Russia, but is extremely unlikely to commit its own military forces to fighting Ukraine.[80]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

7. Iran Update, October 27, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-27-2023

Key Takeaways:

Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip conducted rocket attacks into Israel at roughly half their usual rate on October 27.
The IDF conducted five raids into the Gaza Strip on October 27, and IDF ground forces will expand their operations overnight.
Palestinian militants clashed with Israeli security forces across the West Bank at a higher rate on October 27, amid Israeli arrest raids.
Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), resumed attacks as part of an ongoing attack campaign targeting IDF radar and sensor sites and military targets.
The United States conducted two self-defense airstrikes targeting “IRGC-affiliated targets” in response to drone and rocket attacks against US forces in Iraq and Syria.
The Iran-backed Houthi movement conducted a drone attack targeting southern Israel on October 27.
Iran and its Axis of Resistance are continuing to signal their willingness and capability to escalate against the United States and Israel from multiple fronts.

IRAN UPDATE, OCTOBER 27, 2023

Oct 27, 2023 - ISW Press

Iran Update, October 27, 2023

Andie Parry, Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Brian Carter, and Peter Mills

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments and in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Key Takeaways:

Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip conducted rocket attacks into Israel at roughly half their usual rate on October 27.
The IDF conducted five raids into the Gaza Strip on October 27, and IDF ground forces will expand their operations overnight.
Palestinian militants clashed with Israeli security forces across the West Bank at a higher rate on October 27, amid Israeli arrest raids.
Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), resumed attacks as part of an ongoing attack campaign targeting IDF radar and sensor sites and military targets.
The United States conducted two self-defense airstrikes targeting “IRGC-affiliated targets” in response to drone and rocket attacks against US forces in Iraq and Syria.
The Iran-backed Houthi movement conducted a drone attack targeting southern Israel on October 27.
Iran and its Axis of Resistance are continuing to signal their willingness and capability to escalate against the United States and Israel from multiple fronts.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Erode the will of Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip conducted rocket attacks into Israel at roughly half their usual rate on October 27.[1] The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas’ militant wing—claimed responsibility for five indirect fire attacks.[2] Three of these attacks targeted Tel Aviv and injured several Israeli civilians there.[3] Saraya al Quds—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed responsibility for six rocket attacks, including an attack using a Badr-3 rocket on Ashkelon.[4] The Badr-3 rocket is produced in Gaza and has a 400 kilogram warhead, whereas Palestinian militias most frequently fire Qassem rockets with five kilograms of explosives.[5] Axis of Resistance-affiliated media reported one unclaimed anti-tank munition attack on Israeli forces.[6]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Israeli Ground Operations in the Gaza Strip

The IDF conducted five raids into the Gaza Strip on October 27, and IDF ground forces will expand their operations overnight.[7] The IDF 13th Fleet deployed a tactical unit, ships, and aircraft in a naval raid on Rafah beach in the southern Gaza Strip on October 27.[8] An IDF spokesperson stated that the unit ”destroyed terrorist infrastructures of the Hamas terrorist organization and operated in a compound used by the organization's naval commando forces.”[9] The IDF 36th Division also conducted a raid into central Gaza near Shujayyah using infantry, armor, and engineering units supported by helicopter gunships.[10] The IDF stated the Shujayyah operation had dozens of targets including anti-tank guided missile launch positions and Hamas operational headquarters and militants.[11] Axis media and social media users reported three other armed clashes between Palestinian militias and IDF troops in central and northern Gaza.[12] The IDF spokesperson disclosed IDF group operations in the Gaza Strip will intensify overnight.[13]

The al Qassem Brigades and Axis media incorrectly framed the naval raid engagement as a success for its militants by claiming they forced an IDF withdrawal and air engagement.[14] US military doctrine defines a raid as “an operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an enemy, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability culminating with a planned withdrawal.”[15] The IDF withdrawal after the operation is consistent with the US military doctrinal definition of a raid, which includes a planned retrograde at the end of the mission. The IDF used air support to assist their elements’ withdrawal during the naval raid.[16]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Hamas leadership is urgently calling for further resistance in the West Bank. Hamas Political Bureau leader Ismail Haniyeh called for louder condemnation of Israeli attacks in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.[17] Haniyeh claimed on October 7 that the Al Aqsa Flood Operation began in the Gaza Strip and will extend to the West Bank.[18] A cybersecurity monitoring group said it had observed the largest single internet disruption in the Gaza Strip since hostilities began, amounting to a “total or near total blackout of internet service.”[19] Hamas Political Bureau member Hussam Badran made an urgent appeal to people in the West Bank that “this is the time for weapons.”[20]

Hamas and PIJ claimed their militants died while confronting IDF forces in Jenin. Saraya al Quds mourned a prominent field commander in its Jenin Battalion who died “supporting Gaza” in Jenin.[21] Hamas mourned three militants who died in clashes in the West Bank in Jenin and Qalqiya.[22] Ismail Haniyeh noted that the martyrs of the al Qassem Brigades are the same as Saraya al Quds Brigades and LH throughout the country in a speech on October 26.[23]

Palestinian militants clashed with Israeli security forces across the West Bank at a higher rate on October 27, amid Israeli arrest raids. The IDF, Shin Bet, and Border Police forces arrested 36 Palestinians, including 17 Hamas operatives, in the West Bank. Israel is dismantling Hamas and PIJ command structures in the West Bank.[24] The Palestinian Authority reported that four Palestinians died overnight during Israeli raids in the West Bank.[25]

ISW recorded 14 distinct clashes between Palestinians and Israeli security forces across the West Bank. Saraya Al Quds-Tubas Brigade used an explosive device during clashes with IDF forces in Tubas.[26] CTP-ISW recorded two other instances of Palestinians using IEDs in the northern West Bank.[27]
CTP-ISW recorded eight anti-Israel demonstrations, a majority of which occurred after the internet cuts in the Gaza Strip. Hamas and the PIJ-affiliated Quds News Network reported on their Telegram pages that there are calls for marches in all areas of the West Bank and Jerusalem following the interruption of communication in the Gaza Strip.[28] Palestinians in Ramallah chanted “if you have a rifle, you should either kill a Jew or give it to Hamas.”[29]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), resumed attacks as part of an ongoing attack campaign targeting IDF radar and sensor sites and military targets. LH claimed six anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) attacks on IDF positions along the border with Lebanon on October 27. This is consistent with its rate of attacks prior to October 26.[30] LH did not claim any attacks on October 26 for the first time since CTP-ISW began recording LH claims on October 11.[31] IDF forces responded to the ATGM attacks with artillery fire targeting locations in southern Lebanon where militants had fired into Israel.[32] LH claimed its attacks inflicted ”confirmed casualties”, but the IDF denied that it suffered any casualties.[33] LH has acknowledged that at least 44 of its fighters have died since October 9 due to Israeli attacks responding to LH attacks on IDF forces and Israeli communities along the Lebanese border.[34]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The United States conducted two self-defense airstrikes targeting “IRGC-affiliated targets” in response to drone and rocket attacks against US forces in Iraq and Syria.[35] The United States targeted weapons and an ammunition storage facility near Albu Kamal, Syria.[36] US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin highlighted Iran’s role in attacks against US forces in his statement acknowledging the US airstrikes.[37] A US defense official said that the United States selected the targets to “send a message” to militia groups while “mitigating the risk of escalation.”[38] A local Syrian opposition outlet reported that the airstrike targeted a building used to “hold meetings and receive people coming from Iraq.”[39] It added that the last meeting was held a “few days ago” with “leaders” from the IRGC.[40] The same source reported no casualties in the airstrikes.[41]

The Islamic Resistance of Iraq launched one drone at US forces at Ain al Assad airbase, Iraq on October 27 in response to the US airstrikes.[42] The Islamic Resistance of Iraq claimed the attack roughly 10 hours after the US airstrikes. Iranian state media and local media reported two other rocket attacks targeting US facilities in northeastern Syria on October 26-27.[43] The United States did not confirm these attacks, nor did the Islamic Resistance of Iraq claim the attacks.

The Iran-backed Houthi movement conducted a drone attack targeting southern Israel on October 27.[44] The IDF said that it intercepted an "unknown aerial target” over the Red Sea on October 27.[45] At least two unspecified drones originating in the “Red Sea area” struck Egyptian territory near Taba, a resort town adjacent to Eilat, Israel, and near Nuweiba, 70 kilometers from the Israeli border.[46] The US Navy warship USS Carney intercepted nearly 20 drones and missiles launched by the Houthis from Yemen on October 18.[47]

Iran and its Axis of Resistance are continuing to signal their willingness and capability to escalate against the United States and Israel from multiple fronts. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stated in an interview with NPR on October 27 that Palestinian and Lebanese resistance groups have plans that are “more powerful and deeper than what [the United States] has witnessed.”[48] Abdollahian has previously issued similar warnings. He warned on October 14 that the Axis of Resistance has its “hands on the trigger” and will respond to Israel “at an appropriate time” if Israel continues to attack the Gaza Strip.[49] Abdollahian subsequently warned on October 16 that Iranian-backed militias would imminently take “preemptive actions” against Israel.[50] Abdollahian issued the latter warning two days before Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted attacks on US forces in Iraq on October 18. These attacks marked the first attacks on US forces in the region since the start of the Hamas-Israel war on October 7. Lebanese Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem echoed Abdollahian’s warnings on October 27, stating that the United States and Israel “do not know what the days will hold” if Israel continues its attacks.[51] Qassem made this comment in a meeting with Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Deputy Chairman Ebrahim Azizi in Beirut.

Iranian Friday prayer leaders echoed the above rhetoric in their sermons on October 27. Tehran Interim Friday Prayer Leader Ali Akbari discussed the connected “regional resistance network” encompassing Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Iran and warned that “everyone is ready.”[52] Mashhad Friday Prayer Leader Ahmad Alam ol Hoda separately stated that the Iranian government and people should be ready to go to the front with Israel as soon as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issues an order to do so.[53] Alam ol Hoda’s calls for mobilization are consistent with previous regime efforts to generate momentum for the Hamas-Israel war among the Iranian public, such as launching an online campaign to sign up volunteers to fight Israel.[54] CTP-ISW has previously noted that Alam ol Hoda is known for his ultra-hardline stances and provocative views, which means that his statements do not always reflect the regime's official positions.[55] Alam ol Hoda called on vigilantes to enforce mandatory veiling in the aftermath of the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini movement, for example.[56]

Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani discussed the Hamas-Israel war with Hamas’ International Relations Office head and Political Bureau member Musa Abu Marzouk in Moscow on October 27.[57] Bagheri Kani stated that Iran seeks an immediate ceasefire in the Hamas-Israel war and the provision of humanitarian aid to Gazans.[58] The official Hamas readout of the meeting notably excluded Bagheri Kani’s call for a ceasefire.[59] Marzouk told Saudi-owned Al Arabiya on October 27 that Hamas is trying to bring in all parties, including Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah, that “want to fight with us.”[60]

8. Opinion | The U.S. is walking a familiar tightrope on Israel

Excerpt:

A review of the 60-year U.S. effort to manage this conflict yields some themes conveyed by American officials, over and over. The parties often haven’t listened, but, in this conflict, the stakes are higher. The Gaza war is a potential Cuban missile crisis moment for the region. We’re ominously close to a wider war. To avert disaster, all sides need to face some facts that U.S. analysts keep repeating.

Opinion | The U.S. is walking a familiar tightrope on Israel

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · October 26, 2023

For all the changes in the Middle East, the United States’ core problem there hasn’t changed in 60 years: How can it protect Israel, its closest ally in the region, while also bolstering stability and maintaining its partnerships with Arab neighbors?

The same dilemma has recurred with numbing frequency over the decades: Israel is attacked by Palestinian or Arab foes; it retaliates decisively in an effort to restore deterrence; Arab civilians are killed; and calls mount for a cease-fire. The United States works to broker a formula that defuses the crisis. And an eventual U.S.-brokered cease-fire sets the stage for the next catastrophe.

Because of the monstrous terrorist attack by Hamas on Oct. 7, this time appeared different. The world seemed to understand the need for Israel to take decisive action. But memories proved short: As Gaza was hit by more than 7,000 airstrikes and Palestinian civilian deaths soared, international support for Israel weakened. Now, the United States is trying to keep faith with the Israelis as it also seeks to calm the Arabs and avert a wider war.

President Biden has been among the most skillful practitioners of this art of the impossible. He has embraced and consoled Israelis with his gift for empathy. But at the same time, he has quietly whispered in the ears of Israeli officials that they need to go slow, be careful, avoid a broader conflict and gradually move toward a two-state solution that can provide security.

Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s juggling act would be familiar to their predecessors: They are preserving Israel’s military options against Hamas, while simultaneously helping Qatar negotiate a deal to free Israeli hostages, warning Iran and Hezbollah against widening the war, and protecting U.S. forces against what have been more than a dozen direct attacks by Tehran’s proxies.

A review of the 60-year U.S. effort to manage this conflict yields some themes conveyed by American officials, over and over. The parties often haven’t listened, but, in this conflict, the stakes are higher. The Gaza war is a potential Cuban missile crisis moment for the region. We’re ominously close to a wider war. To avert disaster, all sides need to face some facts that U.S. analysts keep repeating.

Describing a similarly complicated U.S. situation during the 1982 Israeli siege of Palestinian forces in Beirut, then-Secretary of State George Shultz wrote later in his memoirs: “The Arab world blamed us, as Israel’s great ally and financial supporter, for all of Israel’s deeds and looked to us to end the fighting in a responsible way.” In Lebanon, he said, “The Israelis had overplayed their power, and Beirut … lay shattered.” The United States tried, with enormous difficulty, to rebuild order.

Trying to manage conflict between Israeli leader Ariel Sharon and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat was “the closest thing to a diplomatic root canal I’ve ever experienced,” remarked former secretary of state Colin Powell, according to a memoir by his then-aide William J. Burns, who is now CIA director.

The Palestinians need new leadership. The current group has squandered opportunities for peace for half a century. It should be obvious after Oct. 7 that Hamas truly is a terrorist organization that rules Gaza at gunpoint. It should be clear, too, that the Palestinian Authority under President Mahmoud Abbas is a corrupt, feeble organization that’s holding on by a thread in the West Bank. The Palestinians need a new governing order, and Arab governments must help.

This is a moment of opportunity for Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman: He has a chance to alter the dark narrative surrounding him since in the 2018 murder of Post contributing columnist Jamal Khashoggi — by brokering a gradual Arab effort to create a prosperous Palestinian state under new management.

Israel needs better political leadership, too. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu shattered Israel’s unity in the months before the war. He promoted his personal political interest over the nation’s security, and the polls show that Israelis are angry about it. His government, which promoted settlers’ rights and religious extremists rather than national security, shouldn’t survive after the war is over.

This war, for all its horror, should revive Israeli interest in a two-state solution that might provide security and stability. It should demonstrate, as well, something that U.S. officials have been arguing for a generation: that reckless building of settlements poisons the chance for a stable Israeli democracy. Perhaps Israelis will conclude that the way back from this war passes through the tradition of tough-minded peacemakers such as former prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak.

Another lesson is that Israeli-Palestinian peace isn’t an end-state so much as a continuing process, led by the United States. That’s one theme of “Master of the Game,” the superb study of former secretary of state Henry Kissinger’s Middle East diplomacy by Martin Indyk, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel and special envoy for peace negotiations. “Peace for Kissinger was a problem, not a solution,” Indyk writes. Kissinger’s diplomatic machinations created a generally peaceful standoff that lasted 30 years.

Over decades, U.S. presidents have taken extreme risks to protect Israel. When Russia threatened to intervene militarily to protect Egypt during negotiations to end the 1973 war, President Richard M. Nixon, on Kissinger’s advice, ordered U.S. forces to Defcon 3, a heightened state of alert for possible nuclear conflict. The message was received.

When U.S. power has been strong and clearly communicated, wars in the Middle East have been followed by peace agreements that usually lasted. The United States needs to be forcefully involved now, and friends and adversaries need to listen.

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · October 26, 2023

9. Female-led IDF combat squad eliminates nearly 100 Hamas terrorists in firefights along border, report says

Any lessons for us?

Female-led IDF combat squad eliminates nearly 100 Hamas terrorists in firefights along border, report says

IDF's Caracal Battalion is a mixed-gender combat unit

By Stephen Sorace Fox News

Published October 25, 2023 2:10pm EDT

foxnews.com · by Stephen Sorace Fox News

Video

Retired colonel shares stories of women in the Israeli Defense Forces

Retired IDF Colonel Miri Eisin shares possible next step for Israeli forces and explains what factors may impact timing for the planned ground invasion.

A co-ed Israeli combat squad eliminated nearly 100 Hamas terrorists while protecting towns along Israel’s borders, and the unit’s female commander says their heroic actions leave "no more doubts about female combat soldiers," according to a report.

Lt.-Col. Or Ben-Yehuda commands the Caracal Battalion, a mixed-gender infantry combat unit that has been protecting Israel near the southern Gaza Strip from Hamas infiltration, the Jerusalem Post reported.

"Their training and performance on the battlefield have erased any doubts. They fought bravely, saved lives, and emerged as heroes," Ben-Yehuda said of the female troops, according to the newspaper.

Ben-Yehuda received reports of Hamas terrorists near the Sufa and Nirim kibbutzim along the border near the southern Gaza Strip, the report said. She reportedly led her troops to Sufa and learned that terrorists had entered a military base.

LIVE UPDATES: ISRAEL CONDUCTS AIRSTRIKES IN WEST BANK, SYRIA OVERNIGHT, KILLS HAMAS COMMANDER

Lt.-Col. Or Ben-Yehuda, commander of the Caracal Battalion, told the Jerusalem Post that the heroic actions of her squad leave no doubts about the contributions of women on the battlefield. (IDF Spokesman's Unit)

The Israeli squad encountered a convoy of nearly 50 terrorists and the two parties exchanged fire, the report stated.

Israel's Caracal Battalion reportedly eliminated around 100 Hamas terrorists that infiltrated Israel during attacks. (IDF Spokesman's Unit)

The fighting dragged on for nearly four hours, according to the report, with Ben-Yehuda and the Caracal Battalion thwarting the terrorists’ attempts to outflank them. The report said Israeli forces used light anti-armor missiles to help eliminate and disperse the terrorists.

ISRAELI NAVAL FORCES THWART HAMAS' ATTEMPTED INVASION BY SEA, IDF VIDEO SHOWS

Israeli naval forces eventually arrived to help clear terrorists from the base, which was fully secured after 14 hours, according to the newspaper.

Israeli Defense Forces' Caracal Battalion is a co-ed combat squad. (IDF Spokesman's Unit)

Ben-Yehuda said the female soldiers in the battalion played a significant role in protecting towns and repelling the militants. She said her unit killed around 100 terrorists during the fighting.

CLICK TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP

"There are no more doubts about female combat soldiers, who have triumphed in every encounter with terrorists," Ben-Yehuda said, according to the outlet. "At present, we are responsible for 11 towns and are preparing for any potential ground maneuvers to ensure the safety of the southern Gaza border area and the Egyptian border."

foxnews.com · by Stephen Sorace Fox News

10. Ex-Pentagon Adviser: US, Israel Special Forces tried to enter Gaza but were 'shot to pieces'

And MacGregor knows all this how? What is with him? I have seen no other serious reporting. There are only reports of MacGregeor's comments.

Excerpt:

MacGregor stated that 2,000 Marines and 2,000 Special Forces soldiers promptly deployed to the region, but he believes this quantity will not have a significant effect. MacGregor further argues that the United States lacks a genuine military force.

Ex-Pentagon Adviser: US, Israel Special Forces tried to enter Gaza but were 'shot to pieces'

middleeastmonitor.com · October 26, 2023

October 26, 2023 at 6:24 pm

Israel continues to deploy soldiers, tanks and armored vehicles near the Gaza border in Sderot, Israel on October 24, 2023. [Mostafa Alkharouf – Anadolu Agency]

Former Pentagon Advisor, Douglas MacGregor, stated that an American Special Force, accompanied by an Israeli Special Force, were tragically decimated when they attempted to investigate the location of the Israeli hostages in Gaza and were subsequently fired upon.

During an interview on an American TV channel, MacGregor stated that as it has been observed over the last 24 hours, American and Israeli special operations forces entered the Gaza Strip to carry out reconnaissance and assess potential ways for freeing the hostages, but they were attacked and suffered severe casualties.

He shared his belief that what happened was a natural progression and he did not see it as a victory for Israel in any way. He also expressed his concern regarding the potential risks it presented for the Americans.

MacGregor stated that 2,000 Marines and 2,000 Special Forces soldiers promptly deployed to the region, but he believes this quantity will not have a significant effect. MacGregor further argues that the United States lacks a genuine military force.

Unless otherwise stated in the article above, this work by Middle East Monitor is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. If the image(s) bear our credit, this license also applies to them. What does that mean? For other permissions, please contact us.

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middleeastmonitor.com · October 26, 2023

11. U.S. Quietly Expands Secret Military Base in Israel

From the Intercept (which I think has on its agenda to "expose" all "secret bases" bases and all US secrets in geenral).

U.S. Quietly Expands Secret Military Base in Israel

Government documents pointing to construction at a classified U.S. base offer rare hints about a little noted U.S. military presence near Gaza.

Ken Klippenstein, Daniel Boguslaw

October 27 2023, 11:55 a.m.

The Intercept · by Ken Klippenstein, Daniel Boguslaw · October 27, 2023

Two months before Hamas attacked Israel, the Pentagon awarded a multimillion-dollar contract to build U.S. troop facilities for a secret base it maintains deep within Israel’s Negev desert, just 20 miles from Gaza. Codenamed “Site 512,” the longstanding U.S. base is a radar facility that monitors the skies for missile attacks on Israel.

On October 7, however, when thousands of Hamas rockets were launched, Site 512 saw nothing — because it is focused on Iran, more than 700 miles away.

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The U.S. Army is quietly moving ahead with construction at Site 512, a classified base perched atop Mt. Har Qeren in the Negev, to include what government records describe as a “life support facility”: military speak for barracks-like structures for personnel.

Though President Joe Biden and the White House insist that there are no plans to send U.S. troops to Israel amid its war on Hamas, a secret U.S. military presence in Israel already exists. And the government contracts and budget documents show it is evidently growing.

The $35.8 million U.S. troop facility, not publicly announced or previously reported, was obliquely referenced in an August 2 contract announcement by the Pentagon. Though the Defense Department has taken pains to obscure the site’s true nature — describing it in other records merely as a “classified worldwide” project — budget documents reviewed by The Intercept reveal that it is part of Site 512. (The Pentagon did not immediately respond to a request for comment.)

“Sometimes something is treated as an official secret not in the hope that an adversary would never find out about it but rather [because] the U.S. government, for diplomatic or political reasons, does not want to officially acknowledge it,” Paul Pillar, a former chief analyst at the CIA’s counterterrorism center who said he had no specific knowledge of the base, told The Intercept. “In this case, perhaps the base will be used to support operations elsewhere in the Middle East in which any acknowledgment that they were staged from Israel, or involved any cooperation with Israel, would be inconvenient and likely to elicit more negative reactions than the operations otherwise would elicit.”

Rare acknowledgment of the U.S. military presence in Israel came in 2017, when the two countries inaugurated a military site that the U.S. government-funded Voice of America deemed “the first American military base on Israeli soil.” Israeli Air Force’s Brig. Gen. Tzvika Haimovitch called it “historic.” He said, “We established an American base in the State of Israel, in the Israel Defense Forces, for the first time.”

Hamas Attack Provides “Rare Opportunity” to Cleanse Gaza, Israeli Think Tank Says

A day later, the U.S. military denied that it was an American base, insisting that it was merely a “living facility” for U.S. service members working at an Israeli base.

The U.S. military employs similar euphemistic language to characterize the new facility in Israel, which its procurement records describe as a “life support area.” Such obfuscation is typical of U.S. military sites the Pentagon wants to conceal. Site 512 has previously been referred to as a “cooperative security location”: a designation that is intended to confer a low-cost, light footprint presence but has been applied to bases that, as The Intercept has previously reported, can house as many as 1,000 troops.

Site 512, however, wasn’t established to contend with a threat to Israel from Palestinian militants but the danger posed by Iranian mid-range missiles.

The overwhelming focus on Iran continues to play out in the U.S. government’s response to the Hamas attack. In an attempt to counter Iran — which aids both Hamas and Israel’s rival to the north, Hezbollah, a Lebanese political group with a robust military wing, both of which are considered terror groups by the U.S. — the Pentagon has vastly expanded its presence in the Middle East. Following the attack, the U.S. doubled the number of fighter jets in the region and deployed two aircraft carriers off the coast of Israel.

“My speculation is that the secrecy is a holdover from when U.S. presidential administrations tried to offer a pretense of not siding with Israel.”

Top Republicans like Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell have nonetheless castigated Biden for his purported “weakness on Iran.” While some media accounts have said Iran played a role in planning the Hamas attack, there have been indications from the U.S. intelligence community that Iranian officials were surprised by the attack.

The history of the U.S.–Israel relationship may be behind the failure to acknowledge the base, said an expert on overseas U.S. military bases.

“My speculation is that the secrecy is a holdover from when U.S. presidential administrations tried to offer a pretense of not siding with Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflicts,” David Vine, a professor of anthropology at American University, told The Intercept. “The announcement of U.S. military bases in Israel in recent years likely reflects the dropping of that pretense and a desire to more publicly proclaim support for Israel.”

Join The Conversation

The Intercept · by Ken Klippenstein, Daniel Boguslaw · October 27, 2023

12. How Many Wars Can America Fight at the Same Time?

I saw a comment on one of the listservs I pay attention to that said we have a military for 1.5 conflicts while the US faces threats of 3.5 conflicts.

Excerpts:

EA: Honestly, I’m a bit flabbergasted to hear anyone suggest that Biden’s approach to Ukraine has been overly cautious—we have sent it something like $75 billion in arms at this point—or to say that the administration is unwilling to increase defense spending. Last year’s defense budget was almost a trillion dollars, and—in case you forgot—the president just asked for another $106 billion from Congress.

But let’s put that aside and talk about deterrence. Deterrence is not a function of resolve. Deterrence is a function of credibility, which results from a combination of capabilities and resolve. In layman’s terms: You can’t make a credible threat that will deter another country if you don’t have the military capabilities and posture to make good on that threat, or if it doesn’t seem like you’ll follow through. I’ve spent a lot of time building credibility with my preschoolers, so I know what I’m talking about here.

Your argument is that we need to do more around the world or dictators will sense weakness. But I find that argument fails in one key respect: If we do more, everywhere, then our capabilities will be so stretched that we cannot actually make a credible deterrent threat. And in practice, this is exactly what we’re seeing right now: The United States has asked Israel to delay its offensive while it moves more military capabilities into the region in order to deter escalation.

MK: You said the key phrase, “or if it doesn’t seem like you’ll follow through.” Dictators right now suspect that Washington won’t follow through. And Washington’s worries about escalation are misguided. If you caught your preschoolers smoking cigarettes, would you ignore it because you don’t want to escalate the situation? In domestic law enforcement, when someone commits a crime, do we let it go but try to deter the next one? No. We rightly confront them now to prevent future recurrences. Sometimes escalation is the solution. That is what Washington should do with Iran’s support for terrorism that has just resulted in the deaths of at least 31 Americans.

EA: The main difference is that I’m not trying to deter three preschoolers across three different regions with limited resources all at the same time. And also that my preschoolers don’t have ballistic missiles.

How Many Wars Can America Fight at the Same Time?

The country’s adversaries around the world may sense Washington is stretched too thin.

By Emma Ashford, a columnist at Foreign Policy and a senior fellow with the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center, and Matthew Kroenig, a columnist at Foreign Policy and vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Foreign Policy · by Emma Ashford, Matthew Kroenig · October 27, 2023

Matt Kroenig: Hi, Emma. I hope you are great. We sometimes debate what to debate, but this week I think the topic is clear: the Middle East.

Emma Ashford: Are you sure? As U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan wrote in an essay made available this week, “The region is quieter than it has been for decades.” That’s a moment of dark humor in an unpleasant time. I guess he finished his draft before Oct. 7? It’s certainly emblematic of how this administration has handled the region over the last few years.

MK: Things like this make me glad that our column is online and published almost immediately. (What is the value of a printed magazine these days?) You are often wrong, of course, but at least you are never overtaken by events.

EA: Whereas you are never wrong, I’m sure.

But the administration has certainly been more active in the last few weeks. U.S. President Joe Biden’s trip to the region was well received in Israel but a poorly timed catastrophe in Gaza—where an off-course missile hit a hospital—meaning that his trip to Israel’s Arab neighbors got canceled. It made the whole thing look really one-sided.

He also gave a speech upon his return to the U.S.—a rare Oval Office address to the nation, in which he tried to build a fairly tortuous connection between Israel and Ukraine, afterward asking Congress for $106 billion in extra defense spending.

What did you think of the speech?

MK: My bottom-line assessment is that it fell short. I am glad he made his case directly to the American people. After more than 18 months of war in Ukraine, he had yet to deliver a prime-time speech to the nation explaining why the conflict matters for the United States. That was sorely overdue.

He also had some good lines that resonated with me, like about how American global engagement is the glue that holds the world together.

But his attempts to tie the two conflicts together were often muddled and hard to follow.

Most importantly, however, he never really explained why the average American—such as my family and friends back home in Missouri—should care about what happens in Gaza or Ukraine. He said that if Russian President Vladimir Putin isn’t stopped in Ukraine, he will continue to Poland. But if someone doesn’t care about Ukraine, why would they care about Poland?

He should have made a more concrete case for why conflicts in Europe and the Middle East affect the kitchen-table concerns of everyday Americans.

What did you think?

EA: Matt, you must be the only person under retirement age who agrees with Biden that the United States is still the indispensable nation. And I’ll put aside for the moment the question of how Putin, unable to conquer eastern Ukraine, would be able to conquer Poland or anywhere else.

I think the speech fell flat, even in Washington. Some of that is process-related. A little bit of how the sausage is made for our readers: The president had planned a big Ukraine-related Oval Office speech before the current crisis started. The speech he eventually gave—after the horrifying Hamas attacks on Israel—tried to jam Israel into the same speech. But the comparison was really awkward; particularly if you look at public opinion, it was never going to resonate with his base. Democrats broadly support Ukraine, even now, but are much more split on the Israel-Palestine question.

And I think it’s an open question whether Congress will give the president his $106 billion. Even with the addition of Israel aid, border funding, and some Taiwan aid, it’s still almost two-thirds for Ukraine. Republicans in the House aren’t going to like that.

MK: Yes. Biden lumped everything together to try to force GOP members to vote for the bill. It is politically more difficult to vote against Israel than to vote against Ukraine, and Republicans have argued that China and border security should be the priorities. But we will see if this works. Some Republicans are insisting that the various pieces receive separate votes.

EA: There’s a fair amount of pushback on the question. Republican Sen. J.D. Vance’s office even put out a memo laying out the differences between Israel and Ukraine and calling for separate votes.

But we should get back to the Middle East. Israel has not yet engaged in a ground offensive in Gaza, though all indications are that it is planning to do so. U.S. policy appears to be restraining that for the moment, but only so long as the United States needs to plan and prepare for any broader regional escalation. I have some questions about whether a ground offensive will actually achieve what the Israelis need, although it’s certainly true that they don’t have many options at this point. Should they go into Gaza?

MK: They should. Israel has a right and an obligation to defend itself and its population. After suffering the horrific attacks of Oct. 7, it is now obvious that it cannot continue to live with the Hamas threat next door.

And Israel has a viable solution. The stated objective of eliminating Hamas can be achieved through military means. Gaza is a small and isolated territory, and, through a ground assault, the highly capable Israel Defense Forces can capture or kill anyone associated with Hamas. It will be costly and bloody for both sides, and there are big questions about who governs Gaza after the war, but it is a viable option, and Israel is set on this approach.

I am guessing you think Israel should not invade. And if so, what is the alternative?

EA: There aren’t any good alternatives; that’s the problem. Israel obviously has a right to defend itself, and it certainly cannot leave Hamas sitting in Gaza after everything that’s happened in the last two weeks. But at the same time, I think you’re vastly overstating the ease with which it’ll be able to eliminate Hamas through military means.

Counterinsurgency is always difficult; urban warfare even more so. The Israelis are going to lose a lot of young men and women to this campaign. And the fact that civilians can’t in practice flee Gaza means we’re already seeing a humanitarian catastrophe. It’s already a PR disaster for Israel.

Then there is the risk that Hezbollah takes advantage of an Israeli offensive in Gaza to widen the war, and the fact that there’s no clear idea of how Gaza should be governed after the military operation. The whole thing is a toxic mess. I understand why Israeli policymakers feel they need to do this regardless, but it’s always a bad idea to let your enemy determine the field and conditions of battle. An Israeli ground invasion of Gaza lets Hamas choose the battlefield.

But I’m not sitting in Tel Aviv. I’m in Washington, and I think we should talk instead about the U.S. role here.

MK: Other than the president’s disappointing speech, I think the Biden administration has basically adopted the right position on Israel’s war against Hamas. It supports Israel’s right to defend itself through a war to eliminate Hamas. It has also been very clear, however, that it expects Israel to comply with the law of armed conflict. In addition, Washington has delivered humanitarian aid to Palestinian civilians.

My other criticism, though, would be on Washington’s approach to the broader regional context. Iran is the revisionist power in the region behind these terror attacks, and Biden has vowed to “hold them accountable,” but I do not see how he intends to do that. The administration has basically pursued an appeasement strategy with Iran. It failed miserably. It is time for a tougher approach.

I also worry about broader global reactions. China is encroaching on the Second Thomas Shoal, coming dangerously close to triggering the U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty. I worry that, with Washington bogged down with major wars in Europe and the Middle East, Beijing may see the opportunity for aggression.

EA: Let’s take these one by one. First, I think the administration’s approach has leaned a bit too much toward Israel. There are widespread criticisms in countries around the world—not just Arab countries—that highlight the hypocrisy of America’s denunciations of Russia’s indiscriminate bombing in Ukraine but support for Israeli bombing in Gaza. I’m glad the administration was able to get some humanitarian supplies in, but it’s barely a few truckloads. There are dire shortages of food, water, baby formula, and other essentials.

Second, we can debate Iranian culpability in these attacks for hours, but at the end of the day, U.S. intelligence has said it has no evidence that shows these attacks were directed from Tehran. There’s a classic principal-agent problem here: Countries can arm and fund rebels or terror groups, but it’s harder to control them afterward. That doesn’t absolve Iran of culpability here, but it doesn’t appear to have been explicitly directed by it. And I doubt anyone wants a major war with Iran; a recent study by the Eurasia Group Foundation showed that almost 80 percent of Americans want to go back to negotiating with Iran on its nuclear program.

Finally, the China question. I actually somewhat agree with you here. Not necessarily that Beijing sees an opportunity, but that the U.S. is stretched dangerously thin. This crisis—and the ongoing war in Ukraine—is really testing the Biden administration’s assertion that the United States can still do everything. But I don’t see how you square that concern with your desire to start a bigger war with Iran while continuing to support Ukraine.

MK: The United States cannot do everything, but, alongside its allies, it can and must deter and, if necessary, defeat major conflicts in the three most important geostrategic regions of the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East.

EA: A three-war planning construct? The ability to fight wars in three theaters simultaneously? We’ve never had that capability, even at the peak of the unipolar moment.

MK: We need a two-major-theater planning construct, and Iran would be covered as a lesser included case. This is what my colleagues and I on the bipartisan Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States recommended to Congress earlier this month.

But in addition to capabilities, deterrence is a function of resolve. And my assessment is that Biden’s policies have undermined global perceptions of American resolve. The withdrawal from Afghanistan, the overly cautious approach to aiding Ukraine, the appeasement of Iran, the unwillingness to increase defense spending to the levels required to deter China. Dictators are assessing, correctly, that they can get away with murder without triggering an American response.

I think what is needed is a strong U.S. reprisal against Iran to remind the world that the United States remains the world’s only military superpower and put some fear back into the hearts of Chinese President Xi Jinping and Putin.

EA: Honestly, I’m a bit flabbergasted to hear anyone suggest that Biden’s approach to Ukraine has been overly cautious—we have sent it something like $75 billion in arms at this point—or to say that the administration is unwilling to increase defense spending. Last year’s defense budget was almost a trillion dollars, and—in case you forgot—the president just asked for another $106 billion from Congress.

But let’s put that aside and talk about deterrence. Deterrence is not a function of resolve. Deterrence is a function of credibility, which results from a combination of capabilities and resolve. In layman’s terms: You can’t make a credible threat that will deter another country if you don’t have the military capabilities and posture to make good on that threat, or if it doesn’t seem like you’ll follow through. I’ve spent a lot of time building credibility with my preschoolers, so I know what I’m talking about here.

Your argument is that we need to do more around the world or dictators will sense weakness. But I find that argument fails in one key respect: If we do more, everywhere, then our capabilities will be so stretched that we cannot actually make a credible deterrent threat. And in practice, this is exactly what we’re seeing right now: The United States has asked Israel to delay its offensive while it moves more military capabilities into the region in order to deter escalation.

MK: You said the key phrase, “or if it doesn’t seem like you’ll follow through.” Dictators right now suspect that Washington won’t follow through. And Washington’s worries about escalation are misguided. If you caught your preschoolers smoking cigarettes, would you ignore it because you don’t want to escalate the situation? In domestic law enforcement, when someone commits a crime, do we let it go but try to deter the next one? No. We rightly confront them now to prevent future recurrences. Sometimes escalation is the solution. That is what Washington should do with Iran’s support for terrorism that has just resulted in the deaths of at least 31 Americans.

EA: The main difference is that I’m not trying to deter three preschoolers across three different regions with limited resources all at the same time. And also that my preschoolers don’t have ballistic missiles.

At least, I hope they don’t. Can you excuse me for a bit while I go check something?

Foreign Policy · by Emma Ashford, Matthew Kroenig · October 27, 2023

13. US ‘forced to EVACUATE Syria bases after huge wave of Iran-backed attacks’ as region set to blow amid Israel-Gaza war

"Tortoise Media?" I have seen no other reporting on this.

Excerpts:

But a report from Tortoise Media claims that the US has been keeping "quiet" about the true scale of the attacks on their military bases in the region.

A Western intelligence source told the outlet: "From what we’re seeing, the attacks against them have gone through the roof around the region."

The source added: “In north-east Syria, we’re hearing that the Americans have already had to evacuate around a dozen forward operating bases because they can’t protect them anymore.”

AT TIPPING POINT

US ‘forced to EVACUATE Syria bases after huge wave of Iran-backed attacks’ as region set to blow amid Israel-Gaza war

The US is also said to be making 'worst case scenario' preparations to evacuate 600,000 US citizens in Israel and Lebanon

Iona Cleave
Published: 14:38, 27 Oct 2023Updated: 17:03, 27 Oct 2023

The Sun · by Iona Cleave · October 27, 2023

US troops are allegedly evacuating Syrian bases after being targeted by a huge wave of Iran-backed militia attacks, a new report claims.

American officials said that over 24 of its soldiers across Syria and Iraq have been injured in the past week as chaos threatens to descend across the Middle East.

A new report claims US is evacuating some of its Syrian bases as attacks increase (file picture)

US military vehicles on the move in August in Deir ez-Zor province in SyriaCredit: Getty

USS Carney firing its first shot in defence of Israel as it downed a suspected missile launched by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen last week

For the past week, Washington has complained that Tehran is stepping up its attacks on American targets using its regional proxies in revenge for Israel's bombardment of Gaza.

White House spokesman John Kirby said that Iran was "actively facilitating" the assaults and "spurring on others who may want to exploit the conflict".

But a report from Tortoise Media claims that the US has been keeping "quiet" about the true scale of the attacks on their military bases in the region.

A Western intelligence source told the outlet: "From what we’re seeing, the attacks against them have gone through the roof around the region."

The source added: “In north-east Syria, we’re hearing that the Americans have already had to evacuate around a dozen forward operating bases because they can’t protect them anymore.”

However, another anonymous US official told VOA News today that the US is not looking into evacuating any bases in the Middle East despite the rumours.

The report comes after US officials revealed plans are being drawn up to evacuate as many as 600,000 Americans from the region in a "worst-case scenario".

It comes as a time of soaring tensions in the region as the US faces serious questions over the level of involvement its military might have if the conflict spirals into an all-out war.

Since October 17, there have been at least 19 assaults on US bases and personnel in Iraq and Syria using drones and missiles, according to the Pentagon.

On Thursday, a US base at Kharab al-Jir in Syria was attacked for the second time in two days, while a base in western Iraq was also hit.

There are further unconfirmed reports of attacks today at the al-Asad base in Iraq.

Earlier this week, the US took new steps to protect its bases across the region and officials revealed they were leaving open the possibility of evacuations of military families if needed.

The measures reportedly include increasing US military patrols, restricting access to base facilities and hiking intelligence collection, including through drone and other surveillance operations.

The officials also said they would be beefing up defensive operations to counter potential incoming drones, rockets and missiles.

Early this morning, US warplanes struck two Iran-backed militia bases in eastern Syria in response to the targeting of their troops.

According to senior US military officials, the "precision" air strikes were carried out near Boukamal by two F-16 fighter jets.

They claimed to have hit weapons and ammunition depots that were connected to the Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and have been recently used to hit US bases.

The retaliation air strikes were intended to show Iran-backed militant groups that the US would not allow any threats to go unchallenged, officials claimed.

Chaos has unravelled across the Middle East since Israel declared war on Hamas after the terrorists unleashed hell on southern Israel during their bloody October 7 attacks that left some 1,400 Israelis dead.

Meanwhile, Israel has been relentlessly pounding the Gaza Strip from the air, with 6,000 Palestinians said to have been killed in the carnage.

Last night, the IDF said it launched its second "targeted" nighttime raid in a row as tanks, drones and helicopters smashed through the Gaza border, wiping out Hamas terror targets and infrastructure.

It comes as earlier this week, US officials reportedly told Israel to hold off on their expected full-scale ground invasion into Gaza.

The US allegedly asked for the delay so they have time to deliver a dozen advanced air defence systems to the region to protect their troops.

They are said to believe that their bases in the Middle East will become an even greater target to Iran's terror proxies when Israel launches its full-scale invasion into the Gaza Strip.

Speaking of this morning's air strikes, US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin, said they were in response to "unsuccessful attacks" by militia groups armed, equipped and directed by Iran.

He said that President Biden directed the strikes “to make clear that the United States will not tolerate such attacks and will defend itself, its personnel, and its interests.”

Iran is a key backer of Palestinian terror groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad as well as Lebanon-based Hezbollah and Yemen's Houthis.

Washington has already sent two aircraft carriers to the eastern Mediterranean and 2,000 Marines in a bid to help stabilise the region.

Last week, it fired its first shots in the defence of Israel when it downed a missile believed to have been launched by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.

An official said the USS Carney shot down 15 drones and four cruise missiles fired by the militia group in a nine-hour onslaught.

On Monday, four US officials said that Washington was preparing for the possibility of evacuating almost 600,000 Americans in Israel and Lebanon if the Gaza war escalates.

They stated it was a "worst case scenario" but that it would be "irresponsible to not have a plan for everything", reports The Washington Post.

The concern inside Lebanon is Iran-backed Hezbollah who controls large swaths of the fragile country and has been throwing sporadic rockets towards Israel since October 7

Hezbollah has repeatedly promised to join the war in support of Hamas "when the time comes".

American soldiers on patrol in the northeastern Syrian in 2020

An Israeli F-15 fighter tactical fighter aircraft flies along the border with the Gaza as Israel pounds the Gaza StripCredit: AFP

Smoke and fire rise from buildings as people gather amid the destruction in the aftermath of an Israeli strikeCredit: AFP

Children cough as others rush to help the wounded inside GazaCredit: Reuters

Israelis take over as a Hamas rocket flies overheadCredit: AP

The Sun · by Iona Cleave · October 27, 2023

14. The 'SPONGE bomb' Israel are hoping to use to disable Hamas tunnels: New gadget expands and hardens, filling underground passageways

Photos at the link: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-12680935/SPONGE-bomb-Israel-disable-Hamas-tunnels-palestine-gaza.html

The 'SPONGE bomb' Israel are hoping to use to disable Hamas tunnels: New gadget expands and hardens, filling underground passageways

Israeli troops may trap Hamas in tunnels using innovative new 'sponge bombs'

By JOSH WHITE

PUBLISHED: 13:12 EDT, 27 October 2023 | UPDATED: 14:18 EDT, 27 October 2023

Daily Mail · by Josh White · October 27, 2023

Israeli troops could be planning to disable Hamas tunnels and trap the terrorists underground using innovative 'sponge bombs'.

How to deal with concealed fighters hiding in the myriad of tunnels under Gaza will be one the main concerns for the Israel Defence Force (IDF) when they begin their long-promised ground offensive into the besieged city.

And according to some reports, a secret new weapon dubbed the 'sponge bomb' could see deployment for the first time.

Based around a liquid emulsion, the chemical compound can be dropped into a tunnel before rapidly expanding and hardening, potentially trapping attackers down alleys or securing safe routes for Israeli commandos while searching for hostages.

How Israeli sponge bombs could be used to trap Hamas terrorists in tunnels underground

Hamas terrorists sitting in tunnels underneath Gaza which the IDF will try to neutralise with 'sponge bombs'

Troops are said to have used the handheld devices at the Israeli military's 'mini Gaza', a mock-up of the urban warren where they will soon be expected to fight constructed at the Urban Warfare Training Center in the Negev desert.

According to the Telegraph, the bombs feature a metal partition separating the two volatile liquids, which immediately react when they touch.

The material is said to be so hazardous that Israeli troops were blinded during practise sessions.

Foam and even slime have often been considered for their potential military utility, but results have been modest.

A fighter holding a rocket propelled grenade launcher climbs out of a Gaza tunnel

A general view shows the interiors of what the Israeli military say is a cross-border attack tunnel dug from Gaza to Israel, on the Israeli side of the Gaza Strip border

The estimate that the tunnels stretch hundreds of kilometres is widely accepted by security analysts, even though the blockaded coastal strip is only 40km (25 miles) long

American troops used guns shooting ultra-sticky foam as a non-lethal way to disable rioters while on deployment in Somalia in the mid-1990s, although results are said to have been mixed.

However, any weapon, no matter how experimental, could be crucial if Israel does indeed intend to enter the tunnels.

The estimate that they stretch hundreds of kilometres is widely accepted by security analysts, even though the blockaded coastal strip is only 40km (25 miles) long.

And while Hamas is naturally secretive about their networks, the recently released Israeli hostage Yocheved Lifshitz, 85, said: 'It looked like a spider's web, many, many tunnels', adding: 'We walked kilometres under the ground.'

Daily Mail · by Josh White · October 27, 2023

15. Wartime Deepfakes Really Are Blurring Reality, First Major Study Finds

We must fight and compete on this new "battlefield" – the information domain – as a matter or routine and not something "special" or one off.

Wartime Deepfakes Really Are Blurring Reality, First Major Study Finds

Mack DeGeurin

Wed, October 25, 2023 at 4:10 PM EDT·7 min read

finance.yahoo.com · by Mack DeGeurinOctober 25, 2023 at 1:10 PM·7 min read

Photo: Omar Marques (Getty Images)

On March 14, just around a month after Russian troops stormed across Ukraine’s western to begin a year’s long bloody battle, Ukrainian president Vladimir Zelensky appeared on a Ukrainian television station and announced his unconditional surrender. The president, wearing his now iconic military green long-sleeve shirt appeared to stare into a camera and claim the Ukrainian military was “capitulating” and would “give up arms.”

Another brief video appeared on social media sites around the same time appearing to show Zelensky’s foil, Russian president Vladimir Putin, similarly pronouncing a peace deal.

But even though the two videos were quickly debunked, their rapid proliferation online led to a flurry of commentary and news articles warning of the real danger of alter videos being used to confuse and divide the public during a time of war. New research suggests this uptick of deepfakes and anxiety around their distribution could be contributing to an even more difficult problem to solve: people quickly disregarding legitimate media as deepfakes. That, in turn, leads to further erosion of trust in what’s real online.

Those were some of the findings researchers from University College Cork observed as part of a recent study published in the journal PLOS ONE. The researchers picked out nearly 5,000 tweets posted during the first seven months of 2022 in an effort to analyze the role deepfakes may play in wartime misinformation and propaganda. It’s the first study of its kind to empirically analyze the effect of deepfakes during a time of war.

Though the study does reveal plenty of AI-manipulated media images and videos, a shocking portion of the tweets supposedly discussing deepfakes actually involved users falsely characterizing real, legitimate images and videos as digitally altered. The first-of-its-kind findings add new evidence to bolster the fears of past deepfake researchers who fear the rising quality and proliferation of deepfake videos online could lead to an insidious scenario where bad actors can simply claim a video was a “deepfake” in order to dismiss it.

“What we found was that people were using it [the term deepfake] as a buzzword to attack people online,” UCC School of Applied Psychology researcher and study co-author John Twomey told Gizmodo. Deepfakes, like the term “bot” or “fake news” before it, are being weaponized against media or information users simply disagree with.

“It [the study] is highlighting how people are using the idea of deepfakes and becoming hyper skeptical, in many ways, to real media, especially when deepfakes aren’t widely prevalent as it is,” he added. “More people are aware of the deepfakes as opposed to them being actually prevalent.

Much of that mismatch stems from the news media’s over-coverage of the issue. Ironically, well-meaning coverage from journalists warning about the dangers of deepfakes may unintentionally contribute to a worsening of trust in the media generally.

“We need to consider if the news focus on deepfakes is disproportionate to the threat we are currently facing and whether this response is creating more distrust and contributing to an epistemic crisis,” the researchers wrote.

What did the study find?

The study, aptly titled “Do Deepfake Videos Undermine our Epistemic Trust?” sought to analyze ways discussions of deepfakes during a time of war could be degrading public knowledge and shared truth. Using Twitter’s API, the researcher pulled 4869 relevant tweets discussing deepfakes between January 1, 2022, and August 1 of the same year. Twomey says the researchers decided to focus on Twitter because it tends to focus more on journalism and political activism than other social media platforms where deepfakes or discussions of them may proliferate.

The researcher saw an uptick in deepfake-related content on Twitter in the weeks leading up to Russia’s invasion, with news sites and commentators speculating about whether or not Putin would use altered media as part of a ruse to justify military action. The largest number of deepfake-related tweets appeared between March 14 and 16, right around the time the Zelensky and Putin videos started gaining attention. Though many of the Twitter users responding to the Zelensky tweet criticized the quality of the deepfake, others fearfully described it as a potential new weapon of war.

“You’d think deepfakes are harmless if you’ve only seen silly videos of deepfaked Keanu Reeves,” one of the tweets read. “Unfortunately deepfakes can be a new and vicious type of propaganda,” one user tweeted. “We’ve seen it now with deepfakes of the Russian and Ukrainian leaders.”

The Zelensky deepfake was particularly concerning because it originated from an otherwise reputable news source, Ukrainian 24. The news station claims the deepfake, which appeared on one of their webcasts, was the result of a malicious hack they attributed to the Russian government. Russia never claimed credit for the supposed hack. Zelensky himself quickly posted a follow-up video disrupting the deepfake, but only after it had gathered attention on social media. If the quality of that video were improved thanks to advances in rapidly evolving generative AI models, it could have done far more damage.

“The usual indicator of truthfulness and trustworthiness of online information, the source of the video, was undermined by the hack,” the researchers wrote. “If the video had been more realistic and more widely believed, it may have had a more harmful impact.”

The ‘deepfake defense’ is picking up steam

Bad actors and liars are already using so-called “deepfake defenses” to try and weasel themselves out of accountability. Lawyers representing a rioter involved in the January 6 attacks on the Capitol previously attempted to convince a jury that video footage presented at trial clearly showing their client jumping a barricade with a holstered weapon was actually a deepfake. He was ultimately convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison.

In another recent case, a lawyer representing Elon Musk tried to evoke the deepfake defense to cast doubt on a legitimate and widely covered 2016 interview of the billionaire where he claimed his vehicles can drive autonomously “with greater safety than a person.” The judge in that case called out the lawyer’s maneuvers, which she called a “deeply troubling” obfuscation that could do lasting damage to the legal system. Gizmodo recently recounted the saga of the “deepfake cheer mom” who found herself the victim of a global media onslaught after a teen falsely accused her of manipulating a video supposedly showing her vaping. The video was real.

All of those cases successful or not, are attempting to use public concerns over the pervasiveness of deepfakes to cast doubt on reality. That phenomenon, which academics dub “the liar’s dividend” could have disastrous implications during times of war.

Variations of wartime versions of the lair’s dividend are currently playing out in real-time in Gaza, where rapid-fire stories supposedly debunking images and videos as deepfakes aren’t holding up to scrutiny. In one of the more widely publicized examples, commentators claimed an image supposedly depicting a burned Israeli baby was the product of AI-generated propaganda after it was labeled as inauthentic by one generative AI image detector. Further analyses of the image, however, showed it was almost certainly authentic. Pro-Israel commenters have tried to discredit legitimate media posted by pro-Palestinina activists by claiming they were deepfakes.

Twomey would not speculate on what his findings in the Russia-Ukraine conflict could suggest about the current information firestorm but he said he said his research proves deepfakes, and their denials, are something that can be used to sow confusion during times of war.

“The evidence in this study shows that efforts to raise awareness around deepfakes may undermine our trust in legitimate videos,” Twomey indeed. “With the prevalence of deepfakes online, this will cause increasing challenges for news media companies who should be careful in how they label suspected deepfakes in case they cause suspicion around real media.”

Do deepfake videos undermine our epistemic trust? A thematic analysis of tweets that discuss deepfakes in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Published: October 25, 2023
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0291668

Abstract

Deepfakes are a form of multi-modal media generated using deep-learning technology. Many academics have expressed fears that deepfakes present a severe threat to the veracity of news and political communication, and an epistemic crisis for video evidence. These commentaries have often been hypothetical, with few real-world cases of deepfake’s political and epistemological harm. The Russo-Ukrainian war presents the first real-life example of deepfakes being used in warfare, with a number of incidents involving deepfakes of Russian and Ukrainian government officials being used for misinformation and entertainment. This study uses a thematic analysis on tweets relating to deepfakes and the Russo-Ukrainian war to explore how people react to deepfake content online, and to uncover evidence of previously theorised harms of deepfakes on trust. We extracted 4869 relevant tweets using the Twitter API over the first seven months of 2022. We found that much of the misinformation in our dataset came from labelling real media as deepfakes. Novel findings about deepfake scepticism emerged, including a connection between deepfakes and conspiratorial beliefs that world leaders were dead and/or replaced by deepfakes. This research has numerous implications for future research, societal media platforms, news media and governments. The lack of deepfake literacy in our dataset led to significant misunderstandings of what constitutes a deepfake, showing the need to encourage literacy in these new forms of media. However, our evidence demonstrates that efforts to raise awareness around deepfakes may undermine trust in legitimate videos. Consequentially, news media and governmental agencies need to weigh the benefits of educational deepfakes and pre-bunking against the risks of undermining truth. Similarly, news companies and media should be careful in how they label suspected deepfakes in case they cause suspicion for real media.

Figures

Citation: Twomey J, Ching D, Aylett MP, Quayle M, Linehan C, Murphy G (2023) Do deepfake videos undermine our epistemic trust? A thematic analysis of tweets that discuss deepfakes in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. PLoS ONE 18(10): e0291668. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0291668

Editor: Rashid Mehmood, King Abdulaziz University, SAUDI ARABIA

Received: December 15, 2022; Accepted: September 3, 2023; Published: October 25, 2023

Copyright: © 2023 Twomey et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Data Availability: The data will not be fully available for legal/ethical concerns. Namely that the dataset contains un-anonymised user data and the ethical permission to carry out this research was predicated on this data staying confidential. The original dataset will be handed over to UCC psychology departments technical officer (currently Aaron Bolger aaron.bolger@ucc.ie) for storage and access for anyone who meets criteria for access to the confidential data.

Funding: This work was supported with the financial support of the Science Foundation Ireland grant 13/RC/2094_2 and co-funded under the European Regional Development Fund through the Southern & Eastern Regional Operational Programme to Lero - the Science Foundation Ireland Research Centre for Software (www.lero.ie, Award PP5004). These groups had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

Competing interests: The authors have read the journal’s policy and have the following competing interests: Matthew Aylett is employed by CereProc as Chief Scientific Officer. This does not alter our adherence to PLOS ONE policies on sharing data and materials.

Introduction

Synthetic media are a type of audio-visual media which has been partly or fully generated/modified by technology [1]. Deepfakes are a new form of synthetic media which interpolates artificially generated media into an existing video, often with intent to imitate or mimic an individual. Researchers and commentators have argued that deepfakes have the potential to undermine truth, to spread misinformation and to undermine our trust in information, media and democracy [2]. The increasing prevalence of fake videos could undermine what we know to be true [3]. Specifically, academic researchers believe that deepfakes could create a situation where fake videos are believed to be real and conversely, where real videos are denounced as fake. Fears of deepfakes being used to spread disinformation have been realised during the Russo-Ukrainian war. We have seen fake videos of both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, as well as many satirical and entertainment uses of deepfakes around the crisis. Our paper seeks to provide empirical evidence for the hypothesised and forecasted harms of deepfakes to truth and knowledge. The aim of this paper is to understand the nature of deepfake discourse on social media in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war.

In this paper, we analyse Twitter discourses around deepfakes in relation to the Russo-Ukrainian war by carrying out a thematic analysis on relevant tweets during the first months of the 2022 invasion. Our study is the first empirical analysis carried out on the use of deepfakes in wartime misinformation and propaganda. As deepfake technology becomes increasingly accessible, it is important to understand how such threats emerge over social media. Understanding the current threats of deepfakes will have implications in how social media companies and academic researchers deal with harmful deepfakes online. Understanding how the threats of deepfakes emerge online is a significant step in learning how to mitigate their harms. The current paper also has numerous implications for academic research on deepfakes. Our research explores the epistemic harms of deepfakes in practice, as opposed to the theoretical discussions of the concept in academia [4]. We also provide a non-exhaustive timeline of the use of deepfakes and other synthetic media in the Russo-Ukrainian war. The provided timeline is important as both a record of the uses and the impact of deepfakes during the Russian invasion of Ukraine and as a means to gauge the type and quality of synthetic media content created during the conflict.

17. Covert CCP social media accounts bolster China’s united front work in Canada

Excerpts:

Canada should also listen to and empower its Canadians of Chinese descent who have firsthand experience and knowledge of the CCP’s malign influence. Canadian politician Michael Chong, who was targeted in an information operation on WeChat in which the Chinese government was most likely involved, has offered sound advice in testimony to the US Congress. He suggests setting up a foreign agent registry, publicly exposing entities working for Beijing’s interests that fund parliamentarians, and implementing stronger laws targeting financial crime and corruption, among other recommendations.

Canada should not go about countering foreign malign influence by itself. The Australian government should signal to the Canadian and Chinese governments that it is willing to support Canada’s sovereignty. For example, Australia’s own efforts to curtail CCP interference resulted in China’s making 14 demands, including rewinding foreign interference legislation. In the case where Canada makes similar decisions and likewise faces economic coercion by the Chinese government, Australia should resume its World Trade Organization case regarding China’s measures imposing anti-dumping and countervailing duties on Australian barley to deter Beijing from future coercive diplomacy.

Australia too has a lot to learn from Canada. For example, the Canadian government is making efforts to respond to and, increasingly, publicly attribute cyber-enabled foreign interference activity targeting Canada and Canadians—an area that the Australian government has long struggled with.

Covert CCP social media accounts bolster China’s united front work in Canada | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by Albert Zhang · October 24, 2023

In the first part of this investigation, ASPI identified a subnetwork of Spamouflage accounts targeting Canadian politicians that illustrates the potential scope of the Chinese Communist Party’s malign influence operations in Canada. Some of these accounts were also promoting an article published by Red Maple News (红枫林), an influential Chinese-Canadian online media outlet. The article has laundered personal—and publicly unavailable—information to defame Teacher Li, a pseudonym for a Chinese painter based in Italy who became prominent during the 2022 ‘white paper’ protests for sharing information from Chinese social media platforms on Twitter.

Many of these inauthentic accounts created personas with AI-generated profile images (see Figure 1) or impersonated Hong Kong students in Australia.

Figure 1: Spamouflage accounts amplifying defamatory Teacher Li article from Red Maple News

The article posted by Red Maple News is problematic because it reveals Teacher Li’s real full Chinese name, which he has unsuccessfully tried to hide for security reasons, and other information that likely could have only been sourced from Chinese government records and would not be available to the public. As with some other targeted harassment and disinformation campaigns conducted by the CCP, it also includes personal and intimate details, such as claims that Li had asked his parents for money on WeChat, or allegations that Li was in ‘improper relationships’ (不正当的男女关系), a common propaganda trope used by China’s Ministry of State Security and Ministry of Public Security to harass influential dissidents.

While the article doesn’t necessarily contain disinformation (though it certainly publishes claims without any supporting evidence), it clearly breaches journalistic ethics and lacks transparency. It’s unclear whether Red Maple News produced the article of its accord or was directed to publish it. Nor is it clear who the author is or how they obtained the information contained the story.

Red Maple News is the online news website of the Hongfenglin Media Group, which is registered as the Red Maple Journal Corporation in Canada but also has offices in Beijing, Guizhou and Chengdu in China. According to its website, Red Maple News has content-sharing and cooperation agreements with Russia Today News Agency, a Russian state-controlled media outlet; China News Service, a media outlet formerly run by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office which is now part of the United Front Work Department; and the People’s Daily Overseas, the foreign-facing edition of the CCP Central Committee’s official newspaper.

Red Maple News and its founder, Gu Jianyun, appear to be the target of CCP united front work, which seeks to co-opt, control and install overseas Chinese-language media under the party’s leadership. In 2016, Red Maple News was the only Chinese-language media outlet from Canada invited to cover the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, also known as the ‘two sessions’, which would have raised the profile of the organisation in Canada.

Connections and access to Chinese government officials likely incentivise some of Red Maples News’ editorial policies. In 2022, Gu said in an interview with China News Service that she will continue to promote the integrated development of Chinese media, deliver the voice of China, and tell real and vivid Chinese stories that unfold the beauty of China to the world, which are phrases that Xi Jinping, the general secretary of the CCP, has similarly espoused for China to strengthen its international propaganda.

The case of Red Maple News highlights the difficulty of countering the CCP’s malign influence. As Katherine Mansted, a senior fellow at the Australian National University’s National Security College, writes, the CCP has ‘adopted strategies, organisational structures and tactics which exploit the grey zone between acceptable foreign influence activities and unlawful foreign interference’. In principle, there’s no issue with a news media outlet having content-sharing agreements and close links with the CCP, but it becomes problematic when it is directed or incentivised to spread disinformation or participate in transnational repression that is amplified by coordinated inauthentic accounts on social media.

As Canada reckons with its own approach to countering malign foreign influence, it should build upon Australia’s experience and do more to enhance transparency around the influence of foreign powers. While Australia has passed strong counter-foreign-interference laws that capture the most blatant and egregious cases, China experts Clive Hamilton and Alex Joske have rightly pointed out that Australia’s legislation—and mechanisms such as the foreign influence transparency scheme—miss most forms of CCP influence and interference, which are often subtler.

Canada should also listen to and empower its Canadians of Chinese descent who have firsthand experience and knowledge of the CCP’s malign influence. Canadian politician Michael Chong, who was targeted in an information operation on WeChat in which the Chinese government was most likely involved, has offered sound advice in testimony to the US Congress. He suggests setting up a foreign agent registry, publicly exposing entities working for Beijing’s interests that fund parliamentarians, and implementing stronger laws targeting financial crime and corruption, among other recommendations.

Canada should not go about countering foreign malign influence by itself. The Australian government should signal to the Canadian and Chinese governments that it is willing to support Canada’s sovereignty. For example, Australia’s own efforts to curtail CCP interference resulted in China’s making 14 demands, including rewinding foreign interference legislation. In the case where Canada makes similar decisions and likewise faces economic coercion by the Chinese government, Australia should resume its World Trade Organization case regarding China’s measures imposing anti-dumping and countervailing duties on Australian barley to deter Beijing from future coercive diplomacy.

Australia too has a lot to learn from Canada. For example, the Canadian government is making efforts to respond to and, increasingly, publicly attribute cyber-enabled foreign interference activity targeting Canada and Canadians—an area that the Australian government has long struggled with.

aspistrategist.org.au · by Albert Zhang · October 24, 2023

18. U.S. Tries New Tack on Russian Disinformation: Pre-Empting It

Recognize the adversary strategy, understand it, EXPOSE it, and attack with superior political and information warfare.

Good work by the GEC. This should be a matter of routine. We need more reporting like this to help inoculate the public to this Russian strategy.

Excerpts:

State Department officials have linked the article to what they describe as a covert information operation to spread Russia propaganda in Central and South America by producing articles that appear to originate with local media organizations, not the Russian government.

The operation is nascent, but the department’s Global Engagement Center is disclosing the influence campaign in hopes of blunting its effect in a region where Russia has sought to discredit the United States and erode international support for Ukraine.

The center, which since 2017 has focused on combating propaganda and disinformation, routinely details Kremlin efforts, but identifying and trying to pre-empt a campaign when it is barely off the ground is a new tactic. It is one that reflects the realization that false narratives are harder to counter once they have already spread.

U.S. Tries New Tack on Russian Disinformation: Pre-Empting It

By Steven Lee Myers

Published Oct. 26, 2023

Updated Oct. 27, 2023

nytimes.com · by Steven Lee Myers · October 26, 2023

The State Department’s Global Engagement Center is taking the unusual step of disclosing a covert Russian operation when it is barely off the ground.

Thousands of believers gathered at the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra in March. A recent article recycling disinformation about the Orthodox holy site was an example of an online Russian propaganda campaign in Central and South America.Credit...Laetitia Vancon for The New York Times

An article that appeared in August on an international news outlet, Pressenza, recycled a false Russian claim that the West was looting religious relics and art from a monastery in Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, one of the holiest sites in Russian Orthodoxy.

The article stands out, U.S. officials said, not because of what it claimed — but because of its source and intended audience.

State Department officials have linked the article to what they describe as a covert information operation to spread Russia propaganda in Central and South America by producing articles that appear to originate with local media organizations, not the Russian government.

The operation is nascent, but the department’s Global Engagement Center is disclosing the influence campaign in hopes of blunting its effect in a region where Russia has sought to discredit the United States and erode international support for Ukraine.

The center, which since 2017 has focused on combating propaganda and disinformation, routinely details Kremlin efforts, but identifying and trying to pre-empt a campaign when it is barely off the ground is a new tactic. It is one that reflects the realization that false narratives are harder to counter once they have already spread.

“What we’re trying to do is expose Russia’s hidden hand,” James P. Rubin, the center’s coordinator, said in an interview in which he described the Russian effort in broad outlines.

Mr. Rubin said the department was acting “based on new information” but declined to elaborate. The disclosure of the campaign recalls the Biden administration’s release of intelligence findings about Russia’s military before and after its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

It is part of an intensifying campaign for influence in parts of the world where American officials and analysts warn Russia’s hostility toward the United States and its allies has found fertile soil.

The State Department released a report last week about the activities in Brazil of an international organization, New Resistance, which embraces the views of Aleksandr Dugin, a former Soviet dissident who has become a prominent advocate of Russia’s imperial ambitions. The organization, the report said, promotes Russian disinformation, holds seminars and training courses and has supported paramilitary activities.

“Russia has exploited distrust of the United States by characterizing the latter as intent on resource extraction and endorsing economic policies poorly suited to Latin America, offering Russia as a friendly, less intrusive alternative,” said another report released last week by the United States Institute of Peace, a nonpartisan research organization the U.S. Congress founded.

The new campaign, Mr. Rubin and other officials said, involves two Russian companies and the Institute for Internet Development, an industry association a former Kremlin official leads. All have close ties with the presidential administration of Russia’s leader, Vladimir V. Putin.

The companies — the Social Design Agency, a public relations company, and Structura National Technologies, an information technology firm, both in Moscow — have been identified as sources in disinformation campaigns.

Since July, the companies and their executives have faced punitive economic sanctions in the European Union for their involvement in disinformation around the war in Ukraine. That includes the creation of a news outlet, Recent Reliable News, which produced fake articles purporting to be from actual news organizations, including The Washington Post, and promoted them extensively online.

In the current campaign, according to the State Department, the Russian companies intend to commission articles through a network of local writers and to use artificial intelligence chatbots to amplify the articles on social media. The effort aims to cultivate media contacts in countries from Mexico to Chile.

“We expect them to carry out this information manipulation campaign to surreptitiously exploit the openness of Latin America’s media and information ecosystem,” said Mr. Rubin, who took over the Global Engagement Center this year.

The Kremlin devotes significant resources to propagate its views on the war in Ukraine and to denigrate the United States and NATO, using both overt and covert means. American intelligence officials recently warned of a concerted Russian effort inside the United States to undermine political support for providing weapons to the Ukrainian military.

The Institute for Internet Development, a Russian organization led by Aleksei Goreslavsky, who previously oversaw internet policy at the Kremlin, has indicated that it planned to spend the equivalent of $32 million this year on information efforts surrounding the war, according to two other State Department officials, who under department policy spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Those officials said the new campaign was intended to “launder” Russian news and opinion through contacts already writing in Spanish, as well as in Portuguese, for online news organizations in the region.

It was not clear how extensive the campaign would be, but the targeting of so many countries suggested an ambitious one. The officials cited Pressenza and the article in August, which appeared in Spanish, French and English, as an example of the coordination that American government agencies had identified.

The author, according to the byline, was Nadia Schwarz, identified as a correspondent in the outlet’s Moscow bureau.

It echoed accusations first aired a month earlier in Russian state news agencies — and have since been rebutted — that Ukraine planned to remove relics and other valuables from the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, a complex of churches and other buildings dating to the 11th century and recognized as a world heritage site by UNESCO.

“The West is trying to make up, in part, for what it has spent in Ukraine,” a prominent analyst, Rostislav Ishchenko, is quoted in the article as saying. Mr. Ishchenko, who faces sanctions in Ukraine, compared the situation to the long dispute between Peru and Yale University over artifacts taken from Machu Picchu at the beginning of the 20th Century.

The officials also cited a journalist, Oleg Yasinksy, who is based in Chile and whose writings have appeared on the website RT en Español, the Spanish-language arm of the state television network. Mr. Yasinsky could not immediately be reached for comment though his account on X.

Pressenza, which is in Quito, Ecuador, and describes itself as an outlet committed to peace, human rights and nonviolence, did not respond to a written request for comment, nor did the Social Design Agency and the Institute for Internet Development.

Brian Liston, an analyst who studies Recorded Future, a cybersecurity company headquartered in Somerville, Mass., said in an interview that Russia saw information campaigns in Central and South America as a proportionate response to what it sees as American influence efforts in Eastern Europe and the Baltics.

He said it remained to be seen how effective the State Department’s effort to “prebunk” Russian propaganda would prove to be. Disputing false or misleading information in advance, he added, has worked well against specific events that can be anticipated or forecast.

“There are certain applications, I think, in which debunking the narrative is effective,” he said. “I think it’s more limited to anticipating preplanned events or things that are able to be spun up versus in real time.”

nytimes.com · by Steven Lee Myers · October 26, 2023

19. Urban Warfare, Sieges, and Israel’s Looming Invasion of Gaza

Yes, we all must prepare for the worst.

Excerpts:

Therefore, the international community should prepare itself for the worst. Unfortunately, protections for civilian populations, individual civilians, civilian objects, and resources often fall well short of ideal once hostilities begin. As a result, civilians get caught in the middle of horrible, hostile action between competing parties. Given Gaza’s small size, civilian populations and individual civilians have very little recourse regarding relocating from battlefields. If Israel’s offensive attacks into Gaza with full force, onlookers must thus anticipate significant numbers of civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. Precision munitions will not provide much assistance in offsetting the problem of civilian casualties and collateral damage. The promise of precision becomes quickly neutralized when operating in dense urban terrain.

Sieges will likely accompany any Israel offensive into Gaza that looks to gain physical control of territory. Sieges will likely accelerate military casualties, civilian deaths, and damage to civilian infrastructure. Below the surface, sieges will complicate things such as civilian, noncombatant medical care and access to food stuffs and water within Gaza. The international community, to include nongovernment organizations focused on caring for noncombatants in war zones, should proactively prepare for what might well be inevitable and not wait until it is too late, and they are forced to play catch-up.

Urban Warfare, Sieges, and Israel’s Looming Invasion of Gaza - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Amos Fox · October 27, 2023

With Israel’s looming ground offensive against Hamas, and considering the population density of Gaza, urban warfare will certainly be a significant component of the conflict. Urban warfare in Gaza will not be a deft war of maneuver, but rather a slow, methodical grind of attrition. The Israel Defense Forces’ relatively small size in relation to the population density and urban sprawl of Gaza will strip away many of the Israeli military’s inherent asymmetries. Moreover, two additional factors will increase the voracity of urban warfare. First, due to Gaza’s small size, there is almost no land available to fight a war of maneuver on open, flanking terrain. Second, even if there were available open terrain, Hamas will benefit from fighting within the tight confines of the city, whereas the Israel Defense Forces are optimized for mobile warfare on barren plains. As a result, outsiders must anticipate that the conflict will be urban, and because Hamas fighters will not willfully expose themselves to the Israeli military’s sophisticated weaponry, I believe Hamas fighters will hug both Gaza’s urban infrastructure and nest within its civilian population. By staying close to infrastructure, Hamas’ fighters are afforded basic protection from the Israel Defense Forces’ ability to observe, detect, and precisely target their force. At the same time, by operating amongst the Gazans, Hamas can capitalize on the brutality of urban warfare in the information spectrum by showing the world the death and destruction that accompany combat in urban areas.

The siege is a critical component of urban warfare, yet it is often overlooked in today’s analysis of armed conflict. The reasons for this are varied, but more than likely this has to do with the term itself. The word siege immediately elicits images of trebuchets, ballistas, and castles on 16th-century European battlefields. Nevertheless, in recent years a handful of scholars stepped into the murky waters of sieges to better understand how they fit into contemporary armed conflict. Drawing on observations from wars in Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, and the Philippines, for instance, Harvard Law School, in coordination with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United States Military Academy’s Lieber Institute, hosted a two-day conference in the spring of 2022 on international law applicable to sieges in urban warfare.

Moreover, Professor Anthony King also examined sieges in his work Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century. King situates sieges in their modern military and geopolitical context, arguing that the increasing size of cities, coupled with the decreasing size of militaries, finds micro-sieges becoming a common occurrence in armed conflict. Small contemporary forces use micro-sieges, as opposed to full-scale sieges, to isolate only one part of a much larger urban area, to maximize the siege’s effect on the military force and civilian population trapped therein. Operation Iraqi Freedom’s battle of Sadr City is one example of a micro-siege, whereas the Russo-Ukrainian War’s siege of Donetsk Airport (also referred to as the Second Battle of Donetsk Airport) is another classic example of a micro-siege.

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Sieges, however, are neither an anomaly of contemporary armed conflict, nor something that is the result of bad tactics or attritionalist ways of warfare. A survey of armed conflict finds that 60 sieges of various sizes and duration have accompanied conflict since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, all 60 of those sieges occurred in urban areas. Given that arc, and the likelihood that urban warfare will play a significant part in the Israel Defense Forces’ Gaza offensive, it is not a stretch to assume that sieges will maintain a central position within the looming conflict. The international community should thus expect to see one, if not more, sieges during the ground offensive. Given the Israel Defense Forces’ size relative to Gaza’s urban population, these sieges will likely be proximal micro-sieges, radiating from Israeli bases of power and oriented on tactical and operationally relevant military, and potentially political, objectives. Based on quantitative analysis of post–Cold War sieges, if Israel can conduct its sieges between one to 12 months, then they will be operating in the space in which states most often win sieges. Regardless, sieges, much like the other facets of urban warfare, are dirty, deadly business. Israel will have to balance the purpose and effectiveness of siege operations against the international community’s response to identify the true impact of those operations.

What Are Sieges?

Sieges are a multifaceted tool for combatants in armed conflict. Sieges are typically associated with an aggressor encircling a defender. The defender is historically a military force, but by virtue of that force being entrapped in an urban area, noncombatants come under siege as well. This is now the case in Gaza. Aggressors can be any actor — state, non-state actor, proxy force, mercenary group, or any other combatant with the strength to snare an adversary in a city or town.

Encirclement, however, is not a siege’s causal mechanism. In some cases, an aggressor does not possess sufficient size to entirely encircle an urban area, but still finds value in prosecuting a siege. Therefore, the aggressor knowingly executes a porous siege. Operation Inherent Resolve’s siege of Mosul (2016–17) is an example of this situation. The Iraqi Security Forces, bolstered by the U.S.-led coalition to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, did not possess sufficient force to completely encircle the city of Mosul. The Iraqi Security Forces and U.S.-led coalition nonetheless bifurcated the city and conducted micro-sieges to squeeze the life out of the Islamic State. In many other cases, however, adroit actors will leave a portion of a siege open. The aggressor might do this for a variety of reasons.

First, a porous siege provides the aggressor with intelligence. An open artery to and from a siege affords an aggressor the opportunity to observe what goes into and comes out of a besieged area. That information, in turn, allows an aggressor the opportunity to better understand the defender’s capabilities, resource capacity, and force disposition.

Second, an aggressor might use a siege as a punitive action. Consequently, leaving a valve open allows the aggressor to keep metered amounts of supply flow into a besieged area, allowing the defending force and the affected population to remain in the fight longer than they would if contact with the outside world were cut entirely. In doing so, the aggressor can actually increase the severity of punishment on the besieged actor by applying a steady degree of death and destruction on the defender over time. The sieges at Donetsk Airport (2014–15) and Mariupol (2022) are examples of this dynamic. In each case, had the Russian military and its proxy forces closed the perimeters entirely, the Ukrainians would have likely faltered much sooner. But having left a small artery open, the Russian military and its proxy forces inflicted greater punishment by extending the time in which they made Kyiv’s forces defend themselves and spend resources to sustain their force.

Third, a porous siege allows a cynical aggressor the ability to provide a nod of nominal good will to the international community and the provisions of international humanitarian law. Yet, similar to the first option, this also provides an aggressor the opportunity to gain information on the status of the defender’s forces, the overall situation, and force locations.

If an encirclement is not a siege’s causal mechanism, then what is? Put simply, actors use sieges because they accelerate an adversary toward exhaustion and, as Professor Cathal Nolan writes, exhaustion through attrition is how wars are won and lost. Exhaustion is the materiel inability and/or cognitive unwillingness of an actor to continue fighting. Sieges, unlike head-to-head battles, are one of the best ways an actor can effectively impose materiel loss on their adversary, while parrying the reciprocal loss.

It is important to note that a siege is not just a tactical consideration. Sieges can occur in battles, but in most cases, sieges are more often operational and strategic military activities. Time is a useful independent variable for categorizing sieges into tactical, operation, and strategic consideration. Time is a good metric because it reflects the tension between resource consumption, resupply, operational and strategic resources, and resource distribution across all levels of military activity. Put another way, time is a useful metric because it closely links military activities with exhaustion.

Carrying this idea forward, it is possible to categorize sieges of 30 days or less as battles, sieges of a month to six months in length as operations, and any siege longer than six months as a campaign. Referring back to the 60 post–Cold War sieges referenced earlier in this article provides interesting results. Tactical sieges (i.e., battles) occurred in 18 percent of the cases. Operational level sieges, or those lasting from six months to a year, occurred 35 percent of the time. Strategic sieges, or those lasting longer than a year, account for 47 percent of the post–Cold War sieges. Of that 47 percent, 18 of those sieges lasted significantly longer than a year. Given the data, despite the lack of acknowledgment in many policy, academic, or defense circles, sieges are considerably more important than mere tactical considerations.

Who Wins?

In building my dataset on sieges, I began with the post–Cold War period because it more closely aligns with today’s state of the international system than does examining the problem from an earlier point in history. This is important because war and warfare often reflect the periods of time in which they originate. Therefore, data about a modern siege, for instance, would be skewed by incorporating siege information from a period such as World War I or the 19th- century Crimean War.

My research combed through armed conflict in the post–Cold War period and identified 60 sieges. I found that sieges occurred in almost every conflict from the Yugoslav wars of the early 1990s to today’s conflicts in Mali and Sudan. Through my research, I sought to find answers to the following questions: Does the aggressor or defender most often win in a siege? Using states, non-state actors, and principal-proxy dyads as the metric for measurement, which actor fairs better in sieges? What factor does time play in sieges?

As is explained below, I found that aggressors do win more often than defenders in a siege. However, they do not win as unanimously as one might think. Second, non-proxy aligned states come out on top in most sieges, with proxy dyads coming in second, and non-proxy aligned non-state actors finishing last. Regarding time, proxy dyads and non-state actors prevail 80 percent of the time in sieges lasting 30 days or less. States, on the other hand, come out on top 52 percent of the time in sieges lasting between one and six months, and they win 82 percent of the time in sieges that go on for six months to one year. Surprisingly, sieges lasting longer than a year see the state’s dominance give way. States prevail in 39 percent of sieges lasting longer than a year, whereas non-state actors prevail 28 percent of the time, followed by proxy dyads at 17 percent. Although I do not have the data to explain why states thrive in the middle of the siege timeline continuum and do not thrive on the short and long ends of the spectrum, the assumption is that the middle band — between one month and one year — better suits a state’s logistics network. On the short end of less than a month, states might not perform as well because they are quickly overcome by surprise. On the long end of the spectrum, or longer than a year, a state’s power might wain due to flagging political or domestic support. Nonetheless, further research is required to make better educated insights to that problem.

Having framed sieges in post–Cold War armed conflict, who most often wins in siege situations? Of the 60 sieges recorded between the end of the Cold War and today, 60 percent have been won by the aggressor, 30 percent by the defender, and the remainder split between ceasefires, multiple victors, and stalemates, with a few that are ongoing. The besieging actor — referred to as the aggressor — is commonly (61 percent), but not always, a state. Non-state actors, on the other hand, are the aggressor 34 percent of the time. The remaining 5 percent is split across other non-traditional combatants such as proto-states and principal-proxy dyads.

Based on the type of actor, what do the statistics say regarding war outcomes? States win sieges 48 percent of the time. Of significant importance, principal-proxy dyads come in second in win percentage. Principal-proxy dyads, such as Russia and the Donetsk People’s Army, for example, come out on top 23 percent of the time. Non-state actors follow principal-proxy dyads, registering victory 18 percent of the time. The remaining percentage is split amongst stalemates, ceasefires, and ongoing sieges.

The data thus indicates that the aggressor, regardless of their status as a state or non-state actor, is likely to win a siege. Nevertheless, the defender’s 30 percent win percentage suggests an aggressor’s success in entering into a siege is anything but a foregone conclusion. If Israel initiates a siege or series of sieges in Gaza, it is statistically acceptable to assume an Israeli victory. Yet at the same time, if Hamas enlists proxies, or if it operates as a proxy for a larger state such as Iran, it is quite likely that they significantly increase their odds of victory.

Data aside, the competing strategies of Israel and Hamas, on a tight battlefield spotted with densely populated cities, suggests that a horrific war of attrition is afoot. Moreover, the war of attrition will not be limited to military forces, but it will also consume civilian life.

The Legality of Sieges

Under the protection of international humanitarian law, militaries are afforded a surprising amount of latitude for siege operations. Under international humanitarian law, military necessity, proportionality, and distinction are what provide commanders the legal freedom to conduct sieges. Article 23(g) of the Hague Convention of 1899/1907 outlines what is acceptable under the principle of military necessity. Article 23(g) states that a combatant is prohibited from destroying or seizing an adversary’s property, unless the destruction or seizure of property is demanded by the necessities of war. Moreover, this principle must be applied in consideration of other elements of international humanitarian law. Further, military necessity does not act as a defense for prohibited acts.

Proportionality, on the other hand, states that the loss of life and destruction of property that accompany an attack must not be excessive considering the tangible military advantage expected to be gained.

Distinction is the most important element of international humanitarian law relating to sieges. Additional Protocol I prohibits indiscriminate attacks. The protocol’s Article 51 outlines the protection of civilian populations in war zones. Article 51 states that civilian populations and individual civilians should be protected against the inherent dangers of war. Moreover, civilian populations and individual citizens should not be the object of military attacks. Further, attacks or threats of violence to terrorize the civilian population or individual citizens are prohibited. Importantly, Article 51 also makes provisions for civilian populations or individual citizens who take it upon themselves to take up arms. It asserts that once an individual or group of individuals directly participates in hostilities, they lose their protected status.

Further, distinction is important when considering sieges because of the likelihood of indiscriminate attacks. Article 51 provides three provisions defining indiscriminate attacks: attacks not directed at a military objective, attacks using a method or means that cannot be directed at a specific military objective, and attacks whose method or means cannot be limited to a military objective. In addition, Article 51 records two types of attacks that are categorically defined as indiscriminate and thus violate the principle of distinction. Those two conditions are: a bombardment that treats a city with multiple military objectives within it as one collective military objective, and an attack that generates loss of civilian life, injury to noncombatants, and destruction of civilian infrastructure that is excessive to the military objectives.

Additional Protocol I, Article 51 also asserts that reprisals against civilian populations, individual civilians, and civilian objects are prohibited. Military forces are not allowed to move civilian populations or forces from one place to another on a battlefield to shield the force from the effects of combat. Put another way, the use of civilian populations and individual citizens as human shields is prohibited.

Additional Protocol II, among other things, states that combatants must protect civilian populations and that civilian populations and individual civilians must not be the object of an attack. Starvation of civilians is also prohibited as a result of Additional Protocol II. Although it prohibits the starvation of civilians, it does not explicitly state that the starvation of military forces is a violation of international humanitarian law. Regarding starvation, Additional Protocol II also states that the destruction of objects indispensable to the survival of civilian populations, such as food, water, crops, livestock, farming area, and irrigation implements, is strictly prohibited. Note that military forces are again excluded from this condition.

There are several other agreements that also govern international humanitarian law. The Geneva Convention provides several other distinctions pertinent to the legality of sieges. Moreover, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court further codifies many of the provisions found within Additional Protocols I and II, as well as the Geneva Conventions, into a coherent body of rules regarding international humanitarian law.

The language within the corpus of international humanitarian law is broad and resultantly provides military commanders and their political leadership with latitude to conduct sieges so long as civilian populations are properly accounted for. The language within international humanitarian law selectively excludes military forces as a protected element on the battlefield, thus making operations such as a siege legal under international humanitarian law as it pertains to international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict.

Moreover, international humanitarian law does prohibit starvation as a method of warfare, but it does not equate sieges with starvation. As a result, sieges in warfare are allowed, so long as the combatants account for and provide protection for the civilian population and individual civilians within the conflict’s zone of military operations.

The state of Israel, however, is not a signatory to either Additional Protocol I or Additional Protocol II. Israel’s justification for this is that they do not reflect customary law and therefore are not binding. Nonetheless, the Additional Protocols are considered to be norms of customary international law, and they are therefore binding on all parties in conflict, regardless of their status as a signatory or not.

Nonetheless, as several members of the international community, to include the United States, France, Canada, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, recently stated, Israel is well within the parameters of international law to defend itself against terrorism and further terrorist attacks. Israel does appear to be honoring the letter of the law as it pertains to international humanitarian law. It has made several calls for civilian populations and individual citizens to temporarily vacate known hotspots in Gaza. Questions remain, however, regarding the legality of such moves because the mass deportation of groups of individuals can be construed as excessive and not proportional to the engagement area in which Israel intends to operate. Further, Israel is allowing humanitarian aid to reach the Palestinians within Gaza.

Israel will make mistakes and unintentionally hurt innocent civilians. That is certainly one of the most unfortunate aspects of armed conflict. Nevertheless, Israel and the Israel Defense Forces appear to be judiciously applying combat power against military targets, while adhering to the tenets of international humanitarian law. To address concerns of potential bias, it must be noted that adhering to international humanitarian law does not mean that civilian casualties and collateral damage will not be a byproduct of Israel’s right to defend itself. Moreover, the language used in international humanitarian law is occasionally contradictory and worded so theoretically that it can be used to justify the actions of, or to castigate, any combatant engaged in a conflict. Civilian casualties and collateral damage are an unfortunate part of war, regardless of how closely all parties in a conflict try to adhere to international humanitarian law.

Conclusion

Given the latitude that international humanitarian law provides states and militaries to conduct a range of military operations, the frequency of sieges in modern armed conflict, and the siege-friendly conditions of Gaza, it is safe to assume that if Israel does initiate a large-scale invasion of Gaza, then sieges will be a key part of the offensive. Moreover, if Hamas does go underground and utilizes the reported tunnel network that links the disparate parts of Gaza with one another, sieges will likely play an important part in countering the tunnel challenge.

Further, many militaries consider sieges within the acceptable methods of warfare, with the caveat that the civilian population and individual civilians are appropriately protected. Israel, for example, states that sieges are wholly acceptable so long as civilian populations are allowed to leave the city. In terms of process, the onlooker might expect to see a general siege of Gaza, albeit one that is quite porous. Israel will attempt to close routes into the strip, while controlling the flow of humanitarian aid and other necessities of life. Once Israel and the Israel Defense Forces have identified their supporting military objectives, most likely oriented on a city, a garrison, or a force within a city, they will move to establish a micro-siege, or a proximal encirclement and offensive operation against that objective. Due to the considerable force and logistics requirements to maintain a single siege, much less multiple sieges, the Israelis will likely collapse the larger siege of Gaza so to focus forces and resources into micro-siege. Depending on circumstances, the Israelis might keep a small portion of the larger siege of Gaza in place if doing so denies support or reinforcement from external actors.

Therefore, the international community should prepare itself for the worst. Unfortunately, protections for civilian populations, individual civilians, civilian objects, and resources often fall well short of ideal once hostilities begin. As a result, civilians get caught in the middle of horrible, hostile action between competing parties. Given Gaza’s small size, civilian populations and individual civilians have very little recourse regarding relocating from battlefields. If Israel’s offensive attacks into Gaza with full force, onlookers must thus anticipate significant numbers of civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. Precision munitions will not provide much assistance in offsetting the problem of civilian casualties and collateral damage. The promise of precision becomes quickly neutralized when operating in dense urban terrain.

Sieges will likely accompany any Israel offensive into Gaza that looks to gain physical control of territory. Sieges will likely accelerate military casualties, civilian deaths, and damage to civilian infrastructure. Below the surface, sieges will complicate things such as civilian, noncombatant medical care and access to food stuffs and water within Gaza. The international community, to include nongovernment organizations focused on caring for noncombatants in war zones, should proactively prepare for what might well be inevitable and not wait until it is too late, and they are forced to play catch-up.

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Amos Fox is a PhD candidate at the University of Reading. He is currently the chief human resources officer for the Irregular Warfare Initiative and hosts the Revolution in Military Affairs podcast.

Image: Israeli Defense Forces

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Amos Fox · October 27, 2023

20. 'No more sticky notes': Army consolidating 43 incompatible data systems to just 2

Excellent. I hope the Army can get a handle on this problem.

Excerpt:

The result has been decades of laborious workarounds that burn the time of over 170,000 users across the Army, contractors and civil service. Much of this work is what’s sarcastically known as “swivel chair integration,” because the least-bad solution is often to read a number off one screen linked to one system, then turn your chair and manually type the number into another computer linked to another, incompatible system. Many times the only place that related information from separate systems gets pulled together is in an Excel spreadsheet or on a PowerPoint slide. And in the worst cases, staff may just end up scribbling vital data on sticky notes.

'No more sticky notes': Army consolidating 43 incompatible data systems to just 2 - Breaking Defense

breakingdefense-com.cdn.ampproject.org · by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

‘No more sticky notes’: Army consolidating 43 incompatible data systems to just 2

By on October 27, 2023 at 10:40 AM

Soldiers of the 41st Field Artillery lay out their equipment for a visual inventory in Grafenwoehr, Germany, in 2019. Such readiness audits are notoriously time-consuming and prone to error. (Army photo)

AUSA 2023 — “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles,” Sun Tzu said two millennia ago. But how does the Army “know itself” when it has almost half a million active-duty personnel, organized into thousands of units, located at hundreds of bases around the world?

Today, officials say, assessing readiness is a laborious process that requires a lot of manually reentering information from one database into another. That’s because the Army alone uses at least 43 separate and largely incompatible systems to track different types of readiness data. Such data includes how many troops a unit is supposed to have, how many are actually assigned, how many are available for duty as opposed to out sick or on leave, what their ranks and specialties should be and what they actually are, who’s trained or certified in what skills from foreign languages to tank gunnery, what equipment they have on hand and in what condition, what kind of supplies are in stock where, and on and on and on.

The result has been decades of laborious workarounds that burn the time of over 170,000 users across the Army, contractors and civil service. Much of this work is what’s sarcastically known as “swivel chair integration,” because the least-bad solution is often to read a number off one screen linked to one system, then turn your chair and manually type the number into another computer linked to another, incompatible system. Many times the only place that related information from separate systems gets pulled together is in an Excel spreadsheet or on a PowerPoint slide. And in the worst cases, staff may just end up scribbling vital data on sticky notes.

Even if everything ends up correctly entered in all the proper places, finding the right data and putting together an update for commanders — let alone generating user-friendly graphs and charts — can be so time-consuming that some figures are out of date before decision-maker gets to see them. The opportunities for error and wasted effort are immense.

“The end-to-end business process was 55 percent swivel chair, so we weren’t able to visualize all that data,” said Lori Mongold, a veteran civil servant with over three decades’ experience navigating the Army bureaucracy who now works for the planning division at the Army’s Pentagon headquarters, known as staff section G-3/5/7. “Our intent is to automate as much of that swivel chair activity as we can… so the first time somebody generates that authoritative data, it’s usable throughout that [digital] workflow, which we can’t do today.”

In brief, chuckled Peter Bechtel, the assistant deputy chief of staff for G-3/5/7, the goal is “no more sticky notes.” If the new software succeeds, he added, it will aid the Army in everything from assessing unit readiness to finally passing regular financial audits.

The Army aims to solve the problem with a technological one-two punch, Mongold and Bechtel told reporters at the annual Association of the US Army conference. Consolidating all 43 systems into one would “set us up for failure,” Mongold said. “Training is massive in and of itself,” she added, with “the swivel chair [problem] and the associated record-keeping” especially complex. So the Army is going down from 43 readiness systems to two.

The bigger and more ambitious project with the longer timelines is the Army Training Information System. “ATIS will subsume 28 [existing] systems [and] be the authoritative data source for all training data,” according to a follow-up email from service officials to Breaking Defense.

The Army has chosen longtime Pentagon contractor LMI as “lead systems integrator” for ATIS. The company referred Breaking Defense’s questions to the Army, which stated that LMI is “conducting market research, holding Industry Days, and exploring the award of multiple OTAs [Other Transaction Authority contracts]” for various aspects of the program. ATIS is not expected to be operational until fiscal 2027, Mongold said. (An earlier ATIS contract was terminated, but neither the Army nor available public sources provided any details, including what company held that contract.)

The slightly less overwhelming, nearer-term program will combine 15 systems into the Global Force Integrated Management — Operational Environment. GFIM-OE will handle, in essence, every aspect of readiness except for training — from equipment status and supplies to unit manning levels and detailed org charts (what the military calls TOEs, or Tables of Organization & Equipment). Artificial intelligence firm BigBear.ai is on contract to deliver the system, which will run on the cArmy secure cloud hosted by Amazon, in fiscal 2025.

Together, the two programs will cover every aspect of the Army process formally known as “Deploy to Redeploy and Retrograde of Materiel,” which covers a unit’s lifecycle from training up before a deployment to the final return, or write-off, of the last item of equipment from abroad.

Mongold, who oversees both programs for the Army staff, said the aim is to move both to the new and streamlined acquisition process for software, known as the Software Pathway. The Army’s also taking the opportunity to streamline its staff procedures. “We’ve never updated business processes that are 30 years old,” she said.

So, as with any time the Army is replacing a set of legacy systems, there will be a bit of a “culture change” for the users of those systems. Building GFIM includes “business process reengineering” to improve the current processes, said Ryan Legge, who as president of Integrated Defense Solutions oversees the GFIM program for lead contractor BigBear.ai.

Such a complex project requires close and constant coordination between the team at BigBear, Mongold’s staff at Army HQ and Army acquisition officials at the Program Executive Office for Enterprise Information Systems (PEO-EIS), Legge told Breaking Defense in an interview.

“There is a lot of sharing and collaboration going on with both the PEO, which is the program acquisition office, and the functional community, which is G-3,” Legge said. “We are following an agile development process with constant meetings such as PI [Program Increment] planning sessions, daily standups, etc. … It’s key to have the users’ buy-in and have them believe in what we’re doing and the direction the program is going.”

“We’re here to implement a system to make the process better and more efficient for them; we’re not trying to redo everything they’ve ever done,” emphasized Legge, who’s spent two decades at various contractors working for the Army staff. “The development starts with a deep understanding of the details and complexity of the current ‘deploy to redeploy to retrograde’ process and the data associated with that process.”

The first layer of the new architecture is simply making sure that all the “legacy” data scattered throughout the existing systems is preserved and accessible in the new one, translated from the old cacophony of incompatible formats into a harmonious “data mesh.”

The second layer applies commercial “workflow automation” software — for GFIM specifically, the choice was Appian — to turn the complex Army processes into interactive flowcharts, walking users through the steps, data and regulations for a given task.

Then the third and final layer uses that data and those workflows to generate analytics, including up-to-date and easily readable graphics for decisionmakers. It will also output updates to other Army and Defense Department data systems such as Advana.

When the system is fully operational, Legge said, it will enable the Army to identify and remove any bottlenecks in the complex “D2RR” process, helping streamline decision-making.

“We’re pretty excited,” said G-3/5/7’s Bechtel, a retired Army officer himself who’s suffered through years of staff work “I’ve done my share of flipping through flat files and Excel spreadsheets. [With the new systems], it’s all in a seamless architecture.”

Romania Is at a Dangerous Tipping Point

The country is increasingly important to the world—and increasingly unstable.

By Maximilian Hess, a Central Asia fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Foreign Policy · by Maximilian Hess · October 27, 2023

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited Romania on Oct. 10, but the visit did not go entirely as planned, with a scheduled speech in front of the country’s legislature scuppered at the last minute.

Zelensky himself called off the speech, but the real reason was pushback from Romania’s nationalist opposition party, the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), which threatened to protest the speech. The party has seen its support more than double since the 2020 parliamentary election. It leads in some polls for next year’s European Union elections in the country, even though Ukraine and Moldova have both banned its leader from entering their countries over alleged connections to the Kremlin.

The country faces a turning point—both in terms of its position on Ukraine and its position in Europe. In the aftermath of the return of Slovakia’s controversial populist Robert Fico and its subsequent shift toward a stance approaching Hungary’s in terms of resisting European support for Kyiv, Bucharest is likely to prove the next battleground for the agenda. Except it is far more significant.

Romania plays a major role in providing humanitarian aid and delivering military equipment to Ukraine, but most importantly, it is the linchpin ally in enabling grain to reach world markets. More than half of Ukrainian grain has been exported via Romania since Russia’s full-scale invasion began last February.

Romanian relations with Kyiv are a sensitive issue domestically and internationally. Romania’s potential turn will have major ramifications for Europe’s wider economic and political environment, as the country is also set to play a key role in European, and global, energy security over the coming years.

This June, Austria-based multinational OMV and Romanian gas company Romgaz announced that they plan to invest up to 4 billion euros (about $4.26 billion) in developing natural gas fields in the Black Sea, a project that the companies believe could produce at least 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year. Infrastructure development is due to begin next year, and it is hoped that production will begin in 2027. The development of this resource offers the promise of mitigating Russian threats over the medium term because of the promise of Romania’s own hydrocarbons industry.

The successful development of Romania’s gas production offers the ability to blunt the key economic weapon that the Kremlin has used against Europe alongside its war in Ukraine, namely, the weaponization of natural gas supplies that began before the full-scale invasion and subsequently intensified in its aftermath.

The impact of the Kremlin’s strategy has been significant, driving inflation to highs not seen in decades, although the European Union has been successful in decreasing its dependence on Russian natural gas—with Russian gas falling to just 8.4 percent of European imports in the first seven months of 2023, down from 45 percent in 2021.

Nevertheless, the Kremlin has made clear that it is willing to target European economies, and in turn support for Ukraine, through other commodities as well. Its withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July has not had the feared major impact on global grain prices, but it has driven up tensions over European gas markets, including a World Trade Organization dispute from Kyiv against Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia over their unilateral restrictions on Ukrainian grain, while the AUR and other Romanian political parties have also flirted with such action. There is little doubt that Russia will continue such efforts across various classes of commodities.

But gas is undoubtedly the most significant, with a tight global market that is jittery about any disruptions in supply for the foreseeable future. In the past week, European and global gas prices have spiked over a suspicious leak in an offshore pipeline between Finland and Estonia, as they did over threatened strikes in Australia in August. Further gas price increases also threaten to drive renewed inflation, which in turn will require further elevated interest rates and the political and economic costs that those bring.

It is therefore paramount for Ukraine, Europe, and the wider West to see Romanian gas flow as soon as possible. Russia, inversely, has every reason to oppose it. Russia’s militarization of the Black Sea—where it claims territorial waters bordering Romania through its illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea—is an obvious immediate threat, but not the only one, and in Romania it may seek to take advantage of the relative lack of attention that the market receives to try to undermine the project.

Russia has a long history of using networks of influence and business partners to gain a foothold in energy projects across Europe, including in Romania. Russian companies have investments in the country’s metals sector and across its hydrocarbons and port industries. A number of Romanian businessmen have also been long-standing partners of the Kremlin in providing services in Russia.

Far too often, these actions have sailed under the radar. And while the United States and European Union have both adopted significant new anti-kleptocracy agendas in recent years—and underpinned them with threats of sanctions—the bark has been worse than the bite.

For example, the Romanian oil services company Grup Servicii Petroliere (GSP)—controlled by CEO and Board President Gabriel Comanescu—has a long history of contracting with the Kremlin. It also has not announced plans to leave the Russian market, despite increased sanctions following the outbreak of war and even as the brutality of Russia’s invasion and associated war crimes has become apparent.

The company has previously undertaken work that would now be in violation of international sanctions, most notably in July 2014, when it helped the Russian state oil company Gazprom Neft by undertaking drilling work in the Arctic Sea. That contract was announced just five days before the United States introduced its sectoral sanctions on Russia, which specifically banned support for Russian Artic hydrocarbon development projects for affected companies. Gazprom Neft was added to the list shortly thereafter, but GSP’s contract slipped by just in time.

GSP has also been the subject of investigations resulting in revelations from the Panama Papers. Romania’s RISE project, a nonprofit investigative journalism group working in collaboration with the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, reported in 2017 that the firm had not only extensively used offshore structures to minimize its tax payments, but also engaged in suspicious transactions to acquire 10 drills from OMV’s joint venture with the Romanian government, OMV Petrom. A local union leader was subsequently jailed for embezzlement.

Romania’s track record in targeting corruption and Russian influence networks on its own has been mixed. The state’s National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) was not long ago highlighted as a leading example in Eastern Europe for such efforts, but its reputation has since suffered substantial hits. Former directorate head Laura Codruta Kovesi was sacked in 2018 after the Social Democratic Party (PSD) demanded her removal despite President Klaus Iohannis seeking to stop the move, a sacking that the European Court of Human Rights ruled violated due process.

Although Codruta Kovesi has since become the European Union’s chief prosecutor, the anti-corruption agenda in Romania has effectively been frozen in its tracks since her removal. There has been quick turnover in the leadership of the DNA, and Romanian media has repeatedly reported that its directorship has become subject to the political preferences of the government rather than prioritizing effectiveness in tackling corruption.

Romanians repeatedly took to the street in 2017 and 2018 to protest against judicial reforms perceived as institutionalizing political control over the justice system, and the December 2020 election saw the liberal USR Plus alliance record its best-ever result with nearly 16 percent of votes, putting it in third place behind the long-dominant political factions, the PSD and its rivals in the nominally center-right National Liberal Party (PNL).

Even before the rise of AUR’s electoral threat, Romania’s fractured parliament has been highly dysfunctional—and left the country without a credible capability to tackle corruption and potential Russian influence on its own.

A brief alliance between USR and PNL collapsed after just nine months. Romania has had four prime ministers in the past three years, and the latest coalitions have brought together the PNL and PSD, albeit with the prime minister office rotating between the two. Their latest government, formed in June 2023, is headed by PSD leader Marcel Ciolacu, himself once investigated over potential corruption by the DNA under Codruta Kovesi.

Meanwhile, the USR Plus alliance has split, and many of the PNL’s voters appear set to abandon it for the far-right populist Alliance for the Union of Romanians, dragging the country’s entire political discourse to the right and away from the challenge of corruption.

Romania’s gas promise, however, also needs to be a priority to ensure that it is developed for the benefit of Romanians—and for Europe and Ukraine. Yet, with a track record of serving as a vehicle for Russian influence, sanctions evasion must be kept out of Romania’s burgeoning Black Sea gas industry. Europe must also act now to engage proactively to address Romanians political concerns, lest the AUR take advantage of the situation.

But there are still glimmers of hope—a recent poll found that NATO Deputy Secretary Mircea Geoana is favored to win the presidency if he runs as an independent.

It is not too late for Romania’s turning point to be a positive one.

Foreign Policy · by Maximilian Hess · October 27, 2023

22. T-AOS: A New Model for Competition (AFSOC)

Excerpts:

On July 13, 2022, the AFSOC director of operations, Major General Matthew W. Davidson, signed the Future Concept of Operations for Air Force Special Operations Forces Command and Control. The document addresses recommendations from a US Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) comprehensive review by codifying and normalizing its pending force presentation and development model. The goal is to more closely align AFSOF with other SOF tactical units and to better enable AFSOF’s unique multidomain contributions as a competitive advantage for USSOCOM, the theater special operations commands (TSOCs), and the Joint SOF community.

This concept of operations declared the outgoing JSOAC model did not allow AFSOC to adequately sustain capability or to support surge capacity of its forces. Moreover, the aging model, without a thoughtful analysis of the force-generation process, had a near-singular focus and did not provide the right architecture to train air commando skills prior to deployment. The concept also codified the transition of AFSOC’s new C2 structure from the JSOAC model to expeditionary force capabilities.

The core of the JSOAC replacement elements was to center on emerging special operations task groups and their subordinate task units (SOTG/U). With SOTGs commanded by lieutenant colonels, AFSOC increased force flexibility and availability. And with the SOTG certification, verification, and validation process, task force organizations increased their legitimacy.

For context, a special operations task group is a deployable headquarters with two or more special operations task units of different capabilities. A SOTU can be special tactics, aviation, or a mission sustainment team (MST), led by an O-4 or senior O-3, and can be employed independent of an SOTG. The MST is a deployable combat support and combat service support structure for aviation and special tactics SOTUs and can include civil engineering, communications, logistics, security forces, bed down/sustainment, medical, airfield management, highly trained special operations security force teams for force protection at high-risk locations, and contracting capabilities, even when a SOTU is geographically separated from the SOTG.

A SOTG commander can request an aviation staff augmentation team (ASAT) for any task force O-6 or greater that the task group supports. The ASAT plugs into any O-6 or higher staff that requires AFSOF aviation expertise.

T-AOS: A New Model for Competition

airuniversity.af.edu · October 24, 2023

Published
By N. K. Cobb

By fielding five regionally aligned theater-air operations squadrons (T-AOS), Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) has an opportunity to more decisively engage in emerging possibilities associated with strategic competition. In conjunction with the US Air Force’s agile combat employment (ACE) concept, the possibilities exemplify demonstrations of capability, especially when conducted with Joint and combined forces.

Leveraging the ACE tenet of unpredictability, each T-AOS can campaign for operational advantage. In terms of ACE movement and maneuver, a T-AOS can campaign for Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) to expand access and incorporate the battle of the narrative and influence. Agile combat employment-associated possibilities are relevant to the level of AFSOF, influencing conflict diversions by changing an adversary's decision-making and enabling the aggressive generation of conventional airpower at select times and places. To emphasize an important distinction, a T-AOS is not a command-and-control (C2) node but clearly supports this with campaigning options.

Each T-AOS is primarily tasked to campaign for AFSOF wings. First introduced in April 2022 in response to AFSOC strategic guidance to transform AFSOF into the United States’ future needs, the emerging T-AOS concept represents organizational change that, at a minimum, reaches desired objectives such as “decentralized units of action tackling complex challenges” and “systems ready for full-spectrum operations.” The T-AOS as a new operational unit arguably represents one of the most creative changes the Air Force has initiated in its recent history with tremendous application in the current and future competitive environment.

Background

A review of national, defense, and Air Force Special Operations Forces strategies demonstrates the relationship of the T-AOS to strategic competition campaigning. On October 12, 2022, President Joseph Biden opened the National Security Strategy by stating, “We are in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order.” This strategy specifies three major lines of effort:

Invest in the underlying sources and tools of American power and influence.
Build the strongest possible coalition of nations to enhance the United States’ collective influence to shape the global strategic environment and to solve shared challenges.
Modernize and strengthen the US military so it is equipped for the era of strategic competition with major powers, while maintaining the capability to disrupt the terrorist threat to the homeland.

Supporting the National Security Strategy, the 2022 National Defense Strategy identifies three ways in which the Department of Defense will achieve its priorities: integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantage. The strategy states that “campaigning will strengthen deterrence and enable us to gain advantages against the full range of competitor’s coercive actions.”

According to the AFSOC 2020 Strategic Guidance, the command must orient toward strategic competition below armed conflict by investing in new capabilities. To make the dynamic shift from a two-decade priority on counter-violent extremism and crisis response, AFSOC decided to break some things— figuratively, that is—in relatively short order.

The former AFSOC commander, Lieutenant General James C. Slife, directed the elimination of Joint Special Operations Air Components (JSOAC) in task forces and promptly established new command and control (C2) capabilities and the associated training and education programs and procedures to deliberately lead to force certification, verification, and validation (CV2). No AFSOC JSOAC has ever had a pre-deployment verification process like the currently mandated special operations task group (SOTG) process. As initial analysis revealed, the request for forces demand on the enterprise to provide steady-state C2 arrangements commanded by full colonels and to continue that two-decades long commitment was unsustainable.

On July 13, 2022, the AFSOC director of operations, Major General Matthew W. Davidson, signed the Future Concept of Operations for Air Force Special Operations Forces Command and Control. The document addresses recommendations from a US Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) comprehensive review by codifying and normalizing its pending force presentation and development model. The goal is to more closely align AFSOF with other SOF tactical units and to better enable AFSOF’s unique multidomain contributions as a competitive advantage for USSOCOM, the theater special operations commands (TSOCs), and the Joint SOF community.

This concept of operations declared the outgoing JSOAC model did not allow AFSOC to adequately sustain capability or to support surge capacity of its forces. Moreover, the aging model, without a thoughtful analysis of the force-generation process, had a near-singular focus and did not provide the right architecture to train air commando skills prior to deployment. The concept also codified the transition of AFSOC’s new C2 structure from the JSOAC model to expeditionary force capabilities.

The core of the JSOAC replacement elements was to center on emerging special operations task groups and their subordinate task units (SOTG/U). With SOTGs commanded by lieutenant colonels, AFSOC increased force flexibility and availability. And with the SOTG certification, verification, and validation process, task force organizations increased their legitimacy.

For context, a special operations task group is a deployable headquarters with two or more special operations task units of different capabilities. A SOTU can be special tactics, aviation, or a mission sustainment team (MST), led by an O-4 or senior O-3, and can be employed independent of an SOTG. The MST is a deployable combat support and combat service support structure for aviation and special tactics SOTUs and can include civil engineering, communications, logistics, security forces, bed down/sustainment, medical, airfield management, highly trained special operations security force teams for force protection at high-risk locations, and contracting capabilities, even when a SOTU is geographically separated from the SOTG.

A SOTG commander can request an aviation staff augmentation team (ASAT) for any task force O-6 or greater that the task group supports. The ASAT plugs into any O-6 or higher staff that requires AFSOF aviation expertise.

The first aviation staff augmentation teams have already been employed. The ASAT is not intended to replace all other existing Joint Special Operations Forces command-and-control supporting structures with outside air echelons, such as special operations liaison elements to a Joint Force air component command. Not part of the new command-and-control structure, but a distinctly separate force presentation from the SOTG and MST, the T-AOSs are assigned to regionally focused wings, responsible for integration and campaigning up and out with the TSOCs and beyond. In April 2022, Slife stated this emerging T-AOS concept would be needed to assist AFSOC’s transformation to “campaign in the gray zone.”

T-AOS Objectives

In August 2020, then-Chief of Staff of the US Air Force General Charles Q. Brown Jr. compelled the US Air Force to “accelerate change or lose.” More recently, Lieutenant General Tony D. Bauernfeind, AFSOC commander, spoke about the USSOCOM commander’s conceptual ratio of “60-20-20,” representing the percentage of effort that should be relegated to campaigning for strategic competition (60 percent), versus crisis response (20 percent) and counter-violent extremist organization activities (20 percent).

The T-AOS is that element of the AFSOF that facilitates campaigning in strategic competition, which is the “persistent and long-term struggle that occurs between two or more adversaries seeking to pursue incompatible interests without necessarily engaging in armed conflict with each other.” The intent is for a T-AOS to provide a variety of air-related, creative, non-kinetic, nonlethal operational options so Joint commanders can have greater success, especially regarding competitive advantage below armed conflict. The regionally aligned T-AOS

will apply all-source intelligence analysis; multi-domain space, cyber, information, and special operations integration; and a robust planning capability to enable Combatant Commanders and their Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) to fully leverage the unique capabilities AFSOC provides. Working in concert with the TSOCs and coordinating with sister Special Operations Forces (SOF) service components, these squadrons will develop a deep understanding of the environment and develop integrated campaign options for operational commanders.

Author with air commandos in Senegal, 1992; Relationships matter.

To reach the T-AOS objective, Airmen in dynamic leadership roles outside of the cockpit may be called upon to marshal Joint, interagency, and multinational resources while balancing the requirements of an array of stakeholders. These Airmen will seek opportunities to leverage their unique background, training, education, and experience to advance American political objectives.

A theater-air operation squadron can reinforce this concept by supporting partner-nation capability. It supports development and synchronization of AFSOF support to security cooperation, to specialized air mobility, and to Joint, Allied, and partner-nation capacity. Further, it supports capabilities through the development and operationalization of TSOC campaign plans and, to a much lesser degree, by building new air-specific relationships and partnerships.

T-AOS Organization

Although the configuration may change in the future, the T-AOS original subordinate parts are the intelligence, multidomain, and operations flights.

Intelligence Flight

The intelligence flight is the largest portion of a T-AOS and conducts intelligence fusion and analysis activities. The intelligence flight integrates near-real-time analysis and predictive intelligence focused on TSOC priorities.

Operations Flight

The next largest flight is the T-AOS operations flight, consisting of a campaign planning section and a small air advisor team with specific skills and experience. The operations flight is a true integrated section that includes air SOF professionals from the special tactics; SOF air mobility; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and sustainment communities.

Multidomain Flight

The T-AOS multidomain flight includes professionals from the cyber, space, and information operations (IO) communities. Most of this flight’s manning consists of officers who are information operations and public affairs professionals. The T-AOS is an embryonic concept, and its first-generation subordinate elements recently began evolving into squadron A-staff elements and four campaigning flights. For example, the intelligence flight is parallel to an A-2 staff element, and the campaigning flights are personnel from the operations and multidomain element organized into campaigning teams. The campaigning teams plan and advise as required by the wings who advance the AFSOF role in the TSOC and combatant command campaigns. A T-AOS within or outside the continental United States has command relationships that parallel the AFSOC wings it supports.

T-AOS Education and Training

Specific concepts for education and training of T-AOS personnel are being decided as of this writing. The current education and training deliberations between AFSOC training and education working groups include professional development regarding the operational environment, so T-AOS personnel appreciate friendly partner’s perspectives and challenges and the regional compound security threats. Such proposed education and training activities will also include potential operational command authorities, operational capabilities, and Joint fluency for multidomain campaigning and effective Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and commercial enterprise (JIIM-C) expertise so that T-AOS personnel are effective in various environments and missions on arrival.

All personnel will need planning methodologies to communicate with mission-type orders. Force protection training is imperative for Airmen to function and survive in multiple environments. Cognitive skills including critical thinking, creative problem solving, and systemic design thinking are essential for creativity and innovation and for maturity in a mission command environment.

Fundamental skills, beyond maintaining occupational specialty proficiency and leadership fundamentals, will include the Joint planning process (JPP), combatant command theater orientation, the JPP certification exercise, and the annual sustainment of each. All air advisors, in addition, will complete US Air Force Basic Air Advisor training or a SOF equivalent, AFSOF Air Advisor Fundamental Skills, Advanced Special Operations Techniques Level 1, and the AFSOF Air Advisor qualification exercise.

Given systems to be used, the T-AOS directors are asking for prerequisites including top secret clearances to be completed during initial training phases to prevent operational exclusion of new arrivals. A security cooperation course is essential. A contracted embassy operations course has already proven instrumental for T-AOS to integrate more effectively with the greater interagency community, especially regarding integrated deterrence.

Pending Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) core curricula certainly augments senior noncommissioned officer and commissioned officer professional development. JSOU core curriculum modules, especially Understanding Great Power Competition, Understanding the Geo-Strategic Landscape, Risk Calculation and Decision-Making, Joint SOF Roles in Support of Integrative Campaigning Solutions: JIIM-C for IW, and “Thinking” for IW in Compound Security Competition will soon be available on the internet on an on-demand basis.

Considerations for Future Operations

This formal education is a must, given the current strategic competition and ambiguous environment, as there are several dynamics to consider in terms of specifying the why behind the T-AOS concept, socialization of the concept, building capacity, and operationalizing the future operations of theater-air operations squadrons.

The author, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Colin Powell, and Senegalese commandos, 1992.

Supporting the concept of strategic competition, T-AOS campaigns prioritize irregular warfare activities. Such operations are conducted parallel to gray-zone operations. They address challenges occurring below the level of warfare, particularly the power of information and other operational influence possibilities to assist current US efforts regarding the ongoing struggle short of traditional conflict. Strategically, this is where “winning is perhaps better described as maintaining the US government’s positional advantage, namely the ability to influence partners, populations, and threats toward achievement of our regional or strategic objectives.”

Rather than seek a single, specific definition of the gray zone, one should embrace that the gray zone includes diverse challenges with no single solution and has three common characteristics. These characteristics are some form of aggression, the perspective-dependent issues, and ambiguity that exists in terms of the nature of the issue, the parties and policies involved, and the framework of the challenge.

As specified by JSOU President Isaiah Wilson III, such gray-zone winning is accomplished “through access, placement, and strategic influence, setting the conditions for the possibilities of winning before—or even without—the fight.” Those battles, especially the battle of the narrative, are already being waged by US adversaries, nation-state and nonstate, at home and around the globe, and we are behind. A significant part of why we lag in the international battle of the narrative is our military cultural reluctance toward propaganda against our enemies even though our Western political culture does not hesitate to conduct propaganda against fellow Americans.

The AFSOC director of operations, Colonel Jocelyn J. Schermerhorn, noted:

Our adversaries’ ability to leverage the power of information to frustrate the most technically advanced military in the world, both validates the importance of informational power and highlights the need for SOF to master operating in the Information Environment (IE). The IE provides SOF opportunities to proactively create multi-domain dilemmas for adversaries especially below the level of armed conflict. T-AOS is AFSOC’s contribution to the joint force to aggressively understand, blunt, and counter adversary use of ideas, images, and violence.”

Joint headquarters and even established Joint task forces would be able to reach back to a T-AOS for planning assistance given its ability to look at an issue holistically and creatively and develop operational approaches.

For competitive advantage in gray-zone campaigns, AFSOC’s value is directly related to its ability to set conditions. Its role in setting conditions includes:

Creating uncertainty with access and placement efforts while assessing systems, relevant populations, and key stakeholders during presence options.
Inducing friction by testing narratives in conjunction with security assistance and security cooperation activities, with regional foreign internal defense and security force assistance operations, and with a myriad of other creative options.
Imposing costs regarding access and placement to gain institutional knowledge about key air-related systems, the associated relevant populations, and key stakeholders. An example might include environmental samples (soil, water, etc.) to build ecological counternarratives. The possibilities are endless and only limited by imagination.
Providing information, at a minimum, keeps our decisionmakers ahead of the enemy’s decision-making cycle, rendering weaponization possibilities for collected information regarding air systems and possibilities such as air fuel, parts, physical infrastructure, key players, and key terrain.

True creativity is admired by those in positions of authority so much that military campaigning will soon lead to multiple series of operations to win the strategic competition fight rather than ad hoc efforts arranged to simply deter others from winning. Indeed, US SOF should, more so than conventional forces, be the offensive part of the greater integrated deterrence fight. AFSOC can deliberately function as the SOF of the US Air Force and the air in SOF while maintaining service-like responsibilities as a force provider. The potential role of US Air Force special operations in a nation-state warfare Joint task force can easily vary from air contributions to a special operations Joint task force in an irregular warfare task force given the variation in desired outcomes. Given access and placement, an AFSOC T-AOS will increase mobility for integrated teams to conduct a myriad of tasks ranging from situational awareness to influence operations.

Is it possible for an integrated air campaigning entity, the T-AOS, to plan for a single-air platform to safely land at a predetermined location that is not necessarily a prescribed airfield? Could the airfield have been specified by the T-AOS’ own all-source intelligence and operational experts as the single best location to cause a desired reaction from our competitors that triggers information collection, analysis, and dissemination? That single-air platform landing could grow to be three or more near simultaneous landings at prescribed locations in a specified region. The larger group of air platforms could easily come to include not only AFSOF, but also other US Air Force platforms. Imagine the cost imposed and the associated friction induced.

Imagine the potential reactions to a US SOF “back to the future philosophy, mindset, and approach to rediscovering SOF’s full role, purpose, potential, and identity,” where air, land, and maritime SOF are off-loaded to gain advantage using their “comprehensive combination of skills, techniques, operational methods, and tradecraft of the past, amplified by twenty-first century technological advancements.” Imagine the ease of assessing competitor reactions via multiple forms of local, regional, and international media.

In its campaigning, a T-AOS could work with the TSOC to integrate into larger-scale theater operations where other service aircraft join the regional presence operation. Next-level access and placement operations could include partner nations and similar Joint, combined operations could create uncertainty if these operations occurred at informed locations, multiple times. Now, rather than just presence, information gathering and deliberate information transmission, associated with the intent of seeing response communication pathways and links, would expand. In a specific example of such operations, soil samples could be collected, not for potential remote airfields, but rather to test the soil for contamination that could in turn be part of climate change counternarrative possibilities. The strategic competition campaigning possibilities are endless.

Conclusion

The relevance of a T-AOS is centered on its direct relationship to strategic competition and the comparative advantage it offers, as demonstrated by the associated national, defense, and AFSOF strategies, including direction and action from the previous and current AFSOF commanders. AFSOC is investing in tools of influence, building tools of collective influence, and modernizing so it is equipped for strategic competition. The Air Force must now consider the possibilities for future operations given the current competitive, ambiguous environment justifying such a force presentation.

Who will create new training scenarios and incorporate a wholly new force presentation, an integrated team such as a T-AOS, into local unit training, Joint-combined exchange training in theater, and Joint exercises worldwide? At a minimum, one could easily see a T-AOS developing specific plans where portions of the T-AOS would, post-campaigning, participate in exercises with other forces and partners that would assess the viability of planning efforts and mirror the real-world possibilities. Certainly, those in AFSOF positions of authority appreciate that providing the manning, materiel, and financial resources for such an endeavor extends beyond current levels.

Thus far, the rationale for rapid, relevant change bridges two distinctly different approaches taken by the former and current AFSOF commander. The challenge for the former AFSOC commander was to be the change agent. The challenge for the current AFSOC commander is to grow capability while repelling doubts, insist on the fielding of the emerging T-AOS organizations, press for the associated Joint force commander’s campaigns and requisite authorities, and reinforce interagency and international relationships while motivating creative solution sets for future operations. The Joint Operating Concept for Competing calls for “expanding the competitive mindset” by accepting that “our adversaries have a very different conception of warfare.” Our adversaries aim to defeat the United States and replace our nation as the international hegemon without firing a shot. We are behind, but theater-air operations squadrons are one of the creative force presentations for remedying that condition.

N. K. Cobb serves as an academic chair at Joint Special Operations University.

US Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21, Agile Combat Employment (Maxwell AFB, AL: Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, August 23, 2022), 4, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/.

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), AFSOC 2020 Strategic Guidance (Hurlburt Field, FL: AFSOC, 2020), 1, https://media.defense.gov/.

Joseph R. Biden Jr., National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, October 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/.

Department of Defense, “2022 National Defense Strategy,” October 27, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/National-Defense-Strategy/.

AFSOC, Strategic Guidance, 1.

AFSOC/A3O, Concept of Operations for Future Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) Command and Control (C2), July 13, 2022, i.

Hearing to Receive Testimony on United States Special Operations Command's Efforts to Sustain the Readiness of Special Operations Forces and Transform the Force for Future Security, Before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 27, 2022 (statement by Lieutenant General James C. Slife, USAF), 2, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/.

Charles Q. Brown Jr., Accelerate Change or Lose (Washington, DC: Chief of Staff of the Air Force, August 2020), 6, https://www.af.mil/.

Mark A. Milley, Joint Concept for Competing (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 10, 2023), iii, https://s3.documentcloud.org/.

Slife, statement, 3.

Joseph R. Tomczak, Parallel Lives in the Indo-Pacific: Edward Lansdale, Donald Wurster, and the Irregular Warfare Mind-set, white paper (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, June 7, 2023), 6, https://govwhitepapers.com/.

AFSOC, Strategic Guidance.

AFSOC/A3, “Theater Air Operations Squadron (T-AOS) Skills Training Requirements,” Memorandum for Record, May 31, 2023.

Joseph L. Votel et al., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” Joint Forces Quarterly 80, no. 1 (2016): 108, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/.

Wilson, 38.

AFSOC Director of Operations, Concept of Employment, T-AOS, November 30, 2022, 5.

AFSOC, Strategic Guidance, 2.

Will Irwin and Isaiah Wilson III, The Fourth Age of SOF: The Use and Utility of Special Operations Forces in a New Age, Report 22-1 (MacDill AFB, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2022), 4.

Milley, Joint Concept, iv.

airuniversity.af.edu · October 24, 2023

23. Meet Nightshade, the new tool allowing artists to ‘poison’ AI models with corrupted training data

Will this have application in intelligence, information and political warfare, and conflict?

Meet Nightshade, the new tool allowing artists to ‘poison’ AI models with corrupted training data

Carl Franzen

@carlfranzen

October 23, 2023 4:35 PM

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https://venturebeat.com/ai/meet-nightshade-the-new-tool-allowing-artists-to-poison-ai-models-with-corrupted-training-data/?fbclid=IwAR3yqjXA4C9hxw77xvAxAuQJLkHgD4ombW5E9s-TaFewJpJQQmFA8MiQvbE

Since ChatGPT burst onto the scene nearly a year ago, the generative AI era has kicked into high gear, but so too has the opposition.

A number of artists, entertainers, performers and even record labels have filed lawsuits against AI companies, some against ChatGPT maker OpenAI, based on the “secret sauce” behind all these new tools: training data. That is, these AI models would not work without accessing large amounts of multimedia and learning from it, including written material and images produced by artists who had no prior knowledge, nor were given any chance to oppose their work being used to train new commercial AI products.

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In the case of these AI model training datasets, many include material scraped from the web, a practice that artists previously by-and-large supported when it was used to index their material for search results, but which now many have come out against because it allows the creation of competing work through AI.

But even without filing lawsuits, artists have a chance to fight back against AI using tech. MIT Technology Review got an exclusive look at a new open source tool still in development called Nightshade, which can be added by artists to their imagery before they upload it to the web, altering pixels in a way invisible to the human eye, but that “poisons” the art for any AI models seeking to train on it.

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Where Nightshade came from

Nightshade was developed by University of Chicago researchers under computer science professor Ben Zhao and will be added as an optional setting to their prior product Glaze, another online tool that can cloak digital artwork and alter its pixels to confuse AI models about its style.

In the case of Nightshade, the counterattack for artists against AI goes a bit further: it causes AI models to learn the wrong names of the objects and scenery they are looking at.

For example, the researchers poisoned images of dogs to include information in the pixels that made it appear to an AI model as a cat.

After sampling and learning from just 50 poisoned image samples, the AI began generating images of dogs with strange legs and unsettling appearances.

After 100 poison samples, it reliably generated a cat when asked by a user for a dog. After 300, any request for a dog returned a near perfect looking cat.

The poison drips through

The researchers used Stable Diffusion, an open source text-to-image generation model, to test Nightshade and obtain the aforementioned results.

Thanks to the nature of the way generative AI models work — by grouping conceptually similar words and ideas into spatial clusters known as “embeddings” — Nightshade also managed to trick Stable Diffusion into returning cats when prompted with the words “husky,” “puppy” and “wolf.”

Moreover, Nightshade’s data poisoning technique is difficult to defend against, as it requires AI model developers to weed out any images that contain poisoned pixels, which are by design not obvious to the human eye and may be difficult even for software data scraping tools to detect.

Any poisoned images that were already ingested for an AI training dataset would also need to be detected and removed. If an AI model were already trained on them, it would likely need to be re-trained.

While the researchers acknowledge their work could be used for malicious purposes, their “hope is that it will help tip the power balance back from AI companies towards artists, by creating a powerful deterrent against disrespecting artists’ copyright and intellectual property,” according to the MIT Tech Review article on their work.

Hours after MIT Tech Review published its article, the Glaze project from Zhao’s team at the University of Chicago posted a thread of short messages on the social platform X (formerly Twitter) explaining more about the impetus for Nightshade and how it works. The “power asymmetry between AI companies and content owners is ridiculous,” they posted.

The researchers have submitted a paper on Nightshade for peer review to computer security conference Usinex, according to the report.

VentureBeat's mission is to be a digital town square for technical decision-makers to gain knowledge about transformative enterprise technology and transact. Discover our Briefings.

24. Watchdog files complaint over photo revealing identities of Delta Force soldiers

Watchdog files complaint over photo revealing identities of Delta Force soldiers

justthenews.com · by Madeleine Hubbard

The government watchdog Protect the Public's Trust said Wednesday it filed a complaint to the Justice Department over a photo that the White House posted online featuring President Joe Biden meeting with members of the elite U.S. Army "Delta Force" counterterrorism team in Israel.

The photo was on Instagram, Facebook and Twitter for several hours before it was removed, but it featured the men's faces and identifying tattoos in what Protect the Public's Trust says is a dangerous security procedure breach and a possible Espionage Act violation.

The White House later apologized for the incident, but Protect the Public's Trust says it still "should be thoroughly investigated, given the dissent of some Biden administration personnel from the U.S.’s staunch support for Israel," as shown by how many Biden administration appointees have expressed anti-Israel and anti-Semitic sentiments.

The complaint was filed with the Justice Department on Tuesday over the post.

"Whoever posted the unredacted photo at best compromised mission effectiveness and, at worst, endangered the lives of some of our finest warriors," the watchdog's director, Michael Chamberlain, said. "Given the opposition to supporting Israel from members of our own government, the Justice Department must investigate whether the incident is a violation of the Espionage Act. We owe that to the Delta operators who put their lives on the line protecting this country."

Biden visited Israel last week after more than 1,400 people, including at least 31 U.S. citizens, were killed and more than 200 others were taken hostage on Oct. 7 by Hamas, marking the largest mass-murder of Jews since the Holocaust.

Follow Madeleine Hubbard on X or Instagram.

justthenews.com · by Madeleine Hubbard

25. Philippines Drops China Railway Deals, Seeks Other Funders

Philippines Drops China Railway Deals, Seeks Other Funders

Projects involve three railways valued at over $5 billion
Philippines in talks with other Asian nations for financing
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-27/philippines-drops-china-railway-deals-seeks-other-funders?sref=hhjZtX76

By Cliff Harvey Venzon

October 27, 2023 at 2:44 AM EDT

The Philippines will no longer pursue Chinese loans to fund three railway projects valued at more than $5 billion and has started discussions with other Asian countries for alternative financing deals.

“We saw that China appeared to be no longer interested, so we’ll look for other partners,” Transportation Secretary Jaime Bautista said in an interview at his office in Manila on Friday.

China had agreed to fund three railway projects located outside the Philippine capital during the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte who sought closer ties with Beijing. The government of his successor, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., reviewed the deals due to lack of progress from the Chinese side.

Finance Secretary Benjamin Diokno last month notified Chinese Ambassador Huang Xilian in a letter that Manila “is no longer inclined to pursue” Chinese financing for the first phase of the Mindanao Railway Project, a 100-kilometer transport system that would traverse Duterte’s southern home region of Davao and which the government had valued at 81.7 billion pesos ($1.4 billion).

The Chinese Embassy in Manila did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Bautista said the finance department will also send a formal notification to “terminate” the funding for the 50-billion peso Subic-Clark freight railway, which links two former U.S. military bases turned commercial zones, and a proposed long-haul commuter railway in the southern part of the main Luzon Island valued at 175.3 billion pesos, according to an official list of projects as of May 2021.

Turning to other financing options may delay the projects that are critical to the Southeast Asian nation’s infrastructure push to spur its economy. They are among projects initially listed for completion as early as this year.

There are “at least two Asian countries” that are interested in the Subic-Clark and long-haul railway projects, Bautista said, declining to name them because discussions are still preliminary.

The government is also considering funding the three projects or partnering with multilateral lenders and private companies, he added.

The decision to scrap Chinese loans comes against the backdrop of rising tensions between Manila and Beijing in the disputed South China Sea. Matters came to a boil last weekend when boats from the two countries collided on two separate occasions as the Philippines attempted to resupply a World War II-era ship it has used to reinforce its territorial claims.

Race to Fix Crumbling Ship Threatens Conflict in South China Sea

Bautista would not attribute the stalled Chinese loan agreements to the geopolitical tensions. “Even before these tensions started, the discussions weren’t progressing,” he said, adding he would still welcome Chinese financing for other infrastructure projects.

“There are a lot of projects that they can support if they want to,” Bautista said.

26. A Plan for Peace in Gaza

Conclusion:

I first proposed similar reforms in Foreign Affairs in 2014. Since then, internal discord and factionalism have undoubtedly gotten in the way of their consideration, much less their adoption. But given the gravity of the current situation, their time may finally have come—although too late, of course, for the thousands who have perished already. But with the encouragement and backing of Arab countries, this plan could offer a credible way forward. Whatever its flaws or complications, it would certainly be preferable to the options that Israel is evidently considering now, all of which will lead to more violence and bloodshed with little chance of yielding a lasting peace.

A Plan for Peace in Gaza

The Reforms That Could Allow the PLO to Lead and the Palestinian Authority to Govern

By Salam Fayyad

October 27, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Salam Fayyad · October 27, 2023

For the past decade, it has been clear that the “peace process” between Israelis and Palestinians long ago devolved into little more than an extended exercise in kicking the can down the road. Still, in recent years, the absence of sustained large-scale violence produced the illusion of stability. Even those who had not been lulled into complacency were shocked, however, by the outbreak of the devastating war that has been raging since Hamas attacked southern Israel on October 7.

The past three weeks have seen a loss of life on a horrific scale. For Israel, it is the most devastating civilian toll in its 75 years of existence. And more Palestinians were killed in the first 15 days of this war than during the second intifada, which lasted for more than five years, and all the rounds of violence since then, combined. Worse, it appears likely that many more thousands of Palestinian civilians will perish if Israel pursues its declared (though unattainable) objective of eliminating Hamas. The same outcome would follow even from the less ambitious goal of eradicating Hamas’s infrastructure.

Under these conditions, the first priority must be to halt the dash toward the abyss. Toward that end, Hamas must unconditionally release the Israeli civilians it is holding. The recent release of some captives was a step forward, and it is realistic to expect that more will be released.

But Israel does not appear to be in the mood to entertain any talk of a cease-fire at this time—and so far, at least, the Biden administration has been unwilling to press the Israelis to consider that option. Instead, the United States has been merely urging Israel to delay a ground invasion of Gaza until more hostages are released. The onset of such an operation would produce unparalleled carnage, magnify the risk of a broader regional conflict, and potentially threaten governments in a number of Arab countries, which might become destabilized in the face of mass protests. An Israeli invasion of Gaza would also further imperil the Palestinian Authority (PA), which is already vulnerable, as anger grows in the West Bank. Against the backdrop of these considerations, it was hard to see the scorn directed by Israeli officials at the UN secretary-general for his recent call for an immediate cease-fire to end what he called the “epic suffering” in Gaza as anything but reckless endangerment and warmongering.

There remains some hope that the release of Israeli civilians in captivity could carve out enough space for Arab and international diplomacy to find a quick answer to the question of what will happen on “the day after”—that is, who will rule in the aftermath of the ongoing Israeli operation. One idea that must be excluded from consideration is imposing any particular arrangement on the Palestinians after forcing them into submission. Also to be excluded without much deliberation is the idea that the PA, in its current configuration, would return to exercising its purview over the Gaza Strip.

For one thing, it is doubtful that the PA as currently configured would be willing to shoulder the responsibilities of governing Gaza after a deadly and destructive Israeli offensive runs its course. Even if the PA sought that role, it would be unable to perform it, especially given that its already diminished legitimacy is fast vanishing under the pressure of the continuing war.

But a properly reconfigured PA may offer the best option for “the day after” and beyond, providing a segue for the creation of a regionally owned and internationally backed effort to end the Israeli occupation within a framework that credibly addresses the structural weaknesses that bedeviled the peace process over the past three decades.

A WAY FORWARD

The PA was created in 1994 as a transitional governing entity in the West Bank and Gaza under the Oslo Accords, which the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) entered into on behalf of the Palestinian people. But the PA and the PLO soon began to suffer from an erosion of legitimacy brought on by the failure of the Oslo framework to deliver on its promise of a Palestinian state on the territory Israel captured in 1967 and has occupied ever since. The progressive disillusionment with the viability of that goal and the concomitant rise in support for armed resistance, as espoused by Hamas and other political movements that opposed the Oslo framework from the very beginning, have contributed to that erosion, calling into question the continued validity of the PLO’s claim to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Combined with chronic misrule by the authority, the exclusion of a wide range of Palestinian political factions and political orientations has left the PLO and the PA with very little standing among Palestinians.

Both the PLO and the PA should have been reformed and reconfigured long ago, and the urgency of that task has never been greater than it is today. The first step must be the immediate and unconditional expansion of the PLO to include all major factions and political forces, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Hamas won an outright majority in the last parliamentary elections held in the Palestinian territories, in 2006, and although no such elections have been held since then, polls show that Hamas has continued to enjoy considerable public support. Moreover, it is impossible to see how the PLO can credibly make any commitment to nonviolence as part of any attempt to restart the peace process if Hamas and factions of a similar orientation are not represented.

The PLO could be expanded without it having to abandon the requirements of the peace process. But that process would have to be fundamentally altered in ways that address the root causes of its failure to deliver over the past three decades. First and foremost, Israel would need to formally recognize the Palestinians’ right to a sovereign state on the territory that Israel has occupied since 1967. By doing so, Israel would be merely reciprocating the essence of the PLO’s recognition of Israel’s “right to exist in peace and security,” which was enshrined in the Oslo Accords’ declaration of mutual recognition in 1993. Until such recognition is secured, the expanded PLO could adopt a platform a platform that reflects the full spectrum of Palestinian views on what constitutes an acceptable settlement while still preserving a pathway to a negotiated two-state solution.

Finally, in accordance with its Basic Law, the PA would, through a government consented to by the expanded PLO, assume full control over managing the affairs of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza during a multiyear transitional period. During that period, all understandings between Israel and the PA and all Israeli and PA operations would be underpinned by an ironclad mutual commitment to nonviolence. At the end of that phase, the PA would hold national elections on a date agreed to at the beginning of the transition.

I first proposed similar reforms in Foreign Affairs in 2014. Since then, internal discord and factionalism have undoubtedly gotten in the way of their consideration, much less their adoption. But given the gravity of the current situation, their time may finally have come—although too late, of course, for the thousands who have perished already. But with the encouragement and backing of Arab countries, this plan could offer a credible way forward. Whatever its flaws or complications, it would certainly be preferable to the options that Israel is evidently considering now, all of which will lead to more violence and bloodshed with little chance of yielding a lasting peace.

SALAM FAYYAD is Visiting Senior Scholar and Daniella Lipper Coules ’95 Distinguished Visitor in Foreign Affairs at Princeton University. From 2007 to 2013, he served as Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority.
MORE BY SALAM FAYYAD

Foreign Affairs · by Salam Fayyad · October 27, 2023

27. The Decolonization Narrative Is Dangerous and False

Excerpts:

Hamas’s atrocities place it, like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, as an abomination beyond tolerance. Israel, like any state, has the right to defend itself, but it must do so with great care and minimal civilian loss, and it will be hard even with a full military incursion to destroy Hamas. Meanwhile, Israel must curb its injustices in the West Bank—or risk destroying itself— because ultimately it must negotiate with moderate Palestinians.

So the war unfolds tragically. As I write this, the pounding of Gaza is killing Palestinian children every day, and that is unbearable. As Israel still grieves its losses and buries its children, we deplore the killing of Israeli civilians just as we deplore the killing of Palestinian civilians. We reject Hamas, evil and unfit to govern, but we do not mistake Hamas for the Palestinian people, whose losses we mourn as we mourn the death of all innocents.

In the wider span of history, sometimes terrible events can shake fortified positions: Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin made peace after the Yom Kippur War; Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat made peace after the Intifada. The diabolical crimes of October 7 will never be forgotten, but perhaps, in the years to come, after the scattering of Hamas, after Netanyahuism is just a catastrophic memory, Israelis and Palestinians will draw the borders of their states, tempered by 75 years of killing and stunned by one weekend’s Hamas butchery, into mutual recognition. There is no other way.

The Decolonization Narrative Is Dangerous and False

It does not accurately describe either the foundation of Israel or the tragedy of the Palestinians.

By Simon Sebag Montefiore

The Atlantic · by Simon Sebag Montefiore · October 27, 2023

Peace in the Israel-Palestine conflict had already been difficult to achieve before Hamas’s barbarous October 7 attack and Israel’s military response. Now it seems almost impossible, but its essence is clearer than ever: Ultimately, a negotiation to establish a safe Israel beside a safe Palestinian state.

Whatever the enormous complexities and challenges of bringing about this future, one truth should be obvious among decent people: killing 1,400 people and kidnapping more than 200, including scores of civilians, was deeply wrong. The Hamas attack resembled a medieval Mongol raid for slaughter and human trophies—except it was recorded in real time and published to social media. Yet since October 7, Western academics, students, artists, and activists have denied, excused, or even celebrated the murders by a terrorist sect that proclaims an anti-Jewish genocidal program. Some of this is happening out in the open, some behind the masks of humanitarianism and justice, and some in code, most famously “from the river to the sea,” a chilling phrase that implicitly endorses the killing or deportation of the 9 million Israelis. It seems odd that one has to say: Killing civilians, old people, even babies, is always wrong. But today say it one must.

Franklin Foer: Tell me how this ends

How can educated people justify such callousness and embrace such inhumanity? All sorts of things are at play here, but much of the justification for killing civilians is based on a fashionable ideology, “decolonization,” which, taken at face value, rules out the negotiation of two states—the only real solution to this century of conflict—and is as dangerous as it is false.

I always wondered about the leftist intellectuals who supported Stalin, and those aristocratic sympathizers and peace activists who excused Hitler. Today’s Hamas apologists and atrocity-deniers, with their robotic denunciations of “settler-colonialism,” belong to the same tradition but worse: They have abundant evidence of the slaughter of old people, teenagers, and children, but unlike those fools of the 1930s, who slowly came around to the truth, they have not changed their views an iota. The lack of decency and respect for human life is astonishing: Almost instantly after the Hamas attack, a legion of people emerged who downplayed the slaughter, or denied actual atrocities had even happened, as if Hamas had just carried out a traditional military operation against soldiers. October 7 deniers, like Holocaust deniers, exist in an especially dark place.

The decolonization narrative has dehumanized Israelis to the extent that otherwise rational people excuse, deny, or support barbarity. It holds that Israel is an “imperialist-colonialist” force, that Israelis are “settler-colonialists,” and that Palestinians have a right to eliminate their oppressors. (On October 7, we all learned what that meant.) It casts Israelis as “white” or “white-adjacent” and Palestinians as “people of color.”

This ideology, powerful in the academy but long overdue for serious challenge, is a toxic, historically nonsensical mix of Marxist theory, Soviet propaganda, and traditional anti-Semitism from the Middle Ages and the 19th century. But its current engine is the new identity analysis, which sees history through a concept of race that derives from the American experience. The argument is that it is almost impossible for the “oppressed” to be themselves racist, just as it is impossible for an “oppressor” to be the subject of racism. Jews therefore cannot suffer racism, because they are regarded as “white” and “privileged”; although they cannot be victims, they can and do exploit other, less privileged people, in the West through the sins of “exploitative capitalism” and in the Middle East through “colonialism.”

This leftist analysis, with its hierarchy of oppressed identities—and intimidating jargon, a clue to its lack of factual rigor—has in many parts of the academy and media replaced traditional universalist leftist values, including internationalist standards of decency and respect for human life and the safety of innocent civilians. When this clumsy analysis collides with the realities of the Middle East, it loses all touch with historical facts.

Indeed, it requires an astonishing leap of ahistorical delusion to disregard the record of anti-Jewish racism over the two millennia since the fall of the Judean Temple in 70 C.E. After all, the October 7 massacre ranks with the medieval mass killings of Jews in Christian and Islamic societies, the Khmelnytsky massacres of 1640s Ukraine, Russian pogroms from 1881 to 1920—and the Holocaust. Even the Holocaust is now sometimes misconstrued—as the actor Whoopi Goldberg notoriously did—as being “not about race,” an approach as ignorant as it is repulsive.

Contrary to the decolonizing narrative, Gaza is not technically occupied by Israel—not in the usual sense of soldiers on the ground. Israel evacuated the Strip in 2005, removing its settlements. In 2007, Hamas seized power, killing its Fatah rivals in a short civil war. Hamas set up a one-party state that crushes Palestinian opposition within its territory, bans same-sex relationships, represses women, and openly espouses the killing of all Jews.

Very strange company for leftists.

Of course, some protesters chanting “from the river to the sea” may have no idea what they’re calling for; they are ignorant and believe that they are simply endorsing “freedom.” Others deny that they are pro-Hamas, insisting that they are simply pro-Palestinian—but feel the need to cast Hamas’s massacre as an understandable response to Israeli-Jewish “colonial” oppression. Yet others are malign deniers who seek the death of Israeli civilians.

The toxicity of this ideology is now clear. Once-respectable intellectuals have shamelessly debated whether 40 babies were dismembered or some smaller number merely had their throats cut or were burned alive. Students now regularly tear down posters of children held as Hamas hostages. It is hard to understand such heartless inhumanity. Our definition of a hate crime is constantly expanding, but if this is not a hate crime, what is? What is happening in our societies? Something has gone wrong.

In a further racist twist, Jews are now accused of the very crimes they themselves have suffered. Hence the constant claim of a “genocide” when no genocide has taken place or been intended. Israel, with Egypt, has imposed a blockade on Gaza since Hamas took over, and has periodically bombarded the Strip in retaliation for regular rocket attacks. After more than 4,000 rockets were fired by Hamas and its allies into Israeli, the 2014 Gaza War resulted in more than 2,000 Palestinian deaths. More than 7,000 Palestinians, including many children, have died so far in this war, according to Hamas. This is a tragedy—but this is not a genocide, a word that has now been so devalued by its metaphorical abuse that it has become meaningless.

I should also say that Israeli rule of the Occupied Territories of the West Bank is different and, to my mind, unacceptable, unsustainable, and unjust. Settlers under the disgraceful Netanyahu government have harassed and persecuted Palestinians in the West Bank: 146 Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem were killed in 2022 and at least 153 in 2023 before the Hamas attack, and more than 90 since. Again: This is appalling and unacceptable, but not genocide. The Palestinians in the West Bank have endured a harsh, unjust, and oppressive occupation since 1967.

Although there is a strong instinct to make this a Holocaust-mirroring “genocide,” it is not: The Palestinians suffer from many things, including military occupation; settler intimidation and violence; corrupt Palestinian political leadership; callous neglect by their brethren in more than 20 Arab states; the rejection by Yasser Arafat, the late Palestinian leader, of compromise plans that would have seen the creation of an independent Palestinian state; and so on. None of this constitutes genocide, or anything like genocide. The Israeli goal in Gaza—for practical reasons, among others—is to minimize the number of Palestinian civilians killed. Hamas and like-minded organizations have made it abundantly clear over the years that maximizing the number of Palestinian casualties is in their strategic interest. (Put aside all of this and consider: The world Jewish population is still smaller than it was in 1939, because of the damage done by the Nazis. The Palestinian population has grown, and continues to grow, at a substantial and healthy rate. Demographic shrinkage is one obvious marker of genocide. In total, roughly 120,000 Arabs and Jews have been killed in the conflict over Palestine and Israel since 1860. By contrast, at least 500,000 people, mainly civilians, have been killed in the Syrian civil war since it began in 2011.)

If the ideology of decolonization, taught in our universities as a theory of history and shouted in our streets as self-evidently righteous, badly misconstrues the present reality, does it reflect the history of Israel as it claims to do? It does not. Indeed, it does not accurately describe either the foundation of Israel or the tragedy of the Palestinians.

According to the decolonizers, Israel is and always has been an illegitimate freak-state because it was fostered by the British empire and because some of its founders were European-born Jews.

In this narrative, Israel is tainted by imperial Britain’s broken promise to deliver Arab independence, and its kept promise to support a “national home for the Jewish people,” in the language of the 1917 Balfour Declaration. But the supposed promise to Arabs was in fact an ambiguous 1915 agreement with Sharif Hussein of Mecca, who wanted his Hashemite family to rule the entire region. In part, he did not receive this new empire because his family had much less regional support than he claimed. Nonetheless, ultimately Britain delivered three kingdoms—Iraq, Jordan, and Hejaz—to the family.

The imperial powers—Britain and France—made all sorts of promises to different peoples, and then put their own interests first. Those promises to the Jews and the Arabs during World War I were typical. Afterward, similar promises were made to the Kurds, the Armenians, and others, none of which came to fruition. But the central narrative that Britain betrayed the Arab promise and backed the Jewish one is incomplete. In the 1930s, Britain turned against Zionism, and from 1937 to 1939 moved toward an Arab state with no Jewish one at all. It was an armed Jewish revolt, from 1945 to 1948 against imperial Britain, that delivered the state.

Israel exists thanks to this revolt, and to international law and cooperation, something leftists once believed in. The idea of a Jewish “homeland” was proposed in three declarations by Britain (signed by Balfour), France, and the United States, then promulgated in a July 1922 resolution by the League of Nations that created the British “mandates” over Palestine and Iraq that matched French “mandates” over Syria and Lebanon. In 1947, the United Nations devised the partition of the British mandate of Palestine into two states, Arab and Jewish.

The carving of such states out of these mandates was not exceptional, either. At the end of World War II, France granted independence to Syria and Lebanon, newly conceived nation-states. Britain created Iraq and Jordan in a similar way. Imperial powers designed most of the countries in the region, except Egypt.

Nor was the imperial promise of separate homelands for different ethnicities or sects unique. The French had promised independent states for the Druze, Alawites, Sunnis, and Maronites but in the end combined them into Syria and Lebanon. All of these states had been “vilayets” and “sanjaks” (provinces) of the Turkish Ottoman empire, ruled from Constantinople, from 1517 until 1918.

The concept of “partition” is, in the decolonization narrative, regarded as a wicked imperial trick. But it was entirely normal in the creation of 20th-century nation-states, which were typically fashioned out of fallen empires. And sadly, the creation of nation-states was frequently marked by population swaps, huge refugee migrations, ethnic violence, and full-scale wars. Think of the Greco-Turkish war of 1921–22 or the partition of India in 1947. In this sense, Israel-Palestine was typical.

At the heart of decolonization ideology is the categorization of all Israelis, historic and present, as “colonists.” This is simply wrong. Most Israelis are descended from people who migrated to the Holy Land from 1881 to 1949. They were not completely new to the region. The Jewish people ruled Judean kingdoms and prayed in the Jerusalem Temple for a thousand years, then were ever present there in smaller numbers for the next 2,000 years. In other words, Jews are indigenous in the Holy Land, and if one believes in the return of exiled people to their homeland, then the return of the Jews is exactly that. Even those who deny this history or regard it as irrelevant to modern times must acknowledge that Israel is now the home and only home of 9 million Israelis who have lived there for four, five, six generations.

Most migrants to, say, the United Kingdom or the United States are regarded as British or American within a lifetime. Politics in both countries is filled with prominent leaders—Suella Braverman and David Lammy, Kamala Harris and Nikki Haley—whose parents or grandparents migrated from India, West Africa, or South America. No one would describe them as “settlers.” Yet Israeli families resident in Israel for a century are designated as “settler-colonists” ripe for murder and mutilation. And contrary to Hamas apologists, the ethnicity of perpetrators or victims never justifies atrocities. They would be atrocious anywhere, committed by anyone with any history. It is dismaying that it is often self-declared “anti-racists” who are now advocating exactly this murder by ethnicity.

Those on the left believe migrants who escape from persecution should be welcomed and allowed to build their lives elsewhere. Almost all of the ancestors of today’s Israelis escaped persecution.

If the “settler-colonist” narrative is not true, it is true that the conflict is the result of the brutal rivalry and battle for land between two ethnic groups, both with rightful claims to live there. As more Jews moved to the region, the Palestinian Arabs, who had lived there for centuries and were the clear majority, felt threatened by these immigrants. The Palestinian claim to the land is not in doubt, nor is the authenticity of their history, nor their legitimate claim to their own state. But initially the Jewish migrants did not aspire to a state, merely to live and farm in the vague “homeland.” In 1918, the Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann met the Hashemite Prince Faisal Bin Hussein to discuss the Jews living under his rule as king of greater Syria. The conflict today was not inevitable. It became so as the communities refused to share and coexist, and then resorted to arms.

Even more preposterous than the “colonizer” label is the “whiteness” trope that is key to the decolonization ideology. Again: simply wrong. Israel has a large community of Ethiopian Jews, and about half of all Israelis—that is, about 5 million people—are Mizrahi, the descendants of Jews from Arab and Persian lands, people of the Middle East. They are neither “settlers” nor “colonialists” nor “white” Europeans at all but inhabitants of Baghdad and Cairo and Beirut for many centuries, even millennia, who were driven out after 1948.

A word about that year, 1948, the year of Israel’s War of Independence and the Palestinian Nakba (“Catastrophe”), which in decolonization discourse amounted to ethnic cleansing. There was indeed intense ethnic violence on both sides when Arab states invaded the territory and, together with Palestinian militias, tried to stop the creation of a Jewish state. They failed; what they ultimately stopped was the creation of a Palestinian state, as intended by the United Nations. The Arab side sought the killing or expulsion of the entire Jewish community—in precisely the murderous ways we saw on October 7. And in the areas the Arab side did capture, such as East Jerusalem, every Jew was expelled.

In this brutal war, Israelis did indeed drive some Palestinians from their homes; others fled the fighting; yet others stayed and are now Israeli Arabs who have the vote in the Israeli democracy. (Some 25 percent of today’s Israelis are Arabs and Druze.) About 700,000 Palestinians lost their homes. That is an enormous figure and a historic tragedy. Starting in 1948, some 900,000 Jews lost their homes in Islamic countries and most of them moved to Israel. These events are not directly comparable, and I don’t mean to propose a competition in tragedy or hierarchy of victimhood. But the past is a lot more complicated than the decolonizers would have you believe.

Out of this imbroglio, one state emerged, Israel, and one did not, Palestine. Its formation is long overdue.

It is bizarre that a small state in the Middle East attracts so much passionate attention in the West that students run through California schools shouting “Free Palestine.” But the Holy Land has an exceptional place in Western history. It is embedded in our cultural consciousness, thanks to the Hebrew and Christian Bibles, the story of Judaism, the foundation of Christianity, the Quran and the creation of Islam, and the Crusades that together have made Westerners feel involved in its destiny. The British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, the real architect of the Balfour Declaration, used to say that the names of places in Palestine “were more familiar to me than those on the Western Front.” This special affinity with the Holy Land initially worked in favor of the Jewish return, but lately it has worked against Israel. Westerners eager to expose the crimes of Euro-American imperialism but unable to offer a remedy have, often without real knowledge of the actual history, coalesced around Israel and Palestine as the world’s most vivid example of imperialist injustice.

The open world of liberal democracies—or the West, as it used to be called—is today polarized by paralyzed politics, petty but vicious cultural feuds about identity and gender, and guilt about historical successes and sins, a guilt that is bizarrely atoned for by showing sympathy for, even attraction to, enemies of our democratic values. In this scenario, Western democracies are always bad actors, hypocritical and neo-imperialist, while foreign autocracies or terror sects such as Hamas are enemies of imperialism and therefore sincere forces for good. In this topsy-turvy scenario, Israel is a living metaphor and penance for the sins of the West. The result is the intense scrutiny of Israel and the way it is judged, using standards rarely attained by any nation at war, including the United States.

But the decolonizing narrative is much worse than a study in double standards; it dehumanizes an entire nation and excuses, even celebrates, the murder of innocent civilians. As these past two weeks have shown, decolonization is now the authorized version of history in many of our schools and supposedly humanitarian institutions, and among artists and intellectuals. It is presented as history, but it is actually a caricature, zombie history with its arsenal of jargon—the sign of a coercive ideology, as Foucault argued—and its authoritarian narrative of villains and victims. And it only stands up in a landscape in which much of the real history is suppressed and in which all Western democracies are bad-faith actors. Although it lacks the sophistication of Marxist dialectic, its self-righteous moral certainty imposes a moral framework on a complex, intractable situation, which some may find consoling. Whenever you read a book or an article and it uses the phrase “settler-colonialist,” you are dealing with ideological polemic, not history.

Ultimately, this zombie narrative is a moral and political cul-de-sac that leads to slaughter and stalemate. That is no surprise, because it is based on sham history: “An invented past can never be used,” wrote James Baldwin. “It cracks and crumbles under the pressures of life like clay.”

Even when the word decolonization does not appear, this ideology is embedded in partisan media coverage of the conflict and suffuses recent condemnations of Israel. The student glee in response to the slaughter at Harvard, the University of Virginia, and other universities; the support for Hamas amongst artists and actors, along with the weaselly equivocations by leaders at some of America’s most famous research institutions, have displayed a shocking lack of morality, humanity, and basic decency.

One repellent example was an open letter signed by thousands of artists, including famous British actors such as Tilda Swinton and Steve Coogan. It warned against imminent Israel war crimes and totally ignored the casus belli: the slaughter of 1,400 people.

The journalist Deborah Ross wrote in a powerful Times of London article that she was “utterly, utterly floored” that the letter contained “no mention of Hamas” and no mention of the “kidnapping and murder of babies, children, grandparents, young people dancing peacefully at a peace festival. The lack of basic compassion and humanity, that’s what was so unbelievably flooring. Is it so difficult? To support and feel for Palestinian citizens … while also acknowledging the indisputable horror of the Hamas attacks?” Then she asked this thespian parade of moral nullities: “What does it solve, a letter like that? And why would anyone sign it?”

The Israel-Palestine conflict is desperately difficult to solve, and decolonization rhetoric makes even less likely the negotiated compromise that is the only way out.

Since its founding in 1987, Hamas has used the murder of civilians to spoil any chance of a two-state solution. In 1993, its suicide bombings of Israeli civilians were designed to destroy the two-state Olso Accords that recognized Israel and Palestine. This month, the Hamas terrorists unleashed their slaughter in part to undermine a peace with Saudi Arabia that would have improved Palestinian politics and standard of life, and reinvigorated Hamas’s sclerotic rival, the Palestinian Authority. In part, they served Iran to prevent the empowering of Saudi Arabia, and their atrocities were of course a spectacular trap to provoke Israeli overreaction. They are most probably getting their wish, but to do this they are cynically exploiting innocent Palestinian people as a sacrifice to political means, a second crime against civilians. In the same way, the decolonization ideology, with its denial of Israel’s right to exist and its people’s right to live safely, makes a Palestinian state less likely if not impossible.

The problem in our countries is easier to fix: Civic society and the shocked majority should now assert themselves. The radical follies of students should not alarm us overmuch; students are always thrilled by revolutionary extremes. But the indecent celebrations in London, Paris, and New York City, and the clear reluctance among leaders at major universities to condemn the killings, have exposed the cost of neglecting this issue and letting “decolonization” colonize our academy.

Parents and students can move to universities that are not led by equivocators and patrolled by deniers and ghouls; donors can withdraw their generosity en masse, and that is starting in the United States. Philanthropists can pull the funding of humanitarian foundations led by people who support war crimes against humanity (against victims selected by race). Audiences can easily decide not to watch films starring actors who ignore the killing of children; studios do not have to hire them. And in our academies, this poisonous ideology, followed by the malignant and foolish but also by the fashionable and well intentioned, has become a default position. It must forfeit its respectability, its lack of authenticity as history. Its moral nullity has been exposed for all to see.

Again, scholars, teachers, and our civil society, and the institutions that fund and regulate universities and charities, need to challenge a toxic, inhumane ideology that has no basis in the real history or present of the Holy Land, and that justifies otherwise rational people to excuse the dismemberment of babies.

Israel has done many harsh and bad things. Netanyahu’s government, the worst ever in Israeli history, as inept as it is immoral, promotes a maximalist ultranationalism that is both unacceptable and unwise. Everyone has the right to protest against Israel’s policies and actions but not to promote terror sects, the killing of civilians, and the spreading of menacing anti-Semitism.

The Palestinians have legitimate grievances and have endured much brutal injustice. But both of their political entities are utterly flawed: the Palestinian Authority, which rules 40 percent of the West Bank, is moribund, corrupt, inept, and generally disdained—and its leaders have been just as abysmal as those of Israel.

Hamas is a diabolical killing sect that hides among civilians, whom it sacrifices on the altar of resistance—as moderate Arab voices have openly stated in recent days, and much more harshly than Hamas’s apologists in the West. “I categorically condemn Hamas’s targeting of civilians,” the Saudi veteran statesman Prince Turki bin Faisal movingly declared last week. “I also condemn Hamas for giving the higher moral ground to an Israeli government that is universally shunned even by half of the Israeli public … I condemn Hamas for sabotaging the attempt of Saudi Arabia to reach a peaceful resolution to the plight of the Palestinian people.” In an interview with Khaled Meshaal, a member of the Hamas politburo, the Arab journalist Rasha Nabil highlighted Hamas’s sacrifice of its own people for its political interests. Meshaal argued that this was just the cost of resistance: “Thirty million Russians died to defeat Germany,” he said.

Read: Understanding Hamas’s genocidal ideology

Nabil stands as an example to Western journalists who scarcely dare challenge Hamas and its massacres. Nothing is more patronizing and even Orientalist than the romanticization of Hamas’s butchers, whom many Arabs despise. The denial of their atrocities by so many in the West is an attempt to fashion acceptable heroes out of an organization that dismembers babies and defiles the bodies of murdered girls. This is an attempt to save Hamas from itself. Perhaps the West’s Hamas apologists should listen to moderate Arab voices instead of a fundamentalist terror sect.

Hamas’s atrocities place it, like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, as an abomination beyond tolerance. Israel, like any state, has the right to defend itself, but it must do so with great care and minimal civilian loss, and it will be hard even with a full military incursion to destroy Hamas. Meanwhile, Israel must curb its injustices in the West Bank—or risk destroying itself— because ultimately it must negotiate with moderate Palestinians.

So the war unfolds tragically. As I write this, the pounding of Gaza is killing Palestinian children every day, and that is unbearable. As Israel still grieves its losses and buries its children, we deplore the killing of Israeli civilians just as we deplore the killing of Palestinian civilians. We reject Hamas, evil and unfit to govern, but we do not mistake Hamas for the Palestinian people, whose losses we mourn as we mourn the death of all innocents.

In the wider span of history, sometimes terrible events can shake fortified positions: Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin made peace after the Yom Kippur War; Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat made peace after the Intifada. The diabolical crimes of October 7 will never be forgotten, but perhaps, in the years to come, after the scattering of Hamas, after Netanyahuism is just a catastrophic memory, Israelis and Palestinians will draw the borders of their states, tempered by 75 years of killing and stunned by one weekend’s Hamas butchery, into mutual recognition. There is no other way.

The Atlantic · by Simon Sebag Montefiore · October 27, 2023

28. Tell Me How This Ends (Gaza)

Excerpts:

But Efraim Halevy, a legendary head of Mossad, vented his anxieties about any failure to achieve Israel’s stated aims. Although he abhors the Netanyahu government—and doubts the wisdom of its strategy and the competence of the officials charged with executing it—he told me that failure would likely further demoralize the public, which was severely fractured before Hamas’s invasion. Failure to eradicate Hamas would make it nearly impossible to reassure refugees from the townlets and kibbutzim in the south—200,000 of them, by one count—to return and rebuild. In the recriminations that would inevitably follow the war, the political anger provoked by Netanyahu’s judicial reform might return, only this time stoked by a sense of total despair.

Many Israelis told me that they were haunted by a photo of the Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, taken after the end of Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021. After 11 days of Israeli bombing, Sinwar emerged into the daylight, sat in a plush armchair surrounded by rubble, and posed for the camera with a defiant smile. “If you fail in this, it could well mean that what you have intended to achieve, you achieve the opposite,” Halevy told me. “You will be the one who ends up with no cohesion and no will to fight.”

In the midst of such gloom, I also thought I detected muffled hints of hope. Israelis almost universally invoked the unexpected aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the other cataclysmic lapse in the history of the nation’s defense, so searing that it scrambled the politics of both Israel and its neighbors. Some of the Jewish state’s old enemies finally accepted its existence. Fervent hawks in Israel became ambitious peacemakers. No Israeli was willing to stake their reputation on the rise of a new alignment, but they all wanted to believe in its imminence, beyond the carnage.

Tell Me How This Ends

The Israeli operation faces the same question that ultimately vexed the American project in Iraq: What comes next?

By Franklin Foer

The Atlantic · by Franklin Foer · October 27, 2023

In the year leading up to the invasion of Iraq, technocrats in Washington deployed their laptops and prepared for war. Their plans for the governing structures that would replace Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship filled bulging white papers, organizational flowcharts that spilled across thick binders, and dense memoranda for managing esoteric ministries.

Israel is on the brink of testing a far different approach to regime change. Its leaders have announced a desire to dismantle the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip. Rather than entering battle with a carefully constructed blueprint for what might follow victory, though, they are winging it, improvising in the dazed aftermath of a devastating massacre that left its military and political leadership in a state of shame and confusion. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government announced its war aims before it had fully sketched out how it might effectively realize them.

But the Israeli operation faces the same question that ultimately vexed the American project in Iraq: What comes next? Removing murderous Islamists from power solves one problem, but it creates another. Who will govern Gaza after Hamas?

Thus far, the Israelis have answered the question only in the negative. Although some of the ultranationalists in the Netanyahu government openly fantasize about reoccupying Gaza, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has said that his government won’t pursue that path, which would come at a financial, military, and moral cost that Israel apparently doesn’t want to bear. But the alternative to a postwar occupation of some sort is lawlessness, which would permit Hamas’s return, thus undermining the very purpose of the war.

Graeme Wood: A record of pure, predatory sadism

To understand how Israel might better approach the day after, I spoke with veterans of Israel’s security establishment, including a former prime minister, a former national security adviser, and a former head of Mossad, as well as longtime diplomats and analysts in Washington. I asked them to imagine a plausible endgame for Gaza. What I found was both a surprising degree of consensus on a plan for life after Hamas, and a lack of faith in the current Israeli government’s ability to execute it.

There’s a counterfactual history of Gaza that contains a vision for a way forward. In late 2008, at the very end of his time in office, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced his plans to leave his post, to head into the political wilderness. At that moment of transition, Hamas, which had only recently won control of Gaza, launched a fusillade of rocket attacks against targets in southern Israel.

Olmert considered his options. His preferred course of action was regime change, a military campaign that would have eliminated Hamas’s leadership once and for all. But his defense minister and the military’s chief of staff rejected the plan, and let the press know of their opposition. “They already started to leak that Olmert wants to carry on the war in order to prolong, to cancel, his formal retirement and carry on,” Olmert told me. Worried that overruling the objections would look self-serving, he backed away from his plans.

Instead of ejecting Hamas from power, the Israelis bombed Gaza for 22 days, what the military referred to as Operation Cast Lead. But in the course of considering regime change in Gaza, Olmert began to discuss what might come next. “I started to talk with the Americans and the Europeans to bring to Gaza, at the end of the military operation of Israel, an international force to be a caretaker for a period of a few months. To clean it up completely, to stabilize it, and to prepare it for the incoming of the Palestinian Authority security forces.”

In some ways, this vision is more plausible today than when Olmert first imagined it in 2008. Israel has spent the past decade deepening its relations with Arab states in the Gulf, which have been unnerved by Iran’s rise and eager to collaborate with Israel’s tech sector. These countries share Israel’s abiding animosity toward the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist movement of which Hamas is a part, and consider it a profound threat to their own regimes.

Under the aegis of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Dennis Ross, the veteran diplomat, has co-written a proposal to have the U.S. enlist the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan to serve as Gaza’s temporary stewards, bankrolling its reconstruction and providing a security force that supplies a semblance of order. According to Ross, the goal is to turn Gaza “into a place where development and modernization is the aim, not resistance.”

It sounds fanciful, but Brian Katulis, the vice president of the Middle East Institute, who possesses a large network of contacts in governments across the region, described to me a pitch that the Israelis might use to effectively induce their participation: “‘Look, we’re gonna go after these extremists who are a threat to you. But at the end of all of this, there will be some form of a very qualified two-state solution for the Palestinians. We want you to get behind it.’ And you’d paint a vision of the Middle East that wasn’t naive and Pollyannaish, but something that matches up with where they were going already, which is regional integration.”

There are practical reasons for these countries to join. Egypt, for instance, wants its own firms to win massive construction contracts. And Olmert, who has talked with officials from these countries, believes they would be happy to be seen as Gaza’s savior. “The Israeli operation will cause outrage, so that will be an excuse for them to come in, to really start to rehabilitate Gaza,” he told me.

Still, reconstructing Gaza promises to be an enormous, thankless, expensive task, given the likelihood that it will consist of large stretches of rubble and that pockets of armed Hamas fighters will remain. “There’s a risk of terrorists coming back and overthrowing civilians,” Eyal Hulata, who served as Israel’s national security adviser during the premierships of Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, told me.

The precondition of Arab states’ participation is that it would be time-limited and that it would culminate in handing over Gaza to the leadership of the Palestinian Authority, based in the West Bank. The Israeli public is justifiably skeptical of the PA, hardly a bastion of effective governance—and lacking in legitimacy. When I mentioned the possibility of the PA playing a constructive role to Hulata, he joked, “Maybe when there’s a new president and reform and God comes down from heaven and there’s a messiah …” But then he conceded that there’s no viable alternative.

Whatever its many faults, the PA has a security force, some 31,000 members strong, trained and funded by the U.S. military. Israel does not fully trust the PA, but at least the country has a relationship with its leadership and some faith in its ability to perform basic functions. This force would need to double in size during Gaza’s period of Arab stewardship to have sufficient manpower to secure Gaza. “It’s a difficult task, but not an impossible one, given that the United States has overseen this type of force in the West Bank now for 15 years,” Michael Kopolow, of the Israeli Policy Forum, told me.

But the viability of a plan like Ross’s depends on the execution of the war. Although Arab countries might be theoretically attracted to playing the part of Gaza’s savior, their willingness to participate might erode during a brutal war that infuriates their own publics.

And there’s a danger that Israel’s attack on Gaza will destroy the basic infrastructure of governance, complicating any postwar occupation. An Arab coalition could supply money and soldiers, but it would need to rely on Gaza’s technocratic class of civil administrators. This group has been part of the existing Hamas regime, and many are Islamists, but they aren’t gun-touting militants. Qatar, with the assent of the Israelis, has partially paid their salary. They have the competence to distribute aid, pick up trash, and run hospitals—to supply Gaza with a modicum of postwar order. These civil administrators could lend the occupying force some legitimacy in the short term.

This plan isn’t that far removed from what Gallant, the defense minister, has described as the Israeli plan—which has the army leaving Gaza at the end of the war. But Netanyahu would never be able to implement it. His government has long sought to cast aside the PA to appease the settlers and religious zealots in his coalition, who regard it as a primary obstacle to their biblical vision of Greater Israel.

The problem for Netanyahu is that the PA would never want to assume power in Gaza without substantially bolstering its position in the West Bank. It would almost certainly demand stringent constraints on settlement expansion and promises of greater autonomy, measures that Netanhyahu and coalition partners abhor. Gidi Grinstein, who runs the Reut Group, a think tank in Tel Aviv, told me that Netanyahu is once again his own worst enemy. “With his policies on the one hand in the West Bank, Netanyahu is destroying policies on the other hand in Gaza.”

Given that Israel doesn’t want to occupy Gaza—and that its current government would reject its transfer to Palestinians—the question is, does Netanyahu truly want a total victory? In the most plausible (and most familiar) scenario that I heard described, the Netanyahu government prematurely ends its invasion, under pressure from the Biden administration, to restore stability in the region and in the global economy.

Israel could leave Gaza, claiming a partial victory. It could point to evidence that it decimated Hamas leadership, dismantled bunkers, and destroyed its enemy’s arsenal. The Israelis might not achieve their stated goal of regime change, but they will have demonstrated their power and restored a measure of deterrence.

Forced to contend with the continued reality of Hamas, Israel would scramble to erect a raft of pragmatic security measures to further insulate the nation. There’s talk among Israeli officials of surrounding Gaza with a thick buffer of bulldozed territory, perhaps a mile wide. One former official suggested to me that it might be a kill zone, where any Palestinian who set foot would be shot on sight. Such insulation would be accompanied by the implementation of long-standing plans to upgrade security at the Rafah border crossing into Egypt. This would include investment in state-of-the-art technology to screen vehicles headed into Gaza. Israel might demand that international inspectors, preferably Americans, oversee the inspection of incoming traffic.

Read: Israel is walking into a trap

Other Israelis suggested that the campaign to destroy Hamas wouldn’t end with the ground invasion. Israel would continue to kill Hamas leadership with the dedication depicted in the movie Munich. “No matter if they are in Gaza or if they are in Alaska, okay, they have to be eliminated,” Olmert said. Zohar Polti, who ran the Ministry of Defense’s bureau of planning, described how Israeli might keep dispatching special forces into Gaza to act on intelligence to foil attacks on Israel. “That’s very similar to what we’re doing in the cities of the Palestinians, after we see that the Palestinian security services are dealing with, let’s say, a loss of control.”

But Efraim Halevy, a legendary head of Mossad, vented his anxieties about any failure to achieve Israel’s stated aims. Although he abhors the Netanyahu government—and doubts the wisdom of its strategy and the competence of the officials charged with executing it—he told me that failure would likely further demoralize the public, which was severely fractured before Hamas’s invasion. Failure to eradicate Hamas would make it nearly impossible to reassure refugees from the townlets and kibbutzim in the south—200,000 of them, by one count—to return and rebuild. In the recriminations that would inevitably follow the war, the political anger provoked by Netanyahu’s judicial reform might return, only this time stoked by a sense of total despair.

Many Israelis told me that they were haunted by a photo of the Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, taken after the end of Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021. After 11 days of Israeli bombing, Sinwar emerged into the daylight, sat in a plush armchair surrounded by rubble, and posed for the camera with a defiant smile. “If you fail in this, it could well mean that what you have intended to achieve, you achieve the opposite,” Halevy told me. “You will be the one who ends up with no cohesion and no will to fight.”

In the midst of such gloom, I also thought I detected muffled hints of hope. Israelis almost universally invoked the unexpected aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the other cataclysmic lapse in the history of the nation’s defense, so searing that it scrambled the politics of both Israel and its neighbors. Some of the Jewish state’s old enemies finally accepted its existence. Fervent hawks in Israel became ambitious peacemakers. No Israeli was willing to stake their reputation on the rise of a new alignment, but they all wanted to believe in its imminence, beyond the carnage.

The Atlantic · by Franklin Foer · October 27, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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