|
Quotes of the Day:
"Patience is also a form of action."
– Auguste Rodin
"Am I not destroying my enemies when I make friends of them?"
– Abraham Lincoln
"There is no revenge so complete as forgiveness."
– Josh Billings
1. It’s time to form a Japan-South Korea military alliance
2. Will Trump Meet Kim Jong-un Again? He’s Very Open to the Idea.
3. A Donald Trump-Kim Jong-un Meeting Might Be a 'Meaningless' Summit
4. As Trump seeks another meeting with Kim Jong Un, it’s not 2019 anymore
5. ‘Make American Shipbuilding Great Again’: Korea leans into shipbuilding as it woos Trump
6. Trump greeted with hypersonic missile threat at Seoul APEC
7. North Korea and Russia blame ‘aggressive’ US-ROK alliance for tensions: Lavrov
8. Trump, Takaichi reaffirm US-Japan defense ties aboard American aircraft carrier
9. Trump tells families of Japanese abducted by North Korea that US is ‘with them’
10. What the world lost when North Korea’s doors swung closed
11. Presidential Office Prepares Gyeongju Golden Crown for Trump
12. President Lee Names Lee Hae-chan as PUAC Senior Vice Chair
13. Trump's Trip to Pyongyang?
14. Trump renews call for Kim meeting, but North Korea remains silent
15. News of North Korean soldier’s defection spreads quietly along China border
16. S. Korea, U.S. not discuss agenda related to possible Kim-Trump meeting: official
17. S. Korea, U.S., Japan arranging trilateral talks among top diplomats during APEC: sources
18. Industry minister holds 2 rounds of virtual talks with U.S. counterpart on $350 bln investment deal: sources
19. Why Committee for Human Rights in North Korea must be funded -- now more than ever
1. It’s time to form a Japan-South Korea military alliance
Both the President and Prime Minister would have to be willing to place national security and national prosperity above historical issues and expend necessary political capital to make this happen.
But I think it is a long shot.
It’s time to form a Japan-South Korea military alliance - Asia Times
With China’s assertiveness and America’s uncertainty both rising, Seoul and Tokyo must move beyond historical grievances
asiatimes.com · Hanjin Lew · October 25, 2025
Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, warned in her first policy address that “the military movements of China, North Korea, and Russia are becoming a serious threat,” and vowed to “strengthen cooperation with countries that share fundamental values.”
She also pledged to improve relations with Seoul, saying, “With South Korea, an important neighbor, I will work to strengthen ties through direct dialogue between the two nations’ leaders.”
She further described South Korea as “an important partner that must move forward together with allied nations,” signaling her intention to reinforce the framework of US–Japan–South Korea security cooperation.
For a politician who once suggested that, when Japan acts “half-heartedly” over Yasukuni Shrine visits, it “makes the other side forget its place,” a remark widely viewed as condescending toward South Korea, her current emphasis on dialogue with Seoul was striking.
It also underscored the gravity of the geopolitical moment confronting both nations.
A shifting balance in the Indo-pacific
This moment matters. For decades, both South Korea and Japan relied on the United States as the cornerstone of their security.
The “hub-and-spokes” system built after World War II created bilateral, not multilateral, ties – Washington at the hub, allies at the spokes.
That model worked under unchallenged American primacy. It no longer does.
China’s power keeps expanding. North Korea’s nuclear arsenal grows. Russia and China now conduct joint bomber patrols near Korean and Japanese airspace.
In this environment, a structure that prevents the two most capable Asian democracies from defending each other is strategically obsolete.
Complementing the US alliance
Washington has long pressed for deeper trilateral coordination because interoperability strengthens deterrence.
A recent CSIS assessment notes “new horizons” in Korea–US–Japan cooperation, building habits of combined operations, intelligence sharing, and crisis coordination.
A formal Korea–Japan military alliance would institutionalize joint early-warning systems, shared command protocols, and mutual support even if American forces are stretched thin.
Shared threat, shared responsibility
Neither country can manage the region’s threats alone.
Both countries face existential nuclear danger from North Korea and increasingly frequent air incursions by China and Russia. They also rely on vulnerable sea-lanes for energy supply, leaving their economies exposed to any regional conflict.
A bilateral military alliance would allow both nations to respond to these shared vulnerabilities through integrated missile defense, joint naval patrols, and cyber-defense cooperation.
Japan’s Aegis and blue-water capabilities complement South Korea’s growing strength in missiles, drones, and cyberwarfare.
The National Bureau of Asian Research notes that “the key factor in making ROK-US-Japan cooperation sustainable is the shared threat perception toward North Korea and China.”
Work is already under way. A Sejong Institute report calls the 2023 Camp David summit “a practical starting point toward the institutionalization of cooperation” among the United States, South Korea, and Japan.
Overcoming history for survival
History remains the greatest emotional barrier. Yet nations do not survive by clinging to the past; they endure by adapting to the future.
There are precedents. The Korea–Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) proved that mutual security interests can override political turbulence when necessary.
Tokyo’s Defense of Japan 2025 white paper states that, in responding to China, “Japan should act in cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries, and others.”The same report describes South Korea as “an important neighboring country and a partner with which Japan must cooperate to address various challenges facing the international community” – the second consecutive year Seoul has been called an “important partner.”
It highlights closer military coordination between the two countries, noting that after the 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue, both sides agreed such cooperation benefits both nations, strengthens US–ROK–Japan security ties, and is indispensable for a free and open Indo-Pacific.
The paper also warns that as threats such as North Korea’s nuclear program, terrorism, natural disasters, piracy, and maritime insecurity grow more complex, Korea–Japan cooperation has become increasingly vital.
It calls China “the greatest strategic challenge,” requiring continued coordination with allies and friendly nations.
The realist imperative
John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism predicts that great powers seek regional hegemony and smaller states balance against them.
In East Asia, China’s ambitions fit that pattern. The rational response is alliance formation.
If Seoul and Tokyo remain divided, they invite coercion; if they unite, they restore balance.
Security before sentiment
The logic is clear. China’s rise, Russia’s assertiveness, and America’s fatigue have left East Asia exposed.
South Korea and Japan share the most convergent interests in the region. A military alliance would not erase history but secure their future – creating a shield that preserves autonomy, stability, and deterrence.
Strategic realism is not sentimentality – it is survival. A Korea–Japan alliance would turn two vulnerable allies into a self-reliant pillar of regional order, keeping the Indo-Pacific free even as American influence fades.
Hanjin Lew is a South Korean political commentator specializing in alliance politics and East Asian security affairs.
asiatimes.com · Hanjin Lew · October 25, 2025
2. Will Trump Meet Kim Jong-un Again? He’s Very Open to the Idea.
So much speculation. Perhaps too much. What will KJU do? Will he leave POTUS standing at the MDL in JSA?
Will Trump Meet Kim Jong-un Again? He’s Very Open to the Idea.
By Erica L. Green and Katie Rogers
Oct. 28, 2025,
5:21 a.m. ET
NY Times · Katie Rogers · October 28, 2025
LIVE See more updates from this story
Oct. 28, 2025, 6:02 a.m. ET19m ago
President Trump has said he hopes the North Korean leader will reach out so they can meet again. But there has been no public response from Mr. Kim.
Listen to this article · 3:39 min Learn more
President Trump indicated that he’d like the meeting to materialize in the same way it did when the two leaders last met in 2019 on the border between North and South Korea.Credit...Erin Schaff/The New York Times
By Erica L. Green and
Oct. 28, 2025, 5:21 a.m. ET
As President Trump embarked on a diplomatic blitz of ceremonial signings and high-stakes meetings in Asia this week, there was one thing he seemed eager to add to his schedule: a face-to-face meeting with the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un.
In not-so-subtle overtures, Mr. Trump indicated that he hoped Mr. Kim would reach out so they could have their first meeting of his second term. His fawning tone was striking even for a president who prides himself on personal diplomacy, particularly with authoritarian leaders.
As Mr. Trump traveled from Washington to Malaysia, the first stop on his six-day Asia tour, he suggested that he wanted the meeting to materialize in the same way as his hastily organized 2019 meeting with Mr. Kim on the border between North and South Korea did: through a social media post.
But this time — despite much speculation — there has been no public indication that a meeting will take place when Mr. Trump travels to South Korea later in the week.
“Well, I would if he would contact,” Mr. Trump told reporters on Air Force One on Friday, when asked if he would meet Mr. Kim. “The last time I met him, I put it out over the internet that I’m coming to South Korea and if he’d like to meet I’m open to it.”
Mr. Trump suggested that his invite might not reach Mr. Kim, saying that North Korea had “a lot of nuclear weapons but not a lot of telephone service."
“He probably knows I’m coming, right?” he added. “If you want to put out the word, I’m open to it.”
On Monday, as Mr. Trump flew to Japan — where he met with family members of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea— Mr. Trump was asked if would extend his trip in order to accommodate a hypothetical meeting with Mr. Kim. (The president is due back at the White House on Thursday night to participate in Halloween trick-or-treating for law enforcement, military and foster families).
Mr. Trump said it would make sense to meet Mr. Kim on the last leg of his trip, in South Korea, where he is scheduled to meet China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, on Thursday. Mr. Trump said he and Mr. Kim could discuss sanctions on the North, among other topics.
“If he’d like to meet, I’m around,” he said. I’ll be in South Korea, so I can be right over there.”
“I would love to see him if he wants to, if he even gets this message,” he added.
Mr. Trump and the North Korean leader have had a roller coaster of a relationship that dates back to the president’s first term.
They went from publicly comparing the size of their nuclear arsenals — the U.S. “nuclear button” is “much bigger & more powerful,” Mr. Trump wrote on social media in 2018 — to holding warm summits and exchanging letters. Mr. Trump delighted in the correspondence, showing the letters to journalists even though they were classified material. Mr. Trump’s overtures ultimately did little to contain the North’s nuclear program, or to lessen its close ties with Russia.
In fact, North Korea has deepened ties with Russia and China since Mr. Trumps first term. Mr. Trump lashed out at the leaders of all three countries last month when they attended a military parade in Beijing, accusing them in a social media post of uniting to “conspire” against the United States.
Mr. Kim told the North Korean Parliament last month that he had “a good memory” of Mr. Trump from his first term, the country’s state-run news media reported. But he said the North would re-enter negotiations with Washington only if it stopped insisting that it denuclearize.
Choe Sang-Hun contributed reporting.
Erica L. Green is a White House correspondent for The Times, covering President Trump and his administration.
Katie Rogers is a White House correspondent for The Times, reporting on President Trump.
NY Times · Katie Rogers · October 28, 2025
3. A Donald Trump-Kim Jong-un Meeting Might Be a 'Meaningless' Summit
Excerpts:
Experts debate the efficacy of Trump’s first-term “top-down” approach with Kim Jong-un, rather than traditional diplomatic efforts to craft agreements that are elevated to senior leadership for breaking impasses or securing final signature. Despite Trump’s 2018 post-Singapore summit claims that “there is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea” and Kim had already started “de-nuking the whole place,” his unconventional strategy was no more successful than those of his predecessors.
Instead, North Korea continued to develop and deploy new nuclear weapons and missiles, including solid-fueled ICBMs with multiple warheads, hypersonic missiles with maneuverable warheads, tactical nuclear warheads, submarine-launched missiles, and underwater attack systems.
While Trump might revel in another photo-op meeting with Kim, any subsequent negotiations should curtail the North Korean military threat by developing a comprehensive roadmap to denuclearization, including sufficient verification measures to ensure compliance. Washington could first recommend discussions on confidence-building measures to reduce tensions and the potential for miscalculation and conflict by enhancing transparency and notification procedures for military exercises and deployments.
President Trump should not reduce bilateral military exercises with South Korea nor cut U.S. military forces in northeast Asia before a substantial decrease in the North Korean nuclear and conventional forces threat. One does not lower the shield before reducing the threat.
A Donald Trump-Kim Jong-un Meeting Might Be a 'Meaningless' Summit
nationalsecurityjournal.org · Bruce Klingner · October 27, 2025
Published
5 hours ago
North Korea and Donald Trump DMZ back in 2019. Image Credit: White House.
Why A Trump-North Korea Summit Might Not Happen
Despite intense speculation, a meeting between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is highly improbable for the foreseeable future. While some preliminary US preparations were discussed, they were in anticipation of Trump’s unpredictable diplomatic whims rather than any tangible signal of impending engagement with North Korea.
Pyongyang is in a far stronger strategic position than during the first Trump term, negating its need for diplomatic, security, or economic benefits from Washington. The final decision for a meeting is in Kim’s hands, not Trump’s.
Trump’s Dictator Idolatry
Trump repeatedly extols having a strong relationship with Kim, reiterating this week that he would “love to meet” the North Korean leader and could extend his Asia trip to do so. Such a meeting would be a repeat of Trump’s unplanned June 2019 meeting at the inter-Korean demilitarized zone, which took place within a day of his Twitter request.
The United Nations Command’s cancellation of tours to the joint security area in the DMZ this week, and North Korea’s recent sprucing up of its side of the border, are cited as indications of a forthcoming meeting.
However, US and South Korean officials emphasize that no meeting plans have been made, nor has any contact been made with North Korean counterparts. Two senior US officials traveling with Trump to Asia commented that the administration hadn’t sent Kim an invitation.
For the past six years, North Korea has rejected all diplomatic entreaties from the United States, including a personal letter from President Trump. There are no indications of a recent thawing in Pyongyang’s intransigence. Kim Jong-un declared this month that, while he is willing to meet with Trump, the US must abandon its “delusional obsession” with denuclearizing North Korea.
Closed for Discussion
Kim Jong-un sees little need to engage with Washington, since he receives far greater benefits from Russia with fewer conditions than he gets from the United States. Russia’s largesse in return for North Korea providing massive amounts of military equipment, ammunition, and troops enables Pyongyang to mitigate the impact of international sanctions, as does Kim’s lucrative cybercurrency crimes and resurgent trade with China.
Moscow and Beijing are now even more obstructionist in the UN Security Council, preventing any punitive action against North Korea after its repeated violations of UN resolutions. Recent trilateral meetings in Beijing and Pyongyang underscore the strength of their relationships and ability to defy US pressure.
Conditions of the Supreme Leader
Kim Jong-un could, however, potentially see an upside to reaching out to Trump.
The regime has declared it is unwilling to meet until the US reduces its ‘hostile policy’ by canceling allied military exercises and US rotational deployments of strategic assets. Trump unilaterally canceled both of those in 2018 while gaining nothing in return from Pyongyang.
Kim could propose to Trump that they sign a bilateral peace declaration to “end” the Korean War, achieving what no US president had done in seven decades. Pyongyang could suggest that such an accomplishment would merit the Nobel Peace Prize, which has eluded Trump.
However, a simplistic peace declaration with North Korea would be a historic but meaningless feel-good gesture that would not improve the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. It would not reduce the North Korean military threat to the American homeland or US allies. Instead, it could create societal and legislative momentum in both South Korea and the US for premature reduction or removal of US forces and degrading US deterrence capabilities.
Drawing down US forces before reducing the North Korean nuclear, missile, and conventional threats would be a sign of weakness. It would risk destabilizing the region and emboldening Pyongyang to take more provocative actions. It would also play into Beijing’s desire to reduce US influence in the region.
Experts debate the efficacy of Trump’s first-term “top-down” approach with Kim Jong-un, rather than traditional diplomatic efforts to craft agreements that are elevated to senior leadership for breaking impasses or securing final signature. Despite Trump’s 2018 post-Singapore summit claims that “there is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea” and Kim had already started “de-nuking the whole place,” his unconventional strategy was no more successful than those of his predecessors.
Instead, North Korea continued to develop and deploy new nuclear weapons and missiles, including solid-fueled ICBMs with multiple warheads, hypersonic missiles with maneuverable warheads, tactical nuclear warheads, submarine-launched missiles, and underwater attack systems.
While Trump might revel in another photo-op meeting with Kim, any subsequent negotiations should curtail the North Korean military threat by developing a comprehensive roadmap to denuclearization, including sufficient verification measures to ensure compliance. Washington could first recommend discussions on confidence-building measures to reduce tensions and the potential for miscalculation and conflict by enhancing transparency and notification procedures for military exercises and deployments.
President Trump should not reduce bilateral military exercises with South Korea nor cut U.S. military forces in northeast Asia before a substantial decrease in the North Korean nuclear and conventional forces threat. One does not lower the shield before reducing the threat.
About the Author: Bruce Klingner
Bruce Klingner is a senior fellow at the Mansfield Foundation. He previously served 20 years with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, including as CIA’s Deputy Division Chief for Korea. You can follow him on X: @bruceklingner.
In this article:
Written By Bruce Klingner
Bruce Klingner specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center. Klingner’s analysis and writing about North Korea, South Korea and Japan, as well as related issues, are informed by his 20 years of service at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Klingner, who joined Heritage in 2007, has testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He is a frequent commentator in U.S. and foreign media. His articles and commentary have appeared in major American and foreign publications and he is a regular guest on broadcast and cable news outlets. He is a regular contributor to the international and security sections of The Daily Signal. From 1996 to 2001, Klingner was CIA’s Deputy Division Chief for Korea, responsible for the analysis of political, military, economic and leadership issues for the president of the United States and other senior U.S. policymakers. In 1993-1994, he was the chief of CIA’s Korea branch, which analyzed military developments during a nuclear crisis with North Korea.
nationalsecurityjournal.org · Bruce Klingner · October 27, 2025
4. As Trump seeks another meeting with Kim Jong Un, it’s not 2019 anymore
There can be no peaceful coexistence with the Kim family regime. We must understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the regime.
Excerpts:
This is not the same North Korea that Trump encountered in his first term. The country’s arsenal of nuclear warheads has expanded to about 50, according to the Arms Control Association, and Pyongyang has enough fissile material to produce several more nukes each year. Also, North Korea now has several intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, capable of reaching anywhere on the U.S. mainland.
Kim wants North Korea to be recognized as a nuclear nation. While expressing openness to a meeting, Kim said it can happen only if the U.S. drops “its hollow obsession with denuclearization” and instead pursues “peaceful coexistence.” Trump might be tempted to resume his “great relationship” with Kim. “When you say they have to be recognized as a nuclear power, well, they’ve got a lot of nuclear weapons, I’ll say that,” Trump said Friday.
As Trump seeks another meeting with Kim Jong Un, it’s not 2019 anymore
A more emboldened and dangerous North Korea, closer to Russia and China, makes unacceptable demands.
October 27, 2025 at 1:34 p.m. EDTYesterday at 1:34 p.m. EDT
Washington Post · Editorial Board
President Donald Trump’s unorthodox method of foreign policy — centered on personal relationships and eschewing the exacting preparation that historically goes into high-stakes summitry — has produced surprising diplomatic breakthroughs. His repeatedly expressed desire to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un this week during his ongoing swing through Asia would be a major test of Trump’s improvisational style.
The president said on Monday that he could delay his planned return to Washington if Kim is agreeable. If a meeting happens, it would be the fourth face-to-face gathering between Trump and Kim. When they last saw each other, in 2019, it came together in 36 hours, during a similar Asian trip, after Trump posted on Twitter: “I would meet him at the Border/DMZ just to shake his hand and say Hello(?)!” They met the next day at Panmunjom, in the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea.
Engagement might help lower tensions in the region, where North Korea and China are the greatest threats to stability in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, Trump’s three summits with Kim in his first term led to nothing of substance. Their first visit, in Singapore, did not produce a joint declaration. Their second, in Hanoi, ended with Trump walking away when no deal could be reached on curbing Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. The third was quickly followed by more hostility after Trump wisely refused to cancel a long-planned joint military exercise with South Korea.
This is not the same North Korea that Trump encountered in his first term. The country’s arsenal of nuclear warheads has expanded to about 50, according to the Arms Control Association, and Pyongyang has enough fissile material to produce several more nukes each year. Also, North Korea now has several intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, capable of reaching anywhere on the U.S. mainland.
Kim wants North Korea to be recognized as a nuclear nation. While expressing openness to a meeting, Kim said it can happen only if the U.S. drops “its hollow obsession with denuclearization” and instead pursues “peaceful coexistence.” Trump might be tempted to resume his “great relationship” with Kim. “When you say they have to be recognized as a nuclear power, well, they’ve got a lot of nuclear weapons, I’ll say that,” Trump said Friday.
That sounded ominously like a hint that he might be willing to concede North Korea has permanently joined the nuclear club. Such a major concession would be a mistake. Dropping the long-standing goal of denuclearization would fuel talk in Japan and South Korea that maybe they, too, need to acquire nuclear weapons. Both allies already fear the U.S. is no longer a reliable security partner.
Meanwhile, Kim has strengthened his ties with Russia and China. North Korea has sent soldiers to fight, and die, in Russia’s war against Ukraine. And Kim was an honored guest in Beijing, along with Russian President Vladimir Putin, for the 80th anniversary of China’s defeat of Japan in World War II.
Trump’s unusual style of diplomacy produced a ceasefire in Gaza and got the 20 living Israeli hostages released. He was also able to prompt America’s NATO allies to spend more on their defense. Talks with Kim require goals and redlines: persuade Kim to relinquish his nuclear ambitions, keep America’s allies on the same page and remain willing to walk away from a bad deal.
Washington Post · Editorial Board
5. ‘Make American Shipbuilding Great Again’: Korea leans into shipbuilding as it woos Trump
Will POTROK present POTUS with MASGA hat?
‘Make American Shipbuilding Great Again’: Korea leans into shipbuilding as it woos Trump
A South Korean shipbuilding conglomerate is emerging as a key player in President Donald Trump’s plan to revive America’s fleet and in delicate trade talks that could define the U.S.–Korea alliance.
https://www.politico.com/news/2025/10/27/make-american-shipbuilding-great-again-korea-leans-into-shipbuilding-as-it-woos-trump-00623908?utm
Politico
“Everybody knows that U.S. shipbuilding has diminished significantly over the last couple of decades,” said a senior administration official granted anonymity to discuss the administration’s thinking. “We welcome their know-how, their capital and the general collaboration.”
Trump, during a speech to celebrate the Navy’s 250th birthday in Norfolk, Virginia, touted the new investments from overseas, saying America will “soon revitalize our once great shipyards with hundreds of billions of dollars in new investments and people coming from all around the world, and they’re gonna build ships in America.”
Trump arrives in South Korea this week, his third stop on a weeklong Asia trip, where he is expected to meet newly elected President Lee Jae Myung, deliver a speech to business leaders and attend a dinner with other heads of state. The visit comes amid broader tensions between South Korea and the United States over a $350 billion investment that Seoul has pledged, which included $150 billion for shipbuilding cooperation.
The Trump administration wants that money to be a direct investment from the Korean government, while South Korea wants it to come from private companies — like Hanwha. South Korea’s annual gross domestic product is only $1.7 trillion, and some officials worry a direct investment would cause a financial crisis.
But that investment could further anger China, which currently controls roughly 71 percent of global ocean-going shipmaking. Tensions remain high after China sanctioned five of Hanwha’s U.S. subsidiaries earlier this month.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on Monday said an agreement with South Korea is unlikely to be finalized ahead of Trump’s arrival, as the two governments continue to iron out details of the initial agreement on tariff rates they reached in July.
While the exact mix of public, private and sovereign investment remains under negotiation, Hanwha has announced roughly $5 billion in initial funds.
Shipbuilding offers the South Koreans a way to curry favor with Trump and show they are spending serious sums to boost American commercial might and revitalize once-thriving industries. They’ve dubbed their campaign “Make American Shipbuilding Great Again” and arrived at the White House this summer with MAGA-style red caps.
“There needs to be a recognition of all that South Korea is already doing, including in the shipbuilding sector,” said a person familiar with U.S.-South Korean investment talks granted anonymity due to the sensitivity of those discussions.
And partnering in this way with the United States could in turn help buoy South Korean shipbuilding interests, which are second in the world behind China and gaining.
Representatives from Hanwha along with other major South Korean businesses were at Mar-a-Lago this month to speak with Trump about their planned investments in America as trade negotiations, which could ultimately determine tariff rates, come to a head between the two countries.
“The goal is knowledge and technology transfer,” Hanwha Chief Strategy Officer Alex Wong, who until the summer served as Trump’s deputy national security adviser, told POLITICO. “That’s how you catch up on decades of lost expertise.”
Trump appears on board with the idea, telling reporters Monday aboard Air Force One that his administration is crafting “a whole new” visa plan to accommodate South Korean and other foreign manufacturing experts.
Trump observed that some factories make “very complex, very highly sophisticated equipment” that Americans will need to be trained to use. “They’ve gotta bring people in with them for a period of time, and they’ll teach our people how to do it. But even for a fairly long period of time, they’re gonna need expertise to be successful,” Trump said.
In August, Hanwha executives and Lee toured the Philly Shipyard and announced orders for 12 new ships. The South Korean president said at the ceremony that shipbuilding would represent “growth, opportunity, dreams and hope” for young Americans.
Beyond drastically expanding U.S. shipbuilding capacity — from the current two ships per year to as many as 20, including liquefied natural gas carriers — Hanwha aims to train American workers in advanced Korean shipbuilding technologies like automated welding, artificial intelligence-driven inventory systems and digitalized assembly.
“Our ally South Korea is the No. 2 shipbuilder, and with investments like Hanwha is making to grow its shipyard and modernize it with bigger workforce, you’ll start to see the return on that investment as more orders are put in for American sourced ships,” Heritage Foundation senior research fellow Brent Sadler said.
Beijing’s mammoth Jiangnan Shipyard produces more vessels annually than all U.S. shipyards combined. The administration is counting on the investment to help revitalize a U.S. industry that has fallen far below world standards, which puts the United States at disadvantage relative to a chief economic and military rival.
Sadler said recent events such as “the Suez Canal blockage that shut down global supply chains for about a week; the invasion of Ukraine and the shutdown of grain shipment; Beijing’s Covid zero policies and the world’s largest container port shuts down for a day … have made a very compelling case that shipping is a national security item, and we don’t have it.”
That industrial dominance translates into military leverage. In a crisis, whether a conflict over Taiwan or a blockade through chokepoints like the Malacca Strait or Bab el-Mandeb, the United States could find itself struggling to transport goods or project naval power.
“We’ve lost the commercial foundation that underpins maritime power,” said a former NSC official, granted anonymity to speak candidly. “You can’t regenerate or repair your fleet without that base.”
To rebuild that base, the U.S. is turning to its Indo-Pacific allies, especially South Korea. In addition to Hanwha, HD Hyundai Heavy Industries is reportedly in talks to buy a U.S. shipyard. The company in August launched a new entity called Cerberus Maritime with Cerberus Capital Management, whose former CEO, Stephen Feinberg, is now deputy defense secretary.
HD Hyundai Heavy Industries and U.S. shipbuilder HII on Sunday signed a pact at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum in South Korea to team up on U.S. Navy auxiliary ships and link the two nations’ supply chains. The two companies agreed in October to pursue a design contract for the U.S. Navy’s next-generation logistic ship, pairing Hyundai’s experience with HII’s designs.
Hanwha and Hyundai are already bidding on and receiving certain contracts traditionally held by Navy shipyards on the West Coast. That could help cut through existing backlogs by enabling regional facilities to refurbish auxiliary and logistics ships closer to deployment zones. In response to this cooperation, China sanctioned Hanwha’s U.S. subsidiaries. “It was a signal by Beijing to third countries: do not work with the U.S. to gang up on us, or else there will be consequences,” said Patricia Kim, a fellow for the Center for East Asia Policy Studies in the Brookings Institution.
After American unions pushed for a U.S. government probe into China’s maritime dominance, the administration announced port fees on Chinese-owned and operated vessels — $50 per ton starting mid-October, rising annually — a move that triggered Chinese retaliation this month with matching fees on U.S. ships.
Congress, meanwhile, is trying to reinforce the shipbuilding effort. Sens. Todd Young (R-Ind.) and Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.) are pushing the “SHIPS for America Act,” which would create a Maritime Security Trust to channel those port-fee revenues into U.S. shipyards. Labor groups are pressing lawmakers to act quickly, warning that China’s control of global shipbuilding grows daily. Young, who can sometimes be seen in the Senate sporting the “Make American Shipbuilding Great Again” cap, said in an interview that South Korea is essential for providing capital and expertise to train American workers. However, that collaboration has been complicated by a recent immigration raid at a Hyundai plant in Georgia, which led to the detention of 475 workers, mostly South Korean nationals.
Weeks later, Washington allowed South Korean employees to work on short-term visas or a visa waiver program to help build industrial sites in America. Young said the move lowered the temperature, but the issue remains unresolved.
Another friction point is how much shipbuilding work Washington is comfortable offshoring to South Korea. Young, a booster for American manufacturing, said he is open to limited cooperative manufacturing if it strengthens America and keeps domestic jobs at the forefront. “In order for me to keep this coalition together that I think will be important to pass the ‘SHIPS for America Act,’ we need to accept that there may be less foreign manufacturing of certain things than that might otherwise make sense, but I’m comfortable with making those principled compromises,” Young said.
“America First does not mean America alone,” he said. “So we should continue to rely, to some extent — and that’s where the negotiation will occur — on trusted friends and partners for foreign investment and even for cooperative manufacture and repair of certain things.”
Politico
6. Trump greeted with hypersonic missile threat at Seoul APEC
Somehow I do not see the current ROK administration executing an attempted decapitation operation.
Excerpts:
Given that challenge, South Korea may have developed more specialized bunker-buster weapons, such as the Hyunmoo 5 heavy ballistic missile, armed with an 8-ton warhead designed to defeat command bunkers 100 meters deep underground.
South Korea’s doubling down on building decapitation capabilities may stem from the US Trump administration’s preference for engagement with North Korea over a hardline stance. That position may reflect a tacit acceptance of a nuclear-armed North Korea while denying it international recognition as a nuclear power, which is little consolation for South Korea.
However, taking out North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and leadership is an objective fraught with risks. For one, North Korea could be pushed into a use-it-or-lose-it scenario, mounting a conventional or nuclear attack against South Korea, Japan, and the US.
Decapitating the Kim regime also presents a slew of challenges. Even if the Kim dynasty were deposed, the question of who gets to control North Korea’s nuclear arsenal remains unanswered. A successor regime might turn out to be even more opposed to South Korea and the US, more belligerent than the Kim dynasty and more inclined to use nuclear weapons.
As both North and South Korea race to get their hypersonic weapons programs up to speed, the contest is fast becoming less about technology and more about who can shape threat perceptions and the future balance of power on the Korean Peninsula.
Trump greeted with hypersonic missile threat at Seoul APEC - Asia Times
North Korea tests hypersonic weapon days before Trump’s arrival on Peninsula, juicing an arms race with US ally South Korea
asiatimes.com · Gabriel Honrada · October 27, 2025
North Korea’s latest hypersonic missile test has thrust the Korean Peninsula into a new era of strategic competition, as both sides race to master next-generation strike capabilities.
This month, multiple media outlets reported that North Korea test-fired two hypersonic missiles in what state media described as part of efforts to strengthen its “strategic deterrence” against potential enemies.
The missiles, launched from Pyongyang’s Ryokpho District, reportedly flew about 350 kilometers northeast and struck a target in North Hamgyong Province, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
Overseen by senior officials including Pak Jong Chon and Jang Chang Ha, but not leader Kim Jong Un, the tests are believed to have involved the new Hwasong-11E short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) system equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles unveiled in a military parade this month. KCNA called the system “strategic,” implying potential nuclear capability.
The US Indo-Pacific Command condemned the launches as “unlawful and destabilizing,” though they posed no immediate threat to US or allied territories. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) confirmed the launches and said intelligence agencies are analyzing the system’s specifications.
The test came just days before the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in South Korea, attended by US President Donald Trump and China’s Xi Jinping, suggesting a calibrated show of force.
Not to be outdone, South Korea is accelerating its push into hypersonic weapons, with Hyundai Rotem unveiling its first air-launched hypersonic waverider at the 2025 Seoul International Aerospace and Defense Exhibition (ADEX).
The vehicle, powered by a dual-mode ramjet, reaches speeds of up to Mach 6 and combines glide and powered sea-skimming flight for survivability against defenses. Hyundai Rotem said it aims to begin flight testing by the end of the decade under a program supported by the Korea Research Institute for Defense Technology Planning and Advancement (KRIT).
The company also won a US$34 million KRIT contract to develop methane rocket engines for a reusable launch vehicle, a Korean-built alternative to SpaceX’s Falcon 9. Partnering with Korean Air on booster development, Hyundai Rotem is transitioning from Russian kerosene-based technologies to indigenous methane propulsion.
The drive into hypersonics follows successful 2024 scramjet tests by Hanwha Aerospace and the Agency for Defense Development on the Hycore missile. These efforts aim to counter North Korea’s own hypersonic programs and give South Korea a rapid, precision-strike capability.
While North Korea is known for its penchant for bombastic military propaganda – with its hypersonic missile declarations being no exception – the potential threat that its arsenal brings could not be dismissed outright.
Hypersonic weapons are designed to evade current missile defenses with a combination of Mach 6 speed and maneuverability. When deployed with conventional warheads, these weapons add to North Korea’s coercion toolkit versus South Korea, Japan, and the US.
Conventionally-armed short-range hypersonic missiles could enable North Korea to threaten South Korea’s missile defense systems and exert pressure alongside its non-nuclear arms, such as its formidable artillery force, which has much of its firepower aimed at Seoul and South Korea’s major industrial and population centers near the border.
Should North Korea arm its hypersonic weapons with nuclear warheads, which it may most likely do, that move could be considered a further evolution of its nuclear arsenal. Hypersonic weapons offer North Korea a chance to defeat South Korea’s layered missile defenses, keeping the former’s nuclear threat viable.
Alongside that, North Korea is known to be developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability that could reach the US mainland to threaten the logic of the latter’s extended deterrence guarantees to South Korea.
However, it isn’t known whether it has truly mastered MIRV technology, with contradicting statements about its June 2024 test – North Korea claims the test was a success, while South Korean and Japanese authorities dismissed it as a failure.
Aside from testing hypersonic weapons and MIRV-capable ICBMs, North Korea is diversifying its delivery platforms, fielding road and rail-mobile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and cruise missile corvettes to increase the survivability of its nuclear arsenal against a pre-emptive attack.
These efforts may also align with North Korea’s push to gain international recognition as a nuclear power – a status that the US and South Korea flatly reject. Whether that nuclear power status is de facto or internationally recognized by authoritative nuclear powers such as the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), it confers regime security, which is in line with the Kim dynasty’s efforts to ensure its continued survival at the helm of North Korea.
From South Korea’s perspective, hypersonic weapons offer another means to threaten North Korea’s regime survival, which may be the cornerstone of its deterrent strategy. Rather than relying on overt military threats, which seem not to have deterred North Korea from belligerent actions, targeting its nuclear arsenal and leadership might force it to rethink its aggressive courses of action.
Having hypersonic weapons would enable preemptive strikes against time-sensitive targets, such as TELs before they launch their missiles, or SSBNs and warships before they depart port.
Hypersonic missiles, in conjunction with other weapons such as F-35 stealth fighters, stealth drones, Taurus air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), and Hyunmoo family of ballistic missiles, could pre-empt a North Korean attack or even decapitate its leadership.
However, the effectiveness of hypersonic missiles has not been tested on hardened underground infrastructure hundreds of meters under rock – undeclared facilities such as Sinpung-dong, Hoejung-ni, Sangnam-ni and Yongnim Missile Operating Bases that could shelter North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and leadership.
Given that challenge, South Korea may have developed more specialized bunker-buster weapons, such as the Hyunmoo 5 heavy ballistic missile, armed with an 8-ton warhead designed to defeat command bunkers 100 meters deep underground.
South Korea’s doubling down on building decapitation capabilities may stem from the US Trump administration’s preference for engagement with North Korea over a hardline stance. That position may reflect a tacit acceptance of a nuclear-armed North Korea while denying it international recognition as a nuclear power, which is little consolation for South Korea.
However, taking out North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and leadership is an objective fraught with risks. For one, North Korea could be pushed into a use-it-or-lose-it scenario, mounting a conventional or nuclear attack against South Korea, Japan, and the US.
Decapitating the Kim regime also presents a slew of challenges. Even if the Kim dynasty were deposed, the question of who gets to control North Korea’s nuclear arsenal remains unanswered. A successor regime might turn out to be even more opposed to South Korea and the US, more belligerent than the Kim dynasty and more inclined to use nuclear weapons.
As both North and South Korea race to get their hypersonic weapons programs up to speed, the contest is fast becoming less about technology and more about who can shape threat perceptions and the future balance of power on the Korean Peninsula.
asiatimes.com · Gabriel Honrada · October 27, 2025
7. North Korea and Russia blame ‘aggressive’ US-ROK alliance for tensions: Lavrov
Admit nothing, Deny everything, Make counter accusations.
Who has invaded another country? Who is supporting that invasion?
I do not know how Lavrov and Choe can make statements with straight faces.
North Korea and Russia blame ‘aggressive’ US-ROK alliance for tensions: Lavrov
DPRK media, in contrast, does not mention US amid Trump offers to meet Kim Jong Un this week
https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/north-korea-and-russia-blame-aggressive-us-rok-alliance-for-tensions-lavrov/
Colin Zwirko October 28, 2025
Choe Son Hui and Sergei Lavrov in Moscow on Oct. 27 | Image: Russian MFA (Oct. 27, 2025)
The top diplomats of North Korea and Russia blamed the U.S. for causing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and agreed to strengthen relations, according to the Russian foreign ministry, meeting in Moscow on Monday just ahead of President Donald Trump’s visit to South Korea.
DPRK foreign minister Choe Son Hui and her counterpart Sergei Lavrov “expressed a shared view that the main source of heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula, in Northeast Asia, and globally lies in the aggressive actions of the United States and its allies,” the Russian ministry reported.
It added that “Russia expressed its full support for the measures taken by the DPRK leadership to safeguard the country’s sovereignty and ensure its national security,” appearing to refer to Pyongyang’s growing arsenal of nuclear weapons.
In a separate meeting on Monday, Russian leader Vladimir Putin told Choe that “everything is proceeding according to plan” in the development of bilateral relations, while asking her to convey greetings to Kim Jong Un, according to the Kremlin.
KCNA reported that Putin and Choe discussed “continuously strengthening and developing DPRK-Russia relations.”
However, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) did not include mention of the U.S. or South Korea in its reports, only saying Choe and Lavrov conducted “diplomatic coordination regarding major international issues of interest to both countries, achieving consensus on all discussed matters.”
Lavrov and Choe conduct bilateral foreign ministry talks with extended lineups of officials | Image: KCNA (Oct. 28, 2025)Putin and Choe meet in Moscow on Oct. 27, as Lavrov appears in the background on the left | Image: KCNA (Oct. 28, 2025)
The omission comes as Trump has been publicly requesting a meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in recent days but as Pyongyang has yet to respond.
Trump will be in southeastern South Korea on Wednesday and Thursday, but he suggested he is willing to travel to North Korea for a meeting if Kim wants.
The DPRK readout of the Moscow meetings added that Pyongyang expressed “support for all measures taken by the Russian side to eliminate the root causes of the Ukraine conflict and achieve the strategic objectives of the special military operation.”
Lavrov also blamed “Western” powers for “forcing” Putin to invade Ukraine, and thanked North Korea for sending troops to help fight in the war, the Russian foreign ministry reported.
“Russia will never forget the heroic feats performed by the soldiers and officers of the Korean People’s Army in the Kursk Region to liberate Russian soil. These heroic deeds will undoubtedly further strengthen the bonds of friendship and historic alliance in our shared quest for justice,” Lavrov said.
He added that “Russian experts, architects and sculptors are deeply involved in developing and implementing” a new monument and cemetery in Pyongyang that Kim Jong Un unveiled last week for hundreds of DPRK troops killed in the war, and revealed that it is planned to be completed by Feb. 2026.
Choe Son Hui is scheduled to travel to Belarus next to participate in the 3rd International Conference on Eurasian Security taking place from Tuesday to Wednesday.
8. Trump, Takaichi reaffirm US-Japan defense ties aboard American aircraft carrier
A lot of symbolism and messaging here.
Trump, Takaichi reaffirm US-Japan defense ties aboard American aircraft carrier
Two leaders pledge to strengthen alliance in face of ‘unprecedented’ challenges due to North Korea and other threats
https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/trump-takaichi-reaffirm-us-japan-defense-ties-aboard-american-aircraft-carrier/
Jooheon Kim October 28, 2025
U.S. President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi aboard the USS George Washington at Yokosuka Naval Base on Oct. 28, 2025 | Image: White House YouTube
U.S. President Donald Trump and his new Japanese counterpart Sanae Takaichi made a joint appearance on an American nuclear-powered aircraft carrier on Tuesday, reaffirming their commitment to strengthening defense ties in response to North Korea and other regional threats.
Trump’s inspection of the USS George Washington at the U.S. naval base in Yokosuka followed his first summit talks with Prime Minister Takaichi earlier in the day.
Onboard the ship, Takaichi gave a short speech in which she emphasized that the Indo-Pacific region is facing an “unprecedented severe security environment.”
“Peace cannot be preserved by words alone,” she said. “It can only be protected through unwavering determination and action.”
Takaichi recalled that former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Trump previously stood side by side at the same location and demonstrated their resolve that the two countries would join hands to “ensure peace and security in the region.”
U.S. President Donald Trump aboard the USS George Washington at Yokosuka Naval Base on Oct. 28, 2025 | Image: White House YouTube
1
2
3
Trump also spoke to some 6,000 service members from both nations on the ship, highlighting the alliance between the two countries. “Born out of the ashes of a terrible war, our bond has grown over eight decades into the beautiful friendship that we have today.”
The U.S. president announced that he approved the first batch of missiles for Japan’s forces, which are set to arrive this week.
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth gave a speech at the naval base as well, claiming that Trump’s “America first” idea doesn’t mean “America alone.”
“We have our allies, like we do here in Japan, our incredible allies, where we have 55,000 American troops, and we stand shoulder-to-shoulder with them,” he stressed.
Trump’s appearance on one of America’s most powerful naval vessels came as he has also pushed diplomacy with North Korea, repeatedly saying he would like to meet Kim Jong Un when he visits South Korea from Wednesday on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. Pyongyang has not yet responded to Trump’s overtures.
Meanwhile, at the summit earlier in the day, Trump told the Japanese leader that the U.S. is an “’ally at the strongest level.” Takaichi described the relations as the “greatest alliance in the world” and said she is “determined to elevate” it.
U.S. President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi at summit talks in Tokyo on Oct. 28, 2025 | Image: Prime Minister’s Office of Japan
1
2
After the meeting, they signed a document on the supply and securing of rare earths and critical minerals. Following the summit, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt told reporters that Takaichi praised Trump’s international mediation efforts and plans to nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize.
“I expressed my determination to restore robust Japanese diplomacy with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone,” Takaichi said on social media.
Readouts from the two sides made no specific mention of North Korea or trilateral military cooperation with South Korea.
Meanwhile, the DPRK condemned Japan’s recent moves to strengthen its military on Monday, arguing that its “reckless actions can only heighten the international community’s vigilance.” It specifically pointed to Japan’s expansion of its submarine forces and the mass production of long-range missiles, warning that such moves would make the island country a “shared target of punishment.”
Edited by Bryan Betts
9. Trump tells families of Japanese abducted by North Korea that US is ‘with them’
I am sure POTUS understands this is a human rights issue. He seems to be making the case for a human rights upfront approach. If he has a meeting with KJU human rights must be on the agenda.
Trump tells families of Japanese abducted by North Korea that US is ‘with them’
President pledges to ‘do everything’ in his power to resolve issue as he pushes for a meeting with Kim Jong Un
https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/trump-tells-families-of-japanese-abducted-by-north-korea-that-us-is-with-them/
Jooheon Kim October 28, 2025
President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi with families of Japanese abducted by North Korea in Tokyo on Oct. 28, 2025 | Image: Prime Minister’s Office of Japan
U.S. President Donald Trump met family members of North Korean abductees in Tokyo on Tuesday, pledging that Washington will “do everything” it can to resolve the abduction issue.
The meeting took place during a state visit to Japan and followed his first talks with new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi.
“I’ve met the families before and I’m with them all the way, and the U.S. is with them all the way,” he said during the meeting.
“We will do everything within our power,” he added, stating the issue has always been on his mind.
Trump previously met with families of abductees amid his diplomacy with North Korea during his first term. Acting on a request from then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the U.S. president urged DPRK leader Kim Jong Un to address the abduction issue at summit meetings in 2018 and 2019.
Present at Tuesday’s meeting were Sakie Yokota, the mother of abductee Megumi Yokota; Takuya Yokota, Megumi’s younger brother; and Hitomi Soga, an abductee who returned to Japan in 2002.
Takuya, who leads the abductees’ families group, previously warned that the organization would take action against the government if the victims are not repatriated while their surviving parents are still alive. His mother, Sakie, is currently the sole surviving parent of an abductee recognized by the Japanese government.
Takuya also reportedly said that Takaichi is the 14th prime minister since the families’ association was formed, expressing the group’s sense of urgency about whom to ask to resolve the issue.
Tuesday’s meeting came as Trump prepares to visit South Korea from Wednesday around the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, with the president repeatedly stating that he would like to meet Kim Jong Un while on the peninsula.
However, North Korea has yet to respond to Trump’s expressions of interest, and it could take issue with his decision to meet the family members of abductees.
When it comes to Trump’s role in resolving the abduction issue, Oh Gyeong-seob, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said it’s an issue that Tokyo and Pyongyang will need to address on their own through talks.
“Trump could play a role in creating an opportunity for some form of contact between the two countries. But it ultimately requires the two countries to meet directly, since North Korea claims that the matter has already been resolved, while Japan has a different view.”
During the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea abducted several Japanese nationals, with Tokyo officially recognizing 17 victims.
The DPRK formally acknowledged the kidnappings during a 2002 bilateral summit, when then-leader Kim Jong Il met with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, returning five of the 17 individuals.
North Korea has yet to return the remaining 12 abductees, saying some died and others never entered the country, and it now considers the matter “resolved.”
The expert Oh explained that the DPRK primarily abducted the Japanese victims for “espionage.” According to Seoul’s unification ministry, many abductees were required to teach Japanese language, accents and culture to North Korean spies. Pyongyang also used the victim’s Japanese IDs to enable DPRK agents to pose as Japanese nationals.
A 2014 report by the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea suggested that the actual number of abductions could be higher than Japan officially recognizes, estimating that the Kim regime may have taken more than 100 Japanese citizens.
Last week, the Japanese prime minister said she is ready to meet with Kim Jong Un to resolve the deadlock over Pyongyang’s abductions.
Edited by Bryan Betts
10. What the world lost when North Korea’s doors swung closed
As an aside we should revisit this question: What if we learn today that the Dear, Supreme, Great Leader is dead? What actions are we prepared to take to positively exploit the opportunity? Have we conducted sufficient preparation in advance? Do we sufficiently understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the KFR?
I am sure my answers would be different than this author's.
What the world lost when North Korea’s doors swung closed
Revisiting period when the DPRK felt within reach shows how much was taken for granted, and how quickly things change
https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/what-the-world-lost-when-north-koreas-doors-swung-closed/
Fyodor Tertitskiy October 28, 2025
Image: NK News
It’s easy to overlook just how much North Korea has changed in a short amount of time.
I first came to South Korea in 2008, and with the benefit of hindsight, it’s now clear that I arrived at the end of an era — a brief season of openings that felt permanent at the time but are now gone.
Locals could easily and cheaply visit DPRK tourists sites. Thousands of ROK workers commuted daily to factories in North Korea. Chinese border areas were thronged with Koreans who would share details from inside the DPRK.
One by one, these doors swung shut — sometimes loudly, sometimes without ceremony.
Revisiting these closures now provides a sobering reminder of how much observers took for granted at the time. But it also drives home that North Korea’s circumstances could rapidly change again, perhaps even providing a cautious source of hope.
Kim Jong Un and his wife, Ri Sol Ju, climbing Mount Kumgang in Oct. 2019 | Image: KCTV
TOURIST WINDOWS TO THE NORTH
From 1998 to 2008, South Koreans could visit the North as tourists, though for much of that period trips were limited to the Mount Kumgang area.
Gorgeous and semi-legendary in Korean culture, these tall peaks were attractive and exotic enough for South Korean tourists — and letting Southerners go there was politically safe for the North Korean government.
The tourists were isolated from average North Koreans, put under the watchful — and curious — eyes of specially trained guides and state security agents. It looked like this small inter-Korean gateway would last indefinitely.
Another, much more politically risky window opened in Dec. 2007. Kaesong, the last Korean capital before Seoul and a South Korean city before the Korean War, opened to ROK tourists. This looked real, like a bridge was forming between the two countries.
At the time, here in Seoul, you could walk into a travel agency, pay 300,000 won and get a tour. It felt like a miracle.
But it didn’t last. By July 2008, the Kumgang tours were terminated. Kaesong died the following November. Neither tour resumed.
North Korean workers at the Kaesong Industrial Complex in Sept. 2013 | Image: Joint Photo Press Corps
KAESONG’S PROMISE, KAESONG’S SILENCE
Inter-Korean cooperation had been jump-started by the first summit in 2000, but it may have been Kim Jong Il’s 2001 visit to Shanghai that persuaded the Great Commander that a few reforms wouldn’t hurt.
The Kaesong Industrial Complex opened in 2004. For more than a decade, tens of thousands of North Koreans could work there, talk with their South Korean counterparts, and earn wages they could live on. At the peak, their numbers reached an impressive 53,000. It looked big and destined to last.
After a series of crises, Seoul shut the complex in Feb. 2016. It never reopened.
A North Korean woman carrying a child in the countryside | Image: NK News
THE VANISHING PATH SOUTH
After the Great Famine of the 1990s pushed hundreds of thousands of North Koreans toward China, the number arriving in the South skyrocketed.
In 2000, the yearly total passed 500; in 2001, it topped a thousand. The peak came in 2009 — nearly 3,000. It felt as if a small but steadily growing hole had been punched in the Iron Curtain and people were slipping through, carrying their stories to us.
In Dec. 2011, Kim Jong Un took power. One of his first directives that month — before he even assumed his first official post as Supreme Commander — was to crack down on escapes. He was efficient. By 2012, arrivals fell below 1,500 a year.
The pandemic finished what remained: With China and North Korea imposing strict border controls, 2020 saw fewer arrivals than in 2000. Since then, most new arrivals have been those who fled before the pandemic.
North Korean construction workers | Image: NK News (Sept. 9, 2017)
EXPORTED LABOR, IMPORTED TRUTHS
For decades, North Korea has sent workers abroad. Heavily taxed, overworked and closely monitored, these people still fought for any opportunity to work in what some activists have described as “slave-like conditions” because of how much money they could earn.
These workers brought home information about the outside world — and, naturally, became darlings of South Korean intelligence, which received a wealth of information from them.
In 2017, another attempt to curtail the North Korean strategic weapons program resulted in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2397, which demanded workers return home within two years. The decade-long story of hard-working laborers sweating for cash came to a halt.
Since then, only a handful of workers have managed to get clandestine jobs on insecure visas, mostly in Russia and China, protected by an unholy alliance of pro-Pyongyang hardliners and liberals not willing to deprive desperate people of a chance to work.
A photo from 2007 inter-Korean reunion of separated families | Image: Ministry of Unification
REUNIONS, THEN STILLNESS
The year 1985 brought a miracle: the first meetings of families divided by the Korean War since the conflict ended.
The chosen few were allowed only one chance to meet their parents, children and siblings from the other side. The humane custom resumed in 2000. Until 2001, meetings took place in both Seoul and Pyongyang. Then the North stopped allowing visits to the South.
The 21st and most recent meeting took place in 2018, arguably the only tangible result of Moon Jae-in’s engagement policies that year. Perhaps there will never be another.
Korean signs on a street in Yanji in 2011 | Image: Laika ac via Wikimedia Commons
EMPTY SHELVES, QUIET STREETS
If you wanted to study contemporary North Korea in the 2010s, there were two true centers: South Korea and China.
In Seoul, scholars could access the Information Center on North Korea at the Ministry of Unification, the library of the University of North Korean Studies and the vast archives of the National Institute of Korean History south of the capital. Many DPRK escapees were clustered in Seoul and could share memories and experiences.
The second center was in China, in the borderlands of Liaoning and Jilin. While riskier, the Ministry of State Security often looked away as foreigners nosed around.
The region teemed with information. Legal and illicit trade flowed across the Yalu and Tumen rivers. The sounds of the Korean language filled the streets. You could spot North Koreans — Kim Il Sung badges pinned to their chests, always in groups, often in gray suits — walking through Dandong, Yanji, Tumen and other towns.
I remember interviewing an elderly North Korean woman with a Chinese passport. She told stories of her childhood, and of a Chinese citizen admitted to the Workers’ Party in violation of party bylines under Kim Il Sung’s personal order. She spoke of the founding leader with fondness. Of Kim Jong Un, she said only that he was young, and she could not yet judge.
When I said “North Korea,” I pointed across the river. Her home was right there. She had changed her nationality to China by bribing the North Korean secret police, who then petitioned the Chinese embassy for her. She still regretted ceasing to be a North Korean citizen. Stories like hers were everywhere.
A broken bridge between China and North Korea along the Yalu River on June 17, 2016 | Image: NK News
In June 2025, I went to Yanji, and I expected to come back with notebooks full of interviews, fragments, maps, price lists — life’s debris that tells you how a country breathes. Reality had other plans.
Yanji — and to a certain extent, the whole Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture — reminded me of what I’ve read about colonial Korea in the early 1940s, when the peninsula was rapidly assimilated into the Empire of Japan and the Korean language faced systemic suppression.
The Chinese language completely dominates modern Yanji, and the Korean alphabet can be seen as infrequently as on the streets of any Korean town under the Japanese. A shy librarian told me that Korean-language education has been abolished by the central government.
Those who traveled there in 2015 said it wasn’t a problem to find a Korean speaker back in the day. But since then, many ethnic Koreans have left for the South, and those who have stayed often prefer to speak Chinese. Intellectuals hiss about Xi Jinping like one imagines they would have hissed about Prime Minister Tojo back in 1943.
“Do you have North Koreans here?” I asked locals. “Is there a place to buy North Korean books? Old maps of Pyongyang?” Almost every time, the answer was the same: “We did — until 2019. Not anymore.”
Now there are no North Korean books on sale, no exchange students at Yanbian University. There is nothing except the odd bottle of North Korean soju still turning up, contraband cigarettes in Tumen and — so I was told — a handful of DPRK workers at a factory in Longjing, watched closely by minders who have apparently acquired a taste for pizza.
Perhaps there’s a lesson here: The things we treat as permanent can vanish without ceremony, and what we take for granted today may be already gone tomorrow.
11. Presidential Office Prepares Gyeongju Golden Crown for Trump
Presidential Office Prepares Gyeongju Golden Crown for Trump
Gift mirrors Trump's gold preference; Japan gave golden golf ball, Trump to receive Order of Mugunghwa
https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/10/28/64AL3KDAGBB6JGD54NQ3BT4IOA/
By Kim Tae-jun
Published 2025.10.28. 14:48
Updated 2025.10.28. 17:58
The Presidential Office has prepared a Gyeongju golden crown as a gift for U.S. President Donald Trump, who is scheduled to visit South Korea on the 29th. This decision reflects consideration of Trump’s known preference for gold. Japan also previously gifted Trump a “golden golf ball” during his visit to the country.
According to a source from the Presidential Office, President Lee Jae-myung plans to present Trump with a personalized gift during a friendly schedule following their summit. The Presidential Office is preparing “customized gifts” for leaders attending the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Gyeongju, and it was reported that the golden crown was selected for Trump based on his preferences. It was also revealed that Trump, visiting as a state guest, will receive the Order of Mugunghwa from President Lee.
Hwangnamdaechong gold crown and South Mound and North Mound gold waist belts. /Gyeongju National Museum
Japan followed a similar approach. Prime Minister Takaichi gifted Trump a “golden golf ball” utilizing gold leaf techniques from Kanazawa City, Ishikawa Prefecture, considering his fondness for golf. Additionally, it was reported that golf equipment previously used by former Prime Minister Abe, who maintained a close relationship with Trump, was also presented as a gift.
12. President Lee Names Lee Hae-chan as PUAC Senior Vice Chair
It will be interesting to see the direction of the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council (PUAC) under this POTROK.
President Lee Names Lee Hae-chan as PUAC Senior Vice Chairman
https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/10/28/54VFCAEFGVEX3PJLLA2X5HBBPI/
By Park Sang-ki
Published 2025.10.28. 19:55
On May 31 during the presidential election period, then Democratic Party of Korea presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung campaigns with former representative Lee Hae-chan in Sejong City. /News1
President Lee Jae-myung appointed Lee Hae-chan, former representative of the Democratic Party of Korea, as Senior Vice Chairman of the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council (PUAC), a ministerial-level position, on the 28th. The term for the PUAC Senior Vice Chairman is two years.
Kim Nam-jun, presidential office spokesperson, announced the appointment in a written briefing the same day, stating, “The Senior Vice Chairman is a senior political figure who has served as a member of the National Assembly and held key public offices.” He added, “As an individual who has long dedicated himself to unification issues and related activities, it is expected that his seasoned advisory role will support the president’s North Korea and unification policies.”
The Senior Vice Chairman is a seven-term former lawmaker who served as Minister of Education under the Kim Dae-jung administration and as Prime Minister under the Roh Moo-hyun administration. He was the representative of the Democratic Party of Korea from 2018 to 2020 during the Moon Jae-in administration. At the time, when President Lee, then a non-mainstream figure within the party, faced intense criticism from the mainstream pro-Moon (親文) faction, he defended him, calling him “a valuable asset to the party.” He is a representative figure among the Democratic Party’s senior group who actively supported President Lee.
13. Trump's Trip to Pyongyang?
I would POTUS is still a long way from going to Pyongyang.
Trump's Trip to Pyongyang?
[Kim Dae-Joong Column] U.S. Acknowledges North Korea's Nuclear Status, Paving Way for Diplomatic Talks
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/10/27/SMTLYY67SZECXDWZOSQ63E4Y7Y/
By Kim Dae-joong
Published 2025.10.27. 23:55
On June 30, 2019, a photo from North Korea's Rodong Sinmun shows U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un shaking hands in the South Korean section of the inter-Korean truce village of Panmunjom. /Rodong Sinmun News1
The primary focus of U.S. President Donald Trump’s Asia tour is whether he will meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Questions from journalists continued even aboard Air Force One. His response was that he wants to meet but is unsure if it will happen. Trump’s position, which seems as if he has handed over the initiative, is unfamiliar.
Originally, for a summit between the two countries—even if it is a working-level meeting—there must be an agenda and a deal to be struck. There were no prior consultations with North Korea, no signs of behind-the-scenes negotiations, and no reports. Trump, who is usually uninhibited and does not hide his thoughts, has not even hinted at it boastfully. However, as Trump steps onto Korean soil for the first time in a while, the possibility arises: can he simply pass by Kim Jong-un, whom he has habitually boasted about having a “good relationship” with?
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young mentioned the control status of the inter-Korean truce village of Panmunjom, expressing hope for a Trump-Kim meeting and recalling their 2019 encounter. A U.S. diplomatic source said, “Even if Kim Jong-un invites Trump to Pyongyang, Trump would rush there.” It was unclear whether the emphasis was on “Pyongyang” or Trump’s eagerness, but this is the first time Trump’s potential visit to Pyongyang has been mentioned.
So, what about the North Korean nuclear issue, which has been the biggest obstacle between the U.S. and North Korea? First, under Trump, the U.S. has implicitly abandoned denuclearization, which was the cornerstone of its North Korea policy. Trump acknowledged, “North Korea has many nuclear weapons,” effectively recognizing the North’s nuclear arsenal. A source said, “Acceptance and recognition of reality are different,” but that is mere wordplay. Trump now seems to have retreated to accepting North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and pursuing “nuclear arms reduction and freezing the current situation.” North Korea has thus prevailed over the U.S. in getting its nuclear status acknowledged. Second, North Korea seeks the lifting of sanctions. Since the U.S. has recognized its nuclear status, the sanctions based on its nuclear program have lost their meaning. The remaining task is how the Trump administration will lift them. However, from the perspective of a Nobel Peace Prize candidate(?) reshaping the global order and addressing all military conflicts, sanctions against North Korea will no longer hinder his path.
At this point, denuclearization and sanctions relief are no longer obstacles between the two countries. For Trump, this is a retreat from the denuclearization stance that caused the 2019 Hanoi summit to collapse. For Kim Jong-un, it is a self-congratulatory achievement, having successfully developed nuclear weapons and forced the U.S. to back down.
Kim Jong-un can now boast that his status has changed. By deploying troops to Ukraine at Putin’s request, he showcased North Korea’s military power to the world. Leveraging this, he stood alongside Xi Jinping and Putin on the Tiananmen rostrum last September, flaunting a North Korea-China-Russia trilateral system. He likely prides himself on his significant international growth. If given the chance to confront Trump one-on-one, he has no reason to decline. Moreover, if Trump approaches not with tariffs as a weapon but with gifts—acknowledging North Korea’s nuclear status and lifting sanctions—Kim Jong-un would find it hard to let the opportunity pass.
How far will the U.S. and North Korea, or Trump and Kim Jong-un, go? With the nuclear issue removed as an obstacle, the next step might be progress in diplomatic relations. Normalizing U.S.-North Korea diplomatic ties faces many hurdles and unfavorable conditions within the U.S. However, with a leftist regime in South Korea actively supporting and encouraging normalization with North Korea, Trump has nothing to fear. While full diplomatic relations may be distant, establishing consular ties could be a priority.
The question is whether North Korea is ready to open its doors. If it does, it cannot avoid the sounds of the U.S., the scents of South Korea, and the winds of the West. For Kim Jong-un, this could be a risky gamble. His crossroads lies here, and North Korea’s future depends on it. Will it follow Russia’s path, China’s path, or that of European leftist states? Regardless, North Korea has become a nuclear power but is now being pushed into the open and can no longer remain a reclusive state. The question then becomes: how will South Korea respond to North Korea’s nuclear status? That is the issue.
14. Trump renews call for Kim meeting, but North Korea remains silent
What will KJU do?
He is still playing hard to get.
Trump renews call for Kim meeting, but North Korea remains silent - The Korea Times
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
U.S. President Donald Trump said he is willing to extend his stay in South Korea in order to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, but Pyongyang has offered no response, maintaining its customary silence ahead of this week’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province.
Speaking to reporters aboard Air Force One during his flight from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to Tokyo on Monday, Trump said, “If he [Kim] wants to meet, I’d love to,” adding that he “could go over there” while in South Korea.
He emphasized that he and Kim had a “very good relationship” and that extending the trip would be “easy if needed.” It was the latest in a series of gestures that began before his departure for Asia last week.
Trump also referred to North Korea as “a nuclear power,” repeating a phrase he has used since returning to office, and said he is “100 percent open” to another encounter with the North Korean leader. He noted that Washington’s strongest leverage remains “sanctions,” describing them as “a pretty big issue to start from.”
It was the first time in his second term that Trump had publicly suggested including the sanctions regime on the negotiation agenda.
Despite repeated invitations, North Korea has remained unresponsive. The North’s Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui traveled to Russia and Belarus this week and is expected to return after Trump’s two-day visit to South Korea on Wednesday and Thursday.
The itinerary suggests little interest in direct engagement, at least for now.
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young told reporters that Kim “seems to be managing his message to Washington very carefully,” citing reports that North Korean workers recently carried out cleaning and repainting work on the northern side of Panmunjeom.
Analysts said the two leaders appear to have divergent aims. Lim Eul-chul, a professor at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University, said that Pyongyang “probably sees Trump as not yet ready for serious talks,” adding that Kim “would rather avoid another Hanoi-style meeting that ends in political embarrassment.”
The 2019 Hanoi summit between Trump and Kim ended abruptly without a deal being reached. Kim had traveled to Vietnam by train for the two-day meeting and proposed dismantling the Yongbyon nuclear complex in exchange for sanctions relief.
However, Trump demanded that North Korea also disclose and dismantle additional undeclared nuclear sites identified by U.S. intelligence.
When Kim refused, Trump declared that Pyongyang was “not ready to make a deal” and walked out of the talks, leaving the summit without an agreement.
Yang Moo-jin of the University of North Korean Studies, said that Trump’s remarks acknowledging North Korea’s nuclear status were intended to “set the tone for dialogue” during the APEC summit week, but added that “with firm backing from Russia and China, Kim is in no hurry to meet.”
Park Won-gon, a professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University, said that a surprise encounter cannot be ruled out entirely. “Given both leaders’ unpredictable styles, an unplanned decision is always possible,” he said. “But the odds of an actual summit are still quite low.”
During his first term, Trump met with Kim three times, including an impromptu June 2019 meeting at the Demilitarized Zone arranged just 32 hours after Trump proposed it publicly on social media. Officials in Seoul say the current administration is “far better prepared” for a sudden encounter, should one occur again.
Trump is scheduled to arrive in Gyeongju on Wednesday for the APEC summit, where he is expected to meet with other regional leaders, including President Lee Jae Myung. It remains uncertain whether Kim will respond before then, leaving Washington and Seoul watching for any signal from Pyongyang.
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
15. News of North Korean soldier’s defection spreads quietly along China border
The regime cannot suppress the news.
Excerpts:
“Word has quietly gone around among residents of Hoeryong recently that a soldier crossed over the military demarcation line into South Korea,” a Daily NK source in North Hamgyong province said recently. “News of the incident is being carefully shared only among people who trust one another.”
In parts of North Korea along the border with China, users of Chinese-made mobile phones spread domestic news the authorities deem unfit to share, as well as information from the outside world. Rumors of the defection are also being shared, albeit in hushed tones, through the same channels.
According to the source, people who heard the news say “a soldier safely crossed into South Korea,” that it was “fortunate he wasn’t caught,” and that what the soldier did was “amazing since it couldn’t have been an easy decision.”
However, people are cautious about discussing the defection due to surveillance and crackdowns by authorities. Even in marketplaces, which used to be hubs for sharing such information, people are wary of one another, whispering news of the incident only to those they truly trust.
News of North Korean soldier’s defection spreads quietly along China border
Border residents express hope even as surveillance makes information sharing dangerous
By Lee Chae Eun - October 28, 2025
dailynk.com · October 27, 2025
A photo taken of the North Korea - China border in 2014. (Lawrence Wang, Flickr, Creative Commons)
News of a North Korean soldier’s recent defection to the South is quietly spreading among people living along the North Korea-China border. Due to intensifying crackdowns, people are discussing the incident only with their most trusted acquaintances, slowing the spread of information.
“Word has quietly gone around among residents of Hoeryong recently that a soldier crossed over the military demarcation line into South Korea,” a Daily NK source in North Hamgyong province said recently. “News of the incident is being carefully shared only among people who trust one another.”
In parts of North Korea along the border with China, users of Chinese-made mobile phones spread domestic news the authorities deem unfit to share, as well as information from the outside world. Rumors of the defection are also being shared, albeit in hushed tones, through the same channels.
According to the source, people who heard the news say “a soldier safely crossed into South Korea,” that it was “fortunate he wasn’t caught,” and that what the soldier did was “amazing since it couldn’t have been an easy decision.”
However, people are cautious about discussing the defection due to surveillance and crackdowns by authorities. Even in marketplaces, which used to be hubs for sharing such information, people are wary of one another, whispering news of the incident only to those they truly trust.
Information spreads slowly
“In the past, the markets would have been buzzing with news of the defection, but everyone is quiet now because they’ll get called into the Ministry of State Security or police if somebody informs on them,” the source said. “People are being even more careful because this country is very sensitive about rumors of defections.”
Information is not spreading as quickly as before, but people who have heard news of the defection through acquaintances have welcomed it, saying it gave them a sliver of hope when defections have become all but impossible since the COVID-19 pandemic.
“When life was tough, defections were the final escape, but now, nobody can do so lightly since you really have to risk your life trying,” the source said. “Nevertheless, many people continue to look for opportunities, and the latest defection has given them hope — that maybe one day, their day will come.”
In Ryanggang province’s Hyesan, another border city, local residents have quietly discussed the soldier’s defection. Sitting just across from China, Hyesan is a place where outside information arrives relatively quickly. Yet even here, news has traveled slower than in the past due to intensified surveillance and crackdowns.
Hyesan residents who have learned of the defection have shown interest in the soldier’s motivations.
“Nowadays, you get shot just for trying to cross into China, and soldiers would know better than anyone that getting caught trying to cross into South Korea means the firing squad,” a source in Ryanggang province said. “That the soldier decided to try anyway has led to speculation that he must have endured tasks, pressure, beatings or other acts of cruelty that he could not endure in his unit.”
“People who heard the news say that regardless of his reason, it was fortunate that he safely crossed over in the South,” the source said. “There must be many people who hope their chance will come, too, even if they can’t say so openly.”
On the morning of Oct. 19, a North Korean soldier crossed the central stretch of the MDL and announced his intention to defect to the South. The defection was the first by a soldier in a year and two months following a case in Kosong, Kangwon province, in August of last year. It was also the first defection by a soldier since the launch of the Lee Jae Myung administration in South Korea.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · October 27, 2025
16. S. Korea, U.S. not discuss agenda related to possible Kim-Trump meeting: official
[APEC 2025] S. Korea, U.S. not discuss agenda related to possible Kim-Trump meeting: official | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · October 28, 2025
SEOUL, Oct. 28 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States have not coordinated agenda items related to a possible meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un this week, the unification minister said Tuesday.
Seoul's top point man on North Korea, Chung Dong-young, made the remarks during a parliamentary audit amid speculation that Kim and Trump could meet this week on the occasion of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering.
"I believe there have been no discussions between South Korea and the U.S. based on the assumption of a North Korea-U.S. meeting," Chung said when asked if Seoul and Washington have coordinated agenda items such as denuclearization or sanctions relief to brace for a possible Kim-Trump meeting.
The minister said he expects Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of the North's leader, may issue a statement Tuesday or Wednesday over North Korea's stance on Trump's proposal to meet with Kim.
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young (L) responds to an inquiry by a lawmaker during a parliamentary audit session of his ministry on Oct. 28, 2025. (Yonhap)
Trump has made repeated calls signaling his intent to meet with Kim during his trip to South Korea from Oct. 29-30, saying he is "open" to talks with him and describing North Korea as a "sort of nuclear power" at the beginning of his ongoing Asia swing.
He also told reporters aboard Air Force One en route to Tokyo on Monday that he "would love to" meet with Kim if the North Korean leader agrees.
Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said Trump's remarks could "definitely" serve as an inducement to bring Pyongyang back to the dialogue table but noted that the North may now be seeking a "bigger bill" from Washington in return.
"Compared with 2017 and 2018, North Korea has secured a military pact with Russia and strengthened its ties with China," Cho said. "Simply put, I think North Korea could be raising its bill for talks with the U.S.," he added.
If realized, it would mark the first meeting between Kim and Trump in more than six years since their surprise brief meeting at the inter-Korean truce village of Panmunjom in 2019.
sookim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · October 28, 2025
17. S. Korea, U.S., Japan arranging trilateral talks among top diplomats during APEC: sources
Good news.
[APEC 2025] S. Korea, U.S., Japan arranging trilateral talks among top diplomats during APEC: sources | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · October 28, 2025
By Kim Seung-yeon
GYEONGJU, South Korea, Oct. 28 (Yonhap) -- South Korea, the United States and Japan may hold trilateral talks among their top diplomats during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering this week, sources said Tuesday.
The three countries are in talks to arrange the three-way meeting, possibly around Wednesday afternoon following the summit talks between President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump, sources familiar with the matter said.
If held, it will mark the first such meeting between Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, since the launch of the new Japanese cabinet led by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who was elected as leader last week.
The envisioned meeting could offer an opportunity for the three countries to reaffirm their commitment to continuing efforts to enhance their trilateral partnership.
Questions have arisen over whether the trilateral cooperation would continue since Trump began his second term with a drive for the "America First" policy and aggressive tariffs on the U.S.' two key Asian allies and others.
The outlook for relations between South Korean and Japan has become uncertain with the election of the first female leader, who is known for her hard-line stance on issues stemming from Japan's colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula.
A trilateral meeting among Lee, Trump and Takaichi is unlikely to happen this time, according to the sources.
Officers from the special police operation forces check an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) site for safety at the Gyeongju Arts Center, the venue for the APEC CEO summit, in the southeastern city of Gyeongju, on Oct. 28, 2025. (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · October 28, 2025
18. Industry minister holds 2 rounds of virtual talks with U.S. counterpart on $350 bln investment deal: sources
Will we get this done in time?
Industry minister holds 2 rounds of virtual talks with U.S. counterpart on $350 bln investment deal: sources | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Han-joo · October 28, 2025
SEOUL, Oct. 28 (Yonhap) -- Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan and U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick have held two rounds of virtual talks since last weekend, government sources said Tuesday, as the two countries try to narrow differences over the implementation of Seoul's US$350 billion investment pledge under a trade framework agreed in July.
Since returning from a trip to Washington last week, Kim has continued discussions with his U.S. counterpart in an effort to reach a compromise, but sources familiar with the talks said prospects for a major breakthrough remain slim.
The two countries reached a framework trade deal in late July, under which Seoul has committed to investing $350 billion in the U.S., among other pledges, in return for Washington's agreement to lower its "reciprocal" tariff and sector-specific duty on South Korean autos to 15 percent from 25 percent.
But the deal has yet to go into force amid negotiations to narrow gaps over a set of sticking points, including how to fund the investment package.
Initially, Seoul had planned to make only a small portion, less than 5 percent, in direct cash investment, with the bulk of the pledge backed by guarantees. Meanwhile, Washington had reportedly insisted on a cash-heavy approach, citing precedents, such as its agreement with Tokyo.
As the talks progressed, the two sides have reportedly sought a middle ground amid the deadlock.
However, Washington reportedly continues to request a cash investment of $25 billion annually over eight years, totaling $200 billion. South Korea has reportedly offered a cash investment of $7 billion per year over 10 years, amounting to $70 billion in total.
This undated photo, provided by South Korea's industry ministry, shows Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan (R) and U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
khj@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Han-joo · October 28, 2025
19. Why Committee for Human Rights in North Korea must be funded -- now more than ever
Human rights in north Korea is not only a moral imperative. It is a national security issue.
Yes, I am biased. HRNK does tremendous work and punches unbelievably far above its weight. But it can continue its great work only through the support of individual citizens, civil society, philanthropic organizations, foundations, and governments.
Please donate.
Voices Oct. 27, 2025 / 5:51 PM
Why Committee for Human Rights in North Korea must be funded -- now more than ever
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/10/27/perspective-committee-for-human-rights-North-Korea/6181761599619/
By David Maxwell
People look at pictures in front of Seoul City Hall on Friday of North Koreans missing in North Korea during an exhibition held as part of the 2025 Seoul World Convention on North Korean Human Rights The convention was themed 'Let Them Be Free!." Photo by Jeon Heon-kyun/EPA
Oct. 27 (UPI) -- At a time when authoritarian regimes are advancing, democracies are wavering and human rights are increasingly treated as optional rather than essential, one small organization continues to do outsized work on behalf of the most voiceless people on earth -- the 26 million Koreans trapped in North Korea.
The U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, or HRNK -- the world's most authoritative non-governmental agency that documents the Kim regime's atrocities -- is, astonishingly, struggling for funding. This should be a national embarrassment for the United States and a moral wake-up call for policymakers.
For two decades, HRNK has produced the definitive body of work on North Korea's gulag system, crimes against humanity and the regime's apparatus of control.
Its satellite imagery reports are cited by the United Nations, governments and scholars worldwide.
Its work helped shape the landmark 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry, which concluded that the Kim regime commits crimes "without parallel in the contemporary world."
HRNK briefings have repeatedly strengthened mandates for the United Nations Special Rapporteur and sustained international pressure, even when diplomacy and headlines moved on. Nearly every major human rights hearing on North Korea in the U.S. Congress has drawn on HRNK's research.
Yet, while countless NGOs with far less impact routinely have received generous grants from the U.S. State Department, the former USAID and international donors, HRNK is expected to scrape by on shoestring budgets.
Why?
Why do organizations that produce glossy slogans and fleeting awareness campaigns receive millions, while the NGO doing the hardest, most essential and most strategic human rights work on North Korea must fight for survival every fiscal year?
This is not merely a matter of fairness. It is a matter of strategy.
Human rights are a national security issue
There is a dangerous new trend in Washington and Seoul. Human rights in North Korea are being sidelined in favor of "stability," "pragmatism" or "avoiding provocation."
The U.S. government ended broadcasting into the North. The South Korean government has retreated from its former leadership role on freedom and human dignity for all Koreans. The result? A vacuum -- one Kim Jong Un welcomes. When democracies stop speaking, dictatorships grow louder.
This retreat abandons not only universal values, but also strategic leverage. Human rights are not separate from security on the Korean Peninsula -- they are the center of gravity.
A regime that enslaves its own people, runs political prison camps and controls information through terror cannot be trusted to negotiate peace or denuclearization in good faith. Pretending otherwise has failed for more than 70 years.
HRNK is one of the last institutions still telling this truth consistently, factually and globally.
The moral imperative
HRNK gives voice to escapees, preserves testimony and provides the documentation that prevents the world from looking away. It ensures that when the day of change comes -- and it will -- there will be a record, there will be accountability and the Korean people in the North will not be told that no one cared.
If America claims to champion unalienable rights, how can it justify funding countless organizations advancing secondary causes while neglecting the NGO that defends an entire nation of enslaved people? If "Never Again" has any meaning, why are the world's leading investigators of modern gulags left to fundraise like a small neighborhood charity?
A simple ask
HRNK does not need billions. It needs predictable, institutional support -- from the U.S. government, from allies, from foundations and from citizens who believe that freedom is not negotiable. A modest increase in public funding would allow HRNK to:
• Expand monitoring of political prison camps
• Support escapee voices and survivor testimony
• Counter disinformation at the U.N. and in global fora
• Strengthen advocacy networks across Asia, Europe and North America
• Keep human rights at the center of Korea policy rather than at its margins
This is the very definition of high-impact, low-cost investment in freedom.
The bottom line
When the U.S. and Republic of Korea governments shy away from human rights out of fear, fatigue or misplaced diplomacy, we need HRNK more than ever. The organization is doing work that governments should be doing but aren't. It is keeping alive the truth that the Korean people in the north are not invisible, not forgotten, and not abandoned.
If America truly stands for human rights, then funding HRNK is not charity. It is duty.
The author is a member of the board of directors of HRNK.
David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.
Read More
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
