Quotes of the Day:

"Today the man who is the real risk-taker is anonymous and nonheroic. He is the one trying to make institutions work." 

– John William Ward

"The final test of a leader is that he leaves behind him in other men, the conviction and the will to carry on." 

– Walter Lippmann

"Think for yourselves, and let others enjoy the privilege to do so, too." 

– Voltaire

1. Opinion North Korean troops in Russia bring a ‘World-Island’ conflict a step closer

2. On GPS: Kim Jong Un to Putin’s rescue? (video Interview with Dr. Jung Pak)

3. North Korea coup speculation is back!

4. How is the Russian deployment viewed inside N.Korea? (1) Parents of soldiers gradually discovering deployments and information spreading: "They might get to eat plenty of cheese and milk," "No one thinks they're going to war"

5. The price for sending the North's Storm Corps to Russia is a strategic nuclear submarine?

6. Open questions | Why North Korea is starting to become a ‘forgotten’ space for China and the US

7. S. Korea, US to hold '2+2' talks among foreign, defense chiefs amid NK deployment to Russia

8. North Korea And Russia’s ‘Far-Reaching’ Strategic Relationship – Analysis

9. The Lens: South Korea debates conscripting women amid declining birth rate

10. South Korea's birth rate sees glimmer of hope

11. The Kims Are Coming – OpEd

12. Lousy Deterrence Options on the Korean Peninsula

13. NATO confirms N. Korea's troop deployment to Russia's Kursk region

14. Putin the Desperate: North Korea Is Going to War in Ukraine

15. North Korean Missiles Are Attacking Ukraine: What If One Hit a NATO Member?

16. Yoon calls for thorough preparedness against geopolitical risks in Ukraine, Middle East

17. N. Korea claims S. Korean drone took off from western border island in Oct. for incursion into Pyongyang

18. Fatal affair exposes food-for-favors system in N. Korean military

19. Sariwon holds constitutional lectures defining South Korea as "hostile state"

1. Opinion North Korean troops in Russia bring a ‘World-Island’ conflict a step closer

Important geo-poltical history and analysis from Dr. Nicholas Eberstadt.

Excerpts:

But, of course, North Korea’s main services for Moscow have been military. Months into the invasion, it now appears, North Korea began to resupply Russia’s own dwindling stocks of munitions — in particular, the artillery shells and Katyusha-style rockets that have been mainstay ammunition for the Russian offensive.

Over the past two years, little North Korea has somehow managed to provide an amazing amount of armaments for the Russian war effort. North Korea’s estimated population of 26 million isn’t as large as Texas’s, and its $23 billion gross domestic product in 2023, according to South Korean estimates, doesn’t even beat tiny Vermont’s. Yet Western military intelligence suggest that Pyongyang has thus far nonetheless managed to ship up to 20,000 rail containers of missiles and ammunition for the Russian war effort.

At its current production levels, the Russian defense sector might thus have gained the equivalent of several years’ worth of armaments from Pyongyang. According to some Western assessments, up to half the ammunition Russian forces expended in Ukraine this year and last year was of North Korean make — and not obviously inferior to Russia’s own artillery and rockets, at least in the judgment of some experts.

In effect, North Korea has already thrown the Russian war effort a lifeline. Given the burn rate of ammo and Russia’s own limited capacities to turn it out, North Korea’s contribution to the invasion might well have made the difference between the current stalemate and steady Russian setbacks in the field this year and last.

Opinion  North Korean troops in Russia bring a ‘World-Island’ conflict a step closer

The day is long past when Russia, China, Iran and North Korea posed isolated, discrete threats to Western interests.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/10/27/north-korea-troops-russia-ukraine/?

9 min

227

Screenshots from videos shared to social media show what appear to be North Korean troops at a training facility in eastern Russia. (Telegram)

By Nicholas Eberstadt

October 27, 2024 at 6:30 a.m. EDT

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

SEOUL — With the dispatch of thousands of North Korean special forces toward the front lines in Russia’s war against Ukraine — a development first reported by South Korean and Ukrainian intelligence sources, now confirmed by U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin — the emerging contours of global struggle in the post-Cold War era are coming into sharper focus.

Sign up for Shifts, an illustrated newsletter series about the future of work

As North Korean soldiers head into possible combat in Europe — the degree of their ultimate military involvement might turn out to be much greater than generally appreciated — a “World-Island”-style contest seems to be falling into place. Four ambitious, revisionist states at the heart of Eurasia — Russia, China, Iran and North Korea — are coordinating ever more closely to challenge, if not shatter, the prevailing international security order known as Pax Americana.

“World-Island” was geo-strategist Halford Mackinder’s memorable description of Eurasia plus Africa in his 1919 book “Democratic Ideals and Reality,” which expanded on his seminal 1904 essay “The Geographical Pivot of History.” Mackinder prophesied, “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island: Who rules the World-Island commands the World.”

Opinions on the war in Ukraine

Next

OpinionBiden has a 76-day window after the election to get Ukraine right

OpinionUkrainians in Pennsylvania are split on Harris and Trump. How can that be?

OpinionI’m a peace worker. But this is what Ukraine needs to win its war.

OpinionDon’t underestimate the risks of escalation over Ukraine

OpinionAs Putin’s military barbarism continues, U.S. credibility is at stake

OpinionUkraine needs long-range missiles before winter’s onset

OpinionUkraine is bleeding out. It cannot fight forever.

OpinionIn tense Kyiv, Ukrainians fear the war could be decided within months

OpinionGermany is wobbling on Ukraine — and the rest of Europe is watching

OpinionUkraine’s Kursk offensive isn’t just a raid. It’s upending assumptions.

OpinionWhen a 12-hour shift turned into three weeks at Chernobyl

OpinionHow an emboldened Ukraine caught Russia flat-footed

Opinion‘B-girl Kate,’ an Olympic emblem of Ukraine’s survival

OpinionSurprise Ukraine offensive pokes Russia’s soft underbelly

OpinionWhat Vance gets wrong about the China challenge

OpinionLet Ukraine fly its jets from ‘sanctuary bases’ on NATO territory

OpinionWith U.S. aid flowing, Ukraine’s defense stiffens — for now

OpinionBiden should let Ukraine strike back at Russian air bases

OpinionAt the NATO summit, Biden needs to deliver for Ukraine

OpinionRussia is punching back at NATO in the shadows

Ukraine, fatefully, is roughly ground zero in Mackinder’s depiction of that “Heartland” upon which world politics would “pivot” — and is now ground zero of the latest military contest for primacy on that landmass.

Following Opinions on the news

Following

Yet the Kremlin’s quest to re-subjugate Ukraine by force has not gone according to plan. The invasion was not supposed to turn into the current, inconclusive land war now grinding toward its fourth year, costing Russia hundreds of thousands of casualties and the loss of much of it military’s effective fighting power (in the estimate of both U.S. and British militaries).

Russian dictator Vladimir Putin’s war effort appears to be short on both materiel and manpower. And this is where the Russia-North Korea “strategic partnership,” ratified last week by Russian lawmakers, fits in.

Unshakably committed to its own never-ending struggle for mastery over the Korean Peninsula, the super-militarized but acutely-impoverished regime of Kim Jong Un will have no shortage of “asks” in exchange for helping Putin: military technology to modernize conventional weapons programs; scientific-technical expertise for nuclear weapons and missiles; resources and know-how to rejuvenate and improve North Korea’s sprawling, inefficient defense economy.

Over that past two decades, Putin had consigned Pyongyang to something like “smile diplomacy”: offering occasional soothing words of encouragement, while keeping the belligerent state at arm’s length

Then, when the war against Ukraine became a slog, the Kremlin’s posture toward North Korea completely shifted. The strategic partnership quickly tumbled into place in June when Putin visited Pyongyang.

Kim’s mercenary military aid for Moscow builds on his past diplomatic support. Almost immediately with the Russian invasion in February 2022, North Korea expressed its enthusiastic approval. A month later, North Korea joined a handful of countries in voting against a U.N. resolution demanding that Russia “unconditionally withdraw” from Ukrainian territory. In 2023, at an official dinner when Kim and Putin met in Russia, the North Korean leader raised a toast, wishing Putin a “great victory” in Ukraine.

But, of course, North Korea’s main services for Moscow have been military. Months into the invasion, it now appears, North Korea began to resupply Russia’s own dwindling stocks of munitions — in particular, the artillery shells and Katyusha-style rockets that have been mainstay ammunition for the Russian offensive.

Over the past two years, little North Korea has somehow managed to provide an amazing amount of armaments for the Russian war effort. North Korea’s estimated population of 26 million isn’t as large as Texas’s, and its $23 billion gross domestic product in 2023, according to South Korean estimates, doesn’t even beat tiny Vermont’s. Yet Western military intelligence suggest that Pyongyang has thus far nonetheless managed to ship up to 20,000 rail containers of missiles and ammunition for the Russian war effort.

At its current production levels, the Russian defense sector might thus have gained the equivalent of several years’ worth of armaments from Pyongyang. According to some Western assessments, up to half the ammunition Russian forces expended in Ukraine this year and last year was of North Korean make — and not obviously inferior to Russia’s own artillery and rockets, at least in the judgment of some experts.

In effect, North Korea has already thrown the Russian war effort a lifeline. Given the burn rate of ammo and Russia’s own limited capacities to turn it out, North Korea’s contribution to the invasion might well have made the difference between the current stalemate and steady Russian setbacks in the field this year and last.

Now come Kim’s special-forces troops.

A brigade, about 3,000 soldiers, “had been given uniforms, weapons and IDs to disguise themselves as Buryats and Yakuts, ethnic minorities from Siberia with similar physical features to Koreans,” the The Post recently reported, citing South Korean intelligence. North Korean troops have reportedly been spotted at the Ukraine border; the supposition is that they will be under Russian military command, but are apparently operating as distinct and independent units. Another three brigades, up to an additional 9,000 soldiers, will reportedly head to the front this year as well.

In Seoul, Washington and other Western capitals, observers suppose that these North Korean troops might provide technical and other support functions from the rear areas for the Russian war effort. Or that they might be observers learning about the warfare against a modern Western enemy. Or that they might be deployed for combat on Russian soil, in Kursk province, against the Ukrainian sortie that Moscow has not yet been able to beat back. Or maybe, just maybe, they might be sent into Ukraine to fight against its defenders.

Such assessments sound plausible enough — to us. In the sense that those are the sorts of options that Western militaries might consider if they were in charge of that campaign.

But what if we are just “mirror imaging”: misreading the Russian and North Korean dictators, whose intentions and objectives are obviously so different from our own?

Consider for a moment: Could it really make sense to Putin to ask for Kim’s troops simply to help Russia bleed out more slowly? Or for Kim to commit his best forces to a campaign aiming to achieve at best modest gains, when that immensely risky decision to cross the Eurasian Rubicon necessarily entails prospects of indeterminate losses among his elite units and incalculable consequences if unhappy rumors from the front spread back home?

Perhaps so. But one of America’s leading authorities on the North Korean military, professor Bruce Bechtol of Angelo State University in Texas, sees another possibility.

Could these initial North Korean brigades, he muses, be an advance party for a much larger deployment? Say, 50,000 special forces out of Pyongyang’s million-plus army, confidently detailed by Kim to Ukraine since he has no real concern about an attack from South Korea?

A surge like that, Bechtol argues, really could turn the tide in this war: smashing back the Ukrainian military; allowing Russia to conquer significantly more Ukrainian territory, and then positioning Putin to propose a Ukraine settlement of his own liking, on his own terms. In other words: a victory for Russia, with North Korean forces as the game changer.

Bechtol’s worst-case “nightmare” hypothesis is a scenario that might never come to pass — but it is precisely the sort of strategic surprise from the new Russia-North Korean partnership that Western governments should be preparing for. And, so far, they don’t appear to be doing so.

However the Ukraine war unfolds, the deployment of North Korean forces to support an attack on a Western democracy many thousands of miles from the Pyongyang should awaken Americans to the new power politics of the post-Cold War era.

The four aggressive Eurasian dictatorships — Russia, China, Iran and North Korea — are cooperating strategically, and their cooperation is deepening, with an increasing coherence. Three are nuclear-armed and the fourth, Iran, is working to join the club. The day is long past when these regimes posed isolated, discrete threats to Western interests.

True, these state differ in their specific objectives and priorities — and as historian Hal Brands has underscored, they do not form a tightly coordinated alliance like NATO. But they are already more deeply integrated, both economically and militarily, than were the Axis powers of World War II.

China and Russia subsidize North Korea. Russia relies on China for markets, Iran for drones and North Korea for materiel and soldiers. Iran gets military technology from North Korea and economic cooperation with Russia and China. And they serve as defense attorneys for one another in international and diplomatic forums.

There is now a coordinated challenge to the existing U.S.-led security order that stretches from the Middle East through Eurasia, all the way to the Far East.

We must look at the threats we face on World-Island today from the Heartland dictators with new, more strategically sophisticated lenses. We must come to understand that, for all intents and purpose, the war in Gaza and Lebanon against Israel by Iranian proxies is the war by Russia against Ukraine, as would be the war in Taiwan that China may unleash, at a time of Beijing’s own choosing. All one.

The time for posturing about unreservedly defending one Western target of the Heartland dictators’ aggression (Israel) at the expense of another Western target of their aggression (Ukraine) should be over. Setbacks in one theater will only sow more setbacks in other theaters.

Meeting the threats from this confederation of Heartland dictators will be difficult enough, even if we recognize the challenge they pose. If we do not recognize the logic and intentions behind their actions, and respond accordingly, the years ahead — already foreboding — will be even less pleasant.

2. On GPS: Kim Jong Un to Putin’s rescue?

Dr. Jung Pak: "What happens in Asia matters in Europe and what is happening in Europe matters in Asia. And it highlights how important it is for all of our allies and partners to be working together"

On GPS: Kim Jong Un to Putin’s rescue?

Fareed Zakaria, GPS

https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/27/world/video/gps1027-north-korean-troops-arrive-in-russia

Fareed speaks with former senior CIA and State Department official Jung Pak about the presence of North Korean troops in Russia, what this means for the war in Ukraine and the budding alliance between two of America’s most ardent adversaries.

3. North Korea coup speculation is back!

The professor is saying the quiet part out loud. Hardly ever does anyone ever talk about this.

Few people have read Luttwak's seminal work (or keep a copy of his book handy for reference). And fewer have ever applied it to north Korea.

You can download a PDF of Luttwak's book here: https://mirror.explodie.org/108765924-Luttwak-1969-Coup-d-Etat.pdf or access it in an ebook reader format here: https://archive.org/details/coup-detat-a-practical-handbook/page/n3/mode/2up

North Korea coup speculation is back!

Sending 12,000 troops to war irks those about to go, and enrages those coming back. With Kim Jong-un’s policy choice, coup speculation is officially back!

https://www.junotane.com/p/north-korea-coup-speculation-is-back?r=7i07&utm

by Dr. Jeffery Robertson

Oct 27, 2024

3

1

Share

When you’re sending 12,000 troops to battle in support of a side not exactly known for its kind treatment of conscripts, you’ve got to be thinking twice about the the soldiers you’re threatening to send and the soldiers coming back. If those troops end up as cannon fodder, with Kim Jong-un’s stupidity, the coup d’etat speculation is back on!

There’s a history. In 1996, the Korean People's Army Sixth Corps, headquartered in Chongjin, planned a coup d'etat. With the failure of state services and continuing restrictions on trading, North Hamkyung Province was hungry and dissatisfied - including the leadership and officers in each link of the self-monitoring triumvirate of political committees, military command, and National Security Agency. We know it failed, but we also know it’s a very real threat.

Edward N. Luttwak's Coup d’État: A Practical Handbook is the best known book on how to undertake a coup. Does North Korea check all the boxes?

Luttwak’s book explores the mechanics of seizing state power through small, organized efforts, bypassing mass uprisings or large-scale warfare. It details how modern states' bureaucratic and military structures can be exploited for swift takeovers. His work has influenced both coup plotters and governments worldwide, prompting both to refine strategies—either to seize power or prevent it. The book’s impact spans decades, providing insight into real-world coups and shaping political-security frameworks to counteract internal threats to regimes.

The nature of the North Korean state presents unique challenges, requiring a strategy that considers both internal vulnerabilities and external pressures. Drawing on the insights from Luttwak’s text, to destabilize and ultimately collapse the North Korean regime, we need:

• a vulnerable centralized state apparatus

Luttwak emphasizes that a coup or regime change becomes feasible in highly centralized systems where power is concentrated in a few hands. North Korea’s tightly controlled bureaucracy and military chain of command make it vulnerable to disruptions at key nodes. However, these same characteristics act as both strengths and weaknesses. While the leadership relies heavily on elite military units and inner-circle loyalty, these structures also create isolated factions that can be exploited.

Targeting North Korea’s leadership requires infiltrating the command structure or amplifying internal distrust among elite factions. This could involve intelligence operations designed to increase paranoia within the ruling elite, planting the seeds for a self-fulfilling cycle of purges and defections.

• economic deprivation

Luttwak argues that regimes become especially vulnerable during economic crises, which fuel public discontent and elite dissatisfaction. North Korea already suffers from chronic economic deprivation, but the regime's ability to suppress mass uprisings has limited the destabilizing effects of poverty.

Sanctions, although heavily employed, should be refined to better target the regime's elite class rather than the broader population. Simultaneously, humanitarian aid directed at border regions and marginalized communities could increase resentment among those outside the elite circles, undermining the regime’s narrative of strength.

• exploitable communication and information gaps

According to Luttwak, coups succeed when they disrupt the flow of information within a regime, creating confusion and limiting the leadership’s ability to coordinate a response. In North Korea, the state's rigid control over communications isolates it from both domestic and international information networks.

Operations should focus on introducing alternative sources of information into North Korea. For example, the distribution of propaganda via radio waves, smuggled devices, or leaflets can erode the regime’s monopoly on truth. This disruption would weaken the state's ideological control and embolden potential dissidents.

• elite discontent and defections to leverage

Luttwak highlights how military factions and dissatisfied elites often play a pivotal role in coups. While North Korea has implemented strict control mechanisms, recent high-profile defections indicate cracks within the elite class.

Incentivizing high-ranking officials to defect or cooperate covertly can further destabilize the regime. International guarantees for defectors, along with financial incentives, could increase the likelihood of defections from within the military or political elite. Encouraging these individuals to disseminate counter-narratives within the regime could accelerate the erosion of loyalty.

• perceived or actual external threats

Luttwak emphasizes that external military threats or diplomatic crises often lead to internal disarray, particularly in regimes where survival is tied to militaristic policies. In North Korea’s case, the regime relies heavily on the narrative of an external threat to justify its existence and maintain internal unity.

Strategic displays of military strength, combined with diplomatic isolation, could force the regime into overreactions that expose internal weaknesses. Simultaneously, diplomatic outreach to China and Russia—North Korea's traditional allies—can erode the regime’s geopolitical support, isolating it further.

• psychological operations and disruption campaigns ☐

Luttwak’s analysis suggests that successful coups rely on psychological operations to undermine public trust in the regime and create confusion within the leadership. In North Korea, the state ideology is central to regime stability, making it a prime target for psychological disruption.

Targeted messaging campaigns should aim to discredit the Kim dynasty’s legitimacy, highlighting corruption, contradictions, and failures. The spread of dissident voices and testimonies from defectors can further destabilize the regime’s narrative. These operations should be coordinated to coincide with economic or diplomatic pressures, maximizing their psychological impact.

While there have been continuous attempts undermine public trust in the North Korean regime and create confusion within its leadership, the intensity has been tempered by recognition South Korea’s concern that collapse threatened economic well-being, and U.S. concern that collapse threatened regional security.

• localized resistance movements ☐

While Luttwak warns against large-scale revolutions, he acknowledges that localized resistance movements serve as catalysts for regime change. In North Korea, the heavy surveillance and repression make organizing such movements difficult, but small-scale resistance is still possible.

Empowering underground networks and opposition groups within North Korea, particularly along the Chinese border, could create pockets of resistance. Providing logistical and financial support through covert channels would allow these groups to sustain operations and challenge the regime’s control over remote areas. However, financial support must be coupled with a deeper level of inspiration. Whether this comes from ethnic nationalism, evangelical Christianity, or any other anti-regime belief, there needs to be some form of inspiration that pushes individuals and groups to rise up.

Perhaps the greatest weakness in any attempt to undermine the North Korean regime is the absence of a recognized local resistance movement and the impossibility of supporting them through covert channels. Without an opening of the North Korean regime, this is unlikely to change.

Collapsing the North Korean regime requires a nuanced strategy that integrates internal subversion, economic pressure, and external isolation. Drawing on the principles outlined by Luttwak, this strategy emphasizes exploiting vulnerabilities within the leadership structure, promoting defections, and disrupting communication channels. While a direct coup may be challenging, the cumulative impact of these efforts can destabilize the regime and pave the way for meaningful change- then the next problem appears. What comes next?

4. How is the Russian deployment viewed inside N.Korea? (1) Parents of soldiers gradually discovering deployments and information spreading: "They might get to eat plenty of cheese and milk," "No one thinks they're going to war"

How is the Russian deployment viewed inside N.Korea? (1) Parents of soldiers gradually discovering deployments and information spreading: "They might get to eat plenty of cheese and milk," "No one thinks they're going to war"

https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2024/10/military/nk-russia-2/

2024.10.28

Video footage released by Ukraine's Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security (SPRAVDI) on October 18 appears to show a group of North Korean soldiers deployed to Russia receiving supplies.

The governments of South Korea, Ukraine, UK, US, and Japan have confirmed that North Korea has already sent thousands of troops to Russia, which invaded Ukraine. Both North Korea and Russia, which initially denied the deployment, are no longer denying it. What about inside North Korea, where information is strictly controlled? According to three reporting partners living in the northern region of the country, information about troop deployments to Russia is gradually spreading. (KANG Ji-won / ISHIMARU Jiro)

◆ Initially Unaware of the Ukraine War

South Korea's National Intelligence Service revealed information about the North Korean troop deployment to Russia on October 18. When asked the next day, reporting partner A, a Workers' Party member in North Hamgyong Province, told ASIAPRESS, "I knew nothing about it. Haven't heard any rumors either." They noticed no unusual movements in domestic military units. Reporting Partner B from Ryanggang Province similarly responded, "Never heard of it."

Initially, ordinary North Korean citizens' understanding of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the ongoing intense fighting remains vague. According to B, "Most people probably think it's not a war between nations, but rather an ethnic conflict with Ukraine, a former Soviet state, or Russia's civil war."

Specific details about the war situation, such as Russia suffering over 70,000 casualties due to Ukraine's fierce counteroffensive, are completely unknown. Moreover, amid continued economic hardship following the pandemic, citizens haven't had the luxury to pay attention to a war in distant Europe.

As time passed after the South Korean government's announcement, information about the Russian deployment began spreading within North Korea. On October 25, reporting partner C from Ryanggang Province reported, "I heard about troops being sent to Russia. More people here are becoming aware of it." We asked C about the current situation.

Several Russian railway cars were present at the North Korea-Russia border. Some cargo vehicles were covered with green sheets. A slogan reading "Toward New Victory!" can be seen. There are also visible groups of tanks that appear to be for storing oil imported from Russia. Photo taken by ASIAPRESS from the Chinese side of the border on October 21, 2024.

◆ Parents of Soldiers Notice Russian Deployment

--- How did you learn about the Russian deployment?

"I heard it from an acquaintance whose son is in the military. This acquaintance used to send 200-300 yuan every two months to their 22-year-old son through a money transfer agent, but the son contacted them through the agent saying to stop sending money because the unit was going to Russia. The parent said they couldn't openly discuss it as it's a military secret."

*100 yuan is approximately 19,000 North Korean won.

To provide some context, North Korean men currently serve 8 years of military service (longer for certain branches). Except for some units like those related to missiles, it's common knowledge in North Korea that soldiers get poor food rations. It's not uncommon for soldiers to become malnourished.

Worried parents typically deposit money with agents near their sons' military units, paying about 10% commission, so their children can buy bread or rice cakes when they leave the base. Since the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020, control over military personnel has become stricter, with mobile phone use banned and home leave rarely permitted.

◆ Expectation of Better Food in Russia

--- How did your acquaintance, the soldier's parent, react to their son's deployment to Russia? Do they realize there's a possibility of death if their son participates in combat?

"They didn't think (their son) was going into combat. They thought he would just be assigned to guard duty in the rear. Still, being a parent, they were worried."

--- Are there parents who still don't know their sons are being deployed to Russia?

"Many parents probably don't know. Few people know (about the Russian deployment) yet, and even those who do can't freely tell others for fear of punishment. If information about troops being sent to Russia spreads, all parents will try to find out if their sons are going."

--- Besides soldiers' parents, how are others who know about the deployment reacting?

"The general perception is that if deployed to Russia, they won't go hungry because they'll get to eat plenty of things like cheese and milk. People don't even think about them participating in combat."

--- The South Korean government claims that North Korea is isolating the parents of soldiers being sent to Russia to prevent information from spreading. Are the soldiers' parents expressing any complaints?

"What isolation? The parents of deployed soldiers living in my area haven't been isolated. Though worried, they can't speak openly about it. I don't know what will happen if death notices arrive, but for now, there are no voices of anxiety or complaint."

Kim Jong-un visited Russia's Far East last September, meeting with President Putin and inspecting military facilities and a space center during his 5-day, 6-night stay. In June this year, Putin visited North Korea and signed a 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.' This has been extensively covered by North Korean state media. Additionally, as Russian wheat and flour appear in food rations, and tourist and business visitors to North Korea increase, there's growing hope among struggling North Korean citizens that deeper relations with Russia will improve the economy.

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

5. The price for sending the North's Storm Corps to Russia is a strategic nuclear submarine?

This is a Google translation of an RFA report.

Excerpts:

The Storm Corps is the successor to the Special 8th Corps, which was created by integrating several units centered around the 121st Military Unit that North Korea sent to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-hee in 1968. This unit was split into the Reconnaissance Bureau and the Light Instruction and Guidance Bureau and then renamed the 11th Corps . Internally in North Korea, it is called the Storm Corps , the 630th Joint Forces Unit, and the 465th Military Unit . In 2017 , North Korea created an independent military branch called the Special Operations Forces that integrates the special operations forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Force . Although the Navy and Air Force also have special forces , the main force of this special operations force is the 11th Corps, which is part of the Army .

North Korea's special forces are divided into seven branches according to their missions: sniper, light infantry, aviation ground warfare, maritime sniper, aviation sniper, amphibious assault, and mountaineering . Of these , the 11th Corps has three sniper brigades, three aviation ground warfare brigades , and four light infantry brigades . The troops sent to Russia this time are understood to be from the sniper brigade and the light infantry brigade.

...

The reason why the Russian army is struggling in Kursk is the same reason why they are struggling in Donetsk. They are pushing forward without any special tactics and are being swept away by Ukrainian drones and artillery fire . In this area in particular, the Ukrainian army is operating with tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery provided by the United States and Europe .

Russia is planning to form a unit called the "Buryat Battalion" under the 11th Guards Airborne Assault Brigade operating in this region and deploy North Korean troops there . This unit, which consists of many soldiers from the Republic of Buryatia, has many soldiers who are ethnically similar to North Koreans, making it easy to hide the fact that North Korean troops were dispatched . Of course, just because it has a fancy name like the Guards Airborne Assault Brigade does not mean that its tactics or weapons are different . Since this unit has been annihilated and reorganized several times at Kursk, the North Korean military will also be deployed in the so-called "Storm - Z" reckless assault battle and suffer enormous casualties . November in particular is called Rasputitsa, a time when continuous rain turns the roads into mud . The temperature is low and the ground is muddy, so it is expected that there will be a huge number of underground tribes , that is, patients whose feet rot and need to be amputated .

...

Since North Korea paid such a high price, Russia should give something in return. One way to think about it is to build infrastructure and provide training for the North Koreans to build nuclear-powered submarines in Sinpo , large submarines that can launch ballistic missiles . But that costs too much money and time .

If North Korea wants to acquire an underwater retaliatory strike capability in the near future, it can provide Russia’s strategic nuclear submarines in the form of a lease. Russia has experience in the past of leasing an Akula-class attack submarine to India for money . Currently, Russia has 12 strategic nuclear submarines, including five older Delta -IV- class strategic nuclear submarines and seven new Borei-class strategic nuclear submarines . Currently, two Delta -IV- class submarines and one Borei-class submarine are undergoing major repairs and life extension work , and two improved Borei-class submarines are under construction , with construction of two more scheduled to begin this year . Russia plans to secure up to 14 Borei-class submarines , but given the current speed of deployment , there will be spare capacity since two Delta -IV- class submarines have ample life left .

The Bryansk and Karelia, which are currently undergoing life extension work, are aging ships that were commissioned in 1988 and 1989 , but Bryansk was overhauled and improved from 2002 to 2008 , and Karelia from 2004 to 2009 , so they will be able to be used until the 2030s . Both submarines are equipped with 16 "Cineva" submarine-launched ballistic missiles with a range of 8,300 km . These missiles are multiple-warhead nuclear missiles that can strike the entire United States .

The price for sending the North's Storm Corps to Russia is a strategic nuclear submarine?

https://www.rfa.org/korean/weekly_program/c2e0bc15d55cd55cbc18b3c4c2e0bb34ae30b300bc31acfc/nkrussiasubmarine-10252024202517.html

WASHINGTON-Kim Jin-guk kimj@rfa.org

2024.10.27

North Korea's Storm Corps, which fires guns indiscriminately without any concept of concealment, cover, or tactical maneuver

 / Source: Composite of 3 photos released by the Korean Central News Agency

00:00 /16:45

( Host ) We will accurately grasp the current state of the military standoff on the Korean Peninsula and seek a path to peace. This is Kim Jin-guk, presenting 'Encyclopedia of New Weapons on the Korean Peninsula' from Washington D.C. We will connect with Lee Il-woo, Secretary General of Korea's ' Independent Defense Network ' .

A to Z of the North Storm Corps deployed to Russia

( Anchor ) The rumored deployment of North Korea's troops to the Ukraine has been officially confirmed by South Korea, the United States, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization . It is said that elite troops selected from the Storm Corps, considered the most elite unit within the North Korean military, will be deployed to the Kursk Front , a fiercely contested battleground . Is the Storm Corps really such a powerful unit ?

( Lee Il-woo )  In fact, from North Korea's perspective, regular units cannot be sent abroad. As North Korean listeners who are watching this broadcast would know better , regular North Korean military units are a group that labors more than they train . Because the supply situation is not good, the overall nutritional status is poor , and because of the poor nutritional status, it is difficult to conduct proper training or maintain combat capability as a combatant . Since we cannot send soldiers who are skin and bones abroad, we selected units that can at least earn their keep as a combatant and sent them, which is the Storm Corps .

The Storm Corps is the successor to the Special 8th Corps, which was created by integrating several units centered around the 121st Military Unit that North Korea sent to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-hee in 1968. This unit was split into the Reconnaissance Bureau and the Light Instruction and Guidance Bureau and then renamed the 11th Corps . Internally in North Korea, it is called the Storm Corps , the 630th Joint Forces Unit, and the 465th Military Unit . In 2017 , North Korea created an independent military branch called the Special Operations Forces that integrates the special operations forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Force . Although the Navy and Air Force also have special forces , the main force of this special operations force is the 11th Corps, which is part of the Army .

North Korea's special forces are divided into seven branches according to their missions: sniper, light infantry, aviation ground warfare, maritime sniper, aviation sniper, amphibious assault, and mountaineering . Of these , the 11th Corps has three sniper brigades, three aviation ground warfare brigades , and four light infantry brigades . The troops sent to Russia this time are understood to be from the sniper brigade and the light infantry brigade .

North Korean special forces soldier charging while aiming his rifle with a POS-1 4x telescopic sight for the Dragunov sniper rifle in indoor close combat / Source: Korean Central News Agency

Sniper is not a sniper who hits the enemy with a 100% accuracy rifle from a long distance, but is a translation of the Russian word 'tstrelkova ( стрелковая ) ' meaning a rifleman . In the North Korean military , a sniper brigade is a specialized infiltration operation unit that strikes the enemy's rear, similar to the South Korean military's Special Forces or the US military's Green Berets . The light infantry is a specialized unit that disrupts the enemy's rear , similar to the South Korean military's Special Assault Brigade or the US military's Ranger Regiment , and the Aviation Ground Combatant is a unit similar to the Russian Airborne Forces in that it parachutes into the enemy's rear to create a second front . They are basically classified as special forces , but from an expert's perspective, they are not units that can be considered special forces .

When talking to Korean or US special forces operators, they explain that it takes at least 4-5 years and costs several hundred thousand dollars in Korea and 2-3 million dollars in the US to train a special operations agent who can do at least their share in actual combat . Everything from creating a body that can perform missions in extreme environments to training facilities and textbooks to enable versatility in various environments costs money . In the case of the US Navy SEALs, one operator fires more than 50,000 rounds of live ammunition per month , and if they fire just the cheapest 5.56mm rifle bullets at that rate , the ammunition alone will cost $ 25,000 per month . The South Korean military can't even do this. One special forces agent fires about 1,000 rounds a year , and one Navy Special Warfare Flotilla agent fires about 24,000 rounds a year . If you think about whether North Korea has the economic ability to allow its Storm Corps agents to conduct live-fire training of more than 1,000 rounds a year, everyone would think the same .

In fact, if you look at the images of special forces that North Korea releases through its media, it is truly pathetic. They don’t even know how to wear bulletproof vests , and during close combat training , they shoot with 4x magnification scopes on their sniper rifles, and during the airborne ground combat training that Kim Jong-un inspected in March , they didn’t even know how to operate parachutes, so they fell mid-air and got tangled up, resulting in casualties . Even when you see these types of troops on the battlefield, they are just regular infantry , and less-trained infantry at that .

Cases of North Korean soldiers wearing incorrect bulletproof vests and normal areas of bulletproof vests Source: 3 photos from the Korean Central News Agency and a composite photo of X

North Korean troops who went to Russia , where will they be deployed?

( Host ) If the level of troops is not much different from that of regular infantry, it is unlikely that they will be able to exert much force on the battlefield. Ukraine is a very large country , and the front lines are divided into several places . To which front will the North Korean army be deployed and what missions will they be assigned ?

( Lee Il-woo ) Ukraine has a territory more than three times the size of the Korean Peninsula , and the front line has been formed in the region of five oblasts , including Kherson - Zaporizhzhia , Donetsk , Luhansk , and Kharkiv , starting from the south. Since August , when the Ukrainian military invaded Kursk Oblast, a Russian territory across the Sumy Oblast in the northeast, an extremely extensive front line has been formed . Excluding the area facing the wide Dnipro River, the front line formed purely on land is over 700 km long .

Among these, there are four areas where the most intense fighting is taking place : the Pokrovsk and Bukhledar fronts in Donetsk Oblast , the Volchansk front in Kharkiv Oblast , and the Kursk front on the Russian mainland . Of these, the areas where Russia is most desperately fighting are the Pokrovsk and Kursk fronts .

The Pokrovsk region, a key transportation hub, is a battleground where Russia barely captured the Audiuka region in almost two years early this year, and has only advanced 20 km in the past 10 months, deploying more than five divisions . The area has open terrain with many rivers, lakes , and plains , which makes the attacking side easily exposed to the enemy, so the casualties of the Russian army that attack every time are very high . The reason why Russia continues to push here despite the huge casualties is that by capturing Pokrovsk, Russia can achieve the territorial integrity of the Donetsk People's Republic, which separated from Ukraine. The Bukhledar Front is south of this Pokrovsk Front , and the purpose of the attack here is to attack the flank of the Ukrainian army defending the Pokrovsk area . Russia has not been able to advance here for two and a half years, and has lost at least two corps of troops and equipment . Like Pokrovsk, this area is also very difficult to attack because of its open terrain .

According to a report by SROK, a partisan group in the Donetsk region that cooperates with the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Service , Russia is planning to assign North Korean troops to the 29th Combined Arms Army , which is pushing its troops to these fronts , and a North Korean camp has been set up in a village called Sartana, east of the port city of Mariupol in Donetsk Oblast , which was a fierce battle at the beginning of the war. After acclimating to the local environment at this camp, the North Korean troops will go to Pokrovsk and Bukhledar to fight . Since the Russian military's tactic on this front is to advance with artillery fire into the open plains and push back the Ukrainian troops with human wave tactics, most of the North Korean troops deployed here will end up as cannon fodder, or as the locals call it, "cannon fodder . "

The Kursk region in mainland Russia, where the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Service announced on October 23rd (local time) that an advance party of North Korean troops had arrived , is also a battlefield where many North Korean troops will be deployed . Russia is in a situation where its mainland has been invaded for the first time since World War II, and a significant amount of territory has been lost . In September , Putin organized an army of 60,000 to 80,000 troops centered on airborne troops and deployed them to Kursk, and gave a standing order to annihilate all Ukrainian troops in the Kursk region by October 1st , but it failed .

[ Encyclopedia of New Weapons on the Korean Peninsula ] One-two Punch to Stop North Korea's ' Suicide Drone ' Copying Russia's ' Lancet '

[ Encyclopedia of New Weapons on the Korean Peninsula ] F-35C Stealth-equipped 'Washington' departs for the Korean Peninsula

The reason why the Russian army is struggling in Kursk is the same reason why they are struggling in Donetsk. They are pushing forward without any special tactics and are being swept away by Ukrainian drones and artillery fire . In this area in particular, the Ukrainian army is operating with tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery provided by the United States and Europe .

Russia is planning to form a unit called the "Buryat Battalion" under the 11th Guards Airborne Assault Brigade operating in this region and deploy North Korean troops there . This unit, which consists of many soldiers from the Republic of Buryatia, has many soldiers who are ethnically similar to North Koreans, making it easy to hide the fact that North Korean troops were dispatched . Of course, just because it has a fancy name like the Guards Airborne Assault Brigade does not mean that its tactics or weapons are different . Since this unit has been annihilated and reorganized several times at Kursk, the North Korean military will also be deployed in the so-called "Storm - Z" reckless assault battle and suffer enormous casualties . November in particular is called Rasputitsa, a time when continuous rain turns the roads into mud . The temperature is low and the ground is muddy, so it is expected that there will be a huge number of underground tribes , that is, patients whose feet rot and need to be amputated .

What ' big thing ' will the North demand from Russia in return for the Storm Corps ?

( Host )  The North Korean leadership must be aware that there will inevitably be massive casualties due to the battlefield situation and the various problems of the Russian military. If so, it seems that North Korea will also demand something big from Russia in return for this massive military support . Did a Ukrainian intelligence agency reveal that North Korea and Russia are making a dangerous deal that crosses the international community's red line ?

( Lee Il-woo ) In an interview with The Economist on October 22 , the  head of the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Service, Lieutenant General Kirill Budanov , revealed that a secret appendix to the treaty signed between North Korea and Russia in June contained provisions for the deployment of troops and the transfer of strategic weapons . Budanov said that we should not think that North Korea is providing troops and weapons to Russia for free , and that Moscow has been paying Pyongyang and transferring technology . He gave specific details, saying that the technology being transferred to North Korea includes tactical nuclear weapons and various technologies related to submarine-launched missile systems .

Generally, tactical nuclear weapons refer to nuclear weapons with a yield of several kilotons to several tens of kilotons. However, since North Korea has already created a tactical nuclear weapon called the  and is mass-producing it as a standard nuclear warhead for its main delivery means , it is unlikely that they will be transferring any new tactical nuclear weapon manufacturing technology .

What is concerning is the technology related to submarine-launched missile systems, and in fact, this is the technology that the North Korean regime is most thirsty for . As I mentioned when I introduced the Frankenstein submarine , North Korea has long desired a means of retaliatory strike that can hide deep in the ocean for a long time, maintain high survivability , and launch a large number of nuclear attacks on South Korea, Japan , and the US mainland in the event of an emergency . However, North Korea does not have the technology or infrastructure to build a nuclear submarine, let alone the reactor technology needed to build one , let alone the sonar or communication equipment that would go into it , or even the high-strength steel that would go into the submarine's pressure hull .

Since North Korea paid such a high price, Russia should give something in return. One way to think about it is to build infrastructure and provide training for the North Koreans to build nuclear-powered submarines in Sinpo , large submarines that can launch ballistic missiles . But that costs too much money and time .

If North Korea wants to acquire an underwater retaliatory strike capability in the near future, it can provide Russia’s strategic nuclear submarines in the form of a lease. Russia has experience in the past of leasing an Akula-class attack submarine to India for money . Currently, Russia has 12 strategic nuclear submarines, including five older Delta -IV- class strategic nuclear submarines and seven new Borei-class strategic nuclear submarines . Currently, two Delta -IV- class submarines and one Borei-class submarine are undergoing major repairs and life extension work , and two improved Borei-class submarines are under construction , with construction of two more scheduled to begin this year . Russia plans to secure up to 14 Borei-class submarines , but given the current speed of deployment , there will be spare capacity since two Delta -IV- class submarines have ample life left .

The Bryansk and Karelia, which are currently undergoing life extension work, are aging ships that were commissioned in 1988 and 1989 , but Bryansk was overhauled and improved from 2002 to 2008 , and Karelia from 2004 to 2009 , so they will be able to be used until the 2030s . Both submarines are equipped with 16 "Cineva" submarine-launched ballistic missiles with a range of 8,300 km . These missiles are multiple-warhead nuclear missiles that can strike the entire United States .

 Russian Navy Delta-IV class strategic nuclear submarine 'Bryansk' / Source: Russian Navy

Russia has leased nuclear submarines to India, and the United States is also preparing to provide Australia with nuclear submarines , nuclear infrastructure, and construction facilities through AUKUS . The long-standing nuclear power arms control regime has already been broken by the intensification of the new Cold War , and we must prepare for the worst-case scenario where Russia, which now has a spare strategic nuclear submarine, leases or provides strategic nuclear submarines to North Korea .

( Host ) This was Lee Il-woo, Secretary General of the Korea Independent Defense Network. Now, with Kim Jin-guk from RFA in Washington ,  D.C.

Editor Lee Jin-seo, Web Editor Lee Gyeong-ha

6. Open questions | Why North Korea is starting to become a ‘forgotten’ space for China and the US

This article/interview from the South China Morning Post covers a lot of ground.

But there is no mention of unification at all which is likely because the conventional wisdom is that given the security situation and Kim Jong Un's rejection of "peaceful unification," unification is impossible. I would argue otherwise and continue to state the only way to end the nuclear and military threats and the existential threat to the sSouth and the human rights atrocities and crimes against humanity is through unification and the establishment of a free and unified Korea. This must be the end state of any strategy. . And even if peaceful unification is unlikely given the nature, objectives,and strategy of the Kim family regime (which we must thoroughly understand). Now more than ever the ROK, with the support of the US and the ROK/US alliance, must plan for peaceful unification that will be applied in any scenario , contingency, or path to unification (e.g., war, regime collapse, or internal transition to new leadership in the north) while continuing to maintain deterrence and defense against an attack from the north.

Excerpt:

The only thing that can be done is self-help. To ensure that none of the great powers can harm North Korea’s sovereignty and interests, it needs a certain means – nuclear missiles. Thus it succeeded by pouring all of North Korea’s power and energy into it.

I think North Korea is a country that early on defined the strategic competition between the US and China as a new cold war and, in a way, welcomed the advent of US-China strategic competition. If it becomes a new cold war, there will be no choice but to decide whether you are an ally or an enemy, and if that happens, North Korea will benefit from the South Korea-US-Japan versus North Korea-China-Russia structure.

Who would even dare to attack North Korea with nuclear weapons and missiles? The US does not want that, and South Korea cannot do it either. From a security point of view, North Korea is completely safe now.

Open questions | Why North Korea is starting to become a ‘forgotten’ space for China and the US

Political scientist Kim Heung-kyu on the state of play on the Korean peninsula and how Seoul can benefit from Beijing-Washington rivalry

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3283918/why-north-korea-starting-become-forgotten-space-china-and-us?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article

Seong Hyeon Choi

Published: 6:00am, 28 Oct 2024Updated: 10:36am, 28 Oct 2024

Kim Heung-kyu is a professor of political science and diplomacy and director of the US-China Policy Institute at Ajou University in Suwon, South Korea. He is also founder and president of the Plaza Project, a bipartisan think tank affiliated with the Korean National Assembly, and was a policy adviser for the South Korean presidential office. This interview first appeared in SCMP Plus. For other interviews in the Open Questions series, click here.

How do you assess the Korean peninsula situation as North Korea continues to advance its nuclear and missile programme, with no denuclearisation negotiations either with the United States or South Korea for more than five years?

North Korea had tried to improve its relationship with the United States through [former US President Donald] Trump in order to resolve its security issues, but this ended in failure. With the Hanoi summit [in 2019] as a starting point, Kim Jong-un seems to have completely made up his mind that it is impossible to solve North Korea’s security problem through negotiations or any improvement in relations with the US.

The only thing that can be done is self-help. To ensure that none of the great powers can harm North Korea’s sovereignty and interests, it needs a certain means – nuclear missiles. Thus it succeeded by pouring all of North Korea’s power and energy into it.

I think North Korea is a country that early on defined the strategic competition between the US and China as a new cold war and, in a way, welcomed the advent of US-China strategic competition. If it becomes a new cold war, there will be no choice but to decide whether you are an ally or an enemy, and if that happens, North Korea will benefit from the South Korea-US-Japan versus North Korea-China-Russia structure.

Who would even dare to attack North Korea with nuclear weapons and missiles? The US does not want that, and South Korea cannot do it either. From a security point of view, North Korea is completely safe now.

The great powers that can support the energy and economic aid that Pyongyang needs or contain any abuse of sanctions on North Korea are either Russia or China. Pyongyang has been quite successful in that the structure of the new cold war has become fairly comfortable for itself. The only problem is that the relationship with China is not as smooth as expected, and there is a contradicting aspect of China’s interest with North Korea.

North Korea to ‘permanently’ block border links to ‘hostile’ South

Both South and North Korea are pursuing strategies to escalate the conflict. The Yoon [Suk-yeol] administration faces a crisis with low approval ratings and is attempting to increase tensions between the South and the North to reverse that situation. North Korea is also trying to resolve its people’s dissatisfaction over a long-term recession and economic crisis by stoking inter-Korean tensions.

Moreover, if the dispatch of North Korean troops to Ukraine is true, we are witnessing a catastrophe of South Korea’s northern diplomacy, which has been pursued since the previous Roh Tae-woo administration.

North Korea has defined the current situation as a new cold war, and although South Korea has not reached that stage, it is actually implementing a new cold war-like perception and foreign policy. Concerns are growing that the Korean peninsula is approaching its worst military conflict since the Korean war.

How do you assess Kim Jong-un’s leadership since the border lockdown with China in 2020 when the pandemic started? Is Kim becoming more difficult to handle through diplomatic means?

We seem to be underestimating the leadership of Kim Jong-un, [Russian President Vladimir] Putin, [Chinese President] Xi Jinping, and even [former Japanese prime minister Shinzo] Abe. When we analyse from a Western perspective, it appears that the crisis of succession or leadership that exists in any authoritarian or dictatorship system has been emphasised and led to a relatively negative image.

However, if you look at the history of each country, whether it is Kim, Putin or Xi, they have all shown great leadership. As soon as Kim Jong-un rose to power, he purged all the pro-China factions and succeeded in eliminating forces that could pose a threat to him, such as [his uncle] Jang Song-thaek, thereby achieving a certain level of domestic stability. Then he established a nuclear missile capability, building up North Korea’s leverage. By dramatically strengthening relations with Russia, North Korea obtained the energy, minerals and military high technology that it needs. Kim is the one that achieved all of these three enormous goals.

Of course, some economic difficulties cannot be resolved now due to sanctions and especially difficult relations with China, but despite this, I think systemic stability has been greatly strengthened.

Kim Jong-un visits an undisclosed location in North Korea to watch an artillery exercise. Photo: KCNA via AP

How do you think China would see the recent arms exchange and closer ties between North Korea and Russia? There is a view that this is a “marriage of convenience” that Beijing is unhappy about – what is your take on this?

I fundamentally agree, because China does not want to be recognised or treated as a country like Russia or North Korea. Firstly, China is dealing with a much bigger vision and a long-term strategy. Secondly, China does not want the Northeast Asia region to fall into a new cold war. So there is a belief that it is not in China’s interests to be stuck in a structure of South Korea-US-Japan versus North Korea-China-Russia. Thirdly, I think China has already started to move forward with a much larger global strategy and vision, where the importance of traditional security in Northeast Asia has relatively decreased.

China is in a position where it does not want Northeast Asia or the Korean peninsula to become a variable or obstacle to China’s grand strategy or global strategy. There is a difference from North Korea’s strategy, which is much more focused on the Korean peninsula.

Putin, Kim sign ‘strongest ever’ defence treaty amid growing tensions with the West

How do you see progress on communication between the US and China over North Korea? Do you expect their differences to widen in coming years?

First of all, the US wanted to place as much responsibility as possible for the North Korea issue on China, which has the most influence over Pyongyang. This was not such a bad thing for China either, because it was an important issue in maintaining the relationship between the US and China and Beijing could provide what Washington needed – managing North Korea issues. Thus, China has taken on that role and hosted the six-party talks, but the problem now is that all dreams and hopes have been shattered.

This is because, from the US perspective, China does not really do much, and China does not see a need to help the US in managing North Korea as we are in an era of strategic competition. Also, now the US itself has lower interest in North Korea. If you look at the platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties, the content on denuclearisation is completely omitted.

In fact, it started to become a “forgotten” space for both the US and China. However, from South and North Korean perspectives, it actually has to become a growing concern to have a higher chance that they can use it to gain political support or economic benefit. In that sense, it is not a very good situation.

So there will be less interest on the issue going forward?

Yes, because interest is gradually decreasing. North Korea, nevertheless, already has support from Russia and nuclear missiles. It is possible that North Korea will strengthen provocations in order to increase attention.

And because the current Yoon Suk-yeol administration in South Korea pursues peace through force and it is necessary to unite domestic conservative supporters, it will respond more strongly. So it may escalate into a spiral of tension and conflict.

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s approval rating has plummeted. Photo: AP

In the face of North Korean threats there have been calls in South Korea for Seoul to have nuclear weapons. What’s your view on this?

Surprisingly, 60 to 70 per cent of South Korean citizens support possession of nuclear weapons, while the intellectual community had relatively very low support and was negative about the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons. This is because possessing nuclear weapons is against the so-called non-proliferation regime of the five permanent members of the United Nations – an important system that guarantees the interests of the permanent members.

If South Korea possesses nuclear weapons, the non-proliferation regime will collapse, and Seoul will have to endure strong sanctions. Here, the country imposing the harshest sanctions will be the US, just like during the [former South Korean president] Park Chung-hee days [when Seoul attempted to develop nuclear weapons in the 1970s].

However, the problem with South Korea is that, unlike North Korea, it is a so-called trading country. Trade accounts for almost 80 to 90 per cent of South Korea’s GDP. South Korea is also a country without resources. North Korea has resources on its own and can endure [sanctions], but Seoul has almost no resources to do so. This means it cannot withstand sanctions.

Therefore, while this is still only latent, the US variable is important for now. Depending on how the US behaves, South Korea’s choices and support for nuclear armament may change. Some experts are suggesting joint nuclear armament between South Korea and Japan, and the discussion has become much more serious than before, with even conservative supporters taking a positive stance on such proposals – although there is still an “if” factor. In the end, distrust in the US-ROK alliance is becoming the catalyst for South Korea’s nuclear armament.

'It's the tensest city': South Koreans on border with North fear conflict

There has been more military cooperation between South Korea, the US and Japan against North Korean threats, but it also shows Seoul’s foreign policy alignment with Washington. How do you think South Korea would view any future contingencies in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea if the trilateral military cooperation continues?

For now, the consistent message South Korea is sending to the US is that its most important contribution to the South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation system is suppressing North Korea’s provocations, instead of engaging in any direct military intervention [in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea]. Of course, based on the ROK-US alliance, it may be permissible to accept wounded personnel, provide repairs or general goods, but military participation in any actual military hostilities against China is beyond the scope of the ROK-US alliance. This is still the general perception in South Korea.

Moreover, an important variable in military cooperation between South Korea, the US and Japan will probably be the next South Korean presidential election. If the [opposing] Democratic Party wins or a candidate with a different political stance emerges from the ruling party, it will not be easy to continue to push for military and security cooperation between South Korea, the US and Japan. This is because the public’s feelings towards Japan are still not resolved, and Tokyo is not taking active measures to resolve any anti-Japanese sentiment among the Korean people.

So to what extent do you think the recent cooperation between South Korea and Japan will continue in the future, and do you see them achieving any breakthroughs in their historical and territorial disputes?

I believe that Yoon’s current policy towards Japan is not sustainable no matter who becomes the next president. In other words, there is no choice but to take measures to balance the historical issues and the current need for some kind of cooperation between South Korea and Japan.

Secondly, the biggest pending issue between South Korea and Japan is probably neither the North Korea issue nor the China issue, but the issue of Block 7 [South Korea-Japan Joint Development Zone] in the southern part of the Korean coast [in the East China Sea, presumed to have natural resources]. The issue will arise starting next year [as the two countries can decide whether they will extend the joint development treaty or not in June 2025], which is highly likely to lead to a huge conflict between South Korea and Japan.

If that happens, there is a possibility that South Korea-Japan relations will rapidly deteriorate. This is because Japan has no intention of making concessions, but South Korean public sentiment against the current government is too strong for South Korea to accept it as is. This will also bring enormous pressure to the next administration and a very difficult relationship between South Korea and Japan is expected.

Moving on to economic issues, there is a trend among the US and its allies to de-risk their supply chains away from China, and recent statistics suggest South Korea is gradually reducing reliance on exports to China. How do you see this playing out?

I still believe that China is the most important partner of South Korea’s economic cooperation, because it would not be in South Korea’s national interest if it decouples or widens the gap between a large market like China, a country that is still developing and leading the fourth industrial revolution.

Also, in a sense, the current structure to disperse the supply chain amid the US-China strategic competition is not only an effort to weaken the retaliation from Beijing if South Korea has too much reliance on China, but also because of changes in the economic structure. To put it simply, South Korea has nothing to sell and only things to buy. If you look closely, only exports have decreased significantly. This is also a problem with South Korea’s inability – it has become incompetent due to changes in its economic structure.

Hence, South Korea is now taking advantage of the opportunity of strategic competition between the US and China to sell goods that no longer come from China to the US. In that respect, the strategic competition between the US and China can be beneficial to the Korean economy. So there is no need to interpret the US-China strategic competition in a negative way just because of its structural nature.

How do you think Seoul sees Washington’s chip containment policy against Beijing?

Seoul wouldn’t even budge – the US considers the semiconductor field as having a direct link to its core interest in the strategic competition between the US and China and will enforce similar pressure. The patents for all of South Korea’s hi-tech products and machines to produce them are owned by the US. Will China provide them if South Korea does not bow its head to the US? South Korea makes a living out of semiconductors, so it has no choice but to succumb to pressure from the US in this field.

China is also expanding its capabilities in this field relatively quickly, so from South Korea’s perspective, this will be even more unsettling. This is because, on the one hand, South Korea has no choice but to depend on the US, and on the other hand, China is quickly catching up to South Korea’s capabilities. It will have little room to make any other choice now.

Do you think China’s recent economic softening is an opportunity or a risk for South Korea?

It is in South Korea’s best interest for China to have a moderate foreign policy and achieve rapid economic growth. Unfortunately, China’s diplomacy has become quite rigid recently with so-called Wolf Warrior diplomacy. Also, the current trend of taking economic retaliation … is a very burdensome situation for Korea.

The decline in China’s economy is also very burdensome. This is because South Korea’s economy is largely synchronised with China’s economy. So, when China is in trouble, South Korea is also in trouble, and when the Chinese economy recovers, South Korea also recovers. Since that structure is still large, South Korea wants China to develop quickly and well.

However, the structural constraints of strategic competition have become like shackles in the field of diplomacy and security, and South Korea is not free from them. Thus, South Korea is facing a significant dilemma.

In my opinion, the most core element underlying the Yoon administration’s strong security cooperation policy with the US, and between South Korea-US-Japan, is fear. What this means is the question of South Korea being left out in this newly changing diplomatic and security structure and economic decoupling and de-risking.

China is in a situation where it has not been able to present an alternative solution. And while it is engaging in the cooperative relationship with the US and Japan, Seoul has simultaneously activated both the fear that South Korea may be internationally marginalised if the necessity of South Korean industry weakens and the impatience that it must first secure the ROK-US alliance and South Korea-US-Japan cooperation, which it can quickly visualise.

Given President Yoon’s low approval rating, to what extent do you think he will pursue a more hawkish stance on diplomacy with China?

We can fully expect that as well because the diplomatic stance of the Yoon administration ultimately comes from accepting the international political perception of the competition between democracy versus authoritarianism proposed by the Biden administration. However, the problem is, first, even the US no longer views international relations in this way.

The second thing is that there is a lot of resistance in South Korea. Although it is true that the South Korean public’s perception of China has worsened significantly since the THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defence anti-missile system] incident, the majority still oppose a hostile relationship with China, according to polls. It could be a trigger that could further weaken the current approval rating of the already unpopular and weakened Yoon administration. It would be more helpful for them to make the relationship with North Korea more hostile.

US deploys THAAD missile defense system to South Korea

You have argued that South Korea “must seek cooperation and coexistence rather than conflict” in the US-China rivalry. How can Seoul find a balance between cooperating with China and maintaining security ties with the US?

We need to move away from thinking that the current structure is simply a new cold war or a completely dichotomous one. The relationship currently being sought to be established between the US and China seems a bit far from that. Although there is fierce competition between them in core areas, there is a lot of room for cooperation in many others, such as manufacturing or emerging security-related fields. The more we zoom in on it, the better it will be.

In the case of South Korea, it can now actively cooperate with China and also with the US. In areas that the US designates as its core, South Korea does not have any leverage of its own, so it has no choice but to keep saying that it will comply with the ROK-US alliance. On the other hand, South Korea will also begin to increasingly consider security without the US in its North Korea-related policies. The arms race is inevitable, and it would be reasonable to say that South Korea’s modifications and new tactics and development of these strategies are in progress.

Seong Hyeon Choi

FOLLOW

Seong Hyeon joined the SCMP in 2022. He is from South Korea and graduated with a bachelor of journalism and master of international and public affairs from the University of Hong Kong. He worked as a research intern for Korea Chair at US foreign policy think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and as a news trainee for NK news.

7. S. Korea, US to hold '2+2' talks among foreign, defense chiefs amid NK deployment to Russia

S. Korea, US to hold '2+2' talks among foreign, defense chiefs amid NK deployment to Russia

The Korea Times · October 28, 2024

Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul, right, poses with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken during their talks at Seoul's foreign ministry, March 18. Korea Times photo by Wang Tae-seok

South Korea and the United States will hold their "two plus two" talks among the top foreign and defense officials this week, Seoul's foreign ministry said Monday, amid the heightening tensions with North Korea's deployment of its troops to Russia.

The talks will take place in Washington on Thursday (local time) among Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul, Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, the ministry said in a statement.

The meeting comes at a time when North Korea is believed to have sent its soldiers to Russia for possible deployment to the war in Ukraine. South Korea and the United States have confirmed the North's dispatch of thousands of troops to eastern Russia.

The top officials will have "broad discussions on the Korean Peninsula, the bilateral alliance, and other regional and global issues," the ministry said.

The two countries will also adopt a joint statement based on the outcome of their talks, the ministry said.

Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun attends a Cabinet meeting at the presidential office in Yongsan, Seoul, Oct. 15. Yonhap

Also announcing the meeting, the U.S. State Department said in a separate statement that Washington expects the talks will be about "strengthening our cooperation on the full range of global and regional issues, and deepening the U.S.-ROK alliance," calling South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.

While in Washington, Cho and Blinken will hold one-on-one talks on the alliance, trilateral cooperation with Japan, and coordinated responses to North Korean threats, the foreign ministry said.

Cho also plans to meet with U.S. government officials and experts from academia in efforts to seek continued support and cooperation for the development of the South Korea-U.S. alliance.

Following the visit to Washington, Cho and Kim will fly to Canada for the inaugural meeting of the foreign and defense ministers with their Canadian counterparts.

The launch of the "two plus two" talks with Canada makes the North American country South Korea's third partner, after the U.S. and Australia, to hold such a meeting among the foreign and defense ministers.

The first gathering in Ottawa is expected to address a range of issues of mutual interests, including cooperation in defense and security, as well as the Korean Peninsula issues.

They will also release a joint statement after the talks.

During the trip, Cho will meet bilaterally with Canada's Foreign Minister Melanie Joly for discussions on bilateral cooperation and North Korea issues, Cho's office said. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · October 28, 2024

8. North Korea And Russia’s ‘Far-Reaching’ Strategic Relationship – Analysis

Excerpts:

Far-reaching strategic alignment

These developments, including troop deployment and arms exports, are tactical. However, there is a strategic logic to closer military cooperation between the two. To understand that, it is critical to look closely at the regional geopolitical dynamics in Northeast Asia between the US and its allies, South Korea and Japan. Two notable developments concern Russia and North Korea—South Korea-Japan-US trilateral security cooperation and NATO deepening ties with South Korea and Japan.

Furthermore, the Japanese Prime Minister’s latest Asian NATO idea and the US Ambassador’s remarks on Asian economic NATO have only strengthened the concerns in Moscow and Pyongyang about the West’s and its allies’ intention to corner them. Recently, Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, in a press conference confirmed this thesis, stating, ‘It is obvious today that the United States and its allies decided to draw the Asia-Pacific Region into NATO’s sphere of interests by creating all these narrow and exclusive US-led military and political associations. This includes the troika formed by the United States, Japan and South Korea.’

While the question regarding why North Korea will likely send its troops is important, what is more critical to understand is what it is getting in return for its strong support for Russia. Whilst the answer to the question remains unclear due to the opacity of information, based on some reports and the recent Russian support for North Korea, it looks like Pyongyang has reached an understanding with Moscow. This understanding will likely entail providing military and diplomatic support both in materiel and kind, particularly as North Korea looks to modernise and upgrade its arsenal.

Some reports suggest Russia has already supported North’s space programme, and other modern systems, such as fighter jets and air defence, will likely be the low-hanging fruits. Beijing’s unresponsive attitude and neutrality have acted as a tacit support to this relationship. Thus, going forward, if military cooperation persists between Russia and North Korea, we will likely see the latter coming out of its strategic aloofness and becoming a spoiler for the US and its allies in the region. This will likely have strategic implications for Northeast Asian regional stability and the larger Indo-Pacific region.

North Korea And Russia’s ‘Far-Reaching’ Strategic Relationship – Analysis

eurasiareview.com · October 28, 2024

By Abhishek Sharma

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s remarks on the presence of North Korean troops in its temporarily occupied territories have caught international attention, raising concerns about the state of deepening ties between Russia and North Korea.

Following the announcement, the South Korean President called for an urgent national security meeting, after which South Korean intelligence agencies confirmedthat they believed that North Korea had sent their troops. However, both, Russia and North Korea have refuted these claims.

Nonetheless, if proven to be true, this would be considered a drastic step up in their bilateral ties since the signing of the Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in June this year. Following the Treaty, there was already a visible increase in high-level bilateral visits between Russia and North Korea, from ministerial to senior officials. Nevertheless, the pace at which their strategic ties had developed signalled North Korea and Russia were not shying away from openly supporting each other. The troop deployment will only validate the deepening of their ties, highlighting the importance of North Korea in Moscow’s strategic calculus and vice-versa.

Strengthening military cooperation

All this started with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with Kim Jong Un this year to reinvigorate their bilateral ties. Following the meeting, the relations have progressed at an unprecedented pace. Thus, the North Korean troop deployment will only prove that both parties are not hesitating to display their support on the battlefield and in diplomatic avenues, as already seen.

However, this military bonhomie between the two countries started last year with the visit of Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, who attended the Weaponry Exhibition 2023 alongside Kim Jong Un, signifying the importance of arms exports in this relationship. Post his visit, the defence cooperation has increased drastically, benefiting both the Russian and North Korean military economies. Nonetheless, the initial dealings started in the first year of the Russian invasion, when North Korea supported Russia by exporting arms and ammunition. Since then, the exports of military equipment have continued unabated.

Some of the major arms exports between Russia and North Korea, claimed by South Korea’s Joint Chief of Staff, include 2,000 containers of military equipment, including 200,000 rounds and 1 million 122 mm artillery shells and 152 mm shells, respectively. Other arms exports, part of the tranche, include short-range ballistic missiles, machine guns, rocket launchers, and anti-tank guided missiles.

Some open-source evidence of weapons transfer includes the Russian military jet routine visits to Pyongyang, the latest one on 18 October, when a Russian Air Force Ilyushin Il 62-M landed at the Sunan Airport in North Korea. A similar plane also landed at the same airport earlier last month on 20 September, then flew to Khabarovsk and returned to Pyongyang on 22 September. In addition, it is suspected that Russian naval vessels are also transferring arms from the North Korean port of Rason, infamous for exporting 13,000 shipping containers carrying arms since 2022.

As per South Korean Intelligence, North Korea has decided to send its troops to an active war, deployingfour brigades of 12,000 soldiers, including their special forces, signalling its allegiance to Russia. However, this is not the first time that North Korea has sent its troops to another country. During the height of the Cold War, it sent its troops to participate in wars in North Vietnam and Egypt. In addition, the country has also been accused of helping and training the Tanzania and Mozambique military and even providing missile systems. Besides, North Korea has always shown its support to both state and non-state actors in what it saw as a fight against Western imperialism. For instance, in the run-up to 1973, as war was becoming imminent between Egypt and Israel, and the formers severed ties with the erstwhile Soviet Union, North Korea stepped in, sending 20 experienced pilots and 1,500 personnel to support the Egyptian Air Force in handling their Soviet Air Force assets such as the surface-to-air missiles.

Intensifying Russian support to North Korea

In exchange for material support, Russia has also intensified its comprehensive cooperation with North Korea in diplomatic avenues like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), even supporting the North Korean nuclearisation agenda.

During a recent episode of an alleged incursion by a South Korean drone dispersing propaganda leaflets, Russia, unlike North Korea’s other northern neighbour, China, came out in support and condemned South Korea. Maria Zakharova, the Russian foreign ministry spokesperson, said that ‘Such acts are a blatant encroachment on (North Korea’s) sovereignty and internal affairs to destroy its legal state and political framework and deny it the right to its development.’ This unequivocal support was quite unprecedented.

Another landmark decision was the Russian veto of the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea, responsible for monitoring its multilateral sanctions. After its discontinuation, Russia flouted UN sanctions openly. For instance, Russian President Putin gifted Kim Jong Un a Russian-made Aurus Limousine, openly violating the sanctions. Similarly, RUSI, a UK-based think tank report investigation, highlighted the increasing oil trade by North Korean vessels from Russia’s Vostochny port, violating the UN-mandated 500,000 barrels of oil in favour of arms for oil arrangement between the two countries.

However, the most serious U-turn was Russian support for the nuclearisation of North Korea; this stands in stark contrast to Russia’s traditional position. In a briefing, Sergey Lavrov said that for Russia, ‘the very term of ‘denuclearisation’ as applied to North Korea has lost all meaning. For us, this is a closed issue.’ This is opposite to Russian condemnation of Pyongyang’s nuclear test and its support for sanctions. In 2017, a Russian spokesperson in UNSC said that ‘his country did not accept the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s claim to be a nuclear-weapon State.’ This change highlights Moscow’s prioritising its geopolitical interests, supporting Kim’s nuclear agenda over proliferation concerns, unlike China, which continues to support denuclearisation.

Far-reaching strategic alignment

These developments, including troop deployment and arms exports, are tactical. However, there is a strategic logic to closer military cooperation between the two. To understand that, it is critical to look closely at the regional geopolitical dynamics in Northeast Asia between the US and its allies, South Korea and Japan. Two notable developments concern Russia and North Korea—South Korea-Japan-US trilateral security cooperation and NATO deepening ties with South Korea and Japan.

Furthermore, the Japanese Prime Minister’s latest Asian NATO idea and the US Ambassador’s remarks on Asian economic NATO have only strengthened the concerns in Moscow and Pyongyang about the West’s and its allies’ intention to corner them. Recently, Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, in a press conference confirmed this thesis, stating, ‘It is obvious today that the United States and its allies decided to draw the Asia-Pacific Region into NATO’s sphere of interests by creating all these narrow and exclusive US-led military and political associations. This includes the troika formed by the United States, Japan and South Korea.’

While the question regarding why North Korea will likely send its troops is important, what is more critical to understand is what it is getting in return for its strong support for Russia. Whilst the answer to the question remains unclear due to the opacity of information, based on some reports and the recent Russian support for North Korea, it looks like Pyongyang has reached an understanding with Moscow. This understanding will likely entail providing military and diplomatic support both in materiel and kind, particularly as North Korea looks to modernise and upgrade its arsenal.

Some reports suggest Russia has already supported North’s space programme, and other modern systems, such as fighter jets and air defence, will likely be the low-hanging fruits. Beijing’s unresponsive attitude and neutrality have acted as a tacit support to this relationship. Thus, going forward, if military cooperation persists between Russia and North Korea, we will likely see the latter coming out of its strategic aloofness and becoming a spoiler for the US and its allies in the region. This will likely have strategic implications for Northeast Asian regional stability and the larger Indo-Pacific region.

• About the author: Abhishek Sharma is a Research Assistant at the Observer Research Foundation
• Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation
• 
  
• Observer Research Foundation
• ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.

eurasiareview.com · October 28, 2024

9. The Lens: South Korea debates conscripting women amid declining birth rate

Excerpts:

Enlisting women in the military does not directly tackle the root causes of the country’s low birth rate. The factors behind the low fertility rate include extreme work culture, gender inequality and financial constraints that lead many to postpone or forgo having children.

These systemic inequalities must be addressed; the issue isn’t as simple as a lack of interaction between genders.

In addition, the conscription of women would pause their careers and educational pursuits, further delaying family planning.

This break from work would also worsen economic inequalities already set by the massive gender wage gap, leading to women finding the prospects of child-rearing impossible.

The Lens: South Korea debates conscripting women amid declining birth rate

While proponents argue conscription would address military imbalances, critics say the proposal would be ineffective.

South China Morning Post · by 1 hour ago

Ellisha Yao of German Swiss International School argues that conscripting women in South Korea’s military risks worsening gender inequality and economic disparities. Photo: Handout

The recent suggestion by retired Korean Air Force officer Kim Hyung-chul to conscript women to counter the country’s declining birth rate has sparked a heated debate.

Enlisting women in the military does not directly tackle the root causes of the country’s low birth rate. The factors behind the low fertility rate include extreme work culture, gender inequality and financial constraints that lead many to postpone or forgo having children.

These systemic inequalities must be addressed; the issue isn’t as simple as a lack of interaction between genders.

In addition, the conscription of women would pause their careers and educational pursuits, further delaying family planning.

This break from work would also worsen economic inequalities already set by the massive gender wage gap, leading to women finding the prospects of child-rearing impossible.

Not only would conscripting women into the army be ineffective, but it could also pose significant risks to South Korean society at large.

There would be immense backlash from feminist movements and advocates who would argue that there are many dangers of integrating women at a large scale into the military.

They would mention that the military is not equipped to safeguard women against gender-based systemic abuse and sexual assault, running the risk of creating a culture of silence around harassment.

On the other hand, supporters of conscripting women argue it has the potential to alleviate shortages in the military. They claim it will ease the imbalance of military forces between South Korea and North Korea.

However, this argument is outweighed by the apparent lack of effectiveness and dangerous regressive gender-based inequalities of Kim’s proposal.

Check out last week’s news snippet

Read and observe

The fight against overtourism in Europe has stepped up. Photo: Reuters

Pressure continues to grow in popular European travel destinations for a response to the negative impacts of mass tourism.

Last month, the Czech capital, Prague, announced a ban on organised nighttime pub crawls. Councillors say the city wanted to target “more cultured” tourists.

Vaclav Starek, head of the Czech Association of Hotels and Restaurants, hailed the city’s decision. “Trips to the centre in search of beer have been a problem for local people and other tourists, too,” he said.

This announcement came a day after residents in Spain’s two biggest cities marched in protest against rising property prices. Residents blame housing shortages and the increase in prices on homes being used for holiday rentals.

Spain is struggling to balance promoting tourism, a key driver of its economy, and addressing citizens’ concerns over unaffordable rents.

According to municipal figures, Barcelona tourism accounts for roughly 13.5 per cent of Barcelona’s gross domestic product. However, tourism is the third most worrying problem for the city’s 1.6 million residents, according to a municipal survey. This mirrors a trend seen in other tourism hotspots in Europe.

Barcelona deputy mayor Jordi Valls said the city is exploring other measures to manage tourism. The number of cruise ships that can stop at the port has been reduced. Authorities are also “trying to grow and develop other activities” to diversify the economy.

Near Barcelona’s iconic Sagrada Família, Jordi Gimeno’s haberdashery is one of the few traditional shops left in the neighbourhood. “These shops have been closing down because restaurants and souvenir shops have moved in,” he said at the shop his grandmother opened in 1944.

“There are businesses that tourism is not interested in.”

Staff writers

Research and discuss

• What are the implications of crackdowns on tourism in the Czech Republic and Spain?
• What solutions could keep the tourism industry afloat while also addressing the protesters’ concerns?

South China Morning Post · by 1 hour ago

10. South Korea's birth rate sees glimmer of hope

But too little too late?

South Korea's birth rate sees glimmer of hope

Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · October 25, 2024

The number of births in South Korea increased for the second consecutive month in August, offering a small but encouraging sign for the country with the world's lowest birth rate.

Last year, the nation's fertility rate—measuring the number of expected births per woman—dropped to 0.72. President Yoon Suk Yeol has called the declining birth rate a "national emergency," with concerns that prevailing demographic trends could negatively impact the economy.

Despite over $200 billion in government spending on initiatives such as child care and cash subsidies, these efforts have yet to reverse the trajectory.

A couple prepare for their performance at a mass wedding ceremony on February 7, 2020, in Gapyeong, South Korea. Marriages were delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in turn affecting the birth rate. A couple prepare for their performance at a mass wedding ceremony on February 7, 2020, in Gapyeong, South Korea. Marriages were delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in turn affecting the birth rate. Jung Yeon-Je/AFP via Getty Images

According to a report from South Korea's statistics agency, 20,098 babies were born in August, marking a 5.9 percent increase compared with the same month last year. It was also the second consecutive month to see over 1,000 additional births, with the largest increase for August since 2012, when births rose by 6.1 percent.

From January to August 2024, a total of 158,011 births were recorded, a 0.4 percent drop from the same period in 2023. However, the agency cited the COVID-19 pandemic as a factor in the uptick, noting that many couples had delayed marriage until 2022, which in turn postponed births.

Newsweek emailed a request for comment to the South Korean embassy in the U.S.

Statistics Korea anticipated the birth increase may continue for a few more months.

"There is also a base effect of the low number of births last year, so there is a possibility that the increase in the number of births will continue until the end of the year," local media cited the agency as saying. If the upward trend holds, 2024 could mark the first net rise in births since 2015.

Despite these developments, it remains to be seen whether these trends will continue over the long term.

Cultural shifts and rising housing prices, especially in the Seoul Metropolitan Area, have led many millennials and Gen Z South Koreans to delay or avoid starting families. The central and local governments have introduced numerous policies to support child-rearing, but these efforts have not yet delivered significant long-term results.

In response to the crisis, the government is establishing a new ministry to address demographic issues. Newly released data also shows 20 percent year-over-year increase in marriages, while divorces dropped by 5.5 percent.

Deaths rose by 32,244, a 5.6 percent increase that is not unexpected as South Korea nears the point of being a super-aged society, further compounding its demographic woes.

Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · October 25, 2024

11. The Kims Are Coming – OpEd

​I am not a fan of the Ron Paul institute. But this offers an important perspective of how some in the world (and those who align with Ron Paul Institute) view US hypocrisy.

The Kims Are Coming – OpEd

eurasiareview.com · October 27, 2024

After a few cat and mouse days of Defense Secretary Lloyd “Raytheon” Austin’s denials, the Pentagon finally yesterday affirmed that there was evidence of a North Korean military presence in Russia. Asked what they were doing in Russia, Austin replied, “What exactly they are doing? Left to be seen. These are things that we need to sort out.”

For days, South Korea (no conflict of interest there) and Ukraine (nor there) had been claiming that thousands of North Korean soldiers had swooped in to rescue a beaten and bloodied Russian army from certain defeat at the hands of Ukraine (which has lost nearly a million men at arms in the nearly three year war). As the Russian army accelerates its pace, burning through the last fortified towns in eastern Ukraine, the mainstream media continues – with a few reluctant but panicked exceptions – to push the “Russia is losing” narrative.

The added twist of thousands of “evil communists” from North Korea screaming across the Russian tundra (on horseback, no doubt) promises to add new plot lines to the drama concocted by the mainstream media and most of Washington, and indeed the usual suspects are biting furiously at the bait.

Take US House Intelligence Committee Chairman Michael Turner. He is so outraged that there might be members of the North Korean military in Russia that he actually sent a letter to President Biden calling for war. “If North Korean military forces join Russia’s war against Ukraine,” Fox News reported him to say, “the US should consider the possibility of direct military action.”

Against whom? We are already involved in a proxy war with Russia through Ukraine. We are already directly involved in Israel’s seven-front war against its neighbors and Iran. Who does Chairman Turner think we should attack if North Korean troops are present in Russia? Russia? North Korea? China? All of them?

North Korea and Russia have just signed a treaty whereby their two militaries will more closely collaborate and even come to each other’s aid if one is threatened. While such an agreement may give Turner and the other neocons the vapors, it is nothing different than the mutual defense treaty the US has with its NATO partners and with many others on a bipartisan basis.

Treaties for me but not for thee? Is that the name of the “rules-based international order” game?

The hypocrisy runs even deeper. It is well-known and widely reported that NATO countries are training Ukrainian troops not only in NATO countries but inside Ukraine itself. So it’s absolutely fine for the US and its NATO partners to insert troops inside Ukraine to train its military to kill more Russians and to even operate sophisticated weapons systems inside Ukraine that the Ukrainian military could never operate on its own, but if Russia strikes up a deal with North Korea where the two armies can train together inside Russia, it’s a “red line” (as Chairman Turner wrote) that demands that we start WWIII.

It seems we are not sending our best and brightest to Congress.

What we are witnessing is the birth of a new narrative after some 500 Ukraine narratives have already collapsed under the weight of their own contradictions. Remember the two years of “Russia is losing” narrative? Well just this week NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Christopher Cavoli, said in an interview with the German Spiegel magazine that Russia would emerge from this conflict actually STRONGER than when it entered!

But of course they are losing…

So what to do? Just as the Hollywood writers do once a sit-com has run too many seasons and is playing itself out, plot-wise, insert a new character. Insert a new twist, to bamboozle the viewers and give them a new reason to keep watching the program. It’s funny but not funny, because the future of the world hangs in the balance. Just like the film “Idiocracy” has become a documentary in our absurd times, so has “Wag the Dog.” The military industrial complex with its Hollywood-like allies producing endless narratives to keep the gravy train rolling…

P.S. if anyone believes this whole insane and hysterical anti-North Korea narrative is not political…well I have a bridge in Brazoria, TX, to sell you…

• This article was published at Ron Paul Institute

eurasiareview.com · October 27, 2024

12. Lousy Deterrence Options on the Korean Peninsula

Then again, deterrence on the Korean peninsula has been successful for seven decades. We have deterred a resumption of hostilities and we have deterred the use of nuclear weapons.  

But of course we have not deterred the development of nuclear weapons nor have we deterred north Korean provocations. I believe that anyone who thinks we can deter provocations does not understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime and in particular the regime's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies. And although most do not like to admit this, the regime has been effectively operating in the gray zone for seven decades - conducting operations against the South, the US, and the international community below the threshold of war.

But I do not think this is the way to manage the alliance.

Excerpts:

Managing the Alliance

Barring a major strategic shift, the next administration will also have to consider the degree to which it seeks to support South Korea’s conventional counterforce strategy. In essence, Washington has two broad options.

The first is for Washington to maintain the status quo. Given the inexorable development of North Korean nuclear weapon capabilities, this is likely to continue the current degree of policy inertia where South Korea is incrementally provided with or allowed to develop ever greater strategic capabilities. Such continued investments will do little to bolster deterrence stability on the peninsula.

The second option is to pay less attention to South Korean requests for greater capabilities while continuing to provide extended deterrence. Given Seoul’s reliance on the United States for multiple capabilities, this policy path may have benefits, such as dampening the arms race pressures on the peninsula. However, it also produces longer-term risks. If the United States is perceived as ignoring South Korea’s legitimate security concerns, it risks damaging a relationship that is crucial in the U.S. competition with China.

To be sure, the differences between these two options is one of degree. Most likely, the future U.S. administration will try to thread the needle and support some of South Korea’s capability acquisition, while holding back in other instances. However, U.S. policymakers should be aware that relentless South Korean pursuit of conventional counterforce has risks. A fruitless policy of capability one-upmanship with North Korea should be avoided. A nuclear North Korea cannot be wished away, and policymakers in both Washington and Seoul should prioritize maintaining strategic stability.

Lousy Deterrence Options on the Korean Peninsula - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Ian Bowers · October 28, 2024

In an elaborate ceremony in August this year, North Korea celebrated the delivery of 250 nuclear-capable missile launchers to frontline military units. To a crowd of spectators, leader Kim Jong Un declared that North Korea needs to bolster its nuclear deterrence capabilities and that the launchers were an “up-to-date tactical attack weapon” that he “personally designed.”

A month later, President Yoon Suk-yeol promised that South Korea’s conventional weapons, coupled with U.S. extended deterrence, would deter North Korea. South Korea has for almost a decade pursued a conventional counterforce strategy, where it seeks the capability to target North Korea’s nuclear weapons preemptively. In addition, it threatens North Korean leaders with massive punishment. However, despite introducing new weapons, such as the Hyunmoo-5 ballistic missile, South Korea’s deterrence strategy is in dire straits.

As North Korea’s deployment of the new missile launchers attests, South Korea has found itself in an asymmetric arms race that is impossible to win. No matter what conventional capability South Korea introduces, North Korean nuclear weapons will always have the upper hand. This fundamental asymmetry could severely impact crisis stability on the Korean Peninsula. This dynamic, and Pyongyang’s predictable reaction to Seoul’s strategy, provides a sobering lesson for other actors interested in conventional counterforce capabilities, such as Japan.

South Korea’s strategic options are all bad. While conventional counterforce is proving counterproductive, the pursuit of nuclear weapons is a path ridden with danger. Moreover, while South Korea may attempt to ease tensions with the North, working for disarmament is likely a fool’s errand. Extended deterrence is therefore the least bad alternative for South Korea. However, confidence in the alliance is eroding, and no matter who is elected in November, the United States will need to craft its alliance management policies carefully, reassuring South Korea while avoiding accelerating what is already a worsening arms dynamic.

Become a Member

Good Money After Bad?

The South Korean government continues to invest significant proportions of its defense budget in its counterforce and countervalue capabilities. When combined, these capabilities, also known as the three-axis system, include command and control systems, sensors, and weapons such as ballistic and cruise missiles that are aimed at nullifying North Korea’s nuclear capabilities while also punishing its leadership. There is also a missile defense component aimed at intercepting incoming North Korean missiles. All of these capabilities soon will be placed under the newly formed Strategic Command, which is charged with not only controlling a large number of systems across the services but also implementing greater integration of the South Korean conventional systems with U.S. nuclear capabilities.

The problems with this approach are numerous. First, conventional counterforce is extremely difficult to enact, even against a weak nuclear adversary. In the early stages of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, when it possessed a small number of liquid-fueled missiles that were slow to prepare for launch, South Korea may have had a chance at a degree of success in a counterforce strike. In recent years, however, North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities have improved dramatically, and its arsenal of particularly short-range missiles has expanded rapidly. As a result, conventional counterforce on the Korean Peninsula has become almost impossible to operationalize. To preempt a North Korean nuclear attack, South Korea would have to strike possibly hundreds, if not thousands, of targets within a severely constrained time frame. Arguably, North Korea only needs to have one nuclear warhead get through South Korea’s defenses for such an attack to succeed.

Further, there is evidence that the conventional deterrence strategy negatively affects strategic stability. The arms race pressures it creates are obvious and in evidence. Unfortunately for leaders in Seoul, it is much easier for North Korea to expand its nuclear weapons program than it is for South Korea to maintain conventional capabilities that can credibly counter it. In addition, in a crisis, North Korean leaders would potentially have incentives to use nuclear weapons early, facing a “use them or lose them” dilemma. The signals in its 2022 nuclear law that “a nuclear strike shall be launched automatically and immediately” if nuclear command and control “is placed in danger owing to an attack by hostile forces” are an entirely predictable response to South Korea’s threats against North Korean leaders.

To be sure, the three-axis system has given South Korea a conventional warfighting capability that virtually all modern militaries would covet. It now possesses substantial magazine depth and a range of weapons linked to advanced command and control systems that enable strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level strikes against North Korea. Hence, from a conventional perspective, what South Korea has built has significant deterrent potential.

Further, in any peninsular scenario involving the use of nuclear weapons, it is highly unlikely that conventional and nuclear use will be ring-fenced. South Korea’s strike and missile defense capabilities will play a substantial role in fighting North Korea. Hence, proponents of the strategy can also legitimately argue that it may both produce uncertainty among North Korean leaders and contribute to damage limitation, thereby changing the risk calculus in Pyongyang. The strategy does not, however, provide deterrence stability on the peninsula.

Other Bad Options: Nuclear Pursuit, or Hoping for Disarmament

The challenges facing the conventional counterforce strategy seem to be tacitly, if not openly, acknowledged in Seoul. Among the South Korean elite, many are now in favor of bolstering nuclear latency, or strengthening their country’s capability to acquire nuclear weapons rapidly but without building them. South Korea has an advanced nuclear industry and sophisticated delivery vehicles but lacks the enrichment and reprocessing capabilities necessary for producing fissile material for nuclear weapons. A challenge of this approach, as Lami Kim has recently highlighted, is that openly calling for stronger nuclear latency undermines the chances that Washington will approve it. Moreover, while useful as an insurance policy, hedging does not solve immediate deterrence challenges, as building nuclear weapons would take time, even if South Korea did possess enrichment and reprocessing technology.

Calls for a full breakout, and indigenously developing nuclear weapons, have also grown stronger. Among the public, support for nuclear armament has consistently averaged over 70 percent for years. However, nuclear breakout remains fraught with danger and is therefore an unattractive option, something that South Korean elites currently seem to acknowledge. South Korea would risk international opprobrium, sanctions from key trading partners (including the United States and China), and a breakdown in the alliance. Moreover, in the period between a breakout decision and acquisition, it would potentially be vulnerable to a preventive strike from North Korea.

Another approach would be the revival of diplomatic initiatives that were supported by the previous South Korean administration. To be sure, easing tension between the two Koreas could be worthwhile and may lessen the likelihood of armed conflict. However, North Korea’s stance has hardened significantly in recent years. In January 2024, Kim stated that the division between North and South Korea was permanent and that South Korea was the primary foe. Military agreements aimed at mitigating potential flashpoints have also been annulled. Over the short term, it is highly unlikely that North Korea will be receptive to diplomatic overtures emerging from South Korea or Washington. Even the Moon administration, which spoke much more softly regarding North Korea, still sought to carry a big stick, something that North Korea, of course, noticed.

Hopes for disarmament appear equally if not more unrealistic. North Korea has signaled clearly that it is a nuclear state. The longer South Korea, the United States, and the rest of the world formally refuse to accept this reality and insist on disarmament, gradual or otherwise, as a condition of improved relations, the longer this impasse will persist.

Back to Leaning on the United States

That South Korea is now seeking closer strategic integrations with the United States, including leaning on extended deterrence in political and signalling rhetoric, reflects the shortcomings of its other strategic options. In continuously designing around South Korean capabilities, North Korea has forced Seoul to reduce its emphasis on creating a counterforce capability that can function with reduced or no U.S. assistance.

The nuclear consultative group, announced in the Washington Declaration, provides a framework that includes planning, exercises, and consultations for what is now termed “conventional and nuclear integration” between the United States and South Korea. Of course, South Korea’s conventional counterforce capabilities can contribute to extended deterrence. However, it is unclear how this will change the deterrence calculus in Pyongyang. The new relatively new strategic concepts of conventional counterforce and conventional-nuclear integration will not mitigate the possibility of all actors being trapped in a deterrent loop. In essence, reassurance linked to the perceived need for “increased deterrence” through the provision or introduction of more capabilities risks continuously raising the strategic stakes on the peninsula.

The United States, massively superior to North Korea in terms of nuclear weapons, continues to avoid committing to the use of nuclear weapons in response to a North Korean nuclear attack. Fundamentally, therefore, with one exception, nothing has changed in terms of North Korean-U.S. nuclear relations. The one exception is North Korea’s capability to strike the U.S. homeland with a nuclear weapon.

The continued mixed messages from the Yoon administration regarding South Korea’s nuclear desires suggest that the Nuclear Consultative Group has not fully assuaged doubts in Seoul. Neither have high-profile military activities such as the visit of a U.S. nuclear ballistic missile submarine to Busan in July 2023. This leads to the possibility that with every North Korean advance in its missile and nuclear capabilities, the United States will be faced with increased calls for nuclear reassurance measures from South Korea. These measures could include permitting South Korea to build nuclear latency, committing to a nuclear response should North Korea use nuclear weapons, the deployment of strategic assets on the Korean Peninsula, or the stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons on South Korean soil.

Although the current U.S. administration has been reluctant to go down any of these paths, calls for policy shifts will likely only increase in the future. The next U.S. president will be confronted with the challenge of alliance management in the face of an intractable adversary.

Managing the Alliance

Barring a major strategic shift, the next administration will also have to consider the degree to which it seeks to support South Korea’s conventional counterforce strategy. In essence, Washington has two broad options.

The first is for Washington to maintain the status quo. Given the inexorable development of North Korean nuclear weapon capabilities, this is likely to continue the current degree of policy inertia where South Korea is incrementally provided with or allowed to develop ever greater strategic capabilities. Such continued investments will do little to bolster deterrence stability on the peninsula.

The second option is to pay less attention to South Korean requests for greater capabilities while continuing to provide extended deterrence. Given Seoul’s reliance on the United States for multiple capabilities, this policy path may have benefits, such as dampening the arms race pressures on the peninsula. However, it also produces longer-term risks. If the United States is perceived as ignoring South Korea’s legitimate security concerns, it risks damaging a relationship that is crucial in the U.S. competition with China.

To be sure, the differences between these two options is one of degree. Most likely, the future U.S. administration will try to thread the needle and support some of South Korea’s capability acquisition, while holding back in other instances. However, U.S. policymakers should be aware that relentless South Korean pursuit of conventional counterforce has risks. A fruitless policy of capability one-upmanship with North Korea should be avoided. A nuclear North Korea cannot be wished away, and policymakers in both Washington and Seoul should prioritize maintaining strategic stability.

Conventional Counterforce?

The challenges arising from South Korea’s conventional counterforce strategy provide lessons for other actors, including Japan. Although Japan’s pursuit of what it refers to as “counterstrike” capabilities is not yet as far advanced as South Korea’s, it is acquiring several new long-range strike options, including Tomahawks and a domestically produced cruise missile. Although the “counterstrike” capabilities are designated for standoff strikes against an enemy invading Japan or its territorial waters, several of the weapons Japan is acquiring can also be used preemptively for counterforce strikes against North Korea (or even parts of China). Analysts have called for South Korea and Japan to coordinate and in effect create a joint preemptive counterforce strategy.

Similar to the South Koren case, Japan’s acquisition of long-range strike capabilities makes eminent sense from a deterrence and warfighting perspective in a conventional context. It is understandable that Japan is abandoning its past restrictions on long-range strike options. However, regardless of Japanese intentions, its acquisition of long-range strike capabilities when linked to nuclear threats could create some of the same risks to strategic stability as those created by South Korea’s programs. It will impact the postures of Japan’s adversaries and may create new escalation risks. Indeed, Chinese strategists are also concerned about the conventional precision-strike capabilities of both the United States and its allies. Most importantly, in this context, Japanese possession of conventional precision-strike capabilities is unlikely to deter North Korea or China from using nuclear weapons if leaders in those states see no other option.

Unfortunately, the missile and nuclear buildups in Asia will be extremely difficult to stall. However, explicitly linking conventional precision capabilities to nuclear deterrence increasingly seems to be a losing proposition — and a recipe for worsening arms race pressures in the region.

Become a Member

Ian Bowers is a senior researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and an adjunct researcher for the Oslo Nuclear Project.

​Henrik Stålhane Hiim is an associate professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. He works on nuclear strategy, arms control, and security in East Asia.

Image: Baek, Jong-sik via Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Ian Bowers · October 28, 2024

13. NATO confirms N. Korea's troop deployment to Russia's Kursk region

(LEAD) NATO confirms N. Korea's troop deployment to Russia's Kursk region | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr

Kim Han-joo

Diplomacy 20:46 October 28, 2024

(ATTN: CHANGES headline, lead, dateline, photos; UPDATES with more info throughout)

SEOUL/BRUSSELS, Oct. 28 (Yonhap) -- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Mark Rutte confirmed Monday that North Korean troops have been deployed to Russia's Kursk region, a front-line area in its conflict with Ukraine.

"Today I can confirm that North Korean troops have been sent to Russia and that North Korean military units have been deployed to the Kursk region," Rutte told reporters following a briefing from a high-level South Korean delegation.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Mark Rutte speaks during a press briefing at the NATO headquarters in Brussels on Oct. 28, 2024. (Yonhap)

The South Korean delegation, comprised of intelligence and government officials, attended a North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, for the briefing that was joined by ambassadors from NATO's Indo-Pacific partners -- Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. The NAC is NATO's main decision-making body.

The briefing on the deepening military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow came amid reports that Russia is deploying North Korean troops to front-line positions in its prolonged war with Ukraine.

Rutte stated that the deployment marked "a significant escalation of the DPRK's ongoing involvement in Russia's illegal war," referring to North Korea by its official acronym, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"The deepening military cooperation between Russia and North Korea is a threat to both the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic security," Rutte said.

Ukraine earlier claimed that North Korean troops have started moving into the Kursk border region in western Russia, where Ukrainian forces launched an incursion in August.

"Today is for the intelligence briefing," First Deputy Director of the National Intelligence Service Hong Jang-won, who led the delegation, told reporters prior to attending the briefing.

Responding to a question from Yonhap News Agency about whether the NAC would consider sending a monitoring team, Hong stated that such decisions would not be made solely by the delegation.

The delegation's visit follows a request by Rutte for South Korea's briefing during a recent phone call with President Yoon Suk Yeol.

The delegation is also expected to hold talks with Rutte, and other senior NATO and European Union officials.

Discussions may cover support measures for Ukraine, potentially including the dispatch of South Korean intelligence personnel to Kyiv to monitor North Korean troop activity.

They may also touch on South Korea's options for aiding Ukraine, possibly reconsidering its policy on nonlethal aid in favor of providing military assistance.

A high-level South Korean delegation arrives at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization headquarters in Brussels on Oct. 28, 2024. (Yonhap)

elly@yna.co.kr

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr

14. Putin the Desperate: North Korea Is Going to War in Ukraine

Excerpts:

Almost three years in, this war still has surprises left. The impact of North Korea’s intervention is unpredictable. It’s not good for Ukraine, but it might not be of so much benefit to Russia and it could be catastrophic for the Kim Dynasty.

Worst of all, North Korean conscripts who have no reason whatsoever to fight Ukrainians are about to be thrown onto a battlefield distant from their homes and their families, with no real options and no evident way out.

Putin the Desperate: North Korea Is Going to War in Ukraine

nationalsecurityjournal.org · by ByRobert Farley · October 25, 2024

Ukraine War

By​ Robert Farley

North Korea Soldiers. Image Credit: KCNA/North Korean State Media.

The U.S. government and a wide range of media sources have confirmed what Ukraine declared a week ago; North Korean soldiers will become involved in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in substantial numbers. The Department of Defense has reported that up to 12,000 soldiers of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) have or will soon deploy to Russia to begin training in preparation for participation in the war against Ukraine. These troops will augment the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) support for Russia, which has already included munitions, equipment, and political influence. There is no doubt that this is bad news for Ukraine’s war effort, but it also holds significant dangers for both Russia and North Korea. The former now looks desperate to fill out its armies, while the latter is risking a level of international commitment it has largely avoided for almost seventy years.

North Korea Enters the Ukraine War: Implications

North Korea’s commitment to the Russian war effort probably eliminates any possibility that Russia will be forced to end the conflict because of manpower shortages.

Russia has already managed to achieve a substantial manpower advantage at the front, mainly because of mobilization problems in Ukraine. Recent heavy losses in the Donbas have brought Russia’s manpower resilience into question, but even if Moscow cannot rely on Pyongyang for an endless supply of soldiers, even this modest-sized deployment puts a severe dent in Western and Ukrainian hopes that Russia will simply run out of soldiers.

Unknowns

There remains much that we do not know. Will North Korean soldiers serve in combat roles, or primarily in support roles? Will they fight in their own formations, or will they be used as replacements in already-existing Russian units?

What kind of equipment will North Korean troops employ?

How effectively will soldiers of the KPA, a force that has seen little-to-no combat since the 1950s, fight? Can North Korean soldiers adapt to the high-tech reality of drone warfare on the Donbas front?

Will Russia respect the international boundary between Russia and Ukraine in its deployment of North Koreans? How will North Korea react when its soldiers are killed or captured in Russian service?

The overall impact of North Korea’s intervention will depend on how these questions get answered. Russia will benefit from the availability of warm bodies. Still, the degree of that benefit will vary considerably based on how the troops are used, how they perform in their assigned duties, and how much stomach North Korea has for combat losses.

Dangers for Russia

There are significant dangers for both parties in this arrangement. Russian officials cannot be unaware that their apparent need to depend on small, backward North Korea for men and munitions represents a humiliation on the world stage. It also ties Russian policy to the mercurial Kim regime, a fate that Russia and China have tried to avoid over the past two decades.

Moreover, the North Korean troops may be more trouble than they’re worth. There are many logistical problems associated with the integration of operations with an allied force, and neither Russia nor North Korea has any recent experience in resolving these problems. Russian and North Korean equipment should be broadly compatible (Russians originally designed most of the KPA’s equipment, and Russia has been using North Korean weapons during the war) but there will still be differences in maintenance procedures and priorities, as well as differences in combat doctrine. Food will present an underrated problem. The Russian palate is not the North Korean palate, and North Korean soldiers are unaccustomed to the Russian Army’s nutritional strategy. Although this could be a good thing (North Korean soldiers are malnourished in the same fashion as the North Korean citizenry) it could take time to adapt. It sounds absurdly trivial, but complaints about the nature and availability of food are among the most common causes of mutinies in the armed forces.

The KPA is, broadly speaking, a Soviet-style army with Soviet-style training and procedures. The Russian Army has Soviet roots but has also evolved away from this foundation over the past three decades, especially in the past three years. North Korean soldiers should be able to fight in Russian formations, and the Russians will likely figure out ways to use North Korean formations as they become available. However, the delegation of command to foreign officers is invariably fraught from both professional and diplomatic standpoints. North Korean soldiers have only a mercenary (they are reported to be paid $2000/month) interest in this war, and it is not at all difficult to envision conflicts between Russian and North Korean personnel.

North Korea Should Be Concerned

There are also perils for North Korea. The deployment of this force could also change the relationship between North Korea’s political leadership and the Korean People’s Army. Russia is an authoritarian state but not a totalitarian one; it does not maintain the controls on the flow of information that North Korea has long taken for granted. North Korea soldiers fighting in Russia and in Ukraine are likely to have much greater access to news and information about the world than they had in North Korea. KPA soldiers will bring this experience back to North Korea, with uncertain political effects.

The Hermit Kingdom earned its name through a sharp closing off of foreign influence; a substantial group of soldiers in a foreign war in a distant land could create a new class of soldiers interested in a different set of political arrangements for governing the DPRK. Moreover, North Korean mothers are no happier than any other mothers about the prospect of their sons dying for uncertain purposes on distant battlefields.

What Will South Korea Say?

There will also be international repercussions. Pyongyang’s decision to commit to the Russia-Ukraine War has damaged the already fraught relationship between North and South Korea, and may encourage Seoul to greater levels of assistance for Kyiv. The precedent for direct intervention in the conflict has now been broken, which could make it easier for countries like Poland or France to put troops on the ground in Ukraine.

The Ukraine War Goes Global

Almost three years in, this war still has surprises left. The impact of North Korea’s intervention is unpredictable. It’s not good for Ukraine, but it might not be of so much benefit to Russia and it could be catastrophic for the Kim Dynasty.

Worst of all, North Korean conscripts who have no reason whatsoever to fight Ukrainians are about to be thrown onto a battlefield distant from their homes and their families, with no real options and no evident way out.

About the Author: Dr. Robert Farley

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020), and most recently Waging War with Gold: National Security and the Finance Domain Across the Ages (Lynne Rienner, 2023). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.

15. North Korean Missiles Are Attacking Ukraine: What If One Hit a NATO Member?

A good question.

Excerpts:

But North Korea is far away from Europe, and there is no way NATO could strike militarily against Pyongyang. Kim and Putin know this and are likely laughing and figuratively giving high-fives to each other. There will be more strikes from North Korean missiles into Ukraine, and one could perhaps hit a NATO country, although it appears that these munitions are short-range for the time being.

But the North could supply larger missiles with longer ranges that could reach a NATO member. The alliance should come up with a contingency plan in the event this happens. The missile sharing between Russia and the DPRK shows that the war in Ukraine is taking on an international dimension as it enters its third year. This was not supposed to happen but here we are.

It’s time to face the facts that the new Axis of Evil is accurate and ready to fight instead of just insulting the West with idle talk.

North Korean Missiles Are Attacking Ukraine: What If One Hit a NATO Member?

nationalsecurityjournal.org · by Brent M. Eastwood · October 25, 2024

Military Hardware: Tanks, Bombers, Submarines and More

Published

HWASONG-18 ICBM North Korea. Image Credit: North Korean state media.

North Korea and Russia are part of the new Axis of Evil that aims to counter and even eclipse the Western world order led by the United States. Not only are the North Koreans sending troops to fight in Ukraine, but they have been supplying Russia with missiles to launch against Ukrainian cities and military targets in the Donbas region where most fighting is taking place.

U.S. Intelligence Claims North Korean Missiles Are Hitting Ukraine

In May, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) confirmed that Russia was using North Korean missiles in Ukraine. The DIA said debris from Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) missiles were found throughout the war-torn country.

The DIA claimed that “Through careful analysis of open-source imagery, DIA analysts confirms the debris found in Kharkiv on Jan. 2, 2024, is missile debris from a DPRK short-range missile. The report provides a comparative analysis of publicly available images of North Korean missile debris and known North Korean missiles. The report shows that the missile debris in Ukraine is almost certainly of a North Korean ballistic missile.”

Ukrainian Intelligence Has Determined the Same Thing

Ukrainian intelligence analysts have echoed these findings. After examining a missile that hit a structure in the city of Kharkiv earlier this year, a Ukrainian researcher carefully examined parts of the missile all the way down to the screws and parts of tiny computer chips. She found some wreckage that had a letter from the North Korean alphabet. She also discovered a number that was displayed on a panel. It was “112” which corresponds to the DPRK “Juche” calendar that signifies the year 2023.

The Ukrainians believe that Russia has fired dozens of DPRK missiles that have killed more than 24 people and injured at least 70 more.

British Think Tanks Are Tracking These DPRK Missiles Too

Joseph Byrne, a North Korea analyst at the international security think tank the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), couldn’t believe it.

“I never thought I would see North Korean ballistic missiles being used to kill people on European soil,” Byrne said. He and his team at RUSI have been tracking the shipment of North Korean weapons to Russia. This started before DPRK’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un forged a mutual defense pact with Vladimir Putin.

Russian Shipping Is Hauling North Korean Arms

Using satellite imagery, employees at RUSI have “been able to observe four Russian cargo ships shuttling back and forth between North Korea and a Russian military port, loaded with hundreds of containers at a time.”

DPRK Missiles Have Western Components

That’s not all. There has been another alarming discovery. The missiles from the DPRK used in Ukraine have components from the United States and other Western countries. The Kyiv-based Independent Anti-Corruption Commission found that “a number of Western components in a North Korean missile that was shot down in central Ukraine’s Poltava region during early September 2024. Inspection of the missile confirmed the presence of microelectronics manufactured in the US, the UK, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. It was particularly striking to note that many of these components had been produced as recently as 2022 or 2023.”

How Does the International Community Stop This?

What can Ukraine do about this? Not much it turns out.

The North Koreans have decided to play for keeps in the invaded country. They love the hard currency and the goodwill Kim Jong Un enjoys by playing nice with the Russians. This also gives the North Koreans combat experience with their missiles and soldiers. The United States knows it is happening but can only observe this unholy alliance between North Korean and Russia.

This raises the question of further escalation by North Korea in Ukraine. What if a DPRK projectile landed in a NATO country?

False Reports of Russian Missiles Hitting Poland

In November 2022, an Associated Press reporter named James LaPorta filed a story in which he claimed that a Russian missile had crossed into Poland and killed two civilians. I remember this report and I believed it since it came from the AP. Other outlets printed it as fact, too. I even tweeted that Poland could strike back. Many people did the same. It turns out the anonymously-sourced information was false, and the AP took it down, but it almost sparked a wider war.

Escalation of the War

A North Korean missile launch that landed in NATO territory would become a significant development and escalation in the war. It could be considered an accident if it happened, but it could spark some form of retaliation, especially if it landed in Poland or another hawkish country.

What Would NATO Do?

Sweden, a NATO member, would likely bring its diplomats home from North Korea in protest. The United States has no embassy in Pyongyang, but it could raise the alert level on the DMZ. NATO could call a special meeting to ponder what to do in return. The United States has 100,000 troops in Europe, and they would likely pay close attention to what NATO decided to do.

Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin – Unholy Partnership

But North Korea is far away from Europe, and there is no way NATO could strike militarily against Pyongyang. Kim and Putin know this and are likely laughing and figuratively giving high-fives to each other. There will be more strikes from North Korean missiles into Ukraine, and one could perhaps hit a NATO country, although it appears that these munitions are short-range for the time being.

But the North could supply larger missiles with longer ranges that could reach a NATO member. The alliance should come up with a contingency plan in the event this happens. The missile sharing between Russia and the DPRK shows that the war in Ukraine is taking on an international dimension as it enters its third year. This was not supposed to happen but here we are.

It’s time to face the facts that the new Axis of Evil is accurate and ready to fight instead of just insulting the West with idle talk.

About the Author: Dr. Brent M. Eastwood

Brent M. Eastwood, PhD is the author of Don’t Turn Your Back On the World: a Conservative Foreign Policy and Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare plus two other books. Brent was the founder and CEO of a tech firm that predicted world events using artificial intelligence. He served as a legislative fellow for U.S. Senator Tim Scott and advised the senator on defense and foreign policy issues. He has taught at American University, George Washington University, and George Mason University. Brent is a former U.S. Army Infantry officer. He can be followed on X @BMEastwood.

16. Yoon calls for thorough preparedness against geopolitical risks in Ukraine, Middle East

As a global pivotal state South Korea must do this.

Yoon calls for thorough preparedness against geopolitical risks in Ukraine, Middle East

en.yna.co.kr

Yoon calls for thorough preparedness against geopolitical risks in Ukraine, Middle East | Yonhap News Agency

Kim Eun-jung

Defense 15:35 October 28, 2024

SEOUL, Oct. 28 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol on Monday instructed his officials to be thoroughly prepared for risks and uncertainties over raging wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, his office said.

Yoon gave the instruction during a weekly meeting with Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, as North Korean troops were expected to be deployed with the Russian army to fight against Ukraine and as tensions have heightened in the Middle East following Israel's recent deadly air strikes on Iran.

Yoon ordered his aides to "make thorough efforts to manage rising geopolitical risks and external economic uncertainties in regions, including Ukraine and the Middle East," presidential spokesperson Jeong Hye-jeon said in a written briefing.

National Security Adviser Shin Won-sik, who recently returned from his trip to Washington, D.C., for a meeting with his U.S. and Japanese counterparts, also attended the meeting.

President Yoon Suk Yeol (R) meets cadets from the Korea Air Force Academy, who were on a field trip to the presidential office in Seoul, on Oct. 25, 2024, in this photo provided by Yoon's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

Keywords

#Yoon #geopolitical risks

en.yna.co.kr

17. N. Korea claims S. Korean drone took off from western border island in Oct. for incursion into Pyongyang

Two points:

The regime continues to create the narrative of the threat from the South to justify the suffering and sacrifice of the Korean people in the north as Kim seeks to protect himself from them and the outside world.

Second, this may be creating the narrative to justify tensions in the West Sea/NLL area and with the possibility of a kinetic provocation of some kind using the "excuse" of the South's alleged drone incursion.

(2nd LD) N. Korea claims S. Korean drone took off from western border island in Oct. for incursion into Pyongyang

en.yna.co.kr

(2nd LD) N. Korea claims S. Korean drone took off from western border island in Oct. for incursion into Pyongyang | Yonhap News Agency

Lee Minji

North Korea 11:53 October 28, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with details, minor edits throughout)

By Kim Soo-yeon and Lee Minji

SEOUL, Oct. 28 (Yonhap) -- North Korea said Monday that its analysis of the flight log of a drone that crashed in Pyongyang earlier this month showed it took off from a South Korean border island in the Yellow Sea, insisting that the South Korean military is behind what it claimed were South Korea's drone incursions.

South Korea's military called the North's latest claim "unilateral," saying it is "unworthy" of verifying or responding to.

North Korea earlier claimed that South Korean drones carrying anti-North Korea propaganda leaflets were detected in the night skies over Pyongyang three times this month and threatened to respond with force if such flights occur again.

Announcing the final results of its probe into the drone incursions, North Korea's defense ministry said it has analyzed the flight control program from the remains of a drone that crashed after intruding into the North on Oct. 8, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The North said the drone took off from South Korea's border island of Baengnyeong in the Yellow Sea at 11:25:30 p.m. on Oct. 8 and intruded into the territorial air of North Korea.

This image, which was carried by North Korea's state media on Oct. 28, 2024, and appears to have been created by the North, shows the flight path of a drone that Pyongyang claimed was sent by the South Korean military. North Korea said it has analyzed the flight control program of the drone that crashed after intruding into the sky of Pyongyang on Oct. 8, and the flight log showed the drone took off from South Korea's border island of Baengnyeong. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

The drone scattered "political motivational rubbish" in the sky over areas between the building of North Korea's foreign ministry and the Sungri metro station in Pyongyang at 1:32:08 a.m., as well as the building of the defense ministry at 1:35:11 a.m., on Oct. 9, the KCNA said.

North Korea published an illustration that shows what appears to be the flight route of the drone. The flight route, marked as a green line, goes north clockwise along the western coastline after starting from Baengnyeong Island, enters the sky of Pyongyang and goes back south on a similar path in a reverse direction to return to the island.

Among the 238 flight plans and logs of the drone, all flight data, except that on Oct. 8, showed that the drone flew in the South Korean territory, the KCNA said. North Korea also claimed the crashed drone had data of a plan and records to scatter propaganda leaflets over Pyongyang.

The results "clearly proved the most vulgar and shameless provocative nature of the ROK military gangsters who have persistently evaded the responsibility for the illegal intrusion by their drone into the sky above the capital city of the DPRK," a spokesperson at the North's defense ministry said.

ROK stands for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea, and DPRK is the acronym of North Korea's full name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

North Korea warned that "the source of all misfortunes and provocations will disappear forever by the merciless offensive" by the North if South Korea once again infringes upon its sovereignty.

South Korea's military has said it could not confirm whether the North's drone claims are true. In response to North Korea's military threat, Seoul's defense ministry has warned that the North will face "the end of its regime" if it causes any harm to South Korean people.

The South's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reiterated such a stance on Monday and called the North's behavior "shameless."

"North Korea has threatened our safety by infiltrating multiple drones into our airspace over 12 or more occasions in the past 10 years. Its unilateral claim, let alone showing regret over it, is shameless," JCS spokesperson Col. Lee Sung-jun told a regular press briefing.

Lee did not provide further details when asked about the possibility of civilian groups sending drones into North Korea.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Oct. 19, 2024, shows a damaged drone that Pyongyang claims was sent by the South Korean military. The drone is being described by Pyongyang as the same type that was publicly displayed on Armed Forces Day in Seoul earlier this month. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Meanwhile, Kim Yo-jong, the influential sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, issued a statement that apparently reflected her mockery and irritation over South Korea showing no response to Pyongyang's drone claims.

She suggested an "assumed" situation where an unidentified drone flew over the sky of Seoul and scattered leaflets critical of President Yoon Suk Yeol.

"The military, individual organization or any individual of the DPRK did not let fly a drone. We can not confirm it and it is worthless to give answer to it," Kim said.

"This is an assumed situation. Under such situation, I'd like to see once how the dirty curs in Seoul bark. The world may also be curious about it."

Yang Moo-jin, president of the University of North Korean Studies, raised the possibility of the North attempting to fly drones over the South's presidential office or the JCS.

"Kim Yo-jong's statement is seen as deriding the South's response to the Pyongyang drone incident and in a tit-for-tat response there is a possibility it may fly drones carrying propaganda leaflets or trash over the presidential office or the JCS," Yang said.

Last week, North Korean balloons carrying leaflets criticizing Yoon and first lady Kim Keon Hee landed in the presidential compound. It marked the first time the North sent leaflets that directly criticize the president and his wife.

The South's military vowed to take corresponding measures should North Korean drones enter the South's airspace.

"In the event of a drone infiltration, we will respond accordingly and take due measures to protect the safety and assets of our people," the JCS spokesperson said.

Lee, however, said there are no details to confirm at this stage whether the North's trash balloons call for a military response.

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

Keywords

#N Korea #drone incursions

HOME North Korea

en.yna.co.kr

18. Fatal affair exposes food-for-favors system in N. Korean military

Another indication of the potential for loss of coherency of the military.

An indicator of the breakdown of the chains of control (there are three).

We should recall how regime collapse may occur from two conditions. It is the loss of the ability of the party/regime to govern the entire northern territory from Pyongyang combined with the loss of military coherency and military support for the regime.

In short regime collapse will occur when there is a loss of central governing effectiveness combined with the loss of military coherency and support.

Fatal affair exposes food-for-favors system in N. Korean military - Daily NK English

The affair, which began with a commander seeking favors from a supply officer, ended with a ban on enlisted men visiting officers' homes

By Eun Seol - October 28, 2024

dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · October 28, 2024

(FILE PHOTO) Soldiers along the Sino-North Korea border in Namyang, North Hamgyong province.

A company commander of North Korea’s 27th Brigade border guard unit attacked his wife and a non-commissioned officer with a knife after discovering their affair in the early morning hours of Sept. 28.

The incident, which occurred in Kyongwon county, North Hamgyong province, has led to a ban on enlisted personnel visiting officers’ homes.

A source in North Hamgyong province told Daily NK that the non-commissioned officer barely escaped alive, but the wife of the company commander died on the spot.

The company commander had been away on business for several days and had just returned home when he saw his wife and the non-commissioned officer in a compromising position. Enraged, he lost control and attacked the couple.

Following the incident, the company commander was stripped of his rank and detained by the brigade’s security department. He is now awaiting punishment. The non-commissioned officer was dishonorably discharged.

The battalion’s political department ordered soldiers to keep their mouths shut to prevent rumors of the sordid incident from spreading. Word of the killing, however, quickly spread to civilians living in Kwongwon county.

Local residents blamed both the company commander, who had initially welcomed the non-commissioned officer into his home to obtain extra food rations, and expressed remorse over the wife’s death despite her actions.

The non-commissioned officer was in charge of the company’s food supply. He distributed food for the company’s enlisted men, officers, and their families from the battalion’s logistics section. Because he also managed daily necessities such as uniforms and soap, even officers tried to get along with him to get more supplies.

“Officers and their families tried to maintain a close relationship with the non-commissioned officer because he could fiddle with the books to give them an extra gram of rice,” the source said. “The latest incident seems to have occurred after the company commander invited the non-commissioned officer to his home to befriend him, which led to a problem.”

After the incident, the 27th Brigade issued an order banning enlisted men from visiting officers’ homes and warned that it would strictly crack down on such behavior.

North Korean officers often force enlisted men to do chores every holiday, including tending their small fields and fixing their chimneys. So the soldiers welcome the brigade’s order.

“The officers and their families treat the enlisted men like farmhands,” the source said. “The non-commissioned officer visited the company commander’s house for another reason, but the ordinary enlisted men think it’s good that they can no longer do chores at the officers’ houses thanks to the incident.”

The Daily NK works with a network of sources in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. For security reasons, their identities remain anonymous.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · October 28, 2024

19. Sariwon holds constitutional lectures defining South Korea as "hostile state"

​No matter how hard the times are in the north for the people, ideological indoctrination remains paramount.

Sariwon holds constitutional lectures defining South Korea as "hostile state" - Daily NK English

After the lecture, Sariwon officials discussed practical ways to conduct class-consciousness education programs for citizens

By Jeong Seo-yeong - October 28, 2024

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · October 28, 2024

The Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported on Oct. 17 that roads and railroads on the Seoul-Uiju and East Coast corridors had been completely sealed. “This is an inevitable and legitimate measure taken in keeping with the requirement of the DPRK Constitution which clearly defines the ROK as a hostile state, and due to the serious security circumstances running to the unpredictable brink of war owing to the grave political and military provocations of the hostile forces,” the newspaper reported. (Rodong Sinmun, News 1)

North Korean officials in Sariwon attended a lecture on a constitutional amendment officially designating South Korea as a hostile state.

According to a source in North Hwanghae province recently, the Sariwon Legal Department organized the session for managers and officials of the rank of section chief and above on Oct. 18.

The lecture was held in a solemn atmosphere because of the seriousness of the issues discussed. The constitutional amendment is a significant escalation of North Korea’s already hostile attitude toward South Korea.

The lecture focused on how the constitutional amendment explicitly defines South Korea as an enemy state and definitively addresses the territorial issue by drawing a physically barricaded border, just like North Korea’s borders with China and Russia.

The lecture emphasized the importance and significance of considering all borders with South Korea as part of the “southern border” and stressed the need for all officials to have a clear understanding of the southern border.

The lecture instructed officials to cultivate a deep understanding of the meaning of the constitutional amendment and properly educate party members and workers in each organization about the spirit of the constitution. The lecture also reportedly provided concrete guidance on education methods.

“The people who attended the lecture were all officials who are fully prepared and equipped on the political and ideological level, but they seemed to be quite perplexed by the subject of the lecture. At other lectures, members would discuss the issues raised and eagerly express their opinions. But no one spoke up during this lecture, and a gloomy mood prevailed throughout,” the source said.

“Some of the material from this lecture will be used for class-consciousness education in schools and for the general public. The main aim of the education is to spread awareness about the new constitutional amendment defining South Korea as an enemy state and the southern border.”

After the lecture, Sariwon officials discussed practical ways to conduct class-consciousness education programs for citizens, the source said.

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on Oct. 17 that two days earlier, on Oct. 15, workers blew up inter-Korean road and rail links on the Seoul-Uiju and east coast corridors. “This is an inevitable and legitimate measure taken in accordance with the requirement of the Constitution of the DPRK, which clearly defines the ROK as an enemy state, and due to the grave security situation that has reached the unpredictable brink of war as a result of the grave political and military provocations of the hostile forces,” the KCNA said.

In its 11th session on Oct. 7-8, North Korea’s 14th Supreme People’s Assembly amended parts of the constitution. But North Korean reports of the meeting did not specify which parts were changed or how they were changed.

North Korea’s recent moves to sever inter-Korean relations and related news reports suggest that the North’s revised constitution now defines South Korea as an enemy state. This leads some to conclude that Kim Jong Un’s statements that the two countries are in a hostile relationship have now been codified into law.

The Daily NK works with a network of sources in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. For security reasons, their identities remain anonymous.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · October 28, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com