​Quotes of the Day:

"If asked for a brief explanation, I would say that the existential vacuum derives from the following conditions. Unlike an animal, man is not told by drives and instincts what he must do. And in contrast to man in former times, he is no longer told by traditions and values what he should do. Now, knowing neither what he must do nor what he should do, he sometimes does not even know what he basically wishes to do. Instead, he wishes to do what other people do - which is conformism - or he does what other people wish him to do - which is totalitarianism." 

– Dr. Viktor E. Frankl

"Good people are good because they've come to wisdom through failure. We get very little wisdom from success, you know." 

– William Saroyan

"We grow tyrannical fighting tyranny. The most alarming spectacle today is not the spectacle of the atomic bomb in an unfederated world, it is the spectacle of the Americans beginning to accept the device of loyalty oaths and witchhunts, beginning to call anybody they don't like a Communist." 

– E. B. White

1. Trump Tells Asia Allies: It’s Your Turn to Boost Military Spending

2. Trump’s Asia Gambit: Can the US Really Overtake China?

3. Amazon Web Services Plans Additional $5 Billion AI Investment in South Korea

4. Trump’s Desperate Attempts to Meet Kim Jong Un Just Majorly Backfired

5.Trump arrives in South Korea, says Kim Jong Un meeting won't happen

6. A call for true peace — not a deal that forsakes reunification

7. The Disappearance of APEC’s Symbol in Gyeongju (ROK/US Alliance and Kim Jong Un)

8. China, South Korean vessels in 15-hour Yellow Sea stand-off last month, report reveals

9. Why Xi and Trump are set to talk in Busan, away from South Korea’s Apec events

10. Pragmatism with Purpose: South Korea’s Opportunity to Lead in the Indo-Pacific

11. Allied shipbuilding is Asia’s next strategic supply chain

12.  S. Korea, U.S. clinch deal on details of investment pledge

13. S. Korea's push for nuclear-powered submarines gains traction with Lee-Trump summit

14. Korean auto industry relieved by U.S. tariff deal; shipbuilders reaffirm key roles in investment pledge

15. Trump says he and N.K. leader could not 'work out timing' for meeting

16. Top diplomats of S. Korea, U.S., Japan hold talks at APEC gathering: Seoul

17. Editorial: South Korea's Security at Stake in Trump's Nobel Pursuit

18. Trump says he will ‘work very hard with Kim Jong Un’ to achieve Korean peace

1. Trump Tells Asia Allies: It’s Your Turn to Boost Military Spending

I think POTUS is pushing on an open door. Our Asian allies are taking the threats seriously.

But I wish there was a better metric than simply percentage of GDP. But that is the only one that is easily communicated and that people can rally around. But it is hardly a true and sufficient measure of capability and will.

But the key to getting the percentage "right" is properly quantifying it with all the direct and indirect defense expenditures and costs. 

"America First. Allies Always" and America must remain decisively engaged throughout Eurasia to secure its global interests and protect the homeland.

Trump Tells Asia Allies: It’s Your Turn to Boost Military Spending

During six-day tour of a region facing threat of Chinese aggression, Trump reiterates a message that was largely heeded by European nations

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/after-chastising-europe-trump-tells-asia-allies-to-spend-more-on-militaries-c1eb38d5

By Alexander Ward

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, Dasl Yoon

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 and Lara Seligman

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Oct. 29, 2025 5:08 am ET

President Trump at a ceremony in Gyeongju, South Korea, on Wednesday. andrew caballero-reynolds/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Quick Summary

• President Trump urged Asian allies to increase military spending amid rising Chinese aggression and North Korean threats.View more

GYEONGJU, South Korea—Amid the pageantry and backslapping, President Trump’s weeklong Asian swing drew attention to a sour point for allies: The U.S. demand that they spend more to respond to a rising threat of Chinese aggression.

Washington first pressured Europeans to boost their military budgets shortly after Trump took office in January. That push ultimately proved successful, with many allies pledging to increase spending.

Now on Trump’s first visit to the region during his second term, it is Asia’s turn to feel the heat.

Trump aimed to improve security and economic ties with Southeast Asian nations during a summit of leaders in Malaysia last weekend. Then, while standing aboard a U.S. warship docked near Tokyo, he heaped praise on new Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi for her plans to sharply boost military spending. And Trump was expected to urge South Korean President Lee Jae Myung in this ancient city to spend more on the military and for the upkeep of the nearly 30,000 American troops stationed in his country.

The threats are rising, as are concerns that the U.S. is turning its attention away from Asia to focus on priorities closer to home. Beijing will “never promise to renounce the use of force” against Taiwan, the self-governing island democracy that China claims as its own, according to Wednesday remarks by a spokesman for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office.

China has showcased in recent drills how it would encircle and strangle Taiwan by cutting off its life-sustaining shipping lanes—not just exercises rehearing a full-scale invasion. It has bulked up its maritime militia in the South China Sea, carried out unprecedented naval drills close to Japan and erected large steel structures near South Korea.

Meanwhile, North Korea, whose nuclear arsenal is expanding with little pushback from the outside world, test-fired cruise missiles a day before Trump’s Wednesday arrival to South Korea. Leader Kim Jong Un spurned Trump’s offer for a hasty get-together.

Trump is scheduled to meet Chinese leader Xi Jinping on Thursday in South Korea, then head back to Washington. But after Trump leaves the region, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, already in Tokyo, plans stops across Southeast Asia and South Korea, where allied spending is expected to be a point of discussion.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth spoke aboard the aircraft carrier USS George Washington in Yokosuka, Japan, on Tuesday. Kim Kyung-hoon/Reuters

Hegseth, at a Wednesday press conference, said he didn’t discuss military spending with his Japanese counterpart—because he said he didn’t need to. “We both look out the window and see the threat of a Chinese military buildup,” Hegseth said.

But U.S. messaging on the China military threat has been muddied by Trump’s own approach, which is viewed by some regional and U.S. officials as far warmer than in the first term, when Trump made great-power competition with Beijing a cornerstone of his national-security strategy. This time, Trump is more focused on cooperation and dealmaking with Beijing, seeking trade agreements while refusing to ban the Chinese social-media app TikTok in the U.S.

Trump insists he has good personal ties with Xi that can supersede any larger challenges between the world’s two superpowers. But some security experts say Xi doesn’t likely see things the same way.

“Trump may feel like he has a cozy relationship with Xi, but I can assure you that’s not how Xi thinks. He’s purely a power player,” said Charles Boustany, a former Republican lawmaker who is now a trade lobbyist with Capitol Counsel, a firm that has represented the Chinese government. “Whatever transactions he’s going to make have to be perceived as favorable to China.”

On Wednesday, Trump told reporters on Air Force One he expected to lower tariffs in exchange for China’s help in curbing the export of the chemicals used to make fentanyl into the U.S. after his Thursday meeting with Xi.

China’s President Xi Jinping inspects troops during a military parade in Beijing. greg baker/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

In keeping with Trump’s “America First” vision, senior Pentagon officials have proposed the new National Defense Strategy, the department’s guiding doctrine, give priority to protecting the homeland and the Western Hemisphere, according to two people familiar with the discussions. Others, including many in the Trump administration, have advocated for a more full-throated mobilization to prepare for potential war with China.

A draft of the NDS is with Hegseth’s office for review, but there is still disagreement on the final document between senior Pentagon civilians and the military’s Joint Staff, the people said.

As the policy takes shape, Washington wants to see allies shoulder more responsibility for their own defense. 

Trump has frequently claimed that allies are shortchanging the U.S. on security, particularly Japan and South Korea, which host roughly 60,000 and 28,500 American personnel in their countries respectively.

Seoul has already pledged to significantly raise its defense budget next year, with the goal of spending 3.5% of its gross domestic product on defense by 2035. Ahead of summit talks, Lee told Trump that South Korea’s military spending was 1.4 times the size of North Korea’s entire economy, and vowed to significantly boost Seoul’s defense capabilities to help reduce Washington’s defense burden.

Lee also asked Trump to supply fuel for nuclear-powered submarines to allow South Korea to better track Chinese and North Korean submarines, which would lighten the burden for the U.S. military.

Elsewhere, Trump and members of his administration have suggested Taiwan should spend as much as 10% of GDP on defense—a tall order for Taiwan when the figure has long hovered around 2%.

Taiwan has sought to show the U.S. that it is committed to spending more on defense. In August, Taiwan proposed its largest-ever military budget, which aims to reach 3.32% of its GDP for next year, using NATO’s definition of military spending that include costs for coast guard and veteran pensions. President Lai Ching-te has said he hopes to push the figure to 5% by 2030.

A Taiwanese soldier crews a U.S.-made Abrams tank during a live-fire exercises. Ann wang/Reuters

Members of Japan’s military take part in an exercise in Okinawa, Japan. Philip fong/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The problem for Trump is that Washington’s Asian allies face several political and economic constraints in quickly raising their defense budgets, likely keeping them reliant on the U.S. for their security for the foreseeable future.

But Markus Garlauskas, director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council, said the Trump administration is essentially “pushing on an open door” for its partners in the Indo-Pacific, including Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei and Manila, who were already inclined to raise their military spending.

Standing aboard the USS George Washington warship on Tuesday, Takaichi, the Japanese prime minister, addressed U.S. troops and vowed to heed Trump’s call. She plans to raise Japan’s military spending to 2% of gross domestic product by the end of the fiscal year in March 2026. Spending was 1.4% of GDP in the 2024 fiscal year and had been projected to reach around 1.6% this year.

“We are facing an unprecedented security environment,” Takaichi said, speaking through an interpreter and with Trump looking on. “Peace cannot be protected by words alone.”

Write to Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com, Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com and Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com

2. Trump’s Asia Gambit: Can the US Really Overtake China?

​Presence. (and patience and persistence) 

Is it really about "overtaking?" Or is this a battle between two of the most competitive countries in the world? (Something else I learned yesterday - Armeiccans are like Chinese and Chinese are like Americans - two of the most competitive people in the world).

Excerpts:

None of this is easy. China’s geographic proximity, integrated supply chains, and the sheer scale of its markets give it an advantage that a president’s tour alone cannot erase. But the trip matters for what it signals: Americans can still shape outcomes in the region if they commit resources, institutional continuity, and credible economic alternatives. For now, the balance of influence remains tilted toward Beijing; Trump’s tour nudges the needle but does not yet upend the scoreboard.

That should temper both triumphalism and fatalism. Policymakers in Washington should treat the tour as a start line, not a finish line. Southeast Asia will not choose a partner in a binary, Cold War-like sense; it will continue to hedge, i.e., extract benefits from both Beijing and Washington. The long game for the US, therefore, must be to not only make hedging harder to justify by offering reliable, deep, and institutionalized alternatives but also play it so that hedging remains in its favor. Absent that, even the most dramatic diplomatic moments will remain exactly that: dramatic, ephemeral, and unable to displace a regional order largely built on China’s economic gravity.

Politics

Trump’s Asia Gambit: Can the US Really Overtake China?

Presence matters; leaders take global powers seriously who show up

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/trump-asia-gambit-can-usa-overtake-china?utm

Oct 29, 2025

By: Salman Rafi Sheikh

The chairman shuffles

President Donald Trump’s recent sprint across Southeast Asia – a flurry of reciprocal-trade announcements, a high-profile ceasefire ceremony between Thailand and Cambodia, and the promise of talks with Xi Jinping in South Korea – was intended to do one thing loudly: show that the US still matters in Asia.

With Trump dancing to performances in Malaysia and assuring the region “that the United States is with you 100 percent and [that] we intend to be a strong partner for many generations,” the optics and the rhetoric have been undeniable even if the trade terms negotiated are onerous. But the deeper question raised by the trip is structural rather than rhetorical: can this kind of transactional diplomacy reverse China’s deep economic lead in the region?

The empirical backdrop matters. The Lowy Institute’s 2025 Asia Power Index finds China to be Asia’s largest economic player, with the strongest economic relationships and broad investment networks across Southeast Asia. Most importantly, Beijing, even with its surveillance state and bullying tactics in the South China Sea, has overcome the US in terms of popularity. Although the Lowy Institute report shows China’s lead by a tiny margin of just 1 percent, China’s rise has been palpable, translating into a visible structural advantage measured in trade volume, infrastructure finance, and persistent supply-chain integration.

In short, China’s footprint in the region is not merely political theatre; it is baked into how Southeast Asian economies function. Plus, Beijing’s engagement is multilateral, which aligns with regional associations like Asean’s own largely regional and global outlook. The region is known more for thinking regionally than extra-regionally, a policy vision that China understands more than the US. It is for this lack of understanding that Trump, for instance, withdrew from the Trans-Pacific treaty in 2016 and why he didn’t attend the Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) meeting in South Korea on this visit.

Still, Washington’s primary objective remains to tackle China. So what is Trump’s strategy? In practice, it has three visible strands: spectacle, leverage, and hedging. The spectacle is the president showing up – the photo ops, the signing ceremonies, the public mediation of a border ceasefire – that seeks to reassert the US presence after years when many in Asia felt Washington had been distracted. By brokering peace, even if more performance than reality, the drudgery having been accomplished by local players, Trump wants not just to win the Nobel Peace Prize next year, but he also wants to indicate Washington’s continued geopolitical relevance in the region.

The leverage is being reinforced by tying, at least rhetorically, trade access and tariff relief to political cooperation on issues from critical minerals to export controls. The White House framed new reciprocal trade pacts as conditional carrots offered in exchange for market openness and cooperation.

The hedging element of Trump’s strategy may be his smartest play yet and the one Beijing should worry about most. Southeast Asian leaders have been trying to perfect the art of strategic hedging, staying close to China for growth while relying on the US for security. By reasserting Washington’s presence through deals and diplomacy, Trump isn’t just returning to the region; he’s giving Asean capitals something they crave: leverage vis-à-vis Beijing. When states like Malaysia sign new trade accords with the US or countries like Thailand join a US-brokered peace process, they demonstrate to Beijing that Southeast Asia still has options.

This visibility matters: it lets governments negotiate with China from a position of strength rather than dependency. The risk, of course, is that Washington remains a tool rather than a partner. In fact, the strategy risks reducing Washington’s presence to merely a convenient counterweight, not a cornerstone. But as the Lowy Institute’s 2025 Asia Power Index shows, with China’s dominance nearly entrenched, even acting as Beijing’s counterweight may be enough for the US to keep the balance from tipping permanently and irreversibly in Beijing’s favor.

Those moves have immediate strengths. First, presence matters in diplomacy; leaders take global powers seriously who show up and broker outcomes. Trump’s role in the Thailand-Cambodia ceasefire, which commits both sides to withdraw heavy weapons and place observers on the border, translated symbolic leadership into a tangible stability dividend at a volatile moment. Second, the trade commitments create short-term incentives for ASEAN economies to diversify suppliers and buyers, and to align some regulatory standards more closely with the US market. Third, the combination of security signaling and economic offers revives the old US playbook of being a balancer rather than simply a rival.

But these strengths sit beside significant weaknesses. Many headline announcements are frameworks or reciprocal-trade agreements in principle, not fully negotiated and/or ratified treaties. Implementation will require time, congressional buy-in, and budgetary commitments — the kind of sustained statecraft that has been uneven in US policy toward Asia. Trump, therefore, faces the uphill—but possible—task of translating the optics and symbolism of his visit into concrete policy frameworks that are actually implemented.

The ceasefire, for all its welcome effects, is fragile: border conflicts are notoriously difficult to resolve without persistent monitoring and confidence-building measures. Most crucially, US economic credibility is hamstrung by an inconsistent mix of protectionist rhetoric and selective liberalization; Southeast Asian states remember how quickly US commitments can change with domestic politics and administrations.

There is also an arithmetic problem. China’s advantage is structural and cumulative. Decades of trade integration, large-scale infrastructure finance via the Belt and Road and other mechanisms, and a contiguous manufacturing ecosystem make China not just a buyer or investor but the operating system for much of regional trade. Reversing requires building comparable economic architecture – not headline-driven deals – in areas such as ports, connectivity, long-term investment funds, and production networks. That is expensive, slow, and politically demanding, even for Trump.

If the goal is to overtake China as the region’s primary external partner, Washington will need to move from episodic spectacle to structural strategy. Practically, that means three interlocking priorities. First, Washington must actively convert frameworks into durable pacts. Negotiations must be deepened so that the so-called reciprocal agreements are legally binding and include dispute-settlement, investment protections, and clear implementation timelines. Short headlines are useless without durable institutions.

Second, the US needs to offer competitive and predictable financing for ports, power, and digital infrastructure, not merely policy papers. That requires public-private vehicles, strong multilateral coordination (including with and through regional development banks), and political willingness to underwrite long horizons. Third, Southeast Asian partners prize predictability. A US Asia strategy that survives elections and domestic turbulence, backed by a transparent roadmap and multiyear funding, will be far more persuasive than a single tour. From the Obama era “Asia Pivot” to Trump’s latest visit, inconsistency towards the region has been the hallmark of the US policy.

None of this is easy. China’s geographic proximity, integrated supply chains, and the sheer scale of its markets give it an advantage that a president’s tour alone cannot erase. But the trip matters for what it signals: Americans can still shape outcomes in the region if they commit resources, institutional continuity, and credible economic alternatives. For now, the balance of influence remains tilted toward Beijing; Trump’s tour nudges the needle but does not yet upend the scoreboard.

That should temper both triumphalism and fatalism. Policymakers in Washington should treat the tour as a start line, not a finish line. Southeast Asia will not choose a partner in a binary, Cold War-like sense; it will continue to hedge, i.e., extract benefits from both Beijing and Washington. The long game for the US, therefore, must be to not only make hedging harder to justify by offering reliable, deep, and institutionalized alternatives but also play it so that hedging remains in its favor. Absent that, even the most dramatic diplomatic moments will remain exactly that: dramatic, ephemeral, and unable to displace a regional order largely built on China’s economic gravity.

Dr Salman Rafi Sheikh is an Assistant Professor of Politics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) in Pakistan. He is a long-time contributor on diplomatic affairs to Asia Sentinel.

3. Amazon Web Services Plans Additional $5 Billion AI Investment in South Korea

​We have come a long way with Amazon (for at least me personally). I was so happy to be able to get books shipped to Korea when Amazon was first online in the late 1990s. It made our overseas service so much more enjoyable that we could get books rapidly. And now Amazon is a behemoth with its services everywhere.

Amazon Web Services Plans Additional $5 Billion AI Investment in South Korea

AWS is partnering with South Korea’s SK Group conglomerate to build an AI data center in Ulsan

https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/amazon-web-services-plans-additional-5-billion-ai-investment-in-south-korea-84802e84

By Kwanwoo Jun

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Oct. 29, 2025 12:31 am ET

The new investment would bring AWS’s total investment in South Korea to 12.6 trillion won. benoit tessier/Reuters

Quick Summary

• Amazon Web Services will invest an additional $5 billion in South Korea from 2025 to 2031 for new AI data centers.View more

Amazon Web Services plans to invest an additional $5 billion in South Korea over the next six years to build new artificial-intelligence data centers in the country.

Amazon’s cloud-computing arm said Wednesday that it will spend an additional seven trillion won, equivalent to $4.89 billion, from 2025 to 2031 to expand its AI infrastructure in South Korea.

The new investment would bring AWS’s total investment in South Korea to 12.6 trillion won. It has already invested 5.6 trillion won in the country so far, it said.

AWS is partnering with South Korea’s SK Group conglomerate to build an AI data center in the country’s southeastern industrial city of Ulsan. The AI data center will be the largest in South Korea when it is completed by 2027, according to SK Group.

South Korea’s new government under President Lee Jae-myung has selected the AI sector as one of the new economic growth engines and aims to make the country one of the world’s top three AI hubs.

AWS has been expanding its global presence in the fast-growing AI sector. It has announced investments in other countries, including Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore.

Write to Kwanwoo Jun at Kwanwoo.Jun@wsj.com

4. Trump’s Desperate Attempts to Meet Kim Jong Un Just Majorly Backfired

​Desperate attempts? Perhaps POTROK is desperate for talks. I do not think POTUS is. It is simply part of his unconventional and disruptive diplomacy. 

Just as we should not view KJU through the lens of conventional international relations theory, we should not judge POTUS through the lens of conventional diplomacy.

Why international relations theory, negotiations fail with North Korea

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/10/14/perspective-korea-policies-new-strategy/3061760458895/

Trump’s Desperate Attempts to Meet Kim Jong Un Just Majorly Backfired

flip.it · Edith Olmsted

President Donald Trump’s feeble attempts to kiss up to yet another authoritarian leader don’t appear to be working.

Ahead of Trump’s visit to Asia this week, the U.S. president made efforts to meet with Kim Jong Un, suggesting that he could use discussions about sanctions to bring North Korea’s reclusive leader to the table. It seems to have failed.

North Korea released a statement Tuesday that appeared to express support for China in ongoing trade disputes with the United States, according to journalist John Delury. The statement described a spokesperson for the Chinese government’s response to Trump’s recent threat to impose 100 percent tariffs on China starting on November 1.

“It is not a proper way of interacting with China to threaten China with high tariffs rather than reflecting upon themselves, the spokesperson added and urged the U.S. to correct its wrong approach,” the statement said.

Meanwhile, North Korea’s top diplomat Choe Son Hui met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Monday, and expressed “invariable sympathy” and support for Russia’s efforts in its military campaign against Ukraine, Delury reported.

“Everything is going according to plan. Please convey my best wishes to him (Kim),” Putin told Choe, according to Reuters. North Korea has deployed an estimated 10,000 troops in Russia’s war in Ukraine, in return for military and economic aid from Russia.

On Monday, Trump met with the families of Japanese citizens abducted by the North Korean government, which Delury suggested meant he may have given up on the hope of meeting with the notorious dictator. It appears that Trump’s disastrous foreign economic policy has only pushed Russia, North Korea, and China closer together.

Edith Olmsted

@edieocre

Edith Olmsted is an associate writer for The New Republic. She is a journalist and culture writer based in New York City.

flip.it · Edith Olmsted

5. Trump arrives in South Korea, says Kim Jong Un meeting won't happen

​Realistic. Managing expectations. But like 2018 and 2019 POTUS did what no other president has done before: he gave it a shot. And KJU rejected the opportunity for a better future then and he is doing so now because he likely feels the strong support from the Dark Quad or CRInK (and his friends Xi and Putin).

As I have written:

POTUS did something during his first term that no president had done: “He gave it a shot.” He met Kim and he offered him a future. But it was Kim Jong Un who failed to appreciate the opportunity he had. Now in his second term President Trump has the opportunity to implement new elements of policy and strategy that have never before been attempted. These include a human rights upfront approach that keeps human rights on all agendas, a sophisticated and holistic information campaign, and the support for the Korean people's pursuit of a free and unified Korea. There are few pundits who see the opportunities that both South Korea with its 8.15 Unification Doctrine and Kim Jong Un with his new hostile policy toward the South are providing to the U.S. and ROK/U.S. alliance. It is time to recognize that the only path to denuclearization is through unification. Most importantly, the prevention of war and nuclear use, and the long term outcome on the Korean peninsula are important to the national security and national prosperity of the U.S.

Kim can change. Or Kim can be changed by the Korean people in the north.

The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program, military threats, and the crimes against humanity is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a free and unified Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, free market principles, and human rights as determined by the Korean people: A free and unified Korea or in short, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK). Again, Kim can change or be changed.

"Unification first, then dencurlaization; the path to unification is through information and human rights.

World News Oct. 29, 2025 / 6:10 AM

Trump arrives in South Korea, says Kim Jong Un meeting won't happen

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/10/29/korea-Donald-Trump-APEC-Kim-Jong-Un-Gyeongju-meeting-summit/8391761728517/

By Thomas Maresca

1 of 6 | U.S. President Donald Trump, seen on a screen at the APEC media press center in Gyeongju, arrived in South Korea on Wednesday. He said that a meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un would not take place due to timing issues. Photo by Thomas Maresca/UPI

GYEONGJU, South Korea, Oct. 29 (UPI) -- U.S. President Donald Trump arrived in South Korea Wednesday, where he said he wasn't able to "work out timing" for a meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

Trump made the remark during a bilateral meeting with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung in the city of Gyeongju, where the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit is being held, after earlier saying he "would love" to meet Kim during his trip.

"I know Kim Jong Un very well. We get along very well," Trump said. "We really weren't able to work out timing."

Trump met Kim three times during his first term -- in Singapore in 2018, in Hanoi in 2019 and briefly at the Demilitarized Zone later that year. Speculation had swirled that the two could meet again this week in the DMZ truce village of Panmunjom to restart talks over the North's nuclear weapons program.

"I know you are officially at war, but we will see what we can do to get that all straightened out," Trump said to Lee Wednesday. The 1950-53 Korean War ended in a ceasefire but not a peace treaty.

"We'll have other visits, and we'll work very hard with Kim Jong Un and with everybody on getting things straightened out because that makes sense," Trump added.

Lee expressed regret over the missed opportunity and said that he hoped Trump would have a chance to play the role of "peacemaker" on the Korean Peninsula.

"As I mentioned many times, you have wonderful capabilities and skills as a peacemaker," Lee told Trump. "Chairman Kim has not really accepted your good intention and your gesture, so this time it did not happen. But I believe that we've been planting good seeds for a better future."

Earlier on Wednesday, North Korean state media reported that the country had test-fired sea-to-surface strategic cruise missiles in the Yellow Sea, its latest provocation before Trump's visit. A week earlier, Pyongyang claimed that it had successfully tested a "new cutting-edge weapons system" involving hypersonic missiles,

At a welcoming ceremony at Gyeongju National Museum, Lee presented Trump with the Grand Order of Mugunghwa, South Korea's highest decoration to honor his "achievements in paving the way toward peace on the Korean Peninsula."

Trump is the first U.S. president to receive the honor.

Lee also gave his counterpart a replica of a golden crown from the Silla Dynasty, which ruled from 57 BC to 935 AD.

The crown "symbolizes the long-standing peace of the Silla period, as well as a new era of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula and shared growth that Korea and the U.S. will build together," the South's presidential office said in a statement.

After the ceremony, bilateral discussions were expected to include trade, investment, economic and security cooperation and alliance modernization, the office said.

Trump's nearly weeklong trip through Asia has focused on making trade deals and bolstering economic ties with countries in the region. He signed a trade agreement with new Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on Tuesday and inked deals with Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in Kuala Lumpur over the weekend.

The most anticipated engagement of Trump's visit will be on Thursday, when he is scheduled to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping in the port city of Busan before heading back to Washington.

The meeting, their first since 2019, comes as the two superpowers are locked in a trade war. Chinese and U.S. economic officials agreed on a framework for a trade agreement on Sunday on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on NBC's Meet the Press.

In keynote remarks on Wednesday at an APEC CEOs luncheon, Trump said he expected a deal to be finalized during his meeting with Xi.

"We're going to be, I hope, making a deal. I think we're going to have a deal. I think it will be a good deal for both," Trump said. "The world is watching, and I think we'll have something that's very exciting for everybody."

Read More

• Trump, Takaichi sign U.S.-Japan trade, critical minerals deals
• Trump says he 'would love' to meet Kim Jong Un during South Korea trip
• Trump, Xi to meet during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit

6. A call for true peace — not a deal that forsakes reunification

​From my friend and colleague at UPI.. Obviously our views are aligned.

A call for true peace — not a deal that forsakes reunification - The Korea Times

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

Youngjun Kim

As world leaders gather for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, and speculation grows over a potential meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, global attention has turned once again to the Korean Peninsula.

Many headlines focus on whether a new U.S.-North Korea summit will materialize, or whether Washington and Seoul might reach a trade agreement on the sidelines of the APEC event.

But behind those headlines lies a deeper question, one that cuts to the heart of the peninsula’s identity and destiny. For Koreans, this is not merely about diplomacy or trade. It is about whether a divided people can reclaim their unity and moral purpose, or whether the scars of the 20th century — colonization, partition and ideological war — will be allowed to harden into permanence.

Recent surveys show how public sentiment can fluctuate — and how easily it can be misread as national direction. According to a Korea Institute for National Unification poll conducted in mid-2025, only 49 percent of South Koreans said unification with the North is “necessary,” while 63 percent said the two Koreas could “peacefully coexist without unification.” Yet a separate Peaceful Unification Advisory Council survey released in September found that about 68.6 percent of respondents viewed unification as “very necessary” or “quite necessary.”

Such contrasts reveal how question wording and framing can shape results. But they also underscore a deeper truth: Polls may reflect moods, but they cannot determine a nation’s destiny. As retired U.S. Army Col. David Maxwell wrote in UPI on Oct. 24, “The only acceptable end state is a free and unified Korea — regardless of polls.” To confuse transient opinion with enduring purpose is to mistake the noise of the moment for the voice of history.

The current Korean government under President Lee Jae Myung faces a defining test of conscience. Its tone and policy have shown sympathy toward what many interpret as a “two-state” framework — one that risks aligning with Pyongyang’s push for international recognition as a permanent, independent state.

If such a stance becomes entrenched, it will be not merely a policy misjudgment but an indelible stain on history. Accepting division as permanent is to betray those who endured war and dictatorship, and to abandon future generations to a fractured national identity.

Instead, Korea must reclaim its founding ideal — Hongik Ingan, which means “to live for the benefit of all humanity.” This ancient moral philosophy underpins the modern Korean Dream, a vision of unification grounded in freedom, human rights and shared prosperity. Reunification is not an act of conquest or absorption; it is an act of restoration — of healing a divided people and realizing the moral purpose of a nation.

From Washington’s perspective, another summit with Pyongyang would likely focus on denuclearization and regional stability. Yet trust in Seoul has become increasingly fragile. The Lee administration’s sympathetic posture toward Pyongyang, and its ambiguous stance on China and Russia, have raised doubts in Washington about whether Korea remains a fully reliable ally.

In such an environment, calls for Washington to not bypass Seoul ring hollow. The burden of restoring trust lies first with Seoul. If Korea wishes to be treated as a genuine partner rather than a bystander, it must demonstrate through action — not rhetoric — that it stands firmly for freedom, deterrence and alliance unity, rather than accommodation for adversaries who threaten those very principles.

A deal that trades away the principle of one Korean people for temporary political convenience would be a hollow victory — peace built on denial. As Maxwell cautioned in UPI, “Unification must come first, then denuclearization. The path to unification is through information and human rights.”

True peace requires truth, and truth begins with moral clarity. The Korean question cannot be resolved while Seoul blurs the line between democracy and dictatorship, between alliance and appeasement. The future of the peninsula must again be authored in Seoul — by a Korea grounded in freedom, dignity and the courage to lead, not follow.

Reunification is not a sentimental relic of the past. It is a moral, historical and spiritual imperative — the fulfillment of a people’s unfinished journey toward freedom and justice. If the Lee government seeks to stand on the right side of history, it must actively champion unification as not merely rhetoric but a national policy, and anchor it in the Korean Dream built on Hongik Ingan. Only by aligning state policy with this unifying vision can Korea transcend division and fulfill its founding purpose: to serve humanity by achieving a free and unified nation.

If Trump seeks another handshake with the North's Kim, the cameras will capture the spectacle of diplomacy. But history will judge the substance: Will this moment bring Korea closer to freedom and unity, or will it cement division as the permanent order?

The answer depends not on foreign capital but on the conscience of the Korean people. At home and across the diaspora, Koreans must raise a single, unwavering voice:

True peace means one Korea — free, independent and whole.

The time to speak that truth is now.

Youngjun Kim is vice chairman of UPI. The views expressed in the above article are the author’s own.

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

7. The Disappearance of APEC’s Symbol in Gyeongju (ROK/US Alliance and Kim Jong Un)

​Ironically the person dominating the APEC meeting in Korea is not even there: Kim Jong Un. He is able to spin this in a way that makes him perceived as most powerful to the domestic target audiences of the Propaganda and Agitation Department.  

This is another powerful essay very much worth reading.

It is from my good friend and colleague in the UK, Ms Jihyun Park, a political leader, human rights activist, and escapee from north Korea.

[블챌] 일상 포토덤프

The Disappearance of APEC’s Symbol in Gyeongju

https://m.blog.naver.com/freedom88-/224058076578

freedom88-

1분 전

The Disappearance of APEC’s Symbol in Gyeongju

​

At the ongoing APEC meeting in Gyeongju, the fundamental U.S.–Korea alliance seems to have vanished, and the name that echoes countless times from the lips of world leaders is none other than Kim Jong Un.

​

Just yesterday, the same person who met with the families of Japanese abductees—people who still do not know whether their loved ones are alive or dead under a dictatorship—now repeats the dictator’s name as though praising him. It is a sight that provokes deep anger.

​

​

North Korea has changed since the 1990s. Out of its 25 million people, only 0.00137% have found freedom, yet their testimonies have transformed global awareness over the past 20 years. A leader who ignores that powerful truth can never truly change the world.

​

The U.S. Declaration of Independence reflects the philosophy of the British thinker John Locke:

​

“Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends—life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government.”

— U.S. Declaration of Independence, 1776

​

William Wilberforce, who fought for the abolition of slavery, once declared in his famous speech:

​

“You may choose to look the other way, but you can never say again that you did not know.”

— William Wilberforce, Abolition Speech

​

And when describing the horrors aboard slave ships, he said:

​

“Take away your handkerchiefs. Smell this death. And never forget it.”

— Wilberforce, Testimony on the Slave Trade

​

In the first stage, President Trump’s ambition led him to meet Kim Jong Un. But by now, it should be clear that peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula cannot be built on denuclearization alone—the issue of North Korean human rights must be the foundation of any genuine dialogue.

​

As Wilberforce said, those who once turned away cannot now claim ignorance. That is what leadership means.

Yet if, at a U.S.–Korea summit, the name “Jong Un” is uttered so casually, what meaning remains in such a summit?

​

Just two days ago, North Korea sent Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui to meet Putin in Russia, reaffirming the promises Kim Jong Un and Putin made in September. Why did this happen only two days before the Gyeongju meeting?

​

What exactly is the Trump administration doing?

​

They say that not 99% of genius, but 1% of effort, changes the world.

​

Today, though 99% of the world may appear to bow to the United States, if it ignores the 1% who are the North Korean people, it will never overcome the tyranny of China, Russia, and the North Korean regime.

​

The U.S. government must study carefully why China has classified North Korean defectors as a national security threat.

​

This message may be uncomfortable for those who support President Trump. Yesterday, I shared a piece highlighting his humanity. But today, seeing that same humanity seemingly disappear in Korea, I am filled with deep anger.

​

The North Korean people are not tools of political negotiation.

They are not objects to be moved about for ideology or strategy.

They are human beings who deserve the universal rights granted to all people.

​

Moreover, the issue of North Korean human rights reflects the moral compass of all Korean society.

Thus, on matters concerning Korea, Koreans themselves must uphold and defend their own moral values.

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8. China, South Korean vessels in 15-hour Yellow Sea stand-off last month, report reveals

​Two weeks ago at our Potomac Dialogue VADM Won of the Korean Institute for Maritime Strategy (KIMS) briefed this issue in detail.

Here is the CSIS report that the author below is referencing. 

Korea-China Standoffs in the PMZ

October 27, 2025, by Jennifer Jun, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and Victor Cha

https://beyondparallel.csis.org/korea-china-standoffs-in-the-pmz/

It is good to see this in the media during the week of APEC. Few people outside of Korea are tracking this issue. China needs to be called out for their actions.

ChinaMilitary

China, South Korean vessels in 15-hour Yellow Sea stand-off last month, report reveals

US-based think tank details latest encounter over Chinese-built structures in contested maritime zone

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3330644/china-south-korean-vessels-15-hour-yellow-sea-stand-last-month-report-reveals?utm

Seong Hyeon Choi

Published: 10:00am, 29 Oct 2025Updated: 10:09am, 29 Oct 2025

A report by a Washington-based think tank has revealed a tense 15-hour stand-off last month between China’s coastguard and South Korean vessels in a contested area of the Yellow Sea.

The confrontation took place in the disputed Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) after a South Korean research vessel, the Onnuri, approached facilities that Beijing has claimed are used for aquaculture, according to a report posted on Monday to the website Beyond Parallel, operated under the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

The PMZ is an interim area in the Yellow Sea where South Korea and China have overlapping claims relating to their exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Under a 2001 deal, the two sides agreed to allow their fishing vessels to operate in the area and jointly manage marine resources while banning any activities beyond navigation and fishing.

The report came ahead of a trip by Chinese President Xi Jinping to South Korea this week to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) summit in Gyeongju – his first visit to the country in 11 years.

A report published by Beyond Parallel in June also detailed an incident stemming from China and South Korea tensions in the PMZ.

Citing Automatic Identification System data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence, a New Zealand-based AI-powered platform for global maritime intelligence, the report said that Chinese coastguard vessel 6307 and two other vessels followed the Onnuri for about six hours after it entered the PMZ.

The report indicated that South Korean vessels were likely dispatched to observe the Shen Lan 1 and Shen Lan 2 situated in the PMZ. Seoul contends that the two Chinese aquaculture platforms completed by Beijing last year were built without prior consultation, as required under their mutual maritime zone management.

As the Onnuri and a South Korean coastguard vessel approached the structures, two Chinese coastguard ships flanked and followed them closely for 15 hours until the South Korean ships withdrew from the area.

“This latest incident highlights the ongoing pattern of deliberate presence and surveillance near China’s unilaterally deployed platforms in contested waters,” the Beyond Parallel report said.

China began installing the structures in 2018, according to the reports. Beijing has dismissed suspicions that the installations could be used for oil exploration or territorial claims, insisting their only purpose is for fishing and aquaculture and that they comply with both its domestic law and international law.

Construction of the facilities was consistent with a China-South Korea fisheries agreement and has not impacted maritime delimitation, according to Beijing.

China, Japan, South Korea meet Asean bloc

The overlapping areas of the EEZs between China and South Korea, as well as Japan, in the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, are known to have natural resources such as oil, which has led to disputes over claims, including the construction of artificial structures.

South Korean coastguard vessels have previously driven off Chinese fishing boats operating in the area and the PMZ disputes have added to tensions between Seoul and Beijing.

According to South Korea’s coastguard, up to 35 Chinese fishing boats were seized between 2022 and 2024 for operating illegally in waters near Jeju Island.

Socotra Rock, a submerged rock formation known as Ieodo in South Korea and Suyan Islet in China, lies near the Chinese aquaculture facilities and falls within the overlapping EEZ claims between the two countries. In 2003, South Korea set up the Ieodo Ocean Research Centre, which Beijing said engaged in “unilateral” and “illegal” activities in the region.

In February this year, a similar confrontation unfolded in the PMZ when Seoul attempted to investigate another Chinese-built steel structure, which it claimed was an aquaculture platform.

In January, citing intelligence sources, South Korean media reported that China was planning to install as many as 12 steel structures in the waters, with one report claiming one structure was about 50 metres (164 feet) high and wide.

According to the South Korean National Assembly, China has interfered in 27 out of 135 South Korean maritime surveys since 2020 – nearly one in five. A report by the South Korean Navy also showed that at least 13 Chinese ocean observation buoys were installed across the Yellow Sea between 2018 and 2023.

Shen Lan 1, China’s first deep-sea fish farm off Qingdao. Photo: Handout

“While civilian in function as ocean observation buoys, their deployment in sensitive areas and near maritime boundaries also raises questions about long-term strategic utility,” the report said.

China’s use of its coastguard to patrol the PMZ and shadow South Korean ships “resembles grey-zone tactics that Beijing has employed in the South and East China seas to use overwhelming and persistent coastguard presence to assert control over disputed areas”, it added.

Grey-zone tactics are coercive actions that fall short of armed conflict, enabling states to pursue territorial goals without provoking military responses.

Beijing has also deployed coastguards to assert its claims in contested waters, including in stand-offs with the Philippines in the South China Sea and with Japanese vessels near the Diaoyu Islands, known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan, which Tokyo also claims.

Seong Hyeon Choi

Seong Hyeon joined the SCMP in 2022. He is from South Korea and graduated with a bachelor of journalism and master of international and public affairs from the University of Hong Kong. He worked as a research intern for Korea Chair at US foreign policy think tank Center for

9. Why Xi and Trump are set to talk in Busan, away from South Korea’s Apec events

US-China relations

ChinaDiplomacy

Why Xi and Trump are set to talk in Busan, away from South Korea’s Apec events

Chinese foreign ministry confirms leaders to ‘exchange views on bilateral relations and issues of mutual interest’

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3330734/why-xi-and-trump-are-set-talk-busan-away-south-koreas-apec-events?utm

Alyssa Chenin Gyeongju

Published: 4:26pm, 29 Oct 2025

Highly anticipated talks between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump on the sidelines of the Apec summit are set for Thursday in Busan, South Korea – some 85km (53 miles) from the forum’s main events in Gyeongju – and security considerations could explain why as the two seek to make headway on issues that have left bilateral ties strained.

On Wednesday, the Chinese foreign ministry announced that Xi and Trump would meet in Busan to “exchange views on bilateral relations and issues of mutual interest”.

Guo Jiakun, a foreign ministry spokesperson, said the two leaders would engage in in-depth discussions on “strategic and long-term issues” concerning bilateral relations, as well as major topics of mutual interest.

“We are willing to work with the US side to ensure positive outcomes from this meeting, providing new guidance and injecting fresh momentum into the stable development of China-US relations,” Guo added.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (left) and US President Donald Trump last met in person in 2019. Photo: AFP

Speaking to reporters aboard Air Force One on Wednesday morning, Trump said he expected to discuss with Xi fentanyl flows into the US and American farmers.

Trump’s remarks followed a Wall Street Journal report on Tuesday suggesting that Washington might reduce the 20 per cent fentanyl-related tariffs on Chinese exports by half in exchange for Beijing’s crackdown on the export of chemicals used to produce fentanyl.

“I expect to be lowering that because I believe that they’re gonna help us with the fentanyl situation,” Trump said on Wednesday. “They’re gonna be doing what they could do.”

Answering media questions regarding fentanyl, Guo said Beijing had provided help in this regard with positive results and was “open to continuing cooperation”.

“The US should take concrete actions to create the necessary conditions for cooperation,” added Guo, calling China’s stance on the issue consistent and clear.

When asked about a possible one-year pause in Beijing’s rare earth export controls and whether it could lead to further concessions, Trump said: “We haven’t talked about the timing yet, but we’re gonna work out something.”

Trump voiced optimism about reaching a “great deal” with China in his talks with Xi as he spoke to business executives on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit.

The American president said he believed a deal would benefit both the US and China and be “something very exciting for everybody”.

Last week, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said Trump would fly to Busan and meet his Chinese counterpart there on Thursday before departing for Washington.

South Korea is the final leg of Trump’s Asia trip, which began on Sunday and took him to Malaysia and Japan. He is expected to leave South Korea on Thursday, while Xi is scheduled to arrive on Thursday and leave on Saturday.

Meanwhile, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung was scheduled to hold separate summits with Trump on Wednesday and Xi on Saturday, both in Gyeongju. Trump was to skip the main events of the Apec summit, only delivering keynote remarks at a CEO lunch and attending a working dinner with Apec leaders.

As for Busan, the reception hall at the city’s Gimhae International Airport, known as Narae Maru, was renovated recently and mentioned as a possible venue to host the meeting between Xi and Trump, according to South Korean reports.

Narae Maru is situated within a South Korean air force base that is home to the country’s 5th Tactical Airlift Wing.

Kang Jun-young, a professor of Chinese studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, said the airbase might have been chosen as the venue owing to security and intelligence considerations.

“The air force base is a highly secure location where ordinary personnel cannot easily enter or exit, ensuring a higher level of safety. In fact, the venue also hosted a high-level summit in 2005,” Kang said of Narae Maru, site of a 2005 Apec meeting.

Highly secure and inaccessible to the general public, Narae Maru also served as a reception room during a 2019 summit between South Korea and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, according to local media.

Kang highlighted concerns about possible anti-China and anti-US protests, suggesting that this also played a role in the airbase being considered for the Xi-Trump talks.

Chinese leaders have a recent history of arriving at American airbases en route to attending major meetings.

In 2011, for instance, former president Hu Jintao landed at Andrews Air Force Base near Washington for his state visit, while his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, arrived at Ellington Field Joint Reserve Base near Houston for his 2002 trip to the US.

That said, there is no precedent of Chinese leaders taking part in a global summit at a military base.

But such is not the case for other world leaders. Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin held talks at Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, in August.

The expected summit between Xi and Trump would be their first since 2019 and come after China-US trade talks in Kuala Lumpur over the weekend that yielded a preliminary framework deal and an agreement to extend their tariff truce.

Speaking to reporters after the talks, Chinese trade negotiator Li Chenggang said a “preliminary consensus” had been reached and would be submitted for domestic approval by both sides.

On Monday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a phone call with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, telling him that Beijing and Washington should “meet each other halfway” to solve disputes through dialogue instead of exerting pressure.

Additional reporting by Orange Wang

Alyssa Chen

Alyssa joined the Post in 2023 as a reporter on China desk to cover diplomacy. Her interests lie in cross-strait relations and Sino-Japan relations. Previously, she was the Asia Correspondent for the Japan Times, and graduated from the University of Hong Kong.

10. Pragmatism with Purpose: South Korea’s Opportunity to Lead in the Indo-Pacific

​Excepts:

Moving beyond Yoon’s idea of a global pivotal state, South should lead as a resilient democratic nation alongside Japan, defining what FOIP means amid fluctuating U.S. priorities and uncertainty. This “pragmatism with purpose” model would enable South Korea to strengthen its partnership with Japan in a positive external direction, not solely defined by their bilateral relationship. It emphasizes a broader regional context and reinforces a leadership role that reflects South Korea’s current economic, diplomatic, and security strengths. 

As such, the concept of FOIP should not be relegated to only being “values diplomacy” but should instead be treated as a practical national interest directly linked to regional security. Lee’s rhetoric has already laid the foundation for this. At CSIS, he emphasized K-Democracy, describing institutions capable of stopping martial law through democratic means and mass protests without “a single drop of blood.” This presents democracy less as an ideology and more as a reflection on institutional resilience. This reframing can position South Korea and Japan as co-leaders shaping the Indo-Pacific’s future framework, anchoring regional resilience, and reinforcing the perception of a FOIP not only as part of the United States’ values-driven engagement but as a shared Korean-Japanese effort for Indo-Pacific stability that, in turn, benefits national interests.

Under a FOIP agenda framework led by South Korea and Japan, Seoul can more effectively guide how the region addresses cross-cutting security issues, critical technology coordination, and regional capacity-building. Initially, this should focus on: maritime rule of law and maritime domain awareness; secure, diverse supply chains for critical and emerging technologies; institutionalizing trilateral and minilateral multi-domain security exercises, including space and cyber; and regional resilience to transnational threats, including climate impacts on the defense industrial base and disaster response readiness. 

During the initial introduction and official adoptions of the Indo-Pacific concept and FOIP agendas, South Korea’s then-Moon administration prioritized its more hedging approach to balancing relations with China and the U.S., rather than actively engaging with the expanding Indo-Pacific and FOIP agenda. In the end, South Korea had little to show for this balancing act. While Lee has recognized that hedging options are unattainable, any move that distances South Korea from its regional partners on shared objectives under the FOIP umbrella risks losing its growing, but still tenuous, agency and once again allowing others to define the region. 

This is a pivotal moment for South Korea to go beyond the rhetorical commitments of the Yoon administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy by operationalizing the FOIP framework and embedding it as a key part of the Lee administration’s approach to regional strategy. While China may continue rejecting the Indo-Pacific terminology, Japan and Australia will keep promoting the concept through their bilateral statements and shape its development with their own Indo-Pacific strategies and outlooks. An aversion to values-laden rhetoric should not prevent South Korea from pursuing policies that serve its national interests, regardless of their rhetorical origins. The task is to empower Korean pragmatism as a driving force behind FOIP, deliver an agenda framework with allies, and evaluate it by its outcomes. 

If South Korea, as Lee has stated, “falls a single step behind,” it risks becoming “a weary follower.” On the other hand, “move just half a step ahead,” and South Korea can “become a leader with boundless opportunities.”

Pragmatism with Purpose: South Korea’s Opportunity to Lead in the Indo-Pacific

Seoul has a chance to take a leading role in shaping the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Will Lee Jae-myung seize the day?

https://thediplomat.com/2025/10/pragmatism-with-purpose-south-koreas-opportunity-to-lead-in-the-indo-pacific/

By Matthew F. Fleming

October 28, 2025

​

Lee Jae-myung, president of South Korea, addresses the general debate of the United Nations General Assembly’s 80th session, Sep. 23, 2025.

Credit: UN Photo/ Loey Felipe

South Korea must not relinquish its agency and allow others to define the Indo-Pacific without it. As President Lee Jae-myung has stated, South Korea “cannot repeat the mistakes of 120 years ago,” because “in the past, we failed to keep up with the changing international trends and were caught between the great powers and pushed around, ultimately losing our sovereignty.” 

South Korea today possesses capabilities to navigate a volatile regional and international environment that its 19th-century self could only have dreamed of. South Korea has emerged as a G-20 economy, a leading actor in critical and emerging technologies of AI and semiconductors, and a global cultural exporter with soft power reaching far beyond Asia. It is also a resilient democracy that recently weathered the turbulence of a short-lived declaration of martial law by former President Yoon Suk-yeol, who was impeached for his constitutional violations. 

However, Seoul has not consistently translated its strengths into regional agenda-setting or leadership that reflects its substantial economic, cultural, and security advancements. Yoon began to change this oversight with the Camp David Summit, South Korea’s first Indo-Pacific Strategy, and founding membership in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. It will be under Lee that South Korea’s larger regional role can truly start to take shape.

While shared values still play a crucial role in diplomacy and foreign policy and will always be embedded within outcomes, Lee has declared that South Korea will no longer prioritize a “values-based” approach to diplomacy, as conducted under Yoon. Instead, as Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Hyun stated, Lee’s government will pursue a “pragmatic” foreign policy with “no ideological preoccupations” and seek diplomacy from “a common sense approach to policy and pragmatism rooted in national interest.” 

Lee’s inauguration address described his government as “flexible” and “market-oriented” with diplomacy that is “practical.” The first 100 days of the Lee government have shown that this involves abandoning the previous administration’s branding of South Korea as a “global pivotal state.” In practice, this has seen the reversal of Yoon’s “freedom-based unification” approach toward North Korea, with Lee proposing his own “Engagement, Normalization, and Denuclearization” (END initiative). Lee’s approach is reflected thus far in “sound diplomacy” (the dismantling of loudspeakers along the DMZ), addressing the launches of anti-North leaflet balloons, and attempting to restore communication channels.

The Lee government is also attempting to reset and strengthen economic relations with China by sending a special envoy and seeking their assistance with the North Korean nuclear challenge, while maintaining the centrality of the United States alliance and signaling interest in pursuing greater strategic military autonomy by advancing the discussion on the transfer of wartime Conditions-based Operational Control (OPCON).

Although each development in Lee’s pragmatic approach is significant, another key point, crucial to South Korea’s ability to navigate global strategic headwinds, should be emphasized. Lee’s pragmatism has not required abandoning the idea of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), nor should it. 

FOIP is often linked to the United States’ strategic role in the region, and its increased engagement to protect the “rules-based order” and uphold the “values that have underpinned peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.” While the U.S. core pillars of keeping the region “free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient” might have consolidated in U.S. strategies, the initial impetus for both the Indo-Pacific concept and FOIP first emerged in Tokyo’s strategic thinking. 

From Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s Confluence of the Two Seas speech and “Democratic Security Diamond” proposal, to the subsequent introduction of a FOIP strategy in a 2016 Speech at TICAD VI and inclusion in the Minister for Foreign Affairs’ 2017 Diplomatic Bluebook, the concept’s origins reflected Tokyo’s “desire to preserve the blessings of open seas, together with… all countries and peoples who share the same intent.” Therefore, while the U.S. has been a key proponent of a FOIP, the normative framing of values and their practical purpose for agenda-setting potential are fundamentally from within the region.

Since Lee’s inauguration, one of the few explicit mentions of a FOIP was in the Trilateral Ministerial Joint Statement  by the United States, Japan, and South Korea in September 2025, while Lee’s speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) focused on framing “peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.” 

Some might associate the FOIP concept with the values-based diplomatic approach from which the Lee administration is moving away. However, this should be recognized as the crucial moment for South Korea to define what a “free and open Indo-Pacific” truly means in practice. In doing so, Seoul could take a leading role at a pivotal point in evolving U.S. regional priorities. 

Lee’s pragmatism does not require abandoning or replacing the idea of a FOIP. Instead, this pragmatism should serve as the means by which FOIP is implemented and better operationalized, capitalizing on the inherent practical priorities that the FOIP concept has and can continue to facilitate. As a highly trade-dependent economy, South Korea’s prosperity and security rely on secure supply chains and a stable regional environment. FOIP provides the framework to achieve these goals. 

While the United States has played a key role in promoting Indo-Pacific terminology, establishing most existing minilateral partnerships, and shaping the concept of an FOIP, the increasing emphasis on burden-sharing among partners will require allies to take a more prominent lead in implementing initiatives in the region. The question, then, is who will step up.

When the U.S. withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, it was Japan’s leadership that kept the idea alive through the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Although many might expect Japan to once again lead and serve as a backstop for FOIP, relying solely on Tokyo would be tenuous under a new prime minister and a limited political bandwidth. 

Therefore, what is required is for South Korea to join Japan in shaping an FOIP agenda, rather than downgrading or relegating it as merely an incompatible, values-laden idea.

This is where Lee’s pragmatism toward Japan should play a vital role. The Korea-U.S.-Japan Public Perception Survey by the East Asia Institute, the Korea Economic Institute, and the Asia Pacific Initiative showed 75.5 percent of Korean respondents support strengthening Korean security cooperation with Japan above its current level, and 85.6 percent agreed to increasing economic exchange and cooperation. In Japan, new Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae has stated that the “importance of the Japan-South Korea relationship is greater than ever before” and that she will aim to “develop the relationship in a future-oriented and stable manner.” The raised hopes for a productive relationship despite concerns in Seoul about her attitude toward historical issues.

Moving beyond Yoon’s idea of a global pivotal state, South should lead as a resilient democratic nation alongside Japan, defining what FOIP means amid fluctuating U.S. priorities and uncertainty. This “pragmatism with purpose” model would enable South Korea to strengthen its partnership with Japan in a positive external direction, not solely defined by their bilateral relationship. It emphasizes a broader regional context and reinforces a leadership role that reflects South Korea’s current economic, diplomatic, and security strengths. 

As such, the concept of FOIP should not be relegated to only being “values diplomacy” but should instead be treated as a practical national interest directly linked to regional security. Lee’s rhetoric has already laid the foundation for this. At CSIS, he emphasized K-Democracy, describing institutions capable of stopping martial law through democratic means and mass protests without “a single drop of blood.” This presents democracy less as an ideology and more as a reflection on institutional resilience. This reframing can position South Korea and Japan as co-leaders shaping the Indo-Pacific’s future framework, anchoring regional resilience, and reinforcing the perception of a FOIP not only as part of the United States’ values-driven engagement but as a shared Korean-Japanese effort for Indo-Pacific stability that, in turn, benefits national interests.

Under a FOIP agenda framework led by South Korea and Japan, Seoul can more effectively guide how the region addresses cross-cutting security issues, critical technology coordination, and regional capacity-building. Initially, this should focus on: maritime rule of law and maritime domain awareness; secure, diverse supply chains for critical and emerging technologies; institutionalizing trilateral and minilateral multi-domain security exercises, including space and cyber; and regional resilience to transnational threats, including climate impacts on the defense industrial base and disaster response readiness. 

During the initial introduction and official adoptions of the Indo-Pacific concept and FOIP agendas, South Korea’s then-Moon administration prioritized its more hedging approach to balancing relations with China and the U.S., rather than actively engaging with the expanding Indo-Pacific and FOIP agenda. In the end, South Korea had little to show for this balancing act. While Lee has recognized that hedging options are unattainable, any move that distances South Korea from its regional partners on shared objectives under the FOIP umbrella risks losing its growing, but still tenuous, agency and once again allowing others to define the region. 

This is a pivotal moment for South Korea to go beyond the rhetorical commitments of the Yoon administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy by operationalizing the FOIP framework and embedding it as a key part of the Lee administration’s approach to regional strategy. While China may continue rejecting the Indo-Pacific terminology, Japan and Australia will keep promoting the concept through their bilateral statements and shape its development with their own Indo-Pacific strategies and outlooks. An aversion to values-laden rhetoric should not prevent South Korea from pursuing policies that serve its national interests, regardless of their rhetorical origins. The task is to empower Korean pragmatism as a driving force behind FOIP, deliver an agenda framework with allies, and evaluate it by its outcomes. 

If South Korea, as Lee has stated, “falls a single step behind,” it risks becoming “a weary follower.” On the other hand, “move just half a step ahead,” and South Korea can “become a leader with boundless opportunities.”

The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the author’s affiliated employers, organizations, institutions, or other associated entities. The author would like to thank Kester Abbott for their constructive feedback.

Authors

Guest Author

Matthew F. Fleming

Matthew F. Fleming is a Non-Resident James A. Kelly Korea Fellow at the Pacific Forum and a Ph.D. student at Northeastern University. His research focuses on Indo-Pacific strategies, minilateralism, and strategic competition in Northeast Asia, with an emphasis on U.S.-ROK-Japan, U.S.-Korea, and U.S.-Japan foreign relations. Fleming is also a research assistant at the Center for International Affairs and World Cultures.

11. Allied shipbuilding is Asia’s next strategic supply chain

​We need JAROKUS:

A Japan-ROK-US Shipbuilding consortium.

Allied shipbuilding is Asia’s next strategic supply chain - Asia Times

New investment in production capacity by Japan, South Korea and the US could anchor a more resilient global supply chain

https://asiatimes.com/2025/10/allied-shipbuilding-is-asias-next-strategic-supply-chain/

asiatimes.com · Jeffrey M. Voth · October 28, 2025

This article was originally published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with permission.

Sparks flying from Japanese and South Korean shipyards capture how the region’s industrial powerhouses are repositioning their economies to balance risk and trade.

With tensions between Washington and Beijing setting the tone for this week’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, South Korea finds itself hosting the most closely watched diplomatic gathering in years. For Japan, South Korea and the United States, the question is whether new investment in production capacity, beginning with shipbuilding, can anchor a more resilient global supply chain.

That question sits squarely at the heart of APEC’s 2025 agenda, centered on sustainable growth and supply-chain stability. The post-pandemic recovery has exposed the vulnerabilities created by offshoring and just-in-time production, while surging freight costs have tightened financial conditions across the region.

For APEC members, demonstrating progress toward reindustrialization and diversified trade networks will be as important as any communiqué on tariffs or investment liberalization. The industrial frameworks now emerging among major Pacific economies could provide a roadmap for others seeking to combine efficiency with resilience.

Tokyo’s new trade accord with Washington, which includes a $550 billion strategic investment framework, shows how Japan is turning diplomacy into industrial leverage. The agreement channels Japanese capital into US shipbuilding, semiconductors, and energy projects while securing predictable returns and long-term supply-chain access. For investors, it signals that the world once again treats Japan’s manufacturing expertise as a global asset and that economic security is shifting from policy debate to measurable action.

Seoul is pursuing a similar path, although on different terms. About $150 billion of its $350 billion US trade deal commitment will fund Make America Shipbuilding Great Again investments to upgrade US yards with South Korean capital and digital shipbuilding know-how. The rest targets energy, semiconductors, and other strategic sectors.

South Korea’s exposure is heavier than Japan’s because its reserves are smaller and its currency less liquid. President Lee Jae Myung has warned that withdrawing large sums without a dollar-swap line could strain the won and revive memories of 1997-style volatility. Even so, Seoul views the plan as vital for tariff relief.

Japan and South Korea are moving in parallel toward deeper industrial partnerships with Washington. Their investment frameworks cover shipbuilding, semiconductors, energy and other strategic sectors, reflecting a shared emphasis on rebuilding production capacity after years of offshoring.

Shipbuilding stands out because Chinese yards now produce more than half of global output and dominate commercial exports by value, shaping freight costs and vessel availability across global trade.

The United States, by contrast, has only a few major yards remaining. Expanding that capacity with allied capital and expertise could help steady shipping costs, ease bottlenecks and strengthen resilience in global supply chains.

If these investments materialize, their influence will extend well beyond the three partner nations. Southeast Asian economies are already expanding port infrastructure to accommodate new shipping capacity, while Australia is deepening maritime cooperation under its own shipbuilding programs.

Allied financing could open opportunities for regional ship-component suppliers and logistics firms, especially if standards for transparency and sustainability are aligned.

For the broader Indo-Pacific, where energy transport and commercial shipping underpin nearly every trade route, stronger allied production networks could serve as a stabilizing counterweight to market volatility.

As both agreements move ahead, they could redefine how capital, technology and talent flow through Asia’s high-end manufacturing networks. For lenders and investors, the projects show that supply-chain resilience is becoming a tangible source of value.

Japan’s participation gives its trading houses and banks deeper exposure to US industrial assets, while South Korea’s role reinforces demand for its advanced engineering and digital-production systems. Together, these developments highlight how Asia’s leading shipbuilders, already second and third globally (behind China), are extending their strengths into new markets and proving that industrial cooperation can be an engine of regional stability.

For policymakers, the coming APEC meetings will test whether these bilateral industrial frameworks can inspire a broader multilateral approach.

Beyond funding, governments will need to align standards for workforce development, technology transfer and compliance. Establishing a transparent mechanism to track outcomes, from shipyard productivity to export performance, could help convert political commitments into measurable progress. These are practical steps that fit APEC’s tradition of voluntary cooperation while addressing the region’s pressing need for economic security.

As leaders prepare to meet at APEC, attention will turn to how nations translate economic partnerships into practical results. For Japan and South Korea, progress on their new investment frameworks would mean capital flowing into US shipyards, facilities breaking ground and early gains in throughput, workforce training and technology transfer.

Expanding shipbuilding and related industries offers a model for steady growth built on technology, finance and trust. The message from APEC is simple: Shared investment can still drive shared prosperity.

Jeffrey M. Voth (jeff.voth@jlha.com) is an engineering and technology executive focused on strengthening the US defense industrial base and allied cooperation. He has written extensively on the strategic, economic and business implications of spending across the aerospace and defense sectors in publications ranging from World Politics Review and Breaking Defense to the Journal of Business Strategy.

asiatimes.com · Jeffrey M. Voth · October 28, 2025

12. S. Korea, U.S. clinch deal on details of investment pledge

​Great news.

Good work by all action officers and negotiators.

POTUS is ona roll. He needs to take more trips to get more done! :-) 

(LEAD) [APEC 2025] S. Korea, U.S. clinch deal on details of investment pledge | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · October 29, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with more details in paras 2, 12-13; ADDS photo)

By Kim Eun-jung

GYEONGJU, South Korea, Oct. 29 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States have finalized an agreement on the details of Seoul's US$350 billion investment pledge that lowered U.S. tariffs on Korean products, the presidential policy chief said Wednesday.

The agreement was reached in time for President Lee Jae Myung's summit with U.S. President Donald Trump in the southeastern city of Gyeongju, following nearly three months of intense negotiations to narrow gaps on the details of the investment pledge.

"The US$350 billion investment pledge will consist of $200 billion in cash installments and $150 billion allocated for shipbuilding industry cooperation, with an annual cap set at $20 billion," Kim Yong-beom, presidential chief of staff for policy, told reporters.

"As the investments will be made in line with business progress within an annual limit of $20 billion, they will remain within a range the Korean foreign exchange market can absorb, thereby minimizing any impact on the market," he said.

Korean companies will lead the shipbuilding cooperation projects, including direct investment and loan guarantees, Kim said.

Kim Yong-beom (R), the presidential chief of staff for policy, alongside National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac, speaks during a press briefing at the International Media Center for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation gathering in the southeastern city of Gyeongju on Oct. 29, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

Under the finalized terms, U.S. "reciprocal" tariffs on Korean goods and sectoral duties on autos will fall from 25 percent to 15 percent as agreed in an initial deal in July.

Pharmaceutical and lumber products will be granted "most-favored nation treatment," while airplane parts, generic pharmaceuticals and natural resources not produced in the U.S. will be exempt from tariffs.

For semiconductors, tariff levels will be set no less favorable than those applied to Taiwan, South Korea's major competitor in the sector, Kim noted.

Seoul and Washington also agreed to incorporate "commercial rationality" into the memorandum of understanding (MOU) and to split profits equally until the investment amount is recovered.

South Korea additionally secured a safeguard clause, enabling further consultations if the U.S. seeks investments without proper committee review.

"Through this agreement, we expect to improve conditions for Korean companies entering the U.S. market and secure a more favorable export environment than other nations," Kim said. "We also anticipate that clarifying the specific scope and timing of tariff reductions will significantly reduce market uncertainty.

President Lee Jae Myung (R) speaks during a special dinner with U.S. President Donald Trump (L) and leaders of seven other nations at the Hilton Hotel in the southeastern city of Gyeongju on Oct. 29, 2025. (Yonhap)

Kim said the MOU will require a special law on U.S. investment and ratification by the National Assembly for implementation, noting that the lower tariffs will be applied retroactively from the time the bill is submitted to parliament.

He added that the specific terms of the MOU are nearly finalized and that a fact sheet covering both the trade and security components of the agreement between Seoul and Washington will be released in the coming days.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · October 29, 2025

13. S. Korea's push for nuclear-powered submarines gains traction with Lee-Trump summit

​I did not see this coming.

(News Focus) [APEC 2025] S. Korea's push for nuclear-powered submarines gains traction with Lee-Trump summit

en.yna.co.kr

(News Focus) [APEC 2025] S. Korea's push for nuclear-powered submarines gains traction with Lee-Trump summit | Yonhap News Agency

Chae Yun-hwan

Defense 21:31 October 29, 2025

• By Chae Yun-hwan

GYEONGJU, South Korea, Oct. 29 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's drive to acquire nuclear-powered military submarines picked up steam Wednesday after U.S. President Donald Trump agreed on Seoul's need for such advanced submarines.

Earlier in the day, President Lee Jae Myung requested Trump allow South Korea acquire fuel for nuclear-propelled submarines during their summit in the southeastern city of Gyeongju, citing limitations in the capabilities of South Korea's conventionally-powered submarines.

In return, Trump agreed on South Korea's need for nuclear-powered submarines, calling for follow-up talks, according to National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac.

President Lee Jae Myung (R) salutes as he stands alongside U.S. President Donald Trump as they attend a welcoming ceremony for Trump at the Gyeongju National Museum in the southeastern city of Gyeongju on Oct. 29, 2025, following Trump's arrival in the country. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

South Korea's military currently operates a fleet of diesel submarines, which need regular refueling unlike nuclear-propelled ones that can stay submerged for months and avoid detection from adversaries.

"Basically, submarines are all about stealthiness -- whether they can remain underwater for long periods of time," Yu Ji-hoon, a research fellow at the state-run Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, said. "In terms of stealthiness and effectiveness, (nuclear submarines) are unmatched."

Seoul has long flirted with the idea of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, even making efforts to secretly build one in 2003 during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, which was ultimately scrapped after the plan became publicized.

While South Korea possesses capabilities to make conventional submarines, it faces numerous technological obstacles in building nuclear-powered ones, such as developing a small nuclear reactor to fit inside them.

"The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute has done a lot of research on commercial nuclear reactors and has researched small modular reactors, so it would not be impossible but will take time," a military official said.

But the technological obstacles are relatively minor issues as under the allies' nuclear energy pact, Seoul is currently allowed to enrich uranium below 20 percent for peaceful purposes with U.S. consent.

Seoul has been seeking to revise the pact to gain greater flexibility in reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and enriching uranium.

Regarding the issue of fuel for nuclear-powered submarines, Wi said the current treaty would need to be changed so that it would become possible.

"That nuclear fuel would be used for military purposes, and the current treaty does not apply for military purposes so something must be adjusted for the procedures to be completed," he said.

Meanwhile, if South Korea is able to acquire fuel for nuclear-powered submarines, it is expected to take the country about 8 to 10 years for its development and deployment.

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

Keywords

#nuclear-powered submarines

en.yna.co.kr

14. Korean auto industry relieved by U.S. tariff deal; shipbuilders reaffirm key roles in investment pledge

[APEC 2025] (News Focus) Korean auto industry relieved by U.S. tariff deal; shipbuilders reaffirm key roles in investment pledge | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Chang Dong-woo · October 29, 2025

By Chang Dong-woo

SEOUL, Oct. 29 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's auto industry breathed a sigh of relief Wednesday after the United States agreed to lower tariffs on Korean vehicles, while the country's shipbuilding industry reaffirmed its status as a valuable card in Seoul's investment pledges.

Following the summit between South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and his U.S. counterpart, Donald Trump, held in Gyeongju, the host city of this year's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, South Korea announced that it has finalized an agreement with the U.S. on the details of Seoul's US$350 billion investment pledge, part of a broad tariff arrangement reached in July this year.

According to Kim Yong-beom, presidential chief of staff for policy, the investment pledge will be two-pronged: $200 billion in cash installments and $150 billion allocated for shipbuilding industry cooperation, with an annual cap set at $20 billion.

President Lee Jae Myung (R) greets U.S. President Donald Trump at the Gyeongju National Museum in the southeastern city of Gyeongju ahead of their summit talks on Oct. 29, 2025, in this photo provided by the presidential office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

As part of the deal, Washington agreed to lower tariffs on South Korean auto imports to 15 percent from 25 percent.

Following the deal, Hyundai Motor Group welcomed the Seoul-Washington trade deal and vowed to continue efforts to strengthen its competitiveness.

"We express our gratitude to the government for its dedicated efforts throughout the difficult negotiation process that led to this agreement," the group said in a statement.

"Hyundai Motor Co. and Kia Corp. will continue to pursue multifaceted measures to minimize the impact of tariffs while further strengthening our fundamentals through enhanced quality and brand competitiveness, technological innovation and other initiatives," it added.

The tariff reduction will level the playing field for South Korean automakers in the U.S. market.

Previously, Washington had lowered its auto tariffs on imports from Japan and the European Union to 15 percent, while South Korean vehicles continued to face a 25 percent rate for months, weighing down on the price competitiveness of Korean cars.

Hyundai Motor Group Executive Chairman Euisun Chung (C) speaks during a ceremony in Ellaville, in the U.S. state of Georgia, on March 26, 2025, to open the South Korean carmaker's first dedicated EV factory, Hyundai Motor Group Metaplant America. (Yonhap)

The agreement on details for the $150 billion shipbuilding cooperation fund, agreeing to combine direct cash investment from South Korean firms with government-backed guarantees, appears to favor South Korea, granting its companies greater decision making authority and flexibility over investment methods.

Earlier in the day, Trump said in a keynote address at the APEC CEO Summit that Washington will build a "thriving" shipbuilding industry together with South Korea.

"We're serious partners. We're really, we're wedded. And we have a very special relationship, a special bond," he said, referring to South Korea.

In August, South Korea announced its plan to enhance its shipbuilding ties with the U.S. under an initiative dubbed "Make American Shipbuilding Great Again (MASGA)" as part of its tariff deal with the Washington.

"The MASGA fund previously agreed upon required our companies to invest directly in projects designated by the U.S., which created considerable pressure," the official said. "Under the new terms, our companies can now propose their own project plans, and the U.S. side will decide whether to approve them."

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung (5th from L) attends a christening ceremony for the State of Maine, a National Security Multi-mission Vessel, at Hanwha Philly Shipyard in Philadelphia on Aug. 26, 2025, that South Korean shipbuilder Hanwha Ocean has built for the U.S. Maritime Administration. (Yonhap)

odissy@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Chang Dong-woo · October 29, 2025

15. Trump says he and N.K. leader could not 'work out timing' for meeting

KJU had a golf date (or a missile launch to watch). He just coudl not fit in travel to Panmunjom.

(LEAD) [APEC 2025] Trump says he and N.K. leader could not 'work out timing' for meeting | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Haye-ah · October 29, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with more Trump remarks; ADDS photo; RECASTS headline)

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, Oct. 29 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Donald Trump suggested Wednesday that a meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un will not take place during his visit to South Korea this week.

Trump made the remark hours after arriving in the southeastern city of Gyeongju to attend Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation gatherings and a summit with President Lee Jae Myung.

"I know Kim Jong-un very well. We get along very well," he said at the start of his summit with Lee at the Gyeongju National Museum. "We really weren't able to work out timing."

Trump's visit to South Korea from Wednesday to Thursday had sparked speculation he could meet with Kim to resume personal diplomacy over the North's nuclear weapons program.

President Lee Jae Myung (R) shakes hands with U.S. President Donald Trump during their summit meeting at the Gyeongju National Museum in the southeastern city of Gyeongju on Oct. 29, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

The two leaders met three times during Trump's first term -- in Singapore in June 2018, in Vietnam in February 2019 and in the inter-Korean truce village of Panmunjom in June that year.

Panmunjom had been floated as the most likely venue should a fourth meeting materialize.

"I know you are officially at war, but we will see what we can do to get that all straightened out," Trump said, referring to the 1950-53 Korean War having ended in a ceasefire, not a peace treaty.

"We'll have other visits, and we'll work very hard with Kim Jong-un and with everybody on getting things straightened out because that makes sense," he added.

The Trump-Kim meetings had been aimed at yielding an agreement on denuclearizing the North in exchange for U.S. concessions, including sanctions relief, but broke down over differences on how to match their steps.

Prior to arriving in South Korea, Trump had repeatedly expressed his openness to meeting again with Kim, indicating he could even extend his stay in the country if necessary.

The North has yet to publicly respond to the overtures, and in a potential sign of its disinterest, test-fired nuclear-capable cruise missiles the previous day.

U.S. President Donald Trump (R) is greeted by South Korean President Lee Jae Myung at the Gyeongju National Museum in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, southeastern South Korea, on Oct. 29, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Haye-ah · October 29, 2025

16. Top diplomats of S. Korea, U.S., Japan hold talks at APEC gathering: Seoul

Good news. We must sustain trilateral oooperation. 

(LEAD) [APEC 2025] Top diplomats of S. Korea, U.S., Japan hold talks at APEC gathering: Seoul | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · October 29, 2025

(ATTN: RECASTS lead, headline; UPDATES article throughout as talks were held)

By Kim Seung-yeon

GYEONGJU, South Korea, Oct. 29 (Yonhap) -- The top diplomats of South Korea, the United States and Japan had a trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering Wednesday, reversing an earlier cancellation, Seoul's foreign ministry said.

The ministry announced hours earlier that the planned meeting between Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi had been canceled due to scheduling matters.

But they decided to have the meeting in a pull-aside format, the ministry said in a notice to the press.

The three-way talks mark their first since the launch of the new Japanese cabinet led by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, elected last week. They also come after the summit talks between President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump.

Lee is expected to hold bilateral talks with Takaichi on Thursday. Trump also had his first one-on-one meeting with the new Japanese leader in Tokyo before he headed to Korea for the APEC events.

(From L to R) This composite photo, created using AFP pictures, shows Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

The top diplomats were expected to use Wednesday's meeting to reaffirm their continued commitment to advancing their trilateral cooperation even after the leadership change in Japan and despite the U.S. tariff pressure.

Questions have arisen over whether the trilateral cooperation framework, established under their preceding governments, would maintain momentum since Trump began his second term with a drive for the "America First" policy and aggressive tariffs on the U.S.' two key Asian allies and others.

The outlook for relations between South Korean and Japan has become uncertain with the election of the first female leader, who is known for her hard-line stance on issues stemming from Japan's colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula.

The three sides are also expected to discuss North Korean issues, as Pyongyang continues its missile launches while remaining unresponsive to Trump's repeated overtures.

The North's state media said Wednesday it test-fired sea-to-surface strategic cruise missiles into the Yellow Sea the previous day, a provocation that came ahead of Trump's visit to South Korea for the APEC event.

Last week, the North said it conducted a test launch of what it claimed were two hypersonic projectiles that successfully hit the target points.

North Korea's evolving crypto thefts are also likely to be among the agenda items.

A trilateral meeting among Lee, Trump and Takaichi is unlikely to take place during this week's APEC forum, according to diplomatic sources.

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · October 29, 2025

​17. Editorial: South Korea's Security at Stake in Trump's Nobel Pursuit

​The only Nobel for Korea will be for those who achieve a free and unified Korea. Nothing less.

And until tha happens we must sustain the capability and the will to defeat the nKPA should KJU order an attack on the South (or the US).

Editorial: South Korea's Security at Stake in Trump's Nobel Pursuit

https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/10/29/LNTVXYSJ7VFQLOWV4E5654ZTSQ/

By The Chosunilbo

Published 2025.10.29. 00:21

Updated 2025.10.29. 09:28

U.S. President Donald Trump (right) and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un meet and shake hands at the inter-Korean truce village of Panmunjom on June 30, 2019. /Korean Central News Agency-Yonhap

President Donald Trump, when asked what he could present if he meets with Kim Jong-un, said, “We have sanctions (against North Korea),” adding, “There is probably nothing bigger than this.” This implies that the issue of sanctions against North Korea can be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Kim Jong-un. Earlier, while embarking on his Asia tour, Trump also stated, “North Korea is a nuclear power,” and “If Kim Jong-un wishes, I can go to that side (North Korea).” This indicates that President Trump is willing to trade the lifting of sanctions in exchange for the Nobel Peace Prize, which he so desires.

Kim Jong-un’s participation in U.S.-North Korea and inter-Korean dialogues in 2018, during his ‘denuclearization show,’ was due to the suffering caused by sanctions. In 2016, following North Korea’s spree of nuclear and ICBM tests, the UN Security Council blocked transactions involving coal, textiles, and seafood—which accounted for 1st to 3rd place in North Korea’s exports—and also halted the dispatch of overseas labor, a ‘dollar box.’ It also restricted the inflow of petroleum products into North Korea. China and Russia also cast their votes in favor. As a result, North Korea’s exports to China decreased by nearly 90%. Recently, although China and Russia have opened a ‘back door’ for North Korea, the inability to conduct dollar transactions through banks forces them to carry cash. North Korea had stated that the financial sanctions make their “blood dry up.”

In 2019, when meeting with Trump, North Korea proposed abandoning the Yongbyon nuclear facility, which is in a state of scrap metal, in exchange for the complete lifting of key sanctions. When Trump abruptly left his seat, North Korea clung to the U.S., suggesting that they could maximize the scope of dismantlement within the Yongbyon area. This shows how urgent the lifting of sanctions was. There remains a possibility that Kim Jong-un might halt his nuclear spree only when he is pushed to the brink of economic collapse due to sanctions, risking his own downfall.

To lift the UN Security Council sanctions, the consent of the permanent members is required. While China and Russia are on North Korea’s side, Trump’s previously cautious stance on lifting sanctions is also changing. Recently, the Minister of Unification made remarks that seemed to acknowledge North Korea’s nuclear status and advocated for the easing of sanctions. Last January, when Trump expressed his desire to meet with Kim Jong-un and referred to him as a ‘nuclear power,’ the Democratic Party welcomed this stance. The Lee Jae-myung government also appears highly likely to welcome President Trump’s change in attitude.

Former President Moon Jae-in met with the French president in 2018 and requested the ‘easing of UN sanctions.’ President Macron rebutted, stating, “The Security Council sanctions will continue.” Sanctions are the last remaining lever to deter North Korea’s nuclear program. There may come a dizzying moment when we have to rely on the Security Council veto power of France and the UK to uphold them.

​

18. Trump says he will ‘work very hard with Kim Jong Un’ to achieve Korean peace

​There are only 14 words that will achieve peace:

Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through information and human rights.

Trump says he will ‘work very hard with Kim Jong Un’ to achieve Korean peace

US president and ROK counterpart Lee Jae-myung pledge to pursue diplomacy despite low prospects for Trump-Kim meeting

https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/trump-says-hell-work-very-hard-with-kim-jong-un-to-achieve-korean-peace/

Joon Ha Park | Shreyas Reddy October 29, 2025

U.S. President Donald Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung took part in a high honor ceremony before their summit | Image: APEC 2025 KOREA & Yonhap News (Oct. 29, 2025)

U.S. President Donald Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung pledged to continue efforts to forge a lasting “peace” with North Korea at a summit on Wednesday, despite low prospects for a Trump meeting with Kim Jong Un during his visit.

At a meeting on the sidelines of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) events in South Korea, Lee praised Trump’s “wonderful skills as a peacemaker” and offered Seoul’s support for his diplomatic outreach to Pyongyang.

“You have succeeded in bringing peace to many parts of the world, and I hope that your peacemaking skills can be applied to the Korean Peninsula,” he said at the start of their summit. “If that happens, I believe you will be recognized forever in the history of humanity.”

“This will also be welcomed by the Korean people, because bringing permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula has been a long desired hope for our country,” he added.

After a welcome ceremony at the National Museum of Gyeongju on Wednesday afternoon, Lee presented the U.S. president with the Grand Order of Mugunghwa (무궁화대훈장) — the country’s highest state honor — in recognition of Trump’s contributions to peace on the Korean Peninsula and in hope that he will continue to serve as a “peacemaker” in regional affairs.

He also gave Trump a replica of the Cheonmachong (천마총) gold crown, an artifact from Korea’s ancient Silla Dynasty “symbolizing peace and prosperity,” according to the ROK’s Presidential Office.

“The people of Korea are awarding you with their deep appreciation,” Lee said to Trump. 

“That is really beautiful. I’d like to wear it right now. Thank you so much. We’ll cherish it,” Trump said while admiring the Mugunghwa decoration, which was awarded to a U.S. president for the first time.

ROK President Lee Jae-myung presents U.S. President Donald Trump with the Grand Order of Mugunghwa and a replica of the Cheonmachong (천마총) gold crown, an artifact from Korea’s ancient Silla Dynasty during the pair’s summit on Oct. 29, 2025 on the sidelines of the APEC Economic Leaders’ Week in Gyeongju, South Korea | Image: APEC 2025 KOREA & Yonhap News (Oct. 29, 2025)

The bonhomie between the two leaders carried over into the subsequent talks, in which Lee echoed the praise he showered on Trump during their previous summit in August.

Noting that the Korean War is technically ongoing since it ended in an armistice in 1953, not a peace treaty, Lee expressed Seoul’s willingness to help Trump’s efforts as “peacemaker” to resolve the decades-old conflict.

Ahead of Trump’s visit, speculation swirled that he would seek face-to-face talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, much like he did with an impromptu meeting six years ago at the inter-Korean border.

However, Trump dismissed this prospect on Wednesday, stating that the two sides could not “work out the timing” as he focuses on a scheduled summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Thursday.

Nonetheless, he emphasized his interest in renewing his personal relationship with the DPRK leader in the future, and pledged to “work very hard with Kim Jong Un” to bring about peace on the Korean Peninsula.

“I know you’re officially at war, but we’ll see what we can do to get that all straightened out,” Trump said.

“It may take a little time, you have to have a little patience, but we’re absolutely certain that it will [work out.]”

Min Tae-eun, a research fellow at the Seoul-based Korea Institute for National Unification, told NK News that Trump’s pledge to bring peace to the Korean Peninsula may be aimed at gaining leverage over Lee, who is eager to build a positive relationship with Pyongyang.

“It could be seen as a kind of bargaining chip in negotiations — not necessarily aimed only at North Korea, but also at our own government,” she said, explaining that Washington may seek trade deals in priority fields like semiconductors.

“Personally, I don’t think he’s really interested in improving relations with North Korea in a way that would lead to tangible actions or denuclearization,” she added. 

Expressing appreciation for Trump’s openness to meeting Kim, Lee stressed that this posture is important for Seoul, even if a U.S.-DPRK meeting does not happen this week.

“So far Chairman Kim has not accepted your good intentions and good gestures, so this time it did not happen. But I believe we have been planting seeds for a better future,” he said.

As the two leaders pledged to step up cooperation in other areas including shipbuilding, the economy and defense, the U.S. president pledged support for Lee’s efforts toward peace on the Korean Peninsula.

“If we can do this together, then you’ll go down as the greatest [ROK president] of them all, and we’ll try to make that happen.”

Pyongyang has rejected all engagement with Seoul but left the door open to diplomacy with the U.S. if it abandons the goal of denuclearization.

North Korea’s launch of strategic cruise missiles on Tuesday in a show of force to “enemies” seemingly underscored this message, though Trump downplayed the significance of the weapons test.

The two leaders did not raise the issue of denuclearization in their opening remarks, similar to their summit in Washington two months ago.

However, ROK National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac said during a press briefing on Wednesday evening that Lee and Trump discussed coordination against North Korean nuclear threats during their subsequent talks, with South Korea supporting Washington’s “peacemaker” role by acting as a “pacemaker.”

The South Korean president reaffirmed his commitment to promoting denuclearization by easing inter-Korean tensions and eventually working toward “reducing and dismantling North Korea’s nuclear capabilities,” Wi told reporters.

He added that Trump expressed concern about the “serious threat” Pyongyang’s nuclear development poses to regional security, emphasizing the need for stronger allied deterrence against the DPRK.

ROKS Ahn Mu, one of South Korea’s Jangbogo-III (KSS-III) class Batch I submarines | Image: Hanwha Ocean

SEOUL’S NUCLEAR SUB AMBITIONS

During the summit, Lee highlighted South Korea’s push toward alliance modernization, in order to build a more “strategic” security partnership reflecting both countries’ interests.

To this end, he emphasized Seoul’s intent to continue increasing its defense budget and bolstering the ROK military, while continuing to lessen the U.S. defense cost burden in the allies’ deterrence.

This pledge reflects the Trump administration’s persistent calls for allies such as South Korea to step up defense spending, with Seoul already ramping up military budgets.

On Aug. 31, South Korea proposed a record 66.3 trillion won ($48 billion) defense budget for the fiscal year 2026, an increase of about 5 trillion won from 2025 and the largest annual hike in the country’s history. The increase is aimed in part at developing advanced weapons and strengthening the three-axis defense system against North Korea.

Lee also pushed for U.S. support for South Korea’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines during his meeting with Trump.

The South Korean president explained that the acquisition of nuclear submarines will allow Seoul to support U.S. military activities in the Indo-Pacific region by providing patrol duties, and he requested Trump’s support for working-level consultations on the provision of processed uranium.

However, Lee stressed that Seoul’s request does not relate to the pursuit of nuclear weapons systems, an option Washington has long opposed.

“We are not aiming for nuclear-armed submarines, but rather, conventional submarines powered by nuclear energy,” he said.

Trump did not give any particular response to Lee’s request in his opening remarks Wednesday afternoon.

Seoul’s quest for enhanced nuclear submarine capabilities is not new, with South Korea signaling its ambitions since the 2000s to better deter North Korea. 

The country is pushing to revise the U.S.-ROK Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, known as the “123 Agreement,” which blocks Seoul from using U.S.-origin nuclear materials for military purposes, including naval propulsion. 

It also prohibits uranium enrichment above 20 percent and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel without U.S. approval — restrictions that Seoul views as key constraints on its nuclear submarine ambitions.

Jihoon Yu, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, told NK News that the ROK seeks nuclear-powered submarines because they have “far greater underwater endurance and long-distance operational capability” than the ROK navy’s diesel-electric submarines.

Pyongyang has declared its intent to construct a nuclear-powered submarine and recently offered a first glimpse of one under development, signaling plans to arm it with cruise missiles. 

U.S. President Donald Trump’s motorcade, shortly after the American leader arrived in Gyeongju for talks with ROK President Lee Jae-myung | Image: NK News (Oct. 29, 2025)

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Jooheon Kim contributed reporting to this article. Edited by Bryan Betts

Updated at 5:30 p.m. KST with expert comments and at 9:48 p.m. with additional details from ROK official’s briefing

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com