Quotes of the Day:

"Patience is also a form of action." 

– Auguste Rodin

"Am I not destroying my enemies when I make friends of them?"

– Abraham Lincoln

"There is no revenge so complete as forgiveness." 

– Josh Billings

1. Trump’s Big Tariff Task in Asia Is to Close the Deal

2. Everything You Should Know About Trump’s Upcoming Meeting with Xi

3. America Doesn’t Have Enough Weapons for a Major Conflict. These Workers Know Why.

4. Is the U.S. Losing in Vietnam? Russia, North Korea and China Are Gaining.

5. Putin Is Slowly Losing Control of the Ukraine War

6. US Army officer’s death in Dhaka raises questions amid shifting political winds

7. Norway: Russian Arctic Nukes Targeting America

8. Making Waves: Looking Beyond Today’s Illusory ‘Icebreaker Gap’ and Troubled PSC Program to a Cheap, Quiet, and Plentiful Polar Sub Fleet for Tomorrow

9. Trump’s Domestic Pressures for a Potential War in Venezuela

10. Venezuela Says It Captured ‘Mercenaries’ Working With CIA

11. The world is headed for re-globalization not de-globalization, as 'coalitions of the willing' emerge, Mastercard chair and former USTR official says

12. Poland Signs Palantir, Anduril Deals Amid Record Army Spending

13. Russia Aims Drone Attacks at Civilians, a War Crime, U.N. Inquiry Says

14. Opinion | Xi Gives Trump a Taiwan Test

15. Opinion | Asia Gets the Trump Treatment

16. China Pushes to Silence Victims of African Mining Disaster

17. The CRINK: Inside the new bloc supporting Russia's war against Ukraine

18. The State of the Axis of Resistance: Assessing Risks and Opportunities for the United States

19. Using local advantage: how small forces can overcome insurmountable odds

20. The Case for a Multilateral Trade Organization Without America

21. Ron Paul: The Rubio Doctrine, Neocons Are Back – OpEd

22. Is Europe Too Soft to Fight?

23. From Front Lines to Factories: Embedding Industry in US Army Units to Accelerate Combat Iteration

24. Toward a Taiwan Truce – How Trump and Xi Can Pull Back From the Brink

25. The New Eurasian Order – America Must Link Its Atlantic and Pacific Strategies

26. Does the US military need a Cyber Force?

27. Winning the Innovation Race: Why America’s Allies Are the Key to Beating Beijing

1. Trump’s Big Tariff Task in Asia Is to Close the Deal

Let's get it done.

Graphic at the link.

Trump’s Big Tariff Task in Asia Is to Close the Deal

The president’s Asia tour offers the chance to complete trade agreements that have hit roadblocks

https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/trump-tariffs-asia-visit-86d4a6a6

By Jason Douglas

Follow in Tokyo, Timothy W. Martin

Follow in Seoul and Shan Li

Follow in New Delhi

Updated Oct. 27, 2025 11:54 pm ET

President Trump has sounded an optimistic note on talks with China. Evelyn Hockstein/Reuters

Quick Summary

• President Trump aims to finalize trade deals during his Asia tour, following tariff agreements with Southeast Asian nations.View more

President Trump’s quest to reorder global trade through personal diplomacy will be tested during his tour of Asia this week, as he faces the tantalizing prospect of a pact with China and the chance to bust through obstacles to completing deals with other key trading partners.

Trump has won some momentum by winning tariff agreements with a handful of Southeast Asian nations and also sounded an optimistic note on China ahead of a meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping planned for later this week. “I think we are going to come away with a deal,” Trump said Monday aboard Air Force One en route to Japan.

In Tokyo Tuesday, Trump and new Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi pledged to usher in a new “golden age” of U.S.-Japan relations in their first in-person summit.

“We’re going to do tremendous trade together, I think, more than ever before,” Trump said, hailing the trade pact finalized with Japan last month.

Trump is scheduled to be in the region through Thursday. As well as the high-stakes meeting with Xi, Trump is due to sit down with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung on Wednesday.

There is much ground left to cover on trade with other important Asian economies, including South Korea, India, Australia and Taiwan. In some instances, negotiators are struggling to turn bare-bones agreements into actionable deals, while other talks are continuing.

Completing more trade deals would bolster Trump’s centerpiece trade agenda as his controversial levies face legal and political blowback at home and abroad. More delays, despite Trump’s direct involvement, could embolden other countries to dig in longer in the hope of winning more concessions.

“Trump needs to show that he’s winning,” said Carlos Casanova, senior economist for Asia at Union Bancaire Privée, a private bank.

Illustrating the challenge is South Korea, which appeared to tap the brakes on a swift finalization of the deal it struck with Washington earlier this year. A senior aide to South Korea’s president on Monday said a deal was unlikely when Trump meets Lee in South Korea later this week.

The two countries agreed in late July that Seoul would invest $350 billion in the U.S. in return for Washington’s agreement to lower its tariffs on South Korean autos and many other goods to 15% from 25%.

But the two sides have struggled to bridge differences over how exactly the investment pledge will work, with Trump at one point insisting the money be paid “upfront,” rather than on a project-by-project basis similar to the Japan deal.

To some economists, such wrinkles show the perils of Trump’s preference for announcing bold agreements and leaving the nitty-gritty to later. “These deals do still feel quite performative,” said Gaurav Ganguly, head of international economics at Moody’s Analytics.

Still, Trump has signaled a breakthrough with South Korea. “It is pretty close to being finalized,” he said at a news conference aboard Air Force One en route to Malaysia. “If they have it ready, I’m ready.”

South Korean-made autos are subject to U.S. tariffs  kim hong-ji/Reuters

Trump landed in Japan on Monday for an audience with Emperor Naruhito. He is due to discuss trade, defense and other issues with Takaichi at a summit scheduled for Tuesday.

Japan stands as one of the Trump administration’s trade successes: Tokyo has agreed to invest $550 billion in the U.S. over the next few years in exchange for a tariff of 15% on most U.S. imports from Japan, including cars. Under the terms of the agreement, the U.S. has a considerable role in identifying projects for Japan to finance, and Tokyo agreed that the U.S. can take 90% of the profits from its investments once its original outlay has been recouped.

Trump administration officials, shortly after unleashing proposed tariffs on dozens of countries this spring, said they wanted to give priority to quick deals with five countries: Australia, India, Japan, South Korea and the U.K.

The U.K. reached a rapid agreement in which the U.S. rolled back tariffs to 10% in exchange for British purchases of U.S. airplanes and food. Most goods from Australia, which runs a trade deficit with the U.S., are also subject to a 10% tariff, but a deal appears distant. Australian Trade Minister Don Farrell has said the government believes the U.S. should remove the tariffs altogether, but acknowledged it could take time. “These things don’t get resolved overnight,” he told Australian media.

India is also proving tough. Prime Minister Narendra Modi skipped a potential face-to-face meeting with Trump over the weekend in Malaysia, opting to virtually attend the regional Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit.

An employee at a garment factory in India. r. satish babu/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Trade negotiations between New Delhi and Washington had been under way for months when Trump dropped a bomb: The U.S. would impose a 50% tariff on India, partly as punishment for India’s continued purchase of discounted Russian oil.

Modi is facing increasing domestic pressure to hammer out an agreement, as exports of Indian goods to the U.S. have plunged since the tariffs went into effect over the summer. In September, the first full month under Washington’s 50% tariffs, India’s exports to the U.S. fell to $5.5 billion, down 20% from August and nearly 40% from May, according to Ajay Srivastava, founder of New Delhi consulting firm Global Trade Research Initiative.

Taiwan is continuing to seek a lower tariff rate with the U.S. after getting a temporary reduction from a proposed 32% to 20%, which took effect Aug. 7. Officials have rejected the Trump administration’s proposal to evenly split Taiwanese semiconductor production at home and in the U.S.

Taiwan President Lai Ching-te signaled last week that “concrete results” on trade talks could be delivered soon.

Trump has already made some deals during his first trip to Asia since winning his second term.

On Sunday, the U.S. struck detailed agreements with Malaysia and Cambodia that will see the Southeast Asian nations lower tariffs and increase purchases of U.S. goods, including vehicles and farm products. The U.S. also reached looser agreements with Thailand and Vietnam that could provide the foundation for fuller trade deals later on.

Write to Jason Douglas at jason.douglas@wsj.com, Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com and Shan Li at shan.li@wsj.com

Appeared in the October 28, 2025, print edition as 'In Asia, Trump Aims to Seal Deals'.

2. Everything You Should Know About Trump’s Upcoming Meeting with Xi

Is this the most consequential meeting of his presidency? 

Everything You Should Know About Trump’s Upcoming Meeting with Xi

Eight of our contributors break down what’s on the table—and what could go wrong—as Trump sits down with Xi in South Korea.

https://www.thefp.com/p/everything-you-should-know-about-trumps-upcoming-meeting-with-x

By The Editors

10.27.25 —

International

Wars, global trade, and the world’s shifting alliances.

thefp.com

Is the U.S. about to sign a trade deal with China? On Thursday, Donald Trump will travel to South Korea to meet with Chinese president Xi Jinping. The meeting will conclude the Trump’s nearly weeklong tour through Asia, during which he signed trade agreements with Malaysia, Cambodia, and Thailand—each including commitments to support U.S. efforts to contain China’s influence.

In the days leading up to the meeting, representatives from the U.S. and China announced that they had agreed to a framework for a trade deal. But the details remain unclear, as does the likelihood of a final agreement.

Amid this uncertainty, we turned to some of the sharpest voices around to set the stage for the Thursday meeting. What are the stakes of the meeting in Busan? What should Americans hope for—or worry about—in any potential deal? And how might its provisions shape the domestic economy and Washington’s enduring struggle for dominance against its most powerful rival?

Here’s what our contributors had to say:

Patrick McGee, business journalist at the Financial Times and the author of the New York Times bestseller Apple in China:

I see the U.S.-China conflict as a contest between the Great Consumer and the Great Producer. These are the world’s two biggest economies and, as Elon Musk has memorably put it, a full decoupling would be like performing surgery on conjoined twins—the likelihood is high that both will die. Any kind of deal that avoids such high drama will be welcomed by Wall Street, but the details are what matter.

China wants a deal because exporting to the U.S. is massively lucrative. Yet Beijing has been preparing its economy to become more independent for a while. Its Made in China 2025 initiative, first released in 2015, was a plan to boost Chinese manufacturing and sever dependence on the West. Its 2013 Belt and Road Initiative seeks to incentivize non-Western countries to become havens for Chinese imports.

China also has several options to circumvent tariffs and similar actions from the U.S. It can reroute some products through places like Vietnam and India. Or it can export more products to the rest of the world. Sending affordable electric vehicles to Mexico and Canada, for example, could really hurt the U.S. economy.

On the buying side, we’ve already seen China purchase soybeans en masse from Brazil, instead of from rural America. Beijing also has time to insulate its economy. Washington is overstating how much its current tariffs are hurting China—The Economist pointed out recently that this year, China’s stock market “has risen by 34 percent in dollar terms, double the rise for the S&P 500 index.” Plus, Xi doesn’t have midterm elections to worry about.

America wants a deal because China is the world’s biggest maker of things, including big sectors of concern to national security (electronics, batteries, and pharmaceutical ingredients). The American economy needs access to Chinese goods to operate. And America’s biggest companies—Nvidia, Apple, Tesla—are deeply ensconced in their rival in a way that China’s biggest companies—Huawei, Alibaba, Tencent—are not.

Most crucially, China can get around a lack of direct trade with the U.S. in ways that aren’t true the other way around. For example, a single F-35 jet fighter requires over 900 pounds of rare-earth elements, and China controls about 80 percent of the rare-earth supply chain. There is currently no alternative supplier for the U.S.

Thus, the stakes for a deal are enormous, and it’s reasonable to assume Beijing has more leverage here. Indeed, in many ways, the tariffs that Trump has imposed on China have even helped Xi, vindicating his long-held view that China must rely on itself and that Western powers seek to contain—or reverse—China’s rise.

Of course, all this means that if the details of a completed deal are good, Trump would deserve tremendous credit. A big win, especially following the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, would be a repudiation of the expert class and common wisdom, and a vindication for MAGA. Do I hold out much hope for that? No. Would I give him credit if I’m wrong? Absolutely. If the deal is bad, however, expect TACO memes to take over the internet.

Dan Wang, research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the author of the New York Times bestseller Breakneck: China’s Quest to Engineer the Future:

Negotiations over the terms of the U.S.-China relationship will extend far beyond this meeting. I was living in Beijing during the first trade war, which concluded in 2020. Every time it looked like both sides were close to a deal, one party chose to walk away—and then a new round of escalations kicked off. The first trade war concluded through a desultory truce: the optimistically named Phase One trade deal. There was no Phase Two or Three, because the Covid pandemic broke out before the ink was dry, and the two countries fell into even more bitter recriminations.

This history suggests that no truce is likely to be enduring. Meanwhile, both Trump and Xi have shown that they are not very good at keeping their word, quick as they are to walk away or renegotiate if they feel like a deal no longer suits them. There are too many unresolved questions between the two countries, which are ruled by leaders too easily given to caprice, for the U.S. and China to immediately reach any sort of stable living arrangement.

Tyler Cowen, Free Press columnist and Holbert L. Harris Chair of Economics at George Mason University:

What do I want from a U.S. trade deal with China? Most of all, stability and predictability. America has a great deal it needs to do to “deal with China.” That might include boosting our own supplies of rare-earth elements, maintaining our lead in generative AI, and making sure that enough high-quality chips come from somewhere other than Taiwan.

Vigorous action is required on all these fronts. While we are at the wish-making stage, how about better fiscal policies for long-term sustainability, improved science funding, a more rapid and effective military procurement system, and an education system with fewer holes?

But here is the thing—none of those will be accomplished through a trade deal with China. Success or failure on those fronts will depend solely on ourselves. The purpose of a trade deal, at this point, should simply be to put U.S.-China relations back on a normal footing. We are not going to stop significant supplies of dangerous drugs from entering the United States, no matter what China does or does not agree to. We are not going to end China’s trade surplus with us, nor should we fear that trade surplus. And we are not going to end the ability of the Chinese government to have some influence over the real value of its currency, just as we have that same ability.

We could and should turn the drama down a notch. Whether that is what you will get from this episode in the reality TV season, however, remains to be seen.

Niall Ferguson, Milbank Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and founder of the advisory firm Greenmantle:

We already have a pretty good idea of the deal Donald Trump and Xi Jinping will strike in South Korea on Thursday. In effect, it will be a truce in the “battle of the choke points” that had escalated in recent weeks. In essence, we can expect a respite in the complex conflict over supply chains that pits China’s near-monopoly over rare-earth elements against the American control over the supply of the most sophisticated semiconductors.

On Monday, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese vice premier He Lifeng concluded what Bessent called “a very good two-day meeting,” culminating in a framework deal that combined a delay in China’s rare-earth export controls, an extended tariff truce, Chinese commitments to purchase American soybeans, and cooperation to clamp down on the fentanyl trade. It seems likely that Trump and Xi will confirm this narrow deal on Thursday. In addition, Trump may agree to decrease his 20 percent fentanyl tariffs on China or, less likely, ease export controls on semiconductors. Taiwan may come up, but Secretary of State Marco Rubio seems to have ruled out any change in the U.S. position on the island’s status.

Yet a lasting détente is unlikely to last so long as Beijing’s Damocles’ sword of rare-earth export restrictions hangs over the U.S. and its allies. For that reason, even without U.S. concessions on tariffs or export controls, Beijing is likely to exit the meeting strengthened. If so, it will be difficult to avoid the conclusion that, in the battle of the choke points, Beijing now has escalation dominance.

Michael Dunne, founder and chief executive of auto industry advisory firm Dunne Insights and the author of the forthcoming book Car Wars, on the U.S.-China contest for dominance of the electric vehicle industry:

Drowning in overcapacity and beaten down by brutal price wars in their home market, Chinese automakers would kill for an opportunity to enter the U.S., still the most lucrative car market in the world. Today, imports from China are stopped cold at the border by high tariffs and special restrictions around Chinese automotive hardware and software. But it is next to impossible to imagine Trump reducing tariffs on imports from China, in the possible upcoming trade deal or otherwise.

People sometimes forget that Trump was the first to make a preemptive strike on Chinese car imports when he increased tariffs from 2.5 percent to 27.5 percent in 2018. If Trump does announce some tariff relief, we would want to make sure it’s not an AI deepfake version of the president at the helm. He is, after all, the self-proclaimed “Tariff Man,” and access to the lucrative American market is where he enjoys the most leverage.

Once the door opens for one Chinese automaker, many others would pour in, putting immense pressure on major American companies.

Trump should leave tariffs where they are and take a page from China’s playbook by insisting on a joint manufacturing venture as the price of market access. This is exactly what China forced General Motors, Ford, and every other global automaker except Tesla to do over the past 30 years to enter Chinese markets.

Chinese auto executives tell me that they anticipate opportunities to invest in manufacturing companies in the U.S., but only after the midterm elections, out of fear of triggering political controversy. But they are quick to add there is no telling when President Trump could swing things in a totally unexpected direction. For example, Trump might suddenly announce a major deal where he has convinced a major Chinese automaker to invest several billion dollars into a joint venture with an American partner, creating tens of thousands of jobs and building batteries and battery supply chains for America.

This would be a monumental decision with seismic repercussions. And it would require appropriate protections, including tariffs. After all, once the door opens for one Chinese automaker, many others would pour in, putting immense pressure on major American companies. It would no doubt be better for the consumer in the short term, but potentially devastating for Detroit’s overall automotive industry over the next 10 years. If such a deal comes out of the meetings this week, it could be like a meteor hitting the Motor City—and the rest of the country.

Peter Harrell, nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:

Headlines coming out of the Trump-Xi meeting will highlight the tariff rates Washington and Beijing announce, and how many billions of dollars of U.S. soybeans China commits to buy. The more important strategic issues will be buried in the details and not finalized until next year.

For example, will Trump relax U.S. export controls on high-end U.S. computer chips, siding with advisers who want to keep China hooked on U.S. chips—and against those who worry that better chips might help China develop better artificial intelligence? Will Trump encourage China to invest hundreds of billions of dollars in the U.S., as he has in his deals with Japan and Korea—or will national security officials convince him that Chinese investment in U.S. industry can hurt national security objectives? On the Chinese side, watch for details about suspending China’s recent export controls on rare-earth minerals, which would let American companies keep getting Chinese supply in the short term while the U.S. races to develop its own mines and processing over the next few years.

The best-case scenario is a deal that stabilizes the relationship but continues to treat China as the strategic competitor it is—continuing to reduce ties in strategic industries where the U.S. needs to be cutting its exposure to Chinese, but in a timely and orderly manner that lets American businesses adapt and keeps trade flowing for products that are in America’s interest.

Mark L. Clifford, president of the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation and author of The Troublemaker: How Jimmy Lai Became a Billionaire, Hong Kong’s Greatest Dissident, and China’s Most Feared Critic:

In addition to geopolitics and trade, President Trump’s push to free Hong Kong newspaperman and democracy fighter Jimmy Lai from Chinese jail will be a focal point of Thursday’s summit with Xi Jinping.

Trump has repeatedly spoken of the need to free Lai, most recently telling reporters last week that Lai’s freedom is “on my list” for the meeting with Xi. He earlier tasked Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent with making Lai’s freedom part of trade negotiations with China. This is part of Trump’s broader focus on freeing hostages of foreign governments. Administration officials have claimed at least 73 releases since January.

Lai, a rags-to-riches entrepreneur who came to Hong Kong from mainland China as a penniless 12-year-old, found his first fortune making sweaters before setting up Hong Kong’s most successful pro-democracy newspaper. About five years ago, the Chinese government falsely accused him of “collusion with foreign forces” and “sedition,” and he has been held in solitary confinement for almost the entire time since. He is now awaiting a verdict in a long-running National Security Law trial—widely perceived to be a show trial.

A 77-year-old British citizen and a devout Catholic, Lai counts Pope Leo—who recently met his wife and daughter—and Prime Minister Keir Starmer among his supporters. But only Trump has the leverage to spring him from China’s grip.

Trump needs to help Xi understand that Lai is more trouble in prison, where he draws attention to China’s continuing crackdown on Hong Kong, than he would be if he were allowed to seek medical treatment abroad for the heart palpitations he has been experiencing. Lai’s death in prison—not a far-fetched worry for his family—would make him a martyr and be even more damaging to China than his release. Thursday will be a test of both Trump and Xi’s diplomatic instincts.

Grace Jin Drexel, whose father, Christian minister Ezra Jin, was recently imprisoned by Chinese authorities for practicing his faith:

As a proud naturalized American citizen, I am thankful to be able to freely advocate for my father, Pastor Ezra Jin of Zion Church in China, protected by a government with a proud tradition of protecting religious liberty. Earlier this month, my father, along with 22 other leaders of Zion Church, was detained in one of the largest crackdowns on the Christian community in China in 40 years.

President Trump has already shown himself to be a leader, doing things many thought were impossible—not least orchestrating the release of the final remaining hostages in Gaza.

He has openly mentioned that freeing imprisoned dissident Jimmy Lai is a priority going into these talks. Cases like Jimmy Lai’s, my father’s, and other prisoners of conscience in China are an area of opportunity for President Trump to solidify his legacy as a peacemaker as well as a dealmaker. Addressing these cases would work synergistically with his trade agenda and send a clear signal to China that such brazen acts of aggression and violation of religious freedom will not go unnoticed.

The Free Press earns a commission from any purchases made through all book links in this article.

thefp.com

3. America Doesn’t Have Enough Weapons for a Major Conflict. These Workers Know Why.

Excerpts:

Something is going wrong on the assembly lines of America’s arsenal of democracy, and it’s happening at a moment of crisis. The White House, Pentagon and America’s overseas allies are all demanding that defense companies ramp up production to meet the needs of a dangerous geopolitical moment. America is running short of missiles, munitions and battleships. Allies are waiting years for deliveries. Even the Pentagon has to stand in line and wait for delayed shipments of major weapons, like Hellfire missiles, Javelin rocket launchers and sophisticated air defense interceptors. America is trying to surge its military capacity to produce more munitions, missiles and ships, but to do so, it must rely almost entirely on a group of five Fortune 500 defense companies. And none of these companies seem to be on war footing.

Instead of hiring more workers and paying workers more in an effort to retain them, these companies are far more focused on meeting the demands of Wall Street, trying to entice investors and boost their stock price by cutting costs, as well as using billions of dollars in revenue to pay handsome dividends and buy back shares of stock. Last year, for example, Lockheed Martin gave $6.8 billion in buybacks and dividends directly to its shareholders, which amounted to nearly 10 percent of the company’s total revenue and was larger than the $5.3 billion it kept in profits. The same year, RTX (formerly called Raytheon) paid $3.7 billion to shareholders, General Dynamics paid $3 billion and Northrop Grumman paid $3.7 billion. The billions of dollars they send back shareholders each year means that there is less money to go toward paying, hiring or retaining their employees.

As a result, jobs in defense manufacturing are becoming less and less attractive at a time when they need to be getting far more attractive. Many workers are leaving the field or declining to enter it. A survey by the job recruiting firm Acara found that annual turnover in the defense and aerospace industry hit 13 percent in 2023, compared to an average U.S. rate of 3.8 percent. And this is happening just as the need for those skills is rising. Demand for advanced manufacturing skills in the sector is outpacing the number of trained employees, and 75 percent of defense companies are struggling to find qualified employees, the survey found.

America Doesn’t Have Enough Weapons for a Major Conflict. These Workers Know Why.

This summer, employees at several big defense companies went on strike. Their grievances highlight a much larger problem brewing beneath the surface.

By Christopher Leonard

10/27/2025 05:00 AM EDT

Christopher Leonard is the author of Kochland and The Lords of Easy Money: How the Federal Reserve Broke the American Economy. He is currently writing a book about the U.S. defense industry.

https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2025/10/27/lockheed-martin-strike-orlando-weapons-missiles-00514386

Politico

This summer, employees at several big defense companies went on strike. Their grievances highlight a much larger problem brewing beneath the surface.

Workers strike outside of the Lockheed Martin facility in Orlando, Florida, on May 15, 2025. | Phelan M. Ebenhack via AP

By Christopher Leonard10/27/2025 05:00 AM EDT

ORLANDO, Florida — On the Monday morning of Memorial Day, Randy Tejada arrived at a picket line outside Lockheed Martin’s enormous missile factory here, joining about 40 of his colleagues as they stood on a grassy median nearby, holding signs and waving at the passing cars. The missile factory, strangely, was nestled between Disney World and Universal Studios; a giant Ferris wheel loomed across the street from the picket line, creating an almost festive atmosphere. But Tejada had a serious look about him, like a soldier taking up watch duty. He wore a tee-shirt that said: “Grumpy Old Vet. I do what I want.” The air was sweltering, but Tejada said he wasn’t bothered.

“I can stay here as long as I need to,” he said. “I’ve got experience in standing around for hours.”

He was citing his past career in the military: Tejada is a 32-year-old retired U.S. Army helicopter mechanic who joined Lockheed Martin in 2022 on the assembly line. But this spring, after two years of going back and forth with management over problems with his pay, Tejada, along with several hundred of his Orlando colleagues, decided he’d had enough. Wages weren’t keeping pace with inflation; between late 2020 and mid-2022, for example, workers got a 3 percent pay bump as inflation rose by 12 percent. Their health care plans were expensive, the pensions enjoyed by older workers had vanished and the cost of rent in Orlando was skyrocketing. When Lockheed Martin offered the labor union a new contract this spring, the union asked for double-digit pay increases to cover higher costs. The company offered about 3 to 4 percent instead. On May 1, the employees walked off the job and went on strike. For nearly a month, they left empty the workstations where they once assembled missile components, surveillance systems and other defense equipment. The striking workers heard that Lockheed Martin was employing managers, engineers and contract workers to keep the factory going.

The Lockheed strike was part of a wave of labor unrest that swept America’s military-industrial complex over the past year. On May 1, about 4,000 workers went on strike. Nearly 1,000 of them worked for Lockheed Martin, both at Tejada’s facility in Orlando and at another complex in Denver. It was the first labor strike at the Orlando factory since 1963. Another 3,000 employees went on strike in Hartford, Conn., against Pratt & Whitney, which makes engines and other critical components of Lockheed Martin’s F-35 fighter jet. In mid-May, about 2,500 employees of General Dynamics nearly went on a strike at a nuclear submarine factory, before reaching a last-minute deal that kept them on the factory line. Last fall, 33,000 workers went on strike at Boeing, affecting production of both commercial and military aircraft and winning a 38 percent pay raise after seven weeks.

Something is going wrong on the assembly lines of America’s arsenal of democracy, and it’s happening at a moment of crisis. The White House, Pentagon and America’s overseas allies are all demanding that defense companies ramp up production to meet the needs of a dangerous geopolitical moment. America is running short of missiles, munitions and battleships. Allies are waiting years for deliveries. Even the Pentagon has to stand in line and wait for delayed shipments of major weapons, like Hellfire missiles, Javelin rocket launchers and sophisticated air defense interceptors. America is trying to surge its military capacity to produce more munitions, missiles and ships, but to do so, it must rely almost entirely on a group of five Fortune 500 defense companies. And none of these companies seem to be on war footing.

Instead of hiring more workers and paying workers more in an effort to retain them, these companies are far more focused on meeting the demands of Wall Street, trying to entice investors and boost their stock price by cutting costs, as well as using billions of dollars in revenue to pay handsome dividends and buy back shares of stock. Last year, for example, Lockheed Martin gave $6.8 billion in buybacks and dividends directly to its shareholders, which amounted to nearly 10 percent of the company’s total revenue and was larger than the $5.3 billion it kept in profits. The same year, RTX (formerly called Raytheon) paid $3.7 billion to shareholders, General Dynamics paid $3 billion and Northrop Grumman paid $3.7 billion. The billions of dollars they send back shareholders each year means that there is less money to go toward paying, hiring or retaining their employees.

As a result, jobs in defense manufacturing are becoming less and less attractive at a time when they need to be getting far more attractive. Many workers are leaving the field or declining to enter it. A survey by the job recruiting firm Acara found that annual turnover in the defense and aerospace industry hit 13 percent in 2023, compared to an average U.S. rate of 3.8 percent. And this is happening just as the need for those skills is rising. Demand for advanced manufacturing skills in the sector is outpacing the number of trained employees, and 75 percent of defense companies are struggling to find qualified employees, the survey found.

Take Tejada. He is exactly the kind of employee that the Pentagon desperately wants companies like Lockheed to hire. He’s experienced. He’s patriotic, with military experience. And he wants to build a career in the defense industry. His union in Orlando represents more of those kinds of workers. A lot of the employees in it attended a local community college industrial training center where they learned how to assemble complex circuit boards and to run ultra-high-precision machining tools. And many of them have worked at Lockheed Martin for years, if not decades, building the type of expertise that is currently in such high demand.

On the afternoon of May 1, those employees closed up their workstations, put away their tools and decamped to a grassy median along the west side of the Lockheed missile factory. They set up tents and folding chairs and unfurled large banners with inflammatory declarations about corporate greed and unfair labor practices. The several hundred members of UAW Local 788 launched a campaign that day that would, over the next few weeks, turn into a long and grinding campaign.

For the Pentagon, it should have also been a flashing red light — the latest in a long-simmering labor conflict that, from another angle, is also a growing national-security problem.

The landscape around the strikers was surreal in a particularly American way. Back when the missile factory was first opened in 1957, Orlando was a small town surrounded by cattle ranches and citrus groves. It has since transformed into the Mecca of American escapism. The missile factory is surrounded by Universal theme parks, Walt Disney World and a host of busy hotels and convention centers. On rainy nights along the picket line, the fireworks from Disney World could be heard crackling in the clouds while below, the UAW workers held their positions around the clock. They sat in chairs through the nights and waved their signs in the morning, determined to outlast Lockheed in a battle of attrition.

Historically, in the fight against their bosses, unions have had only one real weapon to wield: their numbers. The primary goal of a labor strike is to blockade production and inflict pain on the company so that it will negotiate better terms. But in Orlando, it was hard for the union to enlist enough workers for the fight. Florida is a “right to work” state, meaning that union membership is optional. Workers in an organized factory are free to return to their stations and get back to work, leaving everyone else on the picket line to fight for a contract that would eventually apply to everyone.

The burden of maintaining a successful picket line rested on the shoulders of hourly workers like Gideon Spence, a 37-year-old machinist at the missile factory who constructs finely honed components of weapons systems for the F-35 and Hellfire missiles. Spence is a burly guy with a thick red beard and bright blue eyes who is obsessively focused on his craft. He operates something called a Computer Numerical Control machine, or CNC for short, that shapes raw metal into precision weaponry, with a margin of error that is measured in the millionth of an inch. Spence is on the younger end of the Lockheed workforce, a member of the new generation of workers that military contractors are trying to attract and train. Lockheed Martin, like other contractors, has suffered a wave of retirements over the last decade as the skilled workforce it built up during the Cold War aged out into retirement, draining the best-trained and most experienced employees. This “experience drain” is a key concern for the Pentagon, which it has primarily addressed through education, such as with vocational programs at community colleges or other centers outside the defense companies themselves. But people like Spence are entering the field and quickly discovering that it’s very different from the one described by industry veterans at the union hall.

Unlike his elders, Spence doesn’t have a pension, he has to pay for more of his health insurance out of pocket, and his pay raises have fallen far behind the rising cost of rent, auto insurance and grocery bills. Spence lives about an hour away from the factory because he can’t afford a place in Orlando. Spence also belonged to a generation that often sees labor unions as a relic of the past. In the 1950s, labor unions represented about 30 percent of private-sector workers in the United States. When Spence joined Lockheed, they represented about 6 percent.

The weakness of the union made it a vulnerable target. On the first day of the strike, just hours after workers took up their picket signs, Lockheed Martin’s labor relations team launched a series of precision strikes that seemed aimed at breaking the union’s resolve. On the first day of the strike, union members received an email from Lockheed’s human resources department, sent to their personal accounts at 1:14 p.m. The email’s subject line read: “Procedure to Resign from the Union and Cross Picket Line.”

The text of the email laid out how anyone could file a letter of resignation from the union, notify their manager of the decision and be back on the job at full pay the next day. The email included carefully written statements pointing out that the H.R. team wasn’t recommending that anyone should do this, which might be a violation of labor law, but was simply explaining how to do it should anyone want to.

Lockheed Martin declined to comment in detail for this story. The company issued a statement in response to several detailed questions, pointing out that it engaged in good faith bargaining with the labor union throughout the strike. “These negotiations reflect our shared commitment to supporting the highly skilled workforce that drives our business and advances our national security mission,” the statement said.

On May 23, after three weeks of the strike, a spokesman for the Pentagon’s Missiles and Space Program Office said the Department of Defense had not yet seen an interruption in delivery for Hellfire and so-called JAGM Missiles, important munitions that are designed in Orlando, although full production is spread across several plants. Both missiles were currently on backorder with multi-year wait times, but it didn’t appear the strike would significantly extend those waits. He added: “We will continue to monitor very closely.”

The history of labor unions and the military-industrial complex can best be described as long and tortured.

There has always been an affinity between the two camps. One of the primary promises of an expanded defense industry is that it provides well-paying jobs around the country, a fact that companies like Lockheed Martin heavily promote. Since the 1950s, labor unions have seen the defense industry as a key lifeline to advanced manufacturing jobs, a trend that only accelerated after deindustrialization swept America starting in the 1970s. The weapons industry has now become one of the last vibrant islands of sophisticated manufacturing work in the United States.

Defense jobs account for about 10 percent of America’s manufacturing output, and the bulk of those jobs are high-end, advanced manufacturing that require a lot of skill and training. Lockheed Martin’s F-35 factory in Fort Worth, Texas, for example, contains a mini-factory within it where engineers and production experts build new robots to automate and streamline more parts of the assembly line. The assembly line itself is staffed by workers who painstakingly install expensive sensors and components into every tiny niche of the plane’s body.

But in important ways, the interests of unions and the defense industry have also always been at odds. Defense contractors and the Pentagon have an overarching interest in making weapons as cheaply as possible, which means keeping labor costs low.

These tensions intensified in the aftermath of the Cold War. In 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin called a group of major defense industry CEOs to a dinner that became known as “the last supper.” The companies were encouraged to merge with one another to reduce their output in an age of shrinking military budgets after the Cold War. They did, consolidating control within five firms. Not even a full decade after those mergers came 9/11, after which military budgets exploded, but the same five firms dominate the market, receiving about one-third of all Pentagon contracts and contributing to about 74 percent of all major weapons systems, according to a 2024 report from the Congressional Research Service. Today, Lockheed is the biggest of all these contractors. It received $313 billion dollars of the $2.4 trillion that went to defense contractors over the past five years, more than twice as much as the next biggest company, RTX, according to a new report by the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and the Costs of War project at Brown University. Lockheed’s F-35 program is the single largest weapons program at the Department of Defense.

These defense companies had tremendous leverage when negotiating with the Pentagon during the War on Terror, according to Frank Kendall, who was the Air Force secretary from 2021 to 2025 and who previously served as head of acquisitions from 2011 to 2017. “With size comes power, and the Department’s experience with large defense contractors is that they are not hesitant to use power for corporate advantage,” Kendall wrote in a 2017 book on the acquisitions system. This meant that the companies would stubbornly bargain for months at a time for higher contract payments or better terms on project upgrades, for example, even when the Pentagon was eager and ready to move forward.

Kendall, while he criticized the companies, also reflected a widespread sentiment inside the Pentagon that the companies also had an imperative to earn profits in order to remain healthy: “Profit isn’t optional for businesses,” he wrote. The key was to make sure that the profit motive could be well-aligned with Pentagon priorities.

But the years after 9/11 would show how difficult it was to align these priorities. During the 2000s, the big defense contractors worked relentlessly to expand their profit margins, make their production lines as lean as possible and boost their annual sales. Raytheon’s stock price nearly quintupled from 2001 to 2021 while Northrop Grumman’s rose nearly 700 percent. Lockheed Martin did exceptionally well between 2001 and 2022, when the company’s stock price rose more than tenfold from $34.68 to $389.13 a share. The profitability came, in part, because Lockheed was focused on keeping labor costs low and supply lines trim.

In Orlando, the factory was running at high production during the War on Terror, said Billy Masters, a missile machinist who was the local union president until 2024. “We couldn’t make enough Hellfire missiles. As soon as we were shipping them, the paint was drying, and they were shooting them off,” Masters recalled during an interview in the local union hall in 2022. Employees felt like they were falling behind, especially in the later years of this long span, from about 2015 to 2022. Masters said in 2022 that many of his employees could barely afford apartments in the Orlando area, and one of his new hires was sleeping in her car. That year, an entry-level employee at the factory earned a minimum of $15.45 an hour, which was less than some service-sector jobs in the area. In 2025, a local Buc-ee’s gas station advertised wages for “restroom crews” starting at $20 an hour and car wash employees at $21 an hour.

A lot of people joined Lockheed because they thought it would provide a good long-term career path, but Masters said they found it difficult to live off the wages as they worked their way up the ladder.

“We cannot keep people!” Masters said. “They bring them in on the low end of the pay scale. … They want cheaper wages. They want to keep the wage down. We’re up against profit over anything else.”

This system delivered plenty of profits and munitions over 20 years of the War on Terror, but it seemed to hit a breaking point after Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022. The following years of grinding trench warfare created a bottomless appetite for munitions that the United States was suddenly giving or selling by the thousands to its allies. America expended vast reserves of everything from Howitzer shells to advanced missile systems, first in Ukraine and then in Israel after the Hamas attack of 2023.

These conflicts were marked departures from the War on Terror, when the United States was mostly conducting anti-insurgency operations in the developing world. Putin’s invasion marked the first conflict with a “near peer” nation, meaning an industrialized country with deep reserves of industrial capacity. Tensions had also already been rising with another near peer country, China, which fueled worries of future munitions shortfalls. This means that Lockheed and its peers had to focus on producing more missiles at a faster rate than it did during the War on Terror.

The companies, and the Pentagon, did not seem up to the task. Spending constraints since 2011, triggered by debate over the debt limit, have led Congress to issue budgets largely through annual continuing resolutions, which undercuts efforts to begin multi-year commitments and contracts necessary that would allow companies like Lockheed to boost missile production. The current wait time for a new Hellfire missile is between two and three years from the time it’s ordered, according to the Department of Defense. The wait for a Javelin missile is about three years.

All of this has saddled Lockheed Martin and other companies with two mandates that are in opposition: If it wanted to dramatically increase its missile output and speed up deliveries, the company would need to invest billions of dollars to boost supply chains and hire workers. But this would cut into free cash flow and could hurt its profits, making the company less attractive to investors. The company might be incentivized to boost production if the Pentagon paid all the upfront costs for expansion. But the Pentagon has not done that, nor has it resorted to using more radical measures like forcing increased production through authorities like the Defense Production Act. This has left companies like Lockheed to work with what they have, trying to satisfy both the Pentagon and its investors at the same time.

The tensions were on stark display in 2023. That year was a good one for Lockheed — the company earned $6.9 billion in profit, up 21 percent from the year before. It also had $6.2 billion in free cash flow, meaning the cash it had available after covering costs for operations and capital investment. The company was in a flush position.

But Lockheed also needed to keep its investors happy. The company’s stock price had been lagging in recent years in large part due to chronic delays on F-35 deliveries, which has suffered from software problems. Boosting dividends and buybacks was an easy way to entice investors. In 2023, Lockheed gave $9.2 billion directly to its shareholders, spending $4 billion to buy back shares of its own stock, and then distributing more than $5 billion in the form of direct cash dividend payments. By contrast, Lockheed spent $3 billion that year on research and capital investment. At the same time, Lockheed sought to trim its operations further to boost its profit margins. The company announced it would cut 1 percent of its workforce during 2024 through hiring freezes and voluntary separations. It implemented a new cost-cutting program called “1LMX” to streamline operations and factory production. In Orlando, factory workers like Spence and Masters said they were repeatedly asked to make their operations more “lean,” which often meant taking on more responsibilities and tasks, along with doing smaller things like keeping tools closer at hand or using special plastic trays where spare parts were grouped in clusters for quicker access.

During a public conference call with investors in early 2024, a stock analyst pointed out that even in the face of these improvements, Lockheed’s profit margins were lower than they had been a decade earlier, during the War on Terror. The Missiles and Fire Control division, which includes the Orlando factory, enjoyed profit margins of 18 percent 10 years ago, the analyst pointed out, but profitability had fallen across most of Lockheed’s divisions by about 2 percent by 2023. This happened in part because the Pentagon was trying to keep overall prices low and limit how much it paid to contractors, forcing Lockheed to keep its own costs low in response, even as production costs were rising.

Lockheed’s CEO, Jim Taiclet, said the company was aware of the problem, and would take action.

“We are taking the shareholders’ interest into account and all the things we talked about, which should help improve our margins,” Taiclet said, adding: “Even though it may result in some difficult discussions with some of the customer base.”

The customer base, of course, was the Department of Defense and foreign governments who were frantically asking for more missiles produced on a faster timeline. These needs needed to be met, but so too did the shareholders’.

The shareholders did well. During 2024, Lockheed gave another $6.8 billion back to them in the form of stock buybacks and dividends.

About a year after that call, in May of 2025, the company’s labor relations team sat down in Orlando to negotiate a new five-year contract for workers. Cherrie Bowen, the local union chairwoman, said her negotiating team asked for a raise of 18 percent during the first year of the contract, helping compensate employees for the previous years of high inflation. Lockheed countered with a raise between 3 and 4 percent, she said. The union came back with an offer of 12 percent but made no headway. Bowen and her team presented this offer to their members, and the members voted to go on strike.

Three weeks later, just before Memorial Day weekend, Lockheed agreed to negotiate again. The company said it wanted to meet at a hotel in Phoenix, Arizona, so it could negotiate in tandem with the Orlando union and their counterparts in the Denver local.

Bowen was shocked by the proceedings. She had believed that Lockheed might have been chastened by the strike, and hurt by a slowdown in production. But the company’s offers were essentially unchanged.

Bowen believed that the company was stalling, and she was worried that it would work. The union held down defections over the previous week, but Bowen was worried more people would fold if she came back to Orlando with nothing, perhaps enough to have the local Orlando union chapter decertified. Bowen and her team decided to present Lockheed’s newest offer to its members. The new offer would bump up the minimum wage at the factory from $15.45 to $20 an hour and the top wage from $36.28 to $41.75 an hour, giving everyone a quick raise, if not as much as they’d hoped for. Annual raises were included for each year, beginning with 4 percent the first year, then 3.5 percent the next two years and finally 3 percent for the final year. A company summary of the offer said it would boost total compensation by 41 percent over five years, when all wages and benefits were accounted for.

There was dismay along the picket line when news of the new offer was made public. The terms were substantially similar to the one they’d already rejected. Three weeks of fighting seemed to have won them only a few feet of territory. The raises were similar to what they had at that time — between 3 and 4 percent a year, rather than the 12-to-18 percent first-year increase the union had asked for.

A vote on the contract was set for Friday, May 30.

As the union debated, another labor union claimed victory in their own dispute. The 3,000 workers at Pratt & Whitney in Connecticut voted to accept a new contract from the company after three weeks on the picket line. That union, called the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, or IAM, achieved some major victories during its walkout. The union won a 6 percent raise in the first year of the contract from their current rate, and it won important job-security promises to stop Pratt & Whitney from shifting jobs to new factories in right-to-work states. This was read as an encouraging sign for other labor organizers.

On May 30, the union in Orlando voted to reject Lockheed’s proposal by a margin of 144 to 99, according to a vote tally shared by an employee. But that wasn’t the end of the matter. Orlando’s vote was tallied along with the union in Denver. When that union’s votes were tallied, the total included enough “yes” votes to ratify the contract. Orlando had been outvoted.

The picket line was taken down over the weekend, and workers were told to return to the factory the following Monday.

The alarm bells are ringing.

In April, the prestigious policy journal Foreign Affairs published a clarion call, highlighting the shortfalls in America’s missile supply chain, of which Lockheed Martin’s Orlando factory is a key component. “The American military suffers from munitions shortages across almost every weapons category,” wrote Michael Brown, the former director of the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit.

Also in April, an Army Lt. Colonel named Sandra Thomas published an essay in the magazine National Defense, urging lawmakers to pass sweeping reforms that might invigorate America’s military-industrial complex and restore its capacity to meet the Pentagon’s needs. She said the current defense industry — the largest and most expensive in American history — is now “too small to surge,” leaving U.S. armed forces and allies short of the materiel they need. It’s a startling statement considering that the five top U.S. defense companies reported a combined $216.7 billion in revenue in 2024, according to the trade magazine DefenseNews.

Thomas was the division chief of a team at the Joint Chiefs of Staff office that studied the defense industrial base and its potential to mobilize more production. She has a background in logistics, and spent much of her time wading through reports and data collected by other staffers and outside think tanks, including surveys of military branches and defense contractors. The findings were sobering. One major survey showed that even the biggest defense companies could not significantly increase production of certain munitions unless they were given, in some cases, billions of dollars and several years to complete the task. The manufacturing base had stripped down to the point that it was running full tilt, meeting most of the Pentagon’s current needs but with no room to grow.

“They were just comfortable,” Thomas said of many big defense contractors. She stressed that she was sharing her personal opinion, and not that of the Joint Chief’s office. But Thomas felt that when the government potentially needed more output from the prime contractors, those companies seemed risk averse to making the investment. “That hurts their bottom line,” she said.

A lack of skilled employees is one of the most important barriers to the industry’s expansion. In mid-January, just before Trump’s inauguration, the Joe Biden administration released a 59-page strategy aimed at reshaping the defense industry to prepare it for a new era of higher production. The strategy had four pillars. It sought to expand the defense supply chain while making it more resilient, reform the Pentagon’s acquisition process and write new trade deals that could stimulate the U.S. defense industrial base.

The fourth pillar was developing a workforce that could actually build the weapons. The strategy report stated the problem bluntly: “The labor market lacks sufficient workers with the right skills to meet domestic production and sustainment demand.” To solve for this problem, the strategy focused on ways to expand the pipeline of trained employees who could apply for jobs at places like Lockheed’s Orlando factory. It recommended investments in job training programs and apprenticeships, along with a $300 million program to connect defense contractors to community training programs that focused on science and manufacturing skills.

While this might increase the number of capable employees in the defense sector, the strategy had very little to say about what might happen to them after they were hired. There was no mention of organized labor, worker pay, benefits, working conditions or other factors that might keep young people in these jobs once they attain them. There was also no mention of the powerful incentives on Wall Street that might dissuade companies from extra hiring, on-the-job-training or major wage increases to attract manufacturing talent.

On June 2, just a month after the strike began, the employees at Lockheed Martin returned to their stations inside the missile factory. Gideon Spence, the machinist, said that many of his tools were in disarray and his machine had been poorly maintained. He suspected that a manager or engineer had been running it with little training. It took him a few days to get everything back in order. He had very little to show, economically speaking, for the weeks he had spent on the picket line. He would get a small raise and a $3,000 “signing” bonus for ratifying the contract, but he and other employees felt like they were returning to work almost back where they had started.

“Honestly, a lot of us feel like it was kind of a defeat,” he said.

Saroj Mayes, a Lockheed employee who assembles circuit boards and single mother living in an extended stay hotel in Orlando, said that her first two weeks back at work were unusually hectic. While Lockheed claimed that production was virtually unhindered by the strike, it appeared to her that there was a large backlog of work to catch up on. She works on a special component for a weapons system (many employees are hesitant to get too specific about their jobs, citing national security concerns). Usually she is asked to complete 20 pieces in a week; on her second week back she was asked to complete 100 pieces. Like Spence, she didn’t gain much ground thanks to the strike. She said her pay was increased from $18.06 to $20. She was wondering if it might be enough to put her over the top in her effort to rent an apartment. She was going to keep trying.

“Supposedly, by the end of this year I’ll be making close to $23 an hour. So with that, I should be able to afford something and be OK. But we’ll see,” she said. “Maybe next year.”

Randy Tejada, the Army veteran, said that his assembly station was in good shape upon his return, other than a few expensive tools that had been broken. He said he had been prepared to stay on the picket line for six months, the amount of time he believed it would take to wring true concessions out of Lockheed. But he had been outvoted. When Tejada joined Lockheed, he was attracted to the idea of building a career there. But now he thinks his talents might be more valued elsewhere. He would consider a transfer within Lockheed, but was also thinking about getting a job from a different company, maybe outside the defense sector.

“I’m definitely looking for other options,” he said, “since I see this company doesn’t take people that serious.”

Politico

4. Is the U.S. Losing in Vietnam? Russia, North Korea and China Are Gaining.

Excerpts:

American officials believed nearly two years ago that Vietnam was about to buy C-130 military transport planes from the United States. In interviews, they said the sale would be a powerful blow to Russia, Hanoi’s main military partner, and a clear sign that geopolitical swing states like Vietnam were tilting toward Washington, not Moscow or Beijing.

At Vietnam’s defense expo last December, the country’s prime minister even climbed aboard a visiting C-130, inspecting the cockpit as U.S. commanders watched. A YouTube video seemed to capture a Vietnamese deputy defense minister telling colleagues that three (or maybe 13) planes had been ordered. But then nothing happened.

Instead, Vietnam has stepped up purchases of Russian military equipment, routing around U.S. sanctions meant to cut off business with Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. Leaked documents and interviews with Vietnamese and Western officials all point to a reinvigorated relationship — a return to distrusting America and relying on Russia, with a surge of high-level meetings and previously undisclosed purchases and partnerships.

The evidence reviewed by The New York Times includes records of Vietnam ordering dozens of complex air-defense systems, and high-tech upgrades for submarines, while seeking fleets of new aircraft. Russia and Vietnam have also continued to expand military-technical cooperation through joint ventures. At least one company in Hanoi, Vietnam’s capital, was added to U.S. and European sanctions and export-control lists in 2024 and 2025, suggesting the business was contributing to Russia’s fight against Ukraine.

Most of the transactions and collaborations with Russia have avoided sanctions enforcement, partly with payment systems hidden in other companies, and because the United States let a lot go, believing it was Vietnam’s partner of choice. But Moscow is getting bolder. While many of the secret purchases began during the Biden administration, they appear to be accelerating with President Trump in power — as are public displays of close relations.

Russia’s state news agency announced last month that a newly ratified protocol with Vietnam would let debts for military equipment be paid in Russian rubles.

...

As it has for a long time, though, Vietnam aims to take the long view. For its leaders, swings in influence now do not dictate future events.

As Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam’s famous nationalist, said in 1966: “Everything depends on the Americans. If they want to make war for 20 years, then we shall make war for 20 years. If they want to make peace, we shall make peace and invite them to tea afterward.”

Is the U.S. Losing in Vietnam? Russia, North Korea and China Are Gaining.

U.S. allies worry that American volatility and Russian outreach and arms sales, in particular, are driving Vietnam into a new phase.

By Damien Cave

Damien covers global affairs from a new bureau in Ho Chi Minh City.

• Published Oct. 27, 2025Updated Oct. 28, 2025, 4:19 a.m. ET

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/27/world/asia/vietnam-russia-relations.html

NY Times · Damien Cave · October 27, 2025

U.S. allies worry that American volatility and Russian outreach and arms sales, in particular, are driving Vietnam into a new phase.

Russian-made howitzers and rocket launchers on parade in September during the celebration of Vietnam’s 80th National Day in Hanoi, the capital.Credit...Linh Pham for The New York Times

U.S. allies worry that American volatility and Russian outreach and arms sales, in particular, are driving Vietnam into a new phase.

Russian-made howitzers and rocket launchers on parade in September during the celebration of Vietnam’s 80th National Day in Hanoi, the capital.Credit...Linh Pham for The New York Times

American officials believed nearly two years ago that Vietnam was about to buy C-130 military transport planes from the United States. In interviews, they said the sale would be a powerful blow to Russia, Hanoi’s main military partner, and a clear sign that geopolitical swing states like Vietnam were tilting toward Washington, not Moscow or Beijing.

At Vietnam’s defense expo last December, the country’s prime minister even climbed aboard a visiting C-130, inspecting the cockpit as U.S. commanders watched. A YouTube video seemed to capture a Vietnamese deputy defense minister telling colleagues that three (or maybe 13) planes had been ordered. But then nothing happened.

Instead, Vietnam has stepped up purchases of Russian military equipment, routing around U.S. sanctions meant to cut off business with Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. Leaked documents and interviews with Vietnamese and Western officials all point to a reinvigorated relationship — a return to distrusting America and relying on Russia, with a surge of high-level meetings and previously undisclosed purchases and partnerships.

The evidence reviewed by The New York Times includes records of Vietnam ordering dozens of complex air-defense systems, and high-tech upgrades for submarines, while seeking fleets of new aircraft. Russia and Vietnam have also continued to expand military-technical cooperation through joint ventures. At least one company in Hanoi, Vietnam’s capital, was added to U.S. and European sanctions and export-control lists in 2024 and 2025, suggesting the business was contributing to Russia’s fight against Ukraine.

Most of the transactions and collaborations with Russia have avoided sanctions enforcement, partly with payment systems hidden in other companies, and because the United States let a lot go, believing it was Vietnam’s partner of choice. But Moscow is getting bolder. While many of the secret purchases began during the Biden administration, they appear to be accelerating with President Trump in power — as are public displays of close relations.

Russia’s state news agency announced last month that a newly ratified protocol with Vietnam would let debts for military equipment be paid in Russian rubles.

“The law was signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin,” a Russian statement said.

Vietnamese officials say that their country is simply being pragmatic. Russia has been supplying most of their weapons for decades; Vietnam’s diversification process takes time. But after a pause prompted by Russia invading Ukraine in 2022 — and a drive toward other partners, which the Biden administration had encouraged — Vietnam is back in business with Moscow in ways that could reshape security calculations across Asia.

Much of the region now worries that President Trump, who will be in South Korea this week for the APEC summit meetings, is pushing Hanoi further away, making Asia more dangerous by alienating not just allies but also newer partners.

A U.S. Air Force C-130 transport plane displayed during the Vietnam International Defense Expo in Hanoi last December.Credit...Luong Thai Linh/EPA, via Shutterstock

The groundbreaking ceremony for a new Trump hotel and golf course development in Vietnam in May. The project’s land seizures have infuriated local residents.Credit...Linh Pham for The New York Times

Exasperation with the United States has been building in Vietnam. Blow by blow, it has risen with the elimination of American aid for clean energy and H.I.V. prevention, up-and-down tariffs, indifference to requests for a leader-to-leader meeting, a Trump family golf development near Hanoi that has enraged local residents, and surprises like the new tax on U.S. imports of furniture — one of Vietnam’s priority industries for growth.

It has been 50 years since the war with America ended, but Vietnam is still dominated by factions that either distrust or welcome the West. What Mr. Trump is now doing, according to analysts and officials, is empowering America skeptics and angering America fans.

Near the end of the Biden administration, Vietnam worried about being seen as too close to the United States. Now, in private meetings, Vietnam’s leaders have expressed shock at what they described as a confusing and unfair reversal under the Trump administration that disregards Vietnam’s embrace of a comprehensive strategic partnership.

“The unpredictability of Trump’s policies has made Vietnam very skeptical about dealing with the United States,” said Nguyen The Phuong, a security analyst at the University of New South Wales in Australia. “It’s not only trade but the difficulty of reading his mind and actions.”

New Alignments

Vietnam insists that relations with the United States remain strong. Anna Kelly, a White House spokeswoman, said the American people were benefiting.

“Under President Trump’s leadership, the United States has a great relationship with Vietnam,” she said in response to emailed questions, “which is how the President was able to open Vietnamese markets to American goods.”

But in Japan, South Korea and Australia — and in the American institutions that deal with long-term foreign policy — concern about losing Vietnam keeps growing.

Russia is not the only worry. Vietnam’s leader, To Lam, recently visited North Korea and agreed to cooperate on defense. A few days after Mr. Trump’s “liberation day” tariffs slapped a 46 percent tariff on Vietnamese exports (which was later reduced), China’s leader, Xi Jinping, received a red-carpet welcome in Hanoi. Vietnam then accelerated plans for three cross-border railway projects that Beijing had been seeking for years.

China’s premier, Li Qiang, center, Kim Jong-un of North Korea and To Lam of Vietnam, in a photograph that was distributed by a Russian state media agency, at a commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the North Korea’s Workers’ Party this month in Pyongyang.

Mr. Lam and Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, in April at the Presidential Palace. Amid U.S. tariff surprises, observers have noted Vietnam leaning more toward Russia and China.Credit...Pool photo by Luong Thai Linh

Vietnam has a long history of independence and post-Cold War neutrality. But officials from the region’s democracies now fear that Hanoi is encouraging more “red nationalism” across society and slipping out of its traditional balance between powers.

An alignment or leverage that would make Hanoi more likely to side with China, Russia or North Korea in disputes could lead to a pullback from other partners. South Korea and Japan are Vietnam’s largest sources of foreign investment. Tokyo is building coast guard patrol boats for Vietnam in the hope that they will help monitor and counter Chinese aggression in Asian sea lanes.

In some corners of Washington, too, Vietnam’s choices are facing increased scrutiny. A congressional official said that Congress was briefed this year on a classified assessment of Vietnam’s military acquisitions and upgrades of naval and air defenses.

It was an early warning of growing alarm about the risks of American disengagement in Asia.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is scheduled to make his first official visit to Vietnam in early November. Some Vietnamese and American officials, who requested anonymity to avoid repercussions for addressing sensitive topics, said they hoped that the discussions would revive the two countries’ relationship, or at least prevent further decline.

Along with addressing war legacy issues, like unexploded ordnance, potential purchases are expected to be discussed. Three Vietnamese officials said the C-130s are back in play. Vietnam has also expressed an interest in co-producing unmanned drones — a key component for the outposts it has been fortifying in the South China Sea to fend off Beijing’s competing claims over waterways and the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

Vietnam’s Air Defense and Air Force commander, Maj. Gen. Vu Hong Son, confirmed last month in an essay that major purchases were on the way, including “trainer aircraft, fighter jets, missile systems, antiaircraft guns and new-generation radar systems.”

He did not say where the hardware would come from.

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Some diversification has already happened. Vietnam has started building its own weapons and made modest defense deals with Israel and India, along with a few others.

Though most of its weapons come from Russia, Vietnam is starting to diversify with its own designs. Vietnamese-made TLDK-35 surface-to-air missiles were on display at the exhibition in Hanoi in September.Credit...Linh Pham for The New York Times

Drones developed in Vietnam were also on view at the National Day parade.Credit...Linh Pham for The New York Times

But Vietnam has mostly rebounded to Russia. When Mr. Putin visited in June 2024 — his first trip to Asia since 2018 — he was joined by the head of the Russian state arms exporting company, Rosoboronexport. By that point, Vietnam was already making clandestine plans to buy Russian weapons with secret payments routed through an oil and gas joint venture, according to a 2023 document from Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance.

Vietnam was hedging. The United States figured the C-130s were next. But that deal froze, and Russia’s kept going.

Documents from another Russian defense exporter leaked last month by a pro-Ukrainian hacker group, black8mirror, show that Vietnam was set to receive nine electronic warfare systems in 2024 for Russia’s Su-35, an agile Sukhoi fighter jet. Another 26 components for mobile ground-based systems that can jam radar-guided missiles were to be delivered in 2025 at a listed cost of $189,739,535.

Records from the company, Rostec, also include references to Vietnam seeking new “anti-submarine helicopters” and advanced periscopes for submarines.

Previously unreported, the air-defense orders suggested to analysts — who confirmed that the documents offered a credible glimpse of Vietnam’s plans — that a deal for Su-35s and other aircraft was probably already done. One of several Vietnamese officials who confirmed large orders from Russia said the country purchased 40 new Su-35 and Su-30 fighter jets, as part of a deal worth $8 billion, with deliveries delayed as Moscow searches for ways to supply its own war effort and foreign customers.

“The Russians have been very adept at finding workarounds, including defense exports through third countries,” said Ian Storey, the author of “Putin’s Russia and Southeast Asia: The Kremlin’s Pivot to Asia and the Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War.”

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has drawn Vietnam ever closer to Moscow, including making an official visit to Hanoi in 2024.Credit...Kristina Kormilitsyna/Sputnik, via Reuters

The Russian Rosoboronexport stand at Vietnam’s military expo in 2024.Credit...Luong Thai Linh/EPA, via Shutterstock

For the United States, closer military ties and the sale of F-16 fighter jets, though much discussed, have not materialized.

“Trump is the key point,” said Mr. Phuong, the security analyst in Australia, whose Ph.D. dissertation is about Vietnam’s military. “One official told me that if there is a naval conflict between Vietnam and China, and if Vietnam buys F-16s from the United States, and if Trump thinks that he could make some concession with China, then the United States will ban Vietnam from using the F-16s.”

Disruption Ahead

Vietnam’s concerns have not kept it from rushing to win over Mr. Trump. One avenue has been to fast-track the Trump Organization golf complex (earning the president $5 million, financial records show). Hanoi has also promised to buy more from the United States and to keep China from illegally routing exports through Vietnam to avoid U.S. tariffs.

This young country of 100 million sends nearly a third of what it makes to America — and there is nothing Hanoi wants more than certainty for trade.

Even before Mr. Trump won re-election last fall, Mr. Lam was requesting a meeting, to no avail. Hanoi’s trade negotiators are also desperate for details on new “country of origin” rules and future industry-specific tariffs, which have not been part of the trade announcements coinciding with Mr. Trump’s arrival in Asia this weekend.

“Trump regards this as an ongoing reality show — more ‘deals’ or further tariff increases are almost certain to follow,” said Stephen Olsen, a former U.S. trade negotiator who is now a senior fellow at the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.

Russia has been quick to exploit the growing distance.

Mr. Putin invited and hosted Mr. Lam and his wife in Moscow in May. On Sept. 2, Russian troops marched through Hanoi with Vietnamese regiments for National Day, reaffirming “the pivotal role of defense cooperation,” according to Vietnamese state media. Two weeks later, one of Mr. Putin’s closest aides, Nikolai Patrusev, was in Hanoi discussing maritime security.

Russian soldiers joined Vietnam’s National Day parade in September, a sign of renewed defense cooperation.Credit...Linh Pham for The New York Times

All of the back and forth suggests that for Mr. Putin, Asia has become a place to disrupt American and Chinese plans, and to counter the argument that their rivalry is all that matters.

“Russia under Putin wants to be an independent great power,” said Michael A. McFaul, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia, “not just the junior partner in the autocratic world.”

Beijing seems unconcerned, saying little publicly but still making theatrical displays of its influence.

Chinese troops joined Vietnamese military parades in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi this year — in a country that fought Chinese domination for 1,000 years. Vietnam, Russia and North Korea all sent high-level delegations to Beijing for China’s own extravagant military parade.

Mr. McFaul said that when he meets with China’s Russia experts, their nationalist self-regard dilutes anxiety about Mr. Putin.

“They don’t respect Russia as a great country,” he said. “They see them as a bunch of peasants. The Chinese have a sense of themselves, like, ‘We’ve been a great power for thousands of years, we’re there again, while these guys, the Russians, they’re on the periphery of the global system.’”

As it has for a long time, though, Vietnam aims to take the long view. For its leaders, swings in influence now do not dictate future events.

As Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam’s famous nationalist, said in 1966: “Everything depends on the Americans. If they want to make war for 20 years, then we shall make war for 20 years. If they want to make peace, we shall make peace and invite them to tea afterward.”

A statue of Ho Chi Minh at Vietnam’s National Day commemoration in September.Credit...Linh Pham for The New York Times

Reporting was contributed by Tung Ngo from Hanoi, Vietnam; Eric Schmitt from Washington; Anton Troianovski from Berlin; and Oleg Matsnev from Munich.

Damien Cave leads The Times’s new bureau in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, covering shifts in power across Asia and the wider world.

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 10 of the New York edition

See more on: Russia-Ukraine War, Vladimir Putin

NY Times · Damien Cave · October 27, 2025

5. Putin Is Slowly Losing Control of the Ukraine War

What does he do when he recognizes he has lost control? What comes next?

Putin Is Slowly Losing Control of the Ukraine War

nationalsecurityjournal.org · David Kirichenko · October 27, 2025

Key Points and Summary – Ukraine has shifted strategy from the front to Russia’s rear, using long-range drones and missiles to hit refineries, depots, and industry—2,000 km deep in some cases.

-The campaign is generating fuel shortages, airport shutdowns, rolling blackouts, and rising costs that rattle Russian citizens and elites.

President Donald J. Trump participates in a bilateral meeting with the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin during the G20 Japan Summit Friday, June 28, 2019, in Osaka, Japan. (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)

-Kyiv aims to crack “deathnomics” by attacking the revenues and comforts that sustain the war.

-As defenses stretch to protect refineries and cities, Russia faces shrinking oil income, tax hikes, and a tightening budget.

-With Ukraine scaling domestic strike systems and navigation that beats GPS jamming, the pressure inside Moscow will grow—and the Kremlin can’t ignore it.

Ukraine Is Bringing the War Home to Moscow

The last thing Vladimir Putin expected from his bunker in Moscow in early 2022 was that his army would be ground down fighting for mere inches of territory more than three and a half years into the full-scale invasion. Now, Ukrainian drones buzz across Russia, as Kyiv strikes oil refineries, including one 2,000 kilometers away on Putin’s birthday. For the past two years, Kyiv has increasingly brought the war home to Moscow’s elites.

Ukraine On the March

In the days leading up to May’s Victory Day parade, Ukrainian drones were already buzzing near Moscow. Kyiv said China asked Ukraine not to strike the Kremlin while Xi Jinping was in attendance, likely because it doubted Moscow’s ability to protect him.

For years, both Russian and foreign observers saw Putin as a shrewd, calculating statesman—a leader whose luck and timing always seemed to favor him, until his army met the Ukrainians on the battlefield.

President Donald J. Trump welcomes Russian President Vladimir Putin to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Anchorage, Alaska, August 15, 2025 (DoD photo by Benjamin Applebaum)

Putin’s rise to power in the early 2000s coincided with a surge in global gas prices that filled Russia’s coffers. Throughout his presidency, a social contract has existed: Putin could pursue his imperial ambitions, as long as ordinary Russians didn’t suffer too extensively, and as long as the rent-seeking elites could pillage the country’s resources. Putin thought it all too easy after his 2014 invasion of Crimea, when the West was too scared to act.

The 2022 invasion proved a nightmare for the Kremlin. Bogged down in a war of attrition, Russia resorted to “meatgrinder” assaults against Ukrainian defensive positions, and the bodies began piling up. Kyiv realized that killing Russian soldiers en masse would not be enough to stop them.

As long as there was money to be made, Russians would keep fighting. So Ukraine invested heavily in a long-range drone fleet, striking at the oil revenues that fund the Kremlin’s war machine.

Deathnomics

Kyiv understands that increasing pressure on both the Russian public and the elites is key to ending the war. “That is why only pressure can stop this war,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in a televised evening speech in early October.

A phenomenon that Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev calls “deathnomics” has created a new artificial middle class in Russia, as for many, the war is a way to earn income they wouldn’t have otherwise received. Mothers and wives sometimes encourage loved ones to sign up rather than fall into unemployment or alcoholism, as death payments and battlefield wages can enrich a family. Over time, many Russians became comfortable with the war’s costs.

Putin, speaking to Russian women who had lost their sons in the war in November 2022, told one mother: “Some people die of vodka, and their lives go unnoticed. But your son really lived and achieved his goal. He didn’t die in vain.”

Yet that uneasy stability is starting to crack. Relentless drone strikes from Ukraine are beginning to reverse that complacency. Attacks on fuel depots and energy infrastructure have produced widespread fuel shortages; a thriving black market for gasoline has emerged in some regions. First, people complained about rising prices, then about empty pumps across Russia.

In late September, stations in Moscow and the surrounding region ran dry of Russia’s most popular 92- and 95-octane gasoline grades, forcing drivers to hunt across multiple stations as prices soared above 100 rubles per liter.

The Russian People are Bracing

Russian media recently reported that older Russians who remember the collapse of the Soviet Union are now stocking up on shelf-stable foods in anticipation of further shortages driven by the fuel shortages.

Cities such as Belgorod have endured rolling blackouts after Ukrainian strikes on energy sites. “They cannot be allowed to feel comfortable. And when they no longer feel comfortable, they will begin to raise questions with their leadership,” Zelensky said.

In Moscow and other regions throughout 2025, airports have repeatedly shut down or delayed flights due to Ukrainian drone attacks. Between January and May, Russian airports were shut down 217 times due to Ukrainian drone attacks – more than in all of 2023 and 2024 combined – disrupting tens of thousands of passengers and costing airlines over 1 billion rubles. On September 22, The Moscow Times reported that more than 200 flights were delayed or canceled in the Russian capital following a mass drone strike.

Kyiv’s long-range drones often rely on Russian mobile networks for navigation and reconnaissance, prompting the Kremlin to impose widespread blackouts across dozens of regions. These outages have tripled since June, costing Russia an estimated $557 million per hour in lost productivity, with a $115 impact in Moscow alone.

Moscow’s military budget is also shrinking for the first time since 2022, dropping from $163 billion to $156 billion amid inflation and sanctions. Putin is raising taxes and cutting spending to keep the war going. Russia’s oil and gas export revenues fell by about 25% in September compared with the same month last year. Speaking on October 19, Zelensky said he expects Russia to face a budget deficit of nearly $100 billion by 2026.

Meanwhile, Ukraine is scaling production of long-range missiles and strike systems designed to further squeeze Russia’s logistics and energy lifelines, which will intensify the economic pain for the Kremlin.

At the same time, Ukraine’s defense firms are rapidly innovating. Denis Shtilerman, chief designer at Fire Point, the company behind the FP-1 drone, responsible for about 60% of deep strikes on Russian territory, and the domestic FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile, said it remains “very difficult to reach Moscow” because of its dense air-defense ring and helicopter patrols. Yet Fire Point is developing drones that can navigate without GPS, using a low-altitude night map-matching system to help overcome electronic warfare defenses.

However, the balance is already shifting. In a May interview, Putin said, “We have enough strength to bring what was started in 2022 to a logical conclusion.” Buoyed by overconfidence, he dismissed repeated, at times desperate, attempts by Trump to negotiate a peace deal. But throughout 2025, Ukraine was growing stronger technologically. Now it is Zelensky who cautions Russian leaders to “know where the bomb shelters are.”

Following Trump’s last attempt to meet with Putin in Budapest, which was called off after Russia refused to soften its hardline stance on the war, The Wall Street Journal reported that Washington had quietly lifted a key restriction on Ukraine’s use of Western-supplied long-range missiles. The White House denied the report. Yet on October 22, Kyiv used Western-supplied Storm Shadow missiles to strike an explosives plant in Bryansk, penetrating Russian air defenses.

If Ukraine continues deep-strikes at factories that support the Kremlin’s war effort, Russia will be forced to stretch its already-thin air defenses even further. That, in turn, would allow larger waves of Ukrainian drones to increase pressure on Moscow and even St. Petersburg, forcing the political and economic elites there to confront the threat of war at home.

And if history is any guide, once the war’s pressure intensifies on the Muscovites, even the Kremlin’s walls cannot stand unshaken.

About the Author: David Kirichenko

David Kirichenko is an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. His work on warfare has been featured in the Atlantic Council, Center for European Policy Analysis, and the Modern Warfare Institute, among many others. He can be found on X/Twitter @DVKirichenko.

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6. US Army officer’s death in Dhaka raises questions amid shifting political winds

Seemingly strange circumstances.

Is the Sunday Guardian building a conspiracy theory here?

Based on reports, it appears that he was no longer an active duty officer who was now working for Boeing doing aviation-systems work who likely died of natural causes.

But here is the conspiracy theory:

His death came less than a year after the ouster of Sheikh Hasina and the installation of Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus’s interim government in August 2024—a transition described by several Bangladeshi commentators as influenced by U.S. diplomacy and aid programmes. Washington has denied any role in those events, calling them Bangladesh’s “internal political process.” Jackson’s combination of rank, regional experience, and technical expertise—coupled with the absence of an autopsy and the speed of diplomatic repatriation—has deepened speculation over what he was doing in Dhaka. Officials in both countries continue to describe his death as non-suspicious but offer no further clarity. To those who knew him, Jackson was “the kind of man who prepared for everything.”

US Army officer’s death in Dhaka raises questions amid shifting political winds

By: Abhinandan Mishra

Last Updated: October 26, 2025 04:18:38 IST

Senior U.S. Army officer Terrence “TJ” Jackson died quietly in a Dhaka hotel, raising questions due to his military background, lack of autopsy, and timing after Bangladesh’s political transition. (Image: Ref)

sundayguardianlive.com

7K

New Delhi: The quiet death of Terrence Arvelle “TJ” Jackson, a 50-year-old American national and senior U.S. Army officer, inside a Dhaka hotel has stirred unease in diplomatic and security circles—not only for the secrecy surrounding his work in Bangladesh, but also for its timing, coming months after the country’s dramatic change of government. Jackson, who was based in Raeford, North Carolina, near Fort Liberty—headquarters of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command—was found unresponsive in Room 808 of The Westin Dhaka on the morning of 31 August 2025, according to police documents reviewed by The Sunday Guardian. He had checked in two days earlier after what officials described as “several months in Bangladesh on business.” CCTV footage from the hotel showed no irregular activity, and his body was released to the U.S. Embassy Dhaka without a local autopsy. Authorities listed the preliminary cause as natural. Information obtained by The Sunday Guardian shows that Jackson was no ordinary soldier.

A LinkedIn profile in Jackson’s name—also referenced by several individuals on social media who claimed to know him—listed a career spanning more than two decades in the U.S. Army, including multiple combat deployments and temporary duty assignments across the Asia theater as well as advanced command roles. He identified his current position as Command Inspector General with the 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), the apex administrative and oversight arm of America’s Green Berets. His prior specializations included Infantry Officer(11A) and Special Forces Officer (18A)—fields requiring elite qualifications and leadership certification. The same profile mentioned a bachelor’s degree from The Citadel and a master’s in Defense Analysis (2016-2019) from the Naval Postgraduate School. However, The Sunday Guardian confirmed that the account remained active for weeks after his reported death on 31 August, raising questions about whether the profile was being maintained by him or by another party. In light of this uncertainty, the publication has not relied on the account to verify his current designation.

In early September, a spokesperson for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) stated that “all currently serving personnel who are assigned to the command are accounted for and present,” implying that the LinkedIn profile attributed to Jackson and the individual who died in Dhaka may not belong to the same person. The Army added that it had “no ongoing operations in Dhaka.” A personal tribute posted online by a close friend, verified by The Sunday Guardian, depicted him as calm, analytical, and passionate about radio-controlled aviation, but also noted that he had been in Bangladesh for several months on an assignment linked to aviation-systems work. The post confirmed his date of death as 31 August and recalled that he was preparing to retire within two years. The photograph shared in the tribute matched the officer whose LinkedIn profile is being referenced in media reports.

The Sunday Guardian has reached out to the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Embassy in Dhaka for comment. Queries have also been sent to Boeing Co. and its subsidiary Insitu, for which Jackson was reportedly working while in Dhaka. A response was awaited at the time of going to press. His death came less than a year after the ouster of Sheikh Hasina and the installation of Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus’s interim government in August 2024—a transition described by several Bangladeshi commentators as influenced by U.S. diplomacy and aid programmes. Washington has denied any role in those events, calling them Bangladesh’s “internal political process.” Jackson’s combination of rank, regional experience, and technical expertise—coupled with the absence of an autopsy and the speed of diplomatic repatriation—has deepened speculation over what he was doing in Dhaka. Officials in both countries continue to describe his death as non-suspicious but offer no further clarity. To those who knew him, Jackson was “the kind of man who prepared for everything.”

sundayguardianlive.com

7. Norway: Russian Arctic Nukes Targeting America

Norway: Russian Arctic Nukes Targeting America

https://www.newsmax.com/world/globaltalk/norway-russia-nuclear-weapons/2025/10/26/id/1231925/

newsmax.com · Jim Thomas · October 26, 2025

Norway is warning that Russia has positioned a large nuclear arsenal in the Arctic Circle, now oriented toward the U.S. and NATO allies, underscoring rapidly escalating strategic tensions that Western officials say are expanding beyond Ukraine into the High North, Newsweek reported.

Norwegian Defense Minister Tore Sandvik said Russia has intensified the deployment of nuclear weapons and advanced submarine platforms on its Arctic Kola Peninsula, an area long recognized as the core of Moscow's strategic deterrence and second-strike capability.

In an interview with Britain's Daily Telegraph published Friday, Sandvik described the buildup as a direct threat beyond regional borders.

"Russia is building up on the Kola Peninsula ... where one of the largest arsenals of nuclear warheads in the world is located. [The nuclear weapons] are not only pointed towards Norway, but towards the U.K. and over the pole towards Canada and the U.S."

He said Norway has observed tests of nuclear-capable hypersonic missiles, nuclear-powered torpedoes, and upgraded ballistic submarine units.

"We are the eyes and ears of NATO in this area," he added, stressing that the buildup is ongoing even as Russia fails to achieve battlefield breakthroughs in Ukraine.

Sandvik pointed to two strategic maritime gaps that NATO analysts have monitored since the Cold War: the Bear Gap between Norway and the Svalbard archipelago, and the GIUK Gap among Greenland, Iceland, and the U.K.

Both gaps serve as submarine transit routes into the North Atlantic.

"Putin needs to establish what is called the Bastion defense. He needs to control the Bear Gap to make sure that he can use his submarines and the Northern Fleet. And he wants to deny [NATO] allies access to the GIUK Gap," Sandvik said.

Moscow's Northern Fleet, founded in 1733 and housing strategic nuclear submarines, has remained intact despite heavy Russian losses in Ukraine, according to Sandvik.

"Even though Putin is losing heavily in Ukraine, he has lost 1 million soldiers, [but] the Northern Fleet is intact. And they are developing it. They have a new frigate and a new multirole submarine, developed just in the last two years. The most threatening thing about Russia right now is its submarines."

The warning comes amid intensified escalation between Washington and Moscow.

President Donald Trump this week announced a sanctions package targeting Russian oil giants Rosneft and Lukoil and publicly rejected what he called a "wasted meeting" with Vladimir Putin in Budapest after Russia refused to commit to a ceasefire.

Strategic analysts have long treated the Arctic as one of the most sensitive nuclear flashpoints.

Russia has shown no indication it intends to scale back operations, Western officials say, especially if Ukraine receives longer-range U.S. or NATO missile systems such as Tomahawks.

Norway's warning is the latest to signal that the Arctic theater — not just Eastern Europe — may define the next stage of global confrontation.

Jim Thomas 

Jim Thomas is a writer based in Indiana. He holds a bachelor's degree in Political Science, a law degree from U.I.C. Law School, and has practiced law for more than 20 years.

newsmax.com · Jim Thomas · October 26, 2025

8. Making Waves: Looking Beyond Today’s Illusory ‘Icebreaker Gap’ and Troubled PSC Program to a Cheap, Quiet, and Plentiful Polar Sub Fleet for Tomorrow

Excerpts:

It’s time, I believe, for America to truly Build Back Better (as former President Biden aptly described, building upon the foundation established during the first Trump administration). One might add, budget-wise too –not following down the rabbit hole of hype and hysteria associated with the illogical and largely illusory icebreaker gap.

Russia may well need 40 icebreakers to keep its Northern Sea Route open for business. Canada may in time need that many – if Ottawa ever decides to open its own circuitous, shallow, and largely uncharted Northwest Passage (still a big if). And while China has done diplomatic wonders with its flotilla of five icebreakers in American polar waters, this is mostly smoke and mirrors, as China has no Arctic territory at all, so its feisty flotilla is Beijing’s Arctic presence. And as I explained above: America is the undisputed sovereign of Alaska, and need not counter Beijing’s flotilla with our own. From Alaska’s southeast archipelago to the dateline crossing the Aleutian Islands chain, to the infrastructure-rich North Slope (and a deep-water port forthcoming in the south Seward Peninsula community of Nome), America has plenty of Arctic presence.

If Washington seeks to assert a more mobile and persistent maritime presence off Alaska’s shores, a fleet of my proposed Hickel-class subs could keep the Chinese, or any polar interloper, for that matter, in line. Indeed, whether in time we face off against China and/or Russia as many fear, or Greenland and/or Canada as I imagine to be more likely at present, or just against retreating polar ice and rising polar seas as is in fact most probable, it remains imperative that America fulfill the vision of William H. Seward first articulated in his September 14, 1853 Destiny of America speech calling for America to become a polar power, and in so doing to ascend to the pinnacle of global power (172 years ago to the day this article was written).

On our important and ongoing polar journey, America can and indeed must do a better job understanding the Arctic and its place in our warming and increasingly dynamic world – and more smartly defending our corner of it.

Making Waves: Looking Beyond Today’s Illusory ‘Icebreaker Gap’ and Troubled PSC Program to a Cheap, Quiet, and Plentiful Polar Sub Fleet for Tomorrow

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/10/28/making-waves-looking-beyond-todays-illusory-icebreaker-gap-and-troubled-psc-program-to-a-cheap-quiet-and-plentiful-polar-sub-fleet-for-tomorrow/

by Barry Scott Zellen

|

10.28.2025 at 06:00am

News headlines flashed red and bated Beltway breaths were anxiously held as China deployed its (dubiously) menacing armada of five icebreakers – the Xue Long 2, Tan Suo San Hao, Zhongshandaxue Ji Di, Ji Di, and Shen Hai Yi Hao – into America’s extended continental shelf (ECS) in August. Ever ready for the moment (Semper Paratus, Latin for “always prepared,” after all is its motto!) the United States Coast Guard proudly deployed its newest icebreaker – alongside its medium polar icebreaker Healy and a cutter – the reconditioned Storis, whose new name is Old Norse for “large ice,” even though this newest member of America’s icebreaker fleet is most famous for being swamped on its maiden voyage to Alaska in 2012 as the (formerly) private vessel Aiviq.

With a history this inglorious, the misguided top brass at U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) headquarters – after sinking $2 billion into the much delayed and much over budget Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program (built upon the 2012 launch of a USCG heavy polar icebreaker acquisition program and 2016 establishment of an integrated program office with the Navy) aiming to “Build Back Better” a new fleet of American-made icebreakers but spending more than an Ohio-class nuclear sub costs with (so far) nothing to show for this mini-Manhattan Project of American innovation other than a deepening pool of red ink – decided to buy the controversial Aiviq and refurbish it, design flaws and all, as a quick fix to its growing PR problem. In their self-perceived view, America, the sovereign power that has possessed Alaska for almost 160 years, somehow has an inadequate “Arctic presence” and is so desperate to remedy this (mis)perception that even an ill-designed icebreaker with a dubious haunted history will do.

The Aiviq is not just any icebreaker. It may well be the worst icebreaker for the job. A ProPublica investigation found the Aiviq was already infamous for its “troubled history.” This starts with its “maiden voyage to Alaska” that “ended in a rescue at sea and a Coast Guard investigation,” and includes an “influential donor” who “has made more than $7 million in political contributions since 2012” during which they “sought to sell or lease the ship.” And it culminates in the “Coast Guard’s $125 million purchase of the Aiviq, made under congressional pressure” that followed “the service’s failure to get its preferred, $1 billion model built.” Asks ProPublica, “So how would the U.S. Coast Guard use the Aiviq beyond flag-waving and general presence in the near Arctic? According to [Lawson W.] Brigham, the former icebreaker captain and polar-shipping expert, ‘No one that I know, no study that I’ve seen, no one I’ve talked to really knows.’”

As Malte Humpert reported last year in High North News, “The U.S. Polar Security Cutter program continues to face headwinds. Five years after signing a construction contract, the vessel continues to exist only on the drawing board, with the design still waiting to be finalized. Delivery will now occur no earlier than 2029.” With Beijing’s choreographed deployment of five icebreakers to polar waters America claims as part of its ECS, it is both ironic and potentially tragic that our leaders have embraced the controversial Storis for our collective salvation. Humpert more recently reported in the pages of gCaptain, citing Australian military scholar Elizabeth Buchanan, that: “The U.S. might be an Arctic nation but decades of taking their eye off the prize are coming home to roost – and the next decade is certainly not going to be smooth sailing in the contested maritime domain. No matter the policy commitment, Washington simply can’t magic capability overnight.” But rather than throw two billion dollars at the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program, or even $125 million for the Storis, there are other paths to a more secure Arctic and a more robust, meaningful, and sustained American Arctic presence.

Since its inception, I have instead proposed that America abandon the money pit of the PSC program altogether. Instead, create a new class of “cheap and quiet” diesel-electric submarines, modeled on and inspired by Sweden’s Stirling engine (a quiet and enduring air-independent propulsion (AIP) system) powered Gotland-class subs that have run circles around our own carrier strike groups (CSGs) in allied training missions and war games during which the Swedes’ feisty $100 million diesel-electric sub easily dispatched a $6 billion aircraft carrier.

I dub these new, nimble budget-friendly vessels “Hickel-class” subs in tribute to Wally Hickel, the famed two-term Alaska Governor and former Secretary of the Interior in President Nixon’s cabinet, who famously promoted resource-rich Alaska as part of the global commons. Sweden’s more robust Blekinge-class submarine, still in development, and the next generation to follow the Gotland-class, sports a heftier price tag (already north of $600 million each, and likely to end up over $800 million) but with extended subsurface endurance makes an attractive alternative model – particularly if the price tag for this now much-delayed sub (the first of which is not expected to be launched before 2029) could be driven down at scale. Japanese Sōryū-class AIP subs, at about $500 million each, could also offer a reasonable compromise – with an impressive 40-day subsurface endurance capability, more than twice that of its Swedish counterpart.

Why settle for surface tracking and monitoring icebreakers the way America does now, and the way the Russians did when America sent the Healy two years ago through the Laptev Sea just north of the coastal shipping lanes of the Northern Sea Route, en route to Tromso, Norway, on a science mission that Russia closely tracked but otherwise did nothing to obstruct? Why be content with the misguided rivalry of the current icebreaker gap, reminiscent in all the worst ways of the (John F.) Kennedy-era “missile gap,” which was predicated on a misperception (or outright fabrication) that the Russians were ahead of America in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and which led to an expensive and dangerous proliferation of strategic nuclear weapons and their launching platforms – putting the world on a brittle hair-trigger one mistake away from World War III and, potentially, human extinction?

The icebreaker gap and the current race to restore balance in Arctic presence may not be nearly as dangerous as that was, and will likely never be as expensive or wasteful either. Icebreakers, as everyone acknowledges, are refreshingly dual use, of value not just for sovereign assertion and polar presence but a wide range of practical endeavors such as SAR, intel gathering, and science missions. But given the widening PSC hole into which the American taxpayer has already tossed $2 billion with nothing to show for it, enough to purchase a strategic nuclear sub with the capacity to not only deter aggression against America but to end the sovereign existence of any foe unwise enough to challenge America militarily, the program’s capacity to waste money is already sadly well established.

Adding further doubt to the wisdom of investing any further funds is the dubious nature of the mission for which the PSC program was conceived: asserting an Arctic presence. That’s because America owns Alaska, and the country that sold Alaska to the USA, Russia, has long acknowledged our sovereign possession. It was no coincidence that President Trump’s peace summit with Russian President Putin was hosted there, on an American military base, with American air supremacy on full display. America not only owns Alaska, but Russia fully endorses our ownership of its former Russian-American Company colony. Full stop.

And yes, China can now deploy (as it recently did) a flotilla of five icebreakers into America’s ECS adjacent to Alaska. But this is not the first time Beijing has deployed a flotilla to Alaskan waters. During President Obama’s symbolic visit to the 49th state in 2015, Beijing choreographed another five-ship flotilla, this one comprised of warships, which were dispatched to the Aleutian Islands just in time for the President’s arrival in Nome. Five is definitely Beijing’s go-to number for dramatic flotillas. And while impressive, it’s not that impressive. Five, because Beijing lacks ten assets to deploy at once. Five compares modestly to Russia’s more robust 40. (It’s important to recall that Russia’s vast, 2-million square mile Arctic region greatly dwarves America’s own 663,000 square miles of Arctic, which itself infinitely exceeds China’s zero square miles of Arctic territory.)

If America had such a fleet of inexpensive Hickel-class subs, ideal for the noisy, ice-choked waters of the region, to assert our sovereign maritime Arctic presence on or beneath the surface, we could easily – and stealthily – track Beijing’s flotilla every inch of its journey. Its dual-use advantages would also multiply beyond surface research and diplomatic displays of Arctic maritime presence to include subsurface research as well as a wide variety of search and rescue (SAR) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) missions. And if war ever did break out, these scrappy little subs could readily sink a rival icebreaker fleet (as well as a well-protected carrier strike group) from below without incriminating fingerprints, the sort of “dual use” America might really need one day.

America could, for the same amount of money wasted on our much over-budget and long-delayed PSC program (which, as noted, has yet to yield a single PSC), instead own 20 Hickel-class subs at a thrifty $100 million per. Instead of an IOU for a future heavy icebreaker that may or may not meet the promises of its ambitious marketing materials, America would instead have a fleet of useful dual-use polar subs with diverse mission potential, and a more muscular capacity to not just demonstrate presence but deter aggression. That’s money better spent.

But America can be stubborn when it sets its attention on something, and building upon the Biden-era “ICE Pact” designed “to advance polar icebreaker development,” just last week (on October 9th) President Trump and Finland’s President Alexander Stubb and PM Petteri Orpo signed a $6.1 billion MOU to partner on fast-tracking constructing up to 11 new medium icebreakers (known as “Arctic Security Cutters” (ASPs), in contrast to the heavier and pricier PSCs), four to be built in Finland, and seven more to be built in America. It remains to be seen whether this $6 billion price tag remains on target, or balloons the way the PSC program has. But the important question that remains unasked is this: Does America really urgently need an expanded icebreaker fleet?

Some much needed and welcome wisdom can be found up north across the 49th parallel, from which we can find helpful guidance to slow or even stop America’s present-day icebreaker madness. As CBC’s senior defense writer Murray Brewster has reported, a “former top naval commander and several defence experts have been left scratching their heads following the … recent embrace of the notion of giving the Royal Canadian Navy heavy, armed icebreakers to defend the Arctic.” Brewster added: “Retired vice-admiral Mark Norman told CBC News the decision to build more icebreakers seems more political than practical. … ‘I’m puzzled, because I don’t know what it is we’re trying to achieve other than the political objective of demonstrating a commitment to Arctic sovereignty.” Brewster also cites Canadian Arctic security expert Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary, who suggested instead that “Canada would be better served by investing in under-ice capable submarines. ‘If you are actually in a shooting conflict, you’re going to find out where the icebreaker is right away,’ said Huebert. ‘If you’re going to be putting money into something, put it into a submarine and give it some form of perhaps anti-missile capability.’”

As Craig Hooper, another PSC program critic, has observed in Forbes: “Over the past several months, America’s approach to Polar security has been a perplexing mix of future commitments coupled with tough, near-term pull-backs” and, “[d]espite a lot of White House attention, America’s icebreaking fleet remains in a shambles.” Unfortunately, America’s icebreaker shipbuilding effort is offering more pomp than product.” What America really needs to dominate our warmer, faster paced world is not $2 billion of taxpayer funded “pomp,” but instead a new fleet of cheap (relative to our overpriced and as yet undelivered Polar and Artic Security Cutters), quiet and impressively stealthy subs; swarms of far, far cheaper and more readily scalable long-range drones and a necklace of drone bases on Alaska’s vast coastal and insular territories; and inexpensive Arctic offshore patrol vessels (AOPVs) to secure the always shifting interface between blue water and the ice edge (preferably without the cost overruns and mechanical problems that have plagued Canada’s controversial AOPV program.)

Arctic security expert Jeremy McKenzie has also shined an unflattering light on the troubled PSC program: “I have long felt the USCG is focused on icebreakers at the cost of other much needed Federal investments in the Arctic … Instead, we have focused on a large and vulnerable shiny new command that has absorbed an incredible amount of the available resources and attention.” (McKenzie further refines his refreshing critique of the misguided PSC program in this thoughtful analysis on West Point’s Modern War Institute blog.)

It’s time, I believe, for America to truly Build Back Better (as former President Biden aptly described, building upon the foundation established during the first Trump administration). One might add, budget-wise too –not following down the rabbit hole of hype and hysteria associated with the illogical and largely illusory icebreaker gap.

Russia may well need 40 icebreakers to keep its Northern Sea Route open for business. Canada may in time need that many – if Ottawa ever decides to open its own circuitous, shallow, and largely uncharted Northwest Passage (still a big if). And while China has done diplomatic wonders with its flotilla of five icebreakers in American polar waters, this is mostly smoke and mirrors, as China has no Arctic territory at all, so its feisty flotilla is Beijing’s Arctic presence. And as I explained above: America is the undisputed sovereign of Alaska, and need not counter Beijing’s flotilla with our own. From Alaska’s southeast archipelago to the dateline crossing the Aleutian Islands chain, to the infrastructure-rich North Slope (and a deep-water port forthcoming in the south Seward Peninsula community of Nome), America has plenty of Arctic presence.

If Washington seeks to assert a more mobile and persistent maritime presence off Alaska’s shores, a fleet of my proposed Hickel-class subs could keep the Chinese, or any polar interloper, for that matter, in line. Indeed, whether in time we face off against China and/or Russia as many fear, or Greenland and/or Canada as I imagine to be more likely at present, or just against retreating polar ice and rising polar seas as is in fact most probable, it remains imperative that America fulfill the vision of William H. Seward first articulated in his September 14, 1853 Destiny of America speech calling for America to become a polar power, and in so doing to ascend to the pinnacle of global power (172 years ago to the day this article was written).

On our important and ongoing polar journey, America can and indeed must do a better job understanding the Arctic and its place in our warming and increasingly dynamic world – and more smartly defending our corner of it.

Tags: Artic, Manhattan Project, Naval Icebreakers, President Trump, U.S. Coast Guard

About The Author

• 
  
• Barry Scott Zellen
• Barry Scott Zellen, PhD is a Research Scholar in the Department of Geography at the University of Connecticut (UConn) and a Senior Fellow (Arctic Security) at the Institute of the North (IoN). He is the author, most recently, of Arctic Exceptionalism: Cooperation in a Contested World (Lynne Rienner Books, 2024) He has lived in Inuvik, NWT, Canada (1990-93), Yellowknife, NWT, Canada (1994-98), Whitehorse, Yukon, Canada (1988-89 and 1998-99), and Akureyri, Iceland (2020), and during his 11 years living in the Arctic worked for the Inuvialuit and Gwich’in of the Mackenzie Delta/Western Beaufort Sea region, the Dene and Metis of the Mackenzie Valley, and the Yukon First Nations.

9. Trump’s Domestic Pressures for a Potential War in Venezuela

A "wag the dog?"

Excerpts:

Of course, military operations against Venezuela won't be fully unifying. Many MAGA voters are non-interventionists and will not welcome a protracted operation. Trump will need to hope for hostilities to be short-lasting, or for these voters to be forgiving.

In short, Trump’s “lethal kinetic strikes” in the Caribbean serve two purposes. In Venezuela, it may prompt some military officers to overthrow Maduro. At home, it may please multiple MAGA factions—oil interests, nationalists, MAHA-supporters, ICE-enthusiasts, and Florida Cubans and Venezuelans.

What is striking is how unessential to either of these purposes democracy promotion seems to be. Removing Maduro does not require, necessarily, installing democracy. Most MAGA factions do not seem to be requiring democracy. They can live easily with a pro-Trump government in Caracas, democratic or not.

Trump might have recognized, therefore, that war in Venezuela could be an acceptable bet. Military action is always costly and risky. But Trump may be thinking that military action in Venezuela need not come with the additional expense of democracy building. In the eyes of Trump, this is war at a discount, with a huge domestic payoff. This realization may make war with Venezuela irresistibly affordable.

Trump’s Domestic Pressures for a Potential War in Venezuela

by

Javier Corrales

Javier Corrales is a professor of political science at Amherst College and the author of "Autocracy Rising"

flip.it · Javier Corrales

The Trump Administration is escalating war threats in Venezuela. Officials claim that the goal is to curb the drug trade. Critics contend that the real aim is regime change. These may be secondary aims. A more noble aim might be to promote democracy in Venezuela. However, the most likely impact of President Donald Trump’s approach to a potential war in Venezuela will be consolidated power, and Republican coalition management, at home.

A key part of Trump’s electoral coalition is fraying. Mass deportations are causing buyers’ remorse among Florida Cubans and Venezuelans who voted for Trump. While popular across his MAGA movement, mass deportations have shocked many Latino Trump voters; they likely never thought deportations would be so massive.

The drumbeat of war in Venezuela could appeal to Latinos who voted for Trump, at least in part, because they thought President Joe Biden was too soft toward Latin America’s leftist regimes.

Ironically, Trump’s initial approach toward Venezuela’s leftist dictatorship in the first half of 2025 was even softer than Biden’s. Guided by a pro-oil coalition, Trump’s initial approach to Venezuela was to pact with the dictator: Return a few prisoners, accept deportees, let U.S. oil firms gain more access to Venezuelan oil, and the U.S government would tolerate the regime.

Maduro signed on to this deal. But many Cubans and Venezuelans living in Florida hated it.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio emerged as the strongest advocate on behalf of this disaffected Florida constituency. He persuaded Trump—ever the change-his-mind president—to change his mind about Venezuela. By the end of summer, Trump abandoned his truce approach in favor of war talk.

To be sure, Maduro is one of the world's leading autocratizers—and one of the meanest. He inherited from Hugo Chávez a mixed regime that had plenty of autocratic elements but also democratic traces. In less than one electoral cycle, Maduro eliminated all democratic traces and turned the system into one of the most repressive, poverty-producing, and corrupt machines in the world.

But rather than making the case to go to war against Maduro based on the need for democracy, the Trump Administration is making the case for war based on the need for drug security. This too is part of Trump’s coalition-management strategy at home.

No doubt, the Maduro regime is complicit in the drug trade. But in the scheme of human rights abuses, Maduro’s drug offense is the most minor. The regime’s biggest offense is its brutality toward citizens and destruction of democracy.

But Trump is not a democracy builder. In the case of Venezuela, he is more of a coalition repairman. It seems that all this theater is aimed at pleasing multiple domestic audiences: far-right nationalists, who rejoice in public displays of military bravado; the MAHA sections of the MAGA movement, which want hard-line policies toward the drug trade; oil companies, which want an end of sanctions, and of course Florida MAGA Latinos, who want a hard-line policy toward Maduro.

Another MAGA group with high hopes are ICE-enthusiasts. These groups argue that a pro-Trump government in Venezuela would reduce migration and facilitate deportations. If Maduro is gone, U.S. courts would no longer be able to deem Venezuela unsafe, clearing the way for more deportations.

Of course, military operations against Venezuela won't be fully unifying. Many MAGA voters are non-interventionists and will not welcome a protracted operation. Trump will need to hope for hostilities to be short-lasting, or for these voters to be forgiving.

In short, Trump’s “lethal kinetic strikes” in the Caribbean serve two purposes. In Venezuela, it may prompt some military officers to overthrow Maduro. At home, it may please multiple MAGA factions—oil interests, nationalists, MAHA-supporters, ICE-enthusiasts, and Florida Cubans and Venezuelans.

What is striking is how unessential to either of these purposes democracy promotion seems to be. Removing Maduro does not require, necessarily, installing democracy. Most MAGA factions do not seem to be requiring democracy. They can live easily with a pro-Trump government in Caracas, democratic or not.

Trump might have recognized, therefore, that war in Venezuela could be an acceptable bet. Military action is always costly and risky. But Trump may be thinking that military action in Venezuela need not come with the additional expense of democracy building. In the eyes of Trump, this is war at a discount, with a huge domestic payoff. This realization may make war with Venezuela irresistibly affordable.

flip.it · Javier Corrales

10. Venezuela Says It Captured ‘Mercenaries’ Working With CIA

I have not seen any other significant reporting on this.  

Venezuela Says It Captured ‘Mercenaries’ Working With CIA

https://www.newsweek.com/venezuela-says-it-captured-mercenaries-working-with-cia-10943344?utm

Published

Oct 27, 2025 at 10:57 AM EDT

By Ellie Cook

Senior Defense Reporter

Newsweek is a Trust Project member

Venezuela said it has captured mercenaries "with direct information" relating to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as Caracas accused neighboring Trinidad and Tobago of a "military provocation" by carrying out joint drills with the U.S.

Why It Matters

The Trump administration has launched multiple lethal strikes on alleged drug boats close to Venezuela and Colombia as part of what officials paint as a crackdown on narcotics trafficking into the U.S. that has strained American relations with Colombia, a longtime ally, and worsened tensions with Venezuela. The U.S. moved significant military assets to the southern Caribbean, bolstered by the announcement last week that the U.S. Navy's newest and largest aircraft carrier would join fighter jets, a submarine and multiple warships already in the region.

The White House has little love for Venezuela's authoritarian leader, Nicolás Maduro, and has doubled the reward for information leading to his arrest on drug-related and corruption charges to $50 million. Venezuela said it is ready to respond and released an appeal in English from Maduro, calling for peace.

The USS Gravely destroyer arrives to dock for military exercises in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, on October 26, 2025. | AP Photo/Robert Taylor

What To Know

Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez did not give further details about the "mercenary group" she said was linked to the CIA in a statement published on Sunday but said it intended to carry out what she termed a "false flag" operation. The term refers to a plan that makes another party look responsible for an operation or action. Rodríguez said the operation was setting the stage for a "full military confrontation with our country."

Trump this month confirmed that he greenlit covert CIA operations on land in Venezuela. The agency has a long history of operating in Latin America.

A spokesperson for the U.S. Southern Command referred queries to the White House. Newsweek has reached out to the CIA for comment.

At least 43 people have been killed in U.S. strikes in the southern Caribbean and Pacific since early September, according to figures published by the Trump administration. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said on Friday that the U.S. killed six people in a second strike in the Pacific shortly after the U.S. said an initial attack in the region killed two people.

The administration has publicly acknowledged 10 strikes on alleged drug vessels in both regions. Venezuela, the U.N., international experts as well as Democrats and Republicans have raised concerns that the U.S. strikes break international law. Slovenian President Nataša Pirc Musar, first lady Melania Trump's former lawyer, told Newsweek this month that the U.S. risked losing its international credibility by continuing its strike campaign on the alleged narcotics vessels.

What People Are Saying

Florida Senator Rick Scott told CBS News' 60 Minutes in a program aired on Sunday: “If I was Maduro, I'd head to Russia or China right now.

South Carolina Senator Lindsey Graham on CBS' Face The Nation on Sunday: “The game is changing when it comes to drug traffickers and drug cartels. We're going to use military force like we have in the past to protect our country."

Jenifer Neidhart de Ortiz, the U.S. Embassy Chargé d’Affaires, in a statement about the joint exercises between the U.S. and Trinidad and Tobago: “The partnership between the United States and Trinidad and Tobago exemplifies regional strength through collaboration. Together, we address shared threats like transnational crime and build resilience through training, humanitarian missions, and security efforts."

What Happens Next

While experts say a land invasion of Venezuela by U.S. forces is unlikely, observers suggest that the U.S. could be working toward Maduro's removal from power. The U.S., along with many European and Latin American countries, does not recognize Maduro as the legitimate winner of the July 2024 election.

"I hope Maduro would leave peacefully, but I don't think he's going to stay around much longer," Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina said on Sunday. Florida Republican Senator Rick Scott said over the weekend that Maduro's "days are numbered."

The USS Gravely, a guided-missile destroyer, arrived in Port of Spain, the capital of Trinidad and Tobago, on Sunday as U.S. Marines prepared to train with the Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force (TTDF). The drills are scheduled to last until Thursday.

The government of Trinidad and Tobago said it had been clear about the purpose of the military exercises throughout and it valued its "relationship with the people of Venezuela given our shared history and close fraternal relations."

11. The world is headed for re-globalization not de-globalization, as 'coalitions of the willing' emerge, Mastercard chair and former USTR official says

You cannot put the globalization genie back in the bottle. And those who think they can disengage from globalization are likely destined for failure. Catastrophic failure.

The world is headed for re-globalization not de-globalization, as 'coalitions of the willing' emerge, Mastercard chair and former USTR official says | Fortune

https://fortune.com/2025/10/27/reglobalization-vs-deglobalization-regional-coalitions-of-the-willing-trump-trade-war/?utm

flip.it · Jason Ma

At the Fortune Global Forum in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on Monday, she said trade has actually remained resilient, even as the world muddles through a period of fragmentation and heightened uncertainty.

“Deregulation, re-globalization rather than massive de-globalization, I think, is what’s happening,” said Janow, who is also a former U.S. Trade Representative official. “So you’re seeing more regional concentrations of trade, and I think you’re seeing new experiments being born in this environment.”

That’s because President Donald Trump’s trade war is hitting countries around the world with aggressive tariffs as he seeks to bring more production back to the U.S. and shrink the gap between imports and exports.

While he has backed off on some of his earlier sky-high rates and reached deals with major economies, the average effective tariff rate remains the highest in nearly a century.

As a result, countries that relied on the U.S. for decades as a top export market must now rethink their strategies and turn to other partners.

“I’m paying attention to what is happening under the rubric of coalitions of the willing because there are a lot of restrictions that are being introduced by governments around the world, and some of them in the name of economic security, sometimes in the name of economic growth,” Janow told Fortune’s Diane Brady.

For example, countries in Asia and the Middle East are seeking closer integration, she added, meaning corporate leaders need to work with governments more frequently, too.

At the same time, Western democracies must reinvent themselves to stay competitive, particularly in Europe, where political processes have slowed critical decisions, according to JLL CEO Christian Ulbrich.

“Other countries just have learned to move along much faster and more decisively, and that’s what we are seeing when you look at the growth rates in the world,” he said.

Trump’s China meeting

But the trade relationship that’s top of mind for global markets right now is the one between the world’s two biggest economies.

Over the weekend, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the U.S. and China agreed on a framework for a trade deal that includes Beijing easing rare-earth export restrictions and buying “significant” amounts of U.S. soybeans in exchange for Trump removing his threat to impose 100% tariffs on China.

Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping are scheduled to meet on Thursday on the sidelines of a regional economic conference in South Korea, where they will determine the final details of a deal.

During the Fortune Global Forum, Primavera Capital chairman and CEO Fred Hu said he would like to see a deal with a tariff rate of 15% to 25%, which isn’t ideal but something businesses could live with—and would be far better than “crazy, insane” rates above 100% that would kill trade and the world economy.

In addition, export controls should be highly selective to allow commercial uses while still ensuring national security priorities, rather than imposing across-the-board restrictions, he said. And China must also be a reliable supplier of rare earths, which are critical inputs for a wide range of industries.

“If both sides come to that, I think it will be in a much better place,” Hu added.

flip.it · Jason Ma

12. Poland Signs Palantir, Anduril Deals Amid Record Army Spending

Is Poland now the center of gravity for European defense? Is any country investing more in its defense? It is surely an example of "burden owning" versus "burden sharing."

Poland Signs Palantir, Anduril Deals Amid Record Army Spending

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-28/trump-hails-japan-alliance-offers-takaichi-anything-you-want?sref=hhjZtX76

Wadysaw Kosiniak-KamyszPhotographer: Foto Olmpik/NurPhoto/Getty Images

By Maciej Martewicz

October 27, 2025 at 10:48 AM EDT

Takeaways by Bloomberg AI

• Poland signed deals with Palantir Technologies Inc. and Anduril Industries Inc. to upgrade its army amid record military spending.
• The Palantir deal is a letter of intent on data, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, and Poland is interested in several systems the company offers.
• Poland seeks to spend about 200 billion zloty on defense next year, and the goal is to spend as much of that money domestically as possible.

Poland signed two separate deals with Palantir Technologies Inc. and Anduril Industries Inc. on Monday as the country steps up to upgrade its army amid record military spending.

Poland’s Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz and Palantir Chief Executive Officer Alex Karp signed a letter of intent on data, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity in Warsaw. At the same time, state-owned PGZ SA agreed with Anduril to cooperate on making Barracuda-500M cruise missiles, without saying when production would start or how much the deal was worth.

The Palantir deal is an early stage agreement and neither the government nor the company said how much the deal was worth. Poland is interested in several systems the company offers, including for battlefield management and logistics, Kosiniak-Kamysz said.

“If there’s a unique experience from the battlefield, it’s Palantir that has it,” the minister told reporters in Warsaw on Monday. “What’s important to me is that the linking of the data between all the military units, and that its security is ensured.”

Palantir’s stock recently plunged after reports, which the company disputed, that a battlefield command and control system it was developing for the US Army was seriously flawed.

Poland seeks to spend about 200 billion zloty ($55 billion) on defense next year, or almost 5% of its gross domestic product, compared with 4.7% of GDP in spending planned for this year. The goal is to spend as much of that money domestically as possible.

The minister said the Palantir CEO told him the company planned to invest in Poland, tapping into the potential of the local defense industry and engaging Polish engineers, without giving details. The country expects to sign deals with Palantir for specific systems in the next two or three months.

Alex KarpPhotographer: David Paul Morris/Bloomberg

“Having this support role here as you guys show the rest of Europe how to invest in defense is very important to me and my company,” Karp said in Warsaw. “As we continue to scale this up we’ll find ways to invest not just in a military context, but also in dual-use technologies.”

Anduril and PGZ plan to jointly develop and produce autonomous air systems for the Polish army, including the Barracuda-M. This month, PGZ signed agreements with Germany’s Rheinmetall AG and France’s Eurenco SA on separate cooperation plans.

“Today’s agreement paves the way for technology transfer, joint research and development and developing the equipment, which will strengthen not only Poland but also the entire eastern flank of NATO,” PGZ CEO Adam Leszkiewicz said in a post on X.

Follow all new stories by Maciej Martewicz

13. Russia Aims Drone Attacks at Civilians, a War Crime, U.N. Inquiry Says

We must not give Putin a pass.

Russia Aims Drone Attacks at Civilians, a War Crime, U.N. Inquiry Says

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/27/world/europe/russia-drones-target-civilians.html

NY Times · Andrew E. Kramer · October 27, 2025

In the city of Kherson, in southern Ukraine, small drones routinely target ordinary people by dropping hand grenades, and record video documenting their attacks, a U.N. commission reported.

Listen to this article · 4:27 min Learn more

Taking cover near the scene of shelling as a drone flew overhead in Kherson, Ukraine, in 2023.Credit...Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times

By

Andrew Kramer has been covering the role of drones in war since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022.

Oct. 27, 2025

A U.N. human rights commission has documented hundreds of instances of Russian drone pilots targeting civilians in the city of Kherson in southern Ukraine, and concluded that they amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes.

For more than a year, Russian operators have routinely flown drones into Kherson and dropped hand grenades on civilians on sidewalks or working in backyard gardens, according to a report released on Monday by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. Other attacks hit ambulances and fire brigades, with drones sometimes hovering over burning buildings, waiting to drop grenades on arriving firemen.

What appear, in isolation, to be random acts of cruelty, according to the commission’s report, were actually an intentional pattern of attacks, intended to create “a permanent climate of terror” and force residents out of Kherson. Ukrainians call such hunting of civilians a “drone safari.”

“These attacks were committed as part of a coordinated policy to drive out civilians from those territories and amount to the crime against humanity of forcible transfer of population,” the report concluded.

Russia has denied targeting civilians but declined to cooperate with investigators who had also sought to investigate Ukrainian strikes in Russian-occupied territory on the other side of the frontline.

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Ukraine? , and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

As drones have come to play a larger role in warfare, so too have they come to play a larger role in war crimes, the report showed.

Russian military units often release videos of drone-eye views of civilians being killed, to be posted online by the units or groups affiliated with the Russian Army, apparently as a means of amplifying the threat.

“The city will be dismantled — brick after brick,” one post by a military-affiliated group boasted in May, according to the report. “Stay tuned for updates,” it said.

Anti-drone netting over a street in Kherson this month.Credit...Nina Liashonok/Reuters

The U.N. report is among the most comprehensive to date on Russian drone attacks on civilians in Kherson and other frontline areas in southern Ukraine. Citing local authorities, it estimated that Russian drones have killed more than 200 civilians and wounded 2,000 others over the past year. Investigators interviewed 226 people, including victims and first responders, and reviewed more than 500 videos.

The attacks the inquiry covered used small frontline drones, typically with a range of six miles, not the larger, longer-range drones that Russia routinely uses to bombard Ukrainian cities that are farther from the battlefield. Some frontline drones hover and drop grenades, while others fly into targets and explode. The attacks in Kherson are so frequent that the city has erected miles of net canopies over its streets to block drones.

Russian forces overran Kherson, on the west bank of the lower Dnipro River, in their initial invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Ukraine reclaimed the city in a counteroffensive later that year, but Russian forces kept control over the river’s east bank, within easy drone range. That section of the front line has barely shifted in the last three years.

A paradox of drone weapons lies in their use of remotely viewed video for targeting: They remove the operator from the battlefield, while at the same time providing an intimate view of the violence. It was a factor the U.N. investigators cited in alleging war crimes.

“All the types of short-range drones used in these attacks are equipped with live streaming cameras that focus on particular targets, leaving no doubt about the knowledge and intent of the perpetrators,” the report said.

A Ukrainian soldier scanning the sky for Russian drones near the city of Kherson in 2023.Credit...Finbarr O'Reilly for The New York Times

Investigators documented similar tactics used by Russian drone forces across a wide area of the front, showing that the attacks were directed “under a centralized command,” the report said.

It cited as one example an instance when a drone struck a medical first aid point, starting a fire. When a fire truck arrived to extinguish the blaze, another drone dropped a grenade on it.

The inquiry suggested the tactics were working, keeping residents of Kherson and other riverfront towns on edge, and persuading some to flee.

The report cited a woman living in one area where Russian drones buzz in often.

“It’s a lottery — will a drone fly in or not?” it quoted her as saying. “You go to bed and don’t know if you will be killed or wake up in the morning.”

Andrew E. Kramer is the Kyiv bureau chief for The Times, who has been covering the war in Ukraine since 2014.

A version of this article appears in print on Oct. 28, 2025, Section A, Page 8 of the New York edition with the headline: Russia Aims Drone Attacks at Civilians, a War Crime, U.N. Panel Says

See more on: Russia-Ukraine War, United Nations

NY Times · Andrew E. Kramer · October 27, 2025

14. Xi Gives Trump a Taiwan Test

1. Opinion
2. Review & Outlook
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Xi Gives Trump a Taiwan Test

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/xi-jinping-donald-trump-china-taiwan-south-korea-4638954c

By 

The Editorial Board

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Oct. 27, 2025 5:40 pm ET

WSJ

China’s president wants the U.S. to oppose the democratic island’s independence.

Oct. 27, 2025 5:40 pm ET

Chinese President Xi Jinping Xie Huanchi/Associated Press

President Trump and Xi Jinping will meet in South Korea on Thursday, and most media attention is on trade. But Mr. Xi has another agenda, which is to coax Mr. Trump to weaken American support for the democracy of Taiwan.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said over the weekend that Americans shouldn’t worry that the Administration “is going to get favorable treatment on trade in exchange for walking away from Taiwan. No one is contemplating that.”

Good to hear. Mr. Xi’s big ask has been that the U.S. formally oppose independence for Taiwan. The current U.S. policy is deliberate ambiguity. It acknowledges China’s position that there is one China and that Taiwan is part of it, but doesn’t endorse that policy.

This isn’t a pedantic distinction. Mr. Xi, not unlike Vladimir Putin with Ukraine, aims to condition the world to his narrative that Taiwan is a rogue province—so he can subdue 23 million free people on an island the Chinese Communist Party has never ruled.

The U.S. doesn’t need to clarify its policy on whether it would defend Taiwan in a crisis. But a concession to Mr. Xi on independence would be self-defeating for Mr. Trump’s goals. Mr. Trump wants the island to spend more on its defense, but endorsing Mr. Xi’s view would undermine morale and tell the Taiwanese that attempting to defend itself is futile. That’s what Beijing wants Taipei to conclude.

The practical effect would be to erode deterrence as the U.S. weathers a nadir in military power in this decade. It’d be a show of weakness that invites conflict, which was a GOP critique when Biden’s Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in 2023 that “we do not support” Taiwanese independence.

The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 says: “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes,” would be “of grave concern to the United States.” Only China is resorting to intimidation in the Strait, not Taiwan.

Mr. Rubio’s remarks suggest the President understands all this. But anything can happen with Mr. Trump in a room with Mr. Xi, and the U.S. President often muses that Taiwan is a mere mark on the map thousands of miles away from America.

Taiwan passes every test for a U.S. interest from raw geopolitics to core values. It is part of the first Pacific island chain that forms the U.S. security perimeter against Beijing’s ambitions. Too few politicians are pressing that case to the public. But for this week Mr. Trump can make a donation to world peace by refusing Mr. Xi’s demands to sell out Taiwan.

Journal Editorial Report: Trump inks a deal with Australia on critical minerals.

Appeared in the October 28, 2025, print edition as 'Xi Gives Trump a Taiwan Test'.

WSJ

15. Opinion | Asia Gets the Trump Treatment

Excerpts:

And out of the chaos of Mr. Trump’s trade policies, last summer’s agreements with Japan and South Korea and recent agreements with Southeast Asian partners seem to be entrenching an approach that, whatever its shortcomings, is acceptable to key American trading partners. That approach also serves as at least a partial answer to decades of systemic Chinese abuse of the now-comatose World Trade Organization. A trade regime that imposes higher tariffs on China than on its neighbors and competitors makes it harder for China to cheat.

Neither Messrs. Xi nor Trump can rationally expect a triumph at the summit. Mr. Xi is no Mikhail Gorbachev negotiating his empire’s collapse. And Mr. Trump is no Neville Chamberlain, desperate for face-saving compromise as his empire declines. Each man believes, with some reason, that the nation and system he represents will ultimately emerge victorious from the current competition.

But neither seeks war with the other, and both seek to pursue their competition in conditions that let their societies flourish. Signs that emerged over the weekend of a likely compromise bear this out. Nothing involving Mr. Trump is ever safely predictable, but on balance he appears likely to return from his Pacific odyssey having secured a reasonable short-term compromise with China while advancing his plans for reshaping America’s role in the world.

Opinion | Asia Gets the Trump Treatment

By Walter Russell Mead

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Oct. 27, 2025 4:59 pm ET

WSJ

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/asia-gets-the-trump-treatment-4ed2ea28

Asia Gets the Trump Treatment

After meeting leaders in Japan and South Korea, the president has a summit with Xi.

Oct. 27, 2025 4:59 pm ET

U.S. President Donald Trump at the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Oct. 26. Vincent Thian/Pool/Reuters

The Greatest Show on Earth has moved to Asia for the week. After attending the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ summit in Malaysia, President Trump landed in Japan for meetings with the emperor and prime minister. He will meet President Lee Jae-myung of South Korea and later have his second term’s first face-to-face meeting with China’s leader.

As the summit with Xi Jinping draws near, both sides can point to gains. Mr. Xi has made deft use of his Russian alliance. Propping up Moscow’s war in Ukraine and enlisting North Korea’s productive and military capacity in the war effort, Beijing is weakening both Russia and the West. Even as Vladimir Putin struggles to reassert Russian control in the former western territories of the Soviet Union, Chinese power grows daily across the oil- and resource-rich former Soviet lands in Central Asia.

Opinion: Potomac Watch

Donald Trump Escalates His Trade War With Canada--and Ronald Reagan

After Ontario releases an ad featuring Ronald Reagan touting free trade over tariffs, Donald Trump increases the tariffs on Canada to 10% in response. Is Trump right about Reagan? Plus, President Javier Milei wins in Argentina on a mandate of free-market reforms, and President Trump heads to Asia as the U.S. and China reach a trade truce.Read Transcript

The steady buildup of Chinese military power in the South China Sea and around the Taiwan Strait allows Beijing to step up military pressure on American allies. Chinese cyberespionage and hacking capabilities allow it to steal commercial and security secrets from the U.S. and lesser powers.

Meanwhile, China’s long march to dominate the production and refining of rare-earth minerals has given Mr. Xi an important card to play in the U.S. trade war. Rare earths aren’t Mr. Xi’s only trump card. China’s manufacturing dominance in everything from green technology to pharmaceuticals creates important dependencies across the West. Fears of losing access to China’s consumer market drive many important Western companies to lobby their governments on China’s behalf.

But Mr. Trump also has some high cards, and, as always, it would be a mistake to underestimate both the strength of his position and his capacity for bold moves that increase his leverage in unexpected ways.

The president has done more to counter China’s ambitions than many of his supporters and almost all of his critics understand. Hard-core MAGA Trump supporters often hold a quasi-isolationist worldview that misses the significance of regional competition in Europe, the Middle East and Latin America in the great game of U.S.-China relations. These observers see the Trump administration’s Middle East and Venezuela policies as distractions from the business of making America great again. But the destruction of Iran’s bid for Middle Eastern hegemony boosts Mr. Trump’s position vis-à-vis China. A definitive defeat of China and Russia’s principal ally in the Western Hemisphere would similarly reverberate around the world.

Both in the Middle East and in the Americas, Trump-era foreign policy aims to strengthen American dominance over fossil-fuel markets. One can debate the means, but the objective is sound. America’s ability to control Russia’s oil income and to deter China by blocking Chinese maritime energy imports in a crisis is an ace the president brings to his meeting with Mr. Xi, and it is one whose value China’s leader fully understands.

Mr. Trump’s many establishment critics—wringing their hands over his unorthodox trade politics and his cavalier disregard for the liberal pieties and diplomatic niceties of alliance politics—can see no method in his madness. But when the Chinese and American leaders meet, Mr. Trump will have some solid accomplishments to bolster his position. Both Europe and Japan have turned a corner on defense spending, an accomplishment that has eluded every previous American president since the end of the Cold War.

And out of the chaos of Mr. Trump’s trade policies, last summer’s agreements with Japan and South Korea and recent agreements with Southeast Asian partners seem to be entrenching an approach that, whatever its shortcomings, is acceptable to key American trading partners. That approach also serves as at least a partial answer to decades of systemic Chinese abuse of the now-comatose World Trade Organization. A trade regime that imposes higher tariffs on China than on its neighbors and competitors makes it harder for China to cheat.

Neither Messrs. Xi nor Trump can rationally expect a triumph at the summit. Mr. Xi is no Mikhail Gorbachev negotiating his empire’s collapse. And Mr. Trump is no Neville Chamberlain, desperate for face-saving compromise as his empire declines. Each man believes, with some reason, that the nation and system he represents will ultimately emerge victorious from the current competition.

But neither seeks war with the other, and both seek to pursue their competition in conditions that let their societies flourish. Signs that emerged over the weekend of a likely compromise bear this out. Nothing involving Mr. Trump is ever safely predictable, but on balance he appears likely to return from his Pacific odyssey having secured a reasonable short-term compromise with China while advancing his plans for reshaping America’s role in the world.

Journal Editorial Report: Trump inks a deal with Australia on critical minerals.

Appeared in the October 28, 2025, print edition as 'Asia Gets the Trump Treatment'.

WSJ

16. China Pushes to Silence Victims of African Mining Disaster

This and all the other Chinese atrocities need to be exposed. We cannot allow China to cover up these actions.

Recognize, understand, expose, and attack China's strategies.

China Pushes to Silence Victims of African Mining Disaster

Toxic waste from a Chinese mine in Zambia washed through homes and fields; compensation offers tied to nondisclosure

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/china-africa-mining-disaster-386af938

Bathsheba Musole in her destroyed cornfield.

By Nicholas Bariyo

Follow | Photos by Stanfrance Zulu for WSJ

Oct. 27, 2025 9:00 pm ET

KALUSALE, Zambia—The worst day of Bathsheba Musole’s life started with a deafening crash when the 30-foot wall around a toxic-waste pool collapsed at the Chinese copper mine above her village.

A poisonous river of a stinking yellow liquid rushed downhill, inundating homes and fields, including the one where she grew corn to feed her eight children. The floodwater, laden with cyanide and arsenic, rose chest-high. “I thought I would drown,” said Musole, 48 years old, in a recent interview.

In August, months after the Feb. 18 disaster, officials from Sino Metals, a unit of the state-owned China Nonferrous Mining Corp., showed up at Musole’s half-acre farm, which the Zambian government says is too toxic to sustain crops for at least three years.

They were there to make things right, she recalled them saying. Their offer was $150, but it came with a catch.

To get the money, she would have to agree never to talk about the spill, take legal action against Sino Metals or even reveal the contents of the nondisclosure agreement itself, according to documents presented to other spill victims, which were reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. Local environment activists said those terms were the same for all victims.

An image of the breached dam from a video taken the day after the disaster. Richard Kille/AP

With nothing left in her garden, Musole took the deal, which also entitles her to 11 pounds of cornmeal, a staple of local diets, every month. “At least we have something to eat,” she said. “Most people here are tired of fighting with the Chinese.”

Over the past 25 years, Chinese state-owned businesses have spent tens of billions of dollars in Africa, building seaports, airports, railways, highways, stadiums and hospitals. China invested some $8.7 billion in Africa’s mining industry in 2023 alone, the latest data indicates, compared with $300 million that year by the U.S., according to the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington think tank.

The spending has made China a dominant economic force in Africa, and given it diplomatic leverage at a time when the U.S. is slashing foreign assistance and Russia is dispatching mercenaries and soldiers to the continent. The catastrophic mining accident in Zambia’s Copperbelt Province shows how the investment activity has also brought controversy.

Brigadier Siachitema, a lawyer representing victims of the mine spill, said company officials were “very inhumane.” The affected people, he said, “were not even shown the amount they would receive until after they signed the document.”

A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said in August the mining company had taken responsibility for the spill and was working with the Zambian government to compensate victims.

China Nonferrous Mining blamed the dam’s failure on heavy rains and vandalism by locals that damaged the protective membrane on the pool holding mine tailings. In a written statement in September, it said its compensation offers to farmers are based on a Zambian government assessment, and that it has taken sufficient remedial actions, including restoration efforts in areas affected by the spill. “The incident has not caused any significant impact on the surrounding environment or community,” it said.

China’s deep involvement in Zambia has at times strained relations between the two countries. Zambian union leaders said Chinese managers pay poorly and mistreat workers. Two decades ago, an explosion at the same copper mine where this year’s spill took place killed 46 miners.

When the dam broke, toxic liquid ran down this drainage into the fields of Kalusale.

The Zambian government says the affected fields are too toxic to sustain crops for at least three years.

In recent months, Zambian authorities have shut down, at least temporarily, two smaller Chinese mines after finding leaks in their waste dams.

Economic reliance

Zambia’s government and economy, though, have grown reliant on China. Zambia collects about $2 billion a year in mining taxes, mostly from Chinese mining companies. Half of the copper mined in Zambia, much of it by Chinese companies, is exported to China. Last year, the Zambian government announced that Chinese miners would invest $5 billion in the country by 2031.

Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema, who is seeking re-election next year, is trying to negotiate a break on $6 billion in debts to China. Some analysts said that makes it difficult for the government to press Sino Metals too hard.

“The Hichilema administration finds itself in a difficult spot,” said Louw Nel, an analyst with Oxford Economics Africa, an advisory firm. “The impression that the Hichilema administration is kowtowing to foreign interests gives the opposition something to sink their teeth into at a time when it needs to regain the ascendancy and mount a serious challenge.”

The tailings dam at a Sino Metals copper mine failed in Feb.

Chambishi

Africa

zambia

Kafue

River

Area

shown

Kalusale

Mining waste flowed into the Mwambashi River...

...and then into the Kafue River.

Mwambashi River

Kitwe

2 miles

Source: European Space Agency (March 22, 2025 satellite image)

Carl Churchill/WSJ

The U.S. Embassy in Lusaka, Zambia’s capital, said the size of the spill made it the sixth-worst mine-tailings dam accident ever, by volume. Toxic sludge flowed into the Kafue River, leaving dead fish along a 70-mile stretch and poisoning farm fields. 

Dozens of students at Copperbelt University in Kitwe were hospitalized after drinking contaminated water in February and March, according to a student group. The university closed for two weeks in February, citing the risk that contaminated water posed to students.

In an internal embassy email reviewed by the Journal, U.S. Ambassador Michael Gonzales wrote: “One organization that analyzed over 170 water and soil samples from this disaster report that they have never encountered a polluter that has demonstrated such a lack of remorse or accountability as Sino Metals.” 

Gonzales ordered American personnel out of the city of Kitwe. He told his staff that the U.S. had offered cleanup assistance, but Zambian authorities declined.

Sino Metals said 50,000 metric tons of waste had reached the river. The company deployed boats and enlisted the Zambia Air Force to dump hundreds of tons of lime into the valley in an attempt to neutralize the contamination.

The company tried to neutralize the contamination by dumping lime in the valley. Traces of it remain.

After months of investigation, Drizit Environmental, a South African firm contracted by Sino Metals, concluded that 1.5 million tons of toxic waste had overflowed into the Kafue valley, 30 times what the company had said. Sino Metals terminated the firm’s contract a day before the final report was due, Drizit said in a written statement.

A Sino Metals spokesman said the company ended Drizit’s contract due to “contractual breaches.” He provided no details.

Elisha Matambo, the top government official in Copperbelt Province, announced in July that farmers would be entitled to compensation for the period they won’t be able to plant.

Sino Metals has promised to pay a total of $650,000 to tens of thousands of farmers and fishermen affected by the spill. Local environment activists said Sino Metals officials have offered as little as $100 to some people. To receive payment, locals have to agree to waive the right to make future claims, according to an agreement reviewed by the Journal.

Pressure campaign

In August, Chinese mine officials, accompanied by Zambian government officials, went door-to-door in the village of Sabina, near a tributary of the Kafue River, residents recalled in interviews.

Among those they visited was Timmy Kabindela, 42, whose family has four fish ponds and gardens of cabbage and corn on 50 acres of land. Before the spill, the family business had sold about $900 of fish a week to restaurants in the town of Chambishi.

Kabindela, who manages the family property, first sensed something was amiss on the day of the disaster when he heard a military helicopter circling the neighborhood. He discovered tens of thousands of dead tilapia floating in his ponds.

Timmy Kabindela’s family has four fish ponds that were polluted by the spill. He pointed to a new one under construction.

One of the polluted fish ponds.

Weeks later, he said, he drove to the Sino Metals offices at the mine, where he was promised a cash settlement of $700, free drinking water for three months and several tons of lime to neutralize the polluted pond water. After learning about the other terms of the proposed agreement, he cut the meeting short and drove 240 miles to Lusaka to consult his lawyers.

The following day, he said, the Chinese returned—this time accompanied by police—and put the contract in front of his 80-year-old mother, who signed it. “She had no idea what she was signing,” he said. “I am determined to fight these Chinese in court. They are tricksters.”

Kabindela and dozens of others retained a lawyer and filed a lawsuit against Sino Metals, seeking some $200 million in compensation and environmental restoration.

In a statement last month, China Nonferrous Mining, Sino’s parent, said it would fight the suit, calling the claim “clearly unfounded.” 

Zambia’s mines ministry said company payouts are a first step while the government studies the full extent of the damage. Final compensation levels and the scope of a cleanup will be guided by an independent assessment, the ministry said.

Meanwhile, Sino Metals bulldozers have been leveling ground and removing dried tailings from riverbanks and gardens, which could make such an investigation more difficult. Next to the ruptured dam, another earthen wall is being built in preparation for the resumption of mining operations, according to government officials.

“The Chinese are just putting up a show,” said Samuel Sekanya, a local council member in Chambishi, the mine’s home municipality. “They’re deceiving people into signing documents they can’t comprehend. They don’t care about the plight of the victims.”

Local municipal officials and environmental groups said Sino Metals has hired a security unit that has tried to keep local people from talking to the news media or environmental activists 

Sino Metals is building a new earthen wall in preparation for the resumption of mining operations

In Kalusale, the village near the failed dam, the police warned residents last month not to speak to journalists or share pictures of the damage, according to residents. 

Weeks earlier, a company drone had spotted environmental-group activists speaking to residents, according to two former Sino Metals workers. Police rushed to the scene and arrested several activists, including 25-year-old Sakani Sarah, who was charged with being idle and disorderly. She was detained overnight and paid a $10 fine before being released, according to police documents.

Activists said police have arrested more than a dozen activists and reporters near the mine site over the past three months.

Ponde Chulu, who lives in Kalusale and is a plaintiff in the lawsuit seeking against Sino Metals, said he has gone into hiding to avoid arrest. Chulu, 42, said his wife and six children have been in and out of the hospital over the past six months with skin rashes and sore throats. 

“I am already a victim of pollution,” he said. “But I also have to stay in hiding to avoid the police.”

Write to Nicholas Bariyo at nicholas.bariyo@wsj.com

17. The CRINK: Inside the new bloc supporting Russia's war against Ukraine

What brings the CRInK together? Fear, weakness, desperation, and envy.

Conclusion:

While the CRINK appears to be emerging as a more coherent bloc, many tensions continue to exist among all four countries. The United States should devise a consistent, targeted strategy of seeking to exploit the points of tension between the countries, however difficult that is. It should also seek to deter further aggression by Russia, alone or in concert with its CRINK partners, and strengthen its own defenses against future military challenges by these countries.

The CRINK: Inside the new bloc supporting Russia's war against Ukraine

atlanticcouncil.org · Issue Brief

China Europe & Eurasia Iran Korea Non-Traditional Threats Russia Security & Defense

October 23, 2025 • 9:00 am EThttps://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/russia-tomorrow/the-crink-inside-the-new-bloc-supporting-russias-war-against-ukraine/

By Angela Stent

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 challenged much of the common Western understanding of Russia. How can the world better understand Russia? What are the steps forward for Western policy? The Eurasia Center’s new “Russia Tomorrow” series seeks to reevaluate conceptions of Russia today and better prepare for its future tomorrow.

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Table of contents

Russia’s war against Ukraine has brought it a new set of partners. While this group is sometimes referred to as an axis, in reality it is a set of intensifying bilateral ties with countries—China, Iran and North Korea—that are essential for Russia’s continued prosecution of the war. The presence of these countries’ leaders at the military parade in Beijing to commemorate the eightieth anniversary of the end of World War II in Asia—and their fulsome commitment to a new world order that the United States no longer dominates—suggests that these countries increasingly constitute an anti-US bloc, united not by shared values but by shared grievances.

These three authoritarian states are essential allies not only in the war on Ukraine, but also in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s plan for a “post-West” global order. In Putin’s vision, this would be a multipolar world in which the United States has lost its “hegemonic” role and is only one of several great powers setting the global agenda. As Putin noted at the 2024 Valdai International Discussion Club, “What is at stake is the West’s monopoly, which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union and was held temporarily at the end of the twentieth century. But let me reiterate, as those gathered here understand: any monopoly, as history teaches us, eventually comes to an end.”

What is the nature of Russia’s relationship with these three revisionist powers? To what extent do they coordinate their policies? How durable are these new sets of relationships and how might they evolve once the war is over? This report will address these questions and suggest how the West might deal with “the CRINK”—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—collectively and individually going forward.

China

For centuries, Russia’s ties with China were complex and often adversarial, culminating in armed clashes on the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 (the latest in a series of skirmishes that occurred over the centuries). The original Russian mission to China was established in Beijing in 1658, and the two countries’ ties fluctuated between cooperation and conflict for the next three hundred years. The Russian empire in the mid-nineteenth century annexed what is now the Russian Far East from China, building up the city of Vladivostok, which in Russian means “ruler of the East.” Joseph Stalin did not welcome Mao Zedong’s victory in the Chinese Civil War and, after Stalin’s death, relations deteriorated rapidly, culminating in the 1969 border clashes. Relations began to improve under Mikhail Gorbachev, even though the Chinese were appalled by the collapse of the USSR and the end of Soviet communism. Throughout the centuries, it was clear that Russia and China were not natural partners; Russians consider themselves culturally to be Europeans, not Asians.

In 2022, Putin closed Russia’s window on Europe. Before the invasion of Ukraine, he had prioritized improving ties with China, but since 2022 he has made an unprecedented turn to Asia, courting a larger group of countries. In his quarter century in the Kremlin (with a technical hiatus from 2008–2012 when Dmitry Medvedev nominally led Russia), Putin has courted China, especially after Xi Jinping came to power in 2013. Xi’s first foreign trip was to Russia and the two leaders have met more than forty times since then. They appear to enjoy close personal ties, even if one discounts some of the hyperbole they use when praising each other. Both are autocratic leaders, ideologically aligned and allergic to Western criticisms of their democratic deficits. Neither publicly criticizes the other’s domestic politics. Both publicly favor a multipolar world in which the United States is much diminished and retreats from their respective neighborhoods. China has been Russia’s largest trading partner since 2009, and their bilateral trade has doubled since 2020. The economic relationship is much more important for Russia than for China, but China is a top purchaser of Russian hydrocarbons. Since the start of the war in Ukraine and the imposition of Western energy sanctions against Russia, China has benefited from importing cheap Russian oil.

Putin’s pivot to China began in earnest after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the beginning of the war in the Donbas instigated by Russian proxies and aided by Moscow. China intensified its economic and political ties with Russia after the imposition of Western sanctions and Russia’s ejection from the Group of Eight. Russia and China might not be formal allies, but their ties have deepened and strengthened since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. As Putin has said, Russia and China “are better than allies.” So, despite all the asymmetries in this relationship, it represents a major reorientation of centuries-old Russian foreign policy away from the West and to the East. Even if the partnership is essentially transactional, as long as the leadership in Moscow and Beijing continues to share a basic worldview, the Russian-Chinese partnership will remain a serious challenge to the United States, Europe, and their Asian allies through 2050 and beyond.

What does Russia get out of its strategic partnership with China? Without knowing that China would support him, Putin would not have launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Indeed, he visited Beijing weeks before the invasion and apparently understood that Xi would not criticize his actions as long as he delayed the invasion until after the end of the Beijing Olympics.

China is an enabler of Putin’s war. It has repeated the Russian narrative about NATO’s responsibility for the war and blames the West for the conflict. More importantly, China has given Russia substantial economic, military, and technological assistance for its war machine and is a top purchaser of Russian hydrocarbons, providing the financial wherewithal for the war to continue. Chinese contract soldiers are also fighting with the Russian army in Ukraine. Despite some initial Western hopes that Beijing could act as a mediator and help broker peace between Russia and Ukraine, China’s anemic peace plan was never serious and China has shown no interest in bringing the war to an end. Indeed, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the European Union’s foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas that Beijing cannot accept Russia losing its war against Ukraine as this could allow the United States to turn its full attention to China, contradicting Beijing’s public position of neutrality in the conflict. Indeed, Putin sees China as essential for preserving his own regime’s security.

The Russia-China economic relationship is essential for Russia. China became Russia’s economic lifeline after the Western sanctions were imposed in 2022. It is a highly asymmetrical relationship, with Russia far more dependent on China than vice versa, exchanging raw materials and military hardware for Chinese manufactured goods and technology. Trade with China represents 26 percent of Russia’s total trade, while trade with Russia represents only 3 percent of China’s total trade. China remains Russia’s most important trade partner, whereas Russia ranks sixth for China and the United States is by far China’s highest-ranked trading partner. Chinese goods have now replaced many of the Western goods that disappeared from Russia after the 2022 sanctions. Bilateral trade has doubled since 2022 and payments in rubles and renminbi are replacing the US dollar and the euro. Beijing and Moscow are also actively constructing an alternative international payments system to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) system, from which Russia was partially ejected after the invasion.

Moreover, there is evidence that China has increased sales to Russia of machine tools, microelectronics, and other technology that Moscow is using to produce missiles, tanks, aircraft, and other weaponry for use in its war against Ukraine. For example, 90 percent of Russia’s microelectronics come from China. Even if China does not directly export weapons to Russia, it supplies key components used in Russia’s arsenal.

Military cooperation has also increased significantly in the past few years. This includes joint exercises in the South China Sea, long-range bomber patrols near Alaska, and air and naval joint exercises that have intruded into Japanese and South Korean airspace. Russia and China have conducted joint naval exercises with Iran and with South Africa in recent years. While cooperation and integration between the Russian armed forces and China’s People’s Liberation Army is limited, the potential for deeper integration is there. Russian-Chinese technological cooperation in the military field is growing, including in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and space technology. This multifaceted military cooperation has been beneficial for Russia, which remains behind China technologically.

China is Russia’s essential partner in seeking to challenge US and Western interests around the world and undermine the current international order. Both countries want to make the world safe for authoritarianism at home and abroad and to eliminate what remains of Western democracy-promotion efforts. Both see the United States as their principal adversary. And both are promoting alternative multilateral organizations, such as the expanding BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which have no Western members. Russia has managed to increase its influence in the Global South since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and China has largely supported it in these efforts. It joins Russia in appealing to Global South countries that are wary of the United States and its allies, refuse to choose sides in the Russia-Ukraine war, or view the war as an opportunity to increase their own leverage internationally.

But Russia’s quest for a post-West global order might put it at odds with China going forward. For now, Russia accepts being the junior partner in this alliance; it really has no other choice. But China ultimately does not view Russia as a peer. It sees Russia as a second-rate power, whereas China views itself as a first-rate power and an equal with the United States. As the world’s second-largest economy and largest trading state, China has a far greater stake in regional and global stability than does Russia. Putin used to favor a tripartite Yalta model (after the World War II US-UK-USSR Yalta Conference) for a future global order, in which Russia, China, and the United States would divide the world into three spheres of influence and would not interfere in the other countries’ spheres. But Putin also appears to favor a Hobbesian world order in which instability and disruption serve Russia’s interests. China seeks a post-West order with rules, while Russia prefers a world disorder will no rules.

Despite proclamation of a “no-limits” partnership, mistrust and rivalry in the Russo-Chinese relationship persists. China is wary of Russia’s growing relationship with North Korea because it could embolden North Korea to act more aggressively on the Korean peninsula. Xi might also wonder about the longer-term implications of a reset of US-Russian relations under President Donald Trump. The Trump administration has implied that improved ties between Trump and Putin might cause Putin to rethink Russia’s close ties with China. This is probably an unrealistic goal, given the close ties between the two countries, but Xi cannot be unaware of Washington’s hopes on this score. Indeed, shortly before his election, Trump said of Russia and China, “I’m going to have to un-unite them, and I think I can do that, too.” Moreover, areas of potential Sino-Russian rivalry extend from Central Asia to Africa, South Asia, and the Arctic. And then there are unresolved territorial issues, although these are a longer-term problem. Many in China believe that the Russian Far East, which was conquered by the tsars in the mid-nineteenth century, rightfully belongs to China and must one day be returned.

The Russian concern about longer-term Chinese goals was revealed in a leaked document from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which referred to China as “the enemy” and warned that China is a serious threat to Russian security. The FSB fears Beijing’s efforts to recruit spies from Russia’s scientific community and access sensitive military technology through them. China, it claims, is spying on Russia’s military operations in Ukraine to gain knowledge about Western weapons and warfare. There is also evidence that Chinese groups linked to the government have repeatedly hacked Russian government agencies and companies, searching for military secrets.

Despite mutual suspicions and espionage, Russia and China, in Xi’s words, will continue to walk hand in hand. Putin has framed defeating Ukraine and its Western supporters as an existential issue for both the survival of the Russian state and his own ability to remain in power. Without China, he cannot subdue Ukraine nor secure his regime’s security.

Iran

Russia and Iran have historically had a complex and sometimes antagonistic relationship. But since February 2022, Iran has become an indispensable supporter of Russia’s war, supplying it with drones that have killed Ukrainian soldiers and civilians and destroyed Ukrainian infrastructure. Iran—like China, North Korea, and Russia—seeks to challenge the US-led international order.

For centuries, the Persian and Russian empires were rivals and fought a succession of wars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These wars led consecutive Iranian dynasties to cede the three South Caucasus states and Dagestan in the North Caucasus to the Russian Empire. The Soviet Union supported secessionist movements in Iran in the 1920s. And just after World War II ended, Moscow refused to withdraw its troops from northern Iran, which it had occupied during the war. The Soviets then developed a profitable economic relationship with the shah’s regime while, at the same time, supporting the Iranian Communist Party. In the initial years following the overthrow of the shah in 1979, relations between Moscow and Tehran became strained. Iran’s new rulers called the atheist Soviet Union the “Lesser Satan,” as opposed to the United States as the “Great Satan.” The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan further galvanized Islamic anti-Soviet sentiments, but ties improved after the Soviet-Afghan War ended.

Once Putin came into office in 2000, nuclear power became a focus of the relationship, much to the consternation of the United States. Russia accelerated the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant and agreed to build eight more plants in Iran. When Medvedev was president, US President Barack Obama persuaded him to join tough United Nations (UN) sanctions against Iran after its secret uranium enrichment facility was uncovered near Qom. But after the sanctions were lifted, Russian-Iranian relations grew closer.

It is not known what Iran is receiving in return for its current support of Russia’s war and whether imports from Russia are strengthening Iran’s ability to weaponize its enriched uranium. A decade ago, a Russian Middle East expert reported a conversation with a Russian diplomat who said that “a pro-American Iran is far more dangerous for us than a nuclear Iran.”

From the 1990s until 2022, Russia provided important military assistance to Iran across the ground, aerospace, and naval domains. This was focused more on hardware than technology transfer and consisted of tanks, armored vehicles, anti-tank missiles, combat aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. There was also unofficial assistance for Iran’s ballistic missile and suspected chemical and biological weapons programs.

Prior to the 2022 war on Ukraine, Russia and Iran also grew closer once Moscow involved itself in the Syrian civil war and joined with Iran in backing former Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. Russia’s intervention also strengthened the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps fighting there. Before February 2022, it appeared that the two countries were working closely together in Syria despite differences over issues such as the Caspian Sea demarcation.

Iran was instrumental in assisting Russia at the outbreak of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine after Moscow failed to take Kyiv in three days. It provided Shahed drones, which the two countries now co-produce, and Russian-Iranian defense cooperation has increased markedly since then. Russia, however, has been constrained in how much of its own equipment it can deliver to Iran, such as SU-35 fighter jets and the S-400 missile defense systems, given its own needs as Moscow continues the war.

Russia and Iran have also formalized this relationship. In January 2025, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian traveled to Moscow to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty with Russia. The treaty was presented as a breakthrough between the two countries, but that is an exaggeration. It mainly codifies the close ties that have developed since February 2022. It also stipulates that Russia would not come to Iran’s assistance if it were attacked by the United States or Israel.

Questions also hang over the Russian-Iranian relationship since the overthrow of Assad in Syria and the coming to power of Ahmed al-Sharaa, whose forces fought both Russia and Iran during the long Syrian civil war. While Russia and Iran were joined in supporting Assad, that cooperation is no longer relevant.

Russia sees Iran as an important bridge between Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and South Asia, enhancing the connectivity and the reach of Putin’s Greater Eurasia project. A key component of this project is the North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC). The completion of the INSTC is now a strategic goal for Moscow, and the corridor will facilitate trade between Russia, Iran, and other regional partners, connecting Eurasia to the Persian Gulf and South Asia. The ability to bypass Western-aligned countries will allow Russia not only to skirt sanctions, but also to facilitate closer ties with countries along the corridor.

Before the Hamas terrorist attacks of October 7, 2023, Russia and Israel enjoyed close relations. Israelis described Russia as a neighbor because of its presence in Syria. Russia worked with Israel to prevent the Iranian-backed Hezbollah from attacking Israeli targets, and Israel remained dependent on Russia for security in its north. Since October 7, the situation has changed as Russia has supported Hamas and Putin has distanced himself from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. But at the same time, Russia does not share Iran’s commitment to the destruction of Israel. One-sixth of Israel’s population comes from the former Soviet Union and there are multiple family and business ties between Russia and Israel.

Of course, one important element of the Russian-Iranian relationship is ideological: their shared animosity toward the United States and commitment to a post-West world. Putin has said that he views Iran as important to the “formation of a more equitable multipolar world order.”

Russia and Iran have been driven closer together since February 2022 because of their isolation from much of the world. But that could change if the war with Ukraine ends and Trump’s new reset attempts result in a restored US-Russian relationship. How might that change the Russian-Iranian relationship? Over the years, Iran has become an increasingly important part of Putin’s drive to replace the current international system with a post-West order in which the United States can no longer set the rules. Even if US sanctions on Moscow are lifted and US-Russian ties improve, Iran will remain both a political ally and a customer for Russian goods. If either country experiences a regime change, the situation could look different. But for now, the leaders in Moscow and Tehran appear to be securely ensconced, even if their respective populations remain wary of each other. Just as a US-Russian rapprochement will not succeed in separating Russia from China, better ties with Washington will not induce Moscow to rupture the partnership it has developed with Tehran.

During the Obama administration, Russia played a positive role in negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement restricting Iran’s nuclear program. However, Trump pulled the United States out of that agreement during his first term. Now he seeks to negotiate a new nuclear deal, and Putin has offered to help facilitate such an agreement. However, the Kremlin’s attitude toward a new deal is ambivalent. Lifting sanctions on Iran is not necessarily in Russia’s interest, as Iran could produce additional volumes of oil and compete with Russia again on the international market. So the ideal scenario for the Kremlin would probably be to have the negotiations continue indefinitely with no resolution.

Israel’s attack on Iran highlights the dilemma Moscow faces in dealing with Tehran—and the limits of its influence. Russia immediately condemned the attacks, and Putin and Xi called for a cease-fire and negotiations. But Russia has done little to help Iran militarily and is not obliged to do so by the terms of their strategic partnership treaty. It needs Iran less than it did at the beginning of the Ukraine war, because it is now capable of manufacturing up to 2,700 Iranian-designed Shahed drones a month inside Russia.

Russia’s relations with Iran are indeed linked to its complex ties with Israel. Despite the souring of Israeli-Russian relations since October 7, 2023, both Moscow and Jerusalem want to preserve their bilateral ties. Russia does not share Iran’s stated goal of destroying Israel and might have more to gain economically from Israel than from Iran.

North Korea

Relations between Moscow and Pyongyang have fluctuated in the eighty years since the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was first established. Today, North Korea’s main value for Russia is twofold: to provide artillery, other weapons, and troops for Russia’s war against Ukraine and to be part of the cheering squad for Russia’s emergence as the leader of the so-called “world majority” (i.e., the Global South). Preventing Korea being reunited and allied with the West has always been a key Russian goal.

The Soviet Union helped create the DPRK and largely bankrolled it until the Soviet collapse. It was instrumental in launching the Korean War and then supporting North Korea during the war, although Stalin miscalculated the US response. The war remained a controversial topic between the two countries for many years. Demonstrating his independence, North Korean dictator Kim Il-Sung refused to join Comecon, the Soviet-led economic bloc, and North Korea remained neutral during the years of the Sino-Soviet split. No top Soviet leader ever visited the country, although the Soviet Union continued to provide military assistance to Pyongyang. When Gorbachev came to power, he upended the bilateral relationship by establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea and seeking investment and loans from Seoul. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union collapsed and financial support for Pyongyang disappeared, with disastrous consequences for North Korea. Bilateral ties recovered slowly, and Putin visited Pyongyang early in his presidency. Kim Jong-Il visited Russia in 2001 and 2002, but little came of these visits.

Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia-North Korea ties had started to improve. Before the invasion, ten thousand North Korean workers were sent to work in Russia’s Far East. Despite UN sanctions on North Korea, Russia continued to export coal, oil, and food to North Korea. But China was seen as North Korea’s main supporter until the Russian war on Ukraine.

Russia’s invasion transformed ties between Moscow and Pyongyang. North Korea immediately supported Russia after the war began, particularly at the UN. North Korea was one of only two states (Syria is the other) to give diplomatic recognition to the Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories of Donetsk and Luhansk in 2022. Unlike China, which often abstains on Ukraine-related votes, North Korea has voted many times to support Russian positions on Ukraine at the UN. In 2023, in recognition of North Korea’s support, Russia increased its exports of food and oil, and North Korea and Russia began to exchange high-level visits—more than two dozen since 2023.

A turning point came when Kim attended the 2023 Far East Economic Forum in Vladivostok, where he met Putin and visited the Vostochny Cosmodrome to see Russia’s latest technological innovations in the space field.

Shortly thereafter, Pyongyang began supplying millions of rounds of badly needed ammunition and missiles to Russia. In return, it is believed that Russia supplied North Korea with missiles and space technology; North Korea later carried out a successful missile test. And in the fall of 2024, Pyongyang began sending soldiers to fight in the Kursk region of Russia to dislodge Ukrainian forces there. It is estimated that up to twelve thousand soldiers have fought the Ukrainians, approximately four thousand of whom have died. Ukraine has produced videos of captured North Korean soldiers saying they did not know where they were going or who they would be fighting when they deployed.

North Korea and Russia are now formal allies. In June 2024, Putin went to Pyongyang and the two leaders signed a treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership. It includes a mutual defense clause, obligating both parties to come to the other’s defense should it be attacked by a third party: “Russia shall immediately provide military and other assistance” to the other party if it “falls into a state of war due to armed invasion from an individual or multiple states.” Putin said that the treaty represented a “breakthrough” in Russia’s relations with North Korea.

It is clear what Russia is getting out of this relationship—ammunition, missiles, and troops to fight in Kursk. North Korea has also announced that it will send thousands of military construction laborers to work in Russia.

North Korea likewise receives weapons, including attack drones directed by artificial intelligence, tanks with improved electronic warfare systems, a new naval destroyer fitted with supersonic cruise missiles, and a new air-defense system. Russia is helping North Korea to modernize its antiquated Soviet-era arsenal.

This is a transactional partnership that has elevated North Korea’s international profile and reinforced Putin’s claim that Russia is a leader of the world majority. It has also helped Russia to continue fighting Ukraine.

Is the CRINK an axis?

The US 2025 Intelligence Community’s Worldwide Threat Assessment, delivered to Congress, does not refer to the CRINK as an axis:

These primarily bilateral relationships, largely in security and defense fields, have strengthened their individual and collective capabilities to threaten and harm the United States, as well as improved their resilience against US and Western efforts to constrain or deter their activities. Russia’s war in Ukraine has accelerated these ties, but the trend is likely to continue regardless of the war’s outcome.

US adversaries’ cooperation has nevertheless been uneven and driven mostly by a shared interest in circumventing or undermining US power, whether it be economic, diplomatic, or military—Russia has been a catalyst for the evolving ties, especially as it grows more reliant on other countries for its objectives and requirements including in but not limited to Ukraine. Moscow has strengthened its military cooperation with other states, especially Pyongyang and Tehran. Russia also has expanded its trade and financial ties, particularly with China and Iran, to mitigate the impact of sanctions and export controls.

Some analysts, on the other hand, have argued that the CRINK represents a new “Axis of Upheaval.”

“The group is not an exclusive bloc and certainly not an alliance,” Andrea-Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine wrote in Foreign Affairs. “It is, instead, a collection of dissatisfied states converging on a shared purpose of overturning the principles, rules, and institutions that underlie the prevailing international system.” More recently, Kendall-Taylor and Nicholas Lokker have argued that the group has intensified its military collaboration, creating new challenges for the West.

Experts claim that because these countries share a common goal of ending what they view as a Western-dominated system that ignores their interests, they collectively represent a new threat to the interests of the United States and its allies.

Historian Philip Zelikow argues that the CRINK members’ cooperation is closer than that of the original Axis powers before Pearl Harbor.

Others disagree, arguing that the analogy of the World War II Axis between Germany, Italy, and Japan is not apt because that was a formal alliance dedicated to defeating the Grand Alliance of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Moreover, as Sino-Russian relations expert Elizabeth Wishnick argues in a report for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “An axis would require more than a shared authoritarian playbook and anti-Western orientation. We would expect to see some formalized cooperation among the three countries—We would anticipate a coordinated approach to assisting Russia in Ukraine.”

Russia’s relations with the three countries that have enabled it to continue its war against Ukraine are focused on bilateral ties. Moscow has separate partnerships with all three countries and they vary; the mutual defense clauses with North Korea and Iran, for example, are quite different. Russia is obliged to come to North Korea’s defense should it be attacked, but it has no such obligation to Iran. The four countries have not signed a quadrilateral pact and, apart from a shared desire to upend the current international order, their respective interests are not always congruent. Tensions between Russia, China, and North Korea from the Korean War remain. And China looks warily on the burgeoning Russia-North Korea relationship.

Moreover, the Israeli and US attacks on Iran and the destruction of some of its nuclear program raise issues about the future Russian-Iranian relationship and the Chinese-Iranian relationship. While Putin and Xi condemned the Israeli attacks, warning of the risks of escalation, they were both silent following the US attacks. They subsequently held a phone call urging negotiations but did not come to Tehran’s defense. Given the destruction of Iran’s military installations and the elimination of its key scientists and leading officials, both Russia and China will question Iran’s role as a reliable partner in the future. Russia needs Iran for drone production much less that it did at the beginning of the war, but the Israeli strike might have disrupted elements of Russia’s drone-production supply chain. If the Trump administration were to succeed in improving ties with Iran, that could further complicate the Russian-Iranian relationship.

Moscow will continue to rely on these partners for the duration of its war against Ukraine and beyond. They collectively represent a threat to the United States and its European and Asian allies. But alliances of autocratic leaders contain inherent contradictions. They might collectively share the goal of upending the international order, but they are mainly focused on remaining in power and advancing their own interests, as opposed to creating a new order on which they all agree. Russia might be the driver of the CRINK today, but a new reality might emerge if leadership changes in any of these countries.

Recent developments suggest that the CRINK could be developing into a bloc. As noted earlier, Xi hosted the leaders of North Korea, Iran, and Russia for the first time in September to watch a military parade celebrating the end of World Word II in Asia, a historic show of united opposition to the US-led world order. Western nations, whose leaders were largely absent from the parade and who have voiced disquiet over China’s military ambitions in East Asia, rightly expressed concern about this ostentatious show of unity. Indeed, during the parade China showcased its nuclear ambitions by debuting two new intercontinental ballistic missiles, the DF-5C and DF-61.

The optics of the leaders of China, Russia, and North Korea standing together to review troops and weapons was a powerful reminder that a new global order no longer dominated by the United States is emerging. On his Truth Social site, Trump took aim at Xi as he hosted the parade: “Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against The United States of America.” Trump also questioned whether Xi would credit the United States for the “massive amount of support and blood” it provided to China during World War II. Trump added, “Many Americans died in China’s quest for Victory and Glory.”

Responding to the CRINK

The CRINK represents a growing challenge to the West, both individually and collectively. Responding to the dangers these countries represent will be difficult and costly. Moreover, the Trump administration’s uneven, and at times uncoordinated, approach to countering these threats has raised questions about the extent to which the most powerful Western country will be willing to expend the resources to resist these countries in the future. Driving wedges between them—particularly between Russia and China—is unlikely to work in the short term. The inherent tensions between all of them might eventually lead to a fraying of their ties, but that is unlikely to happen for the duration of the Russian war and its immediate aftermath.

The first Western goal should be to seek to contain the ambitions of all four countries. The United States Department of Defense has defined China as the main pacing threat: “China is the only country that can pose a systemic challenge to the United States in the sense of challenging us, economically, technologically, politically and militarily.”

The Trump administration has highlighted the threat from China and is engaged in difficult tariff negotiations with the country. Trump has also indicated that he would like to improve ties with China, even though he has acknowledged that it will be difficult to reach a deal.

The second goal should be to contain Russia more effectively than has been the case since the Soviet collapse. Every US president since 1992 has sought to reset ties with Russia, but all these resets have failed because of fundamentally mismatched expectations on both sides. Trump’s Russia policy has been contradictory and inconsistent, praising Putin and criticizing Volodymyr Zelensky, reversing himself, and then reiterating his praise for the Russian autocrat. His failure to impose penalties on Russia after Putin reversed himself on agreements that he and Trump had apparently reached days before at their Alaska summit revealed the US inability to follow a consistent policy of deterring Russia from further attacks on Ukraine. Trump has repeated that he seeks a reset of ties with Russia, and he envisages a bright economic future for bilateral relations.

The current US determination to improve ties with Russia works against any attempt to push back against the CRINK. Washington’s European and Asian allies are almost unanimous in their agreement that Moscow must be contained and isolated as long as Russia continues its war. If the United States moves in the opposite direction, allies’ influence will be limited. Nevertheless, the US allies in Europe and Asia might need to step up their policies aimed at containing both Russia itself and its CRINK partners.

The United States has also stressed the threat that North Korea represents. However, Trump has suggested resuming talks with Kim on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program after the failed negotiations of his first administration. And after the US strikes on Iran, Trump has also suggested resuming negotiations on Tehran’s nuclear program.

In other words, it is unclear how far the Trump administration will be willing to take actions to push back consistently against the CRINK and lessen the danger it represents to Western interests. So far, “America First” has not meant a US withdrawal from the world, but has included both military actions against Iran and negations to resolve a number of difficult regional conflicts.

In the face of these uncertainties, Russia will continue to view the CRINK countries as essential partners in its determination to defeat Ukraine and upend the current international order. In addition to seeking to constrain Russia’s ability to continue waging its war against Ukraine and acting as a disruptor on the world stage, the United States should refrain from taking actions that push these four countries toward closer cooperation. Although India is not a member of this group, Prime Minister Narendra Modi went to Beijing for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting that preceded the military parade. India and China have been involved in various border disputes over the past few years, but Modi’s public show of warm ties with both China and Russia in Beijing occurred shortly after Trump imposed 50-percent tariffs on India because of its purchases of Russian oil. Modi has also appeared to endorse the new world order Xi touted in Beijing.

The presence of so many leaders from the Global South at the parade in Beijing was also a reminder that Russia’s war against Ukraine has strengthened both Moscow’s and Beijing’s ties with Global South countries, which do not want to be drawn into the conflict and often reiterate the Russian version of the war’s origins. The United States needs to develop a more effective way of reaching out to countries in the Global South.

While the CRINK appears to be emerging as a more coherent bloc, many tensions continue to exist among all four countries. The United States should devise a consistent, targeted strategy of seeking to exploit the points of tension between the countries, however difficult that is. It should also seek to deter further aggression by Russia, alone or in concert with its CRINK partners, and strengthen its own defenses against future military challenges by these countries.

Read the full issue brief

About the author

Angela Stent is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she focuses on US-Russia policy and Russia’s relations with Ukraine, China, Europe, and the Global South. Concurrently, Stent is senior adviser to Georgetown University.

Before joining AEI, Stent was professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University and directed its Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies. She was also a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, senior adviser to the United States Institute of Peace, and senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund. Previously, she served as a member of the external advisory board to the director of the CIA, a national intelligence officer

for Russia and Eurasia for the National Intelligence Council, and a member of the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning.

Stent’s work has been published in a variety of media outlets and academic journals, including Foreign Affairs, Internationale Politik Quarterly, the Washington Post, and Politico. A popular speaker, she has appeared on CBS, CNN, Bloomberg, BBC, and NBC, among other cable news outlets. Stent has also testified before Congress and is the author of Putin’s world: Russia against the West and with the rest (2023).

She holds a PhD in government and an AM in Soviet studies from Harvard University. Stent also holds an MSc in international relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a BA in economics and history from the University of Cambridge.

18. The State of the Axis of Resistance: Assessing Risks and Opportunities for the United States

The 31 page report can be downloaded here: https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/The-State-of-the-Axis-of-Resistance.pdf?x85095

Excerpts:

There is no guarantee, however, that these victories will last. Iran and its Axis of Resistance remain hostile to the United States and its partners and expect more conflict. They will spend the coming years rebuilding their strength and collaborating with major US adversaries, such as China, North Korea, and Russia, to erode US global influence and undermine the US-led international order. Tehran and its militia allies will, of course, need years of concerted effort and investment to return to their previous levels of strength. But if left unchecked in that time, they will likely succeed, which would enable them to again plunge the Middle East into instability.

The United States cannot accept that risk, as it was under those conditions that Hamas invaded Israel and ignited a war that rapidly spread across the Middle East. Washington faced numerous crises suddenly, as Iranian and Iranian-backed forces attacked American service members, international shipping, and key US partners. Tehran meanwhile accelerated its nuclear activities, at one point having enough fissile material to produce nine nuclear weapons within weeks. These challenges yanked US attention and resources back to the region and away from other global priorities, such as competition with China and Russia. Incurring such a strategic surprise in the Middle East at some future point when the United States has already committed itself to managing crises elsewhere in the world, such as a Chinese attack on Taiwan, could be catastrophic.

The United States should therefore capitalize on the moment of relative weakness affecting Iran and its Axis of Resistance to make lasting gains and prevent them from rebuilding. That means solidifying recent progress and using the positive momentum to further constrain Iranian and Iranian-backed forces across the Middle East. Washington has an unprecedented opportunity in this regard. Pressing this advantage could reduce the medium- and long-term threats to US interests, personnel, and partners and help stabilize the region after two years of widespread conflict. It could also help ensure that the United States can safely focus on advancing its interests and defending its principles elsewhere.

The State of the Axis of Resistance: Assessing Risks and Opportunities for the United States

https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-state-of-the-axis-of-resistance

criticalthreats.org

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Executive Summary:

Iran has suffered repeated defeats across the Middle East since the beginning of 2024. Israel has severely damaged the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance in its campaigns against Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Assad regime in Syria has fallen and severed Iranian access to its militia allies in the Levant. And Israeli operations have eliminated key Iranian and Iranian-backed figures and degraded Iranian air defenses and missile forces. Tehran has thus become more vulnerable and lost much of its regional influence and ability to project force, bringing it to its weakest in decades. These defeats have reduced the threat to US interests, personnel, and partners in the Middle East and afforded the United States the strategic bandwidth to focus its attention and resources on other parts of the globe.

There is no guarantee, however, that these victories will last. Iran and its Axis of Resistance remain hostile to the United States and its partners and expect more conflict. They will spend the coming years rebuilding their strength and collaborating with major US adversaries, such as China, North Korea, and Russia, to erode US global influence and undermine the US-led international order. Tehran and its militia allies will, of course, need years of concerted effort and investment to return to their previous levels of strength. But if left unchecked in that time, they will likely succeed, which would enable them to again plunge the Middle East into instability.

The United States cannot accept that risk, as it was under those conditions that Hamas invaded Israel and ignited a war that rapidly spread across the Middle East. Washington faced numerous crises suddenly, as Iranian and Iranian-backed forces attacked American service members, international shipping, and key US partners. Tehran meanwhile accelerated its nuclear activities, at one point having enough fissile material to produce nine nuclear weapons within weeks. These challenges yanked US attention and resources back to the region and away from other global priorities, such as competition with China and Russia. Incurring such a strategic surprise in the Middle East at some future point when the United States has already committed itself to managing crises elsewhere in the world, such as a Chinese attack on Taiwan, could be catastrophic.

The United States should therefore capitalize on the moment of relative weakness affecting Iran and

its Axis of Resistance to make lasting gains and prevent them from rebuilding. That means solidifying

recent progress and using the positive momentum to further constrain Iranian and Iranian-backed forces across the Middle East. Washington has an unprecedented opportunity in this regard. Pressing this advantage could reduce the medium- and long-term threats to US interests, personnel, and partners and help stabilize the region after two years of widespread conflict. It could also help ensure that the United States can safely focus on advancing its interests and defending its principles elsewhere.

This report provides recommendations that form a foundation from which the United States can develop a more coherent, long-term approach to containing the Iranian threat and promoting Middle Eastern stability.

First, the United States must collaborate with its international partners, especially the European countries, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and rebuilding its offensive capabilities. Negotiations are a perfectly viable way to prevent nuclear proliferation in principle. But the United

States must remain prepared to use force—as it has already to tremendous effect—to prevent Iran

from becoming a nuclear power. The United States and its international partners must also enforce the UN “snapback” sanctions that the United Kingdom, France, and Germany reactivated against Iran. Those sanctions include an international arms embargo that will hinder Iran’s efforts to rebuild its offensive capabilities with foreign assistance.

Second, the United States should support an international effort to establish a new Palestinian governing authority that opposes Hamas and can rebuild the Gaza Strip. That authority could manage the distribution of aid, housing of displaced Gazans, and administration and reconstruction of the strip. It could supplant Hamas as the primary political power in the strip and gradually erode Hamas’s influence. This is the most effective way to create long-term peace in the Gaza Strip; military operations cannot achieve this effect alone, because they challenge Hamas at the military level but not the political one. The international community would, of course, need to support a new governing authority with financial and security assistance, especially as that authority works to

destroy the remaining Hamas remnants. Egypt and the Gulf states are well poised to assist here.

Third, the United States should aggressively support the full implementation of the Israel-Lebanon

ceasefire agreement, which requires that the Lebanese government and military remove Hezbollah forces from southern Lebanon and prevent the group from rebuilding militarily. Newly elected Lebanese

leaders have voiced their desire to disarm Hezbollah promptly. Hezbollah has responded characteristically with threats to the government, highlighting the risk inherent in trying to disarm the group. But Hezbollah is weaker now than at any point in decades; Washington has a rare window of opportunity to defeat a terror group that has long antagonized the United States and killed many Americans. The United States should also explore how to collaborate

with regional partners and use sanctions to prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting.

Fourth, the United States must support long-term Syrian stability and a political order that integrates all ethno-religious minorities, reconciles rival political factions, and destroys Assad-era militant and criminal networks that seek to destabilize the country. Promoting such stability requires maintaining the US force presence in Syria as part of the international coalition to defeat ISIS. The United States should also pressure the transitional government and its backer, Turkey, to build a broad-based and fully representative political system. The United States should similarly press the transitional government to pursue fair and transparent justice against former Assad regime officials who committed crimes against the Syrian people. Doing so would minimize the appeal to some Syrian elements of supporting anti-government networks tied to Bashar al Assad and potentially aligned with Iran.

Fifth, the United States should increase support for—rather than abandon—Iraqi leaders who wish to

see their country independent from Iranian domination. The United States should retain its force presence in Iraq, as it empowers those Iraqi leaders, and collaborate with them to constrain and marginalize Iranian-backed militias. Washington must also be prepared to use force against those militias should they again threaten US service members. The militias stopped attacking US personnel after the United States threatened their key leaders, many of whom are designated terrorists. The United States can maintain this deterrence while exploring political and economic measures with Iraqi leaders to minimize Iranian influence there. The militias will respond threateningly, which is why Iraqi leaders need US backing and protection.

Finally, the United States should seek to render the Houthis unwilling to attack international shipping and US partners. The Houthis are currently willing to do both. Airstrikes alone cannot deter the Houthis. And the United States cannot tolerate a future wherein transit through the Red Sea and Gulf of Oman is under the constant threat of Houthi attack. That would imperil US sailors and vessels transiting the region and continue inflating shipping prices. The United States should specifically be prepared to support local partners in conducting offensive ground operations against the Houthis. A committed US effort to back partners in challenging Houthi political control is the most straightforward—and perhaps only—path to render the Houthis unwilling to conduct attacks outside Yemen.

Read the full report

criticalthreats.org

19. Using local advantage: how small forces can overcome insurmountable odds

18th century history and its application to Australia.

The title caught my eye because iI thought this would be about working through, with, and by indigenous forces. But I was wrong. However, this is an interesting historical perspective for the modern era.

Excerpt:

This article explores the insights gained from this case study for how the Australian Defence Force might confront a numerically superior and more powerful adversary in its near region. It argues that with sufficient strategic patience and smaller, audacious and offensively minded forces operating on interior lines of communication, the ADF can achieve local advantage. However, these small forces must have acquired a mastery of combat in the littoral terrain to Australia’s north and will need to be kept concentrated. This will then achieve a negative strategic aim (in other words, a stalemate) as a pathway to victory against a markedly more powerful foe.

Using local advantage: how small forces can overcome insurmountable odds | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · Iain MacGillivray

Picture yourself on a battlefield. It’s cold, the snow covers the ground, yet the sun shines brightly overhead. You gaze over the landscape and at your fellow soldiers. The prospects for the future seem grim. Your enemy outnumbers you in troops and equipment by more than two to one. Options are limited, and a single wrong move could lead to the downfall of you and your comrades. The only advantage at your disposal is the determination of your outmatched troops as you strive to outmanoeuvre the enemy’s overwhelming army before you.

You might reasonably assume this image refers to Ukraine in 2022. However, the scenario mirrors what the Prussian Army and Frederick the Great encountered during the Third Silesian War (1756 to 1763). Against overwhelming odds, Frederick and his army triumphed over a coalition of continental powers, resulting in a stalemate and eventual peace treaty with the Habsburg monarchy. Frederick managed to overcome his numerical inferiority, securing victories in several battles against a significantly larger regional coalition, effectively employing a strategy of denial of the Habsburg’s objectives.

This article explores the insights gained from this case study for how the Australian Defence Force might confront a numerically superior and more powerful adversary in its near region. It argues that with sufficient strategic patience and smaller, audacious and offensively minded forces operating on interior lines of communication, the ADF can achieve local advantage. However, these small forces must have acquired a mastery of combat in the littoral terrain to Australia’s north and will need to be kept concentrated. This will then achieve a negative strategic aim (in other words, a stalemate) as a pathway to victory against a markedly more powerful foe.

Learning from Frederick: leveraging local advantage to overcome a superior adversary

Much is made these days of the concept of asymmetry. The contemporary discussion tends to focus on technological silver bullets and the inescapable asymmetries between the guerrilla and the counterinsurgent. The original and often neglected point of asymmetry in war is, as American Civil War General Nathan Bedford Forrest decreed, to ‘get there firstest with the mostest.’ An aphorism often attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, ‘God is on the side of the big battalions’, expresses the great advantage that derives from the ability to bring overwhelming force to bear on a smaller portion of the enemy in battle.

Frederick the Great’s triumphs were stemmed largely from his ability to create local numerical asymmetry in battle. His tendency to bring superior numbers of Prussian troops to bear against enemy armies much larger than his own resulted from several factors. Despite his overall inferiority in numbers compared to his enemies, Frederick often acted pre-emptively and offensively, enabling him to bring larger numbers of troops to bear against only parts of the much larger enemy forces before they could concentrate against him. To this end, Frederick conditioned his army to march faster and for longer than the armies of his enemies, often catching them by surprise. Frederick drilled his troops in the difficult technique known as the oblique order, which also created local asymmetry against a larger or similarly sized foe in the confusion of battle.

In the Battles of Rossbach and Leuthan during the Third Silesian War, the Prussian Army was outmatched, facing enemy forces that were double their number and wielded superior weaponry. At Rossbach, Frederick’s troops executed a surprise assault by pretending to attack the Austrian right flank while concentrating his main force on the left. Similarly, at Leuthen, Frederick was able to concentrate the greater part of his smaller army against a smaller, yet numerically superior, section of the Austrian line. In both encounters, Frederick’s enemies suffered greater losses than the Prussians, and although Prussia ultimately found itself in a stalemate at the conclusion of the war, it retained control of Silesia and negotiated a treaty on favourable terms.

Frederick’s genius rested on his recognition of two major strategic advantages. First, he understood that the proximity of Silesia to Prussia enabled the Prussian Army to operate on interior lines of communication, meaning his troops needed to cover less ground than his enemies’ as both sides sought positional advantage over the other. Second, Frederick saw that he did not need to defeat his enemies and win the war decisively. Success required merely that he did not lose. Stalemate and negotiation on favourable terms was enough. These factors both demanded and enabled Frederick to husband his forces over a long period, and to the extent he could, seek battle only in the most favourable circumstances. It was, in essence, a strategy of denial.

The Bird Forces in 1941: A failure to use local advantage

Australia’s modest armed forces and the enormous number of locations in Australia’s north that may need defending present a challenge similar to Prussia’s in the Third Silesian War. Australia’s own experience early in the Pacific theatre of World War II offers a significant lesson in the consequences of ignoring Frederick’s example.

In 1941, the Australian Army stationed troops along the northern approaches to the continent to defend what was known as the Malaya Barrier. The Australian Imperial Force (AIF) 8th Division, one of four divisions, along with other AIF and militia units (known as the Bird Forces) covered a vast area, forming a 7,500 km arc from Malaya, Singapore, Timor (Sparrow Force), Ambon (Gull Force), Port Moresby (50th Brigade) and New Britain and New Ireland (Lark Force) to Nauru (Wren Force) and Ocean Island (Heron Force). The Bird Forces were each based around an AIF infantry battalion but did not operate as a combined arms team.

While the Australian government would withdraw Wren and Heron forces, ceding Nauru and Ocean Island to Imperial Japanese occupation, it refused to abandon the other harbours and airfields across the northern approaches. Australia thought their importance for the defence of Singapore and a potential counteroffensive into the North Pacific was too great. Due to insufficiency of naval and air support for defending or withdrawing the ground forces, the Bird Forces were easily isolated and destroyed. Imperial Japanese attacks on the Bird Forces resulted in more than 2,000 soldiers dying in battle or falling into captivity.

Australia learned valuable lessons from this experience and eventually secured local advantages. This learning was evident when Australian and US forces systematically dismantled isolated Imperial Japanese positions in the Pacific between 1943 and 1945. For Australia, this experience was most apparent in the fighting along the north coast of New Guinea.

Overcoming the odds in the Indo-Pacific

Frederick’s campaigns in Silesia offer some salient lessons for an Australian Defence Force preparing to fight against a major power close to Australia. The circumstances of such a war would likely mean Australia could take advantage of a negative strategic aim, seeking merely not to lose, and accepting that stalemate would be enough for strategic success. Australian forces would have the advantage of operating on interior lines of communication against a foe operating on extended exterior lines. Tactical and operational excellence in tropical and jungle littorals, including the right kinds of specialised materiel, particularly a combination that enabled speed of movement of sufficient forces to establish fortified forward defences or to attack before the enemy was thoroughly prepared and fortified, would give great advantage.

Frederick’s example also offers a couple of important cautions. His success depended on Prussia’s capacity to endure a long war of several years’ duration, which included logistical preparations and a national capacity to endure the harsh social consequences and privations of war. It required strategic patience in equal measure to audacity and offensive mindedness.

Perhaps most importantly, the essence of Frederick’s success was concentration of force. He simply did not divide his relatively modest force too broadly, seeking to use speed of movement to his advantage rather than waiting passively for his foe. The tactical defence is usually the superior tactical form, whereas the strategic offence is normally the superior strategic form. Frederick could not defend everywhere without decisively weakening his forces and creating opportunities for his concentrated enemies to gain local numerical superiority against them. So Frederick kept his army mobile and capable of concentration when and where the opportunities presented themselves.

It is easy to acknowledge that warfare in Frederick’s era was different to warfare today. Yet while the character of war has changed, its fundamental nature remains the same, and history remains our greatest teacher. The Prussian philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz observes, ‘war is a nothing but a duel on a larger scale.’ It is dynamic and interactive in the same way a wrestling match is. Tactics is the material of strategy. Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu cautions that ‘strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory.’

There is an ever-present risk in peacetime of losing touch with the practical essence of strategy. Frederick reminds us that strategy is an active thing, not a theory or a plan. Whereas the failure of the Bird Forces is a caution against this tendency, Australia’s successful offensives against the Imperial Japanese along the north coast of New Guinea affords an important insight into the way to fight a powerful foe close to home.

Frederick’s campaigns in Silesia suggest Australia could take advantage of a negative strategic aim and seek stalemate as a pathway to victory. Interior lines of communication offer another important advantage, and mastery of the littoral terrain to Australia’s north another. Patience, audacity and offensive mindedness in equal measure seems to be essential too. Frederick’s example also cautions against expectations of a short war and the folly of dispersing one’s forces too broadly. Concentration of force, after all, was the essence of Frederick’s genius. As Frederick himself said, ‘He, who defends everything, defends nothing.’

aspistrategist.org.au · Iain MacGillivray

20. The Case for a Multilateral Trade Organization Without America

Is the US going to get left out in the future? 

The Case for a Multilateral Trade Organization Without America

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/major-trading-countries-should-adopt-carney-proposal-for-new-coalition-by-anne-o-krueger-2025-10

Oct 27, 2025

  Anne O. Krueger

US President Donald Trump’s divide-and-rule tactics have shattered the postwar multilateral order. To preserve open, rules-based commerce, America’s major trading partners must form a new coalition capable of upholding the principles that the World Trade Organization can no longer guarantee.

WASHINGTON, DC – Since January, the world has watched in shock as US President Donald Trump’s administration has undermined every pillar of the economic order that the United States helped build and proudly championed for much of the past century.

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Financial Investors Can’t Profit From Complacency Forever

1. Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan argues that bond-market participants and others are consciously choosing to ignore obvious policy risks.

The principles of the postwar international economic order – non-discrimination among trading partners, fair treatment of foreign businesses in domestic courts, and adherence to the rule of law as enshrined in the World Trade Organization’s Articles of Agreement – laid the groundwork for eight decades of unprecedented prosperity and poverty reduction. While economists still debate whether trade was the primary engine of global growth or merely a key facilitator, few would dispute that the liberalization of trade played a central role.

Given this history, it is hardly surprising that the Trump administration’s sweeping, country-specific tariff hikes, which violate the tariff ceilings negotiated under the WTO, have shocked America’s allies. Trump’s invitation to individual countries to “negotiate” tariff reductions represents yet another breach of the multilateral rules-based system, given that these negotiations have been strictly bilateral. These actions violate the WTO’s most-favored-nation principle, which prohibits member states from applying different trade barriers to different countries except under formal free-trade agreements. By raising tariffs above the limits set in WTO agreements, the administration has injected enormous uncertainty into the global trading system.

Talks with South Korea, for example, began only once negotiations with Japan had apparently concluded. While the US agreed to cut the tariff on Japanese automobile imports to 15%, the rate for South Korean cars remains at 25% pending a final agreement. Even the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement offered no shield, as America’s regional partners were forced into separate negotiations.

The distortions don’t stop there. Beyond tariffs, the Trump administration demanded that negotiating partners commit to fixed levels of foreign direct investment in the US. Likewise, as a condition for approving the sale of US Steel to Japan’s Nippon Steel, the administration secured a “golden share,” granting the federal government veto rights over corporate decisions.

At its core, Trump’s trade strategy rests on divide-and-rule tactics. Faced with the threat of severe economic disruption, most national leaders have felt they had no choice but to negotiate and accept terms that heavily favor American interests.

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All of this underscores the urgent need for WTO members to mount a coordinated response. To that end, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has proposed that the world’s largest trade blocs – most notably, the European Union and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) – join forces and form a new multilateral coalition. Acting collectively, such a group would command far greater bargaining power than any country could achieve on its own.

Carney’s proposal, however, would take time to implement, since the two major trading blocs operate under different rules and standards that would need to be reconciled. The CPTPP, formed by the original participants in the Trans-Pacific Partnership after Trump withdrew the US from it at the start of his first presidency, offers a useful model.

Alternatively, WTO members could create a new Global Trade Organization (GTO), adopting the WTO’s Articles of Agreement and incorporating existing mechanisms such as the Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Membership would be open to any country willing to abide by these rules. If EU and CPTPP countries signed on, others – including South Korea – would likely follow.

Critically, accession procedures should be kept simple, ensuring continuity of WTO rules. With most of the world’s trading countries banding together, much of the WTO’s practical value could be preserved until the US decides to change course.

There is already precedent for this kind of initiative. After the US blocked appointments to the WTO’s Appellate Body between 2017 and 2019, 47 members responded by forming the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement, which allows participating members to resolve disputes without US involvement.

The US accounts for about 10-12% of global exports, while China’s share is roughly 15%. If the GTO represented even 60% of international trade, its collective bargaining power would far exceed that of the US, rendering Trump’s divide-and-rule tactics ineffective. More importantly, such unity might eventually persuade American policymakers to return to rules-based cooperation.

To be sure, the WTO must be modernized, especially when it comes to e-commerce, subsidies, and services trade. But restoring the integrity of the global trading system is urgent. By embracing Carney’s initiative and forming a GTO, major economies can reaffirm their commitment to cooperation, stability, and shared prosperity, thereby keeping the spirit of multilateralism alive while paving the way for necessary reforms.

Anne O. Krueger

Writing for PS since 2014

97 Commentaries

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Anne O. Krueger, a former World Bank chief economist and former first deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund, is Senior Research Professor of International Economics at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Development at Stanford University. She is the author of International Trade: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, 2020).

21, Ron Paul: The Rubio Doctrine, Neocons Are Back – OpEd

Wow. Ron Paul pulls no punches.

Conclusion:

After John Bolton’s disastrous stint in the first Trump Administration, promises were made that the second Trump Administration would be neocon-free. Instead, the neocons are back. Unless President Trump wakes up soon, the neocons will destroy his second term…and maybe the country.

Ron Paul: The Rubio Doctrine, Neocons Are Back – OpEd

https://www.eurasiareview.com/27102025-ron-paul-the-rubio-doctrine-neocons-are-back-oped/?utm

flip.it · Ron Paul · October 27, 2025

According to several recent news reports, the two major Trump foreign policy shifts last week are the handiwork of Marco Rubio, the President’s Secretary of State and (acting) National Security Advisor. As with all neocon plans, they will be big on promises and small on delivery.

First up, according to Bloomberg it was Rubio who finally convinced President Trump to take “ownership” of the US proxy war on Russia, and for the first time place sanctions on Russia. Up to this point President Trump chose to portray himself as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia. But with this move against Russia’s oil sector he can no longer credibly claim that this is “Joe Biden’s war.”

The Trump move followed a confusing few weeks since the Trump/Putin Alaska summit in August. After that meeting Trump dropped the neocon position that a ceasefire in the Russia/Ukraine war must occur before any peace negotiations. It was a sign that Trump was looking more realistically at the war. He also said he did not think Ukraine would win, which is pretty obvious.

A surprise call to Putin the day before Ukrainian president Zelensky was to arrive in town just over a week ago reinforced that position and Zelensky left Washington empty-handed. He was seeking Tomahawk missiles that could strike deep into Russian territory.

Then out of the blue President Trump last week announced through his Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent that the US would be sanctioning Russia’s two largest oil companies until Russia declares a ceasefire in the war before negotiations. That won’t happen, but what it does mean is that Rubio and the neocons have successfully gotten Trump to step on the escalation escalator. That is what they always do. It will be much harder to back down now.

At the same time the US Administration was jumping deeper into the Russia/Ukraine war, a long-time neocon dream was suddenly back in play. Although in Trump’s first term a “regime change” operation was attempted against Venezuela, it failed spectacularly. But the neocons have long dreamed of overthrowing the Venezuelan government – they almost got their way back in 2002 – and suddenly after several weeks of extrajudicial murder on the high seas in the name of fighting the drug war, President Trump announced that land strikes on Venezuela would begin soon.

He did mention that he might brief Congress on his plans for war on Venezuela, not that Congress can be bothered to care much one way or the other.

The neocon old guard that still dominates Washington foreign policy is taking a victory lap. South Carolina Senator Lindsey Graham was on the Sunday shows beaming over the conversion of “no regime-change wars” President Trump to “regime change wars” President Trump.

The Saddam Hussein WMD factories of 2002 have become the Nicolas Maduro cocaine and fentanyl factories of 2025 and once again the neocon war lies are amplified by the US mainstream media and transmitted to the American people. A new disaster is in the making. The “global war on terror” has been rebranded the “hemispheric war on narco-terror” and the US military industrial complex is rubbing its hands in anticipation of a windfall.

After John Bolton’s disastrous stint in the first Trump Administration, promises were made that the second Trump Administration would be neocon-free. Instead, the neocons are back. Unless President Trump wakes up soon, the neocons will destroy his second term…and maybe the country.

• This article was published at Ron Paul Institute

flip.it · Ron Paul · October 27, 2025

22. Is Europe Too Soft to Fight?

Excerpts:

It is leadership, then, not latent social weakness, that sets the limits of resolve. And confidence should flow in both directions. People should trust the leaders who guide them, and leaders should trust the societies they serve. Building that mutual confidence demands proximity, in which leaders help to shape society and are, in turn, shaped by it. Policymakers can take several steps to turn that insight into planning and preparation.

First, stop treating surveys as prophecies. The data captures peacetime attitudes, not wartime behavior. Instead, imagine how people might respond well to war — and build the structures that help them do so. In Sweden, the Association of Volunteer Motor Transport Corps trains truck drivers for crisis logistics. It is a model set to replicate the success of Ukraine’s cyber-defense networks.

Second, design mobilization policies that reflect real motivations. People join the military for many reasons: camaraderie, adventure, boredom, even Instagrammable opportunities with specialized equipment. They often embrace the praise of duty to country and self-sacrifice to cover more frivolous impulses. What matters is offering them a way in and then ensuring that service provides meaning once they are inside.

Third, prioritize practical fixes over culture wars. Many recruitment and retention failures are logistical, not cultural. These are solvable — but not if the starting assumption is societal decay. Practical fixes include pre-training to help volunteers meet fitness requirements, short-term service for those with manageable long-term health conditions, leading by explanation instead of orders, and greater attention to mental health.

Fourth, trust people as much as tech. When war comes, people learn the skills they need. The task is to make technology intuitive, like the STEN gun or Panzerfaust — which were simplified for widespread use. Ukrainians using commercial drones, improvising battlefield repairs with 3D-printed parts, and turning ordinary vehicles into communication hubs show the importance of making systems that people can master and adapt under pressure.

Finally, stop reinforcing adversary narratives. Authoritarian states do not own societal cohesion. But when our leaders praise their resolve and cohesion while questioning our own, they legitimize the idea that democracy equals weakness. The traits that define open societies — autonomy, plurality, dissent — can be assets in war, if harnessed rather than feared.

Is Europe Too Soft to Fight?

Florence Gaub and Roderick Parkes

October 28, 2025

https://warontherocks.com/2025/10/is-europe-too-soft-to-fight/

warontherocks.com · October 28, 2025

Europe’s populations are readier to fight than they are often credited. The problem isn’t their lack of will, but elite pessimism about it.

The belief that Europeans are too soft to fight — too coddled, too individualistic, too “post-heroic” — is quietly shaping policy decisions about mobilization, recruitment, and spending. Military veterans, academics, and arguably even European leaders appear more worried with divisions in their own societies than with the adversary itself. And even where self-confidence is growing — in Finland or Poland — it is often tempered by doubts about the crucial question of whether other allies would defend them if attacked.

This skepticism feels plausible — but it risks becoming self-fulfilling. “Will to fight” is not a fixed category. Instead, it is a social potential: something that can be cultivated or suppressed. Across issues as varied as tax compliance, welfare take-up, or financial bailouts, we know that trust or mistrust in society can shape outcomes. Defense is no different. If planners assume society won’t step up and design policies around that belief, they make it more likely that society will live down to expectations.

It is easy to show how leaders’ pessimism about society can become self-fulfilling. People are unlikely to meet the moment when political leaders use conscription to discipline youth rather than to build trained mass. The same holds when leaders oppose pragmatic fixes to recruitment or retention problems, such as allowing soldiers to sleep longer, because they feel it looks “soft.” And when armies place conscripts and reservists in static or dull and dangerous roles out of mistrust in their ability to master complex skills, they squander their potential.

Publics take their cues from such policies. As Australian foreign minister and historian Paul Hasluck put it, people often fail to mobilize not from inherent weakness, but because they see their government doesn’t trust them to. He faulted his own country for shying away from demanding sacrifice or civic contributions — thereby signaling a lack of faith that citizens would rise to the occasion. When governments send that signal, individuals lose confidence that others will do their part, and collective trust erodes.

NATO’s European allies are now deciding how best to invest in their defense. A key question is how to balance spending on advanced technology with building human mass. The danger is getting the balance wrong: acting as technological optimists but societal pessimists, embracing innovation in hardware while seeing demographic change, education, and diversity as weakness. That’s not just analytically incoherent. It encourages societies to see their defining attributes as flaws.

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How We Misread Society

This isn’t to say politicians and planners can afford to ignore the warning signs. There are genuine reasons for pessimism about social cohesion in Europe. Political polarization has deepened across the continent, and trust in institutions has declined. Younger generations place more value on autonomy and personal well-being than on collective duty. And as Europe’s societies have become more diverse and mobile, they have grown fragmented, leaving citizens less confident that others will share the burden when it counts.

But entrenched pessimism, when baked into defense planning, becomes a trap. Leaders should ask a different question: not “What if they won’t fight?” but “What if they would — if the conditions were right?”

When politicians judge normal citizens by the template of the highly trained professional soldier, they not only downplay people’s ability to learn quickly, but also assume ordinary people share the motivations of professionals (often unusually conscientious individuals drawn from families or localities with strong traditions of military service). And when politicians use benchmarks set by past generations to measure today’s society, they underestimate its capacity to rise to a challenge or act differently from the past.

Take the rise of personal independence in Europe. Polls show that individualism erodes peacetime willingness to fight. Yet in war people join up precisely to defend their way of life. Constitutional freedoms like property rights intensify the motivation to fight for house and home. And democratic freedoms encourage people to fight for a future they have chosen. By contrast, authoritarian states with supposedly stronger collective values frequently see their much-vaunted “unity” dissolve under fire, leading to mass desertion.

It’s true that Gen Z shows relatively low employer loyalty and ambition for traditional leadership roles. But they are also mission-driven, competitive, and responsive to recognition. Scandinavian conscription systems —misperceived as a way to discipline “woke youth” — actually succeed because they tap into those motivations, offering public service as a path to personal growth and social esteem. Other militaries are beginning to recognize that they have overemphasized leadership roles while neglecting the importance of “followership.”

Women often report lower willingness to fight, but in many cases it reflects lack of information, not lack of resolve. Women rule out military service not because they reject the idea of violence, but because they are unaware what roles exist, from trauma surgeon to explosive ordnance disposal technician. The tendency to pin the disparity on differences of gender or sex relegates women to “invisible” or “political” battalions and misses opportunities for practical fixes such as raising awareness about specific roles or interservice spouse assignments.

As for being international or cosmopolitan — a mindset European leaders actively cultivated as they pacified the continent — this usually requires first adopting a national identity, then building outward. Cosmopolitans can mobilize quickly when convinced of the justice of their country’s cause. By contrast, across history, the people most bound by “unchosen” ties to family and locality were slow to answer national — let alone international — calls. In a multinational alliance such as NATO, a cosmopolitan outlook can therefore be an asset rather than a liability.

And then there’s political disillusion. Populations that are disenchanted with their government are indeed reluctant to put their lives in its hands. Yet, they may also view participation in war as a way to change the system, as political leverage. Across history, elites have repeatedly expected populations to defend institutions they don’t trust or are excluded from — only to find that society fights best when it has hopes of something new to fight for, whether Poles under Napoleon or Black Americans in World War II.

Why Research Reinforces Pessimistic Policy

Why has the rich academic literature on “will to fight” failed to correct this pessimism? The answer is that the field has been driven mainly by the United Kingdom and the United States, countries without compulsory national service but with a rhetorical faith in “the people.” In those countries, leaders and planners were forced to treat will as something to be estimated from a distance, not shaped through direct contact. As a result, the research findings have been overstretched to meet the demands of anxious policymakers.

Most scholars, for instance, assess a society’s will to fight primarily through peacetime polls. Yet these surveys capture only how people imagine a war they have never experienced. It is hardly surprising that responses look weak: war is frightening, and fighting is still seen as something professionals do. The problem arises when such guesses are treated as forecasts of real behavior, much as peacetime distractions — doom-scrolling TikTok or chasing Instagram likes — are sometimes read as signs of deeper social decline.

When drawing policy lessons to build resolve, academics tend to look to states with the most data and the longest record of success. Yet these are often the least transferable cases — the few countries that have kept service compulsory. Finland built a strong territorial defense because it lived beside a major threat: Its official non-aligned status left it reliant on itself and cautious of expeditionary warfare. Holding Finland up as a model risks disparaging societies whose histories and threat perceptions are very different.

Academics make a similar mistake when drawing lessons from wartime case studies. We both romanticize particular national efforts and generalize them into universal templates. Ukraine is the latest example. Research shows that Ukrainians fight for reasons potentially found elsewhere — trust and distrust, culture, and recent experience — but each of these mattered primarily because of how that specific war struck that country at that moment. Since the next war will be different, we should not overplay Ukraine’s role as a model.

The reason policies such as conscription matter is not that they let politicians reform society or restore moral fiber. Their real value lies in keeping political and military leaders responsive to their citizens. In countries like Finland, where service has been maintained, politicians stay relatively close to society. In the United Kingdom or Germany merely reopening the conscription debate helps close the gap to citizens. This gives policymakers a better sense of national resolve — and their power to shape it — than academic indicators ever could.

The more that political and military leaders come into contact with wider society, the more they tend to see that people’s peacetime characteristics and skills can become assets in war. Policy then shifts toward adapting the military to society rather than trying to adapt society to military needs. This all reflects a basic sociological pattern: When leaders cannot read the people they depend on in a crisis, they grow anxious and pessimistic about them — and that anxiety soon shapes policy. Help them read society, and policy improves.

In Europe, social distance is only now beginning to narrow. After the Cold War, politicians became a separate class, detached from ordinary citizens. Most militaries shrank, professionalized, and lost contact with the broad mass of society. And even neighbors like Poland and Hungary were relative strangers. If academics have failed to offer a corrective to this estrangement, it is because they, too, kept their distance from the rest of society, calling it objectivity but reflecting the rise of a highly educated elite.

So What Should Change?

Ben Connable and Michael McNerney’s assessment in 2018 and Raymond Kuo and Catherine Kish’s analysis in 2025 support this message. Kuo and Kish, writing on Taiwan, show the dangers of bad policymaking: Even when societies are willing, morale falters when policymakers and planners mishandle them. Meanwhile, Connable and McNerney show how often policymakers and planners do just that — reducing war to mechanics even while insisting that intangible human factors decide it.

It is leadership, then, not latent social weakness, that sets the limits of resolve. And confidence should flow in both directions. People should trust the leaders who guide them, and leaders should trust the societies they serve. Building that mutual confidence demands proximity, in which leaders help to shape society and are, in turn, shaped by it. Policymakers can take several steps to turn that insight into planning and preparation.

First, stop treating surveys as prophecies. The data captures peacetime attitudes, not wartime behavior. Instead, imagine how people might respond well to war — and build the structures that help them do so. In Sweden, the Association of Volunteer Motor Transport Corps trains truck drivers for crisis logistics. It is a model set to replicate the success of Ukraine’s cyber-defense networks.

Second, design mobilization policies that reflect real motivations. People join the military for many reasons: camaraderie, adventure, boredom, even Instagrammable opportunities with specialized equipment. They often embrace the praise of duty to country and self-sacrifice to cover more frivolous impulses. What matters is offering them a way in and then ensuring that service provides meaning once they are inside.

Third, prioritize practical fixes over culture wars. Many recruitment and retention failures are logistical, not cultural. These are solvable — but not if the starting assumption is societal decay. Practical fixes include pre-training to help volunteers meet fitness requirements, short-term service for those with manageable long-term health conditions, leading by explanation instead of orders, and greater attention to mental health.

Fourth, trust people as much as tech. When war comes, people learn the skills they need. The task is to make technology intuitive, like the STEN gun or Panzerfaust — which were simplified for widespread use. Ukrainians using commercial drones, improvising battlefield repairs with 3D-printed parts, and turning ordinary vehicles into communication hubs show the importance of making systems that people can master and adapt under pressure.

Finally, stop reinforcing adversary narratives. Authoritarian states do not own societal cohesion. But when our leaders praise their resolve and cohesion while questioning our own, they legitimize the idea that democracy equals weakness. The traits that define open societies — autonomy, plurality, dissent — can be assets in war, if harnessed rather than feared.

BECOME A MEMBER

Florence Gaub, Ph.D., is director of the research division at the NATO Defense College in Rome where she focuses on the future of warfare.

Roderick Parkes, Ph.D., is a senior fellow at the NATO Defense College and most recently served as research director of the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin.

The analysis offered here reflects the personal judgment of the authors and not the position of any organization.

Image: Midjourney

warontherocks.com · October 28, 2025

23. From Front Lines to Factories: Embedding Industry in US Army Units to Accelerate Combat Iteration

Excerpts:

The introduction of modern commercial technologies like AI and UxS has dramatically reshaped the character of war, as evidenced by the conflict in Ukraine. Three years into the war, there is still no equilibrium; in fact, the pace at which technology and tactics are iterating is measured in months and even weeks. Ukraine has managed to maintain and even drive this rapid tempo of change by tightly coupling its warfighters with its defense industrial base. The United States must absorb these lessons to modernize and equip its force, specifically the integration of industry engineers and soldiers on the front line. To succeed, the policy needs to be designed to mitigate legal, cultural, operational, technical, economic, and institutional risks.

The imperative to prepare the US defense industrial base for rapid iteration and acquisition is made more urgent by the unraveling of the liberal international order. Revisionist powers, like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, are actively challenging US hegemony. After decades of relative peace, armed conflict threatens to define the mid-twenty-first century, as conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, and elsewhere are matched by potential flashpoints like Taiwan. While future wars will differ in terrain and tempo, the principles of modularity, iteration, and operator-driven adaptation will remain constant. If the United States hopes to defend its values and deter conflict, it must strengthen and modernize its industrial base to cope with the changing crucible of combat.

As an aside, this is why I am not worried about the future of our Army. Here is a First Lieutenant, Rhodes Scholar, who chose to be an Infantryman. He is someone who will outfight AND outthink our enemies.

First Lieutenant Kai L. Youngren branched infantry from the United States Military Academy in 2023. Pursuing a Rhodes Scholarship, he completed a master’s in public policy and a master’s in global governance and diplomacy at the University of Oxford. The insights gathered for this article came from his work with SAG-U J37 during the summer of 2025.

From Front Lines to Factories: Embedding Industry in US Army Units to Accelerate Combat Iteration - Modern War Institute

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/from-front-lines-to-factories-embedding-industry-in-us-army-units-to-accelerate-combat-iteration/

mwi.westpoint.edu · Kai L. Youngren

The blood-soaked battlefields of Ukraine combine timeless operational principles— speed, surprise, and combined arms maneuver—with new technology, like drones, electronic warfare, and AI. Yet, more striking than the change in the character of war is the pace at which it is changing. In such a dynamic environment, one principle remains firm: Those who adapt, win.

There is no single step the US Army can take to meet this adaptation imperative. But one that it can begin to take now, and that would have a disproportionate impact, is to embed small, collaborative workshop cells— teams of industry engineers and military subject matter experts—within frontline units and training centers. These teams would enable the rapid iteration of low-cost unmanned systems (UxS) and counter–unmanned systems (cUxS), ensuring that battlefield feedback shapes design in real time. Inspired by Ukraine’s success in accelerating UxS innovation, this approach offers a practical path to make the Army more adaptable, agile, and lethal.

The Problem

The UxS and cUxS fight in Ukraine vividly illustrates the speed of battlefield evolution. What began as operational intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, drones have become more agile—utilized for mass fires, precision strikes, mine-laying, cUxS, and more. The versality has been driven by the fielding of increasingly inexpensive commercial FPV and one-way attack drones. As both belligerents developed cUxS measures, like electronic warfare jamming and interceptor drones, UxS operators have had to rapidly modify their systems to remain operationally effective. Adaptations include larger frames, quieter engines, AI targeting systems, and fiber-optic control cables. This continuous adaptation reflects what Zachary Kallenborn and Marcel Plichta call the “counter-counterdrone” dynamic—a multilayered cycle of technological escalation that makes iteration speed decisive. According to a UK Ministry of Defence official, this grinding process produces new UxS capabilities every two to three weeks, highlighting the necessity of constant technological adaptation to maintain superiority. This tit-for-tat arms race is not only shaping the future of warfare—it is revealing that the US defense industrial base is too slow, expensive, and inflexible to cope with the rapid battlefield change. To remain competitive, procurement must move as fast as the fight and institutions must reward adaptation, not perfection.

The Department of Defense acquisitions process is notoriously slow and bureaucratic. Governed by over 3,500 pages of rules under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and its defense supplement (DFARS), the system incentivizes caution and punishes risk. The result is predictable: failed projects, cost overruns, and institutional stagnation. On average, firms take twelve years to deliver the first version of a new weapon system. Even small upgrades lag, such as Lockheed’s two-year delay on the F-35 “technology refresh 3.” While the process crawls, warfighters are left waiting for the capabilities that they need to survive and win.

Over the last several years, DoD sought to address these deficiencies. The 2022 Adaptive Acquisitions Framework created faster acquisition mechanisms, like the urgent capability acquisition pathway and middle tier of acquisition policy, and empowered project managers with greater tailoring authority. Beyond these, there are non-FAR vehicles, such as Other Transaction Agreements (OTAs) and Commercial Solutions Openings (CSOs), that can be leveraged to rapidly onboard commercial technology. While the rules have changed, the culture has not. Consequences of project failure, deeply conservative norms, and bureaucratic oversight continue to disincentivize risk-taking and lock in slow delivery.

Meanwhile, Ukraine shows that speed alone is not enough. To stay relevant on the battlefield, systems must be designed for modularity to facilitate iteration and adaptations as tactics evolve. The best way to ensure battlefield relevance is not through extended lab development cycles—it is through continuous frontline testing and real-time feedback.

The Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) oversees testing and evaluation for every piece of gear in a soldier’s environment. Conducting tests across numerous ranges, ATEC places weapons systems through a comprehensive testing regimen designed to stress the system in combat scenarios and extreme environments. While ATECs testing produces reliable weapons systems, two glaring questions remain: Can ATEC keep pace with the increasingly rapid cycle of iteration and change on the battlefield? And does current testing truly simulate the combat conditions, especially in electronic warfare–dense, GPS-denied environments like Ukraine? If not, new testing models may be needed—ones that are faster and embedded closer to the point of use.

The modern battlefield rewards not just innovation, but iteration. To do this effectively, the defense industry must understand battlefield conditions from the soldier’s perspective. In Ukraine, the urgency of the war and limited resources have forced military and civilian sectors to collaborate in real time. This distributed, bottom-up approach has become central to Ukraine’s success at maintaining technological parity with Russia. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in Ukraine’s UxS and cUxS development cycles.

Lessons Learned from Ukraine

Ukraine’s defense industrial base and procurement system differ sharply from those of the United States. In response to Russia’s invasion, Ukraine rapidly reformed its procurement approach, opening its centralized, state-owned military research and development model and procurement system to private firms and more procurement entities. For example, Ukraine authorized brigades to procure their tactical equipment via the Brave1 marketplace and contracted fifty-eight firms to construct drones. However, these policies create inefficiencies in resource allocation and standardization that the US Army may not be willing—or need—to accept. While not all the lessons from Ukraine are applicable to the American context, the United States can learn from the underlying mechanisms that Ukraine uses to facilitate bottom-up iteration.

Ukrainian industry and soldiers are directly collaborating on equipment modifications, creating real-time feedback loops that allow UxS platforms to be rapidly iterated. To enable this, defense firms, like Skeyton, regularly send key decision-makers and engineers to visit frontline troops. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense integrated mobile drone workshops into their battalions where engineers maintain and upgrade systems according to battlefield needs. As tactics and equipment evolve, these workshops communicate to industry headquarters to inform future designs. As a Ukrainian special operations commander noted, no product “was 100% combat-ready” upon procurement, but was fine-tuned by engineers and soldiers sitting in the trenches together.

Although this model of iteration may prove too costly for high-end strategic weapons systems, it is ideally suited for attritable, modular systems like UxS. These tactical feedback loops are not only critical to meet short-term battlefield needs but also vital to drive innovation by deepening industry’s understanding of the realities of combat. Moreover, the consistent collaboration will enhance soldiers’ “techcraft” competencies—the creative use of technology on the battlefield. While the Army may hesitate to formalize communication between warfighters and industry, the accelerating pace of change on the battlefield makes tighter integration not just advantageous, but essential.

Recommendations

While often conflated, iteration and innovation are two complementary, yet distinct processes. Iteration is characterized by continuous refinement and adaptation of a product whereas innovation involves breakthroughs in design or method. For example, enlarging a drone airframe to carry a bigger warhead is iterative while integrating AI-targeting software for the same drone is innovative. These concepts are linked, with iteration frequently driving innovation over time. On the battlefield, iteration dominates—success depends on fast adaptations to evolving conditions—and effective iteration demands a consistent feedback loop between developers and end-users. As researchers found in a study of Japanese companies, empowering mid-level managers to synthesize frontline feedback with strategic goals drives both performance and innovation. Ukraine’s approach to UxS battlefield iteration offers valuable lessons for the US Army, particularly in how structured feedback loops can be embedded into training and testing environments.

To operationalize these principles, the US Army should build on early steps to partner manufacturers with units under the transformation in contact initiative by launching a full pilot program to embed UxS and cUxS industry engineers within brigades rotating through US combat training centers and select forward units during peacetime exercises. The aim is to gather live-training data and operator feedback to inform real-time iteration of technologies. These feedback loops should be institutionalized, like Ukrainian drone workshops, by creating cells of industry engineers and uniformed subject matter experts to assess, refine, and codevelop modifications to address pressing battlefield problems. Although industry representatives often observe ATEC testing, embedding workshop cells into combat training center rotations would expose how new capabilities function under simulated combat and in the hands of the average soldier. Rather than replacing ATEC’s long-cycle testing, embedded workshops would supplement it by stress-testing adaptability—ensuring new technologies perform under evolving battlefield conditions before formal acquisitions. If successful, these adaptations should directly inform the future design of drones and counterdrone equipment on the production lines.

Despite efforts to create faster pathways, most DoD procurement remains captive to the waterfall-style requirements and oversight model embedded in the FAR process, where extended testing cycles and rigid milestone gates delay responsiveness. Frontline workshop cells offer a way to sidestep this bureaucracy. By treating frontline units and training centers as live test beds, the Army can shift more of the development cycle into the field, using tools like OTAs to refine systems before they ever enter a formal program of record. In this sense, embedded iteration is not just a testing reform—it is an acquisition reform. It allows for agile development outside traditional program constraints while preserving program manager oversight and feedback cycles aligned with tactical need. The result would be a hybrid model that integrates speed, accountability, and operational relevance.

While this proposal emphasizes accelerated testing and iteration, its viability hinges on navigating broader institutional and legal barriers. Embedding workshop cells into operational units will require adjustments in contracting authority, oversight mechanisms, and interorganizational coordination. Fortunately, DoD has experimented with alternative pathways, like the middle tier of acquisition pathway, and programs, like DIU’s Replicator initiative, that offer a foundation for piloting such agile models outside of the FAR process.

Implementation Plan

To operationalize these recommendations, an implementation plan must address six enabling dimensions: legal, cultural, operational, technical, economic, and institutional.

Legal Pathways

To enable embedded workshop cells and battlefield iteration, DoD should issue guidance to encourage the use of existing flexible contracting tools, like OTAs and the middle tier of acquisition pathway. These authorities allow program managers and organizations to structure contracts around broad capability goals, rather than rigid specifications. A March 2025 memo from the secretary of the defense took steps in this direction for software acquisition; the approach should also be extended to hardware. Instead of prescribing a perfect solution to a problem, acquisition specialists should incentivize adaptive development, enabling forward-deployed workshop cells to refine general technological solutions in close coordination with operators.

However, the issuing of broad requirements and relaxing oversight on development can create information asymmetries. To mitigate moral hazard, contracts should also include performance-based incentives, such as milestone payments, that are tied to iteration speed and effective upgrades in addition to cost savings. Additionally, there is a risk that iterated projects expand beyond the requirements scope. Therefore, program managers must retain the authority to assess and approve modifications throughout the development cycle.

Navigating Cultural Friction

Cultural friction may arise on two fronts: from defense primes used to long-cycle procurement and program managers focused on cost savings. Primes may view embedded iteration as a threat to centralized production, particularly as companies specializing in small, relatively cheap systems are increasingly likely to compete with primes on larger, comparatively big-ticket items. But even as nontraditional government contractors develop attritable UxS and cUxS technology for the Army—especially those, like Anduril, who are already engaged with DIU—the broader defense base will remain essential for exquisite platforms, such as Patriot missile batteries, ensuring primes still play a critical role. Internally, DoD leadership must champion this model to shift acquisition culture from risk aversion to adaptive experimentation.

Operational Integration

Successful battlefield integration requires doctrinal grounding. US Army Training and Transformation Command—the newly merged organization combining Training and Doctrine Command and Futures Command—should develop an innovation doctrine to codify the composition, mission, and operational roles of embedded workshop cells. This doctrine will help clarify command relationships and demonstrate how such teams can enhance unit lethality and responsiveness. By institutionalizing their function in doctrine, commanders are less likely to sideline these teams during exercises or operations.

Beyond doctrine, the initiative will need to be piloted in combat training center rotations and large-scale combat operations exercises to gradually rehearse integration. These venues simulate combat, offering industry engineers and unit leaders the opportunity to stress-test procedures, refine feedback loops, and validate the tactical value of iterative engineering. Findings from embedded workshop cells should be logged and transmitted to acquisition program managers and ATEC liaisons via a standardized reporting framework, enabling faster updates to requirements and formal testing protocols.

Ensuring Modularity

Uncontrolled iteration risks creating a fragmented equipment landscape. To preserve interoperability of systems and interchangeability of parts, the Army should enforce standardization around modular architecture. This would allow for diverse platforms to share common software stacks, payload interfaces, and hardware components, such as jammers or munition mounts. Centralized oversight—focused not on dictating design but on ensuring plug-and-play compatibility—will help avoid logistical friction in the field.

Affordability

There will be increased upfront costs associated with requiring sustained firm engagement for technological iteration. However, these costs can be offset through targeted reforms. Firstly, most DoD contracts for continued production are decided annually since multiyear procurement requires the notification and permission of Congress. Experts predict that multiyear contracts could provide projected savings of 5–15 percent to the government through economies of scale. DoD could redirect multiyear contract savings to offset costs for embedded research and development teams. Additionally, by lowering barriers for nontraditional entrants, competition may put downward pressure on prices, especially as strong demand signals for UxS and cUxS technology encourages firms to scale production. Lowering compliance costs for firms producing low-cost, attritable systems may also reduce overall prices. Finally, the expansion of these rapid iteration pathways could lead to mission creep. To avoid massive budgetary expansion, the regulations should be limited to low-cost UxS and cUxS technology.

Scalability Path

To ensure scalable implementation, embedded workshop cells should first be piloted with one brigade per combat training center. Lessons learned from these trials can inform doctrine and structure before a broader rollout. Eventually, the model could expand to divisions and multinational partners in NATO, particularly those operating UxS platforms in electronic warfare–contested environments.

The introduction of modern commercial technologies like AI and UxS has dramatically reshaped the character of war, as evidenced by the conflict in Ukraine. Three years into the war, there is still no equilibrium; in fact, the pace at which technology and tactics are iterating is measured in months and even weeks. Ukraine has managed to maintain and even drive this rapid tempo of change by tightly coupling its warfighters with its defense industrial base. The United States must absorb these lessons to modernize and equip its force, specifically the integration of industry engineers and soldiers on the front line. To succeed, the policy needs to be designed to mitigate legal, cultural, operational, technical, economic, and institutional risks.

The imperative to prepare the US defense industrial base for rapid iteration and acquisition is made more urgent by the unraveling of the liberal international order. Revisionist powers, like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, are actively challenging US hegemony. After decades of relative peace, armed conflict threatens to define the mid-twenty-first century, as conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, and elsewhere are matched by potential flashpoints like Taiwan. While future wars will differ in terrain and tempo, the principles of modularity, iteration, and operator-driven adaptation will remain constant. If the United States hopes to defend its values and deter conflict, it must strengthen and modernize its industrial base to cope with the changing crucible of combat.

First Lieutenant Kai L. Youngren branched infantry from the United States Military Academy in 2023. Pursuing a Rhodes Scholarship, he completed a master’s in public policy and a master’s in global governance and diplomacy at the University of Oxford. The insights gathered for this article came from his work with SAG-U J37 during the summer of 2025.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Chaplain (Col.) Ken Harris, US Army

mwi.westpoint.edu · Kai L. Youngren

24. Toward a Taiwan Truce – How Trump and Xi Can Pull Back From the Brink

Excerpts:

To be sure, this effort could backfire. Xi might pocket U.S. assurances and continue to coerce Taiwan as vigorously as before. But the United States can mitigate the risk by consistently encouraging vigilance about China’s threat to Taiwan. Rather than oversell the assurances as a new dawn of peace, Trump should explain that China’s words must be backed with action, which his administration will monitor closely. Meanwhile, the United States should continue to improve its posture in the Indo-Pacific and help Taiwan strengthen its military capabilities.

Taiwan, too, should keep enhancing its civil and military defenses while restraining its assertions of sovereignty in cross-strait affairs. If Chinese forces keep conducting large exercises and frequent incursions despite Taipei’s restraint, they will further alienate the people of Taiwan and beget greater U.S. support for Taiwan. That would be unfortunate, but it might simply return cross-strait relations to their current state while clarifying Beijing’s intentions. In the worst case, if Xi orders an attack, Taipei and Washington could at least hold up the violated assurances to demonstrate Beijing’s bellicosity and bad faith, helping to attract international support for Taiwan. This is no small benefit: the conflict could turn on the alignment of other countries in the region and beyond.

Because U.S.-Chinese assurances risk alarming Taiwan, Washington should consult with Taipei before and during negotiations to explain its intentions, solicit advice on the concessions it should seek, and make clear what it will not trade away. Keeping Taiwan, Japan, and other allies apprised of U.S. intentions will also counteract China’s attempts to sow doubt about the United States’ reliability as a partner throughout the process.

A final risk is that, as occurred with prior joint communiqués, Congress might push back against the president by strengthening support for Taiwan. Congressional activism could take counterproductive forms, such as a U.S. defense commitment to the island. To avoid this scenario, Trump should work to persuade members of Congress that the deal is beneficial and that his administration will continue supporting Taiwan.

Exchanging assurances with China is perhaps the single most significant action that the United States can take right now to make great-power war less likely. Without conceding much, Washington could stop cross-strait antagonisms from descending further and create room for a better trajectory to emerge. If diplomatic assurances succeed in inducing mutual restraint, and 2027 passes without incident, then a new stability in the western Pacific could take hold, anchoring the security and prosperity of a vital and dynamic region. The moment is right to test a worthy proposition.

Toward a Taiwan Truce

Foreign Affairs · More by Stephen Wertheim · October 28, 2025

How Trump and Xi Can Pull Back From the Brink

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/toward-taiwan-truce

Stephen Wertheim

October 28, 2025

Tourists walking past a wall painted with a Taiwan flag, Kinmen, Taiwan, October 2025 Ann Wang / Reuters

STEPHEN WERTHEIM is a Senior Fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Visiting Lecturer at Yale Law School, and the author of Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy.

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When U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet on Thursday, they should take bold action to reduce the risk of war over Taiwan. That risk has reached alarming heights in recent years. China, the most dangerous party, has militarized the strait, launching large military drills simulating blockades of the island and daily incursions across the median line. Taiwan, under President Lai Ching-te, has asserted its sovereignty in new and destabilizing ways, casting its political system as separate from and threatened by the mainland’s. And the United States has been increasingly one-sided in backing Taiwan, chipping away at previous understandings reached with Beijing on cross-strait issues.

That worsening tensions could spiral into cataclysmic war is now all too imaginable. To address this danger, Washington has sought to strengthen military deterrence. Improving Taiwan’s defenses, and the United States’ regional posture, makes sense, but this alone will not restore stability in the strait. In fact, military buildups without diplomatic assurances are prone to be interpreted by China’s leadership as confirmations of hostile intent. The best way to reverse this dynamic and achieve a substantial reduction in military activities around Taiwan is for both Washington and Beijing to show greater respect for each other’s core positions.

Trump and Xi have an opportunity to do just that. At their meeting, they should initiate working-level talks to formulate a new U.S.-Chinese joint communiqué or, failing that, a pair of parallel statements. The wording would need to be carefully negotiated, but the core bargain should be simple: Washington will not support Taiwan’s independence or rule out peaceful unification with the mainland, and in return, Beijing will avoid the use of force and ease its military intimidation of Taiwan. If done right, these assurances would improve Taiwan’s prospects of preserving self-rule while restraining its leadership from making political statements that upset the status quo.

SPIRALING TENSIONS

Under Xi, China has ramped up pressure on Taiwan in all domains—military, economic, diplomatic, and informational—leading some observers to fear that it might invade or blockade the island as soon as 2027. Still, it remains far from clear that China is bent on mounting a risky attack in any time frame. What is clear is that China might well resort to force should it conclude that Taiwan is becoming independent or permanently severed from the mainland. The United States and Taiwan retain a profound interest in keeping China from reaching such a conclusion.

Unfortunately, Washington and Taipei have moved in the opposite direction, walking back long-standing assurances designed to prevent conflict. Over the past five years, the United States has weakened aspects of its “one China” policy, under which Washington recognizes Beijing’s government as the sole legal representative of China and acknowledges, and does not challenge, Beijing’s position that there is one China of which Taiwan is a part. In its final year, the first Trump administration scrapped restrictions on executive branch contacts with Taiwanese counterparts and sent Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar to Taipei, the highest-level visit by a cabinet official in decades. These moves diminished the United States’ commitment—articulated in the U.S.-Chinese joint communiqués issued in 1972, 1979, and 1982—to forgo official relations with Taiwan. (The Biden administration reinstated the earlier contact guidelines in loosened form.)

Then, as president, Joe Biden twice said that the people of Taiwan should decide whether to be independent. Moreover, on four occasions he declared that he would use military force to defend the island against a Chinese attack, contradicting the customary ambiguity that his predecessors maintained. Although the White House continually affirmed that U.S. policy had not changed, Biden undercut U.S. efforts to deter Taiwan from unilateral moves toward independence. Tensions came to a head in August 2022, when Nancy Pelosi became the first sitting House speaker in a quarter century to visit the island, where she met with President Tsai Ing-wen. Predictably, the visit backfired. Beijing intensified military exercises around Taiwan and began to send ever more planes and ships across the median line of the strait.

Washington and Beijing must show greater respect for each other’s core positions.

After that episode, the Biden administration tried to stabilize relations by reaffirming Washington’s commitment to the “one China” policy and giving private verbal assurances to Xi. And since returning to office Trump has consistently declined to specify how the United States would respond to an attack on Taiwan. Yet damage has been done: Beijing is understandably concerned that the United States might resume degrading cross-strait understandings, whether under Trump or a successor.

Meanwhile, Taipei has not helped matters. Since becoming president of Taiwan, last May, Lai has asserted Taiwan’s separateness from the mainland and muted his predecessor’s efforts to reassure Beijing. Although Tsai hailed from the pro-sovereignty Democratic Progressive Party, she also affirmed that she would conduct cross-strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China constitution and the 1992 act governing relations with the mainland, both of which treat China and Taiwan as part of a single entity. By contrast, Lai has avoided implying that there exists one China that includes Taiwan. He has cast China as a stark threat that aims not only to “annex Taiwan” but also to achieve “international hegemony.” Last March, he designated China as an “external/foreign hostile force” as he launched a series of measures to combat Chinese infiltration within Taiwan, including the reinstatement of military tribunals to try espionage cases against active-duty personnel.

Lai’s moves produced no better results than Pelosi’s visit did. Directly following three of Lai’s major addresses, in which he characterized the political systems in Taipei and Beijing as “not subordinate to each other,” the Chinese military staged blockade-style exercises encircling Taiwan. Conversely, after Lai used less antagonistic language toward China in speeches this May and October, China declined to hold large military drills. In the short term, Taipei’s envelope-pushing pronouncements clearly precipitate greater Chinese coercion. In the longer term, they increase the odds that Beijing could decide to compel unification by force.

Lai may believe that China is coming for Taiwan no matter what, and he has domestic political incentives to remain assertive in cross-strait affairs. Although his recent rhetorical climbdowns are encouraging, he is more likely to sustain his flexibility if the United States reinforces its interest in lowering the temperature. To reduce the risk of war, then, Washington must not only assuage Beijing’s anxieties about U.S. intentions but also restrain Taipei from triggering further escalation.

MUTUALLY ASSURED STABILITY

Fortunately, the United States can achieve both of these goals at once—while obtaining concessions from China. The Trump administration should seek to exchange public assurances with Beijing that move each party away from the other’s redlines. Ideally, the United States and China would do so in a new joint communiqué, adding to the three original statements that continue to form the foundation for diplomatic relations between the countries. A joint communiqué would create sticky commitments, not easily walked back, although the document could be extremely difficult to negotiate, especially if it addressed broader aspects of a fraught bilateral relationship. Even if Trump and Xi ended up issuing individual statements in parallel, that would be a worthwhile fallback; what matters most is to address in substance the central concerns of each side.

Washington should offer to make several key statements. For one, it should affirm that the United States does not and will not support Taiwan independence, and will continue to oppose any unilateral change to the status quo by either side, whether toward independence or unification. The future tense here is the novelty; unlike previous formulations, this one adds “will not support,” thereby extending the U.S. commitment indefinitely and deterring Taipei from declaring independence in the hope that Washington would accede to a fait accompli. Going forward, any American president tempted to support Taiwan’s independence, or even to adopt the permissive attitude that Biden occasionally expressed, would have to more starkly contradict an explicit U.S. pledge. Beijing would be relieved that the United States is no longer muddying and in fact strengthening its nonsupport for independence. And Taipei would be warned that any effort to push toward independence would only push the United States away.

At the same time, the United States would concede little by proffering a future-oriented assurance. Like other elements of the “one China” policy, not supporting independence would remain implicitly conditioned on China not resorting to force. Furthermore, the United States need not go so far as to oppose Taiwan independence outright, as The Wall Street Journal reported that Xi is seeking from Trump. Opposing independence exceeds not supporting it, and would foreclose the possibility, however improbable, that both sides might one day amicably part ways. Instead, the United States should continue to take no position on the ultimate outcome of cross-strait differences, insisting only on a peaceable process.

To deter Taiwan from pursuing permanent separation from China short of independence, the United States should offer a second assurance: that it has an abiding interest in peace and stability across the strait and welcomes any resolution of cross-strait differences, whether involving unification or any other outcome, provided that it is reached by peaceful means, free from coercion, in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides. Crucially, for the first time in a formal, high-level statement, the United States would specify peaceful unification as one of the outcomes it would accept.

The Trump administration should seek to exchange public assurances with Beijing.

This shift should assuage Beijing’s concern that the United States seeks to make Taiwan’s self-rule permanent and emboldens Taipei to take every step toward total separation short of declaring independence. By the same token, the assurance would encourage Taipei to avoid unqualified assertions of separation from the mainland. U.S. officials could reinforce this message by expressing support for renewed cross-strait dialogue, as the Biden administration did in January 2024, and by privately suggesting that Lai, like Tsai, vow to handle the issue in accordance with the Republic of China constitution and Taiwan’s 1992 act.

Still, this new assurance would alter rhetoric alone; the United States’ underlying position, of welcoming any peaceful resolution, would not change. Accordingly, Trump should reject Xi’s request to support “peaceful reunification.” Washington should not back only one particular outcome, and the term “reunification” would implicitly endorse Beijing’s legal and historical claim on Taiwan. Adopting China’s position in this way would be a blunder, diminishing Taiwan’s resolve to resist Chinese aggression and coercion.

In return, Beijing ought to offer equally significant measures. Building on Xi’s statement to Biden in 2023 that he had no timeline for invading Taiwan, China should publicly state that it has no deadline for achieving reunification with Taiwan and will make every effort to pursue reunification through peaceful means. This would constitute the first official, public statement that Beijing lacks any certain date for resolving the Taiwan issue.

China’s no-deadline pledge would advance Taiwan’s interests. If Xi subsequently ordered an attack, he would look two-faced and aggressive, making countries in East and Southeast Asia more likely to rally behind Taiwan. To legitimize its war, China would try to point to provocations by Taipei and Washington—which is why the no-deadline pledge would incentivize them to refrain from acts that Beijing could hold up as compelling casus belli. In this roundabout way, the pledge would redound to China’s benefit, too, as long as Beijing truly does not wish to use force to annex Taiwan.

In parallel with the exchange of assurances, China should agree to reduce its military activities around Taiwan. It should restore the median line of the strait as a tacit buffer, ending its incursions that began in 2019 and ramped up after Pelosi’s visit in 2022. Returning to the status quo ante would signal that Beijing seeks to relax cross-strait tensions and will escalate only in response to new provocations. China should also agree to hold fewer and smaller military exercises around Taiwan and stop intruding into Taiwan’s contiguous zone, which extends 24 nautical miles around the island. The United States could consider offering reciprocal measures, such as retracting the Typhon missile system it placed last year in the Philippines. But even if China made military concessions whereas the United States did not, this would be a fair deal: political pressure from Washington stands a better chance of restraining Taiwan than China’s military intimidation tactics do.

MODEST RISKS, MAJOR UPSIDE

To be sure, this effort could backfire. Xi might pocket U.S. assurances and continue to coerce Taiwan as vigorously as before. But the United States can mitigate the risk by consistently encouraging vigilance about China’s threat to Taiwan. Rather than oversell the assurances as a new dawn of peace, Trump should explain that China’s words must be backed with action, which his administration will monitor closely. Meanwhile, the United States should continue to improve its posture in the Indo-Pacific and help Taiwan strengthen its military capabilities.

Taiwan, too, should keep enhancing its civil and military defenses while restraining its assertions of sovereignty in cross-strait affairs. If Chinese forces keep conducting large exercises and frequent incursions despite Taipei’s restraint, they will further alienate the people of Taiwan and beget greater U.S. support for Taiwan. That would be unfortunate, but it might simply return cross-strait relations to their current state while clarifying Beijing’s intentions. In the worst case, if Xi orders an attack, Taipei and Washington could at least hold up the violated assurances to demonstrate Beijing’s bellicosity and bad faith, helping to attract international support for Taiwan. This is no small benefit: the conflict could turn on the alignment of other countries in the region and beyond.

Because U.S.-Chinese assurances risk alarming Taiwan, Washington should consult with Taipei before and during negotiations to explain its intentions, solicit advice on the concessions it should seek, and make clear what it will not trade away. Keeping Taiwan, Japan, and other allies apprised of U.S. intentions will also counteract China’s attempts to sow doubt about the United States’ reliability as a partner throughout the process.

A final risk is that, as occurred with prior joint communiqués, Congress might push back against the president by strengthening support for Taiwan. Congressional activism could take counterproductive forms, such as a U.S. defense commitment to the island. To avoid this scenario, Trump should work to persuade members of Congress that the deal is beneficial and that his administration will continue supporting Taiwan.

Exchanging assurances with China is perhaps the single most significant action that the United States can take right now to make great-power war less likely. Without conceding much, Washington could stop cross-strait antagonisms from descending further and create room for a better trajectory to emerge. If diplomatic assurances succeed in inducing mutual restraint, and 2027 passes without incident, then a new stability in the western Pacific could take hold, anchoring the security and prosperity of a vital and dynamic region. The moment is right to test a worthy proposition.

Foreign Affairs · More by Stephen Wertheim · October 28, 2025

25. The New Eurasian Order – America Must Link Its Atlantic and Pacific Strategies

Is the future Eurasia?

Excerpts:

Chinese and Russian efforts to remake the world order have worried American allies and spurred them to come together in new and powerful ways. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO deepened its relationships with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. The Five Eyes intelligence alliance—comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States—has taken steps to enhance information sharing and to bolster the security of supply chains. And the G-7 has regularly invited Australia, India, and South Korea to participate in its summits.

U.S. allies can’t reach their full potential without Washington.

The Trump administration can take advantage of this momentum to encourage allies to assume more responsibility. The G-7 Plus, an intergovernmental organization of conflict-affected countries, could become a forum for cooperation on securing critical minerals or countering drug traffickers. A combined meeting of the two Quads to which the United States belongs—in the Indo-Pacific with Australia, India, and Japan, and in Europe with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—could help the two regional groups coordinate their export controls, industrial policies, and technology development.

U.S. allies will continue to work with one another whether or not the United States joins them. But they can’t reach their full potential without Washington’s involvement. Eighty years ago, it took bold U.S. leadership and diplomacy to create the global order. It will take equally innovative leadership to remake it. The U.S. alliance system, built for a previous era, must be overhauled to reflect the new reality of adversarial alignment. Trump has shown little interest in revitalizing or redesigning alliances beyond pushing partners to spend more on defense. U.S. allies are now stronger as a result but still lack a clear strategy for integrating their new capabilities. Without U.S. leadership, allied coalitions might not have the muscle to successfully counter Beijing and Moscow.

On its own, the United States cannot manage Chinese-Russian alignment. But neither can Washington ignore any conflict in Eurasia that comes from it. American allies are rapidly transforming their relationships whether Washington likes it or not; these networks can either serve or undermine U.S. interests depending on how Washington engages with them. If the United States fails to reset ties with Asian and European partners, it risks being left on the sidelines of a rapidly changing world order.

The New Eurasian Order

Foreign Affairs · More by Julianne Smith · October 21, 2025

America Must Link Its Atlantic and Pacific Strategies

November/December 2025 Published on October 21, 2025

Illustration by Michaela Staton; Photo source: Reuters.

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On October 28, 2024, a group of South Korean intelligence officials briefed NATO members and the alliance’s three other Indo-Pacific partners—Australia, Japan, and New Zealand—on a shocking development in the war in Ukraine: North Korea’s deployment of thousands of its troops to Russia’s Kursk region to aid Moscow’s war effort. The fact that Seoul sent its top intelligence analysts to Brussels for the briefing was nearly as stunning as North Korea’s decision to enter the war in Ukraine.

Both developments reflected a new reality. The United States’ adversaries are coordinating with one another in unprecedented ways, creating a more unified theater of competition in Eurasia. In response, U.S. allies are coalescing. For a few years, the United States led that effort. In 2021, it formed AUKUS, a security arrangement with Australia and the United Kingdom. In 2022, NATO began inviting Asian countries to participate in its annual summits. And in 2024, Japan, South Korea, the United States, and the EU created a coalition to loosen China’s grip over pharmaceutical supply chains.

Today, however, the United States appears to be dispensing with a transregional approach to great-power competition. In May, Elbridge Colby, the undersecretary of defense for policy, dissuaded British officials from sending an aircraft carrier on a scheduled deployment to the Indo-Pacific. The gist of Colby’s position, according to an anonymous source quoted by Politico, was simple: “We don’t want you there.” He urged them to focus instead on threats closer to home—namely, Russia.

Washington is now encouraging its Asian and European allies to stick to their neighborhoods—a throwback foreign policy that is ill suited to the current moment. China and Russia are synchronizing their transgressions and sharing weapons and know-how. Together, they pose a threat more formidable than any the United States has faced in decades. The lines between Asia and Europe are blurring, and crises on one continent have spillover effects in the other. The United States should try to influence the new networks its allies are crafting, not resist them. Otherwise, Washington may find itself on the fringes of a new global order.

COME TOGETHER

American primacy depends on Asian and European security. In the 1940s, the political scientist Nicholas Spykman argued the importance of commanding the coastal edges, or rimlands, of Eurasia. “Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia,” he wrote. “Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.”

Since then, every U.S. president—with the exception of Donald Trump—has shared Spykman’s conviction. They have also shared a belief that the United States should never again allow the emergence of a powerful Eurasian bloc that could threaten American interests. Any alignment of regional powers, whether as allies or in coordinated opposition to the United States, could pose a threat to U.S. preeminence. When that happened in the 1910s and again in the 1930s, the United States was drawn into two devastating world wars. Thus, while American leaders firmly committed themselves to both Asian and European security after World War II, they also spent most of the next 50 years trying to keep U.S. adversaries divided and U.S. allies apart.

This approach sustained American dominance for decades. But it is no longer fit for purpose. The United States now faces the prospect of an emerging Eurasian military-industrial bloc. China, the world’s largest economy by purchasing power parity, is building a partnership with Russia that is an alliance in all but name. Both countries have formidable militaries and years of experience carrying out hybrid operations, such as cyberattacks, maritime disruptions, and disinformation campaigns. Last year, Russia signed a mutual defense treaty with North Korea. China has conducted joint military exercises with Belarus and Serbia. Meanwhile, China and Russia use institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS, a group named after its first five members—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—to provide a veneer of legitimacy to their plans.

Although this loose coalescing of adversaries is driven more by shared grievances than by common interests, the United States cannot ignore it. Washington must unify its alliances by investing in cross-regional ties. U.S. President Joe Biden recognized that need and sought to build “the muscle of democratic alliances.” The AUKUS pact, for example, was an ambitious effort to forge connections among allied defense industries across the Atlantic and the Pacific in fundamentally new ways.

The lines between Asia and Europe are blurring.

With Chinese technologies and North Korean troops aiding Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine, European partners know they can’t sit on the sidelines of Asian geopolitics. And Indo-Pacific partners understand that what happens in Ukraine today could influence how China approaches Taiwan tomorrow. As Japan’s former foreign minister Yoshimasa Hayashi has put it, security in Europe and security in the Pacific “are not separable.” Over the past seven years, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the EU all drafted new Indo-Pacific strategies that stress the importance of working with Asian democracies to build resilient supply chains and protect freedom of navigation. In 2021, Germany and the Netherlands deployed frigates to the Indo-Pacific for the first time in decades. And according to the Kiel Institute, a German think tank, Japan has sent more bilateral economic and humanitarian aid to Ukraine than have Finland, France, or Poland.

Since January, the United States has resisted the growing ties between its Asian and European partners. In September, Trump said that he was “not concerned at all” about a Chinese-Russian axis forming against the United States. At the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s largest annual defense conference, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth called for the United States’ European allies to “maximize their comparative advantage” on their own continent and reminded them that “the N in NATO stands for ‘North Atlantic.’” Readouts of meetings between Pentagon officials and European allies no longer mention Indo-Pacific security, as they frequently did over the past few years. And meetings between the United States and Asian countries have stopped referring to the importance of peace in Ukraine. In June, for the first time in three years, Indo-Pacific leaders were absent from NATO’s summit, despite their countries’ significant contributions to European defense.

The Trump administration seems to want its allies, especially those in Europe, to stick to their own backyard so that they can shoulder a larger responsibility for their own security. The United States is focused on maintaining order in the Western Hemisphere, defending the homeland, and limiting U.S. commitments abroad. U.S. adversaries, however, are sharing their technological and military resources in ways that could wear down individual U.S. allies and prolong regional conflicts. Moreover, China and Russia are deploying cyber, space, and other tools around the globe, reducing the chance that any one crisis will be contained within a single geographic region.

Walling off Asian and European allies from one another would leave the United States and its friends weaker. The risk of a multitheater crisis is growing. Washington and its allies need to prepare to deter multiple adversaries in different regions. Their ability, or lack thereof, to muster a unified front will shape the calculus of leaders in Beijing and Moscow. The United States’ friends and foes are realigning. Washington can sit on the sidelines or try to mold the emerging order to its favor.

DOUBLE TROUBLE

China and Russia are collaborating in ways that the United States is not prepared for. The two countries are leveraging their relationship and also their respective partnerships with North Korea and Iran to cause trouble. In Asia and Europe, Beijing and Moscow are using “gray zone” operations to bully U.S. allies, weaken their militaries, and call into question the unity and capability of democratic groups such as the EU, the G-7, and NATO. For instance, China and Russia have tried to intimidate Japan and South Korea by conducting joint air patrols off their coasts. European officials have investigated Chinese- and Russian-linked ships for sabotaging undersea cables in the Baltic Sea. And according to the European Policy Center, Chinese and Russian online disinformation campaigns now “increasingly converge in both tactics and objectives.” For example, Chinese and Russian state media have amplified each other’s narratives, including by blaming NATO for the war in Ukraine and spreading conspiracy theories about the COVID-19 pandemic.

China and Russia are also integrating their capabilities in ways that will shape future wars. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s years-long bombardment of Ukraine would not have been possible without access to Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean weapons, technologies, and personnel. And U.S. officials have said that Moscow is repaying Beijing and Pyongyang by sending them stealth, submarine, missile, and satellite technologies it had previously been unwilling to share. The U.S. intelligence community’s most recent threat assessment warns that this greater alignment of adversaries “increases the chances of U.S. tensions or conflict with any one of these adversaries drawing in another.” In 2024, a bipartisan congressional commission of former senior civilian and military officials similarly concluded that the United States “should assume that if it enters a direct conflict involving Russia, China, Iran, or North Korea, that country will benefit from economic and military aid from the others.”

China and Russia are making themselves more capable of sustaining regional conflicts for a longer time. The United States and its allies will not be prepared to manage this challenge unless they also collaborate militarily. Fortunately, Washington’s friends are already doing so. Just as Russia has relied on Chinese and North Korean assistance to keep up its assault on Ukraine, NATO has been able to sustain Ukrainian defenses because Australia, Japan, and South Korea have been quietly backfilling U.S. stocks of 155-millimeter artillery rounds and Patriot missiles. Similarly, European deployments to the Indo-Pacific theater, although limited, have helped maintain allied presence around the South China Sea and in the Taiwan Strait, especially as U.S. ships have been redeployed to the Middle East and elsewhere.

An Abrams tank near Orzysz, Poland, September 2025 Kacper Pempel / Reuters

These initiatives are a good start, but the United States and its allies will have to do much more to counter China and Russia. The potential for China or Russia to come to each other’s aid also increases the risk of a multitheater conflict. In July, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte warned that, in the event of a crisis over Taiwan, China could ask Russia to keep Washington and its partners “busy in Europe by attacking NATO territory.” Moscow could also distract or dissuade countries from helping Taiwan through nonkinetic means, such as by launching a cyberattack on European power grids. Allied militaries and defense planners will need to address the prospect of a multitheater war collectively. The United States and its partners should begin by expanding real-time information sharing between their capitals, reducing vulnerabilities in their critical infrastructure, planning for shocks to the energy market, and integrating their space and cyber capabilities.

The United States and its friends should also coordinate defense industrial production to fill gaps in one another’s arsenals. They should aim to double their overall production of long-range strike weapons, munitions, and drones within the next five years. If the United States and its allies don’t pool their resources, they could face critical shortages in a future conflict. War games conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies have suggested that the United States could run out of munitions within the first eight days of a war with China over Taiwan. The United States and its partners would need to share resources to take on Beijing’s military-industrial capacity alone. If Russia were to send munitions to China, the need for U.S. allies to leverage their collective resources would be even greater.

Washington should work to build munitions factories across the European and Indo-Pacific theaters, thereby reducing the chance that U.S. adversaries could sever supply lines. It should establish more maintenance, repair, and overhaul facilities for U.S. platforms in allied countries, which would enhance the readiness and preparedness of American forces during a crisis. Washington and its partners also need practice when it comes to surging capabilities across theaters. The United States should, for example, include more European and Indo-Pacific allies in Mobility Guardian, a biennial exercise in which Australia, Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States practice moving troops and weapons over long distances.

LEFT OUT OF THE GROUP CHAT

U.S. allies have already grasped the need to work more closely together. Indeed, Asian and European partners have long turned to one another as a way to hedge against the United States. When Washington is unreliable or unpredictable, ties between Asia and Europe tend to strengthen. The first Trump administration’s retreat from free trade prompted the EU to sign comprehensive trade deals with Japan and Vietnam. Under the second Trump administration, the EU is finalizing new trade deals with India and Indonesia. Standing next to Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto in July, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that “when economic uncertainty meets geopolitical volatility, partners like us must come closer together.”

Because of Chinese-Russian cooperation and the United States’ erratic foreign policy, countries in the Atlantic and the Pacific are aligning on security issues at a scale not seen before. In 2023, Japan and the United Kingdom signed an agreement that opens the door to joint training and rotational deployments. France and the Philippines are considering a similar deal. That same year, Australia became the first non-NATO member of the Movement Coordination Centre Europe, a logistics organization that allows its members to pool military ships and planes for transport. In November 2024, the EU signed new security and defense partnerships with both Japan and South Korea, the first time Brussels has done so with Asian partners.

Rather than resisting or dismissing this cooperation, Washington should shape it. European leaders have already signaled their interest in eventually joining Asia’s Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a move that could leave Washington outside a trade bloc representing roughly 30 percent of global GDP. The United States can still steer the direction of international trade by offering attractive alternatives or harmonizing standards with partners and allies, such as for data-privacy rules or AI regulation.

The Trump administration wants its allies to stick to their own backyard.

A more integrated bloc of friendly countries should be a boon for Washington. Its allies are finally stepping up to share international burdens. France, India, and the EU, for example, are collaborating to improve maritime surveillance in the Indian Ocean. Germany is offering maritime training to countries, such as the Philippines, facing Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. And Australian troops have trained Ukrainian military recruits in the United Kingdom.

But other forms of coordination among allies could prove risky for the United States. Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom are jointly designing a new fighter plane—a test bed for future projects. For decades, allied interoperability has centered on American technologies. If Asian and European allies make their own, such integration could become more difficult. And without American expertise, allied assets could be less competitive.

If the United States abstains from new groups or institutions formed by its allies, it will lose its chance to set the terms for international trade and security. The EU and members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership have already expressed interest in aligning rules on digital trade across Asia and Europe without U.S. input. Such networks could eventually align more directly against U.S. policy or soften their resistance to Chinese or Russian objectives. Countries in Asia and Europe could create more permissive environments for Chinese investments and technologies, halt their nascent cooperation with Taiwan, or temper their support of Ukraine. They could also adopt Chinese telecommunications infrastructure, such as for 5G and 6G networks, that would make them vulnerable to Chinese espionage or create leverage for Beijing. Washington has the capacity to prevent some of these more troubling outcomes if it keeps its seat at the table.

NEW BLOC ON THE BLOCK

The realignment of U.S. allies and adversaries could undermine the institutions that have enabled American primacy. Although the United States’ industrial heartland provided the muscle to win World War II, it was Washington’s ability to set the terms of international rules that reinforced U.S. dominance throughout the Cold War. China and Russia understand this power and seek it for themselves. Cross-regional institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS have supplanted international bodies, including the United Nations, as venues for multilateral collaboration. Through these institutions, China and Russia are building new financial tools and state-led cybersecurity models.

The SCO’s Tianjin summit in September laid bare what’s at stake for the United States. At the meeting, which was attended by more than 20 world leaders and the UN secretary-general, Chinese leader Xi Jinping made clear that his government is unwilling to let “the house rules of a few countries” dominate global affairs. SCO countries announced the formation of a new development bank, which will join the ranks of a similar BRICS-led institution and also China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, as well as new regional centers to coordinate law enforcement, counterterrorism, and antidrug campaigns. Beijing also used the meeting to announce its Global Governance Initiative, an effort to dilute Western influence in global institutions.

Bodies such as the SCO and the BRICS have been in place for decades, but because they have yielded mixed results for China and Russia, they have been easy to dismiss. Central Asian member states are hesitant to rely too much on either Beijing or Moscow. And members are not always aligned. India and Pakistan, for example, both belong to the SCO but remain bitter rivals. Despite these limitations, cross-regional bodies give China and Russia a leg up in building a new world order.

An unidentified missile, Kharkiv, Ukraine, January 2024 Vyacheslav Madiyevskyy / Reuters

China and Russia have much more power over the organizations they lead than the United States has over the United Nations or the G-20. Beijing and Moscow use Eurasian-centric institutions as laboratories to refine new counter-Western initiatives and to give a sheen of global legitimacy to their ideas. Both the SCO and the BRICS have brought on new dialogue partners in recent years that allow China and Russia to claim leadership and influence not only throughout Eurasia but also across the so-called global South.

The practical effects of these institutions can sometimes be hard to see. But their endurance and growth reflect the fact that Beijing and Moscow are steadily harnessing disaffection with Western standards and trade practices. Beijing has gained tremendous influence by directing development spending across Africa, Asia, and Europe. Although the world is far from ditching the U.S. dollar, the SCO and the BRICS are trying to accelerate de-dollarization. Their members are swapping currencies and signing cross-border payment agreements.

Chinese and Russian efforts to remake the world order have worried American allies and spurred them to come together in new and powerful ways. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO deepened its relationships with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. The Five Eyes intelligence alliance—comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States—has taken steps to enhance information sharing and to bolster the security of supply chains. And the G-7 has regularly invited Australia, India, and South Korea to participate in its summits.

U.S. allies can’t reach their full potential without Washington.

The Trump administration can take advantage of this momentum to encourage allies to assume more responsibility. The G-7 Plus, an intergovernmental organization of conflict-affected countries, could become a forum for cooperation on securing critical minerals or countering drug traffickers. A combined meeting of the two Quads to which the United States belongs—in the Indo-Pacific with Australia, India, and Japan, and in Europe with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—could help the two regional groups coordinate their export controls, industrial policies, and technology development.

U.S. allies will continue to work with one another whether or not the United States joins them. But they can’t reach their full potential without Washington’s involvement. Eighty years ago, it took bold U.S. leadership and diplomacy to create the global order. It will take equally innovative leadership to remake it. The U.S. alliance system, built for a previous era, must be overhauled to reflect the new reality of adversarial alignment. Trump has shown little interest in revitalizing or redesigning alliances beyond pushing partners to spend more on defense. U.S. allies are now stronger as a result but still lack a clear strategy for integrating their new capabilities. Without U.S. leadership, allied coalitions might not have the muscle to successfully counter Beijing and Moscow.

On its own, the United States cannot manage Chinese-Russian alignment. But neither can Washington ignore any conflict in Eurasia that comes from it. American allies are rapidly transforming their relationships whether Washington likes it or not; these networks can either serve or undermine U.S. interests depending on how Washington engages with them. If the United States fails to reset ties with Asian and European partners, it risks being left on the sidelines of a rapidly changing world order.

JULIANNE SMITH is President and Co-Founder of Clarion Strategies. She was U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO from 2021 to 2024 and Deputy National Security Adviser to U.S. Vice President Joe Biden from 2012 to 2013.

LINDSEY FORD is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation America. She was Senior Director for South Asia at the National Security Council from 2024 to 2025 and was U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia from 2021 to 2024.

• More by Lindsey Ford

Foreign Affairs · More by Julianne Smith · October 21, 2025

26.Does the US military need a Cyber Force?

Competing FFRDCs/Thank Tanks.

Excerpts:

A specialized cyber force may help. CSIS proposed that other services would secure their own systems and networks while the cyber force would focus on organizing, training, and equipping troops for those specialized skills that CYBERCOM and the other combatant commanders need in order to collect intelligence, take offensive action, or think of big-picture defensive capabilities.

That focus would keep the cyber force lean. The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies think tank estimated that it would start at 10,000 members and grow over time. For comparison, the smallest service today is the Space Force, with about 14,000 members.

There would be costs to standing up a cyber force, namely the legal and bureaucratic hurdles of establishing a new organization, figuring out which units would transfer in and which wouldn’t, then shifting resources away from other services towards this new one. There would also likely be some duplication between what the cyber force does and what the services continue doing.

RAND recommends a middle-of-the-road option, where CYBERCOM would control advanced cyberspace training and education. That could address some of the underlying problems with today’s system while leaving the option of a separate cyber force.

But CSIS and the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies recommend a separate service. On the cost front, they say the cost of setting up a Cyber Force is a lot less than the cost of losing a cyber war. And for duplication, they point out that nearly every service has aircraft for their own needs, but that doesn’t mean there shouldn’t be an Air Force, whose sole purpose is to secure the skies.

Does the US military need a Cyber Force?

Experts say the U.S. military is at risk of being outgunned and outmanned in cyber warfare.

David Roza

Published Oct 27, 2025 9:45 AM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · David Roza

The U.S. military is hemorrhaging talent in cyber warfare, which national security experts warn could lead to America being outgunned and outsmarted by adversaries such as China, Russia, or Iran, who could use cyber weapons to wreak havoc on American military and civilian infrastructure.

The only way to fix it may be to start a seventh branch of the military: a Cyber Force.

There are currently about 225,000 service members, civilians, and contractors who work in cyber fields across the Defense Department. Most of them build, operate, patch, maintain, and do routine security for the 4 million computers and 34 billion IP addresses that make up the larger Department of Defense Information Network.

Each of the military services manages its own information networks and defends them against run-of–the-mill cybersecurity threats. They also recruit and train cyber troops and present them to U.S. Cyber Command, a combatant command that provides cyber support to troops conducting real-world operations.

There is some overlap here between what Cyber Command, or CYBERCOM, does and what the services do, but generally, if it’s offensive operations, or if the threat being defended against is really heavy-duty, that is usually CYBERCOM’s business.

But the services have not coordinated how they train cyber troops. That means service members come to CYBERCOM with different training for the same job, using different terms to refer to the same thing, and bringing their service-specific approaches to cyberspace.

That’s bad because CYBERCOM’s Cyber Mission Force — the 6,000 or so people who actually perform cyberspace operations — is designed to be modular, where teams from different services can swap in and do the same job. That’s according to Aden Magee, a retired Army cyber officer who wrote about this for War on the Rocks in September.

CYBERCOM is often compared with U.S. Special Operations Command, or SOCOM, which oversees real-world special operations and is the only other combatant command also charged with guiding how the services train units for it.

Special operations encompasses sea, air, land, and other domains, so it makes sense for the services to train different types of special operations troops who then bring their unique skillsets to the field. But CYBERCOM focuses solely on the cyber domain, so a cyber soldier should have the same skills as a cyber Marine, experts say.

Plus, SOCOM has also been more proactive than CYBERCOM in telling the services what it wants from them, according to Magee, which means SOCOM actually has what it needs to do its mission.

Personnel with U.S. Cyber Command work in the Integrated Cyber Center, Joint Operations Center at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland on April 2, 2021. Army photo by Josef Cole. Army photo by Josef Cole.

Multiple think tanks agree that the current approach isn’t working. In August, the RAND Corporation published a report saying that the Defense Department can’t recruit and retain the right people for cyber jobs, and that a lot of cyber troops aren’t fully trained or qualified before they show up to operational units.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, pointed out that operational planning is split among the five services, each with its own approach to cyber, which leads to an incoherent strategy. That’s worrying when Chinese hackers have stolen important secrets like F-35 designs and the sensitive personal data of more than 22 million Americans, while Iran and Russia have attacked everything from U.S. pharmaceutical companies to oil pipelines and water treatment plants.

A specialized cyber force may help. CSIS proposed that other services would secure their own systems and networks while the cyber force would focus on organizing, training, and equipping troops for those specialized skills that CYBERCOM and the other combatant commanders need in order to collect intelligence, take offensive action, or think of big-picture defensive capabilities.

That focus would keep the cyber force lean. The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies think tank estimated that it would start at 10,000 members and grow over time. For comparison, the smallest service today is the Space Force, with about 14,000 members.

There would be costs to standing up a cyber force, namely the legal and bureaucratic hurdles of establishing a new organization, figuring out which units would transfer in and which wouldn’t, then shifting resources away from other services towards this new one. There would also likely be some duplication between what the cyber force does and what the services continue doing.

RAND recommends a middle-of-the-road option, where CYBERCOM would control advanced cyberspace training and education. That could address some of the underlying problems with today’s system while leaving the option of a separate cyber force.

But CSIS and the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies recommend a separate service. On the cost front, they say the cost of setting up a Cyber Force is a lot less than the cost of losing a cyber war. And for duplication, they point out that nearly every service has aircraft for their own needs, but that doesn’t mean there shouldn’t be an Air Force, whose sole purpose is to secure the skies.

Dive even deeper into this topic by checking out our YouTube video here.

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27. Winning the Innovation Race: Why America’s Allies Are the Key to Beating Beijing

Excerpts:

We applaud the Trump Administration’s efforts to build on existing domestic “technology builder” initiatives by opening new markets for buyers of American frontier technologies. This “technology buyer” diplomacy was on display in April when President Trump, accompanied by leading technology executives from OpenAI, Nvidia, and others, visited members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to establish substantial technology partnership deals. We strongly support the Administration’s efforts to negotiate sector-specific partnerships in AI, semiconductors, cybersecurity, and rare earths supply chains with NATO, the EU, Japan, South Korea, India, Taiwan, Ukraine, Australia, and others.

Winning the 21st Century innovation race will ensure America's long-term national security, economic prosperity, and freedom to determine its own destiny. Policymakers have achieved a rare consensus that existential geopolitical rivalries demand the US maximize the unique strengths of its private sector with public sector advocacy and investment at home. But because the geopolitical struggle with China and others is global and the stakes of the competition so high, America must forge partnerships that accelerate its investments and efforts at home to effectively meet the challenges confronting her abroad.

Winning the Innovation Race: Why America’s Allies Are the Key to Beating Beijing

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/us-china-tech-race?utm

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27 October, 2025

Tech/CyberAlternative Perspectives

Former Member, CIA’s Senior Intelligence Service

Duyane Norman is a retired member of CIA’s Senior Intelligence Service, having served 28 years in the Directorate of Operations and Directorate of Science and Technology. He is an author and speaker within the Intelligence Community on innovation, technology adoption, and change leadership.

CEO and Co-Founder, Rillian Technologies

Christian Schnedler is a leader in cybersecurity innovation, known for bridging technology, AI, and national security across global markets. He is CEO and co-founder of Rilian Technologies.

OPINION — Precision U.S. airstrikes against Iran’s nuclear program last June demonstrate American technological prowess built on decades of 20th Century Cold War Era investment and innovation. Today, the U.S. continues to originate new technology, yet it finds itself in a race with rivals such as China and Russia to dominate AI, quantum computing, robotics, semiconductors, cyber, and other frontier technologies poised to define global leadership in the 21st Century.

To prevail and prosper in this new geopolitical struggle, the U.S. must build and maintain networks of investors, customers, and collaborators among allies with common values and interests. By forging such networks, the U.S. can accelerate the technology innovation and implementation velocity crucial to outpacing its rivals and their formidable manufacturing capacity, human talent base, and financial resources.

Opportunities (and Risks) of Buyer Alliances

Much of Washington’s bipartisan consensus on the necessity of American technology leadership has rightly focused on the nation’s capacity to “build the future” at home, safely beyond China’s sphere of predation in East Asia, creating American jobs and national wealth, and on terms that ensure these technologies reflect American values.

National innovation initiatives, such as the CHIPS Act, support domestic production of advanced semiconductors, and the Trump and Biden Administrations have rightly advocated robust domestic AI innovation initiatives within our own borders.

But the other side of the 21st Century innovation race is a sprint to forge strong alliances abroad, with buyers who will accelerate domestic efforts by investing in, buying, deploying, and fine tuning U.S. innovations at a greater scale and profit than would ever be possible were U.S. builders limited to merely selling to U.S. government agencies and corporations at home.

Numerous U.S. allies and potential allies in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and beyond share security concerns about aggressive states such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and many share U.S. concerns related to the economic, intelligence, and security implications of future dependence on technologies developed in China.

While Chinese-based technology builders such as Huawei and DeepSeek have potential to outpace U.S. competitors in the coming years, the Western innovation ecosystem continues to produce the finest and greatest variety of technology solutions. By leveraging allied investments in new digital infrastructure and national security, U.S.-based technology builders can assert their industrial advantages over Chinese competitors in quality, variety of options, and open standards to enable these states to implement the technologies they require to modernize, while protecting themselves from aggression and maintaining their digital sovereignty.

Should the U.S. fail to forge these essential partnerships, Chinese rivals will outflank America’s technology builders, penetrate and gain permanent footholds in foreign markets, and establish global technology hegemony over the world’s frontier technologies, and the future.

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A Common Defense of Buyer Alliances Strengthens US National Security

These technology buyer partnerships are not merely about hardware and software sales, market penetration, technology jobs, and reinvestment of newly created wealth at home. By deploying U.S. national security technologies across a wide range of allies abroad, the cost of building, maintaining, and enhancing them at home will decline as their efficacy, lethality, and capacity to deter aggression will surge.

It was the open markets of globalization that enabled Chinese firms to build up tremendous commercial manufacturing capacity in everything from electric cars to computing and telecommunications systems, robotics, ships, pharmaceuticals, and drones. The CCP has leveraged this manufacturing capacity and technical expertise to build new military technology capabilities to threaten the U.S. and its allies. China’s dual-use manufacturing capacity is on vivid display in Ukraine, where the country’s warfighters favor inexpensive, highly-functional drones built with components manufactured in China.

U.S. cybersecurity, AI, and defense tech software technologies are only as impactful as their feedback loops—their capacity to ingest massive amounts of threat and performance data in order to learn and improve their defensive capabilities moving forward.

In the same way U.S. drone technologists are observing and learning how drones are performing (and under-performing) in contested Russia-Ukraine battlefield environments, deploying American security technologies along all fronts of geopolitical conflict will make U.S. defenses at home smarter, faster, more creative, more autonomous, and more lethal based on their ability to learn how our adversaries are operating and understanding the weapons and tactics they are likely to use against America’s military and homeland.

Finally, establishing U.S. technologies’ dominance in more countries ensures the U.S. will define technology standards as they are adopted more broadly. As they are adopted, the U.S. and its allies are in a better position to collaborate, surge resources as needed, and execute to resolve threats faster in times of tremendous crises.

The Race Ahead

We applaud the Trump Administration’s efforts to build on existing domestic “technology builder” initiatives by opening new markets for buyers of American frontier technologies. This “technology buyer” diplomacy was on display in April when President Trump, accompanied by leading technology executives from OpenAI, Nvidia, and others, visited members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to establish substantial technology partnership deals. We strongly support the Administration’s efforts to negotiate sector-specific partnerships in AI, semiconductors, cybersecurity, and rare earths supply chains with NATO, the EU, Japan, South Korea, India, Taiwan, Ukraine, Australia, and others.

Winning the 21st Century innovation race will ensure America's long-term national security, economic prosperity, and freedom to determine its own destiny. Policymakers have achieved a rare consensus that existential geopolitical rivalries demand the US maximize the unique strengths of its private sector with public sector advocacy and investment at home. But because the geopolitical struggle with China and others is global and the stakes of the competition so high, America must forge partnerships that accelerate its investments and efforts at home to effectively meet the challenges confronting her abroad.

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The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com